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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORB THB 

JOINT COMmiTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEAEL HAEBOE ATTACK 

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGKESS 

FIRST SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 



S. Con. Res. 27 i < 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THB ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 27 
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Peari Harbor Attack 




PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 

OF THE PEARL HAEBOR ATTACK 

CONGEESS OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

S. Con. Res. 27 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 27 
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
79716 WASHINGTON : 1946 

/public 






JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL 
HARBOR ATTACK 

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman 
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman 
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from 
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Dlinois Pennsylvania 

OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa- 

HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- five from California 

gan . FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from 

J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin 
North Carolina 



COUNSEL 



(Through January 14, 1946) 
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel 
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel 
JULE M. HANNAFORD, Assistant Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 

(After January 14, 1946) 
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel 
Samuel H. Kaufman. Associate General Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel 
LOGAN J. Lane, Assistant Counsel 



HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 


Pages 


Transcript 




Hearings 


No. 




pages 






1 


1- 399 


1- 1058 


Nov, 


. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 


2 


401- 982 


1059- 2586 


Nov 


. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945, 


3 


983-1583 


2587- 4194 


Dec. 


5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945. 


4 


1585-2063 


4195- 5460 


Dec. 


14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 


5 


2065-2492 


5461- 6646 


Dec. 


31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946. 


6 


2493-2920 


6647- 7888 


Jan. 


15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946. 


7 


2921-3378 


7889- 9107 


Jan. 


22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946., 


8 


3379-3927 


9108-10517 


Jan. 


30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946. 


9 


3929-4599 


10518-12277 


Feb. 


7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946. 


10 


4601-5151 


12278-13708 


Feb. 


15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946. 


11 


5153-5560 


13709-14765 


AjDr. 


9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 

No. Exhibits Nos. 

12 1 through 6. 

13 7 and 8. 

14 9 through 43. 

15 44 through 87. 

16 88 through 110. 

17 111 through 128. 

18 129 through 156. 

19 157 through 172. 

20 173 through 179. 

21 180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations. 

22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings. 

26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings. 

27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings. 
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings. 

34 C'larke Investigation Proceedings. 

35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings. 

36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 

39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- 
ments. 



IV 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 






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INDEX OF WITXESSES 



'"4508-4628 
"'4360' 4508 


554-557, 
607-008 

"143-147' 
"370-386' 

"158-162 


1 1 1 r 1 CC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

1 1 II 'Ci 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

1 1 II 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

1 1 II ICO 1 1 1 1 1 r 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 

1 1 II iC 1 1 1 1 1 1 : 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

1 1 II i(N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 




t^ 1 11 II 1 1 lO ^ CO I 1 1 Ill 

-H 1 11 II 1 1 ICO i-r I 1 1 1 1 1 1 

'^ 1 II II iiiOiiiiiiiiiOiiiii 

1 1 11 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 ■ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

< 1 II II 1 1 i< 1 1 1 I I I 1 1 ;p; 1 I 1 ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 

CO 1 1 I 11 1 1 !^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 


l> 1 1 (N'rt< isO'^^'gO I IT* 1 1 — CI .^fOtO 1— C' -LO-^rO '•.*:OL': crrt 

CO 1 iiMGC iCs'T'O 1 iC5 1 ic^o rcot^c: i<N cr c-i — ~ Tz ^ acr. lo c--ro 

10 1 lOOC illMCO 1 i05 1 iCJO iCOCOO 1— CC — C-3C0— — w— 

t-H 1 iCSCOi-^ll III iiC^I iCJCO' iTfiC^l— CCCO-T'CO c-i c^c^ 

1 1 III iiot^oo 1 IT}- , 1 1 a; 1 1 1 00 1 1 • 1 CO c 

a> 1 irf^ i-(Mt^ 1 ir- 1 1C005 i»:i>-* iCO ilOlOttOCCOlO c:t^i^ occ 
CO 1 lOiCO iCCc<l(N 1 lO 1 1^00 iCSCOCO lO i — — — lOMC cocom loco 
■* 1 lOOOCi,- II i.i(N iiOO 1— iCO MCOOl'- TT. — — 

.-( 1 ic^co lir' 11 1 ic^ iC<)co i-* ic^-* coco-* ,eo c<i iOM 


2-29, 
86-96 

399-403 

229-233 

" 135-146" 

413-415 

225-228 


733-812 

1181-1185 

520-527 
1241-1259" 

"268-283' 

1753-1765' 
"951-960' 



"473-478' 


de C, Adm 

ert 10., Lt. Comdr 

M., Btswn 

)hn S., Brig. Gen 

.oland M., Vice Adm 

ifiis, Col 

, Albert L_.. 

iivili(> C, Comdr 

10., Lt. Col 

1, F. M., Lt. Comdr 

-^on, l?ear Adm 

■rtrude C 

lliajn, Maj. Gen. 

)»4 W., Bcvar Adm 

\vy T., Maj. Gen 

d S., Comdr__ 

Ilalph 

lard 

James W 

'. L., Vice Adm 

A., Col 

W. A., Lt. Col 

ranees M 

p (!liew 

sIcr U 

iOiiis J., Col 

'iirv C, Lt. Col 

ond S- 

ier B., Maj. Gen 

10 

eph M. Lt. (jg) 

'homas E 

ward F., Maj 



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VI 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1915, 

to May 31, 

1946 


Pages 

5080-5089 

""3826-3838 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

Mav 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

163-181 

""418-423' 
""451-464" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


1 llllli irQiO lltlll 1 T}< CO 1-1 1-1 1 1 1 

1 llllli i'l O (MCOCOtO 1 1 1 

SI llllli if^lN 1 1 1 1 1 1 i(N 1 (M 1 III 
5, 1 llllli ij^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lO 1 CTi 1 1 1 

.O 1 llllli 1 '•'" 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 CO CO C3 TJH 1 1 1 

Oil llllli 1 IIIIIIKNCS'M 111 
1 llllli 1 iiiiiiiim"(N III 

I 1 1 1 1 1 ! I I I 1 1 1 1 IM w 1 ; ; 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


S 1 llllli ill i i 1 i 1 1 1 1 1 M 


Joint 
Committee 
E.xhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

Julv 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 

495-510 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

4125-4151 

1695-1732 

2745-2785 
4186-4196 

3195^3201" 
1928-1965 

3642-3643' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
179-184 

'"ios-iii' 

96-105 

74-85 

""368-378' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 
478-483, 
301-310 

1171-1178' 

1178-1180' 
1659-1663, 
170-198 

'"812-843,' 
1538-1571 
504-509 

2-32" 

365-368 

1747-1753" 


1 


Craige, Nelvin L., Lt. Col 

Creighton, John M., Capt. (USN) 

Crosley, Paul C, Comdr 

Curley, J. J. (Ch/CM) 

Curts, M. E., Capt., USN 

Daubin, F. A., Capt., USN 

Davidson, Howard C, Maj. Gen 

Davis, Arthur C, Rear Adm 

Dawson, Harry L 

Deane, John R., Maj. Gen 

DeLany, Walter S., Rear Adm 

Dickens, June D., Sgt 

Dillingham, Walter F 

Dillon, James P 

Dillon, John H., Maj 

Dingcman, Ray E., Col 

Donegan, William Col 

Doud, Harold,' Col 

Dvmlop, Robert H., Col 

Dunning, Mary J 

Dusenburv, Carhsle Clyde, Col 

Dyer, Thomas H., Capt., USN 

Earle, Frederick M., W/0 

Earle, John Bayliss, Capt., USN 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



VII 



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VIII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


&,! 1 l|>« 1 1 1 1 1 ' 1 1 1 1 1 ' ICQ--,,— ,1 1 li-H 

^ i 1 iS i i i i i i i i i i i i i°^°l i i|^5f?f 

lllTjfllllllllllll, COIlTfllJ 

II, ' 1 ! ! 1 I I 1 : I : 1 1 ^ ! 1 cDoiA 
1 ! 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 ! 1 I I 1 1 ; (Nrrt- 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

428-432 
414-417 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


, 1 I 1 I , IfO ,r-H(N 1 , 1 1 1^ 1 Illl 

iiiiiii— iiOOOiiiiiOi till 

«llllll,C<ll>-H'-ll,ll"-'l Illl 

„5 ! ! 1 1 I : icij ;i ! ; ! 1 16 : : : ; i 

a, 1 ir-, lo o t Illl 

1(N "H 1 1 1 1 ,^ 1 ,111 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


^ i i i ; i i i i i i i i i i i i i ! ; i i i 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

,'Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 

1070-1076 
461-469 

"763-772" 
816-851 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


, , 1 , lilt III III 

lO-H ,"<* 1 ,0(N , 1 1 irf<t^ III 100 1 t 

,Ot^ ,t^ 1 , -* -^ 1 1 1 1— l-H III It^ 1 1 

« 1 O 05 ,<N 1 ,(N 05 1 1 1 ilMOl 111 ,t^ 1 1 

^i(McO,| i,|(M.ili(N-Hill II II 

Sill 1 ^ 1 1 t^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 III 1 lO 1 1 

fi-i lOt^ "# 1 ,OTt< 1 1 1 lO'* III I Tt< 1 1 

iCOiO ,(M 1 ilMCO 1 1 1 lO^ III ,t^ I 1 

, O C5 , , 1 05 1 1 1 , C^l 02 1 1 1 , II 

,(NCO, ,,(N,,,,CS-H,,, 1 ,, 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhlbit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
417-430 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

toJan.23, 1942) 


Page» 

1571-1574" 

1664-1676 
"469-473" 


Witness 


Hamilton, Maxwell M., State Dept 

Hannum, Warren T., Brig. Gen 

Harrington, Cyril J 

Hart, Thomas Charles, Senator 

Hayes, Philip, Maj. Gen 

Heard, WiUiam A., Capt., USN 

Henderson, H. H., Lt., USA 

Herron, Charles D., Maj. Gen 

Hill, William H., Senator 

Hohnes, J. Wilfred., Capt., USN 

Holtwick, J. S., Jr., Comdr 

Hoppough, Clay, Lt. Col 

Hornbeck, Stanley K 

Home, Walter Wilton 

Howard, Jack W., Col 

Hubbell, Monroe H., Lt. Comdr 

Huckins, Thomas A., Capt., USN 

Hull, Cordell 

Humphrey, Richard W. RM 3/c 

Hunt, John A., Col 

Ingersoll, Royal E., Adm 

Inglis, R. B., Rear Adm 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



IX 



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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


oiiiiiioooiiiiiiiiiii -r_ro i i 

CO oo 1 1 i S:i^o 1 1 

ic 1 1 1 1 1 loco 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i^Sr^^iM 1 ' 

o.>0 1 Cl ^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1 

CLO 1 1 1 1 1 i(NCO i2St^ 1 1 

f^iO CO I'SS'Hii 

loi ^ iiiii 2"^'' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

119 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

541-553 
182-292 

"140^142' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

103 
107-112 

186 
219-222 

102 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


11—1 1 1 1 1 1 II 

^ ' ' ' ' ' ' 1 ' ' 1 1 ' 1 1 1 ' ' 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 

904-918 

62.^643 

""734-740" 

"'852-885" 


Joint 
Committee 
E.xhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

2665-2695" 
3028-3067 

1161-1185" 

2787-2802" 
1014-1034 
1678-1694 
3226-3250 

2362-2374" 

2-54' 

T. S. 2-52, 

192-226 

3126-3152 

1816-1913 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

214-225 
363-367 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

toJan. 23, 1942) 


1 , 1 -H i(M 1 1 1 10 1 1 1 1 ^ 1 1 1 i-O 1 (N 1 05 

1 r lo 1 1> 1 CO 1 1 1 00 1 1 1 lO 1 1 lO 1 lo CO lO 

«ii,— II,— (ilOiiilMiiiiiOiiiCO ICOMHCO 

0, 1 1 r-l 1 ^ ,T^,_| , 1 1 rt 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 r-H 1 ICOi-l 

a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ii±i 1 1 1 1 1 ^ 
fli 1 ICO iCO 1 CO 1 1 1 (N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 CO i(M 
ii-^iiOi C0iiil~»iiiii0iii05 ifO 
iiT-lii-(i OiiilN l^ 1 


1 


Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN 

Kroner, Hayes A., Brig. Gen 

Landreth, J. L., Ens 

Lane, Louis R., Ch. W/0 

Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col 

Laswell, Alva B., Col. USMC 

Lawton, William S., Col 

Layton, Edwin T., Capt., USN 

Leahy, William D., Adm 

Leary, Herbert F., Vice Adm 

Lewis, Fulton, Jr 

Litell, S. H 

Locey, Frank H 

Lockard, Joseph L., Lt., USA 

Lorence, Walter E., Col 

Lumsden, George, Maj 

Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN 

Lynch, Paul J 

Lynn, George W., Lt. Comdr 

MacArthur, Douglas, Gen 

Marshall, George C, Gen 

Marston, Morrill W., Col 

Martin, F. L., Maj. Gen 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



XI 



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XII 



CONGRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATION TEARL HARBOR ATTaCS 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1045, 

to May 31, 

1946 


Pages 

5210 
4933-5009 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

'" 387-388 ' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

14S 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Oil ^ 1 (Mil 1 Ir^ 1 1 

rtl 1 1 III 1 1 00 1 CO 1 1 1 1^ 1 1 

|ii 11 11 ill 1 11 1 ci 1 1 

t^^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 Ig 1 1 1 1^ 1 I 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


»^ 1 1 1 111 111 1 1 ' ' 1 1 1 1 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


1 1 iC 111 111 .--,•- ^(M't-'iM 1 1 O 1 1 00 00 

11 IT 111 III T^^^^^ ' M 1 1?;: 
(S 1 If: f:^-^- ' - ' :^- 

1 iTjH 111 111 ^J;;cocoio 1 ir}^ 1 iioos 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

1107-1160," 
1240-1252 

3636^3640 
2375-2398, 
3990-3996 
3153-3165 
2923-2933 
3885-3915 

1968-1988" 
1035-1070 

778-789 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
147-169 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


II 11 1 1 1 1 _ 1 1 1 1 

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^ 1 \o^ij, 1 1 i igg 1 1 icii^ 1 1 1 1 


i 

a 


Pettigrew, Moses W., Col 

Phelan, John, Ens 

Phillips, Walter C, Col 

Pickett, Harry K., Col 

Plerson, Millard, Col 

Pine, WiUard B 

Poindexter, Joseph B., Gov 

Powell, Boiling R., Jr., Maj 

PoweU, C. A., Col 

Powers, R. D., Jr., Lt. Comdr 

Prather, Louise _ 

Pratt, John S., Col 

Pye, WiUiam S., Vice Adm 

Rafter, Case B 

Raley, Edward W., Col 

Ramsey, Logan C, Capt., USN 

Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



xni 



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XIV COXGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 






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XVI CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 



JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 145 



AKMY PEARL HAEBOR BOARD 

INDEX TO TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL 

HARBOR BOARD 

WITNESSES 



Name 



Page' 



Allen, Riley H., Editor, Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 125 Merchant Street, Honolulu, T. H.. 

Anderson, Ray, 1930 Euclid Street, Santa Monica, California 

Anstey, Mrs. Alice, 938 East Edgcware Road, Los Angeles, California 

Arnold, H. H., General, United States Army, War Department, Washtagton, D. C 

Ballard, Emma Jane, Colton, California , ..- 

Barber, Bruce O., Attorney, U. S. Departmentof Justice, Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, 3880 Ohrstead Avenue, Los Angeles, Calif 

Bartlett, George Francis, Smartville, California 

Bellinger, P. N. L., Vice Admiral, United States Navy; Commander, Air Force, At- 
lantic Fleet; Administrative Office: Norfolk, Virginia ._- 

Benson, Henry P., Hawaiian Dredgin? Culompany, Honolu, T. H 

Bergquist, Kenneth P., Colonel, Army of the United States, Washington, D. C 

Bicknell, George W., Colonel, United States Army, Military Intelligence, G-2, MIS, 
Washington, D. C 

Block, Claude C, Admiral, United States Navy— Retired; On Active Duty as a Member 
of the General Board 

Bragdon, John Stewart, Brigadier General, United States Army; Chief, Construction 
Division, Office of the Chief of Engineers, War Department, Washington, D. C._ 

Bragdon, John Stewart, Brigadier General, L'nited States Army; etc.— Recalled.. 

Brooks, H. E., Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army; Replacement School Command, 
Birmingham, Alabama 

Brunner, Mrs. Gertrude Campbell, 1210 South Euclid, San Gabriel, California 

Bryden, William, Major General, United States Army; Separations Board, Washington, 
D. C 

Burgin, Henry T., Major General, Army of the United States; Fort Shafter, T. H 

Burr, Harold S., Commander, United States Naval Reserve; 14th Naval District, T. H.. 

Burton, Ralph H., General Counsel for the Committee on Military Affairs, United States 
House of Representatives 

Butterfield, James W., District Director, Baltimore District, Immigration and Naturali- 
zation Service, Baltimore, Maryland 

Capron, W. a., Colonel, Ordnance Department, (Army); Ogden Arsenal, Ogden, Utah.. 

Carmichael, William A., Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry (Army); Southern Securities 
Detachment, Los Angeles, California 

Caulfield, Francis M., Chief Clerk, Central Files, Adjutant General's OfiBce, War 
Department, Washington, D. C .1 

Chun, Philip Chew, 1453 Alencastre Street, Honolulu, T. H 

Clarke, Chester R., 114 Merchant Street, Honolulu, T. H 

Claterbos, Louis J., Colonel (Army), Corps of Engineers; The Engineer School, Fort 
Belvoir, Virginia 

Coll, Raymond S., Editor, The Honolulu Advertiser, Honolulu, T. H 

Colton, Roger B., Major General, Army of the United States, Washington, D. C 

Combs, R. E., Attorney-At-Law, Visalia, Calif 

Connolly, Thomas Ernest, 2400 Fulton Street, San Francisco, California 

Cooper, Howard F., Major, Air Corps; Army Air Force Base, Unit Air Transport Com- 
mand 

Davidson, Howard C, Major General (Army), Commanding lOth-Air Force, Kanjakoha, 
Assam 

De Lany, Walter S., Rear Admiral, United States Navy 

Dillingham, Walter Francis, Carnation Avenue, Honolulu, T. H 

Dillon, James P., Naturalization E.xaminer; Department of Justice, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, Newark, N. J 

Dingeman, Ray E., Colonel (Army), Commanding OflBcer, 144th Group Coast Artillery, 
Fort Ruger, T. H 

Donegan, William, Colonel (Army), Fourth Army, G-3, Sam Houston, Texas 

Earle, Frederick M., Warrant Officer, United States Army 

Elliott, George E., Sergeant (Army), Headquarters Company, Station Complement, 
Camp Lee, Virginia 

Farthing, W. E., Brigadier General (Army), Atlantic Overseas Service Command, Port 
of Newark, Newark, iJ.J 



1413 



4015 



1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original 
transcript of proceedings. 

79716 — i6 — Ex. 145. vol. 1 2 



2 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Index to transcript of proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board — Con. 

WITNESSES— Continued 



Name 



Ferguson, Honorable Homer, A United States Senator from the State of Michigan 

Fielder, Kendall J., Colonel, (Army), General Staff Corps, Headquarters, Pacific Ocean 

Areas, Fort Shafter, T. H__.._-_ 

Flannery, Harry W., 537 North Wilcox, Los Angeles, California 

Fleming, Rober.t J., Colonel, Corps of Engineers, United States Army; Fort DuPont, 

Delaware 

Flood, William J., Brigadier General, United States Army; Chief of Staff, 7th Air Force, 

Hickam Field, Oahu, T. H 

French, Edward F., Colonel (Army), Signal Corps; Officer in Charge, Traffic Operation 

Division, Chief Signal Office, Washington, D. C 

FuRBUSH, Edward A., Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Chicago, Illinois 

Gailey, Charles J., Jr., Colonel (Army), Executive Officer, Operations Division, General 

Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C 

Gerow, Leonard T., Major General (Army) ; Commanding 5th Corps; stationed at Luxem- 

bour 



Gerow, Leonard T., Major General (Army)— Recalled 

Gesler, Earle E., Colonel, United States Army; Corps of Engineers, Division Engineer, 

Middle Atlantic Division, Baltimore, Maryland 

Grafe, Paul, 21 Chester Place, Los Angeles, Cal 

Graves, Sidney C, 2401 Foxhall Road, Washington, D. C 

Grew, Honorable Joseph Clark; Former Ambassador to Japan; Department of State, 

Washington, D. C _ 

Hain, Robert W., Lieutenant Colonel (Army); General Staff, Headquarters, U. S. A. F. 

P. O. A., Fort Shafter, T. H 

Hain, Robert W., Lieutenant Colonel (Army); Fort Shafter, T. H.— Recalled 

Hannum, Warren T., Brigadier General (Army) — Retired, San Francisco, California 

Harrington, Cyril J., 2142 Ewing Street, Los Angeles, California 

Hayes, Philip, Major General, United States Army; Commanding General, Third Service 

Command, Baltimore, Maryland 

Herron, Charles D., Major General (Army) — Retired 

Hill, William Hardy, A Member of the Territorial Legislature of the Territory of Hawaii.. 

HORNE, Walter Wilton, 9425 Wilshire Boulevard, Beverly Hills, California 

Howard, Jack W., Colonel, Quartermaster Corps, United States Army, Presidio of San 

Francisco, California 

Hunt, John A., Colonel (Army), Inspector General's Office, War Department, Washing- 
ton, D. C 

Kay, Harold T., Military Aide to the Governor of Hawaii, Honolulu, T. H. 

Kestly, J. J., Lieiitenant Colonel (Army), Corps of Engineers; Engineer, Base Command. 

KiMMEL, Husband E., Rear Admiral, United States Navy, Retired _-_ 

King, Edgar, Brigadier General, United States Army; Medical Department, Fort Shafter 
T. H. 



King, H. J., 904 South Oakland Street, Pasadena, California 

Kingman, John J., Brigadier General, United States Army, Retired 

Klatt, Lowell v.. Sergeant, Battery A., 509th Gun Battalion, Semi-mobile; (Army) 

KOGAN. Mrs. Mary B., Washington, D. C 

King, Wm. A. Early, Captain (Army), Chicago, 111 

Layton, Edwin T., Captain, United States Navy; United States Pacific Fleet 

Lawton, William S., Colonel (Army); GeneraUStafllCorps, Headquarters, Pacific Ocean 

Areas. Fort Shafter, T. H 

Lewis, Fulton, Jr., Radio News Reporter, Mutual Broadcasting System, W^ashington, D 

C 



Locey, Frank H., Waialea Ranch, Honolulu, T. H 

Lockard, Joseph T;., First Lieutenant, United States Army, Esler Field, Louisiana 

LoREN'CE, Walter E., Colonel, Corps of Entrineers, United States Army; Columbus, Ohio.. 
Lumsden, George, Major (Army); Inspector General's Department, Central Pacific Base 

Command, Fort Shafter, T. H 

Lynch, Paul J., 919 Suiter Street, San Francisco, California 

Marshall, George C, General, United States Army; Chief of Staff, War Department, 

Washincton, D. C 

Marston, Morrill W., Colonel, General Staff, 0-4, United States Army Forces, Pacific 

Ocean Areas 

Martin, F. L., Major General, United States Army, Retired. .._ 

McCarthy, William J., Colonel (Army), 260th Coast Artillery Group, Fort Bliss, Texas.. 
McDonald, Joseph P., Technician Fourth Class, 580th Aircraft Warning (-\rmy), APO 958 
McKee, John L., Brigadier General (Army), 87th Divi.^ion. Fori Jackson, South Carolina 
McKee, Robert Eugene, General Contractor, El Paso, Texas; and Los Angeles, California 
McMorris, Charles H., Rear Admiral, United States Navy; Chief of Joint Staff, Pacific 

Fleet in Pacific Ocean Areas 

Midriff, Frank E., 406 Castle & Cooke Building, Honolulu, T. H 

Midriff, John H., Waialua, Honolulu, T. H 

Meurlott, Byron C, Major (Army), Military Intelligence, Honolulu, T. H 

Miles, Sherman, Major General (Army); Commanding 1st Service Command, Boston, 

M 



Mollison, James A., Brigadier General (Army), Mobile Air Service, Mobile, Alabama. _ 

Moody, George H., Old Pali Road, Honolulu, T. H 

Murray, Maxwell, Major General, United States Army, Commanding Guadalcanal 

Nurse, Howard B., Lieutenant Colonel (Army)— Retired; 729 B Street, San Francisco 
Calif 



Vol. Page I 



^ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original transcript of proceedings. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 3 

1 71(1 ex to transcript of proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board — Con. 

WITNESSES — Continued 



Name 



O'Dell, Robert H., Lieutenant, Infantry (Army); 5th Headquarters, Camp Pickett, 
inia. 



Virgir 



OsMUN, Russell A., Brigadier General (Army); Chief, Military Intelligence Service, War 

Department, AVashington, D. C 

Parker, Maurice Gaylord, Honolulu, T. H 

Perliter, Simon, 1901 Ualakaa Street, Honolulu, T. H 

Petrie, Honorable Lester, Mayor of the City of Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii 

Phillips, Walter C, Colonel (Army); General Staff Corps, Myitkyina, North Burma 

Phillips, Walter C, Colonel (Army);— Recalled 

Pierson, Millard, Colonel (Army); Inspector General's Office, Pacific Ocean Areas 

Plne, Willard Bruce, 320 Carolwood Drive, Los Angeles, California 

Pine, Willard Bruce, 320 Carolwood Drive, Los Angeles, California— Recalled 

Poindexter, Joseph B., 4585 Kahala Avenue, Honolulu, T. H., former Governor of the 

Territory of Hawaii 

Powell, Boiling R., Jr., Major (Army), General Staff Corps; Legislative and Liaison 

Division, War Department, General Staff, Washington, D. C 

Powell, C. A., Colonel (Army), Signal Officer, Pacific Ocean Areas, Fort Shafter, T. H.. 

Pratt, John S., Colonel (Army)- Retired 

Pye, William S., Vice Admiral, United States Navy-Retired 

Rafter, Case B., Washington, D. C 

Reybold, Eugene, Major General, United States Army; Chief of Engineers, War Depart- 
ment, Washington, D. C 

Richards, Robert B., Colonel (Army), General Staff Corps, Acting Chief of Staff, G-2, 

War Department, Washington, D. C 

Robins, Thomas M., Major General, United States Army, Deputy Chief of Engineers, 

War Department, Washington, D. C 

Robinson, Bernard L., Colonel (Army), Corps of Engineers, 521st Engineers, Construc- 
tion, Hollandia, New Guinea 

Robinson, Bernard L., Colonel (Army), Corps of Engineers, etc.— Recalled 

RocHEFORT, Joseph J., Commander, United States Navy, On Duty at Office of Chief of 

Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C 

ROHL, Hans Wilhelm, Rancho Dos Vintos, Camarillo, California 

Row, Lathe B., Colonel (Army); temporarily Assistant Inspector General, Western 

Defense Command; Presidio of San Francisco, California 

Rudolph, Jacob H., Brigadier General— Retired; Milwaukee, Wisconsin 

SCANLON, Martin F., Brigadier General, United States Army, Evaluation Board, Pacific 

Ocean Areas 

Schlesinger, Miss Helen, 254A Lewers Road, Honolulu, T. H 

SCHLEY, Julian L., Major General, United States Army, Washington, D. C 

Shirley, J. P., 501 Belair Road, Los Angeles, California 

Shivers, Robert L., Collector of Customs, Hawaiian Islands, 4775 Aukai Street, Honolulu, 

T. H 

Shoemaker, Thomas B., Assistant Commissioner of Immigration and Naturahzation, 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 

Short, Arthur T., Pleasanton Hotel, Honolulu, T. H 

Short, Walter Campbell, Major General, United States Army— Retired 

Short, Walter Campbell, Major General, United States Army — Retired; Recalled. _. 

Short, Walter C, Major General, United States Army— Retired; Further testimony.,.-.. 

SissON, George A., Civil Engineer, 1545 Domonis Street, Honolulu, T. H 

Stilpiien, Benjamin A., 109 Jarolemon Street, Brooklyn, New York 

Stimson, Honorable Henry L., Secretary of War, Washington, D. C 

Taylor, Angus M., Jr., Captain (Army), Coast Artillery; Office of Internal Security, 

Honolulu, T.H 

Taylor, William E. G., Commander, United States Navy, Quonset Naval Air Station, 

Charlestown, Rhode Island 

Throckmorton, Russell C, Colonel (Army), Infantry, Camp Breckinridge, Kentucky... 

Tillman, Thomas E., 1230 Shafter Street, San Mateo, California 

Tru.man, Louis W., Colonel (Army), Chief of Staff, 84th Division, Camp Claiborne, 

Louisiana 

Tyler, Kermit A., Lieutenant Colonel, Air Corps, Army Air Force Board, Orlando, Fla._. 

TlNDAL, Lorry N., Colonel (Army) Air Corps, Headquarters 9th Air Force, APO 696 

Walker, Eugene B., Colonel, Coast Artillery Corps, United States Army 

Walsh, Roland, Brigadier General, Army of the United States; Commanding General, 

Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot 

Weddington, Leonard D., Colonel (Army), Air Corps, 6th Air Service Command 

Welch, George S., Major, Air Corps (Army), Orlando, Florida 

Wells, B. H., Major General, United States Army, Retired; 4551 Kahala Avenue, Hono- 
lulu T. H 

West, Melbourne H., Lieutenant Colonel (Army), Headquarters, 7th Fighter Wing . 

White, William R., Brigadier General, United States Army, Mira Loma Quartermaster 

Depot, Mira Loma, California 

WiCKisER, Rea B., 1522 Rodney Drive, Los Angeles, California 

WiMER, Benjamin R., Colonel (Army), Corps of Engineers; Engineer, Central Pacific 

Base Command 

Wilson, Durward, Major General (Army), Commanding Southeastern Sector, Eastern 

Defense Command, Raleigh, North Carolina 

Wilson, Earle M., Colonel (Army), Washington, D. C 



^ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original transcript ot proceedings. 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Index to transcript of proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board — Con. 

WITNESSES — Continued 



Name 



Wong, Ahoon H., Deputy County Engineer, Wailuku, Maui 

WooLLEY, Ralpii E., 2349 Oahu Drive, Honolulu, T. H 

Wyman, Theodore, Jr., Colonel, Unted States Army, Corps of Engineers; Cherbourg 
Base Section, Cherbourg, France .-. 

ZuccA, Emil Lawrence, Senior Aircraft Service Mechanic, San Bernardino, California 



DOCUMENTS 



Title 



War Department Radiogram to Commanding General Hawaiian Department, dated No- 
vember 27, 1941, and signed "Marshall" 



Do. 
Do- 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do- 
Do. 
Do. 



Navy Department "War Warning" message, dated November 27, 1941 

Do 

Reply of Lieutenant General Short on November 27, 1941, to Message No. 472 from General 

Marshall on November 27, 1941 

Message dated November 28, 1941, from Lieutenant General Short to Adjutant General 

Message of November 28, 1941. 482 .-. 

Memorandum to the President dated November 27, 1941 

Letter of February 7, 1941 

Letter dated March 5, 1941.. 

Letter dated March 15, 1941 - 

Letter dated April 14, 1941, Excerpts from _ 

Letter dated May 5, 1941 

Letter dated October 10, 1941 

Letter dated October 28, 1941.. 

Letter of October 14, 1941 

Message dated July 7, 1941 

October memorandum. Operations Department 

Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Par. 30 

Hawaiian Defense Project, Category D 

Cooperative Plan 

Telegram from Ambassador Grew to Secretary of State, dated November 17, 1941 

Message of October 16,1941... 

Message of December 7, 1941, to Hawaiian Department, Fort Shaffer, T. H., signed "Mar- 
shall" 



Message dated June 10, 1941, Lieutenant General Short to Adjutant General 

Message dated June 26, 1941, Adjutant General to Lieutenant General Short.. 

Letter dated December 23, 1941, J. P. Poindexter, Governor of Hawaii, to Lieutenant Gen- 
eral Short 

Letter dated December 22, 1941, from civilians of Honolulu to the President 

Conclusions 

Excerpts from Roberts Commission Report 

Paragraph III of Addendum No. 1, Joint Air Operations Agreement 

Excerpts from Paragraph IV of Addendum No. 1 

Extracts from Honolulu newspapers. 

Letter of August 28, 1941, General Kingman to Lemuel B. Schofleld 

Excerpt from letter of July 17, 1944, Honolulu, T. H 

Excerpt from telegram of June 26, 1944 

List of names, furnished by General Reybold _-. - 

Telegram of June 11, 1941, Hawaiian Department to Adjutant General 

Telegram of June 17, 1941, Chief of Engineers to Adjutant General 

Immediate-action letter, May28, 1941 _ 

Memorandum from Colonel Powell to General Colton, dated November 14, 1941 

Letter dated December 31, 1941, Colonel Powell to Chief Signal Officer 

Excerpts from Form 23 

Recommendations of Colonel Hunt.. 

Excerpts from Report of Colonel Hunt 

Conclusions of Colonel Hunt 

Excerpts from Standing Operating Procedure of November 5, 1941 

Excerpts from Order Appointing Army Pearl Harbor Board 

Memorandum for the Judge Advocate General, dated July 12, 1944, by the Acting Secretary 
of War 



Excerpts from letter of Brigadier General John J. Kingman.. 

Excerpts from Report of Interview of February 3, 1944, of John M. Martin. 
Excerpts from Construction Contract 



^ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original transcript of proceedings. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 



Index to transcript of proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board — Con. 

DOCUMENTS— Continued 



Name 



Navy Message of October 16, 1941 - 

Navy Message of November 24, 1941 

The Pacific Fleet in the Command Organization of the Navy, as of December 7, 1941 

Excerpt from Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. 

Excerpt of Fortnight Summary of Current International Situations 

Report of United Stales Ambassador to Japan 

Letter dated November 6, 1940, Colonel Hannum to Lieutenant Colonel Wyman 

Letter dated February 14, 1942, Colonel Lyman to Major General Reybold 

Letter dated February 27, 1942, Colonel Lyman to Major General Reybold 

Letter dated January 22, 1941, Colonel Wynian to Rohl 

Memorandum dated February 14, 1942, Department Inspector to Chief of Staff 

Confidential Report to Colonel Row 

Excerpts from Page 10 of Colonel Hunt's Report 

Excerpts from Page 11 of Colonel Hunt's Report 

Excerpts from Page 31 of Colonel Hunt's Report... 

Excerpts from Federal Bureau of Investigation Report, dated October 29, 1942 

Letter dated March 1, 1943, McKee to Thomason 

Message of December 7, 1941. to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department 

Priority dated August 2, 1944 

Message to War Department dated November 14, 1944 

Excerpts from folder marked "Confidential, 330.92, Japanese Consulate Agents" 

Message to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department dated July 8, 1941 

Newspaper Articles 

Headlines in Honolulu Advertiser 

Editorial in The Honolulu Advertiser, 1/27/42 

Analysis of Inspection of Station X. 2/19/42 

Excerpts from Report of Colonel Hunt 

Excerpts from Report of Colonel Hunt '. 

Excerpts from Report of Colonel Hunt 

Message read by Colonel Hain 

Field Order No. 1 (Mission Orders) 11/2/40 - .-. 

Study of the air situation in Hawaii, 8/20/41 

Statement of Qualifications and Experience 

Excerpts from instructions on cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts 

Memo dictated bv Colonel Toulmin 

Letter dated July 28, 1941. Short to Adjutant General 

Excerpts from Adjutant General's File 121 

G-2 Estimate of international situation, (Japanese) October 17, 1941 

G-2 Estimate of international situation, (Japanese) October 25, 1941 

Memorandum dated September Ifi, 1944, Major Lozier to Major Clausen 

Memorandum dated September 15, 1944, Major Lozier to Major Clausen.. 

Memorandum, 9/11/44, John Edgar Hoover to SAC, Honolulu, T.H 

Memorandum to Colonel Robinson from M. G. Parker, dated March 12, 1942 

Excerpts from Report of Colonel ±iunt 

Memorandum from OfEce of Engineer, Headquarters, Central Pacific Base Command, 

dated September 16, 1944.. _ 

Memorandum for Colonel Colton, MatSriels Branch, from C. A. Powell, Lieutenant 

Colonel, Signal Corps, dated November 14, 1941 

Letter to Pearl Harbor Board of Investigation, signed H. P. Benson, dated September 18, 

1944 



Memorandum dated 18 September, 1944, from Lieutenant Colonel J. S. Bragdon, in answer 

to questions of General Frank in re Mokuleia Airfield 

Letter of September 14, 1944, from Senator Elbert D. Thomas. 

Stenographic report of telephone conversation of September 20, 1944, between Lieutenant 

General George Grunert and United States Senator Elbert D. Thomas 

Excerpt from report of Edward A. Furbush, 4/28/43.. 

Letter dated July 8, 1940, Enright to Early 

Comment and recommendations from N. I. S. Investigation Report, 10/17/40 

Excerpts from N. I. S. Report 3/5/41 

Summary from G-2 Report, Exhibit No. 61 

Letter dated September 26, 1942, to Chief, MIS, G-2, from John S. Gullet 

Memorandum by Butterfleld, 2/5/41 

Letter dated February 4, 1941, Department of Justice to Immigration and Naturalization 

Service, Los Angeles, California 

Letter dated January 22, 1941, Wyman to Rohl 

Public Law No. 671 

Letter dated February 20, 1941, District Director, Los Angeles, to District Director, 

Honolulu 

Excerpt from letter, 3/1/41, to Inspector in Charge, San Pedro, California 

Letter, 3/1/41, Naturalization Examiner to District Director 

Letter, 3/24/41, District Director, Honolulu, to District Director, Los Angeles 

Portion of E.\amination of Mr. Rohl, 5/22/41 

Letter dated May 28, 1941, Inspector Shaw to District Director, Los Angeles, Calif 

Letter dated September 9, 1944, Robert Hoffman to Lieutenant Murphy 

Message 11/28/41 Army Air Force, A-2, to Air .\djutant General, Cable Section 

Message 11/28/41 submitted to General Bryden for approval 

Message No. 482, 11/28/41, to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, from .A.dams.. 
Message, 11/27/41 from Marshall 



13 


1503-A 


13 


1503-C 


16 


1740 


16 


1754 


16 


1770 


16 


1778 


18 


2033 


18 


2038 


18 


2042 


18 


2056 


19 


2094 


19 


2107 


19 


2113 


19 


2114 


19 


2115 


19 


2122 


21 


2413 


24 


2692 


26 


2904 


26 


2972 


26 


2967 


26 


2974 


27 


3110 


28 


3168 


28 


3177 


28 


3228 


28 


3259 


28 


3267 


28 


3298 


28 


3305 


28 


3324 


28 


3344 


29 


3366 


29 


3525 


30 


3639 


30 


3651 


30 


' 3653 


30 


3684 


30 


3689 


31 


3796 


31 


3797 


31 


3800 


32 


3806 


32 


3827 



32 



^ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original transcript of proceedings. 



6 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Index to transcript of proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board - 

DOCUMENTS— Continued 



-Con. 



Name 



Letter, 2/20/41 to District Director, Honolulu, T. H 

Letter, 3/1/41, Dillon to District Director, Honolulu, T. H 

Statement by General Russell and documents regarding relations of the Board to Congress- 
man Robsion 

Radiogram November 24, 1941, Chief, Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific 
Fleet. 



Extract of secret cablegram 11/26/41 to Commanding General Hawaiian Department 

Message 11/27/41 to CINCAF and CINCPAC 

Memorandum for Chief of StalT 11/27/41 in re Far Eastern Situation 

Alert Radiogram 6/17/40, War Department to Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart- 
ment. 



Excerpt from memorandum, 12/15/41, by General Gerow, and paraphrase 

Statement furnished by Colonel Richardson 

Memorandum by T. B. Shoemaker, 2/1/41 

Excerpt from memorandum. Medley to Brown, 7/1/41 

Memorandum, 9/5/41, signed CB 

Memorandum, 9/8/41, sit^ned CB 

Telegram, 9/6/41, Signed Blee 

Letter dated October 10, 1941, Schofield to Stilphen 

Statement by Owen Dixon to Secretary of State 

Transcript of telephone conversation between Lieutenant General Grunert and United 

States Senator Ferguson, at 1 p. m. 28 September, 1944 

Announcement by Lieutenant General Grunert, President of the Army .Pearl,' Harbor 

Board, to all personnel of the Board, 9 a. m.. September 29, 1944 

Memorandum regarding official absence of General Russell (Member) and Colonel Toul- 

min (Executive) -- 

Affidavit of Sidney C. Graves 

Quotations from Volume 3, page 318 of Roberts Commission record 

Message, 12/7/41, Marshall to Hawaiian Department.. 

Request by Major General Walter C. Short for a copy of testimony given before the Board. 

Memorandum by Captain King for Colonel Jones 

Proposed letter to be sent to the Secretary of State, dated August 23, 1944 

Letter, September 23, 1944, Secretary of State to Secretary of War 

Proposed letter to be sent to the Secretary of State, dated September 4, 1944 

Letter, September 28, 1944, Secretary of State to Secretary of War 



36 


4187 


36 


4193 


37 


4362 


37 


4258 


37 


4259 


37 


4262 


37 


4295 


37 


4304 


37 


4308 


37 


4355 


37 


4370 


37 


4371 


37 


4372 


37 


4372 


37 


4373 


37 


4373 


38 


4392 



38 



4403 



38 


4410 


38 


4413 


38 


4419 


38 


4424 


38 


4446 


39 


4457 


39 


4465 


.39 


4468 


39 


4475 


39 


4478 



EXHIBITS 



No. 



3- A 

3-B 

4 

4-A 

4-B 

4-C 

4-D 

4-E 

4-F 

4-0 

4-n 

4-1 

4-J 

4-K 

4-L 

4-M 

4-N 

6 

6 

7 



8-A 
8-B 
9 

10 

II 

U-A 

12 

13 

14 



Bound filo of documents presented by Gen. Short and sworn to by him 

Letter of August 28, 1941, Gen. Kingman to Lemuel B. Schofield ,.- 

Letter dated December 31, 1941, Col. Powell to Chief Signal Oflicer, Washington, 

DC 

Chart of detector station records 

Chart showing plots of airplane flights 

Summary of job orders, Mt. Kaala --• 

Surnm ary of job orders, Kokee 

Summary of job orders, Haleakala 

Summary of job orders, Mauna Loa 

Summary of job orders, Bellows Field 

Summary of job orders. Barking Sands 

Summary of job orders, Morse Field 

Summary of job orders, W heeler Field 

Summary of job orders, Hickam Field 

Summary of job orders. Punchbowl 

Summary of job orders. Diamond Head - --- 

Summary of job orders, Kawailoa 

Summary of job orders. Fort Shafter 

Summary of job orders, Hickam Field. 

Summary of job orders, Kamehameha 

Summary, Hawaiian Constructors, W-414-eng-602 

Exhibits Rohl-Wvman Contracts -.--- 

Transeiipt of hearmgs before the California State Legislature Joint Fact Fmdmg 

Committee on Un- -American .'Vctivities... 

Volume 49, HofTman testimony before House Committee on M ilitary Affairs, 1/24/44. . 
Volume 50, Hoffman testimony before House Committee on Military Affairs, 1/27/44 

Copy of statement by Robert HotTman, 4/29/42 

Statement of Olsen, 12/19/43 

Inte-.-iew of George H. Moody, 4/4/44 

Testimony of Gen. Schley, 2/9/44, before House. 

Testimony of Gen. Schley, 5/4/44, before House 

Folder of Hotel Biltmore recoids 

Statement of Col. Wyman regarding Rohl --■ 

Envelope cont aining telephone record clips 

i Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and 
pages of original transcript of proceedings. 



Page' 



784 
785 
785 
785 
786 
786 
787 
787 



888 
888 
888 



890 
890 
891 



indicate 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 



Index to transcript of proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board — Con. 

EXHIBITS— Continued 



Name 



RMar plotting sheet of December 7, 1941 

Volume of broadcasts, Fulton Lewis. Jr. (Withdrawn after examination by Board 

and returned to witness. See Addenda, Vol. 10, page \177-K) . 

Documents selected from folder relatins to Canol Project. (Withdrawn after exami- 
nation by Board and returned to witness. See Addenda, Vol. 10, Page 1177-A) 

Documents selected from personal file. (AVithdrawn after examination by Board 

and returned to witness. See Addenda, Vol. 10, page 1177-A) 

Items appearing in The Honolulu Adverti'^er 

Items appearing in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin 

Letter of August 18, 1944, from Gen. Miles to Gen. Grunert 

Transcript of telephone conversation of December 3, 1941, between Dr. Mori and 
Tokyo 



Vol. 



Photostat of Japanese map 

Photostat of a captured Japanese map taken from the chart board of a Japanese dive 
bomber 



Captured Japanese map 

Captured Japanese map. 

Captured Japanese map with'translation of Japanese endorsements 

Special report 9/2/41 ". 

Special report 9/4/41 

Priorities on Hawaiian Construction, 29 Aue. 1944 

Mes.sagc 3/3/41, Adams to C. G. Hawaiian Department 

Message 3/4/41, Short to Adjutant General, Washington, 

Message 3/12/41, Adams to C. G. Hawaiian Department 

Letter 3/15/41, Marshall to Short 

Letter 5/29/41, McDole to District Engineer, Honolulu 

Paraphrase, Adams to C. G. Hawaiian Department 

Wyman to C. G. Hawaiian Department, 6/11/41 

AWS Stations 

Wyman to Department Engineer, Hawaiian Department, 2/14/41 

AWS Information Center, Fort Shafter 

Grosse to District Eneireer, Honolulu 

Wyman to C. O., Fort Shafter, 4/18/41 

McDole to District Engineer 5/17/41 

Hannum to Hawaiian Constructors, 1/6/41 

Fleming to District Engineer 9/8/41 

AVyman to Department Engineer, Fort Shafter, 9/3/41 

Wvman to Division Engineer, 3/7/41 

Adcock to Chief Signal Ofhcer 8/.5/40 

Gripper to Chief of Engineers, 8/16/40 

Person to Division Engineer, 10/23/41 

Mathoson to District Engineers, 10/34/41 

Person to Division Engineer, 12/12/41 

Wyman statement "Gasoline"... 

Basic contract 1/3/41 

Supplemental agreement 3/22/41, signed Col. Hannum, Mr. Grafe, and Mr. Patterson. 

Copy of supplemental agreement No. 2, May 5, 1941 

Supnlemental agreement No. 3, 5/22/41 

Supplemental agreement No. 4,6/19/41 

Letter .5/5/43, Commanding General, 8th Service Command 

Map No. 1 from Japanese submarine 

Map No. 2 from Japanese submarine 

Memorandum, 9/7/44, Lt. Gen. Grunert to Commanding General, USAFPOA 

1st endorsement, 9/13/44, to memo 

Memorandum 9/12/44, By Admiral McMorris, with map 

Essential documents in re Bernard Otto Kuehn_ 

Laboratory Report of F. B. I., 11/19/41 re HMAR_ 

Eight-page estimate of equipment, Hawaiian Contracting Co., Ltd 

Circular letter, December 9, 1940, from Office of Chief of Engineers 

Affidavit and exhibits of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr 

Memorandum to Maj. Gen. Frank, signed A. R. Marcy, Colonel, Signal Corps, POA. 

Report on the Establishment of the AWS in Hawaii, 31 August, 1944 

Letter, 8/15/44, Col. Forney to Maj. Clausen 

Letter, 8/14/44, Naval Intelligence to Major Clausen 

Letter, 9/26/42, from G-2, MID, Washington 

Book, "Ten Years in Japan" 

Summary of statements made by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow 

Statement by John Weiner, in re Col. Wyman 

Letter Orders, War Department, A. G. O., 8 July 1944, convening Army Pearl Har- 
bor Board. 

Amending Orders, War Department, A. G. O., 11 July 1944 

Amending Orders, War Department, A. G. O., 22 August 1944 

Supplemental Orders, War Department, A. G. O., 22 July 1944 

Memorandum from Acting Secretary of War to the Judge Advocate General, 12 July 

1944. 
Memorandum addressed to General Grunert, President, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 
25 August 1944, from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI. 



1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original transcript of proceedings. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 



[i] CONTENTS 



MONDAY, AUGUST 7, l'J44 
Testimony of — Page ' 
General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, War Department, Washing- 
ton, D. O 2 

Closed session 6 

Full session resumed 6 

DOCUMENTS 

Memorandum to the President, dated November 27 9 

Letter of February 7, 1941 13 

Letter dated March 5, 1941 19 

Letter dated March 15, 1941 21 

Letter dated April 14, 1941, (excerpts) 26 

Letter dated May 5, 1941 27 

Letter dated October 10, 1941 29 

Letter dated October 28, 1941 30 

Letter dated October 14, 1941 31 

Message dated July 7, 1941 33 

October memorandum. Operations Department 35 

Radiogram dated November 27, 1941 (excerpts) 37 

^ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages 
of original transcript of proceedings. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD H 



m PROCEEDINGS BEFOEE THE AEMY PEARL 

HARBOR BOARD 



MONDAY, AUGUST 7, 1944 

Pentagon Building, 

Washington^ D. C. 

The Board at 11 a. m., pursuant to notice, conducted the hearing of 
witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding. 

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. 
Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members. 

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C. 
Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Brig. Gen. Thomas North, General 
Staff Corps. 

General Grunert. The Board will come to order. Colonel West, 
will you swear the reporters ? 

(Thereupon J. Chester Wilfong and Lloyd L. Harkins were sworn; 
Earl H. Pendell, affirmed.) 

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL GEOEGE C. MARSHALL, CHIEF OF STAFF, 
WAR DEPARTMENT (WASHINGTON, D. C.) 

General Grunert. Will the Recorder swear the witness, please ? 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder.) 

1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board your 
name, rank, organization, and station ? 

General Marshall. General Tjeorge C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, 
War Department ; Washington, D. C. 

5. Colonel West. General, the procedure prescribed for the Board 
requires that all witnesses examined by it be advised [<?] prior 
to testifying of their rights under Article of War 24. The Article of 
War mentioned reads in pertinent part as follows : 

No witness before a military board * * * shall be compelled to incrimi- 
nate himself or to answer any question the answer to which may tend to incrimi- 
nate him, or to answer any question not material to the issue when such answer 
might tend to degrade him. 

In other words, do you fully understand that you do not have to 
answer any question the answer to which may tend to incriminate you, 
but that if you do, such testimony may later be used against you ? 

General Marshall. I do. I would like to say, before you get under 
way, I appreciate very much your coming over here, rather than my 
going over to your place of doing business. I would also like to say 
that I have not had time even to read more than about half way 
through the notes which they prepared for me, but I thought, in view 
of the fact the Secretary did not feel he could appear for quite some 
time, it was essential that I at least make a preliminary appearance 



12 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

before the Board, to give you as much data as I could, so that you could 
get ahead on that basis without undue delay. If necessary, I can 
appear again, regarding any details that either I am misty about, or 
that you wish to go into, that I am not prepared to give you today. 

3. General Grunert. We appreciate very much the opportunity to 
get this background. We need a starting point, and to get the War 
Department background is the start I think we need. 

General, the order convening this Board states, in part : 

[4] Pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Congress, approved 

13 June 1944, a Board of officers is hereby convened to ascertain and report 
the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Terri- 
tory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941, and to make such recommendations as it 
may deem projyer. 

Now, since the existence of the Board is based on the Public Law 
referred to, the Board made a study of congressional hearings thereon, 
and as a result deemed it part of its duties to go into the War De- 
partment background and viewpoints prior to and leading up to 
the Pearl Harbor attack. In consequence, the Board drew up a list 
of subjects on which it desires to question the Chief of Staff. 

The large field to be covered by the Board in the limited time 
available made it advisable to assign objectives or phases of inquiry 
to individual members, although the entire Board will pass upon 
all objectives or phases. General Russell was assigned to this par- 
ticular phase, so he will lead in propounding the questions, and 
other members will assist in developing them. That is just to get 
one member more familiar than the rest of the Board to go into the 
thing. General Russell, if you will take over, and either follow the 
list of subjects, or develop the thing as you see fit, you may proceed. 

4. General Russell. It is my thought. General Marshall, that it 
would probably be well to follow first the subjects that were listed 
in the memorandum that was sent over, and if it becomes necessary 
to refer elsewhere as we go along, we can do it. 

The first subject on this list is described, there, in general terms 
as the "War Council." Apparently some confusion [5] has 
arisen as to the identity of that group. I am responsible for getting it 
into the record, and I have in mind the statements of the Secretary of 
State about the meetings between the Secretary of State, the Secre- 
tary of War, and, on occasions, with the higher military and naval 
authorities ; so it is that group to which we refer. In order to eluci- 
date just a little further, I might say that it was determined to discuss 
that subject with you, because of frequent references to the "war 
council" in the White Paper which the State Department has pre- 
pared and is circulating, showing the State Department's activities, 
through those critical years prior to 1941. 

The first question under the subject of "war council" was the com- 
position of that War Council. Do you recall who attended those 
meetings ? 

General Marshall. Normally, I think it was the Secretary of State, 
the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy. On frequent 
occasions, also. Admiral Stark and myself attended, and we brought 
with us occasionally other officials, or we took other officials with us. 
They occurred in Mr. Hull's office. I think, in most instances, there 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 13 

was no record kept — as far as I know, I haven't a clear picture of 
a recorder being present ; he may have been ; I doubt it ; certainly not 
on all occasions, and I do not recall on any occasion. I may be quite 
wrong about that. How often Admiral Stark and I went, I could 
not say. My dim recollection is that during this critical period, in 
the latter part of August, up until the outbreak of war, we probably 
went to most of the meetings, because I remember I was having a 
very hard time managing my business and attending the meetings, 
because they were rather lengthy; so I recall my [6] dilemma 
of the time involved in doing business there. 

5. General Russell. General Marshall, were there any limitations 
imposed upon you or other representatives of the War Department 
as to what you might disclose, that might have transpired at these 
council meetings? 

General Marshall. I don't recall any limitation. It was a matter 
purely of our judgment. 

6. General Grunert. That was left entirely to the Secretary of 
War's judgment, or your judgment, or to what either one of you 
saw fit to do? 

General Marshall. I have no recollection of the matter, at all. 
I rather think that nothing was said about it, and it was just left to 
our good judgment. As a matter of fact, I might add that, on the 
security end, most of the restrictions were proposed and imposed by 
the military authorities, meaning officers, rather than others; so if 
there was any tendency to restrict and hold, it would have been on 
our part rather than on the other. I recall none whatsoever. 

7. General Russell. Is it true, or not, General Marshall, that as 
we moved along into 1941, and into the autumn of 1941, these meet- 
ings were more frequent than they had been theretofore? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir; that is true. I would like to have 
about 10 minutes of a closed session. 

(There was a closed session from 11 : 10 a. m. to 12 : 07 p. m., during 
which time the Recorder, the Assistant Recorder, and the three 
reporters withdrew.) 

FULL SESSION RESUMED 

8. General Russell. General Marshall, when we were discussing 
[7] the relation between the War Department and the State 
Department as reflected in the council meetings, a moment ago, you 
said that those meetings were a little bit more frequent, in the latter 
part of 1941, than they had been theretofore. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

9. General Russell. In those meetings, the subject of our relation 
with Japan was discussed, I assume? 

General Marshall. With great frequency. 

10. General Russell. Were the possibilities of an assault on 
Hawaii by carrier-borne aviation considered in those meetings, or 
was that considered as a part of the War Department operations? 

General Marshall. I don't recall any specific discussion of an 
attack on Hawaii. There were general discussions of Japanese 
assaults, but they related more to the Indo-China theater, where we 
had positive evidences of their preliminary movements. 



14 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

11. General Russell. Would you say, as a generalization, that the 
relation between the American Government and the Japanese Govern- 
ment became more tense as time went along, in 1941 ? 

General Marshall. Decidedly so. I will add that we were very 
fearful of some warlike act by the Japanese, which immediately 
would have brought about a state of war in the Pacific, for which, 
at the time, we were not prepared; in addition to the fact that we 
had an immediate, close-up interest in the great events that were 
taking place in the European theater. 

12. General Russell. Speaking from memory. General Marshall, 
could you recall any occurrences in any of the council meetings in the 
fall of 1941 which affected to any degree the thinking [8] of 
the War Department toward possible trouble with Japan ? 

General Marshall. I think there were numerous indications 
brought to our attention by the State Department, or to the attention 
of the State Department by the War and Navy Departments, all of 
which indicated a very serious crisis developing in the Pacific in rela- 
tion to Japan. I know that we, meaning Admiral Stark and myself, 
made it very clear, I think, to the Secretary of State, that it was of the 
utmost importance to utilize every resource to delay so long as possible 
any outbreak in the Pacific. 

I recall that, I think early in September, in a discussion at one of 
these meetings, the question was asked of us, what was the earliest date 
in the near future that we would be reasonably prepared to take appro-* 
priate action ; and we finally gave December 5, 1 believe, as that date. 
However, I recall particularly Admiral Stark felt that navally we 
would not be sufficiently prepared until, I believe, January or Febru- 
ary — February is my recollection — and December 5 did not give suffi- 
cient time. The Army estimate of December 5 was based on the 
prospective sailings of transports and cargo boats to the Philippines 
and the movement of a total approaching 100 Flying Fortresses, being 
completed, in the Philippines by that time. 

Actually the sailings were not made at so early a date as anticipated, 
due to combined difficulties of obtaining the necessary boats — that is, 
removing them from their then civil, commercial operations — and also 
the delay in receipt of materiel beyond the dates that had been given 
us, and, in particular, the delayed receipt of 45 Flying Fortresses, and 
the further delay of about two weeks, I believe, in their take-off from 
[9] San Francisco for Hawaii, because of unexpected head winds. 

13. General Russell. General Marshall, based on the information 
which was available to the War Department in the late fall of 1941, 
what if any conclusions were reached as to the probable plans of Japan 
for attack, as they related to the places to be attacked? 

General Marshall. We anticipated, beyond a doubt, a Japanese 
movement in Indo-China and the Gulf of Siam, and against the Malay 
Peninsula. We anticipated also an assault on the Philippines. We 
did not, so far as I recall, anticipate an attack on Hawaii ; the reason 
being that we thought, with the addition of more modern planes, that 
the defenses there would be sufficient to make it extremely hazardous 
for the Japanese to attempt such an attack. 

14. General Grunert. From what we have learned, I do not think 
there is any use going into paragraph "B", about the Atlantic Charter. 

General Marshall. Here is something. In further answer to your 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 15 

question, I find the memorandum to the President on the subject of 
the Far Eastern situation, dated November 27, states this : 

If the current negotiations end witliout agreement, Japan may attack tlie Burma 
Road ; Thailand ; Malaya ; the Netherlands East Indies ; the Philippines ; the 
Russian Maritime Provinces. 

There is little probability of an immediate Japanese attack on the Maritime 
Provinces, because of the strength of the Russian Forces. Recent Japanese troop 
movements all seem to have been southward. 

[10] The magnitude of the effort required will militate against direct 
attack against IMalaya and the Netherlands East Indies until the threat exer- 
cised by United States forces in Luzon is removed. 

Then there are some remarks on the Burma Road or Thailand 
objectives, and this : 

The most essential thing now, from the Ignited States viewpoint, is to gain 
time. Considerable Navy and Army reenforcements have been rushed to the 
Philippines, but the desirable strength has not yet been reached. The process 
of reenforcement is being continued. Of great immediate concern is the safety 
of the Army convoy now near Guam, and the Marine Corps convoy just leaving 
Shanghai. Ground forces to a total of 21,000 are due to sail from the United 
States by December 8, 1941,, and it is important that this troop reenforcement 
reach the Philippines before hostilities commence. 

Precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided as long as con- 
sistent with national policy. The longer the delay, the more positive becomes 
the assurance of retention of these islands as a naval and air base. Japanese 
action to the south of Formosa will be hindered and perhaps seriously blocked 
as long as we hold the Philippine Islands. War with Japan certainly will inter- 
rupt our transport of supplies to Siberia, and probably will interrupt the process 
of aiding China. 

After consultation with each other. United States, British, and Dutch military 
authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counter action against 
Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the 
territory or mandated territory of the United [11] States, the British 
Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move 
forces into Thailand west of 100° East — 

I referred to that a little while ago. 

or south of 10° North— 

"10° North" cuts them off from the Gulf of Siam. 

Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands. 

Japanese involvement in Yunnan or Thailand up to a certain extent is advan- 
tageous, since it leads to further dispersion, longer lines of communication, and 
an additional burden or communications. However, a Japanese advance to the 
west of 100° East or south of 10° North, immediately becomes a threat to Burma 
and Singapore. Until it is patent that Japan intends to advance beyond these 
lines,, no action which might lead to immediate hostilities shoiild be taken. 
It is recommended that — 

prior to the completion of the Philippine reenforcements, military counter 
action be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens United 
States, British, or Dutch territory as above outlined ; 

in case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the 
United States, the British, and the Dutch Governments that advance beyond 
the lines indicated may lead to war ; prior to such warning no joint military 
opposition be taken ; 

steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and 
Dutch for the issuance of such warning. 

[i^] That is signed by Stark and signed by me. 
15. General Russell. Now, General Marshall, General Short went 
out to the Hawaiian Department early in 1941 ; I believe that is true. 
General Marshall. Yes, 



16 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

16. General Russell. Did he come to the Department in Washing- 
ton for conferences before going out ? 

General Marshall. He came to Washington. I haven't a very clear 
recollection of our interview here. The normal procedure would be 
for him to go into War Plans Division and familiarize himself with 
the plans relating to the theater into which h^ was going. I have a 
very indistinct recollection of that visit. However, I have a letter 
I wrote liim just at that time. 

17. General Russell. The letter to which vou refer is the letter of 
February 7, 1941? 

General Marshall. Yes. 

18. General Russell. General Marshall, do you believe that that 
letter contains a complete statement as to the situation in Hawaii 
and the policies which General Short was to follow in his administra- 
tion of the affairs of the Department ? 

General Marshall. No. There was a dozier or a file in the War 
Flans Division, of all the War Department instructions regarding 
the particular defense of that theater. This letter of mine gave a 
personal touch to my general views on the matter. I might say that 
since then I have rarely if ever written to any theater commander, so 
there could never be any confusion between my letters and the plans 
of the War Plans Division. As a matter of fact, I .have rather given 
offense because I have not written. They have written to me, but 
I have seldom ever written to them. [IS] I have made it all 
an official basis, coming from the Operations Section, which was the 
old War Plans Division. However, in this, this is not a complete 
defense of Hawaii, at all. 

19. General Russell. I think that this letter of February 7 should 
be incorporated into and made a part of the record. 

20. General Grunert. What is the restricted, confidential, or other 
classification ? 

21. General Russell. It is a secret letter. 

General Marshall. Well, I do not know as it is secret, now. 

22. General Russell. It is marked "Secret." 

23. General Grunert. We cannot put anything in the record that is 
not supposed to be treated in that manner. 

General Marshall. Yes, I think you can put this in. All that 
letter of his that is here can go into the record. 

24. General Russell. I think then we will attach that letter. 
(Letter of February 7, 1941, is as follows :) 

(Stamped) Secret 

War Department, 
Office of the Chief of Staff, 

Washington, Fehrnary 7, lOJ/L 
Lieut. General Walter O. Short, 
Fort Shafter, 

Territory of Hawaii. 
My Dear Short : I believe you take over command today, however, the reason 
for this letter is a conversation I had yesterday with Admiral Stark. 

******* 

[14] Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at length about 

the deficiencies of Army materiel for the protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred 

specifically to planes and to antiaircraft guns. Of course the facts are as he 

represents them regarding planes, and to a less serious extent regarding caliber 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 17 

.50 machine guns. The 3-inch antiairci-aft gun is on a better basis. What 
Kimmel does not realize is that we are tragically lacking in this materiel 
throughout the Army, and that Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other 
command in the Army. 

The fullest protection for the Fleet is the rather than a major consideration 
for us, there can be little question about that ; but the Navy itself makes demands 
on us for commands other than Hawaii, which make it difficult for us to meet 
the requirements of Hawaii. For example, as I told Stark yesterday — he had 
been pressing me heavily to get some modern antiaircraft guns in the Philippines 
for the protection of Cavite, where they have collected a number of submarines 
as well as the vessels of the Asiatic Fleet — at the present time we have no anti- 
aircraft guns for the protection of Cavite, and very little for Corregidor. By 
unobstrusively withdrawing 3-inch guns from regiments now in the field in active 
training, we had obtained 20 3-inch guns for immediate shipment to the Philip- 
pines. However, before the shipment had been gotten under way the Navy re- 
quested 18 of these guns for Marine battalions to be specially equipped for the 
defense of islands in the Pacific. So I am left with two guns for the Philippines. 
This has happened time and again, and until quantity [15] production 
gets well under way, we are in a most difficult situation in these matters. 

I have not mentioned Panama, but the naval requirements of defense there 
are of immense importance and we have not been able to provide all the guns 
that are necessary, nor to set up the Air units v^-ith modern equipment. However, 
in this instance, we can fly the latest equipment to Panama in one day, some of 
it in four hours. 

You should make clear to Admiral Kimmel that we are doing everything that 
is humanly possible to build up the Army defenses of the Naval overseas installa- 
tions, but we cannot perform a miracle. I arranged yesterday to ship 31 of 
the P36 planes to Hawaii by aircraft carrier from San Diego in about ten days. 
This will give you 50 of this type of plane, deficient in speed compared to the 
Japanese carried based pursuit, and deficient in armament. But at least it 
gives you 50 of the same type. I also arranged with Admiral Stark to ship 50 
P40-B pursuit planes about March 15tli by Naval carrier from San Diego. These 
planes just came into production this week and should be on a quantity basis of 
about 8 a day by the first week in March. 

The Japanese carrier based pursuit plane, which has recently appeared in 
China, according to our information has a speed of .322 miles an hour, a very 
rapid ability to climb and mounts two .20mm and two .30 cal. guns. It has leak- 
proof tanks and armor. Our P40-B will have a speed of 360 miles an hour with 
two .50 cal. machine guns and four of .30 caliber. It will lack the rapidity to 
climb of the Japanese plane. It will have leak-proof tanks and [16] 
armor. 

We have an earlier model of this plane, the P40, delivered between August 
and October, but the Chief of the Air Corps opposes sending it to Hawaii because 
of some engine defect which makes it unsafe for training flights over water. Up 
to the present time we have not had available a modern medium bomber or a 
light bomber. This month the medium bomber will go into production, if not 
quantity production. This plane has a range without bombs of 3,000 miles, 
carries 2,000 pounds and has a speed of 320 miles an hour — a tremendous im- 
provement on the old BIS which you now have. It can operate with bombs 640 
miles to sea, with a safe reserve against the return trip. We plan to give you 
first priority on these planes. I am looking into the question of providing at 
least a squadron of Flying Fortress planes for Hawaii. 

I am seeing what can be done to augment the .50 caliber machine gun set-up, 
but I have no hopes for the next few months. The Navy approached us regard- 
ing barrage ballons. We have three now under test, and 80 in process of manu- 
facture, and 3,000 to be procured if the President will release our estimates. 
However, this provides nothing against the next few months. I am looking 
into the question of possibly obtaining some from England, but they are asking 
us and not giving us these days. The first test of the first forty deliveries 
in June will probably be made in Hawaii. 

You, of course, understand the pressures on the Department for the limited 
material we have, for Alaska. [17] for Panama, and, most confidentiaUy, 
for the possible occupation of the Azores, not to mention the new leased bases. 
However, as I have already said, we are keeping clearly in mind that our first 
conceirn is to protect the Fleet. 

My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is 
done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing 
79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1 3 



18 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk 
of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by Air and by submarine, 
constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing 
threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority. 

Please keep clearly in mind in all of your negotiations that our mission is to 
protect the base and the Naval concentration, and that purpose should be made 
clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel. I accentuate this because I found yes- 
terday, for example, in a matter of tremendous importance, that old Army and 
Navy feuds, engendered from fights over appropriations, with the usual fallacious 
arguments on both sides, still persist in confusing issues of national defense. 
We must be completely impersonal in these matters, at least so far as our own 
nerves and irritations are concerned. Fortunately, and happily I might say, 
Stark and I are on the most intimate personal basis, and that relationship has 
enabled us to avoid many serious difficulties. 
Faithfully yours, 

/s/ G. C. Marshall. 

[18] 25. General Russfxl. General Marshall, in the letter of 
February 7, you stated that the mission of the Army out there was the 
protection of the Navy. ■ 

General Marshall. Yes. 

26. General Russell. Do you regard that as an accurate statement 
of the relation between Army and Navy in the Hawaiian Department? 

General Marshall. Yes. That is the reason for the Army's being 
there. 

27. General Russell. To protect? 

General Marshall. Hawaii's importance to us is as a naval-air base, 
and it is the center of Pacifib Fleet activities. Our mission was to 
protect it, and for that reason, the eventual arrangement of command 
was a naval command. 

28. General Russell. In this letter, February 7, General, the state- 
ment was made by you to General Short that — 

The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by 
submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation. 

Did anything that occurred between the date of this letter of Feb- 
ruary 7 and the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, cause 
you to change in any way that estimate of the situation in Hawaii ? 

General Marshall. Nothing occurred. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

[19] 29. General Russell. General Marshall, between the date 
of FelDruary 7, 1941, and the date of December 7, 1941, do you recall 
any communications with General Short carried on by you either by 
telephone or letter or radiogram or any other method, a record of 
which is not in the War Department files? 

General Marshall. No; I have no recollection of such a thing. 

I have here another letter, of March 5. I do not know whether you 
have it in the record or not. It reads : 

(Letter dated March 5, 1941, is as follows :) 

My Dei^vk Short: I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the 
Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. The establish- 
ment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end 
is a matter of first priority. General Chaney has prepared a report of recent 
exercises held in the United States and incorporated therein his views and 
recommendations based on his experience in these exercises and his observation 
of the system and method employed by the British. A copy of this report is being 
sent to you. 

An air defense exercise is contemplated for the West Coast in the Spring. 
This exercise is to include an establishment similar to that which has been set 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 19 

up in the Air Defense Command exercise in the Northeast and tested during 
January. It is highly desirable that representatives from Hawaii be present 
to observe [20] the details of this exercise. If this is found to be im- 
practicable, we will consider having officers sent to the exercise who shortly 
thereafter are due for station in Hawaii. 
Faithfully yours, 

/s/ G. C. Makshaix, 

Chief of Staff. 

30. General Russell. That is an important matter. Where did that 
letter come from ? 

General JNIarshall. I wrote that to General Short. 

31. General Russell. From what files in the War Department did 
you get that letter ? 

32. General Grunert. In other words, where is there a record of 
that letter, so far as the official files of the War Department are con- 
cerned ? We have not run across it yet. 

General Marshall. I do not know. 

33. General Grunert. It might lead us to believe that there may be 
others. 

General Marshall. My practice, when those personal letters come 
to me, is to send them right to the Operations Section, and they go 
info the files. 

34. General Russell. That letter could have been missed in a hurried 
search. I am sure if I had seen it I would have picked it up. 

35. General Grunert. Was there an answer to that letter. General? 
General Marshall. On the 15th of March General Short replies : 
[21] (Letter dated March 15, 1911, is as follows : 

General George C. Marshall, 

Chief of Staff of the Army, War Department, Washington, D. C. 
Dear Genekal Marshall: In reply to your letter of March 5th I shall give 
you a brief review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department in regard to 
defense from air attack. 

General Marshall. Do you have that letter ? 

36. General Russell. No, sir. 

37. General Grunert. Is there anything in that answer that could 
not be used now? In other words, is there something that might in 
the future jeopardize the defense? 

General Marshall. The letter continues : 

DISPERSION and PROTECTION OF AIRCRAFT 

The most serious situation with reference to an air attack is the vulnerability 
of both the Army and Navy air fields to the attack. Hickam Field is the most 
conspicuous target in sight and the Ford Island Navy Field is not much better. 
Wheeler Field is less conspicuous only because it is in the center of the Island. 
On all fields the planes have been kept lined up on the field where they would 
suffer terrific loss. As I wrote you in my letter of February 19th some work 
has been done towards the preparation of emergency fields on outlying islands, 
but in no case has arrangements been completed for the dispersion of the planes 
in the vicinity of the field or the preparation of bunkers to protect them. I asked 
for [22] money and Engineer troops to do this work. The pursuit planes 
must necessarily be protected on the Island of Oahu on account of their limited 
cruisins radius. 

The Navy is organizing its new landing field at Barbers Point for the use 
of the carrier borne planes. They also are well along on the construction of 
an air base at Kaneohe Bay to which the 5 patrol squadrons will be moved. 
From their point of view this will improve the situation greatly. With the 
arrival of the additional 50 pursuit planes Wheeler Field will be so badly con- 
gested that it will be necessary to establish another landing field. Before my 



20 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

arrival this had practically been decided upon adjacent to the new Navy landing 
field at Barbers Point. However, the Navy objected very strenuously to this 
and I think rightly so as planes coming in or going out from either field would 
have to fly over the other field and constitute a considerable element of danger. 
We have located another field about four miles northeast of Schofield Barracks. 
I think this is far more desirable from every point of view as we shall not be 
in danger of losing planes through the action of small landing parties or of 
having them damaged or of having the field put out of use by shelling from 
enemy ships. The runway will be about 5,000 feet so the bombers can use it as 
an emergency field should Hickam Field be out of action on account of bombing. 
The Observation Squadron and the squadron of light bombers is being [23] 
moved to Bellows Field in the next few days so as to lessen the congestion at 
Wheeler Field. 

Plans have been made to provide gas and bombs at all emergency landing 
fields on outlying islands and for the stationing on Kauai, Maui, and Hawaii 
of the Battalions of National Guard which came from these islands for the 
protection of the air fields from sabotage and small landing parties. Inci- 
dentally these battalions would serve to prevent local disorders. Unless there 
is an emergency these troops will not be sent to the other islands until the 
camp buildings for one company have been provided at each air field. Part of 
each battalion can be quartered in existing Armories on these islands usually 
at some distance from the air field. 

ANTIAIKCRAFT ARTILLERY 

In general we have no serious shortage in 3 inch antiaircraft artillery, only 
16 guns being required to complete our complement. As far as I know no pro- 
vision has been made for 90-mm Antiaircraft guns. 20 out of 135 37-mm 
antiaircraft guns have been received. The exact date of the arrival of the 
others is not known. We are still short 236 of .50 caliber machine guns. 
Perhaps the most serious shortage is 8 long range detectors (AWS) which 
are supposed to arrive in June. Our present sound locators have a range of 
only 41/^ miles so they are practically useless. The new detectors will have 
a maximum range of 120 miles. 

The shortage of personnel is much more serious [24 ] than that of 
equipment. Practically all of the Coast Artillery is assigned dual roles. This 
means that much of the Antiaircraft equipment would not be manned if it were 
essential to man the Harbor Defense guns at the same time. To man the 
authorized equipment would require 2 regiments of Coast Artillery (AA) 
(Mobile) (TO 4-11), 1 battalion, gun, Coast Artillery (AA) (Mobile) (less 
searchlight battery) (TO 4-15). 90 officers and 2,000 replacements to activate 
3 gun batteries and 37-mm batteries. These were covered in my letter of 
February 19th. 

COORDINATION OF ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE 

The coordination of Antiaircraft defense presents quite a different picture at 
Hawaii from that existing in most places on the mainland. The island is so 
small that there would n.ot be the same degree of warning that would exist on 
the mainland. After the installation of our new detectors we shall have some 
warning from the different islands and almost continuous service in the most 
dangerous direction for approximately 75 miles. The pursuit aviation, however, 
will have to be prepared to take the air in the minimum amount of time. 

On account of the congestion in the areas at Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor, 
and Barbers Point, the coordination of the Army and Navy aircraft and of the 
Antiaircraft Artillery presents a very serious problem. We have had a com- 
ihittee of the Army and Navy working on this subject. The committee submitted 
its report March 1st and it is now being reviewed by General Martin, [25] 
commanding the Hawaiian Air Force, General Gardner, conunanding the Hawai- 
ian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, and Admiral Bellinger, commanding the 
NavaJ Air Stati,on. We have had a number of combined air exercises in the 
past month and expect to have a minimum of one each week so we should find 
out anything that is wrong with the plan. 

WEST COAST DEFENSE EXERCISE 

If the Situation here is such as to make it possible I would like to send both 
General Martin and General Gardner to the West Coast Defense Exercise. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 21 

Martin is the senior with his temporary rank and probably will command our 
air defense if it appears that such a command is the proper solution of our 
problem. Gardner has had much more experience with this subject and I feel 
that it would be wise fo send him also as he would be able to get all the details. 
If it is not advisable at the time to send these two officeirs I would like to send 
their Executives as I am sure a lot would be learned from the exercise. 

I feel that the question of Antiaircraft Defense against air attack is the most 
serious problem that we have to face and I hope that funds and Engineer troops 
can be made available soon so that we can get definitely on the way on this 
subject. 

Very sincerely, 

/s/ Walter C. Short. 

[26] 38. General Eussell. Do you have any other letters in 
that file, or interchange of letters ? 

General Marshall. There is a letter from me to General Short, 
dated March 28. There is one from General Short to me, dated March 
6, with relation to aircraft warning service. 

39. General Frank. Is this file a part of your personal files, or War 
Department files ? 

General Marshall. I do not have any personal file. 

40. General Frank. That file can be made available to us, can it 
not? 

General Marshall. Oh, yes. I mentioned the one of March 6 
without reading it. Then there is my letter to him of March 28 
regarding relieving congestion by the construction of one additional 
field and by the dispersion of grounded aircraft in protected centers ; 
stating that a company of aviation engineers will be sent during April, 
and further increases in the engineer garrison are contemplated when 
the necessary personnal can be made available; and my hope of 
arranging for the early augmentation of the antiaircraft garrison so 
as to provide full strength units, and also my approval of the proposal 
to send General Martin and General Gardner. 

Then there is another letter from General Short to me, of April 14, 
regarding certain parcels of land. 

(Excerpt from letter dated April 14, 1941, is as follows:) 

Knowing that you are very much interested in the progress that we are mak- 
ing in cooperating with the Navy I am enclosing the following agreements made 
with them : 

1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian [27] Department and 
Fourteenth Naval District, Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Security Measure. 

2. Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force and Com- 
mander, Naval Base Defense Air Force to implement the above agreement. 

3. Field Orders No. 1 NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the Army 
the provisions of the joint agreement. 

I have found both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch very cooperative and 
we all feel steps have been taken which make it possible for the Army and Navy 
Air Forces to act together and with the unity of command as the situation 
requires. 

We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the air 
force and the antiaircraft defense. 

On May 5 a letter from General Marshall to General Short, referring 
to the letter of April 14tli to w^hich I just referred, reading as follows: 
(Letter dated May 5, 1941, is as follows :) 

Lieutenant General Waltee C. Short, 

Fort 8hafter, T. H. 
My Deab Short: Thank you for your letter of the 14th enclosing the joint 
plans and the estimate concerning possible air action. It is evident that you 
have been on the job, and I know that the Navy is delighted to have such 
generous cooperation. 



22 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[28] The matter of locating strong points at various points throughout the 
Island looks sound to me, and authority to go ahead on the leasing of land 
parcels was radioed on April 22nd. War Plans and the Air Corps are still look- 
ing into the matter of the additional airdrome on Oahu, and I expect to have an 
^ answer for you in a short time. 

I am hoping to leave in the next day or so on an inspection trip to the West 
Coast, which will include a visit to Alaska. I think they are doing a fine job 
up there and it will be good to get away from my desk for awhile. Last week 
the Appropriations Committee kept me on the stand through two successive ses- 
sions of four hours each, which involved answering a barrage of questions on all 
matters great and small. 

It is most gratifying to hear you say that everything is going along extremely 
well and do not hesitate to write at any time. 
Faithfully yours, 

/s/ G. C. Maeshall, 

Chief of Staff. 

On May 29 I received a letter from him in which he reports on 
certain maneuvers, which I think will be probably very interesting to 
you gentlemen if you have not already seen it. 

41. General Russell. That letter is not in the file that was made 
available by the Adjutant General's Office. 

General Marshall. Then there is a letter from me to General 
Short, dated October 10, reading as follows : 

[29] (Letter dated October 10, 1941, is as follows:) 

Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, 

Coiniuanding General, Haivaiian Department, 

Fort Shaffer Hawaii. 
Dear Geneeal Short: The mimeographed standard operating procedure for 
the Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, has just come to my attention and I 
am particularly concerned with missions assigned to air units. For instance, the 
Hawaiian Air Force, among other things, is assigned the mission of defending 
Schofield Barracks and all air fields on Oahu against sabotage and ground 
attacks ; and with providing a provisional battalion of 500 men for military police 
duty. 

This seems inconsistent with the emphasis we are placing on air strength in 
Hawaii, particularly in view of the fact that only minimum operating and main- 
tenance personnel have been provided. As a matter of fact, we are now in process 
of testing the organization of airbase defense battalions, consisting tentatively of 
a rifle company and two antiaircraft batteries, designed for the specific purpose 
of relieving the air maintenance people from ground missions of this kind at 
locations where there are no large garrisons for ground defense, as there are in 
Hawaii. 
I wish you would give this your personal consideration. 
Faithfully yours, 

/s/ G. C. Marshall, 

Chief of Staff. 

[SOI Another letter from me, dated October 28, referring to a 
letter which I do not see here. General Short wrote me on the 14th, 
and it is not in here. 

(Letter dated October 28, 1941, is as follows:) 

Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short, 

Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, 

Fort Shafter, T. H. 
Dear Short: With reference to your letter of October 14, I can understand 
your motives in giving ground defense training to Air Corps personnel which 
at present are excess for the equipment provided. However, the present rate of 
expansion of the Air Force is such that they are having considerable difficulty in 
obtaining experienced maintenance men and it is important that they be per- 
mitted to concentrate on the technical training of all potential mechanics, re- 
gardless of available equipment. Also, it is equally important that they utilize 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 23 

all available time on this specialized training and the men not be left without 
assigned duties particularly during the maneuver period. 

I suggest that you prepare a separate phase of your alert plan based on the 
assumption that the Air Force has been destroyed and a hostile landing effected. 
This plan could provide for the use of the necessary Air Corps personnel for 
ground defense and afford a means of indoctrinating them in ground defense 
tactics. It should, however, for the present at least, be [31] subordi- 

nated to their own specific training requirements. 

It would appear that the best policy would be to allow them to concentrate 
on technical Air (Jorps training until they have completed their expansion pro- 
gram and have their feet on the ground as far as their primary mission is con- 
cerned. War Department Training Circular 47, which was issued July 18, 1941, 
can be accepted as a guide except in extreme situations. 
Faithfully yours, 

/s/ G. C. Maeshaix, 

Chief of Stuff. 

Here [exhibiting] is General Short's letter of October 14, 1941, re- 
plying to my letter of October 10, in which I referred to his standing 
operating procediu-e and said that it "has jnst come to my attention 
and I am particularly concerned with missions assigned to air miits," 
and so forth. 

(Letter dated October 14, 1941, is as follows:) 

General Geobge C. Marshall, 
Chief of Staff of the Army, 

War Department, Washington, D. C. 

Dear General IMaeshail : I have your letter of October 10th with reference to 
the use of men of the Air Force on other than strictly air duties. At the time our 
tentative Standing Operating Procedure was put out the Air Corps had 7,229 men. 
Full Combat details and all overhead required only 3,885 men for the planes and 
organizations actually on hand. This left a surplus of 3,344 men with no assigned 
duties during Maneuvers. One of the main reasons for the [321 assign- 
ment was to give these men something to do during the Maneuvers. Another rea- 
son was the belief that any serious threat of an enemy ground attack of Oahu 
could come only after destruction of our Air Forces. The fact that our planes had 
been destroyed would not mean that all the men had been put out of action. It 
is probable that several thousand men would still be left and it would not look 
plausible to have them sit down and do nothing while Infantrymen were detailed 
to protect them and their air fields. The training after the first two weeks takes 
up only about four hours per month of their time. It seems to me that they 
should continue to be trained as Riflemen in the immediate defense of air fields. 
As regards their use as Military Police that was not correct. The plan was to use 
them for guarding certain essential utilities, which did not require team training. 
However, this will be unnecessary as the Legislature has just passed the Home 
Guard Bill, which will go into effect very soon. They will be able to take over 
guarding of all essential utilities, highway bridges, railroad bridges, etc. 

If it is not desired to train Air Corps men for their own protection and for 
the final defense of the air field I would like to be so advised. 
Very sincerely, 

/s/ Walter C. Short. 

42. General Russell. Do those constitute the complete exchange of 
letters between you and General Short? 

[33'] General Marshall. So far as I know. 

43. General Russell. I repeat the question then, General Mar- 
shall. If there are any others than these transmitting information 
from you to General Short they are in the records of the War Depart- 
ment? 

General Marshall. Yes. Those letters are, in effect, about what an 
officer in my position would say orally if he visited the command. 
They are not specific directives. It is what he thinks; it is what he is 
interested in ; it is his interpretation. 



24 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

44. General Kussell. Particularly the Board was interested in com- 
munications to General Short which bore on the relations between the 
Japanese and our Government in their relations in the Pacific. You 
have nothing in your file here relating to that ? 

General Marshall. Not other than the radios that made certain 
statements regarding that. 

45. General Kussell. To refresh your memory, General Marshall, 
and in order that further search may be made, if necessary, the records 
which have been made available to the Board indicate that on July 7, 
1941, a message was sent out from the Adjuant General to the Com- 
manding General of the Hawaiian Department in which the Japanese 
probabilities were discussed. It is in this language: 

(Message dated July 7, 1941, is as follows:) 

For your infoi'mation. Deduction from information from numerous sources 
is that the Japanese Government has determined upon its future policy which is 
supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups. [^4] This 
policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving probable aggressive action 
against the Maritime Provinces of Russia if and when the Siberian Garrison 
has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany 
will win a decisive victory in European Russia. Opinion is that Jap activity in 
the South will be for the present confined to seizure and development of Naval, 
Army, and Air Bases in Indo China although an advance against the British and 
Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out. The neutrality pact with Russia may be 
abrogated. They have ordered all Jap vessels in U. S. Atlantic ports to be west 
of Panama Canal by first of August. Movement of Jap shipping from Japan 
has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned. 

The situation which developed at that time has been discussed by 
you previously. Our records show, General Marshall, that not again, 
until October, did anything go from the War Department out to 
General Short relating to our relations with Japan and the probabili- 
ties there. 

In October, General Marshall, a memorandum originated in the 
Operations Department General Staff, at Washington, in which was 
discussed a Navy estimate of Japanese probabilities in the Pacific in 
which the Navy had stated that they thought war with Russia was 
imminent and that, since Japan held the British and us responsible 
for their present situation, there was a possibility of their attacking 
us. General Gerow prepared a memorandum which bears your ini- 
tials and some other. [35] initials, disagreeing with that 
estimate and stating that the general recommendation was made that 
this be sent to the Hawaiian Department : 

Tension between the United States and Japan remains strained, but no abrupt 
change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent. 

From July down to October we have nothing else in our records, and 
we were wondering whether or not something else did exist or whether 
that October radiogram constitutes the next message to General Short. 

General Marshall. So far as I know, it does. I think we have some 
passing back and forth between the War Plans Division and his staff 
out there, and I will check on that. That goes on pretty much all the 
time. 

46. General Russell. General Marshal], eliminating messages from 
the Navy which were shown to General Short, the next record that we 
have of any communication from the War Department to General 
Short is on the 27th of November, on which date the alert order went 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 25 

out and a message from G-2 of the War Department to G-2 of the 
Hawaiian Department; and I was wondering if your files showed any 
other communications between the October message and the November 
27 message. 

General Marshall.- I do not know of any. I will check up very 
carefully. 

47. General Grunert. Was it SOP between you and the Navy that 
Navy messages of importance yveva shown to the Army and that Army 
messages of importance were shown to the Navy or did you agree that 
this particular message should or should not be shown ? 

[oS] General Marshall. We did not say that. There were no 

instructions to the Commander not to show it at all. We put that in, 
in these critical cases, to make certain that there was do doubt about it. 
I know of no instructions to an Army Commander not to show this to 
the Navy. That was left to his own discretion. When we come to 
important things we put that in specifically. 

I would like to explain to you here that the reason for that is that 
we did not want to compromise our codes ; and if we sent instructions 
out, if the' Navy sent them out and we sent them out, it presented a 
great hazard in the compromise of the codes. 

48. General Grunert. But all those messages during that critical 
period, I believe, or most of them, did say to show it to the Navy ; and 
in that case you did not send an additional message? 

General Marshaix. No; in ord<^r not to compromise the codes. 

49. General Russell. General Marshall, I will eliminate the Navy 
messages. A message that has been discussed considerably by the 
Board is the message of November 27, 1941, which bore your signature 
and went out to General Short. 

General Marshall. I have it here. 

50. General Russell. Do you recall giving instructions for the 
preparation of that message or participating in its preparation? 

General Marshall. I was away on the 27th. I left here on the 
afternoon of the 26th. I went clown to maneuvers in North Carolina 
and did not return until the night of the 27th. \37] Inciden- 
tally, I think I left immediately after that, on the 28th, and went back 
again; and I have a rather distinct recollection of comparing the 
effect of this statement : 

If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided tlie United States 
desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not comma 
repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might 
jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile .Japanese action you are directed to 
undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but 
these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm 
civil population or disclose intent. 

I have a rather distinct recollection of considering those two state- 
ments. One, incidentally, was a governmental policy, the instructions 
of the President. My very dim recollection of the policy — and Gen- 
eral Gerow or Colonel Bundy might have been more accurate in their 
recollection — is that I indicated the insertion of the overt act. But I 
am not quite clear on that. They may have gotten it from a joint 
board discussion, as General Gerow sat on the joint board. 

I was trying to recall how that instruction came to us, but I think it 
was in a personal interview, but I do not recall it. I know it was the 
Government's policy. 



26 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

51. General Russell. General Gerow's testimony indicates that you 
did not participate in the preparation of this message of November 27, 
by a statement as to who did participate and your name was omitted. 

[3S] General Marshall. I think they knew I was not here. As 
I say, my recollection is very hazy, but I have rather a memory with 
reference to the matter I have just spoken of. It may have been, of 
course, when I looked at it when I returned the following day. 

52. General Russell. Similarly, General Marshall, if a message 
liad been sent by G-2 of the War Department to G-2 of the Hawaiian 
Department on the same date, November 27, you being absent from 
Washington would not have had any personal knowledge of its 
contents ? 

General Marshall. I probably would not have seen it anyway. 

53. General Russell. To continue the history of the November 27 
message. General Marshall, it requested that General Short report the 
action taken on it? 

General Marshall. Yes. 

54. General Russell. Subsequently General Short sent a reply to 
that message in which he refers to the November 27 message from you 
over your signature by number. That message of General Short 
reporting action taken merely states : 

Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy REURAD 
four seven two twenty-seventh. 

The original of General Short's report indicates that it was initialed 
by Secretary Stimson and has a stamp "Noted — Chief of Staff," and 
was initialed by General Gerow. 

The Board has been interested to know the procedure in your office 
as it relates to stamping documents which do not bear your signature. 
Does that indicate that you did or did not see those messages ? 
{S9] General Marshall. Well, I think if you look at the preceding 
message from the Philippines you will find that same rubber stamp 
on there, "Noted— Chief of Staff." 

55. General Russell. That is true. 

General Marshall. And you will find it at the top of the message. 
You will find my initials. 

56. General Russell. Yes ; I do see them. 

General Marshall. But not on'the other one. I do not know about 
that. I do not know what the explanation is. I initial them all ; that 
is my practice. What happens, of course, is that there is more than 
one copy. One goes to the particular section that has the responsi- 
bility for working on it, which in this case was the War Plans Division, 
now the Operations Division, and then one comes to me. I initial it 
and then it goes out to the record. Where I think the Secretary of 
War ought to see it, and if he is not in the distribution, I check it to 
him. Where I think there is somebody else that should be notified, 
I indicate on the face of my copy who else is to be informed of this. 
As a matter of routine one agency is charged with the execution of the 
matter pertaining to the message. But in this particular case I do not 
know. I have no recollection at all. 

57. General Russell. The fact that it reached the Secretary of 
War's office and was by him initialed — would that or not indicate that 
you had sent it up to him or that it might have been sent up to him by 
someone else ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 27 

General Marshall. In this connection I invite your attention to 
the fact that this was filed behind a message from General MacArthur. 
I note that I did not initial it. [40'] They evidently came in 
together. 

58. General Russell. If they were together you might or might 
not have seen them? 

General Marshall. I have no recollection at all. The presumption 
would be that I had seen it. 

59. General Russell. You cannot recall, General Marshall, whether 
or not you had at that time examined the message of the 27th to which 
General Short's radiogram was a reply? 

General Marshall. No. As a matter of fact, my memory is that I 
discussed that message when it was being prepared, though General 
Gerow thinks that I saw it afterwards. 

60. General Grunert. Who has authority to put out such a message ? 

General Marshall. The Acting Chief of Staif ; in that case, who- 
ever was acting in my absence. I do not remember who it was. Prob- 
ably it was Arnold. He w^as the Deputy then. 

61. General Grunert. It was by direction of somebody; other- 
wise they would not just out of a clear sky, after November 27, have 
sent a warning message. It was either by direction of somebody to 
send it or after some sort of a meeting or conference held that they did. 
Otherwise why should it have been sent on the 27th ? Why not on the 
26th or the 28th ? Do you see what I am trying to get at ? 

General Marshall. I see exactly what you mean, but I am having 
difficulty in explaining it to you. I think the message was based on 
something that came in on the 26th, I rather imagine, but I have no 
clear recollection. 

62. General Grunert. But the decision rested, as to whether 
[4-1] a message would be sent or not, with the OPD, or would it 
have to have the O. K. of your office ? 

General Marshall. Normally it would have to have the O. K. here. 
It is a question of good judgment. They send all sorts of messages 
all the time. I only see a small fraction of the messages sent by other 
people. I see the big directives. The same thing would apply to the 
Secretary of War. That was a very important message. I still have 
a very haunting memory that I was in on the discussion of the prepa- 
ration of the message. 

63. General Grunert. There was a so-called message that has not 
been mentioned yet, I believe, a message of November 28. signed by 
the Adjutant General and apparently prepared in the office of the 
Air Force, which dealt mainl}^ with protection against sabotage of 
airplanes. Do you know anything about that message ? 

General Marshall, I know by having looked into it afterwards. 
What actually occurred — and General Arnold can give you a more 
direct statement than I can — Arnold was terribly concerned over the 
fact that they thought they had picked up sabotage on three or four 
of the big planes in this country, in the factories. They were pretty 
certain that certain things were the result of sabotage m the plants. 
But we never had any conclusive proof. So he was sending out a 
message, without any relation to this at all, in regard to that matter, 
and G-2 objected to it as a normal staff operation, that that was their 
bailiwick and not that of the Air Corps. The net result was that the 



28 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

message was redrawn, as I recall, by G-2, and afterwards O. K.'d By 
the War Plans Division and sent, and it went all over the Army, over- 
seas, and Alaska. 

14^] 64. General Grunert. Now, your message of the 27th — 
that was directed to how many agencies ? Panama, Hawaii, the Phil- 
ippines, and West Coast? 

General Marshall. Yes. "West Coast" includes Alaska. 

65. General Grunert. And the G-2 was to all the G-2's? 
General Marshall. The G-2 message had a much wider distribu- 
tion. 

66. General Grunert. It went to all the G-2 departments? 
General Marshall. All. It went all over the place. 

67. General Grunert. The air sabotage message, was that also of 
wide distribution ? 

General Marshall. Wide distribution ; yes. 

68. General Grunert. Is there any idea in your mind that the re- 
cipients of those three messages could have interpreted them or con- 
fused them to one taking the place of the other as the latest instruc- 
tion ? 

General Marshall. I would say that all of these things occurring 
at the same time, this coincidence of reception may have had its bear- 
ing on the matter, very much as the leading planes that we fiiially 
got off from San Francisco arrived — were due to arrive — right in the 
middle of the confusion of the Japanese arrival, which undoubtedly 
did not help the expectations, the anticipations of enemy air approach. 
The G-2 sends a great many messages, as we all know from our own 
experience, and you had a coincidence there of, to a certain extent, 
unrelated messages going in at the same time. 

69. General Grunert. Did you see the reports from the others— 
from Panama, the West Coast, and the Philippines, in- reply to your 
message of November 27th? Apparently you did, because [43'] 
they are initialed. 

General Marshall. I think I initialed all of the others. The only 
one I did not initial, I think, was the Hawaiian one. 

70. General Grunert. And they having reported all the measures 
taken, it seems odd that the Hawaiian should be the only one to mis- 
interpret or confuse the three messages. They all got the same mes- 
sages, so I w^ould like to know if there is any light that I could get on 
why Hawaii particularly could interpret it one way, and the other 
three, the other way. 

General Marshall. I don't know ; I don't know. 

71. General Grunert. I have put in enough, so far. Go ahead. 

72. General Frank. I would like to ask a question. Since Hawaii 
did not take any measures other than those against the sabotage, 
as indicated in the message, and since that reply had been asked for in 
your message of November 27th, was that Hawaiian reply satisfactory ? 

General Marshall. In the first place, as I told you, I have no very 
distinct recollection in the matter. The first definite reaction I have on 
it would be confused with the "backsight" state of mind. Colonel 
Bundy, who had immediate charge of this phase of the affairs in War 
Plans Division, spoke to me about it. His reaction to the message had 
been that, when he referred to his liaison to the Navy, that the whole 
thing opened up, because under the agreement that Short had brought 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 29 

about with Admiral Kimmel, the Navy was charged with the deep re- 
connaissance, the Army, with the close-in affairs that pertained to Oahu 
direct. As I recall the matter, the only way the Army would have been 
involved in the deep reconnaissance would have been in detaching 
units to serve under the Navy. Well, the [44] main thing of 
course was the deep reconnaissance, to get a warning of the approach 
of these people. The reaction to the message also would have to be 
based on a knowledge of what the actual detailed defense order was. 
I was unaware of that. I believe that the No. 1 alert was changed in 
November, when the No. 1 was the top alert and later No. 1 became the 
preliminary alert. » 

73. General Frank. This reply does not refer to a numbered alert. 
It simply refers to the fact that he is taking measures against sabo- 
tage, and the point I was trying to make is this : since there,' was a 
critical situation existing in the Pacific, as you stated in answer to one 
of General Russell's questions, and since the Generals in Panama and 
the Philippines had taken more conclusive measures for protection, 
did it not seem that the measures taken in Hawaii were somewhat 
sketchy ? 

General Marshall. Yes, unless you would assume, as the men who 
were working on the thing did assume, that when he established his 
liaison with the Navy, that meant that reconnaissance had started. 
To what extent they were familiar with the details on the sabotage 
alert, meaning that it took all the planes and massed them, unarmed, 
on the air fields, and that the antiaircraft guns wouldn't have any 
ammunition by them, and things of that nature, I do not know, 

74. General Frank. There is lurking in the background, as a result 
of that report having been called for, and a reply made to it, an as- 
sumption that the reply was satisfactory. If it were not satisfactory, 
would it not have been a logical step for this office to have checked up 
on him? 

General Marshall. Yes, quite so; undoubtedly. 

[4^] 75. General Grunert. It was OPD's business to advise you 
on that particular phase, wasn't it ? You, yourself, do not, necessarily, 
have time to look into all those things. 

76. General Frank. No ; that is true. 

General Marshall. I have a responsibility, though, and the whole 
question was how you interpreted his reply. 

77. General Russell. General Marshall, the Board has been in- 
terested in knowing what information there was in the Office of the 
Chief of Staff as to the actual steps which General Short had taken 
for the defense of Oahu in response to this message of November 27th. 

General Marshall. I just have no recollection of it, at the time. I 
might add that these messages went to all these various commanders, 
and they all came back, the replies came in, and they were analyzed in 
the War Plans Division. Business went ahead. 

78. General Russell. They were seen by you and referred out to the 
War Plans Division for the proper action ? 

General Marshall. Yes. Well, they go to them direct, and a copy 
comes to me. 

79. General Russell. A little earlier in your testimony. General 
Marshall, reference was made to the SOP's from the Hawaiian De- 
partment, and as I recall, your file indicated that they reached you in 



30 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

October. These SOP's have in them these alerts 1, 2, and 3 ; 1 being 
the lowest type of alert. I have been told by someone in the War 
Plans Division that those SOP's were not received in the War Depart- 
ment until after the attack on December 7. 

General Marshall. I couldn't answer that, 

[40] 80. General Eussell. I am merely making this suggestion, 
now, because it may become material later, with the request that search 
be initiated. 

General Marshall. Yes. 

81. General Russell. That is, to determine when those SOP's actu- 
ally reached the War Department. 

General Marshall. All I know is that I was told that this No. 1 
alert alternated in its character from one extreme to another during 
November and December. 

82. General Grunert. There was a so-called "SOP" of November 
5, which may be the one which changed the alerts, if a change was 
made. The testimony of one Admiral Bloch also shows that he con- 
sidered No. 1 of the Army to be a counterpart of No. 1 of the Navy, 
and therefore he didn't know this or that. How true that is, we are 
going to find out, but then so far as the report from Short as to the 
measures taken is concerned, you did not exactly know to what extent 
the measures taken for sabotage extended to other protective means? 

General Marshall. No, I did not. As a matter of fact, my recollec- 
tion is as to these various defense measures from all our overseas 
theaters, that I had not attempted to reach them all. In most cases of 
that kind, though, I don't recall it. In this, I have an outline made of 
the principal points, and I look at that. I recall reading very carefully 
the adjustment that Short made with the Navy, which was a brand- 
new departure, wdiere they defined reconnaissance activities, the Navy 
taking the oversea reconnaissance mission as its responsibility, and 
the Army, the close-in reconnaissance, so far as air was concerned, as 
its responsibility. I recall it very [^7] well, because the air 
people objected, and I supported Short. So I had a reason for recalling 
that quite distinctly. 

83. General Russell. General Marshall, on the point that you are 
discussing now, it is not clear, to me at least, and I do not know 
whether it is, to the other Members of the Board, what action was 
necessary, and who initiated the action to make effective the plan for 
the reconnaissance in the Department. I do not believe the question 
is clear. 

Let us assume that when the message of November 27 reached 
General Short, he had concluded that this outer patrol and imier 
patrol should be made effective. AVe are not clear as to who should 
have made the initial movement to have initiated those patrols. 

General Marshall. My own view of that would be that if the mes- 
sage, as I believe this message was, was repeated to the naval officer, 
which meant it was instructions from the Navy Department, they 
would take action according to it, implementing the thing, as that 
officer's, because Short had no command over him. For several years 
he had known General Short, but they each had a certain mission, 
at a certain time. Now, the point is, though, that the message went 
to one, to be repeated to the other, and worked out both ways, wli^o- 
ever started the message. In this case it was started on the War De- 
partment side. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 31 

8i. General Eussell. Well, is it your view that both having seen 
the message of November 27, without more ado the Navy should have 
started their distant reconnaissance? 

General Marshall. That is right. That is my view. 

85. General Eussell. And the Army, the close-in ? 
General Marshall (reading) : 

[48] Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such 
reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary. 

86. General GRU^^ERT. That leaves it up to both parties to live up 
to their responsibilities ? 

General Marshall. The commanders of overseas garrisons — it is 
quite conceivable they might be attacked, without anything from the 
War Department, whatever. Of course, in all of this the point is the 
transition from peace to a war-time state of mind, and many alerts; 
as you and I recall, in the year 1907, in the Philippines. I, myself, 
have gone through two Japanese alerts. 

87. General Eussell. You were rather well acquainted with the 
foreign policy of the United States as it related to Japanese activities, 
were you not ? 

General Marshall, Yes, sir. 

88. General Eussell. Did you regard that policy as a rather def- 
inite and firm policy? 

General Marshall. I don't believe I could comment on that. In the 
first place, I don't c^uite understand the question, and in the next place 
I would rather not be involved, as a military official, in expressing 
myself on the foreign policy of the United States. 

89. General Eussell. I was leading up to this question — that the 
message of November 27, 1941, apparently can be easily broken down 
into two parts; one dealing with what General Short should do in 
the event of hostilities; the other part dealing with what General 
Short should do prior to hostilities. He was directed to initiate re- 
connaissance and take other measures [49] that he thought 
necessary, and then there are these restrictions or limitations or cau- 
tions. He is to carry out these necessary measures, and reconnais- 
sance, so as not to alarm the civilian population, or disclose intent, and 
then as a general caution he must "limit dissemination of this highly 
secret information to minimum essential officers." Members of the 
Board have been debating whether or not those cautions or restric- 
tions, or however they may be properly defined, were of such nature, 
first, as to minimize in General Shorfs mind the seriousness of the 
situation which actually existed. I am not sure that that is a fair 
question ; it may be a pure opinion. 

General Mar8Hx\ll. I am inclined to think it is. I think that that 
matter ought to just stand on the record. We have got the record of 
what he was tolcl, and you can draw your conclusions from that — the 
series of messages, and also I think you have got to have very clearly 
in mind as I say the transition from a peace state of mind to a war 
state of mind. 

90. General Eussell. I certainly shall not care to pursue the matter 
further or to press you on it. 

91. General Grunert. Just to have it in the record for our future 
consideration, I want to put a query, to be answered, or not as you 
see fit, or whether or not the question is such as to really demand an 



32 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

answer. That is this : Here, the same message, or three messages, go 
to at least four prominent commanders, or three of them, overseas — 
Panama, Hawaii, and the Philippines, and one, on a presumably ex- 
posed West Coast. Three of them apparently interpret those mes- 
sages in one way, and the fourth one does not; so the three of them 
report all the measures they have taken, or show by their reports 
that [50] they considered this as quite a critical and dangerous 
situation; so they take greater measures than the fourth does. Now, 
is there anything in the case of that fourth, which happens to be the 
Hawaiian Department — are there any peculiar circumstances there 
that it should be interpreted in a different way for that command than 
it was in Panama, the Philippines, or on the West Coast ? 

General Marshall. All I can say to that is this — and my answer 
does not explain the contrast between the very, very urgent attitude 
of the naval and army commanders in Hawaii, in the spring and early 
summer, with relation to air and antiaircraft and radar requirements. 
All I can say is that Hawaii had always 130,000 Japanese in a very 
congested district, there, and no commander could ever forget that; 
and the others did not have them. That did not exist in Panama. 
You had Panamanians over the border, but certainly you had no feeling 
of fears regarding them. In the Philippines you had no Japanese 
population certainly of any moment. It actually developed later 
there was a fifth column, very well organized, out there but you 
had always present in your mind in Hawaii the large Japanese popu- 
lation, of unpredictable activities. There, I think, is quite a contrast 
between that one man and the other three. As I say, I don't know ; 
I have never had explained to me, why there was apparently the 
cessation of fears of air attack, that seemed to be preeminent in the 
mind of Admiral Kimmel in February, when he wrote a letter to the 
Secretary of the Navy, and that official wrote to the Secretary of 
War, and embarrassed us greatly, because we had almost nothing to 
give — we were bankrupt so far as materiel was [51] con- 
cerned — and the later urgent requests with regard to radar, for 
example. 

92. General Russell. Those are the only questions I have. 

93. General Frank. I would like to ask one question, here. Back 
here, in the beginning, you stated that the presence of the Army in 
Hawaii was for the protection of a naval and air base ? 

General Marshall. I said, a naval and air base. 

94. General Frank. I just wanted to get it straightened out in the 
record. 

General Marshall. Naval and air. Originally it was naval, and 
then it became naval and air. 

95. General Frank. Have you any information to give or any com- 
ments to make relative to the failure of any contractors on Hawaiian 
projects to complete their work on time, prior to December 7? 

General Marshall. I have no knowledge on that, but we will ex- 
amine the records to see if there is any indication, here. 

96. General Frank. Have you any information as to whether or 
not any military personnel neglected their duties relating to Hawaiian 
construction contracts ? 

General Marshall. I have no knowledge of that. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 33 

97. General Frank. Do you have any information to give to the 
Board on a Mr. Wilhelm Rohl ? 

General Marshall. I have not, personally; but I will have them 
examine into the records of the War Department to see if there is 
anything on the subject here. 

98. General Frank. Were you in any way familiar with the Ha- 
waiian defense contract let by Colonel Theodore Wyman? 

[S2] General Marshall. I was not. 

99. General Frank. Now, General Marshall, a reading of the Rob- 
erts Commission testimony leads one to the conclusion that there was 
a general feeling in both the Army and the Navy, and in Hawaii, that 
there would not be an air attack. In other words, there was a state 
of mind of security against an air attack. Do you believe such a state 
of mind existed? 

General Marshall. I was unaware of it. The previous communi- 
cations we had had, noteably those of the spring and up to June 1941, 
related very specifically to the urgency of measures protective against 
an air attack. 

100. General Frank. Do you believe that the presence of the Fleet 
in being at Pearl Harbor mainly constituted a feeling of security that 
contributed to this state of mind ? 

General Marshall. I had had no opinion on that, and up to this 
instant I do not know whether I have formed any opinion on that or 
not. I had never thought of that particular aspect of the matter. 

101. General Frank. At that time, December 1911, what in your 
opinion was the general feeling in military ^d naval circles relative 
to the effectiveness of the air attack with bombs and torpeclos? 

General Marshall. As I recall, we considered it as very effective, 
in view of what had occurred in the European theater. 

102. General Frank. Over a period of two years, ending December 
7, 1941, on about how many occasions was the Hawaiian Department 
required to go on alert? 

General Marshall. I will have to get that data for you. 

103. General Frank. This next question : Was any consideration 
[JJ] ever given in the War Department to the possibility of a 
feeling of apathy that might ensue as a result of "crying wolf ! wolf ! 
too often"? 

General Marshall. Very much so. 

101. General Frank. With respect to the messages on sabotage sent 
to General Short from Washington, do not the provisions of his war 
plan and his standing operating procedure provide for full defense 
against sabotage? 

General Marshall. I think it does. 

105. General Frank. Were not the provisions of these plans known 
in the War Department? 

General Marshall. They must have been. 

106. General Frank. Then why was sabotage especially singled 
out? 

General Marshall. By whom? 

107. General Frank. By messages that were sent to him. Between 
November 16 and 28 there were six messages sent to him, four of them 
told him to be careful not to disturb the Japanese, and three of them 
cautioned him about sabotage. 

79716— 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1—4 



34 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Marshall. Two of those on sabotage that are related to air 
were just coincidences, and those, not to disturb the Japanese, related 
to air, and the extreme anxiety not to have anything happen which 
would provoke a break, wdiich w^ould enable the Japanese to say that 
we were taking action, to give them an excuse for action; and that 
was to enable Mr. Hull to stall this thin^ off as long as possible. All 
measures against sabotage are very difficult of set-up, because they 
indicate their purpose so plainly when you have to deploy your people 
around the key points and have them stay there in tents or [54-^ 
otherwise, so they always provoke a difficult situation, and one that 
we were fearful would give the Japanese some handle to place the 
accusation against us that we were taking action of a hostile character 
directed towards them. That is as nearly as I can recall the reason 
for the three messages that you refer to, I think, though I have to 
look at the messages to familiarize myself with what they say. I don't 
recall them. 

108. General Frank. In accordance with that, you feel that it was 
a responsibility for the War Department to caution about sabotage ? 

General Marshall. In relation to w^hat I have just said. We were 
trying to be very certain that we did not take measures which the 
Japanese could put their fingers on and say that we were doing 
something that was hostile; and most of your sabotage defense has 
to be right out in the open, a great portion of it. Now, in that respect 
we were doing something. We had to talk about it, too, because 
that was related to the meetings with Mr. Hull, where we were trying 
to do anything possiblS that could be done to stall off a break in 
the Pacific. 

I have got to go. I have got something that just won't wait. 

109. General Grunert. Thank you ver}^ much. General. 

110. Colonel West. As these proceedings are confidential, we are 
cautioning everyone not to mention anything. 

(Thereupon, at 2 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of wit- 
nesses for the day and proceeded to other business.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 35 



[,55] CONTENTS 



TUESDAY, AUGUST 8, 1944 

Testimony of — Page ' 

Brig. Gen. John L. McKee, 87th Division, Fort Jackson, South Caro- 
lina 56 

Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles, Commanding 1st Service Command, Boston, 

Massachusetts 91 

Brig. Gen. Russell A. Osmun, Chief, Militarj- Intelligence Service, War 
Department 133 

Francis M. Caulfield, Chief Clerk, Central Files, Adjutant General's 
Office, War Department 143 

Colonel Charles K. Gailey, Jr., Executive OfRcei", Operations Division, 

General Staff, War Department 145 

DOCUMENTS 

Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Paragraph 30 72 

Hawaiian Defense Project, Category D 73 

Cooperative Plan 83 

Telegram from Ambassador Grew to Secretary of State, dated November 

17, 1941 99 

Addendum to General INIiles' testimony 132-A 

^ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed hy brackets and indicate 
pages of original transcript of proceedings. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 37 



im PEOCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL 

HARBOR BOARD 



TUESDAY, AUGUST 8, 1944 

Munitions Building, 

Washington^ D. C. 

The Board at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the 
hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, 
presiding. 

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. 
Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members. 

Present also : Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, and Major Henry 
C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder. 

General Grunert, The Board will come to order. 

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. JOHN L. McKEE, 87TH DIVISION, FORT 
JACKSON, SOUTH CAROLINA 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Will you please state to the Board your name, 
rank, organization, and station? 

General McKee. Brigadier General John L. McKee, 87th Division, 
Fort Jackson, South Carolina. 

2. General Grunert. General, in an attempt to get at the facts in 
looking at the War Department background and viewpoints prior 
to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack, it is hoped that, by 
reason of your assignment as a member of the OPD at that time, you 
can throw some light on the subject. In order to cover so large a 
field in the time available, [J7] individual Board members 
have been assigned objectives and phases, although the entire Board 
will pass upon all objectives and phases. General Russell has this 
particular phase assigned to him, so he will lead in propounding ques- 
tions, and the other members will assist in developing it. 

3. General Russell. General McKee, what were your duties and 
assignments during the year 1941 ? 

General McKee. In July 1941, I was assigned to the War Depart- 
ment as a member of the War Department General Staff. I was as- 
signed to War Plans Division, to the project group of War Plans 
Division. Specifically, I handled matters which pertained to the 
Hawaiian defense project. 

4. General Russell. Prior to your assignment to the General Staff 
in July of 1941, where were you and what were vou doing? 

General McKee. I was P. M. S. T. at the Valley Forge Military 
Academy, Wayne, Pennsylvania. 



38 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

5. General Russell. At some time prior to your assignment to the 
General Staff in 1941, had you been on duty in the Hawaiian De- 
partment ? 

General McKee. Yes; I was on duty in the Hawaiian Department 
from 1935 to 1937. 

6. General Russell. What was your assignment in the Hawaiian 
Department? 

General McKee. During the first, I should say, three months I 
commanded the 1st Battalion of the 19th Infantry. Then I was 
A-Ssistant G^, Hawaiian Department. My specific duties were to 
handle the Hawaiian defense project. 

7. General Russell. Were you reasonably familiar with 
the [58] plans for the defense of Oahu as developed by the 
War Department ? 

General McKee. I believe I was, 

8. General Russell. Did that familiarity include the joint plan 
between the Army forces and the Navy forces in the Territory ? 

General McKee. Yes, sir. I was familiar with it. 

9. General Russell. General McKee, your position, however, in 
Hawaii, and later on the General Staff, concerned itself principally 
or more immediately with problems of materiel and supply gen- 
erally; is that true? 

General McKee. Personnel and materiel. 

10. General Russell, Is it true or not that in your study of those 
problems of personnel and materiel it was necessary for you to be 
familiar with the tactical situation and the strategical plans and 
demands ? 

General McKee. Yes ; that is true. 

11. General Russell. You were familiar with the several docu- 
ments which embodied the plans that you have just testified about, 
were you ? 

General McKee. That is correct. 

12. General Russell. For the benefit of the Board, and in order 
to clarify our thinking and our study of these documents, would you 
describe these documents briefly, beginning with the basic or under- 
lying document and working toward the definite and detailed plans? 

General McKee. The plans on file in the War Department on De- 
cember 7, 1941, which concerned the Hawaiian Coastal [S9] 
Frontier, were based on the Orange Plan, wdiich was then obsolete. 

May I refer to this document to get the correct name ? 

13. General Russell. Surely. 

General McI^e. The War Plans Division prepared a strategic plan 
which consisted of Operations Plan Rainbow No. 5 and Concentration 
Plan Rainbow No, 5. 

14. General Grunert, Who prepared that? 
General McKee, War Plans Division, 

15. General Grunert, Of the War Department? 

General McKee, The War Department General Staff, A copy of 
Operations Plan Rainbow No. 5 was sent to the Commanding Gen- 
eral, Hawaiian Department, on August 21, 1941. Receipt was ac- 
knowledged on September 3, 1941, A further revision of the Joint 
Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No, 5 was approved by 
the Joint Board on November 19, and a copy of the Joint Army and 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 39 

Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5 was sent to the Commanding 
General, Hawaiian Department, on November 28, 1941, As far as 
1 know, the latter document was not received prior to December 7. 
As I recall, it did not change the mission or concept of the defense of 
the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. 

16. General Grunert. Then the plan actually in existence, to be 
carried out, had been receipted for by the Commanding General, 
Hawaiian Department, September 3, 1941 ? 

General McKee. That is correct. But the plans on file in the War 
Department were not based on that plan. As I understood it, they 
were in the process of revision at that time. The mission and the 
concept were not materially changed over the Orange Plan. The 
Orange Plan related to a specific action. 

[6'6'J 17. General Grunert. What plan was the Commanding 
General of the Hawaiian Department operating under as of Decem- 
ber 7, 1941 ? 

General McKee. Under Rainbow No. 5. 

18. General Grunert. And he had been operating under that since 
September 3, 1941? 

General McKee. That is correct, sir. 

19. General Russell. Was that the document which you referred to 
a little while ago as being obsolete ? 

General McKee. No, sir. Tlie document which I referred to as 
being obsolete was the Orange Plan. The Orange Plan related to a 
specific operation, whereas the Rainbow Plan related to any war in 
which the United States should become engaged. 

20. General Russell. Is a copy of the Orange Plan, obsolete, among 
the documents which you brought over to the hearing room with you 
this morning? 

General McKee. No, sir; I did not bring the Orange Plan. 

21. General Russell. Then it has no materiality in establishing 
the relationship between the War Department and the Hawaiian 
Department ? 

General McKee, No, I think not, because the Commanding Gen- 
eral, Hawaiian Department, had received Rainbow No. 5. 

22. General Frank. In September? 

General MoKee. In September; and although we had not received 
any revision of the plan based on Rainbow No. 5 

23. Genera.! Frank. From him? 

General McKee. From him, on December 7, because of the fact 
that the mission was practically the same, a little bit broader in scope, 
perhaps, and there was no real necessity to change his basic plan. 

[61] 24. General Russell. Would it be possible at this time for 
you to identify, for the convenience of the Board, the document on the 
table which you referred to as Rainbow 5 ? 

General McKee.' This (indicating) is War Department ODerations 
Plan Rainbow No. 5, 1941. 

25. General Russell. The document which you have just handed 
me is the entire plan, or are there other documents related to it? 

General McKee. There are other documents related to that. There 
is the Basic War Plan, the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, 
Rainbow No. 5, and that is Operations Plan Rainbow No. 5 (indi- 
cating) . 



40 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

26. General Eussell, Can you identify the last document which 
you have just described? 

General McKee. It is Operations Plan Kainbow No. 5. 

27. General Russeix. Do you see it on the table here? 

General McKee. That is' it, right here (indicating). The Basic 
War Plan is not here. 

28. General Frank. I thought you iust identified that as the Basic 
War Plan. ' 

General McKee. No; the Operations Plan, War Department Oper- 
ations Plan Rainbow No. 5. The Joint Basic War Plan is not here. 
The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, did not have a 
copy of thet Joint Basic War Plan ; he only had a copy of the Opera- 
tions Plan Rainbow No. 5, which is based on the Joint Plan. 

29. General Grunert. Was there any reason why he should be 
furnished a copy of the Joint Plan? 

General McKee. No, sir. 

30. General Frank. Why not? 

[S2] General McKee. Because this Operations Plan assigned 
him his mission. It establishes a category of defense and, as I recall, 
I think it sets up the missions, the troop bases. 

31. General Frank. What do you mean by "category of defense"? 
General McKee. Categories of defense were assigned to coastal 

frontiers. The category of defense determined the type of attack 
which the Joint Board visualized the particular coastal frontier 
might be subjected to, and formed the basis for the missions which 
it set up for the defense of the coastal frontier. 

32. General Frank. How many categories Avere there? Do you 
remember ? 

General McKee. I do not remember. General. I know the category 
of defense for the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier was Category D. 

33. General Grunert. What does that signify in regard to the 
other categories? 

General McKee. I do not have it specifically stated here, but Cate- 
gory D did not visualize a major attack against that coastal frontier. 
By "major attack" I mean an attack w^iich would result in the 
occupation of the area by a hostile force. 

34. General Russell. Let me say for the benefit of the Board that 
this is a line of questioning which will be developed when we get on 
the other documents. 

35. General Grunert, I thought it might leave a doubt in any- 
one's mind in reading the testimony as to what Category D was, and 
I wanted to develop it to see whether or not it was the highest cate- 
gory or the lowest, or in between, and, generally, [63] what 
that category did cover. 

36. General Russell. We can clarify it at this moment. 

I hand you, General McKee, the Hawaiian defense project, and 
call your attention to subparagraph b under section 2 of that, in 
which category of defense D is described, and will ask you to tell 
the Board, having refreshed your memory from this. 

37. General Frank. What is a category? 

General McKee. It is a classification of defense, of the type of 
defense, based on what the War Department visualizes that the type 
of action will be. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 41 

38. General Frank. How many were there for the Hawaiian 
Department ? 

General McKee. There was only one. The category of defense 
assigned the Hawaiian Department was Category D, which assumes 
the possibility but not the probability of a major attack. 

39. General Grunert. What is included in the definition of a 
major attack? 

General McKee. By "major attack" was meant an attempted land- 
ing on the shores of the land area of that coastal frontier. 

40. General Grunert. Might it be described as an all-out defense ? 
General McKee. Yes, sir; that is a better definition. 

41. General Grunert. Then Category D included how far up the 
scale toward an all-out defense? I might add, did it include raids 
and air attacks and submarine attacks? 

General McKee. Yes ; it did include raids, air attacks, and block- 
ing of channels by hostile vessels. 

42. General Grunert. Keconnaissance, patrolling, and so forth? 
[64-] General McKee. Yes, by surface craft, submarine, or car- 
rier-based aviation. 

43. General Grunert. Is the mission of the Commanding General 
of the Hawaiian Department stated in comparatively few words and 
will you put that in the record ? 

General McKee. Yes. You want the mission of the Army as stated 
in the Hawaiian defense project? 

44. General Grunert. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian 
Department, which I presume is what you call the Army ? 

General McKee. Yes, sir. It is so stated here as the Army 
Hawaiian defense project, which is a document prepared by the Com- 
manding General, Hawaiian Department. It states : 

Missions : Mission for the Army ; to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land 
and air forces and against hostile sympathizers, and to support the Naval forces. 

45. General Grunert. Give me the mission as far as the Navy is 
concerned, if you have it right there. 

General McKee (reading) : 

Mission for the Navy ; to patrol the coastal zone and to control and protect 
shipping therein ; to support the Army forces. 

46. General Russell. Let us go back and see if we can straighten 
this up. General. You say that sometime in September 1941, the War 
Department sent General Short a plan for the defense of the 
Hawaiian Department. Is that right? 

General McKee. It sent in this plan in August, as I recall it, and 
receipt was acknowledged on September 3. 

47. General Russell. Would you, please, for the Board [65] 
identify with a note just what document or documents were sent to 
General Short at that time ? 

General McKee. Yes, sir. 

48. General Russell. Will you just take a piece of paper and put it 
on here so that we will know what you are talking about? 

General McKjee. This (indicating) is the plan that was sent to the 
Hawaiian Department. 

49. General Russell. Suppose you just make a note to that effect. 
General McKee (after writing note as requested. It was receipted 

for by the Hawaiian Department on September 3, 1941. 



42 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

50. General Russell. General, was this document which you have 
just identified for the record the only instruction which General Short 
had from the War Department for his defensive mission out there? 

General McKee. He had received instructions from time to time 
from the War Department, specifically from the Chief of Staff, and 
those instructions were not in conflict at any time with the plan. 

51. General Russell. Do you know anything about when other in* 
structions were received by General Short, personally ? 

General McKee. I do not know personally. 

52. General Russell. When you say that he had received instruc- 
tions from the Chief of Staff, is that a surmise or is it based on fact ? 

General McKee. It is based on my knowledge of the records. 

53. General Russell. What records do you refer to ? 
General McKee. The War Department records 

[66] 54. General Russell. Will you describe them a little bit 
more definitely so that we may locate them ? 

General McKee. Well, there was correspondence, personal corre- 
spondence, between the Chief of Staff and General Short, beginning 
with about the 7th of February, 1941, right straight on up and includ- 
ing December 7, 1941. 

55. General Frank. Were you then currently conversant with this 
correspondence ? 

General McK!ee. Was I then currently conversant with it ? 

56. General Frank. Yes. 

General McKee. In a general way, yes, because it usually resulted 
in some action being taken in the way of priorities for means. 

57. General Russell. Do you have something definitely in mind as 
illustrative of your answer to General Frank? 

General McKee. Well, I have in mind the question of radars; I 
have in mind the question of antiaircraft artillery; the dispersal of 
airplanes; provisions for bunkers; and the dispatching to the Ha- 
waiian Department of an increase in air strength. 

58. General Russell. Those things all resulted from correspond- 
ence between General Marshall and General Short ? 

General McKee. For the most part, yes ; either that or action of the 
Joint Board. One thing that resulted from the action of the Joint 
Board was the project for the defense of the Kaneohe Bay area, which 
occurred 

59. General Russell. Rather late in 1941 ? 

General McKee. No; it was approved, as I recall it, by the Joint 
Board in April 1941. The project was set up for the [67] de- 
fense of Kaneohe Bay, which the Army had not assumed prior to 
that time, and the means had been set up in the Hawaiian defense 
project but had not reached him on December 7, 1941. The additional 
means, I mean. 

60. General Russell. In response to this operational plan which was 
sent out to General Short and received by him on September 3, did he 
prepare any documents for the defense of the Hawaiian theater or 
the Hawaiian frontier and return them to the War Department? 

General McKee. Not to my knowledge. It was my understanding 
that they were in the process of revision. But the War Department 
was not particularly alarmed about that, because of the fact that his 
current defense plan, although not based on Rainbow No. 5, was in 
consonance with it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 43 

61. General Frank. Had lie had time between the receipt of this 
Rainbow 5 and December 7 to have prepared such a plan and have 
gotten it back to the War Department? 

General McKee. Well, I hardly think so. 

02. General Gkuxert. In that respect, from your experience with 
plans and so forth, how long does it usually take for a revision to be 
completed, no matter whether major or apparently minor? Does it 
nsually take up to four or six months to get it through to the W^ar 
Department, on account of all the ramifications? 

General McK?:e. That is correct, sir. I hesitated with regard to 
the Hawaiian Department because actually it entailed no major re- 
vision. It was basically the same. 

63. General Grunert. That is, in your opinion there was no 
\68] major revision needed, in the opinion of the War Plans 
Division ? 

General McKee. That is correct, sir. 

[69] Gi. General Russell. General, if no plan had been pre- 
pared by the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Dspartment and 
returned after the receipt of your plan, in September, on what plan 
or plans was the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department 
proceeding for the defense of the Hawaiian frontier on December 7, 
1941? 

General McKee. As far as the War Department knew, he was 
proceeding on the joint plan. Let me get the correct nomenclature — 
Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, and 
plans pertinent thereto, they consisting of the Joint Defense Plan, 
Hawaiian Theater, the Naval 0]3erations Annex, the Army Operating 
Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. 

65. General Russell. Wait just a minute. I have before me the 
Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, and 
I have before me the Joint Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, labeled 
"Operations Annex." Now, you have mentioned a third document? 

General McKee. I mentioned the Army Operating Defense Plan, 
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, and Operations Orders pertinent thereto. 
These are the several subordinate plans. This was of 1938, and revised 
in 1940; Army Operating Plan for Hawaiian Coastal Frontier; Ha- 
waiian Department ; and this was a division, the 18th Wing, and the 
separate Coast Artillery Brigade. This is the Hawaiian Department 
document. 

66. General Russell. Then am I correct in assuming that the Joint 
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, when 
considered in connection with the Joint Defense Plan, Hawaiian The- 
ater, Naval Operations Annex, and the Army Operating Defense 
Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Operations and Orders, [70] 
1938, constituted the entire plan of the Commanding General for the 
defense of that Department ? 

General McKee. That, together with the Operations and Orders, 
which were issued by the control of the Hawaiian division of the 18th 
Wing, the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Command, and the 
Oj)erations and Orders, are the Hawaiian Department. 

67. General Russell. Then we have here before us. General, all of 
the material documents published by the War Department ? 

General McKee. No, sir — published by the Hawaiian Department. 
That is, but the other is not. 



44 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

68. General Russell. Let me finish my question— published by the 
War Department and the HaAvaiian Department, for the defense of 
the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, on the 7th of December, 1941? 

General McKee. No, sir. You did not mention the Hawaiian De- 
fense Project, revision of 1940; and then there was an SOP which I 
have since learned never reached War Plans Division, but somehow 
or other got to General Marshall, and he commented on it and sent 
it back to General Short in a personal letter. It was a tentative SOP. 

69. General Grunert. By "SOP" you mean "standing operations" 
and operating "procedure"? 

General McKee. Yes, sir. 

70. General Grunert. Do you recall the date on that? Was it 
November 5, 1941 ? 

General McKee. No, sir; it was earlier than that. There was 
another one issued, so I later learned, I believe somewhere around 
November, which had not been received in the War Department on 
December 7. 

[71] 71. General Frank. Did it have to do with the use of air 
troops, outlining their duties ? 

General McKee. Yes, sir. The point m question was, in the first 
SOP missions were assigned the Air Force for the defense of air fields, 
and it was brought to General Marshall's attention by General Arnold, 
and General Marshall w^rote a personal letter to General Short. 

72. General Grunert. By "protection of air fields" you mean the 
ground protection by air personnel? 

General McKee. Yes, sir ; that is what I mean. 

73. General Grunert. That is all. 

74. General Russell. General, now, let us analyze these plans 
briefly. I hand you the War Department operations plans Rainbow 
No. 5. I think you have been over it. Whether it is in the record very 
clearly or not, I do not know. From that will you tell us the mission of 
the Army out there, as assigned to General Short? 

General McKee. Yes, sir. The mission that I read previously was 
not from this document. It was from the Hawaiian Defense Project of 
1940. 

75. General Russell. Who prepared the Hawaiian Defense Project 
of 1940? 

General McKee. The Connnanding General of the Hawaiian De- 
partment. 

76. General Russell. He did not assign himself a mission, did he? 
General McKee. The defense project requires that the commander 

preparing it set forth his mission and his concept of it, which forms a 
basis for his planning. It was his [72] understanding. 

77. Genera] Russell. Well, let us go back to the question. General, 
and see if you can read out the mission which was assigned to General 
Short by the War Department. 

General McKee. You want the joint or the xVrmy mission? 

78. General Russell, Let us liave the joint, first, and then the Army. 
General McKee. I read paragraph 30 : 

HAWAIIAN COASTAL FBONTIER 

******* 

(c) Missions. 

(1) Joint — Hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base and control and protect 
shipping in the Coastal Zone. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 45 

(2) Army — Hold OAHl) against attack by land, sea, and air forces, and against 
hostile sympattiizers. Support naval forces in tlie protection of the sea com- 
munications of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea com- 
munications by oifensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within 
the tactical operating radius of occupied air bases. 

(3) Navy — Patrol the Coastal Zone; control and protect shipping therein; sup- 
port the Army. 

79. General Russell. In the statement of his mission by the 
Hawaiian Defense Commander, General Short, was that mission set 
forth in identical terms in his document with the one by the War De- 
partment ? 

General McKee. No, it was not, because this mission is [73'\ 
somewhat broader and superseded his publication of the Hawaiian 
Defense Project of 1940, and is somewhat broader in scope. The first 
part of it is essentially the same. 

80. General Russell. Now, General McKee, did the War Depart- 
ment have a plan which General Short had worked out to effectuate 
and to accomplish that mission, which provided for the distribution 
of his forces and the establishment of strongpoints, gun positions, 
and so forth ? 

General McKee. Yes, sir. He had such a plan. It is incorporated 
in the plans which you have before you, there — the detailed plan for 
the disposition of his forces. 

81. General Russell. To repel an all-out invasion ? 

General McKee. Yes, sir; to repel an all-out invasion, because in 
the Hawaiian Defense Project he states that while the War Depart- 
ment has assigned Category D, which does not visualize an all-out 
attack, the other bases for training and planning have adopted that 
as meeting any contingency. 

82. General Russell. Could you find that, right quickly, in the 
Hawaiian Defense project, for us? 

General McKee (reading) : 

Basis for planning 

(1) Missions and Conditions. 

(a) All defense plans of Oahu will be based upon the following conditions: 
The currently assigned category of defense will be Category d * * * 
The defense of Oahu will be joint defense by Army and Navy forces under 

the missions as stated in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange * * * 
[74] (b) Possible and probable war situations are: 

(1) The sea lanes from the continental United States to Hawaii are open 
and, that the garrison of Hawaii will be reenforced from continental United 
States. 

(2) That the most probable form of attack is a surprise attack consisting 
of raids, and bombardments by ships, ships' fire, and air forces, and action by 
local sympathizers. 

(3) That the sea lanes from the continental United States will be closed 
and that there will be an attack by a major expeditionary force. From the 
War Department point of view, this contingency is so remote that it will make 
no additional allowances of either men or reserves to meet it. This is com- 
monly referred to as the "cut-off fi'om the Mainland situation". 

(4) The latter contingency forms the basis for our training, as being all in- 
clusive and providing maximum ideality for the troops during their training. 

(e) Conclusion. 

To adopt a defense plan adequate initially, to meet an enemy's maximum 
effort. This plan is outlined in the next paragraph. 

And so on. 

83. General Grunert. May I interject a question, there? 

Those instructions are to ithe effect that the Commanding General 
of the Hawaiian Department has been furnished certain means, and 



46 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I hey prescribe a category defense, which in this case liappens to be 
Category D. Is it not possible and reasonable to suppose [76] 
that conditions might change, in which an all-out defense might be- 
come necessary in a hurry, before the War Department can implement 
the defense command for an all-out defense, and therefore an all-out 
defense might be required with whatever means were handy, and the 
information given to the defense commander in the interim would not 
necessarily make him wait for a change of category? 

General McKee. That is correct, sir, because the category defense 
saj^s — "the possibility but not the probability." He must always be 
prepared for the possibility. 

General McKee. That is correct, sir, because the category defense 
depends a great deal upon what is furnished the commander to defend 
with ? 

General McKee. That is correct, sir. 

85. General Grunert. That is all I have right now. 

86. General Russell. Now, General McKee, after this document had 
gone out to the Hawaiian Department in September 1941, and the 
War Department received no changes in the plans of the Hawaiian 
Department for its defense, am I correct in assuming, or is my recollec- 
tion correct, that you stated that the War Department attached no 
importance to General Short's not having sent in revised plans, be- 
cause these original plans in the main were in line with the operations 
plan which arrived in September ? 

General McKee. That is correct. There was hardly time for him to 
do it, in the first place. In the second, the War Department did not 
press him, because the plans which we knew to be in force were 
considered adequate to meet any contingency. 

[76] 87. General Russell. Now, again, in November, this docu- 
ment that I referred to as the September Rainbow No. 5, was amended 
and sent out to him again with some changes? 

General McKee. That is right. 

88. General Russell. And you never received a receipt from Gen- 
eral Short on that, at all ? 

General McKee. That is correct. I do not recall what that amend- 
ment was, but I am quite sure that it did not materially change the 
mission or the concept. 

89. General Russell. General, some time in November, late Novem- 
ber, 1941, certain messages were sent out to General Short relative to 
the enemy situation, and some directions as to what he should do. 
Are you familiar with those messages? 

General McKee. I am familiar with the messages, but I knew 
nothing about them at the time they were sent. 

90. General Russell. Do you recall any information which reached 
the War Plans Division in November, from the Chief of Staff, or 
from G-2 which materially altered, the international situation as 
it related to the Pacific ? 

General McKee. Yes, sir. There was considerable information 
that reached the War Plans Division as a result of the conferences 
that the State Department were having at that time, and as the 
result of information given the War Plans Division by G-2. As a 
result of that information there were several messages sent to the 
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, acquainting him 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 47 

with the situation. In fact, messages had been sent him previous to 
November, informing him of the strained relations with Japan. 

91. General Russell. General, let us go back now to the [77] 
information wliich your division received from the Chief of Staff. 
Was that information in writing? 

General McKee. I cannot answer that, because I did not figure in 
on it. May I explain the organization? I would like to explain the 
organization of the War Plans Division. The War Plans Division had 
a jDroject group and a strategy-and-policy group. Colonel Bundy was 
the Chief of the Strategy and Policy Group, and Colonel Bundy and 
General Gerow were the two individuals who received this informa- 
tion for War Plans and acted upon it. 

92. General Russell. Do you know what that information was ? 
General McKee. The information was concerning the strained re- 
lations with Japan — the possibilitj^ of war with Japan, actually. 

93. General Russell. Was it general in its nature, or specific? 
General McKee. I can't answer that, because it did not come to me, 

and I can only be guided by what I saw later in the messages. 

94. General Russell. Then all you can testify about the informa- 
tion which reached your division from G-2 and the Chief of Staff 
results from the action which was taken by War Plans Division? 

General McKee. That is correct, sir. 

95. General Russell. So you did not see any documents containing 
specific information, or hear any conversations between the Chief of 
Staff or G-2 and your division, which conveyed any specific infor- 
mation? 

General McKee. I did not hear them ; no, sir. 

96. General Russell. So, so far as you know, there was just a 
[78] change in the operations of your division, or in its instruc- 
tions to General Sliort, and you believe that that was predicated on 
enemy information which must have been received from those sources ? 

General McKee. That is correct. 

97. General Grunert. May I suggest you change "enemy" informa- 
tion to "information concerning Japan," because at that time I do not 
think Japan was an enemy. I know that Japan was not an enemy. 

The Colonel Bundy to whom you refer is now deceased, is he not ? 
General McKee. That is correct, sir. 

98. General Gruxert. And General Gerow, to whom you referred, 
is now in Europe? 

General McKee. That is correct, sir. 

99. General Russell. General, let us turn to the other side of the 
picture, now. You say that you are familiar with the messages that 
were sent to General Short in late November, and you say further that 
there were other messages sent out there to give him the information 
on these strained relations with Japan ; is that true ? 

General McKee. That is true. There was correspondence between 
the Chief of Staff and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian De- 
partment — personal correspondence, in which he expressed his alarm 
at the situation. Also, a message, as I recall, that went out in July 
1941, with specific reference to the Japanese situation, 

100. General Russell. Colonel West, will you get that out of the 
general's file for us, please ? 



48 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[79] General McKee. I think I have it in this thing, I prepared 
at the time of the Roberts Commission. July 7, 1941, a message was 
sent to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department with 
regard to the Japanese situation. 

101. General Russell. What did that message say about probable 
Japanese intentions then ? 

General McKee (reading) : 

For your information deduction from important information from numerous 
sources is tliat tlie Japanese Government has determined upon its future policy 
and is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups. This 
policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving probably aggressive action 
against the military provinces of Russia if and when the Siberian garrison has 
been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will 
win a decisive victory in European Russia. Opinion is that Jap activity in the 
south will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval, Army, 
and air bases in Indo-China, although an advance against the British and Dutch 
cannot be entirely ruled out. The neutrality pact with Russia may be abrogated. 
They have ordered all Jap vessels in United States Atlantic ports to be west of 
the Panama Canal by first of August. IMovement of Jap shipping from Japan has 
been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned. 

102. General Hussell. We know all about that message, General. 
We were just wondering what there was in that message which indi- 
cated to you that there was a changed situation between the Japs 
and the Hawaiian Department. 

[SO] General McKee. Well, I would say the whole tenor of it. 
The whole message indicates that. 

103. General Grunert. With reference to the messages which you 
refer to that went to Hawaii, do you know whether there were some 
naval messages that the naval authorities were directed to transmit 
to the Commanding General at Hawaii? Did such messages come to 
the War Plans Division, so that you would have such knowledge? 

General McKee. Yes, sir. There was a message of, I believe, Novem- 
ber 24, which was sent from the Chief of Naval Operations to the 
Commanding Chief of the Pacific Fleet, in which it says : 

The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch and concurs and requests action 
addressed * * * inform senior Army oflicers their respective areas. 

104. General Grunert. Does that also apply to the so-called "war 
warning" message of November 27 ? 

General McKee. I believe that was a "war warning" message. 

105. General Grunert. In that message does it actually use the 
words "war warning"? 

General McKee. Not in this paraphrase of it, but there was a 
message sent, not the one I have here, but there was a message sent 
which began — 

This is a war warning. 

and the Commanding General of the Pacific Fleet was directed to 
inform the interested Army officers. 

lOG. General Russell. Now, General, I think we can simplify all 
of these messages here and all the evidence about messages by one 
question. You are familiar with the document which was [81] 
prepared by General Gerow and submitted to the Roberts Com- 
mission ? 

General McKee. Yes, sir. I have a copy of it right here. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 49 

107. General Russell. Does that document contain all of the mate- 
rial messages going from the War Department to General Short, 
about which you know ? 

General McKee. Yes, sir. 

108. General Russell. Now, there was a message which went out 
to General Short on the 27th of November, about which you know ? 

General McKee. Yes, sir. 

109. General Russell. And it was signed by the Chief of Staff, 
or the name of the Chief of Staff was signed to it? 

General McKee. I can't answer that. 

110. General Russell. Did you see the reply of General Short to 
that message? 

General McKee. Not at the time. I did not see it until about the 
time of the Roberts Commission. 

111. General Russell. From the 27th day of November until the 
7th day of December, what did the War Plans Division know as to 
the alert which had been made effective in Oahu by General Short? 

General McKee. I cannot answer that, sir, because I personally 
knew nothing of it. I knew nothing of the November 27th message, 
nor did I know anything of the reply that was received thereto. The 
message was prepared by General Gerow and Colonel Bundy, and 
the reply was received by General Gerow, and I was not informed. 

112. General Frank. And yet you were in charge of the Hawaiian 
desk in the War Plans Division? 

[S2~\ General McKee. Yes, sir. I would like to say, however, 
that my duties did not involve plans and policies. That was a func- 
tion of Colonel Bundy's division. When that had been decided on, 
my particular group had to do with furnishing the material means, 
seeing that they got the material means. 

113. General Russell. General, I want to ask you a question, now, 
which you may or may not be able to answer, but with the hope that 
you had some experience which might indicate to the Board just 
what was done under the condition. This joint plan provided for the 
close-in reconnaissance to be done by the Army, and for the distant 
reconnaissance to be done by the Navy; that is true, is it not? 

General McKee. Yes, sir. 

114. General Russell. Do you know what burden if any rested 
upon the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to intiate 
steps to see that both types of reconnaissance were in force if the 
situation demanded such reconnaissance? 

General McKee. Well, there was a joint agreement between the 
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Com- 
manding General of the 14th Naval District, which set forth certain 
measures to be taken with regard to aircraft. 

115. General Russell. I am just wondering whether or not this 
agreement between the Army and the Navy, out there, which stated 
that these measures for the defense of the Hawaiian frontier were 
to be effectuated on a cooperative basis, "v^as the only way that they 
had to set things in motion. 

General McKee. That is correct. There was no unity of command. 

116. General Russell. And therefore anything that had to be 
[<§=?] done had to be reached by mutual agreement, is that true ? 

General McKee. That is correct, sir. 

79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1 5 



50 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

117. General Russell. General, in one of these documents which 
1 saw rather hiirrieclly there seems to be a statement that that coopera- 
tive plan shall remain in effect until something occurs, and I was 
not able to get it out of these documents, here, this morning. Do you 
remember about that? 

General McKee. May I look at the document ? 

118. General Russell. Yes. 
General McKee (reading) : 

When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval 
Base Defense Officer (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that 
the threat of a hostile raid, or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such 
action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to 
make available without delay to the other conmiander such proportion of the 
air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint oper- 
ations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans. 

119. General Russell. The point is this, that the operation of the 
naval and Army forces out there in Hawaii was all to be done by 
agreement ? 

General McKee. That is correct, sir ; but the Commanding General 
of the Hawaiian Department had been given instructions by the Chief 
of Staff that they would get along, that the plans would be 
coordinated. 

120. General Frank. What effect did that have on the Naval Com- 
mander out there? 

[84^] General McKee. The Naval Commander, sir, so far as I 
know, did not know about that letter. That was in a personal letter 
from the Chief of Staff to General Short, which told him the main 
thing was the protection of Pearl Harbor and the Fleet. 

121. General Frank. But really, of what direct effect on the Naval 
Commander would have been instructions by General Marshall to the 
Army Commander? 

General McKee. None, sir, because the Army Cotomander was 
under General Marshall. 

122. General Russell. One other point, I want to clear up, General. 
You say that you never did see the SOP's that General Short prepared 
out there in the fall of 1941 ? 

General McKee. I never did, sir, and as a matter of fact the record 
will show that they were never received in War Plans Division. 

123. General Russell. Then the War Plans Division did not know 
what alert 1, or alert 2, or alert 3, was? 

General McKee. So far as I know ; no, sir. I certainly did not, and 
the record indicates that the SOP was never received in War Plans 
Division. How it got to the Chief of Staff I do not know. I rather 
assume that it got to him because there was a memorandum attached 
to it from General Arnold to the Chief of Staff, in which he drew 
attention to the use of the air-force personnel. 

124. General Grunert. As a matter of fact, is it any of a higher 
commander's business to know just what means are employed to carry 
out the mission, unless it interferes with said mission ? In other words, 
was the War Plans Division in the [88S] habit of calling for all 
the subordinate measures, were they furnished as a matter of course, 
or did the War Plans Division consider that did not particularly affect 
them? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 51 

General McIvee. The War Plans Division was not particularly 
concerned with it. The Commanding General had been given a mis- 
sion, and the means had been provided to carry out that mission. ^ 

125. General Grunekt. In regard to the cooperation we have just 
been talking about, would the lack of cooperation on the part of one 
or the other be any justification for one or the other not carrying out 
his mission ? 

General McKee. No, sir. 

126. General Kussell. General McKee, in connection with these 
questions that General Grunert has asked you, I want to ask you a 
little bit about it. How did the War Plans Division consider from 
tlie standpoint of importance the Hawaiian defense command and its 
mission ? 

General McKee. It considered it all important. It realized that the 
loss of the fleet base, and the Fleet, itself, would put us in the predica- 
ment that they did jDut us in, in the Pacific. 

127. General Russell. As a matter of fact, wasn't that Department 
very high on the priority list from the standpoint of material that was 
shipped out? 

General McKee. Yes, sir; it was, particularly in such things as 
radar equipment, airplanes, antiaircraft artillery — those things that 
the War Department considered were essential to the most probable 
type of attack that would be expected to be delivered against the 
H a w a ii an D epar tment. 

[S6] 128. General Russell. The importance of the Hawaiian 
Depaitment was so pronounced that it resulted, as you have testified 
already, in a considerable amount of correspondence between the Chief 
of Staff, himself, and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian 
Department? 

General McKee. That is correct, sir. 

129. General Russell. The importance of the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment was so pronounced in the War Department that you did prepare 
this operations plan which goes somewhat into detail as to'what is to 
be done out there in the defense of the Hawaiian Department, isn't 
that true ? 

General McKee. I don't recall that that goes into detail. It assigns 
a mission, a category defense, and I think sets up a troop basis. 

loO. General Russell. In all events it speaks for itself, does it not? 

General McKee. Yes, sir. 

131. Genpral Frank. May I ask a question? 
General Russell. Yes. 

132. General Frank. In any event, this war plan would have been 
prepared, whether or not the situation with Japan was acute or not ? 

General McKee. That is correct, sir. 

133. General Russell. You do not mean to testify that just as soon 
as you had prepared this plan and sent it out to General Short that 
you Jost interest in the Hawaiian defense? 

General McKee. Certainly not, sir. That was my particular in- 
terest. 

134. General Russetj;. As a matter of fact, you had agencies set 
up over there in the War Plans Division to follow up these [67] 
things, to see what wps going on ? 

General McKee. That is correct, sir. 



52 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

135. General Russell. And do you not think it was rather impor- 
tant for you people to know what your subordinate commander out 
there was doing in connection with the defense of that department ? 

General McKee. I think we did know, sir. 

136. General Russell. Well, did you not say a moment ago that 
so far as you knew, in that critical period from November 27 to De- 
cember 5, you did not know what disposition Short had made of his 
forces ? 

General McKee. I would like to remind you, sir, that I personally 
did not know about the radiogram of November 27. I did not know 
that this was a critical period. I am speaking personally, now. 

137. General Russell. You heard General Gerow's testimony before 
the Roberts Commission, did you not? 

General McKee. Yes, sir. 

138. General Russell. You know what he testified about that? 

139. General Grunert. May I interject a question? From your 
duties in War Plans Division, and with the knowledge of conditions 
in the Hawaiian Defense Command, do you consider that that Com- 
mand was pretty well implemented for Category D defense, or were 
there any grave deficiencies ? 

General McKee. Well, it was certainly the best equipped defense 
base that we had at that time. Except for airplanes, which were 
generally lacking, a few antiaircraft, some .50-caliber antiaircraft 
machine guns, and the completion of the installation of the fixed radar 
sets, they were well implemented, [<§<S] extremely well. 

140. General Frank. Relatively speaking, it was better equipped 
than any other department, is that correct ? 

General McKee. Yes, sir. 

141. General Frank. Is that correct? 
General McKee. In my opinion ; yes, sir. 

142. General Russell. I have no further questions. 

143. General Grunert. Are there any other questions ? 

144. General Frank. I would like to ask some questions. To get 
back to the manner in which a decision would be made to carry out 
reconnaissance, for instance, it has been brought out that for the Army 
and Navy to act simultaneously on the inauguration of air reconnais- 
sance, it was necessary for that to happen through cooperation? 

General McKee. That is correct, sir. 

145. General Frank. Therefore, if the Army Commander thought 
that reconnaissance should be inaugurated, unless the Naval Com- 
mander reached the same conclusion and took action, it would not nec- 
essarily be inaugurated, is that correct ? 

General McICee. No, sir ; I see no reason why the Army Commander 
could not inaugurate reconnaissance on his own responsibility. 

146. General Frank. All right. 
General McKee. He hacl the means. 

147. General Frank. Do you know that there was an agree^nent 
that the Navy would conduct distant reconnaissance and the Army 
would conduct close-in reconnaissance ? 

General McKee. That is correct, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 53 

148. General Frank. Then if the Army Commander determined 
that [89] distant reconnaissance should be conducted, and the 
Naval Commander did not arrive at the same conclusion, do you think 
it was the duty of the Army Commander to conduct it, under the cir- 
cumstances ? 

General McKee. Yes, sir. If the Naval Commander refused to do 
it and I felt that the security of Oahu depended upon it, I would cer- 
tainly undertake to do it with the means at my disposal. 

149. General Frank. If he conducts distant air recomiaissance, his 
carrying capacity is taken up with gasoline instead of bombs, and he 
finds something, what is he going to do about it ? 

General McKee. He could certainly have alerted his antiaircraft 
artillery, and the troops could have assumed their defense positions, 
if he had known about it ahead of time. 

150. General Frank. What becomes of the whole general plan of 
coordinated action then between the Army and the Navy, if the Army 
dissipates its effort that it is going to coordinate with the Navy in a 
general plan ? 

General McKee. That ii a very difficult question, sir. I see your 
point, but — 

151. General Frank. The question is not difficult. Maybe the an- 
swer is. 

General McKee. The answer is very difficult. I should say that it 
would depend upon how serious the Army Commander thought the 
threat was, and what lack of cooperation he obtained from the Navy. 
As far as I know there was no lack of cooperation. At least, he stated 
that in communications to the Chief of Staff. 

152. Genei-al Frank. Nevertheless, reconnaissance was not [90] 
conducted, was it ? 

General McKee. I do not know, sir. 

153. General Grunetrt. It does not follow that the witness has to 
answer every question. If he has not had the opportunity to prop- 
erly judge, he may or may not answer. He may say he prefers not 
to answer. 

General McKee. I do not know whether a reconnaissance was made 
or not, sir. I am sure that the War Department thought it was being 
made, because it had been made at previous times when the Command- 
ing General of the Hawaiian Department had been advised of a criti- 
cal situation. 

154. General Frank. For the plan to work, both the Army and the 
Navy had to perform functions assigned ? 

General McKee. That is correct, sir. 

155. General Frank. For the Army to conduct the close-in recon- 
naissance without the Navy's conducting distant reconnaissance would 
not have been particularly effective, is that correct? 

General McKee. That is correct, sir. 

156. General Grunert. Are there any further questions? 

157. General Russell. Nothing, 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 
(The Board recessed from 10 : 20 a. m. to 11 : a. m.) 



54 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[01] TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN MILES, COMMAND- 
ING 1ST SERVICE COMMAND, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West, General, will you state to the Board your name, 
rank, organization, and station? 

General Miles. Sherman Miles, Major General, Commanding 1st 
Service Command, Boston, Massachusetts. 

2. General Grunert. General Miles, the Board, in an attempt to get 
at the facts, is looking into the War Department background and view- 
point prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is hoped 
that, because of your assignment as A. C. of S. G-2, at that time, you 
can throw some light on the subject. In order to cover so large a field 
in the limited time available, individual Board members have been 
assigned objectives or phases for special investigation, although the 
entire Board will pass upon the objectives and phases. General Russell 
has this particular phase. So he will lead in propounding the ques- 
tions and the other members will assist in'developing them. So I will 
turn you over to the mercies of General Russell. 

3. General Russell. Wliat was your assignment in the year 1941? 
General Miles. I was Acting Assistant Chief of Staif, G-2, War 

Department. 

4. General Russell. Can you remember approximately the date on 
which you entered upon that assignment? 

General Miles. May 1, 1940. 

5. General Russell. When were you relieved or transfered [92] 
from that assignment? 

General Mii es. The end of January 1942. 

6. General Russell. During that period of time you were actually 
the head of what we know as G-2 which embraced the Military In- 
telligence Division. Was that the name of it? 

General Miles. That was the official name — Military Intelligence 
Division, W^ar Department General Staff. 

7. General Russell. Briefly stated, General ISIiles, wliat were the 
functions of the G-2 section, including this Military Intelligence Di- 
vision? 

General Miles. The Military Intelligence Dvision, General, was 
all-inclusive. It was the whole thing, not as it is now, broken and 
divided between G-2 and Military Intelligence Service. It was all 
one division, just as the Operations and Training Division, or the 
Personnel Division, War Plans Division, and so forth. I was head 
of the entire division, which, in turn, was divided into counter-intelli- 
gence, positive intelligence, and in turn that was divided geograph- 
ically to cover the world, or as much as we could cover. 

8. General Russell. Definitely, General Miles, as to the operations 
of your department related to the Japanese Government during your 
period of service there, what were you attempting to learn about the 
Japanese Government? 

General Miles. We were attempting to learn everything we could 
about the Japanese Government, and had been doing so, in fact, a 
great many years. It was only one of the nations which we were at- 
tempting to cover, to gather all possible information about. Our sys- 
tem was a running digest. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD " 55 

9. General Grunert. May I interrupt there? If anything which 
[93] you put into the record is of such a nature as might be of 
vahie to other nations now, I wish you would consider that and, if so, 
give us that information in closed session, so that it will not be disclosed 
to anybody who may be able to see this record. Do you see what I am 
getting at ? 

General Miles. Yes, sir ; I understand. 

This summary digest was maintained on the principal countries of 
the world. Such a system is no secret. It has been maintained by prac- 
tically every government. It was a running digest covering the mili- 
tary side, the political side, the economic side, and the psychological 
side. All the information that ever came in from any country to G-2 
was collated and put into this digest and sent out to various military 
attaches and G-2s, all the corps areas and overseas departments who 
were interested in a particular country, in the form of corrected loose- 
leaf, so that you had a running build-up constantly. This had been 
going on, to my knowledge, for thirty years. In addition to that, of 
course, we sent out bi-weekly, as I remember, military intelligence sum- 
maries, which were short documents of facts that we had gotten in in 
the last two or three days from all sorts of agencies that we had. I 
say all sorts, because we kept in very close touch w^ith the State De- 
partment, the Department of Commerce, the Rockefeller people in 
South America, and, of course, our own military attaches and observers 
that we had throughout the world. 

That, in general, was our system of getting information and dis- 
seminating it. 

10. General Russell. Did the G-2 section, as such, have [94] 
personnel available for investigations in foreign fields in the year 1941 ? 

General Miles. A limited personnel, General. We were building up. 
When I took over Military Intelligence in May of 1940 I remember 
there were 36 officers in the entire division. We built up rapidly to 
something over 400, with an equal proportion of clerical personnel. 
We built up very rapidly, as the war came nearer and nearer, our 
agencies in the field, field observers, military attaches. Our personnel 
was always limited. We did not have unlimited money or unlimited 
selection of officers, particularly officers. That was a time when the 
Army was building very rapidly. The natural inclination of a soldier 
is to go with troops and remain with troops. The general officers, of 
course, wanted the best men, naturally, and should have had them ; and 
we did not have a free field for the selection of personnel, and quite 
rightly. We did the best we could with the personnel and the funds 
we had available, 

11. General Russell. About when did this personnel reach its maxi- 
mum development of 400 ? 

General Miles. Well, it was increasing all the time I was there. I 
do not know. I imagine it continued to increase after I left. I am 
pretty sure it did. I cannot place any date on any maximum reached. 

12. General Russell. Can you approximate the number of people 
who were available to you for service in Washington -and throughout 
the country and in foreign fields, in October and November of 1941? 

[95] General Miles. General, I would not try to answer that 
question from my memory. The records are certainly available to you. 
I could not do it. 



56 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

13. General Russell. General, a moment a^^o you referred to 
monthly or bi-monthly documents of some kind that were sent to the 
corps commanders and to the overseas departments. Did your office 
maintain copies of those reports? 

General Miles. Oh, yes. 

14. General Russell. Are they in the files now? 

General Miles. I imagine they are, sir. They are permanent rec? 
ords of the Military Intelligence Division. 

15. General Russell. There would be no reason to destroy them at 
all? 

General Miles. Not that I know of. 

16. General Russell. I want at this point to say that I have asked 
for a search of the records over there and have looked at the records, 
but did not discover copies of such reports, although specifically I 
have asked for such reports. I am giving you that, because it may be 
necessary for us to conduct a further search to locate, if possible, 
these documents. 

Now, to discuss for a moment the sources of information which you 
have divulged already and to limit it to Japanese information, what 
sources of information were there in Japan in the fall of 1941 on 
which you as G-2 could rely as to activities of the Japanese at home 
and in home waters? 

General Miles. Within the United States ? 

17. General Russell. No. I am now addressing myself to the situa- 
tion in Japan and have asked what agencies or what sources existed in 
Japan upon which you could rely for information [^6] about 
Japanese activities at home and in home waters. 

General Miles. I would say that by far the most important source 
was our Embassy in Tokyo. We had a very excellent Ambassador who 
had been there a number of years with a staff that had been there a 
good deal longer than that. We had, of course, used the military 
attache and his assistants. The information which we could get on 
the military side from our military attache and his assistants was of 
course very limited; the Japanese being extremely close-mouthed. 
But the Embassy itself was constantly sending in dispatches to the 
State Department — Mr. Grew, particularly — on the state of mind of 
the Japanese people and the probability of what they were going to 
do next, and so forth. We also, of course, had direct access, through 
our very close connection with the State Department, to what was 
transpiring in the negotiations in the fall of 1941 here in Washington. 
Aside from that, I do not think there were any important sources of 
information in Japan. We were getting a good deal of information 
from what might be called the borders; in other words, China, and 
even the part of the Continent occupied by the Japanese. The Koreans 
would get out once in a while and we would get some information in 
that way. We exchanged information very freely with the British 
and to a certain extent, with the Dutch. They were a little afraid to 
give us information, as I remember, but we were getting some. 

18. General I^ussell. Did the British have any organization within 
the homeland of Japan which was watching the movement of their 
Army and Navy in the fall of 1941 ? 

General Miles. I believe that they had about the same as [97] 
we had. As to actually watching the movements of ships and troops, 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 57 

it was necessarily a system that worked sometimes and did not work 
at other times. Yon might see the ships move or the troops move, or 
you might not. 

19. General Russell. General Miles, is it trne or not that from the 
State Department or from our Ambassador to Japan the information 
which we obtained related almost exclusively to the state of mind of 
the Japanese people toward the war and their enmity toward the 
United States? 

General Miles. Are you putting that in the form of a question, sir? 

20. General Russell. Yes. Is it true or not that that was the case? 

General Miles. That was the Ambassador's principal concern, natu- 
rally. I would not say, from my memory of the information that we 
got from our Embassy, that that by any means covered the field. 

21. General Russell. Do you remember a message from our Am- 
bassador along in the fall of 1941, in wliicli he summed up the situation 
and told the State Department to what extent they could rely upon 
him for information of troop movements, movements of the Navy, 
and so forth ? 

General Miles. I do no recall that particular message, General. 

22. General Russell. Maybe I can refresh your memory. May I 
ask you this as a preliminary ? Did you attend the conferences that 
were held by the Secretary of State, which he refers to as the War 
Councils, where he had ordinarily the Secretary of AVar, the Secretary 
of the Navy, and some our high-ranking military [98~\ and 
naval people in to discuss the Japanese situation ? 

General Miles. No, sir. I think only the Chief of Staff attended 
them. 

23. General Russell. I refer particularly to this message which is 
contained in the State Department's book that they call the White 
Paper, which is a report from our Ambassador to Japan on the 17th 
day of November, I believe, 1941 (handing a book to the witness) . 

General Miles. What is the question, now, sir? 

24. General Russell. When did you first know about that message ? 
General Miles. I don't rememlier. General; I can't answer that 

question. 

25. General Frank. Did you know about it at all ? 

General Miles. I am not sure that I did. I think I did, because we 
had very close liaison with the State Department. I feel sure that I 
did ; but, frankly, it is so obvious a message that the impression it gives 
me today is the same impression it gave me then : Yes, of course I know 
we can't count on it. How can we be sure that any group can tell us 
the movement of the Japanese fleet or army? We knew we could not. 

26. General Russell. In other words, the information which you 
have testified that you had from Japan about what was going on over 
there was rather general and indefinite in its nature ? 

27. General Grunert. Unless we know about that message the 
record will not be intelligible. Is it going to be copied into the 
record ? 

28. General Russell. Yes. 

Your information about the activities in Japan in the fall [99] 
of 1941 was very indefinite and general? 
General Miles. Necessarily so. 



58 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

29. General Russell. The message from Ambassador Grew in 
Japan to the Secretary of State for purposes of the record will be 
identified as a paraphrase of a telegram dated November 17, 1941, and 
it may be copied from page 788 of this White Paper entitled "Peace 
and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1911." 

(Telegram from Ambassador Grew to Secretary of State, dated 
November 17, 1941, is as follows :) 

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 

(Telegram: Paraphrase) 

ToKio, Noremljer in, 1941 — 1 p. m. 
(Received November 17—2:09 p. m.) 

1814. Referring to Embassy's previous telegram No. 1736 of November 3, 
3 p. m., final sentence, and emphasizing the need to guard against sudden Japa- 
nese naval or military actions in such areas as are not now involved in the 
Chinese theater of operations. I take into account the probability of the Japanese 
exploiting every possible tactical advantage, such as surprise and initiative. 
Accordingly you are advised of not placing the major responsibility in giving 
prior warning upon the Embassy staff, the naval and military attaches included, 
since in Japan there is extremely effective control over both primary and sec- 
ondary military information. "We would not expect to obtain any information 
in advance either from pei-sonal Japanese contacts or through the press ; the ob- 
servation of [100] military movements is not possible by the few Ameri- 
cans remaining in the country, concentrated mostly in three cities (Tokyo, 
Yokohama, Kobe) ; and with American and other foreign shipping absent from 
adjacent waters the Japanese are assured of the ability to send without foreign 
observation their troop transports in various directions. Japanese troop con- 
centrations were reported recently by American consuls in Manchuria and For- 
mosa, while troop dispositions since last July's general mobilization have, ac- 
cording to all other indications available, been made with a view to enabling 
the carrying out of new operations on the shortest possible notice either in the 
Pacitic southwest or in Siberia or in both. 

We are fully aware that our present most important duty perhaps is to detect 
any premonitory signs of naval or military operations likely in areas mentioned 
above and every precaution is being taken to guard against surprise. The 
Embassy's field of naval or military observation is restricted almost literally 
to what could be seen with the naked eye, and this is negligible. Therefore, 
you are advised, from an abundance of caurion, to discount as much as possible 
the likelihood of our ability to give substantial warning. 

Grew. 

30. General Russell. General Miles, referring to the statement 
which is contained in Ambassador Grew's message : 

and with American and other foreign shipping absent from adjacent waters the 
Japanese are assured of the [101] ability to send without foreign observa- 
tion their troop transports in various directions. 

As a matter of information, do you know why at that particular 
time there was an absence of American and foreign shipping in 
Japanese waters ? 

General Miles. No, sir. I do not remember knowing of any par- 
ticular absence of American shipping from Japanese waters at that 
time. Of course we had had information for a great many years 
which had been considered in all of our war plans in Hawaii that 
there was a certain part of the Pacific Ocean that we called the "Vacant 
Sea" in which there are practically no ships and in which large move- 
ment of ships could occur without anybody seeing them. It was that 
part of the ocean between the great southern routes that go from 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 59 

Hawaii to the coast of Japan and China, and the northern great circle 
routes that go near the Aleutians. 

31. General Russell. The term which you used intrigues me. What 
was it you called it ? 

General Miles. I used to call it the "Vacant Sea." 

32. General Russell. As applied to that part of the Pacific adjacent 
to the mandated islands, would you say that they were in the area 
of the "Vacant Sea" or not ? 

General Miles. No, sir. The southern trade routes, as I remem- 
ber, from Hawaii to Yokohama, we will say, pass considerably north 
of most of the mandated islands, such as the Marianas. All the seas 
surrounding the mandated islands were, as you know, extremely dif- 
ficult for us to penetrate and get any information on for other reasons. 

33. General Russell. Why? 

[102] General Miles. Because the Japanese would not allow 
us in there. You might sail through, but you would not see very 
much. That had existed for many years. 

34. General Russell. Was there any restriction on Americans land- 
ing on those islands that were mandated to the Japanese? 

General Miles. Absolutely, sir. 

35. General Russell. Were Americans prohibited from landing in 
the mandated islands ? 

General Miles. Well, they did not say "Americans are prohibited," 
but Americans did not land. That was well known for years. No 
American warship went in there. 

36. General Frank. Do you know of any American port or any 
point over which the United States had jurisdiction that excluded 
Jap vessels or Japanese nationals ? 

General Miles. No, sir. 

37. General Russell. Do you know where there is any documentary 
evidence of the exclusion of Americans from the Japanese mandated 
islands ? 

General Miles. General, I would not know exactly where to put my 
hand on documentary evidence. It was one of the things perfectly 
well known to all of us in the Intelligence. I should think probably 
the Navy Department could aid you in that respect. I am pretty 
sure that the Navy Department several times tried to get ships in 
there. 

38. General Grunert. As far as the so-called mandated island are 
concerned, they were sort of a blind spot for our Military Intelligence, 
were they ? 

General Miles. Yes, sir. 

[i(93] 39. General Russell. That is exactly what I was trying 
to find out. 

How far are the Marshall Islands from Honolulu? 

General Miles. My recollection is, about 1,600 miles. I would not 
swear to it. 

40. General Russell. General, were you acquainted with the plans 
for the defense of Pearl Harbor and the estimates in connection with 
the Japanese situation as to the probabilities of attack? Were all 
those things known to you at G-2 ? 

General Miles. Rather intimately. I was G-3 of the Hawaiian 
Department from 1929 to 1931. I rewrote the war plan. I wrote the 



60 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

general staff study and estimate of the situation, which was the "bible" 
at that time for some years. Then from 1934 to 1938 I was here in 
War Plans Division and was particularly charged with the three over- 
seas departments, their projects and their plans. So, up to 1938, at 
least, and between 1929 and 1938, 1 was intimately acquainted with it. 

41. General Russell. In our brief study of the plan generally and 
the evidence just given by you, there was considerable emphasis placed 
on a probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor by carrier-borne air- 
craft. During the year 1941 you were, of course, familiar with the 
estimate and the probabilities ? 

General Miles. Yes, sir. 

42. General Russell. Did it occui' to you as G-2 from what port or 
ports these carriers might depart on a mission of that sort ? 

General Miles. They might have departed on a mission from a 
great many ports. We did not know really what bases they had in 
the mandated islands, and obviously they could have departed 
[104^] from almost any port in Japan, such as Kobe or Yokohama. 

43. General Russell. You stated that you did not know what bases 
they had in the mandated islands ? 

General Miles. Very little information on bases in the mandated 
islands. 

44. General Russell. As I recall, they acquired jurisdiction, such 
as they had over the mandated islands, as a result of the settlement at 
the end of the other war in 1918? 

General Miles. That is correct. 

45. General Russell. And in 1941 they had had approximately 
twenty years to develop their bases in the mandated islands, their ports 
and so forth. Was there any information in G-2 in 1941 as to what 
the Japanese had actually done by way of preparing ports and bases 
in any of the mandated islands ? 

General Miles. Very little and very general information. We knew 
that they were developing certain places, such as Palau and Truk 
particularly, and we suspected Saipan. We relied very largely on 
information in Military and Naval Intelligence. Taken together, it 
could not have been calle dany detailed or complete information of 
their possible bases in the mandated islands. 

46. General Frank. Did you have anything on the Island of Jaluit? 
General INItles. I do not remember what we had on Jaluit, but it 

was one of the islands that we used to discuss and suspect that they were 
developing. 

47. General Russell. General Miles, in the fall of 1941 did you in 
G-2 have sufficient data on Japanese developments in the mandated 
islands to predicate an intelligent opinion as to the [^05] pos- 
sibilities of launching convoys from there which might have included 
aircraft carriers ? 

General Miles, I would say that positively we knew enough to form 
an estimate that such a thing was a strong possibility, not a proba- 
bility; that they had the means. That they would do it is another 
matter. They had the means to do it. I M'ould say that our esimate 
at the time was that it was very possible, if not probable, that they did 
have those means. 

48. General Russell. Do you know whether or not the data on 
these developments on the mandated islands is a matter of record any 
place in the G-2 files ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 61 

General Miles. Oh, yes ; we had files on them. We had maps and 
whatever we could get. The Office of Naval Intelligence had even 
more. 

49. General Russell. Did those maps show the developments, or 
just show where the islands were ? 

General Miles. So far as possible we made charts of the islands from 
one source or another and plotted on those charts, both Naval Intelli- 
gence and ours, where we thought they were developing, from what 
information we could get from traveling natives or missionaries or 
what have you. 

50. General Russell. I was asking you some questions a moment 
ago about the inhibition as to our going on those mandated islands. 
Were the inhibitions against going into the mandated islands only 
those of force or semi-force by the Japanese people who were there ? 

General Miles. That is what kept us away. General. 

51. General Russell. They just would not let you go in ? 

[W6] General Miles. They just would not let us go in. They 
had one excuse or another. I don't remember just exactly what they 
were ; but the net result was that mighty few people got into the man- 
dated islands. 

52. General Russell. Did you' attempt to send people from G-2 
into the mandated islands in 1941 ? 

General Miles. No, sir. I do not think any attempt had been made 
by G-2 for ten years. We knew we could not do it and get them out. 

53. General Russell. Were there any restrictions imposed on G-2 
from higher authority about attempting to get in there and develop 
that situation in the mandated islands ? 

General Miles. Not specifically the mandated islands ; no, sir. 

54. General Russell. But you did regard the geographic location 
of these mandated islands with respect to our naval base at Pearl Har- 
bor as being rather material ? 

tjreneral Miles. Yes, I did. General; but, on the other hand, we 
knew perfectly well that Japan could attack the Hawaiian Islands 
without the use of the mandates. I remember very well writing one 
plan in which we developed the other side, based on a surprise attack 
launched from the mainland of Japan, with fast cruisers and carriers, 
carrying troops on their most rapid liners. We worked it up, just how 
they would take those liners off the route for one reason or another — 
this one to be repaired, and so forth — and suddenly launch this attack 
from the "Vacant Sea" and suddenly arrive in Honolulu. So the 
mandates were always a black shadow, but they were not [107] 
the only means of attacking Hawaii, and we knew it as far back as the 
early 1930's. 

55. General Russell. In those studies which were made by you. 
and others with which you may be familiar, did you ever consider 
steps which might be taken to discover in advance the mission and 
dispatch of these convoys to carry out that type of attack? 

General Miles. We considered it, General, but, as Ambassador 
Grew says in that famous dispatch, "Don't rely on us from that point 
of view." It was much more an attack from the other side. 

56. General Frank. What do you mean by that ? 

General Miles. I mean, from the Hawaiian side, particularly air 
reconnaissance and submarine reconnaissance, to detect any force 
coming in before they could actually attack. I recall particularly 



62 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

during all of General Drum's command out there in the middle 1930s 
he was very much interested and was constantly sending in papers to 
War Plans and the}'' were coming to my desk, involving the possi- 
bility of a screen of large bombers which would cover the entire 
enormous perimeter contained in those five big islands. That was a 
current matter almost. Then, of course, the submarine screen was 
another matter that was constantly discussed. We had about twenty 
submarines out there in the middle 1930s. 

But, to answer your question more succinctly, I do not think any 
Intelligence officer ever thought that he could be sure of picking up 
a convoy or attack force or task force in Japan before it sailed and 
know where it was going. That was beyond our terms of efficiency. 

[lOS] 57. General Russell. Or even the mandated islands? 

General Miles. Rather less in the mandated islands. 

58. General Russell. You had less chance there? 
General Miles. Yes. 

59. General Grunert. Would such a force moving from one of the 
mandated islands indicate where it was going? Would there be a 
clear indication that it was bound for Hawaii or elsewhere? 

General Miles. It would be no indication at all where it was going, 
General. 

(There was informal discussion off the record.) 

60. General Russell. The G-2 people in their studies had to all 
intents and purposes eliminated investigations in Japan proper and 
other Japanese territory to determine probable action on the part of 
the Japanese Army and Navy ? 

General Miles. Oh, no, sir. We had not eliminated it. As Ml. 
Grew says, it was the principal task of the Embassy, particularly 
of the military and naval part of the Embassy. What I say is just 
what Mr. Grew says, that we never dreamed that we could rely on 
getting that information. It would have been almost a military 
intelligence miracle had we been able to spot a task force in forming 
and have known before it sailed where it was going. 

61. General Russell. Now, General, if that be true, then the con- 
clusion had been reached, so far as discovering task forces of any 
sort moving to the Hawaiian Islands, that the chief if not the sole 
reliance would have to be placed on reconnaissance agencies based 
on the islands or on United States possessions continguous thereto? 

[JOQI General Miles. Yes, and at sea. I mean, by submarine 
and air power. 

62. General Russell. Do you recall when the last estimate of the 
situation was sent out to the Hawaiian Department from G-2? 

63. General Frank. Prior to December 7? 

64. General Russell. Yes ; prior to December 7, 1941. 

General Miles. General, I do not know that any estimate of the 
situation, if you are using that term strictly, was sent. What we 
sent were those corrected sheets of the digest on Japan from time 
to time, whenever we got the information, and copies of the bi- 
weekly summary. The estimate of the situation is for the informa- 
tion of the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War. G-2 is the 
G-2 of the General Staff. I am bringing up that point because I 
had to be very careful, and I think all G-2s of the General Staff 
have to be very careful that the information you give your Chief 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 63 

is something which he must pass on from the command point of view. 
If that information is habitually sent out to the various overseas 
departments particularly, you run into the serious danger of telling 
tile Lieutenant General commanding the Hawaiian Department, we 
will say, something that G-2 thinks which the Chief of Staff does 
not concur in, and forcing his hand or inducing him to take some 
action in which the Chief of Staff does not concur. In other words, 
you must be careful to keep out of the command channel. So you 
give your information, your summary, your estimate of the situation, 
to 3^our Chief, and action must flow from the Chief through the com- 
mand channels; and G-2 is not in the command channels. 

[110] 65. General Geunert. Insofar as action is concerned on 
the information that is passed to the subordinate command, is that 
action then passed back through G-2, or does G-2 prepare it for the 
C hief of Staff insofar as it pertains to information ? 

General Miles. I do not know that I have your question clearly. 

66. General Grunert. You have gotten information from various 
sources which influenced you to make an estimate of the situation, 
which you passed to the Chief of Staff'. Now, there are parts of that 
information, if true, that certain command channels in the Philip- 
pines or Hawaii should get. Who insures that they get that in- 
formation ? 

General Miles. As a routine matter, G-2 insures it. In other 
words, all information that pertained directly to the Hawaiian De- 
partment or to the Philippine Department that G-2 received, it 
insured that G-2 in that Department got it. That is exclusive, 
however, of any deductions in a very broad sense that G-2 of the 
War Department might draw which would induce action which, in 
other words, was a command proposition. 

67. General Grunert. In other words, you give them the informa- 
tion, but you do not analyze it ; or do you ? 

General Miles. Ordinarily you do not analyze it for him. 

68. General Frank. You gave information and interpretation only 
through command channels? 

General Miles. Interpretation would certainly go only through 
command channels. 

69. General Grunert. Any warning, then, should come from com- 
mand channels rather than from G-2? 

[Ill] General Miles. If it is warning that probably would re- 
sult in action, yes, most definitely. 

70. General Russell. Your G-2 sent a message on November 27 
out to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department ? 

General Miles. Yes ; to all departments, as I remember. 

71. General Russell. Now, a few specific questions, General Miles, 
and I will be through : 

On October 27, 1941, Brink reported to your office that there were 
two aircraft carriers that had been operating among the mandated 
islands, of which Kaga was one. Was Brink one of your operators? 

General Miles. How is the name spelled ? 

72. General Russell. B-r-i-n-k. 

73. General Grunert. Was that not a Colonel Brink for a time in 
Singapore, and then he went to the Philippines? 



64 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Miles. Yes ; that was the man, I think. 

74. General Russell. This was sent from the Philippines? 
General Miles. Yes. 

75. General Grunert. He was one of the staff in the office of the 
A. C. of S., G-2, Philippine Department, and on my recommenda- 
tion he was sent to Singapore to be directly under the War Depart- 
ment there. That is why I recall a man named Brink. 

76. General Russell. Do you have any recollection about that type 
of Japanese aircraft carrier being in the mandated islands ? Do you 
have any independent recollection on that subject? 

General Miles. I remember that the Japanese carriers were reported 
in the mandated islands, but I would not be able to [^^^] pin 
it down to any particular source. 

77. General Russell. Would it be about that time ? 
General Miles. It was about that time. 

78. General Russell. In the records some place we have discovered 
evidence of a photographic mission by aircraft down into the man- 
dated islands in late November or early December of 1941. Do you 
have any independent recollection of that activity on our part? 

General Miles. No, sir ; I did not know we sent one. 

79. General Russell. You were in touch in a general way with the 
Navy at that time in obtaining information from them ? 

General Miles. I was intimately in touch with the Office of Naval 
Intelligence. 

80. General Russell. What did you know from the Navy about the 
location and disposition of the Japanese fleet in late November and 
early December? Do you remember? 

General Miles. My recollection is that the Navy had informa- 
tion of carriers in the mandates, and definitely of a movement of naval 
vessels and transports, they thought, south through the China Sea in 
the direction of Indo China and Thailand. 

81. General Russell. What was your impression as to the knowledge 
which the Navy had generally during the last six months before the 
attack on Pearl Harbor of the location of the Jap Navy and various 
types of craft that were in their Navy? 

General Miles. Their information was very general and incomplete. 

82. General Russell. General, when in your opinion did it t-?-?-^] 
become apparent that war with Japan was inevitable? 

General Miles. On the 27th of November, when we learned that we 
had practically given what might be considered or probably would 
be considered by them an ultimatum to them — from then on I con- 
sidered war as very probable if not inevitable. 

83. General Russell. That was based almost exclusively on the 
negotiations between the Japanese who were in AVashington negotiat- 
ing with our State Department ? 

General Miles. Primarily on that. It was a build-up. 

84. General Russell. In the message of November 27, which I will 
not discuss with you in any great detail, there was a statement that 
negotiations had practically ended. I am not quoting, but it said 
substantially that — although there was a bare possibility that the 
Japanese might come back for further negotiations. Do you remem- 
ber that? 

General Miles. That was in General Marshall's dispatch ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 65 

85. General Russell. Yes. 

General Miles. I don't remember that ; no. 

86. General Russell. Let us assume that they did come back after 
November 27 and continued negotiations: Would that have affected 
your conclusions about the inevitability of war? 

General Miles. Oh, yes. 

87. General Rissell. As a matter of fact, they were back on the 
1st, 2ncl, and 5th of December, were they not? 

General Miles. The reply was not back, sir. 

88. General Russell. I mean, the Japs came back and negotiated. 
[114] General Miles. Oh, they continued to stay here and talk, 

but that all hinged, to. my mind, on the reply or the position taken by 
the Japanese Government as a result of our paper on the 26th of 
November, I think it was. It was considered practically an ultimatum. 

89. General Russell. I think that is all. 

90. General Grunert. I have a few questions. 

General Miles. I should like, if I may, to add a little bit. I am not 
quite sure of my answer there. I did not want to give the impression 
that I thought war was immediately inevitable. 1 thought that very 
definitely an action by Japan, a pretty radical action, would be taken 
almost at once ; that that necessarily would be an overt and open attack 
on the United States. I didn't feel at all sure that war with Japan 
was practically inevitable any time. But there were a good many 
things Japan could have done, if she did break those negotiations, 
short of open war with the United States, and we were considering all 
of those matters. 

91. General Russell. That suggests one other question : Did you 
know that there had been established by reference to the degrees of 
latitude and longitude lines beyond which, if Japan went with armed 
force out in the Pacific, the British, Dutch, and Americans would 
regard that as an act of war ? 

General Miles. Yes. 

92. General Russell. Then you knew as G-2 that if certain things 
occurred, we, in association with those powers, might attack? 

General Miles. Yes; certainly. 

[115] 93. General Frank. You said you were not prevented 
specifically by higher authority from attempting to get information 
regarding the Japanese mandated islands. Was there any general 
prohibition in this regard? Was there a general attitude of 
''hands off"? 

General Miles. Not specifically affecting the mandated islands. It 
was simply a question of whether you wanted to send a man to his 
almost certain death or not, and whether the information you expected 
to get out of it would be worth that risk. But there was no general or 
specific prohibition against my sending a man into the mandated 
islands if I could get him there. But I did not think I could get him 
in there and get him back alive. 

94. General Grunert. Was there or was there not a fear on the 
part of all concerned that doing so and being picked up after having 
done so would offend the Japanese? 

General Miles. Oh, it most certainly would. We would have had 
to disavow it and swear that we never sent him, and so forth. That 
is an old part of the game. 

7971G— 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 1 6 



66 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

95, General Frank. On November 27 there went out a message from 
G-2 of the War Department, which was your organization, saying : 

Advise only Commanding General and Chief of Staff that it appears that confer- 
ence with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage and 
espionage probable. Also posible that hostilities may begin. 

Do you remember that message ? 
General Miles. Very well. 

[110] 96. General Frank. You are familiar with the war plan 
as it applied to Honolulu, the Standing Operating Procedure ? 
General Miles. Yes ; in a general way. 

97. General Frank. Did not the provisions of that war plan and 
the Standing Operating Procedure provide for this defense against 
sabotage ? 

General Miles. Yes; it provided against all forms of attack, in- 
cluding sabotage. 

98. General Frank. Wliy, then, was sabotage especially empha- 
sized in that message? 

General Miles. I will be very glad to answer that question, General, 
but my answer must be somewhat long. 

In the summer of 1939 the President issued a directive to all 
bureaus and offices of tlie Government to keep out of antisabotage 
and antiespionage work, except three that were to do it all, F. B. I., 
O. N. I., and M. I. D. After I took M. I. D. in May of 194U, I began 
to build up the counter-intelligence part of it. I drafted a written 
agreement with F. B. I. and O. N. I. limiting our responsibilities 
under the President's directive. It was then countersigned by the 
three Cabinet Ministers concerned. Then I drew up a counter-sub- 
versive system, and later a counter-intelligence plan, the first one we 
ever had. I met certain opposition among my colleagues, the other 
Assistant Chiefs of Staff, and I am relating it only to point out that 
by the summer of 1941 I had gotten myself in a position where it was 
definitely established that counter-subversive activity of all kinds was 
G-2's responsibility and solely G-2's responsibility. I shared the 
[117] responsibility for measures against an effort to attack by a 
possible enemy with Operations and with War Plans, because I w^as 
supposed to give the information on which their orders were based. 
But I shared with nobody the responsibility for counter-subversive 
measures, and therefore, when I found on the 27th of November that 
nothing was specifically said in General Marshall's dispatch of that 
date, the war warning order, I felt it necessary to warn the G-2's, 
not only the overseas department and later particularly in thi^ coun- 
try, but sent it to all of the corps area G-2's, because we knew the 
build-up in this country very well. The F. B. I., the O. N. 1., and my 
people, were very worried about what could be done in this country, 
l^articularly in the Air Force. General Arnold was very much wor- 
ried, and that broke loose the next day and occasioned the further dis- 
patch of November 28. 

So that was the reason for the emphasis. The policy had alread} 
been laid down by General Marshall's telegrauL So I w^as simply 
backing up the policy of the Chief of Staff and emphasizing the form 
of attack for which I was most directly responsible at G-2. 

99. General Frank. In the begining of General Kussell's questions 
you gave an answer to the effect that as a result of your background 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 67 

and experience you had felt a strong probability of an air raid or air 
attack on Honolulu. Is that correct? 

General Miles. That was one of the methods of attack to which we 
were most vulnerable. 

100. General Frank. At this time, we will say, December 1, 1941, 
what was your attitude as to the probability of such an [-?-^<?] 
air attack? 

General Miles. If the Japs attacked openly at all, and if their 
attack was made on Hawaii, I think I would have said on December 1, 
1941, that an air attack on the installations and the fleet, although I 
did not actually know the ships were there in Pearl Harbor, was one 
of the most probable movements that the Japs would take. 

101. General Frank. Since you went out of your way to caution 
them about sabotage, why did you not likewise go out of your way to 
caution them about the probability of an air attack? 

General Miles. Because, General, all that had been covered in Gen- 
eral Marshall's dispatch in which he specifically ordered such necessary 
reconnaissances — I remember the use of that word — to protect the 
Hawaiian Department against attack. And that was the only way — 
that, and of course radar — that it could have been countered. 

102. General Frank. You knew that the following day General 
Arnold sent a message with respect to sabotage ? 

General Miles. Yes, indeed. 

103. General Frank. Did the logic ever occur to you that as a result 
of emphasizing sabotage in a series of messages it might have the 
result of de-emphasizing something else ? 

General Miles. That had occurred to me. I very strongly objected 
to General Arnold's message on the basis, among other things, that I 
did not want to overemphasize sabotage and that I had already sent 
the day before a sufficient message to cover the question of sabotage. 

104. General Frank. As hindsight, of course, and considering 
[1J9] the fact that provisions for all of these defenses were cov- 
ered in the war plans and other documents, would not the following 
message have sufficed : "War imminent. Act accordingly." ? 

General Miles. For me to send ? 

105. General Frank. No; for the War Department to have sent. 
That would not have emphasized nor de-emphasized anything, would 
it? 

General Miles. I would prefer not to pass upon the Chief of Staff's 
wording in his message of November 27. 

106. General Frank. There w^ere. six messages sent between Novem- 
ber 16th and 28th. Four of them cautioned against provoking the 
Japs ; three of them emphasized sabotage. Now, with respect to cau- 
tion against provoking the Japs : while we were leaning over back- 
ward as a result of these cautions, what was the attitude of the 
Japanese, relatively speaking? 

General Miles. Their attitude where. General ? Here in Washing- 
ton, in the negotiations ? 

107. General Frank. All over the world. Were they as particular 
about preventing any suspicion on our part as we were particular 
about trying to prevent any provocation on their part ? 

General Miles. Oh, no. They had been provocative for a great 
many years, particularly since they began their attack on China. 



68 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

108. General Frank. Will you develop that in just a few words? 
General Miles. I should say that the Japanese attack in Manchuria 

and later in China, which, after all, was the basis [120] of 
our diplomatic negotiations here in Washington in 19-il, was the basic 
cause of it, was the begimiing of a very provocative attitude on the 
part of the Japanese. 

109. General Frank. What I am after is this : There was little or 
no attempt on the Japanese side to keep from provoking us, whereas 
there was every effort on the part of the Americans to keep from pro- 
voking the Japanese ; is that correct? 

General Miles. I should say as a general statement that that is very 
accurate, sir. 

110. General Frank. I asked that of you because you should have 
information on that as the War Department G-2 at that time. 

General Miles. Yes, sir ; but I think it was very general information 
that at Shanghai and all through the Peiping episode, they had been 
very provocative, as we all kncAV ; and it was the policy of our Govern- 
ment not to provoke war; to take a firm stand in a certain way, as you 
know, but not to provoke war with Japan. At least, so we read it. 

111. General Frank. Do you think that we were leaning over back- 
wards in that attitude? 

General Miles. That is a very difficult question to answer, General. 
I simply say that our policy was to avoid any unnecessary provocative 
action. 

[1'2.1] 112. General Frank. You said you objected to Genera] 
Arnold's message. To wliom ? 

General Miles. To General Arnold, in the first place, and later, to 
General Scanlon. It was quite a long discussion, as I remember it. 

113. General Frank. What were the circumstances under which 
your objection was finally overcome and the message sent? 

General Miles. It had to go to the Deputy Chief of Staff, General 
Bryden. General Marshall was away. General Bryden did not want 
to decide it, either, very much. I objected strongly and was backed 
up by General Gerow, and our objections were on this line: (1) this 
antisabotage message had gone out; (2) that a message should not go 
to the air forces alone, but if sent at all, should go to the Commanding 
Generals for their air forces and for everybody else; and (3) that the 
message as originally drawn was very drastic. As you know very well, 
at that time, the Air Force had a lot of young men in command of fields 
and so forth, and a very drastic order, from General Arnold, particu- 
larly, to cargo planes, and so forth, might very well have resulted in 
somebody's being shot. 

I would also like to say, here, that General Arnold's message was 
primarily addressed to the continental United States; he was thinking 
about that. What started him was the fact about seven planes arrived 
at one of your western fields — I think at Salt Lake — all with the same 
trouble, and from different depots, and he thought there was some real 
sabotage going on in this country. But, to go on with the story, we 
finally had to take it to the Deputy Chief of Staff, late that afternoon 
of the 28th. I don't think it was decided until [12.2] about 
six o'clock. General Scanlon was present, i)resenting the Air side, 
and I think, General Gerow and General Gullion, Provost Marshal 
General ; and General Bryden finally decided that it would be sent in 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 69 

modified form ; that is, not such drastic action to be taken against any- 
body who might climb over a fence; and that it would be sent to the 
Commanding Generals, and that the Air Corps might also if they de- 
sired send it direct under General Arnold's name to the Air Force, to 
the Air Commanders concerned; and that was the final decision. 

114. General Frank. Now, another question that I am asking be- 
cause G-2 might have drawn a conclusion on it: What was the atti- 
tude of the public toward the possibility of war at that time? Can 
you answer that ? 

General Miles. I can only give you my impression, that they were 
not nearly as much worried about it as they should have been. After 
all, it was only a few months past since we had saved the Army by one 
vote in the House of Representatives. You remember, I think it was 
in October 1941 that that vote was taken, and we just barely saved 
the Army at that time. 

115. General Frank. What do you mean, "saved the Army"? 
General Mii.es. Well, you remember there was a bill, sir, to send 

back all the men that had been drafted, put them back on the reserve, 
or something like that. 

116. General Kussell. A bill to demobilize the National Guard. 
General Miles. To demobilize the National Guard — send the draf- 
tees back. The War Department was extremely worried about it. 

117. General Frank. Aside from the people "top side" in the Army, 
can you give me an expression of what the attitude in the \Ji23^ 
Army was with respect to the possibility of war ? 

General Miles. Not accurately. I attended the North Carolina 
maneuvers, that November, preceding November, early preceding 
November, and I don't remember to have heard the matter discussed. 
The Army in those days as you well remember, we all remember, was 
intensely busy in building itself and training and maneuvering and 
so forth, and I would not say the Army as a whole were much con- 
cerned as to where war was going to break if they could get their 
troops ready before the break. 

118. General Frank. Do you think they felt that war was on the 
horizon ? 

General Miles. The Army ? 

119. General Frank. Yes. 
General Miles. Yes, sir. 

120. General Frank. All right. 

General Miles. Not necessarily with Japan, but war was on the 
horizon. 

121. General Frank. Did you know that there was a Japanese 
striking force consisting of several carriers and a couple of battle- 
ships and a submarine force in the Marshall Islands, in the vicinity 
of Jaluit, about the 1st of December ? 

General Miles. I knew that such a force had been reported about 
there, and about that time. 

122. General Frank. Was that information given to the Command- 
ing General of the Hawaiian Department? r 

General Miles. I don't know, sir. I do not remember. 

123. General Frank. Have you any way of determining that? 
General Miles. The records of the Military Intelligence Depart- 
ment undoubtedly will disclose it. 



70 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[1^4-] 124. General Frank. If it were given? 

General Miles. Yes, if it were given. I feel very sure that in one 
form or another he was informed of that report. I say "in one form or 
another" because one form might very Avell have been through Navy 
and Fleet. 

125. General Frank. Information on the situation surrounding the 
Hawaiian Islands, you stated some time back, information as to the 
presence of hostile activity in the waters, would nuiinly be obtained 
through submarine reconnaissance and air reconnaissance? 

General Miles. That is correct — and radar. 

r26. General Frank. And radar? Since the Navy is the only 
department that has submarines, and since also in the plan for air 
reconnaissance at Honolulu they were responsible for distant recon- 
naissance, it would appear then that it was the responsibility of the 
Navy to keep both the Army and the Navy in Honolulu advised and 
to provide protection against any kind of attack so far as reconnais- 
sance could provide that, is that correct? 

General Miles. So far as distance reconnaissance is concerned, they 
alone had the means of carrying it out. 

127. General Frank. That is all I have. 

General Grunert. I want you to explain once more so I can get it 
clear in mind about the dissemination of information gathered by G-2, 
of the War Department, so I Avill put in various questions. You get 
information from the State Department, ONI, your own sources, and 
whatever other sources might become available to you. Now, when 
you get this infoi'mation, who judges whether or not particular parts 
of that information [l!2o] are of value and should be trans- 
mitted, for instance, to the commanding general of Hawaii? 

General Miles. The first people who pass on it are the members of 
the section, the Geographical Section, which includes the country 
about which we have that information — the Japanese, we will say. 
Information would pass first througli the Far Eastern Section, I think 
it was called at that time, under Colonel Bratton, of the Intelligence 
Subdivision of the Military Intelligence. That would then go to the 
Intelligence Division, itself, which collated all positive intelligence, 
dealt with all positive intelligence as distinguished from counter intel- 
ligence, the negative side, and would then be sent out. 

If it was simply routine, the Chief in the Military Intelligence Divi- 
sion, G-2, would simply see it passing over his desk. If there were 
any question about it, it would be brought up through normal channels 
to the executive officer, wdio, if he did not feel competent to decide it, 
would take it up with G-2 men ; and that was the method. 

128. General Grunert. If you were disseminating it, then, to the 
various commands, or any particular connnand, would it then pass 
directly from G-2 to such commander, and in what form? 

(xeneral Miles. The normal form would be these semiweekly sum- 
maries. I mean that would be the routine. Then, any particular 
information of particular importance would be telegraphed out to 
tho«e agencies concerned with tliat particular bit of information; in 
the case of Japan, to (certainly) the Philipi)ines, to Hawaii, to Pana- 
ma, to the West Coast, and so forth, I'ight to our military attache at 
China, to the G-2 of the foreign departments, or the corps areas. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 71 

[126] 129. General Grunert. But when you make an estimate 
of the situation, that then ^oes to be processed through War Plans 
Division, to the Chief of Staff? 

General Miles. Yes. 

130. General Grunert. Now, if there is any information to be 
passed out on that estimate, it then must be authorized for you to 
pass it out, or for them to pass it out directly to those concerned, is 
that right? 

General Miles. Yes. It becomes more than information, then; it 
becomes an opinion of the War Department, a communication of the 
Chief of Staff. 

131. General Grunert. All right. Now% the next question I have 
is one on which we will have to go back to the sabotage message. Was 
that sabotage message of November 27 O. K.'d by WPD, or the Chief 
of Staff, or whom? Or was it necessary to have that O. K.'d? Did 
you send it out directly to the G-2 ? 

General Miles. It was not necessary for the Chief of Staff or his 
office to pass on it, since it simply carried out a policy already estab- 
lished by the previous messages of the same date, from General 
Marshall. I do remember, however, consulting, as I almost always 
did. War Plans, as they consulted me on messages, and I think it was 
General Gerow who suggested that I add to the message the G-2 was 
to inform the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff, only. 

132. General Grunert. Did G-2 do its utmost to inform, by contact 
with the various agencies made available, so as to best advise the Chief 
of Staff and keep subordinate commands informed, and so that they 
could carry out their mission ? 

General Miles. I did not hear the first of your question, [J27] 
relative to the G-2. 

133. General Grunert. Did G-2 do its utmost, so far as you could 
judge, to carry out its mission, in informing the Chief of Staff of 
everything they had got, making estimates, and passing down in- 
formation they thought was pertinent? 

General Miles. The answer to that is Yes. 

134. General Grunert. Naturally. I wanted to put it in the record. 
General Miles. I might add, if I may, that we wrote so much that 

we got certain complaints — complaints that nobody could read all the 
stuff we turned out. We certainly tried to do whatever we could. 

135. General Grltnert. Did so many things go out at one time that 
the "low side" might have considered themselves as being informed 
to such a point of saturation that they did not pay much attention to 
the information they were getting ? In other words, "crying wolf ! 
wolf !" so that they became confused, or "fed up"? 

General Miles. That could have been, sir. 

136. General Grunert. Do you think that the G-2 message — we call 
it "the G-2 message," of November 27 — and the sabotage message — 
we call that the "Arnold message," of the 28th, which was sent out 
under the Adjutant General's signature — did you consider whether 
or not they might be taken by the Command "dow^n below" as modi- 
fying or changing the Chief of Staff's instructions of November 27? 

General Miles. No, sir; I did not. The Chief of Staff's message 
of November 27 was a war- warning message, in my mind, all inclusive 



72 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

SO far as different forms of attack or dangers [1^8] might be 
considered, and my message of the same date in regard to sabotage 
was simply inviting the attention of the G-2, who was particularly 
charged with that, in each corps area and overseas department, to 
that particular form of danger. 

137. General Grunert. There was no report from the recipients 
required ? 

General Miles. There was no report required. 

138. General Grunert. That is, to your message. 
General Miles. No answer to my message, of the 27th. 

139. General Grunert. No answer? But there was a report re- 
quired by the Chief of Staff's message of November 27? 

General Miles. That is true, sir. 

140. General Grunert. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian 
Department made his report to the Chief of Staff, presumably on the 
Chief of Staff's message of November 27. Therein, he reported just 
the measures taken as to sabotage. Did you see that report? 

General Miles. I did not see that message — that answer, until after 
Pearl Harbor. 

141. General Grunert. I do not think of anything else. Does 
anybody else think of anything else? 

142. General Frank. When General Grunert just asked you about 
the possibility of confusing those messages on sabotage, you replied 
from the point of view of the man at this end. Now, consider yourself 
for a moment as the man at the receiving end of those messages, not 
know who prepared them, nor anything about their source, but from 
the point of view of their coming from the War Department, and 
considering that as a single source : under those conditions, might it 
or might it not have been a [129] little confusing? 

General Miles. It might have been, but I think the first message 
was signed "Marshall." 

143. General Frank. That is right. 
General Miles. That would be my answer. 

144. General Frank. Now, the next question is: I asked you, in 
my questions a few minutes ago, as to whether or not you had sent 
any message to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment with respect to the presence in the Marshall Islands of this 
Japanese force. We have, we think, all the communications that 
went from the War Department to the Hawaiian Department, from 
the 16th of November until December 7. This Japanese force was 
not in the vicinity of Jaluit until about the 25th. In view of the 
critical stage of the situation, it would seem that that informa- 
tion was rather vital, as there is no record of its having been com- 
municated. Is there any explanation of that? 

General Miles. I wouldn't know what the explanation was, if it 
wasn't connnunicated. If we had known at the time, as we probably 
did, that that information, coming from Navy, was being transmitted 
to the Fleet in Hawaii, to all of their naval vessels, it might very 
well have been that we considered that as sufficient, knowing that 
the two Intelligence branches. Army and Navy, were working in very 
close cooperation, we thought, everywhere — in Hawaii and the West 
Coast and in the Philippines, and so forth. 



PROCEEDi:NfGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 73 

I am a little worried about that message, because I was told, this 
morning, by Military Intelligence, that there are numbered gaps in 
their files today, and they do not know where [130] those 
messages are. We hope you have them, but they do not know. 

145, General Russell. We didn't get them from G-2. 

General Miles. How ? 

14G. General Russell. We haven't gotten anything from G-2. 

147. General Frank. In tlie Roberts Commission interrogation of 
Colonel Fielder, who was G-2 in the Hawaiian Department 

General Miles. Yes, G-2. 

148. General Frank. — he discloses that he was not, prior to Decem- 
ber 7, getting this information from the Navy, in Honolulu. He was 
not getting it. 

General Miles. He should have, of course. 
141). General Frank. That is all. 

150. General Grunert. One final question. In your experience as 
Staff Officer and as a Commander in the field, outside the War Depart- 
ment, would a message signed by Maf-shall carry more weight with 
you than one signed by the Adjutant General, or one signed by a 
Staff Officer? 

General Miles. Very much more weight, General, particularly 
when it begins with some such phrase as "This is a war-warning 
message." 

151. General Grunert. Are there any other questions? 

General Russell. What message did he ever send, beginning that 
way. General Miles ? 

General Miles. My impressions of the message of November 27, 
but I haven't it before me. 

152. General Grunert. There was one message starting out that 
way, but it happened to be a Navy message. This particular message 
from the Chief of Staff did not start out that way, [131] accord- 
ing to the record. 

158. General Russell. Who was Creswell? 

General Miles. Creswell? He was Military Attache in Japan. 

154. General Russell. I want to go back to my Mandated Islands 
for a minute. General, because you have excited me a little bit. I 
want to get some description of those islands. Referring to the 
Marshall Islands, where these carriers are supposed to have assembled, 
that attacked, is there anybody on those islands except Japanese? 

General Miles. Some natives there, I believe — a few, there. 

155. General Russell. Are there towns and roads and those sorts 
of things there ? 

General Miles. The only so-called "civilized people" are the Jap- 
anese, there, and the others are natives of the Islands. They don't live 
in towns, very much, I imagine. My information about the IMandatecl 
Islands is very slim, now, particularly now 

156. General Russell. There is no secret at all about the questions 
that I am asking, and what I am attempting to develop for my own 
satisfaction, in arriving at what happened at Pearl Harbor. They 
had everything on us, yet they sailed up and attacked us, and appar- 
ently today G-2 doesn't know where they came from, or how many 
there were, or where they went to. We have not been able so far to 



74 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

get any very intelligent information on what these convoys were like, 
if there were more than one. Do you have any ideas about that, the 
size of the attacking forces ? 

General Miles. Prior to the attack? 

157. General Russell. No, since the attack. Have you gotten 
[132] information that led you to know how strong these convoys 
were that came in there, launching this attack ? 

General Miles. We have only genei:al information, largely from 
Naval. It was supposed to be the KAGA and AKAGI, those two very 
large carriers of theirs, supported by probably some of their older 
battleships of the KONGO class — their four old battle cruisers; but I 
have no definite information. 

158. General Russell. I think that is all. 

159. General Grunert. Thank you, very much. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 
(Whereupon, at 12:45 p. m., the Board recessed until 2 p. m.) 

[132- A] ADDENDUM TO GENERAL MILES' TESTIMONY 

(The following changes were suggested by General Miles in his 
letter of August 18, 1944, to General Grunert :) 

Page 93, line 18; delete "thirty"; insert "twenty". 

Page 94, line 11; insert comma after word "selection"; delete 
words "of officers,"; insert "of" between words "particularly" and 
"officers." 

Page 94, line 14; delete ",of course,"; insert between words "offi- 
cers" and "wanted" "in the field". 

Page 94, line 15; insert period after word "them"; delete word 
"and" after word "them"; capitalize word "we". 

Page 98, line 18; insert word "probably" between words "is" and 
"the". 

Page 98, line 19 ; insert quotation mark between words "then" and 
"Yes". 

Page 98, line 20; delete word "it"; insert in lieu thereof "the 
Embassy". 

Page 98, line 21; insert quotation mark after "army?". 

Page 102, line 15; add after words "No, sir," "except that late in 
'41 steps were taken to prevent certain Japanese ships from passing 
through the Panama Canal". 

Page 103, line 13; insert word "and" between words "time" and 
"for". 

Page 104, line 18 ; delete words "in Military and" ; substitute there- 
for "from". 

Page 104, line 20 ; delete words "any" and "their". 

[132-B] Page 106, line 25 ; change "the route" to "their routes". 

Page 106, line 26 ; change last word on line "this" to "an". 

Page 106, line 27; insert comma after "Vacant Sea"; delete word 
"and". 

Page 107, line 9 ; delete word "famous". 

Page 107, line 10; delete "It was much more an" preceding word 
"attack", substitute therefor "We". Make balance of line read "at- 
tacked the problem from". 

Page 107, line 15 ; preceding "to" insert "by our people in Hawaii," ; 
change "they" to "it". 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 75 

Page 107, line 17; insert "that" between "1930s" and "he"; insert 
words "in it." after word "interested"; delete word "and"; insert 
"He" before word "was". 

Page 107, line 18 ; insert comma after word "Plans". , 

Page 107, line 21 ; make balance of sentence read "containing the 
five big Hawaiian Islands." 

Page 107, delete word "terms" ; insert in lieu word "dreams". 

Page 109, line 16. Insert period after word "careful"; delete 
"that"; capitalize "the" (last word on line). 

Page 110, line 17. Delete word "very". 

Page 110, line 19. Insert period after word "action" ; make balance 
of line read, "The latter, in other words, is a command proposition." 

Page 110, line 22; change word "him" to "them". 

Page 113, line 4; delete words "to them" after word "ultimatum"; 
insert dashes after word "ultimatum". 

[1S£-G] Page 113, line 5 ; after word "not" insert word "ulti- 
mately". 

Page 113, line 26; insert word "Japanese" between "The" and 
"reply". 

Page 114, line 2; change "that" to "it". 

Page 114, line 3 ; change "our" to "the U. S." 

Page 114, line 4; insert comma after word "was''; change "it" to 
"which". 

Page 114, line 9; change "there" to "regarding inevitable war." 
Change "I did" to "I do". 

Page 114, line 10; insert between words "thought" and "war" the 
words "on November 27th that". 

Page 114, line 11; insert comma after word "that"; change "an" 
to "some". 

Page 114, line 12 ; insert word "but" before "that". 

Page 114, line 13 ; change "that" to "need not" ; delete word "would". 

Page 114, line 15; change "practically" to "immediately"; delete 
"But" ; capitalize "there". 

Page 114, line 16 ; change "did break those" to "broke her". 

Page 114, line 17; insert "in Washington," between "negotiations" 
and "short". 

Page 114, line 18 ; change "matters" to "possibilities". 

Page 115, line 10; delete "but"; capitalize "there". 

Page 115, line 13; change period to comma, and add "or get in- 
formation from him while there," 

Page 116, line 19 ; change "limiting" to "delimiting". 

Page 116, line 22; after word "system" add '*for the Army,"; change 
"counter-intelligence" to " counter-fifth-column". 

Page 116, line 24; insert period after word "staff"; [IS^-D] 
delete word "and". 

Page 116, line 25 ; change "it" to "this". 

Page 117, line 1 ; change "effort to" to "overt". 

Page 117, line 6 ; insert words "about sabotage" between words "said" 
and "in". 

Page 117, line 8 ; insert word "of" between "only" and 'Hhe". 

Page 117, line 9 ; make it read "departments but particularly those in 
this country. It was sent." 

Page 117, line 13 ; change "in" to "t"" 



76 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Page 117, line 14; insert period after "worried"; delete words 
"and that" and insert in lieu thereof "He". 

Page 117, line 17 ; delete period after word "telegram" and add "of 
the 27th." Delete w^ord "So". 

Page 117, line 20; change "at" to "as", change period to comma, and 
add "and reiterating the possibility of open hostilities." 

Page 118, line 4; insert words "Pearl Harbor" between "the" and 
"installations". 

Page 118, line 5; after word "fleet", delete comma, insert i)aren- 
thesis. 

Page 118, line 6; after word "Harbor", delete comma, insert paren- 
thesis. 

Page 118, line 15 ; delete word "it", insert in lieu "such an attack". 

Page 118, line 16; add new sentence, "My message also warned of 
possible hostilities". 

Page 120, line 1 ; delete word "was". 

[IS^-E] Page 121, line 11 ; insert period after "Gerow". Delete 
word "and". Capitalize "our". 

Page 121, line 12 ; change "this" to "an". 

Page 121, line 13 ; change "that a" to "the proposed". 

Page 121, line 15 ; delete word "that". 

Page 121, line 19; change "cargo" to "protect". 

Page 122, line 3; change "Grenerals" to "General"; delete word 
"and". 

Page 122, line 4; insert word "directing" between "not" and "such". 

Page 122, line 5 ; delete "to be taken". 

Page 122, line 6 ; delete "and" (first word) . 

Page 122, line 7; insert comma after "also"; insert comma after 
"desired". 

Page 122, line 9; insert semicolon after "concerned"; delete "and". 

Page 122, line 16; delete "past" between "months" and "since". 

Page 122, line 25 ; insert word "and" between "Guard" and "send". 

Page 123, line 3; delete "that November, preceding November,"; in- 
sert word "the" after "early". 

Page 125, line 9 ; change "That" to "It". 

Page 125, line 18; delete "man; and"; insert in lieu "himself." 
Capitalize "that". 

Page 125, line 23; delete "I mean"; capitalize "that". Delete 
"Then"; capitalize "any". 

Page 125, line 27; delete "and so forth,"; insert word [132-F] 
"possibly". 

Page 125, line 28 ; delete word "right" ; change "at" to "in" ; delete 
comma ; insert word "and" following word "China". 

Page 125, line 29, line 29; delete "foreign departments, or the". 

Page 126, line 20 ; make second word "date". 

Page 126, line 22; insert period after "messages". Delete word 
"and". 

. Page 126, line 23 ; make it read : "that I add to the message that the 
G-2 were to inform their Commanding". 

Page 126, line 24 ; make it read : "Generals and the Chiefs of Staff 
only." 

Page 128, line 18; insert dashes after the word "answer"; delete 
comma. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 77 

Page 132, line 4; make it read: "from Naval Intelligence. The 
ships were siii)p()sed to be the KAGA and AKAGI, those". 

[1.33] AFTERNOON SESSION 

(The Board at 2 p. m. continued the hearing of witnesses.) 

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. RUSSELL A. OSMUN, CHIEF, MILITARY 
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, WAR DEPARTMENT 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board your 
name, rank, organization, and station ? 

General Osmln. Russell A. Osmun, Brigadier General, Chief, Mili- 
tary Intelligence Service, War Department. 

2. General Grunert. General, the Board, in an attempt to get at 
the facts, is looking into the War Department background and view- 
points prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. This in- 
cludes an examination of pertinent available records. It is hoped that 
because of your assignment in the A. C. of S., G-2, War Department 
General Staff, you can throw some light on the subject. In order to 
cover so large a field in the limited time available, individual Board 
members have been assigned objectives and phases for special in- 
vestigation, although the entire Board will pass upon all objectives 
and phases. General Russell has this particular phase, so he will lead 
in propounding questions, and tlie other members will assist in de- 
veloping them. 

3. General Russell. General Osmun, what is your present assign- 
ment ? 

General Osmun. Chief Military Intelligence Service, sir. 

4. General Russell, Is that a branch of the G-2 office. 
General Osmun. One of the two branches of the G-2 office. 

[134] 5. General Russell. As such officer, are you acquainted 
with the files maintained by the office to which you are assigned? 
General Osmun. Yes, sir. 

6. General Russell. Would there be contained in these files records 
or copies of messages, documents, and other memoranda which may 
have transpired between your Department and the Hawaiian De- 
partment in the year 1941? 

General Osmun. Yes, sir. 

7. General Russell. Would there be contained in the same files 
records or copies of similar messages or other documents which might 
have been transferred from your Department to the Chief of Staff 
or other branches of the General Staif? 

General Osmun. Normally, yes, sir. 

8. General Russell. General, did you at my request make a search 
of your files for the purpose of selecting such memoranda as are 
contained therein which relate to the Hawaiian Department in the 
year 1941 ? 

General Osmun. Yes, sir. 

9. General Rltssell. Did you show such documents to me as you 
thought were pertinent? 



78 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Osmun. I showed you all the documents we had found that 
were pertinent. 

10. General Russell. Have you since collecting those documents 
found any other documents ? 

General Osmun. No, sir. May I amend that to say that we are 
making a continuing search, and if any other documents are found 
you will be notified. I don't expect to find any others. 

11. General Russell. This morning in the testimony of U^S] 
General Miles — and I bring this to yo^n- attention because I did not 
know it when I was talking to you before — General Miles stated that 
there were periodic summaries prepared during the year 1941, as I 
now recall, one summary bi-weekly and another possibly bi-monthly, 
which were sent out to the Commanding Generals of the Service Corps 
and Departments. Did you, in your search of the records in your 
office, which search we have just referred to, discover copies of any 
such summaries? 

General Osmun. No, sir; none of those were brought to my atten- 
tion, and I do not think we found any. I asked General Miles about 
that, and he said that in most cases the summaries were prepared for 
the General Staff, because at that time the G-2, as explained to me by 
General Miles, was an Intelligence agency for the War Department, 
and that in certain cases, what you might term summaries were sent 
out from time to time, but those were not of the same character as 
what we would now call an estimate of the situation. 

12. General Frank. In other words, there was information which 
would go to the Chief of Staff but it was not sent out to the theaters? 

General Osmun. I understand so, sir; but I want to emphasize that 
I was not here at the time, and this is hearsay. 

13. General Russell. How long have you been associated with the 
Division of Military Intelligence? 

General Osmun. Since the winter of 1940—11, when I was sent tem- 
porarily to London as an observer for four months. I returned in 
March 1941, and after a few days went back to my normal duty in the 
Office of the Quartermaster General. A year later I was sent out to 
India and have been in Military [136] Intelligence Service 
since. 

14. General Russell. Do you know something of the history of the 
Military Intelligence Division over there? 

General Osmun. Here in Washington ? 

15. General Russell. The general history of this Military Intelli- 
gence Division of the War Department. 

General Osmun. Yes. 

16. General Russell. Do you regard as adequate the means, in- 
cluding personnel, which have been placed at the disposal of that De- 
partment ? 

General Osmun. Absolutely not. 

17. General Russell. Do you regard it as a badly neglected agency 
of the War Department in the past ? 

General Osmun. From the standpoint of military intelligence which 
could have been secured ; yes. 

18. General Russell. General, liow familiar are you with the gen- 
eral geographical situation out in the South Pacific? 

General Osmun. I know very little about it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 79 

19. General Russell. What about the mandated islands? Do you 
know very much about those ? 

General Osmln. Very little. 

20. General Russell. Do you know anything about the Marshall 
Islands? 

General Osmun. No, sir. 

21. General Russell. Do yon know of any reason why Americans 
were not permitted to go on the Marshall Islands? 

General Osmun. I believe there was a stipulation in the mandate 
itself which was interpreted by the Japanese as forbidding foreigners 
to land withotit very severe restrictions. 

[J37] 72. General Russell. Have you ever seen that in the man- 
date document? 

General Osmun. No, sir ; I have never seen the mandate. 

23. General Russell. Suppose there had been available to G-2 ade- 
quate personnel : Do yon_i believe they could have developed what was 
taking ]ilace in the mandated islands in November and December of 
1941? 

General Osmun. I think, sir, that it goes a great deal deeper than 
that. We had a national psychology to contend with. 

24. General Frank. Along what line? 

General Osmun. Lack of belief that we were in danger; disinclina- 
tion to spend the tremendous siuns of money that would be involved. 

25. General Frank. Do you think that was reflected in the small 
margin bv which Congress just prior to that had passed the Army 
bill? 

General Osmun. I will have to say, General, that I am not very much 
of a politician, and I would rather not express an opinion on that, be- 
cause my opinion would be valueless. There was a lack of really 
trained Army officers available, and a general lack of comprehension 
at that time of the need for military intelligence as we have realized 
was necessary. I think if we go back to that time, we will remember 
that very few people thought there ever would be war with Japan. 
Most of our people felt quite secure in our inherent strength, and I 
think the Japanese bogy had been discussed so often that people had 
stopped paying much attention to it. 

26. General Russell. General, I think those are all reasons 
[1S8] why we could not get adequate support; but the question 
was rather a different question. If yoti had had adequate support and 
adequate personnel, what was to have prevented them from going out 
into that area and staying in touch with what was going on ? 

General Osmun. That, again, is a rather difficult question to an- 
swer quickly. If we had had adequate personnel, obviously we nyght 
have had very much better information and probably we might have 
had enough information to have enabled us to have avoided what 
happened. It is a matter of estimate. If we had been perfectly pre- 
l^ared we would not have been stirprised. 

27. General Frank. Do you think that this emphasized effort to 
keep from offending the Japs when the}^ were confronted with no 
such restriction imposed a handicap on our learning about their 
activities ? 



80 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Osmun. I do not think that I could answer that intelli- 
gently, General, because I had nothing to do with the Military Intel- 
ligence at that time except as an observer in this country. I do not 
know what the handicaps were and how much they handicapped the 
people that tried to get the information. I should say offhand that if 
we were handicapped and the others were free to do as they wanted, 
naturally we lost a great deal of information that otherwise could 
have been secured. 

28. General Russell. If you find other documents and records along 
the line we have been questioning you about, will you advise us? 

General Osmun. Yes, sir. We are looking for them. 

[1-39] 29. General Frank. There are other agencies of the Gov- 
ernment besides the Army and Navy that obtain information of vari- 
ous kinds, are there not? 

General Osmun. Yes, sir. 

30. General Frank. It would be advantageous if there were a plan 
for bringing all these agencies together periodically in each area, 
would it noti 

General Osmun. Yes, sir. 

31. General Frank. Do you consider that the bringing together of 
those agencies under the auspices of the Army and Navy could easily be 
accomplished ? 

General Osmun. May I answer that off the record ? 

32. General Frank. Yes. 

(There was informal discussion off the record.) 

General Osmun. I think that any loyal representative of the Gov- 
ernment acting honestly with other similar persons can get the co- 
operation necessary in doing a good, businesslike job if he is given 
half a chance and has guts enough to do what he thinks is right. 

33. General Frank. That will result in getting information that 
will redound to the best interests of our national defense? 

General Osmun. Yes, sir. I have never found, in the two and a 
half years I was over there, any difficulty in dealing wdth anybody who 
was on the square as long as he realized that I was on the square and 
was interested only in stopping the war a few days sooner than it 
otherwise would stop. 

34. General Frank. In the best interests of our United States 
effort? 

[14-0] General Osmun. Yes. 

35. General Frank. Then you believe that efforts should be made 
in these different areas to bring periodically together all American 
agencies concerned with gathering information? 

General Osmun. Yes, sir. 

36. General Grunert. Do you think that in such a combined intelli- 
gence organization, all the agencies concerned would cooperate, or 
would they be inclined to withhold information because of their "hush- 
hush" policy and the demand of secrecy, so that they would get so that 
they would not trust each other ? 

General Osmun. I think that is a question of personalities, and the 
only way I can answer it is to say that in my own recent experience 
overseas we had a number of individuals handling information from 
the very lowest to the highest degrees of security, and yet cooperating 
with the full understanding of each other's problems and, I believe, no 
loss of security. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 81 

37. General Frank. Would the fact that it is in the interest of the 
national effort to be paramount and overcome any minor prejudices 
that might exist? 

General Osmun. At this time, undoubtedly, yes; but- 1 think that 
in peace time much the same conditions would exist. 

38. General Frank. As when? 

General Osmun. As during war time, so far as the willingness to 
cooperate for the best interests of the Government is concerned. 

39. General Frank. Then there is no point in mentioning peace 
time. 

You have been searching recently for all communications [^-4^] 
that were sent from G-2 to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian 
Department between about the 15th of November and December 7 of 
1941; is that correct? 

General Osmun. Yes, sir. 

40. General Frank. Have you found any communication which 
was sent to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department 
from G-2 or from the War Department that advised him that there 
was a Japanese force in the Marshall Islands that moved in there 
between the 25th and 30th of November? 

General Osmun. If so they were in the notes that I gave to General 
Russell — I remember specifically that there was a message to the effect 
that the Japanese fleet had moved south in the general mandated area. 

41. General Frank. It was in one of those radio messages sent 
between the 16th of November and the 7th of December? 

General Osmun. I do not remember the date, sir. I say, if it is in 
any at all, it is in the batch of notes I gave to General Russell. 

42. General Frank. You have given General Russell everything 
that you have found that was sent, have you not? 

General Osmun. Yes, sir. We have given him everything we could. 
I was very definite that nothing was to be withheld from our records. 

43. General Russell. I do not believe that in any of the memoranda 
you gave me there was a reference to the movement of Jap naval forces 
in the mandated area. I will say this: that the only messages that 
you gave me were those which the Board already had copies of. 

[14^] 44. General Grunert. Does it naturally follow that if 
there was such a force in or about the mandated islands at any par- 
ticular time during that critical period, this was the force that made 
the attack on Hawaii ? 

General Osmun. No, sir. 

45. General Grunert. I have one concluding question, to make sure 
that I understand the witness's remark about information summaries. 
General Miles, in his testimony, referred to summaries of information 
and estimates. Summaries were those documents prepared period- 
ically and sent out as a matter of information, whereas estimates were 
those which were prepared for the Chief of Staff and the General 
Staff, Do I understand correctly that you did or not find any sum- 
mai^es of information on the Pacific situation along in 1941 that might 
or might not have been sent out to the Commanding General of the 
Hawaiian Department ? 

General Osmun. That is correct, sir. I have not found any; but 
when I heard General Miles speak about it this morning I directed 
immediate search to find out if we had them. 

79716— 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1 7 



82 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I would like to enter in the record a fact which you gentlemen un- 
doubtedly are aAvare of, that a number of Military Intelligence rec- 
ords undoubtedh' were given to the Roberts Commission, and you 
have undoubtedly seen those, 

46. General Gruxert. Thank you very much. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

\l'i3'] TESTIMONY OF FRANCIS M. CAULFIELD, CHIEF CLEEK, 
CENTRAL FILES, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, WAR DEPART- 
MENT 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Will you state to the Board, Mr. Caulfield, your 
name, address, and occupation. 

Mr. Caulfield. Francis M. Caulfield, Chief Clerk, Central Files, 
Adjutant General's Office, War Department. 

2. General Gruni^rt. Mr. Caulfield, the Board is trjdng to get at 
the facts as to the Pearl Harbor attack, and is at present investigat- 
ing the background, the viewpoints, and so forth, getting facts out of 
the War Department. That includes an examination of the perti- 
nent available records, and we hope that from your position you 
Avill be able to tell us about the Adjutant General's records. General 
Russell will lead, or propound the questions with reference thereto. 

3. General Russell. In your official capacity did you recently par- 
ticipate in a search of the records of the Aclju.tant General's office, 
at my request ? 

Mr. Caulfield. Yes, I did. General. 

4. General Russell. And would you name the others in the Adju- 
tant General's Office who helped us in that search. 

Mr. Caulfield. There was Colonel Sepulveda, and Mrs. Lillian K. 
Bull, and Mr. Joseph Yarborough. I cannot tell you the exact spell- 
ing of his name. And then the clerks in the Central Files and the 
Restricted Files, generally, search for indices. 

0. General Russell. Colonel Sepulveda was unable to attend the 
Board hearing, because he is not permitted to climb the [^4^ 
steps ? 

Mr. Caulfield. That is correct. General. 

6. General Russell. You were second in charge of the search and 
the selection of material from the Adjutant General's records? 

Mr. Caulfield. Yes. sir. 

7. General Russell. Your directions were to make available to me 
as a member of this Board all data, all documents, memorandums, 
and so forth, which in anv wav related to the Hawaiian Department, 
for the year 1941 ? " ' 

Mr. Caulfield. That is correct. General. 

8. General Russell. Were all of those documents in the Adjutant 
General's files, as just described, made available for me? 

Mr. Caulfield. Yes ; they were. General. 

9. General Russell. And the people whom you have just named 
rendered me all the help possible in going through these records and 
selecting those documents which I might think would be pertinent 
and of interest to the Board ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 83 

Mr. Cauupield. That is correct, General. 

10. General Russell,. I have no other questions. 

11. General Grunert. I have no questions. 

12. General Russell. Thank you, 

13. General Grunert. All right. Thank you, very much. 
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

[U5^ TESTIMONY OF COLONEL CHARLES K. GAILEY, JR., EXECU- 
TIVE OFFICER, OPERATIONS DIVISION, GENERAL STAFF, WAR 
DEPARTMENT 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Colonel Gailey, will you state to the Board your 
name, rank, organization, and station. 

Colonel Gailey. Colonel Charles K. Gailey, Jr. ; U. S. Army, Wash- 
ington, D. C. ; at present on duty in the War Department General 
Staff as Executive Officer of the Operations Division. 

2. General Grunert. Colonel Gailey, the Board, in attempting to 
get at the facts, is looking into the War Department background and 
viewpoint prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. This 
includes an examination of pertinent, available records. You have 
been called as a witness because of your familiarity with the records 
in so far as the office of OPD, War Department General Staff, is con- 
cerned, and General Russell will propound whatever questions there 
are. If there are any others, the other members of the Board will 
attempt to develop them. 

3. General Russell. Colonel Gailey, recently, as a Member of this 
Board, I made a request on you for all documents, memorandums, other 
data, and files of the OPD, as they related to operations in the Ha- 
waiian Department for the year 1941; is that true? 

Colonel Gailey. I do not know whether it was in just exactly those 
words or not, sir, but I was instructed to help you out in any way we 
could, sir. 

4. General Russell. I did submit to you a list of documents which 
we thought were in your office and ask that you produce [-?4^] 
them for us? 

Colonel Gailey. Yes, sir. 

5. General Russell. You produced all of the documents which I 
requested, which were in your office ? 

Colonel Gailey. Yes, sir; I believe so. That was turned over to 
Mr. Bond, and I believe he got them all for you. 

6. General Russell. And so far as you know, those are the only 
documents in your office which relate to the subjects that we are inves- 
tigating in this matter? 

Colonel Gailey. General, I did not check those lists of the files that 
you turned over, but I do believe that all the papers that pertain to 
this have been gotten together, I do not know whether at that time or 
at a later time. In what General North's outfit and you got together, 
and what Mr. Bond got together, I think you got it all, sir. 

7. General Russell. In other words, you think the efforts of these 
three people have cleaned out your records of everything material to 
Pearl Harbor for the year 1941 ? 



84 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Gailey. Yes, sir ; I do not think there is anything left. 

8. General Russell. 1 want to make a statement in the record. 
I want to say that the documents which General North obtained have 
been made available to lis. 

Colonel Gailey. Yes, sir. 

9. General Russell. And the Board has had the documents that 
Colonel Gailey made available. 

Colonel Gailey. General, may I make another statement for the 
record? General Handy has issued instructions in the Operations 
Division that any thing this Board desires, they get, [^4'^] and 
we are to give you every aid and assistance in finding what you want 
that we can possiblv give you. 

10. General Gkunert. And General Handy is the A. C. S., O. P. D. ? 
Colonel Gailey. Yes, sir. 

11. General Frank. Have you any knowledge of any papers per- 
taining to the subject on which we are conducting an investigation, 
for which we have not asked ? 

Colonel Gailey. No, sir ; I do not. General. 

May I amend that, sir ? I do not know of all the papers you have 
asked for, sir, but 1 do not know of any papers that are not covered 
in the three categories that I mentioned to General Russell. 

12. General Frank. And that have been made available ? Thanks. 

13. General Grunert, Are there any further questions ? All right. 
Thanks. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 
General Grunert. We are now going to other business. 
(Thereuj)on, at 3:10 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of 
witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 85 



[iy/] CONTENTS 



WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 9, 1944. 

Testimony of — Page » 

General H. H. Arnold, U. S. Army ; War Department, Washinsjton, 

D. C 148 

Colonel Edward F. French, Signal Corps, Officer in charge of the 

Traffic Operation Division, Chief Signal Office, Washington, D. C__ 1S6 

Maj. (Jen. Charles D. Herron, Retired 207 

Maj. Gen. Philip Hayes, U. S. Army, Commanding General, Third 

Service Command, Baltimore, Md 241 

DOCUMENTS 

Message of Novemher 28, 1941, 482 170 

1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original transcript of proceedings. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 87 



Um PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL 

HARBOR BOARD 



WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 9, 1944 

Munitions Building, 

Washington^ D. C. 

The Board at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the 
hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the 
Board, jDresiding. 

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. 
Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members. 

Present also : Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, and Major Henry 
C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder. 

General Grunert. The Board will come to order. 

(Stephen S. Maxon, shorthand reporter, was sworn by the Re- 
corder.) 

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL H. H. ARNOLD, U. S. ARMY, WAR 
DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C. 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24. ) 

1. Colonel West. General, will you state to the Board your name, 
rank, organization, and station. 

General Arnold. H. H. Arnold, General, U. S. Army; station. War 
Department, Washington. 

^2. General Grunert. General Arnold, the Board in an attempt to 
get at the facts, is looking into the War Department background and 
viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is 
hoped that because of your assignment with the Air Forces [-?4^] 
in Washington at that time you can throw some light on the subject. 

In order to cover the large field in the limited time available, indi- 
vidual Board Members have been assigned objectives or phases for 
special investigations, although the entire Board will pass upon all 
objectives and phases. General Russell has this particular phase, 
so he will lead in propounding questions, and the other Membei's will 
assist in developing it ; so I will turn you over to General Russell for 
the time being. 

3. General Russell. General Arnold, Saturday, we submitted to 
General White, for your attention, certain questions or subjects with 
the hope that they would give you an opportunity to refresh your 
mind and collect such data as you would want to answer those ques- 
tions. It is my purpose to follow, in the main, the outline sent you 
on that day. 

Would you please state. General Arnold, your official status during 
the year 1941. 



88 CONGRESSIONAL IN\-ESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Arnou). I was Cliief of Air Corps, until the 5tli of May. 
1941. I was Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, until the 19th of May 
1941 : Deputy Chief^of Staff*, to the balance of the year. I was Chief 
of the Army Air Forces, from the 6th of ^lay 1941 to the balance oi 
the year. 

4. General Eussell. Then, during Xovember and December 1941, 
you were Deputy Chief of Staff and Commander of the Air Forces? 

General Arxou). That is correct. 

5. General Russelx. General Arnold, were you familiar with the 
international situation in 1941 as it related to the Japanese Govern- 
ment ( 

General Akxold. That's a question of relativity. I was [^oO] 
as familiar as an officer in my position could have been. By that I 
mean there were certain things undoubtedly happening that I did 
not know about: there were certam other things happened that I 
did know about. 

6. General Russell. General Arnold, in the critical months of 1941. 
if we may describe those late fall months of 1941 as "the critical 
months." you were Deputy Chief of Staff' and Commander of the 
Air Forces. As Deputy Chief of Staff', you were next to the Chief 
of Staff of the Army, were you not ? 

General Arnold. Yes. sir. 

7. General Gruxert. May I interrupt ( Were you the only Deputy, 
or were there other Deputies ? 

General Arnou). There were two other Deputies. There were 
General Bryden and General Moore. There were three Deputy Chiefs 
of Staff at that time. 

8. General Russell. In the absence of General Marshall from 
"Washington, which of the Deputies was senior and acting? 

General Arnold. General Bryden. 

9. General Russell. General Arnold. I think it would be helpful 
if you could enlarge on or maybe elucidate your answer to the effect 
that you knew some things, and some things you did not know. 

Greneral Arncild. "Well. I don't want to complicate the situation, 
but there were certain ultrasecret things that obviously I knew noth- 
ing about. On the other hand, there were certain ultrasecret things 
that were brought to my attention. I did have access to all of the 
conferences of the G-2 Section. I did have daily conferences with the 
Chief of Staff, I also had my own A-2 Section, that brought me in 
information [^^1] as to what was going on; but after it was 
all over. I realized there were other things that had happened that 
I didn't know anytliing about. 

10. General Russell. General Arnold, we have discovered in our 
investigation the existence of a "council of war." which apparently 
had its meetings over in the office of the Secretary of State. I believe 
Greneral Marshall in his testimony stated that he and General Stark 
frequently attended those council meetings. Were you ever in on 
any of those council meetings ? 

General Arnold. I was never present at any of those meetings. 

11. General Russell. "When you say that after December 7 it de- 
veloped that there were things about which you did not know, were 
any of those things developed in these council meetings that we are 
discussing ? 



PROCEEDIXGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 89 

General Arxold. I think they probably were. 

12. General Russell. Generally. General Arnold, your information 
on the Japanese situation, in the late fall of 1941, indicated a tighten- 
ing in the relationship or a continuing of the relationship; or. just 
what was the trend in our relations with Japan? 

General Arxold. I think you can go back earlier. I think it be- 
came apparent as early as January 1941 that the relations were quite 
strained, and the various things that happened from then on through 
the year indicated that we knew that they were strained and we were 
taking necessary steps to do what we could to prepare for any eventu- 
ality that might occur, without causing an overt act agains the 
Japanese. 

For instance, it was always our endeavor to get as many [io2^ 
airplanes as we could across to the Philippines, and in order to 
do that we had to. as you will know, open up an air route across 
the Pacific, which in those days was quite a task. We did succeed in 
opening up an air route, with the help of the Xavy. by way of Midway 
and Wake, down through Rabaul. into Darwin, and up into the Philip- 
pines. After the route was established, then one of our worries was 
whether or not if the Japs did declare war or start activities against 
us, we could hold those airports open. 

It was some time in the summer, for instance, that I talked with 
Admiral Stark, and he was very much worried about what the Japs 
were doing down in Truk and Jaluit. We knew they were doing some- 
thing down there, we did not know what : so I made arrangements then 
that these planes that were going to the Philippines would fly off their 
course to take pictures of Jaluit and Truk. It was quite a difficult task 
in those days, because the distances were long, we had to have gasoline, 
and every time we put a camera in. every time you put extra ammimi- 
tion in. every time you put gims in. it meant taking off something; and 
yet we needed those photographs badly. 

Well, it was not until December, for instance, that we finally got 
those pictures, and then the planes that got the pictures were the last 
ones to land in the Philippines before the Japs attacked the Philip- 
pines, so what the photographs showed, we never found out. 

I think it was the 17th of November. General George of my outfit, 
then Colonel George, wrote me a memorandum and said he was wor- 
ried about the vulnerability of Wake and Midway, and asked me 
whether we couldn't do something about it. but in l^o^] those 
days we were at peace, we couldn't take the actions that we took later, 
so that I was making a note of it and calling it to the attention of the 
War Department. There wasn't much we could do. We took it up 
with the Xa^-y Department, but that was one of Xavy's tasks in those 
days, and the Xavy was putting in fields with us and for us. and as I 
remember it. they did send some garrisons out to Wake and Midway, 
maybe before and maybe after that: but we were worried — worried 
about losing those two islands. 

Looking back on it. I am convinced now that we all assumed that the 
Japs would attack the Philippines. We were fairly sure that they 
wotild cut our air line, because they had to ciu our air line to stop our 
heavy bombers from getting to the Philippines. We were pretty sure 
that they would attack Wake and Midway when they did attack. 
There was alwavs the chance that thev mifrht attack Hawaii. Xow, 



90 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

against that, we had a very small air force. The planes that we had 
that we could use in those possessions effectively were in the hundreds 
and not in the thousands. 

Simultaneously with that we were trying to build up an air force 
in the United States for any eventuality, and so the number of air- 
planes we could send would be numbered by the dozens; and every 
time you took an airplane away from the United States it meant that 
many less here to build up this Air Force that we knew that some time 
or other we would have to use. 

I think that the Philippine Connnander and the Hawaiian Com- 
mander were aware of the necessity for air, because they asked for 
airplanes. It was in August 1941 that the [i^4] Command- 
ing General of the Hawaiian Department approved a request for 180 
B-l7's. Now, we did not have 180 B-l7's to give them, because at 
that time the total number of B-17's in the Army was only 109. He 
was asking for 180, so his request naturally could not be filled. 

Prior to that, as early as February, we were trying to get P-40's 
out to the Hawaiian Department, and the Commanding General out 
there wanted additional fighter airplanes, because he quite obviously 
saw a possible use for them ; so we went to the extent of getting and 
sending P— lO's out there on carriers, to increase the number he had 
available. 

So I think that there was a general acceptance of the possibility 
of Japanese aggression, certainly against the Philippines and against 
Wake and Midway, and possibly, against Hawaii. 

13. General Russell. General Arnold, there were negotiations 
going on between representatives of the Japanese Government and 
the American Government, in 1941, about which you knew, I guess? 

General Arnold. I knew the negotiations were going on; yes. 

14. General Russell. Were you kept informed as to the develop- 
ments in those negotiations ? 

General Arnold. Not to any 100 percent extent. In other words, 
I knew that on the 27th of November negotiations had broken down, 
apparently broken down, and the Chief of Staff sent a message to the 
Philippines and to the Hawaiian Department. He sent a warning 
message of them. 

15. General Grunert. Do you feel that you were given [^-55] 
sufficient information to carry on your job? 

General Arnold. I feel I was, because I knew. With the general 
situation, I knew that, with the limited means at hand, somehow or 
other we had to do the impossible and get airplanes out to the Philip- 
pines and over to Honolulu. We didn't have the airplanes, so we did 
the best we could. 

16. General Russell. General Arnold, to go back to this subject of 
the negotiations, the fact that those negotiations were occurring in 
no way hindered or delayed your efforts to get aircraft into the Pacific 



area 



General Arnold. As a matter of fact, on the contrary, we leaned 
over backwards to get them over, because somehow or other I person- 
ally never trusted the Japs very much. 

i7. General Russell. You had no faith in the good faith of the 
negotiations? 

General Arnold. I had no faith at all in the negotiations. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 91 

18. General Russell. You stated a moment ago, General Arnold, 
that you knew something was going on in Truk and Jaluit. Gener- 
ally, how far were those islands from Hawaii? 

General Arnold. My recollection is that the distance from Wake to 
Rabaul is about 1400 miles — General Frank knows more about this 
than I do — and Truk and Jaluit were about two thirds the distance, 
one of them on the west side of our course about twenty miles, and the 
other on the east side of our course about sixty miles. 

19. General Russell. Were those two islands in the mandated 
group ? 

General Arnold. Both were in the mandated group, I think. 

20. General Russell. Then, some time in the fall of 1941, [ioS] 
you discovered that something was happening out there ? 

General Arnold. Well, we knew that the Japs were doing something 
there. We knew they were building naval bases. Navy was worried 
about it, and we took it so seriously that I told my boys when they 
flew over there, or who were going to fly over there, that they would 
probably have a fight on their hands, and I cautioned them to have 
their machine guns, or load them, when they flew over those islands; 
so I knew we were going to liave a fight on our hands. 

21. General Rl'Ssell. Did those developments. General Arnold, that 
you have just discussed, in your opinion constitute a threat to Midway 
and Wake and Hawaii? 

General Arnold. In my opinion it was a direct threat against my 
airway across the Pacific, because it cut my airline in two. 

22. General Russell. Were these three points, Hawaii, Midway, 
and Wake, all on your air route ? 

General Arnold. They wei'e all on my airway route. My air route 
went from San Francisco to Hawaii, to Midway, to Wake, and then 
across all the mandated islands, to Rabaul, then across to Darwin and 
Australia, and up into the Philippines; and it was the only route we 
had, because the other route, we had no control over the islands. For 
instance, we would have liked very much at that time, as we have done 
since, to put a route down through Christmas or Canton, Samoa, and 

2o. General Grltnert. Let me interrupt. If the witness is giving 
any testimony that may be of value to the enemy in the future, any- 
thing planned, or something that they do not now [-?->'^] know, 
I suggest we had better have a closed session and have such things ex- 
plained to us, rather than putting it in the record, which may or may 
not get to other eyes than ours. 

General Arnold. I think that is an excellent idea. 

24. General Gkunert. So, if you will keep that in mind as you go 
along, and if there is any such information that you think ought to be 
particularly guarded and not put into the record, then do not give it. 

General Arnold. I am, along that line, a little bit doubtful about 
this photographic business being in your open record, because some- 
body may pick that up at a later date as an act of war, or aggression, or 
something. 

25. Genera] Rltssell. Unfortunately, if that is true. General Arnold, 
it is all through the record in the Roberts Commission proceedings, 
and in our record. 

General Arnold. That is all right. 



92 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

26, General Grunert. Anything that appeared in those reports may 
appear here. 

27. General Russell. That is where we got it, first. 

The point, definitely, that I was attempting to establish, now, k; 
whether or not it was a fact that the Air Corps people, your people, 
considered these developments in the mandated islands as a threa ; 
against Hawaii, Wake, and Midway? 

General Arxold. Against Midway and Wake, certainly; and pos- 
sibly, against Hawaii. Looking back on it now, I cannot remembev 
that we were all so much worried about the innnediate attack on 
Hawaii. It was always a possibility ; but we all thought there certainly 
would be an attack against Midway and Wake, 

[1S8] 28. General Russell. Your reasoning there, I assume, 
General Arnold, was predicated on the fact that Midway and Wake 
were nearer to these Japanese developments in the Mandate than was 
Hawaii? 

General Arnold. That is right. 

[1S9] 29. General Russell. General Arnold, were you at that 
time familiar with the plans for the operation of the Army Air Force 
in the Territory of Hawaii ? 

General Arnold. Yes; I was. 

30. General Russell. Did it include information as to the coopera- 
tion between the Army and Navy Air Forces out there? 

General Arnold. Yes, 

31. General Russell. Did you consider those plans sound from the 
standpoint of air operation? 

General Arnold. No. The Air Force never did consider those plans 
sound. We never considered any plans sound which did not give us 
full opportunity to use the heavy bombers and to get the most out of 
them ; and we did not think that those plans permitted that. We figured 
that they were wasting the striking force on reconnaissance missions, 
so that when we had to use a striking force they would not be available. 

32. General Russell. Did you know what the reconnaissance plan 
was? 

General Arnold. I read it and my people studied it. 

33. General Russell. It is true that the responsibiltiy of the Army 
for reconnaissance ended with its inshore patrol ? 

General Arnold. The responsibility of the Army ended with the 
inshore patrol, but the Navy had the use of the Army heavy bombers 
for the long-range reconnaissance. 

34. General Russell. If they required them ? 

General Arnold. And they did require them, because they did use 
them. 

35. General Russell, When? 

General Arnoij). All during this period, prior to the Pearl Harbor 
attack and after Pearl Harbor, 

[ISO] 36. General Russell. Are you certain about that, General 
Arnold? 

General Arnold. Of course I cannot swear on a stack of Bibles that 
I do not make mistakes, but I have a distinct recollection from seeing 
letters from the Commanding General over there saying they were 
wasting their airplanes by using them on offshore patrols. 

37. General Russell. Do you have any of those letters with you ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 93 

General Arnold. No ; I have not. 

38. General Russell. That is a point that has not yet been brought 
to the knowledge of the Board, and if Ave can get information on it it 
might be of assistance. 

General Arnold. Let me withdraw that answer. Let me look up the 
letters that I have and see whether I can substantiate it. Certainly it 
was happening after Pearl Harbor. I think I had better look that up 
and get the facts before I make that statement. Certainly it happened 
after Pearl Harbor ; and my impression is that I got a letter from Mar- 
tin telling about the use of the airplanes that way, but I may be mis- 
taken. One reason why I think maybe I am mistaken is because, look- 
ing back, I think they only had about 12 B-l7s in Hawaii at that time. 
So I guess I am mistaken. 

39. General Frank. 12 B-l7s and 32 B-18s? 

General Arnold. Yes. I guess I am mistaken. I guess they did not 
have enough to do it if they had wanted to. 

40. General Russell. It was somewhat in conflict with other data 
which we had on that subject, and we just wanted to check L-?^-?] 
it to eliminate any conflicts if possible. 

General Arnold. You might eliminate that part of it, if you will. 

41. General Russell. General Arnold, if the bombers were not 
being used for reconnaissance missions prior to December 7, 1941, 
would you now testify that the plans of operation of the Air Force, 
including cooperation with the Navy Air Force, were sound i 

General Arnold. I still w^ould not say they were sound, because 
there was a conflict of authority, a conflict of command, out there, 
that in our opinion never was straightened out. The Army responsi- 
bility, for instance, as outlined in joint action, was to provide and 
operate the mobile land and air forces required for the defense of the 
coast, aircraft operating in support of Pearl Harbor defenses, and 
general coastal frontier defense in support of or in lieu of naval forces. 

The Navy responsibility was to conduct naval operations directed 
toward the defeat of any enemy force in the vicinity of the coast and 
to support the Army in repelling attacks on coastal objectives. 

In our opinion, there never was any clear-cut line there as to the 
duties of the Army and the Navy as far as the air was concerned, 
because the air overlaps both. 

It is awfully hard for an officer in the Air Force to determine 
whether he is operating in the direct defense of the coast or whether 
he is operatnig against the defeat of enemy forces in the vicinity of the 
coast. One of them is the Navy's responsibility and the other is the 
Army's responsibility ; and [J62'] the airplane is out 150 miles 
to sea and he cannot tell which he is doing. 

42. General Grunert. If the Air Force under your direction did 
not think the plan was sound, what did you do about it ? 

General Arnold. We have always been objecting to those plans; 
we have been objecting for quite some time. 

43. General Grunert. But you found obstacles that could not be 
overcome in order to get across what j^ou air people thought was 
necessary ? 

General Arnold. No. I think that the Navy Department and the 
War Department did what they thought was best under the circum- 
stances. I do not think it w^as possible to have any clear-cut chain of 



94 COXGRESSIOXAL IX^"ESTIGATIOX PEARL H.\RBOR ATTACK 

command as long as everything was done by agi'eement instead of by 
direction. The Joint Board was an agreement Board : it was not a 
direction Board. If the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of 
Xaval Operations agreed, then the Secretary of War and the Secretary 
of the Xavy signed the proceedings and everything was lovely : but if 
they disagreed, there was no possible way. without going to the Presi- 
dent, to get a meeting of the minds. But I think this is the closest 
they could get imder the then existing organization of the War and 
Xavy Departments. 

44. General Gruxert. Even then you thought that certain of your 
equipment would be misused or not properly used ? 

General Arxold. Xot properly used. 

45. General Gruxert. That has since been corrected, has it ? 
General Ap.xold. Yes. by having miity of command. That is what 

they should have had in the first place, and then you would get away 
from all this possibility of misunderstanding and [i^'S] misuse 
of equipment. 

46. General Grttxzrt. Under the circumstances you think, then, 
that a joint air operation plan was about the best that could have 
been done { 

General Arxold. Under the organization, it was the best that could 
be done. I think the organization was faulty to that extent, however. 

47. General Russell. Could you apply that defect in the organisa- 
tion to the scheme of reconnaissance out there where, under the plan 
to which you have just referred, the offshore patrol was for the Xavy 
and the inshore patrol was for the Army ? 

General Arxold ( reading) : 

When naval forces are insuflScient for long distance patrol and search oper- 
ations. Army aircraft are made available. These aircraft will be under the 
tactical control of the naval commander directing search operations. 

That means, then, that we once again take our heavy bombers, which 
are a striking force, and turn them over to the Xavy to be used for 
reconnaissance purposes, which is not a proper employment of heavy 
bombers. 

48. General Gritxert. But this could only be done if agreed to by 
the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, and if he did 
not agree, then it could not be done. 

General Arxold. It says that : 

Joint air attacks on hostile vessels will be executed under tactical command 
of the Xavy. The Department Commander wiU determine the Army's [16-^] 
bombardment strength to particii)ate in each mission, the force to remain avail- 
able to the Xavy, for repeated attacks if required, until completion of the mission. 

The next one says : 

When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search o-pCT- 
ations. Army aircraft are made available. 

I am not sure that that was ever clarified as to who determines 
when they are to be made available or the ntmiber to be made available. 

49. General Gruxert. Did you consider in this respect that the 
Xavy under that plan was charged with what they call di.=tant patrol- 
ling or reconnaissance and that the Army was not so charged ? 

General Arxold. I think that is sound; I think that is absolutely 
correct. 



PROCEEDIXGS OF ARMY PE.\RL H-\RBOR BOARD 95 

50. General Fkaxk. You are familiar with the message that went 
out on Xovember 27. signed "Marshall" ? 

General Arnold. Yes. 

51. General Fraxk. In which he directed General Short to conduct 
such reconnaissance as he deemed necessary ? 

General Arnold. That is correct. 

52. General Frank. The only reconnaissance for which General 
Short was directly responsible was inshore reconnaissance, according 
to the agreement between himself and the Xavy. Is not that correct? 

General Arnold. Rainbow 5 says : 

Hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea, and air 1165] forces, and 
against hostile sympathizers. 

Xo strings attached. So Rainbow 5, as I understand, was in con- 
flict with the joint agreement. 

53. General Frank. "What I am trying to do is to clarify this 
point that General Russell brought out. 

General Arnold. In answer to you. General Fraiik, under Rainbow 
5, and with the instructions received from General Marshall, the 
Commandmg General. Hawaiian Department, had sufficient authority 
to extend his reconnaissance anywhere he wanted to. 

54. General Frank. General Short was given these instructions 
to conduct such reconnaissance as he deemed necessary. Let us 
assume that when he got those instructions, realizing that the Xavy 
was responsible for distant reconnaissance, did he show that to the 
Xavy ? 

General Arnold. That is to be assumed : yes. 

55. General Frank. If the normal operation ensued and they 
followed the operation of the agreement luider which the Xavy was 
responsible for distant reconnaissance, who was responsible under 
this arrangement as to whether they would conduct distant recon- 
naissance or not. 

General Arnold. Under the joint action it was Xavy responsibility. 

56. General Frank. That is what I am trying to get at. Xot with- 
standing the fact, when this order went to Short, if he still adhered 
to the agreement and the Xavy did not see fit to conduct the recon- 
naissance, then the reconnaissance was not conducted. Is that correct ? 

[166] General Arnold. I think that follows. 

57. General Gruntlrt. May I interject this question: If the War 
Department, that phase of the War Department which has to do with 
air, knowing the air plan for the defense of Hawaii, intended in any 
message that went out to the Commanding General of Hawaii that 
he should conduct any reconnaissance except that which was pro- 
vided for in the joint air operations, would the War Department 
naturally have said in this respect that the joint air agreement did 
not govern ? Do you see what I mean ? 

General Arnold. I see what you mean, but I think you wiU find 
that the War Department has consistently refrained from trying to 
tell the theaters how to run their jobs. I as as an individiuVl wrote 
quite frequently to General Martin. I called attention in certain 
cases to certain parts of the air plan out there that I did not agree with, 
but I always put it up to General Martin as something for him to 



96 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

consider with the Navy and with the local authorities, and I never 
tried to tell General Martin how to run his show. 

58. General Grunert. But here comes a directive from the War 
Department to the effect that there would he such reconnaissance and 
so forth, and they referred to air reconnaissance presumably. Natu- 
rally it would seem that the local Commander would consider that 
as referrino^ to those reconnaissances as had been agreed upon. 

General Arnold. That is right. I go right back to my former 
statement, that at that time we all considered an attack against Hono- 
lulu, as far as the air was concerned, a possibility. We did not think 
it would be as acute as an attack against Wake or Midway. 

[167] 58. General Eussell. General Arnold, I had a thought in 
the memorandum which we presented to you earlier expressed as re- 
questing the conclusions which you had reached on the 28th day of 
November, 1941, as to the probability of an air attack on the installa- 
tions at Oahu and the Navy by carrier-borne Japanese aircraft. I am 
not sure but what you have covered that in substance already, but I 
wonder wliether or not you would be good enough to enlarge on that. 

General Arnold. The best way I know how to answer that is that 
when I heard that the attack had been carried out, I was out on the 
West Coast. 

Let me go back a little bit. I went out on the West Coast to expedite 
the departure of B-l7s for the Phillipines, because I was sure in my 
own mind tliat if we could get enough of them out there we could make 
an attack on the Phillipines unsuccessful. We figured if we could get 
enough B-17s the Japs could not successfully attack the Phillipines. 
I went out to the West Coast to exj)edite the departure of some of them. 
I got to Hamiliton Field — and, incidentally, they also on their way 
across from Wake to Rabaul were to take pictures of Truk and Jaluit. 
r talked to all the squadron connnanders and the staff before they took 
off. I told them at that time that they might run into trouble. I told 
them that tliey should have heir guns ready and that they might have 
a fight on their hands. But I did not visualize the fight in Hawaii 
or this side of Hawaii ; I visualized it somewhere on the other side of 
Hawaii. 

60. General Russell. General Arnold, did that thought which you 
had about the probable place of attack out there cause you \i08] 
to send those bombers from the West Coast to Pearl Harbor unarmed? 

General Arnold. They were armed. 

61. General Russell. Did they have annnunition when they left the 
West Coast? 

General Arnold. No, because at that time it was a question of gaso- 
line or ammunition for that long 24:00-mile hop. Obviously we made 
an error, an error in judgment. Somebody had to weigh the fact 
against their certainty of arriving there by providing sufficient gaso- 
line against the probability of their using their machine guns and not 
getting there by carrying that extra amnumition. They had to weigh 
one against the other, and they decided against annnunition. So they 
did not take the ammunition, and they got there right in the middle 
of the Pearl Harbor attack. 

62. General Russell. I was interested in your answer a moment ago 
that you were pressing to get B-I7s to the Philippines because you had 
arrived at the conclusion that if you had enough there the Japs could 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 97 

not attack the Philippines. Are you talking about air attacks or any 
sort of attacks ? 

General Arnold. Any sort of attacks. We believed if a convoy came 
dovrn off the Phillipines we would have another Bismarck Sea, and we 
just anticipated the effectiveness of our bombers by about a year and 
a half. 

63. General Russell. The effectiveness of your bombers, or the con- 
ception of their effectiveness ? 

General Arnold. We had the same idea; we have always believed 
we could do it. 

64. General Russell. Did you not have the same bombers too? 
[169] General Arnold. We had the same B-l7's. 

65. General Russell. It came to pass, General Arnold, that on the 
27th of November a message was sent by the Chief of Staff to these 
overseas departments and the West Coast Command. Were you 
familiar with that ? 

General Arnold. Yes, 

66. General Russell. Were you in on the conferences which led to 
the sending of that message ^ 

General Arnold. Yes, 

67. General Russell. Do you remember whether or not you partici- 
pated in framing that message? 

General Arnold. I did not. 

68. General Russell. You did see that message? 
General Arnold. I saw the message ; yes. 

69. General Russell. Briefly, could you tell us what, in your mind, 
prompted the sending of that message ? 

General Arnold. I think it was the breakdown in the conference 
here in Washington with the Japanese. 

70. General Russell. In other words, there were no hostile develop- 
ments, or possibly I should say that there were no new Japanese move- 
ments in that immediate period around November 27 wliich caused the 
sending of that message ? 

General Arnold. Not so far as I know. 

71. General Russell. And there were no developments which caused 
you to revise your thinking as to the probabilities of Japanese action? 

General Arnold. Not so far as I know. 

72. General Russell. Then it was confined almost exclusively to the 
fact that these negotiations were considered as about [170] at 
an end? 

General Arnold. In my opinion — and I thought it was sound, be- 
cause, as I said before, I never thought the negotiations would get 
nnywhere. 

73. General Russell. You do not know whether the Secretary of 
State had announced to the War and Navy Departments that those 
negotiations were about through? 

General Arnold, I do not know that ; no, sir. 

74. General Russell, General Arnold, on the clay following the 
sending of the message of the 27th, a message was sent by the Adjutant 
General which was copied into tlie memorandum that we sent to you 
two or three days ago, and I want to repeat that message here in the 
record. 

79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1— — 8 



98 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(Message of November 28, 1941, is as follows :) 

114 WAR KR 189 WD Prty 

Washn. D. C. 8:42P Nov. 28, 1941. 
CG 

Hawn Dept Ft Shafter T H 

482 28th Critical situation demands tliat all precautions be taken immedi- 
ately against subversive activities within field of investigative i*esponsibility of 
War Department paren see paragraph three MID SC thirty dash forty five and 
paren stop Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures 
necessary to provide for protection of your establishments comma property 
comma and equipment against sabotage comma protection of your personnel 
against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage 
stop This does not repeat not mean that any [171] illegal measures are 
authorized stop Protective measures should be confined to those essential to 
security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm stop To insure speed 
of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does 
not repeat not affect your i-esponsibility under existing instructions. 

You are familiar with that message, are you not ? 
General Arnold. The message relative to sabotage ? 
General Russell. Yes. It is 482, and begins : 

Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against 
subversive activities. 

General Arnold. Yes. I am familiar with that. 

75. General Russell. Was that message prepared under your super- 
vision ? 

General Arnold. I have got to go back into history to give you the 
background of that. 

We had been having a lot of trouble with our airplanes all over 
the United States. We had been having trouble with them coming 
out of the factories, down at Savannah, and various other stations. 
We had had many accidents that we could not explain, and it looked 
to us as if there was sabotage. Just to what extent sabotage was 
taking place, I did not know. So we went through a period during 
the fall of 1941 when we were endeavoring to stop these iniexplained 
accidents. In certain cases the finger pointed right directly at 
sabotage; in certain other cases, looking back on it now, I know it 
was inexperienced workmen who just could not do the job properly. 
But at that time we were so convinced that it was sabotage that we 
had sent [172] sabotage messages all over the United States, 
to our factories, to our factory representatives, to all the training 
fields; and it was just an unfortunate occurrence that my sabotage 
message, that was brought to my attention by General Scanlon on 
the morning of the 28th of November, came up; and he asked me 
then to send this sabotage message to all stations of the Air Corps. 
He prepared a message and I started it through the machinery to 
send it out to all air stations, but as it went through. General Miles, 
who was then G-2, got hold of it and he said, "If you are going to 
send it to all the air stations you ought to send it to all Army stations 
throughout the world." We had quite a long discussion about it, 
and I withdrew from the discussion and left General Scanlon to carry 
on. Whether or not I actually saw the message as finally sent out, 
before it was sent, I do not know, but I certainly started it. I know 
that General Scanlon was present with General Miles when they 
had their discussion as to what the message should contain and the 
phraseology of it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 99 

76. General Grunert. May I ask there if this message was directed 
particularly at Hawaii ? 

General Arnold. It had no connection with conditions in Hawaii. 
It was an over-all message sent to all Army Air Force stations. 

77. General Grunert. From your background it might appear that 
the result to be attained through that message would apply more to 
air fields in the United States than elsewhere. 

General Arnold. I would not have said that at the time, no, because 
at that time we were fearful of what might happen [17S] in 
Hawaii, due to the Japanese who lived in Hawaii and who had had 
access to our air fields. We did not send it particularly to Hawaii. 
We sent the same thing to Panama, because we were having accidents 
down there too. 

78. General Grunert. Do 3^ou know why the 28th was selected in- 
stead of the 26th or 24th or 29th ^ Was there anything particular 
to bring to mind that particular date ? 

General Arnold. General Scanlon brought it to my attention. Just 
why he picked the 28th I do not know. It was gradually building up 
before we had talked to our various Commanders in the United States 
about sabotage. But why General Scanlon picked the 28th I do not 
know. 

79. General Grunert. Then you do not know whether there is any 
connection between the Chief of Staff's message of November 27 and 
the G-2 message on sabotage and your message? 

General Arnold. I do not think there is any connection. As a 
matter of fact, I do not believe that General Scanlon knew of the Chief 
of Staff's message, 

80. General Frank. In other words, it was a coincidence? 

[174-] Genera] Arnold. It is all coincidence. You have to bear 
in mind that for a lot of these things I am counting on my memory 
and I have given the story as best I remember it. In certain instances 
I have had a cliance to refresh myself; in certain others I have not. 

81. General Kussell,. General Arnold, from your reference to sab- 
otage a moment ago and your subsequent explanation of that situa- 
tion, I gathered the impression that you were referring to sabotage as 
you thought it might exist largely in the plants where your planes 
were being manufactured. 

General Arnold. Also in the operating bases. 

82. General Eusseix. Operating bases. 

General Arnold. Because we knew that we were having these ac- 
cidents in our operating bases, and we could not explain any of them. 

83. General Kussell. Now, to clarify your initial statements and 
(hose made in response to questions from members of the Board, your 
initial conception was to provide in this message of November '28th 
against damage to Air Corps material ? 

General Arnold. That is right, 

84. General Russell. It was converted into an over-all anti-sabo- 
tage message for all Army installations in this conference between you 
and General Scanlon, on the one part, and G-2 on the other? 

General Arnold. That is correct. 

85. General Russell. General Grunert asked you about the fact that 
it was sent out to all of these installations throughout the world, prac- 
tically, and hence had no particular reference to the Hawaiian De- 



100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

partment, to which, as I recall, you replied [i'/S} that it did 
have reference to the Hawaiian Department, because you were ap- 
prehensive about the materiel in the Hawaiian Department. 
General Arnold. Yes. 

86. General Frank. The same as at all other stations in the world ; 
that is correct, isn't it ? 

General Arnold. That is right; all stations in the w^orld. I was 
worried about all of them. 

87. General Russell. General Arnold, in this radiogram of Novem- 
ber 28th, identified as 482, the language is used, "Protective measures 
should be confined to those essential to security," with certain cautions 
which follow. Do you have any recollection as to why that particular 
statement was placed in that message ? 

General Arnold. I was not present when the message was finally 
completed, but as an indication of our belief that there might be sub- 
versive activities in our Hawaiian fields I remember quite distinctly, 
when the first reports came in as to what had allegedly occurred at 
Hickam Field, and they were reports that afterwards I think were 
disproved, that stated that the Japs had deliberately run their dollies 
into the tails of our airi:)lanes and had performed other activities of 
that character, why, we were only too ready to believe them. So that 
was in our minds undoubtedly at that time. 

88. General Russell. The thing that is in the Board's mind at the 
moment is whether or not your limiting the activities to these protec- 
tive measures affected General Short's thinking about what was to be 
done out there. 

[176] General Arnold. Of course, I cannot answer that because 
through all this I have a continuous record of requests for airplanes 
against air attacks, more airplanes, more crews. "Get them over as 
fast as you can. Change the armament. Get these airplanes up to date 
against air attack." That whole thought, that thought goes through 
all the messages, all the letters that came back there for a period of 
the year starting with January 1941. So the thought that we had, the 
impression that it left in our mind, was that they were thinking of air 
attack. 

89. General Russell. Well, to follow the questions 

90. General Grunert. I would like to ask a question on that, unless 
you are ready to continue on it. 

91. General Russell. No, sir. Suppose you ask it. 

92. General Grunert. That message 482 of November 28tli- which we 
have under discussion appeared to wind up with this statement: 

This does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions. 

Do you know what that was intended to convey, whether or not that 
was intended as a caution to the effect that, although you must look 
after the sabotage, you must also look after other cleiensive measures? 
Do you know whether that was in your minds ? 

General Arnold. That was undoubtedly in our minds at that time. 

93. General Grunert. I just wanted to put that in so as to complete 
the idea. 

94. General Russell. You refer to "illegal measures" and enjoin 
against taking illegal measures in this. 

[177] General Arnold. They were not my words. 

95. General Russell. You do not know what that was? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 101 

General Arnold. They were G-2 words. 
9C). General Russell. You do not know what he meant ? 
General Arnold. I do not know what he meant, because I was not 
present when he put those in. 

97. General Russell. General Arnold, it seems, then, that this 
message which you originally designed for the air people had grafted 
onto it by the G-2 Department other instructions which may or may 
not have resulted in some confusion in the message. 

General Arnold. That may be. I am sorry that I was not present 
at the meeting where they drew up the message, so I could give 
what actually took place. 

98. General Grunert. Do you think that General Scanlon would 
have answers to most of these questions ? I believe you said that he 
was present. 

General Arnold. General Bryden might be able to help out on 
them, or General Scanlon, because General Scanlon stood out for 
certain sentences to be included in the War Department message. I 
think that you might be able to get help from one or both of them. 

99. General Russell. Did you see General Short's reply to that 
message of the 28th, General Arnold ? 

General Arnold. I saw General Short's reply. 

100. General Grunert. Was the reply that you saw intended as a 
reply to this message or to the Chief of Staff's message of the 27th in 
which the report was called for ? 

[17S] General Arnold. I think that he made a reply to the 
Chief of Staff's message which was different ; I think it was a shorter 
message. 

101. General Grunert. Yes. 

102. General Russell. As a matter of fact, General Arnold, Gen- 
eral Short did reply and lef erred by number to this radio message 482. 
He did make a rather complete report on that, what he had done in 
response to the directions in message 482. 

General Arnold. You see, at that time I was more interested in 
the air than I was in the rest of the Island because I thought that we 
had a big problem there, so the only thing I was interested in was 
getting a reply from Martin. 

103. General Grunert. In General Short's reply to your message 
did he state, did he enumerate, any other measures than measures 
against sabotage that had been taken ? 

General Arnold. I do not remember that he did. I think it cov- 
ered just sabotage ; security and sabotage. 

104. General Russell. Those are the only questions that I have. 

105. General Grunert. Have you any questions. General Frank? 

106. General Frank. Hawaii was on the priority list for the de- 
livery of airplanes in '41, was it not? 

General Arnold. It was. Second priority. Philippines first 
priority and Hawaii second priority. 

107. General Frank. What was the state of transition from B-18s 
to B-l7s in Hawaii? Do you remember? 

General Arnold. I remember they were having a school out there 
at the time for this transition, and that we sent over some specially 
skilled personnel to help them out in their [179] B-17s, but 
what the exact status of the transition was I do not know. 



102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

108. General Frank, Generally do you know the state of training ? 
General Arnold. We were always of the belief that the Hawaiian 

Air Force was probably better trained than any of our air forces. 
That is the impression we had here in Washington as a result of our 
inspections and due to the fact that they were always carrying out 
some form of mission simulating what they would do in active combat. 

109. General Frank. What I was about to approach was this point, 
which your present answer seems to disclaim, namely, that because 
of the fact that they were charged with training a lot of crews to fly 
B-17s from California to Honolulu and then conduct a lot of transition 
training in Honolulu, and do certain training work in preparation 
for transferring squadrons to the Philippines, that perhaps they got 
themselves into a training state of mind rather than a war state of 
mind. 

General Arnold. I wrote to General Martin, as I said, from time 
to time, and the establishment of a transition school in Hawaii was 
not done until we were assured that they would get more effective 
results by carrying this transition on in Hawaii than if it were done 
in the United States. In other words, w^e had no air force, as such, 
anywhere at that time. No matter where you had that training, it 
was going to disrupt something. Where could be put that training 
so it would interfere least with the creation of the small air force 
than we did have? And it looked to us as if they could carry on 
this transition in Hawaii and interfere less with the training [^SO] 
than anywhere else because we would have the airplanes then available, 
in case of an emergency, where they would be most needed. 

110. General Grunert, May I butt in there? 

General Arnold. And at the same time we were able to take care 
of the transient heavy bombers that were going through. 

111. General Grunert. Was there anything that occurred during 
the attack that reflected the training, whether or not they were ti-ained 
or were not trained ? 

General Arnold. It is rather difficult to answer that question, be- 
cause they didn't have a chance. Those who did have a chance 

112. General Grunert. That is all I wanted. I just wondered. 
They didn't have a chance to show it one way or another ? 

General Arnold. There were three pilots that I remember who had 
a chance, and they went down and took airplanes and went up and 
gave a good account of themselves, but they were the only three that 
I know that had a chance. 

113. General Grunert. Yes. 

114. General Frank. Had anything held up B-17 production that 
in any way had an effect on this situation ? 

General Arnold. No; we did not have the facilities to get the num- 
bers that we wanted. If you will remember, at that time in our 
endeavor to get B-l7s we had 90 in January, and by June the 90 
was up to 109, and by November it had only gone up to 148. That was 
the total number of B-l7s produced by the Boeing Company. We 
just did not have the productive capacity to get the numbers required. 

[181] 115. General Frank. In answer to a question of (leneral 
Russell, I think the tenor of the reply with respect to your thoughts 
on an attack on Hawaii was to the effect that it was possible but not 
considered probable at that time. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 103 

General Arnold. Not as probable as some others. 

116. General Frank. No. 

General Arnold. We always saw the probability, but not as prob- 
able as Wake, Midway, or the Philippines. The Philippines we knew 
were going to get attacked, in our own minds ; we knew that. 

117. General Frank. I would like to develop, if I can, from any 
point of view that you may have, with respect to the attitude of the 
public toward possible war that summer and fall. Do you think gen- 
eral public attitude was reflected in the congressional vote on the Army, 
wheii the Army bill was passed by one vote ? 

General Arnold. I have no doubt in my mind at all but what it was 
reflected. I think the public was very apathetic towards all wars. 

118. General Frank. That is what I want. 

Now, you had opportunities to come in contact with the Army, that 
is, the rank and file. Generally, what, in your opinion, was the atti- 
tude of the rank and file toward the possibility of war? 

General Arnold. I think that ihe average Army officer thought it 
was coming. I do not think there is any question about that. It was 
just a question of time. 

119. General Grunert. Was that instilled into the men? Were 
they war conscious, or were they apathetic to a certain extent? 

[182] . General Arnold. I do not believe that the enlisted men, 
certainly in the Air Force, were as war conscious as the officers, be- 
cause we could not talk as openly to the enlisted men as we did to the 
officers. We had our officers' meetings; and, while we could not tell 
them everything we knew — just like it was out on the West Coast: 
I could not tell them everything we knew, but I told them enough so 
as to make them realize that the conditions were serious. 

120. General Grunert. Do you know what that status was as far as 
the air force in Hawaii was concerned, officers and men? Had you 
any reflection of that through General Martin or elsewise? 

General Arnold. I looked for some correspondence so as to refresh 
my memory on that, and I could not find it ; so I am afraid that my 
hindsight there would indicate an impression that may not be justified. 

121. General Grunert. But you have the impression that somewhere 
along the line correspondence was had on that subject? 

General Arnold. Well, for instance — see if I can find the date in 
here (indicating). As early as March 31st they had a board out in 
Honolulu as to what might happen in case the Japanese did attack 
Pearl Harbor, and that was a board signed by Martin and Bellinger 
in which the}^ outlined in that report pretty nearly what actually did 
happen. So there is no doubt in my mind that the people in Hawaii 
were thinking on the subject and giving it very serious thought. 

[183] 122. General Grunert. Do you know, from any evidence 
available to you, whether or not the officers of the Air Force in Hawaii 
were kept informed of existing conditions, so as to develop a "war 
consciousness," as one might call it? In other words, you told us 
what you knew about the officers and the men. Now, how did that 
apply, in Hawaii? Was there anybody there to tell them, or were 
they told, do you know ? 

General Arnold. You see, I was over in Hawaii shortly before this, 
and at that time, one of the things I was doing was looking around 
with a view of trying to establish in my mind whether some of these 



104 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

things were or were not being done ; and I must say that at tliat time 
it was not as serious as it became later ; but I was very well pleased with 
the way things were being carried on — the training and the building up 
of the facilities for the employment of their air arm, and the training, 
of course, including the instruction given to the individual enlisted 
men and their officers. 

123. General Gkunert. In that connection, do you thing there was a 
cry of "wolf ! wolf !" too often, so as to get them into a frame of mind 
that they would say, "Oh, well! just another cry of 'wolf'!"? 

General Arnold. I wouldn't know that. I was not close enough to 
them to get that impression. 

124. General Gruxert. Are there any other questions? 

125. General Russell, General, you have made it very clear that in 
considering Japanese probabilities, it was your opinion that the at- 
tack would more probably come at Wake and Midway and the Philip- 
pines, which were nearer the Jap bases, than was Hawaii, and yet 
HaAvaii had first priority on ships and other materiel. [^^4] 
Can you explain that ? 

126. General Arnold. In the Air Force it had second priority ; the 
Philippines had first priority, Hawaii the second priority. 

127. General Russell. I misunderstood you. I thought it was the 
otlier way around. 

General Arnold. No. 

128. General Grunert. I understand that it was first priority in most 
things, but on airplanes at that particular time, it was second priority ; 
is that right ? 

General Arnold. That is right. 

129. General Frank. I would like to ask a question, here. Were you 
familiar with the fact that there was a Japanese force of carriers, 
submarines, battleships, and cruisers at Jaluit about the 1st of Decem- 
ber? Did you have knowledge of that? 

General Arnold. Well, that was included in one of the things that 
we were going to look for, when we sent these planes over. We were 
going to look to see if there were any indications of any Japanese 
concentrations or creation of facilities in these Caroline Islands, and 
we figured that by sending these airplanes out and diverting them 
from the course far enough we could find out. As far as I was con- 
cerned at that time, it was a rumor. We didn't know. We had 
heard rumors of it — it was all you got — that there were such con- 
centrations. We did not know for sure. 

130. General Frank. You did not know that the Navy knew? 
General Arnold. No. Well, no; I didn't. 

131. General Frank. I would like to emphasize again, the facility 
or difficulty with which operations might be initiated [^^5] 
through the cooperative basis on which they had to be accomplished 
at Honolulu. Will you just give us a short statement as to your 
opinion of that. 

General Arnold. In my opinion — no, the opinion of the Air 
Forces — that was one of the main criticisms of all the plans that 
they had for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands. Everything was 
cooperation, without any direct responsibility that you get with unity 
of command, with one Commander who is responsible for employing 
the facilities at hand to carry out his mission. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 105 

132. General Frank. That is all. 

General Arnold. I would like to make one request of the Board, if 
I may. I used the word "Eniwetok" when I should have said Jaluit. 
Those two places were Jaluit and Truk, not Eniwetok and Truk. 

133. General Grunert. Make a note of that, please, and change it. 
One last question: With respect to the subject just discussed, did 

that lack of what you considered proper cooperation in Hawaii re- 
flect itself in the attack, as far as you know, from an air viewpoint ? 

General Arnold. In my opinion, the attack came so quickly and was 
so devastating in character that it never gave an opportunity to de- 
termine whether it was lack of unity of command or coordination, or 
what the trouble was. 

134. General Grunert. But if there had been what you might term, 
or have termed, the proper coordination, then it might have reflected 
itself in the earlier stages, particularly in the reconnaissance? 

[1S6] General Arnold. That is the only place where it had an 
opportunity to show itself, in view of the conditions under which 
the attack occurred. 

135. General Grunert. Are there any further questions? 

All right. Thank you very much. We appreciate your coming 
over here, and taking your time. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL EDWARD E. FEENCH, SIGNAL CORPS, 
OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE TRAFFIC OPERATION DIVISION, 
CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICE; WASHINGTON, D. C. 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you state to the Board your name, 
rank, organization, and station. 

Colonel French. Edward F. French ; Colonel, Signal Corps ; officer 
in charge of the Traffic Operation Branch, Office of the Chief Signal 
Office, Washington, D. C. 

2. General Grunert. I would also like to add to the advice given 
you by the Recorder relative to your rights under Article of War 24, 
a caution that in the event there is anything that is ultrasecret, that 
should not be placed in the record, before you answer the question, you 
may consult with the Board to see whether or not we should hear 
what you have to say in closed session. In other words, anything 
that might be of assistance to our enemy in the future. 

Colonel French. Yes, sir. 

3. General Grltnert. It is not as to what has happened, unless 
it is of continuing nature. 

This Board, in an attempt to get at the facts, is looking into the 
War Department background and viewpoints prior to [187] 
and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is hoped that, because 
of your assignment, you can throw some light on the subject. The 
Board has divided the work so that the individual Members thereof 
have a special field of inquiry, although the Board passes on every- 
thing. So, General Russell will be the one that will propound the 
questions to you, with the other Members of the Board asking any 
they see fit, on that particular line on which you are to be a witness. 
I turn you over to General Russell. 



106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

4. General Kussell, Colonel French, what were your duties on the 
7th day of December, 1941 ? 

Colonel French. I was officer in charge of the Traffic Division, and 
Officer in Charge of the War Department Signal Center, Washington, 
D. C. 

5. General Russell. What if any responsibilities did you have on 
that day in selecting the means for the transmission of messages which 
reached the Center from the War Department? 

Colonel French. I had alerted myself on December 7, knowing 
that it was a rather critical period, and I came to the office early on 
Sunday morning, making myself available should any unforeseen cir- 
cumstance arise. 

6. General Grunert. Why did you alert yourself on that particular 
morning? What was in the back of your mind as to the need, that 
caused you to be there that Sunday instead of the Sunday before, or 
the Sunday after? 

Colonel French. I had. General, alerted myself some time before 
that. I had been in my office every Sunday, every day, for quite some 
time. As to the exact days, I cannot now recall, but I spent many 
days and many nights in my office, and signal center. 

[188] 7. General Grunert. Might you have been influenced by 
what had passed through your office elsewhere as to conditions? 

Colonel French. Yes, sir. The tempo was such in my office during 
that period that I felt that it demanded my attention. 

8. General Eussell. Colonel French, on the morning of December 
7, 1941, in your official capacity over there, you could select the means 
or the method by which these messages would be sent ? 

Colonel French. Yes, sir. 

9. General Russell. You had that within your jurisdiction? 
Colonel French. That was my authority ; yes, sir. 

10. General Russell, That was your authority ? 
Colonel French. Yes, sir. 

11. General Grunert. What means were available for trans- 
mission ? 

Colonel French. Sir? 

12. General Grunert. What means were available for such trans- 
mission ? 

Colonel French. Well, the normal means available to us were the 
War Department radio net. You were speaking of Honolulu, now, 
sir, or of all? 

13. General Grunert. Yes, you might give a general answer, and 
then, also, the special one on Hawaii and Honolulu. Did you have 
anv other means besides radios? 

Colonel French. Yes ; 1 did. 

14. General Grunert. The Transoceanic telephone service? 
Colonel French. I had commercial facilities available. 

I never did use Transoceanic telephone for such [189] serv- 
ice, at any time, prior or since. 

15. General Frank. Isn't it available to you? 

Colonel French. You might consider it available to me. General, 
but we had never exercised the practice of using Transoceanic. 
18. General Grunert. Is it used from the other end ? 
Colonel French. Sir? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 107 

17. General Grunert. Is it used from the other end, to the War 
Department ? 

Colonel French. I could not say. It wasn't used to the War 
Department Signal Center, sir. 

18. General Grunert. Would you have known if it had been used, 
for instance, between the Chief of Staff and the Commanding Gen- 
eral of Hawaii, or vice versa ? 

Colonel French. I would not know of that, General. 

19. General Grunert. You would not know that? 

Colonel French. I would not know. That would be entirely up 
to the Chief of Staff. I had no control over the Transoceanic 
facility. 

20. General Frank. Had you thought of it, you could have used 
it, however, is that correct? 

Colonel French. Not in this instance; I could not have used it, 
General, because the message, the traffic, that was to be routed, was 
classified traffic, and would not be put over a voice radio. 

21. General Russell. Colonel French, on this morning of Decem- 
ber 7, 1941, you received for transmission to certain of the overseas 
departments a message from the Chief of Staff, is that true? 

[IdO] Colonel French. Yes, sir. 

22. General Russell. You have had occasion to testify about this 
message and its transmission, before? 

Colonel French. Yes, sir; before the Roberts Commission, sir. 

23. General Russell. And hence you are entirely familiar with the 
message to which I refer? 

Colonel French. Yes, sir. 

24. General Russell. Now, Colonel, can you recall the form in 
which you received that message? 

Colonel French. Yes, sir. 

25. General Russell. Will you tell us just what that was. Had 
it been prepared in longhand, or had it been typewritten or what? 

Colonel French. Colonel Bratton personally brought that message 
to the code room on the morning of December 7. 

26. General Grunert. Who is Colonel Bratton? 

Colonel French. Colonel Bratton is G-2. He is on General Miles's 
staff as G-2 officer. 

27. General Russell. He is overseas. 

Was it written out in longhand, or had it been typewritten? 

Colonel French. I heard Colonel Bratton at the code room asking 
to be admitted, and my office was across the hall from there. I im- 
mediately got up from my desk and went to the code room, and 
Colonel Bratton was then inside the code room. He told me that 
he had this message that he wanted to get out in a hurry. I looked 
at the message with him. The receiving clerk had the message, there. 
Due to the difficulty in reading [^dl] the message, I told 
Colonel Bratton we should type the message up, which he agreed to, 
and I had that message typed in my office. That was to make sure 
that the code clerk would make no error. I had it typed for clarity, 
to make sure that there would be no error made. 

28. General Frank. How long did that take ? 
Colonel French. I couldn't say, General, off-hand. 

29. General Frank. About? 



108 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel French. I would say a few minutes, just to type this mes- 
sage off. 

30. General Russell. Now, Colonel, we have gotten the form of the 
message, and I think we can develop the time element, step by step. 

Colonel French. Yes, sir. 

31. General Russell. It came into your office written out in long- 
hand? 

Colonel French. Written in longhand. 

32. General Russeij:,. I believe it appears somewhere that it was in 
the Chief of Staff's handwriting. 

Colonel French. It might have been. 

33. General Russell. You do not know that? 
Colonel French. I don't remember definitely. 

34. General Russell. Have you any record to show the exact time 
that Colonel Bratton arrived in your office with that message? 

Colonel French. No, sir; I haven't that time available to me. I 
put that time some place after 11 : 30 in the morning, when Colonel 
Bratton arrived there. 

35. General Russell. The first thing that was done to that message 
was having it written on the typewriter, to be clear? 

[19^] Colonel French. Yes, sir. 

36. General Russell. And you say that just took a few minutes, 
because it was a relatively short message ? 

Colonel French. That is correct. 

37. General Russell. When it had been copied on the typewriter, 
what happened to it? 

Colonel French. When it was typed on the typewriter, we had 
Colonel Bratton authenticate it, as I recall. Colonel Bratton read 
it and authenticated the message. We then gave the message to 
the code clerk. I left Colonel Bratton, then, and went to the Signal 
Center, the operating room, to check on the facilities available ; that 
is, as to what the atmospheric conditions were. In the morning, 
when I came in, the normal routine was to check the operating condi- 
tions in the office. They weren't any too satisfactory when I went 
out there. 

38. General Grunert. Are you going to explain that. Colonel ? Do 
you mean the atmospheric conditions, the sending equipment or the 
personnel ? 

Colonel French. The atmospheric conditions, the electrical 

39. General Frank. The interference? 
Colonel French. The ether. Atmospheric 

40. General Frank. Static ? 
Colonel French. Static interference. 

41. General Russell. So, now, you went to check the means avail- 
able to you? 

Colonel French. That's right, sir; and I checked Honolulu be- 
cause that was the point where the message had to route, going to 
Manila and going to Honolulu proper. I found out [19^3] from 
the operator that we had been out of contact with Honolulu since about 
10 : 20 that morning. 

42. General Russell. Now, let us get clear on that. You were out 
of contact, with your radio? 

Colonel French. Correct. That is, the interference was such at 
that time that we were more or less standing by, changing frequencies. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 109 

to see if we could get on a frequency that would get through that 
static ; and that, according to my log, was around 10 : 20, sir. 

43. General Frank. Washington time? 

Colonel French. Yes, sir; Eastern Standard Time. That condi- 
tion did not clear up, according to my log, until about 2 : 30 p. m, that 
afternoon. 

44. General Russell. Was the effect, then, of the static condition 
that you are describing such as to rule out radio as a means of trans- 
mitting that message ? 

Colonel French. To a communication officer, yes, sir. I also ob- 
served that we were having difficulty in working San Francisco at 
that particular time. I hazily recall, now, it was around 11 o'clock 
or later that the log indicated that conditions to San Francisco were 
bad for transmission of messages. 

45. General Russell. Now, how much time was consumed, Colonel, 
in this investigation of radio conditions ? 

Colonel French. I would say, just a few minutes. General. Time 
passes by, when you are under pressure, and I would say maybe three 
to four minutes. At that time, after I had checked the Honolulu 
channel and checked on the San Francisco channel, I immediately 
made up my mind to send this message via [-?54] commercial 
means. That was the most expeditious way, in my judgment, to get 
that message to its destination. 

46. General Russell. Will you describe for us at this point what 
commercial means were available to you. 

Colonel French. We had facilities through the Western Union and 
through the Postal Telegraph. Tlie commercial facilities into Hono- 
lulu, which is what you are interested in at this moment, were the 
RCA, the Mackay, and the Commercial Cable Company. 

47. General Russell. Let us see what the RCA was. 
Colonel French. I beg your pardon ? 

48. General Russell. What was the RCA ? 

Colonel French. The Radio Corporation of America radio facili- 
ties from San Francisco. 

49. General Russell. So you had then, if I am correct on this as- 
sumption, the Western Union, the Postal, and the Radio Corporation 
of America ? 

Colonel French. Well, the Western Union worked with the RCA. 
That was their connecting link to Honolulu. 

50. General Russell. Were any other commercial facilities avail- 
able to you except those three ? 

Colonel French. No, sir. The Postal. 

51. General Russell. Those three? 

Colonel French. Really the fastest facility available to me was 
through the Postal or the Western Union. 

52. General Grunert. Then as I understand it, you have air, wire, 
and telephone — air, telegraph, and telephone through the commercial 
lines ; is that right ? 

Colonel French. In my office. General. We never used U^SI 
telephone to deliver a message to any of our insular possessions. 

53. General Russell. Colonel, when you made this investigation, 
you reached a decision as to what means you would use ? 

Colonel French. Yes, sir; and I had to come to a hurried decision. 

54. General Russell. And you decided on what? 



110 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel F'rench. I decided on sending the message via the Western 
Union. 

55. General Russell. What steps did you take next? 

Colonel French. I did that. I decided on the Western Union for 
the reason that Avhen we were listening for the signals from Honolulu 
we observed Honolulu working San Francisco, so I deducted that the 
fastest way would be to turn it over to the Western Union and they 
would get it to San Francisco by quick dispatch. They had a tube 
connecting their office to the RCA. I was apprized of that. I knew 
that, because we had handled other messages that way at times. When 
we would have interference and had a message of any importance that 
was to be transmitted immediately, we would use the commercial facil- 
ity ; and that had been our practice. 

56. General Russell. Then there were two links to it — you wired 
it out to San Francisco, Western Union, and there it was transmitted 
to Honolulu, RCA? 

Colonel French. I immediately had the teletype operator in the 
signal center inform the Western Union that we would turn this mes- 
sage over to them. I then went back into the code room to check as to 
whether or not the message was then ready to be transmitted. I per- 
sonally took the message out U^^] to the Signal Center and 
turned it over to the operator, there. 

57. General Russell. When you went back into the code room, the 
message was or was not ready ? 

Colonel Fench. The message was ready. 

58. General Russell. Do you have any record to indicate the exact 
time that you went back and found the message ready for sending ? 

Colonel French. No, sir. I did not have the exact time. I wasn't 
checking the time that way, as to the exact time that I arrived back in 
the code room. 

59. General Russell. What was the next step, after you discovered 
that the message had been encoded and was ready for transmission? 
What did you do next ? 

Colonel French. As I recall. Colonel Bratton was at the code room, 
and he asked me how long it would take to get that message trans- 
mitted, and I told him that it would take about 30 to 45 minutes to 
transmit that message to its destination. 

60. General Russell. Now, Colonel, we are attempting to track you, 
to follow you along step by step. You had the message encoded, and 
then you sent it to Western Union ? 

Colonel French. Yes, sir. 

61. General Russell. Did you get a receipt over at Western Union 
for it? 

Colonel F'rench. No, sir. When we transmit, the routine is that 
when the message comes into the code room, we place it in code, and 
then we send the coded message out to the Signal Center, and the 
code message is time-stamped and transmitted to the station concerned. 

62. General Russell. The first time that any notation on [197] 
this message was made as to time was when it reached the message 
center for delivery over to Western Union ? 

Colonel French. No. The original message as typed by Colonel 
Bratton was time-stamped in the code room. 

63. General Russell. Do you know what that time-stamp was? 
Colonel French. I do not recall. 



PROCEEDINGS OP ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 11 1 

64. General Russell. It would have been placed on the message at 
the time that it went from the typewriter to be coded ? 

Colonel French. To the code clerk ; yes, sir. 

65. General Russell. Could you by a search of the records of the 
War Department determine that exact time for us, Colonel ? 

Colonel French. No, sir ; I cannot, for the reason that that message 
was turned back to the originator. We are concerned with the time 
of transmission of that message. 

66. General Russell. So if there is a record showing that time 
stamp, it is not in your files, it is elsewhere? 

Colonel French. It would be either in G-2 or in the OPD office. 

67. General Russell. Now, do you have any record of the exact 
time of the dispatch of this message by Western Union to the west 
coast ? 

Colonel French. Yes, sir. 

68. General Russell. What time was that ? 

Colonel French. That message was dispatched to the west coast for 
Honolulu at 12 : 01, Eastern Standard Time. 

69. General Grunert. What is the difference in time between 
Eastern Standard Time and Honolulu time ? 

Colonel French. Five and a half hours. 

70. General Grunert. If it is 12 : 01 here, what is it in [1981 
Honolulu ? 

Colonel French. Five and a half hours, sir — that would have 
been 6 : 31. 

71. General Russell. I have a statement before me. Colonel, which 
is substantially in line with the facts that you are testifying to at the 
moment. There is a little conflict, which might be adj usted ; and may 
I read this to you ? 

Colonel French. Yes. 

72. General Russell. "The message was filed at 12 : 18 p. m., Decem- 
ber 7, Eastern time"— 12 : 18, Eastern Time— "6 : 48 A. M., Decem- 
ber 7, Honolulu Time," Now, you are testifying about 12 : 01 and 6 : 31. 

Colonel French. Yes, sir. That 12 : 01 was the time that the 
message was — we count that as "filed" in the Signal Center. The 
time that it was finished, with the transmission of that message to the 
Western Union, was 12 : 17 o'clock. 

73. General Russell. Now, Colonel, do you have any data from 
which you can tell us the time of the receipt of that message at 
Honolulu ? 

Colonel French. On sending that message to Honolulu, we asked 
for reported-delivery on the message. The message was delivered — the 
message was received in the RCA office in Honolulu at 7 : 33 Hono- 
lulu time. 

74. General Russell. It therefore took how long ? 

Colonel French. It took 46 minutes from the time the Western 
Union received that message, until they got it to Honolulu. That's 
creditable service. 

75. General Russell. Now, let us assume this, Colonel, for the pur- 
pose of a hasty calculation, that Colonel Bratton reached [1991 
your office at approximately 11 : 30 on that Sunday morning. 



112 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel French. Yes, sir. 

76. General Russell. You said it was 11 : 30 or shortly thereafter? 
Colonel French. Yes, sir. 

77. General Russell. Let us say it was dispatched at 12: 01, which 
was 31 minutes after Bratton appeared at your office. 

Colonel French. That's right — if he arrived at that time. That is 
a question, General, as to the time Colonel Bratton arrived at my 
office with that message. Colonel Bratton stated at one 'time that it 
was 12 : 50 when he filed that message with us, and I believe that 12 : 50 
time Colonel Bratton had in mind was our preparation. 

(Brief interruption.) 

78. General Russell. If he came in, then, to review it. Colonel, at 
11 : 30, and you got it away at 12 : 01, that was only 31 minutes? 

Colonel French. Yes, sir. 

79. General Russell. And it took 46 minutes to transmit it? 
Colonel French. Yes, sir. 

80. General Russell. So it reached Honolulu in 31 plus 46, or 77 
minutes after Colonel Bratton reached your office ? 

Colonel French. On the assumption that Colonel Bratton arrived 
there, as you stated. 

81. General Russell. At approximately 11 : 30. 

Colonel French. I say that it was my opinion in discussing this 
with Colonel Bratton that it was after 11:30, and also in discussing 
the matter with the officers in the Chief of Staff's office, that it was 
after 11 : 30 when he arrived there. 

[2001 82. General Frank. Generally speaking, these assump- 
tions are about correct ; is that it ? 

Colonel French. Yes, sir ; that is correct. 

83. General Frank. All right. 

Colonel French, Colonel Bratton was there during the greater por- 
tion of the time that the message was being prepared. He was very 
greatly exercised in getting it through, and he was in my office and 
saw the diligence that was exercised by us in getting that message 
prosecuted. 

84. General Frank. All right. 

Colonel French. No time was lost at all in getting that message 
prosecuted through my office. 

85. General Grunert. Colonel, in your opinion, was that good time, 
excellent time, or unusually good time, to get the thing off, under the 
conditions ? 

Colonel French. That was unusually good time. General, because 
I was personally pushing the thing. 

86. General Grunert. And had it been sent over your own radio 
net, about how much time would have been saved ? 

Colonel French. Well, I can give you an example. On the 27th of 
November there was a message filed in my office, of grave importance, 
to go to Honolulu, and it was received in my office at 6 p. m. It was 
encoded and sent to the Signal Center for transmission at 6 :11. Due 
to the atmospheric conditions for transmission, the message had to 
be sent by hand. The time that it was received in Honolulu was 6 : 50. 
That was a short message. 

87. General Russell. Now, Colonel, I Avant to develop another 
phase of this. You are acquainted with the time that reasonably 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 113 

1^01] is required for decoding a message of this length, aren't 
you? 

Colonel French. Yes, sir. 

88. General Russell. About what time would the average person- 
nel in the field, sucli as you might expect to find in Honolulu, require 
to decode this message, once it reached Honolulu ? 

Colonel French. Well, the actual work of decoding a message of 
that length would run somewheres between 10 to 15 minutes, on an 
average, in the system in which that was sent, the machine system, 

89. General Russell. Then this message should have been decoded 
and intelligible in 77 minutes plus 15 minutes? 

90. General Frank. Plus the time of getting it. 

91. General Russell. Or, plus the delivery time out in Honolulu. 
Colonel French. With all things being equal, that is true. If the 

message would arrive there in class A order, there were no gobbles 
in the message, the equipment was functioning well, and everything, 
and all operations clicked, I would say that that would be a good 
performance. 

92. General Russell. Then a rather liberal estimate, from the time 
standpoint, would be that, from the moment when General Bratton 
appeared in your office with this message, until it would have been 
decoded and in the hands of the Commanding General, or the proper 
authority in Hawaii, would have been approximately an hour and a 
half? 

93. General Grunert. I do not gather that. I gather that the hour 
and a half would include just the decoding of it at the other end, and 
not the delivery. 

94. General Russell. I was just adding it all up. 

95. General Grunert. We do not know anything about the 
[^02] conditions of delivery. On the record, I will ask you this 
question : Have you any record of the time it was actually received by 
the Commanding General, or one of his staff? Was there a receipt 
demanded for this ? 

Colonel French. Yes. 

96. General Grunert. Or an acknowledgment from the Command- 
ing General? 

Colonel French. We asked for a receipt of delivery. In fact, we 
tried all day to get an acknowledgment of receipt on that message, 
from Honolulu, but things were cracking so fast from 7 : 30 in the 
morning on, and I kept pressing Honolulu, asking for the receipt of 
that message; but there were other things apparently of graver im- 
portance at that time, so that we couldn't get a prompt acknowledg- 
ment from Honolulu. 

97. General Frank. Did you ever get one? 
Colonel French. Yes, sir. 

98. General Frank. What was that time? 

Colonel French. The message, as I recall, was delivered to the 
Signal Center there in Honolulu at 11 : 45. 

99. General Grunert, Do you mean to say there was from 7 : 33 to 
11 : 45 before they decoded it and took it out to Shafter? 

100. General Russell. No. 

Colonel French. He was advised that it was delivered at 11 : 45, 
Honolulu time. That delay was due to the fact that the messenger 
was diverted from his course during the bombing. 

79716— 46— Ex. 145, voL 1 9 



114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

101. General Grunert. Have you finished? I have one question, 
here, when you ^et through, 

102. General Russell. Yes, sir. Suppose you ask your question. 
[£03] 103. General Grunert. I understood you to say that you 

had radio contact with Honolulu up to about 10 a. m., Washington 
time, on December 7. 

Colonel French. 10 : 20, General. 

104. General Grunert. 10:20? 
Colonel French. Yes, sir. 

105. General Grunert. Had you been receiving things from Hono- 
lulu that morning? 

Colonel French. Yes, sir. We exchanged traffic through the morn- 
ing up to 10 : 30. 

106. General Grunert. What would 10:20 Washington time be in 
Honolulu time. It would be before 5 a. m. ? 

Colonel French. It would be before 5 a. m. ; yes, sir. 

107. General Grunert. That is all I wanted. Has anyone else a 
question ? 

108. General Russell. I have no further questions. 

109. General Frank. I would like to ask a question. 

What type of communication does the FBI use in Hawaii, do you 
know? 

Colonel French. I do not know. General, what type the FBI used. 

110. General Frank. Do you ever ask the Navy to communicate 
messages for you ? 

Colonel French. Oh, yes. 

111. General Franch. Did you ask them this morning? 
Colonel French. No, sir. 

112. General Frank. All right. 

Another thing. Was there any indication that the difficulty in 
transmission might have been caused by artificial [204] means ? 
Colonel French. Interference? 

113. General Frank. Yes. 

Colonel French. No, sir. At that time of the year 

114. General Frank. That is all I want. 

Colonel French. At that time of the year we were normally out 
of service with Honolulu between 11 and 1 o'clock. That is a matter 
of official record. 

General Frank. Does the Navy have a more powerful radio than 
the Army, out to Honolulu ? 

115. Colonel French. Yes, at times they do use more power than 
we do ; yes, indeed. But as a matter of practice, traffic going to Hono- 
lulu that we would want to expedite and I considered sending, we 
would not use the Navy. I considered the Navy, with relation to this 
message, but I know that it would have to be delivered from Pearl 
Harbor, up to Fort Shafter, and knowing the Navy condition is the 
same as ours, my judgment was, the fastest delivery for that message 
was by the commercial means. 

116. General Frank. All right. 
Colonel French. That was considered. 

117. General Grunert. Are there any other questions? 

118. General Russell. Colonel, you stated that you had no infor- 
mation about the transmission of information from here to Honolulu 
by telephone. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 115 

Colonel French. I do not quite get the question. 

119. General Russell, You just did not use the telephone, at all? 
Colonel French. We never use the telephone to deliver [205'] 

messages out of the Signal Center ; no, sir. 

120. General Russell. The only thing you had was radio, and when 
it was out, you had to go elsewhere ? 

Colonel French. To a commercial wire. Now, if they wanted to 
use the telephone, that was up to the individuals, themselves, the 
Chief of Staff, or whoever the individual concerned, who would make 
personal calls, or official calls. 

121. General Grunert. You had no authority to use the telephone, 
no matter what the urgency of the message might be ? 

Colonel French. No, I wouldn't say that, General; no, sir. I 
have authority — I assume authority for every available means of 
communication that might be available to get a message to its destina- 
tion; but I would not have sent that message via telephone, because 
it was a classified message; and if I would attempt to have phoned 
the code groups out, it would have taken me longer, and then possibly 
there would have been a misunderstanding, as you know, in trans- 
mission of messages that distance. 

122. General Grunert. Did it occur to you that the urgency of the 
message might require you or suggest to you that you ought to inquire 
whether or not you could send it in the clear by telephone ? 

Colonel French. Well, not sending messages in the clear by tele- 
phone. I didn't consider at all sending that message by telephone. 
I assumed that the proper way to handle that message was via the 
wire means. 

123. General Grunert. Suppose you get information that somebody 
out here in St. Louis is going to shoot somebody else, and you know 
you may not get that message through in time to ['^06] keep 
them from being shot, if you send it via radio, or if it is classified, 
and so forth. Who is the judge of whether or not to send that in 
the clear instead of by code, and so forth ? 

Colonel French. The writer of the message is responsible for the 
classification of the message. General. 

124. General Grunert. And Bratton was informed that it would 
take about so long to get it over, and he did not say, "Get it out 1 
Get it out over some other way !" — he was satisfied with what time 
was going to be consumed in transmitting it ? 

Colonel French. That was the means to transmit that message. 

125. General Russell. Colonel, let us get this part clear. If a 
message comes to you classified, then you have got to send it in code ? 

Colonel French. I must send it in code ; yes, sir. That is written 
in the regulations. 

General Grunert. And you cannot send it in code over the tele- 
phone ? 

Colonel French. I cannot send it in code over the telephone with 
any great dispatch. It would be faster to handle it by wire than it 
would by telephone. 

127. General Grunert. Are there any other questions? If not, 
thanks very much. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

(Whereupon, at 11 : 23 a. m., the Board recessed until 2 p. m.) 



116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
[207] AFTERNOON SESSION 

(The Board at 2 p. m. continued the hearing of witnesses.) 
TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. CHARLES D. HEREON, RETIRED 

(The witness was sworn by the Kecorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24. ) 

1. Colonel West. General, will you state to the Board your name, 
rank, organization, and station? 

General Herron. Maj. Gen. Charles D. Herron, Ketired. 

2. Colonel West. And your address is Washington, D. C. 

3. General Grunert. General, the Board, in attempting to get at 
the facts, is looking into the War Department background and also 
the background in Hawaii, and also to get the viewpoints of those 
formerly in command and having knowledge of the facts, that is, 
both prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is hoped, 
because of your former assignment as Commanding General of the 
Hawaiian Department, that you can throw some light on the subject. 
In order to cover the large field in the limited time we have, indi- 
vidual Board members have been assigned objectives and phases for 
special investigation, although the entire Board will pass on all ob- 
jectives and phases. General Russell has the particular phase in which 
the investigation is being conducted now, so I shall ask him to lead 
in propounding the questions, and the other members will fill in and 
elaborate. General Russell. 

4. General Russell. General Herron, when did you go on duty 
as the Commander of the Hawaiian Department? 

General Herron. In October 1937. 

5. General Russell. And you were retired when ? 
[^6*8] General Herron. In February of '41. 

6. General Russell. During the time that you were there, General, 
I assume that you had your plans for the defense of the Hawaiian 
Department, including the Island of Oahu ? 

General Herron. That is right. 

7. General Russell. What did you regard as your principal mis- 
sion as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department? 

General Herron. To make Pearl Harbor safe for the Navy. 

8. General Russell. Did you have a prepared plan for the defense 
of the Island of Oahu during your tenure as Commanding General 
of the Department. 

General Herron. We did. 

9. General Russell. Do you recall, General Herron, how that was 
designated — that plan — or what its title was ? 

General Herron. No. 

10. General Russell. Did it involve the employment of the means 
available to the Army along with those that were available to the 
Navy on the Island? 

General Herron. It did. 

11. General Russell. General, the Hawaiian Department is asso- 
ciated with the 14th Naval District ; is that true? 

General Herron. That is right ; particularly for planning. 

12. General Russell. Particularly for planning. It is also true 
that the Pacific fleet is based at Pearl Harbor, and this fact brings the 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 117 

Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department in contact with 
the Commander of the Pacific fleet ; is that true ? 

General Hereon. That is right. 

[W9] 13. General Russell. Therefore there is a dual naval 
organization with which the Commanding General of the Hawaiian 
Department deals? 

General Herron. That is correct. 

14. General Russell. During the time that you were in command 
of the Hawaiian Department, do you recall how many Commanders 
of the 14th Naval District were on duty ? 

General Hereon. Two. 

15. General Russell. Could you name those, General Herron? 
General Heeron. The man who was the senior man on this Navy 

Board. 

16. General Frank. Murfin. 

General Heeeon. Admiral Murfin and Admiral Bloch. 

17. General Russell. Now, did these two officers command the 14th 
Naval District? 

General Hereon. They did. 

18. General Russell. During this same period that you were in 
command of the Hawaiian Department who commanded the Pacific 
fleet there? 

General Hereon. Well, Admirals Bloch, Richardson, and Kimmel. 

19. General Russell. General, what was the plan in effect by which 
the combined forces of the Army and Navy were to be employed in this 
area? Or let me make the question maybe a litle plainer: Was the 
plan of mutual cooperation or agreement for the employment of the 
forces in effect during the time you commanded the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment? 

General Heeeon. Yes. 

[210] 20. jOeneral Russell. As the Commanding General of 
the Hawaiian Department, therefore, you had no command function 
which you could exercise as such over the naval units in that area? 

General Heeeon. No. 

21. General Russell. Nor did the Naval Commanders have any 
such command over the Army ? 

General Heeeon. No. 

22. General Russell. General Herron, during this period of time 
will you state briefly just what the relations were between you and these 
Commanders of the Fleet with respect to cooperation? 

General Hereon. The relations could not have been better at any 
time. However, they were much more productive of results toward 
the end of my regime than in the beginning. 

23. General Russell. To what clo you ascribe this development? 
General Heeeon. To the fact that in the beginning we were able 

to obtain for the first time an agreement on joint action which covered 
the entire field under Admiral Murfin with the Navy. Wlien Admiral 
Bloch came in he reviewed that and said he accepted it as a whole ; he 
did not want any changes. So that we had an understood background 
on which to work, and the Navy Admirals were a high type of people. 
Now, then, there was difficulty in working out the air cooperation 
because it was entirely new and because that was the only place the 
Army and Navy could really cooperate, in the air. The Navy was on 



118 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the water, the Army on the land, but in the air there was a place for 
cooperation, joint command, and [^-?-?] so forth, and we had 
a good deal of trouble in arriving at some definite agreement about 
that. 

24. General Russell. Did you, before being retired, effect a work- 
ing agreement for the employment of the joint air forces out there 
which you considered effective ? 

General Hereon, We effected that quite early, but by leaving some 
blank spaces; we did not put down in writing, for instance, who would 
command a joint expedition in the air, although we had something 
that sounded that way. 

25. General Russell. General, there have developed in our investi- 
gation data about the plan for reconnaissance, the inshore patrol being 
maintained by the Army and the distant patrol by the Navy. Was 
that in effect prior to the time that you left Hawaii ? 

General Hereon. It was. We made the agreement I think when 
General Frank was there. Is that right? 

26. General Frank. That is right. 
General Herron. Yes. 

27. General Russell. You had occasion to inaugurate a search or 
patrol out there in the summer of 1940, didn't you, in an alert which 
was in effect out there for some time during the summer and early 
fall of 1940? 

General Hereon. Will you ask me that question again? 

28. General Russell. Did you, or not, have occasion to make effec- 
tive this reconnaissance plan that I have just described, in the summer 
and early fall of 1940? 

General Herron. Whenever we had a joint maneuver, and we began 
to have them in the summer and fall of 1940. 

29. General Russell. Didn't you have an alert in 1940? 

[£12] General Hereon. Oh, we had alerts, yes. We had an 
alert in May of 1940, a total alert on the part of the Army, but the 
Navy was not alerted at that time. 

30. General Russell. Was the Navy alerted in June of 1940? 
General Herron. Not the same time the Army was. 

31. General Russell. General, what I am getting at — and we shall 
check on this alert in a little bit, because we did want to ask you 
some questions about it — what I am getting at is this : Was there at 
any time, during your period of service as the Commanding General 
of the Hawaiian Department, a situation where this system of recon- 
naissance was made effective? 

General Hereon, I hope General Frank will correct me in many 
of my statements about the air out there, but this division for recon- 
naissance purposes came about in this way : it was about that time that 
the Navy was getting very jealous of the Army flying over the water, 
and of course we had to fly over the water out there in order to go up 
and down the Islands. 

Now, then, a reconnaissance such as we could perform with the num- 
ber of planes we had, had no military importance except for this: 
it could scout for submarines, and the Navy were very anxious to 
have us watch the close-in waters for submarines. Well, now, in order, 
to avoid coming to grips with the Navy definitely, we worded it that 
they would be responsible for distant reconnaissance, which of course 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 119 

is logical, as they had the only planes that could go out and stay out; 
and in order to assure that we could fly over the water we put ourselves 
down for close-in reconnaissance, without defining that, but actually 
it amounted to trying to train our people to spot hostile submarines 
which came in close to shore. It had [213] no military sig- 
nificance otherwise. 

32. General Russell. General, I have extracted here from one of 
the A. G. files the orders, messages, and so forth, which were inter- 
changed between you and the War Department in the summer of 1940 
which bear on this subject that we are discussing now, of reconnais- 
sance. This file indicates that on the 17th of June you were directed 
to immediately alert your complete defensive organization to deal with 
possible trans-Pacific raid, to greatest extent possible without creat- 
ing public hysteria or provoking curiosity of newspapers or alien 
agents, and so forth. Now, there were a number of messages that went 
back and forth. At one time you wrote General Marshall a letter, an- 
other time he answered that letter, and finally on this subject of re- 
connaissance, if I remember correctly, — 

General Hereon. Have you my file of personal letters to General 
Marshall ? Is that what you refer to? 

33. General Russell. 1 have a copy of it before me now, and your 
present testimony is not in conflict with, but it just doesn't dovetail 
in with, this file. 

General Herron. Yes. 

34. General Russell. Here is a letter of October 15, 1940, of which 
I shall have the copy in a moment. I think it was your letter to 
General Marshall. 

General Hereon. Yes. 

35. General Russell. In which you said, 

The Navy has resumed the outer air patrol at 180 miles, but has not asked 
us to take any measures. 

General Herron. "Has not asked us" ? Oh, yes. 
[214] 36. General Russell. (Reading:) 

has not asked us to take any measures. Having no evidence of marked change in 
in the situation and with an eye to the conservation of material I have not 
resumed the Army inner air patrol at 40 miles, nor the putting of the pursuit 
planes in the air at dawn. 

We now have guards on utilities and highway patrols at times when they will 
observed. There are constantly small maneuvers (company) on the beaches. It 
is my guess, however, that the international situation drifts to the left and that 
precautions must increase. 

Now, I was struck, in reading that file. General, with the fact that 
as late as October 15, 1940, the Navy was maintaining a distant patrol, 
and you had not resumed the inner air patrol. Now, we were wonder- 
ing when this was taken off, and something of its history. Do you 
recall it now ? 

General Herron. The 40 miles was probably my personal direc- 
tive to the Army only. I do not think I ever told the Navy how 
far out they should go ; I was careful not to. Now, then, the patrol 
was put on on that maneuver or alert of June 15th. We put every- 
body on, did everything we could do, beginning on June 15, and 
kept them on about six weeks. At the end of that time it became 
apparent to me that the soldier on the beach was persuaded that 



120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

there were no Japanese out there. There weren't any phines in the 
sky or ships on the water or submarines underneath, and if they 
came the soldier wouldn't see them. He would go through the mo- 
tions of being out there, and he would be on the job, but it is just 
not in flesh and blood to stand on [^i5] tiptoe indefinately. 

Well, now, we had nothing more from the War Department. Noth- 
ing. Not another word. So on my own responsibility I withdrew 
the whole thing, called the alert off, and turned them to other things, 
in order that I might get them in a frame of mind whereby they would 
see something or hear something if they were put out on the beach. 
So that in the meantime I got what I wanted by putting out these 
battalions and companies in camp, to maneuver along the beach. 
They would be there, but I did not tell them they were on alert. Now, 
in a few weeks I called another alert, but I did not try to keep it six 
weeks again. 

37. General Russell. Did you call the alert on your own motion. 
General, without anything from the War Department? 

General Hereon. From that time on, yes; after June 15th I never 
was ordered again by the War Department, but — — 

38. General Russell. Now may we go back for a minute in an 
attempt to develop the Navy end of this alert. Your alert originated 
from this June 17th message, 1940, where you were directed to alert 
your command against a trans-Pacific raid? 

General Herron. That is right. 

39. General Russell. Now I am merely giving you the date which 
we have to connect up the Navy's tie-in with this alert : It seems that 
on the 20th of June you wired the War Department that you had 
received theirs of June 19th in which you had been directed to ease up 
on the alert which had been ordered on June 17th, but you said. 

Full aircraft and antiaircraft precautions will be continued with easing in 
other lines. Local publicty on maneuvers favorable and not excited. 

[216] But I am attempting now to get the Navy tie-in to this, 
to see what happened. 

On the 21st of June you wired the Chief of Staff this message : 

In interpreting your cable consideration is given to the fact that Navy here 
has nothing from Navy Department regarding Alert. Navy now turning over 
to Army inshore aerial patrol in accordance with existing local joint agreement. 
Will not modify Army Air and Antiair Alert before Monday except on further 
advice from you. 

On the following day General Strong signed a message for General 
Marshall in whiqh he refers to your message of the 21st and says : 

In view of present uncertainty instructions for the Navy other than local 
Naval Forces have not been determined. Continue your Alert in accordance with 
modifications directed in War Department Number 434. 

Now, General Herron, the thing that we were getting at is this: 
You went on an alert on a War Dej^artment order on the 17th of June. 
Five days later, on the 22nd of June, it seems that the Navy had not 
been ordered on an alert and that you people knew nothing about 
what the Navy was doing ; is that true ? 

General Hereon. We knew they were not on an alert. They were 
in full conference between myself and the Navy on the spot there. 
Of course, it modified my opinion as to the urgency of the alert, that 
the Navy had not been alerted. It turned out afterwards to be a 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 121 

drill, but we did not know that at the time. But imagining from the 
fact that the Navy was not alerted, I [217] thought it might 
be a drill. 

40. General Kussell. Then, as late as 1940, when an alert out in 
the Hawaiian Department was ordered, the War Department ordered 
the Army on an alert, and that did not in any way affect the Navy : 
they might or might not go on an alert ? 

General Herron. That is right. 

41. General Grunert. May I interject there: Do you know whether 
or not the Navy queried the Navy Department as to the necessity of 
going on an alert because you were on one ? 

General Herron. They notified the Navy Department immediately. 
I immediately notified the Navy within the hour, showed them my 
message, and they notified the Navy Department, expecting orders, 
and stood by for them and did not get them. 

42. General Russell. Then, as a generalization this is true. General 
Herron, that the War Department could order you to take action 
of some kind which might have been set forth in this joint agree- 
ment between the Army and Navy, but the Navy would not carry 
out its part in this given action unless and until it received an order 
from the Navy Department in Washington ? 

General Herron. Except on a joint maneuver. On a joint ma- 
neuver they carried out their part ; otherwise not. 

43. General Russell. Well, now let us apply that to that recon- 
naissance problem out there. You had the close-in reconnaissance, 
and the Navy the distant reconnaissance, under your agreement ; that 
was true? 

General Herron. That is right. 

44. General Russell. Now, the Army ordered an alert. You went 
on the alert and established the inner patrol. The Navy received 
no orders from the Navy Department. Therefore, the [218] 
distant patrol did not become effective ; is that true ? 

General Hereon. At that time they had a distant patrol on all 
the time, as I remember it. We had great difficulty in finding out 
exactly what the Navy was doing. They were not very frank about 
the distant patrol, and we figured because they didn't have very 
many planes to put out they didn't want to confess that there were 
only one or two or three planes out in a day, so they did not tell 
us very fully how many they had out. I tried to find out indirectly, 
but I never did press the matter, and I never knew exactly what 
they were doing about the distant patrol. 

45. General Grunert. Did you have any means for any distant 
patrol, if you saw fit to do such patrolling to accomplish your own 
mission ? 

General Herron. We had the old B-18, and General Frank and I 
were in full agreement that when a war came on we would do what- 
ever we thought was necessary in the defense of the Island. 

46. General Grunert. Yes. 

General Herron. The joint agreement was so drawn that we could 
do it and not violate its terms. We could. 

47. General Grunert. Well, let me put it this way: Here is the 
Hawaiian Command. It has a mission of protection. In order to 
get information as to what may be against you, you should first have 



122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the direction from it is coming and where it is, and also know what 
is going around your shores, by your inshore patrol. You depend 
on the Navy, according to your agreement, for distant reconnaissance. 

Now, then, was it your conception of your responsibilities 1:2191 
to insure that such a distant reconnaissance was actually in being 
and, if it was not, to do your best toward doing your own distant recon- 
naissance ? 

General Hekron. In time of peace I did not need to be absolutely 
sure. In time of war I did need to be sure. If I was not certain, I 
would use my own planes, and I thought that that term "close-in and 
distant patrolling" was a very elastic term; and, as I say, General 
Frank and I were in full agi^eement : we would go just as far as we 
thought it was necessary and our planes would allow us to in war. 

48. General Grunert, Then, on an alert in time of peace, an alert 
ordered by the War Department, which presumably was in anticipa- 
tion of what might happen, you did not think it was necessary to 
use any of your own means to go out beyond your inshore patrol ? 

General Herron. Well, my impression is that the 40 miles became 
about a hundred miles at that time, but that that is as far as we 
thought we ought to send the B-18s w^ithout a real reason. If one of 
them got down at sea there was very little means to take care of those 
people, and we would have a great deal of responsibility towards 
the parents of the mei) in it and towards the War Department if we 
sent them too far and too often. 

49. General Grunert. All right ; go ahead. 

50. General Russell. I wish you would read the General my last 
question. I think he gave me some experience without answering it. 

The Reporter (reading) : 

Now, the Army ordered an alert. You went on the alert and established the 
inner patrol. The Navy [220] received no orders from the Navy De- 
partment. Therefore, the distant patrol did not become effective; is that true? 

General Herron. My answer was that they had a distant patrol 
en at all times, as I remember. 

51. General Russell. Would that be prior to this alert ? 
General Herron. Yes. 

52. General Russell. Of June 18th? 
General Herron, Is that right, that they had ? 

53. General Frank. I do not recall when they put that on. I 
know they put it on. 

54. General Russell. Do you think it was on when you were 
relieved ? 

General Herron. Oh, yes. All .that summer of 1940 I tried to find 
out details, exactly how many, but without results. 

55. General Russell. Well, is it your impression that that distant 
patrol out there was maintained by the Navy constantly prior 

General Herron. Yes, every day. 

56. General Russei.l. Wlien did it begin ? 

57. General Frank. Don't know. 

General Herron. No, we don't know when it began, 

58. General Russell. You didn't know much about it? 

General Herron. There when we first went out there the Navy 
did not trust us with very much. They told us very little, and we 
had to build that up. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 123 

59. General Grunert. You had doubts, though, about the effi- 
ciency of that patrol on 360 degree circle ? Did you or did you not ? 

[221] General Herron. It was physically impossible with the 
aumber of planes they had. We knew that. With the 50 planes they 
perhaps had and a million square miles, you cannot do it. 

GO. General Ghunert. Then, it was a distant patrol, but its effective- 
ness was problematical. 

61. General Kussell. Now, that being the case, General Herron, 
what did you mean in your letter of October 15, 1940, in which you 
stated that the Navy had resumed the outer patrol? 

General Herron. Presumably it had been off at some time. I do 
not remember more than that. 

62. General Russell. When General Short came out there some- 
time in February, I believe, of 1941, so far as you know, this distant 
reconnaissance was being conducted by the Navy, in whatever manner 
it was being conducted? 

General Herron. They assured us it was being, in very general 
terms. 

63. General Russell. Yes. Now, as a result of naval activity or of 
(he Naval Intelligence personnel, were you furnished periodically or 
frequently with the information which they obtained as to Japanese 
activities in the Hawaiian Department or in the Hawaiian frontier? 

General Herron. Well, that also was a development. When we went 
out, when I first went there, the Army was not entrusted with any 
naval secrets. They did not give us anything. We had to work that 
thing through, and by the time I left them there was complete 
reciprocity on information the two services obtained. 

64. General Russell. How frequently would you get a report on 
what they had discovered about the Japanese? 

[^£2] General Herron. Daily. 

65. General Russell. You got that daily? 
General Herron. Yes. 

66. General Russell. Who was your G-2? 
General Herron. Colonel Marsclen. 

67. General Russell. Do you know wnere he is now ? 
General Herron. He is out there as G-4. 

68. General Grunert. As a matter of record, he is one of the wit- 
nesses that is scheduled to be called. 

69. General Frank. May I interject this one question? 

70. General Russell. Yes. 

General Herron. May I add something to that? 

71. General Russell. Yes, sir. 

General Herron. There is a man here now in this building named 
Bicknell who was an Assistant Q-2. Colonel Bicknell. 

72. General Grunert. Also for the record, he is another witness 
who will be called. 

General Herron. All right. 

73. General ^RANK. I would just like to ask one question. 

74. General Russell. Surely. 

75. General Frank. Do you feel confident that the information on 
Japanese operations that you got from the Navy was the full and com- 
plete information that they had available? 

General Herron. Towards the end, yes. 



124 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

76. General Russell. General Herron, did yon have very intimate 
snpervision of the Department out there in yonr command bj^ the 
War Department. 

General Herron. No. 

77. General Russell. Did you have any trips of inspection by 
[223] General Staff officers out to the Department while you were 
its Commander? 

General Herron. General Marshall came out. 

78. General Russell. Do you recall any others? 
General Herron. Colonel Russell. 

79. General Grunert. Colonel Russell was of the WPD, was he 
not ; War Plans Division ? 

General Herron. Operations Division, yes. 

80. General Grunert. Yes. 

81. General Russell. On the question of the training of your 
troops, did you get any directives from the War Department? 

General Herron. Yes, we got the perfunctory, once-a-year orders 
they sent out to the whole Army. 

82. General Russell. What did they emphasize; do joii recall? 
General Herron. No. 

83. General Russell. That was all I was going to have. 

84. General Grunert. I might put in a few questions here. If they 
happen to touch what you are going into later, why, let me know. 

When you turned over to General Short, I presume that you turned 
over all instructions, plans, orders, and files that would make your 
knowledge available to him so that he would carry on? 

General Herron. I was very careful to do that. 

85. General Grune:rt. Was there anything that you recall in your 
turning over to him that ^-ou spoke to him about particularly, either 
in cautioning, in calling attention to this or that, or what-not, that 
may occur to you now? 

[224^] General Herron. Well, I spoke to him particularly, of 
course, about our Navy relations, our civilian relations, about the 
Japanese situation. 

86. General Grunert. As to the Japanese situation, can you give 
us an idea of your size-up of the so-called Japanese situation, particu- 
larly as to their loyalty, as to their danger in the event of a war 
with Japan, as to their danger to your security or your carrying out 
your plans — along those lines? 

General Herron. Well, perhaps the best answer is to say within the 
last few days that Hawaiian Japanese Battalion (Italy) has been 
cited by General Clark for distinguished conduct in battle and has 
over a thousand purple hearts, onq battalion, plus medals of merit 
and distinguished service crosses : 14 (distinguished service crosses. , 

Now, then, our investigation upon which our war plans were based 
was that that would be the situation in time of war, that the Japanese 
would turn out to be loyal. We did not know how many, but we were 
satisfied that at least 5 percent were committed to Xh& American 
cause, either through conviction or by force or circumstances, such as 
being persona non grata to the Japanese Government. Another 5 
percent we said would be irreconcilable, hostile to the United States. 
The other 90 percent, like anybody else, would sit on the fence until 
they saw which way the cat was going to jump. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 125 

Now, then, the percentage of loyal ones has turned out to be much 
larger than we anticipated. They have been proven in battle. We 
have no doubt about the leading young Japanese being pro- American 
and being able to control all the rest. They are not now and never 
were any menace to our security out there, and that is what we con- 
cluded, and we drew our war plans accordingly. 

[^25] 87. General Grunert. In that respect, what was your 
conclusion as to sabotage, to be expected and to be guarded against? 

General Herron. We concluded there would not be any sabotage, 
and there was not ; not one instance. General Frank got the Air Corps 
away from putting all their planes in the middle of the air fields, and 
built the first bunkers out in the bushes. Before, it was feared that 
they would get the airplanes. He went ahead and developed that. 
Had they been out in the bushes on December 7th the situation would 
have been quite different. 

87. General Grunert. In that alert you mentioned I understood you 
to say there was an effort not to alarm the public. Did you consider 
that any of the alert measures that were taken under that alert 
alarmed the public ? 

General IIerron. Yes. It was the first time that troops had been 
turned out for an alert with the ball ammunition ; and the issue of ball 
ammunition and of ammunition to the Coast Artillery started every- 
one's imagination, and many people thought the Japanese Fleet was 
just off the coast. Some of the officers sent their families to the hills 
that night. 

88. General Grunert. Since that alert, when you have had addi- 
tional alerts, practice alerts, and so forth, were they under assumed war 
conditions with ball ammunition ? 

General Herron. Yes ; from that time on. 

89. General Grunert. Then, did those alerts after the first one 
alarm the public? 

General Herron. No; never again. 

90. General Grunert. Did any of those alerts disclose what your in- 
tention was in the line of just what you were going to [326] do ? 

General Herron. We were very careful not to do the same thing 
twice out there in any maneuver or alert, except, of course, the anti- 
aircraft. We had to put them in about the same place. 

91. General Grunert. The aircraft that you had during an alert 
was dispersed ? 

General Herron. Yes, sir; still further. 

92. General Grunert. What various kinds of alerts did you have? 
Just one, or did you have a series of them in what you did in each alert? 

General Herron. We had two series of alerts, because I felt the 
situation was tense. 

93. General Grunert. Did you have Alert No. 1, in which you did 
certain things, Alert No. 2 in which 3^ou did certain things, and Alert 
No. 3 in which you did certain things, or were they just alerts? 

General Herron. That was a refinement that the training men put 
over on General Short when he came out there. I told him I would 
not do any such thing. There was only one kind of alert, and that was 
a total alert, and then I would do it in accordance with the situation. 
But the training men liked refinements, an they recommended three 
kinds because the Navy had three kinds. But they did not get to the 



126 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

real point of the thing. The Navy has tliree kinds, bnt the all-out alert 
is number one, always. Now they ease up into two and three ; but these 
young men did not know that, and when Short came out they put ovei- 
the three and got them reversed, so that Short went into the Number 1, 
which was sabotage. It did not seem to him a very important change, 
I don't suppose, and it turned out to [327] be vital. It was too 
much of a refinement. 

94. General Grunert. I understand you to say that your primary 
mission was the protection of the fleet when the fleet was in ? 

General Herron. Pearl Harbor and the fleet. 

95. General Frank, I would like to ask one question right there. 
Your plans for meeting any situation in that department were suf- 
ficiently completely so that when they were made effective no addi- 
tional instructions were necessary. Is that correct? 

General Herron. That is correct. 

96. General Frank. Therefore, if a critical situation should arise, 
all that you needed to have been told was "Situation critical. Act 
accordingly" ? 

General Herron. Alert. It would have been a mistake to have 
issued any orders. These several orders would have confused the thing 
if you had. 

97. General Frank. There was no necessity for a special mention 
of sabotage or any other item, because all of those were taken care of 
in your war plans ? 

General Herron. That is correct. 

98. General Russell. General Herron, I have made some more or 
less detailed investigation to determine the number of alerts in the 
Department from the date of this ordered alert of June I7th, 1940, 
until December 7th, 1941. You were in command from June, 1940, to 
February, 1941. Do you remember any alert that you had during 
that period except the one that we have discussed already ? 

General Herron. I cannot give you any data as to the number of the 
times. 

[228] 99. General Russell. In a general way, is it your im- 
pression that prior to the Alert of June I7th, 1940, you had had other 
alerts ? 

General Herron. Yes. 

100. General Russell. Had they been directed by the War Depart- 
ment because of some international situation, or had they been initi- 
ated by you as a matter of training? 

General Herron. They were initiated by me as a matter of training. 

101. General Russell. So far as you recall, therefore, during your 
entire tour of duty as the commanding general of that department, 
there was only one War Department ordered alert? 

General Herron. I am quite sure that is the case. 

102. General Russell. And you think that the alert had practically 
disappeared in October of 1940? 

General Herron. I say, I took it off entirely in six weeks, and then 
put it back on again as soon as I thought the command could bear it. 

103. General Russell. There was some discussion between you and 
General Marshall, by correspondence, as to the effect of alerts on the 
morale of the troops. Do you recall that? 

General Herron. No. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 127 

104. General Grunert. I have one more question on alerts. The 
fact that you received a directive from the War Department to alert 
the command: Did that leave the impression in your mind that if 
anything serious happened in the future the War Department would 
direct you to go on the alert, or leave it to your judgment? 

General Herron. I always felt that I was entirely responsible out 
there and I had better protect the island, 

[M&l 105, General Frank. I would like to ask you this ques- 
tion: In view of the fact that the Navy was not alerted during the 
Army alert in the summer of 1940, had there been occasion for real 
alarm, and had there been a Jap attack, what, in your opinion, would 
have been the result of the naval attitude ? 

General Herron. The Navy would unquestionably have gone on the 
alert had there been any evidence whatsoever. I had no evidence, 
I had only a War Department order. 

106. General Frank. You did not know whether it was based on 
an impending threat, or not? 

General Herron. No. It was a fair conclusion, though, that it was 
not, after a day or two when the Navy got no orders. 

107. General Russell. I did not get that. General. 

General Herron, That when the Navy did not get any orders, like 
ours, it was a fair conclusion that it was a drill and not based on an 
international situation. I can tell you — I think it is all right to — that 
General Marshall told me afterward that he got worried about the 
international situation personally, about that time. So it was a War 
Department function entirely. 

108. General Grunert. During your tour as commanding General, 
Hawaiian Department, did you frequently or infrequently get infor- 
mation from the War Department as to the international situation, 
particularly as to the relationship between the United States and 
Japan? 

General Herron, I got one such message, which was that Germany 
had marched into Poland in the fall of 1939. That is the only thing 
I ever got from the War Department, 

109. General Grunert. Did you feel that it was necessary for 
[230] you to have a fairly intimate picture of things happening 
in the Pacific and in the Far East in order for you to accomplish 
your mission? 

General Herron. I felt that it would be a great help, but that I was 
condemned to go along in the dark as to that. I assumed the War 
Department had much more knowledge than I had, but I also assumed 
that what they had could not be very vital or they would tell me 
something. 

110. General Frank. What would have been your reaction had you 
been told that there was a Japanese striking force of six carriers, two 
battleships, and a large number of submarines in the Marshalls about 
that time ? 

General Herron. I would have been very much alarmed by that 
message. The Navy Department sent out that there was a task force 
being formed in the islands ; that there were two of them, one in the 
islands. They sent such a message in November, that there were two 
task forces forming up, one of which was in the mandated islands. 



128 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

111. General Frank. In November of 1941? 

General Herron. Yes, sir. I would have been very much alarmed 
by that. 

112. General Frank. You say the Navy did send that? 

General Herron. Yes ; they sent it out to the Naval District. It is 
in the Roberts Report. 

113. General Frank. Do you know whether or not it got to General 
Short ? 

General Herron. I do not know what got to General Short, except 
that his staff have told me that the Navy were quite meticulous about 
keeping us informed all that fall, and summer. 

114. General Grunert. Up to the time you left, what was the 
[^31] sentiment or the sense of the people in the Army in Hawaii 
as to a sense of security ? Did they feel that they were secure with the 
Navy in the harbor and the Army on the job, or did tlie}^ feel a sense 
of insecurity? Were you able to judge that? 

General Herron. The people who knew thought that we were fairly 
secure against any attack by surface ships, any attempt to land. We 
also knew, a very few people. General Frank and myself, perhaps, 
that an air force could come in and do damage. We hoped to be able 
to follow them out and destroy the carriers. But I do not think we 
had any idea that we could turn back an aerial attack entirely, for 
this reason : that the only anti-aircraft we had was that which was 
prepared against high-altitude bombing. We did not have the small- 
caliber stuff which you need to do anything about dive bombing. So 
we felt they could come in ; that they would not come in there unless 
they had enough planes to overcome what planes we had. 

115. General Grunert. Do you make a distinction between your 
protective measures when the fleet was in the harbor or when it was 
out at sea? In other words, did you feel more secure, as far as your 
command was concerned, when the fleet was in the harbor than when 
it was out? Did that ever come to your mind or did you ever base 
any decisions upon that? 

General Herron. We assumed in all our planning that we would 
depend on our own resources. Anything the Navy gave us was so 
much velvet. 

116. General Grunert. They you did not feel that you had to take 
any particular measures when the fleet was in than when it was out? 
Your measures were all-inclusive, whether the fleet was in or out. Is 
that the idea ? 

General Herron. They were the best we could do any time, 
[£32] whether the fleet was in or out. 

117. General Grunert. Considering the air component of your 
command there, ordinarily what state of readiness did you demand of 
it, and in that state of readinesss can you recall approximately what 
time it would take to get into the state of alert ? 

General Herron. There was a long period in which the Air Corps 
was undergoing a very great expansion, and the training problem was 
really uppermost. They had to train crews and they had to train 
technicians. They had to train air pilots and other flying people 
and their instructors, and each time they woidd get about ready, there 
would be a new expansion, and we would have to do it over again. 
There finally came a time — I don't remember when it was — when Gen- 



PROCEEDI]V[GS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 129 

eral Frank recommended to me that we go to bat ; that we would have 
to do something like this, as I remember it: Put every man we had 
that could fly on a crew, regardless of his present duty. His school 
duty could not stop. So we organized all the flying crews we could 
with what personnel we had there and put them into the air and 
worked them. It was a make-shift, but it was the best we could do 
with the people we had and the planes we had. 

118. General Russell. General Herron, I have two or three other 
details. I think General Grunert and General Frank have eliminated 
some of the notes I had, but I have just one or two questions on this 
reconnaissance matter. 

You did not have any radar or any air-warning service? 
General Herron. No, sir. 

119. General Russell. If air patrolling was expanded about a hun- 
dred miles, then the possibility of an air attack [^33] develop- 
ing and becoming effective in its operations was pretty large, since 
you did not have the means for such distant reconnaisance? 

General Herrox. If we spotted them a hundred miles out there would 
be no time to do anything. 

120. General Russell. That is what I had in mind. 

121. General Grunert. You did not have any radar or any air-warn- 
ing service or interceptor command as such. Did 3'ou have Triple 
A. I. S. service for the antiaircraft? 

General Herron. Yes. 

122. General Grunert. You had that ? 
General Herron. Yes. 

123. General Grunert. That would give a certain amount of warn- 
ing to the antiaircraft itself? 

General Herron. Yes, sir. 

124. General Russell. The final subject that I have. General, is this : 
In the reports which this Board has seen on the attack of December 
7th, 1941, it is stated almost uniformly, in all of those reports, that 
the nature of the attack indicated very clearly that the attacking force 
knew down to the minutest details where all of our materiel was, in- 
cluding our ships, airplanes and hangars. In other words, the Japanese 
Army and Navy had been completely advised about all of those things 
and had worked out this attack with very great detail. The question 
is this : Was there any way to have prevented the Japanese people from 
acquiring this intimate knowledge about our installations, equipment, 
materiel out there? 

General Herron. No way. Hawaii, or Pearl Harbor, is a gold-fish 
bowl. We assumed that the only rhing the Japanese did not know was 
how we would use our troops in the event of [^-J-i] attack. 
Ever}' thing else we assumed that they must know. 

125. General Frank. I did not get an answer to a question that I 
asked a little while ago about the Army being on the alert and the Navy 
not being on the alert, and what would have been the situation had 
there been an attack. You stated that had there been war the Navy 
would have gone on the alert. What I was after was this : Let us as- 
sume that in 1940, when the Army was in that alert, that there was a 
real menace and that an attack had come similar to the one that came 
on December 7th with the Army on the alert and the Navy not. What 
do you think would have happened ? 

79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1 10 



130 COXGRESSIOXAL IXVESTIGATIOX PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Herron. Well, approximately what happened on December 
7th. The dive bombers would have come in. The Army could not have 
stopped them with its three-inch guns posted up on the hills. They 
necessarily would bring more planes than we had. If we had 50 combat 
planes they would bring 150, surely. 

126. General Gruxekt. You mean that the same consequences or 
consequences of a like or greater or less nature, because of what you 
have told us about what your being on the alert meant, such as dis- 
persion of planes and certain protective measures that may not have 
applied to the alert that the Hawaiian Command was on on December 
Tth? 

General Herrox. I would like to repeat my answer. They would not 
have got anything like the number of our planes that they did get. 
They would' have gotten the sliips in the harbor. We would have 
knocked down a lot of their planes, their fighting planes.. but I think 
their bombers could still have come in. enough of them to destroy those 
ships. That was what we were there for. to do defend the ships and 
the harbor. Whether or [235'] not we saved our owii planes was 
not important relatively. 

127. General Gruxert. That there was not enough antiaircraft in 
and around the harbor to have really denied the air to the Japanese 
bombers? 

General Herrox. There was not the right kind of anti-aircraft. 
It was small-caliber, quick-fire. At that time the small-caliber stuff 
was all going to England. This was quite proper, but erroneous. 

128. General Gruxert. If there are no more questions, let me say, 
General, that we are after facts, and any lead that we can get which 
would helj) us in determining the sources of facts is very much wel- 
comed by the Board. Having had years of experience in that com- 
mand, can you thmk of anything that you might add to your testi- 
mony which might be of assistance to the Board ? 

General Herrox. I would like to make some comments on the Rob- 
erts Report. It is a very wonderful document and a great land-mark 
in this thing, and a point of departure, so that it is bound to be influ- 
ential. But I would like to say a few things about some of the conclu- 
sions in that report. 

129. General Gruxert. Proceed. 

General Herrox. I have here a newspaper copy of that report. One 
of their conclusions was that the orders given by the War Depart- 
ment and Xavy Department made it obligatory upon the two com- 
manders out there to confer, and they say : 

These commanders failed to confer with respect to the •warning orders issued 
on and after November 27th and to adopt and use existing plans to meet the 
emergency. 

They say they failed to confer. Their own report says that on the 
27th. the day after the orders came in, the order from 12361 the 
War Department and the one from the Xavy Department, they did 
get together. ' That was Thursday. They also got together on Mon- 
day, Tuesday and Wednesday of the week the attack came. They go 
ahead and say that if the orders issued by the Chief of Staff of the 
Army and the Chief of Naval Operations on November 27th had been 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 131 

complied with certain things would have been done, and then they 

say: 

None of these conditions was in fact inaugurated — 

that is, alerts and so forth, of the right kind — 

or maintained, for the reason that the responsible commanders failed to consult 
and cooperate as to necessary action based upon warning and to adopt measures 
enjoined by the orders given them by the chiefs of the Army and Navy commands 
in Washington. 

That is, they say the responsible commanders failed to consult. 
Their own record shows that they consulted. 

The report says they failed to cooperate. There is not the slightest 
evidence that there was any failure of cooperation between those two 
commanders in this whole Roberts Report ; and everything that I have 
heard since leads me to believe that there was real cooperation between 
those commanders; that there was no hard feeling of any kind. 

It says they failed to cooperate as to the necessary action based upon 
the warning. The necessary action was all written down in the joint 
agreement between the Army and Navy. I believe they called it a 
joint agreement. It says that they failed to adopt measures enjoined 
by the orders given them by the chiefs of the Army and Navy com- 
mands in Wasfiinsrton. 

To go back to those two messages : Did they fail to obey [237] 
their orders? The Chief of Staff's message informed the command- 
ing general, Hawaiian Department, that negotiations with Japan 
seems to have ended with little likelihood of their resumption, and 
went ahead and gave more information about the general situation. 
Also, that is the one that stated that it was very desirable that the Japs 
should commit the first overt act. The order which was given him 
was this: The message directed him, even prior to hostile action — 
and I think the words "hostile action" are very significant ; they show 
that somebody assumed that the Japanese would declare war and 
then move out, because it does not make any sense in connection with 
a surprise attack to tell him to do something even prior to hostile 
action. It shows the frame of mind of the War Department, that the 
Japanese were going to declare war and then perhaps move out, but 
after they had declared war, apparently, he should undertake such 
reconnaissance and other measures which he deemed necessary. That 
is all the order he got — to undertake such reconnaissance and other 
measure as he deemed necessary. He did not disobey or fail to obey 
that order. So I think there is no ground for any criticism on that 
count. 

The Navy message, which of course had a binding effect upon the 
Army, directed the Navy, after giving them a lot of information, to 
make defense deployment and preparations for carrjnng out war 
tests. That is the only order the Navy got. That bears on the accusa- 
tion in here that those fellows failed to adopt measures enjoined by 
the orders given them. 

Nothing was said in any order from either department about con- 
sulting and conferring ; and they go ahead again and say that it was 
a dereliction of duty on the part of each of them — that is Kimmel 
and Short — not to consult and confer. It is conclu- [238] sive 
that they did consult and confer. 



132 COKGRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Some place else in this report they make it a point that they did not 
have an}' conference directed to the accomplishment of these orders. 
They had these four conferences, and apparently the agenda was in 
connection with the garrisoning by the Army for the relief of the 
Marines who were on some of those western islands. I think that 
was the agenda. But there is certainly no evidence that they ignored 
the message of the 2Tth. 

As evidence that they did confer, it states here that General Short 
asked Captain ]SIcMorris, Operations man for the ^avy, about the 
probability of an aerial attack, and McMorris said there was no prob- 
ability of any such thing. So it would seem they were conferring 
on the probability of attack. 

So that the report is not a hundred per cent. It goes ahead and 
discusses the state of mind of these people and says that the opinion 
prevailed in diplomatic, military and naval circles and the public 
press that any immediate attack by Japan would be in the Far East, 
though it saj's that the existence of such a view, however prevalent, 
did not relieve the commanders of responsibility for the protection 
of our most important outposts. 

That is perfectly true. I agree with that. So that, in my opinion, 
these fellows were guilty. But beyond this general opinion, which 
was revealed in these messages — there was a message from Short — 
all those things worked on the people's frame of mind. I think that 
the War and Xavy Department messages led them to believe that there 
was not to be any attack on Hawaii. 

On Xovember 24th, the Xavy De]3artment sent Kimmel this 
message : 

[239] A surprise movement on the Philippine Islands or Guam is possible. 

It seems to me that the obvious inference from that is. and what 
they didn't say is, that they believed an attack on Hawaii at least to 
be highly improbable. That was on Xovember Sith that they told 
Kimmel that. That is bound to have some effect on the ordinary 
man that believes that God lives in the Xavy Department and the 
War Department and who has not been on the outside and found 
out that it is the Devil. 

On December 6th, the day before the attack, the Xavy Department 
sent this message to the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet out there — 
and all this, of course, got to the Army, because the Xavy showed 
it to them. The message said that naval commanders on outlying 
Pacific islands might be — and the words "might be'" are in code — 
authorized to destroy confidential })apers at that time or later under 
conditions of greater emergency. 

That was on the day before. They were expecting a greater emer- 
gency some time later, but certainly not the next day. That had its 
influence, of course, on Kimmel and Short. 

I quote this not because it bears on whether they were guilty or 
not. but on the degree of punishment of these fellows. 

I would like to tell you something else off the record. 

(Informal discussion off the record.) 

130. General Gruxert. Your comments regarding the Roberts Re- 
port — are they based on full knowledge of what that report contains, 
or how much knowledge of the Roberts Report had you when you 
made these conclusions as to the report ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 133 

General Herkon. They are based entirely on a study of the 
[24-0] Roberts Report. I never had any access to the record. 

131. General Gkunert. If there are no further questions, we thank 
you very much for coming down. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

[341] TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL PHILIP HAYES, U. S. 
ARMY; COMMANDING GENERAL, THIRD SERVICE COMMAND; 
BAETIMORE, MD. 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board your 
name, rank, organization, and station. 

General Hayes. Philip Hayes; Major General, U. S. Arni}^; Com- 
manding General, Third Service Command; Baltimore, Md. 

2. General Grunert. General, the Board, in attempting to get at 
this, is looking into the background and viewpoints prior to and 
leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is hoped that because 
of your assignment in the Hawaiian Department, as Chief of Staff 
of that Department, you may be able to throw some light on the 
subject. In order to cover our large field in the limited time available, 
it has become necessary to assign members of the Board to particular 
fields of investigation, or special investigation, although the Board 
will pass on all the fields. This particular field, for the testimony 
we expect to get out of you, we have assigned to General Russell, 
and he will lead in propounding the questions, and other Members 
will ask such questions as they set fit. General Russell. 

3. General Russell. General Hayes, you were Chief of Staff of the 
Hawaiian Department in 1941 ? 

General Hayes. Yes, sir ; I was. 

4. General Russell. How long prior to that had you occupied 
that position ? 

General Hayes. 1940. I was Acting, the latter part of 1939, when 
Osmun was not so well, and then, when I got the [-4^] place, 
early January, I think, 1940. 

5. General Russell. You became the Chief of Staff? 
General Hayes. Yes. 

6. General Russell. When were you relieved from that assignment ? 

General ILvyes. "Wlien I left Hawaii, officially, which was as I re- 
member November 5, 1941. I went on leave, though, some time in the 
middle of October, prior to my departure, and ceased functioning as 
Chief of Staff some time in the middle part of October. 

7. General Russell. 1941 ? 
General Hayes. 1941. 

8. General Russell, Bv whom were you succeeded as Chief of 
Staff? 

General Hayes. By Colonel Phillips. 

9. General Russell. Had Phillips been on duty on the staff of the 
Commanding General out there prior to the time that he became Chief 
of Staff? 

General Hayes. He was. 

10. General Russell. In what capacity? 



134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Hayes. He was brought over there by General Short to suc- 
ceed me as Chief of Staff, and so he was given a course of training in 
all the G positions, G-1, -2, -3, and -4, general supervisory training, 
and some of the other special staff positions, prior to the time he took 
over. 

11. General Russell. Then you were on duty out there in the 
Hawaiian Department as a staff officer, either Assistant Chief of Staff 
or Chief of Staff, for about how long? 

General Hayes. Four years. , 

[24^1 12. General Russell. General, you had an opportunity 
during your period of service out there to deal with the Navy personnel 
which was on duty in Pearl Harbor and thereabout? 

General Hayes. Yes, sir. 

13. General Russell. That, I believe, is the 14th Naval District, and 
also the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet ? 

General Hayes. Originally it was the 14th Naval District — I am 
talking over the span of years that I was there — and then the Fleet 
was brought in there, and there w^ere the ships afloat and the shore 
installation. 

14. General Russell. Now, you say the Fleet was brought in there. 
Did that occur while you were on duty there? It had not been in 
there before ? 

General Hayes. Oh, yes. 

15. General Russell. Now, about what time was that? 

General Hayes. I don't remember exactly, but it seems to me about 
1939. In the 1939 maneuvers, the Fleet which had been based on San 
Diego was brought over there, and Admiral Richardson was the 
CINCUS ; and it remained there. Although it was still based on San 
Diego, there was a part of the fleet which was based on Honolulu or 
that district. That part of the Fleet as I remember it, was under Vice 
Admiral Adolphus Andrews, but the main part of the Fleet was there 
most of the time from there on. 

16. General Russell. From 1939? 

General Hayes. There still was the 14th Naval District and the 
Fleet ; which were the ships afloat. 

17. General Russell. But the Naval District had been there for a 
long while ? 

[244] General Hayes. That is correct ; yes. 

18. General Russell. And the only change in the Naval situation 
during the time that you were on duty in the period that you have 
described was this basing of a considerable part of the Pacific Fleet 
on Honolulu ? 

General Hayes. That is correct. 

19. General Russell. Now, you had opportunity, I assume, to work 
in and out with a staff of the Commanders of both the District and 
the Fleet? 

General Hayes. I did. 

20. General Russell. What in general would you say about the 
spirit of cooperation which existed between the two services, Army 
and Navy, during this period that you were there ? 

General Hayes. Most cordial, and very marked in contrast to 
what it has been some other places; particularly noticeable there in 
its cordiality. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 135 

21. General Russell. General, -^e have been giving consideration 
to the plan. 

22. General Frank. May I ask a question? 

23. General Russell. Yes. 

24. General Frank. Did it improve during this period? 
General Hayes. During the four years, you mean ? . 

25. General Frank. Yes. 

General Hayes. Yes; I saw a gradual improvement from the time 
that General Moses and General Herron came. It got to a very high 
peak under Herron, but it maintained that same level. 

26. General Russell. After General Short came out, you saw no 
change at all? 

General Hayes. I saw no change. 

[24s] 27. General Russell. General we have been discussing 
with different witnesses and have been studying the plans for the 
defense of Oahu and the Naval base, there, at Honolulu, those criti- 
cal installations on that island, with some considerable interest. Pass- 
ing over the general questions, we will go to the details and discuss 
them with you. 

We have been interested in this question of the reconnaissance 
that was set up between Army and Navy, under which the Navy 
was to do the distant reconnaissance and the Army the close-in re- 
connaissance. Do you have any recollection of that plan, of its general 
provisions ? 

General Hayes. Yes, sir; I do. That plan you are referring to 
was a Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, which was 
based on the theory that the outer reconnaissance should be the 'Nhyj 
and the defense of the land itself was the Army. To the best of 
my recollection the outer patrol was 300 or 350 miles around the 
Island, the Navy responsibility. In addition to that outer patrol 
there were "area forces," so to speak. Navy task forces, that covered 
in their movements certain directions from Oahu. There were some 
destroyers used also in addition to the Navy patrol planes. 

The inner patrol was about fifty miles out. That was a Navy 
responsibility, with surface vessels with with air vessels. We re- 
enforced the inner patrol with some of our air. 

We had also an agreement with the Navy as to the joint use of 
Army and Navy, of air fields on Oahu, dependent upon this situation 
and the mission. 

The land defense was a defense of the Army. In addition to that, 
the Navy had an antiaircraft defense in Pearl Harbor, [^4^] 
which was combined land-and-boat or -ship, which tied in with our 
antiaircraft defense. There were several arguments as to the com- 
mand of certain air ships. Navy or Army, according to the mission. 
That was worked out, though. And so the theory of the defense was — 
the outer defense, the Navy ; land defense, the Army. 

28. General Russell. General, we have attempted to visualize situ- 
ations out there which might develop and have to be controlled or reg- 
ulated by this cooperative-agreement idea under which your defense 
and reconnaissance operated. When did these patrol systems become 
effective ? When were they actually carried on ? 

General Hayes. Do you refer to the time of day ? 



136 COXGRESSIOXAL IXVESTIGATIOX PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

29. General RrssEix. Xo: I am referrinof now in period of time. 
Were they perpetual all the time you were out there ^ During the four 
years, was this patroling going on ? 

General Hayes. Xo. Xot all the time. They were developed largely 
during General Herron's period, and carried on from then. I forget 
the date that General Herron came out. My recollection is General 
Moses left about March 1. or something, the period in March 1938. and 
General Herron came out and became Commanding General : so from 
March 1938 on they were developed. 

30. General Russell. Do you mean that during that period of time 
from 1938 imtil you left out there, in October 1941. eveiy day. this 
patroling. the distant patroling and the near-in patroling. was actually 
being conducted ( 

General Hates. I couldn't say that. I said that was in the Hawaiian 
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. I do know that [--'-i^] I spoke 
to General Herron and General Short, for them to check as to whether 
the outer patrol was on. 

31. General Russell. Do you know whether they did make the check 
or not ( 

General Hates. They did. numerous times. They were satisfied that 
it was. at the times that I asked them. 

32. General Russell. Do you know, of your own knowledge, whether 
or not during this period that you have described, that outer patrol 
was actually taking place i 

General Hates. Oh. I knew that it was taking place: yes: but 
whether it was continual or whether it was spot patrols, or whether 
it was periodic patrols. I didn't know. 

33. General Russell. In other words, you knew generally it was 
going on. but the details of it were unknown to you ? 

General Hates. I do not remember the deta*il of it. 

34. General Russell. How many ships were out. or where they 
went, on those things, yoti did not know ? 

General Hates. Xo. I do remember that when we looked into it 
at various stages, the answer they gave seemed to be satisfactory. 

35. General Russell. Xow. let us discuss the inner patrol as con- 
ducted out there during your tour of duty, by Army people. About 
how continuous was that ? 

General Hates. That patrol was not continuoits. It was certain 
times of the day as I remember, largely at the dawn period, and after 
dawn, until seven or eight o'clock, practically every day. is my recollec- 
tion of it. It is rather vague, but that is what I recollect. 

36. General Russell. Do you think that that was in effect [--^5] 
in the fall of 1941 when you left out there. General? 

General Hates. I think it was in effect, yes. As to whether it was 
daily. I can't recollect. 

37. General Russell. Xow, General, as Chief of Staff you would 
have been acquainted with information which reached the Hawaiian 
Department from the "War Department relating to our relations with 
the Japanese Government, wouldn't you? 

General Hayes. I would have been : yes. sir. 

38. General Russell. You would have known it ? 
General Hates. Yes, 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 137 

39. General Russell. Do you recall messages that reached you 
people out there, in 19-iO and 1941, telling you about these relations 
between the Americans and the Japanese ? 

General Hayes. All these messages that centered on the Japanese 
came I believe after I left the Chief of Stall's office. 

■40. General Russell. You just do not recall any while you were 
there ? 

General Hayes. I recall one or two general ones, but none of these 
specific ones. The last message I remember as Chief of Stall was a 
message which came on a Saturday afternoon, authorizing the De- 
partment Commander to spend $6,000,000 at once for the develop- 
ment of the air fields along the southern route, namely. Christmas 
and Canton and Savaii and Fiji and those places, and stating that 
$5,000,000 more would be available if he needed it. . That is the last 
message 1 remember, of that import. 

41. General Russell. Was there any considerable supervision over 
activities of the Hawaiian Department by the War Depart- [^4^] 
ment { 

General Hayes. I think, as I remember, there was the usual super- 
vision which you would expect in an island that far away. It ap- 
peared to me that the Department Commander was quite free, except 
on the question of materiel and equipment and monies available to 
do certain things; and that was natural at that time, because money 
was not so free. 

42. General Russell. Did that pertain to the training of the troops 
in the Department, also? 

General Hayes. It did. 

43. General Frank. What do you mean? Did what pertain? 

44. General Russell. This very general supervision as to training. 
General Hayes. I guess I misunderstood your question. General. 

I thought that what you meant was, did that question of money affect 
the training. 

45. General Russell. Xo, what I had in mind was this — whether 
or not they attempted, by memoranda, directives, tours of inspection, 
and so forth, to have anj' intimate supervision over your training. 

General Hayes. Xo, sir. 

46. General Russell. They did not ? 
General Hayes. Xo, sir. 

47. General Russell. Xow, we have been interested in this subject 
of alerts. Could you tell us the number of alerts that you can recall, 
which were initiated and carried through in the Hawaiian' Depait- 
ment during your tour of duty tliere ? 

General Hayes. Yes, sir. 'Originally, under General Moses, there 
was what could be called an ''alert." When [250] ' General 
Herron came down, he concentrated on the alert phase, and, because 
an alert in time of peace may be annoying to a high commander, there 
was a general tendency by some of the general officers to want to have 
a different kind of alert, so that their men wouldn't be annoved or 
harrassed. If. for example, they were going to have a certain kind of 
problem — well, we would leave the men in barracks, and we would not 
take them all out. 

General Herron liad one alert— battle-position alert, planes dis- 
persed, observation facilities in position, antiaircraft in position, and 



138 COXGRESSIOXAL IXVESTIGATIOX PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

infantry and artillery in battle position. Then, when General Short 
came there, the question came up again, and he finally decided on 
three alerts — alerts 1, 2, and 3; 1 to be against sabotage, and in which 
everything was centered; 2, to have your observation out, your planes 
dispersed, antiaircraft in position, but infantry and artillery kept 
back at their base stations, their home stations ; 3, everjthing in battle 
position, planes dispersed, observation out, antiaircraft in position, 
infantry and artillery in battle position. 

48. General Gruxert. Did Xo. 2 include dispersion of airplanes? 
General Hates. It is my recollection it did. General. 

49. General Russell. Xow, General, may I summarize, mei-ely for 
the purpose of accuracy. You testified that General Moses had one 
alert ? 

General Hayes. When I say Moses, it just occurred to me while I 
was talking. General Drum left in November 1937, as I remember it, 
and then General Moses was there from Xovember [~^i] 1937 
until March 1938, and most of his regime was concerned with the 
Army-Xavy — with the Xavy maneuvers, and the joint Army and Xavy 
maneuver period which started with preparation in Xovember, and 
which culminated in a maneuver some time as I remember in ]March. 

50. General Russell. And I believe, then, you said that General 
Herron had one alert? 

General Hates. Yes. 

51. General Russell. That is, probably in the summer of 1940, 
called by the War Department : and then General Short 

General Hates. Xo; the plan called for one. His plan called for 
one alert. 

52. General Gruxert. You mean one kind of alert, or one actual 
getting on the ground, being alerted? 

General Hates. Oh, no ; there were several alerts, but one kind, one 
type of alert. 

53. General Russell. Do you remember how many times General 
Herron had his forces out actually on the ground for alerts in his 
regime ? 

General Hates. There were several all-out department alerts; the 
number, I cannot remember. 

54. General Russell. But there were several? 
General Hates. Several. 

55. General Fraxk. Frequent? 

General Hates. ''Frequent" is the word; yes. 

56. General Russell. Xow, when General Short came along, did he 
have any alerts in either of the categories that you have described? 

General Hates. Yes, sir. 

["2o2] 57. General Russell. Do j'ou recall when they were? 

General Hates. I recall one. I believe in September of 1941, we 
were notified by the State Department, with a 6-hour advance notice, 
that they were going to freeze the assets of the Japanese, and he went 
into alert 3, with all the troops out in position. The order came out, 
there was no disturbance of any kmd, and he left them a? I remember 
in maneuvers then for the purpose of not showing that it was an alert 
for that reason but that they were just out training, and they stayed 
out there for several days; then he called maneuvers off. 



J 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 139 

58. General Gruxert. Just a minute, because I have something 
I want to connect up. Do 3'ou recall about what date that alert 3 
was called for, approximately? 

[253] General Hates. I do not remember the date, General, 
but 

59. General Grunert. "\"VTiat part of the month ? 

General Hates. Well, if I could get the date of the Japanese 

60. General Russell. I will give it to you in just a minute. 

Since we have gotten on the subject of dates, I have a very definite 
recollection that that notice came out some time in July about freezing 
their assets. 

General Hates. I think so too, probably, 

61. General Russell. And it was an embargo in its nature. 
General Hates. That is right. Around July 26, or something like 

that, is in my mind. 

62. General Grunert. If that is the case, that alert could not have 
lasted into October or late in the fall, could it? 

General Hates. No. 

63. General Gruxert. I do not care to pursue it any further. 

64. General Russell. General, I have made a search for that alert, 
having in mind determining when it started and when it ended and 
what happened after it was over, but I can find no records in the War 
Department, to this time, even just one message, relating to that July 
alert. 

65. General Grunert. It ^^•ould be in the Hawaiian records, though, 
would it not? 

General Hates. It should be. 

May I speak off the record here for a time ? 

General Grunert. Surely. 

(Informal discussion off the record.) 

66. General Russell. Now, as you recall, just about how long was 
that alert in force, General ? 

[2S4] GeneralHATES. It was three or four days, 

67. General Russell. Was it an all-out alert or a limited alert? 
General Hates. All-out alert, and battle position and maneuver 

positions. 

68. General Frank. Will you please state the circumstances under 
which the alert was decided? 

General Hayes. Sometime during that day the Commanding Gen- 
eral of the Hawaiian Department received notification from the War 
Department that the State Department had advised the War Depart- 
ment that it was intended six hours later to freeze the assets of the 
Japanese; that this notice was given six hours ahead of time, so that 
the Department Commander might make any necessary arrangements 
to meet the situation. G-2, other departments, and the F. B. I.. Chief 
of the F. B. I. in Oahu, were called in, were informed, informed me 
that it looked very safe ; nothing was expected to happen, to the best 
of their knowledge and information. I conveyed this information to 
General Short. He decided to go into maneuver positions which were 
the battle positions, had press releases made out so that they could 
be given to the evening paper, to the effect that the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment was taking the field for a 10-day maneuver period. 



140 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

69. Genenil Frank. This was an all-out alert? 

General Hayes. All-out. Accordingly the troops were put out, and 
nothing happened from the incident. The troops were out in the 
field, to my recollection, three or four days to carry on the idea, and 
then were called in. During this period [255] which was part 
of the defense plan, troops in armored cars or government vehicles were 
marched through the town so that they would be able to meet any 
Japanese situation, as well as the other battle positions out in the 
areas. 

70. General Fkank. I have no more questions. 

71. General Russell. General, there was no other placing of the 
troops on the ground in alert positions by General Short except this 
one of which you have spoken ? 

General Hayes. Oh, yes. there were others. 

72. General Eussell. When was that? 

General Hayes. T do not remember the dates, but they were regular 
maneuvers in the field. 

73. General Russell. Do you refer now to those big maneuvers 
that were held in May? 

General Hayes. No, sir. I refer to other maneuvers. He usually 
had one large maneuver, and then during the year you had several 
maneuvers which covered the same idea but were not as extensive in 
situations. The big maneuver usually was joined in with the Navy in 
some Avay. My recollection is that troops were out in the field a great 
deal of the time. 

74. General Russell. Now, during the year 1941 did you observe in 
Hawaii any indications that the relations between the Ja]:)anese Nation 
and the American Government were becoming more strained? 

General Hayes. If I had not known that they were, I am not certain 
that I M'ould have noticed particularly. I did notice, though, that 
the new consul that they sent out there during that period was a 
much higher type individual when it came to handling affairs, 
appeared to me to be a very high type [356] diplomatic indi- 
vidual. 

75. General Grunert. Did not the press indicate that the relations 
between the two nations were changing? 

General Hayes. Oh, yes, sir; that is correct. 

76. General Grunert. You meant official information; is that the 
idea? 

General Hayes. I also meant 

77. General Russell. I limited the question. 
General Hayes. I meant on the street. 

78. General Russell. No. I limited that question. I had not gone 
into that. I asked you if there were any conditions in Hawaii itself 
which indicated it, and he answered it iu a limited way. Now I was 
going into the other. 

You did state in your answer, however. General, that if you had 
not known that relations were becoming more strained you could not 
have gleaned it from the appearances in Hawaii? 

General Hayes. No. I was referring to the people on the street 
and to things like that. 

79. General Russell. But you did know that they were becoming 
more strained? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 141 

General Hates. Yes. 

80. General Russell. And where did you get that information? 
General Hayes. I got that from the papers and from the types of 

telegrams and radios that came into headquarters. 

81. General Russell. Well, tell us about those radios and telegrams 
that came into headquarters. 

General Hayes. Well, the general tenor of those telegrams was 
that. What did we want in those supplies ? Or what did we want in 
these supplies? Indicating that the War Department was [257] 
interested in building up. This question of the radar, getting the 
money for the radar, the priorities on the radar system : the natural 
things that come in a situation like that. 

82. General Russell. Largely on your projects for getting mate- 
riel ? 

General Hayes. That is right ; and an increase in projects and an 
increase in money. 

83. General Russell. I do not believe that I have anything else, 
General. 

8-1:. General Grunert. I have quite a number of questions here. 
Now that I realize how long General Hayes was with General Short 
as Chief of Staff, it brings up quite a number of questions here, which 
I shall try to get through as rapi'dly as possible. 

From the time General Short took over, were there any particular 
changes that he made in the defensive measures or plan concerning 
defensive measures that General Herron had carried on ? 

General Hayes. Yes. 

85. General Grunert. Will you outline those briefly ? 

General Hayes. As I remember, General Short initially was very 
much concerned about the outer islands, the other islands. He wanted 
some more troops out on the other islands. He felt that the other 
islands were outposts which, if he occupied, would enable him to slow 
up a major attack on Oahu. He concentrated on the building of air- 
fields. The basic defense plan was not changed much, as I remember. 
The boundaries of the divisions, the north-and-south, on some of the 
Hawaiian Islands, were changed, but the theory of it 

[268] 86. General Frank. Boundaries between what? 

General Hayes. Between sectors : north sector and south sector. 
But the theory of the defense, namely to hold the beaches lightly 
with a large mobile striking force, was kept by him. 

87. General Grunert. Did he emphasize training more than Gen- 
eral Herron did ? In other words, was he primarily a training man ? 

General Hayes. He primarily was a training man. 

88. General Grunert. Yes. 

General Hayes. He was out a great deal of the time. I would often 
never see him until late in the afternoon. 

89. General Grunert. Was there as much cooperation and coor- 
dination with the Navy, or more, after General Short took over, or 
what? 

General Hayes. That is a difficult question to answer, for this 
reason : that General Herron was probably the most popular com- 
mander they had ever had out there. He was greatly admired, and 
they had deep affection for him. It is a personal thing. He knew 
the Admirals better than General Short did. Officially and in their 
dealings they went through the same steps. 



142 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

90. General Frank. Who? That is General Short and General 
Herron ? 

General Hayes. General Herron, yes. That was because General 
Short followed the policies which General Herron had established. 

91. General Frank. Yes. 

[259] General Hates. And that was once or twice a week 
either going one way across, and the General and Chief of Staff going 
over to call on the Admiral and Chief of Staff. 

92. General Grunert. Do you recall a letter sent out by the Sec- 
retary of the Navy of January 24, 1941, regarding defensive meas- 
ures in cooperation with the Navy, to make such measures effective, 
which the Secretary of War on February 7, 1941, sent out to the 
Commanding General of Hawaii? It referred particularly to taking 
effective measures so as to be prepared for any eventuality. 

General Hates. I do not remember a specific letter. I do remem- 
ber some letters along that line. 

93. General Grunert. At about that time ? 
General Hates. About that time, yes, sir. 

94. General Grunert. Then, you would not recall just what meas- 
ures were taken in consequence of that letter ? 

General Hates. No, except during the period of three years there 
was an intense training program. It was on the increase all along. 

95. General Grunert. As I recall that letter, it referred also to 
possibility of air raids and attacks. 

General Hates. . That is correct. 

96. General Grunert. And that the measures to be taken were 
more in line with particularly guarding against such. 

General Hates. That is correct. 

97. General Grunert. Now, can you give us a little short idea of 
what you considered conditions in Hawaii to be from early February 
until you left? In other words, were they disturbed? Were there 
rumblings among the population? Was the command [£60~\ 
afraid of sabotage, of upheavals of the population itself? Were the 
conditions between the military and naval and the civil population 
friendly or not so? In other words, general conditions as to the 
jDopulation, especially the Japanese population on the Island of Oahu. 

General Hates. Yes, sir. First of all, as to the relationships with 
the Navy, it was most cordial. I never saw any incident in the higher 
echelon where there was not extreme cordiality. 

98. General Grunert. Well, in that cordiality was there also effi- 
ciency in the exchange of information, and was it effective in order 
to allow you to do what was necessary to be done ? 

General Hates. There was a sort of an agi'eement that when any- 
thing came in that was important, that touched on a naval phase in 
any way, we would call up the Navy, and General Herron or General 
Short and myself would go over and see the Admiral, or the Admiral 
and his Chief of Staff would come over to see either General Herron 
or Short. I do not know the number of times that would happen, 
but it was two or three times at least every month. 

99. General Grunert. Did that extend down to the staff echelons as 
well as the higher command, the G-2s, the G-3s corresponding? 

General Hayes. The G-2s and the O. N. I.s were very close together. 
They transferred information one to the other continually. There 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 143 

was liaison in the G-3. I would send an officer over, and our G-3 
would go over and see their war plans. There was cooperation. It 
was there when I left. 

[?261] 100. General Grunert. How about confidence? 

General Hayes. Confidence in the individuals or confidence in the 
plan? 

101. General Grunert. Confidence in either, as to their doing their 
respective job and playing a game with each other in the cooperative 
line. 

General Haytes. I think there was confidence. You remember, dur- 
ing that period the joint action of the Army and Navy changed from 
paramount interests to cooperation, and we had a lot of conferences 
and discussions so that this cooperation would work, and during that 
period also the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was written. 

102. General Grunert. All right; let us drop the subject of coop- 
eration and coordination and go to the civilian personnel. 

General Hayes. There was no particular evidence of there being 
any great strain that I saw. 

103. General Grunert. How did you size up the Japanese element? 
As dangerous ? 

General Hayes. I sized it up this way : General Herron, based upon 
that action, picked out 

104. General Frank. Based upon what ? 

General Hayes. Based upon General Herron's action. I am going 
to tell you about it. 

105. General Frank. Yes. 

General Hayes. He picked out something between fifty and a hun- 
dred of the very top civilians in Hawaii. Some had been there four 
years, and some had been there fifty years, many of them born there, 
and he asked them to give him their comments [262} on the 
Japanese. I think out of it the whole thing came, in general, that 10 
percent were definitely loyal to the Emperor, that 10 percent probably 
were loyal to our country, that 80 percent you could not tell about : if 
the going was good for us, they would be with us; if the going was 
good for the Japanese, they would be with the Japanese. But none 
of these people would tell you that they really understood the Japa- 
nese ; that they had the oriental veil that no occidental has ever been 
able to get through. I know that I went out with Japanese official 
parties and they were most cordial. 

106. General Grunert. Well, now, from all this did you or the Com- 
manders over there figure that sabotage was going to be one of their 
main troubles in the future if anything happened, or didn't that over- 
shadow other things that had to be done? 

General Hayes. Sabotage, because of the uncertainty of the Japa- 
nese no one knew, was always possible and present in the thoughts. 

107. General Frank. And taken care of in the war plans? 
General Hayes. That is correct. 

108. General Grunert. And was that one of the reasons that they 
separated the alerts into 1, 2, and 3? 

General Hayes. It may have been. That was not worked out by me. 

109. General Grunert. That was not worked out by you? 
General Hayes. No. 



144 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

110. General Grunert. How did that come about? I understood 
General Herron to say that that was put across by the training people 
after he left. 

General Hayes. After General Herron left. That is correct. 

[26-3] 111. General Grunert. Because when General Herron 
was there he had the one kind of an alert. 

General Hayes. That is my recollection. 

112. General Grunert. That there were three types of alert? 

General Hayes. General Short worked on that himself. 

llo. General Grunert. He worked on that' himself ? 

General Hayes. With Colonel Phillips, the man who followed me. 

114. General Grunert. All right; we shall go to another one. 
General Hayes. I did not work on that. 

115. General Frank. Was that in effect before you were relieved? 
General Hayes. Oh, yes. 

116. General Frank. Tlie three types of alert? 
General Hayes. Yes. 

117. General Frank. Were in effect? 
General Hayes. Yes. 

118. General Frank. Before you went on leave to come back to the 
United States? 

General Hayes. That is right. 

119. General Grunert. Now I shall ask you a few questions on the 
subject of command and staff. 

Was it normal for General Short, when he was in command, to con- 
sult with or have conferences with his senior commanders of the 
Department ? 

General Hayes. Yes, sir, it was. 

120. General Grunert. Outside of actual maneuvers. And did 
he pass information to them as to conditions that he became aware 
of, and sought their advice or put propositions to them before 
[^<54] he made his decisions on the matter, or did he just rely on 
his staff? 

General Hayes. No; I think from my recollection he conveyed the 
information and, wlien he felt it was necessary, asked them as well 
as his staff. 

121. General Frank. How often did he see his main commanders? 
General Herron saw them every week, didn't he? 

General Hayes. Yes. 

122. r^eneral Frank. How often did General Short see them? 
General Hayes. My recollection is that he saw them every week 

or two. He was very acute to this matter of .training, and when you 
are acute on the subject of training you just have to see the com- 
manders, and he saw them, not only the top but down below. 

123. General Grunert. But then most of his conferences were on 
the subject of training? 

General Hayes. No, sir ; they were on the subject of air. That was 
quite a subject, the defense by air, and he saw the air commanders 
or commander quite often, the engineers on projects. He had a regu- 
lar flow of staff officers. 

124. General Grunert. Now, as to the question of staff, did you 
as Chief of Staff have frequent conferences with your General Staff 
heads? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 145 

General Hayes. Oh, I saw them every day and discussed. 

125. General Grunert. And were they given responsibility and re- 
quired to live up to it, or did they look to the high command, as the 
Chief of Staff or the Commanding General, to make most of their 
decisions, and then just follow them out, instead of making recom- 
mendations ? 

[26o] General Hayes. I think they functioned as the General 
Staff officers should have functioned. You gave them the policy, 
and they functioned under those policies. 

126. General Grunert. Do you care to express your opinion or 
judgment of the man who succeeded you? You need not answer if 
you do not desire to. 

General Hayes. I would like to say this: I do not know as to his 
ability as a Chief of Staff. He was very much concerned with G-3. 
I think that was his trend. 

127. General Frank. Do you feel that he had worked himself in 
to the position of Chief of Staff by the time of the Pearl Harbor 
attack? 

General Hayes. I do not. That is an opinion. 

128. General Russell, General, while we are on this subject of Gen- . 
eral Short as a trainer, do you think that he emphasized training 
to the point that it was a detriment to his mission, his defensive mis- 
sion of i^rotection of the fleet at Oahu ? 

General Hayes. No, sir. You could not read the defense plan and 
meet your mission without being intimately connected with the train- 
ing end of it. 

129. General Grunert. I would like to stop right here and take 
a recess of about a minute. 

(A brief informal recess was taken.) 

[266] 130. General Grunert. When you left the Department, 

about what was the state of the anti-aircraft defense system? Did 
you consider it in pretty good shape and efficient ? 

General Hayes. Yes ; I did. I think it was in good shape and was 
a good plan. Furthermore, at that time there was not a great deal 
of anti-aircraft equipment in the whole Army. They needed more 
and they could not get it because it was not there. The plan for the 
defense was ver}?- well drawn out and sound. The coverage was excel- 
lent. Some of the material was not the most modern :. That is my 
view. 

131. General Frank. What, in your opinion, ever brought about the 
frame of mind that resulted in a decision to install Alert No. 1 ? 

132. General Grunert. May I ask if by "install No. 1" you mean 
the classes of alert? 

General Frank. Yes. 

133. General Grunert. The question that General Frank has asked 
refers to the classes of alert, 1, 2 and 3, which was a change from what 
General Herron had. 

General Hayes. Yes; I understand. I think the reason that he put 
in Class 1 Alert was that he felt that sabotage was always possible 
and probably j^resent and dangerous. 

134. Genera] Frank. Had you ever discussed the reasons with him 
for that kind of an alert? 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 1 11 



146 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Hates. Yes, a couple of times; and then he took it up 
himself and worked with Phillips, to my recollection. 

135. General Frank. On that I would like to ask you this : Since, in 
the situation in July of 1941, which was much less acute than this one, 
be installed an all-out alert, what do you think influenced him at this 
time to decide on the No. 1 Alert ? 

12&7] General Hayes. "This time" being December 7? 

136. General Frank. November 27th. 

General Hates. I think, a radiogram which he probably received 
from some Washington source stressing sabotage. 

137. General Frank. You were gone at the time? 
General Hates. I was gone at the time. 

138. General Frank. The Navy had different classes of alert, did 
they not ? 

General Hates. Yes; they had different alerts. What they were, 
in detail, I do not know. 

139. General Frank. Are you conversant with whether or not Navy 
No. 1 Alert was an all-out alert ? 

General Hates. I am not positive. I would not like to say at this 
time. I did know at the time, but it has escaped my memory. 

140. General Frank. Do you laiow that there was an air estimate 
of the situation prepared and signed by Admiral Bellinger and Gen- 
eral Martin ? 

General Hates. Yes. 

141. General Frank. That was during your time? 
General Hayes. Yes. 

142. General Frank. Do you remember the conclusion to which they 
came as to the most probable enemy action ? 

General Hates. No. 

143. General Frank. Do you remember whether or not they antic- 
ipated an air raid ? 

General Hates. Yes. 

144. General Frank. They did? 
General Hayes. Yes. 

[£68] 145. General Frank. As the most probable enemy action ? 

General Hayes. As the most probable. Ancl that was also the esti- 
mate of the situation of the Depai'tment. General Herron's estimate, 
which was still in effect, as I remember, was that the most probable line 
of action was an air raid some time shortly after dawn. He did not 
name Sunday specifically. 

146. General Frank. Were jou surprised at that air raid? 
General Hayes. On December 7th ? 

147. General Frank. Yes. 

General Hayes. I was surprised, but I was not surprised in the form 
of the attack, 

148. General Frank. Would you have anticipated it? 
General Hates. If I had been there? 

149. General Frank. Yes. 

General Hayes. Yes ; I think that I would have done this : I would 
not have anticipated it, but I would have been prepared, as I was a 
disciple of one alert and everything out. 

150. General Frank. Had you been the Chief of Staff would jou 
have recommended an all-out alert ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 147 

General Hates. Definitely. 

151. General Frank. Here is another line of questions of which you 
may or may not have some knowledge. Do you have any knowledge 
concerning the failure of the contractors, the Hawaiian constructors, 
to complete the construction of the Hawaiian defense projects within 
the time prior to the 7th of December, 1911, which the contracting job 
orders required. 

General Hayes. I do not remember the details of that at all. 

152. General Frank. Do you remember any complaints having been 
made that the contractors were not completing their work on [269] 
time? 

General Hayes. Yes. There were various projects. There was the 
tunnel project and various projects that pressure was put on. The one 
on which the most pressure was put, I think, was this radar. 

153. General Frank. Who put the pressure on? 
General Hayes. General Short. 

154. General Grunert. On whom? 
General Hayes. On the War Department. 

155. General Grunert. Is that of record ? 

General Hayes. Oh, there must be a record of it. I know there were 
telegrams sent. 

156. General Frank. Or did he not put the pressure on the con- 
tractor ? Why on the War Department ? 

General Hayes. I think he put it on the contractor. And was told 
that he could not get this stuff ; they said that he could not get priorities 
on materiel and things like that. Then he went to the War Department 
for help. 

157. General Frank. After the contractor told him this, he then 
went to the War Department? 

General Hayes. That is my recollection. 

158. General Grunert. Who is directly supervising contracts? 
General Hayes. At that time it was between the Colonel Lyman and 

Colonel Wyman. Wyman was the Division Engineer and Lyman was 
the Department Engineer. 

159. General Grunert. Wyman was the Division Engineer? 
General Hayes. Yes. And then it was headed up into G-4. 

160. General Grunert. Did he put pressure through G-4 on Lyman 
or Wyman, the contractor, or how ? 

[270] General Hayes. I think he worked it through the offices ; 
not the contractor himself. 

161. General Frank. Who was G-1 at the time? 

General Hayes. Bank or Marsden — I think Marsden was G^. He 
is out in Hawaii still. 

162. General Frank. Who was G-2? 

General Hayes. Fielder. General Short brought Fielder down to 
relieve Marsden and put Marsden as G-4. 

163. General Frank. Do you have any knowledge concerning delays 
with reference to underground gasoline storage facilities? 

General Hayes. I have a definite recollection of it. The detail of it 
is not sufficient to give as evidence ; but a great deal of time and thought 
was given to that by General Short. 

164. General Frank. Prior to your departure was the aircraft warn- 
ing system functioning? . 



148 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Hayes. Only on the Island of Oaliu. There were no sta- 
tions on Kauai, none on Molokai, none on Maui, and none on Hawaii, 
although all the stations had been recommended. Had been work done 
on them, but it was over a lon^ period of time. 

165. General Frank. The job orders called for those installations 
to have been completed before you left, did they not? 

General Hayes. Oh, yes ; June 30, August 30, September 30, and on ; 
various changes. 

166. General Frank. And the reason that they were not completed 
was because of the contractor claiming that he was not able to get 
credit for material ; is that correct ? 

General Hayes. Not only that. General Short sent many a radio- 
gram and many letters trying to get this radar equipment in, and he 
was told that he could not get it, as I remember, [i?77] because 
of priorities. Panama was first, the Philippines next — I don't remem- 
ber that; they were probably away down on the list. But the West 
Coast, second, and Hawaii third. The thing was delayed from time 
to time for various reasons, and one of them was that the stuff was not 
there and they could not get all the money at the time they wanted to 
get it; and many letters and telegrams were sent on that matter. 

167. General Grunert. Did that mean the complete project, or did 
it refer to part of the project, such as roads or concrete work or radar 
itself, or what? Would you be able to testify on that particular 
subject? 

General Hayes. These places were so out of the way, on the tops of 
isolated mountains, that in order to live there they had to have certain 
things, and in order to get things there they had to have certain roads 
built. Take Kawailoa and Waialee. They were very difficult places. 

168. General Frank. Do you have any knowledge as to whether or 
not any military personnel neglected their duties relating to the 
contract ? 

General Hayes. For the radars? 

169. General Frank. For the radars or for any of the construction. 
General Hayes. No, sir. 

170. General Frank. Was there any feeling to that effect? 
General Hayes. Not to my knowledge. This radar business was 

pressing, pressing, pressing all the time to get it in, and they just 
could not get it in. 

171. General Frank. Did you ever hear of a contractor by the name 
of Wilhelm Rohl ? 

[272^ General Hayes. Yes. 

172. General Frank. Did anything ever come up about his status? 
General Hayes. Not while I was there. Afterwards I read about 

him. I only saw him once. 

173. General Frank. You knew nothing about him while you were 
there ? 

General Hayes. No, sir. It came up just a month or so ago, in the 
paper, about Ted Wyman and Rohl together. 

174. General Frank. I have no further questions. 

175. General Grunert. Was the Interceptor Command organized 
before you went on leave from the Chief of Staff's position ? 

General Hayes. It was organized and training was going on in 
an improvised way, with whatever equipment they had. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 149 

176. General Eussell. Where did this man Ted Wyman come 
from ? He was an Army man, was he not ? 

General Hayes. He was the Division Engineer. 

177. General Russell. How long was he out there during your tour 
of duty « 

General Hayes. A couple of years, I guess. 

178. General Russell. He came out about two years before you 
left? 

General Hayes. As I remember it. 

179. General Russell. Was he charged immediately with the in- 
stallation of this radar system and the supervision of its installation ? 

General Hayes. No. 

180. General Russell. What was his relation to the radar system? 
General Hayes. Well, in certain things as Division Engineer he 

functioned under the Chief of Engineers. In cer- [273] tain 
things he functioned under the Department Commander. He prob- 
ably arranged the contract, to get it done and, after he got the ma- 
chinery, constructed the thing. I forget the details of it, but that 
was the idea. 

181. General Russell. What was the relation of the Department 
Commander to this project for the installation of the radar? 

General Hayes. It was his responsibility. It was not the Chief 
of Engineers' responsibility. It is a tactical unit. 

18i2. General Russell. Who made the initial contract for the in- 
stallation of the permanent radar station? 

General Hayes. I do not know. 

183. General Frank. It was made by Wyman. I want to find out 
what right he had over the supervision of this station. 

General Hayes. The tactical location and everything else was 
decided by him. 

184. General Russell. Did he have anything to do with letting 
the contract, as to who was to build them ? 

General Hayes. I do not remember anything about that. 

185. General Russell. Did you not know, as a matter of fact, that 
the contract was let in Washington to this man Rohl? 

General Hayes. I read about it. I didn't know it at the time. 

186. General Russell. Is it not true that the supervision of the 
installation was by this man Wyman, the District Engineer out there? 

General Hayes. Yes. There was a joint action between the Depart- 
ment Engineer and the Division Engineer, Certain things the Divi- 
sion Engineer did for the Department Commander, and certain things 
lie did for the Chief of Engineers. 

187. General Russell. Who made the contract providing the period 
[274] in which these things would be set up ? 

General Hayes. That, as I recollect, came from Washington; and 
when the work did not meet the date Washington was contacted and 
it was put over to another date, a later date. 

188. General Russell. All of which decision was made in AVashing- 
ton, independent of anything that the Commanding General of the 
Hawaiian Department did or could do? 

General Hayes. I am not certain about that independence, except 
that pressure was put on the War Department. 



150 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

189. General Russell. But the decisions were made in Washington ? 
General Hayes. That is my impression. But I think you can get 

all that from the engineers who worked on it. 

190. General Grunert. If there are no further questions, we thank 
you for coming up, General. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 
(Whereupon, at 5 o'clock p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of 
witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 151 



CONTENTS 



FRIDAY, AUGUST 11, 1944 

Testimony of— ^^se' 

Maj. Gen. Walter Campbell Sliort, United States Army, Retired 276 

DOCUMENTS 

Message of October 16, 1941 279 

Radiogram dated November 27, 1941, Chief of Staff to Gen. Short 28G 

Reply of Lt. Gen. Short on November 27, 1941, to message No. 472 from 

Gen. Marshall on November 27, 1941 286 

Message dated November 28, 1941, from Adjutant General to Lt. Gen. 

Short 293 

Message dated November 28, 1941, from Lt. Gen. Short to Adjutant General- 294 
Message of December 7, 1941, to Hawaiian Department, Ft. Shafter, T. H. 

signed "Marshall" 309 

Message dated June 10, 1941, Lt. Gen. Short to Adjutant General 826 

Message dated June 26, 1941, Adjutant General to Lt. Gen. Short 327 

Letter dated December 23, 1941, J. B. Poindexter, Governor of Hawaii to 

Lt. Gen. Short 337 

Letter dated December 22, 1941, from civilians of Honolulu to the Presi- 
dent 342 

Conclusions 344 

Excerpts from Roberts' Commission Report 382 

Paragraph III of Addendum No. 1, Joint Oi)erations Agreement 388 

Excerpts from Paragraph IV of Addendum No. 1 388 

EXHIBITS 

In Evidence 
No. 1 Bound file of documents presented by Gen. Short and sworn to by 

him 351 

1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original transcript of proceedings. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 153 



W6-\ PKOCEEDINGS BEFOEE THE ARMY PEAEL 

HARBOR BOARD 



FRIDAY, AUGUST 11, 1944 

Munitions Building, 

Washington, D. C, 

The Board at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on August 9, 194-1:, conducted 
the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the 
Board, presiding. 

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. 
Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members. 

Present also : Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, and Major Henry 
C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder. 

General Grunert. The Board will come to order. 

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER CAMPBELL SHORT, UNITED 
STATES ARMY, RETIRED (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, BRIG. 
GEN. THOMAS H. GREEN, UNITED STATES ARMY) 

(The w^itness was sworn b}' the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Will you please state to the Board your name, 
rank, organization, and station? 

General Short. Walter Camjibell Short, Major General, United 
States Army, Retired. My number is 01621. I am living in Dallas, 
Texas. I am not stationed any place. 

2. General Grunert. General, the order convening this Board re- 
quires it to ascertain and report the facts relating to the [^77] 
attack made by Japanese armed forces on the Territory of Hawaii on 
the 7th of December, 1941. You having been in command of the 
Hawaiian Department from the 8th of February to the iTth of Decem- 
ber, 1941, have been ordered to appear as a witness before the Board; 
ii.nd the Board hopes to get at the facts from a consideration of your 
testimony, from that of other witnesses, and from that contained in 
documentary evidence. 

You have already furnished the Board with a list of witnesses whom 
you believe have knowledge of facts pertinent to the issue. The Board 
hopes to be able to have all these witnesses testify. 

The Board has been informed that the War Department has fur- 
nished you a copy of the records of the Roberts Commission, except 
certain exhibits which have been made available to you for examina- 
tion. The Board made a study of those records and, as a result thereof, 
many of its questions are based on that study. 

Have you a statement which you desire to submit to the Board? 



154 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. Yes, sir. I would like to make an oral statement 
and then submit a statement in writing, with supporting documents. 

3. General Grunert. If so, at the time you submit the statement in 
writing the Recorder will swear you to it so that that statement can 
be made a part of the record for the Board's consideration. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

4. General Grunert. Will you please go ahead with your state- 
ment, and then I will lead in propounding questions to [278] 
try to get at some of the facts under various objectives aand phases. 

General Short. I would like to state, in the first place, that I am 
just as interested as the Board in having all the facts uncovered. 
I believe I can only gain by having the Board get a full knowledge 
of everything leading up to the attack. I regret that I was not 
granted the privilege of having counsel present at the interrogation 
of all witnesses, because I think that things might have been brought 
out that might not be brought out without that. However, since that 
has been refused, I would like to have a copy of my own testimony 
before the Board, as soon as convenient after the meeting, and I would 
like, when the Board has completed its work, to have a complete copy 
of the record of the Board with an opportunity to go over it, so that 
I will know what has gone before. I believe that that request is 
reasonable. 

(Informal discussion off the record.) 

5. General Grunert. General Short, I do not think it is within 
the authority of the Board to make a decision as to whether or not 
the Board will furnish you such a copy, and the Board suggests that 
you make application to the War Department for such a copy. 

General Short. Shall I proceed? 

6. General Grunert. Yes. 

General Short. I would like to call the attention of the Board to 
the fact that I have had a copy of the record of the Roberts Commis- 
sion only about a day and a half. I have been able to refresh my 
memory to a considerable extent, but it is barely possible, since it has 
been two years and eight months, [279] that there might be 
some slight discrepancy in details between what I would say now and 
what I said then. I do not think it would be anything of any impor- 
tance, but it is possible that some detail would escape my mind. 

I would like to begin by reading the message that I got from the 
War Department on October 16. That was the first in this situation. 
It came through the Navy and is a paraphrase of the dispatch from 
the Chief of Naval Operations. 

(Message of October 16, 1941, is as follows:) 

Japanese Cabinet resignation creates a grave situation. If a new Cabinet is 
formed it probably will be anti-American and strongly nationalistic. If the 
Konoye Cabinet remain it will operate under a new mandate which will not 
include rapprochement with the United States. Either way hostilities between 
Japan and Russia are strongly possible. Since Britain and the United States 
are held responsible by Japan for their present situation, there is also a possi- 
bility that Japan may attack these two powers. In view of these possibilities 
you will take due precautions, including such preparatory deployments as will 
not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan. 

General Grunert. What is the date of that? 
General Short. October 16, 1941. 

I would like to point out that the message says that hostilities be- 
tween Japan and Russia are strongly possible, [£80] and that 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 155 

there is a possibility of that situation between the United States and 
Japan. There is quite a distinction, 

I also point out that they did not want me to do anything that would 
disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against 
Japan. That seemed to be a matter of considerable importance at 
that time. 

There was nothing further of importance received on the question 
of Japan from then until the 27th day of November ; and this is the 
wire that I had from the Chief of Staff. Incidentally, I want to call 
attention to the number of this particular radiogram. The number 
happens to be very important. 472 is the number. I would like to 
read it so that everybody will have it fresh in their minds. 

(Eadiogram dated November 27, 1941, is as follows:) 

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes, 
with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back 
and offer to continue stop Japanese future action unpredictable and hostile 
action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot repeat cannot be avoided 
the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. 

That is a statement of a good deal of importance. 

This policy should not repeat should not be construed as restricting you to 
a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese 
action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as 
[281] you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as 
not comma repeat not comma to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. 
Report measures taken. 

That is a most important thing. They called on me for a report of 
measures taken. 

Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 
so far as they pertain to Japan stop Limit dissemination of this highly secret 
information to minimum essential oflBcers. 

There are several things that should be noted in this. The first is 
that Japan must take the first overt act ; that the population in Hawaii 
must not be alarmed. In other words, there was still a hope in the 
minds of the War Department that differences might be composed, and 
they apparently wanted to be particularly careful not to add to the 
flames. 

Undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary. 

I will take up in detail a little later the fact that long distance recon- 
naissance was definitely a function of the Navy ; that the document had 
been signed by Admiral Bloch, Commanding the 14th Naval District, 
and myself, and had been approved by the Chief of Staff ; so that the 
War Plans Division certainly should have known the definite provi- 
sion in regard to reconnaissance. 

We had only 12 bombers, 6 of which were out of commission, be- 
cause we had stripped them to send other bombers to the Philippines, 
capable of long distance reconnaissance, so that all the ships that we 
could have sent out for a thousand miles [282] and back were 
6 flying fortresses, if we had been depending on our own reconnais- 
sance. So it was a very much safer proposition to carry out the plan 
as agreed upon by the Navy, wherein all the long range reconnaissance 
of both the Army and Navy functioned under one plan, so that there 
would not be any duplication of reconnaissance and there would be 



156 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

an undivided responsibility. So that the Xavy definitely had the 
responsibility. 

We thought when we drew up the plans on March 21. 1941 — and. as 
I say, the Chief of Staff approved them, and I saw no reason for mak- 
ing any change and starting with my own reconnaissance, because 
I had received this radio I did not believe that the War Department 
wanted us to abrogate the agreement with the Navy and start out on 
our own. When I got this wire, in view of the last statement about 
disseminating it to as few oifRcers as possible, I immediately talked 
it over with my Chief of Staff, who had been my G-3 up to a month 
before, and made the decision, after we had talked it over, to call 
Alert Xo. 1. I later communicated this dispatch to G-2 and to the 
echelon commanders. That same afternoon I talked the matter over 
with General Martin and General Burwell, and the contents of the 
message in general were sent to the two division commanders, the 
Infantry Division and the liaison officers. I did not at that time go 
further down in the list in disseminating the information. 

[Copy] 

3141 Southwestern Boulevard, 

Dallas 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944. 
Subject : Corrections in testimony. 
To : President, Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before 
the Army Pearl Harbor Board : 

Page 282, line 21, — change "Burwell to Burgin." 

* * * * * * * 

(s) Water C. Short 
Walter C. Short, 
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired. 

As to what this Alert Xo. 1 consisted of, we had three types of alert 
inider our standing operational procedure. We had worked from 
July 14, when we brought out a tentative standing operational proce- 
dure : we worked over this very [283] carefully with all of the 
echelon so as to get a reaction on every paragraph, got their recom 
mendations, had repeated conferences, and on the 5th of November 
we put out the operating procedure. Our purpose in putting it out 
as an operating procedure was to get rid of a great amount of secrecy, 
so that each company commander, battalion commander, and regimen- 
tal commander could know exactly what their finictions were. As long 
as the document was considered highly secret, which it had been before, 
it was important to have everybody understand so that he could answer 
immediately to a separate order and know exactly and so that every 
unit would know exactl}' what its job was and could go to it without 
any confusion. 

Our Alert Xo. 1 was a defense against sabotage, espionage, and sub- 
versive activities without any threat from the outside. 

Alert Xo. 2 included all these sabotage measures in Xo. 1. and, 
in addition, defense against air attacks and surface and submarine 
attacks. 

Alert Xo. 3 was a defense against an all-out attack, where everybody 
moved to their battle stations and carried out their duties as if there 
was a possible attempt at landing in sight. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 157 

In making up my mind as to which alert to use I was influenced 
by several things. In the first place, I knew from repeated conversa- 
tions with the Navy that the Japanese naval vessels were supposed to 
136 either in their home ports or proceeding to the south. They had 
no information indicating that any Japanese vessels were proceeding 
east. The nearest Japanese base to Hawaii was 2,100 miles. All of 
our information [^S4] indicated that the Japanese had no 
bomber that could take oS from one of those land bases, bomb Ha- 
waii, and return. 

In addition to that, we had a large part of the United States Fleet 
at Honolulu. They constantly had used task forces, usually two, some- 
times three. Those task forces had carriers with them ; and the normal 
practice, as I understand it, was for the planes of the carrier force to 
scour the ocean 300 miles to each side. In other words, any carrier 
force had a real reconnaissance for a width of 600 miles. For the 
two you would have 1,200 miles of the ocean in the vicinity of those 
two forces well covered. If there were three you would have 1,800 
miles. 

In addition, the Navy had bases at Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and 
Johnston, and did certain reconnaissances from those islands. It 
cut down the flying hours very materially from what would have hap- 
pened if they had tried to do it all from Honolulu. 

I knew of these things, and it made me feel that the chance of an 
attack by air was very slight, or that it was highly improbable. I 
also had the expressed opinion on that day, the morning of the 27th, 
the clay I received this wire, when I had been in conference with Ad- 
miral Kimmel in reference to reinforcing the garrisons of Wake and 
Midw^^y by Army planes, a squadron at each place; but naturally, with 
the limited pursuit we had, if you reinforced Midway and Wake you 
would cut down your air defense in Honolulu. The question came up 
as to how serious was the need for pursuit for the immediate protection 
of Honolulu. Admiral Kimmel asked Captain McMorris, his opera- 
tion officer, what he thought the changes of a [2So] surprise 
attack on Honolulu were, and Captain McMorris replied, none. 

I have in this supporting document an affidavit, I was accompanied 
at the conference by General Martin and Colonel MoUison. We 
were all present when this happened, and I have the affidavit of 
Colonel Mollison as to what was said. 

Admiral Kimmel took no exception to the statement of Captain 
McMorris. As I remember, Admiral Bloch was there, and there 
seemed to be no difference of opinion at all. That was the existing 
opinion of Kimmel's staff, that there was practically no danger of 
a surprise attack by air on Honolulu, 

In addition to that, it was a question of training. Alerts Nos. 2 
and 3 would require so many men on duty. Alert No. 3 would take 
every man, practically, so it would eliminate any training. Alert No, 
2 would practically put every man of the harbor defense, the antiair- 
craft, and the air on duties that would prohibit training. The situa- 
tion in the air with regard to training was quite serious. We had 
been given the mission of ferrying B-l7s to the Philippines, We 
had already sent, I think, two groups, one of 9 and one of 12, We 
had also sent some crews to San Francisco for the purpose of bringing 
them back to the Philippine Islands. We had only 6 flying fortresses 



158 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

in commission to train all of these crews. If you remember, at that 
time a flying fortress was relatively new and you could not just pick 
up a pilot here and there and say he could fly a flying fortress. 
He had to be stepped up. We had a bunch of the old obsolete B-18 
bombers that were death traps if you put anybody in them to fight, 
but it was one step in teaching a pilot how to handle larger ships. 
They were put [286] on those. They were put on the A-20s 
for a little time, and finally got to the B-l7s. With the limited num- 
ber of ships we had it took time to train these crews; not just the 
pilots. In addition to that we had to train the bombardiers and the 
gunners so that they could protect themselves from the Japanese 
going over the mandated islands. 

General Martin and I talked over the situation and we felt that we 
should do nothing that would interfere with the training or the ferry- 
ing gi-oup. The responsibility was definitely on the Hawaiian De- 
partment. It was up to us to get the ships there and get them there 
without loss ; and we could do it if we started them out with untrained 
crews. 

That had a great deal to do with my decision to go into Alert No. 1 
rather than Alert No. 2 or No. 3. 

In addition, I would like to read the wire sent to the War 
Department : 

Re your radiogram 472 — 

That definitely tied it in with the wire which I had gotten signed 
"Marshall" on the 27th. This was sent on the 27th within an hour 
after I got the message. There should not be any question, if anybody 
read this carefully, as to what radiogram it was replying to. I 
definitely identify it as a reply to the radiogram in which he had told 
me to report the action taken. This radiogram stated : 

(Keply of Lt. Gen. Short on November 27, 1941, to message No. 472 
from General Marshall on November 27, 1941, is as follows:) 

Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy. 

I am pointing out particularly the number of that message, [£87] 
because after I made that report to the War Department of exactly 
what I was doing — that was on the 27th of November — I received 
nothing from them until the 7th of December, after the attack, indi- 
cating that they thought my action was not correct. They did not 
come back and say, "Your sabotage arrangements are all right, but we 
feel here that there is danger of additional hostile action, that you 
ought to alert your command for an air attack or for possible attempts 
at landing." They came back with nothing of that kind. 

I could draw only one conclusion, and it was reinforced by a number 
of other incidents that I will cover. I could draw only one conclu- 
sion — that as far as the War Department was concerned they approved 
of my action, because they had ten days after telling me to report to 
tell me that they did not approve it. 

[£88] General Gerow, in his testimony before the Eoberts Com- 
mission, stated that it was the function of his division in the War 
Department, in the War Plans Division, the General Staff, to follow 
up on that instruction that they had given him to report action, but 
they didn't do it, and they didn't realize that this wire of mine was an 
answer to their wire of the 27th, although I referred directly to the 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 159 

wire. It could not have been an answer to anything else. So there 
was a period of ten days when the War Plans Division didn't even 
take the trouble to tell me I hadn't answered it. They apparently 
didn't know whether I had answered it or not, and I had answered it as 
specifically as I knew how. 

To show that I was not the only one that considered attack by air on 
Honolulu improbable, General Marshall in his testimony before the 
Roberts Commission stated that he was surprised by the attack on 
Honolulu. He was asked by the Board why he didn't use the — I will 
come to that a little later, but I would like to bring it out at this time — 
why he did not use the scrambler telephone to send his message to me 
on December 7th. He said, Well, the time of getting connections across 
the Pacific was frequently considerable, that he did not consider it 
absolutely secret, and that if he had been going to use the telephone he 
would first of all have called the Philippines, which would have taken 
more time, because that was the point where he considered the great 
threat was. 

In other words, he said frankly that he was surprised at the attack 
on Honolulu. That, along with the various other things that hap- 
pened, which I shall take up, led me to believe [2891 abso- 
lutely — at the time I didn't know of that, but I did know of the other 
things — that the War Department did not fear an attack on Honolulu 
from the air. 

There is one other point that I had not covered in regard to ordering 
that Alert No. 1, was the fact that 37 percent of our population in 
Honolulu, in the Hawaiian Islands, approximately 160,000, was Japa- 
nese or Japanese-American. With a population of that size it made 
sobotage highly probable, with those thousands of — there were about 
85,000 actual aliens, and it looked reasonable that some of those aliens 
Vv'ould be in the employ of the Japanese Government and would at- 
tempt sabotage. Character of the population made it most important 
that we make every possible provision for action against sabotage. 

There was another reason that was very important in determining 
whether we should go into Alert No. 2 or No. 1. We had bunkers built 
that we had built without money, with our engineer battalion, at 
Wheeler Field, for distributing our pursuit planes so in case of attack 
that they would not be so likely to suffer damage. Alert No. 2 pro- 
vided that the pursuit planes should be distributed to their bunkers 
so as to avoid damage from hostile air attack. 

Now, the two methods of handling your ships as regards safety were 
diametrically opposed. If you wanted to protect your ships from 
sabotage, you wanted them grouped; and what made it even more 
important was, we had not gotten fencing for fencing the fields, and 
we had not gotten flood lights. So if you scattered some 200 ships all 
over the landscape, you had to have men at every ship, enough men to 
protect the individual ship from sabotage, and it would have taken a 
verv large part 1290] of the Air Force to carry this out. 

We had asked for money, for $240,000. I will get the date on that 
(referring to records). We asked for $240,000 on May 15. $102,000 
was authorized on July 11, $91,000 on August 12. By the time we had 
the money, the fencing was not available locally, and we had to order 
it from the States. Getting it from the States, we had to get a priority, 



160 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

first on the purchase and then on the question of ship space. It took 
about 15 weeks to get a priority. It took additional time then to get 
the priority on ship space. A result was that the District Engineer, 
who was responsible for putting in the manproof fence around the air- 
fields, had not received any of this wire up to December T. The 
Quartermaster had the responsibility for fencing in certain gasoline 
storage in the vicinity of Schofield and a few other things, and he had 
gotten a small amount, but he had beaten the District Engineer to the 
local supply and had gotten what there was, and it was just not 
available. 

Now, that made the question of the dispersion of planes and the 
protection from sabotage all the more clifHcult. It looked as thougli 
up to the time we had the fencing, if we were trying to protect them 
from sabotage, we should group them at the various fields, distribute 
them by fields as much as we could, but group them where they could 
be held under very close observation. Colonel Burwell had been 
given the job by the Air Corps of making a very complete investigation 
and study of the question of sabotage, because it was a thing that was 
always possible and, particularly with the Air and the Hawaiian 
I2i91] Air Depot, was most serious; and he had come out very 
strongly in his recommendations that in any alert against sabotage the 
planes should be grouped as closely as possible where there would not 
be any possibility of sabotage. 

I would like to point out that the Hawaiian Department had no 
means in itself for obtaining information as to the movement of Jap- 
anese ships. We were dependent wholly upon the Navy getting our 
information through the 14th Naval District or receiving that infor- 
mation from tlie War Department. We had no agents in any part 
of the world except right in the Hawaiian Islands. That was the 
only place that we had agents for obtaining information. So we were 
necessarily dependent upon the Navy or the War Department for 
information as to movement of these ships. 

And, as I have said before, the responsibility for the distant recon- 
naissance had been assumed by the Navy, which we all thought — and 
which apparently the War Department and Navy agreed with fully 
and api^roved the scheme — that they were the logical people, con- 
sidering the means that they had, to have the responsibility for distant 
reconnaissance. This was drawn up in a very formal way and sent 
on to the War and Navy Departments for approval. 

I will go into some detail on what was provided in this air because 
that was the most important place of cooperation between the two 
services. The command in Hawaii, as you all know, was exercised 
by cooperation and not by unity of command up to December 7. We 
agreed that the distant reconnaissance would be carried out by the 
Navy, that in case of a threat or of an actual attack, without waiting 
for any orders, that I [292] would make available to the Navy 
the greatest possible number of bombers. I would make the decision, 
but it was agreed and was in the written plan that was approved that 
that would be the maximum number that I could spare. There might 
be a situation where I would have to hold onto a few ; that when that 
was done they were to be placed absolutely under the control of the 
Navy. They operated with Patwing 2. The Army gave them no 
jnissions. Tliey received their orders from Patwing 2, they made 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 161 

their reports to Patwing 2, and the thing happened automatically. 
We went into a maneuver, and it was provided that in case of an 
attack — we had started out with the idea that there would be a request. 
We found in our maneuvers — we were carrying on weekly exercises — 
that that was too slow, so we made it automatic : in case anything 
happened the Commander of the Army bombers reported immediately 
to Admiral Bellinger, who had Patwing 2, and was under his orders. 
There was a provision in this that at any time when there wasn't a 
maneuver, there wasn't an attack, there hadn't been an emergency 
agreed upon, that the Navy did not have sufficient force of long-range 
reconnaissance planes, that they could call upon the Army and that 
we would furnish strength according to what we had. That had been 
definitely agreed upon. 

[Copy] 

3141 Southwestern Boulevard, 

Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 19U. 
Subject; Corrections in testimony. 
To : President, Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the 
Army Pearl Harbor Board : 

******* 
Page 291, line 24, after "air" add "plan". 

******* 

/s/ Walter C. Short, 
Walter C. Short, 
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired. 

On the other hand, if there was any air action — defensive air action — 
over the Islands, then their fighters that could be made available, like 
the marine fighters that were stationed at Ewa Field and any carrier 
fighters that happened to be off their carrier and ashore, w^ere to im- 
mediately pass to the control of the Army so that there would be a 
unified control of the fighters under the Army for fighting immediately 
over [£03] the Islands, and control by the Navy for distant 
reconnaissance. There was another provision that in case it was nec- 
essary to have fighter escorts for the bombers in attacking enemy 
vessels, that those fighter escorts would also pass to the control of 
the Navy. If they were going to make an attack on naval enemy 
vessels and called upon us for escorts, they passed to their command. 
We dichi't hold any strings on them at all; we turned them over to 
them. 

Now, these things had been maneuvered. We had at least one air 
exercise a week with the Navy from March on, so that it had been 
worked out until it functioned quite smoothly. That method had 
been followed from March 21st and was in effect on December 7th, 
and as far as I know it is still in effect. It may have been changed ; 
I don't know. 

On the 28th of November I received a message from the War De- 
partment that I would like to read : 482. I notice this is 482. Their 
one of the 27th was 472. 

(Message, November 28, 1941, from Adjutant General to Lt. Gen. 
Short, is as follows :) 

Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against 
subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Depart- 

79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1 12 



162 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ment (see paragraph 3 MID SC thirty dash forty five) stop. Also desired that 
you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protec- 
tion of your establishment comma property comma and equipment against 
sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and 
protection of all activities against espionage stop. [2941 This does not 
repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop. Protective 
measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding un- 
necessary publicity and alarm. 

They are still wanting to do nothing, apparently, to alarm the 
Japanese public in Hawaii. 

To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air 
stations but this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing 
instructions. 

Now, my wire in answer to 472 had been sent fairly early on the 
afternoon of the 27th. This was dated the 28th. There was no doubt 
in my mind but what they had my wire before this was sent, but 
apparently they didn't take the trouble to check up and see that my 
wire was answering theirs — my radio — from what General Gerow 
stated in his testimony. 

Now, when I got that, I prepared, in connection with G-2, an 
answer to the War Department, It just happened that we thought 
of these things months before and were able to answer them very 
completely. 

This was sent on the 28th : 

(Message, November 28, 1941, from Lt. Gen. Short to Adjutant 
General, is as follows :) 

Re your radiogram four eight two twenty eighth comma full precautions are 
being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative respon- 
sibility of War Department — 

and giving the number of those paragraphs 

and military establishments including personnel and [295] equipment 
stop As regards protection of vital installations outside of military reserva- 
tions such as power plants, telephone exchanges and highway bridges comma 
this headquarters by confidential letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty one 
requested the Governor of the Territory to use tlie broad powers vested in him 
by section sixty seven of the Organic Act which provides comma in effect 
comma that the Governor may call upon the commanders of military and naval 
forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress 
lawless violence comma invasion comma insurrection and so forth stop Pursu- 
ant to the authority stated the Governor on June twentieth confidentially made 
a formal written demand of this headquarters to furnish and continue to fur- 
nish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage comma 
and lawless violence in connection therewith comma being committed against 
vital installations and structures in the Territory stop Pursuant to the fore- 
going request appropriate militai'y protection is now being afforded vital civil- 
ian installations stop In this connection connna at the instigation of this 
headquarters the City and Covmty of Honolulu on June thirtieth nineteen forty 
one enacted an ordnance which permits the Commanding General Hawaiian 
Department to close or restrict the use of and travel upon any highway within 
the City and County of Honolulu wherever the Commanding General deems such 
action necessary in the interest of national [296] defense. The author- 
ity thus given has not been exercised. Relations with FBI and all other Fed- 
eral and Territorial officials are jmd have been cordial and mutual cooperation 
has been given on all pertinent matters. 

Now, they had stressed that we were not authorized, in view of 
their wire, "to take any illegal measures, and I was being careful to 
show them that we were taking all the measures they wanted and 
that we were absolutely within our legal rights, because we had 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 163 

thought back ahead as far back as June and arranged it. For the 
last two years there had been a very considerable amount of the time 
that the Army had had guards over bridges and water works, elec- 
tric light plants, and so forth, and there was a possibility that some 
sentry would shoot someone and he would have no defense. That had 
prompted me to get this legal authority from the Governor, so the 
Army would be fully protected. We' would be within our legal 
rights. And our relations with the Governor and with the Mayor 
were such that we were able to accomplish this and to have them feel 
that it was the thing to do. So we were able to answer the War De- 
partment's message and state that we were wholly protected legally 
in doing the things that we were doing. 

And you notice in that message that it is all sabotage and subver- 
sive activities and espionage; and, as I say, that message was sent 
after my message should have been received, and undoubtedly after 
my message was received. There was no doubt in my mind that they 
were fully cognizant of my report of action taken when they sent 
this message. 

Now, to make it even stronger, you notice in this message [£97] 
they said they were sending identical messages to the air stations 
direct, because they apparently wanted to be sure these measures 
were put into effect at once. In other words, sabotage was terrifically 
important to them. 

General Martin got such a message from General Arnold, and he 
answered even in more detail than I have, telling them exactly what 
they were doing on all airfields. So they had answers from me and 
from General Martin showing exactly what we were doing, in great 
detail, and if they didn't know what we were doing it was simply 
because they didn't read our messages. The information was defi- 
nitely there. 

Now, in addition to prescribing this Alert No. 1, I prescribed that 
the Aircraft Warning Service would work definitely, as such, from 
4 o'clock in the morning — from two hours before dawn to one hour 
after dawn, which was practically from 4 to 7. This service was 
very new. Along probably early in November we had received the 
mobile sets. There was no fixed station that was in operation. 

I might go into a little explanation there. The original plan as 
drawn up provided for three fixed stations at very great altitude in 
all cases : one at Kaala on the Island of Oahu, about the highest point 
we could put it; one at Haleakala on the Island of Maui, about 
10,000 feet high; and one at Kohee on the Island of Kauai, which was 
very new. This increased the range of the stations very greatly, but 
it also increased the dilRculty of erection, because for the one at Kaala 
all material had to be drawn by cable. We could not start any con- 
struction at all until we got a cable that could be used to 12981 
draw the material to the top of the mountain. 

As I say, none of these fixed stations was in operation. We had 
gotten, along in November, the mobile stations, and as soon as we 
got them we started using them right away; and when this message 
of the 27th came along, I prescribed that the Aircraft Warning 
Service would function those hours. In addition to that, they had 
their normal training. They trained then from 7 to 11, and they 
had maintenance work, work of that kind, from 12 to 4. 



164 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Now, it turned out that we were putting a little bit too gi-eat a 
strain on this materiel, and later in the afternoon period we had 
three stations working from 11 to 1, and three working from 1 to 4, 
so that there was a little more chance for maintenance work and 
keeping them in shape. But that was the situation, and the Inter- 
ceptor Command was working with them. We were trying to edu- 
cate the Interceptor Command and the Aircraft Warning Service, 
and using this training period as an opportmiity to give them work 
at what we considered the most dangerous time of the day. The 
Navy had a liaison officer functioning with this outfit. 

I want to take up the question of conferences with the Navy, as 
there have been at times certain allegations that the Army and Navy 
didn't get together, didn't talk things over. You might think from 
some of the statements that we were almost utter strangers, and 
that was far from the fact. As a matter of fact. Admiral Kimmel 
and Admiral Bloch and I were on extremely friendly terms person- 
ally and as well as having very frequent conferences officially. I 
think that Admiral Kimmel [299] and I played golf to- 
gether an average of every other Sunday morning, and very fre- 
quently the Sunday mornings we didn't play golf he dropped over to 
my quarters; so that we really were in very close personal touch as 
well as officially. 

On the 27th of November, the day this message came in, we had 
a conference for probably three hours that morning on the question 
of the reinforcement of the garrisons at Midway and Wake each by 
a squadron of Army pursuit planes. That was at the conference at 
which I told you a while ago that the Navy staff stated that they con- 
sidered that there was practically no possibility of surprise attack 
on Hawaii. I would like to have you bear in mind that that was 
within three or four hours before I received this message from the 
War Department on the 27th, I had a very recent opinion from the 
Navy that they did not consider such attack probable. They had 
sources of information that I didn't have. With their task forces 
and their distant reconnaissance they had ways of obtaining infor- 
mation that I didn't have. There was every reason why I should 
accept their opinion as of value. 

7. General Frank. I did not quite understand what you said there 
about information that the Navy had that you didn't have. 

General Short. They had sources of information. They got con- 
tinual information from the Navy Department as to location of 
Japanese ships. They had their task forces out constantly several 
hundred miles out from Honolulu, and spreading out with their air. 
aerial reconnaissance from the carrier. In other words, if there were 
Japanese ships roaming around the ocean there, they had a chance to 
pick them up, know they were there. If they didn't— couldn't stop 
them, they at least could be [300] expected, I thought, to get 
information of their presence, and I was sure they would tell me if 
they had any such information. Now, I had no sources of informa- 
tion comparable to that, and it was a natural thing that I should 
accept the opinion of the Navy on that i)articular subject. 

[301] It seemed to be the best informed opinion that there was 
in the vicinity. There did not seem to be a divided opinion. So far 
as I could figure, the Staff of Admiral Kimmel accepted Captain 
McMorris's statement as their own comments. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 165 

8. General Grunert. When you get to a stopping point, at the end 
of any particular subject, we will have a short recess. 

General Short. Let me take just about two minutes, and I will be 
there, I think. 

Now, that was on the 27th of November. On the 1st, he and I both 
received radiograms, from the Navy and War Departments, relative to 
the possible relief of the Marines on Wake Island and Midway, so that 
they could be made available for landing parties; and we were called 
upon for our opinion. We had a long conference on the 1st. On the 
'2nd, he came, I think it was, to my quarters, w^ith an 8-page letter that 
he had prepared, to the Navy Department, setting forth his views on 
that. We were both full}^ of the opinion that the relief should not take 
place until certain work was completed on the airfields at Wake and 
Midway. The civilian construction and the labor condition was quite 
complicated, the water proposition was very difficult at both places, 
and we both felt that it would be an advantage if they could delay 
their relief until that construction work was completed. 

He brought this long letter, to the Navy Department, setting forth 
his views, to my quarteis, as I remember, and read it to me, and we 
went over it; and I was in full accord with his views on the subject. 

On the 3rd, we had another conference at his headquarters. [302] 
After reading his letter, I had prepared my radiogram to the War 
Department, setting forth my vieAvs, which I say were practically in 
full accord with his on that, and we went over my radiogram and the 
radiogram he prepared for the Navy Department. There was one 
difference of opinion, there. He wanted definite unity of command 
on the outlying islands for the Navy, and I felt we should have the 
same type of command that we had on Hawaii, which was command 
by cooperation. I felt that as long as we had command by cooperation 
oi'i Hawaii, it should extend to the subject garrisons; that if we wanted 
a unity of command on Hawaii, then naturally we would go to unity 
of command on the outlying islands. Each one of us stated his views 
on that subject fully to his own Department, so that there was no hard 
feeling about it. It was a perfectly cordial personal relation, and each 
one felt the other fellow should present his own views to the other 
Department, where there was a diflerence of opinion. 

That went in on the 2nd. We also had orders to relieve the Navy 
garrison at Canton Island. They did not have much, and we had 
conferences that covered that to some extent, that morning, and then 
on the next day. Major Fleming, who was acting as my liaison with the 
Navy on all the matters with regard to the relief of the various garrisons 
on the islands, had a conference with Colonel Phyphffer, of the Marine 
Corps, with reference to procuring 5-inch Marine antiaircraft guns, 
because the Army had none, and we thought, in shoving the outposts 
out as far as Canton, with a small garrison, it was important to have 
the best antiaircraft we could have. 

I covered these conferences, because it shows you very [SOS] 
definitely that our conferences were not infrequent, and that during 
this period of stress we were in almost daily conference, where, if at 
any time the Navy had had any piece of information about carriers, 
their presence, or that they could not be accounted for, I was sure 
that they would have told me. 

During this period, the 27th to the 6th of December, they made no 
request for Army planes for long-distance reconnaissance, so I was 



166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

convinced that they either knew where the Japanese carriers were, or 
had enough information that they were not uneasy, and with the task 
forces that I knew they had out, that they felt they could handle the 
situation. I did not know in an official manner ordinarily when they 
were sending out task forces, but I usually knew informally; and I 
knew at that time they were preparing to send some new task forces 
out in the next two or three days ; and I had gotten permission to send 
one of my assistant G-3's with the task force going to Johnston Island, 
because the Marines were going to carry out a landing exercise, and I 
particularly wanted our G-3 Section to observe exactly how it was 
done; so I did know that the Navy had out one task force, and were 
sending out two more ; and I knew the approximate places they were 
going, so I had a good deal of personal information on what the recon- 
naissance could cover. 

I think we can take a break, right there. 

(Brief recess.) 

9, General Grunert. All right. The Board will proceed. 
General Short. Shall I go ahead with my talk ? 

10. General Grunert. Go ahead. 

General Short. There were two incidents that happened prior to the 
attack, that convinced me fully that the War [304] Depart-, 
ment had no feeling that there was danger of Japanese air attack at 
Honolulu. On December 5, a B-24 arrived from the mainland. It 
came in with one .30-caliber gun and two .50-caliber guns in the tail. 
That is all the equipment it had, and it had no ammunition; but in 
spite of the fact that it came in that way, we had very specific instruc- 
tions from the War Department as to how it was to be equipped when 
it left Honolulu to fly over and photograph Truk and Jaluit. 

I will read you that message in a little while. This indicated to 
me, the way it came in and the way it was ordered to go out, that the 
War Department felt that there was no danger of an air attack on 
Honolulu, or between Honolulu and San Francisco, that the plane was 
safe, could be sent without ammunition, and that it was a greater 
hazard to carry that weight in ammunition than it was to take a chance 
of meeting the Japs without any ability to return their fire ; but they 
did feel that when you hit the Mandate islands there was a real possi- 
bility of their being attacked from those land bases out there, and they 
gave positive instructions that they should be in shape to return the 
attack and not take a chance of being brought down without being able 
to fight back. 

Now, I would like to read a message : 

Reference two B dash twenty four airplanes for special photo mission stop it 
is desired that the pilots be instructed to photograph Truk Island in the Caroline 
Group Jaluit in the Marshall gi-oup stop visual reconnaissance should be made 
simultaneously stop information desired as to the number and location of naval 
vessels including submarines comma airfields comma aircraft comma {.305} 
guns comma barracks and camps stop Pilots should be warned islands strongly 
fortified and manned stop Photography and reconnaissance must be accomplished 
at high altitude and there must be no circling or remaining in the vicinity stop 
Avoid Orange aircraft by utilizing maximum altitude and speed stop Instruct 
crews if attacked by planes to use all means in their power for self-preservation 
stop The two pilots and co-pilots should be instructed to confer with Admiral 
Kimmel upon arrival at Honolulu to obtain his advice stop If distance from Wake 
and Jaluit to Moresby is too great comma suggest one B dash twenty four pro- 
ceed from Wake to Jaluit and back to Wake comma then Philippines by usual 
route photographing Ponape while en route Moresby stop Advise pilots best time 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 167 

of day for photographing Truk and Jaluit stop Upon arrival in Philippines two 
copies each of any photographs taken will be sent to General MacArthur comma 
Admiral Hart comma Admiral Kimmel comma the Chief of Naval Opei'ations 
comma and the War Department stop Insure that both B dash twenty four air- 
planes be fully equipped with gun ammunition upon departure from Honolulu 

In other words, they show beyond any question that they considered 
it important to have them armed when they leave Honolulu and that 
they did not consider it important to have them armed up to Honolulu. 

iilong that same line, for two months, when we had been flying 
planes, B-17's, to the Philippines, without any instructions from the 
War Department, I had personally seen that ships were armed, that 
everything was in readiness for [306] self-defense, and I had 
personally instructed the leader of the group out there that he was to 
take no chances of being shot down by the Japs; if they approached 
him, and acted suspiciously, that he must not wait to let them get in 
the first shot, he was to protect himself. That had been going on for a 
couple of months, beyond Honolulu. 

Now, when that wire was received, the planes were examined. We 
found that we could by robbing B-l7's get the guns to equip this B-24, 
and that we had the ammunition, without any trouble; but we did not 
have the adapters, and General Martin, commanding the Hawaiian 
Air Force, prepared a wire to the Chief of Air Corps, which was sent 
over his signature and mine, both, stating, requesting that the second 
B-24 bring the equipment for the first, that had been left behind, and 
that we were holding the first B-24: there until it was properly equipped 
before starting on its mission. It was there at the time of the attack, 
in a hangar, awaiting to be equipped, and it was destroyed. The other 
B-24 didn't get in. 

Now, that message, at least part of it, here, is of interest : 

Strongly recommend — 
This was after we had told them what wasn't there in the way of 
equipment — 

Strongly recommend that second B-24 bring necessary equipment from main- 
land for installation on. both planes prior to departure from Hickam Field stop 
Plane being held here until satisfactorily armed stop Subject plane has no 
armorplate installation stop except for removal of passenger seats plane equipped 
as for ferry service North [307] Atlantic 

We pointed out to them at that time the way they were sending 
the planes in. 

The other incident which showed that up to the last minute the War 
Department considered that there was no danger whatever of attack 
between Honolulu and San Francisco was the fact that on the night of 
the fith, 9 : 30 p. m., San Francisco time, 12 : 30 a. m. Eastern Stand- 
ard Time, and 10 : 30 San Francisco time, or 1 : 30 a. m., on the 7th, on 
Eastern Standard Time, two groups of planes left Hamilton Field, six 
in each group, for the Philippine Islands. Those planes, when they 
came in, they came in during the first attack. They all arrived be- 
tween 8 and 8 : 20. The first plane I think hit the landing mat about 
five minutes after eight, and the pilot was killed as they hit the landing 
mat. Four out of the eight planes — out of the 12 — four of the 12 
were destroyed. Those planes had no ammunititon. The guns were all 
cosmolined. The guns had never been bore-sighted. If they could 
have shot anything, they couldn't count on hitting anything. They 
had skeleton crews consisting of a pilot and a co-pilot, navigator, en- 



168 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

gineer, and a radioman, so if they had had their guns all complete and 
their ammunition, they didn't have the crews to defend themselves, and 
this ceased to be a theory, it wasn't an academic question, because they 
came in right in the midst of the first Japanese attack, and they were 
unable to fire a shot, unable to defend themselves. The first man 
tried to land. Of course, they knew nothing of what was going on, 
because there hadn't been time to get anything to them. The first tried 
to land at Hickam Field, and they landed pretty [308] much 
around Oahu, anywhere they could. Some landed at Bellows Field. 
I think there were at least four or five that landed at outlying fields. 
They didn't have enough gas to go to outlying islands, but it is per- 
fectly evident to me that if the War Department expected an at- 
tack on the 7th of December, they wouldn't have started planes out from 
Hamilton field in that condition. It says to me very definitely that 
their estimate was exactly the same as mine, that they were not ex- 
pecting an air attack on Honolulu, or there wouldn't be any excuse 
in the world for anybody authorizing planes to come in that condi- 
tion. They felt that the hazard of carrying the extra weight in am- 
munition was greater than the hazard of a possible attack by Japanese. 
It turned out they were wrong. It meant very definitely, to me, that 
the War Department did not expect an attack that morning. 

I would like to point out also that from November 28 up to December 
7 I had not had one single word from the War Department on the 
situation. If there was any crisis in the situation, they had com- 
pletely failed to inform me of it. If they thought there was a crisis, 
I felt that I would be informed, if there was any crisis in the situa- 
tion at all, but there had been nothing for that period. 

Now, apparently some time after those planes had left Hamilton 
Field in that condition, the War Department must have gotten some 
information that alarmed them, or that they felt that they ought to 
get to me as early as possible, and the Chief of Staff filed a message 
at 12 : 18 p. m., Washington time, December 7. That was 6 : 48 a. m., 
Honolulu time. 

[S09] General Short. Here is the message: 

(Message of December 7, 1941, to Hawaiian Department, Ft. Shafter, 
T. H., Signed "Marshall", is as follows:) 

Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard Time today — 

That would be 5i/o hours earlier in Honolulu — 

what amounts to an ultimatum. Also they are under orders to destroy their code 
machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we 
do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform Naval authorities of this 
communication. 

As I say, that was filed at 12 : 18. It was sent by commercial radio, 
the R. C. A. I did not know at that time why it was sent commercially. 
However, early that morning our radio had great difficulty keeping in 
communication through the War Department radio. Our set was a 
10 k. g. set, not powerful like the Navy's or the R. C. A. ; and things 
that I have seen in the Roberts report since indicate that the message 
was sent via R. C. A. because the War Department felt that it could not 
be gotten through on the War Department radio. It arrived in 
Honolulu at 7 : 33 a. m., December 7, Honolulu time. Just what 
happened right at that time, I am not sure, but the attack struck 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 169 

within 22 minutes after, and it looks like what probably happened 
was that they did not get under way on the delivery until the attack 
struck, and they waited until the most serioils part of the bombardment, 
practically all of it was over, and delivered the message to the Signal 
Office at 11 : 45 a. m. The attack had taken place at 7 : 55 a. m. The 
message was decoded and [SIO] delivered to the Adjutant 
General at 2 : 58 p. m., 7 hours and 3 minutes after the attack when 
we got this important piece of information. We had a scrambled phone 
that, ordinarily, you could get through in ten or fifteen minutes. It 
looks reasonable that they thought, even then, that if there was going 
to be a hostile attack, they would have tried to get it to us by more 
than one means of communication. General Marshall stated that the 
reason he did not telephone was that it took some time, that he had 
called the Philippines before he called Hawaii, and there was possi- 
bility of a leak which would embarrass the State Department. In 
other words, I think there was a feeling still at that time that secrecy 
was more important than the time element in getting the information 
to us as rapidly as possible. Whatever the reason was, we got that 
information seven hours after the attack. So it meant that at the 
time we were attacked we had no information from the War Depart- 
ment since November 28th. If they had used the scrambled phone 
and gotten it through in ten or fifteen minutes we would probably have 
gotten more of the import and a clearer-cut idea of the danger, from 
that message, and we would have had time to warm up the planes 
and get them in the air to meet any attack. 

[Copy] 

3141 Southweste:rn Boulevard, 

Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, IBJfJf. 
Subject : Corrections in testimony. 
To : President, Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before tbe 
Army Pearl Harbor Board : 

iti ***** * 

Page 310, line 9, change "had" to "would have". 
******* 

/s/ Walter C. Short, 
Walter C. Short, 
Major Oencral, U. S. Army, Retired. 

[Copy] 

3141 Southwestern Boulevard, 

Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944. 
Subject : Corrections in testimony. 
To : President, Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the 
Army Pearl Harbor Board: 

* * * w * * * 

Page 310, line 17, change "scrambled" to "scrambler". 



/s/ Walter C. Short, 
Walter C. Short, 
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired. 



170 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

There were two things that took place that morning in addition 
to not getting the message to us that might have worked out to our 
very great advantage if they had been handled differently. 

A two-man submarine got into Pearl Harbor. I think it probably 
was about 6 : 45 when we first got the first indication of it, and I 
think it was entered as about 7 : 12, or something [311] like 
that, when the report was made ; but at approximately 7 : 15 they 
could have reported to me that there had been a submarine attack. 
That would, under the conditions, have indicated to me that there was 
danger. The Navy did not visualize it as anything but a submarine 
attack. They considered that and sabotage their greatest danger; 
and it was Admiral Bloch's duty as Commander of the District to 
get that information to me right away. He stated to me in the pres- 
ence of Secretary Knox that at the time he visualized it only as a 
submarine attack and was busy with that phase of it and just failed 
to notify me ; that he could see then, after the fact, that he had been 
absolutely wrong, but that at the time the urgent necessity of getting 
the information to me had not — at any rate, I did not get the informa- 
tion until after the attack. 

The other thing was that at 7 :20 — there had been an agreement on 
the part of the control officers of the Navy and Aircraft Warning 
Service Command and not to go through the training period on Sunday 
morning. They normally worked from 7 o'clock on to 4 as a training 
proposition, but they had agreed that they would not work that morn- 
ing. However, Lieutenant Tyler, the officer in charge of the inter- 
ceptor station, remained at the station, and the station continued to 
work for practice. They picked up a considerable number of planes 
132 miles out in a direction 3 degrees east of north. The observer did 
not know anything about any planes being out and got quite alarmed 
about it. He called the operator and got in contact with Lieutenant 
Tyler and the Lieutenant talked to them about it and got the report 
and made the decision that [312] it was not of any importance. 

He had three reasons for that. In the first place, he thought it might 
be a task force, because that happened all the time. They picked them 
up from the station. He thought possibly it was a bombing mission 
from Hickam that had gone out. In the third place, what made him 
very positive that it was only friendly planes was the fact that he knew 
that a flight of B-17s was coming in from the mainland that morning. 
It turned out that that flight actually came in just five minutes behind 
those Japanese planes, and the direction from which they came in was 
just 3 degrees off of what the Japs came in. They came from straight 
north and the Japs came from 3 degrees east of north. So you can see 
that the Lieutenant had some grounds for feeling that it was just 
a routine friendly plane mission. He had been listening to Hawaiian 
music from 4 o'clock on, which practically always meant that they were 
bringing in a group of planes from the States, because they had no 
beam there and they used that for orientation, and he felt they were 
about due. They actually came in just five minutes later. If he had 
alerted the Interceptor Command there would have been time, if the 
pursuit squadrons had been alerted, to disperse the planes. There 
would not have been time to get them in the air. You could not have 
warmed them up and gotten them into the air on time, but the loss 
would have been greater 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 171 

11. General Fkank. You say the loss would have been greater. 
General Short. The loss would have been very greatly lessened. 

12. General Grunert. We want the record clear. You mean the loss 
would have been greatly lessened ? You said "greater." 

[S13] General Short. I ment to say, it would have made a great 
difference. What you have said is much better. It would have made 
a great difference in the loss. It probably would not have protected 
the battleships; it probably woulcl not have protected the Hawaiian 
depot, because they would not have had time to get the planes in the 
air. But, on the other hand, our aircraft would have been more in- 
stantly ready for action. It would have been a question of split- 
seconds instead of minutes in getting into action. 

When the attack took place at 7 : 55 on December 7th I was in my 
quarters. When I heard the first bomb explode I thought that the 
Navy was probably carrying out some exercises that either they had 
not told us about or that I had forgotten about. When the second 
explosion took place I was out on my back porch where I could get 
a look at Pearl Harbor, and I saw smoke rising, and I came to the 
conclusion that something was seriously wrong. The Chief of Staff, 
who lived next door, ran in the front door and called to me and said, 
"It is the real thing. We have just had a message from Hickam Field". 
That was probably two or three minutes after 8 when he came in and 
notified me. By 8 : 10 all major echelon commanders had been told to 
go into Alert No. 3, and everything was under way. The first plane 
of the enemey, I think, was brought down at five minutes after 8". So 
you can get an idea of the length of time it took to get into action. 
The antiaircraft had skeleton crews at all of their guns. They acted 
as crews to protect from sabotage, but there were enough men to fire 
the guns. They had the small arms ammunition at the guns. At the 
3-inch guns they had ammunition very immediately accessible, sir, 
probably 55 yards, for all but four batteries. There were four batteries 
in posi- [3^4-] tion, but there was no place for storing ammu- 
nition except right out in the open ; and when the alert went on, that 
did not look like the thing to do, so they did not have those guns work- 
ing. The first 3-inch guns to get into action went into action at 8 : 15, 
and between 8 : 15 and 10 they were all put in readiness for action. 
Those last four batteries that did not have the ammunition drew it 
at 8 : 15, and the last one finished up at 10 a. m. 

There is an exhibit here that shows when every battery was alerted, 
when it went into action; and the time that they went into action 
naturally varied, with whether or not they had a target. Some of 
them did not get targets until later in the morning, but they were ready 
to act and were alerted at the times given. 

We had that morning the following planes : We had pursuit planes 
in commission, 80; pursuit planes out of commission, 69. They were 
in various stages of repair. Some may have been slightly out of com- 
mission, and so forth. But those that were actually available were put 
into the air at that time. 

We had six reconnaissance planes in commission and seven out of 
commission. We had 39 bombers in commission and 33 out. Of those 
bombers the only ones available for a real mission were the six Flying 
Fortresses that were in commission, and the A-20's. I guess you 



172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

would consider those bombers, General Frank. We had a total of 10 
A-20's in commission and one out of commission. Then there were 
the old B-lS's that were not of any very great value. 

To show what took place between then and the 20th, we had gotten 
our repair facilities, in spite of the very great damage done to the 
Hawaiian Air Depot, and within two or three days we [315] 
were repairing more planes than we were before, because the men 
worked 24 hours a day. 

Immediately following the bombing it looked like the machinery 
was almost a total wreck. As a matter of fact, we salvaged between 
80 and 85 per cent of the machines, so that we were able to get our 
repair facilities going very well. We had a new building that appar- 
ently the Japs had not identified as a repair shop, and we had gotten 
all of the new machinery probably within the week before, and we had 
not installed it yet. It was in the new building, not installed, and 
the old building, which they undoubtedly had spotted, was entirely 
demolished, and it looked like our machinery was all shot, but we were 
able to move about 80 per cent within the new building, and in a period 
of 24 hours we were getting along very well and the result was that 
on the 20th of December we had 61 pursuit planes actually in commis- 
sion and we had 22 that could be repaired. It might take a few liours 
on some and a day on others. 

As to reconnaissance planes, we had six in commission and two 
that could be repaired locally. 

Of bombers we had 50 in commission and 13 could be repaired 
locally. 

However, there had been 20 bombers received from the mainland. 
It was very unfortunate that of the B-l7's, four that came in from 
the States were destroyed, and there were only two that were service- 
able out of our six that were in commission, so that we lost the 
six B-17's, and for some reason the A-20's escaped untouched. Ap- 
parently they were not conspicuous. So the greater part of our losses 
was the old B-18's which we could afford better than anything else, 
and we were able in a few days to carry on our missions very well. 

[316] As to what took place with the infantry outfits, as soon 
as they got the message for Alert No. 3 they turned out. The 24th 
Division turned out at 8 : 10 and returned the fire of the enemy 
])lanes, and at 8 : 30 they were moving out to their battle positions. 
The 25th Division was also moving out to their battle positions by 
8 : 30. By 4 o'clock the 24th Division were all in battle positions 
and the 25th by 5 o'clock. They had to move pretty much all over 
the island. We also had a plan for the movement of troops to their 
positions in case of attack with a minimum of 200 yards between 
vehicles, because we did not want to take a chance of having a bunch 
of vehicles and having enormous losses from air attack. So, mov- 
ing in that kind of formation naturally took longer. But they had 
drawn fire, and we had both divisions complete by 5 o'clock in the 
afternoon. The harbor troops had their ammunition immediately 
at hand and the antiaircraft had theirs very early. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 173 

[Copy] 

3141 Southwestern Boltlevard, 

Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944. 
Subject : Corrections in testimony. 
To : President, Army Pearl Harbor Board. 
1. I request that the follo\A'ing corrections be made in my testimony before 

the Army Pearl Harbor Board : 

******* 

Page 316, line 14, before word "fire" insert "one day's". 
******* 

/s/ Walter C. Short. 
Walter C. Short. 
Major General, U. 8. Army, Retired. 

The civilian elements that we had been training worked extremely 
well. We had 16 surgical teams that we had organized among the 
doctors on the Island. The first one of these teams reported to the 
hospital at 9 o'clock. They made it an hour and five minutes. We 
had 20 first-aid stations that were organized, with ambulances and 
so forth. At 12 o'clock noon they started evacuating the women and 
children from Hickam and Wheeler Fields and the harbor defense 
positions that were in immediate danger, according to the plans that 
had been draw^n up, and they were located in school buildings at 
Shafter, and the ordnance depot went into two underground rooms 
that were being constructed at Shafter, one of which was for cold 
storage, which was about finished, and those people were put in there 
temporarily. The others went to schools, and all arrange- [S17'\ 
ments were made to set up cafeterias and issue blankets; and we got 
them out of what looked like danger spots and sent them up to these 
localities for two or three days, depending on how many slit trenches 
were completed, and then they were allowed to return, and the slit 
trenches were immediately available to their quarters so they could 
get into them. 

[Copy] 

3141 Southwestern BouLBn?ARD, 

Dallas 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944. 
Subject : CoxTections in testimony. 
To : President, Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before 
the Army Pearl Harbor Board : 

******* 

Page 316, line 26, — after word "building" insert "period". 
******* 

/s/ Walter C. Short, 
Waltee C. Short, 
Major General, U. 8. Army, Retired. 

As soon as the attack took place G-2 and the F. B. I. started round- 
ing up enemy agents that they had listed. They had two lists, one of 
people that were to be arrested immediately and thrown into a con- 
centration camp, and the other a list of those to be held under 
observation. 

Of those who w^ere supposed to be thrown into concentration camp 
that afternoon they had arrested all but four, four that they did not 
find, and they got them the next day. They actually rounded up and 
put over on Sand Island 370 Jap agents, 98 German agents, and 14 
Italians. 



174 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Almost before the first attack was finished the 804th Engineers, 
which was a battalion of aviation engineers, started clearing the fields 
at Wheeler and Hickam, and the air men started pulling their planes 
and getting them together as rapidly as they could, and by 7 :50 all the 
pursuit that was in condition to get into the air was put into the air. 
This pursuit actually brought down 10 Japanese planes. One brought 
down four, one brought down two, and the others were individual 
planes. 

[Copy] 

3141 Southwestern Boulevard, 

Dallas 5, Texas, No. 10, 19U- 
Subject: Corrections in testimony. 
To : President, Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before 
the Army Pearl Harbor Board : 

Page 317, line 21,— change "7 : 50" to "S : 50". 

3|e 4: 4: 4: 4: 4i 4= 

/s/ Walter C. Short, 
s Walter C. Short, 

Major General, U. S. Army, Retired. 

I have in this report an exhibit showing exactly what batteries 
brought down enemy planes and what the Air Corps brought down. 
It shows 38. G-2 thought there was a possibility of 9 duplications. 
The Army brought down somewhere between 29 and 38 planes. It 
might have been 29; it might have been 38; [318'\ it might 
have been anything in between, because there was a number of planes 
brought down ; and G-2 sifted the thing as carefully as possible and 
oame to the conclusion that 29 was the minimum and 38 was the 
maximum of planes brought down. 

The enemy planes were estimated to be somewhere between 160 and 
l80. In other words, we brought down somewhere between 15 and 
20 per cent of the enemy planes, which I believe was a very good 
average in any place in the world. That percentage has not been 
exceeded very often, in spite of the fact that we were not instantly 
expecting fire attack. I think that the number of planes brought 
down by aircraft and antiaircraft fire is something that we need not 
be ashamed of. If we had known they were coming we probably 
would have gotten a greater percentage ; but we might not get more, 
because it happens frequently that when flying over Europe they come 
back with less than 3 or 5 per cent loss. 

[Copy] 

3141 SOUTHWESTEBN BOULEIVARD, 

Dallas 5, Texas, No. 10, lOU. 
Subject : Corrections in testimony. 
To : President, Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the 
Army Pearl Harbor Board : 

******* 

Page 318, line 10, change "fire" to "air". 

/s/ Walter C. Short 
Walter C. Short, 
Major General, U. 8. Army, Retired. 

I got in touch with the Governor on the afternoon of the 7th and 
had a conference with him as to whether or not he should declare 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 175 

martial law, and after talking it over from all angles he and I decided 
that we should delay martial law to give him a chance to put into effect 
the M-Day Bill. There were some features of the M-Day Bill — I will 
say that is the mobilization day bill that gave the governor the author- 
ity to create auxiliary police, home guards, auxiliary firemen and 
organize them, and all kinds of things. Some of those things had 
not been fully implemented. The Home Guards had not been called 
out. We felt that if we put martial law into effect immediately there 
was some question whether he could call them out, but delaying martial 
law until the next day would let him as the civil governor go ahead 
and implement that bill, and we [319] would have a whole 
lot more to work with. So that was done. He put the basis of the 
M-Day Bill into effect on the 7th, and on the 8th he declared martial 
law and asked me to take over. 

1320] When that was done, the courts were closed, civilian offi- 
cials were asked to continue on their jobs, and an advisory committee 
composed of the Governor as the head of it was organized, and a mili- 
tary commission was organized, and provost court was established. 
The sale of liquor was pr'ohibited. Those were the important steps. 

Almost before the bombing was over, the District Engineers had a 
gang of civilian workmen down at Hickam Field repairing the water 
lines and sewer pipes that were broken during the bombing. By that 
night I think we had water service, which was most important because 
we had, as you know to have been a fact, the aqua system of our gaso- 
line floating on the water, and it was very inconvenient to try to use it 
without the water system open. 

On the 8th, the morning of the 8th, I directed the District Engineer, 
who had a large organization, to take over all engineering supplies 
on the Island and to order all contractors to report to him to work 
under him, and take over all labor. We centralized the labor and ma- 
terials in tlie District Engineer because he had a large organiza- 
tion. We let the Navy have from that pool what they had to have, 
and we also distributed material from that pool to the Department 
Engineer. 

The Department Engineer was given the mission of field fortifi- 
cations and anything that was to be done with troop labor. The Dis- 
trict Engineer took over chiefly the construction of new airfields. We 
had had projects under way, or we had been trying to get money; we 
didn't have them under way. We had the plans complete, and he 
started immediately on these new airfields all over the Island. We 
had constructed bunkers [321] for pursuit planes. We had 
not constructed bunkers for the bomber planes down at Hickam because 
the character of the soil was such theVe, we had to build up. We could 
not dig down, and we did not have the heavy machinery necessary for 
doing that. He brought in these contractors, and by noon of the 8th 
he was in full swing at Kahuku putting in a new field, putting in 
bunkers at Hickam, starting expanding the field at Haleiwa, putting 
in a new field at Kipapa, and putting a temporary field on the golf 
course at Schofield. 

The Department Engineer on the 8th distributed his materials and 
started troops on the field fortifications, and on the 9th he started 
making slit trenches in the parks, near school buildings, and near all 



176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

places where many people worked throughout the city, so that there 
would be air shelters as early as possible. 

Up to the present time I have talked wholly of what was done im- 
mediately before the attack, practically from November 27th on. 
I would like to talk about the steps that I took to improve the for- 
tifications on the Hawaiian Islands and to prepare the command for 
defense. I think that my work should be judged throughout the whole 
period that I was in command, from the 7th day of February until 
when I was relieved on December 16th. 

I got there on the 5th, took over from General Herron, who left on 
the 7th, and by the 19th I had made a pretty thorough inspection or 
survey, and on the 19th I wrote a letter to the Chief of Staff outlining 
the things that I thought required immediate attention. I should 
like to go over some of those things. 

[3£2] First, the question of the cooperation of the Navy in get- 
ting more definite plans for our cooperation, like we did on that air. 
That was consummated by March 21st. That was something we could 
take care of very readily without money. 

I took up the question of dispersion of planes for their protection, 
and putting the maintenance of the air underground. I took up the 
question of the antiaircraft defense. The garrisons of the Coast Artil- 
lery were such that almost all organizations had a dual function : they 
had to man harbor defenses, and they had to man antiaircraft defense. 
In other words, if they had an attack from the sea and the air at the 
same time, one of the two sets of equipment just could not be manned, 
and we felt that there should be enough troops there so that it would 
be possible to have at least one relief for both weapons. 

There were certain things about the harbor defenses that apparently 
needed to be attended to. There was no protection for the gun crews 
at the harbor defenses, and that was gone into. The searchlights : we 
had a lot of old searchlights that were not modern, and that was 
taken up. 

There had been relatively little done on roads and trails for the 
movement of reserves, and the Island is small enough that with suitable 
roads and trails we could move reserves very rapidly to any point. 
For instance, we completed one, changed one trail to a motor trail, 
where it had taken two hours and twenty minutes to move our reserves 
over the trail on foot, and after we had completed the trail we could 
move our reserves and occupy the points where the reserve was to go 
within twenty minutes. That shows the question of the time element 
that was [323] important. 

There had been no bombproofs or shelters for the various command 
posts except for the headquarters Of the Department. It was felt that 
under present conditions it was not reasonable, where you could foresee 
where your command posts would be, not to give them protection for 
the command post and the communications. 

Now, this letter was written to the Chief of Staff, and then as we got 
the estimates and the detail plans together they were sent in to the 
War Department. On September 10 we sent in complete plans for 
putting the maintenance for aircraft underground. Those came back 
on October 27 disapproved, stating that the amount of money involved, 
which was between three and four million dollars, was too great, and 
that they would not approve putting the maintena^nce underground... 



PROCEEDINGS OP^ ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 177 

I point out ill this letter to tliem that the maintenance shop at 
Hickam Field stood up like a sore thumb : you could see it for ten or 
fifteen miles out, and that if we ever had an air attack it would be one 
of the first buildings to go, and which was very definitely proved to be 
true, and the maintenance was moved out soon after the attack. They 
started construction out in the gulches, ravines, and distributed the 
maintenance so it was not all in one place, could not be all destroyed 
at one time. 

The field fortifications had never been properly camouflaged, and 
we made a careful estimate and put in for funds. The scheme was 
approved, but the funds had not been allotted. They were not avail- 
able, apparently, and had not been allotted on December 7. 

[024.] We asked for $350,000 for roads and trails, and we got 
some of that and had done quite a bit of work on roads and trails for 
moving reserves before the attack took place. 

We had asked — we made a study and showed them that it was nec- 
essary to have 180 B-17's for a proper reconnaissance in case the Navy 
was ever pulled out, and a correspondingly large number of pursuit 
planes. It was perfectly apparent that we could not accommodate those 
planes on the airfield we had, and we put in for authority to build ten 
additional airfields, and those fields were located: we were putting 
bombers on the outlying islands, making provisions for them so in case 
of an alarm we could move the bombers oil of Hickam, disperse them to 
the outlying islands where we should not have so great losses. We were 
figuring on putting in fields at Barking Sands on Kauai, Burns Field 
on Kauai, Homestead Field on Molokai, Hilo and Morse Field on the 
Island of Hawaii, improve Bellows Field on Oahu, improve Haleiwa 
Field on Oahu, build a new field on the Island of Lanai, and a field at 
Parker's Ranch on the Island of Oahu. We asked for a field at Kipapa 
on the Island of Oahu, but the War Department disapproved that and 
directed us to prepare plans for a field at Kahuku. Those fields were 
all approved, but the funds had not been allotted, but we were able to 
go ahead and do a lot without funds. 

The District Engineer worked very closely with the W. P. A., and 
we put up barracks on most of the outlying islands with W. P. A. 
money, some civilian labor, and some soldier labor, but we got them up 
and got started and were pretty well under way before we got any 
money from the War Department. We did not do anything until the 
plans had been approved, but when the plan [S2S] was ap- 
proved we went ahead as far as we could go with W. P. A. funds and 
had quite a good start in that way. 

There was another subject : that Kaneohe Bay had been quite highly 
developed by the Navy, Originally there hacl not been enough of a 
channel there for any of the boats to come in, so it was not any more 
dangerous than the rest of the east side of the Island, and they had 
dredged out Kaneohe Bay so that light cruisers could come in, and 
destroyers, without any difficulty. In other words, they had opened 
our back door just absolutely wide to an enemy. 

Now, when that was first started the War Department or the Com- 
mander there, I am not sure which, stated that he did not raise any 
objection to this development, but he could not garrison it, could not 
defend it. Well, when I saw what the situation was, I decided that 
having guards at your front door and leaving the baqk door \yide 

• 7,9'^16— 4;6— Ex, 145. yol, 1 1.3. 



178 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

open didn't offer very much protection, and I told the Navy I would 
take over the responsibility, and immediately notified the War Depart- 
ment of the situation, and they agreed to it, that the Army necessarily 
would have to take over the defense of Kaneohe Bay because it left 
the Island wide open otherwise, as it wa«3 not included in war garrison 
at all. Wtir garrison at that time was set at 59 000, and we asked for 
an increase in the war garrison to 71,500 to take care of Kaneohe Bay 
and certain increases in the air. We had asked for increases in the 
Engineers for aviation purposes, and general service regiment for 
building roads and trails. We had gotten our increases allowed in the 
Engineers. We had been told that the increases for the air would not 
be allowed until litmitation on the 59,000 war garrison was lifted. 
IS2'6] So we were turned down on a number of things on the basis 
that they could not go beyond the 59,000. 

I considered the airfields and the aircraft, probably the aircraft 
Avarning service, the most important of all projects that we had in the 
Islands. The War Department originally had agreed to furnish ma- 
terials so we could have those completed by June 30th, but things were 
not coming along. I had almost weekly conferences with the District 
Engineer, who did all the aircraft warning work and all the airfield 
work; and Major Fleming, an engineer in my G^ section, was my 
liaison officer with the District Engineer and could give many more 
of the details than I could, because he followed it. He was practically 
in daily conference with the District Engineer and the civil officer, but 
it became apparent that we were being slowed down terribly on that, 
and I sent a message that I would like to read, on the lOth of June. 
Here is a message I sent to the Adjutant General at that time : 

(Message, June 10, 1941, LT. Gen. Short to Adjutant General, is as 
follows:) 

Division Engineer San Francisco has informed me that the priority covering 
contract W dash four one four Engineer seven eight four with Interstate Equip- 
ment Corporation Elizabeth New Jersey is now A dash one dash G — 

That means the priority number. 

This conti'act is the one for furnisliing all materials for cableway to Kaala air- 
craft warning station stop Motor and all electrical equipment sub contracted to 
General Electric stop Division Engineer states that [327] with this priority 
there is strong probability that delivery this electrical material to contractor will 
be delayed about fifteen weeks stop This Kaala station is the most important in 
aircraft warning system and early completion of this cableway is essential stop — 

I want particularly to point out this last sentence : 

I consider this aircraft warning service as the most important single project 
in this Department stop Strongly recommended that the War Department give 
all possible assistance to Chief of Engineers to have priority on this contract 
changed to A dash one dash B 

Now, I got a wire back from the Adjutant General : 
(Message, June 26, 1941, Adjutant General to Lt. Gen. Short, is as 
follows:) 

Re your radiogram three zero zero nine prior contract W dash four one four 
Engineers seven eight four Kaala aircraft warning station advanced to A dash 
one C 

We asked for 1-B. 

Chief of Engineers will instruct Division Engineer on procedure should results 
under this priority be unsatisfactory 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 179 

Now, I wanted to point this out particularly because a committee 
of Congress, in investigating Colonel Wyman, stated that there had 
been no attempt by the Commanding General in Hawaii to speed up 
this contract. This is very plain what we had done, and the trouble 
as I had it at that time from the Chief of Engineers and from Major 
Fleming, who was my liaison, was the nonreceipt of material, and the 
priority system had [S28] probably more to do with that than 
any one thing. This Kaala station, we couldn't do a thing toward the 
construction there until we got that cable because everything had to be 
pulled up to the top of the mountain by cable. It was so steep you 
couldn't get material of any weight up there any other way. 

The priority proposition was very complicated. There was no one 
on the Island that was authorized to grant priorities. If a thing 
went in from the Government as a direct Government purchase, we 
could get the priority and get it through, but we were in the habit 
of buying a great deal of material locally for defense construction, 
and when those people ran out of supplies they could not replace 
them, and the only way they could get a replacement was to get us 
to get a priority for them. So you can see that it just slowed down 
all construction work if we had to wait for fifteen weeks for a pri- 
ority to make the purchase, and then wait several weeks maybe for a 
priority to get it on the boat; and I asked them to establish an office 
of production management on the Island of Ouhu that would handle 
that. They finally agreed to establish it, but it was never established 
during my time there. But I wanted to point that out as one of the 
serious difficulties in getting these air warning service stations con- 
structed. 

And the same way with all kinds of construction work. We finally 
got authority to build up a certain pool of lumber for the Quarter- 
master, no other articles but lumber. So that we were getting in 
additional troops, having to build barracks for new troops coming 
in. We were able to go ahead. The District [S^O] Engineer 
asked for a revolving fund of $1,000,000 to enable him to have sup- 
plies on hand when he got projects approved and money allotted. 
This was never given him, but $500,000 worth of material was pur- 
chased ahead of time from funds that the Chief of Engineers saw 
were going to be available, so the situation was remedied somewhat, 
but it was still very difficult at the time of the attack. 

13. General Grunert. When you get to another place to pause, 
we shall have another recess. 

General Short. All right. Eight now. 

14. General Grunert. Recess for five minutes, please. 
(Thereupon there was a brief informal recess.) 

[3S0] General Short. The construction of the ferrying route 
by the southern route to Australia, was one of the important things 
that came up. On the fourth of October, we got a wire from the War 
Department, saying that they wanted the northern route closed, 
so they would not have to use Midway and Wake, when it was con- 
structed, and they wanted it constructed "in weeks, and not years." 
That is the way it was put. That included Christmas Island, Canton 
Island, New Caledonia, Suva in the Fiji Islands, and Townsville, in 
Australia. Darwin was originally one of the places indicated, but 
that was then, I think, turned over to the Philippine Department. 
It was taken away from us. 



180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

There was no suitable places for landinjy grounded Army planes 
on these islands, so I got in touch with the Navy, made arrangements 
to get some large airplanes to take our engineers to these places, to 
make the survey, and waited, got no further instructions, sent two or 
three radios to the War Department. Apparently, we were all ready 
within a day or two. because Navy came through very nicely with 
everything we needed to take Air groups there to make reconnais- 
sances, but I heard nothing from the War Department, and I wired 
them, and I wired them two or three times, and we finally got au- 
thority on the 11th of November to go ahead. Apparently it had been 
held up while the State Department threshed out with England the 
permission to go ahead and build on these islands, because we claimed 
Canton and Christmas, and they also claimed Canton and Christmas, 
and so as I say we were delayed from the 4th of October till the 11th 
of November, before we got authority to proceed. 

Between the 11th of November and the 25th of December, we 
[S31] completed the landing of crews, so we could get the B-17s 
through to Australia, and a flight of three planes actually made the 
trip on December 28. There were great difficulties involved. 

We had to bring machinery in from the States, and a lot of work- 
men in, from the States. Honolulu had been pretty well stripped 
of all heavy machinery, which slowed it down, and we divided the 
thing, so the work at Christmas Island was done by our engineers, 
the work at Canton was to be done by civilians. We had to finish 
it with engineers, because when the attack struck we had only two 
small water stills down there, in the storage, a few thousands of 
gallons of fresh water. We had large stills on the way, on the trans- 
port, and the Navy turned that transport back. We couldn't leave 
civilians there without water, to be possibly captured by the Japanese, 
because we had about 55 soldiers as I remember with the detail, so we 
sent the HALEAKALA, a boat we got from the Inter-Island Ship- 
ping Company, and took them off, and left the engineer, left the Army 
detachment there to finish, a thing which they succeeded in doing. 
I do not mean to present the idea that these were fine, finished air- 
fields. They were strips into the prevailing wind, landing strips 
made out of coral, and we hadn't had time to surface them, but we 
actually got them through. The engineers made arrangements at 
the Fiji Islands with the New Zealand Government to do the work 
there, and made arrangements on New Caledonia to have the Aus- 
tralian Government do the work, because they were in control, and 
they were very fortunate at Townsville, Australia, because they got 
there and found the Australians had just completed a strip 3,500 feet 
long, and were going to move. 

[^32] They got in there, Saturday afternoon, and they were 
starting to move the machinery away, Monday morning, and made a 
contract right then and there, and we got that finished up in very 
short order. The result was we actually were able to put that into 
commission and fly planes over it on December 28. I have a letter 
here — I won't take the trouble to read it to you — a letter from General 
Arnold, stating he thought we had done the job in unbelievably short 
time, and it turned out to be most necessary, because the other route 
was absolutely out. Without that route, we would have been in very 
serious difficulty. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 181 

I took up — and you will find supporting letters in here ; you will find 
letters to the Adjutant General, in a very great number of cases — in- 
creases of certain types of troops. That is especially true for the Air 
Corps, for the Coast Artillery, so as to have at least one relief for all 
their weapons, and for the engineers. Also, I got authority to change 
the old square division to two triangular divisions, and w^e put that 
into effect. The outlying islands had never been garrisoned. I sent 
on my own responsibility a battalion of National Guard to the Island 
of Hawaii, one to Kauai, one to Molokai, and one to Maui. We later 
got the approval of the War Department for expanding those garri- 
sons and putting some artillery there. 

What we were trying to do was to have enough on these important 
islands to put down any uprising of the Japanese population, and to 
prevent any small force from landing without opposition. We 
changed. When I got there, I found that their war plan was a highly 
secret order. You probably remember Field Order No. 1, General 
Frank. It meant that the subordin- [333] ate officers couldn't 
possibly know what to do, because it was so secret it was kept from 
them, and we decided to get out a standing operating procedure and 
separate all the strictly secret stuff and keep it out, so that every man in 
the outfit would know exactly Avhat his mission Avas. We thought 
out this standing operating procedure after we had department 
maneuvers in May, and both maneuvers convinced us that the old 
field order just was not workable on account of the secret business. 
We brought out the standing operating procedure in July, worked at 
it, revising it in November; finally, on November 5, we put it out in its 
final form, and we furnished ten copies to the Navy at that time, so 
that they would know what our general plan of defense was. 

The situation was such that I felt the time had arrived for the civil 
community to take an active interest in the defense of the island. I 
was asked to talk before the Chamber of Commerce on Army Day, 
April 6, 1941. I decided that that was a good time to launch this, so 
I would have the maximum publicity, have practically all the im- 
l)()rtant business men in the islands there to talk to, and get the maxi- 
mum amount of publicity from the papers. 

I put up the proposition to them that there were certain things that 
were absolutely essential from the point of view of the civil community ; 
first, production and storage of food. Hawaii has never been self- 
supporting from the point of view of food. It is not that the land is not 
l^rocluctive, but that there has been more money in growing the pine- 
apple and sugar than in growing things to eat — vegetables. There 
luid been some work done for some time on planning, as to what could 
be grown. [334] We got the plantation managers to agree to 
put in a certain number of things. One man would say he would try 
out so many acres of tomatoes ; another one, so many acres of potatoes, 
and learn how to grow them in that climate and in that soil, and with 
the various bugs that attacked them. We carried on this work until 
we knew what we could do, and we had an estimate of the seeds re- 
quired. We had an agreement from every big plantation owner in 
the Island that he would grow so many acres of such and such things, 
and we had a list of the light farm vehicles that would be needed in 
order to grow these things on the plantation. 



182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

That planning was done ahead of time. On the storage side, we 
thought that we should have a six-months supply on hand, there was 
relatively little storage space in Honolulu, and that we should get 
storage space constructed. Our estimates indicated that it would re- 
quire about $2,500,000 to increase the storage of food to a six-months 
supply, and about $900,000 worth of feed for dairy cattle and poultry. 
We got the Governor to go after Mr. LaGuardia's Defense Committee, 
to try to get the funds on that. We didn't succeed, before December 7, 
but I think on December 17 that we got the funds that the Governor 
and Delegate King had been trying to get for us, so we had the thing 
under way, in that Way. 

The next thing I considered as of importance was the organization 
of the doctors and nurses. If they are not organized, in case of an 
emeri>ency, they would probably be of very little help; and the Medi- 
cal Association got squarely behind the project. They organized 16 
surgical teams, 20 first-aid teams, and they had a considerable number 
of rehearsals and entered into [SMI it very enthusiastically 
and it paid big dividends on December 7, because they turned out 
and functioned almost like trained outfits, as a result. 

We felt that we needed an auxiliary police force to assist in guard- 
ing the utilities, bridges, and so forth, so that the soldiers could be 
relieved for real fighting, in an emergency. After we got the M Day 
bill through, these forces were organized, and they turned out and 
manned the defenses on two or three different occasions, and proved to 
be quite valuable. We also had additional fire organizations, volun- 
teer fire organizations, organized with the idea that if we got a bad 
fire from bombing we would be able to supplement the fire organization 
very largely. We tried to get a lot of additional hose and some ad- 
ditional fire engines out of LaGuardia's Committee. We had not 
succeeded in getting them at the time of the attack. 

We made plans. There are certain sections of Honolulu, especially 
adjacent to the water-front, where there is a storage of ga,soline and 
oil and things of that kind that might start a terrific conflagration and 
that would certainly, if we ever go any shelling from a surface ship, 
it would certainly come in for its bombing, very likely too, from the 
air; and we drew a plan for the evacuation of all the women and 
children from those areas. We decided Avhere we would locate camps 
to take care of them, and Colonel Lyman, the Department Engineer, 
drew up detail plans. After the M Duy Bill was put into effect, on 
the 8th of December, the Governor was able to make funds available 
immediately, and we started the construction of those camps at once. 

[336] There was a limited amount of trucks, surgical dressings, 
and so forth, in the Island. We had built up some reserves in the 
Army, we had available for the Army itself. We couldn't get from 
the War Department the funds that would be necessary to take care 
of the civil population in case that there were serious casualties that 
way. The Red Cross sent a representative out there. I had a good 
many conferences with him, and we persuaded them to establish a 
depot of $200,000 worth of Red Cross supplies. They were able to do 
it by a subterfuge of calling it a depot for the Far East, on the theory 
that it would be used for any emergency anywhere in the Far East, 
but we got it established, and we had a very great percentage of those 
supplies actually in the depot when the attack took place, so that that 
was extremely valuable, in taking care of the wounded, at that time. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 183 

We had made plans, a complete survey, for establishing hospitals at 
various places, including St. Louis College, and we actually set up that 
hospital. We had started, the day before. We had gotten authority 
to lease the buildings, and we had started setting up that hospital the 
day before, and we had it in full operation on the day of the attack. 
The two men that were probably most largely responsible for all the 
medical preparation were Colonel King, now General King, who was 
the Department Surgeon, and Colonel Fronck, the Reserve officer who 
had been provided us by the Regular Army, who w^as a surgeon in 
Honolulu. They had great enthusiasm and very considerable knowl- 
edge, and they did marvelous things, as it turned out. 

I felt that my work in preparation for the civil community [337] 
was really one of the important parts of my job, because we got things 
where they functioned on the day of the attack, that just couldn't have 
functioned if we hadn't made these studies. There were some things 
we didn't complete. We had started an inventory of all of the food 
supplies on the Island. We expected to get it taken at the end of 
December. The merchants had agreed to do this without any expense. 
We had the plans all made. In the end, we took that inventory from 
the 8th to the 10th of December. Beginning the morning of the day 
after the attack, we made that inventory. We were able to tell the 
War Department exactly what was on hand in the Island, and where 
we had expected to have, and hoped to have, a 60-days supply, we 
found there was only 37, so we got the AVar Department to agree to ship 
a certain tonnage on, of food supplies, every week, so as to take care of 
the population and build up a reserve. 

Again the Army was all right, we had our six-months supplies, and 
I had got some additional cold-storage at Schofield and was building 
an underground storage at Shafter, which was completed within a 
week after the attack ; so the Army, just for taking care of itself, there 
was no difficulty, but there was serious difficulty from the point of view 
of the civil population. 

Now, at the expense of boring you, I would like to read to you a letter 
that the Governor wrote to me, unsolicited, as a result of that work. 
It shows the attitude that the civil community had towards me. It 
reads : 

Territory of Hawaii, 
Executive Chambers, Honolulu 

[3381 23 December 1941. 
Lieutenant General Walter C. Shobt 

Fort Shafter, T. H. 

My Dear General Short : Having noted in the public press that an investi- 
gation is being made as to the military preparedness of the Army and Navy in 
Hawaii on December 7, 1941, I believe it appropriate that I make to you a 
statement as to the state of preparedness of the civil communities of these 
Islands for war when they were so insidiously and treacherously attacked on 
December 7, 1941. 

The citizens of the Hawaiian Islands have always appreciated that these 
Islands were important to National Defense from a military standpoint, but it 
has been only since your arrival in these Islands on February 5, 1941, that it 
has been brought home to the civil population the importance of the part it 
would play in the event of a war in the Pacific. On December 7th, the citizens 
of these Islands met the hour of their test in such a manner as to make me proud 
to be the Chief Executive of these Islands. Tour foresight in urging the popula- 
tion to prepare to meet the possible vicissitudes of war and the joint efforts of 
the Army and civil population in planning and preparing for this emergency was 
m'agnificently rewarded. 

It may be of interest to point out in detail some of the plans and preparations 
which bore fruit on December 7, 1941 : 



184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(1) The enactment of the Hawaiian Defense Act by a special session of 
Legislature called for that purpose. 

[339] That is what we call the "M Day Bill." 

This legislation permits a mobilization of the entire civil economy of the Islands 
in the interest of National Defense or in the event of disaster. By virtue of this 
act, civilian defense vras planned and many of its phases were brought to such 
a point of preparation that they were able to go into action immediately and to 
function effectively on December 7, 1941. 

(2) The production and conservation of food: Householders were persistently 
urged to stock their shelves in canned food. It is estimated that this resulted 
in increasing the available food supply of the Hawaiian Islands by more than 
twenty percent. Federal appropriation was requested for procurement and stor- 
age for food reserve. This appropriation has, since December 7, 1941, been 
authorized. By agreement with plantation owners, plans were made for the 
procurement and storage of seed and the planting of certain large areas with 
quick growing food crops. Agreenjents were also made for the growing, in 
normal times, of those crops not usually grown in marketable quantities. In 
furtherance of this plan, the War Department was induced to permit the pur- 
chase of Island grown potatoes for the use of the Army although the price was 
above that of mainland potatoes. In anticipation of the receipt of reserve sup- 
plies of food asked for in the emergency, the Army supported a certificate of 
necessity for building an adequate wareliouse to meet tliese needs. This ware- 
house is now available for the storage of food supply when it arrives. 

[340] (3) The medical facilities for the care of the injured and wounded 
during any disaster was one of the first things accomplished by the civilians of 
these Islands for an emergency. This resulted in mobilizing the entire medical 
profession of the Islands with all its medical facilities. Approximately three 
thou.sand persons were given training and instrni'tion in First-Aid as required 
by the Red Cross. The persons thus trained assisted in carrying out the arduous 
tasks of evacuation. Twenty First-Aid units were organized, each unit con- 
sisting of personnel of about one hundred and twenty. An ambulance corps 
of one hundred and forty improvised ambulances were organized. The per- 
formance of their tasks by these groups was one of the highlights of the civil 
defense efforts on December 7, 1941. 

(4) Plans for the evacuation of women and children and the preparation of 
shelters for workers in essential industries had reached a high state of perfec- 
tion on December 7, 1941, and the evacuation of women and children from areas 
attacked was accomplished in a most admirable manner. 

(5) An auxiliary police force to guard utilities and to prevent sabotage was 
organized at an early date in our preparation and it was able to function instantly 
when called upon to do so on the morning of December 7th. The work of this 
force was exceptional and excellent. 

(6) Legislation authorizing a home guard was enacted at the special session 
of the Territorial legislature. It was well planned and so organized that [S^l] 
1400 of such home guardsmen could and were placed on duty thereby relieving 
members of the Army for other military duty. 

(7) There were many other matters too numerous to detail here which were 
planned and accomplished at your instigation. Important among these was the 
bringing home to the public the urgent necessity for cooperation and public 
service in times of emergency. 

All of the foregoing required tremendous effort on the part of the local author- 
ities, the citizenry and military authorities. All such efforts have been rewarded 
since December 7, 1941, in that Territorial and City Governments and all phases 
of the public welfare have overcome all obstacles and have operated smoothly 
as a direct result of prior planning and training. 

It is my belief that the public has confidence in the military and civil au- 
thorities. The fact that the Japanese Government has seen fit to infiict a 
treacherous attack has not in any way diminished the faith of this community 
in your demonstrated abilities. I wish to state that the magnificent way in 
which the Territory of Hawaii met its problem in its crucial hour was in a large 
measure due to your foresight. I am deeply grateful for your efforts on behalf 
of the Territory. 

You are at liberty to use this letter in any way which you see fit. 
Very sincerely yours, 

(S) J. B. POINDEXTER, 

Governor of Hawaii. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 185 

[343] I said that I felt that my work with the civil community 
was almost equally important with my work with the military as a 
preparation for defense; and I have here a much shorter letter that 1 
would like to take your time to read. This letter is addressed to 
the President, from Honolulu. 

(The letter from civilians of Honolulu to the President, dated 
December 22, 1941, is as follows :) 

We, the undersigned, representing substantial business and social organizations 
in Hjlwaii, and liaving liad for many years in many ways a vital interest in 
the armed forces stationed in Hawaii, do hereby wish to express our sincere 
appreciation of the services rendered to this Territory and to our Nation by 
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short. 

We have found him at all times to he most cooperative and furthermore he 
has exercised a vigorous leadership in causing this community to prepare for 
an emergency such as exists at present. Almost a year ago he laid out a plan 
for this purpose and has taken all steps practicable toward carrying out such 
a plan. 

General Short's thorough foresight and his forceful presentation of his ideas 
to our "Territorial Legislature", to our local officials, and to our community 
in general have been very largely responsible for (a) the enactment of a sound 
"M-Day" Bill; (b) for the provision of a Territorial Guard; (c) for the de- 
cision "to increase stored food and to produce food; and (d) for the prevention 
of sabotage. He has shown a correct and sympathetic attitude toward the prob- 
lems of the civil community in assuring cooperation of civilians. 

[343] He has maintained a high morale in his C<mimand and has con- 
ducted "alerts" from time to time. He has proceeded with preparing his troops 
and with plans, now looking for financing from federal funds, for adequate and 
safe storage of sufficient supplies and equipment of all sorts for their use in a 
probable emergency. 

We are encouraged by the fact that a committee has been appointed to go 
into various phases of the entire case, believing that the excellent men you have 
selected will render a just report, fair to all concerned. 

INIeanwhile. we wish to express to yourself and to all concerned our high 
esteem and our full confidence in the character and ability of General Walter 
C. Short as a citizen and as an officer, whatever his assignment may be. 

This letter is prepared without the knowledge or consent of General Short 
or any other official, merely in our hope that no unwarranted discredit may 
accrue to the record of such a conscientious and able officer, through adverse 
publicity or otherwise. This concern is in no way lessened by our vital interest 
in the adequate defense of Hawaii and our Nation. 

With very best respects and wishes, we are 
Yours very truly, 

The important part of this letter is the people who si^rned it. 

The mayor of the City of Honolulu; the president of the Hawaiian 
Trust Company, Limited; the vice-president of Alexander & Baldwin, 
Ltd. ; the president of the Oahu Railway & Land Co. ; the president of 
Lewers & Cook, Ltd.; Assistant Food Administrator, O. C. D. ; the 
Governor of Hawaii; the chief justice of [34-^] the Supreme 
Court: the Director of Civilian Defense for Oahu; the President of 
Theo PI. Davies & Co., Ltd. ; Executive Vice-President, Bishop National 
of Hawaii and Honolulu ; Executive Vice-President, Bishop Trust Co., 
Ltd. ; Executive Vice-President, Hawaiian Sugar Planters Associa- 
lion ; President, American Factors, Ltd. ; Treasurer, American Factors, 
Ltd. ; President, C. Brewer & Co., Ltd. ; Trustee, Bernice P. Bishop 
Estate; Territorial Director of Civilian Defense; Manager, Merchan- 
ili.se Department, Alexander t"^ Baldwin, Ltd. 

Those of you who know Honolulu know that that list represents 
Jiretty nearly all the important business organizations in Honolulu, 
and it means much more than the same number of names woidd mean. 



186 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

in any community in the United States. There is a closer organization 
over there. I read it as an indication of what the civil community 
thought of the work I had done. 

That is all I have, except that I would like to present my conclusions 
and I would like to read them — a couple of pages — so as "to give them 
rather exact instead of just speaking them, if that is satisfactory. 

(The conclusions are as follows:) 

1. The radiogram from the War Department through CINCUS Fleet of October 
16th emphasized that measures taken by me during the grave situation of tlie 
Japanese negotiations should not disclose strategic intention nor constitute pro- 
vocative actions against Japan. 

The radiogram of November 27th reiterated that action should be carried out 
so as "not repeat not to disclose intent," not alarm civil population, and avoid 
unnecessary publicity. 

l3Jf5] When the War Department was notified that the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment was alerted against sabotage it not only did not indicate that the command 
should be alerted against a hostile surface, sub-surface, ground or air attack, but 
replied emphasizing the necessity for protection against sabotage and subversive 
measures. This, taken in connection with the two previous radiograms mentioned, 
indicated to me a tacit consent to the alert against sabotage ordered by tihe 
Hawaiian Department. 

I would like to interpose there that General Gerow's testimony before 
the Board showed that there had not been enough check made to even 
be aware that an answer had been received. 

2. The Hawaiian Department is not provided with an agency for locating enemy 
ships in various parts of the world. Such information as it may acquire on this 
subject must be obtained from the Fourteenth Naval District or from the War 
Department. 

The "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier" placed 
upon the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District the responsibility for 
distance reconnaissance. Annex #7 to the "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan" 
provides that when naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search 
operations and army aircraft are made available, these will be under the tactical 
control of the naval command during search operations. That means that the 
army planes receive their missions and all instructions from the naval commander 
and carry out the search as he deems necessary in order to carry out his respon- 
sibility for distant reconnaissance. 

[3^6] "During the period November 27th to December 6th, the Navy made 
no request for army planes to participate in distant reconnaissance. To me 
this mieant that they had definite information of the location of enemy carriers 
or that the number unaccounted for was such that naval planes could make the 
necessary reconnaissance without assistance from the army. During this period 
I was in fi-equent conferences with the Commander-in-Chief of the United States 
Fleet and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and at no time 
was anything said to indicate that they feared the possibility of an attack by the 
Japanese by air. In fact, the sentiment was expressed by a naval staff officer 
that there was no probability of such an attack. With a large part of the 
United States Navy in Hawaiian waters and with their sources of information, 
I was convinced that the Navy would be able either to intercept any carrier 
attempting to approach Oahu or at least to obtain such information from task 
forces or by reconnaissance as to make them aware of the presence of carriers 
in the Hawaiian waters and of the possibility of an air attack. 

3. Action of the War Department on December .^)th, and as late as 1 :.S0 A. M., 
Eastern standard time, December 7th, in dispatching planes from the mainland 
to Honolulu without ammunition indicated that the War Department did not 
believe in the probability of an early Japanese attack upon Honolulu. 

I might add there that General Marshall's testimony stated frankly 
that the attack was a surprise to him, and he felt that the greatest 
threat was in the Philippine Islands. 

[3^7] I felt that I had a right to expect the War Department to furnish 
me by the miost rapid means possible information should a real crisis arise in 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 187 

Japanese relations. I did not expect that when the crisis arose the desire for 
secrecy would be considered more important than the element of time. Had 
the message in regard to the Japanese ultimatum and the burning of their code 
machines been given me by telephone as an urgent message in the clear without 
loss of time for encoding and decoding, etc., I, in all probability, would have 
had approximately two hours in which to make detailed preparations to meet 
an imimediate attack. 

4. I feel that my work in the Hawaiian Department should be judged by my 
activities throughout the complete period from the assumption of command on 
February 7th until my relief upon December 16th. I believe that any careful 
examination of my work during that period will prove that I have worked very 
seriously at the job and have accomplished measures of very considerable im- 
portance. I do not see how I could better have carried out what appeared to 
be the desires of the War Departm>ent unless I was supposed to know more than 
the War Department about the danger of Japanese attack and more than the 
Navy Department about the location of the Japanese carriers. To have taken 
more steps in preparation against a Japanese attack than I did would certainly 
have alarmed the civil population and caused publicity contrai'v to War Depart- 
ment instructions. I do not believe that I should be found guilty even of an 
error in judgment because I did not have the vision to foresee that the War 
Department would not notify me of a crisis in the least possible time [3^8] 
and that the Navy with its large fleet in Hawaiian waters would not be able to 
carry out its mission of intercepting Japanese carriers, or at least detecting 
their presence in Hawaiian waters and informing me of the fact. 

That concludes my statement, General. 

15. General Grunert. Do I understand that in addition to that 
verbal statement you have a written statement ? 

General Short. I want to submit this (exhibiting). It has every- 
thing that I have covered in it except my statement wdth reference to 
the statement of General Marshall and of General Gerow, and it has 
supporting documents, the letters to the War Department requesting 
funds, requesting increases of certain troops, and authority to build 
air fields, and so forth, and the action of the War Department; and it 
is indexed, so that I think the Board without any difficulty can find 
anything it wants. 

16. General Grunert, We will take a recess at this time until 2 
o'clock. 

(Thereupon, at 12 : 18 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2 o'clock 
p. m.) 
[349] afternoon session 

(T^ie Board at 2 p. m. continued the hearing of witnesses.) 

17. General Grunert. The Board will please come to order. 

I understand that there is a list of names submitted by General Short 
of witnesses who possibly have knowledge of the facts. I understood 
from his adviser. General Green, that they had no particular reason 
to call these witnesses except that they thought they knew of the facts ; 
but if there are any particular facts that General Short would like to 
have the Board look after and bring out by calling these witnesses, or 
when these witnesses appear before the Board, then I suggest that 
after each one of those names they list the points that they would like 
to have the Board inquire into. The Board will probably do so any- 
way, but in that w^ay we shall be sure to cover the ground with respect 
to which General Short thinks they have knowledge of facts. 

General Short. I think in all cases but probably one that the job 
that they are indicated as holding would indicate pretty clearly what 
you indicated. Now, Fleming, I think I just showed, was Assistant 
G-4, but he was my liaison man with the District Engineer for all the 



188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

work that he did for us for the ferrying group, and to a considerable 
extent after General Hayes left the Department he was my liaison 
man there. 

18. General Grunert. I think that the Board gathered that through 
your statement this morning and would naturally cover those points. 

General Short. Yes. 

19. General Grunert. But if you wish to give us a list of those 
points on which you suggest that the Board inquire into as far as that 
witness is concerned, I shall be glad to have [850] you give a 
report of that. 

General Short. Yes. The others I think would just logically, from 
the jobs they had, inquire into the things that would be pertinent. 

20. General Grunert. All right. 

21. Colonel West. Do you swear that the contents of that file that 
you are about to introduce into evidence are true, to your best knowl- 
edge and belief, so help you God? 

General Short. Yes. 

22. General Grunert. That written statement will be made a part 
of the record. 

23. General Frank. Should it not be referred to as the exhibit so 
and so marked in such and such a manner? 

24. Colonel West. I was simply trying to get away from making it 
an exhibit so that we would not have to make extra copies of it for 
every part of the record. I think if w^e can just incorporate it by refer- 
ence in the record and say it was received and made a part of the file 
of the Board it would be preferable, sir. 

General Green. How many copies are you going to have of the 
record ? 

25. Colonel West. Five. 

General Green. We can furnish them five copies of them when we 
get them. 

General Short. I can furnish that many. 

[Copy] 

3141 Southwestern Boulevard. 

Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10. 19JtJ,. 
Subject : Corrections in testimony. 
To : President, Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

1. I request that tlie following corrections be made in my testimony before the 
Army Pearl Harbor Board : 

« 4: « * * 4= « 

Page 350, line 25, — after word "can" insert "not". 

******* 

/s/ Walter C. Short 
Walter C. Short, 
Major General, U. 8. Army, Retired. 

26. Colonel West. Or we can make that an exhibit originally. I 
•suggest, then, we mark this Exhibit 1. 

General Green. You mark it and give it back. I have to use it. 

[SSI] 27. Colonel West. This is the first ofKcial exhibit, then, 
Exhibit No. 1. 

(Bound file of documents presented b}' General Short and sworn to 
by him was marked Exhibit 1 and received in evidence.) 

28. General Grunert. All right; we shall proceed. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 189 

General Short's verbal statement lias furnished answers to many of 
the questions the Board desired to propound. However, I shall pro- 
ceed to open up the various topics on my agenda and review the ques- 
tions I have on each such topic, .changing some in the light of the 
knowledge gleaned, and adding others. Should I ask any that have 
been answered in the statement, the witness or members of the Board 
will please indicate that they have been so answered, so that we shall 
not waste time in repetition. When I have finished with each topic, 
after my own questions I will give each Board member an opportunity 
to question the witness on that topic before passing to the next. 

General Short, will you please state the period during which you 
commanded the Hawaiian Department, and whom you succeeded in 
command ? 

General Short. I commanded the Hawaiian Department from 
February 7, 1941, to December 16, 1911. I succeeded Lieutenant Gen- 
eral Charles D. Herron. 

29. General Grunert. Will you also please state whether you know 
how you came to be selected for that command ? 

General Short. I was commanding the 1st Corps down at Colum- 
bia, South Carolina, and received a personal letter from the Chief of 
Staff stating that — I guess that was along about the middle of Decem- 
ber — stating that he thought of detailing me [353] to com- 
mand the Hawaiian Department. It happened that my wife's father 
had been quite ill not so very long before, and she was rather anxious 
not to go outside of the country; so I wrote and said to the Chief of 
Staff if it wei'e purely a routine assignment I would rather not have it, 
but if it were in the nature of anything unusual on account of world 
conditions, that naturally I would be glad to go, and he came back 
and said I would be sent. 

30. General Grunert. Any questions on that particular phase? 
(No response.) 

Will you briefly state what instructions, if any, you received con- 
cerning the Hawaiian Department prior to assumption of command, 
particularly as to your mission and responsibilities, if that has not 
already been covered in your statement? 

General Short. It has not. I came down to Washington just before 
leaving the East, I think about the, oh, first week in January, and I 
saw the Chief of Staff for a few minutes, but he did not go into par- 
t iculars of my mission at all. 

31. General Grunert. Any questions? 

32. General Russell. Yes, I have some. General. 

At that time. General Short, did you have a conference with the 
War Plans Division, as it was known at that time? 

General Short. I spent two days around the War Department, and 
I had a considerable number of conferences, trying to find out what 
they had in the way of equipment, whether their equipment was 
modern, and, where it was not, when that we were going to get it. 
Things of that kind. But I remember I had a conference with Gen- 
eral Spaatz about the air equipment over there. I had a conference 
with somebody who had been in Hawaii fairly [S5S1 recently, 
about the developing of air fields on the outlying islands. I had a 
conference with someone about the type of artillery that they had in 



190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Hawaii. I think they still, as I remember, had some British 75s 
at that time. 

I had a number of conferences of that kind trying to find out how 
the command Mas equipped and what the prospect was of getting 
mor modern equipment. I do not remember the names of a lot of 
people. I think I talked with General Gerow, who was in the War 
Plans. I know I talked with General Spaatz, and it has been four 
years: I don't remember the other people I did talk with. It has 
been three years and probably eight months. 

There is one thing I remember that I particularly talked with Gen- 
eral Spaatz about, because he had just come back from England. I 
talked at considerable length with him about the question of disper- 
sion and protection of airplanes, because we had not had an awful 
lot at that time in this country about it, and he was probably the best 
informed man we had. 

33. General Russell. Did you know the mission of the Hawaiian 
Department at that time, General Short ? 

General Short, I think I did. I undoubtedly went over that with 
War Plans Division. 

34. General Grunert. Will you briefly state what pertinent in- 
structions, information, and so forth you received from your pred- 
ecessor, particularly as to your missions and responsibilities ? 

General Short. He had a very considerable list of things that he 
though it would be well — where he kept notes himself — would be 
well for me to talk to him about, and we spent pretty much the whole 
of an afternoon going over those points. 

[S54] 35. General Grunert. Were there any particular points 
that now occur to you that stand out in that turnover ? 

General Short. Well, I think probably the deficiencies in personnel 
and equipment, that he perhaps laid more emphasis on that than 
anything else, and there was a problem that I think had been making 
him think quite a bit, that at that time they were calling in the drafts, 
and the first draft ran about 66 or 67 percent Japanese, and I believe 
that the second draft had just come in at that time and that it was 
higher. I am quite sure that we called the third draft in later, which 
finally got up to 89 percent, but I think that that was one of the 
things that kind of worried General Herron a little bit about the 
assignment of those people and the employment of the National Guard, 
because the National Guard over there was just a cross section of the 
population : we had everything in the world. 

36. General Frank. What was that? 

General Short. The National Guard, which was called out in the 
Federal service. It was strictly a cross section of the population : 
Hawaiians, Chinese, Koreans, Japanese, and he was a little doubtful 
just to what extent we should put those people in various responsible 
positions. 

37. General Grunert. General Short, do you recall a letter of Feb- 
I'uary 7, '41, from the Chief of Staff in which he generally brings to 
5^our mind certain conditions about the Hawaiian Defense Command? 

General Short. May I take a look at the letter, because it was not 
received on that date, and I do not recall it exactly by date. 

[355] 38. General Grunert. It starts right there. It is rather 
a lengthy one (indicating). 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 191 

General Short. Oh, yes. Yes, I recall that very well. 

39. General Grunert. Was there anything in that letter that was 
new to you, that had not been referred to in your turnover by General 
Herron ? 

General Short. No. The one thing that that letter emphasized to 
me, I think more than anything else, was the necessity for the closest 
cooperation with the Navy. I think that that part of the letter im- 
pressed me more than anything else. 

40. General Grunert. Do you recall this particular expression in 
that letter : "The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise 
raid by air and by submarine constitute the real perils of the situation" ? 

General Short. I remember that letter and remember it generally. 
I do not remember just exactly the expression. I remember that 
those things were emphasized. 

41. General Grunert. About that time or from that time on through 
the rest of the summer and into the fall, you have pretty well out- 
lined what steps you took toward improving the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment defenses, but were you at all deeply concerned as to or respecting 
the probability of an attack by an enemy air raid? If so, what did 
you do during the succeeding months to minimize the effect of such a 
raid if it occun^ed ? 

General Short. Because of the information I had from the Navy 
and the Navy strength that was there, I was not exercised [3S6] 
at any one time as to the possibility of an immediate attack. I realized 
that there was a possibility of a considerable part of that navy being 
moved out at some time and that the danger would become very acute. 
With that in mind, I made a special effort to bring the antiair equip- 
ment up to date and to get enough coast artillery personnel that we 
would not have to have dual assignments, and to get the aircraft warn- 
ing service functioning. As I read to you this morning, I wired the 
War Department that I considered the aircraft warning the most 
important project in the whole Department. 

42. General Russell. General, I do not want to crash in on your 
plan there, but General Short has just given an answer here that at- 
tracts attention to something that I do not recall having been in the 
record before. 

General, you stated that you, visualizing a time when the Navy or 
a substantial part of it might be away from Pearl Harboi', — 
General Short. Yes, sir. 

43. General Russell. — that you emphasized then the perfection of 
your antiaircraft defense. What part was the Navy playing in the 
antiaircraft defense that might be dissipated by the Navy's going 
away ? 

General Short. They had no landing fields closer than 2100 miles. 
They could not, with land planes, attack Honolulu at that time. They 
didn't have planes. I figured as long as the Navy was there in such 
force that they could not bring the carriers into position from which 
they could attack the Island without the Navy either knowing where 
they were or getting enough information to know that thej were some- 
where in the [3571 vicinity; and with the Navy away, why, 
I realized that they could run carriers in, without any question, and 
make an attack. 



192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

44. General Kussell. Well, I have read since lunch here an extract 
from this Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, in two paragraphs of 
which are outlined Army and Navy missions, and one of the Navy 
misssions was attacking enemy naval forces. The thing that you are 
testifying about now is that you thought if the Navy was in there in 
carriers they would prevent carriers from approaching within — 

General Short. Striking distance. 

45. General Russell. Striking distance? 
General Short. Yes, sir. 

46. General Russell. I just wanted to clarify that. 

47. General Frank. I would like to determine, upon what did you 
base that assumption? Did you believe that the presence of the fleet 
in being at Pearl Harbor constituted a security? 

General Short. It did, because they constantly had task forces out, 
and they had carriers with those task forces, and they spread their 
planes out from the task forces, and it seemed to me that there was 
every reasonable chance that they would discover enemy carriers or 
get enough information to know that they were dangerous. 

48. General Frank. To get into your relations with the Navy : Did 
you feel that you always 

49. General Russell. Do you not have that somewhere ? 

50. General Grunert. That comes in a later topic, but you may 
develop these now if you do not go too deeply into it. Since you have 
already asked it, go ahead. 

51. General Frank. Well, he has just given an answer that 
[rSSS] opens up this. 

52. General Grunert. Everything will open up everything else. 
Go ahead. 

53. General Frank. It opens up this question. 

Will you please read the last thing I said, Mr. Reporter? 
(The pending unfinished question of General Frank, as above re- 
corded, was read by the reporter.) 

54. General Frank. Did you feel that you always had full infor- 
mation on what the Navy was doing ? 

General Short. I would like to put it this way : I felt that Admiral 
Kimmel and Admiral Bloch, either one, would have definitely given 
me anything that they thought had any bearing on my job; that if 
they were sure that it was an absolutely inside naval proposition that 
did not concern me in any way, they might not have given it to me. 
I do not know whether that is in answer to your question, but 

55. General Frank. The question as to whether or not you got the 
information was placed upon a trust that you had that they would 
have given it to you? 

General Short. Absolutely. 

5fi. General Frank. If they in theii- judgment tliought 

General Short. Thought. 

57. General Frank. — that you were interested ? 

General Short. Thought it was of any value to me or that I was 
interested. 

58. General Frank. Do you feel that you were secure in that? 
General Short. I do not know what other basis you could work on. 

I had no right to demand that they give me all information they had. 
[359'] 59. General Frank. Did you know each time a task force 
went out? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 193 

General Short. Not officially. I think I most always did person- 
ally because I talked with Admiral Kimmel particularly. I saw more 
of him than I did of Admiral Bloch, and whenever I saw him, which 
was usually at least once a week, he told me what they were doing. 

60. General Frank. A task force could have gone out and back in 
a period of a week, however, without your ever knowing anything 
about it? 

General Short. Oh, yes, and they were sending — they had a task 
force out all the time, and it was a routine training with them. Of 
course, if we were putting on an air problem with them or if there 
was something like a marine landing, as I spoke of this morning, 
down at Johnston Island, they were telling me particularly about that 
because they would figure I would want to send someone. 

61. General Frank. You did not constantly know where task forces 
were? 

General Short. No, except as we happened to talk about it in a 
personal kind of a way. 

62. General Frank. And by the same token you did not know how 
much of the perimeter of Honolulu was being covered, nor when any 
part of it was being covered ? 

General Short. Now, what do you mean by "perimeter"? 

63. General Frank. The 360 degrees around Oahu. 

General Short. No, I did not. I did not know exactly what the 
reconnnaissance was. I did know in general terms that it was largely 
to the west. I think that they did most of their [S60] task 
work to the west, from the north around to the west, to the south; 
that if you would go from a little bit east of Midway Island and 
draw your circle towards the west through Palmyra, Johnston, Can- 
ton, Christmas, that you would cover the area that they felt was most 
dangerous and that they operated in the most. 

[361] 64. General Frank. Were you advised that there was 
a Japanese task force in the Marshalls, between the 25th and 30th of 
November ? 

General Short. No, sir. In fact, as I remember the thing, I was 
led to believe that there was a task force of Japanese out some- 
where to the south of Japan, but not in those Islands. My feeling 
was that it was more directed toward the Philippines. 

65. General Frank. You had no knowledge ? 

General Short. At least, I don't remember that I had any. That 
is my recollection, that my information was that the Japanese ships 
were either in their home ports or had been sent to the south. 

66. General Frank. Would you not have been concerned if you 
had gotten the information that there was a Japanese force 

General Short. In the mandated islands? Yes, yes. 

67. General Frank. There was a piece of information that Navy 
had that they did not give you ? 

General Short. Yes, that may have happened. Did they have defi- 
nite information to that effect, or was it rumor ? 

68. General Frank. It was information that is reported in the 
Roberts report, of which they were sufficiently confident to notify the 
Navy Department in Washington. 

General Short. In a report from Kimmel, you mean, or from the 
Asiatic Fleet ? 

69. General Frank. From Kimmel to Washington. 

79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1 14 



194 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. To Washington? Well, I don't remember it, if 
he gave it, and I think I would have remembered it, because I do 
remember that we talked about the location of the fleet during that 
period, and as I remember it, it was rumored that [362] the 
Japanese ships were partly in their home ports, and that what were 
not there, they thought were proceeding to the south. 

70. General Frank. The basis of your feeling of security then 
was the belief that the Navy was effectively at its job? 

General Short. I would rather say, a confidence, than a belief — a 
confidence that they were working at their job and doing it effectively. 

71. General Grunert. The next item I would like to ask some 
questions on is that of the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense 
Plan, which the Board understands was the basic plan for the defense 
of Hawaii. Did not that plan charge the commanding general of 
the Hawaiian Department with providing antiaircraft defense of 
Oahu, with particular attention to Pearl Harbor naval base and naval 
forces present? 

General Short. I would say, w4th particular attention to the Pearl 
Harbor naval base. I don't remember that it mentioned the naval 
ships present. I don't know; it may; but I don't remember that it 
does. 

72. General Grunert. But that brings into question this: Did 
the Commanding General keep himself informed as to naval forces 
present? If not, why not ? Part of that has been covered. Did you 
consider that your job in defending Pearl Harbor as a naval base 
was greater when the Fleet was present in the harbor, or when the 
major part was not in the harbor? 

General Short. I would have considered that the task forces out 
lessened my job very greatly, because it made the danger of attack 
much less. That is, if they bottled everything up in the harbor, that 
my job would be very much more difficult, because I wouldn't count on 
the knowledge they would [363] have, and their ability to stop 
carriers coming in. 

73. General Frank. I would just like to clarify my own mind on 
what your inference, there, is. Do you mean by your answer that as a 
result of the task forces being out, you felt a certain security, in that 
they would have covered the area around, and therefore would have 
provided you with negative information that the enemy was not in 
the vicinity? 

General Short. That was correct. I considered the task forces they 
had out at that time would cover 1,200 to 1,800 miles of ocean pretty 
thoroughly. 

74. General Frank. That was ill part of your confidence in the ef- 
fectiveness of the Navy? 

General Short. Yes. The more task forces they had out, the less 
they had to do with long-distance air reconnaissance. 

75. General Grunert. Then you did not consider that you had to 
check up on the number of vessels in or out, or going in or out? 

General Short. I would say frankly that I imagine that as a Senior 
Admiral, Kimmel would have resented it if I had tried to have him 
report every time a ship went in or out, and as I say, our relations 
were such that he gave me without any hesitancy any piece of informa- 
tion that he thought was of interest. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 195 

76. General Grunert. Of course, your control post must have 
known ? 

General Short. They did, in Hawaii ; they knew before the attack. 
We had one officer, a "noncom," a lieutenant colonel — I have forgotten 
his name — Dingman, or something of that kind — and a sergeant, who 
were there, to work chiefly to learn how to [364] work with the 
Navy on that, to see what the problem was, and whenever we had any 
kind of maneuver, then we increased that to three, so as to have a 24- 
hour shift, and during the day hours, that he would be on there, he 
would know what came out ; but he wasn't there. One man couldn't 
be there 24 hours in the day, and we had only one, except during the 
periods of maneuvers. 

77. General Grunert. I don't know what it was then, but now, in all 
these important harbors, there is an Army officer on duty 24 hours of 
the day, whose business it is to act in emergencies, in getting immediate 
connection with the commanding officer of the harbor defenses, and be 
particularly on the alert. All the harbor defense is particularly con- 
cerned whenever there is a convoy or a large number of ships in the 
harbor. Now, did that not appear necessary in 1941 ? 

General Short. During the period that this officer was at the con- 
trol post, he kept up that work with the harbor defense, to tell them 
whether they were ships that should be fired on or should not be fired 
on. Of course, after the December 7 attack, we had 24 hours a day of a 
Coast Artillery officer right there so that he would receive the maxi- 
mum information, through the Navy, as to whether that was a friendly 
ship or not. 

78. General Grunert. But up to that time it was not considered 
necessary ? 

General Short. The man, the one officer and one man were there 
to keep up this touch, and the training, and to keep the Coast Artillery 
in touch, so that there wouldn't be anything new when we did put on 
three in an emergency. 

79. General Grunert, "Well, you produced that Joint Plan. 

80. General Frank. There was a Japanese submarine that was 
[3SS] attacked on information from the Navy, right there in the 
immediate vicinity of Pearl Harbor, on the morning of December 7? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

81. General Frank. When were you advised of that? 

General Short. I didn't know of it till after the attack. I don't 
think I knew it till the 8th. 

82. General Frank. Until the 8th? 

General Short. Yes. Of course, after the attack, why, it wasn't 
of any particular importance. I think it was the 8th when Admiral 
Kimmel himself told me about that. 

8r3, General Frank. Knowledge of that would have been important ? 

General Short. Knowledge of that would have been very impor- 
tant, because if I had had it, about 7 : 15, I could have dispersed my 
planes. I couldn't have got them into the air, there wasn't time 
enough, long enough to get them into the air, but I could have dis- 
persed them and lessened the losses. 

They did not connect it with the general raid, they thought it was 
separate. 



196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

84. General Grunert. In protecting the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, 
which later referred to the protection of the naval and air base, it 
would appear that the idea of protecting that base is to protect what 
is inside of that. Now, I just ran across this paragraph, 17-a of this 
Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, which reads as follows : 

The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, shall provide for — 
a The beach and land, seacoast and antiaircraft defense of OAHU with par- 
ticular attention to the [SGC] PEARL HARBOR NAVAL BASE and navaJ 
forces present thereat, HONOLULU HARBOR, CITY OF HONOLULU, and the 
SCHOFIELD BARRACKS-WHEELER FIELD-LUALUALEI area. 

General Short. That is the ammunition. I would like to expand. 

85. General Grunert. That seems to emphasize the naval forces 
"present thereat." 

General Short. I would like to expand on that a little. We hadn't 
gotten to the degree of coordination of antiaircraft fire where we 
took over the antiaircraft fire, or of the ships in the harbor. Now, 
that might come any time. With the Marines at Ewa, it came under 
air command. There w^ere naval guns, and, through naval guns, the 
ships themselves, their antiaircraft facilities did not function under 
the antiaircraft commander. 

86. General Grunert. That was not tied in with your antiaircraft 
defense ? 

General Short. No ; we hadn't gotten that far in the coordination, 
and I think it would take some time to perfect it to the point where 
it would be possible. 

87. General Frank. I would like to ask a question. Really, what is 
the difference in your employment and deployment, whether the Fleet 
is in or out? 

General Short. There would be none, as far as our own guns were 
concerned, but if you bring in a lot of ships there with a great deal 
of antiaircraft on them, then if you were going to be a coordinated 
whole, it might affect your dispositions quite a little bit ; but as I say, 
our coordination hadn't gotten to the point where that we were plan- 
ning a control of [3671 antiaircraft fire of the guns that were 
actually — of the ships that were actually anchored in the harbor. 

88. General Frank. So far as your mobile antiaircraft artillery was 
concerned, it would go 

General Short. We made no changes. We were deployed so as to 
protect that basin, and the fact that there would be some additional 
antiaircraft fire from ships in there did not cause us to change any 

89. General Frank. When the Fleet was in ? 

General Short. — because we thought that the battle danger was 
greater with them in there, and it was also more dangerous to the 
enemy, and that there was also the possibility of doing more damage 
when they were in there, so it was better to have a greater volume of 
fire right there. 

I do not know whether that answers your question, or not. 

90. General Frank. And the employment of your aircraft was the 
same, or different? 

General Short. It was the same. 

91. General Frank. In both cases? 

General Short. Yes, except that we would just add that much more 
antiaircraft from the ships that were actually there. -They were, 
however, not controlled by us. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 197 

92. General Grunert. Under this Joint Coastal Frontier Defense 
Plan, wasn't the Army charged with providing antiaircraft intelli- 
gence warning services, and the protection of landing fields and naval 
installations? 

Geenral Short. That is correct. 

93. General Grunert. Also with the establishment of an inshore 
aerial patrol of the Oahu defensive coastal area, in [368] co- 
operation with the Naval inshore patrol and the antiaircraft warning 
service for the Hawaiian Islands ? 

General Short. The only possible value of the inshore patrol, which 
extended not beyond 20 miles, was for picking up submarines. Any 
information on air that you got from a patrol at not more than 20 
miles out would be worth so little that you might as well not have it. 

94. General Grunert. But you were charged with 

General Short. We were charged with that, and as I say, it was 
of value chiefly as to submarines, and I might add, there, also, that 
while 20 miles was the limit on the thing, that most of the time our 
patrols were limited to 10 milesc on account of having single-engine 
planes, and the Air felt that in peacetime they shouldn't take unneces- 
sary risks in flying over the water. 

. 95. General Grunert. We will come back again to this question of 
reconnaissance and inshore patrol, a little later. Are there any other 
questions ? If not, I will go to the next subject. 

It appears that on the 24th of January, 1941, the Secretary of the 
Navy wrote a letter to the Secretary of War, and he in his reply 
stated in effect that all the materiel for the antiaircraft or the air 
warning service would be there in Hawaii not later than June, 1941. 
This is the Secretary of War's reply of February 7, which, in para- 
graph 6, states: 

I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding Gen- 
eral of the Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the 
local naval anthorities in making these measures effective. 

[369] Do you recall that? 

General Short. I recall that, very well, and we kept after it, try- 
ing to get — if you remember, this morning I read you a wire I sent, 
in June — I think, June 10 — in which I told him that all this ma- 
teriel was held up, and that, largely on account of the priority prop- 
osition, and trying to get the priority changed to 1-B. They ad- 
vanced it to 1-C, but they never did advance it to 1-B. 

96. General Grunert. That letter from the Secretary of the Navy 
to the Secretary of War states in part as follows : 

The dangers envisaged, in their order of importance and probability, are 
considered to be (1) air bombing attack, (2) air-torpedo-plane attack, (3) sabo- 
tage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire. Defense 
against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have been provided 
for satisfactorily. 

What definite action was taken, as to taking effective measures? 
What dispositions were made, or plans revised, exercises held, or 
cooperation with the Navy, to look after those particular points which 
the Secretary of War had sent out and ordered or directed that 
action be taken ? What was done f oUownig that ? 

General Short. In the first place, we kept hammering on that to 
get the weapons that had been allotted. For instance, we had 140 
or 145 37-mm. guns we were supposed to get, but we never did get but 



198 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

20, before December 7. "We were supposed to get some more 90-mm. 
guns : we never got them. Now, that is on the question of equipment 
sought. We were also trying to get personnel, so we would not have 
to have dual assignments. [370] Every Coast Artillery out- 
fit practically had to use the same man to man the harbor defenses 
and antiaircraft. If you had an attack of both kinds at the same 
time, you couldn't possibly specify both means. 

Now, on the question of using what we had — we had a minimum. 
From March 21, on, we had a minimum of one exercise a week be- 
tween the Air of the Army and the Air of the Navy, and worked very 
hard at the question of coordination; and I think we learned a lot. 

97. General Grunert. What measures would you say bore directly 
on these points made, particularly in preparation to combat an air 
attack ? 

General Short. First of all trying to get the equipment and per- 
sonnel. 

98. General Grunert. Equipment for what? 
General Short. For the antiaircraft. 

99. General Grunert. Antiaircraft? What else? 

General Short. Equipment and personnel, they were. It was the 
aircraft and antiaircraft chiefly. We tried to get more pursuit planes. 
We tried to get more long-range bomber planes, so that we could give 
them assistance in the distant reconnaissance, and then we worked 
with them, as I say, at least once a week, learning how to work to- 
gether. 

100. General Grunert. Then the air warning service loomed 
largely ? 

General Short. I believe the General and I considered it the most 
important single project we had. 

101. General Grunert. Then the interceptor command, which in- 
cluded the air warning service and the handling of the anti- [371] 
aircraft ? 

General Short. I might say that that question of interceptor com- 
mand was a brand-new thing in the States. I think it was early fall 
before they went to that command in the States, and they had a school, 
and we sent two air people. General Davidson and another air officer, 
Colonel Powell, of the Signal Corps, and one of his officers, back, 
so as to try to institute the very latest thing out in intercepter com- 
mand, because the idea was completely new. They ordered, first, two 
officers over there, and we wired and asked if we couldn't increase it 
to four so we would get the benefit of several points of view. 

102. General Grunert. All right, we will develop that subject a 
little more, later. We will come first to the Joint Air Operations 
Agreement, of March 21, which is one I understand was in effect on 
December 7. Under that agreement was the Army charged with the 
tactical command of the defense of air operations over and in the im- 
mediate vicinity of Oahu ? 

General Short. They were. 

103. General Grunert. Was that agreement well understood by 
both the Army and the Navy ? 

General Short. Fully understood. It was maneuvered quite con- 
stantly. 

104. General Grunert. I want to refer to one of the things brought 
out by your statement this morning — control of Army and Navy 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 199 

planes over the sea and over the land. As I understood it, when they 
functioned over the sea, the Navy controlled, and when they func- 
tioned over the land, the land defense generally controlled? 

[37£] General Short. I wouldn't say exactly that if they func- 
tioned over water in the immediate vicinity of Oahu, then the Army 
controlled ; it was a question of whether you were sending out to some 
distance to attack an enemy fleet; then it was definitely Navy. If 
the enemy's planes were coming in attacking Honolulu, our pursuit 
might chase them 20 or 25 miles out there, but they would still be 
under Army command. 

105. General Grunert. What I am interested in is if you turned 
them over to the Navy for attack outside, and then the force keeps 
coming in, during that transition period, are they then turned back 
to the Army for the main defense? 

General Short. Well, if you visualize it, there would probably be 
a period there when it would be pretty hard to say who was control- 
ling. As I see the thing, what you have suggested would only take 
place if the enemy licked the air forces sent out, and chased them 
back in; and when the enemy followed them in there, naturally, 
everything that the Army had would strike the enemy, and if there 
was anything left of the pursuit planes that were being chased by 
the enemy, I suppose sooner or later, in a reasonably short time, they 
would get under control of the Army; but there would be a period 
there where you probably would hardly know who was controlling a 
particular squadron, if they were being chased. 

106. General Grunert. That would seem to indicate to me that the 
joint command would probably have solved the question better than 
command by cooperation? 

General Short. You mean unity of command ? 

107. General Grunert. Unity of command. 
General Short. Undoubtedly. 

[S73] 108. General Grunert. Was there anything in that joint 
agreement, the Joint Air Operations Agreement, that provided who 
would track planes from the time they attacked and left the land 
defense and went back to their carriers? Whose job was that? 

General Short. That was the Navy's job. Now, I don't know 
whether the joint plan specifically w^ords that, but it was thoroughly 
understood that it was the Navy's job ; and, right during the attack, 
General Martin called up and talked with Admiral Bellinger twice, 
and asked for a specific mission for tracking, which way he wanted 
him to go; and when he didn't get it, he at 11 : 27 sent planes out on 
his own mission, because he had not been assigned a mission, and he 
had something they could use. 

109. General Grunert. In that Joint Air Agreement, what was 
the agreement about the reconnaissance? 

General Short. The Navy were definitely responsible for distant 
reconnaissance. 

110. General Grunert. What did you understand "distant recon- 
naissance" to mean? 

General Short. Anything beyond the 20-mile zone. 

111. General Grunert. And what means did the Navy have for 
such distant reconnaissance, if the Navy should have happened to be 
out? 



200 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. There was a certain number of planes, squadrons 
that were assigned, that were not supposed to go out with the Fleet. 
Of course, that probably would be changed, as the Fleet had differ- 
ent missions, but we had talked over that a good deal, and they were 
trying, I think, to arrive at enough planes that they could always 
leave a certain number of [374-] squadrons under the com- 
mand of the 14th Naval District. 

112. General Grunert. If you were not satisfied with the Navy 
distant reconnaissance, did you feel that it was your responsibility 
to do any such distant reconnaissance if it threatened your defense? 

General Short. I had only six planes that I could have used for 
distant reconnaissance solely. 

113. General Grunert. If you had had ample planes, would you 
have considered it your responsibility ? 

General Short. If I had had ample planes and felt that the Navy 
were not doing the job, undoubtedly I would have talked it over with 
them, and if they had refused to do the job under those conditions, I 
would have asked the War Department to abrogate the agreement, 
and go ahead and do it. We had made a very comprehensive study, 
because we visualized the Navy's being away to such an extent that 
we would have to take over the reconnaissance, and you probably 
have seen that study where we arrived at the conclusion we needed 
180 Flying Fortresses, and it was a rather well done, rather scientific 
study, I thought, and the air people put a lot of thought on it. 

114. General Grunert. Did your so-called "close-in" reconnais- 
sance mean to you the inshore patrol ? 

General Short. That is what it would amount to; yes. We had a 
reconnaissance outfit at Bellows Field, and we put in a certain num- 
ber of hours every day, training on reconnaissance; and they prima- 
rily did that. 

115. General Grunert. What value was the inshore patrol to the 
Army as a defensive measure ? 

General Short. None, except for submarines that might [376] 
come to the surface and shell some installation. 

116. General Grunert. Did you know whether or not the Navy 
conducted its distant reconnaissance regularly, or spasmodically, or 
what? 

General Short. I knew that they had these task forces out all the 
time, with carriers, and that as part of the task force exercise, they 
always sent the planes approximately 300 miles each way. I knew 
that they did a certain amount of patrolling from Midway and Wake 
and Johnston Island, and I didn't know specifically — I don't know 
that it was the same thing every day. I don't know what the varia- 
tion was. I knew that they were doing that kind of work constantly. 

117. General Grunert. Then you did not know whether the 360 
degrees of the compass were covered that way ? 

General Short. I knew it couldn't be covered. 

118. General Grunert. Could not be ? 

General Short. Could not be. Nobody had the navy force to cover 
it ; it was impossible. 

119. General Grunert. Then did you in the absence of information 
of any danger consider it necessary to assure yourself the Navy was 
giving the 360-degree coverage ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 201 

General Short. They couldn't. I was confident that they didn't 
have enough to do it. That was one reason we put in theat study on 
the question of how many B-l7's it would take to do the job, and that 
careful study made it perfectly plain that the combined Army and 
Navy didn't have anything like enough. 

120. General Grtinert. Then fror your understanding, the Navy 
did not have enough to do its full job of distant reconnaissance, and 
you did not have enough to do anything on your own ? 

[376] General Short. That is correct. I had enough to assist 
them some, if they asked for it. 

[377] 121. General Grunert. Outside of your knowing 
whether a task force was out or not, did the Navy keep you informed 
as to what distant reconnaissance they were making ? 

General Short. Not specifically. I knew they were making recon- 
naissance from Midway and Wake and Johnston, but I did not know 
exactly just when it was and what it consisted of. I knew they were 
making some all the time with their task forces. 

122. General Frank. In the message of November 27, that War 
Department message signed "Marshall", you were directed to con- 
duct such reconnaissance as you deemed necessary ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

123. General Frank. Did you show that message to the naval 
commander ? 

General Short. I am quite sure I did ; yes. 

124. General Frank. Since, from the point of view of protection 
against air attack, close-in reconnaissance was ineffective without 
distnat reconnaissance 

General Short (interposing). Ineffective in any case, I would say. 
It would be in just a few minutes from the time you discovered it. 

125. General Frank, (continuing). — did not this order for you 
to conduct reconnaissance convey some sort of an obligation to the 
naval commander? 

General Short. I will tell you what it conveyed to me, and that is 
that when that message was written whoever wrote it did not take 
into consideration or overlooked our definite agreement that the Navy 
was responsible for long-distance reconnaissance. It did not take 
that into consideration and did not take into consideration the fact 
that we had only six planes [378] that could do long-distance 
reconnaissance. So, no matter what I had tried to do would be ap- 
parently ineffectual. The only thing we could do was to count on tne 
Navy, because they had practically everything there was to do it with. 

126. General Frank. At this time the order had gone out; the fat 
was in the fire. Was there no reaction on the part of the naval com- 
mander to consider that he had some sort of an obligation to conduct 
some distant reconnaissance ? 

General Short. He got a message, I think, about the same time, 
that I am sure made him tighten up a little more, and he had three 
task forces out where he ordinarily had two ; and I believe that they 
considered their task force was the best possible reconnaissance, be- 
cause of the way that they fanned out with practically a 600-mile 
front for the task force. 

127. General Frank. Here was this agreement for cooperative ac- 
tion. On whose shoulders was the responsibility to determine whether 
or not distant air reconnaissance should be carried out? 



202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. I would say it would be definitely on the Navy. 

128. General Frank. Here was a situation in which an order went 
out from one of the two major national defense departments of the 
government, which ordered reconnaissance on the part of one which 
was the responsibility of the other, and that spirit of cooperation 
just did not take, did it? 

General Short. No ; I do not believe that is a correct way of putting 
it. I believe, frainkly, that the man who wrote the wire just did 
not realize when he wrote it that the Navy were the responsible parties. 
He wrote it without any consideration of that or without any consid- 
eration of what we had to do the job with. The order could not be 
carried out. You could not [379] carry on any distant recon- 
naissance worthy of the name with six planes. 

129. General Frank. But the Navy had some P. B. Y. boats ? 
General Short. It had lots of them. But I do not believe it was the 

intention of the War Department that we abrogate that agreement 
with the Navy ; and as long as the agreement was not abrogated, then 
the responsibility for doing it was definitely on them. 

130. General Grunekt. Did not that message charge you with 
informing the Admiral of the Fleet of that message ? 

General Short. I furnished him a copy of the message. 

131. General Grunert. At that time, did you make inquiries as to 
what reconnaissance was going to be made ? 

General Short. As I say, I talked things over with him that day 
and for several days, as to what task groups they were sending out 
for reconnaissance between those islands, but I did not pin him down 
and say, "Are you going to send a plane every hour? What is it going 
to search? How many degrees? How are you going to do your mis- 
sion ?" I did not ask him that. 

132. General Grunert. For comparative purposes, in the Philip- 
pines we also had an agreement with the Navy for distant recon- 
naissance, and the two operations men got together and charted the en- 
tire section around Luzon, 360 degrees. They figured just how these 
long-range Navy planes would cover certain arcs, and what the Army 
planes would cover. It was practically identical with the Hawaiian 
situation. But you had no such arrangement, as far as Hawaii was 
concerned, for covering the entire perimeter in arcs? 

General Short. Did you have an arrangement there whereby the 
Army planes were definitely under the command of the Navy 
[380] and the Navy assumed full responsibility ? 

133. General Grunert. We did not. 

General Short. That seems to me to be the difference. They assumed 
a definite responsibility, and we passed the command of our recon- 
naissance planes whenever they called for it. We went definitely 
under their command, so that the planning of the sectors and what each 
squadron would search, and everything of that kind, was distinctly a 
naval job, and they had such a preponderance of power for the recon- 
naissance that it would not have looked very well for us to try to 
prescribe the reconnaissance when we had only a handful of planes. 

134. General Grunert. In your message of November 27, you say, 
"Laiason with the Navy." Just what did you mean by that? How 
did that cover anything required by that particular message ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 203 

General Short. To my mind it meant very definitely keeping in 
touch with the Navy, knowing what information they had and what 
they were doing. 

135. General Grunert. Did it indicate in any way that you expected 
the Navy to carry out its part of that agreement for long-distance 
reconnaissance ? 

General Short. Yes. Without any question, whether I had sent 
that or not, it would have affected it, because they had signed a definite 
agreement which was approved by the Navy as well as our Chief of 
Staff. 

136. General Frank. Some time back in the testimony you stated 
that General Martin was in contact with Admiral Bellinger of the 
Naval Operations OfSce. 

General Short. No; he was Commander of Patwing 2. 

137. General Frank. I meant, naval air operations. You were 
asking if they had any information on the location of these [381^ 
carriers ? 

General Short. Yes. 

138. General Frank. And the Roberts report indicates that at 10 : 30 
a. m. they did have information on the location of those carriers, that 
they had a bearing of some 357 degrees, or the reciprocal thereof, which 
is 178? 

General Short. I think 178 was where they thought they were. 
But, as a matter of fact, Martin sent his planes to search, as I remem- 
ber, from 165 to 190 or 195, something like that. 

139. General Frank. With the Navy having search planes and the 
Army having at least two 

General Short (interposing). We had more than that. We had 
six that took off on November 27th. 

[Copy] 

3141 Southwestern Boulevard, 

Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 19U. 

Subject: Corrections in testimony. 

To : President, Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the 
Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

******* 

Page 381, line 14, change "Nov. 27" to "Dec. 7". 
******* 

/s/ Walter O. Short 
Waltek C. Short, 
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired. 

140. General Frank. The perimeter of the 360 degrees was certainly 
reduced two points. That information was available; was that-givsn 
by the Navy to the Army? 

General Short. Before Martin sent the planes out, as I understand 
it, he had talked with Bellinger twice, but Bellinger apparently did 
not have enough information to give him a definite mission. He got 
some information from the Interceptor Command as to the direction 
that those planes had taken when they left. They may have changed 
their direction ten miles out. I think that caused him to take the 



204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

direction he did. I know one thing: There had been a report that 
there was a Japanese carrier some 40 or 50 miles off Barbers Point, 
and he sent out to investigate that at the same time. It was south- 
west of Barbers Point. It turned out not to be of any value. Later, 
after that mission was finished, there was apparently some little con- 
fusion. General Martin, I think, had the im- [382] pression 
that they did not operate under the Navy until along about 2 o'clock. 
I do not know when it was, because the thing did not come up until 
it was too late for me to dig clear down into the files and verify which 
statement was correct. 

141. General Kussell. We have talked about prior-to-attack recon- * 
naissance and a lot about pursuit after attack. General Grunert was 
discussing with you the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, where 
apparentl}'^ the relations between the Army and Navy touching all 
these questions of reconnaissance and defense were set up and worked 
out? Is that correct? 

General Short. That is correct. 

142. General Russell. There is a statement in the official report 
of the Roberts Commission which is not entirely clear to me, in para- 
graph 5 of that report, and I will read the sentence. 

(Excerpt from Roberts Commission report:) 
This Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan 

I assume they are referring to this document (indicating) — 

was intended to become operative upon order of the War and Navy Departments 
or as agreed upon by the local commanders in the case of an emergency, a threat 
of hostile action, or the occurrence of war. 

The plan itself says that this agreement shall take effect at once and 
will remain effective until notice in writing by either party of their 
renunciation in whole or in part. 

My question is this : Was the Coastal Frontier Defense Plan effec- 
tive from the date that you and Admiral Bloch signed it? Was it 
effective from then on, or did something have to happen thereafter to 
make it effective? 

General Short. As a matter of fact, we put it into effect for training 
purposes right away, and forwarded it to Washington [383] 
for approval, and it was approved. I think that the distinction was 
that in normal peace times, when there was no danger whatever, these 
things would not all be done, but we might agree any time during 
that period that we would go into a state of maneuver, and then they 
would all be done. If an emergency turned up they went into effect 
automatically. 

143. General Grunert. Who determined the emergency? 
General Short. Just like December 7 — there was no argument that 

the emergency was there — 

144. General Russell. I want to follow this thought, because I feel 
it was material in determining what was going on out there. Let us 
deal with prior hostile actions. There had been no attack. We had 
been discussing this question of reconnaissance, and you knew about 
naval reconnaissance at that time. Was it your impression, or not, 
General Short, that reconnaissance was constant from the day you 
reached Hawaii on February 7, 1941, until the attack on December 7, 
1941? 



PROCEEDIl^irGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 205 

General Short. I think that there was a very considerable amount 
of reconnaissance from February 7th, because they had been to a cer- 
tain extent in a state of excitement out there for about two years. The 
Navy particularly had had an awful lot of warnings, and they were 
conducting their task force so as to give them training and reconnais- 
sance all the time, and then when November 27 came along, Kimmel, 
as I understand it, tightened up his reconnaissance a very great deal. 

145. General Russell. We would like to get some facts, because we 
have not gotten any, so far, in this connection on this reconnaissance 
by the Navy. Did your predecessor, who was General Herron, out 
there, discuss with, you what reconnaissance was being carried on by 
the Navy when you arrived there? 

[384-] General Short. I do not remember that he did. 

146. General Russell. Did he or not tell you that he had been 
making efforts for almost a year to determine what they were doing 
and had never found out? 

General Short. He did not. 

147. General Russell. From the time you went in there on February 
7 down to December 7 you made no investigation to determine defi- 
nitely who was out, as a matter of routine, did you ? 

General Short. I did not ask for any formal reports. As I say, I 
knew almost constantly what the Navy did have out. 

148. General Russell. You did? 

General Short. I knew almost constantly what they had out, be- 
cause I saw Admiral Kimmel frequently. In fact, our relations were 
such that he always talked over what he did have out. 

149. General Russell. What did he tell you with respect to your 
last conference with him, when reconnaissance was discussed, before 
December 7th, as to what he had out? 

General Short. He told me what task force he was sending out. 
We looked on task forces as the best means of reconnaissance. 

150. General Russell. So far as you know, then, prior to December 
7, 1941, the only reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy was with 
the task forces that were out ? 

General Short. No. I knew they were sending planes out from 
Midway and Wake and Johnston all the time. I didn't know exactly 
what hours they were sending them out, but I knew they were making 
reconnaissance. 

151. General Russell. Is this an accurate statement, then, that you 
did not know whether or not any distant reconnaissance [385] 
was being conducted from Oahu ? 

General Short. I would say that I knew that there was very little 
if any, because it was not an economical way to conduct it, with task 
force out on the island bases. When you consider the number of 
planes they had I do not think they were sending them a thousand 
miles and back. 

152. General Russell. Your definite impression was that the only 
distant reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy under this agree- 
ment was that reconnaissance which was being conducted by task forces 
when they went out ? 

General Short. And from Midway, Johnston and Wake, and to a 
lesser extent, probably, from Panama. 

153. General Russell. But none was going out from Oahu? 



206 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. No ; I don't think so, because it would have been a 
big waste of planes. 

154. General Grunert, How much of the 360 degrees did those 
reconnaissance planes cover? 

General Short. My opinion would be a little over 180. 

155. General Grunert. And the task forces covered what? 
General Short. I meant the task forces and the islands together. 

I could not say. .Possibly Admiral Kimmel can tell you definitely. 
I do not think there was much reconnaissance east of Midway or 
Christmas. I may be wrong, but it was my impression that that was 
true. 

156. General Frank. What about north of the Hawaiian group? 
General Short. From Midway they went straight north. I do not 

think they went much east. 

157. General Russell. In this November 27th conference did you 
know what task forces were out that clay? 

General Short. Yes. 

[386] 158. General Russell. Definitely? 

General Short. Yes ; I knew what were out, and I got permission to 
send an officer with one force that was going out. 

159. General Russell. Did you consider the task forces that were 
out or that were about to be sent out were adequate for the purpose? 

General Short. It was almost all the Navy had except battleships. 
It was all the cruisers and most of the destroyers and all the carriers. 
So, whether it was adequate or not, it was all. 

160. General Russell. Let me come back to this sentence that I read 
to you first, because I don't think there is information on this particu- 
lar subject in the record, about when this was to become effective ; that 
is, when this Coastal Frontier Defense was to become effective. 

General Short. When we signed the agreement it was tentatively 
effective. Of course, it had to be approved by the Chief of Staff and 
the Chief of Naval Operations, and we started carrying it out right 
away. 

161. General Grunert. The operation become effective according to 
the terms of it. When approved, it made the plan effective. But the 
provisions of operating the long-distance reconnaissance provided 
therein did not become effective except during an emergency? 

General Short. That is correct. 

162. General Grunert. Who declared the emergency prior to when 
hostilities opened ? When did it become effective ? 

General Short. As I say, it is my opinion, and I think you can 
verify the details by Admiral Kimmel, that probably for [S87] 
almost two years 

163. General Grunert (interposing). It had been in effect? 
General Short. As far as reconnaissance went, it has been in effect, 

because for a year before I got out there the Navy had been very 
keenly alive to the situation. I think that reconnaissance was about 
as effective as they thought they could make it for almost the whole 
of two years. 

164. General Russell. I want to ask you one or two questions. 
You talked about when this plan became effective and that they were 
constantly conducting reconnaissance out there. Is it true or not 
that you were ordered into an alert prior to the alert of November 27, 
or did you go into an all-out alert prior to that? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 207 

General Short. We had it along in May as a matter of training. 

165. General Russell. But that was not an order from higher 
authority ? 

General Short. No. We had never received an order from higher 
authority with reference to it, but there was no confusion of any kind 
as a result of having it. We had, I think, about 12 days of it at that 
time. 

166. General Grunert. This joint air operations agreement was an 
agreement under the Joint Defense Plan ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

167. General Grunert. It appears that there is an addendum No. I 
to the Joint Air Operations Agreement which is a joint estimate of 
the air action necessary, dated the 31st of March, 1941, and signed by 
General Martin and Admiral Bellinger. Were you informed of its 
provisions, particularly as to the estimated possible enemy action and 
the probability of a surprise [rSSS] dawn air attack? 

General Short. I undoubtedly went over all the details of that 
with General Martin before he and Admiral Bellinger read the 
agreement. 

168. General Grunert. In paragraph III of that addendum it says: 
(Paragraph III of Addendum No. 1 to the Joint Air Operations 

Agreement is as follows:) 

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by: 

1. A surprise submarine attacl? on stiips in the operating area. 

2. A surprise attack on Oaliu including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor. 

3. A combination of these two. 

Paragraph IV says, in part : 

(Excerpt from paragraph IV of Addendum No. 1 to the Joint Air 
Operations Agreement is as follows:) 

(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to 
reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. 

Again, it comes back to reconnaissance. You consider that they 
did make such reconnaissance as the means allowed ? 

General Short. As far as possible I think they were employing all 
of their force. 

169. General Grunert. You were fully aware, then, of the possible 
surprise air attack? 

General Short. Oh, yes. 

170. General Grunert. As to paragraph (4) of Section IV of that 
addendum, it reads in part as follows : 

(Excerpt from paragraph (4) of section IV of addendum No. 1 is 
as follows:) 

None of the above actions can be initiated by our [389] forces until 
an attack is known to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand, when 
an attack develops, time will probably be vital and our actions must start with 
a minimum of delay. It therefore appears that task forces should be organized 
now, missions assigned, conditions of readiness defined and detailed plans 
prepared so that coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all 
elements when one of the visualized emergencies arises. 

Did not the repeated warnings from the War Department and 
Navy Department indicate to you a like probability of the imminence 
of an attack under which you should have complied with paragraph 
(4) of Section IV of the addendum? 



208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. We had gone ahead and maneuvered, and we had 
it to where it was automatic in case anything happened. The man 
in charge of bombers reported. There was no order necessary. He 
just reported. 

171. General Grunert. Then, what I gather from you is that all 
the plans were laid had the judgment been that such an attack was 
imminent? 

General Short. Definitely. 

172. General Grunert. As to Addendum II of that same Joint 
Air Agreement which decribes the various states of readiness of planes, 
why, under the circumstances, with reference to Material Readiness 
E, which meant that aircraft would conduct routine operations for 
the purposes of this plan, were not the time and the hours prescribed? 

General Short. Because we believed that the possibility of an air 
attack was remote, and apparently the Chief of Staff definitely be- 
lieved the same thing in his testimony before the [390] Roberts 
Commission, and we felt that we required all possible time for train- 
ing in the Air Corps, because we had to prepare these teams for 
ferrying to the Philippines, Just as soon as we got a trained unit 
we lost it by transferring it to the Philippines. 

General Grunert. Have the members of the Board any other 
questions on that phase ? 

173. General Frank. We return again to the point that you placed 
your abiding confidence in the belief that the Navy would give you 
warning of an attack ? 

General Short. Definitely. 

174. General Frank. And as it worked out it would seem that your 
complete confidence in the Navy was optimistic? 

General Short. That is true. 

175. General Grunert. How did you size up conditions generally 
on the Island of Oahu from the time you took command until early 
in November when these things started to develop ? By that I mean, 
the nature of the population, conditions as to internal trouble, con- 
ditions as to probable sabotage. Give us a picture of that which de- 
veloped in your mind during that time. 

General Short. It looked to me like with 37 per cent of the popula- 
tion Japanese or American-Japanese, 160,000, sabotage at least would 
be a very serious thing; that in case of war with Japan, if we were 
not alert to the extreme, we might have very serious things happen 
in our air and harbor defenses, particularly, and that if it got out 
of hand there was even a possibility of an uprising. I did not look 
on that as sure, but if we let it get out of hand there was a possibility. 
We devoted a great deal of energy to that ; and I believe that had been 
true for years out there. 

[39 J] 176. General Grunert. Did you inherit this feeling, or 
did it develop in your own mind as a result of your experience? 

General Short. I am sure that my predecessor had the same feeling, 
and I take it that officers who had been there even earlier had the 
same feeling. 

177. General Grunert. Did subsequent events show your fears were 
groundless ? 

General Short. It is hard to say, because we kept such a close line on 
it that it never had a chance to develop. What would have developed 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 209 

if we had been careless about that side of the question, nobody knows. 

178. General Grunert. Can you give us the line-up on that, as to 
what we might call personalities, in so far as you see fit ? In the civil 
government was there any friction, any disagreement, any strong or 
weak characters that carried others with them one way or the other, 
or were there any such problems as that? 

General Short. We had no friction at all. Admiral Kimmel and 
Admiral Bloch and I were on extremely friendly terms. I believe 
Bellinger and Martin worked very closely together. They were the 
two that probably would have more to do with carrying out the agree- 
ment than anybody else. I do not think there was anything like that 
at all. 

179. General Grunert. What about the governor and the F. B. I. ? 
General Short. Just as an example, we thought we would be in a 

much better local status if we had the governor write us a letter re- 
questing us to take over the guarding of all the roads, bridges, and so 
forth. He did so without any hesitation at all, and it put us in a better 
local status. As to the mayor, when we put the proposition up to him 
that there were a number of [39>2~\ roads along the seacoast 
which, if an emergency arose, we would have to close, he had an 
ordnance passed so that we had authority to close them whenever we 
deemed it was necessary for defense. As to the F. B. I., we were on 
very friendly terms. There was no friction anywhere between my 
headquarters and the Navy or the civilian officials. 

180. General Grunert. So far as I can judge from your testimony, 
there were no particular obstacles placed in the way of defense by any 
particular persons or officials? 

General Short. On the contrary, they helped out a great deal. We 
worked with the Territorial Eoad Commission, so that if we did not 
have the money and we needed a military road, they would frequently 
kick through with the money and do the work for us. That shows 
how we operated. 

[393] 181. General Grunert. Now, during your regime there, 
were there any particular changes in missions or responsibilities from 
the time you took over up until you were relieved ? 

General Short. The biggest change was getting that coordination 
between the Army and Navy air, getting the responsibility for recon- 
naissance, and pinning the thing right down. 

182. General Grunert. That is what I am going into now, the ques- 
tion of cooperation, coordination between the Army and Navy and 
civil agencies. 

Will you describe the method of coordination that was employed in 
the Joint Coastal Defense Plan, what mutual cooperation existed 
between the Army and Navy prior to and on December 7th ? You have 
touched on that in a number of places. Is there anything you can 
amplify on that? 

General Short. Only, as I said, by people like Martin and Bellin- 
ger, who had to work together in case of emergency, working together, 
and we had these exercises a minimum of one a week, air exercises, 
where we had to work together, but having our coast — our harbor 
defense people have a man in the control post and work every day 
directly with the naval people there to know what boats were coming 
in, and to have them indicate whether they were targets, and every- 

79716—46 — Ex. 145, vol. 1 15 



210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

thing of that kind, and with the higher command I did most of that 
myself. "When I first got there my Chief of Staff at that time, Phil 
Hayes, was on most excellent terms with the Navy, and I never went 
for a conference without taking him along, because that he had been 
doing an awful lot of liaison work, that he was there until about the 
first of November; and after that I largely took [394] Major 
Fleming and the engineers with me, and I sometimes took General 
Martin and his Chief of Staff if there was an air proposition. 

183. General Grunert. Would it be feasible for you to give the 
Board, for inclusion in the record, a list of the conferences you had 
with Admirals Kimmel and Bloch, as to dates and general subjects, 
as far as you can remember, between November 25th and December 
7th? 

General Short. On November 27th I had a conference with them 
with reference to the question of reinforcing the garrisons of Wake 
and Midway with a squadron each of Army pursuit planes. On De- 
cember 1st I had a conference with them with reference to the relief — 
we had wires from Washington with reference to the relief of the 
marine garrisons by the Army. 

On December 2nd Admiral Bloch was not with us. Admiral Kimmel 
came to my quarters with a long letter he had prepared covering the 
whole subject, and I went over it carefully with him; and then on 
December the 3rd we met again, and I had my radiograms ready for 
the War Department, and he had his. That was the last formal con- 
ference, I believe, that we had; that was December 3rd; but we had 
our subordinates : Fleming and Colonel Phyphf f er had a conference 
on the 4th. 

Now, I don't think on the 5th or 6th that we had any direct confer- 
ence. My G-2 was in touch with O. N. I., I know, on those dates, but 
I think he was probably the only member of the staff. 

184. General Gruxert. That conference, the conference seemed to 
be more on the subject of what was to take place farther east. Now, 
as to both messages, one that the Navy received on the [o9o] 
27th and one you received on the 27th, were they a subject of a confer- 
ence ? 

General Short. Not of a formal conference. We exchanged mes- 
sages, undobutedly talked the thing over, but we didn't get together 
for a particular — each one knew what the — each one knew what 

185. General Grunert. Well, then, you refer to these conferences as 
formal conferences ? 

General Short. Those other conferences were where we had some 
particular subject we had to make a report to Washington on; we 
each one knew what the other fellow was doing in regard to those 
messages. 

186. General Grunert. You had made a report on the November 
27th message, to Washington. 

General Short. Of just what I was doing, and I did that before I 
saw Admiral Kimmel, because I did that within thirty minutes after 
the message came in. 

187. General Grunert. Did you discuss with the Navy whether they 
considered your Army Alert No. 1 was sufficient ? 

General Short. I didn't ask them whether they considered it. I 
told them that is what we were on. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 211 

188. General Grunert. Did they know what the Army Alert No. 1 
was? 

General Short. They had ten copies that were furnished to them 
on November 5th. 

189. General Grunert. Well, you and I know that when you get a 
big document, unless the subordinates dig out those things and say, 
"These are the important things," why, the high command has not 
the time to carefully peruse the document. 

[396] General Short. I think the operations officer of the 14th 
Naval District did dig into it and knew what it meant. 

190. General Grunert. The operations officer of the 14th Naval 
District? 

General Short. 14th Naval District. I think so. I think that he 
knew what it meant. 

191. General Grunert. Yes. Then we get into the subject of 
alerts a little later on, but in connection with this cooperation : Do you 
know of any misunderstanding as to the Navy No. 1 Alert and your 
No. 1 Alert, as not considering them the same ? 

General Short. Well, I think the Navy, as far as alerts for sabotage 
went, that they hadn't been off of it in two years, hardly. They had a 
terrifically tight antisabotage guard in the Navy Yard. They went 
so far that they would not employ any man of Japanese blood. He 
might have been an American citizen for two generations, but they 
would not let him in the Navy Yard. They went to greater extremes 
than we did. 

192. General Grunert. It appears here from some evidence in the 
Roberts Commission report that Colonel Phillips, your Chief of Staff — 
he was Senior Army Member of the Local Joint Planning Committee 
since November 6th? 

General Short. That is right. 

193. General Grunert. He says that committee never met after com- 
munication of November 27. Had they been meeting periodically ? 

General Short. No. They met when there was something we 
thought a change 

194. General Grunert. Necessary? 

[397] General Short. A change necessary. The last, the most 
important thing out there where there had been a great many meet- 
ings, was when we made that agreement in regard to the joint de- 
fense of air. Now, I do not know how many meetings they had at 
that time. They had any number of meetings. But it was the kind 
of a board that only met when there was something to take up in the 
nature of a change. 

195. General Grunert. Nature of a change of existing plan, in- 
structions ? 

General Short. That is right. 

196. General Grunert. They did not meet when there was any- 
thing that might be in the offing ? 

General Short. No, sir. 

197. General Grunert. Then you took care of that yourself, and 
you were accompanied 

General Short. I very largely did the liaison work with the Navy 
myself. 

198. General Grunert. Did your aide accompany you ? 



212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. The aide would usually accompany me. He fre- 
quently wasn't in the conference, as I say, and as long as Hayes was 
my Chief of Staff, because of his experience of over two years with 
the Navy I took him with me always. 

199. General Grunert. That was about up to October ? 

General Short. The first of November, and there was about a 
month after he left, and I usually had after that Martin, maybe Mol- 
lison of the Air, and Fleming of the Engineers, who was may Assist- 
ant G-4, following a great many things the Navy were interested in. 

[398] 200. General Grunert. Now, Admiral Kimmel, in the 
Roberts report, is reported to have claimed that the Navy was not 
informed that this Sergeant Lockhart picked up the approaching 
planes, and that this prevented the Navy from trailing them. 

General Short. You mean ? 

201. General Grunert. What was the understanding as to how 
he should be informed, and so forth ? 

General Short. Well, as a matter of fact, the Army wasn't in on 
that. I think that is the case he is talking about where they picked 
them up at 7 : 20 that morning and notified Lieutenant Tyler, who 
was the control officer, and he thought it meant nothing but the planes 
coming in from San Francisco, and he didn't alert anybody. So the 
Navy were not alone in that. 

202. General Grunert. Admiral Kimmel also claims here in his 
testimony that the furnished the Army information as to ships in and 
out of the harbor and that this had been done for months. 

General Short. Well, as a matter of fact, I say, not 24 hours of 
the day, but we had this Lieutenant Colonel there, and he reported ; 
he made a report to G-3, so during the period of the day that he 
was there we had the report constantly, and in any maneuver period 
we had it for 24 hours of the day, but I do not believe that we got it 
except when we had a liaison officer there. It wasn't a liaison officei- 
exactly; we didn't call him "liaison." He was on duty with the harlMn- 
control post, and during the hours that he was on duty we hr.d ;i 
complete report. I do not think we had the complete report \lie 
other hours. I might be mistaken, but I don't believe so. 

203. General Frank. Would it have done you any good to have 
known how many ships were in there ? 

[399] General Short. No. It was only worth something in 
this way. General : that it was a thing that in time of war you would 
have — they would have to carefully observe every ship going in and 
out, and the harbor defense would have to know whether that was 
a ship that should be fired upon, and that was his job, was to sit right 
there with the Navy, and when a ship was spotted they indicated to 
him whether it was a friendly ship which should not be fired on or a 
ship that should be fired on, you see ; and if the harbor defense were 
having drills or exercises, he transmitted that immediately, and they 
went through simulated fire on any 

204. General Frank. But so far as any change in plans was con- 
cerned 

General Short. There was no change. 

205. General Frank. It made no difference? 

General Short. It was no change in plan. It was just simply a 
case that when there was an emergency you put three men in there 
and you had 24 hours a day in place of 8 hours a day. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 213 

206. General Grunert. Now, I am just trying to form a picture 
of the cooperation and the information which passed back and forth 
between the two commands, to see how that cooperation worked. Here 
are several questions I have along that line : 

In this testimony before the Roberts Commission Admiral Kimmel 
claimed that he was never informed of the measures taken by the 
Army after the messages of November 27. 

General Short. He was never probably given any formal notice. 
As I say, he and I talked together. I am sure he knew exactly what 
we were doing because we talked together there [4^0] hours 
that week. 

207. General Grunert. And Admiral Bloch states he did not know 
that radars were not working all the time, nor anything about inshore 
aerial patrol. 

General Short. Well, he may not have known, but they had a 
naval officer working with the Interceptor Command daily, and it was 
that naval officer's job to transmit the information, whenever it was 
working, to the Navy. So I am sure that somebody in the Navy 
knew. 

2'08. General Grunert. Here is one : that Admiral Bloch, although 
he talked to General Short many times after November 27th, was not 
informed that the Army was only alterted to prevent sabotage. He 
learned differently only after the attack, that Army Alert No. 1 was 
the lowest and did not correspond with the Navy Alert No. 1, which 
was the highest. 

General Short. He had ten copies. It was his operation officer 
that got ten copies of our Standing Operating Procedure on November 
5th. If any of his staff officers took the trouble to read them, he should 
have known exactly what Alert No. 1 was, or if he had asked me. 
It never occurred to me that they didn't understand our Alert No. 1, 
because we had furnished the copies with that specifically in view. 

2'09. General Grunert. Here is one that may touch on cooperation 
with civil authorities. It is stated here that Mr, Angus Taylor, 
United States District Attorney, wanted to prosecute some Jap agents 
for failure to register under the Alien Registration Act, but General 
Short was opposed to this without giving them a notice so to do, 
claiming it would react unfavorably to his plan of trying to make 
friends and create [401] good relations amongst them. 

Now, was that a question of cooperation or a question of judgment 
on one part or one side ? 

General Short. That was purely a question of judgment. The 
question came up. That law had been passed, as I remember, in 
'39, and nobody in Honolulu, in the Hawaiian Islands, paid any at- 
tention to it. The law required the registration of alien agents, and 
after it had been going along for two years and nobody paying any 
attention to it at all, probably not — well. Shivers, an F. B. I. man, 
said he doubted if more than 10 percent of the agents knew they 
were ever supposed to register. He agreed with me, took the point 
of view that the fairest thing to do — that we weren't wanting to 
create a lot of ill feeling, and if it ever came to a war we would 
have this Japanese population to handle; that we didn't want to 
create disloyalty. We wanted to create as much loyalty as we could, 
and I had no objection to their arresting every one of them, but 
I said they ought to give them a period of ten days, or whatever 



214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

they wanted to, to register before, and announce it definitely, so all 
that were not registered at the end of that period would be arrested 
for not complying with the law. 

The Navy and Taylor wanted to just go out and arrest them right 
now. Shivers and I thought it was not a desirable thing to do, 
and I radioed my opinion fully to the War Department, and the 
War Department agreed a hundred percent with my stand on the 
question. I wasn't making any objection to his arresting them, but 
as a matter of fair play and not to create a lot of disloyalty among 
the Japanese-Americans who might be loyal, we didn't want to make 
it appear that we were just trying to soak [40^] people who 
might not know it. 

210. General Grunert. In your testimony before the Koberts Com- 
mission I have two points on cooperation. 

211. General Frank. May I? I would like to ask a question on 
this thing. 

212. General Grunert. Go ahead. 

213. General Frank. Those Japs under consideration for arrest 
were nothing more or less than Japanese spies; isn't that correct? 

General Short. Some of them probably were. The chances are 
that most of them were not. I think it would be more nearly meet- 
ing the situation to say that they were largely propaganda agents. 
They had, they called them, consular agents scattered all over. 

214. General Frank. They called them what? 
General Short. Consular agents. 

215. General Frank. Oh, yes. 

General Short. And the reason I say they w^ere not to any large 
extent spies because the Japanesepaper there published a complete 
list of them, so it was no trouble to get the list of them. What they 
tried to do was to more or less control and influence the Japanese 
population, and undoubtedly some of them were spies, and some of 
them were perfectly innocent people that were just carrying out 
propaganda. 

216. General Frank. To control the Japs? 
General Short. Controlled by the Japanese consul. 

217. General Frank. They were trying to control them in what 
direction? 

General Short. Well, to keep them pro- Japanese, to bring [4^3] 
them up as Japanese rather than just plain Americans, I think. That 
would be my estimate of the situation. 

218. General Frank. That was an un-American activity, then, was 
it not? 

General Short. It was an un-American activity; there is no ques- 
tion about it. I had no objection to the arrest, but the way the thing 
had been conducted. I talked with Shivers. We had a complete list 
of them. He said probably not more than 10 percent knew they were 
violating the law. 

219. General Frank. And they had continued to undermine the 
American Government for quite a period of time; isn't that right? 

General Short. Probably had. 

220. General Frank. And we had condoned it? 

General Short. We had paid no attention to the law ; we had done 
nothing to enforce the law. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 215 

221. General Russell. I would like to ask a question or two on 
that. 

What evidence did you have against any specific consular agent 
that he was undermining the American Government? 

General Short. The F. B. I. kept a file on every one of those people, 
and the O. N. I. That was their job, and the way the things were 
delineated it was their job rather than the Army's in peace time. 

222. General Russell. Did they, either of those agencies, indicate 
to you the name of one or more of these agents who had been in that 
specific job? 

General Short. Oh, I know they had two lists: a list they called 
an A list that they thought were dangerous enough that [404^ 
in case of a war they should be confined at once, and we confined 
all of those. 

223. General Russell. General Short, maybe I can't ask my ques- 
tions correctly, but I am certainly not getting much of a specific 
answer. The thing I am attempting to show now is whether or not 
you were given evidence against specific people upon whom or against 
whom you could have brought prosecutions for un-American activities. 

General Short. Let me put it this way: that any one individual 
that I wanted to know about, the F. B. I. and my G-2, if he had been 
implicated in anything, would have a record of him and would give 
it to me. 

224. General Russell. And that record would indicate specific un- 
American acts? 

General Short. Whethei- — if he had been in un-American acts, 
yes. 

225. General Russell. And there were some who had been engaged 
in it, and you could have proved it ? 

General Short. In all probability. 

226. General Russell. Yes. Now, then, General Short, if you 
had a list of these people published in a paper, what was to be accom- 
plished by registration ? 

General Short. Well, it was a Federal law. There might have been 
a lot of agents that were not published in that list, don't you see. It 
was possible. 

227. General Russell. Yes. 

General Short. And there was a law making it an offense to be 
a foreign agent and not register, and it had been enforced I think 
in the Stat'es ; it had never been enforced out there. 

[405^ 228. General Grunert. What authority did you have to 
enforce it ? Wasn't that an F. B. I. matter ? 

General Short. That was F. B. I. 

229. General Grunert. That was a Federal matter? 

General Short. That was Department of Justice. Yes, it was just 
a question — the question came up I think probably — I don't know 
whether the Navy or the District Attorney brought it up, and I didn't 
think — I was afraid that the way they were going to do it that it would 
create a lot of disloyalty among the Japanese-American population 
and make it more difficult for us to handle the population. I had no 
objection to the arrest if they would make it perfectly plain to these 
people that they were supposed to register and if they didn't regis- 
ter by a certain date that they would arrest them all. 



216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

230. General Grunert. I have two more questions on this subject. 
We shall exhaust this subject and then we shall take a recess. If you 
have any more I think this subject of cooperation 

231. General Russell. I have two more. 

232. General Grunert. Well, I will finish up these two, and then 
we shall finish your question and then take a recess. 

In your testimony before the Roberts Commission there appears 
this expression : "The Navy was more secrecy minded." 
General Short. I think that is strictly true. 

233. General Grunert. Did that prevent them from giving you in- 
formation that you should have had ? 

General Short. Well, I do not think it would have prevented them 
from giving me information that they thought I should have. It 
might prevent them from giving me information [W^] that 
they thought was strictly of interest to the Navy and that they 
shouldn't give to anybody. Now, I think that they give much less 
to their staff than we do to ours. I think that is strictly true, that 
they have always held things more secret: the same thing would be 
more secret to them than to us. 

234. General Grunert. But you still had confidence that they would 
pass to you what they thought you ought to have ? 

General Short. If they thought it was anything of genuine interest 
to me, I do not think there is any question but what they would give 
it to me. 

235. General Grunert. The other one is this, to this effect: You 
stated that because of the restricted area of Pearl Harbor, whenever 
the fleet was in and naturally was huddled, that adequate protection 
from the air was almost impossible — complete protection, we will put 
it. Was this ever discussed with Admiral Kimmel or Bloch with 
a view to avoiding such huddling or making such a big target? 

General Short. No, it was not. Now, I discussed it at some length 
with Admiral Standley on the Roberts Commission. 

236. General Grunert. All right; go ahead with your question (ad- 
dressing General Russell ) . 

General Short. As a matter of fact, I think I remember Admiral 
Kimmel stating that any time that he thought there was any prob- 
ability of an air attack he wanted to get everything out of the har- 
bor. I think I remember his making that statement. You know the size 
of the harbor there, and I am quite sure that I remember his mak- 
ing that statement, that if at any time he was convinced there was 
danger of an air attack, that [407] he would want to move 
everything in the way of major ships out. 

237. General Grunert. All right. 

238. General Russell. General Short, you stated that you had very 
little time to read this Roberts report? 

General Short. That is right. 

239. General Russell. Have you read the testimony of your G-2, 
who I believe was named Fielder? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

240. General Russell. Did you read that ? 
General Short. Yes, sir. 

241. General Russell. Do you remember the statement in Colonel 
Fielder's testimony that prior to December 7th they never received 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 217 

any reports giving you information on Japanese activities at all, where 
the fleet was, and tilings of that sort? 

General Short. I haven't got the question now. That he never 
received ? 

242. General Kussell. Did you see where Colonel Fielder stated 
that they did not get this enemy information or Japanese information 
reports at all before December 7, 1941 ? 

General Short. Oh, you mean ship movements? Wasn't that 
what — was that what you meant ? 

General Kussell. Well, I recall it. 

General Short. I think that his statement was that we could not 
get from the Navy reports of movements of Japanese ships prior to 
December 7th, before December 7th, which I think is correct. 

244. General Russell. As I recall. Colonel Fielder's testimony was 
to the effect that this bureau in the Navy which corresponds to our 
G-2 never gave them anything before December 7th. 

[4i08] General Short. I am inclined to believe that if you will 
look that up carefully that it was just in reference to Japanese ships. 

245. General Russell. Well, I will look it up during the recess. 
General Short. Because they worked very closely as far as any 

individuals went. 

246. General Russell. Well, I am not talking about any residents. 
I am talking about the activity of the Japanese armed forces 
either 

General Short. Well, I think as far as the Japanese Fleet goes, that 
he made that statement, that that is correct. 

247. General Russell. And you never saw any reports as to the 
whereabouts of the Japanese ships ? 

General Short. All I got was by personal conversation with Ad- 
miral Kimmel and 

248. General Russell. And they did not send over reports? 
General Short. No, we did not get reports. 

249. General Russell. All right. 

General Short. But I got a great deal from personal conversation. 

250. General Russell. One other question on operations, the oper- 
ations end : Your alerts were ordered by the War Department ? 

General Short. No, sir, not necessarily. 

251. General Russell. Could have been? 
General Short. They could have been ordered. 

252. General Russell. Or you might have originated them? 
General Short. Yes. The War Department never did order any 

particular type of alert during my time. 

[iOO] 253. General Russell. But you had no jurisdiction at all 
over ordering the Navy to go on alert ? 

General Short. Oh, no, none whatever. 

254. General Russell. So you could be on your highest form of 
alert, and the Navy could be on no alert at all ? 

General Short. Just — yes. 

255. General Russell. That is all. 

256. General Frank. I would like to ask a couple of questions. 

In cooperation with the Navy was there a preponderance of getting 
along necessary on the part of the Army, or did you feel that the 
Navy was meeting you fully half way ? 



218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. I felt that they played the game pretty well. Really, 
I felt they played the game better than I had ever seen the Navy play 
the game. 

257. General Frank. You have stated heretofore that you felt a 
certain degree of security because of your confidence about the ef- 
fectiveness of naval protection. Do you now feel that you were over- 
confident about naval effectiveness? 

General Short. Apparently they did not have enough to give com- 
plete protection, and they w^ere giving protection in the sectors they 
thought most dangerous. 

258. General Frank. Do you now feel that you perhaps had mis- 
placed confidence in them ? 

General Short. I had too much confidence. 

259. General Frank. Another thing : Do you now feel that the Navy 
withheld from you certain information that they had available that 
would have been invaluable to you ? 

General Short. I don't believe that they purposely withheld any- 
thing from me that they thought really concerned me. 

[4^0] 260. General Frank. Don't you think that that informa- 
tion about the naval task force with carriers and submarines and 
battleships down in Jaluit would have vitally affected you ? 

General Short. Yes, possibly. 

261. General Grunert. Did the Navy understand your mission and 
your responsibility sufficient to be able to be a good judge of what 
should be passed to you or what shouldn't be passed to you ? 

General Short. Oh, I think they did, definitely. 

262. General Grunert. We shall take a ten-minute recess. We shall 
begin again directly after 4 : 15. 

(Thereupon there was a brief informal recess.) 

[^ii] 263. General Grunert. I have a question, here, on the 
so-called Plan for Air Defense of Oahu, submitted to the War De- 
partment on the 20th of August, 1941, by the Commanding General 
of the Hawaiian Air Forces, General Martin, through the Command- 
ing General of the Hawaiian Department. Did you know anything 
about that particular so-called "plan" of August 20 ? 

General Short. Was that the plan for the searching of the 360- 
degree sector? 

264. General Grunert. Right. 

General Short. Oh, yes. I went over that in very great 

265. General Grunert. Did you concur in that plan? 
General Short. I thought it was an excellent study. 

266. General Grunert. Now, we go into these various messages. 
Do you admit having received from the Commander in Chief of the 
Pacific Fleet a paraphrased dispatch on the 16th of October ? 

General Short. Yes, sir; that was the first message I read to you, 
today. 

267. General Grunert. That is the one which informed all con- 
cerned of "the existing grave situation," and which directed the Navy 
"to take due precautions" which would not "constitute provocative 
action against Japan." If so, what was your reaction thereto, and 
what precautions did you require of the Army, in view thereof ? 

General Short. We had had all the utilities guarded, all the 
bridges, and since we put out our guards on that account, in July, when 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 219 

they closed the banks, and when we got that I just simply cautioned 
people that were responsible for that guarding to be unusually careful. 
We didn't go into any additional alert. It wasn't a formal alert, 
but we had all of [U^] the utilities guarded, and we kept them 
guarded, since July. 

268. General Grunert. Then this "grave situation," what did you 
i nterpret that to be ? A grave situation ? 

General Short. You mean, in that ? 

269. General Grunert. In that particular message. 

General Short. Well, if you read that message as a whole and not 
any one line of it you will see that they felt sure that Japan was 
going to attack Russia, but they thought it was only a possibility they 
might attack the United States and Great Britain. Tliere was a 
strong possibility that they would attack Russia. It looked as if they 
thought something was going to happen, but they were not at all so 
sure we were going to be involved in the thing. 

270. General Grunert. That was your interpretation ? 

General Short. That was my interpretation, considering the mes- 
sage as a whole; and that they didn't want to do anything to arouse 
Japan and make our situation worse with them. 

271. General Grunert. Are there any questions ? 

272. General Russell. Yes; I want to follow up on that, on this 
one message ; that is all. 

General Short, the files in the Adjutant General's office indicate 
that the War Department did not agree with that Navy summary, 
and General Gerow recommended to the Chief of Staff that they send 
you another message in lieu of that one. The message recommended 
to be sent to you, by the War Department, was : 

Tension between United States and Japan remains strained but no (repeat No) 
abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent (end). 

[4^3] That is according to this Adjutant General's file. That 
order or that statement was sent to you under "No. 266", radiogram 
No. 266. Do you recall that ? 

General Short. What was the date of that ? 

273. General Russell. October 18. 
General Short. 18th? 

274. General Russell. Yes, sir. 

General Short. That was two days after this Navy business? 

275. General Russell. The War Department made a study. The 
War Plans Division made a study of this Navy message, and they 
disagreed with the situation? 

General Short. I do not remember that. Apparently this naval 
message must have made more of an impression on me that that, that 
I got, because I had this definitely in mind and dug it out; and if 
I got it — I suppose, if they sent it, I got that message — ^but, as I say, 
the Navy message was stronger and it had made more of an impression. 

276. General Russell. This is the message, and it is supposed to 
have been sent to you under "266," October 20. 

General Short. October 20? It may have been, but you notice it 
let up. It let up on things, and I naturally would not remember that 
as I would one that tightened up. 

277. General Russell. Are the records of these messages which 
came to you out there from the War Department now in the Hawaiian 
Department ? 



220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. That is where they would be. 

278. General Russell. Would they be available? 
General Short. They would be available. 

279. General Russell. Therefore, if you received this message 
14^4] 266, on October 20, saying that there was no change in 
Japanese foreign policy, it would be out there? 

General Short. It would be of record, out there; yes, sir; but I 
frankly do not happen to remember that. 

280. General Russell. You do not remember ? 
General Short. It may be because it was easing off. 

281. General Grunert. The next message I wish to refer to is the 
message from the Navy to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific 
Fleet, November 24, 1941, in which it is stated as an opinion that — 

A surprise, aggressive movement in any direction is possible. 

and in which it was directed not to — 

precipitate Jap action 

Was this information transmitted to you ? 

General Short. I do not think I ever got that message. 

282. General Russell. If you never got it, you cannot give us a 
reaction thereto ? 

General Short. No; I don't remember ever having seen that mes- 
sage. Now, it is an outside possibility. 

283. General Grunert. You omitted mention of that message in 
your statement, so presumably 

General Short. Now, I might have seen it, and we might not have 
had an official copy given to us, and I might have forgotten about 
it. Kimmel might have shown it to me and just handed it to me to 
look at, and taken it back, and I might not have remembered it ; I 
don't know, but I don't think I have ever seen it. 

284. General Russell. So far as you know, then, you didn't 
\4i^] take an}^ action on it^ 

General Short. No. 

285. General Russell. So far as the Army is concerned? 
General Short. No. 

286. General Frank. Had it been made of record in your head- 
quarters, would you have known about it? 

General Short. Oh, if it had come to my headquarters, I am sure 
I would have seen it. I might not have remembered it, but I know I 
would have seen it if it came there, because those messages were brought 
to me immediately. 

287. General Grunert. What was the procedure when the Navy 
over there received a message, and they transmitted information to 
you ? Did they give you a paraphrased copy of it ? Did they inform 
you by word of mouth, or is there a record of such messages as were 
transmitted to you in the headquarters of the Hawaiian Department ? 

General Short. Normally they would send me, by an officer, a 
paraphrased copy, and if I were in my office it would be delivered 
to me personally ; if not, it would be delivered to the Chief of Staff. 
Now, if it was something that Kimmel thought he ought to discuss with 
me immediately before he sent a message back to the Navy Department, 
he would probably call me up and ask me if I wouldn't come over to 
his headquarters, and then he would read it to me, and we would dis- 
cuss it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 221 

288. General Grunert. We go on to the next message, the Navy 
message to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, of November 
27. 

General Short. I feel sure that I have seen that message, although 
we could not find a copy of it in our headquarters, [4^^] when 
Ave looked for it, for the Koberts Commission's report. That was 
during the period when I was down there at Kinnnel's headquarters 
every day for three or four days, and in all probability he either read 
it to me, or I read it right there, because it is familiar to me ; but we 
couldn't find a copy. 

289. General Frank. That is the one which says "This is a war 
warning." 

General Short. "This is a war warning," yes. 

290. General Frank. And it anticipates attacks on Guam, the Phil- 
ippine Islands, Thai, Kra Isthmus, and Borneo? 

General Short. Yes. 

291. General Grunert. The testimony before the Roberts Commis- 
sion includes the testimony of Admiral Kimmel, in which he says 
he definitely remembers sending the "war warning" message to Gen- 
eral Short. He says it seems that he handed it to him and discussed it 
with him in his own office. 

General Short. I think, in Kimmel 's office, rather than mine. I 
think there is no question but that I saw the telegram, that I saw the 
radiogram, but we did not find an official copy of it in our headquar- 
ters. There is no doubt in my mind but what I saw it. 

192. General Grunert. What action did you take with regard to 
that message, as to the Army preparation ? 

General Short. On the same day, I had had this message from the 
Chief of Staff, and I took action on the Chief of Staff's message rather 
than on that massage. 

293. General Grunert. You did not consider the words "a war warn- 
ing" as being of such nature as to require you to take more measures 
than you did? 

[4^7] General Short. The Navy used that expression every 
once in a while in their messages. 

294. General Grunert. Meaning what, thereby ? 
General Short. ( Answer withdrawn by the witness. ) 

295. General Grunert. I will ask you that question. Do you mean 
it is in the line of "crying wolf ! wolf !" ? 

General Short. To a certain extent; yes. That may not have been 
a fair answer. 

296. General Grunert, Are there any questions about that 
message ? 

297. General Frank. No, 

298. General Grunert. We go to the next message, on which I 
have a number of questions, so I had better read them, one at a time, 
and you can answer them, one at a time. 

It is the Chief of Staff's message of November 27 to the Command- 
ing General of the Hawaiian Department, in which, in part, the fol- 
lowing information was furnished and directive given: 

Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any 
moment. 



222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

And then, again — 

If hostilities cannot (repeat Cannot) be avoided U. S. desires Japan commit 
first overt act. This policy should not (repeat Not) be construed as restrict- 
ing you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. 

And then again — 

Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such recon- 
naissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should 
be carried out [418] so as not (repeat Not) to alarm the civil popula- 
tion or disclose intent. 

If any of these questions were answered in your statement or in 
previous questions, here, we will just say "covered." 

What reconnaissances were made, and what other measures were 
taken ? I think that has been answered. 

General Short. That has been answered very fully. 

299. General Grunert. What measures did the Commanding Gen- 
eral of the Hawaiian Department consider desirable, but that could 
not be taken without alarming the civil population or disclosing 
intent? In other words, did you consider that you wanted to take 
other measures, but you did not take them, because of the restrictions 
in that? 

General Short. No, sir; I will say frankly that I did not believe, 
in view of all the information I had, that there would be an air attack 
there, so I didn't — I didn't want to go into alert No. 2. 

300. General Grunert, If a defense against attack could not be 
undertaken before the commission by Japan of the first overt act, what 
preparatory measures could have been undertaken ? Were such meas- 
ures taken ? 

General Short. Of course, we could have done one or two things 
that could have been, the way it worked out, highly desirable. We 
could have gone into alert No. 2, that being an instant readiness for 
an air attack and a surface and a subsurface attack, or we could have 
gone into alert No. 3, under the guise of a maneuver, and moved 
everybody to battle positions. Either one would have been very 
desirable. 

301. General Grunert. You were particularly informed — 

This policy should not * * * be construed as restricting [4^9] you to 
a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. 

In your judgment, wdiat action was necessary to insure your 
defense ? 

General Short. My judgment at the time was that while the hos- 
tilities might take place, the hostilities, in our case, would be in all 
probability sabotage, or possible uprisings; and I believe from the 
testimony of the Cliief of Staff that he was thoroughly in accord with 
that opinion, himself. 

302. General Grunert. My next few questions appear to have been 
answered, but I will put them in the record. 

What report on the measures taken was submitted to the War De- 
partment ? That has been answered. 

General Short. Yes, but I think I would like to repeat that. 

303. General Grunert. All right. 

General Short. I refer, by number, Department radiogram, and 
identify very definitely their "radiogram No. So-and-So" — I think 
it was 472, received, alerted for sabotage, liaison with the Navy. In 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 223 

other words, there should have been no possible misunderstanding 
to what message that referred, because it identified the War Depart- 
ment number. 

304. General Grunert. Did the War Department have any com- 
ment to make on your report ? 

General Short. They never at any time admitted that they knew 
what I was doing, or that I was doing too much, or too little. 

305. General Grunert. If not, did this lead you to believe that 
measures taken sufficed under existing conditions, [4^0] and 
that inasmuch as the War Department was cognizant of the situa- 
tion, this relieved you of not taking additional defensive measures? 

General Short. It lead me to believe that the War Department 
was 1007o in accord with my belief, that they approved definitely of 
what I was doing. 

306. General Grunert. Did you specifically query the War De- 
partment on this aspect ? 

General Short. No, I had reported on what I was doing, and I 
had no further comment for them, except on more sabotage. They 
came back, and I thought it was coming up after they had considered 
my message — it was the next day — going into detail on sabotage, 
stating that — 

Be sure not to do anything illegal, etc. 

And I went back and told them exactly what I was doing, and the 
legal authority I had for it. 

307. General Grunert. Did you figure that the War Department 
had opportunity to get your report and then send the other message 
that you received? Was not this report submitted on the 28th, and 
did you not get the other message on the 28th ? 

General Short. No; my report was submitted on the 27th, and I 
would say that their message came in, as I remember, at 1 : 16 p.m., 
on the 27th, I think that we answered that message within 30 
minutes. 

308. General Grunert. But you do not know whether it is a fact 
or not that it was received ? 

General Short. I do not know whether it was actually delivered 
to them, but I frankly, from reading Gerow's testimony, I think that 
the trouble came that nobody ever took the trouble [4^^] to 
follow up and see that I had made the report of action that they indi- 
cated, and that they didn't check up and see the number of the radio- 
gram that my report referred to. He states frankly that it was the 
duty of his division, and it wasn't done. 

309. General Grunert. I will ask if it is your testimony, that I 
recall, now, you never took into consideration whether or not to 
take any additional measures, and if you had taken such measures 
it might be against the desires of the War Department ? 

General Short. I think if I had done anything to alarm the Japa- 
nese population in Hawaii, it would have been decidedly against the 
desires of the War Department. 

310. General Grunert. It never occurred to you, though, to ask 
the War Department whether or not you should take additional 
measures ? 



224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. I had reported. They gave me a directive to report 
the action taken. I reported exactly the action I had taken, and 1 
figured if they did not approve, that they would come right back and 
say so, or if they wanted me to do more; and they did come back, but 
it was just more sabotage, so I thought that they approved of what 
I was doing, but wanted to be 100% sure of the details. 

311. General Grunert. Before I go into the next one, have you any 
questions, any of you ? • x- t 

312. General Russell. I think, at the end of your examination 1 
will possibly want to ask General Short some questions about this 
War Department relation, but I do not think it is relevant to ask it 

at this point. 

[4^2] 313. General Grunert. I have one separate subject, 
here— influences of and conclusions from what I call the warning 
message, under which we can carry most everything in that line that 
comes up, that we have not covered before. 

314. General Russell. I think so, too. 

315. General Grunert. We go to the next one, the message from 
the Adjutant General, of November 28, 1941. This question of mine 
appears to have been answered. "Did you consider this message of 
the 28th as a reply to your report of the 28th ?" 

General Short. I very definitely did — my report of the 27th. 

316. General Grunert. The 27th ? 

General Short. Yes, sir; I very definitely did. 

317. General Grunert. We go to the next, the report of November 
28, by the Commanding General. I still have November 28 as your 
report. 

General Short. Well, there are two reports. I reported the action 
taken, on the 27th. They replied on the 28th, with all this business 
about sabotage, and I wrote another report, then, on the 28th, stat- 
ing the legal authority that I was given, from the Governor, to do 
all these things, and from the Mayor of Honolulu. 

318. General Grunert. And that was your report of the 28th to 
the message of the 28th. 

General Short. That is correct ; and my report of the 27th was to 
the message of the 27th. In other words, both messages were an- 
swered practically as soon as received. 

319. General Grunert. And that just elaborated on your sabotage, 
on the measures taken ? 

[42S] General Short. And assuring them that I was not taking 
any illegal action, because they had been apparently worried about my 
doing things that would get the Army in bad with the civil authorities. 

320. General Grunert. Now, there appear to be three messages here. 

321. General Russell. General, before you go away from that mes- 
sage of the 28th, I have something with me. 

General Short. I think you have the "work sheets." 

322. General Russell. No, I have had this message checked, and 
I assumed that you would not remember it, but I am merely calling 
attention to it, so we will check it in Hawaii. There is a message which 
came out on the 28th, 484. Now, the message that General Grunert 
has just been asking you about is 482. 

General Short. 482 — that is right. 



PROCEEDINCJiS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 225 

323. General Russell. This goes to the Commanding General of the 
Hawaiian Department, and it is signed "Arnold," and stamped 
officially. 

General Short. That is the one signed by Arnold. That is the one 
that went, practically identical to my message, that went to all the air 
stations. 

324. General Eussell. You see this one, 482, went to all the air 
stations. 484 did not go to the air stations. I just wondered if you 
have any point in getting 482. 

General Short. Here is 482. It is the one that came to me, and it 
says at the end of it — 

To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air 
stations, but this does not (repeat Not) affect your responsibility under existing 
[424] instructions. 

Now, that is 482, according to my number. And this is the one that 
went — ^yoii see it is addressed "attention Commanding Air Forces.'' 
It went to Martin, it went to the air station, and he replied to him 
three or four days later in great detail. 

325. General Grunert. I think the witness is right. That was the 
Philippine message, 

326. General Russell. I do not think we ought to be partial to 
any of these messages. I think we ought to get them all in. 

General Short. I have tried to keep straight on all of them. 

327. General Grunert. We will go to the next one. It is a message 
of December 3, a Naval dispatch of December 3, 1941, from the Navy 
Department to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, to the 
effect that — 

Information discloses evidence instructions were sent to various Japanese 
diplomatic and consular posts to destroy certain codes and ciphers and to burn 
certain documents. 

Was this information transmitted to you ? 
General Short. I never saw that message. 

328. General Grunert. There were some Navy messages in De- 
cember ? 

General Short. I say I never saw it. I think it was quoted in the 
Roberts Commission's report when it came out, but up to that time 
I had never seen it. 

[4^5] 320. General Grunert. There were also two messages, one 
dated December 4 and the other December 6, from the same source to 
the same person, regarding the destruction of their own confidential 
documents. Was that information transmitted to you? 

General Short. It was not. I got no copy of it. 

330. General Grunert. You had none of the information that was 
disclosed in those three messages? 

General Short. No, sir. 

331. General Grunert. Now, we get to the mesage of the Chief 
of Staff to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated 
December 7, 1941. 

General Short. I can locate it for you, I am sure. It is on page 20. 

332. General Grunert. It is the message from the Chief of Staff to 
the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, December 
7, 1941. I think you have given us full information as to that mes- 
sage, as to the time of its receipt and everything. 

7971G — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 1 16 



226 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Is there anything further that you wish to add about that; or 
are there any questions that the Board has about that particular 
message ? ( No resj)onse. ) There appear to be none. 

I will ask you a question about that. In your testimony before 
the Roberts Commission you refered to a time-consuming code which 
might have been avoided, that is, the time-consuming part, by the 
use of the telephone. Had you or had the War Department been 
in the past, during your service over there, using that phone for 
highly-secret matters ? 

General Short. We used it for highly-important matters. 

333. General Grunert. Do you consider, with reference to the 
message of December 7th, 1941, that the situation at the time 
[42(>] might have been aggravated had there been a leak in trans- 
mission had they used the phone ? 

General Short. I think the time element was the most important 
element in that situation. 

334. General Grunert. Is this in retrospect? 

General Short. I was going to say that if I had been sitting there 
in the position of the Chief of Staff I might have done just what 
he did. Apparently even at that late date they still thought that 
secrecy was more important than the time element, and they did not 
visualize any attack on Honolulu at that time. 

335. General Grunert. We want to develop, if there is anything 
else to be brought out, the conclusions drawn from this series of 
messages. 

General Short. I read those conclusions to you, if you remember, 
because I wanted to be very exact ; and think that is as good a state- 
ment of the conclusions as I could make. 

336. General Grunert. I will ask you some questions to see whether 
or not they have been covered and in order to get into the record 
why these messages served to emphasize danger from sabotage and 
why not the necessity of taking a state of war readiness, and why 
was not the subject of taking a state of war readiness consideried. 
I think you have w^ell covered the question of sabotage; but did it 
ever occur to you that the warnings in this information necessitated 
taking a state of war readiness as compared with a state of internal 
security readiness ? 

General Short. There were two things involved. One was the 
information that I had from the Navy as to what they knew about 
naval ships; and, as I say, my confidence that they could prevent the 
carriers from getting through. The other was the [4^7"] in- 
sistance on the part of the War Department that the public must not be 
alarmed and that the intent must not be disclosed and that there must 
not be any provocative measures against Japan. I think if they had 
been convinced that something was absolutely imminent, the only 
thing they would be worried about would be my getting one hundred 
per cent ready. They would not have cared whether I alarmed' 
the public or what I did so long as I got ready in the least possible time 
to meet the situation. If they had been expecting an air attack they 
would have said, "Alert for an air attack at once." I do not think 
they would have taken any chances. 

337. General Grunert. To what extent did the Navy's conclusion 
that Japanese carriers were still at home ports influence you to con- 
sider that Alert No. 1 was adequate ? 



PROCEEDINGS OP' ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 227 

General Short. From all we knew of their land planes, they could 
not make an attack from land bases; and if the carriers were so 
accounted for that they were not of danger to us, it looked as if we 
were safe from air attack, 

338. General Grunert. What influenced you to believe that the 
chances of a raid out there, wdth the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor or 
thereabouts, were practical nil? 

General Short. The Operations Officer had stated specifically in 
answer to a question of Admiral Kimmel that he considered that there 
was no chance of a surprise attack. 

339. General Grunert. In view of the lack of definite knowledge 
as to the intentions of Japan, why were not measures taken to cover 
any eventuality? 

General Short. If you had taken measures to meet any eventuality, 
you would have disregarded other parts of the message. They said, 
"Do not alarm the public. Do not disclose [4^81 intent. Do 
nothing provocative to Japan." 

340. General Grunert. Do you consider that taking defensive 
measures of any kind necessarily would disclose intent? 

General Short. Under the strained relations, if we were moving 
live ammunition to all the guns — remember, in DeRussy everything 
was right under the eye of the public. Your guns were just in the 
middle of the city, and there is no question but that it would have 
given rise to a lot of speculation. 

341. General Grunert. How w^ould they know you had live am- 
munition ? 

General Short. We had antiaircraft guns there as close as from 
that window (indicating). If you put the ammunition out people 
walking along the sidewalk could read it on the boxes. 

342. General Grunert. They knew that the army was kept over 
there to defend the island. Are they supposed to be impotent and 
not to be trusted to take ammunition out ? I cannot understand the 
psychology. 

General Short. Taking live ammunition out, I think, in a period 
of strained relations like that, is a very different thing from moving 
it in maneuvers or on target practice that everybody has been ac- 
customed to. 

343. General Grunert. You were over there with the intent of 
defending the island. 

General Short. The papers were writing up the situation and they 
were writing scare headlines, and in combination it would have been 
just exactly what they told us not to do. They said not to alarm the 
public. If the War Department felt as you do about it I do not think 
they should have sent out any such instructions. 

344. General Grunert. What ground had you to assume that the 
[4^9] War Department messages regarding subversive activitiea 
and antisabotage and your reports thereon constituted adequate pre- 
paratory measures ? 

General Short. Because, having received my report as to exactly 
what I was doing, they had let ten days go by without ever telling mo 
I was doing too much or too little. 

345. General Grunert. Did you consider, having made this re^ 
port and no reply having been received, that it absolved you against 
taking other measures ? 



228 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. I did. I thought they agreed with me a hundred 
percent. And there were other things that influenced me. I pointed 
out before certain planes coming in from the mainland without 
ammunition and with all guns cosmolined. I can see a definite argu- 
ment that they did not consider any great danger in the situation. 

346. General Grunert. To what extent, if any, did you develop a 
sense of security due to the opinion prevalent in diplomatic, mili- 
tary and naval circles and in the public press, that any immediate 
attack by Japan would be in the Far East? Was this justified from 
a military viewpoint? 

General Short. I supposed that perhaps we had all been influenced 
over a period of years by the fact that our war plans had always been 
against an attack on the Philippine Islands. The war plans had 
not been built against an attack on Hawaii. I was very familiar with 
those plans. I had been in the far eastern section of G-2 for three 
years and had commanded one of those maneuver forces. 

347. General Grunert. To what extent, if any, did the fact that 
they were planning to send Army troops to relieve marines in the 
mandates influence you as to your decision not to take any [4^0\ 
greater defensive measures than you did? 

General Short. That in itself would have had no effect. That 
would have indicated to me that they foresaw the ])ossibility of using 
Marines for landing forces, and they wanted to get all the Marines 
where they would be available. It did not mean necessarily anything 
immediate; and, as a matter of fact, it was not exactly an order; 
it was a call for a recommendation, and Kimmel and I both recom- 
mended that it be put off until certain construction had been com- 
pleted. 

348. General Grunert. I think you have covered most of the rest 
of my questions. I may have one more. Did you not give thought, 
or did you give thought, to the policy of the Axis Powers to usually 
attack on Sundays and also to the fact that Japan usually attacks on 
declaration of war but not waiting until its opponent is advised of 
that declaration ? 

General Short. I fully expected Japan to attack, but I expected her 
to attack the Philippines on account of the presence of the fleet. I 
thought she would attack where she would not be confronted with so 
large forces. 

349. General Frank. Of the 6 messages that were sent to you, three 
from the Navy and three from the Army, between November 16th 
and 28th, you seem to have been conversant with five of them. Four 
of them cautioned to be careful and not do anything that would pro- 
voke Japan. Three of them cautioned against sabotage. Was there 
any cumulative effect of this sabotage caution ? 

General Short. Undoubtedly it caused me to feel that the War 
Department agreed with my own judgment that the greatest danger 
was internal danger from the Japanese population. 

350. General Frank. Did not the provisions of your war plans 
[-^^i] and your standing operating procedure provide fully for 
defense against all situations ? 

General Short. It did. The three alerts made the thing very defi- 
nitely provided for. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 229 

351, General Frank. Were not the provisions of your war plan 
and standing operation procedure known in the War Department? 

General Short. Oli, yes. 

352, General Grunert. You say, "Oh, yes." But what do you know 
about it ? 

General Short. They were reported on November 5. I do not 
know that anybody had read them. 

353, General Grunert. We have had testimony to the effect that 
the War Plans Division representatives did not know the S. O. P, 

(xeneral Short, That is quite possible; but they were forwarded to 
the War Department — just the same as the War Plans Division did 
not know that I made a report which they called for, 

354, General Russell. Is there record of those S, O. P.'s having 
been forwarded to the War Department? 

General Short. I think so. There would undoubtedly be a letter 
of transmittal. 

355, General Grunert. Then are you of the opinion that they 
knew what was in your S. O, P, of the 5th of November and knew 
your classes of alerts? 

General Short. When I sent the message I knew there was a pos- 
sibility that the man who got the message would not know what 
Alert No. 1 was, so I said "Alert for sabotage." I did not use "Alert 
No. 1," because I thought the man who got the message might not 
have read the procedure and would have to look it up and spend 
some time; so I said "Alert for sabotage." 

[4'^2] 356. General Frank. Suppose that instead of all the 
provisions that were placed in these messages you had received one 
saying "War imminent. Act accordingly." 

General Short. I, in all probability, would have gone to Alert 
No. 3. 

357. General Frank. Why would you have gone to Alert No. 3 
in the event of naval advice to the contrary? 

General Short, That would have indicated at least that the War 
Department were 100 percent convinced that something had happened, 

358. General Grunert, Then "War innninent" to the Navy did 
not mean the same that "War imminent" would have meant to you? 

General Short, Absolutely not, because I knew that expression 
had been used frequently in naval messages. 

359. General Frank. Now, with respect to the cautions against 
provoking the Japs, that was a national policy, was it not ? 

General Short. Apparently, yes, without exception. 

360. General Frank. While we were refraining from provoking 
the Japs in general, what were they doing ? 

General Short. I would not know enough of all of their diplo- 
matic circumstances to tell you, sir. They were apparently getting 
ready to make some preparations to attack, if that is what you mean. 

361. General Frank. Do you not think that that was generally 
known? 

General Short. You mean by our diplomats ? 

362. General Frank. Yes. 

General Short. I do not know. After an event has happened 
many people profess to have known things that they did not know 
before. 



230 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[433] 363. General Frank. Were you not familiar with Mr. 
Grew's reports? 

General Shokt. I have read his statement in the State Department 
A^Hiite Paper. But the Grew report I think was te nmonth sbef ore. 

364. General Frank. That indicated the attitude of the Japs, did 
it not? 

General Short. Yes; but if it has been ten months or a year, they 
might come to the conclusion that Grew had been wrong. 

365. General Frank. Further, you were familiar, were you not, 
with the activities of the Japanese agents attached to the consulate? 

General Short. We felt sure that they were carrying on propaganda 
to have people keep their dual citizenship in place of renouncing it, and 
things of that kind. 

366. General Grunert. Was there anything by way of indication in 
Honolulu or about Honolulu to the effect that they were arrogant, that 
they despised this nation because of what looked to be a weak-kneed 
policy of conciliation? 

General Short. No ; I would not say they were. At the time they 
closed all the Japanese bank accounts — I guess that was in July — there 
was a lot of uneasiness among the Japanese population, a very great 
deal of uneasiness, but I do not remember at any time any arrogant 
attitude on the part of the population. 

367. General Frank. You do not seem to have a feeling that we were 
very restricted in our efforts or that we were impeded at all in taking 
full-out measures for national defense in our attitude of keeping from 
provoking the Japs? 

[434] General Short. I think we were to a certain extent. As 
I explained a while ago, if we had taken any action; for instance, 
suppose at that time we had seized all these consular agents. That 
would have been exactly what the War Department did not want us to 
do. When we got that message on November 27th about hostilities, 
if we had recommended to the District Attorney that he arrest all 
those consular agents, I think we would have been doing exactly what 
the War Department directed us not to do. 

368. General Grunert. If you had not received any message from 
the War Department, what would have been your action? AVhat 
would you have done or not done ? 

General Short. We had been not quite on Alert No. 1 from July on, 
from the time the banks were closed. We were extremely watchful. 
I think in all probability we would have been on Alert No. 1 with a 
careful recheck of all our guards and strengthening where necessary. 

369. General Grunert. But still you would not have gone beyond 
Alert No. 1? 

General Short. No ; I do not think we w'ould, because, as I saw the 
thing, I did not visualize an air attack at that time. 

370. General Frank. Had you been on sort of an alert ever since 
July? 

General Short. At least half an alert. We had never taken the 
guards off of the highway bridges and utilities. Our guards along the 
waterfront were not nearly as strong as they were after November 27. 
We put out a lot of additional guards and checked on everything; and 
we had gotten all of the gasoline people, all of the public utility people, 
as early as July, to build man-proof fences and put flood lights around 
the properties \435] so that we could guard them. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 231 

371. General Frank. Do you think that this continuous alert had 
been carried to such an extent that the command had become apathetic ? 

General Short. I do not, because when the attack occurred every- 
thing clicked. There was not any confusion of any kind. There was 
no clelay, and the troops went into action as fast as anybody could 
expect them to. 

372. General Frank. Do you recall ever seeing the order that called 
for the alert of the previous year, 1940? 

General Short. You mean Field Order No. 1? 

373. General Frank. No; the order that came from the War De- 
partment. 

General Short. I think I knew about one that General Marshall 
sent out, and I did not tell them whether it was the real thing, or not. 
It stayed out for some time. I don't remember the wording of the 
alert, but I knew about it; and they were kept on that alert, as I 
remember, for some time, not knowing whether it was drill or whether 
it was the real thing, 

[Copy] 

3141 Southwestern BouiJrPAKD, 

Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 19U- 
Subject : Corrections in testimony. 
To : President, Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

1. I request that tlie following corrections be made in my testimony before the 
Array Pearl Harbor Board : 

******* 

Page 435, line 15, — omit "I". 
******* 
* ****** 

/s/ Walter C. Short, 
Walter C. Short, 
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired. 

374. General Frank. Did these caution messages have any effect on 
the full-out measures that you had taken ? 

General Short. They made us extremely cautious about everything 
possible pertaining to sabotage. We tightened up and it would have 
been very difficult for them to have gotten away with anything. 

375. General Grunert, What, short of a War Department order 
to do so, would have caused you to take Alert No. 2 or No. 3? 

General Short. If they had radioed me that they considered there 
was danger of an air attack we would have been in Alert No. 2 in 
three minutes. If they had wired me that they considered [4^6] 
there was danger not only of an air attack but a possible attempt at 
landing, we would have been alerted just as fast, because we were so 
organized that all we had to do was to put Alert No. 2 in effect or 
Alert No. 3 in effect and there would be no delay and no confusion. 

376. General Grunert. If you had never received what we called 
a G-2 sabotage alert and the so-called Arnold sabotage alert, would 
you still have gone under Alert No. 1 ? 

General Short. I went on Alert No. 1 when I received the message 
from the Chief of Staff, because I thought it was the thing to do. 
If I had received nothing else and gotten no reply after making my 
report, I might have wondered more about it. But in view of the 
things that came afterward, and the planes that came in without 
ammunition, without preparation for defense, I was a hundred per 
cent convinced. 



232 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

377. General Frank. I would like to develop this thought for just 
ca minute. This is in consideration generally of military operations. 
Irj estimating the situation with which a military commander is 
confronted, our teachngs in the military establishment generally have 
been along the lines of taking all information that is available, evalu- 
ating it and using it as a guide. Is that correct? 

General Short. Yes. 

378. General Frank. That is in accordance with our Leavenworth 
teaching, our war college teaching and out actual practice in the 
organization. Now, in coming to a decision on military disposition 
and general practice in the Army, Army teachings, as perhaps Army 
tradition, indicate that a commander should prepare for enemy action 
of what character ? 

[4^7] General Short. The worst. 

379. General Frank. The worst. Now, can you tell me why that 
was not done in this instance? 

General Short. Everything indicated to me that the War Depart- 
ment did not believe that there was going to be anything more than 
sabotage; and, as I have explained, we had a very serious training 
proposition with the Air Corps particularly, that if we went into 
Alert No. 2 or 3 instead of No. 1 at the time that we couldn't meet the 
requirements on the Philippine ferrying business. Also the fact that 
they told me to report the action taken unquestionably had an influ- 
ence because when I reported action taken and there was no comment 
that my action was too little or too much I was a hundred per cent 
convinced that they agreed with it. They had a lot more information 
than I had. 

380. General Russell. General Short, before asking you some ques- 
tions about the relations between the Hawaiian Department and the 
War Department, I want to come back to one thing that was brought 
up a little earlier in theafternoon, because it is going to be a very 
material issue here apparently, and that is the extent of the naval 
reconnaissance on the 27th of November and the days thereafter. 
I do not want to repeat the questions 

(xeneral Short. No. 

381. General Russell. or to elicit the answers that have already 

taken place here this afternoon; but the statement which you made as 
to task forces which were acting at the same time as reconnaissance 
parties on which these planes were sent is in conflict with all of the 
other facts or statements that I know of about that situation. 

[4J^8] General Short. In other words, you do not believe the 
task forces were out. 

382. General Russell. I have no personal belief about it. 
General Short. No, but I mean your information doesn't indi- 
cate ? 

383. General Russell. My information is that there were a couple 
of task forces that had gone out to the east to leave some people on 
some islands. That is, as they were returning from this mission, the 
planes had been sent out. 

384. General Frank. To the east or west ? 

385. General Russell. On that way (indicating) ; I don't know 
which way that was. 

General Short. I think I am correct in stating that there was one 
task torce coming back in and that there were two going out, one going 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 233 

towards Midway aiid one going to Johnston Island, that landed — I 
know in that case it landed just five minutes before the attack. It 
got the report of the attack in five minutes after they landed. I had a 
staff officer with that one, so I know in regard to that. 

386. General Eussell. As a matter of fact, General Short, it may 
come to pass that you will be back here tomorrow ; and I think you will 
find, or you will find in this Roberts report a statement as to naval 
activity on December 7th, and I am merely suggesting that if you desire 
it might be well to check that and check that evidence which you have 
given this afternoon. 

General Short. And I think it would be well to check specifically, 
if you have Admiral Kimmel, as to what task forces were out. I am 
quite convinced that there was one coming in and two going out. 

[4^9] 387. General Russell. Your evidence was this afternoon 
that the Navy had out on reconnaissance all of its available 

General Short. I think they had every carrier. 

388. General Russell. Every one. 

General Short. I think there were only about two cruisers that were 
in the harbor and just a small number of destroyers. Their battle- 
ships were all in. 

389. General Russell. Very well. 
General Short. I think that is correct. 

390. General Russell. You get the sense of the remarks that I am 
making? 

General Short. Yes. 

391. General Russell. My effort is to eliminate from this record 
every factual issue that it is possible to eliminate. 

General Short. I have no worry of definitely saying that that was 
the case, but Admiral Kimmel could give you positive information 
on the subject. I think I am definitely correct, and I know that the 
one that went south to Johnston Island landed just five minutes before 
the attack, because I say I had a staff officer on it. 

392. General Russell. Yes. Now, before we leave this subject of 
reconnaissance to determine what else could have been done that day, 
you had these people on from 4 until 7, on the radar? 

General Short. That is right. 

393. General Russell. There are statements in the record and 
facts as to how effective those radar training or mobile sets were, how 
far they would reach, and how accurately they operated. Now, how 
far could your radar detect the presence of aircraft? 

General Short. That morning they actually detected it at [440] 
132 miles, apparently. 

394. General Russell. Well, might it not be that they had taken 
off from a carrier which was 132 miles away? 

General Short. They might have. 

395. General Russell. Do you know, General Short, whether or 
not they would have detected aircraft any farther away than 130 
miles? 

General Short. In all probability not with our mobile stations. 
Now, we hoped, with those fixed stations that we were building up 
as high as 10,000 feet, eventually to get to 200 miles with those sta- 
tions, 10,000 feet up. We didn't figure that we could count on more 



234 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

than 75 or a hundred miles under average conditions with the mobile 
stations. There are times when you get them farther. 

396. General Russell. Therefore, the reconnaissance agency 
available to you that morning was limited in the detection of aircraft 
in the air to 130 miles or so ? 

General Short. That was as far as we could expect it, yes. 

397. General Russell. The only other reconnaissance measure 
which you could have taken would have been in connection with the 
distant reconnaissance? 

General Short. Distant reconnaissance. 

398. General Frank. Something that you have to realize about the 
operation of radar is that radar will not operate over the curvature 
of the earth. 

General Short. That is the reason for going up 10,000 feet. 

399. General Frank. Also, the higher the aircraft is flying the 
further away it will pick it up, and also the higher the [44^] 
radar is above the sea level the further away it will pick it up. 

400. General Russell. I understand all those factors, but the thing 
that I was attempting to develop was the strength of the radar in- 
strument which you were operating. 

General Short. I think that 132 miles is about as far as we could 
ever hope to get anything with those mobile sets. 

401. General Russell. What I had in mind was whether or not 
they were to the radar world what the walkie-talkie was to our radio 
in the Army. 

General Short. To a certain extent. They would not get the dis- 
tance that the fixed stations would get. 

402. General Grunert. What is the line of the rest of your ques- 
tions ? 

403. General Russell. In the rest of my questions, I believe, except 
some miscellaneous, I am going to talk about or ask General Short 
some questions on what he knew about the general hostile situation. 

404. General Grunert. I think we have gone about as far as we 
can today, and we shall start tomorrow morning on the rest of this 
agenda, in which we shall cover interceptor command, aircraft warn- 
ing service, A. A. defense, in-shore patrol, command, and staff and 
so forth, and there will be an opportunity to get those questions in. 

(Thereupon, at 5:25 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of 
witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 235 



[44^] CONTENTS 



SATURDAY, AUGUST 12, 1944 

Testimony of — Page ' 

Maj. Gen. Walter Campbell Short, United States Army, Retired — 

Resumed 443 

DOCUMENTS 

Extracts from Honolulu Newspapers 467 

^ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages 
of original transcript of proceedings. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 237 



\.W\ PEOCEEDINGS BEFOEE THE AEMY PEAKL 

HARBOK BOARD 



SATUBDAY, AUGUST 12, 1944 

Munitions Building, 

W ashington^ D. C. 

The Board at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the 
hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, 
presiding. 

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. 
Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members. 

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, and Major Henry 
C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder. 

General Grunert. The Board will come to order. 

(M. R. O'Connor and V. C. Brown, transcribing reporters, were 
sworn by the Recorder. ) 

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER CAMPBELL SHORT, UNITED 
STATES ARMY, RETIRED— Resumed. (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS 
COUNSEL, BRIG. GEN. THOMAS H. GREEN, UNITED STATES ARMY) 

405. General Grunert. You may proceed. 

406. Colonel West. The witness is reminded that he is still under 
oath. It will not be necessary t(j repeat the oath. 

407. General Grunert. We will take up the combination of Inter- 
ceptor Commands and Air Warning Service. 

408. General Russell. I have some questions that I did not [4-^4] 
finish yesterday. 

409. General Grunert. Do you want to take them up on subjects 
that we went into yesterday ? 

410. General Russell. Yes. 

411. General Grunert. All right. We will wait until General Rus- 
sell finishes his questions, and take up the topics which I mentioned. 

412. General Russell. General Short, when we left off yesterday 
we were discussing the reconnaissance which was being conducted by 
the Navy on the 6th and 7th of December. There seemed to be some 
confusion as to just what was being done. I have had an opportunity 
to check the Navy testimony on that. I thought it would be well to 
have our record clear on it if it could be made clear. 

Captain DeLany of the Navy testified before the Roberts Commis- 
sion. Did you know Captain DeLany ? 
General Short. Yes. 

413. General Russell. He stated that certain of the Pacific Fleet 
was in Pearl Harbor, describing it as Task Force 1, giving the number 
of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers; also the ships of the base force 



238 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

with the Oregon as the flagship, and repair ships. Those were the ships 
at Pearl Harbor on the morning of the 7th ? 
General Short. Yes. 

414. General Russell. He said that out was Task Force 8, the En- 
terprise with the addition of heavy cruisers and a squadron of destroy- 
ers ; that they were approximately 200 miles west of Oahu. 

415. General Frank. When? 

[44^] 416. General Russell. They were returning from an ex- 
pedition to Wake Island where they had landed a squadron of Marines. 
That was on the night of December 6, 1941. It was from that point 
that the Enterprise sent 18 or 19 planes out on a definite reconnais- 
sance mission. That is one of the forces. The second task force that 
was out was No. 12 in which was the Lexington. Is that a carrier ? 
General Short. That is a carrier. 

417. General Russell. They were approximately 425 miles south- 
east of Midway ? 

General Short. Yes. 

418. General Russell. And their principal mission was landing 
a squadron of Marine bombers on that island. 

General Short. Did he not indicate that the men went out on 
this task force with planes ? 

419. General Russell. He makes no reference to any reconnais- 
sance launched from the Lexington. 

General Short. He might not, because, as I understand it, it was 
habitual. 

420. General Russell. We will attempt to develop that; but I am 
attempting now to get the record straight. 

Now, in addition to these 18 or 19 planes that had been sent out 
by Task Force 8 from the Enterprise, there were either three or 
four patrol planes carrying out the morning search required by the 
secuity order in the operated areas to the southward of Oahu ? 

General Short. Yes. 

421. General Russell. Evidently they had their base at Pearl 
[U^] Harbor. 

General Short. Did he say anything about any planes that went 
to Johnston Island and landed on Johnston Island five minutes be- 
fore the Japs struck Pearl Harbor? The mission was commanded, 
as I remember, by Admiral Brown. 

422. General Russell. Where is Johnston Island ? 

General Short. About 900 to 1100 miles southwest of Oahu. I 
think it is about 900 miles. 

423. General Russell. We will check on that later. 

General Short. I am so positive about it because I had a staff 
officer with them. 

424. General Russell. Yesterday, General Short, you were asked 
a hypothetical question by General Frank which, in substance, was 
about this : Had you received a message on December 7 saying "War 
is imminent. Do the necessary," what would you have done ? To that 
question you replied, "I would have gone into Alert 3." 

General Short. I think I probably would if I had received such 
a message. Of course I did not receive it. It is purely hypothetical. 
It would be very difficult to say positively what I would or would 
not have done. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 239 

425. General Kussell. In all the evidence which was adduced on 
yesterday the definite trend, if not the definite conclusion, could be 
reached that, based on the information which you had, you had no 
confusion in your thinking about the adequacy of going into an alert 
for sabotage? 

General Short. That is correct. 

426. General Russell. There was nothing left in your mind about 
that that was uncertain or indefinite. 

General Short. That is correct. 

[^7] 427. General Eussell. In your early testimony, however, 
you referred to the fact that when you received this very important 
message of November 27 you did reach the conclusion that the War 
Department thought that there was still some possibility of avoid- 
ing war with Japan ? 

General Short. I thought so from the caution about not taking 
any provocative measures against Japan and not alarming the public. 
To take the message of the 16th of October and the 27th of November 
together, they indicated to me that they were still hopeful of avoid- 
ing hostilities. 

428. General Russell.#Do you recall that in the message of No- 
vember 27 and at the beginnmg of that message, there is language 
to the effect that there existed the barest possibility that the Japs 
might come back and offer to continue negotiations? 

General Short. Yes. 

429. General Russell. What effect on your thinking would the 
return of the Japanese and the resumption of negotiations have had ? 

General Short. That there was a possibility of arriving at some- 
thing short of war. 

430. General Russell. Did you have from the War Department, 
after the message of November 27, 1941. any further information as 
to the resumption of negotiations with the Japanese? 

General Short. I had nothing. All I had from the War Depart- 
ment was the message of November 28 which went into detail about 
sabotage. 

431. General Russell. From the press or any other source did you 
know that between November 27 and December 7 there were [44^] 
other negotiations between the Japanese representatives in Wash- 
ington and our Government? 

General Short. I am sure I knew whatever was in the papers. I 
habitually read them. 

432. General Russell. If, then, as a m.atter of fact, the Japanese 
returned on the 1st, 2nd, or 5th of December, the chances are you 
knew about it? 

General Short. I undoubtedly knew about it. 

433. General Russell. Then the possibility that they might come 
back for other negotiations had become an actuality? 

General Short. Yes. 

434. General Russell. General Short, what if any information did 
you have from the War Department from the message in July 1941 
to the message of October 16, 1941 ? 

General Short. I do not remember anything outstanding. I have 
not dug into it, gotten out the messages and gone over them; but 
there was a break there where messages struck me as a very out- 



240 CONGRESSIONAL IN\^STIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

standing piece of information in July, and the next serious one was 
October 16. Do not misunderstand me ; there may have been others 
that I do not recalL 

435. General Russell. During this period of time you did have 
some correspondence with General Marshall, did you not? 

General Short. I possibly did, on the question of obtaining things 
for the Department. Just what correspondence I had directly with 
him at that time I do not recall. 

436. General Russell. Did you have any messages from G-2 or 
other agencies of the War Department detailing or describing to 
you what was going on in our international relations with Japan ? 

[4W] General Short. I do not think so. 

437. General Russell. "Were you told at some time in September 
1941 that General Marshall and others who were in conference with 
the Secretary of State had decided that war with Japan was inevitable ? 

General Short. I do not think I ever knew of that conference. 

438. General Russell. Did you know that the policy of the United 
States Government from some time in August or Se})tember of 1941 
until the date of the attack was largely one of a delaying action, 
playing for time, with the realization Ihat war with Japan was 
inevitable? 

General Short. I think I knew at the time in an indefinite way. 
Later on I undoubledly got that information when I read the State 
Department paper that came out a year or so afterwards. 

439. General Rl^ssell. Did you know. General Short, as Commander 
of the Hawaiian Department, that we were negotiating with the 
British and Dutch about coordinated military action in the Pacific 
area ? 

General Short. I knew nothing that was not in the papers. 

440. General Russell. Did you know that an agreement had been 
reached with all nations, the effect of which was that if the Japanese 
moved forces into Thailand west of 100 degrees east or south of 10 
degrees north we would regard that as an act of war ? 

General Short. I did not. 

441. General Russell. Nobody ever conveyed that information to 
you at all? 

General Short. If it was not in the papers I did not know that; 
and I am sure I do not remember its being in the papers. 

1450] 442. General Russell. You would hardly think that that 
information would be in the public press? 

General Short. I would not expect it to be. 

443. General Russell. General Short, suppose you had known this 
policy of the American Government and su])pose that it was taken in 
association or in conference with those other powers, do you think you 
would have been in a better position to have estimated the situation 
on the 27th of November when it was brought to your attention that 
negotiations had practically ended? 

General Short. I think it would have made me more conscious 
that war was practically unavoidable. 

444. General Russell. And in reply to General Frank's question 
yesterday you stated that you would have gone into Alert No. 3 if 
you had known that war was unavoidable? 

General Short. I do not think that is a good way of putting it. If 
T knew it was immediately imminent. Because it might be una void- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 241 

able and go along for a year, and you would not want to go into No. 3 
and stay there. But if I had known it was immediately imminent, 
then I should think I would have gone into Alert No. 3. 

445. General Russei^l. If you had known all these things and then 
it had been brought to your attention that these negotiations had 
about ended, would or not that have indicated to your mind the pos- 
sible imminence of war? 

General Short. It would have looked to me definite that the war 
was almost upon us, 

446. General Russell. General Short did you know that on the 
[451] 26th of November the State Department handed to the Japa- 
nese representatives a memorandum which G-2 of the AVar Department 
at least considered as an ultimatum to the Japanese Government? 

General Short. I knew nothing of anything of the kind until a 
year or so afterwards, whenever that State Department paper came 
out. 

447. General Russell. Did you know on the 27th of November, 
when you received that message, that the Secretary of State had in 
a meeting on the 25th of November told the Secretary of War, the 
Secretary of the Navy, and probably the Chief of Staff of the Army, 
and Admiral Stark, that the State Department had gone as far as it 
could in its negotiations with the Japanese and that the security of 
the nation was then in the hands of the armed forces? 

General Short. I did not, 

448. General Russell. Did you know that in Januaiy of 1941 
Ambassador Grew made a report to the State Department or to the 
Secretary of State in which he stated that there were rumors in Japan 
that in event of trouble with America the Japs would attack Pearl 
Harbor ? 

General Short. At that time I was not in connnand; but I have 
known of that later, I think probably a year or so later. I do not 
think I knew anything about it at that time. 

449. General Russell, Did you have any information in the period 
from November 27 to December 7, 1941, as to the disposition of the 
Japanese Fleet? 

General Short. I am sure that I talked with Admiral Kimmel and, 
from the information, I thought that the Fleet was either in home 
ports or that a very considerable number [-^5^] of Japanese 
ships had been sent south. As I remember, that was the gist of the 
thing. I know my impression was that they were moving more 
towards either the Malay Peninsula or the Philippines. 

450. General Russell. What was your impression as to what the 
Fleet knew about the location of the Japanese Fleet and its various 
types of surface ships during the six months immediately preceding 
the attack on Pearl Harbor? 

General Short. Admiral Bloch was in command of the District 
and kept a map locating as many as possible of the Japanese ele- 
ments. I do not believe they felt that it was very complete or that 
it was accurate enough. I do not believe we were able to have agents 
in Japan accomplish much of anything. The means of obtaining 
information are not known to me. 

451. General Russell. What type of ship would have been of more 
interest to yoii as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment ? I refer now to Japanese craft. 

79716— 46— Ex. 145, voL 1 17 



242 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short, Carriers. Submarines would be second, probably. 

452. General Russell. If you had known that during the last six 
months prior to December 7, 1941, the location of the carriers of the 
Japanese Fleet were unknown to our Navy for 112 out of 180 days, 
what effect would that have had ? 

General Short. It would undoubtedly have made me feel that the 
reports were far from complete. 

May I ask. General Russell, whether you mean 112 days in a 
stretch, or two-thirds of the days just taking the calendar days, that 
they did not know where the ships were ? 

[4^3] 453. General Russell. Not 112 days on a stretch, but at 
intervals. 

General Short. That might have a very different meaning. A ship 
might go from one harbor to another and there might be several days 
that they would not know anything about it except that it had left 
the previous harbor. 

454. General Russell. The information seems to be that they were 
lost 12 periods and those 12 periods apparently aggregated 112 days. 

Now, I have some miscellaneous questions and I shall be through. 

It is your belief, as I remember, that information about the Japa- 
nese was conveyed to you in talks, informal talks, between you and 
the Navy Commanders ? 

General Short. Yes; almost wholly. 

455. General Russell. Is it your opinion or not that unity of com- 
mand would have been more effective than the cooperative agreement 
under which you and the Navy were working? 

General Short. I think it would. 

456. General Russell. With the lack of enemy information. Gen- 
eral Short, and the possibility of confusion created by the messages 
which you received from Washington, and maybe looking back in 
retrospect, do you not think that the situation demanded vigorous 
action on your part? 

General Short. Very definitely not, from the information I had. 

457. General Russell. General Short, on the morning of December 
7th the only screening or reconnaissance work that was being done 
was by the Navy ? 

[4^4] General Short. That is correct. 

458. General Russell. You were there with the mission of protect- 
ing the Navy. 

General Short. I might add one thing. From 4 to 7 we had our 
Aircraft Warning Service, which was practically the only thing the 
Army had for reconnaissance. 

459. General Russell. A moment ago we were discussing what 
you would have done in event that you thought war was inevitable 
and imminent; and I have some recollection of a statement made 
by you on yesterday relating to a discussion with the Navy Com- 
manders as to what they would have clone with respect to dispersing 
the ships and moving them out of the harbor in the event of war. 

General Short. I do not know whether it took place right at that 
time, but at some time I talked with Admiral Kimmel about the ques- 
tion of procedure in case of an air attack, and I very definitely had 
the idea that if he expected any immediate air attack he would clear 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 243 

the harbor. Just when that conversation took place — we had so 
many — I would not know. 

460. General Russell. Yesterday m your testimony, General 
Short, you made some comparison of the aircraft available to you for 
the protection of Pearl Harbor and the Island of Oahu, with the 
number of aircraft that came in from the Japanese carriers. I have 
some notes about it, but they are not very complete. Did you form 
any conclusion as to the relative strength of the aircraft available to 
you and that of the Japs that made the attack? 

General Short. We thought that they had somewhere between 160 
and 180 planes. I believe the Navy figured possibly a [4^S-] 
larger number than that. We had 105 pursuit planes that were modern 
enough to fight. We had 6 flying fortresses that were capable of 
being used on a mission. We had 10 A-20's, 9 of which were in com- 
mission, that were good for a relatively short mission. We had quite 
a bunch, probably 50 of the B-18s. It would have been suicide to 
send men in them. They were not even fast enough to run away if 
he had an idea of doing nothing but going out and looking around 
and returning as soon as he liad his information. I believe that is a 
correct statement. General Frank. They were so obsolescent that 
they were almost useless. 

461. General Frank. It depends upon the point of view of the seri- 
ousness of the situation and how much you felt you wanted to pay for 
the information for which they went. 

General Short. I did not mean I would not use anything in the 
world, no matter how obsolete ; but they were not modern ships in any 
sense. 

462. General Frank. No. 

463. General Russell. You referred to the number of aircraft that 
were available there because of the presence of the Navy; I mean, 
Navy aircraft. 

General Short. I might say that the ships that I gave you were 
not all. I think we had a total of 80 pursuit planes that were in com- 
mission. That includes some older types. 

464. General Russell. I believe all those details are in your state- 
ment. I was just attempting to get your considered opinion as to the 
relative strength of the contesting air forces. 

General Short. I do not believe we could have mustered as much 
strength in modern planes if we had everything we could have 
[4^56] put in the air. We would have been quite inferior to the 
Japanese. 

465. General Russell. Do you include the Navy ships also? 

General Short. That is another proposition. The Navy had a con- 
siderably greater number of reconnaissance planes than we had. My 
recollection is that it was something like 95 for reconnaissance. 

466. General Russell. Whatever the relative strengths of the con- 
testing forces may have been on the morning of December 7, 1941, 
had you been in Alert No. 3 the damage which was done to us out 
there may have been greatly lessened? 

General Short. Yes. I do not believe that we could have kept 
those low-flying planes from getting in, because the antiaircraft 
was almost helpless against them. They came in extremely close 



244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to the water. The estimates were anywhere from 10 feet to 200 feet 
above the water. I believe that antiaircraft men will tell you that 
that would be the most difficult target to handle; the angle changes 
so rapidly. 

467. General Russell. Were those the ships that did the worst 
damage ? 

General Short. The torpedo planes, as I understand it, did the 
real damage. I think the real damage to the ships was practically 
all done in the first five or ten minutes of the action. 

468 General Grunert. Will you please differentiate between ships 
of the air and ships of the Navy so that the record will show which 
is which ? 

General Short. I will say planes from now on. 

469. General Russell, t believe you stated on yesterday that 
[4'57] there was no surprise that the Japs would attack without 
a declaration of war? 

General Short. That is correct. 

470. General Russell. Had there been any changes on the Island 
proper, under your command out there during the year 1941, which 
indicated the imminence of war? 

General Short. I do not believe that there were any outward signs 
in the Japanese population. The only time that anything was defi- 
nitely indicated was when they closed their accounts in the banks. 
There was a great deal of restlessness on that account. It practically 
stopped the business of the Japanese merchants. There was quite 
an upset at that time. I think it was more noticeable then than at 
any other time. 

471. General Russell. Would it have been possible to have guarded 
your aircraft against sabotage even though it had been dispersed? 

General Short. Yes; but it would have taken a very great number 
of men and it would have interfered very seriously with training. 
If we had had the fencing and the floodlights the number required 
would not have been so great. 

472. General Russell. Were there not frequent arrivals of aircraft 
from the United States, in Oahu ? 

General Short. Not frequent arrivals. It was considered some- 
what a perilous flight. We got in certain groups of flying fortresses 
and B-24's, the only time I remember flights coming all the way. 
AVhen our pursuit planes were brought in they were brought in on 
carriers and took off in some instances and came in maybe the last 
200 miles. 

473. General Russell. General Short, were there any considerable 
number of visitations or inspection trips made by War [4^S] 
Department personnel out in your area in 1941? 

(xeneral Short. There were several people that came out there. 

474. General Russell. What was their purpose? 

General Short. I took it that their purpose was to get a look at the 
status of things on the Island. As I remember. General Evans of the 
Air Corps came out and looked over things ; and the Division Engineer 
from San Francisco came out and spent several days and inspected the 
Office of the District Engineer, because the District Engineer func- 
tioned directly under him. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 245 

[Copy] 

3141 SOUTHWKSTERN BOUI^EVARD, 

Dallas 5, Texas, No. 10, 19U- 
Subject : Corrections in testimony. 
To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

1. I request that tlie following corrections be made in my testimony before the 
Army Pearl Harbor Board : 

Page 458, line 7, change "General Evans" to General Emmons". 

4: 4< 4: :«: 4: 4: 4: 

/s/ Walter C. Short, 

Walter C. Short, 
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired. 

475. General Grunert. Who was that ? 

General Short. Hannum. He came out and stayed several days and 
had two or three conferences with me at the end of his inspection. He 
came to tell me what he had found, and so forth. 

476. General Russell. Did they bring you any details of the negoti- 
ations between the Japs and our Government? 

General Short. No. 

477. General Russell. On yesterday you discussed the necessity for 
arming and equipping these ships to fight, which were on the way to 
the Philippines, stopping off at Oahu. Where would they next stop 
to pick up gas? 

General Short. They were flying then to Midway to Wake and from 
Wake to Port Moresby. 

478. General Russell. Could they get gas at Midway? 

General Short. Yes ; they could get gas at Midway and at Wake and 
at Port Moresby ; and then they landed up around Darwin. 

479. General Russell. How far was it to Midway, the first stop for 
gas? 

\_JtS9] General Short. I believe Midway is 1,100 miles. It is 
about 900 or 1,000 miles from there on to Wake, as I remember. The 
longest jump was from Wake to Port Moresby. 

480. General Russell. There has been some discussion about what 
would have happened if you had had another hour and a half or two 
hours on the December 7 message. I want to ask you two or three ques- 
tions now about the condition of readiness. At some place in the 
record we have seen that it would require four hours for you to have 
gotten your aircraft into the air ready to fight. 

General Short. No. There is a type of alert where it would re- 
quire it, but in a case of emergency, the very fact that the pursuit planes 
were actually in the air by 8 : 50 shows that they did not require four 
hours. It would take a little longer for the bombers, but they are not 
defensive planes. If they were going to load up with bombs it would 
take a little longer, but it would not take that much time. As a mat- 
ter of fact, they were actually in the air at 11 : 27. 

481. General Russell. The bombers? 
General Short. Yes. 

482. General Grunert. What was the idea of the 4-hour period? 
General Short. On account of personnel. If you had a 4:-minute, 

you had to have the personnel right at the planes. If you had a 30- 
minute, you had to have the men at the airfield. If you had 4 hours 
the crew members could be in their barracks. 



246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

483. General Grunert. Under your Alert No. 1 where were the men ? 
General Short. In our Alert No. 1 the men that were required for 

guarding purposes were all definitely at their [-^-^^l planes. 
The crews were not tied down. 

484. General Grunert. Someone must have figured 4 hours. Why 
did they not make it 3 or 2 ? 

General Short. They had a 2 and they had a 4. 

485. General Grunert. Individual planes could do some fighting, 
but organized fighting in the air would take how long? 

General Short. It actually took 55 minutes. 

486. General Grunert. Were they organized to fight in the air, or 
was it individual fighting? 

General Short. It was largely individual. They took off in two or 
three, when they got to the field. Most of the officers were spending 
their nights in their own quarters at Schofield Barracks several miles 
away. 

487. General Grunert. My understanding was that the 4-hour 
was for perfectly organized fighting in the air ? 

General Short. By making it 4 hours it gave the possibility to the 
men going ahead with recreation and athletics without being worried 
about getting that alert. That could go right ahead with their normal 
functions. They might have been out on a problem where it would 
take them an hour to get back in. 

[461] 488. General Grunert. Well, that was Alert No. 1, was 
it? 

General Short. Alert No. 1 ; they went right ahead with their 
training 

489. General Grunert. All right. 
General Short. Completed it. 

490. General Russell. General Short, a great deal has been said 
about the population of Oahu there, the Hawaiian Islands generally. 
How many Americans were there there? 

General Short. I think there were normally about 20,000, but of 
course there were at that time, with the armed services there, approx- 
imately close to probably fifty-seven, fifty-eight thousand Army per- 
sonnel there, and I would say more than that of the Navy, that is, in 
and out with the Navy. 

491. General Russell. People who resided there and who were not 
in the armed forces, there were about how many? 

General Short. Probably about 20,000, but there were a lot of de- 
fense workers. I expect the American population had been increased 
to 40,000 in that last year, but the normal population of Americans 
was rather small. 

492. General Russell. General Short, on the 24th of January a 
letter originated in the office of the Secretary of the Navy that General 
Grunert examined you on yesterday. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

493. General Russell. The substance of the letter was that the Navy 
was very apprehensive about an air attack on the ships there at 
Hawaii. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

494. General Russell. Now, in late November, early December, 
when you had the conference at which it was stated that the [463] 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 247 

possibility of an attack of that sort at Oahu was nil — Do you recall 
that? 

General Short. Yes. 

495. General Russell. Can you account for the change in the 
attitude of the Navy personnel between this date of January and 
late November toward an air attack? 

General Short. One was an attack and the other was a surprise 
attack. The question there was whether a surprise attack. 

496. General Russell. The question where? 

General Short. The question November 27 was the question 
whether surprise attack was possible. 

497. General Russell. Well, you do not think that the letter of 
January 24th related to a surprise attack? 

General Short. It might have related to either one, but I mean 
the apprehension of the Navy about getting our antiaircraft and 
our pursuit defense built up was not just for siu-prise attack but 
for any kind of an attack. The Japanese might have attacked them 
in superior force. You see, their Navy had been reduced by send- 
ing certain elements to the Atlantic Fleet, and they might have 
been subject to an attack any time, and if it were reduced too much 
they might have been worried alDout being attacked by superior 
force, in which case the air business would have been serious. They 
were, I think, interested not just from the point of view of surprise 
attack but of always having proper antiaircraft defense. 

498. General Russell. You think that the general interest inspired 
the letter of January 24? 

General Short. I think so. 

[46S] 499. General Grunert. Before you leave that subject: 
Was there a sentiment in the Army and Navy in Hawaii from about 
January 1, '41, to July, we will say, in which they seemed to fear 
action by Japan against Pearl Harbor, and then from July on they 
seemed to have more of a sense of security and did not appear to be 
so alarmed about the Japanese attacking Pearl Harbor? Did you 
have any knowledge of any such sentiment? 

General Short. I don't think so. They were pushing us all the 
time on the question of antiaircraft defense and air — and pursuit 
defense. 

500. General Frank. Who was pushing you ? 

General Short. The Navy. They were always talking to me about 
the desirability of getting everything that we had coming to us 
in the way of antiaircraft guns and getting better guns. They 
thought our 3-inch equipment was not satisfactory, and we were 
supposed to get some new 90-millimeter guns which we never got. 
They felt that our old 3-inch equipment was decidedly inferior to 
their antiaircraft guns, and they were anxious to have us build up 
our antiaircraft to the latest type, with sufficient numbers. 

501. General Grunert. In February 1941 Admiral Kimmel is al- 
leged to have been astounded at the existing weaknesses of the Pearl 
Harbor defenses. 

General Short. That inspection was made before I got there. I 
know about it. 

502. General Grunert. And he is supposed to have pointed out 
the inadequacy of antiaircraft guns, the obsolescence of land-based 



248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

aircraft, the lack of aircraft detectors. Now, was that cured so that 
the sentiment was different after about the middle [4^4] of 
the year, or what? 

General Short, Well, we were definitely — we had hoped to have 
the antiaircraft warning service, the material delivered by June 30th. 
That was the original plan. The Navy probably felt better because 
funds had been allotted for that purpose, and there was a definite — 
we were definitely trying to get it installed. 

503. General Grunert. But as far as you know there was no real 
change in sentiment throughout the year ? 

General Short. I think the change was that they thought that we 
were putting more emphasis on it than had been put on it previously, 
that they had a little more feeling of confidence that we were going 
in a period of a few months to be better prepared. 

504. General Russell. I have one more miscellaneous question: 
General Short, this subject of the creation of this Board, of the proper 
procedure by the War Department, was on debate in the Congress. 
A Representative of one of the States made the argument or took the 
position that on the 6th day of December at about noon an intel- 
ligence officer from your staff brought to your quarters a deciphered 
message which had been intercepted. As I recall, it was a telephone 
conversation between some Jap at Oahu and some Japanese official 
on the homeland. The Congressman charged that you were engaged 
in some sort of social activity and cursed this officer out and ran him 
out of the quarters. I do not know that you will come back before 
this Board, and I am bringing that representation to your attention 
now for any remark that you would like to make about that. 

General Short. Colonel Bicknell brought that message to [465] 
me at about 7 o'clock, I would say sometime around between 6 : 30 and 
7 o'clock, on the evening of the Bth. Colonel Fielder — I don't know 
whether he came with Bicknell or whether I sent for him, but we 
went — the three of us went over it together, and we were frankly un- 
able to get anything definite out of it. I have read it again since I 
have been here, and in the light of all events that have taken place it 
would be very difficult for me to interpret it today and say, This 
means so and so. 

505. General Grunert. Do you mean the message was so garbled 
that you couldn't understand it ? 

General Short. No. It was such general talk that it could mean 
anything, and that the only way that you could possibly know what it 
could mean would be if you knew that the individuals had agreed 
ahead of time. There were certain words in that ; in the light of every- 
thing that has happened, there is a possibility that certain flowers 
meant certain types of ships, and that we don't know, but at the time 
neither Bicknell nor Fielder had a suggestion as to the possible mean- 
ing of it. If they had had a month to work on it and had gotten 
something further, maybe they could. But nobody was able to say. 
Well, that means so and so. 

506. General Grunert, As I recall this Congressman's statement, 
he stated something to the effect that you cursed this officer who 
brought the message, and practically threw him out. 

General Short. Bicknell is in town. I think you could verify 
that very simply by having him. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 249 

507. General Grunert. We shall go into that, but while you are 
here and the subject was brought up 

[466] General Short. He came, and, as I say, Fielder either 
came w^ith him or I sent for Fielder, and the three of us read it, and 
Bicknell had liad more time looking over the message than anybody 
else, and we first asked him if he had any interpretation he could 
make, and he didn't have, and Fielder didn't have, and I frankly 
couldn't interpret it. 

508. General Frank. Is there or is there not any basis of fact in 
the report ? 

General Short. There is absolutely no basis of fact, except that the 
report was made to me. 

509. General Grunert. Such a report? 

General Short. And it was discussed with Bicknell, who was the 
contact officer, and with Fielder, who was my G-2, and we all ad- 
mitted we couldn't interpret it. Now, as I say, they might have come 
back if nothing had iiappened : the next week or ten days they prob- 
ably would have come back with some kind of a possible interpreta- 
tion, miglit not have come back with one that they felt was positive, 
but Bicknell was suspicious because he knew something of the man 
who did the talking, and he was suspicious on that point. He said 
that it just didn't look right to him, that he couldn't make an inter- 
pretation of it. 

510. General Russell. That is all the questions I have. 

511. General Grunert. I have one more question before we go to 
the next two topics. 

General Short. I might add there that there wasn't any social func- 
tion going on at my house, or anything, at the time that he came there. 
Just the three of us were in on the thing. 

512. General Grunert. As to your possible knowledge of the im- 
minence of war with Japan, had you been reading tlie Honolulu 
[W] Advertiser? 

General Short. I read the Honolulu papers carefully. 

513. General Grunert. I quote extracts here on which I would like 
to question you : 

(Extracts from Honolulu newspapers were read as follows:) 

Headline, page 1, Sunday, 80th of November, '41 : Japanese nation ready, may 
strike over week end. 

General Short. That is November 30th? 

514. General Grunert. 30th of November, 1941 : 

Japanese May Strike Over Week End 
Kurusu bluntly warned nation ready for battle 

Then, another headline, page 1, Monday, 1st of December: 

Hull, Kurusu in crucial meeting today 

Some unofficial quarters asserted that Japanese Premier General To jo's speech 
on Saturday indicated that Japan may possibly have decided upon war. 

Did such articles like that give you pause for thought as to the 
possible imminence of war? 

General Short. Undoubtedly, but I didn't look on those things as 
authentic, as coming from the State Department. 

515. General Grunert. Now, a Mr. Raymond Coll, C-o-1-1, Ha- 
Avaiian newspaper editor, is quoted by a Washington newspaper 



250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

shortly after submission of the Roberts report January 24, '42, in 
substance that General Short and Admiral Kimmel had made clear 
by their utterances before December 7, '41, the probability and the 
imminence of a Japanese attack at an early date. Is that true? 

General Short. I wouldn't say that, at an early date. [4^^] 
We had both made repeated talks as to the necessity for the civil 
community preparing for war. My first talk was on Army Day on 
April 6. I had pounded at them to get them to provide production, 
storage of food, to organize their doctors, and to organize an auxiliary 
police force, auxiliary firemen. It wasn't preparation for war to- 
morrow, but it was getting the community organized so that if any- 
thing did happen there wouldn't be confusion, that there would be 
efficiency. That had been going on — I started April 6. 

516. General Grunert. And when was your most recent talk before 
December 7 in that way ? 

General Short. I do not think that I had made a public talk for 
some time. I could not say what date, but the one talk where that 
I got the whole thing before the community and got their interest 
and got a very considerable action was on April 6, and we had kept 
on pushing the thing from April the 6th on. 

517. General Grunert. Your G-2, Colonel Fielder, also made some 
talks? 

General Short. Colonel Fielder in the last month or six weeks made 
a considerable number of talks, made talks in different islands. 

518. General Grunert. All right. We shall go ahead with the two 
topics. 

519. General Frank. I have some questions. 

520. General Grunert. Have you some questions before you want 
to open up the other two topics ? 

521. General Frank. I have some questions about this that we have 
been talking about. 

[4^9] 522. General Grunert. Go ahead. Finish that, and then 
we shall take up the other. 

523. General Frank. Did you say that you saw the message from 
the Navy of November 27th ? 

General Short. I am sure I did, although we could not find the 
official copy in the files. 

524. General Frank. In that message was the statement generally 
along the line, "An amphibious expedition against either the Philip- 
pines, Thai, or the Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is indicated 
by the number, equipment, and organization of Japanese task forces"? 

General Short. Yes, sir, I remember that. 

525. General Frank. What was your reaction ? 

General Short. My reaction naturally from that was that if there 
was an attack going to take place it would more likely fall on the 
Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, or that neighborhood over there 
than at Honolulu ; that our hostilities in all probability would be in 
the nature of sabotage or uprisings, but in any event that 

526. General Frank. In other words, that led you away from the 
thought of an attack on Honolulu ? 

General Short. Very definitely. 

527. General Frank. Did you consider the Aircraft Warning Serv- 
ice a form of reconnaissance ? 



PROCEEDI]SrGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 251 

General Short. The best, the only form the Army had of real 
reconnaissance. 

528. General Frank. Well, then, since that War Department mes- 
sage of November 27th directed reconnaissance, why didn't [■W0'\ 
you make the Aircraft Warning Service reconnaissance more 
extensive ? 

General Short. It was very, very new. We had very few trained 
men. We made it definite for what we considered the most dangerous 
period, and they carried on — that was from 4 to 7, and they carried 
on training from 7 to 11 and from 1 to 4. The last period was largely 
maintenance. We were working the men a good — a very large num- 
ber of hours, because it was practically one relief for the thing. 

529. General Frank. However, after the December 7th attack they 
went on a 24-hour basis ? 

General Short. You can work men 24 hours when you are at war. 
You can't in peace times continue to work 24 hours indefinitely. 

530. General Frank. On the other hand, a year before that, in 
the alert that ran from June through to August, they were 

General Short. They didn't have any Aircraft Warning Service. 

531. General Frank. I know, but they were on a full-out 24-hour 
basis at that time so far as working 24 hours was concerned. 

General Short. On maneuvers you expect to. We did that in May. 
We had the whole command out, and they worked without regard 
to hours, but you can't do it indefinitely. 

532. General Frank. Did you confer with your staff relative to the 
probability of an air attack? 

General Short. When I got that message my Chief of Staff and 
I talked over carefully what alert we should go into. He had just 
finished a month before being G-3, and we talked over [4'^^] 
what alert we thought was essential, and I had the G-2 in and talked 
with him, and I think he agreed fully with me that that was our 
danger. I did not talk it over with the other members of the staff 
aside from G-2 and G-3. I talked it over, not asking whether they 
thought there would be an air attack, but I talked to the echelon 
commanders, particularly I think General Martin of the Air and 
General Burgin of the Coast Artillery. I think I personally gave 
them the messages and talked about what we wanted done. And I 
talked with General Murray. He had control of most of the sabotage 
in the Honolulu area, and I imagine that I had at least four or five 
conferences with him in the next week, because we were having a 
very complete check made by him personally of the guarding of the 
waterfront and everything of that kind, and we ran into some things 
that we thought had not been as completely done as they should 
be, and we made a very considerable number of changes. 

533. General Frank. All right. Now, you have given considerable 
testimony about how you arrived at your conclusion of the adequate- 
ness of Alert No. 1, and in general may we say that you came to this 
conclusion as a result of your faith in the effectiveness of naval oper- 
ations and the influence of naval opinion and to a certain extent of 
the line of thought as a result of what was contained in messages 
between the 16th of November and the 27th ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. And that was later confirmed by, may I 
add, actions of the War Depai'tment in not replying to my message 



252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and stating they wanted more, and in sending planes in without any 
ammunition. 

534. General Frank. All right. Did you feel that the wording 
[472] of messages coming in there to you indicated an effort to- 
ward a supervisory control ? 

General Short. I thought that it indicated very definitely two 
things : that they wanted me to be extremely careful and not have an 
incident with the Japanese population that would arouse Japan, and 
the other thing was not to violate territorial laws in my eagerness to 
carry out defensive measures. 

535. General E'rank. The question has arisen in the minds of the 
Board as to why, when that air estimate anticipated just exactly what 
happened, steps were not taken to meet it. I assume that the 
answer 

General Short. You mean the estimate of the year — you mean the 
year before? 

536. General Frank. No. The Martin-Bellinger estimate. 
General Short. Oh. 

537. General Frank. Of 1941. 
General Short. Yes. 

538. General Frank. I assume the answer is the answer that you 
gave to the question asked just two or three questions back. 

General Short. Yes. 

539. General Frank. How long previous to November '41 was daily 
reconnaissance performed by the Army? 

General Short. We had a reconnaissance squadron stationed at 
Bellows Field that had a regular training program providing for 
so many hours of reconnaissance daily. They were the ones that per- 
formed it. It was a daily training proposition really. They per- 
formed this reconnaissance as part of the training of their squadron 
daily. 

540. General Frank. Was this going on in November '41 ? 

[473] General Short. Yes, sir, this was going on. I think you 
may somewhere have maybe the program of Bellows Field which 
would show you just exactly what they were carrying on just in their 
daily training. 

541. General Frank. But this was not being carried on on the morn- 
ing of 

General Short. Not then on that morning, because it was Sunday 
morning. 

542. General Frank. Yes. That was a form of reconnaissance? 
General Short. It was very definitely reconnaissance. 

543. General Frank. That you were carrying on? 

General Short. But it was of no particular value where air was 
concerned, not like the Aircraft Warning Service. It actually would 
have been of real value only against submarines, as I see it. 

544. General Frank. All right. 

545. General Grunert. That was the only reconnaissance mission 
that those training planes had, was it not? 

General Short. Yes, the close-in reconnaissance : go out 20 miles. 

546. General Grunert. Were they armed, and did they have 
ammunition? 

(leneral Short. They did not. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 253 

547. General Frank. Did you have an official arrangement for 
systematic furnishing of information to your headquarters from the 
Navy? 

General Spiort. The G-2 and O. N. I. were in constant touch, and 
they had a teletype circuit that they and the F. B, I. were on. [-^^7] 
That worked both ways, so they could instantly exchange information. 
We were not getting routine daily reports of the O. N. I. 

548. General Frank. What I am trying to arrive at is this : You, 
through your testimony, have stated that in your personal contacts with 
Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch you were advised at intervals 
with respect to when task forces went out, but I am trying to make 
it appear in the record that there was no official arrangement for that 
kind of information to come into your headquarters. 

General Short. No, there were no written reports being transmitted 
every day to us as to exactly what was being done, until after the attack. 
That went into effect right away on December 7. 

549. General Frank. Not only that, but you may or may not have 
known when task forces went out; is that correct? 

General Short. Yes, I think I probably always knew what they did 
have out : I mean, in general terms ; I may not have known the exact 
number of ships, but I always knew in general terms what was out. 

550. General Frank. Did you always know where they were? 
General Short. In general locations, probably whether they were 

going towards Canton, whether they were going towards Wake, 
whether they were going towards Midway. 

551. General Frank. How often did they go into the area north 
and east of Oahu ? 

General Short. They constantly had them out. 

552. General Frank. In the north and east? 

[475] General Sitort. Largely north. North and west, you 



mean 



553. General Frank. No. I mean north and east. 
General Short. Oh, you mean to the east of Midway? 

554. General Frank. No. I mean straight north and northeast of 
Oahu. 

General Short. I don't think that they — I think they went straight 
north quite a bit. I don't think they went east to any considerable 
extent, that they considered that the area to the west was more dan- 
gerous and that the great part of their work was done there. 

555. General Grunert. Their task forces, the directions that they 
went, got to be soit of routine, so that Japanese agents could have 
been aware that they seldom went to the north and east? 

General Short. I don't — I never knew the exact courses that the 
task forces traveled on. I knew where they wound up, but when they 
were going to Wake Island I didn't know whether they shot out this 
way for a few hundred miles and then this way (indicating) . I never 
did know their courses. 

556. General Frank. The manner in which this information came 
into Army hands, namely, that it was given in more or less of a per- 
sonal manner to you, did not made it readily available to your staff for 
planning purposes, did it? 

General Short. No, except that if I had gotten anything of prime 
importance I naturally would have called in G-2. 



254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

557. General Grunert. Then there were no periodic meetings 

General Short. No periodic. 

558. General Grunert. — between the Army and Navy representa- 
tives to interchange information or say, "There is nothing doing 
[476] today," or what? 

General Short. There was practically — there w^as daily contact 
between O. N. I. and G-2, and, as I say, w'ith the teletype they could 
exchange messages just any minute. 

559. General Frank. I know, but the O. N. I. never gave to your 
G-2 any information about these task forces ? 

General Short. No, they did not, not until after December 7. 

560. General Frank. Now let us get back to the method of disper- 
sion and protection. Had the bombers at Hickam Field been dis- 
persed, either with or without bunkers, and had the crews at critical 
hours or in emergency manned the machine guns in the airplanes, that 
would have furnished a defense against attack from the air as well 
as against an attack by saboteurs on the ground, would it not ? 

General Short. To a very limited extent. You probably know 
better than I to what range that you would expect them to be effective. 
My understanding is that they don't count on the .30 caliber in a fight 
much beyond a hundred yards, or the .50 caliber something like two 
hundred yards. Is that correct? 

561. General Frank. Well, that is correct, but at the height at which 
the Jap planes were attacking the fields that morning those machine 
guns certainly would have been effective ? 

General Short. They probably would have had some effect. 

562. General Frank. And just that method that we were recounting 
was used the year before ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. Now, I'll tell you, our main — with the 
heavy bombers our idea was to disperse to the outlying islands. That 
was what we were working towards. We couldn't [W7'\ dis- 
perse at Hickam Field ; the character of the ground was such that you 
couldn't roll the heavy bombers off of the apron and count on getting 
them out. When we finally got where we could disperse them, we had 
to build bunkers above the ground, because you couldn't dig down on 
account of the water, and you had to build runways that were macadam 
to a certain extent, and the ground was of such a nature that you 
couldn't just run them out promiscuously over the ground. 

563. General Frank. You are talking about the B-l7s ? 
General Short. Yes. 

564. General Frank. But you had only 12 of those ? 
General Short. That is correct. 

565. General Frank. Out on that morning? 
General Short. That is correct. 

566. General Frank. Now^ let us pursue this defense against sabo- 
tage a little further. Hickam Field was not very extensive ? 

General Short. No, not very great. 

567. General Frank. It was bounded by the water on the south and 
by the channel and the Navy on the west. There was a plan the year 
previous to place barbed wire along the exposed boundary to the 
north and east of the field, clear the space in front of the barbed w^ire, 
and enfilade it with machine guns. 

General Short. We had put in in May for money for wire for fenc- 
ing the fields and enfilading the fields. We finally got the money in 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 255 

September, and on account of the priority proposition, because the 
material was not available locally, we had not gotten the material 
at the time of the attack. 

568. General Frank. For the fence. 

General Short. Yes. 

[4'/'S] 569 General Grunert. Had you got any other material ? 

General Short. What? 

570. General Grunert. Did you have barbed wire? 

General Short. The amount of barbed wire in Honolulu at that time 
was, I would say, extremely limited. The supplies had been used up 
there, and the merchants couldn't get anything without priorities, so 
anything in the construction line was extremely difficult to get. 

571. General Grunert. If they defended that way in 1940, was that 
just a plan? 

General Short. That was '41. That was just a plan, if you are 
talking about that. They didn't have that. 

572. General Frank. Yes. A certain amount of barbed wire was 
put in place, and the Engineers, in that warehouse at Kamehameha, 
had a certain supply of barbed wire? 

General Short. We had a certain supply of barbed wire, but that 
wasn't what they were trying to fence with, that barbed wire. AVe had 
rolls of that we were using for field fortification work. We had dumps 
established on that, but that was not what the air people wanted for 
fencing the fields. They wanted a 

573. General Frank. Well, it was not a question of using it for 
fencing, but it was a question of using it as protection against people 
coming in for sabotage. 

General Short. I see. 

574. General Frank. Then, there was an officer by the name of Lord, 
of the Corps of Engineers, who designed an armored machine gun box, 
and we actually installed one and put machine guns in it, at the angle 
at the northeast side of Hickam so that it [-^7^] enfiladed the 
area in front of the barbed wire. 

General Short. We had regular ground defense organized. We had 
infantry organizations detailed to assist in that ground defense. We 
had a battalion of 500 airmen trained by infantry officers for that 
ground defense. 

575. General Grunert. Then, the reason you bunched the airplanes 
on Hickam is that there was not room to spread them, or what? 

General Short. Two reasons. The first reason was that the ques- 
tion of sabotage was, we figured, very much safer, and, as I told you 
in my testimony. Colonel Burwell had made a very detailed investiga- 
tion for the Air Corps and very strongly recommended that they be 
grouped. 

576. General Grunert. Well, could they have been dispersed 
despite Burwell's report? 

General Short. The heavy ones could not. The flying fortresses 
could not have been moved off on account of the nature of the ground. 

577. General Grunert. What proportion were they of the rest of the 
planes? 

General Short. They were the valuable portion, you might say. 

578. General Grunert. How many? What percentage ? 



256 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. I think there ^ve^e 12 of those aiul I think about 54 
of the old B-18s, but they were worth decidedly more than all of the 
B-18s. And there were some A-20s. There were 10 A-20s, and the 
A-20s weren't touched in the attack, 

579. General Frank. As a matter of fact, the B-l7s could have 
been placed on the runways other than the north-and-south runway, 
[4^0] because that was clone before, and if necessary they could 
have taken off in a light cross wind, because that north-and-south run- 
way was used about 80 percent of the time. 

General Short. Yes. Of course, the more you scattered them the 
more difficult was your protection. 

580. General Grunert. Were these planes on all the fields, as I say, 
bunched on your order, or on the judgment of the commanding officer 
of the field ? 

General Short. They were definitely — it was provided in Alert 
No. 1. We had given serious consideration to that. As I say, we 
had had this very elaborate study made, and Alert No. 1 — we had 
decided very definitely that it was advantageous to disperse them 
by fields as much as possible, but to group them on any particular 
field. 

581. General Frank. How was it anticipated that a sabotage would 
be accomplished ? 

General Short. In any possible way. 

582. General Frank. Well, what? 

General Short. We figured that there were enough alien Japanese 
on the Island, 

583. General Frank. Hand grenades or hand bombs ? 

General Short, I wouldn't — you can just visualize anything you 
want to, anything from having a man in the Hawaiian Depot that was 
working on motors put emery in the motors, or anything. There were 
all types of possible sabotage, 

584. General Frank, As a matter of fact, if you bunch them all 
together and somebody heaves a hand grenade or a bomb in there, he 
destroys not one but several. 

General Short, Yes, but if you have them grouped it [4^-?] 
doesn't take very many men to be sure that nobody can get close 
enough to heave in. That was the idea. 

585. General Frank. Then, furthermore, if a fire is started and 
they are all bunched together, it is almost impossible to get in there 
through the heat and get those that are not yet affected away, and 
while they are all bunched together you can't man the machine guns 
on the interior ones and have them as positive machine gun defense 
against the people advancing across the airdrome. 

General Short. We were not counting on — we were counting on 
the machine gims mounted on the ground for that defense. That is 
a strange thing: at Kaneohe Bay all of their planes that were dis- 
persed were destroyed without exception, and the ones that were 
grouped on the landing aprons were very largely saved. They were 
damaged to some extent, but very largely saved, and the others were 
all destroyed, 

586. General Frank, Were the machine guns in the airplanes 
manned ? 

General Short, I don't know, I don't image they were, but I 
don't know. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 257 

587. General Frank. Another thing: there were a certain number 
of Air Corps men that were excess at the time because you didn't have 
enough available equipment. 

General Short. That is correct. » 

588. General Grunert. These planes at Kaneohe Bay, what planes 
were they ? Navy ? 

General Short. Navy planes. 

589. General Grunert. It would appear that the Japanese came 
over to cripple the Navy more than the Army. Would it have been 
[482] possible that they selected those targets which would cripple 
the Navy and keep the Navy from going to the Far East ? In other 
words, did it appear possible their objectives were Navy objectives 
more than Army objectives? 

General Short. No. The ones I was pointing out that were not 
destroyed there were also naval planes that were up on the landing 
field and on the apron, and their losses among them were not so very 
great, but my understanding is that in the group that were dispersed 
every single plane was lost. 

[483] 590. General Frank. It would have been possible, be- 
cause there were excess men in the Air Force, to have dispersed them, 
and to have had the men protect the perimeter of the flying field and 
thus have been protected by dispersion from both air attack and 
sabotage ? , 

General Short. Yes. 

591. General Frank. But that comes to a question of judgment? 
General Short. And also a question that, you see those men were 

not just sitting there doing nothing, they were all being trained for 
some job, and if you stayed on this Alert No, 1 for a month and 
kept those men all around the perimeter of the airfield, you couldn't 
do anything else with them. 

592. General Frank. Were your personnel being trained to ferry 
planes to the Philippines? 

General Short. They were. We were definitely responsible for 
the ferrying of the planes to the Pliilippines. 

593. General Frank. How much did that interfere with your train- 
ing for your own war effort ? 

General Short. It meant that as far as the B-l7's were concerned 
we had to have all of our B-l7's constantly on work training those 
crews, and, to make it worse, to keep those planes, we didn't have 
spare parts for B-l7's, and to keep them going to the Philippines, 
we had to rob six of our planes of parts to keep the others going, 
and our orders were such that we felt that our first mission there was 
to shove the planes to the Philippines, so we took the parts from six 
of our planes, to keep the others going. 

594. General Frank. We had testimony that we read in the Rob- 
erts Keport that Admiral Bloch, and I am not so sure about [484] 
Admiral Kimmel, but Admiral Bloch is distinctly of the impression 
that the aircraft warning service was in continual operation. What 
led him to that conclusion? 

General Short. I don't know. 

595. General Frank. Had you reported ? 

General Short. No, I had not. They should have known what 
was going on. They had a Naval liaison officer in our G-3 section 
who knew exactly what was being done, and he should have kept 

79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1 18 



258 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

them, the right man, informed of details. Lieutenant Burr, of the 
Navy, was on duty as liaison officer with the G-3 for the express pur- 
pose of keeping Navy informed. 

596. General Frank. Here are two letters, one of which is of the 
19th of June, that you sent to Admiral Bloch : 

It is anticipated tliat the Army Aircraft Yearning Service will be placed in 
operation in the near future. Due to interest expressed by the Navy radio oper- 
ators in the Army equipment, I will cause arrangements to be effected to afford 
such naval personnel as you may desire to inspect the Army. 

That is one. Is that correct? 

General Short. Now, I must say that we went further than that. 
They had a man, a Commander Taylor, who was supposed to be 
quite an expert. 

597. General Frank. Yes. 

General Short. And he assisted us in getting the thing under way ; 
so there were at least two naval officers who should have known 
exactly what was going on. 

598. General Frank. You remember writing this letter? 
General Short. I remember the letter ; yes. 

[4j8'o] 599. General Frank. And here is a letter. 

General Short. Now, may I say, there, that originally the War 
Department had stated that we would get delivery of the Aircraft 
Warning Service materiel by June 30. We didn't get it, but that was 
their original hope. 

600. General Frank. Then, on the 5th of August there is another 
letter, in which you stated : 

The Army's Aircraft Warning facilities for the Hawaiian Department are 
rapidly approaching completion. 

General Short. We hoped, we kept hoping all the time they would 
get that materiel in, and they approved the priority, and they didn't 
give it as good a priority as we asked for, but they improved it, and 
said that if that did not produce it, the Chief of Engineers would act. 

601. General Frank. This quotation from a letter of August 5 is 
from a letter that you wrote to Admiral Kimmel ? 

General Short. Yes. 

602. General Frank. Do you think that these two letters, and espe- 
cially this last one, led the Navy to a conclusion as to the operating 
effectiveness of the AWS ? 

General Short. It was done to try to keep them informed of the 
situation, and what we expected. You will notice, in neither one of 
the letters did I tell them that we had it, but we were hopeful, when 
I wrote those letters, and they were so interested that I was trying to 
keep them informed. 

603. General Frank. You stated that you didn't expect an air 
attack; is that correct? 

General Short. That is correct. 

604. General Fr^vnk. Now, with respect to that do you want to 
[4^6] make any differentiation between an air attack as a part of a 
general attack, and an air raid, a hit-and-run proposition? 

General Short. I didn't expect either one, frankly, with the infor- 
mation I had. 

605. General Frank. All right. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 259 

606. General Russell. Two or three things, very briefly, General. 
There was some discussion about this reconnaissance which was being 
conducted by Army personnel as part of the training, from one of those 
airfields. 

General Short. Yes. 

607. General Russell. General Short, when you went out to the 
Department and took command, were those reconnaissances being 
made as part of training the men ? 

General Short. I think in all probability they were, although Bel- 
lows Field, ac the time I took command, was relatively little developed. 
We had developed Bellows Field and were using it much more, but I 
think they had the same small squadron of reconnaissance planes, and 
were working on the training of it, probably from Wheeler Field. 

608. General Russell. Do you know whether or not it is true that 
in the year 1940 the Department was ordered under an alert from the 
War Department, and that in the fall of 1940 the War Department 
directed General Herron, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian 
Department, to discontinue these reconnaissances, except as part of 
this training ? 

General Short. I do not know, sir. 

609. General Russell. You would not know, then, whether that was 
set up under War Department order by Herron and carried on under 
you, or not ? 

[4S7] General Short. I do not. 

610. General Russell. General, a great deal has been said about this 
November 27 message, and the failure of those men who were on the 
radar that morning, when they detected the presence of the incoming 
aircraft, to report it. Did the provision in the November 27 order, 
that you would disseminate this highly secret information to thcL 
minimum number of officers, in your opinion prevent you from pass- 
ing it down, so that the officer in the control office that morning, or 
the central information office, could have had it ? 

General Short. I wouldn't have expected him to have it. He was 
just one of a number of 3^oung officers that were being trained in there. 
He had only been in there a few days. 

611. General Russell. It is quite obvious that if he and the man 
on the radar had had the information that an attack might come, they 
would not have been so complacent. 

General Short. Possibly not, but I think his complacency was 
based on his knowledge of our own planes that were coming in. 

612. General Russell. A great deal has been said about the instal- 
lation of the permanent radar stations out there. Who made the con- 
tact for the installations of those ? 

General Short. The district engineer. 

613. General Frank. Colonel Wyman? 
General Short. Colonel Wyman. 

614. General Russell. Upon whom was it necessary for you to 
rely in order to hasten the installation of those radar stations ? 

General Short. As far as the work went, it was necessary to call 
upon the contracts of Colonel Wyman. On the other hand, we had 
to get back to getting materiel. I do not think [i^8] he was 
responsible for the materiel. I do not believe that his contracts had 
anything to do with obtaining the electrical materiel and things of 
that kind. 



260 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

615. General Russell. Upon whom was the responsibility for ob- 
taining that electrical materiel? 

General Short. I think that the Signal Corps, in the United States, 
had ordered those. I think I am correct. I may be wrong about it, 
but that is my feeling, that the Signal Corps in all probability bought 
those. 

616. General Russell. Was that an agency over which you had 
control ? 

General Short. No control, whatever. All I could do was to cable 
the War Department, radio the War Department and ask them to 
try to speed things up. Yesterday, you remember, I read you a wire 
to the War Department, June 10. 

617. General Russell. Yes, sir. 

General Short. And I asked for a change of priorities so as to get 
the things. I do not know definitely who purchased that materiel, 
but it was Signal Corps materiel, so I assume that they did. 

(Brief recess.) 

618. General Grunert. The Board will come to order. 

General Short, I have a number of questions here on the Interceptor 
Command, and on an activity of that Command, the Air Warning 
Service. I will ask those on the Interceptor Command as such, first. 

On the 5th of November, 1941, I understand you put out an SOP, 
and in that SOP it referred to an Interceptor Command. Was that 
an Interceptor Command actually organized and in [^55] 
being on December 7? 

General Short. It was actually functioning, but I would say that 
it wasn't definitely put in. It was actually functioning, but the Air- 
craft Warning Service had not definitely been put under the com- 
mand, as a command of the Interceptor Command. It was in the 
process of formation. 

619. General Grunert. My understanding of an interceptor com- 
mand is that it has the Air Warning Service as one of its primary 
functions, and it also has the fighter aircraft, and it has control of 
the antiaircraft. 

General Short. That's correct. 

620. General Grunert. Is that the conception of that ? 

General Short. May I explain that at that time the idea was quite 
new, and we had sent General Davidson and Colonel Powell and two 
subordinate officers to the school in the States, and they got back, I 
believe, about the 4th or 5th of December, and we were waiting on their 
return, to be sure we were fully — we had put this, what we thought 
was correct, in the Standing Operating Procedure, and we were wait- 
ing on their return to put it in effect, when they would know exactly 
what the War Department was doing in the mainland. 

621. General Grunert. When did they return? 

General Short. I think it was about the 4th or 5th of December. 
They had been back only a day or two. 

622. General Grunert. And General Davidson was in command 
of the Interceptor Command ? 

General Short. He was the one who was to — he was in command 
of the pursuit, and in all this exercise we had been carrying on ; it was 
functioning under him, but the actual [4^0] command of these 
units had not been turned over to him, on December 7. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 261 

623. General Grunert. Then there was no Interceptor Command, 
as such, with a commander ? 

General Short. You might say that, formally, but it was all work- 
ing just as if it existed. We were trying to get to the point where we 
thought we could issue the order. 

624. General Grunert. Well, the order was issued ? 

General Short. But not made — that part of that Standing Oper- 
ating Procedure was more or less suspended till we got General Da- 
vidson and Colonel Powell's opinion. 

625. General Grunert. Then the component parts of the Inter- 
ceptor Command were in existence and functioning, but not the Inter- 
ceptor Command, as a whole? 

General Short. They were functioning together, you might say, 
cooperating and coordinating, but had not been placed definitely under 
Davidson's command. 

626. General Grunert. And tests and practices were conducted of 
component parts, but not as a whole ? 

General Short. Yes, they were conducted as a whole, but the ques- 
tion of being absolutely under his command, the order had not been 
issued. 

627. General Grunert. Then, was there Navy representation, there? 
Did you participate in tests and practices? 

General Short. I am of the opinion that they were there. Whether 
they were there constantly, I don't know, but the provision was for 
them, and we had had this Naval Commander Taylor working with 
them, and I believe it was about the 24th of November that we had 
asked the Navy, through him ; had him [4^-?] request the Navy 
to have officers there to work with us, as early as possible. 

628. General Grunert. There was an actual information center or- 
ganized, was there? 

General Short. Oh' yes; there was an actual information center 
organized, and it was working daily. It was working just the same 
as it would have worked if the definite order was issued. 

629. General Grunert. Who had charge of that? 

General Short. Well, you had your aircraft warning service, there ; 
you had your control officer, who was actually in charge of the func- 
tioning of it. 

630. General Grunert. Who was he ? 

General Short. We was General Davidson's recommendation — I 
mean. General Davidson's representative. 

631. General Grunert. Who had charge of the center? 

General Short. Wlien it was functioning, the control officer had 
charge. 

632. General Grunert. Who was the control officer ? 

General Short. I was just trying to think of the Major's name. It 
was an Air Corps Major that was representing General Davidson. 

633. General Grunert. Was his name Bergquist ? 

General Short. I think so, I think so ; and General Davidson, him- 
self, was there a great deal of the time. 

634. General Grunert. Then it seems to me that it was understood 
that Davidson, some time in the future, was to have this, and during 
the present, had an interest in being there. Did he ? 



262 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. Yes, sir ; very' definitely, he Imew he was [4^^] 
going to get it, and that it was just dependent on when he said he was 
ready. 

635. General Grunert. Where did the Signal Officer, Colonel Pow- 
ell, come in ? 

General Short. Powell? Well, I should say he was responsible for 
the technical functioning of all the stations, and the transmission of 
the information to the control room. 

636. General Grunert. But he was not in control of the informa- 
tion center ? 

General Short, No. I would say that Bergquist was more in 
charge of the whole thing than Colonel Powell. 

637. General Grunert. Wliat was Bergquist's relationship to Gen- 
eral Davidson? 

General Short. He was General Davidson's man. He was his rep- 
resentative. 

638. General Grunert. Then, as far as you know, there were some 
naval officers interested in the thing, but whether they had actually 
been detailed, there 

General Short. We had made the request, and Commander Taylor 
was working all the time with the outfit. Now, whether they had ac- 
tually sent these people that we had asked to have sent, I don't know. 
1 was through the place two or three times, and it may be that if Tay- 
lor was there, that I thought of him as the Naval representative. 

639. General Grunert. AVas the Navy kept informed of its status 
all through this organizing state, so that they knew what to depend 
upon, and what its status was? 

General Short. We had two officers. We had one officer. Lieuten- 
ant Burr, who was the liaison man with the G-3, whose [WS] 
duty was solely to keep Navy infonned of what we were doing. Then, 
we had the other man, who was Taylor, that he was there to help us, 
because he was an expert on the thing. It wasn't primarily his duty 
to keep the Navy informed. It was Burr's duty to keep the Navy 
informed. I think, however, that Taylor probably did keep them 
informed, to a considerable extent. 

640. General Grunert. Then, whether the Navy was informed as 
to its status, was a question of whether Commander Taylor or Lieu- 
tenant Burr 

General Short. Burr, particularly. Whether Burr did the job 
he was detailed for 

641. General Grunert. He was detailed under what? 

General Short. G-3. He was supposed to know everything, and 
he sat in on everything that G-3 had. 

642. General Grunert. So far as you know, there was no Navy man 
actually detailed as part of the information center ? 

General Short. I frankly do not know definitely. I know the re- 
quest was made, and I was of the opinion that it was being carried out; 
but I can't say, definitely. 

643. General Grunert. Part of the testimony before the Roberts 
Commission stated : 

General Short testified that there were uaval officers at the information center, 
but Admiral Kimmel stated that no naval officer had ever been detailed to the 
Air Warning Service Center, to keep the Navy advised. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 263 

General Short. Well, as I say, I couldn't say definitely. I know 
the request had been made, that it was contemplated, and I thought it 
had been carried out. 

644. General Grunert. Now, referring to the testimony before 
[W4] tbe Koberts Commission: 

General Short admitted that at the time of the attack the Interceptor Com- 
mand had not a definite organization and that he didn't know for sure whether 
the Navy knew this. 

I think you have covered that. 

General Short. That is correct. They should have known from 
Burr. Whether they did, I don't know. 

645. General Grunert. Then, there is a statement here in that rec- 
ord which states : 

The Air Force merely cooperated on its own hook. 

meaning that they cooperated, when they saw fit, or if they saw fit? 
General Short. No, they always had a control officer there. 

646. General Grunert. Then, I have a note here to the effect the 
Interceptor Command was actually activated December 17. 

General Short. I think that is probably correct, that that was the 
date when that official order was put out. 

647. General Grunert. Now, as to the Air Warning Service, will 
you tell us what that consisted of, and what it was intended to consist 
of, and what was actually in being in the latter part of November and 
early in December. 

(xeneral Short. It was intended to consist of the pursuit command, 
which was two groups, I think, of seven squadrons. 

648. General Grunert. I am talking about the Air Warning Service. 
General Short. Oh, I thought you meant the Interceptor Command. 
\4^S] 649. General Grunert. The Air Warning Service. 
General Short. The Air Warning Service, we actually had mobile 

stations. We had no fixed station that was able to function. 

650. General Grunert. How many fixed stations were there to be, 
and how many mobile stations were there to be ? 

General Short. In the original plan, there were to be three fixed sta- 
tions. Then that was switched, and Burr changed that, at a later date, 
and increased the number to six. 

[Copy] 

3141 Southwestern Boulevard, 

Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 19J,Jf. 
Subject : Correction in testimony. 
To : President, Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the 
Army Pearl Harbor Board : 



* 



Page 495, lines 8 and 9 omit "and Burr changed that". 



/s/ Walter C. Short, 
Walter C. Short, 
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired. 

651. General Grunert. When was that? 

General Short. Oh, I don't know. I think that may have been some 
time along — well, maybe as late as September, and we were to have six 



264 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

mobile stations, and I am inclined to believe — I am not sure whether the 
parts for all of those mobile stations had arrived, or whether we were 
able to operate only three. I am not definite on the number that we 
were actually able to operate. 

[W6] 652. General Grunert. Then there were supposed to be 
six permanent and six mobile? 

General Short. Six mobile and six permanent; that is right. 

653. General Grunert. Now we shall take the permanent. How 
many permanent were there actually operating or in condition to 
operate ? 

General Short. None. 

654. General Grunert. None. Of the mobile stations how many 
were operating or able to operate ? 

General Short. I am inclined to think that the parts had arrived 
for all of them. I don't know. I visited in that period of ten days, 
I think, three of the stations. I can't say definitely whether all six 
were operating or not. 

655. General Grunert. Wliat seemed to delay first the mobile sta- 
tions ? Wliat delayed their installation ? 

General Short, The question of electrical equipment. 

656. General Grunert. Electrical equipment? 

General Short. Obtaining the electrical equipment. We had been 
promised it by June 30. 

657. General Grunert. They needed no particular' construction? 
General Short. No. 

658. General Grunert. Except access to the station? 

General Short. That was it. The construction that they required 
could be done without any great amount of material, because 

659. General Grunert. When the Secretary of War told the Secre- 
tary of the Navy in February of '41 that all material for the air warn- 
ing system would be over there by June, what [W^] did he 
mean ? 

General Short. I think that he expected 

660. General Grunert. For all stations? 

General Short. I think that he expected it for all stations. 

661. General Grunert. But you said that there were to be three 
permanent. 

General Short. Yes. Well, I mean at the time he made the state- 
ment he would have expected to have the material there for three 
fixed, and as it existed. 

662. General Grunert. For the project as it existed? 
General Short. As it existed, and then it was changed. 

663. General Grunert. Then he expected to have the material over 
there for six mobile and three permanent? 

General Short. Finally, but when he wrote the letter I would say 
three fixed and six mobile. 

664. General Grunert. All right. Now, why didn't he get the 
material there? What were the conditions in June when the Navy 
had a right to expect that the Army had its stuflf over there? 

General Short. As I read you a wire yesterday of June 10 I sent 
to the Adjutant General stating that the electrical equipment and 
the cables for the construction had not been obtained, and apparently 
a priority was holding it up. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 265 

665. General Grunert. Well, now, as to the permanent stations, 
what was short there ? Why didn't — ■ — 

General Short. Well, the first thing that was short on Kaala, which 
was possibly the most important permanent station, was the cable. 

666. General Grunert. The cable. 

[4^5] General Short. We couldn't even start. 
667 General Grunert. You told us that. 

General Short. We couldn't even start construction because the 
only way to get the material up on top of the mountain was by cable. 

668. General Grunert. Was all other material present except the 
cable ? 

General Short. Oh, no, no. As a matter of fact, on December 7th 
you didn't have material for the fixed stations. I think maybe that 
it was largely there except motors. 

669. General Grunert. Then, the shortage of equipment applied 
to both of them ? 

General Short. I do not remember the details of just what parts 
of the equipment, but I know that the equipment for the fixed stations 
had not been completed at that time. 

670. General Grunert. Now, in what way were the fixed stations 
different from the mobile ? 

General Short. They were much more powerful stations. 

671. General Grunert. More powerful. How were they run, by 
generated electricity or by gas, gas machine, or what ? 

General Short. I think that we had contracts for the public utility 
companies to run wires so we could use current generated in that way, 
and then we had motors so in case that went out we could have an 
alternative. 

672. General Grunert. Yes. But it was not until June that you 
started to get after the War Department ? 

General Short. That is right. 

673. General Grunert. What happened between February and 
June? 

\_Jf99'\ General Short. They agreed — we had been told they 
would arrive by June 30th. We weren't really expecting them until 
right at the end of June, and we didn't find out until early in June 
that they were not going to get there, and when we did I sent the wire. 

674. General Grunert. When did they actually get all the equip- 
ment, if ever, before you left ? 

General Short. They did not. I think we got practically all of 
the equipment for the mobile stations along maybe the last week in 
October or the first week in November, because we set them up as 
soon as we got them. 

675. General Grunert. Then, all the mobile stations should have 
been working on December 7? 

General Short. I am under the impression that we had the mobile 
equipment. Now, there may be one or two that had not been com- 
pletely set up. 

676. General Grunert. But how about the equipment for the 
permanent ones? 

General Short. I am sure that it had not all arrived. 

677. General Grunert. So you couldn't operate anything on ac- 
count of the lack of equipment ? 



266 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. Lack of equipment as far as permanent ones. 

678. General Grunert. And you didn't have all the stuff to put on 
the inaccessible places, so it was not so much the question of roads and 
cables to get the whole thing working, if you didn't have all that 
equipment ? 

General Short. No, only that we were particularly anxious to get 
the construction work all done so when the equipment arrived there 
would be no additional delay. 

[oOO] GT9. General Grunert. Then, there w^as a combination, 
as I see it : the lack of equipment and the lack of materials to construct 
cables to get the equipment — to put them in these permanent stations. 

General Short. That is correct. 

680. General Grunert. After June 10th when again did you go 
after the War Department or anybody else? 

General Short. I kept in constant touch with the exact status of 
the construction of the fixed stations by — I had a liaison officer. Major 
Fleming in the Engineers, who was in almost daily touch with the 
District Engineers and reported to me on the status of construction. 

681. General Grunert. You used Fleming as your liaison with 
the District Engineer ? 

General Short. With the District Engineer. He was an engineer 
and was one of the Assistant G-4, and he was almost in daily touch 
with the District Engineer in regard to construction of airfields, air- 
craft warning service, and certain construction for storage of am- 
munition up in the vicinity of Scofield. 

68:2. General Grunert. Was the District Engineer under you? 

General Short. He was not. 

683. General Grunert. Was he not placed under you along .toward 
the fall sometime? 

General Short. He was not. He came under me with everything 
else on December 7th, or December 8th; when the martial law was 
declared, why, naturally he came under me. 

684. General Grunert. And to whom did he look for instructions, 
and how far could you push him ? 

[SOI] General Short. I'll tell you how they worked. Tradi- 
tionally, you know, all field fortifications have been carried out by 
the Engineers, all airfield construction. He was made responsible 
for that by the War Department, and for the construction of these 
aircraft warning stations, and I might say also for the construction 
of bombproofs. If we had a project like bombproofing a headquar- 
ters or providing for gasoline storage, ammunition storage, I talked 
over with responsible people what they thought we ought to have. If 
it were a question of providing — now, the heavy seacoast giuis over 
there, none of them had any protection for personnel. In that case 
I would talk it over with the Chief of the Coast Artillery, General 
Burgin, have Fleming in on it, have him draw up roughly what we 
were after. Then the District Engineer would put his engineers and 
his draftsmen on the thing and draw up detailed plans, and then we 
would have a conference with the District Engineer, with Fleming 
and Burgin, say, and go over the detail plans. If they appeared 
to be fully what we wanted, the approval was given to the plan. 

685. General Grunert. You approved the plan? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 267 

General Short. Approved the plan, and then he got the money 
from the Chief of Engineers in Washington. 

686. General Grunert. Who decided on when such and such a 
thing had to be in ? 

General Short. We made the decision as to when we wanted it in. 
Of course, you couldn't make a decision that it had to be in because 
you didn't know how long it was going to take to get the money 
and you clidn't know how long it was going to take to get the material. 

[502] 687. General Grunert. Well, at certain times all these 
contracts were let and had a completion date at least estimated. 

General Short. I think most all 

• 688. General Grunert. Who estimated that? 

General Short. Most all the contracts, that would have been done 
by the dates of the needing. Most all of the contracts of the District 
Engineer I think had been let before my arrival. He was working on 
those same contracts. Now, some 

689. General Grunert. You were interested in getting these defense 
contracts completed as of the date of completion? 

General Short. That is right, and I had 

690. General Grunert. Who extended the date from time to time? 
Did you ? 

General Short. Often it was force of circumstances, that it was 
impossible to get the material, that there wasn't any question of any- 
body extending it; it just was an impossibility. I had a confer- 
ence 

691. General Grunert. From whom did j'Ou get reports that it was 
impossible to get the material ? 

General Short. I had a conference on an average of every week or 
ten days with the District Engineer. 

692. General Grunert. From the District Engineer you got the 
information ? 

General Short. From the District Engineer and with Major Flem- 
ing present. He kept me — I probably saw Fleming almost every day 
and talked over some of these things with him, and, as I say, the Dis- 
trict Engineer came in and made a report of progress probably every 
week or ten days and went into his [SOS] difficulties, whatever 
they were. 

693. General Grunert. If they were not satisfied with that progress, 
what was your recourse ? 

General Short. To wire the War Department. 

694. General Grunert. And ycu did that once in June? 
General Short. I did that. 

695. General Grunert. On the air warning stuff ? 
General Short. I did. 

696. General Grunert. Did you make any other complaints to the 
War Department as to lack of material ? 

General Short. I did. The other complaint, the other things — 
well, for instance, the airfields were not going as fast as I wanted 
them, but it was anuestion of a.llotment of funds. I was trying con- 
stantly to get the allotment of funds. We couldn't do anything until 
we got it. We had the approval of the project, but we didn't have the 
funds, actual funds, in most cases. 



268 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

697. General Grunert. Were you responsible for getting the 
things, or was the District Engineer ? 

General Short. I was responsible for getting projects approved 
and the amount approved, and the funds then were transmitted to 
the District Engineer. 

698. General Grunert. But as far as the air warning service is 
concerned, it wasn't a question of funds ? 

General Short. No, it was not. 

699. General Grunert. It was a question of getting the air warn- 
ing service completed as quickly as possible ? 

General Short. That is correct. 

700. General Grunert. And you found that the material was not 
[504^ going in as you desired or thought it should, so you com- 
plained to the War Department ? 

General Short. The report that the District Engineer had from 
the Division Engineer in San Francisco, he was advised by the Divi- 
sion Engineer that there was going to be a very considerable delay 
on account of priorities. He felt apparently that if we could get the 
War Department to step up our priority, that we would get it very 
much faster, and that is what prompted that. 

701. General Grunert. And that contractor was dependent upon 
the Army getting priorities for him ? 

General Short. Very definitely. That is the only way. That is 
the only way you could get any priority. 

702. General Grunert. And as far as you know there was no fault 
or delay on the part of the contractor ? 

General Short. I don't know of any delay on his part. 

703. General Grunert. Well, now, after June 10th when you made 
your complaint, did you then think that everything was O. K., that 
they would do it when they could, or didn't you needle them again? 

General Short. As I say, I had a conference and got a report of 
progress probably on an average of every week or ten days, a per- 
sonal conference, and if there was anything we felt could be pushed 
faster we tried to have it done. 

704. General Grunert. Did you feel it was necessary to go after 
the War Department again ? 

General Short. We did — not on those particular things. Often we 
could get something speeded up by a conference with the District 
Engineers. 

[60S] 705. General Grunert. Were you satisfied with the prog- 
ress made ? 

General Short. I wasn't satisfied. I wasn't satisfied very fre- 
quently with the progress made. 

706. General Grunert. Well, here is from June to December, a 
matter of nearly six months, and still the thing is not completed. 

General Short. It took about fifteen weeks to get a priority through. 

707. General Grunert. Well, you were put on a higher priority 
then? 

General Short. Yes, but we never did get on — now, the Navy were 
on an A-1. We never— and I tried to get this put on a 1-B, and they 
put it on a 1-C. 

708. General Grunert. You were very much concerned about 
this air warning service ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 269 

General Short. I was very much concerned. 

709. General Grunert. That was really your No. 1 priority con- 
struction ? 

General Short. That was. It was the thing I looked on as prob- 
ably the most 'essential thing. 

710. General Grunert. Was it important enough to bring it to the 
personal attention of the Chief of Staff? 

General Short. I had written a letter about the whole thing to 
Chief of Staff sometime earlier, on that. I did bring the question of 
priority to the attention of the Deputy Chief of Staff, of the whole 
priority, and I got some help from General Moore, who was the 
Deputy Chief of Staff. I did not get what I asked for, but I got 
some decided help as a result of my direct [606] communica- 
tion with him, not on this, but I got authority for creating a lumber 
pile so we could have some lumber on hand to build barracks, and we 
got a certain amount of hardware material that the District Engineer 
was going to need ; that they built up the thing ahead of time. But 
I would say the Deputy Chief of Staff had more to do with helping 
us on that than anybody else. 

[507] 711. General Grunert. Now, I think you referred to 
this in your testimony before : General Short wrote Admiral Kimmel 
June 19th that air warning service would be in operation in the 
near future. Against on August 5, '41, that the air warning service 
was rapidly nearing completion. 

When did it actually get in operation? That has been answered. 

General Short. That is about the first week in November. 

712. General Grunert. Why the delay ? In other words, now here 
you write the Navy on the 19th, "near future" ; on August 5th, "and 
rapidly nearing completion". Then from August 5th to December 
7th, September, October, November, four months, the thing isn't 
completed yet. And did you again notify the Navy that you were in 
error or mistaken about the near completion ? 

General Short. They, I am sure, they were. We at least had one 
of their officers who was helping set up the whole thing and knew 
the exact status of the thing. Now, I don't think I wrote another 
letter to them on that. I undoubtedly talked to them about it, be- 
cause that project was very dear to their hearts. They were ter- 
ribly interested in it. 

713. General Grunert. Captain DeLany knew the air warning 
service was very unsatisfactory. I say we found that out from Cap- 
tain DeLany. And then again it says, "General Short said his S. O. P. 
on November 5, '41, was issued as an accomplished procedure." Evi- 
dently the 

General Short. It was with regard to everything except the Inter- 
ceptor Command. 

714. General Grunert. Everything but that point. 

Again referring to the Roberts Commission : General Short states 
that it would have made no difference in his plan if he [508] 
had been furnished with all the materials needed; also that if his 
radars had all been completed he would still have been operating them 
the same way he was doing December 7th, '41. I just have a question 
here of why. You mean by that that you would have been operating 
just during those same morning hours? 



270 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Genenil Short. In all probability my estimate of the situation was 
such that I didn't think it required a 24:-hour operation of them. 

715. General Gkuneht. Do you suppose it was general knowledge 
that you were operating just between those hours : general knowledge 
to the public, or that the Japanese agents could have gotten that 
information ? 

General Short. Japanese agents; it would have been possible for 
them to ge that information. 

716. General Grunert. Would you suppose that would have influ- 
enced them to attack after they presumed that the radar, the air 
warning service, had quit for the day ? 

General Short. I have no way of knowing. 

717. General Grunert. I have a note here that the air warning 
service, the mobile unit training, had been in training since November 
1st. Do you consider that the mobile units actually installed were 
capable of operating on December 7th to a reasonable degree of 
efficiency ? 

General Short. I think that the men were not experts, but I think 
they were getting trained to the point where they could do pretty well. 

718. General Grunert. And then it was just a question ol their 
operating on that particular day and that particular time? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

719. General Grunert. I have exhausted my questions on this 
[509] interceptor and air warning, on which you undoubtedly 
have a number of questions. I yield to you next. 

720. General Frank. I would like to bring out in a little greater 
detail some facts about the equipment furnished and that needed. 
With respect to equipment furnished, is it a fact that, so far as the 
radar themselves were concerned, you had three heavy radar sets 
complete and six mobile sets complete ? 

General Short. I am of the opinion that we did not have the motors. 
Now, Colonel Powell would be very much safer on that answer than 
I would be. 

721. General Frank. You mean the motor generators? 
General Short. Yes. 

722. General Frank. Well, if they were hooked up with commercial 
current, then you didn't need them? 

General Short, You w^ouldn't have had to have them. You do 
need them so that if anything went wrong with the current. 

723. General Frank. For reserve? 

General Short. Yes. But, as I say, that is a feeling I have, but I 
wouldn't be safe. 

724. General Frank. Well, what I am getting at is this.: from the 
point of view of the Secretary of War when he made the statement that 
this material would be furnished in June or about. 

General Short. It definitely was not. The material I am sure 
didn't get there until about November 1st. He thought it. would. I 
was told by the War Department, as I remember, that by June 80th, 
we would have everything. 

725. General Frank. I have a signed letter here from the Signal 
Corps which, in answer to some questions that we asked, states as fol- 
lows: "All components of one SCR 271 set were turned [^^0] 
over by the Signal Corps to the Quartermaster for shipment on the ' 
26th of May." 



iPROCEEDINGS OF ARISIY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 271 

General Short. All components? 

726. General Fkaxk. Of one. 
General Short. Of one set? 

727. General Frakk. Yes. 
General Short. Well, now, that is a- 



728. General Frank. Now, just a minute. "All components of two 
SCR 271 were turned over for shipment on the 26th of June, one month 
later." 

General Short. Yes. 

729. General Frank. So there were three sets? 

General Short. Yes. Now, you have got to figure they have got 
to get priority to ship them. 

730. General Frank. Now ; five SCR 270. which are the mobile sets, 
were delivered to the Quartermaster for shipment on the 22nd of July. 

General Short. Yes. 

731. General Frank. It is not so material about the mobile sets 
because along in November you had the mobile sets and they were 
functioning. 

General Short. Yes, they were functioning, and I think 

732. General Frank. All I wanted to bring out is this : that it was 
not a question as to whether or not you had the radar equipment on 
hand. It was a question of having the installation in which you 
were going to put it in shape so that you could erect the radar on that 
installation. 

[611] General Short. In at least one case the question of a 
collar was involved. 

733. General Grunert. Do I understand, then, that all the perma- 
nent radar. equipment to be installed in permanent stations was in 
Hawaii and available, except some parts that were still missing? 

General Short. I think some of the parts were missing. I would 
not know definitely. The only safe way would be to call Colonel 
Powell or someone directly responsible. ' But this letter that they had 
shipped the equipment would not necessarily mean that it all ar- 
rived. If one part failed to arrive it would have prevented the use 
of the system. 

73-i. General Frank. The shortage of equipment to build roads, to 
build emplacements in these sites after you got to them over the roads, 
was really what was holding up the installation and operation of the 
permanent stations. Is that correct ? 

General Short. I believe that the roads and the buildings, except 
at Kaala were pretty well completed. That is just memory. I have 
no statement as to just the degree. We got reports of the degree of 
comjiDletion : but I believe that on the Island of Maui the Hateakala 
Station was actually on. I believe that, ihe road construction had 
been done. 

735. General Grunert. Where would such reports be available for 
t he record ? 

General Short. I think that the District Engineer and the Depart- 
meiit Signal Officer would both know definitely the status. 

736. General Frank. As a matter of fact, are you really conversant 
with those details? 

General Short. No. I knew generally, but as to exactly what had 
been received I would not know. 



272 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[SJ2] 737. General Grunert. We will develop that later. We 
want to find out how much you know, so that if there are some of these 
questions that you cannot answer you can say so. We have other ways 
of getting the information. 

General Short. I would not know except in a general way. 

738. General Frank. May we have a copy of the June 10th message? 
General Short. It is in this book, 1-E. 

739. General Frank. May we also have copies of the letters in which 
you asked for priorities ? 

General Short. Yes. 

740. General Frank. As a matter of fact, while the A. W. S. system 
was not completed, with full advantage of the power available. and the 
distance obtainable by the permanent station, nevertheless the A. W. S. 
system was operative with mobile sets up to a distance of about 130 
miles. Is not that correct? 

General Short. That is correct. You could not count on 130 miles, 
but under favorable conditions you would get it. 

741. General Frank. I bring that out to clarify something that 
General Grunert spoke about. 

Have you any information to give or comments to make relative to 
the failure of any contractors on the Hawaiian construction to com- 
plete their work ? 

General Short. I do not believe that the District Engineer ever 
reported to me that the contractor had fallen down on his job. I 
think most of the reports he made to me was as to the inability to get 
materials so that he could push the contractor. 

742. General Frank. Have you any information as to whether or 
not any military personnel neglected duties relating to the Hawaiian 
construction contract ? 

[SIS^ General Short. I have none. 

743. General Frank. Do you have any information to give to the 
Board on a Mr. Wilhelm Rohl, a German contractor who operated 
in Hawaii ? 

General Spiort. I have never even heard his name until a few 
months ago. 

744. General Frank, ^ere you in any way familiar with the. Ha- 
waii an defense contract that was let by Colonel Theodore Wyman 
to The Hawaiian Constructors? 

General Short. It was let before my arrival in the Islands. I knew 
that generally The Hawaiian Constructors were doing the work there, 
but I was not at all familiar with the details. I might state that 
when Colonel Hannum came out from San Francisco he went over 
the work that Colonel Wyman was doing, and after he had made an 
inspection of the office and the work he came to my office and made 
a report to me of what he had found, and seemed to be thoroughly 
satisfied with the conditions that he had found. 

745. General Frank. Are you familiar as to whether there were any 
parts missing on the radar, or were they parts of generator sets? 

General Short. I could not say definitely. I had the feeling that 
generator sets were missing, but I might be wrong. I am sure that 
they were not complete. 

746. General Frank. Yesterday in your testimony you gave some 
information relative to the state of training of bombardment. That 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 273 

was only part of the force that was there available. Wliat was the 
state of training with respect to your fighter aviation units? 

General Short. We had a bunch of new aviators sent over [-5.7^] 
that had just completed their primary training. I think it was 200 
hours. None of them had flown the P-40, a much faster ship than 
the training ship. As I remember, the air people stepped them up 
gradually by putting them on the P-36. I think they may have flown 
the A-20's before they went to the P-40's ; but it was a gradual propo- 
sition of getting the pilots where they were safe to fly the plane, and 
then they were given gunnery, probably, after they had reached that 
stage. 

747. General Frank. Did you anticipate 24-hour use of the aircraft 
warning service just as soon aS your permanent stations were in- 
stalled? 

General Spiort. Any time that the situation demanded. 

748. General Frank. If the equipment could stand it was there any 
point in not operating it if a critical situation existed ? 

General Short. If a critical situation existed, unquestionably ; but 
as a peace-time proposition if there was any critical situation I do not 
know whether you would operate it 24 hours a day, or not. We had 
not had the experience. 

749. General Grunert. Did you not, in answer to my question, 
state that it would not have made any difference whether all equip- 
ment was there and all stations in, that you would have done the same? 

General Short. With the estimate I had of the situation, that is 
correct. 

750. General Frank. Who determined the hours of operation of the 
A.W. S. sets, from5to7? 

General Short. In the morning or the afternoon ? 

751. General Frank. In the morning. 
General Short. 4 to 7 ? 

752. General Frank. Yes. 

[SIS] General Short. I made the determination, because all 
of our studies indicated that they were the most dangerous hours, 
that if carrier planes were going to attack they would come in so 
that when they returned to their carriers — they would not want to re- 
turn before daylight, because they would not dare to turn on lights for 
landing on their carriers. They would run in as close as they could 
so as to get there near dawn, do their bombing and go back and make a 
landing on their carriers. If you will take that study about the 180 
B-17's, that is gone into very fully as to the different distances. 

753. General Grunert. Then there must have been in your mind 
some idea that there might be some little danger of it actually hap- 
pening in those hours, or was it just for practice in order that they 
might get used to those hours ? 

General Short. If there was going to be any danger, definitely 
that would be the dangerous time; and also I wanted them to get 
accustomed to working, so that in critical periods they would be thor- 
oughly familiar with the conditions during that time. 

754. General Frank. This No. 1 Alert at this time anticipated that 
pilots would be available to fly their aircraft within what length 
of time ? 

79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1— — 19 



274 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. Four hours, I think. That was not a question of 
being able to put a plane in the air in four hours, but it was a ques- 
tion of making the personnel available. 

755. General Frank. In other words, you depended on four hours? 

General Short. No. That would be the maximum time. As a mat- 
ter of fact, the conditions were such there that 50 per cent of the per- 
sonnel, I would say, or more, were always there, unless they were 
out on a problem or maneuvers. 

[516] 756. General Fraxk. Generally an optimistic estimate of 
the range at which the radar was effective was about 130 miles? 

General Short. That is really better than we estimate. I think 
Ave estimated 75 to 100 miles. It is just like anything else. There 
were times when they were perfect. ' 

757. General Frank. That would enable an approaching force to 
get in there well within a half hour? 

General Short. Yes. 

758. General Frank. Considering that pilots were not to be alerted 
except on a four-hour basis and with most everybody else having a 
day off on Sunday, why was the A. W. S. operated at all on Sunday? 

General Short. Largely because it was new and they needed train- 
ing in it more than any other element of the command. 

769. General Frank. When we speak of the A. W. S. Ave really 
mean construction of the information center and the establishment 
of communications betAveen the radar station and that center? 

General Short. And the operation of the radar station; yes. 

760. General Grunert. Also communication betAveen the center 
and the command? 

General Short. Any communications; yes. 

761. General Frank. All communications. 
General Short. Yes. 

762. General Frank. Why was it put under the Signal Corps? 
General Short. All that technical work had to be done by the 

Signal Corps. 

763. General Frank. AVhy Avas not the control of its installation 
placed under the Air Force Avho were going to operate it? 

\517] General Short. At that time AA^e did not think that the 
technical training of the Air Corps had progressed to a point AA'here Ave 
could count on performance. We thought it was a little better if 
the Signal Corps man felt that he had control up to the time he said 
his operators Avere in shape to turn over, and things Avould go along a 
little faster. It might haA^e been wrong. 

764. General Frank. It strikes me that right within the Army itself 
you had a situation between the Air Force and the Signal Corps where 
this A. W. S. was operating on a cooperatiA^e basis rather than on a 
positive command basis. 

General Short. Because it had not reached a state of training where 
AA'e thought it could AA-ork to the best advantage. 

765. General Frank. But if the vast proportion of the people con- 
cerned AA'ith its operation were Air Force people 

General Short (interposing). Not the technical operation. The 
operation of the communications and the radar system is definitel}' for 
the Signal Corps. 

766. General Frank. But the moment it became operatiA^e it came 
under the control of the Air Force? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 275 

General Short. Yes. 

767. General Frank. Why not put it under control of the Air Force 
in the first place? 

General Short. Because the Signal Corps thought they could train 
them faster to where they were better technical men than if it were 
put under the Air Force. 

7G8. General Frank. Generally in the United States these installa- 
tions were put under the supervision of the Air Force Interceptor 
Commander. 

General Short. The actual installation? 

[518] 769. General Frank. Yes. 

General Short. We fully intended, as you notice from our standing 
operating procedure, to have them operated by the Air Corps, but the 
building up of the stations and all of the technical w^ork we looked 
upon as a Signal Corps matter. 

770. General Grunert. When they operated during maneuvers and 
tests with the Navy, I understood from my reading that the informa- 
tion center and such warning service as was in existence actually oper- 
ated with the Navy during some of those maneuvers and tests. Who 
operated the system then? 

General Short. We did not have a system formally set up until — 
well, it was pretty close to November 27th. 

771. General Grunert. Somebody operated it during maneuvers? 
General Short. The Signal Corps undoubtedly operated it. 

772. General Grunert. Colonel Powell ? 

General Short. Yes. We had not built the control station at that 
time. 

773. General Grunert. This youngster. Lieutenant Tyler, who ap- 
parently in the information center or the control center, whatever 
you may have called it — I understood from your testimony that you 
considered him as in charge there at the time ; is that right ? 

General Short. I did. He w^as the control officer who was there. 

774. General Grunert. Under wdiose direction was he then func- 
tioning ? 

General Short. Under General Davidson's, the actual command for 
all operating purposes. It was operating the same as it would have 
been if General Davidson had been actually placed in command. 

['5W]_ 775. General Grunert. Then it was by and with his con- 
sent that he was doing what he was doing, and not by order? 

General Short. General Davidson; yes; and he understood that 
it would be by order as soon as it got to the point where he and 
Colonel Powell thought it would be proper. 

776. General Grunert. The next two subjects, Antiaircraft Defense, 
and Inshore Aerial Patrol, I think we have covered, unless either one 
of you has any particular question that has not been covered on those 
two subjects. If not, I will go to the next subject. Command and 
Staff. I have some general questions here that I w^ould like to pro- 
pound. 

Were conferences held by you or your Chief of Staff with the princi- 
pal subordinate commanders wherein they were kept informed of 
the situation and, in turn, informed you of the measures taken 
by them to meet such situations ? 

General Short. We had a conference normally on Saturday morn- 
iner. 



276 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

777. General Grunert. Normally once a week ? 
General Short. Yes, sir. 

778. General Grunert. Were subordinate commanders informed 
of the imminent approach of probable hostilities set forth in the mes- 
sages received late in November and early in December? 

General Short. G-2 and G-3 and the Chief of Staff were. Whether 
all of the subordinate members of the staff were, I am not sure. 

779. General Grunert. Were discussions had as to measures to be 
adopted in preparation for such an eventuality ? 

General Short. My discussions on that were confined to G-2, G-3, 
and the Chief of Staff and the Echelon Command. 

[Copy] 

3141 Southwestern Boulevaed, 

Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 19U- 
Subject : Corrections in testimony. 
To : President, Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before 
the Army Pearl Harbor Board : 

Page 519, line 29, change "command" to "commanders". 

if ***** * 

/s/ Walter C. Short, 
Waxtee C. Short, 
Major General, V. S. Army, Retired. 

780. General Frank. Who were the echelon commanders? 

[520] General Short. An Air Corps officer, General Martin, 
General Burgin, and the two division commanders. 

781. General Grunert. In the weekly conferences, when the ques- 
tion of a plan or order came up, such as your S. O. P. of November 5, 
was that generally discussed ? 

General Short. Whoever was responsible for the development of 
that would conduct a discussion and would outline what was being 
done, the state of it, and ask for questions. It would depend on what 
the type of project was, what staff officer would have it. 

782. General Grunert. With whom did you discuss or from whom 
did you seek advice as to whether or not you should put your com- 
mand in Alert 1, 2 or 3? Mind you, I do not mean after you would 
make a decision, but to get information. 

General Short. The Chief of Staff and the G-2, and General Mar- 
tin. I think I talked more at length with him, because he had that 
ferrying business, and he and I talked at considerable length on that. 

783. General Grunert. When you received the message of Novem- 
ber 27th from the Chief of Staff, how long was it before you decided 
upon what alert to adopt? 

General Short. I decided in a very few minutes, because if I wanted 
to go further, all I had to do was to say "Go into Alert No. 2 or Alert 
No. 3." 

784. General Grunert. Then this long conversation with General 
Martin was a build-up before that ? 

General Short. No. I talked to him. I had him over within 
probably an hour after I had made the decision and talked it over 
with him that same afternoon; and I think I talked with General 
Burgin that same afternoon. I talked with General [521] 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 277 

Murray on several occasions, because he had the most serious part of 
that sabotage work. 

General Grunert. That was after the decision was made? 

General Short. Yes. 

876. General Grunert. Did you then consider that they had the 
right to argue whether or not that was the best for their command? 
Or did you change your decision, or was it an accomplished fact? 

General Short. As a matter of fact, I believe General Burgin felt 
that we might go successively into 2 and 3 and go into a maneuver like 
we had in May. 

787. General Grunert. You and I will know that it is not a good 
thing to have a round robin to get a bunch of opinions, or the opinion 
of a group, on which to make a decision, except to seek advice. But 
after a decision is made, then everybody carries it out without ques- 
tion, and a great many of them feel probably that they have no more 
say after the decision is made. 

General Short. I do not believe that my higher echelon command- 
ers or my staff felt that way about it. If they had any suggestions 
which they though were important I am sure they would have made 
them. 

788. General Grunert. You feel, then, that your subordinate com- 
manders and your staff felt free to come to you if they thought that 
you may have been mistaken in what you did from the information 
you had? 

General Short. I am sure they would. 

789. General Grunert. Were those commanders and staff officers 
informed about the other information you had received from the 
Navy concerning what we might call the critical period, or were they 
only informed of the November 27th information? 

[522] General Short. I am quite sure that they were all in- 
formed of the July business and were all informed of the October 16 
and November 27th information. Between that I do not remember 
anything of sufficient importance from the Navy to give to them in 
detail. I may have talked casually about it. 

790. General Grunert. The notes on the testimony before the Rob- 
erts Commission indicates that General Wilson, commanding the 24th 
Division, was never called in conference or consulted regarding the 
warning message of November 27th. 

General Short. Did he say he got it from the Division Officer ? 

791. General Grunert. He said he was never consulted. 

General Short. He had the north sector where the anti-sabotage 
work was not nearly as serious. While I had repeated conferences 
with Murray, I may not have had any with Wilson. 

792. General Grunert. Wilson thought the Navy had an inshore 
and offshore patrol. Why was he not instructed and informed? 

General Short. His job was quite different from that of the other 
divisions. While I had repeated conferences with Murray, and I had 
Murray personally inspect every post and he came back to me with 
recommendations and made a lot of changes 

793. General Grunert (interposing). That was in connection with 
your Alert 1 ? 

General Short. Yes. 



278 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

794. General Grunert. But in connection with the possibility of his 
giving advice as to any other alert, he, Wilson, did not have any 
information ? 

General Short. I did not have any conference with him as to 
whether he wanted to advise me as to something different. 

795. General Grunert. Colonel Fielder says he discussed the 
[623] possibility of an attack with the Commanding General in a 
purely academic way. I do not quite understand how there is any- 
thing academic about discusssing the possibility of an attack. 

General Short. I do not. We discussed the possibility, probably 
because he was G-2 and was supposed to have some information. 

796. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not your Chief of 
Staff and your G-2 agreed that you had pulled the right alert? 

General Short. I am sure they both fully agreed. 

797. General Grunert. General Murray, when he got Alert No. 1, 
was not informed as to the seriousness of the existing situation, no 
intimation, nothing, although he talked to the Commanding General, 
Hawaiian Department, several times between November 27 and De- 
cember 7. Why was he not informed? 

General Short. I am sure he had all the information that I did. 
I may not have given him the idea that we were going out in the 
midst of an attack the next day. That may be what he means. But 
he probably had as much conversation with General Murray about 
what we were doing as anybody in the command, because he made a 
tremendous amount of changes. 

[Copy] 

3141 SOUTHWESTEEN BOUI.EVARD, 

Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 19U- 
Subject : Corrections in testimony. 
To: Presidenr, Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before 
the Army Pearl Harbor Board : 

* * if * * ' * 

Page 523, line 19, —change "but he" to "but I". 
******* 

/s/ Walter C. Short, 
Walter C. Short. 
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired. 

798. General Grunert. I think he refers not to Alert No. 1, but to 
the general situation and the knowledge you had. 

General Short. I am sure he knew the contents of the message. 
But I did not go down and talk over with him what his opinion was 
as to whether the message meant they were going to attack or whether 
he would expect at attack. 

799. General Grunert. General Burgin did not know the Inter- 
ceptor Command under General Davidson was not working. He 
thought it was, because it had been for drill. 

[52 Q General Short. That is what I say. It was actually 
operating, but lind not been officially organized. 

800. General Grunert. You had a conference once a week. Wliat 
did you confer on if it were not what the condition of things was 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 279 

and what should or should not be done, and so forth ? I do not know 
whether this is the truth, but that it what is in the record, and we 
will question about it. 

General Short. Undoubtedly that is correct. Burgin was not in 
on the weekly conferences. I did confer with the staff. 

801. General Grunert. Then the weekly conference was a staff 
conference and not a conference with subordinate commanders? 

General Short. No. We had a conference with subordinate com- 
manders on irregular occasions, whenever there was something we 
thought we should take up with them. 

:. 802. General Grunert. When you wanted to talk to your com- 
manders about anything you had a special conference and not a 
periodical one? 

General Short. That is correct. I had them very often, one at a 
time, because they were problems that might be different. 

[52o~\ General Grunert. ''Lt. Col. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, in- 
formed the staff at a meeting on December 6 that the Japs were burn- 
ing papers on December 5. Says it meant that war was imminent, 
to him." De he so inform his Chief of Staff or his Commanding Gen- 
eral? If so, what conclusions were reached with regard to it? 

General Short. I am sure he didn't inform me. I don't know 
whether he informed the G-2 of it. On the other hand, we burnt 
similar messages every day, so I don't think Colonel Fielder would 
have thought so much of it. 

804. General Grunert. But this seems to intimate that a member 
of your staff, or assistant to a head of your staff, thought that war 
was imminent. 

General Short. Well, he was decidedly less experienced than 
Fielder. He was a Reserve Officer, and he might have taken that 
burning of messages as a good deal more serious, and may have been 
overlooking the fact that we burn similar messages constantly. 

805. General Grunert. That may have been an afterthought with 
him, for all I know. 

General Short. Yes. 

806. General Grunert. But that was in the record. 
General Short. It may have been. 

807. General Grunert. And General Martin did not seem to know 
that the Interceptor Command was not activated until December 17. 

General Short. Well, the fact was it was actually operating, and 
there was such a technical difference, there that apparently Bergin 
and Martin, neither one realized it hadn't gone out as an order. It 
was actually operating daily. 

[526] 808. General Grunert. General Eudolph, the Command- 
ing General of the Bombers, stated that had he had any intimation of 
preceding trouble his planes would not have been bunched or concen- 
trated but would have been ready for the air. Then, in parenthesis, 
"especially on a Sunday morning." Was he not informed by the 
Commanding General, or the Commanding General of the Air Forces, 
of the warnings of the immediate past? 

General Short. I went over the thing very fully with General 
Martin, talked over with him at as great length as anybody. I would 
imagine that he talked with his subordinate commanders. 



280 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

809. General Grunert. There is in the record somewhere, I believe, 
that General Martin sent two telegrams, to General Davidson, abso- 
lutely telling him to bunch his airplanes. 

810. General Frank. One, from Martin, and one from the De- 
partment ? 

811. General Grunert. I meant that Martin sent one, and he re- 
ceived another one, presumably from the Department, to that effect. 

General Short. The Standing Operating Procedure definitely pro- 
vided for distributing by airfield, but grouping them all on the indi- 
vidual airfield. 

812. General Grunert. I wondered why, in view of the Standing 
Operating Procedure, these telegrams on this particular thing were 
necessary ? 

General Short. I do not know they were sent. 

813. General Grunert. Was there some argument about whether 
to do it or not ? 

General Short, General Davidson might have asked the [S27] 
question; I don't know. Now, I will tell you one thing that might 
have caused it. We were having an exercise, maybe a month or so 
before that, and I got up to Wheeler Field along about 11 o'clock 
at night and found that their planes had not been distributed in the 
bunker, and that gasoline had not been put in the bunkers, and that 
ammunition had not been put in the bunkers, and the situation was 
such that it should have been, in this maneuver; and that might 
have caused somebody to ask the question. I did not know that that 
had taken place. 

814. General Grunert. That is all I have on that particular subject. 
Do any questions occur to any one of you two, on what I call the 
"command" subject? 

I have one question, or a small series of questions, here, on alerts. 
The points that you seemed to dwell upon in your testimony before 
the Roberts Commission as the reasons for alert 1, and not 2 and 3, 
are briefly summarized as follows : Strong possibility of sabotage, no 
definite information to indicate an attack by air. Under alert 2, some 
bombers would have had to go to other Island. No fence for the 
airfields available. The difficulty of constructing the bunkers on 
Hickam Field. The interference with training, particularly aircraft 
ferrying training. Under alert 2, the aircraft would have been placed 
where it could not continue its proper training. 

If any of these are incorrect, will you so inform me. 

Are those the ones? 

General Short. That is correct. 

815. General Grunert. Have any of the other Members any ques- 
tions to ask on the subject of alerts ? 

The next subject I have is "defensive and protective [S28] 

measures." A great many of these questions have been answered, but 
I would like to go over those that I have, to make sure that I haven't 
missed any points that I particular!}^ wanted to have brought out. 

In the Roberts Report it referred to a deficiency of materiel. What 
particular deficiency was there that interfered with the taking of ap- 
propriate defense measures, with the means available? Did the de- 
ficiency of any materiel prevent you from taking whatever measures 
were possible with what you had ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 281 

General Short. No, but it would not have been as effective as it 
would have been, if we had all of the materiel. 

816. General Grunert. Generally, how would increasing the de- 
fense measures curtail the training or virtually suspend same? 

General Short. If Alert No. 3 had been ordered, practically every 
man in the Department would have gone to his field positions, and all 
training would have stopped. 

817. General Grunert. Did Alert No. 2 

General Short, Alert No. 2 would have practically stopped the 
training of the Air Corps and the Antiaircraft Corps. It would not 
have interfered seriously with the training of the infantry divisions. 

818. General Grunert. Did you have any provisions in Alert No. 2, 
where only a certain part of each squadron was to be alerted, and the 
rest would come in ? 

General Short. When we went to the No. 2, we put all of the Air, 
all of the antiaircraft, definitely on the alert, and all of the harbor 
defense. 

819. General Grunert. Wliile on the subject of alerts, when you 
took over, I understand there was just one class of alert [6291 
that covered everything to be done ; and some time after you took over, 
you established 1, 2, and 3. What was the purpose in establishing 
three classes of alert and not continuing what had been done in the 
past? 

General Short. What had been done in the past was done by what 
they call Field Order No. 1, which was highly secret, so nobody knew 
what his job was, and when anything went into effect there had to 
be all kinds of long-winded orders issued, causing delay and confu- 
sion, and what we were trying to do was to eliminate all the secret 
stuff from the standing operating procedure and get it so that we 
could actually use any alert against any situation without confusion, 
and as promptly as possible. That was the basic reason for it. 

820. General Grunert. Of course, then, it is a question of judg- 
ment as to what alert to adopt, the decision to be made at that time. 
Had you had only one alert. Would you then have alerted yourself ? 

General Short. If you had nothing but alert 3, you probably would 
have gone to alert 3, but if it be provided that every time there was 
any kind of an alarm, that you went into your field positions, you 
would probably have turned out the whole command. 

821. General Grunert. There appear to have been some actions 
taken and orders issued since December 7* for instance, at Wheeler 
Field, by the Commanding OiRcer,. pertaining to chemical air attack, 
on December 9; air-raid instructions, on December 7; distribution 
of Claxon horns for air-raid-warning systems; after attack, prac- 
ticed air-raid for Honolulu, December 9, and the exchange of old 
gas masks for new, December 9. 

[SSOI Are these indications that no such, or inadequate, instruc- 
tions regarding these measures were issued prior to December 7? 

General Short. It simply means that we learned that certain parts 
of our plan we thought necessary to improve or change. Now, we, 
on the Claxons, were trying sirens, or Claxons, to make them for the 
City of Honolulu, that could be heard; and we had been expecting 
to get them. We hadn't got them. When this thing came on, we issued 
the best thing we had to them. 



282 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

822. General Grunert. Somewhere in the report it shows that some 
Army officer's wife stated that she did not know what was to be 
done in case of an air raid, and that she had never been told what 
to do; whether to go out — she did not say this, but the intimation 
was — whether to go out and jump into a slit trench, or whether to 
go to a certain place for shelter. 

Were those matters covered prior to December 7? 

General Short. We had a plan for evacuation of all the women and 
children from the affected area. We did not have trenches con- 
structed, as we did, later. Beginning on the 8th of December, we 
actually dug the trenches on the lawns of the officers' quarters. We did 
not have them at that time. We had the plan for the evacuation, and 
the evacuation started according to plan at 12 o'clock, noon, and 
they were moved to school buildings, or cafeterias were set up, cots and 
blankets issued, and that all existed by a plan and was carried out 
by the civil community. 

823. General Grunert. Were there- any black-out regulations in 
effect? 

[531] General Short. We had had two or three black-out alerts 
with the civil community. 

824. General Grunert, In the testimony of General Burgin, it was 
reported that he stated to the effect that he believed General Short 
counted on the Navy for warning from sea approach — that is, Navy 
scouting — and that Short expressed himself forcibly that no enemy 
ships could get close enough to land a plane. Why this belief? 

General Short. I believed that the Navy would be able — 

825. General Grunert. Your confidence in the Navy ? 
General Short. In my confidence in the Navy. 

826. General Grunert. Then there is an expression attributed to 
you, which you are quoted as having said — 

Frankly, I was more serious about training rather than expecting anything to 
happen at that time. 

Why this, in view of the messages received ? 

General Short. What I meant by that was, on an air attack, in 
view of the information that the Navy had given me that the Japa- 
nese fleet were proceeding to the south, and all, I foresaw a possible 
attack on the Philipppine Islands, but did not think we would have 
anything besides sabotage and possible uprisings. 

82T. General Grunert. "General Short issued orders for a practice 
air-raid on December 10; instructions for protective measures in 
Honolulu, December 9; and an SOP on defense against a gas attack, 
and a bulletin of information for the conduct of families in an air- 
raid, Dec. 7." Were no such instructions issued prior to the attack? 

General Short. We had had practice alerts with the civil [532] 
community. I couldn't have issued orders to the civil community 
until we were under martial law. 

828. General Frank. May I ask a question, now ? 

829. G^eneral Grunert. All right. Go ahead. I have three more, 
here, w^hen I get around to it. 

830. General Frank. They had instructions, issued in the studies 
by the Office of Civilian Defense? 

General Short. I say we had alerts in the civil community, and the 
Governor put out instructions, and it was all done at our inspection. 
It wasn't a question of our issuing them orders. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 283 

[Copy] 

3141 Southwestern Boulevard, 

Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 19U- 
Subject : Corrections in testimony. 
To : President, Army Pearl Harbor Board. 

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before 
the Army Pearl Harbor Board : 

If sa Sf if ■)( * * 

Page 532, line 10, — change "inspection" to "suggestion". 
******* 

'/»/ Walter C. Short 
Walter C. Short, 
Major General, U. 8. Army, Retired. 

831. General Grunert. Under Alert No. 2, "ammunition would 
have been at the guns. However, this would have alarmed the public, 
contrary to War Department instructions." I am quoting this from 
a statement which you made, somewhere in the Roberts Commission 
report. I will read that again: 

Under Alert No. 2, ammunition would have been at the guns. However, this 
would have alarmed the public, contrary to War Department instructions. 

Why should this have alarmed the public? 

General Short. Because it was something we never did. Now, the 
small-arms ammunition was for protection against sabotage, because 
all of the guards and everybody of that kind was armed with small- 
arms ammunition ; but we never moved out loaded ammunition to 
those guns that were set up right in the City. 

832. General Grunert. Did it ever occur to you that it might have 
been a good thing to have done that with a daily routine, about once 
a week, and so forth? 

[533] General Short. Not in view of tlie messages I was get- 
ting from the War Department not to alarm the public. 

833. General Grunert. Did you consider the War Department in- 
structions mandatory on this subject, even if it jeopardized your 
defense ? 

General Short. No, not if it definitely jeopardized my defense, and 
if I had thought there was going to be an air attack, everything 
would have been out there. 

834. General Grunert. "If so, why didn't you ask the War Depart- 
ment to O.. K. your going on Alert No. 2?" 

General Short. I didn't believe so, and they knew I was on Alert 
No. 1, and didn't tell me I was wrong. They had known, for ten 
days. 

835. General Frank. Might it not have been a good idea from the 
very start to have gone into the field periodically with real ammuni- 
tion, as a maneuver measure, and that would have eliminated drawing 
attention to it? 

General Short. I think that everyone who has ever done any ma- 
neuvering realizes that one of the things you always do on maneuvers 
is to inspect very carefully and make the officer sign a certificate that 
there is no live ammunition there, because you don't want to kill the 
people in maneuvers. I have never been in a maneuver in my life that 
I didn't require certificates from battalion commanders that there was 
no live ammunition there. 

836. General Russell. General Short, suppose that every week you 
had taken all your people and give them live ammunition and run 



284 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

them out to these gun positions : what effect would that have had in 
developing a "wolf! wolf!" spirit, that has [S34-] been dis- 
cussed here quite frequently ? 

General Short. Well, I am sure that they would have thought it 
was very unnecessary. 

837. General Russell. That is all. 

838. General Grunert. One question, here. Somewhere in my 
notes, here. I have something to the effect that your Chief of Staff, 
Colonel Phillips, stated that he was not informed as to what took 
place at your conferences with the Admiral. Did you keep him in- 
formed, or did you discuss with him what happened ? 

General Short. Anything of any importance, I am sure I discussed 
with him. We were on a very friendly personal basis, and I am sure 
that if I picked up any piece of information that I thought was of any 
importance — and 1 know that I talked to him about certain task 
forces, because when it came to sending an officer along, why, he would 
be the one that would get out the order. 

839. General Frank. May I ask a question ? 

Might he have come to that conclusion through the absence of in- 
formation that even you didn't have ? 

General Short. He might have. I don't believe that he intended 
to indicate that I withheld information from him. 

'840. Genefral Grunert. Vice Admiral Pye, U. S. Navy, stated 
before the Roberts Commission that after he took command, after 
December 17, he called in General Emmons, and they really got to- 
gether on inshore and distant patrolling. 

General Short. He had unity of command. 

841. General Grunert. The officer states that "now" this is done. 
Does that mean that there was no real getting together prior to that ? 

[SSS] General Short. No, but it means that beginning Decem- 
ber 17 there was unity of command. He could call up General Em- 
mons and order him to do things, and that the situation was com- 
pletely changed with reference to the command. 

842. General Grunert. He states "they really got together," mean- 
ing, "They have now really got together for cooperation." 

General Short. You had passed from cooperation to unity of 
command. 

843. General Grunert. Then does that lead you to believe that you 
two couldn't get together, without the unity of command? 

General Short. We could get together. I am satisfied unity of 
command would always be more successful than cooperation. 

844. General Grunert. What struck me was that "they really got 
together," meaning that in a sense they didn't get together, before. 

General Short. The point of view with the fellow that's in com- 
mand, when he is in command of the whole thing, would always be, 
I think, that he could control things better. 

845. General Grunert. I have this question : What evacuation pro- 
visions under alert 2 were there? Were there any evacuation pro- 
visions under that alert? 

General Short. We had elaborate evacuation plans, to be carried 
out by the committees in town. They would not be carried out till 
the notice was given for them to be carried out. They were not just 
developed as part of any one plan. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 285 

846. General Grunert. Then in your verbal statement to the Board 
at the beginning of the hearings, here, I gathered that [636] 
there was a spurt in construction after December 7, compared to de- 
lays prior thereto. How did that come about ? 

General Short. They gave me a "blank check." 

847. General Grunert. A "blank check" ? But your materials, your 
priorities, and your shipments, and everything? 

General Short. Yes, but we also took over all the material on the 
Island, no matter who had it. If we needed it, we took it. 

848. General Grunert. Then there was material on the Island that 
could possibly have been used before, had you been able to get it ? 

General Short. There may have been in the hands of plantations 
certain material which we could have used. There may have been, in 
the hands of certain contractors ; and beginning the 8th of December 
the district engineer was ordered to take over all construction ma- 
terial and take over all contractors with their machinery, for war. 
In other words, the situation was so changed that we could take any- 
thing that was in the Island, no matter whether the man wanted 
to give it up or not. 

849. General Grunert. Now, the question is whether to continue. 
I do not think I have many more questions, here, but I will check them 
over. This is on the state of readiness of aircraft, which probably 
has been covered, but I want to check it. The questions under that 
topic have all been covered. I go to the next one, incidents during the 
attack. 

Was the attack of December 7 a complete surprise to you ? 
General Short. It was. 

850. General Grunert. Were you informed of the sinking of one 
submarine at about 6 : 45 a. m., December 7, in the prohibited [537] 
area off Pearl Harbor? 

General Short. I was not. I didn't know about it, until the follow- 
ing day. 

851. General Grunert. At what time on December 7 did you realize 
an attack was on ? 

General Short. Practically, when the first bomb dropped, about 
7:55. I was not sure till two or three minutes later, when the second 
one was dropped, and I ran out and looked ; and at 8 : 03 my Chief of 
Staff came in a minute or two afterwards, ran into my house and said 
he had messages from Hickam and Wheeler, practically the same 
thing. 

852. General Grunert. What Naval support was rendered the 
Army in its mission of securing Pearl Harbor against hostile attack, 
on December 7 ? What did they do to help ? 

General Short. All of their ships that were in there, as I understand 
it, did antiaircraft fire, and the Marines had certain antiaircraft in- 
stallations at Ewa Field, and went into action. 

853. General Grunert. This was all part of the plan for defense 
under your tactical control ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. Of course, now, the guns on the ships were 
not under my tactical control. 

854. General Grunert. They had not been worked into the scheme 
of protection? 



286 COXGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. No. no : we had not gone that far with the coopera- 
tion. All of the naval and marine guns ashore operated under our 
antiaircraft, but the guns on the ship did not. 

555. General Gruxert. "Wliat firing they did aboard those ships 
during the attack was on their own ? 

[oSS] General Short. It was on their own. 

556. General Gruxert. And did they appear to be surprised, also? 
General Short. I think they were as much surprised. They had, 

I believe, skeleton crews on their guns, and I believe that possibly 
two ginis on each battleship had full crews — two .50-caliber guns. 
That is just memory. It may be inaccurate. 

857. General Gruxert. Under the special items I have two ques- 
tions. Did anything provide for the restriction of military persoimel 
under your various classes of alerts? 

General Short. "We had certain battalions, of which every man 
was held right in camp, and there was motor transportation there 
to move those battalions: and. of course, the personnel that was on 
guard over these various installations were definitely restricted. 

S5S. General Gruxert. Let me put it in the line of social gathering. 

General Short. There were no restrictions at all except for the 
people who were on duty. 

859. General Gruxert. There were no restrictions on social gather- 
ings, under Alert Xo. 1 ? 

General Short. No, sir. 

860. General Gruxert. How about 2. and 3? 

General Short. "We had not. definitely, but with Alert No. 3, every 
officer would have been on duty, and there could not have been any 
social gathering. On Alert Xo. 2. it would have been possible for 
officers of the infantry division to have attended a social function. 

861. General Gruxert. I have no further questions. Has either 
[539] of you any questions on any subject? 

862. General Russell. I just have two or three brief ones. Is Gen- 
eral Short's report on this action of December 7 in that file, there, 
as a part of it ? 

General Short. It is. Tlie first 50 pages of this report is a state- 
ment, first, of events leading up 

[-54^] 563. General Eussell. I am rather familiar with it. 

General Short. — and then of the events that took place, and then 
later on the things, the steps I had taken to improve the defenses and 
to improve the possibility of correct action by the civil community. 

864. General Eussell. Now, did the Navy have a Pearl Harbor 
only two carriers, the Lexington and the Enterprise ? 

General Short. They had not a single carrier in Pearl liarbor that 
morning. 

865. General Russell. I mean if they had all been in. were only 
two carriers based at Pearl Harbor? 

General Short. I believe that you are right, but I wouldn't be a 
hundred per cent positive. But I know there was no carrier in there. 

866. General Eussell. That is all. 

General Short. There mav have been one. There mav have been 
one other. The LEXINGTON and the ENTERPRISE.' Was there 
a carrier called the P-a-t-r-o-n by any chance? 

867. General Russell. I didn't see a record of it anywhere. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 287 

General Short. I know the LEXINGTON and the ENTERPRISE 
were there, and I am not sure whether there was anything else or not. 
Of course, you understand the cruisers carried a certain number of 
planes, so that if a task force was out there was a certain number of 
planes available for reconnaissance even if they did not have a carrier. 

868. General Grunert. General, do you wish to make any addi- 
tional statement in view of what has transpired during your hearing ? 

General Short. I do not believe that I do, sir. 

869. General Grunert. Do you wish to appear again before the 
[541] Board for a rehearing or for such questions as the Board 
might have as it develops testimony ? 

General Short. If the Board feels that it has developed things 
that require my testimony, I do. 

870. General Grunert. Would it be more convenient to you to 
come to San Francisco in the last week in September, or Washington 
the first week in October ? 

General Short. I am about half way. It wouldn't matter very 
much. 

871. General Grunert. Then if the Recorder gets in touch with you 
upon our return to San Francisco from Hawaii, we can determine 
where to give you an additional hearing. 

General Short. Yes. Whatever place the Board would desire me. 
I can be there because the difference in time would be very little. 

872. General Grunert. All right. The Board thanks you for com- 
ing up and giving us 3'our testimony. 

General Short. I thank the Board for very courteous treatment. 
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 
(Thereupon, at 12:35 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of 
witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 289 



CONTENTS 



MONDAY, AUGUST 14, 1944 

Testimony of— Page ' 

Brig. Gen. John J. Kingman, U. S. Army (Retired) 543 

Maj. Gen. Eugene Reybold, Chief of Engineers, United States Army, 

Washington, D. C ± 568 

Maj. Gen. Julian L. Schley, United States Army, Washington, D. C__ 635 
Maj. Gen. Roger B. Colton, Army of the United States, Washing- 
ton, D. C 670 

Maj. Gen. Thomas M. Robins, United States Army, Deputy Chief of 

Engineers, Washington, D. G 697 

DOCTTMENTS 

Letter of August 28, 1941, Gen. Kingman to Lemuel B. Schofield 546 

Excerpt from letter of July 17, 1944, Honolulu, T. H 557 

Excerpt from telegram of June 26, 1944 : 571 

List of names furnish by General Reybold 594 

Telegram of June 11, 1941, Hawaiian Department to Adjutant General — 602 

Telegram of June 17, 1941, Chief of Engineers to Adjutant General 603 

Immediate-action letter, May 28, 1941 679 

Memorandum from Col. Powell to Gen. Colton, November 14, 1941 688 

Letter dated December 31, 1941, Col. Powell to Chief Signal Officer 694 

EXHIBITS 

No. 3. Letter dated December 31, 1941, Col. Powell to Chief Signal Officer, 

Washington, D. C 694 

3-A. Chart of detector station records 695 

3-B. Chart showing plots of airplane flights 695 

1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by bracliets and indicate pages 
of original transcript of proceedings. 



79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 1 20 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 291 



[^^] PEOCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL 

HARBOR BOARD 



MONDAY, AUGUST 14, 1944 

Munitions Building, 

Washington^ D. G. 

The Board at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on Saturday, conducted 
the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen, George Grunert, President of the 
Board, presiding. 

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. 
Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, members. 

Present also : Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, and Major Henry 
C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder. 

General Grunert. The Board will come to order. 

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. JOHN J. KINGMAN, U. S. ARMY 

(RETIRED) 

(The witness wa^ sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. General Kingman, will you state to the Board 
your name, rank, organization, and station. 

General Kingman. Brigadier General John J. Kingman, U. S. 
Army, retired ; Washington, D. C. 

2. (jeneral (jrunert. General, the Board, in attempting to get at 
the facts, is looking into the War Department background, to get 
what information may be gleaned here in the War Department as to 
matters which related to the Hawaiian Department. It is hoped that 
because of your assignment at the time of the attack • \5J(-Jf\ on 
Hawaii and prior thereto, you can give us some facts that will help 
us in what we are concerned with and doing. 

In order to cover the large field in the short time we have available, 
I have had to parcel out special investigations to individual Members 
of the Board, although the entire Board will pass on all the subjects; 
so General Frank has drawn this special line of investigation, and I 
will ask General Frank to lead in propounding the questions. Then, 
if General Russell or I have anything to ask in addition thereto, we 
will do so. General Frank. 

3. General Frank. On what duty were you, in 1941 ? 
General Kingman. I was Assistant to the Chief of Engineers. 

4. General Frank. In that capacity, what were your responsibili- 
ties? 

General Kingman, I had under my supervision six sections of the 
office of the Chief of Engineers. They were the Military Personnel 



292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

section, the Railway section, the Intelligence section; what had been 
called the "Construction" section, later for a short time called the 
"Fortification" section, and the Operations and Training section. The 
other, I cannot think of at the moment. 

5. General Frank. Did you have anything to do with the process- 
ing of contracts ? 

General Kingman. No. I used to sign the papers sometimes, when 
General Schley, the Chief of Engineers, was absent. 

6. General Frank. In your capacity as Assistant Chief to the Chief 
of Engineers, and in your capacity in accordance with the duties that 
were assigned to you, would you have had any information relative 
to the failure of any contractors on [^45] Hawaiian projects 
to complete their work on time ? 

General Kingman. None, whatever ; no, sir. 

7. General Frank. Did you have any such information? 
General Kingman. I did not. 

8. General Frank. The several sections that you have referred to 
were in that part of the office over which you had supervision? 

General Kingman. Yes ; that is right. 

General Frank. Did a German by the name of Hans Wilhelm Rohl 
ever come to your attention ? 

General Kingman. I never met him, that I know of; but I knew 
that there was a man named Rohl, I didn't know the rast of his name, 
who was a member of a firm of contractors in southern California, that 
had the contract for the Los Angeles breakwater. 

9. General Frank. On August 28, 1941, you signed a letter request- 
ing action on Rohl's citizenship papers, of which this is reported as a 
copy ; is that correct ? 

General Kingman. I think that is correct ; yes, sir. 

10. General Frank. Why was this request made by you ? 
General Kingman. .It was signed by me as a routine matter. I 

have looked the matter up in the last two days. I have here a photo- 
static copy of the file-copy of that letter, with the initials of the officials 
who prepared the letter for signature. 

11. General Frank. Who were they? 

General Kingman. I find that the letter was drafted by an employee 
named Benjamin L. Stilphen, who was then in the Contracts and 
Claims Branch, Office of Chief of Engineers. Later, he was commis- 
sioned in November, and I learned Saturday 1:^4^] that he has 
been either retired or discharged for physical disability, and is now 
somewhere in New York City. This letter was initialed in the ordinary 
routine, and, as you see here, I find those initials "F. T. J." By looking 
in the telephone book of the War Department, I was able to locate that 
man as now Major Frederick T. Johnson. I talked with him, and he 
gave me the information about the letter having been drafted by this 
man Stilphen. 

The final initialing was by Colonel Earl E. Tresler, who was the 
head of the Finance Section, Office, Chief of Engineers. I have no 
personal knowledge as to why the letter was initiated. 

12. General Frank. Whose initials are those, directly under the 
signature ? 

General Kingman. Colonel Gesler's. He is now division engineer 
of the Middle Atlantic Division, in Baltimore. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 293 

13. Colonel West. May I ask at this stage that, if that photostatic 
letter has been received in evidence, we have the reporter mark it "Ex- 
hibit 2," for purposes of identification. 

14. Major Clausen. It has been. It is Exhibit 2. 
(The letter of August 28, 1941, is as follows :) 

War Department, 
Office of the Chief of Engineers, 

WasJiington, August 28, 1941. 
Lemuel B. Schofield, 

Special Assistant, Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, 

Office of the Attorney General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. 
Dear Mr. Schofield: [54~] The Hawaiian Constructors, a joint venture 
consisting of the W. E. Callahan Construction Co., Los Angeles, Calif. ; Rohl-Con- 
nolly Co., San Francisco and Los Angeles, Calif. ; Gunther & Shirley Co., Los 
Angeles, Calif., and Ralph E. Woolley, contractor of Honolulu, T. H., are working 
on very important defense construction at Honolulu, T. H., pursuant to Engineer 
Corps Contract No. 2-414-eng-602. 

Mr. H. W. Rohl, 8519 Hollywood Boulevard, Los Angeles, Calif., one^of the 
prinoipal stockholders of the Rohl-Connolly Co., applied to the United States dis- 
trict court at Los Angeles, Calif., on January 15, 1941, for his final citizenship 
papers which have not, as yet, been issued. Mr. Rohl is possessed of outstanding 
ability, excellent judgment, and resourcefulness for the management of difficult 
construction work. Some of the outstanding woi'k performed by Mr. Rohl was 
the construction of the Los Angeles-Long Beach detached breakwater, the con- 
struction of the Headgate Dam at Parker, Ariz., for the Indian Service, and mis- 
cellaneous dams, tunnels, and other heavy construction in the State of California. 
To date, Mr. Rohl's valuable services have not been available for Government de- 
fense projects because of his alien status. 

The services of Mr. Rohl are of vital importance to the expeditious com- 
pletion of the aforementioned defense construction project because of his peculiar 
qualifications and scarcity of qualified supervisory personnel. It is the under- 
standing of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States is beyond 
question. It is therefore requested that the granting of Mr. Rohl's final citi- 
zenship papers be [548] expedited. 

Your consideration and cooperation will be very much appreciated. 
"Very respectfully, 

John .T. Kingman, 

Brigadier General, 
Acting Chief of Engineers. 

15. General Frank. Do you know why this request was made to 
hurry his citizenship papers ? 

General Kingman. Well, I know that it had something to do with 
the work going on in the Hawaiian Islands. That is stated in the 
letter. 

16. General Frank. Did you know Rohl? 

General Kingman. I don't think I ever met him. When I was 
Division Engineer in San Francisco, his company had the contract on 
the Los Angeles breakwater, and I inspected the work on two or 
three occasions, but so far as I can recall I never met Rohl. I might 
possibly have met him, without recalling it. 

17. General Frank. What was the general reputation of that firm ? 

General Kingman. They were supposed to be very good contrac- 
tors. They did a good job on that breakwater. That is the only 
contract that they had, that I ever had anything to do with. 

18. General Frank. With so many firms in the United States 
whose members were reputable, "1000%" citizens, why were you press- 
ing the case of Rohl, a German citizen ? 

General Kingman. I didn't know he was a German citizen. 

19. General Frank. You signed this letter ? 



294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[^4^1 General Kingman. Nothing says that he is a German 
citizen in that. 

20. General Frank. In order to get citizenship, he certainly had 
to be something besides an American ? 

General Kingman. Well, he might have been anything, belonged 
to any nationality, other than the United States. 

21. General Frank. As long as you were signing the letter, did 
not your curiosity lead you to question the nationality from which 
he was changing? 

General Kingman. There was nothing in that letter that aroused 
any misgivings in my mind as to the propriety of signing it. I didn't 
question it, at all. 

22. General Frank. You, therefore, did not know that he was a 
German citizen? 

General Kingman. I certainly did not. 

23. General Frank. At this time, the war in Europe was on, was 
it not? 

General Kingman. Oh, yes ! We were not in it. 

24. General Frank. However, our sympathies certainly were not 
neutral, were they ? 

General Kingman. Evidently not ! 

25. General Frank. And yet, here was a man whose citizenship 
papers you were trying to expedite, and it never occurred to you as 
to what his original nationality was ? 

General Kingman. No ; it did not. 

26. General Frank. Did you know Colonel Theodore Wyman? 
General Kingman. Oh, yes ; I knew him. 

27. iGeneral Frank. Did you know anything about his personal 
association with Rohl ? 

[SSOl General Kingman. No, no; nothing. 

28. General Frank. You knew nothing as to whether a friendship 
existed there, or what those personal relationships were? 

General Kingman. No ; I knew nothing about that. 

29. General Frank. It seems a little difficult for me, in view of the 
upset in world relations at that time, to reconcile how these steps 
could have been taken to get a man by the name of Rohl citizenship, 
without being interested to the extent of wanting to know what his 
original nationality was. Does it not seem peculiar to you that, on the 
verge of war with Germany, the office of the Corps of Engineers was 
trying to clear a German citizen for naturalization, so as to give him 
war contracts ? 

General Kingman. Of course, we knew nothing about his national- 
ity ; at least, I knew nothing about it. 

30. General Frank. Certainly somebody in the Corps of Engineers 
had to know something about his nationality, or he would not have 
been asking for citizen papers. 

General Kingman. I don't know what other people may have known 
about it. I doubt if they knew that he was a German. 

31. General Frank. When a man makes application for citizenship, 
he certainly has to state his original allegiance? 

General Kingman. Well, I presume he must have stated that to 
the court. I dare say the FBI and the Department of Justice knew 
about it, but the Corps of Engineers, I don't think had been fur- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 295 

nished any information that would arouse any misgivings whatever 
in regard to the man's nationality. 

32. General Frank. In any event, you were not familiar with it? 
[S51] General Kingman. I knew nothing whatever about it. I 

was merely acting for the Chief of Engineers in signing a great many 
papers ; and I signed this one, in the absence of the Chief of Engineers. 

33. General Frank. Are you familiar with the negotiations for 
a contract dated the 20th of December 1940 with the Hawaiian Con- 
structors for defense projects in Hawaii ? 

General Kingman. No, sir. 

34. General Frank. Do you know anything concerning the failure 
of those contractors to complete the construction of the defense 
projects? 

General Kingman. No, sir. I thought they had probably done 
pretty well, from what I heard. 

35. General Frank. Do you have any knowledge concerning 
whether any military personnel neglected their duties relating to that 
contract ? 

General Kingman. No ; I have no knowledge. A day or two ago, I 
received a letter that might be of interest to this Board. I do not 
know whether it is proper for me to submit it, or not. 

36. General Frank. That is all right. 

General Kingman. It is from a man that worked for me on Cor- 
regidor some thirty-odd years ago, when we were building the fortifi- 
cations of Corregidor. 

37. General Frank. To what does the letter refer? 

General Kingman. It refers to Colonel Wyman. I do not know 
whether it is proper to submit it, or not. 

38. General Frank. During that period of Wyman's life does this 
come in? 

[552] General Kingman. December 7, 1941. 

39. General Frank. What was your assignment on the 20th of De- 
cember 1940? Were you Assistant Chief of Engineers? 

General Kingman. Yes, sir. 

40. General Frank. And you had the same responsibilities on the 
20th of December as you enumerated at the beginning of this inter- 
rogation ? 

General Kingman. That is correct. That did not include any- 
thing to do with making the construction contracts. The Supply 
Section came under me, too. 

41. General Frank. Did you know during any of this period that 
Hans Wilhelm Kohl had been under investigation by a Government 
agency for suspicious activities ? 

General Kingman. I did not. 

42. General Frank. What if any measures should have been taken 
by the personnel of the Corps of Engineers for the protection of the 
Government against contracting with a person having such a record ? 

General Kingman. If they had any reason to question his loyalty, 
they should have reported him to the FBI for investigation, I should 
think. 

43. General Frank. Who, in the office of the Corps of Engineers, 
was responsible for looking into a man's reputation, who was handling 
Government contracts through the engineers ? Who was responsible 
for it, in the office of the Corps of Engineers ? , 



296 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Kingman. I don't believe I can answer that question. 

44. General Frank. You signed this letter that you presented 
[5SS] to the Board? 

General Kingman. Yes, sir. 

45. General Frank. You stated you were not familiar with the 
details. Somebody in that office certainly had to be familiar with 
the details and responsible for the facts in the letter. Who was that? 

General Kingman. That would have been Colonel Gesler, with 
relation to contracts. He was the one who finally initialed this letter. 

46. General Frank, In what part of the office did he serve ? 
General Kingman. He was head of the Finance Section. 

47. General Frank. Did not the Intelligence Section or the Person- 
nel Section come into this, at some place ? 

General Kingman. No ; none whatever. They wouldn't have known 
anything about it. 

48. General Frank. Do you mean to say, if there was a question 
relative to the suspicious activities of an individual with whom the 
Corps of Engineers was doing business, the espionage or counter- 
espionage agency would not have been concerned with it? 

General Kingman. That would have been G-2, not the engineers. 

49. General Frank. The engineers were the people who had the 
direct contact with this man? 

General Kingman. That is correct. 

50. General Frank. Wouldn't they have reported it? 

General Kingman. I don't think they had anything to report — as 
far as I know. 

51. General Frank. *You are familiar with the Espionage Act 
[554] of the 28th of March 1940, are you ? 

General Kingman. Yes, sir. I have had no contact with it, at 
all ; no duties in connection with it. 

52. General Frank. Give us a short resume of that, will you, Major 
Clausen? 

53. Major Clausen. Yes. This act forbids the employment of 
aliens upon a government contract, or making aliens aware of the 
details of a government contract dealing with national defense. It 
is a penal offence to so do. 

General Kingman. I had nothing to do with making these contracts. 

54. General Frank. Did you ever receive any notice of any reports 
concerning activities in Hawaii of Colonel Wyman that were were 
derogatory to Colonel Wyman ? 

General Kingman. I never did ; no. I wouldn't have received them, 
any way. 

55. General Frank. Who would have received them ? 

General Kingman. I think General Robins would have received 
them. 

56. Major Clausen. May I interrupt to say that the Espionage Act 
to which my attention was invited was set forth by the War Depart- 
ment in Circular 121, in 1940, and then distributed to war installations 
of the War Department. 

57. General Frank. In your capacity as assistant to the Chief of 
Engineers, did you have anything to do with the assignment of 
personnel ? 

General Kingman. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 297 

58. General Frank. Would you know when an officer was relieved 
for inefficiency? 

[555] General Kingman. Oh, yes ! 

59. General Frank. Was Colonel Wyman relieved for inefficiency, 
from Hawaii? 

General Kingman. Well, that was after I retired, I believe, that he 
was relieved from Hawaii. 

60. General Frank. Were you familiar with the Canol project? 
General Kingman. In a general way, in the way everyone of us is. 

61. General Frank. With respect to this letter that you have about 
Colonel Wyman, what is the tenor of it ? 

General Kingman. It is a personal letter to me from a man I knew 
years ago, and in it he mentions what happened on the Tth of Decem- 
ber 1941. I don't know whether this Board would like to look at it 
informally or not. 

62. General Russell. Was this man Sisson, about whom you are 
talking, and from whom you received that letter, a great big, tall 
fellow ? 

General Kingman. Yes. 

63. General Russell. Do you know anything of his history in the 
States ? 

General Kingman. I know that after he worked for the Engineer 
Department in the Philippines, at the time I knew him, from 1907 to 
1910, he went into private practice, I think, for about twenty years, 
as an engineer. Then, as I recall it, about 1930 or 1931 he came back 
to the Engineer Department and worked in the Ohio Valley Division ; 
I think, most of the time in the Huntington District. 

64. General Russell. I am only interested in the period. General, 
when he was not with the Government, but was out as [556] a 
private engineer. Do you know where he was located during that 
period ? 

General Kjngman. I remember he wrote me that he was in Canada a 
part of the time. 

65. General Russell. Do you know whether he went into the south- 
ern part of the United States ? 

General Kingman. No ; I do not. 

66. General Russell. His name is George A. Sisson ? 
General Kingman. Sisson. 

67. General Russell. That is all. 

[657] 68. General Frank. Will you read that part of the letter 
which is pertinent ? 

General Kingman. The letter is dated Honolulu, T. H., 17 July 
1944, contains the following : 

Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., U. S. A., was District Engineer liere during 
tlie most strenuous period and really got things done. He was a real hustler. 
Unfortunately, it looks as though someone in Washington has been trying to 
make a goat of him. The statement that recently appeared in the papers that 
he was drunk on the morning of December 7, 1941, was absolutely false. I was 
Area Engineer of the 2nd Field Area with my office at Hickam Field, which, 
as you no doubt know, adjoins Pearl Harbor. The Jap planes attacked Hickam 
at the same time others hit Pearl Harbor. We had a crew working that morning 
and as soon as the attack started an assistant of mine rushed to the phone and 
tried to call Lieutenant Colonel B. L. Robinson at his residence to inform him 
of the attack, however that line was busy. He then called Colonel Wyman at 
his residence. Colonel Wyman answered the phone and was in good condition. 



298 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I have talked to employees who were in the district office when he arrived short- 
ly afterwards and they stated that he was entirely sober. Colonel Wyman, 
being the go-getter that he is, natvirally has stepped on various toes at times, but 
he was the man who really got work accomplished. As a matter of fact, he im- 
pressed me as being the coolest, most capable [558] officer here at the time 
of the "blitz." Wyman, like others, has some faults, but neglecting his duty was 
not one of them. 

He had made a rather unfortunate choice of the contractors who secured the 
fixed-fee contract. I understand that on the Coast the tinns that went in and 
formed the Hawaiian Constructors were reliable firms. The trouble was that 
they sent their scrub team over here. However, in spite of that they accomplished 
a lot of work. 

69. General Frank. Of course, it must be realized that that is not 
sworn testimony; it is simply an expression of opinion. Nor is it 
known how familiar the writer was with the situation where Wyman 
was on that morning, because his only contact with Wyman was by 
telephone; that is correct, isn't it? 

General Kingman. That is correct, yes. 

70. General Frank. Yes. So that first paragraph is more or less 
in the category of hearsay ? 

General Kingman. I should say entirely. 

71. General Frank. All right. 

72. General Grunert. Who was Chief Engineer at the time you were 
Assistant Chief? 

General Kingman. Major General Julian L. Schley. 

73. General Grunert. When you testified as to the number of activi- 
ties in the Engineer office of which you had charge, you said the con- 
struction section. Did that construction section have anything to do 
with the letting of contracts? 

General Kjngman. When the contracts were let by the [559] 
necessary engineer they were then forwarded through the Division 
Engineer to the Office of Chief of Engineers if it was a large enough 
contract to require the approval of the Chief of Engineers, and were 
handled by the finance section. That is where this letter with reference 
to Rohl was prepared. 

74. General Grunert. Did you have anything to do with the check- 
ing of the progress under the contracts where they led to construc- 
tion? 

General Kingman. My construction section did on fortification 
work. 

75. General Grunert. Would construction mider the Air Warning 
Service come under fortification work? 

General Kingman. It did for a time under this construction section. 

76. General Grunert. Did you know how things were progressing 
in Hawaii ? The contracts referred to the defense projects in Hawaii, 
including the one of the Air Warning Service. 

General Kingman. No, I did not. 

77. General Grunert. You did not know anything about those? 
General Kjngman. No. 

78. General Grunert. And it was not part of your duties to check 
that up to see whether the contract was progressing, to see whether 
it should be done away with ? Or, in other words, you did not know 
anything about that contract ? 

General Kjngman. No. 

79. General Grunert. Now, what were the regulations as to the 
checking of contractors? Here, as I understand, the District Eiigi- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 299 

neer awarded a contract to a contractor or to a number of contractors. 
Whose business is it to' check as to the [660'} reliability of said 
contractors ? Is it the District Engineer's ? Is it the finance section ? 
Or is it nobody's business ? 

General Kingman. Well, it would be primarily the District Engi- 
neer, and finally the checking would be done in this finance section 
handling contracts in the office of the Chief of Engineers. 

80. General Grunert. Then, it was up to the finance section of the 
Chief of Engineers office to check on the District Engineer? 

General Kingman. That organization has been — I am speaking of 
the organization as it was at that time. 

81. General Grunert. Yes. 

General Kingman. It has been so modified since my retirement that 
I cannot tell you about the way it is today. 

82. General Grunert. Well, what I am trying to get at is this : 
Who was responsible that the German citizen was awarded a defense 
contract ? 

General Kingman. Well, I think someone else could answer that 
question a great deal better than I can, because I had no supervision 
over this contract. 

83. General Grunert. That is what I am trying to get at. Who, 
in your opinion, could answer that line of questions? 

General Kingman. I think General Reybold or General Robins 
could answer that much better than I could. 

84. General Grunert. Now, you signed the letter urging the ex- 
pediting of citizenship to this man Rohl. You say you signed as a 
matter of form or routine. Had you signed similar letters to get 
citizenship for other people or hurry them up, or was this the only 
case that you remember? 

[S61] General Kingman. I think that is the only case I ever 
handled — I ever signed as Acting Chief of Engineers. 

85. General Grunert. Then, you did not think, inasmuch as no 
other cases that you knew of had gone through, that you should look 
at it and make inquiries about it ? Did it strike you as anything un- 
usual ? 

General Kingman. None whatever. As I have stated before, there 
was nothing in the circumstances which aroused any misgiving on 
my part. 

86. General Grunert. Then, it was the custom in the Chief Engi- 
neer's office to sign most everything proposed by some other section or 
that responsible head; is that the general idea of it? I will not say 
signed everything, but you put your signature to a letter proposed by, 
initialed by, so and so ; that means you trust him that that is all righ ? 

General Kingman. Yes, sir. 

87. General Grunert. You did not think you had to go into it any 
further, even though it may have referred to something that might 
have caused suspicion otherwise ? 

General Kingman. So far as I knew at that time, this was a very 
unimportant matter. 

88. General Grunert. You say you think the Board can get the 
best evidence as to the letting of contracts, and so forth, from the 
officer who was then finance officer of the Chief of Engineers office? 

General Kingman. Yes, sir. 

89. General Frank. What was his name ? 



300 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Kingman. Colonel Earl E. Gesler. 

90. General Grunert. How is Wyman considered as an officer 
[562] among his fellow officers? 

-General Kingman. Well, he is considered one of the most efficient 
officers on construction that we have in the Corps of Engineers. 

91. General Grunert. What is he, dynamic? 
General Kingman. Very dynamic. 

92. General Grunert. Or what is known as a go-getter? 
General Kingman. Absolutely. 

93. General Grunert. Has he been in trouble before because of 
that go-getting attitude ? Do you know ? 

General Kingman. Well, he sometimes would ride a little roughshod 
over people, and they did not like it. 

94. General Grunert. Generally, what were the reports on him 
prior to your retirement, that you know of officially, as having charge 
of that part of the office ? 

General Kingman. He was rated as a superior officer. 

95. General Grunert. One other question I have: While you knew 
Eohl in California and I believe had awarded a contract to his firm, 
was there any inclination on his part to try to entertain you? 

General Kingman. So far as I know, I never personally met Mr. 
Rohl. 

96. General Grunert. As far as you know there was no attempt 
on his part to get in your good graces by social entertainment ? 

General Kingman. None whatever. 

97. General Grunert. I have no further questions. 

98. General Russell. Did you have any? 

99. General Frank. No. 

100. General Russell. I have some, from these notes that I have 
[S6S] here : 

General, you stated that when this letter, the mimeographed copy 
of which has been furnished the Board, was submitted to you for 
signature there was nothing in it that indicated to you something out 
of the ordinary? 

General Kingman. That is correct. 

101. General Russell. In that letter there is a sentence that, "To 
this date Mr. Rohl's valuable services have not been available for 
Government defense projects because of his alien status," That sen- 
tence was in there, and that did not indicate to you that his status 
was about to be changed so that he could get information on our 
defense projects? 

General Kingman. I don't know whether I get the import of that 
question exactly. 

102. General Russell. This letter was for the purpose of changing 
his status from that of a foreigner to that of an American. 

General Kingman. Yes. 

103. General Russell. And the purpose of it was to enable him 
to do defense project work. 

General Kingzsian. Yes. 

104. General Russell. Did that not indicate to your mind imme- 
diately, General, that some investigation of that sort of thing should 
be made by the Corps of Engineers before they placed their stamp of 
approval on this proposed changed status ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 301 

General Kingman. No, it did not. This man had been doing work 
for the Corps of Engineers for several years. 

105. General Russell. Well, now, this job that he had done out 
on the West Coast under your supervision, at Los Angeles, I [564-] 
believe — did that come in the category of a defense project? 

General Kingman, No; it was building a breakwater there. 

106. General Russell. So far as you knew, therefore, this was the 
first time that a foreigner with the name of Rohl was going to par- 
ticipate in a defense project? 

General Kingman. That is correct, yes. 

107. General Russell. Now, you say that you did not know what 
nationality Rohl was. Did that name indicate anything to you ? 

General Kingman. Not a thing, no. 

108. General Russell. At that time, General, was it difficult to get 
competent contracting firms to do the work that the Engineers wanted 
done for the Govermnent? 

General Kingman. I had nothing to do with that, but I think it 
probably was pretty difficult to get them at the outlying places where 
we were doing work, remote portions of the Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans. 

109. General Russell. Then, in these areas that you last described 
you did have difficulties in getting contracting firms to go there to 
do the work ? 

General Kingman. Well, as I say, I had nothing to do with this. 

110. General Russell. You just do not know? 
General Kingman. I do not know. 

111. General Russell. Now, in reply to some question that was 
asked by General Frank you stated that you thought the contractors 
had "done pretty well," if I recall your language, out at Hawaii. 1 
wanted to ask you now, was it generally considered in the Office of the 
Chief of Engineers that satisfactory progi'ess was being made by the 
firms who were IS65] doing the work out at Hawaii in the year 
1941? 

General Kingman. I do not know the ans^A er to that. 

112. General Russell. Well, what did you mean a moment ago when 
you said you thought the contractors had done pretty well at Hawaii ? 

General Kingman. Well, that was just the impression that I had 
gotten, from no direct connection with the w^ork. 

113. General Frank. Casual conversation? 

General Kingman. Just casual conversation without any knowledge 
of the details. 

114. General Russell. But you are not in position now to testify 
whether or not they had done pretty well out there ? 

General Kingman. No. 

115. General Russell. When was this breakwater work done at Los 
Angeles ? 

General Kingman. Well, it was started, as I recall it, about Sep- 
tember 1936. 

116. General Russell. And finished when? 

General Kingman. It might have been in '38 or '39 ; I am not sure. 

117. General Russell. General, do you know whether or not the 
request made in this letter of August 28, '41, for speeding up action on 
Rohl's naturalization application originated in the Office of the Chief 
of Engineers or out on the West Coast ? 



302 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Kingman. I found nothing in the file to indicate where it 
originated, but I think probably that General Robins or Colonel Gesler 
could give evidence on that point. 

118. General Russell. You were fairly well acquainted with the 
Office of the Chief of P^ngineers in Washington here at that time, 
[566] were you not ? 

General Kingman. Yes. 

119. General Russell. Would there have been any reason for any- 
one in this office here to have known of the filing of Rohl's application 
for naturalization or the progress which had been made on it unless 
such person or persons in the Office of the Chief of Engineers had 
been told by someone who was on the scene where the naturalization 
application was pending ? 

General Kingman. I would say no. 

120. General Russell. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that the 
interest of the Engineer Corps was first developed elsewhere than in 
the Office of the Engineers here ? 

General Kingman. I would say that probably this was initiated by 
the District Engineer, Colonel Wyman. 

121. General Russell. Were you more or less familiar, General, with 
the agencies available to the Engineer Corps for expediting work on 
contracts such as that which was being done at Hawaii? Do you 
know the machinery that w^as used by the Engineers to hurry along 
work on the contracts ? 

General Kingman. Well, there was no machinery that I know of 
other than the offices of the District Engineer and the Division Engi- 
neer concerned. 

122. General Russell. Who were where the work was being done? 
General Kingman. Yes. 

[567] 123. General Russell. These contracts were being exe- 
cuted in Oahu. What authority did the Commander of the Hawaiian 
Department have over that work ? 

General Kingman. I do not know. 

124. General Russell, Were you not Assistant to the Chief of Engi- 
neers at that time ? 

General Kingman. Yes. I may have known at that time. If I did, 
I have forgotten now. 

125. General Russell. That is all I have to ask. 

126. General Frank. Were you acquainted with any employees or 
officials of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization ? 

General Kingman. No, sir. 

127. General Frank. This letter, then was brought to you to sign 
purely in your capacity as Assistant to the Chief of Engineers ? 

General Kingman. As Acting Chief of Engineers. 

128. General Frank. Will you differentiate briefly between defense 
projects and other projects ? 

General Kingman. Defense projects would be those that related to 
the national defense. 

129. General Frank. The Rohl firm had a contract with the Corps 
of Engineers prior to the time that they were considered for defense 
projects. What I am trying to bring out is, what kind of projects 
were they working on before they were considered for defense 
projects? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 303 

General Kingman. The only contract that I know of that they had 
was this one on the breakwater at Los Angeles. 

130. General Frank. What kind of a project do you call that? 

General Kingman. A river and harbor project. 

[568] 131. General Frank. As distinguished from a defense 
project ? 

General Kingman. Absolutely. 

132. General Frank. That is what I am after. I have nothing 
further. 

133. General Grunert. There appears to be nothing further, Gen- 
eral. Thank you very much for coming. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. EUGENE REYBOLD, CHIEF OF ENGI- 
NEERS, UNITED STATES ARMY (ACCOMPANIED BY DOUGLAS I. 
McKAY, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, AND 
MAJOR LUE LOZIER, J. A. G., ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICE OF CHIEF 
OF ENGINEERS) 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Cononel West. Will you please state to the Board your name, 
rank, organization, and station? 

General Reybold. Eugene Reybold— R-e-y-b-o-l-d ; Major General, 
Chief of Engineers ; stationed in Washington, D. C. 

2. Colonel West. For the purposes of the record will you also 
please state the names and connections of the gentlemen who are 
accompanying you ? 

General Reybold, Mr. Douglas I. McKay, Special Assistant to the 
Chief of Engineers, and Major Lue Lozier, J. A. G., assigned to the 
Office of Chief of Engineers. 

3. General Grunert. General, the Board is attempting to get at 
the facts about the attack on Hawaii, and we are now looking into the 
War Department background, together with all the information we 
can get that refers to conditions in Hawaii prior [569] to and 
during the attack. So we have called you in the hope that we will 
get some information that will lead us to facts or that you will give 
us facts on which to make a report and judge what to recommend. 
In order to cover the large field in the limited time we have available, 
individual Board members have been assigned objectives or phases for 
special investigation, although the Board itself will pass on all phases. 
General Frank has been assigned this particular phase, and I am 
going to ask him to lead in pro])ounding the questions, and the other 
Board members will fill in and develop the subject. 

4. General Frank. What was your assignment during the years 
1940 and 1941? 

General Reybold. Up until August 1940, 1 was the Division Engi- 
neer. 

5. General Frank. Where? 

General Reybold. At Little Rock, in the United States Engineers 
Department, and on about August 1st I was assigned as Acting G-4 
of the War Department. 



304 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

6. General Frank. That is, in 1940? 

General Reybold. That is 1940. On October 1, 1941, I was ap- 
pointed Chief of Engineers. So I served as G-4 of the War Depart- 
ment from the period of about August 1 — I think it was August 4, 
to be specific — until September 30, 1941. 

7. General Frank. We are interested in the progress of certain con- 
struction projects in Hawaii as identified by job order which cover 
the construction of certain aircraft warning service installations in 
Hawaii. W^e are desirous of getting information on the progress or 
lack of progress of that construction. Are you familiar with those 
details ? 

[570] General Reybold. I am not familiar with those details, 
although I have made some examination of the records existing in the 
Office of the Chief of Engineers. 

8. General Frank. Was there some delay in the construction of the 
aircraft warning service projects? 

General Reybold. Apparently the initial job orders issued in con- 
nection with three fixed stations were issued in June of 1941. To be 
specific, permit me to refer to Job Order 23.1 under date of June 18, 
1941. 

9. General Frank. All right. 

General Reybold. That job order provides for A. W. S. camp, 
utilities, and fence, Kokee Road, and was to have commenced on June 
23, 1941, with ah estimated date of completion set as September 23, 
1941. 

10. General Frank. The completion date was September 23? 
General Reybold. Yes. 

11. General Frank. What happened to it? That is what I am 
interested in. 

General Reybold. I have a record here which I cannot reconcile, 
identified as Job Order 23.1 Revised, dated December 17, 1941, entitled 
A. W. S. base camp and field station. It is not in exact agreement 
with the project title of 23.1 referred to a moment ago. It is dated 
December 17, 1941. But subsequent information was obtained through 
a telegram received from the District Engineer in Honolulu on June 
26, 1944, fixing the date of completion as 31 December, 1941, indicating 
further in this telegram that the time of completion was changed to 
that date under date of November 30, 1941, 

[571] 12. General Frank. What was the cause of these delays? 

General Reybold. All that I can do at the moment is to generalize on 
those delays and to quote from the same telegram referred to a moment 
ago as having been received from the District Engineer at Honolulu. 

13. General Frank. In 1944? 

General Reybold. Yes. I quote now from that telegram in response 
to inquiry of my office : 

(Excerpt from telegram of June 26, 1944, is as follows :) 

Chronological sequence causing delay in contstruction cannot be given. Stop. 
Causes of delay can be attributed to the following : numerous changes in plan by 
issuing agency, difficulty in procuring special items of Signal Corps buildings and 
structures from the Mainland, critical situation in shipping facilities, radar equip- 
ment required for the operation of stations was to be furnished by Signal Corps 
and was late in arriving at its destination in the Islands, inclement weather con- 
ditions in the vicinity of stations during construction period delayed work to 
some extent stop 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 305 

14. General Grunert. Like all generalizations, they do not state 
anything in particular as to any one of the delays mentioned there? 

General Reybold. That is correct. 

15. General Frank. Do you have any first-hand information with 
respect to the causes for those delays, or has all this information been 
obtained by you from some members of your [57£] organiza- 
tion? 

General Reybold. That is correct. All the information I have is 
obtained from the records and from these few telegrams that have 
been dispatched to our present District Engineer in Honolulu. 

16. General Frank. Therefore, this information that we are obtain- 
ing is repeated information taken from original records that are 
elsewhere ? 

General Reybold. That is correct. 

17. General P^rank. Where are these original records? 

General Reyboid. In the Office of the District Engineer in Hono- 
lulu; and perhaps some of the original copies are on file in our own 
office. 

18. General Frank. Are there people on duty now in Honolulu who 
are conversant with those original records ? 

General Reybold. I would judge that the present District Engineer, 
with the assistance of some of his division employees who have been 
on duty there since the period under discussion, would be able to fur- 
nish valuable information. 

19. General Frank. I am interested not only in this Job Order 
23.1 ; I am interested in Job Order No. 23 which has to do with the 
construction of a road, with addendum 1, 2, and 3, and Job Order 23-1. 
I am interested in Job Order 41, which has to do with the construction 
of a road on Haleakala, and addendum 1, 2, and 3. I am interested in 
Job Order No. 2.1 which covers an access road from Kolekole Pass to 
the proposed site of the cableway at Kaala; Job Order No. 2 covers 
the construction of the cableway itself; Job Order 2.2 which covers 
the construction [573] of the A. S. W. camp and installation 
on the top of Kaala ; also Job Order 46, which later was suspended, 
covering the road, buildings, and so forth, on the top of Mauna Loa. 
Then, in addition, I am interested in Job Order 20.1 covering the 
construction, including the fabrication and installation, of 12 50,000- 
gallon gasoline storage tanks; Job Order 20.120 covering 6 50,000- 
gallon gasoline tanks; Job Order No. 20.130 covering 12 50,000-gallon 
tanks ; Job Order 25 : construct, fabricate and install 9 50,000-gallon 
gasoline storage tanks, the first addendum thereto; and Job Ordei 
21.1 covering 9 50,000-gallon storage tanks, and certain others. 

The point arises that all the information that we would get from 
you is information that you have collected from original sources, when 
those original sources would be available to us. Is that correct? 

General Reybold. That is correct. 

20. General Frank. Therefore I question the advisability of pursu- 
ing the details of this matter further with the Chief of Engineers, 
when we are going into the original records in Honolulu. 

21. General Grunert. I agree with you. 

22. General Russell. I have just one question on that point. 
General, I listened to your description of what happened to this 

initial job order 23.1. I may be mistaken, but I gathered the im- 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 1 21 



306 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

pression that some of the information which you gave us as to delays 
was gathered from original memoranda or data in the Office of the 
Chief of Engineers here in AVashington ? 

General Ketbold. Xo, sir. That information came to us in the 
form of a telegram -which was in response to a telegram [o74.] 
that we had sent to our District Engineer at Honolulu under date of 
19 June, 1944 : and I will be glad to submit this as part of the record, 
and the response, which speaks for itself ; both our telegram and the 
reply. 

23. General Eussell. That is the second record to which you re- 
ferred, the 1944 telegram, and the reply thereto, about which there 
was no confusion. But earlier, and in the beginning, you read to us 
some other papers which you had in your hand, giving us the history 
of the postponements of 23.-1 which involved work on the A. "\Y. S. 
station, and I was wondering if all that data was collected from the 
Hawaiian office or if some of it was gotten out of the Engineer's office 
here. 

General Retbold. What I have said up to this time has been taken 
from the job order records of Xo. 23.1 and the telegi'am received from 
our District Engineer. 

24. General Eussell. All those records on 23.1 came from Hawaii ? 
General Eetbold. Yes. 

[575] 25, General Frank. Do you have a monthly progress re- 
port that you require be sent into your office from your district engi- 
neers ? 

General Eetbold. At that time we had a report generally known 
throughout the service as a "monthly report of operations,*' and those 
reports are on file in our office. 

26. General Frank. Would they cover these job-orders in which 
we are interested ? 

General Eetbold. Only in a general way. 

27. General Frank, We will give you references to these job-orders 
and ask, if you please, that you forward us copies of the progress re- 
jDorts on these jobs, through to the completion of the project. 

General Eetbold. We will be very glad to give you whatever records 
we have in that respect. I should like to add that in our search of 
these records, the report of operations for the month of November, 
in connection with the storage tanks referred to, is missing from our 
files. 

28. General Frank. Are vou familiar with the negotiations for a 
contract. W-414-eng-602. dated the 20th of December. 1940, with the 
Hawaiian Constructors, for defense projects in Hawaii? 

General Eetbold, Only as I have examined to some limited extent 
the contract on file in the office of the Chief of Engineers. 

29. General Frank, That was before you were directly associated 
wit h the Corps of Engineers ? 

General Eetbold. Yes, sir. I was not appointed until October 1, 
1941. 

[576] 30. General Frank. Are you at all conversant with the 
case of Hans Wilhelm Eohl ? 

General Eetbold. Only as I have read in the papers and heard over 
the radio, and in connection with the report of the Military Affairs 
Committee of the House, and what we might term the "squadroom 
talk." I never met the gentleman, to my knowledge. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 307 

31. General Frank. Do you know whether or not he is at the mo- 
ment a government contractor ? 

General Reybold. I do not. 

32. General Grunert. Could he be, without your knowledge ? 
General Eeybold. He might be. 

33. General Frank. After all the investigation that has gone on 
with respect to his firm, wouldn't it have been normal for you to have 
had an investigation in your own establishment, to have uncovered 
that? 

General Eeybold. It might well have been. 

34. General Frank. Whose responsibility is that? 

General Eeybold. That's perhaps the responsibility of the Chief 
of Engineers, but we have pretty close watch on those things through 
the office of the Provost Marshal General, and through G-2, and 
through the Service Command headquarters, in this country ; and of 
course any individual leaving these shores for a foreign nation is very 
carefully investigated prior to his departure. 

35. General Frank. However, foreign agents have methods of com- 
municating their information without they themselves leaving the 
country ; that is correct ? 

General Eeybold. Oh, yes 

[577] 36. General Frank. Have you any personal or official 
knowledge of the reliability of one EohlJ 

General Eeybold. I know nothing about the individual, personally. 
Going back to contracts, if they be a fixed-fee contract, we have a Con- 
tract Advisory Committee sitting in our office, which looks into the 
ability to perform, and the financial responsibility of every contractor, 
before we award a contract ; and that is equally true of course of a 
lump-sum contract ; we examine very carefully into those features. 

37. General Frank. What did you call that agency ? 

General Eeybold. "Contract Advisory Committee," it is called. 

38. General Frank. Did that exist at the time this contract was let? 
General Eeybold. That existed, and I have been told — I can't vouch 

for this — that this particular contract, at the time of its award, was 
referred to that Contract Advisory Committee for its approval prior 
to the award. 

39. General Frank. Do you know who comprised that committee 
at that time ? 

General Eeybold. I could readily get that : Mr. Blossom, Mr. Har- 
vey, Mr. Dresser, Mr. Talow, now a Colonel in the Army, and Mr. A. L. 
Sherman. 

40. General Frank. You are conversant with the Espionage Act 
that requires contractors receiving defense-project contracts to be citi- 
zens of the United States ? 

General Eeybold. I am not familiar with it, but I judge that that's 
so, all right. 

41. General Frank. Well, that is a law. 
IS7S] General Eeybold. Yes. 

42. General Frank. I am just developing this as a background for 
the next question. Whose responsibility would it be to check as to 
whether or not a contractor was a citizen of the United States ? 

General Eeybold. That would be the responsibility of everyone in 
connection with the award of a contract. By that I mean if a contract 
be under consideration for award in a district, the district engineer, 



308 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and, in turn, if it came forward, the division engineer; and if again 
it required the approval of the Chief of Engineers, it would be the 
responsibility of the Office of the Chief of Engineers. 

43. General Grunert. Is that all set forth in regulations and in- 
structions, or is it just understood? 

General Reybold. I think that is generally understood. 

44. General Frank. So far as you know, then, there is nothing spe- 
cific in the regulations about that ? 

General Reybold. Nothing specific, but here is a copy of a letter 
which may be of interest to the Board, under date of December 12, 
1941. The subject is "Counter Subversive System." It is addressed 
to "The Commanding Generals, All Corps Areas; and The Chief of 
Engineers." With your permission, I will read it. It is brief. 

45. General Frank. Proceed. 
General Reybold (reading) : 

1. Reference is made to the Counter Subversive System which was inaugurated 
by the Construction Division of the Quartermaster Corps at the time that the 
Construction Division was under the jurisdiction of the Quartermaster General. 

[579] 2. In view of the fact that the Construction Division has recently been 
placed under the jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers, it is directed that the 
Counter Subversive System referred to in paragraph 1 above be maintained by 
the Corps of Engineers, and that it continue to function under the control of Corps 
Area Commanders in accordance with the provisions of Counter Subversive 
Instructions. 
By order of the Secretary of War : 

E. S. Adams 
Major General, 
The Adjutant Oeneral. 

46. General Frank. Are you conversant with the fact that the firm 
of Rohl-Connolly Co. had a contract for building a breakwater in Los 
Angeles ? 

General Reybold. Only by hearsay. 

47. General Frank. In a situation like that, and in accordance with 
this system, as outlined in that letter you just read, will you explain 
how that counterespionage system would work in determining any 
questionable activities of Mr. Rohl ? 

General Reybold. Our people in our district maintain very close 
contact of course with the Service Command Headquarters, their sub- 
versive people, the G-2 people. They, at the Corps Areas or Service 
Command headquarters, know what is going on in the line of Federal 
work throughout their respective commands, I judge, under the terms 
of this letter, and we in turn have an Intelligence Section in our own 
office which maintains very close contact with the activities of our 
office, and, in turn, with the G-2, and with the Provost Marshal 
General. 

[580] 48. General Frank. Is there a clean-cut line of operation, 
or is it of nebulous positiveness as to the manner in which it works? 

General Reybold. There is nothing positive on the books, to my 
knowledge, as to a requirement as to looking into the loyalty of a 
contractor, prior to Pearl Harbor. 

49. General Frank. What if any orders of the Corps of Engineers 
required that the loyalty and background of proposed contractors be 
investigated before a contract was awarded? 

General Reybold. We say, none as to loyalty, As to background, 
it was the duty of the Corps of Engineers to be informed about and be 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 309 

satisfied with the experience, ability to perform, and financial respon- 
sibility of its contractors. 

At the time, preceding the award of this contract there was no 
occasion for the Chief of Engineers to suspect or doubt the loyalty 
of any member of the contracting group. Had there been, the matter 
would have been reported to G-2 for appropriate attention. As of 20 
December 1940, and before, G-2 was the sole agency within the War 
Department charged with the duty of reporting on and conducting 
investigations into matters pertaining to loyalty, 

50. General Russell. General, was that the 20th of December, 1940, 
or 1941 ? 

General Retbold. That was 1940. That was the time of the letting 
of the basic contract. General. 

51. General Frank. In the case of Rohl, are you conversant with 
the personal relationship of Colonel Theodore Wyman and Rohl? 

General Reybold. Nothing more than what I have heard, and 
[S81] read in testimony. 

52. General Frank. You have gathered from that testimony that 
Rohl and Wyman were intimate or casual friends ? 

General Reyrold. I would say that they were pretty close friends. 

53. General Frank. In a situation like that, where the friendship 
was so close between the man letting the contract and the man receiving 
it, a situation could exist where there could be some question about the 
loyalty of the man receiving the contract, and the system which was 
implemented for determining that being distributed among the Corps 
of Engineers, the Corps Area Commander, the FBI, the G-2 of the 
War Department, that system might be so diversified as to prevent its 
ever being picked up; is that correct? 

General Reybold. . It might be. 

54. General Frank. Therefore, might it not be logical to draw the 
conclusion that the system for determining this was rather loose ? 

General Reybold. I would say Yes. 

55. General Frank. I think we will go back and take the questions 
that we sent over to you, ask you those questions, and proceed with the 
development in accordance with the answers that have been prepared 
in your office. Just give me a general answer to these questions, and 
then I can pursue that later, in view of our understanding. 

General Reybold. All right. 

56. General Frank. As of the 7th of December, what was the state 
of completion of the work on each item contemplated by Contract 
No. W^14-eng-602? 

[582] General Reybold. Our records are not clear, and I would 
suggest that that information be obtained in detail from the district 
office in Honolulu. 

57. General Frank. That office has the original records ? 
General Reybold. It has the original records. 

58. General Frank. The next question : When was the work on each 
item commenced? 

General Reybold. The same answer as (a). 

59. General Frank. What were the number and locations of the 
permanent aircraft warning stations included within the work of the 
contract ? 



310 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Eeyeold. The original contract, dated 20 December, 1940, 
and approved by the Under Secretary of War, 3 January 1941, did 
not specify the number nor the site locations. It provided : 

Warning service stations at locations to be determined, specified in Article I, 1. 
Article I, IB : 

Aircraft warning service stations on the Islands of Oahu, Hawaii ; Maui and 
Kauai, involving certain installations, including buildings, roads, trails, cable- 
ways, haulage ways and other structures appurtenant to aircraft warning ser- 
vice, as directed by the Contracting OflScer. 

As of the date of the contract, the War Department had authorized 
the construction of the following : 
(a) Three fixed stations, as follows : 
Mt. Kaala on Oahu 
Haleakala on Maui 
Kokee on Kauai 
[SS'S] (b) Seven mobile stations, 
(c) One information center at Fort Shafter. 

There is a lot more to this. I do not know whether you want to 
hear all this stuff, or not. We have got an awful lot of stuff in here. 
It is a sort of summation of that contract. 

60. General Grunert. Let us put it in the record. Go ahead. We 
may need it, later on. 

61. General Frank. Go ahead. 

General Reybold. On the 21 April 1941, the District Engineer sub- 
mitted revised detail cost estimates on the original program, increas- 
ing the estimated costs from $505,000 to $890,804. On 24 May 1941 
this office requested allotment of additional funds for this work of 
$385,804. On 8 July 1941 the District Engineer^ submitted additional 
data regarding costs requested by the Chief Signal Officer 10 June 
1941. 

[584] The War Department of 8 July 1941 authorized general 
changes in the program, including the addition of three more fixed 
stations (at Pahoa on Hawaii, Opana on Oahu, and Manawahua on 
Oahu) and the reduction of the number of mobile stations from 
seven to six (eliminating the Mauna Loa station and changing the 
location of some of the other mobile stations), and requesting esti- 
mates of cost and report on locations. 

The requested estimates of cost and report were forwarded by the 
District Engineer 18 September 1941, and were forwarded by this 
office 3 October 1941 to the Adjutant General through the Chief 
Si^al Officer. The Secretary of War approved the revised Ha- 
waiian aircraft warning service program on 4 December 1941, before 
which date no construction could have been started on the additional 
work covered by the revised program, nor job orders thereon issued 
to the contractor. 

Accordingly, "the number and location of the permanent aircraft 
warning stations included within the work of the contract" on 7 
December 1941 were the three fixed stations and the information 
center described in subparagraph (4) above, approved by the Secre- 
tary of War 4 December 1941. 

62. General Grunert. May I develop that a little more? I did 
not quite understand from the reading of that. It seems the origi- 
nal contracts were awarded. Then they kept changing or asking for 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 311 

more money, and this went on from early in '41 until December '41. 
What was actually completed in the contract, or are all these per- 
taining to the same contract that were not completed or only par- 
tially completed? I do not get a clear picture of what was done 
except that they kept asking for something else. 

[585] In other words, is there any clear-cut thing there to 
show, This was a contract to so and so; they did so and so on it by 
such and such a time? 

We shall have to take each one of these contracts, it seems to me, 
and follow it up as to what was done with it. If it was revised, who 
asked that it be revised? Who approved the revision? How much 
did it cost? Was there money available? Were the materials avail- 
able ? and all that. Otherwise I do not get a clear picture of it at all. 
It seems building the Air Warning Service was just not done during 
that year, and we want to find out why. 

63. General Frank. Well, I can explain that. 

64. General Grunert. Can you? 

65. General Frank. To this extent. There was a master contract 
made, and that did not cover the specific projects. As a project 
came up, then that particular project was covered by a job order 
which became a part of the master contract, and those projects as 
covered by these specific job orders were the things to which I 
referred when I first started questioning the Chief of Engineers. 

66. General Grunert. That is just what I want to get in the rec- 
ord, so it will be intelligible to the laymen who will have to study 
the thing. 

67. General Frank. And we have here a complete record of the 
commencement datCj the estimated date of completion, and the vari- 
ous revised dates, and the addendum to the original job orders in 
each instance. 

68. General Grunert. All right, fine. Now, what can Ave get from 
the present witness that will help us toward a better [586] 
understanding of that when we get to the source of the record? 

69. General Frank. That I think will be brought out as we ask 
these questions. 

70. General Grunert. All right ; go ahead, then. 

General Reybold. Without putting this on the record unless you 
want it there, General, that is a little confusing. I know this thing is 
confusing to me too. But what had been done up to this date when I 
quit reading there was to develop facts ; that although there were nu- 
merous plans in the mill over there being considered, quite a program : 
Navy, Army, and everything else, what you are trying to get at here 
was as of December the 7th what might have been completed in the 
nature of these air warning stations. Now, that is what you want to 
do, and I developed down to the fact that there were three of them 
firmly on the books, even though you will find later that that devel- 
oped into six fixed stations, six movable stations, and one communica- 
tions center. 

71. General Grunert. You see what I want: when the record is 
completed I want to be able to read it and study the record. Now, what 
have we got? What facts have we? When we put in a report, we 
cannot bear out all this unless we have something in the record to 
show for it, and this talk off the record will not help us a bit when it 
comes to thinking back on it. 



312 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Reybold. Yes. 

72. General Grunert. What I want to do is to get this in the record 
so we can study the record and come to conclusions and piece it out by 
additional testimony where necessary. 

General Reyrold. Well, the last paragraph I wrote there finally 
concludes those three stations. 

[587] 73. General Frank. All right. That is in answer to what 
question, now? 

General Reybold. That was c. That was 2 c. 

74. General Frank. All right. Now, what were the number and 
location of the underground gasoline storage tanks included within 
the work of the contract ? 

General Reybold. We cannot answer that from the records on file in 
the Office of the Chief of Engineers. 

75. General Grunert. Can you suggest where we can find informa- 
tion on that subject? 

General Reybold. That information can be obtained from the Dis- 
trict Engineer in Honolulu, who has the original records. 

76. General Frank. Which if any of these facilities were completed 
as of the 7th of December, '41 ? 

General Reybold. None, except at least one mobile station with the 
smaller type tower afiixed to a truck, was in operation in a temporary 
location in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. As to the status of comple- 
tion of the three fixed stations and the information center on 30 No- 
vember 1941, see Inclosures 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. 

Now, that is these things [indicating]. 

77. General Frank. What do those inclosures show ? 

General Reybold. They show the status of completion as of Novem- 
ber 30, 1941, of the three fixed air warning stations that had been ap- 
proved for construction, and the information center. 

78. General Frank. In answer to the original question, "Avhich if 
any of these facilities were completed as of the 7th of December, 1941 ?" 
what is your answer? 

General Reybold. None insofar as the fixed stations are [588] 
concerned. 

79. General Frank. What was the status of completion of the in- 
formation center? 

General Reybold. 72 percent on November 30, 1941. 

80. General Frank. Do you have information there on the per- 
centage of completion of the fixed stations ? They were three in num- 
ber, were they not? 

General Reybold. Mt. Kaala : the project as a whole was 50 percent 
completed, the access road was 97 percent completed, and the cableway 
20 percent completed. 

Haleakala : project as a whole, 96.4 percent; access road, 100 percent; 
power building, 60 percent; barracks and communications building, 
99.9 percent complete; detector building and tower, 95 percent 
complete. 

Kokee : project as a whole was 50 percent completed ; access road, 86 
percent; power building, 57 percent; barracks and communications 
building, 70 percent; detector building and tower, 84 percent. 

81. General Frank. In answer to the following question, "What was 
the time fixed by the contract and the job orders for completion of 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 313 

each of these facilities?" that information is more readily available 
from the original records in Honolulu ? 
General Retbold. Yes. 

82. General Frank. In the delays in completing the facilities what 
were the causes ? 

General Reybold. I could give you no further information on that 
question than that read from a telegram received from the District 
Engineer. 

83. General Frank. In Honolulu? 
[589'] General Retbold. In Honolulu. 

84. General Frank. Therefore, that information should be avail- 
able to us in Honolulu ? 

General Reybold. Correct. 

85. General Frank. Do you know whether or not protests as to the 
delays were made to the contractors ? 

General Reybold. I do not. 

86. General Frank. Do you know whether or not your office was 
advised with respect to the delays? 

General Reybold. I do not. 

87. General Frank. Have you any information as to any of the de- 
lays for which the contractors were responsible ? 

General Reybold. I have no such information. 

88. General Frank. Do you have any information as to any delays 
for which the Government was responsible ? 

General Reybold. In general terms, it is known that the following 
constitute certain sources of delay : (a) Numerous changes in plans by 
the using agency. 

89. General Frank. What do you mean by "the using agency" ? 
General Reybold. Signal Corps if they were going to operate these 

installations. 

90. General Frank. Or the Aircraft Warning Service ? 

General Reybold. Or the Aircraft Warning Service, wherever that 
belongs. 

91. General Frank. All right. 

General Reybold. (b) Difficulty in procuring special items of Sig- 
nal Corps buildings and structures from mainland, 

92. General Frank. What do you mean by "special items"? 

General Reybold. Well, special items of Air Corps [590] in- 
stallations and everything, you might say, in connection with building 
materials, with perhaps the exception of rock. Crushed rock did not 
have to be shipped over from the United States. 

93. General Frank. Well, I am trying to be a little more specific 
there as to exactly the things to which you refer. Will you state that 
again, please ? 

General Reybold. Difficulty in procuring special items of Signal 
Corps buildings and structures from the United States. Those steel 
towers were fabricated in the United States. 

94. General Frank. Do you really know whether or not the non- 
receipt of those in Honolulu held up construction? Do you really 
know that ? 

General Reybold. Specifically I do not. 

95. General Frank. All right. Proceed with the answer. 
General ReybOld. I know in general terms also, there was a critical 

situation in shipping facilities, but nothing specific. I am told that 



314 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

radar equipment required for the operation of the aircraft warning 
service stations was to be furnished by the Signal Corps and was late 
in arriving at the destination in the Islands. 

96. General Frank, May I ask a question right there : The founda- 
tions on which to install this permanent equipment could have been 
put in prior to the arrival of this equipment ? 

General Reybold. If the location had been definitely fixed. 

97. General Frank. If the location had been fixed and if the plans 
had been furnished you ? 

General Retbold. That is correct. 

98. General Frank. Therefore, the nonarrival of the radar 
[591] equipment itself need not have held up preparatory con- 
struction ? 

General Reybold. No, not preparatory construction, if the plans 
and the location were at hand. 

99. General Frank. Go ahead. 

General Reybold. Labor shortage and special difficulty in securing 
competent, experienced supervisory personnel. 

Earlier competition for labor, and supply priorities, between the 
different agencies of the Government engaged in the defense program. 

And to some limited extent, which I think you could write off, in- 
clement weather, because they will have that under any contract, but 
is merely reported from over there. Inclement weather is the last 
thing. 

100. General Frank. This answer that you have given is all the 
information you have as to the causes of the delay in the installation of 
this equipment ? 

General Reyboi;D. That is all that we have. 

101. General Frank. Wliat equipment was furnished for the in- 
stallation and the facilities for the underground gasoline storage 
tanks? 

General Reybold. We have no answer to that question yet, but are 
continuing our search of the files. 

102. General Frank. Where is information more readily available 
on that? 

General Reybold. In the office of the District Engineer at Honolulu. 

103. General Frank. Do you know when this equipment was deliv- 
ered in the Hawaiian Islands ? 

Genera] Reybold. I do not. 

[592] 104. General Frank. Do you know from whom this 
equipment was received ? 
(jeneral Reybold. I do not. 

105. General Frank. What was the chain of command, so far as the 
District Engineer in Hawaii was concerned, from the commencement 
of the work under the contract and down to the 7th of December? 

General Reybold. The District Engineer reported to the Division 
Engineer, and he, the Division Engineer, in turn reported to the Chief 
of Engineers. 

106. General Frank. The District Engineer in this instance was 
Colonel Wyman in Honolulu ? 

General Reybold. Tliat is correct. General Hanntim at San Fran- 
cisco was the Division Engineer. 

107. General Frank. What if any responsibility had the Com- 
manding General of the Hawaiian Department in this instance? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 315 

General Reybold. Would you state that again? 

108. General Frank. Wliat if any responsibility did the Command- 
ing General of the Hawaiian Department have with respect to this 
construction ? 

General Reybold. He had nothing to do with the actual operations, 
except of course the District Engineer had the closest contact with 
him; but I would judge that in the planning for these installations 
which we are discussing here he would have a very great responsibility 
in determining the number and locations of the installations. 

109. General Frank. What I am after is : To what extent would it 
have been possible for him to have taken steps to have expedited 
[693] work on any project in a contract? 

General Reybold. He might well have gone first to our District 
Engineer; and if he did not obtain the results I am sure that a com- 
munication either with the Division Engineer or with the Chief of 
Engineers would have brought forth results. 

110. General Frank. Do you know whether or not that was done ? 
General Reybold. I do not. 

111. General Frank. Will it be possible for you to furnish the names 
and locations of military personnel and supervisory civilian employees 
of the Corps of Engineers who were on duty in Hawaii during this 
period ? 

General Reybold. I have here the record of military personnel on 
duty at the time under consideration, but have not a list of the civilian 
personnel. 

112. General Frank. It is the supervisory civilian personnel we 
want. I would rather change that to supervisory civilian personnel. 

General Reybold. I would suggest that the supervisory personnel be 
obtained from the office of the District Engineer in Honolulu. Now, 
would you prefer that we wire and get that for you? We probably 
could. 

113. General Grunert. It is up to you. 

114. General Frank. Yes, we would like to have that list available 
prior to going there, so that we shall know where they are. It may 
be necessary to contact some of them in the United States. 

115. General Grunert. We shall take a recess for five minutes. 
(Thereupon there was a brief informal recess.) 

[594.] 116. General Grunert. The Board will come to order. 

117. General Frank. I should like to have this list of names in- 
cluded in the record, but I should like to have after each name the 
position that he held. 

118. General Reybold. We shall be glad to furnish that information. 
(List of names furnished by General Reybold is as follows :) 
(Original transcript does not contain above-mentioned list.) 
[596] 119, General Frank. Who was the contracting officer with 

respect to the mentioned contract during this period ? 
General Reybold. Colonel Theodore Wyman. 

120. General Frank. What were the duties of the District Engineer 
and the contracting officer with raspect to this mentioned contract? 

General Reybold. Could I go back and add to that other question ? 
"i ou asked who was the contracting officer. I think we should clear 
up one point in there that you may want to follow up. 

121. General Frank. Yes? 



316 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Retbold. I said, Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., signed the 
original contract and Supplements Nos. 2 to 10, both inclusive, and 
Change Orders Nos. 1 to 6, both inclusive, as contracting officer. These 
covered the period from 20 December 1940 to 29 November 1941. 
Colonel (now Brigadier General, Retired) Warren T. Hannum, then 
Division Engineer, South Pacific Division, signed Supplement No. 1 
as contracting officer. Supplements and Change Orders numbered 
higher than 10 and 6, respectively, bear dates "after Pearl Harbor." 

And then in answer to the question, "Wliat were the duties of the 
District Engineer and the contracting officer with respect to the 
mentioned contract?" the answer: To administer and exercise general 
supervision over the performance of the contract. 

122. General Frank. What if any orders of the Corps of Engineers 
prohibited the acceptance by the District Engineer and the contracting 
officer of favors or gifts from contractors? 

[597] General Reybold. Reference is made to Army Regulations 
C'00-10, 6 December 1939, which was in effect during this period. Also 
to the following provisions of Orders and Regulations, Corps of 
Engineers, dated 15 January 1939 : 

Par. 17 (c), Officers of the Corps of Engineers shall not engage in any work 
outside the duties officially assigned to them that may interfere with the iter- 
formance of their official duties or conflict with the duties asigned to the Corps 
of Engineers and they shall not, without the prior assent of the Chief of Engi- 
neers and the Secretary of War, accept compensation for services from any State, 
municipality, corporation, or person that has any interest that touches on the 
duties of the Corps of Engineers." 

Par. 17 (d). Receipt by officers of pay from State or private interests for 
services rendered in connection with the supervision of expenditure of funds 
contributed toward river and harbor improvements is not authorized. 

Par. 1039.8 (c). The practice of receiving presents from persons not in the 
Military Establishment or in the employ of the Government in recognition of 
services rendered, through not expressly forbidden, is opposed to the spirit of 
the statute and for that reason is not approved by the department. 

123. General Frank. Will you state generally from your memory 
the provisions of Army Regulation 600-10? 

General Reybold. That general paragraph forbids the [555] 
acceptance of gifts. 

124. General Frank. You may get it and read the language into the 
record later. 

Would you consider frequent companionship with, frequent enter- 
tainment by, and association with a contractor by a District Engineer 
as being in compliance with these general provisions ? 

General Reybold. Personally I have always tried to avoid that sort 
of thing, and I think you have got to know your contractors. There 
are contractors who couldn't buy me a sandwich, and there are other 
contractors who, out of mere courtesy, could buy me a sandwich so to 
speak. In this particular instance it is apparent to me that there was 
too much familiarity between the contracting officer and the con- 
tractor, only as I observed from what I have heard and what I have 
read, and from no first-hand information that I have ever observed. 

125. General Frank. What if any orders of the Corps of Engineers 
required that the loyalty and background of proposed contractors be 
investigated before a contract w^as aAvarded? 

General Reybold. None as to loyalty. At the time preceding the 
awarding of this contract there was no occasion for the Chief of 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 317 

Engineers to suspect or doubt the loyalty of any member of the con- 
tracting group. Had there been, the matter would have been reported 
to G-2 for appropriate attention. As of 20 December 1940, and before, 
G-2 was the sole agency within the War Department charged with the 
duty of reporting on and conducting investigations into matters per- 
taining to loyalty. 

128. General Frank. Has that procedure been changed in any way 
[5^9] since December Tth ? 

General Reybold. Loyalty investigations now rest with the Office 
of the Provost Marshal General. 

127. General Frank. Do you consider the present system is suf- 
ficiently watertight? 

General Reybold. I believe it is now, perhaps more as a result of 
the investigation concerning this man Rohl than ever before. 

128. General Frank. This still depends upon each of the various 
agents concerned doing his part as he sees it in making the necessary 
reports ? 

General Reybold. That is correct. 

129. General Frank. It does not siDecifically require an investiga- 
tion into loyalty ; it is a question of a man's individual interpretation 
of his duties ? 

General Reybold. I would say you are correct insofar as contracts 
within continental United States are concerned, but on the other 
hand I do believe that contractors going into our outlying possessions, 
and particularly to foreign countries, would be very, very carefully 
surveyed. 

130. General Frank. Do you feel that there is still room for im- 
provement of the system of checking on these people ? 

General Reybold. It could be strengthened. 

131. General Frank. Who was responsible for investigating the 
loyalty and background of the contractors in this mentioned contract? 

General Reybold. I would say initially the contracting officer. 

[600] 132. General Frank. Who was? 

General Reybold. Who was Colonel Theodore Wyman. 

133. General Frank. What reports with respect to the loyalty and 
background of Hans Wilhelm Rohl, of the Rohl-ConnoUy Company 
were received by the contracting officer, the District Engineer, the 
Division Engineer, and the Chief of Engineers before this contract 
was awarded? 

General Reybold. None as to loyalty so far as the Chief of Engi- 
neers was concerned. 

134. General Frank. What attempts were made to get such 
reports ? 

General Reybold. None by the Office of the Chief of Engineers. 

135. General Frank. What if any complaints or derogatory re- 
marks as to performance by the contractors were received by the 
contracting officer, the District Engineer, the Division Engineer, or 
the Chief of Engineers before the Tth of December, '41 ? 

General Reybold. None insofar as the Chief of Engineers is 
concerned. 

136. General Frank. If there were complaints, none of them got 
as high as the Office of the Chief of Engineers ? 



318 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Reybold. To the best of my knowledge, that answer is 
correct. 

137. General Frank. In your testimony covering any orders pro- 
hibiting the acceptance by the District Engineer of Favors or gifts you 
referred to Army Regulation 600-10. Can you give me the provisions 
of that Army Regulation? 

General Reybold (reading) : 

It is impossible to [601] enumerate all of the various outside activi- 
ties and interests to which these regulations refer. The following examples may 
be regarded as typical : 

138. General Frank. Are you reading from the Army Regulation ? 
General Reybold. Yes, and the one to which I referred a few 

moments ago. 

139. General Frank. Yes. 

General Reybold. That is all in quotation except, "and the one to 
which I referred a minute ago." I mention (a) : 

Acceptance by an oflScer of a substantial loan or gift or any emolument from 
a person or firm with whom it is the officer's duty as an agent of the Government 
to carry on negotiations. 

[602] 140. General Frank. Have you any knowledge concern- 
ing whether any military personnel neglected duties relating to this 
contract ? 

General Reybold. None to my knowledge. 

141. General Frank. Have you any knowledge as to whether there 
was any neglect of duty by not properly investigating the loyalty of 
Hans Wilhelm Rohl prior to the award of the contract? 

General Reybold. I would say there was none. 

142. General Frank. Have you any information as to whether or 
not there was neglect of duty by not supervising properly the per- 
formance of the contractors work? 

General Reybold. None, to my knowledge. 

143. General Frank. You have already stated that so far as you 
know there was no informing of higher authority of delays and de- 
ficiencies. 

General Reybold. I have here a telegram received from the 
Hawaiian Department, addressed to the Adjutant General, under date 
of June 11, 1941. 

(Telegram dated June 11, 1941, from Hawaiian Department to 
the Adjutant General, is as follows.) 

I have been informed by the Division Engineer, San Francisco, that A-l-G 
is the priority covering contract W-414 Engineer 784 with Interstate Equii>- 
ment Corporation, Elizabeth, New Jersey, materials for cableway to Kaala 
aircraft warning station covered by this contract. General Electric has sub- 
contract for motor and all electrical equipment. According to Division Engi- 
neer a delay of about fifteen weeks in the delivery of this electrical material 
to contractor [603] is strongly probable under its priority. As this Kaala 
station is most important in our aircraft warning system it is essential that 
this cableway be completed early. In this Department this aircraft service is 
considered to be the most important single project. War Department assistance 
to District Engineer to have priority of this contract changed to A-l-B is 
strongly recommended. 

To which this office replied, under date of June 17, 1941, to the 
Adjutant General, under the heading of Second Indorsement : 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 319 

(Telegram dated June 17, 1941, from Chief of Engineers to the 
Adjutant General, is as follows :) 

1. By telephonic conversation with the Priorities Committee, Army and Navy 
Munitions Board, a rating of A-l-C was authorized. 

2. The contractor should contact his suppliers to determine if satisfactory 
delivery can be made with this rating. If not, he should contact other sources 
for early delivery. 

3. In the event further assistance is requested instructions in circular letter 
Finance No. 144 should be followed. 

144. General Frank. Do you know the outcome of that? 
General Reybold. I do not, without further search of the records. 

145. General Frank. In any event, it was not sufficiently advanced 
to enable the cableway to be constructed and the aircraft warning 
system to be erected on Mt. Kaala prior to December 7. That is 
correct, is it not ? 

General Reybold, To my knowledge, that is correct. 

[604] General Grunert. May I interject a question there? I 
presume, with reference to raising the priority, it was raised when 
you put it in 1-C. What does that mean in actual weeks' saving be- 
tween one priority and the other, normally ? 

General Reybold. I would never be able to answer that. 

147. General Grunert. Why was it put in 1-C if it did not make 
any difference ? 

General Reybold. It would perhaps enable the manufacturer to 
secure components at an earlier date than he would otherwise have 
secured under the former priority. 

148. General Frank. To your knowledge, what information was 
given Colonel Wyman to complete these defense projects as speedily 
as possible ? 

General Reybold. None from my office, to my knowledge. The 
presume, with reference to raising the priority, it was raised when 
ment Commander. 

149. General Frank. What were the functions of the position which 
you occupied on the 20th of December, 1940, with respect to this 
contract referred to above ? 

General Reybold. I was G^ of the War Department. 

150. General Frank. Did you have any responsibility in that 
capacity for this contract? 

General Reybold. Unquestionably there was something concerning 
that matter that passed through G-4. What it was I do not remem- 
ber at the moment. 

151. General Frank. It was a matter of policy rather than one of 
operation ? 

General Reybold. Yes, indeed. 

[60S] 152. General Frank. Have you any memory of anything 
passing through G-4 with respect to this contract at that time? 

General Reybold. I have a faint recollection of some difficulty in 
fixing upon the location of some of the aircraft warning station sites. 

153. General Frank. Was that some difficulty that you were hav- 
ing with the Department of the Interior ? 

General Reybold. Yes. That was mixed up in the affair. I think 
the Secretary of the Interior was very insistent upon having locations 
of roads and the character of the buildings that were to be installed 



320 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

on his reservation placed before him for approval, or his representa- 
tives. 

154. General Frank. Do you know whether or not that held up 
the work? 

General Reybold. I do not. 

155. General Frank. Can you find out? 

General Reybold. I think you would have to obtain that from the 
District Engineer's office in Honolulu, because evidence would have 
to be weighed as to whether fixing upon the location or the receipt 
of the last piece of material and equipment to be installed would be 
a governing factor. 

166. General Grunert. There is a question that I want to ask there : 
Could a contract have been let without the location having been fixed? 
In other words, if there was any delay would it have been before the 
contract was let, or would that keep the contract from being let until 
there was a determination ? 

General Reybold. Not in this kind of a contract. General. This 
is a so-called fixed-fee contract, and its terms are very flexible. I 
might refer, perhaps, to what General Frank stated [606] in 
one of his opening remarks, that the contract is very general in na- 
ture, and the work was specified by job orders; and until one of 
those job orders was issued there could be nothing specific concerning 
any individual item. 

157. General Frank. You read a radiogram from the Hawaiian 
Department asking for a change in priority. Do you have any other 
examples or instances in which there was complaint made or help 
asked for from Hawaii to assist in completing those projects in 
Hawaii ? 

General Reybold. I have nothing insofar as our search of the rec- 
ords has revealed to the moment. We are continuing our search, and 
anything brought to light will be furnished to the Board. 

158. General Frank. Will you give us negative as well as positive 
information on that ? 

General Reybold. Yes. 

159. General Frank. So that if you do not find anything we will 
be so advised ? 

General Reybold. Yes ; I will be glad to do so. 

160. General Frank. What means did the District Engineer, 
Colonel Wyman, have to prod or drive the contractor or to bring 
pressure to bear so that the work would be completed within the time 
specified ? 

General Reybold. He had full authority. 

161. General Frank. What could he have done if the contractor 
were not working as fast as he thought he should ? 

General Reybold. He could have urged him verbally, urged him 
in writing, and advised him that the contract would be canceled unless 
he took steps to expedite it. 

[607] 162. General Frank. This question has been answered 
piecemeal. I will ask it again. What if any measures should have 
been taken by personnel of the Corps of Engineers for the protection 
of the Government against contracting with a person having a record 
like that of Hans Wilhelm Rohl? What measures should have been 
taken ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 321 

Genef al Reybold. It is a difficult question to answer. If the char- 
acter of the individual had in some manner been brought to the at- 
tention of the Corps of Engineers, unquestionably the investigation 
would have gone deeper; but under the circumstances there was no 
reason to believe at that time, as far as I know, that the individual 
was a dangerous character. I am told, although I have not looked 
up the records, that he had done work for us on a breakwater some- 
where on the Pacific Coast and that his services were satisfactory. 

163. General Frank. He had been under investigation by the F. B. 
I., had he not? 

General Reybold. Not to our knowledge. 

164. General Frank. That, in turn, indicates looseness in the gen- 
eral system, does it not? 

General Reybold. Perhaps so; yes. 

165. General Frank. What if any rules or regulations did Colonel 
Wyman violate in event that he, having been informed that Rohl 
was an alien, discussed with him details of a secret defense project 
contract ? 

General Reybold. What did he violate? 

166. General Frank. Yes. 

General Reybold. I w^ould say, the rules of good judgment and 
common sense. 

[608] 167. General Frank. Is there any written regulation or 
specific document that covers that? 

General Reybold. AR 380-5, to safeguard military informa- 
tion, certainly covers it. 

168. General Grunert. When was that published? 
General Reybold. June 10, 1939. * 

169. General Frank. Did you ever receive notice or have knowl- 
edge of any reports concerning the activities of Colonel Wyman in 
Hawaii that were derogatory to Colonel Wyman ? 

General Reybold. No ; I never had any such report. 

170. General Frank. Were you Chief of Engineers when he was 
relieved from Hawaii? 

General Reybold. Yes. 

171. General Frank. Did you ever receive notice or have knowl- 
edge of a report dated the 14th of February, 1942, by an Army officer 
to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to the effect 
that Colonel Wyman should be relieved as District Engineer for 
inefficiency ? 

General Reybold. I do not recall any such thing. There may be 
something like that in the record. 

172. General Frank. When Colonel Wyman was relieved as Dis- 
trict Engineer what were the circumstances ? 

General Reybold. I believe that that was done after we had de- 
centralized completely all engineer work to the Department Com- 
mander ; and that was done by an order or circular letter of the Adju- 
tant General of the Army under date of February 28, 1942. 

173. General Frank. Do you know whether or not the question of 
Wyman's efficiency entered into the matter ? 

General Reybold. No. I do know this, that the Department 
[SOO] Engineer, who was Colonel Lyman at that time, either wrote 
a personal letter to me or to somebody in my office indicating that he 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 1 22 



322 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

could get along without Wyman over there, or perhaps better with- 
out him. I am just stating from memory. 

174. General Frank. Do you have a copy of that letter? 
General Reybold. I do not know. I will have to look it up. 

175. General Frank. Please look it up and let us have a copy of it 
if it is available. 

General Reybold. Yes, sir. 

176. General Grunert. Colonel Lyman is deceased, is he not? 
General Reybold. That is correct, sir. 

177. General Frank. Are you conversant with any Inspector Gen- 
eral's report on Colonel Wyman's operations as District Engineer in 
Hawaii ? 

General Reybold. Some time after Wyman was brought back to 
this country and was then in charge of the Canol project, and as a 
result of some reports received from that project, together with 
some reports that had been received through a Congressman — I think 
it was Representative Thomason of Texas — in which a contractor by 
the name of McKee was registering some violent complaints about 
Wyman and his activities in Hawaii, 1 asked for an Inspector General 
to look into the matter, and a Colonel Hunt investigated the activities 
in Alaska on the Canol project, and I think he extended his investi- 
gation to Hawaii, but to what extent I do not remember. There is 
a report from the Inspector General on file that perhaps is available. 

178. General Frank. For the purposes of the record I will state 
[010] that we have accessible Colonel Hunt's report on that in- 
vestigation, and we are calling Colonel Hunt as a witness before the 
Board. 

Do you have any memory of wiiat the conclusions were of that in- 
vestigation ? 

General Reybold. To the effect that Colonel Wyman should not be 
placed in charge. I do not know whether it said "of public works," 
or "civil works," or "large public works;" but the conclusion was that 
he should not be placed in charge of large work in connection with 
our works program, or words to that effect. I would rather get the 
lecord on that. 

179. General Frank. Has he been so placed since that time? 
General Reybold. Since the receipt of that report? 

180. General Frank. Yes. 

General Reybold. No; he has not. He has been in command of a 
general service regiment. 

181. General Frank. With respect to the assignment of Colonel 
Wyman on the Canol project, what if anything do j^ou know concern- 
ing a contract or contracts awarded to Rohl's firm on this project? 

General Reybold. I do not think that Rohl has ever been on that 
project, although, in connection with an extension of the Alaskan 
highway from Hanes, I believe it is called, down near Skagway to a 
})oint somewhere north and west of Whitehorse, a contract was let 
with Foley Brothers, and then I believe that certain equipment which 
belongs to the Rohl-ConnoUy organization, was either brought on the 
job or an attempt made to negotiate for that equi])nient. There was 
some connection in the contract between Foley Brothers and this 
particular strip of road to \011] which I refer. 

182. General Frank. Was this during your regime as Chief of 
Engineers ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 323 

General E-eybold. Yes. 

183. General Frank. Were yon conversant at that time with tho 
AVyman-Rohl contact and intimacy ? 

General Reybold. I would have to look up that contract. I do not 
know whether Rohl's name appears in it or not, but I have my doubts 
whether it appears. I think it was something that was brought to my 
attention after that. 

184. General Frank. Has there ever been in your mind any suspi- 
cion about the association between Rohl and Wyman? 

General Reybold. Not a bit, not in my mind. 

185. General Frank. Does there now exist any suspicion? 
General Reybold. Not in my mind. He is the most indiscreet man 

that I ever knew. I would put it that way. I do not know Wvman, 
but 

186. General Frank. Who was indiscreet? 

General Reybold. Wyman, in his business transactions. I do not 
know the man" very well, but he is known to me as a "go-getter." In 
what he does on the side he evidently is very, very indiscreet. 

187. General Frank. When was Colonel Wyman relieved from his 
assignment to the Canol project? 

General Reybold. It was prior to Hunt's investigation. 

188. General Frank. Will you provide that particular informatioii 
witli the particulars surrounding his relief in detail? 

General Reybold. Yes. 

189. General Frank, You have a Colonel Horowitz? 
[612] General Reybold. Yes. 

190. General Frank. Colonel Horowitz made an investigation of 
that situation, did he not? 

General Reybold. He made an investigation of the progress of con- 
struction in what we called our Northwest Division, and his report was 
very derogatory concerning Wyman in his treatment of personnel and 
other matters. 

191. General Grunert. Is that report available? 
General Reybold. I think it is. 

192. General Grunert. Do you have a copy of it? 
19o. Major Clausen. We have a copy, sir. 

194. General Frank. What if anything did you have to do with 
Colonel Wyman 's first assignment ? 

General Reybold. I had all to do with it. I relieved him from 
service in the Northwest Service Command and sent him to a general 
service regiment. 

195. General Frank. Do you know what has been the nature of 
liis services in that regiment? 

General Reybold. No; I do not. It was trained at Camp Clai- 
bourne, Louisiana, and later went to England, and I do not know just 
exactly the service of either himself or his regiment from that date. 

196. General Frank. Do you have anything in addition to the 
answers to the questions I have asked you that you want to state to the 
Board with respect to this situation ? 

General Reybold. I have nothing further to state to the Board. 

197. General Grunert. General Ru=!sell. have you anv question';? 
[613] 198. General Russell. Reference has been made to the 

elasticity of this basic contract under which the work was to be 
done at Honolulu. I have gotten the impression, General, that 



324 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

you entered into a contract in which you paid the contractor for 
whatever he did plus some profit. 

General Retbold. Plus a fixed fee ; yes. 

199. General Russell. You could do anything out there that you 
wanted to do under this basic contract? 

General Retbold. That is correct. 

200. General Grunert. As I understand it, then, this basic con- 
tract was awarded in December of 1940, and under that basic con- 
tract there were a number of subcontracts which resulted in job 
orders, so-called. A job order specifies the actual date of com- 
pletion ? 

General Reybold. Yes. 

201. General Grunert. Why the constant revision and constant 
changes of the estimated date of completion? Was there anything 
anywhere along the line that pinned down the contractor to finish 
the work in a specified time? 

General Retbold. Only by the issuance of the job order. You 
will find instances in which the job order was revised. 

202. General Grunert. Who had the authority .to revise it? 
General Retbold. That is all in the hands of the contracting 

officer and the District Engineer, who, in this case, were one and 
the same. 

203. General Grunert. Then if you have contracts which are not 
on a fixed-fee basis, and are flexible, the contractor must live up 
to it more than in the case of the other kind ? 

General Retbold. Yes, sir. If you have what we term a [614-] 
firm contract or a lump-sum contract, the time for completion is 
definitely specified. But frequently in cases of those contracts there 
are delays that cannot be charged to the contractor, and then the 
contracting officer, after hearing the evidence, may supplement that 
contract and extend the time of completion. 

204. General Grunert. Then it is within the judgment of the Dis- 
trict Engineer or the one who awarded the contract ? 

General Retbold. Yes. 

205. General Grunert. It can go on ad infinitum, as far as he is 
concerned, if he believes that it is justified? 

General Retbold. He could, but in some cases he may have to refer 
the contract to his higher echelon, the Division Engineer, or over to 
the Chief of Engineers for approval of these extensions. 

206. General Grunert. What I am getting at is the picture, as you 
see it, just as well as the Board is trying to look at it. Almost a year 
had gone by from the time they started the Air Warning Service over 
there, and to complete these stations a lot of construction had to take 
place, a lot of material had to be furnished. Then came along, in 
June, definite contracts, and they were delayed and delayed or revised 
until the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Board must find the facts in 
the case and must render a report on who is reponsible for these de- 
lays. Were they acts of God? Were they created by man, or what? 
So far as you know, the Chief of Engineers Office had no control over 
those delays ? 

General Retbold. No, except that a report may have [6^5] 
reached our office to give help. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 325 

207. General Grunert. The only report you received to give help 
was that one of June 11 ; and you gave such help as you could under 
the circumstances ? 

General Reybold. Yes. There may be others in our records, but I 
cannot tell you until our search is more complete. 

208. General Grunert. I wish that search would be as complete as 
possible, because I think a great deal depends on whether or not those 
who were on the ground and howled to be given help could have done 
something themselves. 

209. General Frank. The establishment of priorities might have 
had some very potent effects on this construction. Is that correct? 

General Retbold. Yes. But if I may say this to the Board, upon 
the conclusion of the Board's detailed investigation in the field you 
may be able to pick up some leads that would be beneficial to us in 
running down what we did do over here in response to certain re- 
quests that perhaps w^e will not find in our records. 

210. General Grunert. General Short in his testimony referred to a 
message he sent to the Adjutant General complaining about this fif- 
teen weeks' delay before he could get any cable over there ; and so the 
action taken here to help in that particular instance ought to be pretty 
well traced if we can possibly do it. 

What is this system of priorities? Will you explain to the Board 
the system of priorities and who makes them and who can change 
them so that you could get something done more quickly and get things 
done in the time in which they ought to be done ? 

[676'] General Reybold. Yes. In the old days that was more 
or less wholly within the hands of the Army and Navy Munitions 
Board. Then when the War Production Board came into being, I 
think that is the ultimate authority now on these higher priorities. 
But I firmly believe in those days that the Army and Navy Munitions 
Board set the priorities. At least they did a mighty good job on the 
screening process to see whether they should be pushed up in priority. 

211. General Grunert. Priority on materials, priority on shipping, 
priority on raw materials, or what? 

General Reybold. Mostly on manufactured goods. 

212. General Grunert. If it were a question of cable, what would 
that mean ? 

General Reybold. That would mean that perhaps the Navy was in 
for a vast quantity of cable, that the Maritime Commission might be 
in for a vast quantity of cable, and the Signal Corps might be in for a 
vast quantity of cable. 

213. General Grunert. At that time, if that were the case, and he 
asked for priorities, say, on getting cable, whose business was it to 
represent to the Army and Navy Munitions Board the urgency of 
sending that cable to the District Engineer over there so he could 
satisfy the Commanding General ? 

General Reybold. In the first place, the Commanding General over 
there would make his request, and it was up to us to transmit that right 
over to the War Department, which we did promptly, and get it before 
the Army and Navy Munitions Board; and probably some of our 
people over there appeared in person to try to get it. 

[617] 214. General Grunert. Presumably it was done because 
you changed the priority ? 



326 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Reybold. Yes. 

215. General Grunert. Was there any follow-up on this? 
General Reybold. I cannot say at the moment. 

216. General Grunert. You do not know whether he complained 
again or whether your office on its own hook followed up to see whether 
or not what you had arranged had actually been acceded to? 

General Reybold. I am certain of a follow-up in our office, because 
that is one thing that we do pay particular attention to. 

217. General Grunert. Suppose this priority is granted: Who 
determines whether or not there is shipping space to get the cable to 
him ? Where does that come in ? 

General Reybold. Through the Transportation Corps. 

218. General Grunert. They had their priority question? 
General Reybold. In that particular case I think General Hannum, 

our Division Engineer out there, did a mighty good job. He was right 
behind all those shipments, and I might say also in representing 
Wyman in this country in procurement of materials needed for that 
vast job over there. 

219. General Grunert. If you as an engineer had been in Wyman's 
shoes over there and had a job to do — I as Commanding General and 
you as District Engineer. Suppose I should say, "Here, Reybold, I 
have got to get those stations in. My whole plan depends on it. I 
have got to get them in in a hurry. You have the contracts." What 
could you do or what would you have done to put those things 
through ? 

[•618] General Reybold. I certainly would have prepared a tele- 
gram for the signature of the Commanding General to the War 
Department w^ith all the power I could put behind it. 

220. General Grunert. And if you did not get action you would do 
it again ? 

General Reybold. Yes. 

221. General Grunert. Until you were told to stop ? 
General Reybold. That is right. 

222. General Russell. Suppose you had a different sort of engineer 
out there, a .go-getter type, who thinks that the Commanding General 
doesn't know what it is all about, anyway, and he doesn't follow up. 
What could the Commanding General dp about it? 

General Reybold. What I would do would be to report him over 
here to the Chief of Staff and have him kicked out of there. 

223. General Russell. Would you go over to the War Department? 
General Reybold. Yes. Any Department Commander who sent 

anything to me and said, "You have a District Engineer who is not 
playing the game with me," — ^lie would be out of there on the next boat, 
as far as I am concerned. 

224. General Russell. You have made rather a careful search and 
you have not found one line from Wyman about any other delays out 
there ? 

General Reybold. We have not found anything here so far. Han- 
num was doing everything in the world for Lyman at that time. I do 
not know about telephone calls. 

225. General Grunert. Right on that line : You referred to Wyman 
as a go-getter. Go-getters usually take the sort of [619] action 
that you say you think you would take. Why, then, all these delays? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 327 

Can you put your finger on why there was a delay at least from June 
to December? Have you tried to analyze that in your own mind as 
to what caused these delays, priorities, materials, conniving, or what? 
General Rfa'bold. I think a combination of factors, General. I am 
only giving my opinion, because I have tried to wade into this the same 
as you gentlemen have. But I think one of the great delays was inde- 
cision as to location, indecision as to how many of these air warning 
stations should be adopted in their program. 

226. General Grunert. AVlio makes that decision ? 

General Reybold. I sho^uld think all the planning was done by the 
Commanding General and his Department Engineer. He had a De- 
partment Engineer. They did the planning ; also G-4. 

227. General Gritnert. The Commanding General would have to 
approve those plans and any changes in them before they were ever 
adopted as a job order? 

General Reybold. All that planning would come up to a certain 
point, and when concluded it would be turned over to the District En- 
gineer, who was Wyman. If all I hear about Wyman is true — and I 
know very little about Wyman personally; I had never served with 
him ; but all through the whole Corps of Engineers, if you wanted 
soinebody to go get somebody to do something, they would have selected 
Wyman. He is a go-getter. How much his ears were knocked back 
by the high command over there I do not know; but I do not think 
there is anybody that can knock his ears back if he has materials in 
there to do a job. 

\6S0] 228. General Grunert. Then he was really selected foi" 
this job because of that reputation? Is that the reason he was 
selected for successive large construction jobs that involved go-gettei"s 
to get things done? 

[6£1] General Reyb-old. He was, in comiection with the Fort 
Peck dam. Now, whetlier he was sent to Hawaii for that purpose, I am 
inclined to think that he was due for foi-eign service and was sent to 
Hawaii under the old "foreign service jilan." 

229. General Russell. Is there any evidence in your records indicat- 
ing that this delay could in any way be attributed to slow operations on 
the part of the contractor? 

General Reybold. No, sir. 

230. General Russell. There is no evidence, therefore, that indicates 
that he "drug his feet" at all? 

General Reybold. No, sir. 

231. General Russell. In the event he was operating rather slowly, 
do you think the fact that Wyman may have been under some sort of 
obligation to the contractor because of extensive entertainment might 
have prevented Wyman from "pinning back the ears" of that con- 
ti-actor? 

General Reybold. Oh, I would doubt that ! I think Wyman is the 
type of man that would really "kick anybody down" to accomplish his 
mission of consti'uction work. 

232. General Russell. Notwithstanding the fact that he may have 
been on a liquor party with a man whose "ears" he was going to "pin 
bnck," for three or four days prior to that? 

General Reybold. Absolutely. 

233. General Russell. It would have no effect on him, at all? 



328 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Reybold. No, sir ; I do not think it would have a bit of effect 
on him. 

234. General Russell. And yet you have never served with Wyman ? 
General Reybolu. I have never served with him. 

235. General Russell. And all of your opinion of Wyman has been 
[633] formed on these reports about his disposition as a "go- 
getter" ? 

General Reybold. That is correct ; by very reliable officers in the 
Corps of Engineers. 

236. General Russell. Let us go back to the time you made your 
basic contract in December 1940. Were you furnished at that time 
with any plan by the tactical command out there as to what they wanted 
done with respect to an air warning service ? I do not care to go into 
the details of the plan. I am attempting to find out if the tactical peo- 
ple gave you a plan in 1940. 

General Reybold. Only from hearsay. Have you had Colonel 
Fleming before the Board ? 

237. General Russell. Not yet. 
General Reybold. Have you listed him ? 

238. General Frank. Yes. 

General Reybold. I would judge that he would give you a very good 
explanation. 

239. General Russell. Was or not this establishment of an air 
warning service out there an integral part of the job that these people 
were employed to do ? 

General Reybold. Yes, indeed ! This is incorporated right in the 
contract, isn't it? 

240. General Russell. Can you tell us how much of these funds that 
were being allotted for your Hawaiian Department contract were 
going to be expended on this air-warning-service installation? 

General Reybold. I couldn't tell you, unless they came in [623] 
with a separate project, for approval. 

241. General Russell. The point I make is this. General — that the 
engineers in the Chief of Engineers' office did not make the contract 
and agree to pay that man an approximate sum of money for an air- 
warning service, unless you knew something about the nature of the 
service, did you ? 

General Reybold. That's correct. The original contract on that 
must be based on some sort of estimate; otherwise you couldn't de- 
termine his fixed fee. 

242. General Russell. And that estimate was based on a plan for the 
establishment of an air-warning service? 

General Reybold. Unquestionably, as one of the items. 

243. General Russell. Do you know how much of a change occurred 
in that plan between that date and June ? 

General Reybold. No, sir. 

244. Geeneral Russell. And yet you testify that in your opinion the 
change in the plan by the tactical command was the prime factor in 
working delay out there? 

General Reybold. No, I didn't testify definitely. ^ 

245. Greneral Russell. I will ask two or three more questions along 
this line. General, you do not know now how many changes occurred 
on the part of the tactical commander between December 1940 and 
June 1941, as to the establishment of this air-warning service? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 329 

General Reybold. No. 

246. General Eussell. That would be a matter of record entirely ? 
General Reybold. I would think so, yes. 

247. General Russell. And the facts would have to be obtained 
elsewhere ? 

[624] General Reybold. That's true. 

248. General Russell. But when you let your initial contract in 
December 1940, it was based on a definite plan for the establishment 
of an air-warning service out in Hawaii ? 

General Reybold. That is correct. 

249. General Russell. And therefore the tactical people, who had 
been in there before, had worked out a plan for that system, and it 
was in existence in December 1940 ? 

General Reybold. Must have been; yes, 

250. General Russell. And there is, in the Engineer's office, in 
Honolulu, a record of all of these changes that had been proposed 
by the tactical commander between li^40 and the date of the comple- 
tion of the air-warning service? 

General Reybold. Must be. 

251. General Russell. And we can get that out there ? 
General Reybold. That's correct, sir. 

252. General Russell. And so far as you know, that is the only 
place ? 

General Reybold. That is correct. 

253. General Russell. You referred to the mobile stations, a mo- 
ment ago, and it is your opinion that the engineers had something 
to do with the construction of those stations ? 

General Reybold. I think we would have built the shelters and 
roads into the stations, of course. 

254. General Russell. Whatever the causes may have been, General, 
not one of these fixed or permanent stations in connection with the 
air-warning service had been completed on December 7, 1941 ? 

General Reybold. That's correct, although the report [625] 
that we had from the field indicated that one of those stations was 
fairly well completed on November 30. 

255. General Grunert. If not complete, could they have been oper- 
ated, do you know ? 

General Reybold. I don't know. 

256. General Russell. I was going to ask this question in comiec- 
tion with that same thought: If they had not been completed, the 
engineer people or the contracting people were there, engaged in com- 
pleting it? 

General Reybold. I can't answer that question. 

257. General Russell. Isn't it true that the tactical commander 
would have been prevented from moving in and taking over those in- 
stallations and beginning their operation, until the work had been 
completed and had been approved and accepted by the engineers? 

General Reybold. That isn't true in all instances, General, because 
we have now in our program, and even during the big program in 
this country, what we term "beneficial occupancy," when the using 
agencies did move in prior to positive, absolute, 100% completion. 

258. General Russell. You do not know whether this system of 
"beneficial occupancy" was in effect as respects those permanent radar 
stations in Hawaii on the 7th of December, 1941 ? 



330 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Eetbold. I do not. 

259. General Russell. Is there anywhere that we could determine 
whether or not negotiations for that "beneficial occupancy" had been 
initiated, and the result thereof ? 

General Reybold. Only on the ground, in Hawaii. 

260. General Russell. I think we have discussed quite freely 
[6£6] with you the opinion which you have of Wyman, and the 
sources from which you got your information on which to base that 
opinion. Now, General, you testified rather vigorously a while ago 
as to his efficiency out there in Hawaii. Was that opinion of Wyman 
changed in any way by virtue of Hunt's report? 

General Reybold. I really couldn't say. I glanced over that re- 
port, General, but I would have to go back and read it. I really don't 
know. I suppose that assisted him in the formulation of his judgment 
that never again should this man be placed on a big job of construction 
and responsibility where he is dealing with contractors. 

261. General Russell. You were charged then with the responsi- 
bility of arriving at a conclusion about whether or not you would take 
him off that sort of work, were you not ? 

General Reybou). When I got Hunt's report ? 

262. General Russell. Yes. 

General Reybold. 1 had him off before that, I think. 

263. General Russell. What had happened. General, that made 
you change your opinion of Wyman as an outstanding "go getter," 
especially fitted for the big stuff out in Hawaii, taking him off and 
sending him to a service regiment ? What were your mental processes 'i 

General Reybold. My mental processes were, even though he is a 
"go-getter," he just makes too damned much trouble for me to be 
bothered with that kind of people, I can find other people who don't 
make all that kind of mess, who will go and do a job. Now, that's the 
whole thing, in a nutshell. 

264. General Russell. Let us sum it up : He could do his job, but he 
carried a mess along with it ? 

[6i^7] General Reybold. That's right. 

265. General Russell. And you wanted somebody who would do 
the job and leave the mess at home? 

General Reybold. That's right. 

266. General Russell. So you put him in the service regiment? 
Now, what would be your definition of the "mess" that he made? 

General Reybold. Oh, complaints — complaints from his subordi- 
nates — and of course these things that have come up in connection 
with this contract — that's enough for me. I said the man is indiscreet, 
and I would say that he is exceedingly indiscreet in his deahngs with 
contractors who are doing work for the Government, if it all be true — 
"if it all be true." 

267. General Russell. You believed in the reality of those charges 
or the truthfulness of those charges to the extent that you decided 
to relieve him from that sort of work, didn't you ? 

General Reybold. Yes, sir. 

268. General Frank. I would like to ask a question, there. You 
are his direct superior ? 

General Reybold. That's right. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 331 

269. General Frank. In the face of all this indiscretion, have you 
ever had it investigated, as his superior, with a view to determining 
whether or not he should be disciplined ? 

General Retbold. That's the reason I sent Hunt up there, or asked 
the Inspector General to send an inspector up there. 

270. General Frank. If that be the case, then why were not Hunt's 
conclusions pursued more vigorously and more intimately ? 

General Eeybold. There was nothing in Hunt's recommendation, 
to my knowledge, that this man should be brought to trial, or anything. 
[628] 271. General Russell. I have no more questions. 

272. General Grunert. I have a few questions to clear up, here. 
Are delays such as appear to have occurred in these contracts in 
Hawaii normal under a fixed-fee contract^ In other words, do a 
lot of these contracts hang over, change, and one thing and another, 
so that when you figure on something's being done in about three 
months it usually takes about six or nine ? 

General Reybold. No, sir; that's not common. 

273. General Grunert. That is not common ? 
General Reybold. No, sir. 

274. General Grunert. The causes that you stated that might have 
caused delay, here, are those causes common to contracts, as a rule — 
priorities, and inclement weather, and those that you enumerated? 
Are those particular to that Hawaiian bunch of contracts ? 

General Reybold. They may apply, of course, anywhere, but I 
think that that group of generalities mentioned by me on more than 
one occasion this morning might well bear further investigation to 
get down to some of the details. Anj^ contractor on a job, or we 
in preparing our plans and specifications and our estimates, and the 
time of completion, of course, take into consideration weather condi- 
tions. If you start a job, in other words, in a northern territory in 
November, you know that you are going to get into difficulties of 
weather, but if you start to build in northern New York in May, you 
have the season ahead of you and you know your weather pretty well. 

275. General Grunert. Usually in making an estimate of the sit- 
uation, which is true about your estimate of the date of completion of 
the contract, do not the experienced engineers [629] take that 
into consideration? They make estimates, and then they have to 
reestimate, and sometimes do it a third time? Is that normal in a 
series of contracts, or is that quite abnormal ? 

General Reybold. It is abnormal, and every contract, in tlie conduct 
of its prosecution, would have to be considered on its own merits, and 
even every one of these job-orders that you have under consideration 
here will have to be considered on its own merits. 

276. General Grunert. When it gets to the place where a district 
engineer doesn't think his contractors are coming across, can he not 
abrogate that contract, can he not give it to somebody else, and get the 
job done? 

General Reybold. Yes, sir; yes, sir. 

277. General Grunert. And none of that was done in this case, 
apparently ? 

General Reybold. I don't know w^hether it was or not. I doubt it. 

278. General Grunert. I do not know of any. We have not gone 



332 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

into it thoroughly yet, but I do not know of any case where they say, 
"You haven't done this job; we give it to somebody else"; but that is 
done, not infrequently, is it ? 

General Reybold. Oh, it is very seldom that we have to come to 
that ; once in a while. 

279. General Grunert. What conditions require or demand that, or 
you do take it out of their hands and do it yourself, or get somebody 
else to contract? 

General Reybold. A breach of contract, or a man who doesn't pro- 
gress, doesn't show that he has made any [630] effort to pro- 
gress, he hasn't brought any additional equipment on, as required or 
as requested by us, and we have played along with him and tried to be 
square — then we notify him that he is done, or that if he isn't going to 
come across within 30 days we are going to take his contract away 
from him. 

280. General Grunert. Then it is usually a question of good will 
and intent, to a great extent ? 

General Reybold. Yes, sir. 

281. General Grunert. I think Wyman was decorated with some 
sort of decoration. Was that done through your office? If so, for 
what reason ? 

General Reybold. That was done on the recommendation of General 
Hannum, and I think it was for his work in relation to the construc- 
tion of those "stepping-stone" airfields, if I remember correctly. We 
have a record on that. 

282. General Grunert. You mean that would be beyond Hawaii? 
General Reybold. Yes, sir. 

283. General Grunert. On the way out to the Far East ? 
General Reybold. Yes, sir. 

284. General Grunert. He was given what — the Legion of Honor, 
or the Legion of Merit? 

General Reybold. He was given a Distinguished Service Medal. I 
will check on that. Maybe you would like to have the citation. Gen- 
eral, and the recommendation upon which it was based, for your 
record. 

285. General Frank. Yes. 

286. General Grunert. Together with the time it was actually 
recommended. 

287. General Frank. Yes — and the time it was awarded. 

[63J] 288. General Grunert. One more question. I think it 
will probably be of value in checking. This Advisory Committee 
that investigates contracts and one thing and another — is there a 
chairman of that Advisory Committee, and do you recall who was 
Chairman ? 

General Reybold. We can find that out. 

289. General Frank. I want the name of the one single individual 
who is best qualified to give us information on what went on in the 
Contract Advisory Committee in the fall of 1940. Can you give us 
that name, now ? 

General Reybold. Will you let me find out? I know what you 
want. 

290. General Frank. You will advise us with respect to that name ? 
General Reybold. I will. 

291. General Grunert. Are there any other questions? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 333 

292. General Frank. You called this contract a "cost-plus-fixed- 
fee" contract ? 

General Reybold. That is right. 

293. General Frank. And in this type of contract there usually is 
no penalty clause ? 

General Reybold. No, there is no penalty clause. 

294. General Frank. In a fixed contract, there is a penalty clause, 
as a rule, in which event, if the contract is not finished on time, through 
the fault of the contractor, he pays a penalty ? 

General Reybold. That is correct. 

295. General Frank. That is one of the disadvantages of this type 
of contract, is it not? 

General Reybold. It is; but I doubt whether you could ever 
[632] have gotten anybody to go over there on a lump-sum basis, 
with so many unknowns attached to a contract, and get it under way. 
There was no other way in God's world of prosecuting a contract such 
as this, except under this cost-plus-a-fixed-fee basis. 

296. General Frank. Who presented the case of the War Depart- 
ment to the Priorities Board in order to get a high priority for ma- 
teriel for the War Department ? 

General Reybold. We will have to furnish that information later, 
General. 

297. General Frank. What I am after is this : How was its strate- 
gical urgency represented to the Priorities Board ? 

General Reybold, I couldn't answer that, unless these individual — 
I cannot answer that question. 

298. General Frank. This thought enters into this situation : it is, 
that here was a highly important strategical project that was not 
finished in time, so that the permanent aircraft warning service was 
effective on December 7. It is possibly conceivable that direct re- 
sponsibility can be traced back to the failure to give sufficiently high 
priority to the materiel going into that project, is it not? 

General Reybold. It is possible. 

299. General Frank. Therefore, the details following through to 
the conclusion of that priority's being established is something in 
which we are interested, do you see? 

General Reybold. Yes, indeed ; and I would suggest that the records 
of our Division Office at San Francisco, and Colonel Hannum, be con- 
sulted very freely in those matters, particularly in connection with 
shipping facilities to Hawaii at that time. 

300. General Frank. Another thing on which I would like to 
[6'33] ask you to make a record is to give us as complete a list as 
possible from your point of view of possible reasons of delays that 
contributed to the delay in finishing this work at Hawaii. 

General Reybold. You want that for the record, or just possible 
delays that we might think of, over in our office ? 

301. General Frank. I would like to have you, within the next day 
or two, send us a written statement of those, will you please ? 

General Reybold. I would be glad to do so, and that will relate also 
to our Division Office? 

302. General Frank. Yes. 
General Reybold. In San Francisco ? 

303. General Frank. Yes. 



334 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Wliat do you know about disciplinary action of Wyman as the result 
of the Dawson Creek explosion? Are you familiar with that ? 

General Reybold. I am familiar with it to the extent that there was 
an explosion. It might be well to have General Worsham of our 
present office over here, who was in command. 

304. General Grunert. He was your District Engineer in charge? 
General Reybold. He was the District Engineer, at that time. 

305. General Fraxk. Do you know whether or not there was any 
disciplinary action taken against Wyman ? 

General Reybold. Xot to my knowledge. 

306. General Fraxk. That is what I am interested in. 

General Reybold. There is a report. Somebody certainly made a 
report on that thing, whether it was our fire-fighting people or whether 
it was the Provost Marshal General, or the FBI, or what went up 
there. It was on Canadian territory. 

[6S4-^ 307. General Fraxk. You would have a report of disci- 
plinary action under the 104th Article of War. would you not? 

General Reybold. Oh, yes. 

308. General Fraxk. By and large — and I have brought this out 
before, in testimony — the general system of information with respect 
to personnel, activities, G-2 information, and so forth, as it relates to 
contracts, is not so clean-cut. would you say? 

General Reybold. It is not. 

309. General Fraxk. I have nothing further. 

310. General Grunert. General Russell? 

311. General Russell. Xo. 

312. General Gruxert. Thank you very much. General. We took 
quite a bit of your time. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 
General Gruxert. The Board will recess until 2 o'clock. 
(Thereupon, at 1 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2 o'clock 
p. m.) 

[OSS] afferxoox session 

(The Board at 2 o'clock p. m. continued the hearing of witnesses.) 

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL JULIAN L. SCHLEY, UNITED 

STATES ARMY 

(The witness was sworn by the recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Will you state to the Board your name, rank, 
organization, and station? 

General Sc