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I
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORB THB
JOINT COMmiTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEAEL HAEBOE ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGKESS
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27 i <
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THB ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 27
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Peari Harbor Attack
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HAEBOR ATTACK
CONGEESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 27
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
79716 WASHINGTON : 1946
/public
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK
ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Dlinois Pennsylvania
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa-
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- five from California
gan . FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin
North Carolina
COUNSEL
(Through January 14, 1946)
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel
JULE M. HANNAFORD, Assistant Counsel
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
(After January 14, 1946)
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel
Samuel H. Kaufman. Associate General Counsel
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel
LOGAN J. Lane, Assistant Counsel
HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
Pages
Transcript
Hearings
No.
pages
1
1- 399
1- 1058
Nov,
. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2
401- 982
1059- 2586
Nov
. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945,
3
983-1583
2587- 4194
Dec.
5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4
1585-2063
4195- 5460
Dec.
14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5
2065-2492
5461- 6646
Dec.
31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6
2493-2920
6647- 7888
Jan.
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7
2921-3378
7889- 9107
Jan.
22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946.,
8
3379-3927
9108-10517
Jan.
30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9
3929-4599
10518-12277
Feb.
7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10
4601-5151
12278-13708
Feb.
15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11
5153-5560
13709-14765
AjDr.
9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
No. Exhibits Nos.
12 1 through 6.
13 7 and 8.
14 9 through 43.
15 44 through 87.
16 88 through 110.
17 111 through 128.
18 129 through 156.
19 157 through 172.
20 173 through 179.
21 180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34 C'larke Investigation Proceedings.
35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse-
ments.
IV
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
c si
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^ i i i i i i 1 i i ! 1 1 1 I 1 1 I ! 1 1 1 1 1
! 1 ! 1 ! 1 ! ! 1 ! i ! I ! ! i oc I 1 I 1 I 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 OC IIIIIII
« 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 iCO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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iCO .(N :Tr 1 ^<NCC(N 1111— :JC— 1 1—1 1
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1 1 1 loo "I I I I I 1 1 I 1 I 1"* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 1 1 ICO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
S 1 t 1 iCO 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 I—I 11
^ 1 1 1 1 1 II 1 1 1 1 1 II
.a 1 1 1 1 i-H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 to 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
a, 1 1 1 i05 , , , ,^
1 1 1 iCO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1-^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
- -5?
I| .5lS2
OS 1 1 1 1 1 loooo 1 1 1— IT}* 1— <o idd lO 1
O 1 1 1 1 1 iCOeO 1 1 iCS iN iiCO iX(M i(N 1
•cpq IIIII 1— lO 1 1 it^ iCQ iCiro ICON ico i
g, 1 IIIII 1 — — 1 1 1 1— 1 ii-( 1 ! — 1 1 1 — 1 1 1 1
„ecO iiiiiill ill! il lOI it^l iTjii
a,o 1 1 1 1 1 it>co 1 1 iCi i05 'ccci it^-"** 1^ 1
N 1 1 1 1 1 ic^ro 1 1 •— I—' ixx iec(M ico i
IIIII 1— O 1 1 it> i(N 1 CO 1 (N 1 1
i
1 ! 1 I d 1 ! 1 1 ! ! ! 1 1 1 1 ! ! 1 1 1 1 1 !
i i i il i i i i i i i ; s i =^ s i i ; i j i 1
i i|ig i i i i i i \y<i<< i i^ ioJ i
S is i«^:^ i ii ii:^^-^^'^! i^^^:3
INDEX OF WITXESSES
'"4508-4628
"'4360' 4508
554-557,
607-008
"143-147'
"370-386'
"158-162
1 1 1 r 1 CC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 II 'Ci 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 II 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 II ICO 1 1 1 1 1 r 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1
1 1 II iC 1 1 1 1 1 1 : 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 II i(N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1
t^ 1 11 II 1 1 lO ^ CO I 1 1 Ill
-H 1 11 II 1 1 ICO i-r I 1 1 1 1 1 1
'^ 1 II II iiiOiiiiiiiiiOiiiii
1 1 11 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 ■ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
< 1 II II 1 1 i< 1 1 1 I I I 1 1 ;p; 1 I 1 ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I
CO 1 1 I 11 1 1 !^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
l> 1 1 (N'rt< isO'^^'gO I IT* 1 1 — CI .^fOtO 1— C' -LO-^rO '•.*:OL': crrt
CO 1 iiMGC iCs'T'O 1 iC5 1 ic^o rcot^c: i<N cr c-i — ~ Tz ^ acr. lo c--ro
10 1 lOOC illMCO 1 i05 1 iCJO iCOCOO 1— CC — C-3C0— — w—
t-H 1 iCSCOi-^ll III iiC^I iCJCO' iTfiC^l— CCCO-T'CO c-i c^c^
1 1 III iiot^oo 1 IT}- , 1 1 a; 1 1 1 00 1 1 • 1 CO c
a> 1 irf^ i-(Mt^ 1 ir- 1 1C005 i»:i>-* iCO ilOlOttOCCOlO c:t^i^ occ
CO 1 lOiCO iCCc<l(N 1 lO 1 1^00 iCSCOCO lO i — — — lOMC cocom loco
■* 1 lOOOCi,- II i.i(N iiOO 1— iCO MCOOl'- TT. — —
.-( 1 ic^co lir' 11 1 ic^ iC<)co i-* ic^-* coco-* ,eo c<i iOM
2-29,
86-96
399-403
229-233
" 135-146"
413-415
225-228
733-812
1181-1185
520-527
1241-1259"
"268-283'
1753-1765'
"951-960'
"473-478'
de C, Adm
ert 10., Lt. Comdr
M., Btswn
)hn S., Brig. Gen
.oland M., Vice Adm
ifiis, Col
, Albert L_..
iivili(> C, Comdr
10., Lt. Col
1, F. M., Lt. Comdr
-^on, l?ear Adm
■rtrude C
lliajn, Maj. Gen.
)»4 W., Bcvar Adm
\vy T., Maj. Gen
d S., Comdr__
Ilalph
lard
James W
'. L., Vice Adm
A., Col
W. A., Lt. Col
ranees M
p (!liew
sIcr U
iOiiis J., Col
'iirv C, Lt. Col
ond S-
ier B., Maj. Gen
10
eph M. Lt. (jg)
'homas E
ward F., Maj
rt
—
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00000000
VI
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1915,
to May 31,
1946
Pages
5080-5089
""3826-3838
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
Mav 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
163-181
""418-423'
""451-464"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
1 llllli irQiO lltlll 1 T}< CO 1-1 1-1 1 1 1
1 llllli i'l O (MCOCOtO 1 1 1
SI llllli if^lN 1 1 1 1 1 1 i(N 1 (M 1 III
5, 1 llllli ij^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lO 1 CTi 1 1 1
.O 1 llllli 1 '•'" 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 CO CO C3 TJH 1 1 1
Oil llllli 1 IIIIIIKNCS'M 111
1 llllli 1 iiiiiiiim"(N III
I 1 1 1 1 1 ! I I I 1 1 1 1 IM w 1 ; ;
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
S 1 llllli ill i i 1 i 1 1 1 1 1 M
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
Julv 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
495-510
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
4125-4151
1695-1732
2745-2785
4186-4196
3195^3201"
1928-1965
3642-3643'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
179-184
'"ios-iii'
96-105
74-85
""368-378'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
Pages
478-483,
301-310
1171-1178'
1178-1180'
1659-1663,
170-198
'"812-843,'
1538-1571
504-509
2-32"
365-368
1747-1753"
1
Craige, Nelvin L., Lt. Col
Creighton, John M., Capt. (USN)
Crosley, Paul C, Comdr
Curley, J. J. (Ch/CM)
Curts, M. E., Capt., USN
Daubin, F. A., Capt., USN
Davidson, Howard C, Maj. Gen
Davis, Arthur C, Rear Adm
Dawson, Harry L
Deane, John R., Maj. Gen
DeLany, Walter S., Rear Adm
Dickens, June D., Sgt
Dillingham, Walter F
Dillon, James P
Dillon, John H., Maj
Dingcman, Ray E., Col
Donegan, William Col
Doud, Harold,' Col
Dvmlop, Robert H., Col
Dunning, Mary J
Dusenburv, Carhsle Clyde, Col
Dyer, Thomas H., Capt., USN
Earle, Frederick M., W/0
Earle, John Bayliss, Capt., USN
INDEX OF WITNESSES
VII
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WW
VIII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
&,! 1 l|>« 1 1 1 1 1 ' 1 1 1 1 1 ' ICQ--,,— ,1 1 li-H
^ i 1 iS i i i i i i i i i i i i i°^°l i i|^5f?f
lllTjfllllllllllll, COIlTfllJ
II, ' 1 ! ! 1 I I 1 : I : 1 1 ^ ! 1 cDoiA
1 ! 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 ! 1 I I 1 1 ; (Nrrt-
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
428-432
414-417
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
, 1 I 1 I , IfO ,r-H(N 1 , 1 1 1^ 1 Illl
iiiiiii— iiOOOiiiiiOi till
«llllll,C<ll>-H'-ll,ll"-'l Illl
„5 ! ! 1 1 I : icij ;i ! ; ! 1 16 : : : ; i
a, 1 ir-, lo o t Illl
1(N "H 1 1 1 1 ,^ 1 ,111
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
^ i i i ; i i i i i i i i i i i i i ! ; i i i
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
,'Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
1070-1076
461-469
"763-772"
816-851
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
, , 1 , lilt III III
lO-H ,"<* 1 ,0(N , 1 1 irf<t^ III 100 1 t
,Ot^ ,t^ 1 , -* -^ 1 1 1 1— l-H III It^ 1 1
« 1 O 05 ,<N 1 ,(N 05 1 1 1 ilMOl 111 ,t^ 1 1
^i(McO,| i,|(M.ili(N-Hill II II
Sill 1 ^ 1 1 t^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 III 1 lO 1 1
fi-i lOt^ "# 1 ,OTt< 1 1 1 lO'* III I Tt< 1 1
iCOiO ,(M 1 ilMCO 1 1 1 lO^ III ,t^ I 1
, O C5 , , 1 05 1 1 1 , C^l 02 1 1 1 , II
,(NCO, ,,(N,,,,CS-H,,, 1 ,,
Joint
Committee
E.xhlbit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
417-430
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
toJan.23, 1942)
Page»
1571-1574"
1664-1676
"469-473"
Witness
Hamilton, Maxwell M., State Dept
Hannum, Warren T., Brig. Gen
Harrington, Cyril J
Hart, Thomas Charles, Senator
Hayes, Philip, Maj. Gen
Heard, WiUiam A., Capt., USN
Henderson, H. H., Lt., USA
Herron, Charles D., Maj. Gen
Hill, William H., Senator
Hohnes, J. Wilfred., Capt., USN
Holtwick, J. S., Jr., Comdr
Hoppough, Clay, Lt. Col
Hornbeck, Stanley K
Home, Walter Wilton
Howard, Jack W., Col
Hubbell, Monroe H., Lt. Comdr
Huckins, Thomas A., Capt., USN
Hull, Cordell
Humphrey, Richard W. RM 3/c
Hunt, John A., Col
Ingersoll, Royal E., Adm
Inglis, R. B., Rear Adm
INDEX OF WITNESSES
IX
T777TTT777ok
roio
00^
i
I>0 lO
O^ GO
J>. lO Tti
^.
'* CO
C2 (N lO
CD lO TjH
'^ CO
^ CO
'^ CD
^-lO
CO 00
CO CO
coi>
I I
CO <N
coi:~-
»0 lO r^ £2 "* '^ t^ "^
t--TtH^J^O300Tt<^
lO '^
' -^ lOt^
o
O
d
-a
o
O
-?3 O
T3 go
g ^ ^oj ^03 ^03
S H§^
.oaH^T3
>•- to a s a
e3 (U (D .S .S .3
bC bC be bC bi)E
C 0 c c c t=
o
u
^-§a
k> k> K> l^ k> l^ K> ►> k vt
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
oiiiiiioooiiiiiiiiiii -r_ro i i
CO oo 1 1 i S:i^o 1 1
ic 1 1 1 1 1 loco 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i^Sr^^iM 1 '
o.>0 1 Cl ^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1
CLO 1 1 1 1 1 i(NCO i2St^ 1 1
f^iO CO I'SS'Hii
loi ^ iiiii 2"^''
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
119
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
541-553
182-292
"140^142'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
103
107-112
186
219-222
102
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
11—1 1 1 1 1 1 II
^ ' ' ' ' ' ' 1 ' ' 1 1 ' 1 1 1 ' '
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
904-918
62.^643
""734-740"
"'852-885"
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
2665-2695"
3028-3067
1161-1185"
2787-2802"
1014-1034
1678-1694
3226-3250
2362-2374"
2-54'
T. S. 2-52,
192-226
3126-3152
1816-1913
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
214-225
363-367
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
toJan. 23, 1942)
1 , 0 1 -H i(M 0 1 1 1 10 1 1 1 1 ^ 1 1 1 i-O 1 (N 1 05
1 r lo 1 1> 1 CO 0 1 1 1 00 1 1 1 lO 1 1 lO 1 lo CO lO
«ii,— II,— (ilOiiilMiiiiiOiiiCO ICOMHCO
0, 1 1 r-l 1 ^ ,T^,_| , 1 1 rt 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 r-H 1 ICOi-l
a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ii±i 1 1 1 1 1 0 ^
fli 1 ICO iCO 1 CO 1 1 1 (N 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 CO i(M
ii-^iiOi C0iiil~»iiiii0iii05 ifO
iiT-lii-(i OiiilN l^ 1
1
Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN
Kroner, Hayes A., Brig. Gen
Landreth, J. L., Ens
Lane, Louis R., Ch. W/0
Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col
Laswell, Alva B., Col. USMC
Lawton, William S., Col
Layton, Edwin T., Capt., USN
Leahy, William D., Adm
Leary, Herbert F., Vice Adm
Lewis, Fulton, Jr
Litell, S. H
Locey, Frank H
Lockard, Joseph L., Lt., USA
Lorence, Walter E., Col
Lumsden, George, Maj
Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN
Lynch, Paul J
Lynn, George W., Lt. Comdr
MacArthur, Douglas, Gen
Marshall, George C, Gen
Marston, Morrill W., Col
Martin, F. L., Maj. Gen
INDEX OF WITNESSES
XI
O I '
i>o.
CO
lO
I lO
00 I
tocc
00 .-I
a> o
CftIN
o
CO lO <N OtLi
02 (M CO -^ Xa
00 c» CO 00 f^
CO 00 coco Jh
r^i /-•> ri^ /~t-\ ^^
^1
t^OO
^ -H TtH
O iC ■— I
-# tl I
I I 00
O ^ CO
CT>0 rH
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XII
CONGRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATION TEARL HARBOR ATTaCS
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1045,
to May 31,
1946
Pages
5210
4933-5009
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
'" 387-388 '
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
14S
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Oil ^ 1 (Mil 1 Ir^ 1 1
rtl 1 1 III 1 1 00 1 CO 1 1 1 1^ 1 1
|ii 11 11 ill 1 11 1 ci 1 1
t^^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 Ig 1 1 1 1^ 1 I
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
»^ 1 1 1 111 111 1 1 ' ' 1 1 1 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
1 1 iC 111 111 .--,•- ^(M't-'iM 1 1 O 1 1 00 00
11 IT 111 III T^^^^^ ' M 1 1?;:
(S 1 If: f:^-^- ' - ' :^-
1 iTjH 111 111 ^J;;cocoio 1 ir}^ 1 iioos
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
1107-1160,"
1240-1252
3636^3640
2375-2398,
3990-3996
3153-3165
2923-2933
3885-3915
1968-1988"
1035-1070
778-789
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
147-169
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
II 11 1 1 1 1 _ 1 1 1 1
1 i^j^r^-* 1 1 o 1 ,--,0-00 1 1 ICO r* 1 1 1 1
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i
a
Pettigrew, Moses W., Col
Phelan, John, Ens
Phillips, Walter C, Col
Pickett, Harry K., Col
Plerson, Millard, Col
Pine, WiUard B
Poindexter, Joseph B., Gov
Powell, Boiling R., Jr., Maj
PoweU, C. A., Col
Powers, R. D., Jr., Lt. Comdr
Prather, Louise _
Pratt, John S., Col
Pye, WiUiam S., Vice Adm
Rafter, Case B
Raley, Edward W., Col
Ramsey, Logan C, Capt., USN
Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm
INDEX OF WITNESSES
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XIV COXGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 145
AKMY PEARL HAEBOR BOARD
INDEX TO TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD
WITNESSES
Name
Page'
Allen, Riley H., Editor, Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 125 Merchant Street, Honolulu, T. H..
Anderson, Ray, 1930 Euclid Street, Santa Monica, California
Anstey, Mrs. Alice, 938 East Edgcware Road, Los Angeles, California
Arnold, H. H., General, United States Army, War Department, Washtagton, D. C
Ballard, Emma Jane, Colton, California , ..-
Barber, Bruce O., Attorney, U. S. Departmentof Justice, Immigration and Naturalization
Service, 3880 Ohrstead Avenue, Los Angeles, Calif
Bartlett, George Francis, Smartville, California
Bellinger, P. N. L., Vice Admiral, United States Navy; Commander, Air Force, At-
lantic Fleet; Administrative Office: Norfolk, Virginia ._-
Benson, Henry P., Hawaiian Dredgin? Culompany, Honolu, T. H
Bergquist, Kenneth P., Colonel, Army of the United States, Washington, D. C
Bicknell, George W., Colonel, United States Army, Military Intelligence, G-2, MIS,
Washington, D. C
Block, Claude C, Admiral, United States Navy— Retired; On Active Duty as a Member
of the General Board
Bragdon, John Stewart, Brigadier General, United States Army; Chief, Construction
Division, Office of the Chief of Engineers, War Department, Washington, D. C._
Bragdon, John Stewart, Brigadier General, L'nited States Army; etc.— Recalled..
Brooks, H. E., Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army; Replacement School Command,
Birmingham, Alabama
Brunner, Mrs. Gertrude Campbell, 1210 South Euclid, San Gabriel, California
Bryden, William, Major General, United States Army; Separations Board, Washington,
D. C
Burgin, Henry T., Major General, Army of the United States; Fort Shafter, T. H
Burr, Harold S., Commander, United States Naval Reserve; 14th Naval District, T. H..
Burton, Ralph H., General Counsel for the Committee on Military Affairs, United States
House of Representatives
Butterfield, James W., District Director, Baltimore District, Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service, Baltimore, Maryland
Capron, W. a., Colonel, Ordnance Department, (Army); Ogden Arsenal, Ogden, Utah..
Carmichael, William A., Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry (Army); Southern Securities
Detachment, Los Angeles, California
Caulfield, Francis M., Chief Clerk, Central Files, Adjutant General's OfiBce, War
Department, Washington, D. C .1
Chun, Philip Chew, 1453 Alencastre Street, Honolulu, T. H
Clarke, Chester R., 114 Merchant Street, Honolulu, T. H
Claterbos, Louis J., Colonel (Army), Corps of Engineers; The Engineer School, Fort
Belvoir, Virginia
Coll, Raymond S., Editor, The Honolulu Advertiser, Honolulu, T. H
Colton, Roger B., Major General, Army of the United States, Washington, D. C
Combs, R. E., Attorney-At-Law, Visalia, Calif
Connolly, Thomas Ernest, 2400 Fulton Street, San Francisco, California
Cooper, Howard F., Major, Air Corps; Army Air Force Base, Unit Air Transport Com-
mand
Davidson, Howard C, Major General (Army), Commanding lOth-Air Force, Kanjakoha,
Assam
De Lany, Walter S., Rear Admiral, United States Navy
Dillingham, Walter Francis, Carnation Avenue, Honolulu, T. H
Dillon, James P., Naturalization E.xaminer; Department of Justice, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Newark, N. J
Dingeman, Ray E., Colonel (Army), Commanding OflBcer, 144th Group Coast Artillery,
Fort Ruger, T. H
Donegan, William, Colonel (Army), Fourth Army, G-3, Sam Houston, Texas
Earle, Frederick M., Warrant Officer, United States Army
Elliott, George E., Sergeant (Army), Headquarters Company, Station Complement,
Camp Lee, Virginia
Farthing, W. E., Brigadier General (Army), Atlantic Overseas Service Command, Port
of Newark, Newark, iJ.J
1413
4015
1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original
transcript of proceedings.
79716 — i6 — Ex. 145. vol. 1 2
2 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Index to transcript of proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board — Con.
WITNESSES— Continued
Name
Ferguson, Honorable Homer, A United States Senator from the State of Michigan
Fielder, Kendall J., Colonel, (Army), General Staff Corps, Headquarters, Pacific Ocean
Areas, Fort Shafter, T. H__.._-_
Flannery, Harry W., 537 North Wilcox, Los Angeles, California
Fleming, Rober.t J., Colonel, Corps of Engineers, United States Army; Fort DuPont,
Delaware
Flood, William J., Brigadier General, United States Army; Chief of Staff, 7th Air Force,
Hickam Field, Oahu, T. H
French, Edward F., Colonel (Army), Signal Corps; Officer in Charge, Traffic Operation
Division, Chief Signal Office, Washington, D. C
FuRBUSH, Edward A., Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Chicago, Illinois
Gailey, Charles J., Jr., Colonel (Army), Executive Officer, Operations Division, General
Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C
Gerow, Leonard T., Major General (Army) ; Commanding 5th Corps; stationed at Luxem-
bour
Gerow, Leonard T., Major General (Army)— Recalled
Gesler, Earle E., Colonel, United States Army; Corps of Engineers, Division Engineer,
Middle Atlantic Division, Baltimore, Maryland
Grafe, Paul, 21 Chester Place, Los Angeles, Cal
Graves, Sidney C, 2401 Foxhall Road, Washington, D. C
Grew, Honorable Joseph Clark; Former Ambassador to Japan; Department of State,
Washington, D. C _
Hain, Robert W., Lieutenant Colonel (Army); General Staff, Headquarters, U. S. A. F.
P. O. A., Fort Shafter, T. H
Hain, Robert W., Lieutenant Colonel (Army); Fort Shafter, T. H.— Recalled
Hannum, Warren T., Brigadier General (Army) — Retired, San Francisco, California
Harrington, Cyril J., 2142 Ewing Street, Los Angeles, California
Hayes, Philip, Major General, United States Army; Commanding General, Third Service
Command, Baltimore, Maryland
Herron, Charles D., Major General (Army) — Retired
Hill, William Hardy, A Member of the Territorial Legislature of the Territory of Hawaii..
HORNE, Walter Wilton, 9425 Wilshire Boulevard, Beverly Hills, California
Howard, Jack W., Colonel, Quartermaster Corps, United States Army, Presidio of San
Francisco, California
Hunt, John A., Colonel (Army), Inspector General's Office, War Department, Washing-
ton, D. C
Kay, Harold T., Military Aide to the Governor of Hawaii, Honolulu, T. H.
Kestly, J. J., Lieiitenant Colonel (Army), Corps of Engineers; Engineer, Base Command.
KiMMEL, Husband E., Rear Admiral, United States Navy, Retired _-_
King, Edgar, Brigadier General, United States Army; Medical Department, Fort Shafter
T. H.
King, H. J., 904 South Oakland Street, Pasadena, California
Kingman, John J., Brigadier General, United States Army, Retired
Klatt, Lowell v.. Sergeant, Battery A., 509th Gun Battalion, Semi-mobile; (Army)
KOGAN. Mrs. Mary B., Washington, D. C
King, Wm. A. Early, Captain (Army), Chicago, 111
Layton, Edwin T., Captain, United States Navy; United States Pacific Fleet
Lawton, William S., Colonel (Army); GeneraUStafllCorps, Headquarters, Pacific Ocean
Areas. Fort Shafter, T. H
Lewis, Fulton, Jr., Radio News Reporter, Mutual Broadcasting System, W^ashington, D
C
Locey, Frank H., Waialea Ranch, Honolulu, T. H
Lockard, Joseph T;., First Lieutenant, United States Army, Esler Field, Louisiana
LoREN'CE, Walter E., Colonel, Corps of Entrineers, United States Army; Columbus, Ohio..
Lumsden, George, Major (Army); Inspector General's Department, Central Pacific Base
Command, Fort Shafter, T. H
Lynch, Paul J., 919 Suiter Street, San Francisco, California
Marshall, George C, General, United States Army; Chief of Staff, War Department,
Washincton, D. C
Marston, Morrill W., Colonel, General Staff, 0-4, United States Army Forces, Pacific
Ocean Areas
Martin, F. L., Major General, United States Army, Retired. .._
McCarthy, William J., Colonel (Army), 260th Coast Artillery Group, Fort Bliss, Texas..
McDonald, Joseph P., Technician Fourth Class, 580th Aircraft Warning (-\rmy), APO 958
McKee, John L., Brigadier General (Army), 87th Divi.^ion. Fori Jackson, South Carolina
McKee, Robert Eugene, General Contractor, El Paso, Texas; and Los Angeles, California
McMorris, Charles H., Rear Admiral, United States Navy; Chief of Joint Staff, Pacific
Fleet in Pacific Ocean Areas
Midriff, Frank E., 406 Castle & Cooke Building, Honolulu, T. H
Midriff, John H., Waialua, Honolulu, T. H
Meurlott, Byron C, Major (Army), Military Intelligence, Honolulu, T. H
Miles, Sherman, Major General (Army); Commanding 1st Service Command, Boston,
M
Mollison, James A., Brigadier General (Army), Mobile Air Service, Mobile, Alabama. _
Moody, George H., Old Pali Road, Honolulu, T. H
Murray, Maxwell, Major General, United States Army, Commanding Guadalcanal
Nurse, Howard B., Lieutenant Colonel (Army)— Retired; 729 B Street, San Francisco
Calif
Vol. Page I
^ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original transcript of proceedings.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 3
1 71(1 ex to transcript of proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board — Con.
WITNESSES — Continued
Name
O'Dell, Robert H., Lieutenant, Infantry (Army); 5th Headquarters, Camp Pickett,
inia.
Virgir
OsMUN, Russell A., Brigadier General (Army); Chief, Military Intelligence Service, War
Department, AVashington, D. C
Parker, Maurice Gaylord, Honolulu, T. H
Perliter, Simon, 1901 Ualakaa Street, Honolulu, T. H
Petrie, Honorable Lester, Mayor of the City of Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii
Phillips, Walter C, Colonel (Army); General Staff Corps, Myitkyina, North Burma
Phillips, Walter C, Colonel (Army);— Recalled
Pierson, Millard, Colonel (Army); Inspector General's Office, Pacific Ocean Areas
Plne, Willard Bruce, 320 Carolwood Drive, Los Angeles, California
Pine, Willard Bruce, 320 Carolwood Drive, Los Angeles, California— Recalled
Poindexter, Joseph B., 4585 Kahala Avenue, Honolulu, T. H., former Governor of the
Territory of Hawaii
Powell, Boiling R., Jr., Major (Army), General Staff Corps; Legislative and Liaison
Division, War Department, General Staff, Washington, D. C
Powell, C. A., Colonel (Army), Signal Officer, Pacific Ocean Areas, Fort Shafter, T. H..
Pratt, John S., Colonel (Army)- Retired
Pye, William S., Vice Admiral, United States Navy-Retired
Rafter, Case B., Washington, D. C
Reybold, Eugene, Major General, United States Army; Chief of Engineers, War Depart-
ment, Washington, D. C
Richards, Robert B., Colonel (Army), General Staff Corps, Acting Chief of Staff, G-2,
War Department, Washington, D. C
Robins, Thomas M., Major General, United States Army, Deputy Chief of Engineers,
War Department, Washington, D. C
Robinson, Bernard L., Colonel (Army), Corps of Engineers, 521st Engineers, Construc-
tion, Hollandia, New Guinea
Robinson, Bernard L., Colonel (Army), Corps of Engineers, etc.— Recalled
RocHEFORT, Joseph J., Commander, United States Navy, On Duty at Office of Chief of
Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C
ROHL, Hans Wilhelm, Rancho Dos Vintos, Camarillo, California
Row, Lathe B., Colonel (Army); temporarily Assistant Inspector General, Western
Defense Command; Presidio of San Francisco, California
Rudolph, Jacob H., Brigadier General— Retired; Milwaukee, Wisconsin
SCANLON, Martin F., Brigadier General, United States Army, Evaluation Board, Pacific
Ocean Areas
Schlesinger, Miss Helen, 254A Lewers Road, Honolulu, T. H
SCHLEY, Julian L., Major General, United States Army, Washington, D. C
Shirley, J. P., 501 Belair Road, Los Angeles, California
Shivers, Robert L., Collector of Customs, Hawaiian Islands, 4775 Aukai Street, Honolulu,
T. H
Shoemaker, Thomas B., Assistant Commissioner of Immigration and Naturahzation,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Short, Arthur T., Pleasanton Hotel, Honolulu, T. H
Short, Walter Campbell, Major General, United States Army— Retired
Short, Walter Campbell, Major General, United States Army — Retired; Recalled. _.
Short, Walter C, Major General, United States Army— Retired; Further testimony.,.-..
SissON, George A., Civil Engineer, 1545 Domonis Street, Honolulu, T. H
Stilpiien, Benjamin A., 109 Jarolemon Street, Brooklyn, New York
Stimson, Honorable Henry L., Secretary of War, Washington, D. C
Taylor, Angus M., Jr., Captain (Army), Coast Artillery; Office of Internal Security,
Honolulu, T.H
Taylor, William E. G., Commander, United States Navy, Quonset Naval Air Station,
Charlestown, Rhode Island
Throckmorton, Russell C, Colonel (Army), Infantry, Camp Breckinridge, Kentucky...
Tillman, Thomas E., 1230 Shafter Street, San Mateo, California
Tru.man, Louis W., Colonel (Army), Chief of Staff, 84th Division, Camp Claiborne,
Louisiana
Tyler, Kermit A., Lieutenant Colonel, Air Corps, Army Air Force Board, Orlando, Fla._.
TlNDAL, Lorry N., Colonel (Army) Air Corps, Headquarters 9th Air Force, APO 696
Walker, Eugene B., Colonel, Coast Artillery Corps, United States Army
Walsh, Roland, Brigadier General, Army of the United States; Commanding General,
Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot
Weddington, Leonard D., Colonel (Army), Air Corps, 6th Air Service Command
Welch, George S., Major, Air Corps (Army), Orlando, Florida
Wells, B. H., Major General, United States Army, Retired; 4551 Kahala Avenue, Hono-
lulu T. H
West, Melbourne H., Lieutenant Colonel (Army), Headquarters, 7th Fighter Wing .
White, William R., Brigadier General, United States Army, Mira Loma Quartermaster
Depot, Mira Loma, California
WiCKisER, Rea B., 1522 Rodney Drive, Los Angeles, California
WiMER, Benjamin R., Colonel (Army), Corps of Engineers; Engineer, Central Pacific
Base Command
Wilson, Durward, Major General (Army), Commanding Southeastern Sector, Eastern
Defense Command, Raleigh, North Carolina
Wilson, Earle M., Colonel (Army), Washington, D. C
^ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original transcript ot proceedings.
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Index to transcript of proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board — Con.
WITNESSES — Continued
Name
Wong, Ahoon H., Deputy County Engineer, Wailuku, Maui
WooLLEY, Ralpii E., 2349 Oahu Drive, Honolulu, T. H
Wyman, Theodore, Jr., Colonel, Unted States Army, Corps of Engineers; Cherbourg
Base Section, Cherbourg, France .-.
ZuccA, Emil Lawrence, Senior Aircraft Service Mechanic, San Bernardino, California
DOCUMENTS
Title
War Department Radiogram to Commanding General Hawaiian Department, dated No-
vember 27, 1941, and signed "Marshall"
Do.
Do-
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do-
Do.
Do.
Navy Department "War Warning" message, dated November 27, 1941
Do
Reply of Lieutenant General Short on November 27, 1941, to Message No. 472 from General
Marshall on November 27, 1941
Message dated November 28, 1941, from Lieutenant General Short to Adjutant General
Message of November 28, 1941. 482 .-.
Memorandum to the President dated November 27, 1941
Letter of February 7, 1941
Letter dated March 5, 1941..
Letter dated March 15, 1941 -
Letter dated April 14, 1941, Excerpts from _
Letter dated May 5, 1941
Letter dated October 10, 1941
Letter dated October 28, 1941..
Letter of October 14, 1941
Message dated July 7, 1941
October memorandum. Operations Department
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Par. 30
Hawaiian Defense Project, Category D
Cooperative Plan
Telegram from Ambassador Grew to Secretary of State, dated November 17, 1941
Message of October 16,1941...
Message of December 7, 1941, to Hawaiian Department, Fort Shaffer, T. H., signed "Mar-
shall"
Message dated June 10, 1941, Lieutenant General Short to Adjutant General
Message dated June 26, 1941, Adjutant General to Lieutenant General Short..
Letter dated December 23, 1941, J. P. Poindexter, Governor of Hawaii, to Lieutenant Gen-
eral Short
Letter dated December 22, 1941, from civilians of Honolulu to the President
Conclusions
Excerpts from Roberts Commission Report
Paragraph III of Addendum No. 1, Joint Air Operations Agreement
Excerpts from Paragraph IV of Addendum No. 1
Extracts from Honolulu newspapers.
Letter of August 28, 1941, General Kingman to Lemuel B. Schofleld
Excerpt from letter of July 17, 1944, Honolulu, T. H
Excerpt from telegram of June 26, 1944
List of names, furnished by General Reybold _-. -
Telegram of June 11, 1941, Hawaiian Department to Adjutant General
Telegram of June 17, 1941, Chief of Engineers to Adjutant General
Immediate-action letter, May28, 1941 _
Memorandum from Colonel Powell to General Colton, dated November 14, 1941
Letter dated December 31, 1941, Colonel Powell to Chief Signal Officer
Excerpts from Form 23
Recommendations of Colonel Hunt..
Excerpts from Report of Colonel Hunt
Conclusions of Colonel Hunt
Excerpts from Standing Operating Procedure of November 5, 1941
Excerpts from Order Appointing Army Pearl Harbor Board
Memorandum for the Judge Advocate General, dated July 12, 1944, by the Acting Secretary
of War
Excerpts from letter of Brigadier General John J. Kingman..
Excerpts from Report of Interview of February 3, 1944, of John M. Martin.
Excerpts from Construction Contract
^ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original transcript of proceedings.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
Index to transcript of proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board — Con.
DOCUMENTS— Continued
Name
Navy Message of October 16, 1941 -
Navy Message of November 24, 1941
The Pacific Fleet in the Command Organization of the Navy, as of December 7, 1941
Excerpt from Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.
Excerpt of Fortnight Summary of Current International Situations
Report of United Stales Ambassador to Japan
Letter dated November 6, 1940, Colonel Hannum to Lieutenant Colonel Wyman
Letter dated February 14, 1942, Colonel Lyman to Major General Reybold
Letter dated February 27, 1942, Colonel Lyman to Major General Reybold
Letter dated January 22, 1941, Colonel Wynian to Rohl
Memorandum dated February 14, 1942, Department Inspector to Chief of Staff
Confidential Report to Colonel Row
Excerpts from Page 10 of Colonel Hunt's Report
Excerpts from Page 11 of Colonel Hunt's Report
Excerpts from Page 31 of Colonel Hunt's Report...
Excerpts from Federal Bureau of Investigation Report, dated October 29, 1942
Letter dated March 1, 1943, McKee to Thomason
Message of December 7, 1941. to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department
Priority dated August 2, 1944
Message to War Department dated November 14, 1944
Excerpts from folder marked "Confidential, 330.92, Japanese Consulate Agents"
Message to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department dated July 8, 1941
Newspaper Articles
Headlines in Honolulu Advertiser
Editorial in The Honolulu Advertiser, 1/27/42
Analysis of Inspection of Station X. 2/19/42
Excerpts from Report of Colonel Hunt
Excerpts from Report of Colonel Hunt '.
Excerpts from Report of Colonel Hunt
Message read by Colonel Hain
Field Order No. 1 (Mission Orders) 11/2/40 - .-.
Study of the air situation in Hawaii, 8/20/41
Statement of Qualifications and Experience
Excerpts from instructions on cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts
Memo dictated bv Colonel Toulmin
Letter dated July 28, 1941. Short to Adjutant General
Excerpts from Adjutant General's File 121
G-2 Estimate of international situation, (Japanese) October 17, 1941
G-2 Estimate of international situation, (Japanese) October 25, 1941
Memorandum dated September Ifi, 1944, Major Lozier to Major Clausen
Memorandum dated September 15, 1944, Major Lozier to Major Clausen..
Memorandum, 9/11/44, John Edgar Hoover to SAC, Honolulu, T.H
Memorandum to Colonel Robinson from M. G. Parker, dated March 12, 1942
Excerpts from Report of Colonel ±iunt
Memorandum from OfEce of Engineer, Headquarters, Central Pacific Base Command,
dated September 16, 1944.. _
Memorandum for Colonel Colton, MatSriels Branch, from C. A. Powell, Lieutenant
Colonel, Signal Corps, dated November 14, 1941
Letter to Pearl Harbor Board of Investigation, signed H. P. Benson, dated September 18,
1944
Memorandum dated 18 September, 1944, from Lieutenant Colonel J. S. Bragdon, in answer
to questions of General Frank in re Mokuleia Airfield
Letter of September 14, 1944, from Senator Elbert D. Thomas.
Stenographic report of telephone conversation of September 20, 1944, between Lieutenant
General George Grunert and United States Senator Elbert D. Thomas
Excerpt from report of Edward A. Furbush, 4/28/43..
Letter dated July 8, 1940, Enright to Early
Comment and recommendations from N. I. S. Investigation Report, 10/17/40
Excerpts from N. I. S. Report 3/5/41
Summary from G-2 Report, Exhibit No. 61
Letter dated September 26, 1942, to Chief, MIS, G-2, from John S. Gullet
Memorandum by Butterfleld, 2/5/41
Letter dated February 4, 1941, Department of Justice to Immigration and Naturalization
Service, Los Angeles, California
Letter dated January 22, 1941, Wyman to Rohl
Public Law No. 671
Letter dated February 20, 1941, District Director, Los Angeles, to District Director,
Honolulu
Excerpt from letter, 3/1/41, to Inspector in Charge, San Pedro, California
Letter, 3/1/41, Naturalization Examiner to District Director
Letter, 3/24/41, District Director, Honolulu, to District Director, Los Angeles
Portion of E.\amination of Mr. Rohl, 5/22/41
Letter dated May 28, 1941, Inspector Shaw to District Director, Los Angeles, Calif
Letter dated September 9, 1944, Robert Hoffman to Lieutenant Murphy
Message 11/28/41 Army Air Force, A-2, to Air .\djutant General, Cable Section
Message 11/28/41 submitted to General Bryden for approval
Message No. 482, 11/28/41, to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, from .A.dams..
Message, 11/27/41 from Marshall
13
1503-A
13
1503-C
16
1740
16
1754
16
1770
16
1778
18
2033
18
2038
18
2042
18
2056
19
2094
19
2107
19
2113
19
2114
19
2115
19
2122
21
2413
24
2692
26
2904
26
2972
26
2967
26
2974
27
3110
28
3168
28
3177
28
3228
28
3259
28
3267
28
3298
28
3305
28
3324
28
3344
29
3366
29
3525
30
3639
30
3651
30
' 3653
30
3684
30
3689
31
3796
31
3797
31
3800
32
3806
32
3827
32
^ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original transcript of proceedings.
6
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Index to transcript of proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board -
DOCUMENTS— Continued
-Con.
Name
Letter, 2/20/41 to District Director, Honolulu, T. H
Letter, 3/1/41, Dillon to District Director, Honolulu, T. H
Statement by General Russell and documents regarding relations of the Board to Congress-
man Robsion
Radiogram November 24, 1941, Chief, Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet.
Extract of secret cablegram 11/26/41 to Commanding General Hawaiian Department
Message 11/27/41 to CINCAF and CINCPAC
Memorandum for Chief of StalT 11/27/41 in re Far Eastern Situation
Alert Radiogram 6/17/40, War Department to Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart-
ment.
Excerpt from memorandum, 12/15/41, by General Gerow, and paraphrase
Statement furnished by Colonel Richardson
Memorandum by T. B. Shoemaker, 2/1/41
Excerpt from memorandum. Medley to Brown, 7/1/41
Memorandum, 9/5/41, signed CB
Memorandum, 9/8/41, sit^ned CB
Telegram, 9/6/41, Signed Blee
Letter dated October 10, 1941, Schofield to Stilphen
Statement by Owen Dixon to Secretary of State
Transcript of telephone conversation between Lieutenant General Grunert and United
States Senator Ferguson, at 1 p. m. 28 September, 1944
Announcement by Lieutenant General Grunert, President of the Army .Pearl,' Harbor
Board, to all personnel of the Board, 9 a. m.. September 29, 1944
Memorandum regarding official absence of General Russell (Member) and Colonel Toul-
min (Executive) --
Affidavit of Sidney C. Graves
Quotations from Volume 3, page 318 of Roberts Commission record
Message, 12/7/41, Marshall to Hawaiian Department..
Request by Major General Walter C. Short for a copy of testimony given before the Board.
Memorandum by Captain King for Colonel Jones
Proposed letter to be sent to the Secretary of State, dated August 23, 1944
Letter, September 23, 1944, Secretary of State to Secretary of War
Proposed letter to be sent to the Secretary of State, dated September 4, 1944
Letter, September 28, 1944, Secretary of State to Secretary of War
36
4187
36
4193
37
4362
37
4258
37
4259
37
4262
37
4295
37
4304
37
4308
37
4355
37
4370
37
4371
37
4372
37
4372
37
4373
37
4373
38
4392
38
4403
38
4410
38
4413
38
4419
38
4424
38
4446
39
4457
39
4465
.39
4468
39
4475
39
4478
EXHIBITS
No.
3- A
3-B
4
4-A
4-B
4-C
4-D
4-E
4-F
4-0
4-n
4-1
4-J
4-K
4-L
4-M
4-N
6
6
7
8-A
8-B
9
10
II
U-A
12
13
14
Bound filo of documents presented by Gen. Short and sworn to by him
Letter of August 28, 1941, Gen. Kingman to Lemuel B. Schofield ,.-
Letter dated December 31, 1941, Col. Powell to Chief Signal Oflicer, Washington,
DC
Chart of detector station records
Chart showing plots of airplane flights
Summary of job orders, Mt. Kaala --•
Surnm ary of job orders, Kokee
Summary of job orders, Haleakala
Summary of job orders, Mauna Loa
Summary of job orders, Bellows Field
Summary of job orders. Barking Sands
Summary of job orders, Morse Field
Summary of job orders, W heeler Field
Summary of job orders, Hickam Field
Summary of job orders. Punchbowl
Summary of job orders. Diamond Head - ---
Summary of job orders, Kawailoa
Summary of job orders. Fort Shafter
Summary of job orders, Hickam Field.
Summary of job orders, Kamehameha
Summary, Hawaiian Constructors, W-414-eng-602
Exhibits Rohl-Wvman Contracts -.---
Transeiipt of hearmgs before the California State Legislature Joint Fact Fmdmg
Committee on Un- -American .'Vctivities...
Volume 49, HofTman testimony before House Committee on M ilitary Affairs, 1/24/44. .
Volume 50, Hoffman testimony before House Committee on Military Affairs, 1/27/44
Copy of statement by Robert HotTman, 4/29/42
Statement of Olsen, 12/19/43
Inte-.-iew of George H. Moody, 4/4/44
Testimony of Gen. Schley, 2/9/44, before House.
Testimony of Gen. Schley, 5/4/44, before House
Folder of Hotel Biltmore recoids
Statement of Col. Wyman regarding Rohl --■
Envelope cont aining telephone record clips
i Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and
pages of original transcript of proceedings.
Page'
784
785
785
785
786
786
787
787
888
888
888
890
890
891
indicate
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
Index to transcript of proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board — Con.
EXHIBITS— Continued
Name
RMar plotting sheet of December 7, 1941
Volume of broadcasts, Fulton Lewis. Jr. (Withdrawn after examination by Board
and returned to witness. See Addenda, Vol. 10, page \177-K) .
Documents selected from folder relatins to Canol Project. (Withdrawn after exami-
nation by Board and returned to witness. See Addenda, Vol. 10, Page 1177-A)
Documents selected from personal file. (AVithdrawn after examination by Board
and returned to witness. See Addenda, Vol. 10, page 1177-A)
Items appearing in The Honolulu Adverti'^er
Items appearing in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin
Letter of August 18, 1944, from Gen. Miles to Gen. Grunert
Transcript of telephone conversation of December 3, 1941, between Dr. Mori and
Tokyo
Vol.
Photostat of Japanese map
Photostat of a captured Japanese map taken from the chart board of a Japanese dive
bomber
Captured Japanese map
Captured Japanese map.
Captured Japanese map with'translation of Japanese endorsements
Special report 9/2/41 ".
Special report 9/4/41
Priorities on Hawaiian Construction, 29 Aue. 1944
Mes.sagc 3/3/41, Adams to C. G. Hawaiian Department
Message 3/4/41, Short to Adjutant General, Washington,
Message 3/12/41, Adams to C. G. Hawaiian Department
Letter 3/15/41, Marshall to Short
Letter 5/29/41, McDole to District Engineer, Honolulu
Paraphrase, Adams to C. G. Hawaiian Department
Wyman to C. G. Hawaiian Department, 6/11/41
AWS Stations
Wyman to Department Engineer, Hawaiian Department, 2/14/41
AWS Information Center, Fort Shafter
Grosse to District Eneireer, Honolulu
Wyman to C. O., Fort Shafter, 4/18/41
McDole to District Engineer 5/17/41
Hannum to Hawaiian Constructors, 1/6/41
Fleming to District Engineer 9/8/41
AVyman to Department Engineer, Fort Shafter, 9/3/41
Wvman to Division Engineer, 3/7/41
Adcock to Chief Signal Ofhcer 8/.5/40
Gripper to Chief of Engineers, 8/16/40
Person to Division Engineer, 10/23/41
Mathoson to District Engineers, 10/34/41
Person to Division Engineer, 12/12/41
Wyman statement "Gasoline"...
Basic contract 1/3/41
Supplemental agreement 3/22/41, signed Col. Hannum, Mr. Grafe, and Mr. Patterson.
Copy of supplemental agreement No. 2, May 5, 1941
Supnlemental agreement No. 3, 5/22/41
Supplemental agreement No. 4,6/19/41
Letter .5/5/43, Commanding General, 8th Service Command
Map No. 1 from Japanese submarine
Map No. 2 from Japanese submarine
Memorandum, 9/7/44, Lt. Gen. Grunert to Commanding General, USAFPOA
1st endorsement, 9/13/44, to memo
Memorandum 9/12/44, By Admiral McMorris, with map
Essential documents in re Bernard Otto Kuehn_
Laboratory Report of F. B. I., 11/19/41 re HMAR_
Eight-page estimate of equipment, Hawaiian Contracting Co., Ltd
Circular letter, December 9, 1940, from Office of Chief of Engineers
Affidavit and exhibits of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr
Memorandum to Maj. Gen. Frank, signed A. R. Marcy, Colonel, Signal Corps, POA.
Report on the Establishment of the AWS in Hawaii, 31 August, 1944
Letter, 8/15/44, Col. Forney to Maj. Clausen
Letter, 8/14/44, Naval Intelligence to Major Clausen
Letter, 9/26/42, from G-2, MID, Washington
Book, "Ten Years in Japan"
Summary of statements made by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow
Statement by John Weiner, in re Col. Wyman
Letter Orders, War Department, A. G. O., 8 July 1944, convening Army Pearl Har-
bor Board.
Amending Orders, War Department, A. G. O., 11 July 1944
Amending Orders, War Department, A. G. O., 22 August 1944
Supplemental Orders, War Department, A. G. O., 22 July 1944
Memorandum from Acting Secretary of War to the Judge Advocate General, 12 July
1944.
Memorandum addressed to General Grunert, President, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
25 August 1944, from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI.
1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original transcript of proceedings.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
[i] CONTENTS
MONDAY, AUGUST 7, l'J44
Testimony of — Page '
General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, War Department, Washing-
ton, D. O 2
Closed session 6
Full session resumed 6
DOCUMENTS
Memorandum to the President, dated November 27 9
Letter of February 7, 1941 13
Letter dated March 5, 1941 19
Letter dated March 15, 1941 21
Letter dated April 14, 1941, (excerpts) 26
Letter dated May 5, 1941 27
Letter dated October 10, 1941 29
Letter dated October 28, 1941 30
Letter dated October 14, 1941 31
Message dated July 7, 1941 33
October memorandum. Operations Department 35
Radiogram dated November 27, 1941 (excerpts) 37
^ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages
of original transcript of proceedings.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD H
m PROCEEDINGS BEFOEE THE AEMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD
MONDAY, AUGUST 7, 1944
Pentagon Building,
Washington^ D. C.
The Board at 11 a. m., pursuant to notice, conducted the hearing of
witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.
Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D.
Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.
Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C.
Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Brig. Gen. Thomas North, General
Staff Corps.
General Grunert. The Board will come to order. Colonel West,
will you swear the reporters ?
(Thereupon J. Chester Wilfong and Lloyd L. Harkins were sworn;
Earl H. Pendell, affirmed.)
TESTIMONY OF GENERAL GEOEGE C. MARSHALL, CHIEF OF STAFF,
WAR DEPARTMENT (WASHINGTON, D. C.)
General Grunert. Will the Recorder swear the witness, please ?
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder.)
1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board your
name, rank, organization, and station ?
General Marshall. General Tjeorge C. Marshall, Chief of Staff,
War Department ; Washington, D. C.
5. Colonel West. General, the procedure prescribed for the Board
requires that all witnesses examined by it be advised [<?] prior
to testifying of their rights under Article of War 24. The Article of
War mentioned reads in pertinent part as follows :
No witness before a military board * * * shall be compelled to incrimi-
nate himself or to answer any question the answer to which may tend to incrimi-
nate him, or to answer any question not material to the issue when such answer
might tend to degrade him.
In other words, do you fully understand that you do not have to
answer any question the answer to which may tend to incriminate you,
but that if you do, such testimony may later be used against you ?
General Marshall. I do. I would like to say, before you get under
way, I appreciate very much your coming over here, rather than my
going over to your place of doing business. I would also like to say
that I have not had time even to read more than about half way
through the notes which they prepared for me, but I thought, in view
of the fact the Secretary did not feel he could appear for quite some
time, it was essential that I at least make a preliminary appearance
12 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
before the Board, to give you as much data as I could, so that you could
get ahead on that basis without undue delay. If necessary, I can
appear again, regarding any details that either I am misty about, or
that you wish to go into, that I am not prepared to give you today.
3. General Grunert. We appreciate very much the opportunity to
get this background. We need a starting point, and to get the War
Department background is the start I think we need.
General, the order convening this Board states, in part :
[4] Pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Congress, approved
13 June 1944, a Board of officers is hereby convened to ascertain and report
the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Terri-
tory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941, and to make such recommendations as it
may deem projyer.
Now, since the existence of the Board is based on the Public Law
referred to, the Board made a study of congressional hearings thereon,
and as a result deemed it part of its duties to go into the War De-
partment background and viewpoints prior to and leading up to
the Pearl Harbor attack. In consequence, the Board drew up a list
of subjects on which it desires to question the Chief of Staff.
The large field to be covered by the Board in the limited time
available made it advisable to assign objectives or phases of inquiry
to individual members, although the entire Board will pass upon
all objectives or phases. General Russell was assigned to this par-
ticular phase, so he will lead in propounding the questions, and
other members will assist in developing them. That is just to get
one member more familiar than the rest of the Board to go into the
thing. General Russell, if you will take over, and either follow the
list of subjects, or develop the thing as you see fit, you may proceed.
4. General Russell. It is my thought. General Marshall, that it
would probably be well to follow first the subjects that were listed
in the memorandum that was sent over, and if it becomes necessary
to refer elsewhere as we go along, we can do it.
The first subject on this list is described, there, in general terms
as the "War Council." Apparently some confusion [5] has
arisen as to the identity of that group. I am responsible for getting it
into the record, and I have in mind the statements of the Secretary of
State about the meetings between the Secretary of State, the Secre-
tary of War, and, on occasions, with the higher military and naval
authorities ; so it is that group to which we refer. In order to eluci-
date just a little further, I might say that it was determined to discuss
that subject with you, because of frequent references to the "war
council" in the White Paper which the State Department has pre-
pared and is circulating, showing the State Department's activities,
through those critical years prior to 1941.
The first question under the subject of "war council" was the com-
position of that War Council. Do you recall who attended those
meetings ?
General Marshall. Normally, I think it was the Secretary of State,
the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy. On frequent
occasions, also. Admiral Stark and myself attended, and we brought
with us occasionally other officials, or we took other officials with us.
They occurred in Mr. Hull's office. I think, in most instances, there
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 13
was no record kept — as far as I know, I haven't a clear picture of
a recorder being present ; he may have been ; I doubt it ; certainly not
on all occasions, and I do not recall on any occasion. I may be quite
wrong about that. How often Admiral Stark and I went, I could
not say. My dim recollection is that during this critical period, in
the latter part of August, up until the outbreak of war, we probably
went to most of the meetings, because I remember I was having a
very hard time managing my business and attending the meetings,
because they were rather lengthy; so I recall my [6] dilemma
of the time involved in doing business there.
5. General Russell. General Marshall, were there any limitations
imposed upon you or other representatives of the War Department
as to what you might disclose, that might have transpired at these
council meetings?
General Marshall. I don't recall any limitation. It was a matter
purely of our judgment.
6. General Grunert. That was left entirely to the Secretary of
War's judgment, or your judgment, or to what either one of you
saw fit to do?
General Marshall. I have no recollection of the matter, at all.
I rather think that nothing was said about it, and it was just left to
our good judgment. As a matter of fact, I might add that, on the
security end, most of the restrictions were proposed and imposed by
the military authorities, meaning officers, rather than others; so if
there was any tendency to restrict and hold, it would have been on
our part rather than on the other. I recall none whatsoever.
7. General Russell. Is it true, or not, General Marshall, that as
we moved along into 1941, and into the autumn of 1941, these meet-
ings were more frequent than they had been theretofore?
General Marshall. Yes, sir; that is true. I would like to have
about 10 minutes of a closed session.
(There was a closed session from 11 : 10 a. m. to 12 : 07 p. m., during
which time the Recorder, the Assistant Recorder, and the three
reporters withdrew.)
FULL SESSION RESUMED
8. General Russell. General Marshall, when we were discussing
[7] the relation between the War Department and the State
Department as reflected in the council meetings, a moment ago, you
said that those meetings were a little bit more frequent, in the latter
part of 1941, than they had been theretofore.
General Marshall. Yes, sir.
9. General Russell. In those meetings, the subject of our relation
with Japan was discussed, I assume?
General Marshall. With great frequency.
10. General Russell. Were the possibilities of an assault on
Hawaii by carrier-borne aviation considered in those meetings, or
was that considered as a part of the War Department operations?
General Marshall. I don't recall any specific discussion of an
attack on Hawaii. There were general discussions of Japanese
assaults, but they related more to the Indo-China theater, where we
had positive evidences of their preliminary movements.
14 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
11. General Russell. Would you say, as a generalization, that the
relation between the American Government and the Japanese Govern-
ment became more tense as time went along, in 1941 ?
General Marshall. Decidedly so. I will add that we were very
fearful of some warlike act by the Japanese, which immediately
would have brought about a state of war in the Pacific, for which,
at the time, we were not prepared; in addition to the fact that we
had an immediate, close-up interest in the great events that were
taking place in the European theater.
12. General Russell. Speaking from memory. General Marshall,
could you recall any occurrences in any of the council meetings in the
fall of 1941 which affected to any degree the thinking [8] of
the War Department toward possible trouble with Japan ?
General Marshall. I think there were numerous indications
brought to our attention by the State Department, or to the attention
of the State Department by the War and Navy Departments, all of
which indicated a very serious crisis developing in the Pacific in rela-
tion to Japan. I know that we, meaning Admiral Stark and myself,
made it very clear, I think, to the Secretary of State, that it was of the
utmost importance to utilize every resource to delay so long as possible
any outbreak in the Pacific.
I recall that, I think early in September, in a discussion at one of
these meetings, the question was asked of us, what was the earliest date
in the near future that we would be reasonably prepared to take appro-*
priate action ; and we finally gave December 5, 1 believe, as that date.
However, I recall particularly Admiral Stark felt that navally we
would not be sufficiently prepared until, I believe, January or Febru-
ary— February is my recollection — and December 5 did not give suffi-
cient time. The Army estimate of December 5 was based on the
prospective sailings of transports and cargo boats to the Philippines
and the movement of a total approaching 100 Flying Fortresses, being
completed, in the Philippines by that time.
Actually the sailings were not made at so early a date as anticipated,
due to combined difficulties of obtaining the necessary boats — that is,
removing them from their then civil, commercial operations — and also
the delay in receipt of materiel beyond the dates that had been given
us, and, in particular, the delayed receipt of 45 Flying Fortresses, and
the further delay of about two weeks, I believe, in their take-off from
[9] San Francisco for Hawaii, because of unexpected head winds.
13. General Russell. General Marshall, based on the information
which was available to the War Department in the late fall of 1941,
what if any conclusions were reached as to the probable plans of Japan
for attack, as they related to the places to be attacked?
General Marshall. We anticipated, beyond a doubt, a Japanese
movement in Indo-China and the Gulf of Siam, and against the Malay
Peninsula. We anticipated also an assault on the Philippines. We
did not, so far as I recall, anticipate an attack on Hawaii ; the reason
being that we thought, with the addition of more modern planes, that
the defenses there would be sufficient to make it extremely hazardous
for the Japanese to attempt such an attack.
14. General Grunert. From what we have learned, I do not think
there is any use going into paragraph "B", about the Atlantic Charter.
General Marshall. Here is something. In further answer to your
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 15
question, I find the memorandum to the President on the subject of
the Far Eastern situation, dated November 27, states this :
If the current negotiations end witliout agreement, Japan may attack tlie Burma
Road ; Thailand ; Malaya ; the Netherlands East Indies ; the Philippines ; the
Russian Maritime Provinces.
There is little probability of an immediate Japanese attack on the Maritime
Provinces, because of the strength of the Russian Forces. Recent Japanese troop
movements all seem to have been southward.
[10] The magnitude of the effort required will militate against direct
attack against IMalaya and the Netherlands East Indies until the threat exer-
cised by United States forces in Luzon is removed.
Then there are some remarks on the Burma Road or Thailand
objectives, and this :
The most essential thing now, from the Ignited States viewpoint, is to gain
time. Considerable Navy and Army reenforcements have been rushed to the
Philippines, but the desirable strength has not yet been reached. The process
of reenforcement is being continued. Of great immediate concern is the safety
of the Army convoy now near Guam, and the Marine Corps convoy just leaving
Shanghai. Ground forces to a total of 21,000 are due to sail from the United
States by December 8, 1941,, and it is important that this troop reenforcement
reach the Philippines before hostilities commence.
Precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided as long as con-
sistent with national policy. The longer the delay, the more positive becomes
the assurance of retention of these islands as a naval and air base. Japanese
action to the south of Formosa will be hindered and perhaps seriously blocked
as long as we hold the Philippine Islands. War with Japan certainly will inter-
rupt our transport of supplies to Siberia, and probably will interrupt the process
of aiding China.
After consultation with each other. United States, British, and Dutch military
authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counter action against
Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the
territory or mandated territory of the United [11] States, the British
Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move
forces into Thailand west of 100° East —
I referred to that a little while ago.
or south of 10° North—
"10° North" cuts them off from the Gulf of Siam.
Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.
Japanese involvement in Yunnan or Thailand up to a certain extent is advan-
tageous, since it leads to further dispersion, longer lines of communication, and
an additional burden or communications. However, a Japanese advance to the
west of 100° East or south of 10° North, immediately becomes a threat to Burma
and Singapore. Until it is patent that Japan intends to advance beyond these
lines,, no action which might lead to immediate hostilities shoiild be taken.
It is recommended that —
prior to the completion of the Philippine reenforcements, military counter
action be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens United
States, British, or Dutch territory as above outlined ;
in case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the
United States, the British, and the Dutch Governments that advance beyond
the lines indicated may lead to war ; prior to such warning no joint military
opposition be taken ;
steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and
Dutch for the issuance of such warning.
[i^] That is signed by Stark and signed by me.
15. General Russell. Now, General Marshall, General Short went
out to the Hawaiian Department early in 1941 ; I believe that is true.
General Marshall. Yes,
16 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
16. General Russell. Did he come to the Department in Washing-
ton for conferences before going out ?
General Marshall. He came to Washington. I haven't a very clear
recollection of our interview here. The normal procedure would be
for him to go into War Plans Division and familiarize himself with
the plans relating to the theater into which h^ was going. I have a
very indistinct recollection of that visit. However, I have a letter
I wrote liim just at that time.
17. General Russell. The letter to which vou refer is the letter of
February 7, 1941?
General Marshall. Yes.
18. General Russell. General Marshall, do you believe that that
letter contains a complete statement as to the situation in Hawaii
and the policies which General Short was to follow in his administra-
tion of the affairs of the Department ?
General Marshall. No. There was a dozier or a file in the War
Flans Division, of all the War Department instructions regarding
the particular defense of that theater. This letter of mine gave a
personal touch to my general views on the matter. I might say that
since then I have rarely if ever written to any theater commander, so
there could never be any confusion between my letters and the plans
of the War Plans Division. As a matter of fact, I .have rather given
offense because I have not written. They have written to me, but
I have seldom ever written to them. [IS] I have made it all
an official basis, coming from the Operations Section, which was the
old War Plans Division. However, in this, this is not a complete
defense of Hawaii, at all.
19. General Russell. I think that this letter of February 7 should
be incorporated into and made a part of the record.
20. General Grunert. What is the restricted, confidential, or other
classification ?
21. General Russell. It is a secret letter.
General Marshall. Well, I do not know as it is secret, now.
22. General Russell. It is marked "Secret."
23. General Grunert. We cannot put anything in the record that is
not supposed to be treated in that manner.
General Marshall. Yes, I think you can put this in. All that
letter of his that is here can go into the record.
24. General Russell. I think then we will attach that letter.
(Letter of February 7, 1941, is as follows :)
(Stamped) Secret
War Department,
Office of the Chief of Staff,
Washington, Fehrnary 7, lOJ/L
Lieut. General Walter O. Short,
Fort Shafter,
Territory of Hawaii.
My Dear Short : I believe you take over command today, however, the reason
for this letter is a conversation I had yesterday with Admiral Stark.
*******
[14] Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at length about
the deficiencies of Army materiel for the protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred
specifically to planes and to antiaircraft guns. Of course the facts are as he
represents them regarding planes, and to a less serious extent regarding caliber
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 17
.50 machine guns. The 3-inch antiairci-aft gun is on a better basis. What
Kimmel does not realize is that we are tragically lacking in this materiel
throughout the Army, and that Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other
command in the Army.
The fullest protection for the Fleet is the rather than a major consideration
for us, there can be little question about that ; but the Navy itself makes demands
on us for commands other than Hawaii, which make it difficult for us to meet
the requirements of Hawaii. For example, as I told Stark yesterday — he had
been pressing me heavily to get some modern antiaircraft guns in the Philippines
for the protection of Cavite, where they have collected a number of submarines
as well as the vessels of the Asiatic Fleet — at the present time we have no anti-
aircraft guns for the protection of Cavite, and very little for Corregidor. By
unobstrusively withdrawing 3-inch guns from regiments now in the field in active
training, we had obtained 20 3-inch guns for immediate shipment to the Philip-
pines. However, before the shipment had been gotten under way the Navy re-
quested 18 of these guns for Marine battalions to be specially equipped for the
defense of islands in the Pacific. So I am left with two guns for the Philippines.
This has happened time and again, and until quantity [15] production
gets well under way, we are in a most difficult situation in these matters.
I have not mentioned Panama, but the naval requirements of defense there
are of immense importance and we have not been able to provide all the guns
that are necessary, nor to set up the Air units v^-ith modern equipment. However,
in this instance, we can fly the latest equipment to Panama in one day, some of
it in four hours.
You should make clear to Admiral Kimmel that we are doing everything that
is humanly possible to build up the Army defenses of the Naval overseas installa-
tions, but we cannot perform a miracle. I arranged yesterday to ship 31 of
the P36 planes to Hawaii by aircraft carrier from San Diego in about ten days.
This will give you 50 of this type of plane, deficient in speed compared to the
Japanese carried based pursuit, and deficient in armament. But at least it
gives you 50 of the same type. I also arranged with Admiral Stark to ship 50
P40-B pursuit planes about March 15tli by Naval carrier from San Diego. These
planes just came into production this week and should be on a quantity basis of
about 8 a day by the first week in March.
The Japanese carrier based pursuit plane, which has recently appeared in
China, according to our information has a speed of .322 miles an hour, a very
rapid ability to climb and mounts two .20mm and two .30 cal. guns. It has leak-
proof tanks and armor. Our P40-B will have a speed of 360 miles an hour with
two .50 cal. machine guns and four of .30 caliber. It will lack the rapidity to
climb of the Japanese plane. It will have leak-proof tanks and [16]
armor.
We have an earlier model of this plane, the P40, delivered between August
and October, but the Chief of the Air Corps opposes sending it to Hawaii because
of some engine defect which makes it unsafe for training flights over water. Up
to the present time we have not had available a modern medium bomber or a
light bomber. This month the medium bomber will go into production, if not
quantity production. This plane has a range without bombs of 3,000 miles,
carries 2,000 pounds and has a speed of 320 miles an hour — a tremendous im-
provement on the old BIS which you now have. It can operate with bombs 640
miles to sea, with a safe reserve against the return trip. We plan to give you
first priority on these planes. I am looking into the question of providing at
least a squadron of Flying Fortress planes for Hawaii.
I am seeing what can be done to augment the .50 caliber machine gun set-up,
but I have no hopes for the next few months. The Navy approached us regard-
ing barrage ballons. We have three now under test, and 80 in process of manu-
facture, and 3,000 to be procured if the President will release our estimates.
However, this provides nothing against the next few months. I am looking
into the question of possibly obtaining some from England, but they are asking
us and not giving us these days. The first test of the first forty deliveries
in June will probably be made in Hawaii.
You, of course, understand the pressures on the Department for the limited
material we have, for Alaska. [17] for Panama, and, most confidentiaUy,
for the possible occupation of the Azores, not to mention the new leased bases.
However, as I have already said, we are keeping clearly in mind that our first
conceirn is to protect the Fleet.
My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is
done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing
79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1 3
18 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk
of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by Air and by submarine,
constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing
threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority.
Please keep clearly in mind in all of your negotiations that our mission is to
protect the base and the Naval concentration, and that purpose should be made
clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel. I accentuate this because I found yes-
terday, for example, in a matter of tremendous importance, that old Army and
Navy feuds, engendered from fights over appropriations, with the usual fallacious
arguments on both sides, still persist in confusing issues of national defense.
We must be completely impersonal in these matters, at least so far as our own
nerves and irritations are concerned. Fortunately, and happily I might say,
Stark and I are on the most intimate personal basis, and that relationship has
enabled us to avoid many serious difficulties.
Faithfully yours,
/s/ G. C. Marshall.
[18] 25. General Russfxl. General Marshall, in the letter of
February 7, you stated that the mission of the Army out there was the
protection of the Navy. ■
General Marshall. Yes.
26. General Russell. Do you regard that as an accurate statement
of the relation between Army and Navy in the Hawaiian Department?
General Marshall. Yes. That is the reason for the Army's being
there.
27. General Russell. To protect?
General Marshall. Hawaii's importance to us is as a naval-air base,
and it is the center of Pacifib Fleet activities. Our mission was to
protect it, and for that reason, the eventual arrangement of command
was a naval command.
28. General Russell. In this letter, February 7, General, the state-
ment was made by you to General Short that —
The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by
submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation.
Did anything that occurred between the date of this letter of Feb-
ruary 7 and the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, cause
you to change in any way that estimate of the situation in Hawaii ?
General Marshall. Nothing occurred.
(Discussion off the record.)
[19] 29. General Russell. General Marshall, between the date
of FelDruary 7, 1941, and the date of December 7, 1941, do you recall
any communications with General Short carried on by you either by
telephone or letter or radiogram or any other method, a record of
which is not in the War Department files?
General Marshall. No; I have no recollection of such a thing.
I have here another letter, of March 5. I do not know whether you
have it in the record or not. It reads :
(Letter dated March 5, 1941, is as follows :)
My Dei^vk Short: I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the
Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. The establish-
ment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end
is a matter of first priority. General Chaney has prepared a report of recent
exercises held in the United States and incorporated therein his views and
recommendations based on his experience in these exercises and his observation
of the system and method employed by the British. A copy of this report is being
sent to you.
An air defense exercise is contemplated for the West Coast in the Spring.
This exercise is to include an establishment similar to that which has been set
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 19
up in the Air Defense Command exercise in the Northeast and tested during
January. It is highly desirable that representatives from Hawaii be present
to observe [20] the details of this exercise. If this is found to be im-
practicable, we will consider having officers sent to the exercise who shortly
thereafter are due for station in Hawaii.
Faithfully yours,
/s/ G. C. Makshaix,
Chief of Staff.
30. General Russell. That is an important matter. Where did that
letter come from ?
General JNIarshall. I wrote that to General Short.
31. General Russell. From what files in the War Department did
you get that letter ?
32. General Grunert. In other words, where is there a record of
that letter, so far as the official files of the War Department are con-
cerned ? We have not run across it yet.
General Marshall. I do not know.
33. General Grunert. It might lead us to believe that there may be
others.
General Marshall. My practice, when those personal letters come
to me, is to send them right to the Operations Section, and they go
info the files.
34. General Russell. That letter could have been missed in a hurried
search. I am sure if I had seen it I would have picked it up.
35. General Grunert. Was there an answer to that letter. General?
General Marshall. On the 15th of March General Short replies :
[21] (Letter dated March 15, 1911, is as follows :
General George C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff of the Army, War Department, Washington, D. C.
Dear Genekal Marshall: In reply to your letter of March 5th I shall give
you a brief review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department in regard to
defense from air attack.
General Marshall. Do you have that letter ?
36. General Russell. No, sir.
37. General Grunert. Is there anything in that answer that could
not be used now? In other words, is there something that might in
the future jeopardize the defense?
General Marshall. The letter continues :
DISPERSION and PROTECTION OF AIRCRAFT
The most serious situation with reference to an air attack is the vulnerability
of both the Army and Navy air fields to the attack. Hickam Field is the most
conspicuous target in sight and the Ford Island Navy Field is not much better.
Wheeler Field is less conspicuous only because it is in the center of the Island.
On all fields the planes have been kept lined up on the field where they would
suffer terrific loss. As I wrote you in my letter of February 19th some work
has been done towards the preparation of emergency fields on outlying islands,
but in no case has arrangements been completed for the dispersion of the planes
in the vicinity of the field or the preparation of bunkers to protect them. I asked
for [22] money and Engineer troops to do this work. The pursuit planes
must necessarily be protected on the Island of Oahu on account of their limited
cruisins radius.
The Navy is organizing its new landing field at Barbers Point for the use
of the carrier borne planes. They also are well along on the construction of
an air base at Kaneohe Bay to which the 5 patrol squadrons will be moved.
From their point of view this will improve the situation greatly. With the
arrival of the additional 50 pursuit planes Wheeler Field will be so badly con-
gested that it will be necessary to establish another landing field. Before my
20 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
arrival this had practically been decided upon adjacent to the new Navy landing
field at Barbers Point. However, the Navy objected very strenuously to this
and I think rightly so as planes coming in or going out from either field would
have to fly over the other field and constitute a considerable element of danger.
We have located another field about four miles northeast of Schofield Barracks.
I think this is far more desirable from every point of view as we shall not be
in danger of losing planes through the action of small landing parties or of
having them damaged or of having the field put out of use by shelling from
enemy ships. The runway will be about 5,000 feet so the bombers can use it as
an emergency field should Hickam Field be out of action on account of bombing.
The Observation Squadron and the squadron of light bombers is being [23]
moved to Bellows Field in the next few days so as to lessen the congestion at
Wheeler Field.
Plans have been made to provide gas and bombs at all emergency landing
fields on outlying islands and for the stationing on Kauai, Maui, and Hawaii
of the Battalions of National Guard which came from these islands for the
protection of the air fields from sabotage and small landing parties. Inci-
dentally these battalions would serve to prevent local disorders. Unless there
is an emergency these troops will not be sent to the other islands until the
camp buildings for one company have been provided at each air field. Part of
each battalion can be quartered in existing Armories on these islands usually
at some distance from the air field.
ANTIAIKCRAFT ARTILLERY
In general we have no serious shortage in 3 inch antiaircraft artillery, only
16 guns being required to complete our complement. As far as I know no pro-
vision has been made for 90-mm Antiaircraft guns. 20 out of 135 37-mm
antiaircraft guns have been received. The exact date of the arrival of the
others is not known. We are still short 236 of .50 caliber machine guns.
Perhaps the most serious shortage is 8 long range detectors (AWS) which
are supposed to arrive in June. Our present sound locators have a range of
only 41/^ miles so they are practically useless. The new detectors will have
a maximum range of 120 miles.
The shortage of personnel is much more serious [24 ] than that of
equipment. Practically all of the Coast Artillery is assigned dual roles. This
means that much of the Antiaircraft equipment would not be manned if it were
essential to man the Harbor Defense guns at the same time. To man the
authorized equipment would require 2 regiments of Coast Artillery (AA)
(Mobile) (TO 4-11), 1 battalion, gun, Coast Artillery (AA) (Mobile) (less
searchlight battery) (TO 4-15). 90 officers and 2,000 replacements to activate
3 gun batteries and 37-mm batteries. These were covered in my letter of
February 19th.
COORDINATION OF ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE
The coordination of Antiaircraft defense presents quite a different picture at
Hawaii from that existing in most places on the mainland. The island is so
small that there would n.ot be the same degree of warning that would exist on
the mainland. After the installation of our new detectors we shall have some
warning from the different islands and almost continuous service in the most
dangerous direction for approximately 75 miles. The pursuit aviation, however,
will have to be prepared to take the air in the minimum amount of time.
On account of the congestion in the areas at Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor,
and Barbers Point, the coordination of the Army and Navy aircraft and of the
Antiaircraft Artillery presents a very serious problem. We have had a com-
ihittee of the Army and Navy working on this subject. The committee submitted
its report March 1st and it is now being reviewed by General Martin, [25]
commanding the Hawaiian Air Force, General Gardner, conunanding the Hawai-
ian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, and Admiral Bellinger, commanding the
NavaJ Air Stati,on. We have had a number of combined air exercises in the
past month and expect to have a minimum of one each week so we should find
out anything that is wrong with the plan.
WEST COAST DEFENSE EXERCISE
If the Situation here is such as to make it possible I would like to send both
General Martin and General Gardner to the West Coast Defense Exercise.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 21
Martin is the senior with his temporary rank and probably will command our
air defense if it appears that such a command is the proper solution of our
problem. Gardner has had much more experience with this subject and I feel
that it would be wise fo send him also as he would be able to get all the details.
If it is not advisable at the time to send these two officeirs I would like to send
their Executives as I am sure a lot would be learned from the exercise.
I feel that the question of Antiaircraft Defense against air attack is the most
serious problem that we have to face and I hope that funds and Engineer troops
can be made available soon so that we can get definitely on the way on this
subject.
Very sincerely,
/s/ Walter C. Short.
[26] 38. General Eussell. Do you have any other letters in
that file, or interchange of letters ?
General Marshall. There is a letter from me to General Short,
dated March 28. There is one from General Short to me, dated March
6, with relation to aircraft warning service.
39. General Frank. Is this file a part of your personal files, or War
Department files ?
General Marshall. I do not have any personal file.
40. General Frank. That file can be made available to us, can it
not?
General Marshall. Oh, yes. I mentioned the one of March 6
without reading it. Then there is my letter to him of March 28
regarding relieving congestion by the construction of one additional
field and by the dispersion of grounded aircraft in protected centers ;
stating that a company of aviation engineers will be sent during April,
and further increases in the engineer garrison are contemplated when
the necessary personnal can be made available; and my hope of
arranging for the early augmentation of the antiaircraft garrison so
as to provide full strength units, and also my approval of the proposal
to send General Martin and General Gardner.
Then there is another letter from General Short to me, of April 14,
regarding certain parcels of land.
(Excerpt from letter dated April 14, 1941, is as follows:)
Knowing that you are very much interested in the progress that we are mak-
ing in cooperating with the Navy I am enclosing the following agreements made
with them :
1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian [27] Department and
Fourteenth Naval District, Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Security Measure.
2. Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force and Com-
mander, Naval Base Defense Air Force to implement the above agreement.
3. Field Orders No. 1 NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the Army
the provisions of the joint agreement.
I have found both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch very cooperative and
we all feel steps have been taken which make it possible for the Army and Navy
Air Forces to act together and with the unity of command as the situation
requires.
We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the air
force and the antiaircraft defense.
On May 5 a letter from General Marshall to General Short, referring
to the letter of April 14tli to w^hich I just referred, reading as follows:
(Letter dated May 5, 1941, is as follows :)
Lieutenant General Waltee C. Short,
Fort 8hafter, T. H.
My Deab Short: Thank you for your letter of the 14th enclosing the joint
plans and the estimate concerning possible air action. It is evident that you
have been on the job, and I know that the Navy is delighted to have such
generous cooperation.
22 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[28] The matter of locating strong points at various points throughout the
Island looks sound to me, and authority to go ahead on the leasing of land
parcels was radioed on April 22nd. War Plans and the Air Corps are still look-
ing into the matter of the additional airdrome on Oahu, and I expect to have an
^ answer for you in a short time.
I am hoping to leave in the next day or so on an inspection trip to the West
Coast, which will include a visit to Alaska. I think they are doing a fine job
up there and it will be good to get away from my desk for awhile. Last week
the Appropriations Committee kept me on the stand through two successive ses-
sions of four hours each, which involved answering a barrage of questions on all
matters great and small.
It is most gratifying to hear you say that everything is going along extremely
well and do not hesitate to write at any time.
Faithfully yours,
/s/ G. C. Maeshall,
Chief of Staff.
On May 29 I received a letter from him in which he reports on
certain maneuvers, which I think will be probably very interesting to
you gentlemen if you have not already seen it.
41. General Russell. That letter is not in the file that was made
available by the Adjutant General's Office.
General Marshall. Then there is a letter from me to General
Short, dated October 10, reading as follows :
[29] (Letter dated October 10, 1941, is as follows:)
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short,
Coiniuanding General, Haivaiian Department,
Fort Shaffer Hawaii.
Dear Geneeal Short: The mimeographed standard operating procedure for
the Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, has just come to my attention and I
am particularly concerned with missions assigned to air units. For instance, the
Hawaiian Air Force, among other things, is assigned the mission of defending
Schofield Barracks and all air fields on Oahu against sabotage and ground
attacks ; and with providing a provisional battalion of 500 men for military police
duty.
This seems inconsistent with the emphasis we are placing on air strength in
Hawaii, particularly in view of the fact that only minimum operating and main-
tenance personnel have been provided. As a matter of fact, we are now in process
of testing the organization of airbase defense battalions, consisting tentatively of
a rifle company and two antiaircraft batteries, designed for the specific purpose
of relieving the air maintenance people from ground missions of this kind at
locations where there are no large garrisons for ground defense, as there are in
Hawaii.
I wish you would give this your personal consideration.
Faithfully yours,
/s/ G. C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff.
[SOI Another letter from me, dated October 28, referring to a
letter which I do not see here. General Short wrote me on the 14th,
and it is not in here.
(Letter dated October 28, 1941, is as follows:)
Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short,
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.
Dear Short: With reference to your letter of October 14, I can understand
your motives in giving ground defense training to Air Corps personnel which
at present are excess for the equipment provided. However, the present rate of
expansion of the Air Force is such that they are having considerable difficulty in
obtaining experienced maintenance men and it is important that they be per-
mitted to concentrate on the technical training of all potential mechanics, re-
gardless of available equipment. Also, it is equally important that they utilize
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 23
all available time on this specialized training and the men not be left without
assigned duties particularly during the maneuver period.
I suggest that you prepare a separate phase of your alert plan based on the
assumption that the Air Force has been destroyed and a hostile landing effected.
This plan could provide for the use of the necessary Air Corps personnel for
ground defense and afford a means of indoctrinating them in ground defense
tactics. It should, however, for the present at least, be [31] subordi-
nated to their own specific training requirements.
It would appear that the best policy would be to allow them to concentrate
on technical Air (Jorps training until they have completed their expansion pro-
gram and have their feet on the ground as far as their primary mission is con-
cerned. War Department Training Circular 47, which was issued July 18, 1941,
can be accepted as a guide except in extreme situations.
Faithfully yours,
/s/ G. C. Maeshaix,
Chief of Stuff.
Here [exhibiting] is General Short's letter of October 14, 1941, re-
plying to my letter of October 10, in which I referred to his standing
operating procediu-e and said that it "has jnst come to my attention
and I am particularly concerned with missions assigned to air miits,"
and so forth.
(Letter dated October 14, 1941, is as follows:)
General Geobge C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.
Dear General IMaeshail : I have your letter of October 10th with reference to
the use of men of the Air Force on other than strictly air duties. At the time our
tentative Standing Operating Procedure was put out the Air Corps had 7,229 men.
Full Combat details and all overhead required only 3,885 men for the planes and
organizations actually on hand. This left a surplus of 3,344 men with no assigned
duties during Maneuvers. One of the main reasons for the [321 assign-
ment was to give these men something to do during the Maneuvers. Another rea-
son was the belief that any serious threat of an enemy ground attack of Oahu
could come only after destruction of our Air Forces. The fact that our planes had
been destroyed would not mean that all the men had been put out of action. It
is probable that several thousand men would still be left and it would not look
plausible to have them sit down and do nothing while Infantrymen were detailed
to protect them and their air fields. The training after the first two weeks takes
up only about four hours per month of their time. It seems to me that they
should continue to be trained as Riflemen in the immediate defense of air fields.
As regards their use as Military Police that was not correct. The plan was to use
them for guarding certain essential utilities, which did not require team training.
However, this will be unnecessary as the Legislature has just passed the Home
Guard Bill, which will go into effect very soon. They will be able to take over
guarding of all essential utilities, highway bridges, railroad bridges, etc.
If it is not desired to train Air Corps men for their own protection and for
the final defense of the air field I would like to be so advised.
Very sincerely,
/s/ Walter C. Short.
42. General Russell. Do those constitute the complete exchange of
letters between you and General Short?
[33'] General Marshall. So far as I know.
43. General Russell. I repeat the question then, General Mar-
shall. If there are any others than these transmitting information
from you to General Short they are in the records of the War Depart-
ment?
General Marshall. Yes. Those letters are, in effect, about what an
officer in my position would say orally if he visited the command.
They are not specific directives. It is what he thinks; it is what he is
interested in ; it is his interpretation.
24 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
44. General Kussell. Particularly the Board was interested in com-
munications to General Short which bore on the relations between the
Japanese and our Government in their relations in the Pacific. You
have nothing in your file here relating to that ?
General Marshall. Not other than the radios that made certain
statements regarding that.
45. General Kussell. To refresh your memory, General Marshall,
and in order that further search may be made, if necessary, the records
which have been made available to the Board indicate that on July 7,
1941, a message was sent out from the Adjuant General to the Com-
manding General of the Hawaiian Department in which the Japanese
probabilities were discussed. It is in this language:
(Message dated July 7, 1941, is as follows:)
For your infoi'mation. Deduction from information from numerous sources
is that the Japanese Government has determined upon its future policy which is
supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups. [^4] This
policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving probable aggressive action
against the Maritime Provinces of Russia if and when the Siberian Garrison
has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany
will win a decisive victory in European Russia. Opinion is that Jap activity in
the South will be for the present confined to seizure and development of Naval,
Army, and Air Bases in Indo China although an advance against the British and
Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out. The neutrality pact with Russia may be
abrogated. They have ordered all Jap vessels in U. S. Atlantic ports to be west
of Panama Canal by first of August. Movement of Jap shipping from Japan
has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned.
The situation which developed at that time has been discussed by
you previously. Our records show, General Marshall, that not again,
until October, did anything go from the War Department out to
General Short relating to our relations with Japan and the probabili-
ties there.
In October, General Marshall, a memorandum originated in the
Operations Department General Staff, at Washington, in which was
discussed a Navy estimate of Japanese probabilities in the Pacific in
which the Navy had stated that they thought war with Russia was
imminent and that, since Japan held the British and us responsible
for their present situation, there was a possibility of their attacking
us. General Gerow prepared a memorandum which bears your ini-
tials and some other. [35] initials, disagreeing with that
estimate and stating that the general recommendation was made that
this be sent to the Hawaiian Department :
Tension between the United States and Japan remains strained, but no abrupt
change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent.
From July down to October we have nothing else in our records, and
we were wondering whether or not something else did exist or whether
that October radiogram constitutes the next message to General Short.
General Marshall. So far as I know, it does. I think we have some
passing back and forth between the War Plans Division and his staff
out there, and I will check on that. That goes on pretty much all the
time.
46. General Russell. General Marshal], eliminating messages from
the Navy which were shown to General Short, the next record that we
have of any communication from the War Department to General
Short is on the 27th of November, on which date the alert order went
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 25
out and a message from G-2 of the War Department to G-2 of the
Hawaiian Department; and I was wondering if your files showed any
other communications between the October message and the November
27 message.
General Marshall.- I do not know of any. I will check up very
carefully.
47. General Grunert. Was it SOP between you and the Navy that
Navy messages of importance yveva shown to the Army and that Army
messages of importance were shown to the Navy or did you agree that
this particular message should or should not be shown ?
[oS] General Marshall. We did not say that. There were no
instructions to the Commander not to show it at all. We put that in,
in these critical cases, to make certain that there was do doubt about it.
I know of no instructions to an Army Commander not to show this to
the Navy. That was left to his own discretion. When we come to
important things we put that in specifically.
I would like to explain to you here that the reason for that is that
we did not want to compromise our codes ; and if we sent instructions
out, if the' Navy sent them out and we sent them out, it presented a
great hazard in the compromise of the codes.
48. General Grunert. But all those messages during that critical
period, I believe, or most of them, did say to show it to the Navy ; and
in that case you did not send an additional message?
General Marshaix. No; in ord<^r not to compromise the codes.
49. General Russell. General Marshall, I will eliminate the Navy
messages. A message that has been discussed considerably by the
Board is the message of November 27, 1941, which bore your signature
and went out to General Short.
General Marshall. I have it here.
50. General Russell. Do you recall giving instructions for the
preparation of that message or participating in its preparation?
General Marshall. I was away on the 27th. I left here on the
afternoon of the 26th. I went clown to maneuvers in North Carolina
and did not return until the night of the 27th. \37] Inciden-
tally, I think I left immediately after that, on the 28th, and went back
again; and I have a rather distinct recollection of comparing the
effect of this statement :
If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided tlie United States
desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not comma
repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might
jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile .Japanese action you are directed to
undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but
these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm
civil population or disclose intent.
I have a rather distinct recollection of considering those two state-
ments. One, incidentally, was a governmental policy, the instructions
of the President. My very dim recollection of the policy — and Gen-
eral Gerow or Colonel Bundy might have been more accurate in their
recollection — is that I indicated the insertion of the overt act. But I
am not quite clear on that. They may have gotten it from a joint
board discussion, as General Gerow sat on the joint board.
I was trying to recall how that instruction came to us, but I think it
was in a personal interview, but I do not recall it. I know it was the
Government's policy.
26 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
51. General Russell. General Gerow's testimony indicates that you
did not participate in the preparation of this message of November 27,
by a statement as to who did participate and your name was omitted.
[3S] General Marshall. I think they knew I was not here. As
I say, my recollection is very hazy, but I have rather a memory with
reference to the matter I have just spoken of. It may have been, of
course, when I looked at it when I returned the following day.
52. General Russell. Similarly, General Marshall, if a message
liad been sent by G-2 of the War Department to G-2 of the Hawaiian
Department on the same date, November 27, you being absent from
Washington would not have had any personal knowledge of its
contents ?
General Marshall. I probably would not have seen it anyway.
53. General Russell. To continue the history of the November 27
message. General Marshall, it requested that General Short report the
action taken on it?
General Marshall. Yes.
54. General Russell. Subsequently General Short sent a reply to
that message in which he refers to the November 27 message from you
over your signature by number. That message of General Short
reporting action taken merely states :
Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy REURAD
four seven two twenty-seventh.
The original of General Short's report indicates that it was initialed
by Secretary Stimson and has a stamp "Noted — Chief of Staff," and
was initialed by General Gerow.
The Board has been interested to know the procedure in your office
as it relates to stamping documents which do not bear your signature.
Does that indicate that you did or did not see those messages ?
{S9] General Marshall. Well, I think if you look at the preceding
message from the Philippines you will find that same rubber stamp
on there, "Noted— Chief of Staff."
55. General Russell. That is true.
General Marshall. And you will find it at the top of the message.
You will find my initials.
56. General Russell. Yes ; I do see them.
General Marshall. But not on'the other one. I do not know about
that. I do not know what the explanation is. I initial them all ; that
is my practice. What happens, of course, is that there is more than
one copy. One goes to the particular section that has the responsi-
bility for working on it, which in this case was the War Plans Division,
now the Operations Division, and then one comes to me. I initial it
and then it goes out to the record. Where I think the Secretary of
War ought to see it, and if he is not in the distribution, I check it to
him. Where I think there is somebody else that should be notified,
I indicate on the face of my copy who else is to be informed of this.
As a matter of routine one agency is charged with the execution of the
matter pertaining to the message. But in this particular case I do not
know. I have no recollection at all.
57. General Russell. The fact that it reached the Secretary of
War's office and was by him initialed — would that or not indicate that
you had sent it up to him or that it might have been sent up to him by
someone else ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 27
General Marshall. In this connection I invite your attention to
the fact that this was filed behind a message from General MacArthur.
I note that I did not initial it. [40'] They evidently came in
together.
58. General Russell. If they were together you might or might
not have seen them?
General Marshall. I have no recollection at all. The presumption
would be that I had seen it.
59. General Russell. You cannot recall, General Marshall, whether
or not you had at that time examined the message of the 27th to which
General Short's radiogram was a reply?
General Marshall. No. As a matter of fact, my memory is that I
discussed that message when it was being prepared, though General
Gerow thinks that I saw it afterwards.
60. General Grunert. Who has authority to put out such a message ?
General Marshall. The Acting Chief of Staif ; in that case, who-
ever was acting in my absence. I do not remember who it was. Prob-
ably it was Arnold. He w^as the Deputy then.
61. General Grunert. It was by direction of somebody; other-
wise they would not just out of a clear sky, after November 27, have
sent a warning message. It was either by direction of somebody to
send it or after some sort of a meeting or conference held that they did.
Otherwise why should it have been sent on the 27th ? Why not on the
26th or the 28th ? Do you see what I am trying to get at ?
General Marshall. I see exactly what you mean, but I am having
difficulty in explaining it to you. I think the message was based on
something that came in on the 26th, I rather imagine, but I have no
clear recollection.
62. General Grunert. But the decision rested, as to whether
[4-1] a message would be sent or not, with the OPD, or would it
have to have the O. K. of your office ?
General Marshall. Normally it would have to have the O. K. here.
It is a question of good judgment. They send all sorts of messages
all the time. I only see a small fraction of the messages sent by other
people. I see the big directives. The same thing would apply to the
Secretary of War. That was a very important message. I still have
a very haunting memory that I was in on the discussion of the prepa-
ration of the message.
63. General Grunert. There was a so-called message that has not
been mentioned yet, I believe, a message of November 28. signed by
the Adjutant General and apparently prepared in the office of the
Air Force, which dealt mainl}^ with protection against sabotage of
airplanes. Do you know anything about that message ?
General Marshall, I know by having looked into it afterwards.
What actually occurred — and General Arnold can give you a more
direct statement than I can — Arnold was terribly concerned over the
fact that they thought they had picked up sabotage on three or four
of the big planes in this country, in the factories. They were pretty
certain that certain things were the result of sabotage m the plants.
But we never had any conclusive proof. So he was sending out a
message, without any relation to this at all, in regard to that matter,
and G-2 objected to it as a normal staff operation, that that was their
bailiwick and not that of the Air Corps. The net result was that the
28 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
message was redrawn, as I recall, by G-2, and afterwards O. K.'d By
the War Plans Division and sent, and it went all over the Army, over-
seas, and Alaska.
14^] 64. General Grunert. Now, your message of the 27th —
that was directed to how many agencies ? Panama, Hawaii, the Phil-
ippines, and West Coast?
General Marshall. Yes. "West Coast" includes Alaska.
65. General Grunert. And the G-2 was to all the G-2's?
General Marshall. The G-2 message had a much wider distribu-
tion.
66. General Grunert. It went to all the G-2 departments?
General Marshall. All. It went all over the place.
67. General Grunert. The air sabotage message, was that also of
wide distribution ?
General Marshall. Wide distribution ; yes.
68. General Grunert. Is there any idea in your mind that the re-
cipients of those three messages could have interpreted them or con-
fused them to one taking the place of the other as the latest instruc-
tion ?
General Marshall. I would say that all of these things occurring
at the same time, this coincidence of reception may have had its bear-
ing on the matter, very much as the leading planes that we fiiially
got off from San Francisco arrived — were due to arrive — right in the
middle of the confusion of the Japanese arrival, which undoubtedly
did not help the expectations, the anticipations of enemy air approach.
The G-2 sends a great many messages, as we all know from our own
experience, and you had a coincidence there of, to a certain extent,
unrelated messages going in at the same time.
69. General Grunert. Did you see the reports from the others—
from Panama, the West Coast, and the Philippines, in- reply to your
message of November 27th? Apparently you did, because [43']
they are initialed.
General Marshall. I think I initialed all of the others. The only
one I did not initial, I think, was the Hawaiian one.
70. General Grunert. And they having reported all the measures
taken, it seems odd that the Hawaiian should be the only one to mis-
interpret or confuse the three messages. They all got the same mes-
sages, so I w^ould like to know if there is any light that I could get on
why Hawaii particularly could interpret it one way, and the other
three, the other way.
General Marshall. I don't know ; I don't know.
71. General Grunert. I have put in enough, so far. Go ahead.
72. General Frank. I would like to ask a question. Since Hawaii
did not take any measures other than those against the sabotage,
as indicated in the message, and since that reply had been asked for in
your message of November 27th, was that Hawaiian reply satisfactory ?
General Marshall. In the first place, as I told you, I have no very
distinct recollection in the matter. The first definite reaction I have on
it would be confused with the "backsight" state of mind. Colonel
Bundy, who had immediate charge of this phase of the affairs in War
Plans Division, spoke to me about it. His reaction to the message had
been that, when he referred to his liaison to the Navy, that the whole
thing opened up, because under the agreement that Short had brought
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 29
about with Admiral Kimmel, the Navy was charged with the deep re-
connaissance, the Army, with the close-in affairs that pertained to Oahu
direct. As I recall the matter, the only way the Army would have been
involved in the deep reconnaissance would have been in detaching
units to serve under the Navy. Well, the [44] main thing of
course was the deep reconnaissance, to get a warning of the approach
of these people. The reaction to the message also would have to be
based on a knowledge of what the actual detailed defense order was.
I was unaware of that. I believe that the No. 1 alert was changed in
November, when the No. 1 was the top alert and later No. 1 became the
preliminary alert. »
73. General Frank. This reply does not refer to a numbered alert.
It simply refers to the fact that he is taking measures against sabo-
tage, and the point I was trying to make is this : since there,' was a
critical situation existing in the Pacific, as you stated in answer to one
of General Russell's questions, and since the Generals in Panama and
the Philippines had taken more conclusive measures for protection,
did it not seem that the measures taken in Hawaii were somewhat
sketchy ?
General Marshall. Yes, unless you would assume, as the men who
were working on the thing did assume, that when he established his
liaison with the Navy, that meant that reconnaissance had started.
To what extent they were familiar with the details on the sabotage
alert, meaning that it took all the planes and massed them, unarmed,
on the air fields, and that the antiaircraft guns wouldn't have any
ammunition by them, and things of that nature, I do not know,
74. General Frank. There is lurking in the background, as a result
of that report having been called for, and a reply made to it, an as-
sumption that the reply was satisfactory. If it were not satisfactory,
would it not have been a logical step for this office to have checked up
on him?
General Marshall. Yes, quite so; undoubtedly.
[4^] 75. General Grunert. It was OPD's business to advise you
on that particular phase, wasn't it ? You, yourself, do not, necessarily,
have time to look into all those things.
76. General Frank. No ; that is true.
General Marshall. I have a responsibility, though, and the whole
question was how you interpreted his reply.
77. General Russell. General Marshall, the Board has been in-
terested in knowing what information there was in the Office of the
Chief of Staff as to the actual steps which General Short had taken
for the defense of Oahu in response to this message of November 27th.
General Marshall. I just have no recollection of it, at the time. I
might add that these messages went to all these various commanders,
and they all came back, the replies came in, and they were analyzed in
the War Plans Division. Business went ahead.
78. General Russell. They were seen by you and referred out to the
War Plans Division for the proper action ?
General Marshall. Yes. Well, they go to them direct, and a copy
comes to me.
79. General Russell. A little earlier in your testimony. General
Marshall, reference was made to the SOP's from the Hawaiian De-
partment, and as I recall, your file indicated that they reached you in
30 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
October. These SOP's have in them these alerts 1, 2, and 3 ; 1 being
the lowest type of alert. I have been told by someone in the War
Plans Division that those SOP's were not received in the War Depart-
ment until after the attack on December 7.
General Marshall. I couldn't answer that,
[40] 80. General Eussell. I am merely making this suggestion,
now, because it may become material later, with the request that search
be initiated.
General Marshall. Yes.
81. General Russell. That is, to determine when those SOP's actu-
ally reached the War Department.
General Marshall. All I know is that I was told that this No. 1
alert alternated in its character from one extreme to another during
November and December.
82. General Grunert. There was a so-called "SOP" of November
5, which may be the one which changed the alerts, if a change was
made. The testimony of one Admiral Bloch also shows that he con-
sidered No. 1 of the Army to be a counterpart of No. 1 of the Navy,
and therefore he didn't know this or that. How true that is, we are
going to find out, but then so far as the report from Short as to the
measures taken is concerned, you did not exactly know to what extent
the measures taken for sabotage extended to other protective means?
General Marshall. No, I did not. As a matter of fact, my recollec-
tion is as to these various defense measures from all our overseas
theaters, that I had not attempted to reach them all. In most cases of
that kind, though, I don't recall it. In this, I have an outline made of
the principal points, and I look at that. I recall reading very carefully
the adjustment that Short made with the Navy, which was a brand-
new departure, wdiere they defined reconnaissance activities, the Navy
taking the oversea reconnaissance mission as its responsibility, and
the Army, the close-in reconnaissance, so far as air was concerned, as
its responsibility. I recall it very [^7] well, because the air
people objected, and I supported Short. So I had a reason for recalling
that quite distinctly.
83. General Russell. General Marshall, on the point that you are
discussing now, it is not clear, to me at least, and I do not know
whether it is, to the other Members of the Board, what action was
necessary, and who initiated the action to make effective the plan for
the reconnaissance in the Department. I do not believe the question
is clear.
Let us assume that when the message of November 27 reached
General Short, he had concluded that this outer patrol and imier
patrol should be made effective. AVe are not clear as to who should
have made the initial movement to have initiated those patrols.
General Marshall. My own view of that would be that if the mes-
sage, as I believe this message was, was repeated to the naval officer,
which meant it was instructions from the Navy Department, they
would take action according to it, implementing the thing, as that
officer's, because Short had no command over him. For several years
he had known General Short, but they each had a certain mission,
at a certain time. Now, the point is, though, that the message went
to one, to be repeated to the other, and worked out both ways, wli^o-
ever started the message. In this case it was started on the War De-
partment side.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 31
8i. General Eussell. Well, is it your view that both having seen
the message of November 27, without more ado the Navy should have
started their distant reconnaissance?
General Marshall. That is right. That is my view.
85. General Eussell. And the Army, the close-in ?
General Marshall (reading) :
[48] Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such
reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.
86. General GRU^^ERT. That leaves it up to both parties to live up
to their responsibilities ?
General Marshall. The commanders of overseas garrisons — it is
quite conceivable they might be attacked, without anything from the
War Department, whatever. Of course, in all of this the point is the
transition from peace to a war-time state of mind, and many alerts;
as you and I recall, in the year 1907, in the Philippines. I, myself,
have gone through two Japanese alerts.
87. General Eussell. You were rather well acquainted with the
foreign policy of the United States as it related to Japanese activities,
were you not ?
General Marshall, Yes, sir.
88. General Eussell. Did you regard that policy as a rather def-
inite and firm policy?
General Marshall. I don't believe I could comment on that. In the
first place, I don't c^uite understand the question, and in the next place
I would rather not be involved, as a military official, in expressing
myself on the foreign policy of the United States.
89. General Eussell. I was leading up to this question — that the
message of November 27, 1941, apparently can be easily broken down
into two parts; one dealing with what General Short should do in
the event of hostilities; the other part dealing with what General
Short should do prior to hostilities. He was directed to initiate re-
connaissance and take other measures [49] that he thought
necessary, and then there are these restrictions or limitations or cau-
tions. He is to carry out these necessary measures, and reconnais-
sance, so as not to alarm the civilian population, or disclose intent, and
then as a general caution he must "limit dissemination of this highly
secret information to minimum essential officers." Members of the
Board have been debating whether or not those cautions or restric-
tions, or however they may be properly defined, were of such nature,
first, as to minimize in General Shorfs mind the seriousness of the
situation which actually existed. I am not sure that that is a fair
question ; it may be a pure opinion.
General Mar8Hx\ll. I am inclined to think it is. I think that that
matter ought to just stand on the record. We have got the record of
what he was tolcl, and you can draw your conclusions from that — the
series of messages, and also I think you have got to have very clearly
in mind as I say the transition from a peace state of mind to a war
state of mind.
90. General Eussell. I certainly shall not care to pursue the matter
further or to press you on it.
91. General Grunert. Just to have it in the record for our future
consideration, I want to put a query, to be answered, or not as you
see fit, or whether or not the question is such as to really demand an
32 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
answer. That is this : Here, the same message, or three messages, go
to at least four prominent commanders, or three of them, overseas —
Panama, Hawaii, and the Philippines, and one, on a presumably ex-
posed West Coast. Three of them apparently interpret those mes-
sages in one way, and the fourth one does not; so the three of them
report all the measures they have taken, or show by their reports
that [50] they considered this as quite a critical and dangerous
situation; so they take greater measures than the fourth does. Now,
is there anything in the case of that fourth, which happens to be the
Hawaiian Department — are there any peculiar circumstances there
that it should be interpreted in a different way for that command than
it was in Panama, the Philippines, or on the West Coast ?
General Marshall. All I can say to that is this — and my answer
does not explain the contrast between the very, very urgent attitude
of the naval and army commanders in Hawaii, in the spring and early
summer, with relation to air and antiaircraft and radar requirements.
All I can say is that Hawaii had always 130,000 Japanese in a very
congested district, there, and no commander could ever forget that;
and the others did not have them. That did not exist in Panama.
You had Panamanians over the border, but certainly you had no feeling
of fears regarding them. In the Philippines you had no Japanese
population certainly of any moment. It actually developed later
there was a fifth column, very well organized, out there but you
had always present in your mind in Hawaii the large Japanese popu-
lation, of unpredictable activities. There, I think, is quite a contrast
between that one man and the other three. As I say, I don't know ;
I have never had explained to me, why there was apparently the
cessation of fears of air attack, that seemed to be preeminent in the
mind of Admiral Kimmel in February, when he wrote a letter to the
Secretary of the Navy, and that official wrote to the Secretary of
War, and embarrassed us greatly, because we had almost nothing to
give — we were bankrupt so far as materiel was [51] con-
cerned— and the later urgent requests with regard to radar, for
example.
92. General Russell. Those are the only questions I have.
93. General Frank. I would like to ask one question, here. Back
here, in the beginning, you stated that the presence of the Army in
Hawaii was for the protection of a naval and air base ?
General Marshall. I said, a naval and air base.
94. General Frank. I just wanted to get it straightened out in the
record.
General Marshall. Naval and air. Originally it was naval, and
then it became naval and air.
95. General Frank. Have you any information to give or any com-
ments to make relative to the failure of any contractors on Hawaiian
projects to complete their work on time, prior to December 7?
General Marshall. I have no knowledge on that, but we will ex-
amine the records to see if there is any indication, here.
96. General Frank. Have you any information as to whether or
not any military personnel neglected their duties relating to Hawaiian
construction contracts ?
General Marshall. I have no knowledge of that.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 33
97. General Frank. Do you have any information to give to the
Board on a Mr. Wilhelm Rohl ?
General Marshall. I have not, personally; but I will have them
examine into the records of the War Department to see if there is
anything on the subject here.
98. General Frank. Were you in any way familiar with the Ha-
waiian defense contract let by Colonel Theodore Wyman?
[S2] General Marshall. I was not.
99. General Frank. Now, General Marshall, a reading of the Rob-
erts Commission testimony leads one to the conclusion that there was
a general feeling in both the Army and the Navy, and in Hawaii, that
there would not be an air attack. In other words, there was a state
of mind of security against an air attack. Do you believe such a state
of mind existed?
General Marshall. I was unaware of it. The previous communi-
cations we had had, noteably those of the spring and up to June 1941,
related very specifically to the urgency of measures protective against
an air attack.
100. General Frank. Do you believe that the presence of the Fleet
in being at Pearl Harbor mainly constituted a feeling of security that
contributed to this state of mind ?
General Marshall. I had had no opinion on that, and up to this
instant I do not know whether I have formed any opinion on that or
not. I had never thought of that particular aspect of the matter.
101. General Frank. At that time, December 1911, what in your
opinion was the general feeling in military ^d naval circles relative
to the effectiveness of the air attack with bombs and torpeclos?
General Marshall. As I recall, we considered it as very effective,
in view of what had occurred in the European theater.
102. General Frank. Over a period of two years, ending December
7, 1941, on about how many occasions was the Hawaiian Department
required to go on alert?
General Marshall. I will have to get that data for you.
103. General Frank. This next question : Was any consideration
[JJ] ever given in the War Department to the possibility of a
feeling of apathy that might ensue as a result of "crying wolf ! wolf !
too often"?
General Marshall. Very much so.
101. General Frank. With respect to the messages on sabotage sent
to General Short from Washington, do not the provisions of his war
plan and his standing operating procedure provide for full defense
against sabotage?
General Marshall. I think it does.
105. General Frank. Were not the provisions of these plans known
in the War Department?
General Marshall. They must have been.
106. General Frank. Then why was sabotage especially singled
out?
General Marshall. By whom?
107. General Frank. By messages that were sent to him. Between
November 16 and 28 there were six messages sent to him, four of them
told him to be careful not to disturb the Japanese, and three of them
cautioned him about sabotage.
79716— 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1—4
34 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Marshall. Two of those on sabotage that are related to air
were just coincidences, and those, not to disturb the Japanese, related
to air, and the extreme anxiety not to have anything happen which
would provoke a break, wdiich w^ould enable the Japanese to say that
we were taking action, to give them an excuse for action; and that
was to enable Mr. Hull to stall this thin^ off as long as possible. All
measures against sabotage are very difficult of set-up, because they
indicate their purpose so plainly when you have to deploy your people
around the key points and have them stay there in tents or [54-^
otherwise, so they always provoke a difficult situation, and one that
we were fearful would give the Japanese some handle to place the
accusation against us that we were taking action of a hostile character
directed towards them. That is as nearly as I can recall the reason
for the three messages that you refer to, I think, though I have to
look at the messages to familiarize myself with what they say. I don't
recall them.
108. General Frank. In accordance with that, you feel that it was
a responsibility for the War Department to caution about sabotage ?
General Marshall. In relation to w^hat I have just said. We were
trying to be very certain that we did not take measures which the
Japanese could put their fingers on and say that we were doing
something that was hostile; and most of your sabotage defense has
to be right out in the open, a great portion of it. Now, in that respect
we were doing something. We had to talk about it, too, because
that was related to the meetings with Mr. Hull, where we were trying
to do anything possiblS that could be done to stall off a break in
the Pacific.
I have got to go. I have got something that just won't wait.
109. General Grunert. Thank you ver}^ much. General.
110. Colonel West. As these proceedings are confidential, we are
cautioning everyone not to mention anything.
(Thereupon, at 2 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of wit-
nesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 35
[,55] CONTENTS
TUESDAY, AUGUST 8, 1944
Testimony of — Page '
Brig. Gen. John L. McKee, 87th Division, Fort Jackson, South Caro-
lina 56
Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles, Commanding 1st Service Command, Boston,
Massachusetts 91
Brig. Gen. Russell A. Osmun, Chief, Militarj- Intelligence Service, War
Department 133
Francis M. Caulfield, Chief Clerk, Central Files, Adjutant General's
Office, War Department 143
Colonel Charles K. Gailey, Jr., Executive OfRcei", Operations Division,
General Staff, War Department 145
DOCUMENTS
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Paragraph 30 72
Hawaiian Defense Project, Category D 73
Cooperative Plan 83
Telegram from Ambassador Grew to Secretary of State, dated November
17, 1941 99
Addendum to General INIiles' testimony 132-A
^ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed hy brackets and indicate
pages of original transcript of proceedings.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 37
im PEOCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD
TUESDAY, AUGUST 8, 1944
Munitions Building,
Washington^ D. C.
The Board at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the
hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board,
presiding.
Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D.
Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.
Present also : Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, and Major Henry
C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder.
General Grunert, The Board will come to order.
TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. JOHN L. McKEE, 87TH DIVISION, FORT
JACKSON, SOUTH CAROLINA
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Will you please state to the Board your name,
rank, organization, and station?
General McKee. Brigadier General John L. McKee, 87th Division,
Fort Jackson, South Carolina.
2. General Grunert. General, in an attempt to get at the facts in
looking at the War Department background and viewpoints prior
to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack, it is hoped that, by
reason of your assignment as a member of the OPD at that time, you
can throw some light on the subject. In order to cover so large a
field in the time available, [J7] individual Board members
have been assigned objectives and phases, although the entire Board
will pass upon all objectives and phases. General Russell has this
particular phase assigned to him, so he will lead in propounding ques-
tions, and the other members will assist in developing it.
3. General Russell. General McKee, what were your duties and
assignments during the year 1941 ?
General McKee. In July 1941, I was assigned to the War Depart-
ment as a member of the War Department General Staff. I was as-
signed to War Plans Division, to the project group of War Plans
Division. Specifically, I handled matters which pertained to the
Hawaiian defense project.
4. General Russell. Prior to your assignment to the General Staff
in July of 1941, where were you and what were vou doing?
General McKee. I was P. M. S. T. at the Valley Forge Military
Academy, Wayne, Pennsylvania.
38 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
5. General Russell. At some time prior to your assignment to the
General Staff in 1941, had you been on duty in the Hawaiian De-
partment ?
General McKee. Yes; I was on duty in the Hawaiian Department
from 1935 to 1937.
6. General Russell. What was your assignment in the Hawaiian
Department?
General McKee. During the first, I should say, three months I
commanded the 1st Battalion of the 19th Infantry. Then I was
A-Ssistant G^, Hawaiian Department. My specific duties were to
handle the Hawaiian defense project.
7. General Russell. Were you reasonably familiar with
the [58] plans for the defense of Oahu as developed by the
War Department ?
General McKee. I believe I was,
8. General Russell. Did that familiarity include the joint plan
between the Army forces and the Navy forces in the Territory ?
General McKee. Yes, sir. I was familiar with it.
9. General Russell. General McKee, your position, however, in
Hawaii, and later on the General Staff, concerned itself principally
or more immediately with problems of materiel and supply gen-
erally; is that true?
General McKee. Personnel and materiel.
10. General Russell, Is it true or not that in your study of those
problems of personnel and materiel it was necessary for you to be
familiar with the tactical situation and the strategical plans and
demands ?
General McKee. Yes ; that is true.
11. General Russell. You were familiar with the several docu-
ments which embodied the plans that you have just testified about,
were you ?
General McKee. That is correct.
12. General Russell. For the benefit of the Board, and in order
to clarify our thinking and our study of these documents, would you
describe these documents briefly, beginning with the basic or under-
lying document and working toward the definite and detailed plans?
General McKee. The plans on file in the War Department on De-
cember 7, 1941, which concerned the Hawaiian Coastal [S9]
Frontier, were based on the Orange Plan, wdiich was then obsolete.
May I refer to this document to get the correct name ?
13. General Russell. Surely.
General McI^e. The War Plans Division prepared a strategic plan
which consisted of Operations Plan Rainbow No. 5 and Concentration
Plan Rainbow No, 5.
14. General Grunert, Who prepared that?
General McKee, War Plans Division,
15. General Grunert, Of the War Department?
General McKee, The War Department General Staff, A copy of
Operations Plan Rainbow No. 5 was sent to the Commanding Gen-
eral, Hawaiian Department, on August 21, 1941. Receipt was ac-
knowledged on September 3, 1941, A further revision of the Joint
Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No, 5 was approved by
the Joint Board on November 19, and a copy of the Joint Army and
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 39
Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5 was sent to the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department, on November 28, 1941, As far as
1 know, the latter document was not received prior to December 7.
As I recall, it did not change the mission or concept of the defense of
the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.
16. General Grunert. Then the plan actually in existence, to be
carried out, had been receipted for by the Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department, September 3, 1941 ?
General McKee. That is correct. But the plans on file in the War
Department were not based on that plan. As I understood it, they
were in the process of revision at that time. The mission and the
concept were not materially changed over the Orange Plan. The
Orange Plan related to a specific action.
[6'6'J 17. General Grunert. What plan was the Commanding
General of the Hawaiian Department operating under as of Decem-
ber 7, 1941 ?
General McKee. Under Rainbow No. 5.
18. General Grunert. And he had been operating under that since
September 3, 1941?
General McKee. That is correct, sir.
19. General Russell. Was that the document which you referred to
a little while ago as being obsolete ?
General McKee. No, sir. Tlie document which I referred to as
being obsolete was the Orange Plan. The Orange Plan related to a
specific operation, whereas the Rainbow Plan related to any war in
which the United States should become engaged.
20. General Russell. Is a copy of the Orange Plan, obsolete, among
the documents which you brought over to the hearing room with you
this morning?
General McKee. No, sir; I did not bring the Orange Plan.
21. General Russell. Then it has no materiality in establishing
the relationship between the War Department and the Hawaiian
Department ?
General McKee, No, I think not, because the Commanding Gen-
eral, Hawaiian Department, had received Rainbow No. 5.
22. General Frank. In September?
General MoKee. In September; and although we had not received
any revision of the plan based on Rainbow No. 5
23. Genera.! Frank. From him?
General McKee. From him, on December 7, because of the fact
that the mission was practically the same, a little bit broader in scope,
perhaps, and there was no real necessity to change his basic plan.
[61] 24. General Russell. Would it be possible at this time for
you to identify, for the convenience of the Board, the document on the
table which you referred to as Rainbow 5 ?
General McKee.' This (indicating) is War Department ODerations
Plan Rainbow No. 5, 1941.
25. General Russell. The document which you have just handed
me is the entire plan, or are there other documents related to it?
General McKee. There are other documents related to that. There
is the Basic War Plan, the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan,
Rainbow No. 5, and that is Operations Plan Rainbow No. 5 (indi-
cating) .
40 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
26. General Eussell, Can you identify the last document which
you have just described?
General McKee. It is Operations Plan Kainbow No. 5.
27. General Russeix. Do you see it on the table here?
General McKee. That is' it, right here (indicating). The Basic
War Plan is not here.
28. General Frank. I thought you iust identified that as the Basic
War Plan. '
General McKee. No; the Operations Plan, War Department Oper-
ations Plan Rainbow No. 5. The Joint Basic War Plan is not here.
The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, did not have a
copy of thet Joint Basic War Plan ; he only had a copy of the Opera-
tions Plan Rainbow No. 5, which is based on the Joint Plan.
29. General Grunert. Was there any reason why he should be
furnished a copy of the Joint Plan?
General McKee. No, sir.
30. General Frank. Why not?
[S2] General McKee. Because this Operations Plan assigned
him his mission. It establishes a category of defense and, as I recall,
I think it sets up the missions, the troop bases.
31. General Frank. What do you mean by "category of defense"?
General McKee. Categories of defense were assigned to coastal
frontiers. The category of defense determined the type of attack
which the Joint Board visualized the particular coastal frontier
might be subjected to, and formed the basis for the missions which
it set up for the defense of the coastal frontier.
32. General Frank. How many categories Avere there? Do you
remember ?
General McKee. I do not remember. General. I know the category
of defense for the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier was Category D.
33. General Grunert. What does that signify in regard to the
other categories?
General McKee. I do not have it specifically stated here, but Cate-
gory D did not visualize a major attack against that coastal frontier.
By "major attack" I mean an attack w^iich would result in the
occupation of the area by a hostile force.
34. General Russell. Let me say for the benefit of the Board that
this is a line of questioning which will be developed when we get on
the other documents.
35. General Grunert, I thought it might leave a doubt in any-
one's mind in reading the testimony as to what Category D was, and
I wanted to develop it to see whether or not it was the highest cate-
gory or the lowest, or in between, and, generally, [63] what
that category did cover.
36. General Russell. We can clarify it at this moment.
I hand you, General McKee, the Hawaiian defense project, and
call your attention to subparagraph b under section 2 of that, in
which category of defense D is described, and will ask you to tell
the Board, having refreshed your memory from this.
37. General Frank. What is a category?
General McKee. It is a classification of defense, of the type of
defense, based on what the War Department visualizes that the type
of action will be.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 41
38. General Frank. How many were there for the Hawaiian
Department ?
General McKee. There was only one. The category of defense
assigned the Hawaiian Department was Category D, which assumes
the possibility but not the probability of a major attack.
39. General Grunert. What is included in the definition of a
major attack?
General McKee. By "major attack" was meant an attempted land-
ing on the shores of the land area of that coastal frontier.
40. General Grunert. Might it be described as an all-out defense ?
General McKee. Yes, sir; that is a better definition.
41. General Grunert. Then Category D included how far up the
scale toward an all-out defense? I might add, did it include raids
and air attacks and submarine attacks?
General McKee. Yes ; it did include raids, air attacks, and block-
ing of channels by hostile vessels.
42. General Grunert. Keconnaissance, patrolling, and so forth?
[64-] General McKee. Yes, by surface craft, submarine, or car-
rier-based aviation.
43. General Grunert. Is the mission of the Commanding General
of the Hawaiian Department stated in comparatively few words and
will you put that in the record ?
General McKee. Yes. You want the mission of the Army as stated
in the Hawaiian defense project?
44. General Grunert. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian
Department, which I presume is what you call the Army ?
General McKee. Yes, sir. It is so stated here as the Army
Hawaiian defense project, which is a document prepared by the Com-
manding General, Hawaiian Department. It states :
Missions : Mission for the Army ; to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land
and air forces and against hostile sympathizers, and to support the Naval forces.
45. General Grunert. Give me the mission as far as the Navy is
concerned, if you have it right there.
General McKee (reading) :
Mission for the Navy ; to patrol the coastal zone and to control and protect
shipping therein ; to support the Army forces.
46. General Russell. Let us go back and see if we can straighten
this up. General. You say that sometime in September 1941, the War
Department sent General Short a plan for the defense of the
Hawaiian Department. Is that right?
General McKee. It sent in this plan in August, as I recall it, and
receipt was acknowledged on September 3.
47. General Russell. Would you, please, for the Board [65]
identify with a note just what document or documents were sent to
General Short at that time ?
General McKee. Yes, sir.
48. General Russell. Will you just take a piece of paper and put it
on here so that we will know what you are talking about?
General McKjee. This (indicating) is the plan that was sent to the
Hawaiian Department.
49. General Russell. Suppose you just make a note to that effect.
General McKee (after writing note as requested. It was receipted
for by the Hawaiian Department on September 3, 1941.
42 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
50. General Russell. General, was this document which you have
just identified for the record the only instruction which General Short
had from the War Department for his defensive mission out there?
General McKee. He had received instructions from time to time
from the War Department, specifically from the Chief of Staff, and
those instructions were not in conflict at any time with the plan.
51. General Russell. Do you know anything about when other in*
structions were received by General Short, personally ?
General McKee. I do not know personally.
52. General Russell. When you say that he had received instruc-
tions from the Chief of Staff, is that a surmise or is it based on fact ?
General McKee. It is based on my knowledge of the records.
53. General Russell. What records do you refer to ?
General McKee. The War Department records
[66] 54. General Russell. Will you describe them a little bit
more definitely so that we may locate them ?
General McKee. Well, there was correspondence, personal corre-
spondence, between the Chief of Staff and General Short, beginning
with about the 7th of February, 1941, right straight on up and includ-
ing December 7, 1941.
55. General Frank. Were you then currently conversant with this
correspondence ?
General McK!ee. Was I then currently conversant with it ?
56. General Frank. Yes.
General McKee. In a general way, yes, because it usually resulted
in some action being taken in the way of priorities for means.
57. General Russell. Do you have something definitely in mind as
illustrative of your answer to General Frank?
General McKee. Well, I have in mind the question of radars; I
have in mind the question of antiaircraft artillery; the dispersal of
airplanes; provisions for bunkers; and the dispatching to the Ha-
waiian Department of an increase in air strength.
58. General Russell. Those things all resulted from correspond-
ence between General Marshall and General Short ?
General McKee. For the most part, yes ; either that or action of the
Joint Board. One thing that resulted from the action of the Joint
Board was the project for the defense of the Kaneohe Bay area, which
occurred
59. General Russell. Rather late in 1941 ?
General McKee. No; it was approved, as I recall it, by the Joint
Board in April 1941. The project was set up for the [67] de-
fense of Kaneohe Bay, which the Army had not assumed prior to
that time, and the means had been set up in the Hawaiian defense
project but had not reached him on December 7, 1941. The additional
means, I mean.
60. General Russell. In response to this operational plan which was
sent out to General Short and received by him on September 3, did he
prepare any documents for the defense of the Hawaiian theater or
the Hawaiian frontier and return them to the War Department?
General McKee. Not to my knowledge. It was my understanding
that they were in the process of revision. But the War Department
was not particularly alarmed about that, because of the fact that his
current defense plan, although not based on Rainbow No. 5, was in
consonance with it.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 43
61. General Frank. Had lie had time between the receipt of this
Rainbow 5 and December 7 to have prepared such a plan and have
gotten it back to the War Department?
General McKee. Well, I hardly think so.
02. General Gkuxert. In that respect, from your experience with
plans and so forth, how long does it usually take for a revision to be
completed, no matter whether major or apparently minor? Does it
nsually take up to four or six months to get it through to the W^ar
Department, on account of all the ramifications?
General McK?:e. That is correct, sir. I hesitated with regard to
the Hawaiian Department because actually it entailed no major re-
vision. It was basically the same.
63. General Grunert. That is, in your opinion there was no
\68] major revision needed, in the opinion of the War Plans
Division ?
General McKee. That is correct, sir.
[69] Gi. General Russell. General, if no plan had been pre-
pared by the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Dspartment and
returned after the receipt of your plan, in September, on what plan
or plans was the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department
proceeding for the defense of the Hawaiian frontier on December 7,
1941?
General McKee. As far as the War Department knew, he was
proceeding on the joint plan. Let me get the correct nomenclature —
Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, and
plans pertinent thereto, they consisting of the Joint Defense Plan,
Hawaiian Theater, the Naval 0]3erations Annex, the Army Operating
Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.
65. General Russell. Wait just a minute. I have before me the
Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, and
I have before me the Joint Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, labeled
"Operations Annex." Now, you have mentioned a third document?
General McKee. I mentioned the Army Operating Defense Plan,
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, and Operations Orders pertinent thereto.
These are the several subordinate plans. This was of 1938, and revised
in 1940; Army Operating Plan for Hawaiian Coastal Frontier; Ha-
waiian Department ; and this was a division, the 18th Wing, and the
separate Coast Artillery Brigade. This is the Hawaiian Department
document.
66. General Russell. Then am I correct in assuming that the Joint
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, when
considered in connection with the Joint Defense Plan, Hawaiian The-
ater, Naval Operations Annex, and the Army Operating Defense
Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Operations and Orders, [70]
1938, constituted the entire plan of the Commanding General for the
defense of that Department ?
General McKee. That, together with the Operations and Orders,
which were issued by the control of the Hawaiian division of the 18th
Wing, the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Command, and the
Oj)erations and Orders, are the Hawaiian Department.
67. General Russell. Then we have here before us. General, all of
the material documents published by the War Department ?
General McKee. No, sir — published by the Hawaiian Department.
That is, but the other is not.
44 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
68. General Russell. Let me finish my question— published by the
War Department and the HaAvaiian Department, for the defense of
the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, on the 7th of December, 1941?
General McKee. No, sir. You did not mention the Hawaiian De-
fense Project, revision of 1940; and then there was an SOP which I
have since learned never reached War Plans Division, but somehow
or other got to General Marshall, and he commented on it and sent
it back to General Short in a personal letter. It was a tentative SOP.
69. General Grunert. By "SOP" you mean "standing operations"
and operating "procedure"?
General McKee. Yes, sir.
70. General Grunert. Do you recall the date on that? Was it
November 5, 1941 ?
General McKee. No, sir; it was earlier than that. There was
another one issued, so I later learned, I believe somewhere around
November, which had not been received in the War Department on
December 7.
[71] 71. General Frank. Did it have to do with the use of air
troops, outlining their duties ?
General McKee. Yes, sir. The point m question was, in the first
SOP missions were assigned the Air Force for the defense of air fields,
and it was brought to General Marshall's attention by General Arnold,
and General Marshall w^rote a personal letter to General Short.
72. General Grunert. By "protection of air fields" you mean the
ground protection by air personnel?
General McKee. Yes, sir ; that is what I mean.
73. General Grunert. That is all.
74. General Russell. General, now, let us analyze these plans
briefly. I hand you the War Department operations plans Rainbow
No. 5. I think you have been over it. Whether it is in the record very
clearly or not, I do not know. From that will you tell us the mission of
the Army out there, as assigned to General Short?
General McKee. Yes, sir. The mission that I read previously was
not from this document. It was from the Hawaiian Defense Project of
1940.
75. General Russell. Who prepared the Hawaiian Defense Project
of 1940?
General McKee. The Connnanding General of the Hawaiian De-
partment.
76. General Russell. He did not assign himself a mission, did he?
General McKee. The defense project requires that the commander
preparing it set forth his mission and his concept of it, which forms a
basis for his planning. It was his [72] understanding.
77. Genera] Russell. Well, let us go back to the question. General,
and see if you can read out the mission which was assigned to General
Short by the War Department.
General McKee. You want the joint or the xVrmy mission?
78. General Russell, Let us liave the joint, first, and then the Army.
General McKee. I read paragraph 30 :
HAWAIIAN COASTAL FBONTIER
*******
(c) Missions.
(1) Joint — Hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base and control and protect
shipping in the Coastal Zone.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 45
(2) Army — Hold OAHl) against attack by land, sea, and air forces, and against
hostile sympattiizers. Support naval forces in tlie protection of the sea com-
munications of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea com-
munications by oifensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within
the tactical operating radius of occupied air bases.
(3) Navy — Patrol the Coastal Zone; control and protect shipping therein; sup-
port the Army.
79. General Russell. In the statement of his mission by the
Hawaiian Defense Commander, General Short, was that mission set
forth in identical terms in his document with the one by the War De-
partment ?
General McKee. No, it was not, because this mission is [73'\
somewhat broader and superseded his publication of the Hawaiian
Defense Project of 1940, and is somewhat broader in scope. The first
part of it is essentially the same.
80. General Russell. Now, General McKee, did the War Depart-
ment have a plan which General Short had worked out to effectuate
and to accomplish that mission, which provided for the distribution
of his forces and the establishment of strongpoints, gun positions,
and so forth ?
General McKee. Yes, sir. He had such a plan. It is incorporated
in the plans which you have before you, there — the detailed plan for
the disposition of his forces.
81. General Russell. To repel an all-out invasion ?
General McKee. Yes, sir; to repel an all-out invasion, because in
the Hawaiian Defense Project he states that while the War Depart-
ment has assigned Category D, which does not visualize an all-out
attack, the other bases for training and planning have adopted that
as meeting any contingency.
82. General Russell. Could you find that, right quickly, in the
Hawaiian Defense project, for us?
General McKee (reading) :
Basis for planning
(1) Missions and Conditions.
(a) All defense plans of Oahu will be based upon the following conditions:
The currently assigned category of defense will be Category d * * *
The defense of Oahu will be joint defense by Army and Navy forces under
the missions as stated in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange * * *
[74] (b) Possible and probable war situations are:
(1) The sea lanes from the continental United States to Hawaii are open
and, that the garrison of Hawaii will be reenforced from continental United
States.
(2) That the most probable form of attack is a surprise attack consisting
of raids, and bombardments by ships, ships' fire, and air forces, and action by
local sympathizers.
(3) That the sea lanes from the continental United States will be closed
and that there will be an attack by a major expeditionary force. From the
War Department point of view, this contingency is so remote that it will make
no additional allowances of either men or reserves to meet it. This is com-
monly referred to as the "cut-off fi'om the Mainland situation".
(4) The latter contingency forms the basis for our training, as being all in-
clusive and providing maximum ideality for the troops during their training.
(e) Conclusion.
To adopt a defense plan adequate initially, to meet an enemy's maximum
effort. This plan is outlined in the next paragraph.
And so on.
83. General Grunert. May I interject a question, there?
Those instructions are to ithe effect that the Commanding General
of the Hawaiian Department has been furnished certain means, and
46 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I hey prescribe a category defense, which in this case liappens to be
Category D. Is it not possible and reasonable to suppose [76]
that conditions might change, in which an all-out defense might be-
come necessary in a hurry, before the War Department can implement
the defense command for an all-out defense, and therefore an all-out
defense might be required with whatever means were handy, and the
information given to the defense commander in the interim would not
necessarily make him wait for a change of category?
General McKee. That is correct, sir, because the category defense
saj^s — "the possibility but not the probability." He must always be
prepared for the possibility.
General McKee. That is correct, sir, because the category defense
depends a great deal upon what is furnished the commander to defend
with ?
General McKee. That is correct, sir.
85. General Grunert. That is all I have right now.
86. General Russell. Now, General McKee, after this document had
gone out to the Hawaiian Department in September 1941, and the
War Department received no changes in the plans of the Hawaiian
Department for its defense, am I correct in assuming, or is my recollec-
tion correct, that you stated that the War Department attached no
importance to General Short's not having sent in revised plans, be-
cause these original plans in the main were in line with the operations
plan which arrived in September ?
General McKee. That is correct. There was hardly time for him to
do it, in the first place. In the second, the War Department did not
press him, because the plans which we knew to be in force were
considered adequate to meet any contingency.
[76] 87. General Russell. Now, again, in November, this docu-
ment that I referred to as the September Rainbow No. 5, was amended
and sent out to him again with some changes?
General McKee. That is right.
88. General Russell. And you never received a receipt from Gen-
eral Short on that, at all ?
General McKee. That is correct. I do not recall what that amend-
ment was, but I am quite sure that it did not materially change the
mission or the concept.
89. General Russell. General, some time in November, late Novem-
ber, 1941, certain messages were sent out to General Short relative to
the enemy situation, and some directions as to what he should do.
Are you familiar with those messages?
General McKee. I am familiar with the messages, but I knew
nothing about them at the time they were sent.
90. General Russell. Do you recall any information which reached
the War Plans Division in November, from the Chief of Staff, or
from G-2 which materially altered, the international situation as
it related to the Pacific ?
General McKee. Yes, sir. There was considerable information
that reached the War Plans Division as a result of the conferences
that the State Department were having at that time, and as the
result of information given the War Plans Division by G-2. As a
result of that information there were several messages sent to the
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, acquainting him
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 47
with the situation. In fact, messages had been sent him previous to
November, informing him of the strained relations with Japan.
91. General Russell. General, let us go back now to the [77]
information wliich your division received from the Chief of Staff.
Was that information in writing?
General McKee. I cannot answer that, because I did not figure in
on it. May I explain the organization? I would like to explain the
organization of the War Plans Division. The War Plans Division had
a jDroject group and a strategy-and-policy group. Colonel Bundy was
the Chief of the Strategy and Policy Group, and Colonel Bundy and
General Gerow were the two individuals who received this informa-
tion for War Plans and acted upon it.
92. General Russell. Do you know what that information was ?
General McKee. The information was concerning the strained re-
lations with Japan — the possibilitj^ of war with Japan, actually.
93. General Russell. Was it general in its nature, or specific?
General McKee. I can't answer that, because it did not come to me,
and I can only be guided by what I saw later in the messages.
94. General Russell. Then all you can testify about the informa-
tion which reached your division from G-2 and the Chief of Staff
results from the action which was taken by War Plans Division?
General McKee. That is correct, sir.
95. General Russell. So you did not see any documents containing
specific information, or hear any conversations between the Chief of
Staff or G-2 and your division, which conveyed any specific infor-
mation?
General McKee. I did not hear them ; no, sir.
96. General Russell. So, so far as you know, there was just a
[78] change in the operations of your division, or in its instruc-
tions to General Sliort, and you believe that that was predicated on
enemy information which must have been received from those sources ?
General McKee. That is correct.
97. General Grunert. May I suggest you change "enemy" informa-
tion to "information concerning Japan," because at that time I do not
think Japan was an enemy. I know that Japan was not an enemy.
The Colonel Bundy to whom you refer is now deceased, is he not ?
General McKee. That is correct, sir.
98. General Gruxert. And General Gerow, to whom you referred,
is now in Europe?
General McKee. That is correct, sir.
99. General Russell. General, let us turn to the other side of the
picture, now. You say that you are familiar with the messages that
were sent to General Short in late November, and you say further that
there were other messages sent out there to give him the information
on these strained relations with Japan ; is that true ?
General McKee. That is true. There was correspondence between
the Chief of Staff and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian De-
partment— personal correspondence, in which he expressed his alarm
at the situation. Also, a message, as I recall, that went out in July
1941, with specific reference to the Japanese situation,
100. General Russell. Colonel West, will you get that out of the
general's file for us, please ?
48 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[79] General McKee. I think I have it in this thing, I prepared
at the time of the Roberts Commission. July 7, 1941, a message was
sent to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department with
regard to the Japanese situation.
101. General Russell. What did that message say about probable
Japanese intentions then ?
General McKee (reading) :
For your information deduction from important information from numerous
sources is tliat tlie Japanese Government has determined upon its future policy
and is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups. This
policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving probably aggressive action
against the military provinces of Russia if and when the Siberian garrison has
been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will
win a decisive victory in European Russia. Opinion is that Jap activity in the
south will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval, Army,
and air bases in Indo-China, although an advance against the British and Dutch
cannot be entirely ruled out. The neutrality pact with Russia may be abrogated.
They have ordered all Jap vessels in United States Atlantic ports to be west of
the Panama Canal by first of August. IMovement of Jap shipping from Japan has
been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned.
102. General Hussell. We know all about that message, General.
We were just wondering what there was in that message which indi-
cated to you that there was a changed situation between the Japs
and the Hawaiian Department.
[SO] General McKee. Well, I would say the whole tenor of it.
The whole message indicates that.
103. General Grunert. With reference to the messages which you
refer to that went to Hawaii, do you know whether there were some
naval messages that the naval authorities were directed to transmit
to the Commanding General at Hawaii? Did such messages come to
the War Plans Division, so that you would have such knowledge?
General McKee. Yes, sir. There was a message of, I believe, Novem-
ber 24, which was sent from the Chief of Naval Operations to the
Commanding Chief of the Pacific Fleet, in which it says :
The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch and concurs and requests action
addressed * * * inform senior Army oflicers their respective areas.
104. General Grunert. Does that also apply to the so-called "war
warning" message of November 27 ?
General McKee. I believe that was a "war warning" message.
105. General Grunert. In that message does it actually use the
words "war warning"?
General McKee. Not in this paraphrase of it, but there was a
message sent, not the one I have here, but there was a message sent
which began —
This is a war warning.
and the Commanding General of the Pacific Fleet was directed to
inform the interested Army officers.
lOG. General Russell. Now, General, I think we can simplify all
of these messages here and all the evidence about messages by one
question. You are familiar with the document which was [81]
prepared by General Gerow and submitted to the Roberts Com-
mission ?
General McKee. Yes, sir. I have a copy of it right here.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 49
107. General Russell. Does that document contain all of the mate-
rial messages going from the War Department to General Short,
about which you know ?
General McKee. Yes, sir.
108. General Russell. Now, there was a message which went out
to General Short on the 27th of November, about which you know ?
General McKee. Yes, sir.
109. General Russell. And it was signed by the Chief of Staff,
or the name of the Chief of Staff was signed to it?
General McKee. I can't answer that.
110. General Russell. Did you see the reply of General Short to
that message?
General McKee. Not at the time. I did not see it until about the
time of the Roberts Commission.
111. General Russell. From the 27th day of November until the
7th day of December, what did the War Plans Division know as to
the alert which had been made effective in Oahu by General Short?
General McKee. I cannot answer that, sir, because I personally
knew nothing of it. I knew nothing of the November 27th message,
nor did I know anything of the reply that was received thereto. The
message was prepared by General Gerow and Colonel Bundy, and
the reply was received by General Gerow, and I was not informed.
112. General Frank. And yet you were in charge of the Hawaiian
desk in the War Plans Division?
[S2~\ General McKee. Yes, sir. I would like to say, however,
that my duties did not involve plans and policies. That was a func-
tion of Colonel Bundy's division. When that had been decided on,
my particular group had to do with furnishing the material means,
seeing that they got the material means.
113. General Russell. General, I want to ask you a question, now,
which you may or may not be able to answer, but with the hope that
you had some experience which might indicate to the Board just
what was done under the condition. This joint plan provided for the
close-in reconnaissance to be done by the Army, and for the distant
reconnaissance to be done by the Navy; that is true, is it not?
General McKee. Yes, sir.
114. General Russell. Do you know what burden if any rested
upon the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to intiate
steps to see that both types of reconnaissance were in force if the
situation demanded such reconnaissance?
General McKee. Well, there was a joint agreement between the
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Com-
manding General of the 14th Naval District, which set forth certain
measures to be taken with regard to aircraft.
115. General Russell. I am just wondering whether or not this
agreement between the Army and the Navy, out there, which stated
that these measures for the defense of the Hawaiian frontier were
to be effectuated on a cooperative basis, "v^as the only way that they
had to set things in motion.
General McKee. That is correct. There was no unity of command.
116. General Russell. And therefore anything that had to be
[<§=?] done had to be reached by mutual agreement, is that true ?
General McKee. That is correct, sir.
79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1 5
50 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
117. General Russell. General, in one of these documents which
1 saw rather hiirrieclly there seems to be a statement that that coopera-
tive plan shall remain in effect until something occurs, and I was
not able to get it out of these documents, here, this morning. Do you
remember about that?
General McKee. May I look at the document ?
118. General Russell. Yes.
General McKee (reading) :
When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval
Base Defense Officer (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that
the threat of a hostile raid, or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such
action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to
make available without delay to the other conmiander such proportion of the
air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint oper-
ations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans.
119. General Russell. The point is this, that the operation of the
naval and Army forces out there in Hawaii was all to be done by
agreement ?
General McKee. That is correct, sir ; but the Commanding General
of the Hawaiian Department had been given instructions by the Chief
of Staff that they would get along, that the plans would be
coordinated.
120. General Frank. What effect did that have on the Naval Com-
mander out there?
[84^] General McKee. The Naval Commander, sir, so far as I
know, did not know about that letter. That was in a personal letter
from the Chief of Staff to General Short, which told him the main
thing was the protection of Pearl Harbor and the Fleet.
121. General Frank. But really, of what direct effect on the Naval
Commander would have been instructions by General Marshall to the
Army Commander?
General McKee. None, sir, because the Army Cotomander was
under General Marshall.
122. General Russell. One other point, I want to clear up, General.
You say that you never did see the SOP's that General Short prepared
out there in the fall of 1941 ?
General McKee. I never did, sir, and as a matter of fact the record
will show that they were never received in War Plans Division.
123. General Russell. Then the War Plans Division did not know
what alert 1, or alert 2, or alert 3, was?
General McKee. So far as I know ; no, sir. I certainly did not, and
the record indicates that the SOP was never received in War Plans
Division. How it got to the Chief of Staff I do not know. I rather
assume that it got to him because there was a memorandum attached
to it from General Arnold to the Chief of Staff, in which he drew
attention to the use of the air-force personnel.
124. General Grunert. As a matter of fact, is it any of a higher
commander's business to know just what means are employed to carry
out the mission, unless it interferes with said mission ? In other words,
was the War Plans Division in the [88S] habit of calling for all
the subordinate measures, were they furnished as a matter of course,
or did the War Plans Division consider that did not particularly affect
them?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 51
General McIvee. The War Plans Division was not particularly
concerned with it. The Commanding General had been given a mis-
sion, and the means had been provided to carry out that mission. ^
125. General Grunekt. In regard to the cooperation we have just
been talking about, would the lack of cooperation on the part of one
or the other be any justification for one or the other not carrying out
his mission ?
General McKee. No, sir.
126. General Kussell. General McKee, in connection with these
questions that General Grunert has asked you, I want to ask you a
little bit about it. How did the War Plans Division consider from
tlie standpoint of importance the Hawaiian defense command and its
mission ?
General McKee. It considered it all important. It realized that the
loss of the fleet base, and the Fleet, itself, would put us in the predica-
ment that they did jDut us in, in the Pacific.
127. General Russell. As a matter of fact, wasn't that Department
very high on the priority list from the standpoint of material that was
shipped out?
General McKee. Yes, sir; it was, particularly in such things as
radar equipment, airplanes, antiaircraft artillery — those things that
the War Department considered were essential to the most probable
type of attack that would be expected to be delivered against the
H a w a ii an D epar tment.
[S6] 128. General Russell. The importance of the Hawaiian
Depaitment was so pronounced that it resulted, as you have testified
already, in a considerable amount of correspondence between the Chief
of Staff, himself, and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian
Department?
General McKee. That is correct, sir.
129. General Russell. The importance of the Hawaiian Depart-
ment was so pronounced in the War Department that you did prepare
this operations plan which goes somewhat into detail as to'what is to
be done out there in the defense of the Hawaiian Department, isn't
that true ?
General McKee. I don't recall that that goes into detail. It assigns
a mission, a category defense, and I think sets up a troop basis.
loO. General Russell. In all events it speaks for itself, does it not?
General McKee. Yes, sir.
131. Genpral Frank. May I ask a question?
General Russell. Yes.
132. General Frank. In any event, this war plan would have been
prepared, whether or not the situation with Japan was acute or not ?
General McKee. That is correct, sir.
133. General Russell. You do not mean to testify that just as soon
as you had prepared this plan and sent it out to General Short that
you Jost interest in the Hawaiian defense?
General McKee. Certainly not, sir. That was my particular in-
terest.
134. General Russetj;. As a matter of fact, you had agencies set
up over there in the War Plans Division to follow up these [67]
things, to see what wps going on ?
General McKee. That is correct, sir.
52 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
135. General Russell. And do you not think it was rather impor-
tant for you people to know what your subordinate commander out
there was doing in connection with the defense of that department ?
General McKee. I think we did know, sir.
136. General Russell. Well, did you not say a moment ago that
so far as you knew, in that critical period from November 27 to De-
cember 5, you did not know what disposition Short had made of his
forces ?
General McKee. I would like to remind you, sir, that I personally
did not know about the radiogram of November 27. I did not know
that this was a critical period. I am speaking personally, now.
137. General Russell. You heard General Gerow's testimony before
the Roberts Commission, did you not?
General McKee. Yes, sir.
138. General Russell. You know what he testified about that?
139. General Grunert. May I interject a question? From your
duties in War Plans Division, and with the knowledge of conditions
in the Hawaiian Defense Command, do you consider that that Com-
mand was pretty well implemented for Category D defense, or were
there any grave deficiencies ?
General McKee. Well, it was certainly the best equipped defense
base that we had at that time. Except for airplanes, which were
generally lacking, a few antiaircraft, some .50-caliber antiaircraft
machine guns, and the completion of the installation of the fixed radar
sets, they were well implemented, [<§<S] extremely well.
140. General Frank. Relatively speaking, it was better equipped
than any other department, is that correct ?
General McKee. Yes, sir.
141. General Frank. Is that correct?
General McKee. In my opinion ; yes, sir.
142. General Russell. I have no further questions.
143. General Grunert. Are there any other questions ?
144. General Frank. I would like to ask some questions. To get
back to the manner in which a decision would be made to carry out
reconnaissance, for instance, it has been brought out that for the Army
and Navy to act simultaneously on the inauguration of air reconnais-
sance, it was necessary for that to happen through cooperation?
General McKee. That is correct, sir.
145. General Frank. Therefore, if the Army Commander thought
that reconnaissance should be inaugurated, unless the Naval Com-
mander reached the same conclusion and took action, it would not nec-
essarily be inaugurated, is that correct ?
General McICee. No, sir ; I see no reason why the Army Commander
could not inaugurate reconnaissance on his own responsibility.
146. General Frank. All right.
General McKee. He hacl the means.
147. General Frank. Do you know that there was an agree^nent
that the Navy would conduct distant reconnaissance and the Army
would conduct close-in reconnaissance ?
General McKee. That is correct, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 53
148. General Frank. Then if the Army Commander determined
that [89] distant reconnaissance should be conducted, and the
Naval Commander did not arrive at the same conclusion, do you think
it was the duty of the Army Commander to conduct it, under the cir-
cumstances ?
General McKee. Yes, sir. If the Naval Commander refused to do
it and I felt that the security of Oahu depended upon it, I would cer-
tainly undertake to do it with the means at my disposal.
149. General Frank. If he conducts distant air recomiaissance, his
carrying capacity is taken up with gasoline instead of bombs, and he
finds something, what is he going to do about it ?
General McKee. He could certainly have alerted his antiaircraft
artillery, and the troops could have assumed their defense positions,
if he had known about it ahead of time.
150. General Frank. What becomes of the whole general plan of
coordinated action then between the Army and the Navy, if the Army
dissipates its effort that it is going to coordinate with the Navy in a
general plan ?
General McKee. That ii a very difficult question, sir. I see your
point, but —
151. General Frank. The question is not difficult. Maybe the an-
swer is.
General McKee. The answer is very difficult. I should say that it
would depend upon how serious the Army Commander thought the
threat was, and what lack of cooperation he obtained from the Navy.
As far as I know there was no lack of cooperation. At least, he stated
that in communications to the Chief of Staff.
152. Genei-al Frank. Nevertheless, reconnaissance was not [90]
conducted, was it ?
General McKee. I do not know, sir.
153. General Grunetrt. It does not follow that the witness has to
answer every question. If he has not had the opportunity to prop-
erly judge, he may or may not answer. He may say he prefers not
to answer.
General McKee. I do not know whether a reconnaissance was made
or not, sir. I am sure that the War Department thought it was being
made, because it had been made at previous times when the Command-
ing General of the Hawaiian Department had been advised of a criti-
cal situation.
154. General Frank. For the plan to work, both the Army and the
Navy had to perform functions assigned ?
General McKee. That is correct, sir.
155. General Frank. For the Army to conduct the close-in recon-
naissance without the Navy's conducting distant reconnaissance would
not have been particularly effective, is that correct?
General McKee. That is correct, sir.
156. General Grunert. Are there any further questions?
157. General Russell. Nothing,
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(The Board recessed from 10 : 20 a. m. to 11 : a. m.)
54 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[01] TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN MILES, COMMAND-
ING 1ST SERVICE COMMAND, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West, General, will you state to the Board your name,
rank, organization, and station?
General Miles. Sherman Miles, Major General, Commanding 1st
Service Command, Boston, Massachusetts.
2. General Grunert. General Miles, the Board, in an attempt to get
at the facts, is looking into the War Department background and view-
point prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is hoped
that, because of your assignment as A. C. of S. G-2, at that time, you
can throw some light on the subject. In order to cover so large a field
in the limited time available, individual Board members have been
assigned objectives or phases for special investigation, although the
entire Board will pass upon the objectives and phases. General Russell
has this particular phase. So he will lead in propounding the ques-
tions and the other members will assist in'developing them. So I will
turn you over to the mercies of General Russell.
3. General Russell. Wliat was your assignment in the year 1941?
General Miles. I was Acting Assistant Chief of Staif, G-2, War
Department.
4. General Russell. Can you remember approximately the date on
which you entered upon that assignment?
General Miles. May 1, 1940.
5. General Russell. When were you relieved or transfered [92]
from that assignment?
General Mii es. The end of January 1942.
6. General Russell. During that period of time you were actually
the head of what we know as G-2 which embraced the Military In-
telligence Division. Was that the name of it?
General Miles. That was the official name — Military Intelligence
Division, W^ar Department General Staff.
7. General Russell. Briefly stated, General ISIiles, wliat were the
functions of the G-2 section, including this Military Intelligence Di-
vision?
General Miles. The Military Intelligence Dvision, General, was
all-inclusive. It was the whole thing, not as it is now, broken and
divided between G-2 and Military Intelligence Service. It was all
one division, just as the Operations and Training Division, or the
Personnel Division, War Plans Division, and so forth. I was head
of the entire division, which, in turn, was divided into counter-intelli-
gence, positive intelligence, and in turn that was divided geograph-
ically to cover the world, or as much as we could cover.
8. General Russell. Definitely, General Miles, as to the operations
of your department related to the Japanese Government during your
period of service there, what were you attempting to learn about the
Japanese Government?
General Miles. We were attempting to learn everything we could
about the Japanese Government, and had been doing so, in fact, a
great many years. It was only one of the nations which we were at-
tempting to cover, to gather all possible information about. Our sys-
tem was a running digest.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD " 55
9. General Grunert. May I interrupt there? If anything which
[93] you put into the record is of such a nature as might be of
vahie to other nations now, I wish you would consider that and, if so,
give us that information in closed session, so that it will not be disclosed
to anybody who may be able to see this record. Do you see what I am
getting at ?
General Miles. Yes, sir ; I understand.
This summary digest was maintained on the principal countries of
the world. Such a system is no secret. It has been maintained by prac-
tically every government. It was a running digest covering the mili-
tary side, the political side, the economic side, and the psychological
side. All the information that ever came in from any country to G-2
was collated and put into this digest and sent out to various military
attaches and G-2s, all the corps areas and overseas departments who
were interested in a particular country, in the form of corrected loose-
leaf, so that you had a running build-up constantly. This had been
going on, to my knowledge, for thirty years. In addition to that, of
course, we sent out bi-weekly, as I remember, military intelligence sum-
maries, which were short documents of facts that we had gotten in in
the last two or three days from all sorts of agencies that we had. I
say all sorts, because we kept in very close touch w^ith the State De-
partment, the Department of Commerce, the Rockefeller people in
South America, and, of course, our own military attaches and observers
that we had throughout the world.
That, in general, was our system of getting information and dis-
seminating it.
10. General Russell. Did the G-2 section, as such, have [94]
personnel available for investigations in foreign fields in the year 1941 ?
General Miles. A limited personnel, General. We were building up.
When I took over Military Intelligence in May of 1940 I remember
there were 36 officers in the entire division. We built up rapidly to
something over 400, with an equal proportion of clerical personnel.
We built up very rapidly, as the war came nearer and nearer, our
agencies in the field, field observers, military attaches. Our personnel
was always limited. We did not have unlimited money or unlimited
selection of officers, particularly officers. That was a time when the
Army was building very rapidly. The natural inclination of a soldier
is to go with troops and remain with troops. The general officers, of
course, wanted the best men, naturally, and should have had them ; and
we did not have a free field for the selection of personnel, and quite
rightly. We did the best we could with the personnel and the funds
we had available,
11. General Russell. About when did this personnel reach its maxi-
mum development of 400 ?
General Miles. Well, it was increasing all the time I was there. I
do not know. I imagine it continued to increase after I left. I am
pretty sure it did. I cannot place any date on any maximum reached.
12. General Russell. Can you approximate the number of people
who were available to you for service in Washington -and throughout
the country and in foreign fields, in October and November of 1941?
[95] General Miles. General, I would not try to answer that
question from my memory. The records are certainly available to you.
I could not do it.
56 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
13. General Russell. General, a moment a^^o you referred to
monthly or bi-monthly documents of some kind that were sent to the
corps commanders and to the overseas departments. Did your office
maintain copies of those reports?
General Miles. Oh, yes.
14. General Russell. Are they in the files now?
General Miles. I imagine they are, sir. They are permanent rec?
ords of the Military Intelligence Division.
15. General Russell. There would be no reason to destroy them at
all?
General Miles. Not that I know of.
16. General Russell. I want at this point to say that I have asked
for a search of the records over there and have looked at the records,
but did not discover copies of such reports, although specifically I
have asked for such reports. I am giving you that, because it may be
necessary for us to conduct a further search to locate, if possible,
these documents.
Now, to discuss for a moment the sources of information which you
have divulged already and to limit it to Japanese information, what
sources of information were there in Japan in the fall of 1941 on
which you as G-2 could rely as to activities of the Japanese at home
and in home waters?
General Miles. Within the United States ?
17. General Russell. No. I am now addressing myself to the situa-
tion in Japan and have asked what agencies or what sources existed in
Japan upon which you could rely for information [^6] about
Japanese activities at home and in home waters.
General Miles. I would say that by far the most important source
was our Embassy in Tokyo. We had a very excellent Ambassador who
had been there a number of years with a staff that had been there a
good deal longer than that. We had, of course, used the military
attache and his assistants. The information which we could get on
the military side from our military attache and his assistants was of
course very limited; the Japanese being extremely close-mouthed.
But the Embassy itself was constantly sending in dispatches to the
State Department — Mr. Grew, particularly — on the state of mind of
the Japanese people and the probability of what they were going to
do next, and so forth. We also, of course, had direct access, through
our very close connection with the State Department, to what was
transpiring in the negotiations in the fall of 1941 here in Washington.
Aside from that, I do not think there were any important sources of
information in Japan. We were getting a good deal of information
from what might be called the borders; in other words, China, and
even the part of the Continent occupied by the Japanese. The Koreans
would get out once in a while and we would get some information in
that way. We exchanged information very freely with the British
and to a certain extent, with the Dutch. They were a little afraid to
give us information, as I remember, but we were getting some.
18. General I^ussell. Did the British have any organization within
the homeland of Japan which was watching the movement of their
Army and Navy in the fall of 1941 ?
General Miles. I believe that they had about the same as [97]
we had. As to actually watching the movements of ships and troops,
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 57
it was necessarily a system that worked sometimes and did not work
at other times. Yon might see the ships move or the troops move, or
you might not.
19. General Russell. General Miles, is it trne or not that from the
State Department or from our Ambassador to Japan the information
which we obtained related almost exclusively to the state of mind of
the Japanese people toward the war and their enmity toward the
United States?
General Miles. Are you putting that in the form of a question, sir?
20. General Russell. Yes. Is it true or not that that was the case?
General Miles. That was the Ambassador's principal concern, natu-
rally. I would not say, from my memory of the information that we
got from our Embassy, that that by any means covered the field.
21. General Russell. Do you remember a message from our Am-
bassador along in the fall of 1941, in wliicli he summed up the situation
and told the State Department to what extent they could rely upon
him for information of troop movements, movements of the Navy,
and so forth ?
General Miles. I do no recall that particular message, General.
22. General Russell. Maybe I can refresh your memory. May I
ask you this as a preliminary ? Did you attend the conferences that
were held by the Secretary of State, which he refers to as the War
Councils, where he had ordinarily the Secretary of AVar, the Secretary
of the Navy, and some our high-ranking military [98~\ and
naval people in to discuss the Japanese situation ?
General Miles. No, sir. I think only the Chief of Staff attended
them.
23. General Russell. I refer particularly to this message which is
contained in the State Department's book that they call the White
Paper, which is a report from our Ambassador to Japan on the 17th
day of November, I believe, 1941 (handing a book to the witness) .
General Miles. What is the question, now, sir?
24. General Russell. When did you first know about that message ?
General Miles. I don't rememlier. General; I can't answer that
question.
25. General Frank. Did you know about it at all ?
General Miles. I am not sure that I did. I think I did, because we
had very close liaison with the State Department. I feel sure that I
did ; but, frankly, it is so obvious a message that the impression it gives
me today is the same impression it gave me then : Yes, of course I know
we can't count on it. How can we be sure that any group can tell us
the movement of the Japanese fleet or army? We knew we could not.
26. General Russell. In other words, the information which you
have testified that you had from Japan about what was going on over
there was rather general and indefinite in its nature ?
27. General Grunert. Unless we know about that message the
record will not be intelligible. Is it going to be copied into the
record ?
28. General Russell. Yes.
Your information about the activities in Japan in the fall [99]
of 1941 was very indefinite and general?
General Miles. Necessarily so.
58 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
29. General Russell. The message from Ambassador Grew in
Japan to the Secretary of State for purposes of the record will be
identified as a paraphrase of a telegram dated November 17, 1941, and
it may be copied from page 788 of this White Paper entitled "Peace
and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1911."
(Telegram from Ambassador Grew to Secretary of State, dated
November 17, 1941, is as follows :)
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
(Telegram: Paraphrase)
ToKio, Noremljer in, 1941 — 1 p. m.
(Received November 17—2:09 p. m.)
1814. Referring to Embassy's previous telegram No. 1736 of November 3,
3 p. m., final sentence, and emphasizing the need to guard against sudden Japa-
nese naval or military actions in such areas as are not now involved in the
Chinese theater of operations. I take into account the probability of the Japanese
exploiting every possible tactical advantage, such as surprise and initiative.
Accordingly you are advised of not placing the major responsibility in giving
prior warning upon the Embassy staff, the naval and military attaches included,
since in Japan there is extremely effective control over both primary and sec-
ondary military information. "We would not expect to obtain any information
in advance either from pei-sonal Japanese contacts or through the press ; the ob-
servation of [100] military movements is not possible by the few Ameri-
cans remaining in the country, concentrated mostly in three cities (Tokyo,
Yokohama, Kobe) ; and with American and other foreign shipping absent from
adjacent waters the Japanese are assured of the ability to send without foreign
observation their troop transports in various directions. Japanese troop con-
centrations were reported recently by American consuls in Manchuria and For-
mosa, while troop dispositions since last July's general mobilization have, ac-
cording to all other indications available, been made with a view to enabling
the carrying out of new operations on the shortest possible notice either in the
Pacitic southwest or in Siberia or in both.
We are fully aware that our present most important duty perhaps is to detect
any premonitory signs of naval or military operations likely in areas mentioned
above and every precaution is being taken to guard against surprise. The
Embassy's field of naval or military observation is restricted almost literally
to what could be seen with the naked eye, and this is negligible. Therefore,
you are advised, from an abundance of caurion, to discount as much as possible
the likelihood of our ability to give substantial warning.
Grew.
30. General Russell. General Miles, referring to the statement
which is contained in Ambassador Grew's message :
and with American and other foreign shipping absent from adjacent waters the
Japanese are assured of the [101] ability to send without foreign observa-
tion their troop transports in various directions.
As a matter of information, do you know why at that particular
time there was an absence of American and foreign shipping in
Japanese waters ?
General Miles. No, sir. I do not remember knowing of any par-
ticular absence of American shipping from Japanese waters at that
time. Of course we had had information for a great many years
which had been considered in all of our war plans in Hawaii that
there was a certain part of the Pacific Ocean that we called the "Vacant
Sea" in which there are practically no ships and in which large move-
ment of ships could occur without anybody seeing them. It was that
part of the ocean between the great southern routes that go from
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 59
Hawaii to the coast of Japan and China, and the northern great circle
routes that go near the Aleutians.
31. General Russell. The term which you used intrigues me. What
was it you called it ?
General Miles. I used to call it the "Vacant Sea."
32. General Russell. As applied to that part of the Pacific adjacent
to the mandated islands, would you say that they were in the area
of the "Vacant Sea" or not ?
General Miles. No, sir. The southern trade routes, as I remem-
ber, from Hawaii to Yokohama, we will say, pass considerably north
of most of the mandated islands, such as the Marianas. All the seas
surrounding the mandated islands were, as you know, extremely dif-
ficult for us to penetrate and get any information on for other reasons.
33. General Russell. Why?
[102] General Miles. Because the Japanese would not allow
us in there. You might sail through, but you would not see very
much. That had existed for many years.
34. General Russell. Was there any restriction on Americans land-
ing on those islands that were mandated to the Japanese?
General Miles. Absolutely, sir.
35. General Russell. Were Americans prohibited from landing in
the mandated islands ?
General Miles. Well, they did not say "Americans are prohibited,"
but Americans did not land. That was well known for years. No
American warship went in there.
36. General Frank. Do you know of any American port or any
point over which the United States had jurisdiction that excluded
Jap vessels or Japanese nationals ?
General Miles. No, sir.
37. General Russell. Do you know where there is any documentary
evidence of the exclusion of Americans from the Japanese mandated
islands ?
General Miles. General, I would not know exactly where to put my
hand on documentary evidence. It was one of the things perfectly
well known to all of us in the Intelligence. I should think probably
the Navy Department could aid you in that respect. I am pretty
sure that the Navy Department several times tried to get ships in
there.
38. General Grunert. As far as the so-called mandated island are
concerned, they were sort of a blind spot for our Military Intelligence,
were they ?
General Miles. Yes, sir.
[i(93] 39. General Russell. That is exactly what I was trying
to find out.
How far are the Marshall Islands from Honolulu?
General Miles. My recollection is, about 1,600 miles. I would not
swear to it.
40. General Russell. General, were you acquainted with the plans
for the defense of Pearl Harbor and the estimates in connection with
the Japanese situation as to the probabilities of attack? Were all
those things known to you at G-2 ?
General Miles. Rather intimately. I was G-3 of the Hawaiian
Department from 1929 to 1931. I rewrote the war plan. I wrote the
60 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
general staff study and estimate of the situation, which was the "bible"
at that time for some years. Then from 1934 to 1938 I was here in
War Plans Division and was particularly charged with the three over-
seas departments, their projects and their plans. So, up to 1938, at
least, and between 1929 and 1938, 1 was intimately acquainted with it.
41. General Russell. In our brief study of the plan generally and
the evidence just given by you, there was considerable emphasis placed
on a probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor by carrier-borne air-
craft. During the year 1941 you were, of course, familiar with the
estimate and the probabilities ?
General Miles. Yes, sir.
42. General Russell. Did it occui' to you as G-2 from what port or
ports these carriers might depart on a mission of that sort ?
General Miles. They might have departed on a mission from a
great many ports. We did not know really what bases they had in
the mandated islands, and obviously they could have departed
[104^] from almost any port in Japan, such as Kobe or Yokohama.
43. General Russell. You stated that you did not know what bases
they had in the mandated islands ?
General Miles. Very little information on bases in the mandated
islands.
44. General Russell. As I recall, they acquired jurisdiction, such
as they had over the mandated islands, as a result of the settlement at
the end of the other war in 1918?
General Miles. That is correct.
45. General Russell. And in 1941 they had had approximately
twenty years to develop their bases in the mandated islands, their ports
and so forth. Was there any information in G-2 in 1941 as to what
the Japanese had actually done by way of preparing ports and bases
in any of the mandated islands ?
General Miles. Very little and very general information. We knew
that they were developing certain places, such as Palau and Truk
particularly, and we suspected Saipan. We relied very largely on
information in Military and Naval Intelligence. Taken together, it
could not have been calle dany detailed or complete information of
their possible bases in the mandated islands.
46. General Frank. Did you have anything on the Island of Jaluit?
General INItles. I do not remember what we had on Jaluit, but it
was one of the islands that we used to discuss and suspect that they were
developing.
47. General Russell. General Miles, in the fall of 1941 did you in
G-2 have sufficient data on Japanese developments in the mandated
islands to predicate an intelligent opinion as to the [^05] pos-
sibilities of launching convoys from there which might have included
aircraft carriers ?
General Miles, I would say that positively we knew enough to form
an estimate that such a thing was a strong possibility, not a proba-
bility; that they had the means. That they would do it is another
matter. They had the means to do it. I M'ould say that our esimate
at the time was that it was very possible, if not probable, that they did
have those means.
48. General Russell. Do you know whether or not the data on
these developments on the mandated islands is a matter of record any
place in the G-2 files ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 61
General Miles. Oh, yes ; we had files on them. We had maps and
whatever we could get. The Office of Naval Intelligence had even
more.
49. General Russell. Did those maps show the developments, or
just show where the islands were ?
General Miles. So far as possible we made charts of the islands from
one source or another and plotted on those charts, both Naval Intelli-
gence and ours, where we thought they were developing, from what
information we could get from traveling natives or missionaries or
what have you.
50. General Russell. I was asking you some questions a moment
ago about the inhibition as to our going on those mandated islands.
Were the inhibitions against going into the mandated islands only
those of force or semi-force by the Japanese people who were there ?
General Miles. That is what kept us away. General.
51. General Russell. They just would not let you go in ?
[W6] General Miles. They just would not let us go in. They
had one excuse or another. I don't remember just exactly what they
were ; but the net result was that mighty few people got into the man-
dated islands.
52. General Russell. Did you' attempt to send people from G-2
into the mandated islands in 1941 ?
General Miles. No, sir. I do not think any attempt had been made
by G-2 for ten years. We knew we could not do it and get them out.
53. General Russell. Were there any restrictions imposed on G-2
from higher authority about attempting to get in there and develop
that situation in the mandated islands ?
General Miles. Not specifically the mandated islands ; no, sir.
54. General Russell. But you did regard the geographic location
of these mandated islands with respect to our naval base at Pearl Har-
bor as being rather material ?
tjreneral Miles. Yes, I did. General; but, on the other hand, we
knew perfectly well that Japan could attack the Hawaiian Islands
without the use of the mandates. I remember very well writing one
plan in which we developed the other side, based on a surprise attack
launched from the mainland of Japan, with fast cruisers and carriers,
carrying troops on their most rapid liners. We worked it up, just how
they would take those liners off the route for one reason or another —
this one to be repaired, and so forth — and suddenly launch this attack
from the "Vacant Sea" and suddenly arrive in Honolulu. So the
mandates were always a black shadow, but they were not [107]
the only means of attacking Hawaii, and we knew it as far back as the
early 1930's.
55. General Russell. In those studies which were made by you.
and others with which you may be familiar, did you ever consider
steps which might be taken to discover in advance the mission and
dispatch of these convoys to carry out that type of attack?
General Miles. We considered it, General, but, as Ambassador
Grew says in that famous dispatch, "Don't rely on us from that point
of view." It was much more an attack from the other side.
56. General Frank. What do you mean by that ?
General Miles. I mean, from the Hawaiian side, particularly air
reconnaissance and submarine reconnaissance, to detect any force
coming in before they could actually attack. I recall particularly
62 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
during all of General Drum's command out there in the middle 1930s
he was very much interested and was constantly sending in papers to
War Plans and the}'' were coming to my desk, involving the possi-
bility of a screen of large bombers which would cover the entire
enormous perimeter contained in those five big islands. That was a
current matter almost. Then, of course, the submarine screen was
another matter that was constantly discussed. We had about twenty
submarines out there in the middle 1930s.
But, to answer your question more succinctly, I do not think any
Intelligence officer ever thought that he could be sure of picking up
a convoy or attack force or task force in Japan before it sailed and
know where it was going. That was beyond our terms of efficiency.
[lOS] 57. General Russell. Or even the mandated islands?
General Miles. Rather less in the mandated islands.
58. General Russell. You had less chance there?
General Miles. Yes.
59. General Grunert. Would such a force moving from one of the
mandated islands indicate where it was going? Would there be a
clear indication that it was bound for Hawaii or elsewhere?
General Miles. It would be no indication at all where it was going,
General.
(There was informal discussion off the record.)
60. General Russell. The G-2 people in their studies had to all
intents and purposes eliminated investigations in Japan proper and
other Japanese territory to determine probable action on the part of
the Japanese Army and Navy ?
General Miles. Oh, no, sir. We had not eliminated it. As Ml.
Grew says, it was the principal task of the Embassy, particularly
of the military and naval part of the Embassy. What I say is just
what Mr. Grew says, that we never dreamed that we could rely on
getting that information. It would have been almost a military
intelligence miracle had we been able to spot a task force in forming
and have known before it sailed where it was going.
61. General Russell. Now, General, if that be true, then the con-
clusion had been reached, so far as discovering task forces of any
sort moving to the Hawaiian Islands, that the chief if not the sole
reliance would have to be placed on reconnaissance agencies based
on the islands or on United States possessions continguous thereto?
[JOQI General Miles. Yes, and at sea. I mean, by submarine
and air power.
62. General Russell. Do you recall when the last estimate of the
situation was sent out to the Hawaiian Department from G-2?
63. General Frank. Prior to December 7?
64. General Russell. Yes ; prior to December 7, 1941.
General Miles. General, I do not know that any estimate of the
situation, if you are using that term strictly, was sent. What we
sent were those corrected sheets of the digest on Japan from time
to time, whenever we got the information, and copies of the bi-
weekly summary. The estimate of the situation is for the informa-
tion of the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War. G-2 is the
G-2 of the General Staff. I am bringing up that point because I
had to be very careful, and I think all G-2s of the General Staff
have to be very careful that the information you give your Chief
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 63
is something which he must pass on from the command point of view.
If that information is habitually sent out to the various overseas
departments particularly, you run into the serious danger of telling
tile Lieutenant General commanding the Hawaiian Department, we
will say, something that G-2 thinks which the Chief of Staff does
not concur in, and forcing his hand or inducing him to take some
action in which the Chief of Staff does not concur. In other words,
you must be careful to keep out of the command channel. So you
give your information, your summary, your estimate of the situation,
to 3^our Chief, and action must flow from the Chief through the com-
mand channels; and G-2 is not in the command channels.
[110] 65. General Geunert. Insofar as action is concerned on
the information that is passed to the subordinate command, is that
action then passed back through G-2, or does G-2 prepare it for the
C hief of Staff insofar as it pertains to information ?
General Miles. I do not know that I have your question clearly.
66. General Grunert. You have gotten information from various
sources which influenced you to make an estimate of the situation,
which you passed to the Chief of Staff'. Now, there are parts of that
information, if true, that certain command channels in the Philip-
pines or Hawaii should get. Who insures that they get that in-
formation ?
General Miles. As a routine matter, G-2 insures it. In other
words, all information that pertained directly to the Hawaiian De-
partment or to the Philippine Department that G-2 received, it
insured that G-2 in that Department got it. That is exclusive,
however, of any deductions in a very broad sense that G-2 of the
War Department might draw which would induce action which, in
other words, was a command proposition.
67. General Grunert. In other words, you give them the informa-
tion, but you do not analyze it ; or do you ?
General Miles. Ordinarily you do not analyze it for him.
68. General Frank. You gave information and interpretation only
through command channels?
General Miles. Interpretation would certainly go only through
command channels.
69. General Grunert. Any warning, then, should come from com-
mand channels rather than from G-2?
[Ill] General Miles. If it is warning that probably would re-
sult in action, yes, most definitely.
70. General Russell. Your G-2 sent a message on November 27
out to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department ?
General Miles. Yes ; to all departments, as I remember.
71. General Russell. Now, a few specific questions, General Miles,
and I will be through :
On October 27, 1941, Brink reported to your office that there were
two aircraft carriers that had been operating among the mandated
islands, of which Kaga was one. Was Brink one of your operators?
General Miles. How is the name spelled ?
72. General Russell. B-r-i-n-k.
73. General Grunert. Was that not a Colonel Brink for a time in
Singapore, and then he went to the Philippines?
64 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Miles. Yes ; that was the man, I think.
74. General Russell. This was sent from the Philippines?
General Miles. Yes.
75. General Grunert. He was one of the staff in the office of the
A. C. of S., G-2, Philippine Department, and on my recommenda-
tion he was sent to Singapore to be directly under the War Depart-
ment there. That is why I recall a man named Brink.
76. General Russell. Do you have any recollection about that type
of Japanese aircraft carrier being in the mandated islands ? Do you
have any independent recollection on that subject?
General Miles. I remember that the Japanese carriers were reported
in the mandated islands, but I would not be able to [^^^] pin
it down to any particular source.
77. General Russell. Would it be about that time ?
General Miles. It was about that time.
78. General Russell. In the records some place we have discovered
evidence of a photographic mission by aircraft down into the man-
dated islands in late November or early December of 1941. Do you
have any independent recollection of that activity on our part?
General Miles. No, sir ; I did not know we sent one.
79. General Russell. You were in touch in a general way with the
Navy at that time in obtaining information from them ?
General Miles. I was intimately in touch with the Office of Naval
Intelligence.
80. General Russell. What did you know from the Navy about the
location and disposition of the Japanese fleet in late November and
early December? Do you remember?
General Miles. My recollection is that the Navy had informa-
tion of carriers in the mandates, and definitely of a movement of naval
vessels and transports, they thought, south through the China Sea in
the direction of Indo China and Thailand.
81. General Russell. What was your impression as to the knowledge
which the Navy had generally during the last six months before the
attack on Pearl Harbor of the location of the Jap Navy and various
types of craft that were in their Navy?
General Miles. Their information was very general and incomplete.
82. General Russell. General, when in your opinion did it t-?-?-^]
become apparent that war with Japan was inevitable?
General Miles. On the 27th of November, when we learned that we
had practically given what might be considered or probably would
be considered by them an ultimatum to them — from then on I con-
sidered war as very probable if not inevitable.
83. General Russell. That was based almost exclusively on the
negotiations between the Japanese who were in AVashington negotiat-
ing with our State Department ?
General Miles. Primarily on that. It was a build-up.
84. General Russell. In the message of November 27, which I will
not discuss with you in any great detail, there was a statement that
negotiations had practically ended. I am not quoting, but it said
substantially that — although there was a bare possibility that the
Japanese might come back for further negotiations. Do you remem-
ber that?
General Miles. That was in General Marshall's dispatch ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 65
85. General Russell. Yes.
General Miles. I don't remember that ; no.
86. General Russell. Let us assume that they did come back after
November 27 and continued negotiations: Would that have affected
your conclusions about the inevitability of war?
General Miles. Oh, yes.
87. General Rissell. As a matter of fact, they were back on the
1st, 2ncl, and 5th of December, were they not?
General Miles. The reply was not back, sir.
88. General Russell. I mean, the Japs came back and negotiated.
[114] General Miles. Oh, they continued to stay here and talk,
but that all hinged, to. my mind, on the reply or the position taken by
the Japanese Government as a result of our paper on the 26th of
November, I think it was. It was considered practically an ultimatum.
89. General Russell. I think that is all.
90. General Grunert. I have a few questions.
General Miles. I should like, if I may, to add a little bit. I am not
quite sure of my answer there. I did not want to give the impression
that I thought war was immediately inevitable. 1 thought that very
definitely an action by Japan, a pretty radical action, would be taken
almost at once ; that that necessarily would be an overt and open attack
on the United States. I didn't feel at all sure that war with Japan
was practically inevitable any time. But there were a good many
things Japan could have done, if she did break those negotiations,
short of open war with the United States, and we were considering all
of those matters.
91. General Russell. That suggests one other question : Did you
know that there had been established by reference to the degrees of
latitude and longitude lines beyond which, if Japan went with armed
force out in the Pacific, the British, Dutch, and Americans would
regard that as an act of war ?
General Miles. Yes.
92. General Russell. Then you knew as G-2 that if certain things
occurred, we, in association with those powers, might attack?
General Miles. Yes; certainly.
[115] 93. General Frank. You said you were not prevented
specifically by higher authority from attempting to get information
regarding the Japanese mandated islands. Was there any general
prohibition in this regard? Was there a general attitude of
''hands off"?
General Miles. Not specifically affecting the mandated islands. It
was simply a question of whether you wanted to send a man to his
almost certain death or not, and whether the information you expected
to get out of it would be worth that risk. But there was no general or
specific prohibition against my sending a man into the mandated
islands if I could get him there. But I did not think I could get him
in there and get him back alive.
94. General Grunert. Was there or was there not a fear on the
part of all concerned that doing so and being picked up after having
done so would offend the Japanese?
General Miles. Oh, it most certainly would. We would have had
to disavow it and swear that we never sent him, and so forth. That
is an old part of the game.
7971G— 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 1 6
66 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
95, General Frank. On November 27 there went out a message from
G-2 of the War Department, which was your organization, saying :
Advise only Commanding General and Chief of Staff that it appears that confer-
ence with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage and
espionage probable. Also posible that hostilities may begin.
Do you remember that message ?
General Miles. Very well.
[110] 96. General Frank. You are familiar with the war plan
as it applied to Honolulu, the Standing Operating Procedure ?
General Miles. Yes ; in a general way.
97. General Frank. Did not the provisions of that war plan and
the Standing Operating Procedure provide for this defense against
sabotage ?
General Miles. Yes; it provided against all forms of attack, in-
cluding sabotage.
98. General Frank. Wliy, then, was sabotage especially empha-
sized in that message?
General Miles. I will be very glad to answer that question, General,
but my answer must be somewhat long.
In the summer of 1939 the President issued a directive to all
bureaus and offices of tlie Government to keep out of antisabotage
and antiespionage work, except three that were to do it all, F. B. I.,
O. N. I., and M. I. D. After I took M. I. D. in May of 194U, I began
to build up the counter-intelligence part of it. I drafted a written
agreement with F. B. I. and O. N. I. limiting our responsibilities
under the President's directive. It was then countersigned by the
three Cabinet Ministers concerned. Then I drew up a counter-sub-
versive system, and later a counter-intelligence plan, the first one we
ever had. I met certain opposition among my colleagues, the other
Assistant Chiefs of Staff, and I am relating it only to point out that
by the summer of 1941 I had gotten myself in a position where it was
definitely established that counter-subversive activity of all kinds was
G-2's responsibility and solely G-2's responsibility. I shared the
[117] responsibility for measures against an effort to attack by a
possible enemy with Operations and with War Plans, because I w^as
supposed to give the information on which their orders were based.
But I shared with nobody the responsibility for counter-subversive
measures, and therefore, when I found on the 27th of November that
nothing was specifically said in General Marshall's dispatch of that
date, the war warning order, I felt it necessary to warn the G-2's,
not only the overseas department and later particularly in thi^ coun-
try, but sent it to all of the corps area G-2's, because we knew the
build-up in this country very well. The F. B. I., the O. N. 1., and my
people, were very worried about what could be done in this country,
l^articularly in the Air Force. General Arnold was very much wor-
ried, and that broke loose the next day and occasioned the further dis-
patch of November 28.
So that was the reason for the emphasis. The policy had alread}
been laid down by General Marshall's telegrauL So I w^as simply
backing up the policy of the Chief of Staff and emphasizing the form
of attack for which I was most directly responsible at G-2.
99. General Frank. In the begining of General Kussell's questions
you gave an answer to the effect that as a result of your background
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 67
and experience you had felt a strong probability of an air raid or air
attack on Honolulu. Is that correct?
General Miles. That was one of the methods of attack to which we
were most vulnerable.
100. General Frank. At this time, we will say, December 1, 1941,
what was your attitude as to the probability of such an [-?-^<?]
air attack?
General Miles. If the Japs attacked openly at all, and if their
attack was made on Hawaii, I think I would have said on December 1,
1941, that an air attack on the installations and the fleet, although I
did not actually know the ships were there in Pearl Harbor, was one
of the most probable movements that the Japs would take.
101. General Frank. Since you went out of your way to caution
them about sabotage, why did you not likewise go out of your way to
caution them about the probability of an air attack?
General Miles. Because, General, all that had been covered in Gen-
eral Marshall's dispatch in which he specifically ordered such necessary
reconnaissances — I remember the use of that word — to protect the
Hawaiian Department against attack. And that was the only way —
that, and of course radar — that it could have been countered.
102. General Frank. You knew that the following day General
Arnold sent a message with respect to sabotage ?
General Miles. Yes, indeed.
103. General Frank. Did the logic ever occur to you that as a result
of emphasizing sabotage in a series of messages it might have the
result of de-emphasizing something else ?
General Miles. That had occurred to me. I very strongly objected
to General Arnold's message on the basis, among other things, that I
did not want to overemphasize sabotage and that I had already sent
the day before a sufficient message to cover the question of sabotage.
104. General Frank. As hindsight, of course, and considering
[1J9] the fact that provisions for all of these defenses were cov-
ered in the war plans and other documents, would not the following
message have sufficed : "War imminent. Act accordingly." ?
General Miles. For me to send ?
105. General Frank. No; for the War Department to have sent.
That would not have emphasized nor de-emphasized anything, would
it?
General Miles. I would prefer not to pass upon the Chief of Staff's
wording in his message of November 27.
106. General Frank. There w^ere. six messages sent between Novem-
ber 16th and 28th. Four of them cautioned against provoking the
Japs ; three of them emphasized sabotage. Now, with respect to cau-
tion against provoking the Japs : while we were leaning over back-
ward as a result of these cautions, what was the attitude of the
Japanese, relatively speaking?
General Miles. Their attitude where. General ? Here in Washing-
ton, in the negotiations ?
107. General Frank. All over the world. Were they as particular
about preventing any suspicion on our part as we were particular
about trying to prevent any provocation on their part ?
General Miles. Oh, no. They had been provocative for a great
many years, particularly since they began their attack on China.
68 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
108. General Frank. Will you develop that in just a few words?
General Miles. I should say that the Japanese attack in Manchuria
and later in China, which, after all, was the basis [120] of
our diplomatic negotiations here in Washington in 19-il, was the basic
cause of it, was the begimiing of a very provocative attitude on the
part of the Japanese.
109. General Frank. What I am after is this : There was little or
no attempt on the Japanese side to keep from provoking us, whereas
there was every effort on the part of the Americans to keep from pro-
voking the Japanese ; is that correct?
General Miles. I should say as a general statement that that is very
accurate, sir.
110. General Frank. I asked that of you because you should have
information on that as the War Department G-2 at that time.
General Miles. Yes, sir ; but I think it was very general information
that at Shanghai and all through the Peiping episode, they had been
very provocative, as we all kncAV ; and it was the policy of our Govern-
ment not to provoke war; to take a firm stand in a certain way, as you
know, but not to provoke war with Japan. At least, so we read it.
111. General Frank. Do you think that we were leaning over back-
wards in that attitude?
General Miles. That is a very difficult question to answer, General.
I simply say that our policy was to avoid any unnecessary provocative
action.
[1'2.1] 112. General Frank. You said you objected to Genera]
Arnold's message. To wliom ?
General Miles. To General Arnold, in the first place, and later, to
General Scanlon. It was quite a long discussion, as I remember it.
113. General Frank. What were the circumstances under which
your objection was finally overcome and the message sent?
General Miles. It had to go to the Deputy Chief of Staff, General
Bryden. General Marshall was away. General Bryden did not want
to decide it, either, very much. I objected strongly and was backed
up by General Gerow, and our objections were on this line: (1) this
antisabotage message had gone out; (2) that a message should not go
to the air forces alone, but if sent at all, should go to the Commanding
Generals for their air forces and for everybody else; and (3) that the
message as originally drawn was very drastic. As you know very well,
at that time, the Air Force had a lot of young men in command of fields
and so forth, and a very drastic order, from General Arnold, particu-
larly, to cargo planes, and so forth, might very well have resulted in
somebody's being shot.
I would also like to say, here, that General Arnold's message was
primarily addressed to the continental United States; he was thinking
about that. What started him was the fact about seven planes arrived
at one of your western fields — I think at Salt Lake — all with the same
trouble, and from different depots, and he thought there was some real
sabotage going on in this country. But, to go on with the story, we
finally had to take it to the Deputy Chief of Staff, late that afternoon
of the 28th. I don't think it was decided until [12.2] about
six o'clock. General Scanlon was present, i)resenting the Air side,
and I think, General Gerow and General Gullion, Provost Marshal
General ; and General Bryden finally decided that it would be sent in
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 69
modified form ; that is, not such drastic action to be taken against any-
body who might climb over a fence; and that it would be sent to the
Commanding Generals, and that the Air Corps might also if they de-
sired send it direct under General Arnold's name to the Air Force, to
the Air Commanders concerned; and that was the final decision.
114. General Frank. Now, another question that I am asking be-
cause G-2 might have drawn a conclusion on it: What was the atti-
tude of the public toward the possibility of war at that time? Can
you answer that ?
General Miles. I can only give you my impression, that they were
not nearly as much worried about it as they should have been. After
all, it was only a few months past since we had saved the Army by one
vote in the House of Representatives. You remember, I think it was
in October 1941 that that vote was taken, and we just barely saved
the Army at that time.
115. General Frank. What do you mean, "saved the Army"?
General Mii.es. Well, you remember there was a bill, sir, to send
back all the men that had been drafted, put them back on the reserve,
or something like that.
116. General Kussell. A bill to demobilize the National Guard.
General Miles. To demobilize the National Guard — send the draf-
tees back. The War Department was extremely worried about it.
117. General Frank. Aside from the people "top side" in the Army,
can you give me an expression of what the attitude in the \Ji23^
Army was with respect to the possibility of war ?
General Miles. Not accurately. I attended the North Carolina
maneuvers, that November, preceding November, early preceding
November, and I don't remember to have heard the matter discussed.
The Army in those days as you well remember, we all remember, was
intensely busy in building itself and training and maneuvering and
so forth, and I would not say the Army as a whole were much con-
cerned as to where war was going to break if they could get their
troops ready before the break.
118. General Frank. Do you think they felt that war was on the
horizon ?
General Miles. The Army ?
119. General Frank. Yes.
General Miles. Yes, sir.
120. General Frank. All right.
General Miles. Not necessarily with Japan, but war was on the
horizon.
121. General Frank. Did you know that there was a Japanese
striking force consisting of several carriers and a couple of battle-
ships and a submarine force in the Marshall Islands, in the vicinity
of Jaluit, about the 1st of December ?
General Miles. I knew that such a force had been reported about
there, and about that time.
122. General Frank. Was that information given to the Command-
ing General of the Hawaiian Department? r
General Miles. I don't know, sir. I do not remember.
123. General Frank. Have you any way of determining that?
General Miles. The records of the Military Intelligence Depart-
ment undoubtedly will disclose it.
70 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[1^4-] 124. General Frank. If it were given?
General Miles. Yes, if it were given. I feel very sure that in one
form or another he was informed of that report. I say "in one form or
another" because one form might very Avell have been through Navy
and Fleet.
125. General Frank. Information on the situation surrounding the
Hawaiian Islands, you stated some time back, information as to the
presence of hostile activity in the waters, would nuiinly be obtained
through submarine reconnaissance and air reconnaissance?
General Miles. That is correct — and radar.
r26. General Frank. And radar? Since the Navy is the only
department that has submarines, and since also in the plan for air
reconnaissance at Honolulu they were responsible for distant recon-
naissance, it would appear then that it was the responsibility of the
Navy to keep both the Army and the Navy in Honolulu advised and
to provide protection against any kind of attack so far as reconnais-
sance could provide that, is that correct?
General Miles. So far as distance reconnaissance is concerned, they
alone had the means of carrying it out.
127. General Frank. That is all I have.
General Grunert. I want you to explain once more so I can get it
clear in mind about the dissemination of information gathered by G-2,
of the War Department, so I Avill put in various questions. You get
information from the State Department, ONI, your own sources, and
whatever other sources might become available to you. Now, when
you get this infoi'mation, who judges whether or not particular parts
of that information [l!2o] are of value and should be trans-
mitted, for instance, to the commanding general of Hawaii?
General Miles. The first people who pass on it are the members of
the section, the Geographical Section, which includes the country
about which we have that information — the Japanese, we will say.
Information would pass first througli the Far Eastern Section, I think
it was called at that time, under Colonel Bratton, of the Intelligence
Subdivision of the Military Intelligence. That would then go to the
Intelligence Division, itself, which collated all positive intelligence,
dealt with all positive intelligence as distinguished from counter intel-
ligence, the negative side, and would then be sent out.
If it was simply routine, the Chief in the Military Intelligence Divi-
sion, G-2, would simply see it passing over his desk. If there were
any question about it, it would be brought up through normal channels
to the executive officer, wdio, if he did not feel competent to decide it,
would take it up with G-2 men ; and that was the method.
128. General Grunert. If you were disseminating it, then, to the
various commands, or any particular connnand, would it then pass
directly from G-2 to such commander, and in what form?
(xeneral Miles. The normal form would be these semiweekly sum-
maries. I mean that would be the routine. Then, any particular
information of particular importance would be telegraphed out to
tho«e agencies concerned with tliat particular bit of information; in
the case of Japan, to (certainly) the Philipi)ines, to Hawaii, to Pana-
ma, to the West Coast, and so forth, I'ight to our military attache at
China, to the G-2 of the foreign departments, or the corps areas.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 71
[126] 129. General Grunert. But when you make an estimate
of the situation, that then ^oes to be processed through War Plans
Division, to the Chief of Staff?
General Miles. Yes.
130. General Grunert. Now, if there is any information to be
passed out on that estimate, it then must be authorized for you to
pass it out, or for them to pass it out directly to those concerned, is
that right?
General Miles. Yes. It becomes more than information, then; it
becomes an opinion of the War Department, a communication of the
Chief of Staff.
131. General Grunert. All right. Now% the next question I have
is one on which we will have to go back to the sabotage message. Was
that sabotage message of November 27 O. K.'d by WPD, or the Chief
of Staff, or whom? Or was it necessary to have that O. K.'d? Did
you send it out directly to the G-2 ?
General Miles. It was not necessary for the Chief of Staff or his
office to pass on it, since it simply carried out a policy already estab-
lished by the previous messages of the same date, from General
Marshall. I do remember, however, consulting, as I almost always
did. War Plans, as they consulted me on messages, and I think it was
General Gerow who suggested that I add to the message the G-2 was
to inform the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff, only.
132. General Grunert. Did G-2 do its utmost to inform, by contact
with the various agencies made available, so as to best advise the Chief
of Staff and keep subordinate commands informed, and so that they
could carry out their mission ?
General Miles. I did not hear the first of your question, [J27]
relative to the G-2.
133. General Grunert. Did G-2 do its utmost, so far as you could
judge, to carry out its mission, in informing the Chief of Staff of
everything they had got, making estimates, and passing down in-
formation they thought was pertinent?
General Miles. The answer to that is Yes.
134. General Grunert. Naturally. I wanted to put it in the record.
General Miles. I might add, if I may, that we wrote so much that
we got certain complaints — complaints that nobody could read all the
stuff we turned out. We certainly tried to do whatever we could.
135. General Grltnert. Did so many things go out at one time that
the "low side" might have considered themselves as being informed
to such a point of saturation that they did not pay much attention to
the information they were getting ? In other words, "crying wolf !
wolf !" so that they became confused, or "fed up"?
General Miles. That could have been, sir.
136. General Grunert. Do you think that the G-2 message — we call
it "the G-2 message," of November 27 — and the sabotage message —
we call that the "Arnold message," of the 28th, which was sent out
under the Adjutant General's signature — did you consider whether
or not they might be taken by the Command "dow^n below" as modi-
fying or changing the Chief of Staff's instructions of November 27?
General Miles. No, sir; I did not. The Chief of Staff's message
of November 27 was a war- warning message, in my mind, all inclusive
72 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SO far as different forms of attack or dangers [1^8] might be
considered, and my message of the same date in regard to sabotage
was simply inviting the attention of the G-2, who was particularly
charged with that, in each corps area and overseas department, to
that particular form of danger.
137. General Grunert. There was no report from the recipients
required ?
General Miles. There was no report required.
138. General Grunert. That is, to your message.
General Miles. No answer to my message, of the 27th.
139. General Grunert. No answer? But there was a report re-
quired by the Chief of Staff's message of November 27?
General Miles. That is true, sir.
140. General Grunert. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian
Department made his report to the Chief of Staff, presumably on the
Chief of Staff's message of November 27. Therein, he reported just
the measures taken as to sabotage. Did you see that report?
General Miles. I did not see that message — that answer, until after
Pearl Harbor.
141. General Grunert. I do not think of anything else. Does
anybody else think of anything else?
142. General Frank. When General Grunert just asked you about
the possibility of confusing those messages on sabotage, you replied
from the point of view of the man at this end. Now, consider yourself
for a moment as the man at the receiving end of those messages, not
know who prepared them, nor anything about their source, but from
the point of view of their coming from the War Department, and
considering that as a single source : under those conditions, might it
or might it not have been a [129] little confusing?
General Miles. It might have been, but I think the first message
was signed "Marshall."
143. General Frank. That is right.
General Miles. That would be my answer.
144. General Frank. Now, the next question is: I asked you, in
my questions a few minutes ago, as to whether or not you had sent
any message to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Depart-
ment with respect to the presence in the Marshall Islands of this
Japanese force. We have, we think, all the communications that
went from the War Department to the Hawaiian Department, from
the 16th of November until December 7. This Japanese force was
not in the vicinity of Jaluit until about the 25th. In view of the
critical stage of the situation, it would seem that that informa-
tion was rather vital, as there is no record of its having been com-
municated. Is there any explanation of that?
General Miles. I wouldn't know what the explanation was, if it
wasn't connnunicated. If we had known at the time, as we probably
did, that that information, coming from Navy, was being transmitted
to the Fleet in Hawaii, to all of their naval vessels, it might very
well have been that we considered that as sufficient, knowing that
the two Intelligence branches. Army and Navy, were working in very
close cooperation, we thought, everywhere — in Hawaii and the West
Coast and in the Philippines, and so forth.
PROCEEDi:NfGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 73
I am a little worried about that message, because I was told, this
morning, by Military Intelligence, that there are numbered gaps in
their files today, and they do not know where [130] those
messages are. We hope you have them, but they do not know.
145, General Russell. We didn't get them from G-2.
General Miles. How ?
14G. General Russell. We haven't gotten anything from G-2.
147. General Frank. In tlie Roberts Commission interrogation of
Colonel Fielder, who was G-2 in the Hawaiian Department
General Miles. Yes, G-2.
148. General Frank. — he discloses that he was not, prior to Decem-
ber 7, getting this information from the Navy, in Honolulu. He was
not getting it.
General Miles. He should have, of course.
141). General Frank. That is all.
150. General Grunert. One final question. In your experience as
Staff Officer and as a Commander in the field, outside the War Depart-
ment, would a message signed by Maf-shall carry more weight with
you than one signed by the Adjutant General, or one signed by a
Staff Officer?
General Miles. Very much more weight, General, particularly
when it begins with some such phrase as "This is a war-warning
message."
151. General Grunert. Are there any other questions?
General Russell. What message did he ever send, beginning that
way. General Miles ?
General Miles. My impressions of the message of November 27,
but I haven't it before me.
152. General Grunert. There was one message starting out that
way, but it happened to be a Navy message. This particular message
from the Chief of Staff did not start out that way, [131] accord-
ing to the record.
158. General Russell. Who was Creswell?
General Miles. Creswell? He was Military Attache in Japan.
154. General Russell. I want to go back to my Mandated Islands
for a minute. General, because you have excited me a little bit. I
want to get some description of those islands. Referring to the
Marshall Islands, where these carriers are supposed to have assembled,
that attacked, is there anybody on those islands except Japanese?
General Miles. Some natives there, I believe — a few, there.
155. General Russell. Are there towns and roads and those sorts
of things there ?
General Miles. The only so-called "civilized people" are the Jap-
anese, there, and the others are natives of the Islands. They don't live
in towns, very much, I imagine. My information about the IMandatecl
Islands is very slim, now, particularly now
156. General Russell. There is no secret at all about the questions
that I am asking, and what I am attempting to develop for my own
satisfaction, in arriving at what happened at Pearl Harbor. They
had everything on us, yet they sailed up and attacked us, and appar-
ently today G-2 doesn't know where they came from, or how many
there were, or where they went to. We have not been able so far to
74 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
get any very intelligent information on what these convoys were like,
if there were more than one. Do you have any ideas about that, the
size of the attacking forces ?
General Miles. Prior to the attack?
157. General Russell. No, since the attack. Have you gotten
[132] information that led you to know how strong these convoys
were that came in there, launching this attack ?
General Miles. We have only genei:al information, largely from
Naval. It was supposed to be the KAGA and AKAGI, those two very
large carriers of theirs, supported by probably some of their older
battleships of the KONGO class — their four old battle cruisers; but I
have no definite information.
158. General Russell. I think that is all.
159. General Grunert. Thank you, very much.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Whereupon, at 12:45 p. m., the Board recessed until 2 p. m.)
[132- A] ADDENDUM TO GENERAL MILES' TESTIMONY
(The following changes were suggested by General Miles in his
letter of August 18, 1944, to General Grunert :)
Page 93, line 18; delete "thirty"; insert "twenty".
Page 94, line 11; insert comma after word "selection"; delete
words "of officers,"; insert "of" between words "particularly" and
"officers."
Page 94, line 14; delete ",of course,"; insert between words "offi-
cers" and "wanted" "in the field".
Page 94, line 15; insert period after word "them"; delete word
"and" after word "them"; capitalize word "we".
Page 98, line 18; insert word "probably" between words "is" and
"the".
Page 98, line 19 ; insert quotation mark between words "then" and
"Yes".
Page 98, line 20; delete word "it"; insert in lieu thereof "the
Embassy".
Page 98, line 21; insert quotation mark after "army?".
Page 102, line 15; add after words "No, sir," "except that late in
'41 steps were taken to prevent certain Japanese ships from passing
through the Panama Canal".
Page 103, line 13; insert word "and" between words "time" and
"for".
Page 104, line 18 ; delete words "in Military and" ; substitute there-
for "from".
Page 104, line 20 ; delete words "any" and "their".
[132-B] Page 106, line 25 ; change "the route" to "their routes".
Page 106, line 26 ; change last word on line "this" to "an".
Page 106, line 27; insert comma after "Vacant Sea"; delete word
"and".
Page 107, line 9 ; delete word "famous".
Page 107, line 10; delete "It was much more an" preceding word
"attack", substitute therefor "We". Make balance of line read "at-
tacked the problem from".
Page 107, line 15 ; preceding "to" insert "by our people in Hawaii," ;
change "they" to "it".
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 75
Page 107, line 17; insert "that" between "1930s" and "he"; insert
words "in it." after word "interested"; delete word "and"; insert
"He" before word "was".
Page 107, line 18 ; insert comma after word "Plans". ,
Page 107, line 21 ; make balance of sentence read "containing the
five big Hawaiian Islands."
Page 107, delete word "terms" ; insert in lieu word "dreams".
Page 109, line 16. Insert period after word "careful"; delete
"that"; capitalize "the" (last word on line).
Page 110, line 17. Delete word "very".
Page 110, line 19. Insert period after word "action" ; make balance
of line read, "The latter, in other words, is a command proposition."
Page 110, line 22; change word "him" to "them".
Page 113, line 4; delete words "to them" after word "ultimatum";
insert dashes after word "ultimatum".
[1S£-G] Page 113, line 5 ; after word "not" insert word "ulti-
mately".
Page 113, line 26; insert word "Japanese" between "The" and
"reply".
Page 114, line 2; change "that" to "it".
Page 114, line 3 ; change "our" to "the U. S."
Page 114, line 4; insert comma after word "was''; change "it" to
"which".
Page 114, line 9; change "there" to "regarding inevitable war."
Change "I did" to "I do".
Page 114, line 10; insert between words "thought" and "war" the
words "on November 27th that".
Page 114, line 11; insert comma after word "that"; change "an"
to "some".
Page 114, line 12 ; insert word "but" before "that".
Page 114, line 13 ; change "that" to "need not" ; delete word "would".
Page 114, line 15; change "practically" to "immediately"; delete
"But" ; capitalize "there".
Page 114, line 16 ; change "did break those" to "broke her".
Page 114, line 17; insert "in Washington," between "negotiations"
and "short".
Page 114, line 18 ; change "matters" to "possibilities".
Page 115, line 10; delete "but"; capitalize "there".
Page 115, line 13; change period to comma, and add "or get in-
formation from him while there,"
Page 116, line 19 ; change "limiting" to "delimiting".
Page 116, line 22; after word "system" add '*for the Army,"; change
"counter-intelligence" to " counter-fifth-column".
Page 116, line 24; insert period after word "staff"; [IS^-D]
delete word "and".
Page 116, line 25 ; change "it" to "this".
Page 117, line 1 ; change "effort to" to "overt".
Page 117, line 6 ; insert words "about sabotage" between words "said"
and "in".
Page 117, line 8 ; insert word "of" between "only" and 'Hhe".
Page 117, line 9 ; make it read "departments but particularly those in
this country. It was sent."
Page 117, line 13 ; change "in" to "t""
76 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Page 117, line 14; insert period after "worried"; delete words
"and that" and insert in lieu thereof "He".
Page 117, line 17 ; delete period after word "telegram" and add "of
the 27th." Delete w^ord "So".
Page 117, line 20; change "at" to "as", change period to comma, and
add "and reiterating the possibility of open hostilities."
Page 118, line 4; insert words "Pearl Harbor" between "the" and
"installations".
Page 118, line 5; after word "fleet", delete comma, insert i)aren-
thesis.
Page 118, line 6; after word "Harbor", delete comma, insert paren-
thesis.
Page 118, line 15 ; delete word "it", insert in lieu "such an attack".
Page 118, line 16; add new sentence, "My message also warned of
possible hostilities".
Page 120, line 1 ; delete word "was".
[IS^-E] Page 121, line 11 ; insert period after "Gerow". Delete
word "and". Capitalize "our".
Page 121, line 12 ; change "this" to "an".
Page 121, line 13 ; change "that a" to "the proposed".
Page 121, line 15 ; delete word "that".
Page 121, line 19; change "cargo" to "protect".
Page 122, line 3; change "Grenerals" to "General"; delete word
"and".
Page 122, line 4; insert word "directing" between "not" and "such".
Page 122, line 5 ; delete "to be taken".
Page 122, line 6 ; delete "and" (first word) .
Page 122, line 7; insert comma after "also"; insert comma after
"desired".
Page 122, line 9; insert semicolon after "concerned"; delete "and".
Page 122, line 16; delete "past" between "months" and "since".
Page 122, line 25 ; insert word "and" between "Guard" and "send".
Page 123, line 3; delete "that November, preceding November,"; in-
sert word "the" after "early".
Page 125, line 9 ; change "That" to "It".
Page 125, line 18; delete "man; and"; insert in lieu "himself."
Capitalize "that".
Page 125, line 23; delete "I mean"; capitalize "that". Delete
"Then"; capitalize "any".
Page 125, line 27; delete "and so forth,"; insert word [132-F]
"possibly".
Page 125, line 28 ; delete word "right" ; change "at" to "in" ; delete
comma ; insert word "and" following word "China".
Page 125, line 29, line 29; delete "foreign departments, or the".
Page 126, line 20 ; make second word "date".
Page 126, line 22; insert period after "messages". Delete word
"and".
. Page 126, line 23 ; make it read : "that I add to the message that the
G-2 were to inform their Commanding".
Page 126, line 24 ; make it read : "Generals and the Chiefs of Staff
only."
Page 128, line 18; insert dashes after the word "answer"; delete
comma.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 77
Page 132, line 4; make it read: "from Naval Intelligence. The
ships were siii)p()sed to be the KAGA and AKAGI, those".
[1.33] AFTERNOON SESSION
(The Board at 2 p. m. continued the hearing of witnesses.)
TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. RUSSELL A. OSMUN, CHIEF, MILITARY
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, WAR DEPARTMENT
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board your
name, rank, organization, and station ?
General Osmln. Russell A. Osmun, Brigadier General, Chief, Mili-
tary Intelligence Service, War Department.
2. General Grunert. General, the Board, in an attempt to get at
the facts, is looking into the War Department background and view-
points prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. This in-
cludes an examination of pertinent available records. It is hoped that
because of your assignment in the A. C. of S., G-2, War Department
General Staff, you can throw some light on the subject. In order to
cover so large a field in the limited time available, individual Board
members have been assigned objectives and phases for special in-
vestigation, although the entire Board will pass upon all objectives
and phases. General Russell has this particular phase, so he will lead
in propounding questions, and tlie other members will assist in de-
veloping them.
3. General Russell. General Osmun, what is your present assign-
ment ?
General Osmun. Chief Military Intelligence Service, sir.
4. General Russell, Is that a branch of the G-2 office.
General Osmun. One of the two branches of the G-2 office.
[134] 5. General Russell. As such officer, are you acquainted
with the files maintained by the office to which you are assigned?
General Osmun. Yes, sir.
6. General Russell. Would there be contained in these files records
or copies of messages, documents, and other memoranda which may
have transpired between your Department and the Hawaiian De-
partment in the year 1941?
General Osmun. Yes, sir.
7. General Russell. Would there be contained in the same files
records or copies of similar messages or other documents which might
have been transferred from your Department to the Chief of Staff
or other branches of the General Staif?
General Osmun. Normally, yes, sir.
8. General Russell. General, did you at my request make a search
of your files for the purpose of selecting such memoranda as are
contained therein which relate to the Hawaiian Department in the
year 1941 ?
General Osmun. Yes, sir.
9. General Rltssell. Did you show such documents to me as you
thought were pertinent?
78 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Osmun. I showed you all the documents we had found that
were pertinent.
10. General Russell. Have you since collecting those documents
found any other documents ?
General Osmun. No, sir. May I amend that to say that we are
making a continuing search, and if any other documents are found
you will be notified. I don't expect to find any others.
11. General Russell. This morning in the testimony of U^S]
General Miles — and I bring this to yo^n- attention because I did not
know it when I was talking to you before — General Miles stated that
there were periodic summaries prepared during the year 1941, as I
now recall, one summary bi-weekly and another possibly bi-monthly,
which were sent out to the Commanding Generals of the Service Corps
and Departments. Did you, in your search of the records in your
office, which search we have just referred to, discover copies of any
such summaries?
General Osmun. No, sir; none of those were brought to my atten-
tion, and I do not think we found any. I asked General Miles about
that, and he said that in most cases the summaries were prepared for
the General Staff, because at that time the G-2, as explained to me by
General Miles, was an Intelligence agency for the War Department,
and that in certain cases, what you might term summaries were sent
out from time to time, but those were not of the same character as
what we would now call an estimate of the situation.
12. General Frank. In other words, there was information which
would go to the Chief of Staff but it was not sent out to the theaters?
General Osmun. I understand so, sir; but I want to emphasize that
I was not here at the time, and this is hearsay.
13. General Russell. How long have you been associated with the
Division of Military Intelligence?
General Osmun. Since the winter of 1940—11, when I was sent tem-
porarily to London as an observer for four months. I returned in
March 1941, and after a few days went back to my normal duty in the
Office of the Quartermaster General. A year later I was sent out to
India and have been in Military [136] Intelligence Service
since.
14. General Russell. Do you know something of the history of the
Military Intelligence Division over there?
General Osmun. Here in Washington ?
15. General Russell. The general history of this Military Intelli-
gence Division of the War Department.
General Osmun. Yes.
16. General Russell. Do you regard as adequate the means, in-
cluding personnel, which have been placed at the disposal of that De-
partment ?
General Osmun. Absolutely not.
17. General Russell. Do you regard it as a badly neglected agency
of the War Department in the past ?
General Osmun. From the standpoint of military intelligence which
could have been secured ; yes.
18. General Russell. General, liow familiar are you with the gen-
eral geographical situation out in the South Pacific?
General Osmun. I know very little about it.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 79
19. General Russell. What about the mandated islands? Do you
know very much about those ?
General Osmln. Very little.
20. General Russell. Do you know anything about the Marshall
Islands?
General Osmun. No, sir.
21. General Russell. Do yon know of any reason why Americans
were not permitted to go on the Marshall Islands?
General Osmun. I believe there was a stipulation in the mandate
itself which was interpreted by the Japanese as forbidding foreigners
to land withotit very severe restrictions.
[J37] 72. General Russell. Have you ever seen that in the man-
date document?
General Osmun. No, sir ; I have never seen the mandate.
23. General Russell. Suppose there had been available to G-2 ade-
quate personnel : Do yon_i believe they could have developed what was
taking ]ilace in the mandated islands in November and December of
1941?
General Osmun. I think, sir, that it goes a great deal deeper than
that. We had a national psychology to contend with.
24. General Frank. Along what line?
General Osmun. Lack of belief that we were in danger; disinclina-
tion to spend the tremendous siuns of money that would be involved.
25. General Frank. Do you think that was reflected in the small
margin bv which Congress just prior to that had passed the Army
bill?
General Osmun. I will have to say, General, that I am not very much
of a politician, and I would rather not express an opinion on that, be-
cause my opinion would be valueless. There was a lack of really
trained Army officers available, and a general lack of comprehension
at that time of the need for military intelligence as we have realized
was necessary. I think if we go back to that time, we will remember
that very few people thought there ever would be war with Japan.
Most of our people felt quite secure in our inherent strength, and I
think the Japanese bogy had been discussed so often that people had
stopped paying much attention to it.
26. General Russell. General, I think those are all reasons
[1S8] why we could not get adequate support; but the question
was rather a different question. If yoti had had adequate support and
adequate personnel, what was to have prevented them from going out
into that area and staying in touch with what was going on ?
General Osmun. That, again, is a rather difficult question to an-
swer quickly. If we had had adequate personnel, obviously we nyght
have had very much better information and probably we might have
had enough information to have enabled us to have avoided what
happened. It is a matter of estimate. If we had been perfectly pre-
l^ared we would not have been stirprised.
27. General Frank. Do you think that this emphasized effort to
keep from offending the Japs when the}^ were confronted with no
such restriction imposed a handicap on our learning about their
activities ?
80 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Osmun. I do not think that I could answer that intelli-
gently, General, because I had nothing to do with the Military Intel-
ligence at that time except as an observer in this country. I do not
know what the handicaps were and how much they handicapped the
people that tried to get the information. I should say offhand that if
we were handicapped and the others were free to do as they wanted,
naturally we lost a great deal of information that otherwise could
have been secured.
28. General Russell. If you find other documents and records along
the line we have been questioning you about, will you advise us?
General Osmun. Yes, sir. We are looking for them.
[1-39] 29. General Frank. There are other agencies of the Gov-
ernment besides the Army and Navy that obtain information of vari-
ous kinds, are there not?
General Osmun. Yes, sir.
30. General Frank. It would be advantageous if there were a plan
for bringing all these agencies together periodically in each area,
would it noti
General Osmun. Yes, sir.
31. General Frank. Do you consider that the bringing together of
those agencies under the auspices of the Army and Navy could easily be
accomplished ?
General Osmun. May I answer that off the record ?
32. General Frank. Yes.
(There was informal discussion off the record.)
General Osmun. I think that any loyal representative of the Gov-
ernment acting honestly with other similar persons can get the co-
operation necessary in doing a good, businesslike job if he is given
half a chance and has guts enough to do what he thinks is right.
33. General Frank. That will result in getting information that
will redound to the best interests of our national defense?
General Osmun. Yes, sir. I have never found, in the two and a
half years I was over there, any difficulty in dealing wdth anybody who
was on the square as long as he realized that I was on the square and
was interested only in stopping the war a few days sooner than it
otherwise would stop.
34. General Frank. In the best interests of our United States
effort?
[14-0] General Osmun. Yes.
35. General Frank. Then you believe that efforts should be made
in these different areas to bring periodically together all American
agencies concerned with gathering information?
General Osmun. Yes, sir.
36. General Grunert. Do you think that in such a combined intelli-
gence organization, all the agencies concerned would cooperate, or
would they be inclined to withhold information because of their "hush-
hush" policy and the demand of secrecy, so that they would get so that
they would not trust each other ?
General Osmun. I think that is a question of personalities, and the
only way I can answer it is to say that in my own recent experience
overseas we had a number of individuals handling information from
the very lowest to the highest degrees of security, and yet cooperating
with the full understanding of each other's problems and, I believe, no
loss of security.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 81
37. General Frank. Would the fact that it is in the interest of the
national effort to be paramount and overcome any minor prejudices
that might exist?
General Osmun. At this time, undoubtedly, yes; but- 1 think that
in peace time much the same conditions would exist.
38. General Frank. As when?
General Osmun. As during war time, so far as the willingness to
cooperate for the best interests of the Government is concerned.
39. General Frank. Then there is no point in mentioning peace
time.
You have been searching recently for all communications [^-4^]
that were sent from G-2 to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian
Department between about the 15th of November and December 7 of
1941; is that correct?
General Osmun. Yes, sir.
40. General Frank. Have you found any communication which
was sent to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department
from G-2 or from the War Department that advised him that there
was a Japanese force in the Marshall Islands that moved in there
between the 25th and 30th of November?
General Osmun. If so they were in the notes that I gave to General
Russell — I remember specifically that there was a message to the effect
that the Japanese fleet had moved south in the general mandated area.
41. General Frank. It was in one of those radio messages sent
between the 16th of November and the 7th of December?
General Osmun. I do not remember the date, sir. I say, if it is in
any at all, it is in the batch of notes I gave to General Russell.
42. General Frank. You have given General Russell everything
that you have found that was sent, have you not?
General Osmun. Yes, sir. We have given him everything we could.
I was very definite that nothing was to be withheld from our records.
43. General Russell. I do not believe that in any of the memoranda
you gave me there was a reference to the movement of Jap naval forces
in the mandated area. I will say this: that the only messages that
you gave me were those which the Board already had copies of.
[14^] 44. General Grunert. Does it naturally follow that if
there was such a force in or about the mandated islands at any par-
ticular time during that critical period, this was the force that made
the attack on Hawaii ?
General Osmun. No, sir.
45. General Grunert. I have one concluding question, to make sure
that I understand the witness's remark about information summaries.
General Miles, in his testimony, referred to summaries of information
and estimates. Summaries were those documents prepared period-
ically and sent out as a matter of information, whereas estimates were
those which were prepared for the Chief of Staff and the General
Staff, Do I understand correctly that you did or not find any sum-
mai^es of information on the Pacific situation along in 1941 that might
or might not have been sent out to the Commanding General of the
Hawaiian Department ?
General Osmun. That is correct, sir. I have not found any; but
when I heard General Miles speak about it this morning I directed
immediate search to find out if we had them.
79716— 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1 7
82 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I would like to enter in the record a fact which you gentlemen un-
doubtedly are aAvare of, that a number of Military Intelligence rec-
ords undoubtedh' were given to the Roberts Commission, and you
have undoubtedly seen those,
46. General Gruxert. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
\l'i3'] TESTIMONY OF FRANCIS M. CAULFIELD, CHIEF CLEEK,
CENTRAL FILES, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, WAR DEPART-
MENT
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Will you state to the Board, Mr. Caulfield, your
name, address, and occupation.
Mr. Caulfield. Francis M. Caulfield, Chief Clerk, Central Files,
Adjutant General's Office, War Department.
2. General Gruni^rt. Mr. Caulfield, the Board is trjdng to get at
the facts as to the Pearl Harbor attack, and is at present investigat-
ing the background, the viewpoints, and so forth, getting facts out of
the War Department. That includes an examination of the perti-
nent available records, and we hope that from your position you
Avill be able to tell us about the Adjutant General's records. General
Russell will lead, or propound the questions with reference thereto.
3. General Russell. In your official capacity did you recently par-
ticipate in a search of the records of the Aclju.tant General's office,
at my request ?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, I did. General.
4. General Russell. And would you name the others in the Adju-
tant General's Office who helped us in that search.
Mr. Caulfield. There was Colonel Sepulveda, and Mrs. Lillian K.
Bull, and Mr. Joseph Yarborough. I cannot tell you the exact spell-
ing of his name. And then the clerks in the Central Files and the
Restricted Files, generally, search for indices.
0. General Russell. Colonel Sepulveda was unable to attend the
Board hearing, because he is not permitted to climb the [^4^
steps ?
Mr. Caulfield. That is correct. General.
6. General Russell. You were second in charge of the search and
the selection of material from the Adjutant General's records?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes. sir.
7. General Russell. Your directions were to make available to me
as a member of this Board all data, all documents, memorandums,
and so forth, which in anv wav related to the Hawaiian Department,
for the year 1941 ? " '
Mr. Caulfield. That is correct. General.
8. General Russell. Were all of those documents in the Adjutant
General's files, as just described, made available for me?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes ; they were. General.
9. General Russell. And the people whom you have just named
rendered me all the help possible in going through these records and
selecting those documents which I might think would be pertinent
and of interest to the Board ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 83
Mr. Cauupield. That is correct, General.
10. General Russell,. I have no other questions.
11. General Grunert. I have no questions.
12. General Russell. Thank you,
13. General Grunert. All right. Thank you, very much.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
[U5^ TESTIMONY OF COLONEL CHARLES K. GAILEY, JR., EXECU-
TIVE OFFICER, OPERATIONS DIVISION, GENERAL STAFF, WAR
DEPARTMENT
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Colonel Gailey, will you state to the Board your
name, rank, organization, and station.
Colonel Gailey. Colonel Charles K. Gailey, Jr. ; U. S. Army, Wash-
ington, D. C. ; at present on duty in the War Department General
Staff as Executive Officer of the Operations Division.
2. General Grunert. Colonel Gailey, the Board, in attempting to
get at the facts, is looking into the War Department background and
viewpoint prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. This
includes an examination of pertinent, available records. You have
been called as a witness because of your familiarity with the records
in so far as the office of OPD, War Department General Staff, is con-
cerned, and General Russell will propound whatever questions there
are. If there are any others, the other members of the Board will
attempt to develop them.
3. General Russell. Colonel Gailey, recently, as a Member of this
Board, I made a request on you for all documents, memorandums, other
data, and files of the OPD, as they related to operations in the Ha-
waiian Department for the year 1941; is that true?
Colonel Gailey. I do not know whether it was in just exactly those
words or not, sir, but I was instructed to help you out in any way we
could, sir.
4. General Russell. I did submit to you a list of documents which
we thought were in your office and ask that you produce [-?4^]
them for us?
Colonel Gailey. Yes, sir.
5. General Russell. You produced all of the documents which I
requested, which were in your office ?
Colonel Gailey. Yes, sir; I believe so. That was turned over to
Mr. Bond, and I believe he got them all for you.
6. General Russell. And so far as you know, those are the only
documents in your office which relate to the subjects that we are inves-
tigating in this matter?
Colonel Gailey. General, I did not check those lists of the files that
you turned over, but I do believe that all the papers that pertain to
this have been gotten together, I do not know whether at that time or
at a later time. In what General North's outfit and you got together,
and what Mr. Bond got together, I think you got it all, sir.
7. General Russell. In other words, you think the efforts of these
three people have cleaned out your records of everything material to
Pearl Harbor for the year 1941 ?
84 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Gailey. Yes, sir ; I do not think there is anything left.
8. General Russell. 1 want to make a statement in the record.
I want to say that the documents which General North obtained have
been made available to lis.
Colonel Gailey. Yes, sir.
9. General Russell. And the Board has had the documents that
Colonel Gailey made available.
Colonel Gailey. General, may I make another statement for the
record? General Handy has issued instructions in the Operations
Division that any thing this Board desires, they get, [^4'^] and
we are to give you every aid and assistance in finding what you want
that we can possiblv give you.
10. General Gkunert. And General Handy is the A. C. S., O. P. D. ?
Colonel Gailey. Yes, sir.
11. General Frank. Have you any knowledge of any papers per-
taining to the subject on which we are conducting an investigation,
for which we have not asked ?
Colonel Gailey. No, sir ; I do not. General.
May I amend that, sir ? I do not know of all the papers you have
asked for, sir, but 1 do not know of any papers that are not covered
in the three categories that I mentioned to General Russell.
12. General Frank. And that have been made available ? Thanks.
13. General Grunert, Are there any further questions ? All right.
Thanks.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
General Grunert. We are now going to other business.
(Thereuj)on, at 3:10 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of
witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 85
[iy/] CONTENTS
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 9, 1944.
Testimony of — Page »
General H. H. Arnold, U. S. Army ; War Department, Washinsjton,
D. C 148
Colonel Edward F. French, Signal Corps, Officer in charge of the
Traffic Operation Division, Chief Signal Office, Washington, D. C__ 1S6
Maj. (Jen. Charles D. Herron, Retired 207
Maj. Gen. Philip Hayes, U. S. Army, Commanding General, Third
Service Command, Baltimore, Md 241
DOCUMENTS
Message of Novemher 28, 1941, 482 170
1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original transcript of proceedings.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 87
Um PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 9, 1944
Munitions Building,
Washington^ D. C.
The Board at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the
hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the
Board, jDresiding.
Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D.
Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.
Present also : Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, and Major Henry
C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder.
General Grunert. The Board will come to order.
(Stephen S. Maxon, shorthand reporter, was sworn by the Re-
corder.)
TESTIMONY OF GENERAL H. H. ARNOLD, U. S. ARMY, WAR
DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24. )
1. Colonel West. General, will you state to the Board your name,
rank, organization, and station.
General Arnold. H. H. Arnold, General, U. S. Army; station. War
Department, Washington.
^2. General Grunert. General Arnold, the Board in an attempt to
get at the facts, is looking into the War Department background and
viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is
hoped that because of your assignment with the Air Forces [-?4^]
in Washington at that time you can throw some light on the subject.
In order to cover the large field in the limited time available, indi-
vidual Board Members have been assigned objectives or phases for
special investigations, although the entire Board will pass upon all
objectives and phases. General Russell has this particular phase,
so he will lead in propounding questions, and the other Membei's will
assist in developing it ; so I will turn you over to General Russell for
the time being.
3. General Russell. General Arnold, Saturday, we submitted to
General White, for your attention, certain questions or subjects with
the hope that they would give you an opportunity to refresh your
mind and collect such data as you would want to answer those ques-
tions. It is my purpose to follow, in the main, the outline sent you
on that day.
Would you please state. General Arnold, your official status during
the year 1941.
88 CONGRESSIONAL IN\-ESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Arnou). I was Cliief of Air Corps, until the 5tli of May.
1941. I was Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, until the 19th of May
1941 : Deputy Chief^of Staff*, to the balance of the year. I was Chief
of the Army Air Forces, from the 6th of ^lay 1941 to the balance oi
the year.
4. General Eussell. Then, during Xovember and December 1941,
you were Deputy Chief of Staff and Commander of the Air Forces?
General Arxou). That is correct.
5. General Russelx. General Arnold, were you familiar with the
international situation in 1941 as it related to the Japanese Govern-
ment (
General Akxold. That's a question of relativity. I was [^oO]
as familiar as an officer in my position could have been. By that I
mean there were certain things undoubtedly happening that I did
not know about: there were certam other things happened that I
did know about.
6. General Russell. General Arnold, in the critical months of 1941.
if we may describe those late fall months of 1941 as "the critical
months." you were Deputy Chief of Staff' and Commander of the
Air Forces. As Deputy Chief of Staff', you were next to the Chief
of Staff of the Army, were you not ?
General Arnold. Yes. sir.
7. General Gruxert. May I interrupt ( Were you the only Deputy,
or were there other Deputies ?
General Arnou). There were two other Deputies. There were
General Bryden and General Moore. There were three Deputy Chiefs
of Staff at that time.
8. General Russell. In the absence of General Marshall from
"Washington, which of the Deputies was senior and acting?
General Arnold. General Bryden.
9. General Russell. General Arnold. I think it would be helpful
if you could enlarge on or maybe elucidate your answer to the effect
that you knew some things, and some things you did not know.
Greneral Arncild. "Well. I don't want to complicate the situation,
but there were certain ultrasecret things that obviously I knew noth-
ing about. On the other hand, there were certain ultrasecret things
that were brought to my attention. I did have access to all of the
conferences of the G-2 Section. I did have daily conferences with the
Chief of Staff, I also had my own A-2 Section, that brought me in
information [^^1] as to what was going on; but after it was
all over. I realized there were other things that had happened that
I didn't know anytliing about.
10. General Russell. General Arnold, we have discovered in our
investigation the existence of a "council of war." which apparently
had its meetings over in the office of the Secretary of State. I believe
Greneral Marshall in his testimony stated that he and General Stark
frequently attended those council meetings. Were you ever in on
any of those council meetings ?
General Arnold. I was never present at any of those meetings.
11. General Russell. "When you say that after December 7 it de-
veloped that there were things about which you did not know, were
any of those things developed in these council meetings that we are
discussing ?
PROCEEDIXGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 89
General Arxold. I think they probably were.
12. General Russell. Generally. General Arnold, your information
on the Japanese situation, in the late fall of 1941, indicated a tighten-
ing in the relationship or a continuing of the relationship; or. just
what was the trend in our relations with Japan?
General Arxold. I think you can go back earlier. I think it be-
came apparent as early as January 1941 that the relations were quite
strained, and the various things that happened from then on through
the year indicated that we knew that they were strained and we were
taking necessary steps to do what we could to prepare for any eventu-
ality that might occur, without causing an overt act agains the
Japanese.
For instance, it was always our endeavor to get as many [io2^
airplanes as we could across to the Philippines, and in order to
do that we had to. as you will know, open up an air route across
the Pacific, which in those days was quite a task. We did succeed in
opening up an air route, with the help of the Xavy. by way of Midway
and Wake, down through Rabaul. into Darwin, and up into the Philip-
pines. After the route was established, then one of our worries was
whether or not if the Japs did declare war or start activities against
us, we could hold those airports open.
It was some time in the summer, for instance, that I talked with
Admiral Stark, and he was very much worried about what the Japs
were doing down in Truk and Jaluit. We knew they were doing some-
thing down there, we did not know what : so I made arrangements then
that these planes that were going to the Philippines would fly off their
course to take pictures of Jaluit and Truk. It was quite a difficult task
in those days, because the distances were long, we had to have gasoline,
and every time we put a camera in. every time you put extra ammimi-
tion in. every time you put gims in. it meant taking off something; and
yet we needed those photographs badly.
Well, it was not until December, for instance, that we finally got
those pictures, and then the planes that got the pictures were the last
ones to land in the Philippines before the Japs attacked the Philip-
pines, so what the photographs showed, we never found out.
I think it was the 17th of November. General George of my outfit,
then Colonel George, wrote me a memorandum and said he was wor-
ried about the vulnerability of Wake and Midway, and asked me
whether we couldn't do something about it. but in l^o^] those
days we were at peace, we couldn't take the actions that we took later,
so that I was making a note of it and calling it to the attention of the
War Department. There wasn't much we could do. We took it up
with the Xa^-y Department, but that was one of Xavy's tasks in those
days, and the Xavy was putting in fields with us and for us. and as I
remember it. they did send some garrisons out to Wake and Midway,
maybe before and maybe after that: but we were worried — worried
about losing those two islands.
Looking back on it. I am convinced now that we all assumed that the
Japs would attack the Philippines. We were fairly sure that they
wotild cut our air line, because they had to ciu our air line to stop our
heavy bombers from getting to the Philippines. We were pretty sure
that they would attack Wake and Midway when they did attack.
There was alwavs the chance that thev mifrht attack Hawaii. Xow,
90 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
against that, we had a very small air force. The planes that we had
that we could use in those possessions effectively were in the hundreds
and not in the thousands.
Simultaneously with that we were trying to build up an air force
in the United States for any eventuality, and so the number of air-
planes we could send would be numbered by the dozens; and every
time you took an airplane away from the United States it meant that
many less here to build up this Air Force that we knew that some time
or other we would have to use.
I think that the Philippine Connnander and the Hawaiian Com-
mander were aware of the necessity for air, because they asked for
airplanes. It was in August 1941 that the [i^4] Command-
ing General of the Hawaiian Department approved a request for 180
B-l7's. Now, we did not have 180 B-l7's to give them, because at
that time the total number of B-17's in the Army was only 109. He
was asking for 180, so his request naturally could not be filled.
Prior to that, as early as February, we were trying to get P-40's
out to the Hawaiian Department, and the Commanding General out
there wanted additional fighter airplanes, because he quite obviously
saw a possible use for them ; so we went to the extent of getting and
sending P— lO's out there on carriers, to increase the number he had
available.
So I think that there was a general acceptance of the possibility
of Japanese aggression, certainly against the Philippines and against
Wake and Midway, and possibly, against Hawaii.
13. General Russell. General Arnold, there were negotiations
going on between representatives of the Japanese Government and
the American Government, in 1941, about which you knew, I guess?
General Arnold. I knew the negotiations were going on; yes.
14. General Russell. Were you kept informed as to the develop-
ments in those negotiations ?
General Arnold. Not to any 100 percent extent. In other words,
I knew that on the 27th of November negotiations had broken down,
apparently broken down, and the Chief of Staff sent a message to the
Philippines and to the Hawaiian Department. He sent a warning
message of them.
15. General Grunert. Do you feel that you were given [^-55]
sufficient information to carry on your job?
General Arnold. I feel I was, because I knew. With the general
situation, I knew that, with the limited means at hand, somehow or
other we had to do the impossible and get airplanes out to the Philip-
pines and over to Honolulu. We didn't have the airplanes, so we did
the best we could.
16. General Russell. General Arnold, to go back to this subject of
the negotiations, the fact that those negotiations were occurring in
no way hindered or delayed your efforts to get aircraft into the Pacific
area
General Arnold. As a matter of fact, on the contrary, we leaned
over backwards to get them over, because somehow or other I person-
ally never trusted the Japs very much.
i7. General Russell. You had no faith in the good faith of the
negotiations?
General Arnold. I had no faith at all in the negotiations.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 91
18. General Russell. You stated a moment ago, General Arnold,
that you knew something was going on in Truk and Jaluit. Gener-
ally, how far were those islands from Hawaii?
General Arnold. My recollection is that the distance from Wake to
Rabaul is about 1400 miles — General Frank knows more about this
than I do — and Truk and Jaluit were about two thirds the distance,
one of them on the west side of our course about twenty miles, and the
other on the east side of our course about sixty miles.
19. General Russell. Were those two islands in the mandated
group ?
General Arnold. Both were in the mandated group, I think.
20. General Russell. Then, some time in the fall of 1941, [ioS]
you discovered that something was happening out there ?
General Arnold. Well, we knew that the Japs were doing something
there. We knew they were building naval bases. Navy was worried
about it, and we took it so seriously that I told my boys when they
flew over there, or who were going to fly over there, that they would
probably have a fight on their hands, and I cautioned them to have
their machine guns, or load them, when they flew over those islands;
so I knew we were going to liave a fight on our hands.
21. General Rl'Ssell. Did those developments. General Arnold, that
you have just discussed, in your opinion constitute a threat to Midway
and Wake and Hawaii?
General Arnold. In my opinion it was a direct threat against my
airway across the Pacific, because it cut my airline in two.
22. General Russell. Were these three points, Hawaii, Midway,
and Wake, all on your air route ?
General Arnold. They wei'e all on my airway route. My air route
went from San Francisco to Hawaii, to Midway, to Wake, and then
across all the mandated islands, to Rabaul, then across to Darwin and
Australia, and up into the Philippines; and it was the only route we
had, because the other route, we had no control over the islands. For
instance, we would have liked very much at that time, as we have done
since, to put a route down through Christmas or Canton, Samoa, and
2o. General Grltnert. Let me interrupt. If the witness is giving
any testimony that may be of value to the enemy in the future, any-
thing planned, or something that they do not now [-?->'^] know,
I suggest we had better have a closed session and have such things ex-
plained to us, rather than putting it in the record, which may or may
not get to other eyes than ours.
General Arnold. I think that is an excellent idea.
24. General Gkunert. So, if you will keep that in mind as you go
along, and if there is any such information that you think ought to be
particularly guarded and not put into the record, then do not give it.
General Arnold. I am, along that line, a little bit doubtful about
this photographic business being in your open record, because some-
body may pick that up at a later date as an act of war, or aggression, or
something.
25. Genera] Rltssell. Unfortunately, if that is true. General Arnold,
it is all through the record in the Roberts Commission proceedings,
and in our record.
General Arnold. That is all right.
92 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
26, General Grunert. Anything that appeared in those reports may
appear here.
27. General Russell. That is where we got it, first.
The point, definitely, that I was attempting to establish, now, k;
whether or not it was a fact that the Air Corps people, your people,
considered these developments in the mandated islands as a threa ;
against Hawaii, Wake, and Midway?
General Arxold. Against Midway and Wake, certainly; and pos-
sibly, against Hawaii. Looking back on it now, I cannot remembev
that we were all so much worried about the innnediate attack on
Hawaii. It was always a possibility ; but we all thought there certainly
would be an attack against Midway and Wake,
[1S8] 28. General Russell. Your reasoning there, I assume,
General Arnold, was predicated on the fact that Midway and Wake
were nearer to these Japanese developments in the Mandate than was
Hawaii?
General Arnold. That is right.
[1S9] 29. General Russell. General Arnold, were you at that
time familiar with the plans for the operation of the Army Air Force
in the Territory of Hawaii ?
General Arnold. Yes; I was.
30. General Russell. Did it include information as to the coopera-
tion between the Army and Navy Air Forces out there?
General Arnold. Yes,
31. General Russell. Did you consider those plans sound from the
standpoint of air operation?
General Arnold. No. The Air Force never did consider those plans
sound. We never considered any plans sound which did not give us
full opportunity to use the heavy bombers and to get the most out of
them ; and we did not think that those plans permitted that. We figured
that they were wasting the striking force on reconnaissance missions,
so that when we had to use a striking force they would not be available.
32. General Russell. Did you know what the reconnaissance plan
was?
General Arnold. I read it and my people studied it.
33. General Russell. It is true that the responsibiltiy of the Army
for reconnaissance ended with its inshore patrol ?
General Arnold. The responsibility of the Army ended with the
inshore patrol, but the Navy had the use of the Army heavy bombers
for the long-range reconnaissance.
34. General Russell. If they required them ?
General Arnold. And they did require them, because they did use
them.
35. General Russell, When?
General Arnoij). All during this period, prior to the Pearl Harbor
attack and after Pearl Harbor,
[ISO] 36. General Russell. Are you certain about that, General
Arnold?
General Arnold. Of course I cannot swear on a stack of Bibles that
I do not make mistakes, but I have a distinct recollection from seeing
letters from the Commanding General over there saying they were
wasting their airplanes by using them on offshore patrols.
37. General Russell. Do you have any of those letters with you ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 93
General Arnold. No ; I have not.
38. General Russell. That is a point that has not yet been brought
to the knowledge of the Board, and if Ave can get information on it it
might be of assistance.
General Arnold. Let me withdraw that answer. Let me look up the
letters that I have and see whether I can substantiate it. Certainly it
was happening after Pearl Harbor. I think I had better look that up
and get the facts before I make that statement. Certainly it happened
after Pearl Harbor ; and my impression is that I got a letter from Mar-
tin telling about the use of the airplanes that way, but I may be mis-
taken. One reason why I think maybe I am mistaken is because, look-
ing back, I think they only had about 12 B-l7s in Hawaii at that time.
So I guess I am mistaken.
39. General Frank. 12 B-l7s and 32 B-18s?
General Arnold. Yes. I guess I am mistaken. I guess they did not
have enough to do it if they had wanted to.
40. General Russell. It was somewhat in conflict with other data
which we had on that subject, and we just wanted to check L-?^-?]
it to eliminate any conflicts if possible.
General Arnold. You might eliminate that part of it, if you will.
41. General Russell. General Arnold, if the bombers were not
being used for reconnaissance missions prior to December 7, 1941,
would you now testify that the plans of operation of the Air Force,
including cooperation with the Navy Air Force, were sound i
General Arnold. I still w^ould not say they were sound, because
there was a conflict of authority, a conflict of command, out there,
that in our opinion never was straightened out. The Army responsi-
bility, for instance, as outlined in joint action, was to provide and
operate the mobile land and air forces required for the defense of the
coast, aircraft operating in support of Pearl Harbor defenses, and
general coastal frontier defense in support of or in lieu of naval forces.
The Navy responsibility was to conduct naval operations directed
toward the defeat of any enemy force in the vicinity of the coast and
to support the Army in repelling attacks on coastal objectives.
In our opinion, there never was any clear-cut line there as to the
duties of the Army and the Navy as far as the air was concerned,
because the air overlaps both.
It is awfully hard for an officer in the Air Force to determine
whether he is operating in the direct defense of the coast or whether
he is operatnig against the defeat of enemy forces in the vicinity of the
coast. One of them is the Navy's responsibility and the other is the
Army's responsibility ; and [J62'] the airplane is out 150 miles
to sea and he cannot tell which he is doing.
42. General Grunert. If the Air Force under your direction did
not think the plan was sound, what did you do about it ?
General Arnold. We have always been objecting to those plans;
we have been objecting for quite some time.
43. General Grunert. But you found obstacles that could not be
overcome in order to get across what j^ou air people thought was
necessary ?
General Arnold. No. I think that the Navy Department and the
War Department did what they thought was best under the circum-
stances. I do not think it w^as possible to have any clear-cut chain of
94 COXGRESSIOXAL IX^"ESTIGATIOX PEARL H.\RBOR ATTACK
command as long as everything was done by agi'eement instead of by
direction. The Joint Board was an agreement Board : it was not a
direction Board. If the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of
Xaval Operations agreed, then the Secretary of War and the Secretary
of the Xavy signed the proceedings and everything was lovely : but if
they disagreed, there was no possible way. without going to the Presi-
dent, to get a meeting of the minds. But I think this is the closest
they could get imder the then existing organization of the War and
Xavy Departments.
44. General Gruxert. Even then you thought that certain of your
equipment would be misused or not properly used ?
General Arxold. Xot properly used.
45. General Gruxert. That has since been corrected, has it ?
General Ap.xold. Yes. by having miity of command. That is what
they should have had in the first place, and then you would get away
from all this possibility of misunderstanding and [i^'S] misuse
of equipment.
46. General Grttxzrt. Under the circumstances you think, then,
that a joint air operation plan was about the best that could have
been done {
General Arxold. Under the organization, it was the best that could
be done. I think the organization was faulty to that extent, however.
47. General Russell. Could you apply that defect in the organisa-
tion to the scheme of reconnaissance out there where, under the plan
to which you have just referred, the offshore patrol was for the Xavy
and the inshore patrol was for the Army ?
General Arxold ( reading) :
When naval forces are insuflScient for long distance patrol and search oper-
ations. Army aircraft are made available. These aircraft will be under the
tactical control of the naval commander directing search operations.
That means, then, that we once again take our heavy bombers, which
are a striking force, and turn them over to the Xavy to be used for
reconnaissance purposes, which is not a proper employment of heavy
bombers.
48. General Gritxert. But this could only be done if agreed to by
the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, and if he did
not agree, then it could not be done.
General Arxold. It says that :
Joint air attacks on hostile vessels will be executed under tactical command
of the Xavy. The Department Commander wiU determine the Army's [16-^]
bombardment strength to particii)ate in each mission, the force to remain avail-
able to the Xavy, for repeated attacks if required, until completion of the mission.
The next one says :
When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search o-pCT-
ations. Army aircraft are made available.
I am not sure that that was ever clarified as to who determines
when they are to be made available or the ntmiber to be made available.
49. General Gruxert. Did you consider in this respect that the
Xavy under that plan was charged with what they call di.=tant patrol-
ling or reconnaissance and that the Army was not so charged ?
General Arxold. I think that is sound; I think that is absolutely
correct.
PROCEEDIXGS OF ARMY PE.\RL H-\RBOR BOARD 95
50. General Fkaxk. You are familiar with the message that went
out on Xovember 27. signed "Marshall" ?
General Arnold. Yes.
51. General Fraxk. In which he directed General Short to conduct
such reconnaissance as he deemed necessary ?
General Arnold. That is correct.
52. General Frank. The only reconnaissance for which General
Short was directly responsible was inshore reconnaissance, according
to the agreement between himself and the Xavy. Is not that correct?
General Arnold. Rainbow 5 says :
Hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea, and air 1165] forces, and
against hostile sympathizers.
Xo strings attached. So Rainbow 5, as I understand, was in con-
flict with the joint agreement.
53. General Frank. "What I am trying to do is to clarify this
point that General Russell brought out.
General Arnold. In answer to you. General Fraiik, under Rainbow
5, and with the instructions received from General Marshall, the
Commandmg General. Hawaiian Department, had sufficient authority
to extend his reconnaissance anywhere he wanted to.
54. General Frank. General Short was given these instructions
to conduct such reconnaissance as he deemed necessary. Let us
assume that when he got those instructions, realizing that the Xavy
was responsible for distant reconnaissance, did he show that to the
Xavy ?
General Arnold. That is to be assumed : yes.
55. General Frank. If the normal operation ensued and they
followed the operation of the agreement luider which the Xavy was
responsible for distant reconnaissance, who was responsible under
this arrangement as to whether they would conduct distant recon-
naissance or not.
General Arnold. Under the joint action it was Xavy responsibility.
56. General Frank. That is what I am trying to get at. Xot with-
standing the fact, when this order went to Short, if he still adhered
to the agreement and the Xavy did not see fit to conduct the recon-
naissance, then the reconnaissance was not conducted. Is that correct ?
[166] General Arnold. I think that follows.
57. General Gruntlrt. May I interject this question: If the War
Department, that phase of the War Department which has to do with
air, knowing the air plan for the defense of Hawaii, intended in any
message that went out to the Commanding General of Hawaii that
he should conduct any reconnaissance except that which was pro-
vided for in the joint air operations, would the War Department
naturally have said in this respect that the joint air agreement did
not govern ? Do you see what I mean ?
General Arnold. I see what you mean, but I think you wiU find
that the War Department has consistently refrained from trying to
tell the theaters how to run their jobs. I as as an individiuVl wrote
quite frequently to General Martin. I called attention in certain
cases to certain parts of the air plan out there that I did not agree with,
but I always put it up to General Martin as something for him to
96 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
consider with the Navy and with the local authorities, and I never
tried to tell General Martin how to run his show.
58. General Grunert. But here comes a directive from the War
Department to the effect that there would he such reconnaissance and
so forth, and they referred to air reconnaissance presumably. Natu-
rally it would seem that the local Commander would consider that
as referrino^ to those reconnaissances as had been agreed upon.
General Arnold. That is right. I go right back to my former
statement, that at that time we all considered an attack against Hono-
lulu, as far as the air was concerned, a possibility. We did not think
it would be as acute as an attack against Wake or Midway.
[167] 58. General Eussell. General Arnold, I had a thought in
the memorandum which we presented to you earlier expressed as re-
questing the conclusions which you had reached on the 28th day of
November, 1941, as to the probability of an air attack on the installa-
tions at Oahu and the Navy by carrier-borne Japanese aircraft. I am
not sure but what you have covered that in substance already, but I
wonder wliether or not you would be good enough to enlarge on that.
General Arnold. The best way I know how to answer that is that
when I heard that the attack had been carried out, I was out on the
West Coast.
Let me go back a little bit. I went out on the West Coast to expedite
the departure of B-l7s for the Phillipines, because I was sure in my
own mind tliat if we could get enough of them out there we could make
an attack on the Phillipines unsuccessful. We figured if we could get
enough B-17s the Japs could not successfully attack the Phillipines.
I went out to the West Coast to exj)edite the departure of some of them.
I got to Hamiliton Field — and, incidentally, they also on their way
across from Wake to Rabaul were to take pictures of Truk and Jaluit.
r talked to all the squadron connnanders and the staff before they took
off. I told them at that time that they might run into trouble. I told
them that tliey should have heir guns ready and that they might have
a fight on their hands. But I did not visualize the fight in Hawaii
or this side of Hawaii ; I visualized it somewhere on the other side of
Hawaii.
60. General Russell. General Arnold, did that thought which you
had about the probable place of attack out there cause you \i08]
to send those bombers from the West Coast to Pearl Harbor unarmed?
General Arnold. They were armed.
61. General Russell. Did they have annnunition when they left the
West Coast?
General Arnold. No, because at that time it was a question of gaso-
line or ammunition for that long 24:00-mile hop. Obviously we made
an error, an error in judgment. Somebody had to weigh the fact
against their certainty of arriving there by providing sufficient gaso-
line against the probability of their using their machine guns and not
getting there by carrying that extra amnumition. They had to weigh
one against the other, and they decided against annnunition. So they
did not take the ammunition, and they got there right in the middle
of the Pearl Harbor attack.
62. General Russell. I was interested in your answer a moment ago
that you were pressing to get B-I7s to the Philippines because you had
arrived at the conclusion that if you had enough there the Japs could
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 97
not attack the Philippines. Are you talking about air attacks or any
sort of attacks ?
General Arnold. Any sort of attacks. We believed if a convoy came
dovrn off the Phillipines we would have another Bismarck Sea, and we
just anticipated the effectiveness of our bombers by about a year and
a half.
63. General Russell. The effectiveness of your bombers, or the con-
ception of their effectiveness ?
General Arnold. We had the same idea; we have always believed
we could do it.
64. General Russell. Did you not have the same bombers too?
[169] General Arnold. We had the same B-l7's.
65. General Russell. It came to pass, General Arnold, that on the
27th of November a message was sent by the Chief of Staff to these
overseas departments and the West Coast Command. Were you
familiar with that ?
General Arnold. Yes,
66. General Russell. Were you in on the conferences which led to
the sending of that message ^
General Arnold. Yes,
67. General Russell. Do you remember whether or not you partici-
pated in framing that message?
General Arnold. I did not.
68. General Russell. You did see that message?
General Arnold. I saw the message ; yes.
69. General Russell. Briefly, could you tell us what, in your mind,
prompted the sending of that message ?
General Arnold. I think it was the breakdown in the conference
here in Washington with the Japanese.
70. General Russell. In other words, there were no hostile develop-
ments, or possibly I should say that there were no new Japanese move-
ments in that immediate period around November 27 wliich caused the
sending of that message ?
General Arnold. Not so far as I know.
71. General Russell. And there were no developments which caused
you to revise your thinking as to the probabilities of Japanese action?
General Arnold. Not so far as I know.
72. General Russell. Then it was confined almost exclusively to the
fact that these negotiations were considered as about [170] at
an end?
General Arnold. In my opinion — and I thought it was sound, be-
cause, as I said before, I never thought the negotiations would get
nnywhere.
73. General Russell. You do not know whether the Secretary of
State had announced to the War and Navy Departments that those
negotiations were about through?
General Arnold, I do not know that ; no, sir.
74. General Russell, General Arnold, on the clay following the
sending of the message of the 27th, a message was sent by the Adjutant
General which was copied into tlie memorandum that we sent to you
two or three days ago, and I want to repeat that message here in the
record.
79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1— — 8
98 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(Message of November 28, 1941, is as follows :)
114 WAR KR 189 WD Prty
Washn. D. C. 8:42P Nov. 28, 1941.
CG
Hawn Dept Ft Shafter T H
482 28th Critical situation demands tliat all precautions be taken immedi-
ately against subversive activities within field of investigative i*esponsibility of
War Department paren see paragraph three MID SC thirty dash forty five and
paren stop Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures
necessary to provide for protection of your establishments comma property
comma and equipment against sabotage comma protection of your personnel
against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage
stop This does not repeat not mean that any [171] illegal measures are
authorized stop Protective measures should be confined to those essential to
security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm stop To insure speed
of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does
not repeat not affect your i-esponsibility under existing instructions.
You are familiar with that message, are you not ?
General Arnold. The message relative to sabotage ?
General Russell. Yes. It is 482, and begins :
Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against
subversive activities.
General Arnold. Yes. I am familiar with that.
75. General Russell. Was that message prepared under your super-
vision ?
General Arnold. I have got to go back into history to give you the
background of that.
We had been having a lot of trouble with our airplanes all over
the United States. We had been having trouble with them coming
out of the factories, down at Savannah, and various other stations.
We had had many accidents that we could not explain, and it looked
to us as if there was sabotage. Just to what extent sabotage was
taking place, I did not know. So we went through a period during
the fall of 1941 when we were endeavoring to stop these iniexplained
accidents. In certain cases the finger pointed right directly at
sabotage; in certain other cases, looking back on it now, I know it
was inexperienced workmen who just could not do the job properly.
But at that time we were so convinced that it was sabotage that we
had sent [172] sabotage messages all over the United States,
to our factories, to our factory representatives, to all the training
fields; and it was just an unfortunate occurrence that my sabotage
message, that was brought to my attention by General Scanlon on
the morning of the 28th of November, came up; and he asked me
then to send this sabotage message to all stations of the Air Corps.
He prepared a message and I started it through the machinery to
send it out to all air stations, but as it went through. General Miles,
who was then G-2, got hold of it and he said, "If you are going to
send it to all the air stations you ought to send it to all Army stations
throughout the world." We had quite a long discussion about it,
and I withdrew from the discussion and left General Scanlon to carry
on. Whether or not I actually saw the message as finally sent out,
before it was sent, I do not know, but I certainly started it. I know
that General Scanlon was present with General Miles when they
had their discussion as to what the message should contain and the
phraseology of it.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 99
76. General Grunert. May I ask there if this message was directed
particularly at Hawaii ?
General Arnold. It had no connection with conditions in Hawaii.
It was an over-all message sent to all Army Air Force stations.
77. General Grunert. From your background it might appear that
the result to be attained through that message would apply more to
air fields in the United States than elsewhere.
General Arnold. I would not have said that at the time, no, because
at that time we were fearful of what might happen [17S] in
Hawaii, due to the Japanese who lived in Hawaii and who had had
access to our air fields. We did not send it particularly to Hawaii.
We sent the same thing to Panama, because we were having accidents
down there too.
78. General Grunert. Do 3^ou know why the 28th was selected in-
stead of the 26th or 24th or 29th ^ Was there anything particular
to bring to mind that particular date ?
General Arnold. General Scanlon brought it to my attention. Just
why he picked the 28th I do not know. It was gradually building up
before we had talked to our various Commanders in the United States
about sabotage. But why General Scanlon picked the 28th I do not
know.
79. General Grunert. Then you do not know whether there is any
connection between the Chief of Staff's message of November 27 and
the G-2 message on sabotage and your message?
General Arnold. I do not think there is any connection. As a
matter of fact, I do not believe that General Scanlon knew of the Chief
of Staff's message,
80. General Frank. In other words, it was a coincidence?
[174-] Genera] Arnold. It is all coincidence. You have to bear
in mind that for a lot of these things I am counting on my memory
and I have given the story as best I remember it. In certain instances
I have had a cliance to refresh myself; in certain others I have not.
81. General Kussell,. General Arnold, from your reference to sab-
otage a moment ago and your subsequent explanation of that situa-
tion, I gathered the impression that you were referring to sabotage as
you thought it might exist largely in the plants where your planes
were being manufactured.
General Arnold. Also in the operating bases.
82. General Eusseix. Operating bases.
General Arnold. Because we knew that we were having these ac-
cidents in our operating bases, and we could not explain any of them.
83. General Kussell. Now, to clarify your initial statements and
(hose made in response to questions from members of the Board, your
initial conception was to provide in this message of November '28th
against damage to Air Corps material ?
General Arnold. That is right,
84. General Russell. It was converted into an over-all anti-sabo-
tage message for all Army installations in this conference between you
and General Scanlon, on the one part, and G-2 on the other?
General Arnold. That is correct.
85. General Russell. General Grunert asked you about the fact that
it was sent out to all of these installations throughout the world, prac-
tically, and hence had no particular reference to the Hawaiian De-
100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
partment, to which, as I recall, you replied [i'/S} that it did
have reference to the Hawaiian Department, because you were ap-
prehensive about the materiel in the Hawaiian Department.
General Arnold. Yes.
86. General Frank. The same as at all other stations in the world ;
that is correct, isn't it ?
General Arnold. That is right; all stations in the w^orld. I was
worried about all of them.
87. General Russell. General Arnold, in this radiogram of Novem-
ber 28th, identified as 482, the language is used, "Protective measures
should be confined to those essential to security," with certain cautions
which follow. Do you have any recollection as to why that particular
statement was placed in that message ?
General Arnold. I was not present when the message was finally
completed, but as an indication of our belief that there might be sub-
versive activities in our Hawaiian fields I remember quite distinctly,
when the first reports came in as to what had allegedly occurred at
Hickam Field, and they were reports that afterwards I think were
disproved, that stated that the Japs had deliberately run their dollies
into the tails of our airi:)lanes and had performed other activities of
that character, why, we were only too ready to believe them. So that
was in our minds undoubtedly at that time.
88. General Russell. The thing that is in the Board's mind at the
moment is whether or not your limiting the activities to these protec-
tive measures affected General Short's thinking about what was to be
done out there.
[176] General Arnold. Of course, I cannot answer that because
through all this I have a continuous record of requests for airplanes
against air attacks, more airplanes, more crews. "Get them over as
fast as you can. Change the armament. Get these airplanes up to date
against air attack." That whole thought, that thought goes through
all the messages, all the letters that came back there for a period of
the year starting with January 1941. So the thought that we had, the
impression that it left in our mind, was that they were thinking of air
attack.
89. General Russell. Well, to follow the questions
90. General Grunert. I would like to ask a question on that, unless
you are ready to continue on it.
91. General Russell. No, sir. Suppose you ask it.
92. General Grunert. That message 482 of November 28tli- which we
have under discussion appeared to wind up with this statement:
This does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions.
Do you know what that was intended to convey, whether or not that
was intended as a caution to the effect that, although you must look
after the sabotage, you must also look after other cleiensive measures?
Do you know whether that was in your minds ?
General Arnold. That was undoubtedly in our minds at that time.
93. General Grunert. I just wanted to put that in so as to complete
the idea.
94. General Russell. You refer to "illegal measures" and enjoin
against taking illegal measures in this.
[177] General Arnold. They were not my words.
95. General Russell. You do not know what that was?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 101
General Arnold. They were G-2 words.
9C). General Russell. You do not know what he meant ?
General Arnold. I do not know what he meant, because I was not
present when he put those in.
97. General Russell. General Arnold, it seems, then, that this
message which you originally designed for the air people had grafted
onto it by the G-2 Department other instructions which may or may
not have resulted in some confusion in the message.
General Arnold. That may be. I am sorry that I was not present
at the meeting where they drew up the message, so I could give
what actually took place.
98. General Grunert. Do you think that General Scanlon would
have answers to most of these questions ? I believe you said that he
was present.
General Arnold. General Bryden might be able to help out on
them, or General Scanlon, because General Scanlon stood out for
certain sentences to be included in the War Department message. I
think that you might be able to get help from one or both of them.
99. General Russell. Did you see General Short's reply to that
message of the 28th, General Arnold ?
General Arnold. I saw General Short's reply.
100. General Grunert. Was the reply that you saw intended as a
reply to this message or to the Chief of Staff's message of the 27th in
which the report was called for ?
[17S] General Arnold. I think that he made a reply to the
Chief of Staff's message which was different ; I think it was a shorter
message.
101. General Grunert. Yes.
102. General Russell. As a matter of fact, General Arnold, Gen-
eral Short did reply and lef erred by number to this radio message 482.
He did make a rather complete report on that, what he had done in
response to the directions in message 482.
General Arnold. You see, at that time I was more interested in
the air than I was in the rest of the Island because I thought that we
had a big problem there, so the only thing I was interested in was
getting a reply from Martin.
103. General Grunert. In General Short's reply to your message
did he state, did he enumerate, any other measures than measures
against sabotage that had been taken ?
General Arnold. I do not remember that he did. I think it cov-
ered just sabotage ; security and sabotage.
104. General Russell. Those are the only questions that I have.
105. General Grunert. Have you any questions. General Frank?
106. General Frank. Hawaii was on the priority list for the de-
livery of airplanes in '41, was it not?
General Arnold. It was. Second priority. Philippines first
priority and Hawaii second priority.
107. General Frank. What was the state of transition from B-18s
to B-l7s in Hawaii? Do you remember?
General Arnold. I remember they were having a school out there
at the time for this transition, and that we sent over some specially
skilled personnel to help them out in their [179] B-17s, but
what the exact status of the transition was I do not know.
102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
108. General Frank, Generally do you know the state of training ?
General Arnold. We were always of the belief that the Hawaiian
Air Force was probably better trained than any of our air forces.
That is the impression we had here in Washington as a result of our
inspections and due to the fact that they were always carrying out
some form of mission simulating what they would do in active combat.
109. General Frank. What I was about to approach was this point,
which your present answer seems to disclaim, namely, that because
of the fact that they were charged with training a lot of crews to fly
B-17s from California to Honolulu and then conduct a lot of transition
training in Honolulu, and do certain training work in preparation
for transferring squadrons to the Philippines, that perhaps they got
themselves into a training state of mind rather than a war state of
mind.
General Arnold. I wrote to General Martin, as I said, from time
to time, and the establishment of a transition school in Hawaii was
not done until we were assured that they would get more effective
results by carrying this transition on in Hawaii than if it were done
in the United States. In other words, w^e had no air force, as such,
anywhere at that time. No matter where you had that training, it
was going to disrupt something. Where could be put that training
so it would interfere least with the creation of the small air force
than we did have? And it looked to us as if they could carry on
this transition in Hawaii and interfere less with the training [^SO]
than anywhere else because we would have the airplanes then available,
in case of an emergency, where they would be most needed.
110. General Grunert, May I butt in there?
General Arnold. And at the same time we were able to take care
of the transient heavy bombers that were going through.
111. General Grunert. Was there anything that occurred during
the attack that reflected the training, whether or not they were ti-ained
or were not trained ?
General Arnold. It is rather difficult to answer that question, be-
cause they didn't have a chance. Those who did have a chance
112. General Grunert. That is all I wanted. I just wondered.
They didn't have a chance to show it one way or another ?
General Arnold. There were three pilots that I remember who had
a chance, and they went down and took airplanes and went up and
gave a good account of themselves, but they were the only three that
I know that had a chance.
113. General Grunert. Yes.
114. General Frank. Had anything held up B-17 production that
in any way had an effect on this situation ?
General Arnold. No; we did not have the facilities to get the num-
bers that we wanted. If you will remember, at that time in our
endeavor to get B-l7s we had 90 in January, and by June the 90
was up to 109, and by November it had only gone up to 148. That was
the total number of B-l7s produced by the Boeing Company. We
just did not have the productive capacity to get the numbers required.
[181] 115. General Frank. In answer to a question of (leneral
Russell, I think the tenor of the reply with respect to your thoughts
on an attack on Hawaii was to the effect that it was possible but not
considered probable at that time.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 103
General Arnold. Not as probable as some others.
116. General Frank. No.
General Arnold. We always saw the probability, but not as prob-
able as Wake, Midway, or the Philippines. The Philippines we knew
were going to get attacked, in our own minds ; we knew that.
117. General Frank. I would like to develop, if I can, from any
point of view that you may have, with respect to the attitude of the
public toward possible war that summer and fall. Do you think gen-
eral public attitude was reflected in the congressional vote on the Army,
wheii the Army bill was passed by one vote ?
General Arnold. I have no doubt in my mind at all but what it was
reflected. I think the public was very apathetic towards all wars.
118. General Frank. That is what I want.
Now, you had opportunities to come in contact with the Army, that
is, the rank and file. Generally, what, in your opinion, was the atti-
tude of the rank and file toward the possibility of war?
General Arnold. I think that ihe average Army officer thought it
was coming. I do not think there is any question about that. It was
just a question of time.
119. General Grunert. Was that instilled into the men? Were
they war conscious, or were they apathetic to a certain extent?
[182] . General Arnold. I do not believe that the enlisted men,
certainly in the Air Force, were as war conscious as the officers, be-
cause we could not talk as openly to the enlisted men as we did to the
officers. We had our officers' meetings; and, while we could not tell
them everything we knew — just like it was out on the West Coast:
I could not tell them everything we knew, but I told them enough so
as to make them realize that the conditions were serious.
120. General Grunert. Do you know what that status was as far as
the air force in Hawaii was concerned, officers and men? Had you
any reflection of that through General Martin or elsewise?
General Arnold. I looked for some correspondence so as to refresh
my memory on that, and I could not find it ; so I am afraid that my
hindsight there would indicate an impression that may not be justified.
121. General Grunert. But you have the impression that somewhere
along the line correspondence was had on that subject?
General Arnold. Well, for instance — see if I can find the date in
here (indicating). As early as March 31st they had a board out in
Honolulu as to what might happen in case the Japanese did attack
Pearl Harbor, and that was a board signed by Martin and Bellinger
in which the}^ outlined in that report pretty nearly what actually did
happen. So there is no doubt in my mind that the people in Hawaii
were thinking on the subject and giving it very serious thought.
[183] 122. General Grunert. Do you know, from any evidence
available to you, whether or not the officers of the Air Force in Hawaii
were kept informed of existing conditions, so as to develop a "war
consciousness," as one might call it? In other words, you told us
what you knew about the officers and the men. Now, how did that
apply, in Hawaii? Was there anybody there to tell them, or were
they told, do you know ?
General Arnold. You see, I was over in Hawaii shortly before this,
and at that time, one of the things I was doing was looking around
with a view of trying to establish in my mind whether some of these
104 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
things were or were not being done ; and I must say that at tliat time
it was not as serious as it became later ; but I was very well pleased with
the way things were being carried on — the training and the building up
of the facilities for the employment of their air arm, and the training,
of course, including the instruction given to the individual enlisted
men and their officers.
123. General Gkunert. In that connection, do you thing there was a
cry of "wolf ! wolf !" too often, so as to get them into a frame of mind
that they would say, "Oh, well! just another cry of 'wolf'!"?
General Arnold. I wouldn't know that. I was not close enough to
them to get that impression.
124. General Gruxert. Are there any other questions?
125. General Russell, General, you have made it very clear that in
considering Japanese probabilities, it was your opinion that the at-
tack would more probably come at Wake and Midway and the Philip-
pines, which were nearer the Jap bases, than was Hawaii, and yet
HaAvaii had first priority on ships and other materiel. [^^4]
Can you explain that ?
126. General Arnold. In the Air Force it had second priority ; the
Philippines had first priority, Hawaii the second priority.
127. General Russell. I misunderstood you. I thought it was the
otlier way around.
General Arnold. No.
128. General Grunert. I understand that it was first priority in most
things, but on airplanes at that particular time, it was second priority ;
is that right ?
General Arnold. That is right.
129. General Frank. I would like to ask a question, here. Were you
familiar with the fact that there was a Japanese force of carriers,
submarines, battleships, and cruisers at Jaluit about the 1st of Decem-
ber? Did you have knowledge of that?
General Arnold. Well, that was included in one of the things that
we were going to look for, when we sent these planes over. We were
going to look to see if there were any indications of any Japanese
concentrations or creation of facilities in these Caroline Islands, and
we figured that by sending these airplanes out and diverting them
from the course far enough we could find out. As far as I was con-
cerned at that time, it was a rumor. We didn't know. We had
heard rumors of it — it was all you got — that there were such con-
centrations. We did not know for sure.
130. General Frank. You did not know that the Navy knew?
General Arnold. No. Well, no; I didn't.
131. General Frank. I would like to emphasize again, the facility
or difficulty with which operations might be initiated [^^5]
through the cooperative basis on which they had to be accomplished
at Honolulu. Will you just give us a short statement as to your
opinion of that.
General Arnold. In my opinion — no, the opinion of the Air
Forces — that was one of the main criticisms of all the plans that
they had for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands. Everything was
cooperation, without any direct responsibility that you get with unity
of command, with one Commander who is responsible for employing
the facilities at hand to carry out his mission.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 105
132. General Frank. That is all.
General Arnold. I would like to make one request of the Board, if
I may. I used the word "Eniwetok" when I should have said Jaluit.
Those two places were Jaluit and Truk, not Eniwetok and Truk.
133. General Grunert. Make a note of that, please, and change it.
One last question: With respect to the subject just discussed, did
that lack of what you considered proper cooperation in Hawaii re-
flect itself in the attack, as far as you know, from an air viewpoint ?
General Arnold. In my opinion, the attack came so quickly and was
so devastating in character that it never gave an opportunity to de-
termine whether it was lack of unity of command or coordination, or
what the trouble was.
134. General Grunert. But if there had been what you might term,
or have termed, the proper coordination, then it might have reflected
itself in the earlier stages, particularly in the reconnaissance?
[1S6] General Arnold. That is the only place where it had an
opportunity to show itself, in view of the conditions under which
the attack occurred.
135. General Grunert. Are there any further questions?
All right. Thank you very much. We appreciate your coming
over here, and taking your time.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
TESTIMONY OF COLONEL EDWARD E. FEENCH, SIGNAL CORPS,
OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE TRAFFIC OPERATION DIVISION,
CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICE; WASHINGTON, D. C.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you state to the Board your name,
rank, organization, and station.
Colonel French. Edward F. French ; Colonel, Signal Corps ; officer
in charge of the Traffic Operation Branch, Office of the Chief Signal
Office, Washington, D. C.
2. General Grunert. I would also like to add to the advice given
you by the Recorder relative to your rights under Article of War 24,
a caution that in the event there is anything that is ultrasecret, that
should not be placed in the record, before you answer the question, you
may consult with the Board to see whether or not we should hear
what you have to say in closed session. In other words, anything
that might be of assistance to our enemy in the future.
Colonel French. Yes, sir.
3. General Grltnert. It is not as to what has happened, unless
it is of continuing nature.
This Board, in an attempt to get at the facts, is looking into the
War Department background and viewpoints prior to [187]
and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is hoped that, because
of your assignment, you can throw some light on the subject. The
Board has divided the work so that the individual Members thereof
have a special field of inquiry, although the Board passes on every-
thing. So, General Russell will be the one that will propound the
questions to you, with the other Members of the Board asking any
they see fit, on that particular line on which you are to be a witness.
I turn you over to General Russell.
106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
4. General Kussell, Colonel French, what were your duties on the
7th day of December, 1941 ?
Colonel French. I was officer in charge of the Traffic Division, and
Officer in Charge of the War Department Signal Center, Washington,
D. C.
5. General Russell. What if any responsibilities did you have on
that day in selecting the means for the transmission of messages which
reached the Center from the War Department?
Colonel French. I had alerted myself on December 7, knowing
that it was a rather critical period, and I came to the office early on
Sunday morning, making myself available should any unforeseen cir-
cumstance arise.
6. General Grunert. Why did you alert yourself on that particular
morning? What was in the back of your mind as to the need, that
caused you to be there that Sunday instead of the Sunday before, or
the Sunday after?
Colonel French. I had. General, alerted myself some time before
that. I had been in my office every Sunday, every day, for quite some
time. As to the exact days, I cannot now recall, but I spent many
days and many nights in my office, and signal center.
[188] 7. General Grunert. Might you have been influenced by
what had passed through your office elsewhere as to conditions?
Colonel French. Yes, sir. The tempo was such in my office during
that period that I felt that it demanded my attention.
8. General Eussell. Colonel French, on the morning of December
7, 1941, in your official capacity over there, you could select the means
or the method by which these messages would be sent ?
Colonel French. Yes, sir.
9. General Russell. You had that within your jurisdiction?
Colonel French. That was my authority ; yes, sir.
10. General Russell, That was your authority ?
Colonel French. Yes, sir.
11. General Grunert. What means were available for trans-
mission ?
Colonel French. Sir?
12. General Grunert. What means were available for such trans-
mission ?
Colonel French. Well, the normal means available to us were the
War Department radio net. You were speaking of Honolulu, now,
sir, or of all?
13. General Grunert. Yes, you might give a general answer, and
then, also, the special one on Hawaii and Honolulu. Did you have
anv other means besides radios?
Colonel French. Yes ; 1 did.
14. General Grunert. The Transoceanic telephone service?
Colonel French. I had commercial facilities available.
I never did use Transoceanic telephone for such [189] serv-
ice, at any time, prior or since.
15. General Frank. Isn't it available to you?
Colonel French. You might consider it available to me. General,
but we had never exercised the practice of using Transoceanic.
18. General Grunert. Is it used from the other end ?
Colonel French. Sir?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 107
17. General Grunert. Is it used from the other end, to the War
Department ?
Colonel French. I could not say. It wasn't used to the War
Department Signal Center, sir.
18. General Grunert. Would you have known if it had been used,
for instance, between the Chief of Staff and the Commanding Gen-
eral of Hawaii, or vice versa ?
Colonel French. I would not know of that, General.
19. General Grunert. You would not know that?
Colonel French. I would not know. That would be entirely up
to the Chief of Staff. I had no control over the Transoceanic
facility.
20. General Frank. Had you thought of it, you could have used
it, however, is that correct?
Colonel French. Not in this instance; I could not have used it,
General, because the message, the traffic, that was to be routed, was
classified traffic, and would not be put over a voice radio.
21. General Russell. Colonel French, on this morning of Decem-
ber 7, 1941, you received for transmission to certain of the overseas
departments a message from the Chief of Staff, is that true?
[IdO] Colonel French. Yes, sir.
22. General Russell. You have had occasion to testify about this
message and its transmission, before?
Colonel French. Yes, sir; before the Roberts Commission, sir.
23. General Russell. And hence you are entirely familiar with the
message to which I refer?
Colonel French. Yes, sir.
24. General Russell. Now, Colonel, can you recall the form in
which you received that message?
Colonel French. Yes, sir.
25. General Russell. Will you tell us just what that was. Had
it been prepared in longhand, or had it been typewritten or what?
Colonel French. Colonel Bratton personally brought that message
to the code room on the morning of December 7.
26. General Grunert. Who is Colonel Bratton?
Colonel French. Colonel Bratton is G-2. He is on General Miles's
staff as G-2 officer.
27. General Russell. He is overseas.
Was it written out in longhand, or had it been typewritten?
Colonel French. I heard Colonel Bratton at the code room asking
to be admitted, and my office was across the hall from there. I im-
mediately got up from my desk and went to the code room, and
Colonel Bratton was then inside the code room. He told me that
he had this message that he wanted to get out in a hurry. I looked
at the message with him. The receiving clerk had the message, there.
Due to the difficulty in reading [^dl] the message, I told
Colonel Bratton we should type the message up, which he agreed to,
and I had that message typed in my office. That was to make sure
that the code clerk would make no error. I had it typed for clarity,
to make sure that there would be no error made.
28. General Frank. How long did that take ?
Colonel French. I couldn't say, General, off-hand.
29. General Frank. About?
108 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel French. I would say a few minutes, just to type this mes-
sage off.
30. General Russell. Now, Colonel, we have gotten the form of the
message, and I think we can develop the time element, step by step.
Colonel French. Yes, sir.
31. General Russell. It came into your office written out in long-
hand?
Colonel French. Written in longhand.
32. General Russeij:,. I believe it appears somewhere that it was in
the Chief of Staff's handwriting.
Colonel French. It might have been.
33. General Russell. You do not know that?
Colonel French. I don't remember definitely.
34. General Russell. Have you any record to show the exact time
that Colonel Bratton arrived in your office with that message?
Colonel French. No, sir; I haven't that time available to me. I
put that time some place after 11 : 30 in the morning, when Colonel
Bratton arrived there.
35. General Russell. The first thing that was done to that message
was having it written on the typewriter, to be clear?
[19^] Colonel French. Yes, sir.
36. General Russell. And you say that just took a few minutes,
because it was a relatively short message ?
Colonel French. That is correct.
37. General Russell. When it had been copied on the typewriter,
what happened to it?
Colonel French. When it was typed on the typewriter, we had
Colonel Bratton authenticate it, as I recall. Colonel Bratton read
it and authenticated the message. We then gave the message to
the code clerk. I left Colonel Bratton, then, and went to the Signal
Center, the operating room, to check on the facilities available ; that
is, as to what the atmospheric conditions were. In the morning,
when I came in, the normal routine was to check the operating condi-
tions in the office. They weren't any too satisfactory when I went
out there.
38. General Grunert. Are you going to explain that. Colonel ? Do
you mean the atmospheric conditions, the sending equipment or the
personnel ?
Colonel French. The atmospheric conditions, the electrical
39. General Frank. The interference?
Colonel French. The ether. Atmospheric
40. General Frank. Static ?
Colonel French. Static interference.
41. General Russell. So, now, you went to check the means avail-
able to you?
Colonel French. That's right, sir; and I checked Honolulu be-
cause that was the point where the message had to route, going to
Manila and going to Honolulu proper. I found out [19^3] from
the operator that we had been out of contact with Honolulu since about
10 : 20 that morning.
42. General Russell. Now, let us get clear on that. You were out
of contact, with your radio?
Colonel French. Correct. That is, the interference was such at
that time that we were more or less standing by, changing frequencies.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 109
to see if we could get on a frequency that would get through that
static ; and that, according to my log, was around 10 : 20, sir.
43. General Frank. Washington time?
Colonel French. Yes, sir; Eastern Standard Time. That condi-
tion did not clear up, according to my log, until about 2 : 30 p. m, that
afternoon.
44. General Russell. Was the effect, then, of the static condition
that you are describing such as to rule out radio as a means of trans-
mitting that message ?
Colonel French. To a communication officer, yes, sir. I also ob-
served that we were having difficulty in working San Francisco at
that particular time. I hazily recall, now, it was around 11 o'clock
or later that the log indicated that conditions to San Francisco were
bad for transmission of messages.
45. General Russell. Now, how much time was consumed, Colonel,
in this investigation of radio conditions ?
Colonel French. I would say, just a few minutes. General. Time
passes by, when you are under pressure, and I would say maybe three
to four minutes. At that time, after I had checked the Honolulu
channel and checked on the San Francisco channel, I immediately
made up my mind to send this message via [-?54] commercial
means. That was the most expeditious way, in my judgment, to get
that message to its destination.
46. General Russell. Will you describe for us at this point what
commercial means were available to you.
Colonel French. We had facilities through the Western Union and
through the Postal Telegraph. Tlie commercial facilities into Hono-
lulu, which is what you are interested in at this moment, were the
RCA, the Mackay, and the Commercial Cable Company.
47. General Russell. Let us see what the RCA was.
Colonel French. I beg your pardon ?
48. General Russell. What was the RCA ?
Colonel French. The Radio Corporation of America radio facili-
ties from San Francisco.
49. General Russell. So you had then, if I am correct on this as-
sumption, the Western Union, the Postal, and the Radio Corporation
of America ?
Colonel French. Well, the Western Union worked with the RCA.
That was their connecting link to Honolulu.
50. General Russell. Were any other commercial facilities avail-
able to you except those three ?
Colonel French. No, sir. The Postal.
51. General Russell. Those three?
Colonel French. Really the fastest facility available to me was
through the Postal or the Western Union.
52. General Grunert. Then as I understand it, you have air, wire,
and telephone — air, telegraph, and telephone through the commercial
lines ; is that right ?
Colonel French. In my office. General. We never used U^SI
telephone to deliver a message to any of our insular possessions.
53. General Russell. Colonel, when you made this investigation,
you reached a decision as to what means you would use ?
Colonel French. Yes, sir; and I had to come to a hurried decision.
54. General Russell. And you decided on what?
110 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel F'rench. I decided on sending the message via the Western
Union.
55. General Russell. What steps did you take next?
Colonel French. I did that. I decided on the Western Union for
the reason that Avhen we were listening for the signals from Honolulu
we observed Honolulu working San Francisco, so I deducted that the
fastest way would be to turn it over to the Western Union and they
would get it to San Francisco by quick dispatch. They had a tube
connecting their office to the RCA. I was apprized of that. I knew
that, because we had handled other messages that way at times. When
we would have interference and had a message of any importance that
was to be transmitted immediately, we would use the commercial facil-
ity ; and that had been our practice.
56. General Russell. Then there were two links to it — you wired
it out to San Francisco, Western Union, and there it was transmitted
to Honolulu, RCA?
Colonel French. I immediately had the teletype operator in the
signal center inform the Western Union that we would turn this mes-
sage over to them. I then went back into the code room to check as to
whether or not the message was then ready to be transmitted. I per-
sonally took the message out U^^] to the Signal Center and
turned it over to the operator, there.
57. General Russell. When you went back into the code room, the
message was or was not ready ?
Colonel Fench. The message was ready.
58. General Russell. Do you have any record to indicate the exact
time that you went back and found the message ready for sending ?
Colonel French. No, sir. I did not have the exact time. I wasn't
checking the time that way, as to the exact time that I arrived back in
the code room.
59. General Russell. What was the next step, after you discovered
that the message had been encoded and was ready for transmission?
What did you do next ?
Colonel French. As I recall. Colonel Bratton was at the code room,
and he asked me how long it would take to get that message trans-
mitted, and I told him that it would take about 30 to 45 minutes to
transmit that message to its destination.
60. General Russell. Now, Colonel, we are attempting to track you,
to follow you along step by step. You had the message encoded, and
then you sent it to Western Union ?
Colonel French. Yes, sir.
61. General Russell. Did you get a receipt over at Western Union
for it?
Colonel F'rench. No, sir. When we transmit, the routine is that
when the message comes into the code room, we place it in code, and
then we send the coded message out to the Signal Center, and the
code message is time-stamped and transmitted to the station concerned.
62. General Russell. The first time that any notation on [197]
this message was made as to time was when it reached the message
center for delivery over to Western Union ?
Colonel French. No. The original message as typed by Colonel
Bratton was time-stamped in the code room.
63. General Russell. Do you know what that time-stamp was?
Colonel French. I do not recall.
PROCEEDINGS OP ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 11 1
64. General Russell. It would have been placed on the message at
the time that it went from the typewriter to be coded ?
Colonel French. To the code clerk ; yes, sir.
65. General Russell. Could you by a search of the records of the
War Department determine that exact time for us, Colonel ?
Colonel French. No, sir ; I cannot, for the reason that that message
was turned back to the originator. We are concerned with the time
of transmission of that message.
66. General Russell. So if there is a record showing that time
stamp, it is not in your files, it is elsewhere?
Colonel French. It would be either in G-2 or in the OPD office.
67. General Russell. Now, do you have any record of the exact
time of the dispatch of this message by Western Union to the west
coast ?
Colonel French. Yes, sir.
68. General Russell. What time was that ?
Colonel French. That message was dispatched to the west coast for
Honolulu at 12 : 01, Eastern Standard Time.
69. General Grunert. What is the difference in time between
Eastern Standard Time and Honolulu time ?
Colonel French. Five and a half hours.
70. General Grunert. If it is 12 : 01 here, what is it in [1981
Honolulu ?
Colonel French. Five and a half hours, sir — that would have
been 6 : 31.
71. General Russell. I have a statement before me. Colonel, which
is substantially in line with the facts that you are testifying to at the
moment. There is a little conflict, which might be adj usted ; and may
I read this to you ?
Colonel French. Yes.
72. General Russell. "The message was filed at 12 : 18 p. m., Decem-
ber 7, Eastern time"— 12 : 18, Eastern Time— "6 : 48 A. M., Decem-
ber 7, Honolulu Time," Now, you are testifying about 12 : 01 and 6 : 31.
Colonel French. Yes, sir. That 12 : 01 was the time that the
message was — we count that as "filed" in the Signal Center. The
time that it was finished, with the transmission of that message to the
Western Union, was 12 : 17 o'clock.
73. General Russell. Now, Colonel, do you have any data from
which you can tell us the time of the receipt of that message at
Honolulu ?
Colonel French. On sending that message to Honolulu, we asked
for reported-delivery on the message. The message was delivered — the
message was received in the RCA office in Honolulu at 7 : 33 Hono-
lulu time.
74. General Russell. It therefore took how long ?
Colonel French. It took 46 minutes from the time the Western
Union received that message, until they got it to Honolulu. That's
creditable service.
75. General Russell. Now, let us assume this, Colonel, for the pur-
pose of a hasty calculation, that Colonel Bratton reached [1991
your office at approximately 11 : 30 on that Sunday morning.
112 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel French. Yes, sir.
76. General Russell. You said it was 11 : 30 or shortly thereafter?
Colonel French. Yes, sir.
77. General Russell. Let us say it was dispatched at 12: 01, which
was 31 minutes after Bratton appeared at your office.
Colonel French. That's right — if he arrived at that time. That is
a question, General, as to the time Colonel Bratton arrived at my
office with that message. Colonel Bratton stated at one 'time that it
was 12 : 50 when he filed that message with us, and I believe that 12 : 50
time Colonel Bratton had in mind was our preparation.
(Brief interruption.)
78. General Russell. If he came in, then, to review it. Colonel, at
11 : 30, and you got it away at 12 : 01, that was only 31 minutes?
Colonel French. Yes, sir.
79. General Russell. And it took 46 minutes to transmit it?
Colonel French. Yes, sir.
80. General Russell. So it reached Honolulu in 31 plus 46, or 77
minutes after Colonel Bratton reached your office ?
Colonel French. On the assumption that Colonel Bratton arrived
there, as you stated.
81. General Russell. At approximately 11 : 30.
Colonel French. I say that it was my opinion in discussing this
with Colonel Bratton that it was after 11:30, and also in discussing
the matter with the officers in the Chief of Staff's office, that it was
after 11 : 30 when he arrived there.
[2001 82. General Frank. Generally speaking, these assump-
tions are about correct ; is that it ?
Colonel French. Yes, sir ; that is correct.
83. General Frank. All right.
Colonel French, Colonel Bratton was there during the greater por-
tion of the time that the message was being prepared. He was very
greatly exercised in getting it through, and he was in my office and
saw the diligence that was exercised by us in getting that message
prosecuted.
84. General Frank. All right.
Colonel French. No time was lost at all in getting that message
prosecuted through my office.
85. General Grunert. Colonel, in your opinion, was that good time,
excellent time, or unusually good time, to get the thing off, under the
conditions ?
Colonel French. That was unusually good time. General, because
I was personally pushing the thing.
86. General Grunert. And had it been sent over your own radio
net, about how much time would have been saved ?
Colonel French. Well, I can give you an example. On the 27th of
November there was a message filed in my office, of grave importance,
to go to Honolulu, and it was received in my office at 6 p. m. It was
encoded and sent to the Signal Center for transmission at 6 :11. Due
to the atmospheric conditions for transmission, the message had to
be sent by hand. The time that it was received in Honolulu was 6 : 50.
That was a short message.
87. General Russell. Now, Colonel, I Avant to develop another
phase of this. You are acquainted with the time that reasonably
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 113
1^01] is required for decoding a message of this length, aren't
you?
Colonel French. Yes, sir.
88. General Russell. About what time would the average person-
nel in the field, sucli as you might expect to find in Honolulu, require
to decode this message, once it reached Honolulu ?
Colonel French. Well, the actual work of decoding a message of
that length would run somewheres between 10 to 15 minutes, on an
average, in the system in which that was sent, the machine system,
89. General Russell. Then this message should have been decoded
and intelligible in 77 minutes plus 15 minutes?
90. General Frank. Plus the time of getting it.
91. General Russell. Or, plus the delivery time out in Honolulu.
Colonel French. With all things being equal, that is true. If the
message would arrive there in class A order, there were no gobbles
in the message, the equipment was functioning well, and everything,
and all operations clicked, I would say that that would be a good
performance.
92. General Russell. Then a rather liberal estimate, from the time
standpoint, would be that, from the moment when General Bratton
appeared in your office with this message, until it would have been
decoded and in the hands of the Commanding General, or the proper
authority in Hawaii, would have been approximately an hour and a
half?
93. General Grunert. I do not gather that. I gather that the hour
and a half would include just the decoding of it at the other end, and
not the delivery.
94. General Russell. I was just adding it all up.
95. General Grunert. We do not know anything about the
[^02] conditions of delivery. On the record, I will ask you this
question : Have you any record of the time it was actually received by
the Commanding General, or one of his staff? Was there a receipt
demanded for this ?
Colonel French. Yes.
96. General Grunert. Or an acknowledgment from the Command-
ing General?
Colonel French. We asked for a receipt of delivery. In fact, we
tried all day to get an acknowledgment of receipt on that message,
from Honolulu, but things were cracking so fast from 7 : 30 in the
morning on, and I kept pressing Honolulu, asking for the receipt of
that message; but there were other things apparently of graver im-
portance at that time, so that we couldn't get a prompt acknowledg-
ment from Honolulu.
97. General Frank. Did you ever get one?
Colonel French. Yes, sir.
98. General Frank. What was that time?
Colonel French. The message, as I recall, was delivered to the
Signal Center there in Honolulu at 11 : 45.
99. General Grunert, Do you mean to say there was from 7 : 33 to
11 : 45 before they decoded it and took it out to Shafter?
100. General Russell. No.
Colonel French. He was advised that it was delivered at 11 : 45,
Honolulu time. That delay was due to the fact that the messenger
was diverted from his course during the bombing.
79716— 46— Ex. 145, voL 1 9
114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
101. General Grunert. Have you finished? I have one question,
here, when you ^et through,
102. General Russell. Yes, sir. Suppose you ask your question.
[£03] 103. General Grunert. I understood you to say that you
had radio contact with Honolulu up to about 10 a. m., Washington
time, on December 7.
Colonel French. 10 : 20, General.
104. General Grunert. 10:20?
Colonel French. Yes, sir.
105. General Grunert. Had you been receiving things from Hono-
lulu that morning?
Colonel French. Yes, sir. We exchanged traffic through the morn-
ing up to 10 : 30.
106. General Grunert. What would 10:20 Washington time be in
Honolulu time. It would be before 5 a. m. ?
Colonel French. It would be before 5 a. m. ; yes, sir.
107. General Grunert. That is all I wanted. Has anyone else a
question ?
108. General Russell. I have no further questions.
109. General Frank. I would like to ask a question.
What type of communication does the FBI use in Hawaii, do you
know?
Colonel French. I do not know. General, what type the FBI used.
110. General Frank. Do you ever ask the Navy to communicate
messages for you ?
Colonel French. Oh, yes.
111. General Franch. Did you ask them this morning?
Colonel French. No, sir.
112. General Frank. All right.
Another thing. Was there any indication that the difficulty in
transmission might have been caused by artificial [204] means ?
Colonel French. Interference?
113. General Frank. Yes.
Colonel French. No, sir. At that time of the year
114. General Frank. That is all I want.
Colonel French. At that time of the year we were normally out
of service with Honolulu between 11 and 1 o'clock. That is a matter
of official record.
General Frank. Does the Navy have a more powerful radio than
the Army, out to Honolulu ?
115. Colonel French. Yes, at times they do use more power than
we do ; yes, indeed. But as a matter of practice, traffic going to Hono-
lulu that we would want to expedite and I considered sending, we
would not use the Navy. I considered the Navy, with relation to this
message, but I know that it would have to be delivered from Pearl
Harbor, up to Fort Shafter, and knowing the Navy condition is the
same as ours, my judgment was, the fastest delivery for that message
was by the commercial means.
116. General Frank. All right.
Colonel French. That was considered.
117. General Grunert. Are there any other questions?
118. General Russell. Colonel, you stated that you had no infor-
mation about the transmission of information from here to Honolulu
by telephone.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 115
Colonel French. I do not quite get the question.
119. General Russell, You just did not use the telephone, at all?
Colonel French. We never use the telephone to deliver [205']
messages out of the Signal Center ; no, sir.
120. General Russell. The only thing you had was radio, and when
it was out, you had to go elsewhere ?
Colonel French. To a commercial wire. Now, if they wanted to
use the telephone, that was up to the individuals, themselves, the
Chief of Staff, or whoever the individual concerned, who would make
personal calls, or official calls.
121. General Grunert. You had no authority to use the telephone,
no matter what the urgency of the message might be ?
Colonel French. No, I wouldn't say that, General; no, sir. I
have authority — I assume authority for every available means of
communication that might be available to get a message to its destina-
tion; but I would not have sent that message via telephone, because
it was a classified message; and if I would attempt to have phoned
the code groups out, it would have taken me longer, and then possibly
there would have been a misunderstanding, as you know, in trans-
mission of messages that distance.
122. General Grunert. Did it occur to you that the urgency of the
message might require you or suggest to you that you ought to inquire
whether or not you could send it in the clear by telephone ?
Colonel French. Well, not sending messages in the clear by tele-
phone. I didn't consider at all sending that message by telephone.
I assumed that the proper way to handle that message was via the
wire means.
123. General Grunert. Suppose you get information that somebody
out here in St. Louis is going to shoot somebody else, and you know
you may not get that message through in time to ['^06] keep
them from being shot, if you send it via radio, or if it is classified,
and so forth. Who is the judge of whether or not to send that in
the clear instead of by code, and so forth ?
Colonel French. The writer of the message is responsible for the
classification of the message. General.
124. General Grunert. And Bratton was informed that it would
take about so long to get it over, and he did not say, "Get it out 1
Get it out over some other way !" — he was satisfied with what time
was going to be consumed in transmitting it ?
Colonel French. That was the means to transmit that message.
125. General Russell. Colonel, let us get this part clear. If a
message comes to you classified, then you have got to send it in code ?
Colonel French. I must send it in code ; yes, sir. That is written
in the regulations.
General Grunert. And you cannot send it in code over the tele-
phone ?
Colonel French. I cannot send it in code over the telephone with
any great dispatch. It would be faster to handle it by wire than it
would by telephone.
127. General Grunert. Are there any other questions? If not,
thanks very much.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Whereupon, at 11 : 23 a. m., the Board recessed until 2 p. m.)
116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[207] AFTERNOON SESSION
(The Board at 2 p. m. continued the hearing of witnesses.)
TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. CHARLES D. HEREON, RETIRED
(The witness was sworn by the Kecorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24. )
1. Colonel West. General, will you state to the Board your name,
rank, organization, and station?
General Herron. Maj. Gen. Charles D. Herron, Ketired.
2. Colonel West. And your address is Washington, D. C.
3. General Grunert. General, the Board, in attempting to get at
the facts, is looking into the War Department background and also
the background in Hawaii, and also to get the viewpoints of those
formerly in command and having knowledge of the facts, that is,
both prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is hoped,
because of your former assignment as Commanding General of the
Hawaiian Department, that you can throw some light on the subject.
In order to cover the large field in the limited time we have, indi-
vidual Board members have been assigned objectives and phases for
special investigation, although the entire Board will pass on all ob-
jectives and phases. General Russell has the particular phase in which
the investigation is being conducted now, so I shall ask him to lead
in propounding the questions, and the other members will fill in and
elaborate. General Russell.
4. General Russell. General Herron, when did you go on duty
as the Commander of the Hawaiian Department?
General Herron. In October 1937.
5. General Russell. And you were retired when ?
[^6*8] General Herron. In February of '41.
6. General Russell. During the time that you were there, General,
I assume that you had your plans for the defense of the Hawaiian
Department, including the Island of Oahu ?
General Herron. That is right.
7. General Russell. What did you regard as your principal mis-
sion as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?
General Herron. To make Pearl Harbor safe for the Navy.
8. General Russell. Did you have a prepared plan for the defense
of the Island of Oahu during your tenure as Commanding General
of the Department.
General Herron. We did.
9. General Russell. Do you recall, General Herron, how that was
designated — that plan — or what its title was ?
General Herron. No.
10. General Russell. Did it involve the employment of the means
available to the Army along with those that were available to the
Navy on the Island?
General Herron. It did.
11. General Russell. General, the Hawaiian Department is asso-
ciated with the 14th Naval District ; is that true?
General Herron. That is right ; particularly for planning.
12. General Russell. Particularly for planning. It is also true
that the Pacific fleet is based at Pearl Harbor, and this fact brings the
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 117
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department in contact with
the Commander of the Pacific fleet ; is that true ?
General Hereon. That is right.
[W9] 13. General Russell. Therefore there is a dual naval
organization with which the Commanding General of the Hawaiian
Department deals?
General Herron. That is correct.
14. General Russell. During the time that you were in command
of the Hawaiian Department, do you recall how many Commanders
of the 14th Naval District were on duty ?
General Hereon. Two.
15. General Russell. Could you name those, General Herron?
General Heeron. The man who was the senior man on this Navy
Board.
16. General Frank. Murfin.
General Heeeon. Admiral Murfin and Admiral Bloch.
17. General Russell. Now, did these two officers command the 14th
Naval District?
General Hereon. They did.
18. General Russell. During this same period that you were in
command of the Hawaiian Department who commanded the Pacific
fleet there?
General Hereon. Well, Admirals Bloch, Richardson, and Kimmel.
19. General Russell. General, what was the plan in effect by which
the combined forces of the Army and Navy were to be employed in this
area? Or let me make the question maybe a litle plainer: Was the
plan of mutual cooperation or agreement for the employment of the
forces in effect during the time you commanded the Hawaiian Depart-
ment?
General Heeeon. Yes.
[210] 20. jOeneral Russell. As the Commanding General of
the Hawaiian Department, therefore, you had no command function
which you could exercise as such over the naval units in that area?
General Heeeon. No.
21. General Russell. Nor did the Naval Commanders have any
such command over the Army ?
General Heeeon. No.
22. General Russell. General Herron, during this period of time
will you state briefly just what the relations were between you and these
Commanders of the Fleet with respect to cooperation?
General Hereon. The relations could not have been better at any
time. However, they were much more productive of results toward
the end of my regime than in the beginning.
23. General Russell. To what clo you ascribe this development?
General Heeeon. To the fact that in the beginning we were able
to obtain for the first time an agreement on joint action which covered
the entire field under Admiral Murfin with the Navy. Wlien Admiral
Bloch came in he reviewed that and said he accepted it as a whole ; he
did not want any changes. So that we had an understood background
on which to work, and the Navy Admirals were a high type of people.
Now, then, there was difficulty in working out the air cooperation
because it was entirely new and because that was the only place the
Army and Navy could really cooperate, in the air. The Navy was on
118 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the water, the Army on the land, but in the air there was a place for
cooperation, joint command, and [^-?-?] so forth, and we had
a good deal of trouble in arriving at some definite agreement about
that.
24. General Russell. Did you, before being retired, effect a work-
ing agreement for the employment of the joint air forces out there
which you considered effective ?
General Hereon, We effected that quite early, but by leaving some
blank spaces; we did not put down in writing, for instance, who would
command a joint expedition in the air, although we had something
that sounded that way.
25. General Russell. General, there have developed in our investi-
gation data about the plan for reconnaissance, the inshore patrol being
maintained by the Army and the distant patrol by the Navy. Was
that in effect prior to the time that you left Hawaii ?
General Hereon. It was. We made the agreement I think when
General Frank was there. Is that right?
26. General Frank. That is right.
General Herron. Yes.
27. General Russell. You had occasion to inaugurate a search or
patrol out there in the summer of 1940, didn't you, in an alert which
was in effect out there for some time during the summer and early
fall of 1940?
General Hereon. Will you ask me that question again?
28. General Russell. Did you, or not, have occasion to make effec-
tive this reconnaissance plan that I have just described, in the summer
and early fall of 1940?
General Herron. Whenever we had a joint maneuver, and we began
to have them in the summer and fall of 1940.
29. General Russell. Didn't you have an alert in 1940?
[£12] General Hereon. Oh, we had alerts, yes. We had an
alert in May of 1940, a total alert on the part of the Army, but the
Navy was not alerted at that time.
30. General Russell. Was the Navy alerted in June of 1940?
General Herron. Not the same time the Army was.
31. General Russell. General, what I am getting at — and we shall
check on this alert in a little bit, because we did want to ask you
some questions about it — what I am getting at is this : Was there at
any time, during your period of service as the Commanding General
of the Hawaiian Department, a situation where this system of recon-
naissance was made effective?
General Hereon, I hope General Frank will correct me in many
of my statements about the air out there, but this division for recon-
naissance purposes came about in this way : it was about that time that
the Navy was getting very jealous of the Army flying over the water,
and of course we had to fly over the water out there in order to go up
and down the Islands.
Now, then, a reconnaissance such as we could perform with the num-
ber of planes we had, had no military importance except for this:
it could scout for submarines, and the Navy were very anxious to
have us watch the close-in waters for submarines. Well, now, in order,
to avoid coming to grips with the Navy definitely, we worded it that
they would be responsible for distant reconnaissance, which of course
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 119
is logical, as they had the only planes that could go out and stay out;
and in order to assure that we could fly over the water we put ourselves
down for close-in reconnaissance, without defining that, but actually
it amounted to trying to train our people to spot hostile submarines
which came in close to shore. It had [213] no military sig-
nificance otherwise.
32. General Russell. General, I have extracted here from one of
the A. G. files the orders, messages, and so forth, which were inter-
changed between you and the War Department in the summer of 1940
which bear on this subject that we are discussing now, of reconnais-
sance. This file indicates that on the 17th of June you were directed
to immediately alert your complete defensive organization to deal with
possible trans-Pacific raid, to greatest extent possible without creat-
ing public hysteria or provoking curiosity of newspapers or alien
agents, and so forth. Now, there were a number of messages that went
back and forth. At one time you wrote General Marshall a letter, an-
other time he answered that letter, and finally on this subject of re-
connaissance, if I remember correctly, —
General Hereon. Have you my file of personal letters to General
Marshall ? Is that what you refer to?
33. General Russell. 1 have a copy of it before me now, and your
present testimony is not in conflict with, but it just doesn't dovetail
in with, this file.
General Herron. Yes.
34. General Russell. Here is a letter of October 15, 1940, of which
I shall have the copy in a moment. I think it was your letter to
General Marshall.
General Hereon. Yes.
35. General Russell. In which you said,
The Navy has resumed the outer air patrol at 180 miles, but has not asked
us to take any measures.
General Herron. "Has not asked us" ? Oh, yes.
[214] 36. General Russell. (Reading:)
has not asked us to take any measures. Having no evidence of marked change in
in the situation and with an eye to the conservation of material I have not
resumed the Army inner air patrol at 40 miles, nor the putting of the pursuit
planes in the air at dawn.
We now have guards on utilities and highway patrols at times when they will
observed. There are constantly small maneuvers (company) on the beaches. It
is my guess, however, that the international situation drifts to the left and that
precautions must increase.
Now, I was struck, in reading that file. General, with the fact that
as late as October 15, 1940, the Navy was maintaining a distant patrol,
and you had not resumed the inner air patrol. Now, we were wonder-
ing when this was taken off, and something of its history. Do you
recall it now ?
General Herron. The 40 miles was probably my personal direc-
tive to the Army only. I do not think I ever told the Navy how
far out they should go ; I was careful not to. Now, then, the patrol
was put on on that maneuver or alert of June 15th. We put every-
body on, did everything we could do, beginning on June 15, and
kept them on about six weeks. At the end of that time it became
apparent to me that the soldier on the beach was persuaded that
120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
there were no Japanese out there. There weren't any phines in the
sky or ships on the water or submarines underneath, and if they
came the soldier wouldn't see them. He would go through the mo-
tions of being out there, and he would be on the job, but it is just
not in flesh and blood to stand on [^i5] tiptoe indefinately.
Well, now, we had nothing more from the War Department. Noth-
ing. Not another word. So on my own responsibility I withdrew
the whole thing, called the alert off, and turned them to other things,
in order that I might get them in a frame of mind whereby they would
see something or hear something if they were put out on the beach.
So that in the meantime I got what I wanted by putting out these
battalions and companies in camp, to maneuver along the beach.
They would be there, but I did not tell them they were on alert. Now,
in a few weeks I called another alert, but I did not try to keep it six
weeks again.
37. General Russell. Did you call the alert on your own motion.
General, without anything from the War Department?
General Hereon. From that time on, yes; after June 15th I never
was ordered again by the War Department, but — —
38. General Russell. Now may we go back for a minute in an
attempt to develop the Navy end of this alert. Your alert originated
from this June 17th message, 1940, where you were directed to alert
your command against a trans-Pacific raid?
General Herron. That is right.
39. General Russell. Now I am merely giving you the date which
we have to connect up the Navy's tie-in with this alert : It seems that
on the 20th of June you wired the War Department that you had
received theirs of June 19th in which you had been directed to ease up
on the alert which had been ordered on June 17th, but you said.
Full aircraft and antiaircraft precautions will be continued with easing in
other lines. Local publicty on maneuvers favorable and not excited.
[216] But I am attempting now to get the Navy tie-in to this,
to see what happened.
On the 21st of June you wired the Chief of Staff this message :
In interpreting your cable consideration is given to the fact that Navy here
has nothing from Navy Department regarding Alert. Navy now turning over
to Army inshore aerial patrol in accordance with existing local joint agreement.
Will not modify Army Air and Antiair Alert before Monday except on further
advice from you.
On the following day General Strong signed a message for General
Marshall in whiqh he refers to your message of the 21st and says :
In view of present uncertainty instructions for the Navy other than local
Naval Forces have not been determined. Continue your Alert in accordance with
modifications directed in War Department Number 434.
Now, General Herron, the thing that we were getting at is this:
You went on an alert on a War Dej^artment order on the 17th of June.
Five days later, on the 22nd of June, it seems that the Navy had not
been ordered on an alert and that you people knew nothing about
what the Navy was doing ; is that true ?
General Hereon. We knew they were not on an alert. They were
in full conference between myself and the Navy on the spot there.
Of course, it modified my opinion as to the urgency of the alert, that
the Navy had not been alerted. It turned out afterwards to be a
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 121
drill, but we did not know that at the time. But imagining from the
fact that the Navy was not alerted, I [217] thought it might
be a drill.
40. General Kussell. Then, as late as 1940, when an alert out in
the Hawaiian Department was ordered, the War Department ordered
the Army on an alert, and that did not in any way affect the Navy :
they might or might not go on an alert ?
General Herron. That is right.
41. General Grunert. May I interject there: Do you know whether
or not the Navy queried the Navy Department as to the necessity of
going on an alert because you were on one ?
General Herron. They notified the Navy Department immediately.
I immediately notified the Navy within the hour, showed them my
message, and they notified the Navy Department, expecting orders,
and stood by for them and did not get them.
42. General Russell. Then, as a generalization this is true. General
Herron, that the War Department could order you to take action
of some kind which might have been set forth in this joint agree-
ment between the Army and Navy, but the Navy would not carry
out its part in this given action unless and until it received an order
from the Navy Department in Washington ?
General Herron. Except on a joint maneuver. On a joint ma-
neuver they carried out their part ; otherwise not.
43. General Russell. Well, now let us apply that to that recon-
naissance problem out there. You had the close-in reconnaissance,
and the Navy the distant reconnaissance, under your agreement ; that
was true?
General Herron. That is right.
44. General Russell. Now, the Army ordered an alert. You went
on the alert and established the inner patrol. The Navy received
no orders from the Navy Department. Therefore, the [218]
distant patrol did not become effective ; is that true ?
General Hereon. At that time they had a distant patrol on all
the time, as I remember it. We had great difficulty in finding out
exactly what the Navy was doing. They were not very frank about
the distant patrol, and we figured because they didn't have very
many planes to put out they didn't want to confess that there were
only one or two or three planes out in a day, so they did not tell
us very fully how many they had out. I tried to find out indirectly,
but I never did press the matter, and I never knew exactly what
they were doing about the distant patrol.
45. General Grunert. Did you have any means for any distant
patrol, if you saw fit to do such patrolling to accomplish your own
mission ?
General Herron. We had the old B-18, and General Frank and I
were in full agreement that when a war came on we would do what-
ever we thought was necessary in the defense of the Island.
46. General Grunert. Yes.
General Herron. The joint agreement was so drawn that we could
do it and not violate its terms. We could.
47. General Grunert. Well, let me put it this way: Here is the
Hawaiian Command. It has a mission of protection. In order to
get information as to what may be against you, you should first have
122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the direction from it is coming and where it is, and also know what
is going around your shores, by your inshore patrol. You depend
on the Navy, according to your agreement, for distant reconnaissance.
Now, then, was it your conception of your responsibilities 1:2191
to insure that such a distant reconnaissance was actually in being
and, if it was not, to do your best toward doing your own distant recon-
naissance ?
General Hekron. In time of peace I did not need to be absolutely
sure. In time of war I did need to be sure. If I was not certain, I
would use my own planes, and I thought that that term "close-in and
distant patrolling" was a very elastic term; and, as I say, General
Frank and I were in full agi^eement : we would go just as far as we
thought it was necessary and our planes would allow us to in war.
48. General Grunert, Then, on an alert in time of peace, an alert
ordered by the War Department, which presumably was in anticipa-
tion of what might happen, you did not think it was necessary to
use any of your own means to go out beyond your inshore patrol ?
General Herron. Well, my impression is that the 40 miles became
about a hundred miles at that time, but that that is as far as we
thought we ought to send the B-18s w^ithout a real reason. If one of
them got down at sea there was very little means to take care of those
people, and we would have a great deal of responsibility towards
the parents of the mei) in it and towards the War Department if we
sent them too far and too often.
49. General Grunert. All right ; go ahead.
50. General Russell. I wish you would read the General my last
question. I think he gave me some experience without answering it.
The Reporter (reading) :
Now, the Army ordered an alert. You went on the alert and established the
inner patrol. The Navy [220] received no orders from the Navy De-
partment. Therefore, the distant patrol did not become effective; is that true?
General Herron. My answer was that they had a distant patrol
en at all times, as I remember.
51. General Russell. Would that be prior to this alert ?
General Herron. Yes.
52. General Russell. Of June 18th?
General Herron, Is that right, that they had ?
53. General Frank. I do not recall when they put that on. I
know they put it on.
54. General Russell. Do you think it was on when you were
relieved ?
General Herron. Oh, yes. All .that summer of 1940 I tried to find
out details, exactly how many, but without results.
55. General Russell. Well, is it your impression that that distant
patrol out there was maintained by the Navy constantly prior
General Herron. Yes, every day.
56. General Russei.l. Wlien did it begin ?
57. General Frank. Don't know.
General Herron. No, we don't know when it began,
58. General Russell. You didn't know much about it?
General Herron. There when we first went out there the Navy
did not trust us with very much. They told us very little, and we
had to build that up.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 123
59. General Grunert. You had doubts, though, about the effi-
ciency of that patrol on 360 degree circle ? Did you or did you not ?
[221] General Herron. It was physically impossible with the
aumber of planes they had. We knew that. With the 50 planes they
perhaps had and a million square miles, you cannot do it.
GO. General Ghunert. Then, it was a distant patrol, but its effective-
ness was problematical.
61. General Kussell. Now, that being the case, General Herron,
what did you mean in your letter of October 15, 1940, in which you
stated that the Navy had resumed the outer patrol?
General Herron. Presumably it had been off at some time. I do
not remember more than that.
62. General Russell. When General Short came out there some-
time in February, I believe, of 1941, so far as you know, this distant
reconnaissance was being conducted by the Navy, in whatever manner
it was being conducted?
General Herron. They assured us it was being, in very general
terms.
63. General Russell. Yes. Now, as a result of naval activity or of
(he Naval Intelligence personnel, were you furnished periodically or
frequently with the information which they obtained as to Japanese
activities in the Hawaiian Department or in the Hawaiian frontier?
General Herron. Well, that also was a development. When we went
out, when I first went there, the Army was not entrusted with any
naval secrets. They did not give us anything. We had to work that
thing through, and by the time I left them there was complete
reciprocity on information the two services obtained.
64. General Russell. How frequently would you get a report on
what they had discovered about the Japanese?
[^£2] General Herron. Daily.
65. General Russell. You got that daily?
General Herron. Yes.
66. General Russell. Who was your G-2?
General Herron. Colonel Marsclen.
67. General Russell. Do you know wnere he is now ?
General Herron. He is out there as G-4.
68. General Grunert. As a matter of record, he is one of the wit-
nesses that is scheduled to be called.
69. General Frank. May I interject this one question?
70. General Russell. Yes.
General Herron. May I add something to that?
71. General Russell. Yes, sir.
General Herron. There is a man here now in this building named
Bicknell who was an Assistant Q-2. Colonel Bicknell.
72. General Grunert. Also for the record, he is another witness
who will be called.
General Herron. All right.
73. General ^RANK. I would just like to ask one question.
74. General Russell. Surely.
75. General Frank. Do you feel confident that the information on
Japanese operations that you got from the Navy was the full and com-
plete information that they had available?
General Herron. Towards the end, yes.
124 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
76. General Russell. General Herron, did yon have very intimate
snpervision of the Department out there in yonr command bj^ the
War Department.
General Herron. No.
77. General Russell. Did you have any trips of inspection by
[223] General Staff officers out to the Department while you were
its Commander?
General Herron. General Marshall came out.
78. General Russell. Do you recall any others?
General Herron. Colonel Russell.
79. General Grunert. Colonel Russell was of the WPD, was he
not ; War Plans Division ?
General Herron. Operations Division, yes.
80. General Grunert. Yes.
81. General Russell. On the question of the training of your
troops, did you get any directives from the War Department?
General Herron. Yes, we got the perfunctory, once-a-year orders
they sent out to the whole Army.
82. General Russell. What did they emphasize; do joii recall?
General Herron. No.
83. General Russell. That was all I was going to have.
84. General Grunert. I might put in a few questions here. If they
happen to touch what you are going into later, why, let me know.
When you turned over to General Short, I presume that you turned
over all instructions, plans, orders, and files that would make your
knowledge available to him so that he would carry on?
General Herron. I was very careful to do that.
85. General Grune:rt. Was there anything that you recall in your
turning over to him that ^-ou spoke to him about particularly, either
in cautioning, in calling attention to this or that, or what-not, that
may occur to you now?
[224^] General Herron. Well, I spoke to him particularly, of
course, about our Navy relations, our civilian relations, about the
Japanese situation.
86. General Grunert. As to the Japanese situation, can you give
us an idea of your size-up of the so-called Japanese situation, particu-
larly as to their loyalty, as to their danger in the event of a war
with Japan, as to their danger to your security or your carrying out
your plans — along those lines?
General Herron. Well, perhaps the best answer is to say within the
last few days that Hawaiian Japanese Battalion (Italy) has been
cited by General Clark for distinguished conduct in battle and has
over a thousand purple hearts, onq battalion, plus medals of merit
and distinguished service crosses : 14 (distinguished service crosses. ,
Now, then, our investigation upon which our war plans were based
was that that would be the situation in time of war, that the Japanese
would turn out to be loyal. We did not know how many, but we were
satisfied that at least 5 percent were committed to Xh& American
cause, either through conviction or by force or circumstances, such as
being persona non grata to the Japanese Government. Another 5
percent we said would be irreconcilable, hostile to the United States.
The other 90 percent, like anybody else, would sit on the fence until
they saw which way the cat was going to jump.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 125
Now, then, the percentage of loyal ones has turned out to be much
larger than we anticipated. They have been proven in battle. We
have no doubt about the leading young Japanese being pro- American
and being able to control all the rest. They are not now and never
were any menace to our security out there, and that is what we con-
cluded, and we drew our war plans accordingly.
[^25] 87. General Grunert. In that respect, what was your
conclusion as to sabotage, to be expected and to be guarded against?
General Herron. We concluded there would not be any sabotage,
and there was not ; not one instance. General Frank got the Air Corps
away from putting all their planes in the middle of the air fields, and
built the first bunkers out in the bushes. Before, it was feared that
they would get the airplanes. He went ahead and developed that.
Had they been out in the bushes on December 7th the situation would
have been quite different.
87. General Grunert. In that alert you mentioned I understood you
to say there was an effort not to alarm the public. Did you consider
that any of the alert measures that were taken under that alert
alarmed the public ?
General IIerron. Yes. It was the first time that troops had been
turned out for an alert with the ball ammunition ; and the issue of ball
ammunition and of ammunition to the Coast Artillery started every-
one's imagination, and many people thought the Japanese Fleet was
just off the coast. Some of the officers sent their families to the hills
that night.
88. General Grunert. Since that alert, when you have had addi-
tional alerts, practice alerts, and so forth, were they under assumed war
conditions with ball ammunition ?
General Herron. Yes ; from that time on.
89. General Grunert. Then, did those alerts after the first one
alarm the public?
General Herron. No; never again.
90. General Grunert. Did any of those alerts disclose what your in-
tention was in the line of just what you were going to [326] do ?
General Herron. We were very careful not to do the same thing
twice out there in any maneuver or alert, except, of course, the anti-
aircraft. We had to put them in about the same place.
91. General Grunert. The aircraft that you had during an alert
was dispersed ?
General Herron. Yes, sir; still further.
92. General Grunert. What various kinds of alerts did you have?
Just one, or did you have a series of them in what you did in each alert?
General Herron. We had two series of alerts, because I felt the
situation was tense.
93. General Grunert. Did you have Alert No. 1, in which you did
certain things, Alert No. 2 in which 3^ou did certain things, and Alert
No. 3 in which you did certain things, or were they just alerts?
General Herron. That was a refinement that the training men put
over on General Short when he came out there. I told him I would
not do any such thing. There was only one kind of alert, and that was
a total alert, and then I would do it in accordance with the situation.
But the training men liked refinements, an they recommended three
kinds because the Navy had three kinds. But they did not get to the
126 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
real point of the thing. The Navy has tliree kinds, bnt the all-out alert
is number one, always. Now they ease up into two and three ; but these
young men did not know that, and when Short came out they put ovei-
the three and got them reversed, so that Short went into the Number 1,
which was sabotage. It did not seem to him a very important change,
I don't suppose, and it turned out to [327] be vital. It was too
much of a refinement.
94. General Grunert. I understand you to say that your primary
mission was the protection of the fleet when the fleet was in ?
General Herron. Pearl Harbor and the fleet.
95. General Frank, I would like to ask one question right there.
Your plans for meeting any situation in that department were suf-
ficiently completely so that when they were made effective no addi-
tional instructions were necessary. Is that correct?
General Herron. That is correct.
96. General Frank. Therefore, if a critical situation should arise,
all that you needed to have been told was "Situation critical. Act
accordingly" ?
General Herron. Alert. It would have been a mistake to have
issued any orders. These several orders would have confused the thing
if you had.
97. General Frank. There was no necessity for a special mention
of sabotage or any other item, because all of those were taken care of
in your war plans ?
General Herron. That is correct.
98. General Russell. General Herron, I have made some more or
less detailed investigation to determine the number of alerts in the
Department from the date of this ordered alert of June I7th, 1940,
until December 7th, 1941. You were in command from June, 1940, to
February, 1941. Do you remember any alert that you had during
that period except the one that we have discussed already ?
General Herron. I cannot give you any data as to the number of the
times.
[228] 99. General Russell. In a general way, is it your im-
pression that prior to the Alert of June I7th, 1940, you had had other
alerts ?
General Herron. Yes.
100. General Russell. Had they been directed by the War Depart-
ment because of some international situation, or had they been initi-
ated by you as a matter of training?
General Herron. They were initiated by me as a matter of training.
101. General Russell. So far as you recall, therefore, during your
entire tour of duty as the commanding general of that department,
there was only one War Department ordered alert?
General Herron. I am quite sure that is the case.
102. General Russell. And you think that the alert had practically
disappeared in October of 1940?
General Herron. I say, I took it off entirely in six weeks, and then
put it back on again as soon as I thought the command could bear it.
103. General Russell. There was some discussion between you and
General Marshall, by correspondence, as to the effect of alerts on the
morale of the troops. Do you recall that?
General Herron. No.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 127
104. General Grunert. I have one more question on alerts. The
fact that you received a directive from the War Department to alert
the command: Did that leave the impression in your mind that if
anything serious happened in the future the War Department would
direct you to go on the alert, or leave it to your judgment?
General Herron. I always felt that I was entirely responsible out
there and I had better protect the island,
[M&l 105, General Frank. I would like to ask you this ques-
tion: In view of the fact that the Navy was not alerted during the
Army alert in the summer of 1940, had there been occasion for real
alarm, and had there been a Jap attack, what, in your opinion, would
have been the result of the naval attitude ?
General Herron. The Navy would unquestionably have gone on the
alert had there been any evidence whatsoever. I had no evidence,
I had only a War Department order.
106. General Frank. You did not know whether it was based on
an impending threat, or not?
General Herron. No. It was a fair conclusion, though, that it was
not, after a day or two when the Navy got no orders.
107. General Russell. I did not get that. General.
General Herron, That when the Navy did not get any orders, like
ours, it was a fair conclusion that it was a drill and not based on an
international situation. I can tell you — I think it is all right to — that
General Marshall told me afterward that he got worried about the
international situation personally, about that time. So it was a War
Department function entirely.
108. General Grunert. During your tour as commanding General,
Hawaiian Department, did you frequently or infrequently get infor-
mation from the War Department as to the international situation,
particularly as to the relationship between the United States and
Japan?
General Herron, I got one such message, which was that Germany
had marched into Poland in the fall of 1939. That is the only thing
I ever got from the War Department,
109. General Grunert. Did you feel that it was necessary for
[230] you to have a fairly intimate picture of things happening
in the Pacific and in the Far East in order for you to accomplish
your mission?
General Herron. I felt that it would be a great help, but that I was
condemned to go along in the dark as to that. I assumed the War
Department had much more knowledge than I had, but I also assumed
that what they had could not be very vital or they would tell me
something.
110. General Frank. What would have been your reaction had you
been told that there was a Japanese striking force of six carriers, two
battleships, and a large number of submarines in the Marshalls about
that time ?
General Herron. I would have been very much alarmed by that
message. The Navy Department sent out that there was a task force
being formed in the islands ; that there were two of them, one in the
islands. They sent such a message in November, that there were two
task forces forming up, one of which was in the mandated islands.
128 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
111. General Frank. In November of 1941?
General Herron. Yes, sir. I would have been very much alarmed
by that.
112. General Frank. You say the Navy did send that?
General Herron. Yes ; they sent it out to the Naval District. It is
in the Roberts Report.
113. General Frank. Do you know whether or not it got to General
Short ?
General Herron. I do not know what got to General Short, except
that his staff have told me that the Navy were quite meticulous about
keeping us informed all that fall, and summer.
114. General Grunert. Up to the time you left, what was the
[^31] sentiment or the sense of the people in the Army in Hawaii
as to a sense of security ? Did they feel that they were secure with the
Navy in the harbor and the Army on the job, or did tlie}^ feel a sense
of insecurity? Were you able to judge that?
General Herron. The people who knew thought that we were fairly
secure against any attack by surface ships, any attempt to land. We
also knew, a very few people. General Frank and myself, perhaps,
that an air force could come in and do damage. We hoped to be able
to follow them out and destroy the carriers. But I do not think we
had any idea that we could turn back an aerial attack entirely, for
this reason : that the only anti-aircraft we had was that which was
prepared against high-altitude bombing. We did not have the small-
caliber stuff which you need to do anything about dive bombing. So
we felt they could come in ; that they would not come in there unless
they had enough planes to overcome what planes we had.
115. General Grunert. Do you make a distinction between your
protective measures when the fleet was in the harbor or when it was
out at sea? In other words, did you feel more secure, as far as your
command was concerned, when the fleet was in the harbor than when
it was out? Did that ever come to your mind or did you ever base
any decisions upon that?
General Herron. We assumed in all our planning that we would
depend on our own resources. Anything the Navy gave us was so
much velvet.
116. General Grunert. They you did not feel that you had to take
any particular measures when the fleet was in than when it was out?
Your measures were all-inclusive, whether the fleet was in or out. Is
that the idea ?
General Herron. They were the best we could do any time,
[£32] whether the fleet was in or out.
117. General Grunert. Considering the air component of your
command there, ordinarily what state of readiness did you demand of
it, and in that state of readinesss can you recall approximately what
time it would take to get into the state of alert ?
General Herron. There was a long period in which the Air Corps
was undergoing a very great expansion, and the training problem was
really uppermost. They had to train crews and they had to train
technicians. They had to train air pilots and other flying people
and their instructors, and each time they woidd get about ready, there
would be a new expansion, and we would have to do it over again.
There finally came a time — I don't remember when it was — when Gen-
PROCEEDI]V[GS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 129
eral Frank recommended to me that we go to bat ; that we would have
to do something like this, as I remember it: Put every man we had
that could fly on a crew, regardless of his present duty. His school
duty could not stop. So we organized all the flying crews we could
with what personnel we had there and put them into the air and
worked them. It was a make-shift, but it was the best we could do
with the people we had and the planes we had.
118. General Russell. General Herron, I have two or three other
details. I think General Grunert and General Frank have eliminated
some of the notes I had, but I have just one or two questions on this
reconnaissance matter.
You did not have any radar or any air-warning service?
General Herron. No, sir.
119. General Russell. If air patrolling was expanded about a hun-
dred miles, then the possibility of an air attack [^33] develop-
ing and becoming effective in its operations was pretty large, since
you did not have the means for such distant reconnaisance?
General Herrox. If we spotted them a hundred miles out there would
be no time to do anything.
120. General Russell. That is what I had in mind.
121. General Grunert. You did not have any radar or any air-warn-
ing service or interceptor command as such. Did 3'ou have Triple
A. I. S. service for the antiaircraft?
General Herron. Yes.
122. General Grunert. You had that ?
General Herron. Yes.
123. General Grunert. That would give a certain amount of warn-
ing to the antiaircraft itself?
General Herron. Yes, sir.
124. General Russell. The final subject that I have. General, is this :
In the reports which this Board has seen on the attack of December
7th, 1941, it is stated almost uniformly, in all of those reports, that
the nature of the attack indicated very clearly that the attacking force
knew down to the minutest details where all of our materiel was, in-
cluding our ships, airplanes and hangars. In other words, the Japanese
Army and Navy had been completely advised about all of those things
and had worked out this attack with very great detail. The question
is this : Was there any way to have prevented the Japanese people from
acquiring this intimate knowledge about our installations, equipment,
materiel out there?
General Herron. No way. Hawaii, or Pearl Harbor, is a gold-fish
bowl. We assumed that the only rhing the Japanese did not know was
how we would use our troops in the event of [^-J-i] attack.
Ever}' thing else we assumed that they must know.
125. General Frank. I did not get an answer to a question that I
asked a little while ago about the Army being on the alert and the Navy
not being on the alert, and what would have been the situation had
there been an attack. You stated that had there been war the Navy
would have gone on the alert. What I was after was this : Let us as-
sume that in 1940, when the Army was in that alert, that there was a
real menace and that an attack had come similar to the one that came
on December 7th with the Army on the alert and the Navy not. What
do you think would have happened ?
79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1 10
130 COXGRESSIOXAL IXVESTIGATIOX PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Herron. Well, approximately what happened on December
7th. The dive bombers would have come in. The Army could not have
stopped them with its three-inch guns posted up on the hills. They
necessarily would bring more planes than we had. If we had 50 combat
planes they would bring 150, surely.
126. General Gruxekt. You mean that the same consequences or
consequences of a like or greater or less nature, because of what you
have told us about what your being on the alert meant, such as dis-
persion of planes and certain protective measures that may not have
applied to the alert that the Hawaiian Command was on on December
Tth?
General Herrox. I would like to repeat my answer. They would not
have got anything like the number of our planes that they did get.
They would' have gotten the sliips in the harbor. We would have
knocked down a lot of their planes, their fighting planes.. but I think
their bombers could still have come in. enough of them to destroy those
ships. That was what we were there for. to do defend the ships and
the harbor. Whether or [235'] not we saved our owii planes was
not important relatively.
127. General Gruxert. That there was not enough antiaircraft in
and around the harbor to have really denied the air to the Japanese
bombers?
General Herrox. There was not the right kind of anti-aircraft.
It was small-caliber, quick-fire. At that time the small-caliber stuff
was all going to England. This was quite proper, but erroneous.
128. General Gruxert. If there are no more questions, let me say,
General, that we are after facts, and any lead that we can get which
would helj) us in determining the sources of facts is very much wel-
comed by the Board. Having had years of experience in that com-
mand, can you thmk of anything that you might add to your testi-
mony which might be of assistance to the Board ?
General Herrox. I would like to make some comments on the Rob-
erts Report. It is a very wonderful document and a great land-mark
in this thing, and a point of departure, so that it is bound to be influ-
ential. But I would like to say a few things about some of the conclu-
sions in that report.
129. General Gruxert. Proceed.
General Herrox. I have here a newspaper copy of that report. One
of their conclusions was that the orders given by the War Depart-
ment and Xavy Department made it obligatory upon the two com-
manders out there to confer, and they say :
These commanders failed to confer with respect to the •warning orders issued
on and after November 27th and to adopt and use existing plans to meet the
emergency.
They say they failed to confer. Their own report says that on the
27th. the day after the orders came in, the order from 12361 the
War Department and the one from the Xavy Department, they did
get together. ' That was Thursday. They also got together on Mon-
day, Tuesday and Wednesday of the week the attack came. They go
ahead and say that if the orders issued by the Chief of Staff of the
Army and the Chief of Naval Operations on November 27th had been
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 131
complied with certain things would have been done, and then they
say:
None of these conditions was in fact inaugurated —
that is, alerts and so forth, of the right kind —
or maintained, for the reason that the responsible commanders failed to consult
and cooperate as to necessary action based upon warning and to adopt measures
enjoined by the orders given them by the chiefs of the Army and Navy commands
in Washington.
That is, they say the responsible commanders failed to consult.
Their own record shows that they consulted.
The report says they failed to cooperate. There is not the slightest
evidence that there was any failure of cooperation between those two
commanders in this whole Roberts Report ; and everything that I have
heard since leads me to believe that there was real cooperation between
those commanders; that there was no hard feeling of any kind.
It says they failed to cooperate as to the necessary action based upon
the warning. The necessary action was all written down in the joint
agreement between the Army and Navy. I believe they called it a
joint agreement. It says that they failed to adopt measures enjoined
by the orders given them by the chiefs of the Army and Navy com-
mands in Wasfiinsrton.
To go back to those two messages : Did they fail to obey [237]
their orders? The Chief of Staff's message informed the command-
ing general, Hawaiian Department, that negotiations with Japan
seems to have ended with little likelihood of their resumption, and
went ahead and gave more information about the general situation.
Also, that is the one that stated that it was very desirable that the Japs
should commit the first overt act. The order which was given him
was this: The message directed him, even prior to hostile action —
and I think the words "hostile action" are very significant ; they show
that somebody assumed that the Japanese would declare war and
then move out, because it does not make any sense in connection with
a surprise attack to tell him to do something even prior to hostile
action. It shows the frame of mind of the War Department, that the
Japanese were going to declare war and then perhaps move out, but
after they had declared war, apparently, he should undertake such
reconnaissance and other measures which he deemed necessary. That
is all the order he got — to undertake such reconnaissance and other
measure as he deemed necessary. He did not disobey or fail to obey
that order. So I think there is no ground for any criticism on that
count.
The Navy message, which of course had a binding effect upon the
Army, directed the Navy, after giving them a lot of information, to
make defense deployment and preparations for carrjnng out war
tests. That is the only order the Navy got. That bears on the accusa-
tion in here that those fellows failed to adopt measures enjoined by
the orders given them.
Nothing was said in any order from either department about con-
sulting and conferring ; and they go ahead again and say that it was
a dereliction of duty on the part of each of them — that is Kimmel
and Short — not to consult and confer. It is conclu- [238] sive
that they did consult and confer.
132 COKGRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Some place else in this report they make it a point that they did not
have an}' conference directed to the accomplishment of these orders.
They had these four conferences, and apparently the agenda was in
connection with the garrisoning by the Army for the relief of the
Marines who were on some of those western islands. I think that
was the agenda. But there is certainly no evidence that they ignored
the message of the 2Tth.
As evidence that they did confer, it states here that General Short
asked Captain ]SIcMorris, Operations man for the ^avy, about the
probability of an aerial attack, and McMorris said there was no prob-
ability of any such thing. So it would seem they were conferring
on the probability of attack.
So that the report is not a hundred per cent. It goes ahead and
discusses the state of mind of these people and says that the opinion
prevailed in diplomatic, military and naval circles and the public
press that any immediate attack by Japan would be in the Far East,
though it saj's that the existence of such a view, however prevalent,
did not relieve the commanders of responsibility for the protection
of our most important outposts.
That is perfectly true. I agree with that. So that, in my opinion,
these fellows were guilty. But beyond this general opinion, which
was revealed in these messages — there was a message from Short —
all those things worked on the people's frame of mind. I think that
the War and Xavy Department messages led them to believe that there
was not to be any attack on Hawaii.
On Xovember 24th, the Xavy De]3artment sent Kimmel this
message :
[239] A surprise movement on the Philippine Islands or Guam is possible.
It seems to me that the obvious inference from that is. and what
they didn't say is, that they believed an attack on Hawaii at least to
be highly improbable. That was on Xovember Sith that they told
Kimmel that. That is bound to have some effect on the ordinary
man that believes that God lives in the Xavy Department and the
War Department and who has not been on the outside and found
out that it is the Devil.
On December 6th, the day before the attack, the Xavy Department
sent this message to the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet out there —
and all this, of course, got to the Army, because the Xavy showed
it to them. The message said that naval commanders on outlying
Pacific islands might be — and the words "might be'" are in code —
authorized to destroy confidential })apers at that time or later under
conditions of greater emergency.
That was on the day before. They were expecting a greater emer-
gency some time later, but certainly not the next day. That had its
influence, of course, on Kimmel and Short.
I quote this not because it bears on whether they were guilty or
not. but on the degree of punishment of these fellows.
I would like to tell you something else off the record.
(Informal discussion off the record.)
130. General Gruxert. Your comments regarding the Roberts Re-
port— are they based on full knowledge of what that report contains,
or how much knowledge of the Roberts Report had you when you
made these conclusions as to the report ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 133
General Herkon. They are based entirely on a study of the
[24-0] Roberts Report. I never had any access to the record.
131. General Gkunert. If there are no further questions, we thank
you very much for coming down.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
[341] TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL PHILIP HAYES, U. S.
ARMY; COMMANDING GENERAL, THIRD SERVICE COMMAND;
BAETIMORE, MD.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board your
name, rank, organization, and station.
General Hayes. Philip Hayes; Major General, U. S. Arni}^; Com-
manding General, Third Service Command; Baltimore, Md.
2. General Grunert. General, the Board, in attempting to get at
this, is looking into the background and viewpoints prior to and
leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is hoped that because
of your assignment in the Hawaiian Department, as Chief of Staff
of that Department, you may be able to throw some light on the
subject. In order to cover our large field in the limited time available,
it has become necessary to assign members of the Board to particular
fields of investigation, or special investigation, although the Board
will pass on all the fields. This particular field, for the testimony
we expect to get out of you, we have assigned to General Russell,
and he will lead in propounding the questions, and other Members
will ask such questions as they set fit. General Russell.
3. General Russell. General Hayes, you were Chief of Staff of the
Hawaiian Department in 1941 ?
General Hayes. Yes, sir ; I was.
4. General Russell. How long prior to that had you occupied
that position ?
General Hayes. 1940. I was Acting, the latter part of 1939, when
Osmun was not so well, and then, when I got the [-4^] place,
early January, I think, 1940.
5. General Russell. You became the Chief of Staff?
General Hayes. Yes.
6. General Russell. When were you relieved from that assignment ?
General ILvyes. "Wlien I left Hawaii, officially, which was as I re-
member November 5, 1941. I went on leave, though, some time in the
middle of October, prior to my departure, and ceased functioning as
Chief of Staff some time in the middle part of October.
7. General Russell. 1941 ?
General Hayes. 1941.
8. General Russell, Bv whom were you succeeded as Chief of
Staff?
General Hayes. By Colonel Phillips.
9. General Russell. Had Phillips been on duty on the staff of the
Commanding General out there prior to the time that he became Chief
of Staff?
General Hayes. He was.
10. General Russell. In what capacity?
134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Hayes. He was brought over there by General Short to suc-
ceed me as Chief of Staff, and so he was given a course of training in
all the G positions, G-1, -2, -3, and -4, general supervisory training,
and some of the other special staff positions, prior to the time he took
over.
11. General Russell. Then you were on duty out there in the
Hawaiian Department as a staff officer, either Assistant Chief of Staff
or Chief of Staff, for about how long?
General Hayes. Four years. ,
[24^1 12. General Russell. General, you had an opportunity
during your period of service out there to deal with the Navy personnel
which was on duty in Pearl Harbor and thereabout?
General Hayes. Yes, sir.
13. General Russell. That, I believe, is the 14th Naval District, and
also the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet ?
General Hayes. Originally it was the 14th Naval District — I am
talking over the span of years that I was there — and then the Fleet
was brought in there, and there w^ere the ships afloat and the shore
installation.
14. General Russell. Now, you say the Fleet was brought in there.
Did that occur while you were on duty there? It had not been in
there before ?
General Hayes. Oh, yes.
15. General Russell. Now, about what time was that?
General Hayes. I don't remember exactly, but it seems to me about
1939. In the 1939 maneuvers, the Fleet which had been based on San
Diego was brought over there, and Admiral Richardson was the
CINCUS ; and it remained there. Although it was still based on San
Diego, there was a part of the fleet which was based on Honolulu or
that district. That part of the Fleet as I remember it, was under Vice
Admiral Adolphus Andrews, but the main part of the Fleet was there
most of the time from there on.
16. General Russell. From 1939?
General Hayes. There still was the 14th Naval District and the
Fleet ; which were the ships afloat.
17. General Russell. But the Naval District had been there for a
long while ?
[244] General Hayes. That is correct ; yes.
18. General Russell. And the only change in the Naval situation
during the time that you were on duty in the period that you have
described was this basing of a considerable part of the Pacific Fleet
on Honolulu ?
General Hayes. That is correct.
19. General Russell. Now, you had opportunity, I assume, to work
in and out with a staff of the Commanders of both the District and
the Fleet?
General Hayes. I did.
20. General Russell. What in general would you say about the
spirit of cooperation which existed between the two services, Army
and Navy, during this period that you were there ?
General Hayes. Most cordial, and very marked in contrast to
what it has been some other places; particularly noticeable there in
its cordiality.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 135
21. General Russell. General, -^e have been giving consideration
to the plan.
22. General Frank. May I ask a question?
23. General Russell. Yes.
24. General Frank. Did it improve during this period?
General Hayes. During the four years, you mean ? .
25. General Frank. Yes.
General Hayes. Yes; I saw a gradual improvement from the time
that General Moses and General Herron came. It got to a very high
peak under Herron, but it maintained that same level.
26. General Russell. After General Short came out, you saw no
change at all?
General Hayes. I saw no change.
[24s] 27. General Russell. General we have been discussing
with different witnesses and have been studying the plans for the
defense of Oahu and the Naval base, there, at Honolulu, those criti-
cal installations on that island, with some considerable interest. Pass-
ing over the general questions, we will go to the details and discuss
them with you.
We have been interested in this question of the reconnaissance
that was set up between Army and Navy, under which the Navy
was to do the distant reconnaissance and the Army the close-in re-
connaissance. Do you have any recollection of that plan, of its general
provisions ?
General Hayes. Yes, sir; I do. That plan you are referring to
was a Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, which was
based on the theory that the outer reconnaissance should be the 'Nhyj
and the defense of the land itself was the Army. To the best of
my recollection the outer patrol was 300 or 350 miles around the
Island, the Navy responsibility. In addition to that outer patrol
there were "area forces," so to speak. Navy task forces, that covered
in their movements certain directions from Oahu. There were some
destroyers used also in addition to the Navy patrol planes.
The inner patrol was about fifty miles out. That was a Navy
responsibility, with surface vessels with with air vessels. We re-
enforced the inner patrol with some of our air.
We had also an agreement with the Navy as to the joint use of
Army and Navy, of air fields on Oahu, dependent upon this situation
and the mission.
The land defense was a defense of the Army. In addition to that,
the Navy had an antiaircraft defense in Pearl Harbor, [^4^]
which was combined land-and-boat or -ship, which tied in with our
antiaircraft defense. There were several arguments as to the com-
mand of certain air ships. Navy or Army, according to the mission.
That was worked out, though. And so the theory of the defense was —
the outer defense, the Navy ; land defense, the Army.
28. General Russell. General, we have attempted to visualize situ-
ations out there which might develop and have to be controlled or reg-
ulated by this cooperative-agreement idea under which your defense
and reconnaissance operated. When did these patrol systems become
effective ? When were they actually carried on ?
General Hayes. Do you refer to the time of day ?
136 COXGRESSIOXAL IXVESTIGATIOX PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
29. General RrssEix. Xo: I am referrinof now in period of time.
Were they perpetual all the time you were out there ^ During the four
years, was this patroling going on ?
General Hayes. Xo. Xot all the time. They were developed largely
during General Herron's period, and carried on from then. I forget
the date that General Herron came out. My recollection is General
Moses left about March 1. or something, the period in March 1938. and
General Herron came out and became Commanding General : so from
March 1938 on they were developed.
30. General Russell. Do you mean that during that period of time
from 1938 imtil you left out there, in October 1941. eveiy day. this
patroling. the distant patroling and the near-in patroling. was actually
being conducted (
General Hates. I couldn't say that. I said that was in the Hawaiian
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. I do know that [--'-i^] I spoke
to General Herron and General Short, for them to check as to whether
the outer patrol was on.
31. General Russell. Do you know whether they did make the check
or not (
General Hates. They did. numerous times. They were satisfied that
it was. at the times that I asked them.
32. General Russell. Do you know, of your own knowledge, whether
or not during this period that you have described, that outer patrol
was actually taking place i
General Hates. Oh. I knew that it was taking place: yes: but
whether it was continual or whether it was spot patrols, or whether
it was periodic patrols. I didn't know.
33. General Russell. In other words, you knew generally it was
going on. but the details of it were unknown to you ?
General Hates. I do not remember the deta*il of it.
34. General Russell. How many ships were out. or where they
went, on those things, yoti did not know ?
General Hates. Xo. I do remember that when we looked into it
at various stages, the answer they gave seemed to be satisfactory.
35. General Russell. Xow. let us discuss the inner patrol as con-
ducted out there during your tour of duty, by Army people. About
how continuous was that ?
General Hates. That patrol was not continuoits. It was certain
times of the day as I remember, largely at the dawn period, and after
dawn, until seven or eight o'clock, practically every day. is my recollec-
tion of it. It is rather vague, but that is what I recollect.
36. General Russell. Do you think that that was in effect [--^5]
in the fall of 1941 when you left out there. General?
General Hates. I think it was in effect, yes. As to whether it was
daily. I can't recollect.
37. General Russell. Xow, General, as Chief of Staff you would
have been acquainted with information which reached the Hawaiian
Department from the "War Department relating to our relations with
the Japanese Government, wouldn't you?
General Hayes. I would have been : yes. sir.
38. General Russell. You would have known it ?
General Hates. Yes,
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 137
39. General Russell. Do you recall messages that reached you
people out there, in 19-iO and 1941, telling you about these relations
between the Americans and the Japanese ?
General Hayes. All these messages that centered on the Japanese
came I believe after I left the Chief of Stall's office.
■40. General Russell. You just do not recall any while you were
there ?
General Hayes. I recall one or two general ones, but none of these
specific ones. The last message I remember as Chief of Stall was a
message which came on a Saturday afternoon, authorizing the De-
partment Commander to spend $6,000,000 at once for the develop-
ment of the air fields along the southern route, namely. Christmas
and Canton and Savaii and Fiji and those places, and stating that
$5,000,000 more would be available if he needed it. . That is the last
message 1 remember, of that import.
41. General Russell. Was there any considerable supervision over
activities of the Hawaiian Department by the War Depart- [^4^]
ment {
General Hayes. I think, as I remember, there was the usual super-
vision which you would expect in an island that far away. It ap-
peared to me that the Department Commander was quite free, except
on the question of materiel and equipment and monies available to
do certain things; and that was natural at that time, because money
was not so free.
42. General Russell. Did that pertain to the training of the troops
in the Department, also?
General Hayes. It did.
43. General Frank. What do you mean? Did what pertain?
44. General Russell. This very general supervision as to training.
General Hayes. I guess I misunderstood your question. General.
I thought that what you meant was, did that question of money affect
the training.
45. General Russell. Xo, what I had in mind was this — whether
or not they attempted, by memoranda, directives, tours of inspection,
and so forth, to have anj' intimate supervision over your training.
General Hayes. Xo, sir.
46. General Russell. They did not ?
General Hayes. Xo, sir.
47. General Russell. Xow, we have been interested in this subject
of alerts. Could you tell us the number of alerts that you can recall,
which were initiated and carried through in the Hawaiian' Depait-
ment during your tour of duty tliere ?
General Hayes. Yes, sir. 'Originally, under General Moses, there
was what could be called an ''alert." When [250] ' General
Herron came down, he concentrated on the alert phase, and, because
an alert in time of peace may be annoying to a high commander, there
was a general tendency by some of the general officers to want to have
a different kind of alert, so that their men wouldn't be annoved or
harrassed. If. for example, they were going to have a certain kind of
problem — well, we would leave the men in barracks, and we would not
take them all out.
General Herron liad one alert— battle-position alert, planes dis-
persed, observation facilities in position, antiaircraft in position, and
138 COXGRESSIOXAL IXVESTIGATIOX PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
infantry and artillery in battle position. Then, when General Short
came there, the question came up again, and he finally decided on
three alerts — alerts 1, 2, and 3; 1 to be against sabotage, and in which
everything was centered; 2, to have your observation out, your planes
dispersed, antiaircraft in position, but infantry and artillery kept
back at their base stations, their home stations ; 3, everjthing in battle
position, planes dispersed, observation out, antiaircraft in position,
infantry and artillery in battle position.
48. General Gruxert. Did Xo. 2 include dispersion of airplanes?
General Hates. It is my recollection it did. General.
49. General Russell. Xow, General, may I summarize, mei-ely for
the purpose of accuracy. You testified that General Moses had one
alert ?
General Hayes. When I say Moses, it just occurred to me while I
was talking. General Drum left in November 1937, as I remember it,
and then General Moses was there from Xovember [~^i] 1937
until March 1938, and most of his regime was concerned with the
Army-Xavy — with the Xavy maneuvers, and the joint Army and Xavy
maneuver period which started with preparation in Xovember, and
which culminated in a maneuver some time as I remember in ]March.
50. General Russell. And I believe, then, you said that General
Herron had one alert?
General Hates. Yes.
51. General Russell. That is, probably in the summer of 1940,
called by the War Department : and then General Short
General Hates. Xo; the plan called for one. His plan called for
one alert.
52. General Gruxert. You mean one kind of alert, or one actual
getting on the ground, being alerted?
General Hates. Oh, no ; there were several alerts, but one kind, one
type of alert.
53. General Russell. Do you remember how many times General
Herron had his forces out actually on the ground for alerts in his
regime ?
General Hates. There were several all-out department alerts; the
number, I cannot remember.
54. General Russell. But there were several?
General Hates. Several.
55. General Fraxk. Frequent?
General Hates. ''Frequent" is the word; yes.
56. General Russell. Xow, when General Short came along, did he
have any alerts in either of the categories that you have described?
General Hates. Yes, sir.
["2o2] 57. General Russell. Do j'ou recall when they were?
General Hates. I recall one. I believe in September of 1941, we
were notified by the State Department, with a 6-hour advance notice,
that they were going to freeze the assets of the Japanese, and he went
into alert 3, with all the troops out in position. The order came out,
there was no disturbance of any kmd, and he left them a? I remember
in maneuvers then for the purpose of not showing that it was an alert
for that reason but that they were just out training, and they stayed
out there for several days; then he called maneuvers off.
J
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 139
58. General Gruxert. Just a minute, because I have something
I want to connect up. Do 3'ou recall about what date that alert 3
was called for, approximately?
[253] General Hates. I do not remember the date, General,
but
59. General Grunert. "\"VTiat part of the month ?
General Hates. Well, if I could get the date of the Japanese
60. General Russell. I will give it to you in just a minute.
Since we have gotten on the subject of dates, I have a very definite
recollection that that notice came out some time in July about freezing
their assets.
General Hates. I think so too, probably,
61. General Russell. And it was an embargo in its nature.
General Hates. That is right. Around July 26, or something like
that, is in my mind.
62. General Grunert. If that is the case, that alert could not have
lasted into October or late in the fall, could it?
General Hates. No.
63. General Gruxert. I do not care to pursue it any further.
64. General Russell. General, I have made a search for that alert,
having in mind determining when it started and when it ended and
what happened after it was over, but I can find no records in the War
Department, to this time, even just one message, relating to that July
alert.
65. General Grunert. It ^^•ould be in the Hawaiian records, though,
would it not?
General Hates. It should be.
May I speak off the record here for a time ?
General Grunert. Surely.
(Informal discussion off the record.)
66. General Russell. Now, as you recall, just about how long was
that alert in force, General ?
[2S4] GeneralHATES. It was three or four days,
67. General Russell. Was it an all-out alert or a limited alert?
General Hates. All-out alert, and battle position and maneuver
positions.
68. General Frank. Will you please state the circumstances under
which the alert was decided?
General Hayes. Sometime during that day the Commanding Gen-
eral of the Hawaiian Department received notification from the War
Department that the State Department had advised the War Depart-
ment that it was intended six hours later to freeze the assets of the
Japanese; that this notice was given six hours ahead of time, so that
the Department Commander might make any necessary arrangements
to meet the situation. G-2, other departments, and the F. B. I.. Chief
of the F. B. I. in Oahu, were called in, were informed, informed me
that it looked very safe ; nothing was expected to happen, to the best
of their knowledge and information. I conveyed this information to
General Short. He decided to go into maneuver positions which were
the battle positions, had press releases made out so that they could
be given to the evening paper, to the effect that the Hawaiian Depart-
ment was taking the field for a 10-day maneuver period.
140 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
69. Genenil Frank. This was an all-out alert?
General Hayes. All-out. Accordingly the troops were put out, and
nothing happened from the incident. The troops were out in the
field, to my recollection, three or four days to carry on the idea, and
then were called in. During this period [255] which was part
of the defense plan, troops in armored cars or government vehicles were
marched through the town so that they would be able to meet any
Japanese situation, as well as the other battle positions out in the
areas.
70. General Fkank. I have no more questions.
71. General Russell. General, there was no other placing of the
troops on the ground in alert positions by General Short except this
one of which you have spoken ?
General Hayes. Oh, yes. there were others.
72. General Eussell. When was that?
General Hayes. T do not remember the dates, but they were regular
maneuvers in the field.
73. General Russell. Do you refer now to those big maneuvers
that were held in May?
General Hayes. No, sir. I refer to other maneuvers. He usually
had one large maneuver, and then during the year you had several
maneuvers which covered the same idea but were not as extensive in
situations. The big maneuver usually was joined in with the Navy in
some Avay. My recollection is that troops were out in the field a great
deal of the time.
74. General Russell. Now, during the year 1941 did you observe in
Hawaii any indications that the relations between the Ja]:)anese Nation
and the American Government were becoming more strained?
General Hayes. If I had not known that they were, I am not certain
that I M'ould have noticed particularly. I did notice, though, that
the new consul that they sent out there during that period was a
much higher type individual when it came to handling affairs,
appeared to me to be a very high type [356] diplomatic indi-
vidual.
75. General Grunert. Did not the press indicate that the relations
between the two nations were changing?
General Hayes. Oh, yes, sir; that is correct.
76. General Grunert. You meant official information; is that the
idea?
General Hayes. I also meant
77. General Russell. I limited the question.
General Hayes. I meant on the street.
78. General Russell. No. I limited that question. I had not gone
into that. I asked you if there were any conditions in Hawaii itself
which indicated it, and he answered it iu a limited way. Now I was
going into the other.
You did state in your answer, however. General, that if you had
not known that relations were becoming more strained you could not
have gleaned it from the appearances in Hawaii?
General Hayes. No. I was referring to the people on the street
and to things like that.
79. General Russell. But you did know that they were becoming
more strained?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 141
General Hates. Yes.
80. General Russell. And where did you get that information?
General Hayes. I got that from the papers and from the types of
telegrams and radios that came into headquarters.
81. General Russell. Well, tell us about those radios and telegrams
that came into headquarters.
General Hayes. Well, the general tenor of those telegrams was
that. What did we want in those supplies ? Or what did we want in
these supplies? Indicating that the War Department was [257]
interested in building up. This question of the radar, getting the
money for the radar, the priorities on the radar system : the natural
things that come in a situation like that.
82. General Russell. Largely on your projects for getting mate-
riel ?
General Hayes. That is right ; and an increase in projects and an
increase in money.
83. General Russell. I do not believe that I have anything else,
General.
8-1:. General Grunert. I have quite a number of questions here.
Now that I realize how long General Hayes was with General Short
as Chief of Staff, it brings up quite a number of questions here, which
I shall try to get through as rapi'dly as possible.
From the time General Short took over, were there any particular
changes that he made in the defensive measures or plan concerning
defensive measures that General Herron had carried on ?
General Hayes. Yes.
85. General Grunert. Will you outline those briefly ?
General Hayes. As I remember, General Short initially was very
much concerned about the outer islands, the other islands. He wanted
some more troops out on the other islands. He felt that the other
islands were outposts which, if he occupied, would enable him to slow
up a major attack on Oahu. He concentrated on the building of air-
fields. The basic defense plan was not changed much, as I remember.
The boundaries of the divisions, the north-and-south, on some of the
Hawaiian Islands, were changed, but the theory of it
[268] 86. General Frank. Boundaries between what?
General Hayes. Between sectors : north sector and south sector.
But the theory of the defense, namely to hold the beaches lightly
with a large mobile striking force, was kept by him.
87. General Grunert. Did he emphasize training more than Gen-
eral Herron did ? In other words, was he primarily a training man ?
General Hayes. He primarily was a training man.
88. General Grunert. Yes.
General Hayes. He was out a great deal of the time. I would often
never see him until late in the afternoon.
89. General Grunert. Was there as much cooperation and coor-
dination with the Navy, or more, after General Short took over, or
what?
General Hayes. That is a difficult question to answer, for this
reason : that General Herron was probably the most popular com-
mander they had ever had out there. He was greatly admired, and
they had deep affection for him. It is a personal thing. He knew
the Admirals better than General Short did. Officially and in their
dealings they went through the same steps.
142 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
90. General Frank. Who? That is General Short and General
Herron ?
General Hayes. General Herron, yes. That was because General
Short followed the policies which General Herron had established.
91. General Frank. Yes.
[259] General Hates. And that was once or twice a week
either going one way across, and the General and Chief of Staff going
over to call on the Admiral and Chief of Staff.
92. General Grunert. Do you recall a letter sent out by the Sec-
retary of the Navy of January 24, 1941, regarding defensive meas-
ures in cooperation with the Navy, to make such measures effective,
which the Secretary of War on February 7, 1941, sent out to the
Commanding General of Hawaii? It referred particularly to taking
effective measures so as to be prepared for any eventuality.
General Hates. I do not remember a specific letter. I do remem-
ber some letters along that line.
93. General Grunert. At about that time ?
General Hates. About that time, yes, sir.
94. General Grunert. Then, you would not recall just what meas-
ures were taken in consequence of that letter ?
General Hates. No, except during the period of three years there
was an intense training program. It was on the increase all along.
95. General Grunert. As I recall that letter, it referred also to
possibility of air raids and attacks.
General Hates. . That is correct.
96. General Grunert. And that the measures to be taken were
more in line with particularly guarding against such.
General Hates. That is correct.
97. General Grunert. Now, can you give us a little short idea of
what you considered conditions in Hawaii to be from early February
until you left? In other words, were they disturbed? Were there
rumblings among the population? Was the command [£60~\
afraid of sabotage, of upheavals of the population itself? Were the
conditions between the military and naval and the civil population
friendly or not so? In other words, general conditions as to the
jDopulation, especially the Japanese population on the Island of Oahu.
General Hates. Yes, sir. First of all, as to the relationships with
the Navy, it was most cordial. I never saw any incident in the higher
echelon where there was not extreme cordiality.
98. General Grunert. Well, in that cordiality was there also effi-
ciency in the exchange of information, and was it effective in order
to allow you to do what was necessary to be done ?
General Hates. There was a sort of an agi'eement that when any-
thing came in that was important, that touched on a naval phase in
any way, we would call up the Navy, and General Herron or General
Short and myself would go over and see the Admiral, or the Admiral
and his Chief of Staff would come over to see either General Herron
or Short. I do not know the number of times that would happen,
but it was two or three times at least every month.
99. General Grunert. Did that extend down to the staff echelons as
well as the higher command, the G-2s, the G-3s corresponding?
General Hayes. The G-2s and the O. N. I.s were very close together.
They transferred information one to the other continually. There
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 143
was liaison in the G-3. I would send an officer over, and our G-3
would go over and see their war plans. There was cooperation. It
was there when I left.
[?261] 100. General Grunert. How about confidence?
General Hayes. Confidence in the individuals or confidence in the
plan?
101. General Grunert. Confidence in either, as to their doing their
respective job and playing a game with each other in the cooperative
line.
General Haytes. I think there was confidence. You remember, dur-
ing that period the joint action of the Army and Navy changed from
paramount interests to cooperation, and we had a lot of conferences
and discussions so that this cooperation would work, and during that
period also the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was written.
102. General Grunert. All right; let us drop the subject of coop-
eration and coordination and go to the civilian personnel.
General Hayes. There was no particular evidence of there being
any great strain that I saw.
103. General Grunert. How did you size up the Japanese element?
As dangerous ?
General Hayes. I sized it up this way : General Herron, based upon
that action, picked out
104. General Frank. Based upon what ?
General Hayes. Based upon General Herron's action. I am going
to tell you about it.
105. General Frank. Yes.
General Hayes. He picked out something between fifty and a hun-
dred of the very top civilians in Hawaii. Some had been there four
years, and some had been there fifty years, many of them born there,
and he asked them to give him their comments [262} on the
Japanese. I think out of it the whole thing came, in general, that 10
percent were definitely loyal to the Emperor, that 10 percent probably
were loyal to our country, that 80 percent you could not tell about : if
the going was good for us, they would be with us; if the going was
good for the Japanese, they would be with the Japanese. But none
of these people would tell you that they really understood the Japa-
nese ; that they had the oriental veil that no occidental has ever been
able to get through. I know that I went out with Japanese official
parties and they were most cordial.
106. General Grunert. Well, now, from all this did you or the Com-
manders over there figure that sabotage was going to be one of their
main troubles in the future if anything happened, or didn't that over-
shadow other things that had to be done?
General Hayes. Sabotage, because of the uncertainty of the Japa-
nese no one knew, was always possible and present in the thoughts.
107. General Frank. And taken care of in the war plans?
General Hayes. That is correct.
108. General Grunert. And was that one of the reasons that they
separated the alerts into 1, 2, and 3?
General Hayes. It may have been. That was not worked out by me.
109. General Grunert. That was not worked out by you?
General Hayes. No.
144 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
110. General Grunert. How did that come about? I understood
General Herron to say that that was put across by the training people
after he left.
General Hayes. After General Herron left. That is correct.
[26-3] 111. General Grunert. Because when General Herron
was there he had the one kind of an alert.
General Hayes. That is my recollection.
112. General Grunert. That there were three types of alert?
General Hayes. General Short worked on that himself.
llo. General Grunert. He worked on that' himself ?
General Hayes. With Colonel Phillips, the man who followed me.
114. General Grunert. All right; we shall go to another one.
General Hayes. I did not work on that.
115. General Frank. Was that in effect before you were relieved?
General Hayes. Oh, yes.
116. General Frank. Tlie three types of alert?
General Hayes. Yes.
117. General Frank. Were in effect?
General Hayes. Yes.
118. General Frank. Before you went on leave to come back to the
United States?
General Hayes. That is right.
119. General Grunert. Now I shall ask you a few questions on the
subject of command and staff.
Was it normal for General Short, when he was in command, to con-
sult with or have conferences with his senior commanders of the
Department ?
General Hayes. Yes, sir, it was.
120. General Grunert. Outside of actual maneuvers. And did
he pass information to them as to conditions that he became aware
of, and sought their advice or put propositions to them before
[^<54] he made his decisions on the matter, or did he just rely on
his staff?
General Hayes. No; I think from my recollection he conveyed the
information and, wlien he felt it was necessary, asked them as well
as his staff.
121. General Frank. How often did he see his main commanders?
General Herron saw them every week, didn't he?
General Hayes. Yes.
122. r^eneral Frank. How often did General Short see them?
General Hayes. My recollection is that he saw them every week
or two. He was very acute to this matter of .training, and when you
are acute on the subject of training you just have to see the com-
manders, and he saw them, not only the top but down below.
123. General Grunert. But then most of his conferences were on
the subject of training?
General Hayes. No, sir ; they were on the subject of air. That was
quite a subject, the defense by air, and he saw the air commanders
or commander quite often, the engineers on projects. He had a regu-
lar flow of staff officers.
124. General Grunert. Now, as to the question of staff, did you
as Chief of Staff have frequent conferences with your General Staff
heads?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 145
General Hayes. Oh, I saw them every day and discussed.
125. General Grunert. And were they given responsibility and re-
quired to live up to it, or did they look to the high command, as the
Chief of Staff or the Commanding General, to make most of their
decisions, and then just follow them out, instead of making recom-
mendations ?
[26o] General Hayes. I think they functioned as the General
Staff officers should have functioned. You gave them the policy,
and they functioned under those policies.
126. General Grunert. Do you care to express your opinion or
judgment of the man who succeeded you? You need not answer if
you do not desire to.
General Hayes. I would like to say this: I do not know as to his
ability as a Chief of Staff. He was very much concerned with G-3.
I think that was his trend.
127. General Frank. Do you feel that he had worked himself in
to the position of Chief of Staff by the time of the Pearl Harbor
attack?
General Hayes. I do not. That is an opinion.
128. General Russell, General, while we are on this subject of Gen- .
eral Short as a trainer, do you think that he emphasized training
to the point that it was a detriment to his mission, his defensive mis-
sion of i^rotection of the fleet at Oahu ?
General Hayes. No, sir. You could not read the defense plan and
meet your mission without being intimately connected with the train-
ing end of it.
129. General Grunert. I would like to stop right here and take
a recess of about a minute.
(A brief informal recess was taken.)
[266] 130. General Grunert. When you left the Department,
about what was the state of the anti-aircraft defense system? Did
you consider it in pretty good shape and efficient ?
General Hayes. Yes ; I did. I think it was in good shape and was
a good plan. Furthermore, at that time there was not a great deal
of anti-aircraft equipment in the whole Army. They needed more
and they could not get it because it was not there. The plan for the
defense was ver}?- well drawn out and sound. The coverage was excel-
lent. Some of the material was not the most modern :. That is my
view.
131. General Frank. What, in your opinion, ever brought about the
frame of mind that resulted in a decision to install Alert No. 1 ?
132. General Grunert. May I ask if by "install No. 1" you mean
the classes of alert?
General Frank. Yes.
133. General Grunert. The question that General Frank has asked
refers to the classes of alert, 1, 2 and 3, which was a change from what
General Herron had.
General Hayes. Yes; I understand. I think the reason that he put
in Class 1 Alert was that he felt that sabotage was always possible
and probably j^resent and dangerous.
134. Genera] Frank. Had you ever discussed the reasons with him
for that kind of an alert?
79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 1 11
146 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Hates. Yes, a couple of times; and then he took it up
himself and worked with Phillips, to my recollection.
135. General Frank. On that I would like to ask you this : Since, in
the situation in July of 1941, which was much less acute than this one,
be installed an all-out alert, what do you think influenced him at this
time to decide on the No. 1 Alert ?
12&7] General Hayes. "This time" being December 7?
136. General Frank. November 27th.
General Hates. I think, a radiogram which he probably received
from some Washington source stressing sabotage.
137. General Frank. You were gone at the time?
General Hates. I was gone at the time.
138. General Frank. The Navy had different classes of alert, did
they not ?
General Hates. Yes; they had different alerts. What they were,
in detail, I do not know.
139. General Frank. Are you conversant with whether or not Navy
No. 1 Alert was an all-out alert ?
General Hates. I am not positive. I would not like to say at this
time. I did know at the time, but it has escaped my memory.
140. General Frank. Do you laiow that there was an air estimate
of the situation prepared and signed by Admiral Bellinger and Gen-
eral Martin ?
General Hates. Yes.
141. General Frank. That was during your time?
General Hayes. Yes.
142. General Frank. Do you remember the conclusion to which they
came as to the most probable enemy action ?
General Hates. No.
143. General Frank. Do you remember whether or not they antic-
ipated an air raid ?
General Hates. Yes.
144. General Frank. They did?
General Hayes. Yes.
[£68] 145. General Frank. As the most probable enemy action ?
General Hayes. As the most probable. Ancl that was also the esti-
mate of the situation of the Depai'tment. General Herron's estimate,
which was still in effect, as I remember, was that the most probable line
of action was an air raid some time shortly after dawn. He did not
name Sunday specifically.
146. General Frank. Were jou surprised at that air raid?
General Hayes. On December 7th ?
147. General Frank. Yes.
General Hayes. I was surprised, but I was not surprised in the form
of the attack,
148. General Frank. Would you have anticipated it?
General Hates. If I had been there?
149. General Frank. Yes.
General Hayes. Yes ; I think that I would have done this : I would
not have anticipated it, but I would have been prepared, as I was a
disciple of one alert and everything out.
150. General Frank. Had you been the Chief of Staff would jou
have recommended an all-out alert ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 147
General Hates. Definitely.
151. General Frank. Here is another line of questions of which you
may or may not have some knowledge. Do you have any knowledge
concerning the failure of the contractors, the Hawaiian constructors,
to complete the construction of the Hawaiian defense projects within
the time prior to the 7th of December, 1911, which the contracting job
orders required.
General Hayes. I do not remember the details of that at all.
152. General Frank. Do you remember any complaints having been
made that the contractors were not completing their work on [269]
time?
General Hayes. Yes. There were various projects. There was the
tunnel project and various projects that pressure was put on. The one
on which the most pressure was put, I think, was this radar.
153. General Frank. Who put the pressure on?
General Hayes. General Short.
154. General Grunert. On whom?
General Hayes. On the War Department.
155. General Grunert. Is that of record ?
General Hayes. Oh, there must be a record of it. I know there were
telegrams sent.
156. General Frank. Or did he not put the pressure on the con-
tractor ? Why on the War Department ?
General Hayes. I think he put it on the contractor. And was told
that he could not get this stuff ; they said that he could not get priorities
on materiel and things like that. Then he went to the War Department
for help.
157. General Frank. After the contractor told him this, he then
went to the War Department?
General Hayes. That is my recollection.
158. General Grunert. Who is directly supervising contracts?
General Hayes. At that time it was between the Colonel Lyman and
Colonel Wyman. Wyman was the Division Engineer and Lyman was
the Department Engineer.
159. General Grunert. Wyman was the Division Engineer?
General Hayes. Yes. And then it was headed up into G-4.
160. General Grunert. Did he put pressure through G-4 on Lyman
or Wyman, the contractor, or how ?
[270] General Hayes. I think he worked it through the offices ;
not the contractor himself.
161. General Frank. Who was G-1 at the time?
General Hayes. Bank or Marsden — I think Marsden was G^. He
is out in Hawaii still.
162. General Frank. Who was G-2?
General Hayes. Fielder. General Short brought Fielder down to
relieve Marsden and put Marsden as G-4.
163. General Frank. Do you have any knowledge concerning delays
with reference to underground gasoline storage facilities?
General Hayes. I have a definite recollection of it. The detail of it
is not sufficient to give as evidence ; but a great deal of time and thought
was given to that by General Short.
164. General Frank. Prior to your departure was the aircraft warn-
ing system functioning? .
148 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Hayes. Only on the Island of Oaliu. There were no sta-
tions on Kauai, none on Molokai, none on Maui, and none on Hawaii,
although all the stations had been recommended. Had been work done
on them, but it was over a lon^ period of time.
165. General Frank. The job orders called for those installations
to have been completed before you left, did they not?
General Hayes. Oh, yes ; June 30, August 30, September 30, and on ;
various changes.
166. General Frank. And the reason that they were not completed
was because of the contractor claiming that he was not able to get
credit for material ; is that correct ?
General Hayes. Not only that. General Short sent many a radio-
gram and many letters trying to get this radar equipment in, and he
was told that he could not get it, as I remember, [i?77] because
of priorities. Panama was first, the Philippines next — I don't remem-
ber that; they were probably away down on the list. But the West
Coast, second, and Hawaii third. The thing was delayed from time
to time for various reasons, and one of them was that the stuff was not
there and they could not get all the money at the time they wanted to
get it; and many letters and telegrams were sent on that matter.
167. General Grunert. Did that mean the complete project, or did
it refer to part of the project, such as roads or concrete work or radar
itself, or what? Would you be able to testify on that particular
subject?
General Hayes. These places were so out of the way, on the tops of
isolated mountains, that in order to live there they had to have certain
things, and in order to get things there they had to have certain roads
built. Take Kawailoa and Waialee. They were very difficult places.
168. General Frank. Do you have any knowledge as to whether or
not any military personnel neglected their duties relating to the
contract ?
General Hayes. For the radars?
169. General Frank. For the radars or for any of the construction.
General Hayes. No, sir.
170. General Frank. Was there any feeling to that effect?
General Hayes. Not to my knowledge. This radar business was
pressing, pressing, pressing all the time to get it in, and they just
could not get it in.
171. General Frank. Did you ever hear of a contractor by the name
of Wilhelm Rohl ?
[272^ General Hayes. Yes.
172. General Frank. Did anything ever come up about his status?
General Hayes. Not while I was there. Afterwards I read about
him. I only saw him once.
173. General Frank. You knew nothing about him while you were
there ?
General Hayes. No, sir. It came up just a month or so ago, in the
paper, about Ted Wyman and Rohl together.
174. General Frank. I have no further questions.
175. General Grunert. Was the Interceptor Command organized
before you went on leave from the Chief of Staff's position ?
General Hayes. It was organized and training was going on in
an improvised way, with whatever equipment they had.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 149
176. General Eussell. Where did this man Ted Wyman come
from ? He was an Army man, was he not ?
General Hayes. He was the Division Engineer.
177. General Russell. How long was he out there during your tour
of duty «
General Hayes. A couple of years, I guess.
178. General Russell. He came out about two years before you
left?
General Hayes. As I remember it.
179. General Russell. Was he charged immediately with the in-
stallation of this radar system and the supervision of its installation ?
General Hayes. No.
180. General Russell. What was his relation to the radar system?
General Hayes. Well, in certain things as Division Engineer he
functioned under the Chief of Engineers. In cer- [273] tain
things he functioned under the Department Commander. He prob-
ably arranged the contract, to get it done and, after he got the ma-
chinery, constructed the thing. I forget the details of it, but that
was the idea.
181. General Russell. What was the relation of the Department
Commander to this project for the installation of the radar?
General Hayes. It was his responsibility. It was not the Chief
of Engineers' responsibility. It is a tactical unit.
18i2. General Russell. Who made the initial contract for the in-
stallation of the permanent radar station?
General Hayes. I do not know.
183. General Frank. It was made by Wyman. I want to find out
what right he had over the supervision of this station.
General Hayes. The tactical location and everything else was
decided by him.
184. General Russell. Did he have anything to do with letting
the contract, as to who was to build them ?
General Hayes. I do not remember anything about that.
185. General Russell. Did you not know, as a matter of fact, that
the contract was let in Washington to this man Rohl?
General Hayes. I read about it. I didn't know it at the time.
186. General Russell. Is it not true that the supervision of the
installation was by this man Wyman, the District Engineer out there?
General Hayes. Yes. There was a joint action between the Depart-
ment Engineer and the Division Engineer, Certain things the Divi-
sion Engineer did for the Department Commander, and certain things
lie did for the Chief of Engineers.
187. General Russell. Who made the contract providing the period
[274] in which these things would be set up ?
General Hayes. That, as I recollect, came from Washington; and
when the work did not meet the date Washington was contacted and
it was put over to another date, a later date.
188. General Russell. All of which decision was made in AVashing-
ton, independent of anything that the Commanding General of the
Hawaiian Department did or could do?
General Hayes. I am not certain about that independence, except
that pressure was put on the War Department.
150 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
189. General Russell. But the decisions were made in Washington ?
General Hayes. That is my impression. But I think you can get
all that from the engineers who worked on it.
190. General Grunert. If there are no further questions, we thank
you for coming up, General.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Whereupon, at 5 o'clock p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of
witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 151
CONTENTS
FRIDAY, AUGUST 11, 1944
Testimony of— ^^se'
Maj. Gen. Walter Campbell Sliort, United States Army, Retired 276
DOCUMENTS
Message of October 16, 1941 279
Radiogram dated November 27, 1941, Chief of Staff to Gen. Short 28G
Reply of Lt. Gen. Short on November 27, 1941, to message No. 472 from
Gen. Marshall on November 27, 1941 286
Message dated November 28, 1941, from Adjutant General to Lt. Gen.
Short 293
Message dated November 28, 1941, from Lt. Gen. Short to Adjutant General- 294
Message of December 7, 1941, to Hawaiian Department, Ft. Shafter, T. H.
signed "Marshall" 309
Message dated June 10, 1941, Lt. Gen. Short to Adjutant General 826
Message dated June 26, 1941, Adjutant General to Lt. Gen. Short 327
Letter dated December 23, 1941, J. B. Poindexter, Governor of Hawaii to
Lt. Gen. Short 337
Letter dated December 22, 1941, from civilians of Honolulu to the Presi-
dent 342
Conclusions 344
Excerpts from Roberts' Commission Report 382
Paragraph III of Addendum No. 1, Joint Oi)erations Agreement 388
Excerpts from Paragraph IV of Addendum No. 1 388
EXHIBITS
In Evidence
No. 1 Bound file of documents presented by Gen. Short and sworn to by
him 351
1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original transcript of proceedings.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 153
W6-\ PKOCEEDINGS BEFOEE THE ARMY PEAEL
HARBOR BOARD
FRIDAY, AUGUST 11, 1944
Munitions Building,
Washington, D. C,
The Board at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on August 9, 194-1:, conducted
the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the
Board, presiding.
Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D.
Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.
Present also : Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, and Major Henry
C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder.
General Grunert. The Board will come to order.
TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER CAMPBELL SHORT, UNITED
STATES ARMY, RETIRED (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, BRIG.
GEN. THOMAS H. GREEN, UNITED STATES ARMY)
(The w^itness was sworn b}' the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Will you please state to the Board your name,
rank, organization, and station?
General Short. Walter Camjibell Short, Major General, United
States Army, Retired. My number is 01621. I am living in Dallas,
Texas. I am not stationed any place.
2. General Grunert. General, the order convening this Board re-
quires it to ascertain and report the facts relating to the [^77]
attack made by Japanese armed forces on the Territory of Hawaii on
the 7th of December, 1941. You having been in command of the
Hawaiian Department from the 8th of February to the iTth of Decem-
ber, 1941, have been ordered to appear as a witness before the Board;
ii.nd the Board hopes to get at the facts from a consideration of your
testimony, from that of other witnesses, and from that contained in
documentary evidence.
You have already furnished the Board with a list of witnesses whom
you believe have knowledge of facts pertinent to the issue. The Board
hopes to be able to have all these witnesses testify.
The Board has been informed that the War Department has fur-
nished you a copy of the records of the Roberts Commission, except
certain exhibits which have been made available to you for examina-
tion. The Board made a study of those records and, as a result thereof,
many of its questions are based on that study.
Have you a statement which you desire to submit to the Board?
154 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. Yes, sir. I would like to make an oral statement
and then submit a statement in writing, with supporting documents.
3. General Grunert. If so, at the time you submit the statement in
writing the Recorder will swear you to it so that that statement can
be made a part of the record for the Board's consideration.
General Short. Yes, sir.
4. General Grunert. Will you please go ahead with your state-
ment, and then I will lead in propounding questions to [278]
try to get at some of the facts under various objectives aand phases.
General Short. I would like to state, in the first place, that I am
just as interested as the Board in having all the facts uncovered.
I believe I can only gain by having the Board get a full knowledge
of everything leading up to the attack. I regret that I was not
granted the privilege of having counsel present at the interrogation
of all witnesses, because I think that things might have been brought
out that might not be brought out without that. However, since that
has been refused, I would like to have a copy of my own testimony
before the Board, as soon as convenient after the meeting, and I would
like, when the Board has completed its work, to have a complete copy
of the record of the Board with an opportunity to go over it, so that
I will know what has gone before. I believe that that request is
reasonable.
(Informal discussion off the record.)
5. General Grunert. General Short, I do not think it is within
the authority of the Board to make a decision as to whether or not
the Board will furnish you such a copy, and the Board suggests that
you make application to the War Department for such a copy.
General Short. Shall I proceed?
6. General Grunert. Yes.
General Short. I would like to call the attention of the Board to
the fact that I have had a copy of the record of the Roberts Commis-
sion only about a day and a half. I have been able to refresh my
memory to a considerable extent, but it is barely possible, since it has
been two years and eight months, [279] that there might be
some slight discrepancy in details between what I would say now and
what I said then. I do not think it would be anything of any impor-
tance, but it is possible that some detail would escape my mind.
I would like to begin by reading the message that I got from the
War Department on October 16. That was the first in this situation.
It came through the Navy and is a paraphrase of the dispatch from
the Chief of Naval Operations.
(Message of October 16, 1941, is as follows:)
Japanese Cabinet resignation creates a grave situation. If a new Cabinet is
formed it probably will be anti-American and strongly nationalistic. If the
Konoye Cabinet remain it will operate under a new mandate which will not
include rapprochement with the United States. Either way hostilities between
Japan and Russia are strongly possible. Since Britain and the United States
are held responsible by Japan for their present situation, there is also a possi-
bility that Japan may attack these two powers. In view of these possibilities
you will take due precautions, including such preparatory deployments as will
not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan.
General Grunert. What is the date of that?
General Short. October 16, 1941.
I would like to point out that the message says that hostilities be-
tween Japan and Russia are strongly possible, [£80] and that
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 155
there is a possibility of that situation between the United States and
Japan. There is quite a distinction,
I also point out that they did not want me to do anything that would
disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against
Japan. That seemed to be a matter of considerable importance at
that time.
There was nothing further of importance received on the question
of Japan from then until the 27th day of November ; and this is the
wire that I had from the Chief of Staff. Incidentally, I want to call
attention to the number of this particular radiogram. The number
happens to be very important. 472 is the number. I would like to
read it so that everybody will have it fresh in their minds.
(Eadiogram dated November 27, 1941, is as follows:)
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes,
with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back
and offer to continue stop Japanese future action unpredictable and hostile
action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot repeat cannot be avoided
the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.
That is a statement of a good deal of importance.
This policy should not repeat should not be construed as restricting you to
a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese
action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as
[281] you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as
not comma repeat not comma to alarm the civil population or disclose intent.
Report measures taken.
That is a most important thing. They called on me for a report of
measures taken.
Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5
so far as they pertain to Japan stop Limit dissemination of this highly secret
information to minimum essential oflBcers.
There are several things that should be noted in this. The first is
that Japan must take the first overt act ; that the population in Hawaii
must not be alarmed. In other words, there was still a hope in the
minds of the War Department that differences might be composed, and
they apparently wanted to be particularly careful not to add to the
flames.
Undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.
I will take up in detail a little later the fact that long distance recon-
naissance was definitely a function of the Navy ; that the document had
been signed by Admiral Bloch, Commanding the 14th Naval District,
and myself, and had been approved by the Chief of Staff ; so that the
War Plans Division certainly should have known the definite provi-
sion in regard to reconnaissance.
We had only 12 bombers, 6 of which were out of commission, be-
cause we had stripped them to send other bombers to the Philippines,
capable of long distance reconnaissance, so that all the ships that we
could have sent out for a thousand miles [282] and back were
6 flying fortresses, if we had been depending on our own reconnais-
sance. So it was a very much safer proposition to carry out the plan
as agreed upon by the Navy, wherein all the long range reconnaissance
of both the Army and Navy functioned under one plan, so that there
would not be any duplication of reconnaissance and there would be
156 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
an undivided responsibility. So that the Xavy definitely had the
responsibility.
We thought when we drew up the plans on March 21. 1941 — and. as
I say, the Chief of Staff approved them, and I saw no reason for mak-
ing any change and starting with my own reconnaissance, because
I had received this radio I did not believe that the War Department
wanted us to abrogate the agreement with the Navy and start out on
our own. When I got this wire, in view of the last statement about
disseminating it to as few oifRcers as possible, I immediately talked
it over with my Chief of Staff, who had been my G-3 up to a month
before, and made the decision, after we had talked it over, to call
Alert Xo. 1. I later communicated this dispatch to G-2 and to the
echelon commanders. That same afternoon I talked the matter over
with General Martin and General Burwell, and the contents of the
message in general were sent to the two division commanders, the
Infantry Division and the liaison officers. I did not at that time go
further down in the list in disseminating the information.
[Copy]
3141 Southwestern Boulevard,
Dallas 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944.
Subject : Corrections in testimony.
To : President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.
1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before
the Army Pearl Harbor Board :
Page 282, line 21, — change "Burwell to Burgin."
* * * * * * *
(s) Water C. Short
Walter C. Short,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.
As to what this Alert Xo. 1 consisted of, we had three types of alert
inider our standing operational procedure. We had worked from
July 14, when we brought out a tentative standing operational proce-
dure : we worked over this very [283] carefully with all of the
echelon so as to get a reaction on every paragraph, got their recom
mendations, had repeated conferences, and on the 5th of November
we put out the operating procedure. Our purpose in putting it out
as an operating procedure was to get rid of a great amount of secrecy,
so that each company commander, battalion commander, and regimen-
tal commander could know exactly what their finictions were. As long
as the document was considered highly secret, which it had been before,
it was important to have everybody understand so that he could answer
immediately to a separate order and know exactly and so that every
unit would know exactl}' what its job was and could go to it without
any confusion.
Our Alert Xo. 1 was a defense against sabotage, espionage, and sub-
versive activities without any threat from the outside.
Alert Xo. 2 included all these sabotage measures in Xo. 1. and,
in addition, defense against air attacks and surface and submarine
attacks.
Alert Xo. 3 was a defense against an all-out attack, where everybody
moved to their battle stations and carried out their duties as if there
was a possible attempt at landing in sight.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 157
In making up my mind as to which alert to use I was influenced
by several things. In the first place, I knew from repeated conversa-
tions with the Navy that the Japanese naval vessels were supposed to
136 either in their home ports or proceeding to the south. They had
no information indicating that any Japanese vessels were proceeding
east. The nearest Japanese base to Hawaii was 2,100 miles. All of
our information [^S4] indicated that the Japanese had no
bomber that could take oS from one of those land bases, bomb Ha-
waii, and return.
In addition to that, we had a large part of the United States Fleet
at Honolulu. They constantly had used task forces, usually two, some-
times three. Those task forces had carriers with them ; and the normal
practice, as I understand it, was for the planes of the carrier force to
scour the ocean 300 miles to each side. In other words, any carrier
force had a real reconnaissance for a width of 600 miles. For the
two you would have 1,200 miles of the ocean in the vicinity of those
two forces well covered. If there were three you would have 1,800
miles.
In addition, the Navy had bases at Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and
Johnston, and did certain reconnaissances from those islands. It
cut down the flying hours very materially from what would have hap-
pened if they had tried to do it all from Honolulu.
I knew of these things, and it made me feel that the chance of an
attack by air was very slight, or that it was highly improbable. I
also had the expressed opinion on that day, the morning of the 27th,
the clay I received this wire, when I had been in conference with Ad-
miral Kimmel in reference to reinforcing the garrisons of Wake and
Midw^^y by Army planes, a squadron at each place; but naturally, with
the limited pursuit we had, if you reinforced Midway and Wake you
would cut down your air defense in Honolulu. The question came up
as to how serious was the need for pursuit for the immediate protection
of Honolulu. Admiral Kimmel asked Captain McMorris, his opera-
tion officer, what he thought the changes of a [2So] surprise
attack on Honolulu were, and Captain McMorris replied, none.
I have in this supporting document an affidavit, I was accompanied
at the conference by General Martin and Colonel MoUison. We
were all present when this happened, and I have the affidavit of
Colonel Mollison as to what was said.
Admiral Kimmel took no exception to the statement of Captain
McMorris. As I remember, Admiral Bloch was there, and there
seemed to be no difference of opinion at all. That was the existing
opinion of Kimmel's staff, that there was practically no danger of
a surprise attack by air on Honolulu,
In addition to that, it was a question of training. Alerts Nos. 2
and 3 would require so many men on duty. Alert No. 3 would take
every man, practically, so it would eliminate any training. Alert No,
2 would practically put every man of the harbor defense, the antiair-
craft, and the air on duties that would prohibit training. The situa-
tion in the air with regard to training was quite serious. We had
been given the mission of ferrying B-l7s to the Philippines, We
had already sent, I think, two groups, one of 9 and one of 12, We
had also sent some crews to San Francisco for the purpose of bringing
them back to the Philippine Islands. We had only 6 flying fortresses
158 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in commission to train all of these crews. If you remember, at that
time a flying fortress was relatively new and you could not just pick
up a pilot here and there and say he could fly a flying fortress.
He had to be stepped up. We had a bunch of the old obsolete B-18
bombers that were death traps if you put anybody in them to fight,
but it was one step in teaching a pilot how to handle larger ships.
They were put [286] on those. They were put on the A-20s
for a little time, and finally got to the B-l7s. With the limited num-
ber of ships we had it took time to train these crews; not just the
pilots. In addition to that we had to train the bombardiers and the
gunners so that they could protect themselves from the Japanese
going over the mandated islands.
General Martin and I talked over the situation and we felt that we
should do nothing that would interfere with the training or the ferry-
ing gi-oup. The responsibility was definitely on the Hawaiian De-
partment. It was up to us to get the ships there and get them there
without loss ; and we could do it if we started them out with untrained
crews.
That had a great deal to do with my decision to go into Alert No. 1
rather than Alert No. 2 or No. 3.
In addition, I would like to read the wire sent to the War
Department :
Re your radiogram 472 —
That definitely tied it in with the wire which I had gotten signed
"Marshall" on the 27th. This was sent on the 27th within an hour
after I got the message. There should not be any question, if anybody
read this carefully, as to what radiogram it was replying to. I
definitely identify it as a reply to the radiogram in which he had told
me to report the action taken. This radiogram stated :
(Keply of Lt. Gen. Short on November 27, 1941, to message No. 472
from General Marshall on November 27, 1941, is as follows:)
Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy.
I am pointing out particularly the number of that message, [£87]
because after I made that report to the War Department of exactly
what I was doing — that was on the 27th of November — I received
nothing from them until the 7th of December, after the attack, indi-
cating that they thought my action was not correct. They did not
come back and say, "Your sabotage arrangements are all right, but we
feel here that there is danger of additional hostile action, that you
ought to alert your command for an air attack or for possible attempts
at landing." They came back with nothing of that kind.
I could draw only one conclusion, and it was reinforced by a number
of other incidents that I will cover. I could draw only one conclu-
sion— that as far as the War Department was concerned they approved
of my action, because they had ten days after telling me to report to
tell me that they did not approve it.
[£88] General Gerow, in his testimony before the Eoberts Com-
mission, stated that it was the function of his division in the War
Department, in the War Plans Division, the General Staff, to follow
up on that instruction that they had given him to report action, but
they didn't do it, and they didn't realize that this wire of mine was an
answer to their wire of the 27th, although I referred directly to the
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 159
wire. It could not have been an answer to anything else. So there
was a period of ten days when the War Plans Division didn't even
take the trouble to tell me I hadn't answered it. They apparently
didn't know whether I had answered it or not, and I had answered it as
specifically as I knew how.
To show that I was not the only one that considered attack by air on
Honolulu improbable, General Marshall in his testimony before the
Roberts Commission stated that he was surprised by the attack on
Honolulu. He was asked by the Board why he didn't use the — I will
come to that a little later, but I would like to bring it out at this time —
why he did not use the scrambler telephone to send his message to me
on December 7th. He said, Well, the time of getting connections across
the Pacific was frequently considerable, that he did not consider it
absolutely secret, and that if he had been going to use the telephone he
would first of all have called the Philippines, which would have taken
more time, because that was the point where he considered the great
threat was.
In other words, he said frankly that he was surprised at the attack
on Honolulu. That, along with the various other things that hap-
pened, which I shall take up, led me to believe [2891 abso-
lutely— at the time I didn't know of that, but I did know of the other
things — that the War Department did not fear an attack on Honolulu
from the air.
There is one other point that I had not covered in regard to ordering
that Alert No. 1, was the fact that 37 percent of our population in
Honolulu, in the Hawaiian Islands, approximately 160,000, was Japa-
nese or Japanese-American. With a population of that size it made
sobotage highly probable, with those thousands of — there were about
85,000 actual aliens, and it looked reasonable that some of those aliens
Vv'ould be in the employ of the Japanese Government and would at-
tempt sabotage. Character of the population made it most important
that we make every possible provision for action against sabotage.
There was another reason that was very important in determining
whether we should go into Alert No. 2 or No. 1. We had bunkers built
that we had built without money, with our engineer battalion, at
Wheeler Field, for distributing our pursuit planes so in case of attack
that they would not be so likely to suffer damage. Alert No. 2 pro-
vided that the pursuit planes should be distributed to their bunkers
so as to avoid damage from hostile air attack.
Now, the two methods of handling your ships as regards safety were
diametrically opposed. If you wanted to protect your ships from
sabotage, you wanted them grouped; and what made it even more
important was, we had not gotten fencing for fencing the fields, and
we had not gotten flood lights. So if you scattered some 200 ships all
over the landscape, you had to have men at every ship, enough men to
protect the individual ship from sabotage, and it would have taken a
verv large part 1290] of the Air Force to carry this out.
We had asked for money, for $240,000. I will get the date on that
(referring to records). We asked for $240,000 on May 15. $102,000
was authorized on July 11, $91,000 on August 12. By the time we had
the money, the fencing was not available locally, and we had to order
it from the States. Getting it from the States, we had to get a priority,
160 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
first on the purchase and then on the question of ship space. It took
about 15 weeks to get a priority. It took additional time then to get
the priority on ship space. A result was that the District Engineer,
who was responsible for putting in the manproof fence around the air-
fields, had not received any of this wire up to December T. The
Quartermaster had the responsibility for fencing in certain gasoline
storage in the vicinity of Schofield and a few other things, and he had
gotten a small amount, but he had beaten the District Engineer to the
local supply and had gotten what there was, and it was just not
available.
Now, that made the question of the dispersion of planes and the
protection from sabotage all the more clifHcult. It looked as thougli
up to the time we had the fencing, if we were trying to protect them
from sabotage, we should group them at the various fields, distribute
them by fields as much as we could, but group them where they could
be held under very close observation. Colonel Burwell had been
given the job by the Air Corps of making a very complete investigation
and study of the question of sabotage, because it was a thing that was
always possible and, particularly with the Air and the Hawaiian
I2i91] Air Depot, was most serious; and he had come out very
strongly in his recommendations that in any alert against sabotage the
planes should be grouped as closely as possible where there would not
be any possibility of sabotage.
I would like to point out that the Hawaiian Department had no
means in itself for obtaining information as to the movement of Jap-
anese ships. We were dependent wholly upon the Navy getting our
information through the 14th Naval District or receiving that infor-
mation from tlie War Department. We had no agents in any part
of the world except right in the Hawaiian Islands. That was the
only place that we had agents for obtaining information. So we were
necessarily dependent upon the Navy or the War Department for
information as to movement of these ships.
And, as I have said before, the responsibility for the distant recon-
naissance had been assumed by the Navy, which we all thought — and
which apparently the War Department and Navy agreed with fully
and api^roved the scheme — that they were the logical people, con-
sidering the means that they had, to have the responsibility for distant
reconnaissance. This was drawn up in a very formal way and sent
on to the War and Navy Departments for approval.
I will go into some detail on what was provided in this air because
that was the most important place of cooperation between the two
services. The command in Hawaii, as you all know, was exercised
by cooperation and not by unity of command up to December 7. We
agreed that the distant reconnaissance would be carried out by the
Navy, that in case of a threat or of an actual attack, without waiting
for any orders, that I [292] would make available to the Navy
the greatest possible number of bombers. I would make the decision,
but it was agreed and was in the written plan that was approved that
that would be the maximum number that I could spare. There might
be a situation where I would have to hold onto a few ; that when that
was done they were to be placed absolutely under the control of the
Navy. They operated with Patwing 2. The Army gave them no
jnissions. Tliey received their orders from Patwing 2, they made
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 161
their reports to Patwing 2, and the thing happened automatically.
We went into a maneuver, and it was provided that in case of an
attack — we had started out with the idea that there would be a request.
We found in our maneuvers — we were carrying on weekly exercises —
that that was too slow, so we made it automatic : in case anything
happened the Commander of the Army bombers reported immediately
to Admiral Bellinger, who had Patwing 2, and was under his orders.
There was a provision in this that at any time when there wasn't a
maneuver, there wasn't an attack, there hadn't been an emergency
agreed upon, that the Navy did not have sufficient force of long-range
reconnaissance planes, that they could call upon the Army and that
we would furnish strength according to what we had. That had been
definitely agreed upon.
[Copy]
3141 Southwestern Boulevard,
Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 19U.
Subject; Corrections in testimony.
To : President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.
1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the
Army Pearl Harbor Board :
*******
Page 291, line 24, after "air" add "plan".
*******
/s/ Walter C. Short,
Walter C. Short,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.
On the other hand, if there was any air action — defensive air action —
over the Islands, then their fighters that could be made available, like
the marine fighters that were stationed at Ewa Field and any carrier
fighters that happened to be off their carrier and ashore, w^ere to im-
mediately pass to the control of the Army so that there would be a
unified control of the fighters under the Army for fighting immediately
over [£03] the Islands, and control by the Navy for distant
reconnaissance. There was another provision that in case it was nec-
essary to have fighter escorts for the bombers in attacking enemy
vessels, that those fighter escorts would also pass to the control of
the Navy. If they were going to make an attack on naval enemy
vessels and called upon us for escorts, they passed to their command.
We dichi't hold any strings on them at all; we turned them over to
them.
Now, these things had been maneuvered. We had at least one air
exercise a week with the Navy from March on, so that it had been
worked out until it functioned quite smoothly. That method had
been followed from March 21st and was in effect on December 7th,
and as far as I know it is still in effect. It may have been changed ;
I don't know.
On the 28th of November I received a message from the War De-
partment that I would like to read : 482. I notice this is 482. Their
one of the 27th was 472.
(Message, November 28, 1941, from Adjutant General to Lt. Gen.
Short, is as follows :)
Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against
subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Depart-
79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1 12
162 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ment (see paragraph 3 MID SC thirty dash forty five) stop. Also desired that
you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protec-
tion of your establishment comma property comma and equipment against
sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and
protection of all activities against espionage stop. [2941 This does not
repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop. Protective
measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding un-
necessary publicity and alarm.
They are still wanting to do nothing, apparently, to alarm the
Japanese public in Hawaii.
To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air
stations but this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing
instructions.
Now, my wire in answer to 472 had been sent fairly early on the
afternoon of the 27th. This was dated the 28th. There was no doubt
in my mind but what they had my wire before this was sent, but
apparently they didn't take the trouble to check up and see that my
wire was answering theirs — my radio — from what General Gerow
stated in his testimony.
Now, when I got that, I prepared, in connection with G-2, an
answer to the War Department, It just happened that we thought
of these things months before and were able to answer them very
completely.
This was sent on the 28th :
(Message, November 28, 1941, from Lt. Gen. Short to Adjutant
General, is as follows :)
Re your radiogram four eight two twenty eighth comma full precautions are
being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative respon-
sibility of War Department —
and giving the number of those paragraphs
and military establishments including personnel and [295] equipment
stop As regards protection of vital installations outside of military reserva-
tions such as power plants, telephone exchanges and highway bridges comma
this headquarters by confidential letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty one
requested the Governor of the Territory to use tlie broad powers vested in him
by section sixty seven of the Organic Act which provides comma in effect
comma that the Governor may call upon the commanders of military and naval
forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress
lawless violence comma invasion comma insurrection and so forth stop Pursu-
ant to the authority stated the Governor on June twentieth confidentially made
a formal written demand of this headquarters to furnish and continue to fur-
nish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage comma
and lawless violence in connection therewith comma being committed against
vital installations and structures in the Territory stop Pursuant to the fore-
going request appropriate militai'y protection is now being afforded vital civil-
ian installations stop In this connection connna at the instigation of this
headquarters the City and Covmty of Honolulu on June thirtieth nineteen forty
one enacted an ordnance which permits the Commanding General Hawaiian
Department to close or restrict the use of and travel upon any highway within
the City and County of Honolulu wherever the Commanding General deems such
action necessary in the interest of national [296] defense. The author-
ity thus given has not been exercised. Relations with FBI and all other Fed-
eral and Territorial officials are jmd have been cordial and mutual cooperation
has been given on all pertinent matters.
Now, they had stressed that we were not authorized, in view of
their wire, "to take any illegal measures, and I was being careful to
show them that we were taking all the measures they wanted and
that we were absolutely within our legal rights, because we had
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 163
thought back ahead as far back as June and arranged it. For the
last two years there had been a very considerable amount of the time
that the Army had had guards over bridges and water works, elec-
tric light plants, and so forth, and there was a possibility that some
sentry would shoot someone and he would have no defense. That had
prompted me to get this legal authority from the Governor, so the
Army would be fully protected. We' would be within our legal
rights. And our relations with the Governor and with the Mayor
were such that we were able to accomplish this and to have them feel
that it was the thing to do. So we were able to answer the War De-
partment's message and state that we were wholly protected legally
in doing the things that we were doing.
And you notice in that message that it is all sabotage and subver-
sive activities and espionage; and, as I say, that message was sent
after my message should have been received, and undoubtedly after
my message was received. There was no doubt in my mind that they
were fully cognizant of my report of action taken when they sent
this message.
Now, to make it even stronger, you notice in this message [£97]
they said they were sending identical messages to the air stations
direct, because they apparently wanted to be sure these measures
were put into effect at once. In other words, sabotage was terrifically
important to them.
General Martin got such a message from General Arnold, and he
answered even in more detail than I have, telling them exactly what
they were doing on all airfields. So they had answers from me and
from General Martin showing exactly what we were doing, in great
detail, and if they didn't know what we were doing it was simply
because they didn't read our messages. The information was defi-
nitely there.
Now, in addition to prescribing this Alert No. 1, I prescribed that
the Aircraft Warning Service would work definitely, as such, from
4 o'clock in the morning — from two hours before dawn to one hour
after dawn, which was practically from 4 to 7. This service was
very new. Along probably early in November we had received the
mobile sets. There was no fixed station that was in operation.
I might go into a little explanation there. The original plan as
drawn up provided for three fixed stations at very great altitude in
all cases : one at Kaala on the Island of Oahu, about the highest point
we could put it; one at Haleakala on the Island of Maui, about
10,000 feet high; and one at Kohee on the Island of Kauai, which was
very new. This increased the range of the stations very greatly, but
it also increased the dilRculty of erection, because for the one at Kaala
all material had to be drawn by cable. We could not start any con-
struction at all until we got a cable that could be used to 12981
draw the material to the top of the mountain.
As I say, none of these fixed stations was in operation. We had
gotten, along in November, the mobile stations, and as soon as we
got them we started using them right away; and when this message
of the 27th came along, I prescribed that the Aircraft Warning
Service would function those hours. In addition to that, they had
their normal training. They trained then from 7 to 11, and they
had maintenance work, work of that kind, from 12 to 4.
164 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Now, it turned out that we were putting a little bit too gi-eat a
strain on this materiel, and later in the afternoon period we had
three stations working from 11 to 1, and three working from 1 to 4,
so that there was a little more chance for maintenance work and
keeping them in shape. But that was the situation, and the Inter-
ceptor Command was working with them. We were trying to edu-
cate the Interceptor Command and the Aircraft Warning Service,
and using this training period as an opportmiity to give them work
at what we considered the most dangerous time of the day. The
Navy had a liaison officer functioning with this outfit.
I want to take up the question of conferences with the Navy, as
there have been at times certain allegations that the Army and Navy
didn't get together, didn't talk things over. You might think from
some of the statements that we were almost utter strangers, and
that was far from the fact. As a matter of fact. Admiral Kimmel
and Admiral Bloch and I were on extremely friendly terms person-
ally and as well as having very frequent conferences officially. I
think that Admiral Kimmel [299] and I played golf to-
gether an average of every other Sunday morning, and very fre-
quently the Sunday mornings we didn't play golf he dropped over to
my quarters; so that we really were in very close personal touch as
well as officially.
On the 27th of November, the day this message came in, we had
a conference for probably three hours that morning on the question
of the reinforcement of the garrisons at Midway and Wake each by
a squadron of Army pursuit planes. That was at the conference at
which I told you a while ago that the Navy staff stated that they con-
sidered that there was practically no possibility of surprise attack
on Hawaii. I would like to have you bear in mind that that was
within three or four hours before I received this message from the
War Department on the 27th, I had a very recent opinion from the
Navy that they did not consider such attack probable. They had
sources of information that I didn't have. With their task forces
and their distant reconnaissance they had ways of obtaining infor-
mation that I didn't have. There was every reason why I should
accept their opinion as of value.
7. General Frank. I did not quite understand what you said there
about information that the Navy had that you didn't have.
General Short. They had sources of information. They got con-
tinual information from the Navy Department as to location of
Japanese ships. They had their task forces out constantly several
hundred miles out from Honolulu, and spreading out with their air.
aerial reconnaissance from the carrier. In other words, if there were
Japanese ships roaming around the ocean there, they had a chance to
pick them up, know they were there. If they didn't— couldn't stop
them, they at least could be [300] expected, I thought, to get
information of their presence, and I was sure they would tell me if
they had any such information. Now, I had no sources of informa-
tion comparable to that, and it was a natural thing that I should
accept the opinion of the Navy on that i)articular subject.
[301] It seemed to be the best informed opinion that there was
in the vicinity. There did not seem to be a divided opinion. So far
as I could figure, the Staff of Admiral Kimmel accepted Captain
McMorris's statement as their own comments.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 165
8. General Grunert. When you get to a stopping point, at the end
of any particular subject, we will have a short recess.
General Short. Let me take just about two minutes, and I will be
there, I think.
Now, that was on the 27th of November. On the 1st, he and I both
received radiograms, from the Navy and War Departments, relative to
the possible relief of the Marines on Wake Island and Midway, so that
they could be made available for landing parties; and we were called
upon for our opinion. We had a long conference on the 1st. On the
'2nd, he came, I think it was, to my quarters, w^ith an 8-page letter that
he had prepared, to the Navy Department, setting forth his views on
that. We were both full}^ of the opinion that the relief should not take
place until certain work was completed on the airfields at Wake and
Midway. The civilian construction and the labor condition was quite
complicated, the water proposition was very difficult at both places,
and we both felt that it would be an advantage if they could delay
their relief until that construction work was completed.
He brought this long letter, to the Navy Department, setting forth
his views, to my quarteis, as I remember, and read it to me, and we
went over it; and I was in full accord with his views on the subject.
On the 3rd, we had another conference at his headquarters. [302]
After reading his letter, I had prepared my radiogram to the War
Department, setting forth my vieAvs, which I say were practically in
full accord with his on that, and we went over my radiogram and the
radiogram he prepared for the Navy Department. There was one
difference of opinion, there. He wanted definite unity of command
on the outlying islands for the Navy, and I felt we should have the
same type of command that we had on Hawaii, which was command
by cooperation. I felt that as long as we had command by cooperation
oi'i Hawaii, it should extend to the subject garrisons; that if we wanted
a unity of command on Hawaii, then naturally we would go to unity
of command on the outlying islands. Each one of us stated his views
on that subject fully to his own Department, so that there was no hard
feeling about it. It was a perfectly cordial personal relation, and each
one felt the other fellow should present his own views to the other
Department, where there was a diflerence of opinion.
That went in on the 2nd. We also had orders to relieve the Navy
garrison at Canton Island. They did not have much, and we had
conferences that covered that to some extent, that morning, and then
on the next day. Major Fleming, who was acting as my liaison with the
Navy on all the matters with regard to the relief of the various garrisons
on the islands, had a conference with Colonel Phyphffer, of the Marine
Corps, with reference to procuring 5-inch Marine antiaircraft guns,
because the Army had none, and we thought, in shoving the outposts
out as far as Canton, with a small garrison, it was important to have
the best antiaircraft we could have.
I covered these conferences, because it shows you very [SOS]
definitely that our conferences were not infrequent, and that during
this period of stress we were in almost daily conference, where, if at
any time the Navy had had any piece of information about carriers,
their presence, or that they could not be accounted for, I was sure
that they would have told me.
During this period, the 27th to the 6th of December, they made no
request for Army planes for long-distance reconnaissance, so I was
166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
convinced that they either knew where the Japanese carriers were, or
had enough information that they were not uneasy, and with the task
forces that I knew they had out, that they felt they could handle the
situation. I did not know in an official manner ordinarily when they
were sending out task forces, but I usually knew informally; and I
knew at that time they were preparing to send some new task forces
out in the next two or three days ; and I had gotten permission to send
one of my assistant G-3's with the task force going to Johnston Island,
because the Marines were going to carry out a landing exercise, and I
particularly wanted our G-3 Section to observe exactly how it was
done; so I did know that the Navy had out one task force, and were
sending out two more ; and I knew the approximate places they were
going, so I had a good deal of personal information on what the recon-
naissance could cover.
I think we can take a break, right there.
(Brief recess.)
9, General Grunert. All right. The Board will proceed.
General Short. Shall I go ahead with my talk ?
10. General Grunert. Go ahead.
General Short. There were two incidents that happened prior to the
attack, that convinced me fully that the War [304] Depart-,
ment had no feeling that there was danger of Japanese air attack at
Honolulu. On December 5, a B-24 arrived from the mainland. It
came in with one .30-caliber gun and two .50-caliber guns in the tail.
That is all the equipment it had, and it had no ammunition; but in
spite of the fact that it came in that way, we had very specific instruc-
tions from the War Department as to how it was to be equipped when
it left Honolulu to fly over and photograph Truk and Jaluit.
I will read you that message in a little while. This indicated to
me, the way it came in and the way it was ordered to go out, that the
War Department felt that there was no danger of an air attack on
Honolulu, or between Honolulu and San Francisco, that the plane was
safe, could be sent without ammunition, and that it was a greater
hazard to carry that weight in ammunition than it was to take a chance
of meeting the Japs without any ability to return their fire ; but they
did feel that when you hit the Mandate islands there was a real possi-
bility of their being attacked from those land bases out there, and they
gave positive instructions that they should be in shape to return the
attack and not take a chance of being brought down without being able
to fight back.
Now, I would like to read a message :
Reference two B dash twenty four airplanes for special photo mission stop it
is desired that the pilots be instructed to photograph Truk Island in the Caroline
Group Jaluit in the Marshall gi-oup stop visual reconnaissance should be made
simultaneously stop information desired as to the number and location of naval
vessels including submarines comma airfields comma aircraft comma {.305}
guns comma barracks and camps stop Pilots should be warned islands strongly
fortified and manned stop Photography and reconnaissance must be accomplished
at high altitude and there must be no circling or remaining in the vicinity stop
Avoid Orange aircraft by utilizing maximum altitude and speed stop Instruct
crews if attacked by planes to use all means in their power for self-preservation
stop The two pilots and co-pilots should be instructed to confer with Admiral
Kimmel upon arrival at Honolulu to obtain his advice stop If distance from Wake
and Jaluit to Moresby is too great comma suggest one B dash twenty four pro-
ceed from Wake to Jaluit and back to Wake comma then Philippines by usual
route photographing Ponape while en route Moresby stop Advise pilots best time
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 167
of day for photographing Truk and Jaluit stop Upon arrival in Philippines two
copies each of any photographs taken will be sent to General MacArthur comma
Admiral Hart comma Admiral Kimmel comma the Chief of Naval Opei'ations
comma and the War Department stop Insure that both B dash twenty four air-
planes be fully equipped with gun ammunition upon departure from Honolulu
In other words, they show beyond any question that they considered
it important to have them armed when they leave Honolulu and that
they did not consider it important to have them armed up to Honolulu.
iilong that same line, for two months, when we had been flying
planes, B-17's, to the Philippines, without any instructions from the
War Department, I had personally seen that ships were armed, that
everything was in readiness for [306] self-defense, and I had
personally instructed the leader of the group out there that he was to
take no chances of being shot down by the Japs; if they approached
him, and acted suspiciously, that he must not wait to let them get in
the first shot, he was to protect himself. That had been going on for a
couple of months, beyond Honolulu.
Now, when that wire was received, the planes were examined. We
found that we could by robbing B-l7's get the guns to equip this B-24,
and that we had the ammunition, without any trouble; but we did not
have the adapters, and General Martin, commanding the Hawaiian
Air Force, prepared a wire to the Chief of Air Corps, which was sent
over his signature and mine, both, stating, requesting that the second
B-24 bring the equipment for the first, that had been left behind, and
that we were holding the first B-24: there until it was properly equipped
before starting on its mission. It was there at the time of the attack,
in a hangar, awaiting to be equipped, and it was destroyed. The other
B-24 didn't get in.
Now, that message, at least part of it, here, is of interest :
Strongly recommend —
This was after we had told them what wasn't there in the way of
equipment —
Strongly recommend that second B-24 bring necessary equipment from main-
land for installation on. both planes prior to departure from Hickam Field stop
Plane being held here until satisfactorily armed stop Subject plane has no
armorplate installation stop except for removal of passenger seats plane equipped
as for ferry service North [307] Atlantic
We pointed out to them at that time the way they were sending
the planes in.
The other incident which showed that up to the last minute the War
Department considered that there was no danger whatever of attack
between Honolulu and San Francisco was the fact that on the night of
the fith, 9 : 30 p. m., San Francisco time, 12 : 30 a. m. Eastern Stand-
ard Time, and 10 : 30 San Francisco time, or 1 : 30 a. m., on the 7th, on
Eastern Standard Time, two groups of planes left Hamilton Field, six
in each group, for the Philippine Islands. Those planes, when they
came in, they came in during the first attack. They all arrived be-
tween 8 and 8 : 20. The first plane I think hit the landing mat about
five minutes after eight, and the pilot was killed as they hit the landing
mat. Four out of the eight planes — out of the 12 — four of the 12
were destroyed. Those planes had no ammunititon. The guns were all
cosmolined. The guns had never been bore-sighted. If they could
have shot anything, they couldn't count on hitting anything. They
had skeleton crews consisting of a pilot and a co-pilot, navigator, en-
168 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
gineer, and a radioman, so if they had had their guns all complete and
their ammunition, they didn't have the crews to defend themselves, and
this ceased to be a theory, it wasn't an academic question, because they
came in right in the midst of the first Japanese attack, and they were
unable to fire a shot, unable to defend themselves. The first man
tried to land. Of course, they knew nothing of what was going on,
because there hadn't been time to get anything to them. The first tried
to land at Hickam Field, and they landed pretty [308] much
around Oahu, anywhere they could. Some landed at Bellows Field.
I think there were at least four or five that landed at outlying fields.
They didn't have enough gas to go to outlying islands, but it is per-
fectly evident to me that if the War Department expected an at-
tack on the 7th of December, they wouldn't have started planes out from
Hamilton field in that condition. It says to me very definitely that
their estimate was exactly the same as mine, that they were not ex-
pecting an air attack on Honolulu, or there wouldn't be any excuse
in the world for anybody authorizing planes to come in that condi-
tion. They felt that the hazard of carrying the extra weight in am-
munition was greater than the hazard of a possible attack by Japanese.
It turned out they were wrong. It meant very definitely, to me, that
the War Department did not expect an attack that morning.
I would like to point out also that from November 28 up to December
7 I had not had one single word from the War Department on the
situation. If there was any crisis in the situation, they had com-
pletely failed to inform me of it. If they thought there was a crisis,
I felt that I would be informed, if there was any crisis in the situa-
tion at all, but there had been nothing for that period.
Now, apparently some time after those planes had left Hamilton
Field in that condition, the War Department must have gotten some
information that alarmed them, or that they felt that they ought to
get to me as early as possible, and the Chief of Staff filed a message
at 12 : 18 p. m., Washington time, December 7. That was 6 : 48 a. m.,
Honolulu time.
[S09] General Short. Here is the message:
(Message of December 7, 1941, to Hawaiian Department, Ft. Shafter,
T. H., Signed "Marshall", is as follows:)
Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard Time today —
That would be 5i/o hours earlier in Honolulu —
what amounts to an ultimatum. Also they are under orders to destroy their code
machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we
do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform Naval authorities of this
communication.
As I say, that was filed at 12 : 18. It was sent by commercial radio,
the R. C. A. I did not know at that time why it was sent commercially.
However, early that morning our radio had great difficulty keeping in
communication through the War Department radio. Our set was a
10 k. g. set, not powerful like the Navy's or the R. C. A. ; and things
that I have seen in the Roberts report since indicate that the message
was sent via R. C. A. because the War Department felt that it could not
be gotten through on the War Department radio. It arrived in
Honolulu at 7 : 33 a. m., December 7, Honolulu time. Just what
happened right at that time, I am not sure, but the attack struck
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 169
within 22 minutes after, and it looks like what probably happened
was that they did not get under way on the delivery until the attack
struck, and they waited until the most serioils part of the bombardment,
practically all of it was over, and delivered the message to the Signal
Office at 11 : 45 a. m. The attack had taken place at 7 : 55 a. m. The
message was decoded and [SIO] delivered to the Adjutant
General at 2 : 58 p. m., 7 hours and 3 minutes after the attack when
we got this important piece of information. We had a scrambled phone
that, ordinarily, you could get through in ten or fifteen minutes. It
looks reasonable that they thought, even then, that if there was going
to be a hostile attack, they would have tried to get it to us by more
than one means of communication. General Marshall stated that the
reason he did not telephone was that it took some time, that he had
called the Philippines before he called Hawaii, and there was possi-
bility of a leak which would embarrass the State Department. In
other words, I think there was a feeling still at that time that secrecy
was more important than the time element in getting the information
to us as rapidly as possible. Whatever the reason was, we got that
information seven hours after the attack. So it meant that at the
time we were attacked we had no information from the War Depart-
ment since November 28th. If they had used the scrambled phone
and gotten it through in ten or fifteen minutes we would probably have
gotten more of the import and a clearer-cut idea of the danger, from
that message, and we would have had time to warm up the planes
and get them in the air to meet any attack.
[Copy]
3141 Southweste:rn Boulevard,
Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, IBJfJf.
Subject : Corrections in testimony.
To : President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.
1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before tbe
Army Pearl Harbor Board :
iti ***** *
Page 310, line 9, change "had" to "would have".
*******
/s/ Walter C. Short,
Walter C. Short,
Major Oencral, U. S. Army, Retired.
[Copy]
3141 Southwestern Boulevard,
Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944.
Subject : Corrections in testimony.
To : President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.
1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the
Army Pearl Harbor Board:
* * * w * * *
Page 310, line 17, change "scrambled" to "scrambler".
/s/ Walter C. Short,
Walter C. Short,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.
170 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
There were two things that took place that morning in addition
to not getting the message to us that might have worked out to our
very great advantage if they had been handled differently.
A two-man submarine got into Pearl Harbor. I think it probably
was about 6 : 45 when we first got the first indication of it, and I
think it was entered as about 7 : 12, or something [311] like
that, when the report was made ; but at approximately 7 : 15 they
could have reported to me that there had been a submarine attack.
That would, under the conditions, have indicated to me that there was
danger. The Navy did not visualize it as anything but a submarine
attack. They considered that and sabotage their greatest danger;
and it was Admiral Bloch's duty as Commander of the District to
get that information to me right away. He stated to me in the pres-
ence of Secretary Knox that at the time he visualized it only as a
submarine attack and was busy with that phase of it and just failed
to notify me ; that he could see then, after the fact, that he had been
absolutely wrong, but that at the time the urgent necessity of getting
the information to me had not — at any rate, I did not get the informa-
tion until after the attack.
The other thing was that at 7 :20 — there had been an agreement on
the part of the control officers of the Navy and Aircraft Warning
Service Command and not to go through the training period on Sunday
morning. They normally worked from 7 o'clock on to 4 as a training
proposition, but they had agreed that they would not work that morn-
ing. However, Lieutenant Tyler, the officer in charge of the inter-
ceptor station, remained at the station, and the station continued to
work for practice. They picked up a considerable number of planes
132 miles out in a direction 3 degrees east of north. The observer did
not know anything about any planes being out and got quite alarmed
about it. He called the operator and got in contact with Lieutenant
Tyler and the Lieutenant talked to them about it and got the report
and made the decision that [312] it was not of any importance.
He had three reasons for that. In the first place, he thought it might
be a task force, because that happened all the time. They picked them
up from the station. He thought possibly it was a bombing mission
from Hickam that had gone out. In the third place, what made him
very positive that it was only friendly planes was the fact that he knew
that a flight of B-17s was coming in from the mainland that morning.
It turned out that that flight actually came in just five minutes behind
those Japanese planes, and the direction from which they came in was
just 3 degrees off of what the Japs came in. They came from straight
north and the Japs came from 3 degrees east of north. So you can see
that the Lieutenant had some grounds for feeling that it was just
a routine friendly plane mission. He had been listening to Hawaiian
music from 4 o'clock on, which practically always meant that they were
bringing in a group of planes from the States, because they had no
beam there and they used that for orientation, and he felt they were
about due. They actually came in just five minutes later. If he had
alerted the Interceptor Command there would have been time, if the
pursuit squadrons had been alerted, to disperse the planes. There
would not have been time to get them in the air. You could not have
warmed them up and gotten them into the air on time, but the loss
would have been greater
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 171
11. General Fkank. You say the loss would have been greater.
General Short. The loss would have been very greatly lessened.
12. General Grunert. We want the record clear. You mean the loss
would have been greatly lessened ? You said "greater."
[S13] General Short. I ment to say, it would have made a great
difference. What you have said is much better. It would have made
a great difference in the loss. It probably would not have protected
the battleships; it probably woulcl not have protected the Hawaiian
depot, because they would not have had time to get the planes in the
air. But, on the other hand, our aircraft would have been more in-
stantly ready for action. It would have been a question of split-
seconds instead of minutes in getting into action.
When the attack took place at 7 : 55 on December 7th I was in my
quarters. When I heard the first bomb explode I thought that the
Navy was probably carrying out some exercises that either they had
not told us about or that I had forgotten about. When the second
explosion took place I was out on my back porch where I could get
a look at Pearl Harbor, and I saw smoke rising, and I came to the
conclusion that something was seriously wrong. The Chief of Staff,
who lived next door, ran in the front door and called to me and said,
"It is the real thing. We have just had a message from Hickam Field".
That was probably two or three minutes after 8 when he came in and
notified me. By 8 : 10 all major echelon commanders had been told to
go into Alert No. 3, and everything was under way. The first plane
of the enemey, I think, was brought down at five minutes after 8". So
you can get an idea of the length of time it took to get into action.
The antiaircraft had skeleton crews at all of their guns. They acted
as crews to protect from sabotage, but there were enough men to fire
the guns. They had the small arms ammunition at the guns. At the
3-inch guns they had ammunition very immediately accessible, sir,
probably 55 yards, for all but four batteries. There were four batteries
in posi- [3^4-] tion, but there was no place for storing ammu-
nition except right out in the open ; and when the alert went on, that
did not look like the thing to do, so they did not have those guns work-
ing. The first 3-inch guns to get into action went into action at 8 : 15,
and between 8 : 15 and 10 they were all put in readiness for action.
Those last four batteries that did not have the ammunition drew it
at 8 : 15, and the last one finished up at 10 a. m.
There is an exhibit here that shows when every battery was alerted,
when it went into action; and the time that they went into action
naturally varied, with whether or not they had a target. Some of
them did not get targets until later in the morning, but they were ready
to act and were alerted at the times given.
We had that morning the following planes : We had pursuit planes
in commission, 80; pursuit planes out of commission, 69. They were
in various stages of repair. Some may have been slightly out of com-
mission, and so forth. But those that were actually available were put
into the air at that time.
We had six reconnaissance planes in commission and seven out of
commission. We had 39 bombers in commission and 33 out. Of those
bombers the only ones available for a real mission were the six Flying
Fortresses that were in commission, and the A-20's. I guess you
172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
would consider those bombers, General Frank. We had a total of 10
A-20's in commission and one out of commission. Then there were
the old B-lS's that were not of any very great value.
To show what took place between then and the 20th, we had gotten
our repair facilities, in spite of the very great damage done to the
Hawaiian Air Depot, and within two or three days we [315]
were repairing more planes than we were before, because the men
worked 24 hours a day.
Immediately following the bombing it looked like the machinery
was almost a total wreck. As a matter of fact, we salvaged between
80 and 85 per cent of the machines, so that we were able to get our
repair facilities going very well. We had a new building that appar-
ently the Japs had not identified as a repair shop, and we had gotten
all of the new machinery probably within the week before, and we had
not installed it yet. It was in the new building, not installed, and
the old building, which they undoubtedly had spotted, was entirely
demolished, and it looked like our machinery was all shot, but we were
able to move about 80 per cent within the new building, and in a period
of 24 hours we were getting along very well and the result was that
on the 20th of December we had 61 pursuit planes actually in commis-
sion and we had 22 that could be repaired. It might take a few liours
on some and a day on others.
As to reconnaissance planes, we had six in commission and two
that could be repaired locally.
Of bombers we had 50 in commission and 13 could be repaired
locally.
However, there had been 20 bombers received from the mainland.
It was very unfortunate that of the B-l7's, four that came in from
the States were destroyed, and there were only two that were service-
able out of our six that were in commission, so that we lost the
six B-17's, and for some reason the A-20's escaped untouched. Ap-
parently they were not conspicuous. So the greater part of our losses
was the old B-18's which we could afford better than anything else,
and we were able in a few days to carry on our missions very well.
[316] As to what took place with the infantry outfits, as soon
as they got the message for Alert No. 3 they turned out. The 24th
Division turned out at 8 : 10 and returned the fire of the enemy
])lanes, and at 8 : 30 they were moving out to their battle positions.
The 25th Division was also moving out to their battle positions by
8 : 30. By 4 o'clock the 24th Division were all in battle positions
and the 25th by 5 o'clock. They had to move pretty much all over
the island. We also had a plan for the movement of troops to their
positions in case of attack with a minimum of 200 yards between
vehicles, because we did not want to take a chance of having a bunch
of vehicles and having enormous losses from air attack. So, mov-
ing in that kind of formation naturally took longer. But they had
drawn fire, and we had both divisions complete by 5 o'clock in the
afternoon. The harbor troops had their ammunition immediately
at hand and the antiaircraft had theirs very early.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 173
[Copy]
3141 Southwestern Boltlevard,
Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944.
Subject : Corrections in testimony.
To : President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.
1. I request that the follo\A'ing corrections be made in my testimony before
the Army Pearl Harbor Board :
*******
Page 316, line 14, before word "fire" insert "one day's".
*******
/s/ Walter C. Short.
Walter C. Short.
Major General, U. 8. Army, Retired.
The civilian elements that we had been training worked extremely
well. We had 16 surgical teams that we had organized among the
doctors on the Island. The first one of these teams reported to the
hospital at 9 o'clock. They made it an hour and five minutes. We
had 20 first-aid stations that were organized, with ambulances and
so forth. At 12 o'clock noon they started evacuating the women and
children from Hickam and Wheeler Fields and the harbor defense
positions that were in immediate danger, according to the plans that
had been draw^n up, and they were located in school buildings at
Shafter, and the ordnance depot went into two underground rooms
that were being constructed at Shafter, one of which was for cold
storage, which was about finished, and those people were put in there
temporarily. The others went to schools, and all arrange- [S17'\
ments were made to set up cafeterias and issue blankets; and we got
them out of what looked like danger spots and sent them up to these
localities for two or three days, depending on how many slit trenches
were completed, and then they were allowed to return, and the slit
trenches were immediately available to their quarters so they could
get into them.
[Copy]
3141 Southwestern BouLBn?ARD,
Dallas 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944.
Subject : CoxTections in testimony.
To : President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.
1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before
the Army Pearl Harbor Board :
*******
Page 316, line 26, — after word "building" insert "period".
*******
/s/ Walter C. Short,
Waltee C. Short,
Major General, U. 8. Army, Retired.
As soon as the attack took place G-2 and the F. B. I. started round-
ing up enemy agents that they had listed. They had two lists, one of
people that were to be arrested immediately and thrown into a con-
centration camp, and the other a list of those to be held under
observation.
Of those who w^ere supposed to be thrown into concentration camp
that afternoon they had arrested all but four, four that they did not
find, and they got them the next day. They actually rounded up and
put over on Sand Island 370 Jap agents, 98 German agents, and 14
Italians.
174 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Almost before the first attack was finished the 804th Engineers,
which was a battalion of aviation engineers, started clearing the fields
at Wheeler and Hickam, and the air men started pulling their planes
and getting them together as rapidly as they could, and by 7 :50 all the
pursuit that was in condition to get into the air was put into the air.
This pursuit actually brought down 10 Japanese planes. One brought
down four, one brought down two, and the others were individual
planes.
[Copy]
3141 Southwestern Boulevard,
Dallas 5, Texas, No. 10, 19U-
Subject: Corrections in testimony.
To : President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.
1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before
the Army Pearl Harbor Board :
Page 317, line 21,— change "7 : 50" to "S : 50".
3|e 4: 4: 4: 4: 4i 4=
/s/ Walter C. Short,
s Walter C. Short,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.
I have in this report an exhibit showing exactly what batteries
brought down enemy planes and what the Air Corps brought down.
It shows 38. G-2 thought there was a possibility of 9 duplications.
The Army brought down somewhere between 29 and 38 planes. It
might have been 29; it might have been 38; [318'\ it might
have been anything in between, because there was a number of planes
brought down ; and G-2 sifted the thing as carefully as possible and
oame to the conclusion that 29 was the minimum and 38 was the
maximum of planes brought down.
The enemy planes were estimated to be somewhere between 160 and
l80. In other words, we brought down somewhere between 15 and
20 per cent of the enemy planes, which I believe was a very good
average in any place in the world. That percentage has not been
exceeded very often, in spite of the fact that we were not instantly
expecting fire attack. I think that the number of planes brought
down by aircraft and antiaircraft fire is something that we need not
be ashamed of. If we had known they were coming we probably
would have gotten a greater percentage ; but we might not get more,
because it happens frequently that when flying over Europe they come
back with less than 3 or 5 per cent loss.
[Copy]
3141 SOUTHWESTEBN BOULEIVARD,
Dallas 5, Texas, No. 10, lOU.
Subject : Corrections in testimony.
To : President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.
1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the
Army Pearl Harbor Board :
*******
Page 318, line 10, change "fire" to "air".
/s/ Walter C. Short
Walter C. Short,
Major General, U. 8. Army, Retired.
I got in touch with the Governor on the afternoon of the 7th and
had a conference with him as to whether or not he should declare
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 175
martial law, and after talking it over from all angles he and I decided
that we should delay martial law to give him a chance to put into effect
the M-Day Bill. There were some features of the M-Day Bill — I will
say that is the mobilization day bill that gave the governor the author-
ity to create auxiliary police, home guards, auxiliary firemen and
organize them, and all kinds of things. Some of those things had
not been fully implemented. The Home Guards had not been called
out. We felt that if we put martial law into effect immediately there
was some question whether he could call them out, but delaying martial
law until the next day would let him as the civil governor go ahead
and implement that bill, and we [319] would have a whole
lot more to work with. So that was done. He put the basis of the
M-Day Bill into effect on the 7th, and on the 8th he declared martial
law and asked me to take over.
1320] When that was done, the courts were closed, civilian offi-
cials were asked to continue on their jobs, and an advisory committee
composed of the Governor as the head of it was organized, and a mili-
tary commission was organized, and provost court was established.
The sale of liquor was pr'ohibited. Those were the important steps.
Almost before the bombing was over, the District Engineers had a
gang of civilian workmen down at Hickam Field repairing the water
lines and sewer pipes that were broken during the bombing. By that
night I think we had water service, which was most important because
we had, as you know to have been a fact, the aqua system of our gaso-
line floating on the water, and it was very inconvenient to try to use it
without the water system open.
On the 8th, the morning of the 8th, I directed the District Engineer,
who had a large organization, to take over all engineering supplies
on the Island and to order all contractors to report to him to work
under him, and take over all labor. We centralized the labor and ma-
terials in tlie District Engineer because he had a large organiza-
tion. We let the Navy have from that pool what they had to have,
and we also distributed material from that pool to the Department
Engineer.
The Department Engineer was given the mission of field fortifi-
cations and anything that was to be done with troop labor. The Dis-
trict Engineer took over chiefly the construction of new airfields. We
had had projects under way, or we had been trying to get money; we
didn't have them under way. We had the plans complete, and he
started immediately on these new airfields all over the Island. We
had constructed bunkers [321] for pursuit planes. We had
not constructed bunkers for the bomber planes down at Hickam because
the character of the soil was such theVe, we had to build up. We could
not dig down, and we did not have the heavy machinery necessary for
doing that. He brought in these contractors, and by noon of the 8th
he was in full swing at Kahuku putting in a new field, putting in
bunkers at Hickam, starting expanding the field at Haleiwa, putting
in a new field at Kipapa, and putting a temporary field on the golf
course at Schofield.
The Department Engineer on the 8th distributed his materials and
started troops on the field fortifications, and on the 9th he started
making slit trenches in the parks, near school buildings, and near all
176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
places where many people worked throughout the city, so that there
would be air shelters as early as possible.
Up to the present time I have talked wholly of what was done im-
mediately before the attack, practically from November 27th on.
I would like to talk about the steps that I took to improve the for-
tifications on the Hawaiian Islands and to prepare the command for
defense. I think that my work should be judged throughout the whole
period that I was in command, from the 7th day of February until
when I was relieved on December 16th.
I got there on the 5th, took over from General Herron, who left on
the 7th, and by the 19th I had made a pretty thorough inspection or
survey, and on the 19th I wrote a letter to the Chief of Staff outlining
the things that I thought required immediate attention. I should
like to go over some of those things.
[3£2] First, the question of the cooperation of the Navy in get-
ting more definite plans for our cooperation, like we did on that air.
That was consummated by March 21st. That was something we could
take care of very readily without money.
I took up the question of dispersion of planes for their protection,
and putting the maintenance of the air underground. I took up the
question of the antiaircraft defense. The garrisons of the Coast Artil-
lery were such that almost all organizations had a dual function : they
had to man harbor defenses, and they had to man antiaircraft defense.
In other words, if they had an attack from the sea and the air at the
same time, one of the two sets of equipment just could not be manned,
and we felt that there should be enough troops there so that it would
be possible to have at least one relief for both weapons.
There were certain things about the harbor defenses that apparently
needed to be attended to. There was no protection for the gun crews
at the harbor defenses, and that was gone into. The searchlights : we
had a lot of old searchlights that were not modern, and that was
taken up.
There had been relatively little done on roads and trails for the
movement of reserves, and the Island is small enough that with suitable
roads and trails we could move reserves very rapidly to any point.
For instance, we completed one, changed one trail to a motor trail,
where it had taken two hours and twenty minutes to move our reserves
over the trail on foot, and after we had completed the trail we could
move our reserves and occupy the points where the reserve was to go
within twenty minutes. That shows the question of the time element
that was [323] important.
There had been no bombproofs or shelters for the various command
posts except for the headquarters Of the Department. It was felt that
under present conditions it was not reasonable, where you could foresee
where your command posts would be, not to give them protection for
the command post and the communications.
Now, this letter was written to the Chief of Staff, and then as we got
the estimates and the detail plans together they were sent in to the
War Department. On September 10 we sent in complete plans for
putting the maintenance for aircraft underground. Those came back
on October 27 disapproved, stating that the amount of money involved,
which was between three and four million dollars, was too great, and
that they would not approve putting the maintena^nce underground...
PROCEEDINGS OP^ ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 177
I point out ill this letter to tliem that the maintenance shop at
Hickam Field stood up like a sore thumb : you could see it for ten or
fifteen miles out, and that if we ever had an air attack it would be one
of the first buildings to go, and which was very definitely proved to be
true, and the maintenance was moved out soon after the attack. They
started construction out in the gulches, ravines, and distributed the
maintenance so it was not all in one place, could not be all destroyed
at one time.
The field fortifications had never been properly camouflaged, and
we made a careful estimate and put in for funds. The scheme was
approved, but the funds had not been allotted. They were not avail-
able, apparently, and had not been allotted on December 7.
[024.] We asked for $350,000 for roads and trails, and we got
some of that and had done quite a bit of work on roads and trails for
moving reserves before the attack took place.
We had asked — we made a study and showed them that it was nec-
essary to have 180 B-17's for a proper reconnaissance in case the Navy
was ever pulled out, and a correspondingly large number of pursuit
planes. It was perfectly apparent that we could not accommodate those
planes on the airfield we had, and we put in for authority to build ten
additional airfields, and those fields were located: we were putting
bombers on the outlying islands, making provisions for them so in case
of an alarm we could move the bombers oil of Hickam, disperse them to
the outlying islands where we should not have so great losses. We were
figuring on putting in fields at Barking Sands on Kauai, Burns Field
on Kauai, Homestead Field on Molokai, Hilo and Morse Field on the
Island of Hawaii, improve Bellows Field on Oahu, improve Haleiwa
Field on Oahu, build a new field on the Island of Lanai, and a field at
Parker's Ranch on the Island of Oahu. We asked for a field at Kipapa
on the Island of Oahu, but the War Department disapproved that and
directed us to prepare plans for a field at Kahuku. Those fields were
all approved, but the funds had not been allotted, but we were able to
go ahead and do a lot without funds.
The District Engineer worked very closely with the W. P. A., and
we put up barracks on most of the outlying islands with W. P. A.
money, some civilian labor, and some soldier labor, but we got them up
and got started and were pretty well under way before we got any
money from the War Department. We did not do anything until the
plans had been approved, but when the plan [S2S] was ap-
proved we went ahead as far as we could go with W. P. A. funds and
had quite a good start in that way.
There was another subject : that Kaneohe Bay had been quite highly
developed by the Navy, Originally there hacl not been enough of a
channel there for any of the boats to come in, so it was not any more
dangerous than the rest of the east side of the Island, and they had
dredged out Kaneohe Bay so that light cruisers could come in, and
destroyers, without any difficulty. In other words, they had opened
our back door just absolutely wide to an enemy.
Now, when that was first started the War Department or the Com-
mander there, I am not sure which, stated that he did not raise any
objection to this development, but he could not garrison it, could not
defend it. Well, when I saw what the situation was, I decided that
having guards at your front door and leaving the baqk door \yide
• 7,9'^16— 4;6— Ex, 145. yol, 1 1.3.
178 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
open didn't offer very much protection, and I told the Navy I would
take over the responsibility, and immediately notified the War Depart-
ment of the situation, and they agreed to it, that the Army necessarily
would have to take over the defense of Kaneohe Bay because it left
the Island wide open otherwise, as it wa«3 not included in war garrison
at all. Wtir garrison at that time was set at 59 000, and we asked for
an increase in the war garrison to 71,500 to take care of Kaneohe Bay
and certain increases in the air. We had asked for increases in the
Engineers for aviation purposes, and general service regiment for
building roads and trails. We had gotten our increases allowed in the
Engineers. We had been told that the increases for the air would not
be allowed until litmitation on the 59,000 war garrison was lifted.
IS2'6] So we were turned down on a number of things on the basis
that they could not go beyond the 59,000.
I considered the airfields and the aircraft, probably the aircraft
Avarning service, the most important of all projects that we had in the
Islands. The War Department originally had agreed to furnish ma-
terials so we could have those completed by June 30th, but things were
not coming along. I had almost weekly conferences with the District
Engineer, who did all the aircraft warning work and all the airfield
work; and Major Fleming, an engineer in my G^ section, was my
liaison officer with the District Engineer and could give many more
of the details than I could, because he followed it. He was practically
in daily conference with the District Engineer and the civil officer, but
it became apparent that we were being slowed down terribly on that,
and I sent a message that I would like to read, on the lOth of June.
Here is a message I sent to the Adjutant General at that time :
(Message, June 10, 1941, LT. Gen. Short to Adjutant General, is as
follows:)
Division Engineer San Francisco has informed me that the priority covering
contract W dash four one four Engineer seven eight four with Interstate Equip-
ment Corporation Elizabeth New Jersey is now A dash one dash G —
That means the priority number.
This conti'act is the one for furnisliing all materials for cableway to Kaala air-
craft warning station stop Motor and all electrical equipment sub contracted to
General Electric stop Division Engineer states that [327] with this priority
there is strong probability that delivery this electrical material to contractor will
be delayed about fifteen weeks stop This Kaala station is the most important in
aircraft warning system and early completion of this cableway is essential stop —
I want particularly to point out this last sentence :
I consider this aircraft warning service as the most important single project
in this Department stop Strongly recommended that the War Department give
all possible assistance to Chief of Engineers to have priority on this contract
changed to A dash one dash B
Now, I got a wire back from the Adjutant General :
(Message, June 26, 1941, Adjutant General to Lt. Gen. Short, is as
follows:)
Re your radiogram three zero zero nine prior contract W dash four one four
Engineers seven eight four Kaala aircraft warning station advanced to A dash
one C
We asked for 1-B.
Chief of Engineers will instruct Division Engineer on procedure should results
under this priority be unsatisfactory
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 179
Now, I wanted to point this out particularly because a committee
of Congress, in investigating Colonel Wyman, stated that there had
been no attempt by the Commanding General in Hawaii to speed up
this contract. This is very plain what we had done, and the trouble
as I had it at that time from the Chief of Engineers and from Major
Fleming, who was my liaison, was the nonreceipt of material, and the
priority system had [S28] probably more to do with that than
any one thing. This Kaala station, we couldn't do a thing toward the
construction there until we got that cable because everything had to be
pulled up to the top of the mountain by cable. It was so steep you
couldn't get material of any weight up there any other way.
The priority proposition was very complicated. There was no one
on the Island that was authorized to grant priorities. If a thing
went in from the Government as a direct Government purchase, we
could get the priority and get it through, but we were in the habit
of buying a great deal of material locally for defense construction,
and when those people ran out of supplies they could not replace
them, and the only way they could get a replacement was to get us
to get a priority for them. So you can see that it just slowed down
all construction work if we had to wait for fifteen weeks for a pri-
ority to make the purchase, and then wait several weeks maybe for a
priority to get it on the boat; and I asked them to establish an office
of production management on the Island of Ouhu that would handle
that. They finally agreed to establish it, but it was never established
during my time there. But I wanted to point that out as one of the
serious difficulties in getting these air warning service stations con-
structed.
And the same way with all kinds of construction work. We finally
got authority to build up a certain pool of lumber for the Quarter-
master, no other articles but lumber. So that we were getting in
additional troops, having to build barracks for new troops coming
in. We were able to go ahead. The District [S^O] Engineer
asked for a revolving fund of $1,000,000 to enable him to have sup-
plies on hand when he got projects approved and money allotted.
This was never given him, but $500,000 worth of material was pur-
chased ahead of time from funds that the Chief of Engineers saw
were going to be available, so the situation was remedied somewhat,
but it was still very difficult at the time of the attack.
13. General Grunert. When you get to another place to pause,
we shall have another recess.
General Short. All right. Eight now.
14. General Grunert. Recess for five minutes, please.
(Thereupon there was a brief informal recess.)
[3S0] General Short. The construction of the ferrying route
by the southern route to Australia, was one of the important things
that came up. On the fourth of October, we got a wire from the War
Department, saying that they wanted the northern route closed,
so they would not have to use Midway and Wake, when it was con-
structed, and they wanted it constructed "in weeks, and not years."
That is the way it was put. That included Christmas Island, Canton
Island, New Caledonia, Suva in the Fiji Islands, and Townsville, in
Australia. Darwin was originally one of the places indicated, but
that was then, I think, turned over to the Philippine Department.
It was taken away from us.
180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
There was no suitable places for landinjy grounded Army planes
on these islands, so I got in touch with the Navy, made arrangements
to get some large airplanes to take our engineers to these places, to
make the survey, and waited, got no further instructions, sent two or
three radios to the War Department. Apparently, we were all ready
within a day or two. because Navy came through very nicely with
everything we needed to take Air groups there to make reconnais-
sances, but I heard nothing from the War Department, and I wired
them, and I wired them two or three times, and we finally got au-
thority on the 11th of November to go ahead. Apparently it had been
held up while the State Department threshed out with England the
permission to go ahead and build on these islands, because we claimed
Canton and Christmas, and they also claimed Canton and Christmas,
and so as I say we were delayed from the 4th of October till the 11th
of November, before we got authority to proceed.
Between the 11th of November and the 25th of December, we
[S31] completed the landing of crews, so we could get the B-17s
through to Australia, and a flight of three planes actually made the
trip on December 28. There were great difficulties involved.
We had to bring machinery in from the States, and a lot of work-
men in, from the States. Honolulu had been pretty well stripped
of all heavy machinery, which slowed it down, and we divided the
thing, so the work at Christmas Island was done by our engineers,
the work at Canton was to be done by civilians. We had to finish
it with engineers, because when the attack struck we had only two
small water stills down there, in the storage, a few thousands of
gallons of fresh water. We had large stills on the way, on the trans-
port, and the Navy turned that transport back. We couldn't leave
civilians there without water, to be possibly captured by the Japanese,
because we had about 55 soldiers as I remember with the detail, so we
sent the HALEAKALA, a boat we got from the Inter-Island Ship-
ping Company, and took them off, and left the engineer, left the Army
detachment there to finish, a thing which they succeeded in doing.
I do not mean to present the idea that these were fine, finished air-
fields. They were strips into the prevailing wind, landing strips
made out of coral, and we hadn't had time to surface them, but we
actually got them through. The engineers made arrangements at
the Fiji Islands with the New Zealand Government to do the work
there, and made arrangements on New Caledonia to have the Aus-
tralian Government do the work, because they were in control, and
they were very fortunate at Townsville, Australia, because they got
there and found the Australians had just completed a strip 3,500 feet
long, and were going to move.
[^32] They got in there, Saturday afternoon, and they were
starting to move the machinery away, Monday morning, and made a
contract right then and there, and we got that finished up in very
short order. The result was we actually were able to put that into
commission and fly planes over it on December 28. I have a letter
here — I won't take the trouble to read it to you — a letter from General
Arnold, stating he thought we had done the job in unbelievably short
time, and it turned out to be most necessary, because the other route
was absolutely out. Without that route, we would have been in very
serious difficulty.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 181
I took up — and you will find supporting letters in here ; you will find
letters to the Adjutant General, in a very great number of cases — in-
creases of certain types of troops. That is especially true for the Air
Corps, for the Coast Artillery, so as to have at least one relief for all
their weapons, and for the engineers. Also, I got authority to change
the old square division to two triangular divisions, and w^e put that
into effect. The outlying islands had never been garrisoned. I sent
on my own responsibility a battalion of National Guard to the Island
of Hawaii, one to Kauai, one to Molokai, and one to Maui. We later
got the approval of the War Department for expanding those garri-
sons and putting some artillery there.
What we were trying to do was to have enough on these important
islands to put down any uprising of the Japanese population, and to
prevent any small force from landing without opposition. We
changed. When I got there, I found that their war plan was a highly
secret order. You probably remember Field Order No. 1, General
Frank. It meant that the subordin- [333] ate officers couldn't
possibly know what to do, because it was so secret it was kept from
them, and we decided to get out a standing operating procedure and
separate all the strictly secret stuff and keep it out, so that every man in
the outfit would know exactly Avhat his mission Avas. We thought
out this standing operating procedure after we had department
maneuvers in May, and both maneuvers convinced us that the old
field order just was not workable on account of the secret business.
We brought out the standing operating procedure in July, worked at
it, revising it in November; finally, on November 5, we put it out in its
final form, and we furnished ten copies to the Navy at that time, so
that they would know what our general plan of defense was.
The situation was such that I felt the time had arrived for the civil
community to take an active interest in the defense of the island. I
was asked to talk before the Chamber of Commerce on Army Day,
April 6, 1941. I decided that that was a good time to launch this, so
I would have the maximum publicity, have practically all the im-
l)()rtant business men in the islands there to talk to, and get the maxi-
mum amount of publicity from the papers.
I put up the proposition to them that there were certain things that
were absolutely essential from the point of view of the civil community ;
first, production and storage of food. Hawaii has never been self-
supporting from the point of view of food. It is not that the land is not
l^rocluctive, but that there has been more money in growing the pine-
apple and sugar than in growing things to eat — vegetables. There
luid been some work done for some time on planning, as to what could
be grown. [334] We got the plantation managers to agree to
put in a certain number of things. One man would say he would try
out so many acres of tomatoes ; another one, so many acres of potatoes,
and learn how to grow them in that climate and in that soil, and with
the various bugs that attacked them. We carried on this work until
we knew what we could do, and we had an estimate of the seeds re-
quired. We had an agreement from every big plantation owner in
the Island that he would grow so many acres of such and such things,
and we had a list of the light farm vehicles that would be needed in
order to grow these things on the plantation.
182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
That planning was done ahead of time. On the storage side, we
thought that we should have a six-months supply on hand, there was
relatively little storage space in Honolulu, and that we should get
storage space constructed. Our estimates indicated that it would re-
quire about $2,500,000 to increase the storage of food to a six-months
supply, and about $900,000 worth of feed for dairy cattle and poultry.
We got the Governor to go after Mr. LaGuardia's Defense Committee,
to try to get the funds on that. We didn't succeed, before December 7,
but I think on December 17 that we got the funds that the Governor
and Delegate King had been trying to get for us, so we had the thing
under way, in that Way.
The next thing I considered as of importance was the organization
of the doctors and nurses. If they are not organized, in case of an
emeri>ency, they would probably be of very little help; and the Medi-
cal Association got squarely behind the project. They organized 16
surgical teams, 20 first-aid teams, and they had a considerable number
of rehearsals and entered into [SMI it very enthusiastically
and it paid big dividends on December 7, because they turned out
and functioned almost like trained outfits, as a result.
We felt that we needed an auxiliary police force to assist in guard-
ing the utilities, bridges, and so forth, so that the soldiers could be
relieved for real fighting, in an emergency. After we got the M Day
bill through, these forces were organized, and they turned out and
manned the defenses on two or three different occasions, and proved to
be quite valuable. We also had additional fire organizations, volun-
teer fire organizations, organized with the idea that if we got a bad
fire from bombing we would be able to supplement the fire organization
very largely. We tried to get a lot of additional hose and some ad-
ditional fire engines out of LaGuardia's Committee. We had not
succeeded in getting them at the time of the attack.
We made plans. There are certain sections of Honolulu, especially
adjacent to the water-front, where there is a storage of ga,soline and
oil and things of that kind that might start a terrific conflagration and
that would certainly, if we ever go any shelling from a surface ship,
it would certainly come in for its bombing, very likely too, from the
air; and we drew a plan for the evacuation of all the women and
children from those areas. We decided Avhere we would locate camps
to take care of them, and Colonel Lyman, the Department Engineer,
drew up detail plans. After the M Duy Bill was put into effect, on
the 8th of December, the Governor was able to make funds available
immediately, and we started the construction of those camps at once.
[336] There was a limited amount of trucks, surgical dressings,
and so forth, in the Island. We had built up some reserves in the
Army, we had available for the Army itself. We couldn't get from
the War Department the funds that would be necessary to take care
of the civil population in case that there were serious casualties that
way. The Red Cross sent a representative out there. I had a good
many conferences with him, and we persuaded them to establish a
depot of $200,000 worth of Red Cross supplies. They were able to do
it by a subterfuge of calling it a depot for the Far East, on the theory
that it would be used for any emergency anywhere in the Far East,
but we got it established, and we had a very great percentage of those
supplies actually in the depot when the attack took place, so that that
was extremely valuable, in taking care of the wounded, at that time.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 183
We had made plans, a complete survey, for establishing hospitals at
various places, including St. Louis College, and we actually set up that
hospital. We had started, the day before. We had gotten authority
to lease the buildings, and we had started setting up that hospital the
day before, and we had it in full operation on the day of the attack.
The two men that were probably most largely responsible for all the
medical preparation were Colonel King, now General King, who was
the Department Surgeon, and Colonel Fronck, the Reserve officer who
had been provided us by the Regular Army, who w^as a surgeon in
Honolulu. They had great enthusiasm and very considerable knowl-
edge, and they did marvelous things, as it turned out.
I felt that my work in preparation for the civil community [337]
was really one of the important parts of my job, because we got things
where they functioned on the day of the attack, that just couldn't have
functioned if we hadn't made these studies. There were some things
we didn't complete. We had started an inventory of all of the food
supplies on the Island. We expected to get it taken at the end of
December. The merchants had agreed to do this without any expense.
We had the plans all made. In the end, we took that inventory from
the 8th to the 10th of December. Beginning the morning of the day
after the attack, we made that inventory. We were able to tell the
War Department exactly what was on hand in the Island, and where
we had expected to have, and hoped to have, a 60-days supply, we
found there was only 37, so we got the AVar Department to agree to ship
a certain tonnage on, of food supplies, every week, so as to take care of
the population and build up a reserve.
Again the Army was all right, we had our six-months supplies, and
I had got some additional cold-storage at Schofield and was building
an underground storage at Shafter, which was completed within a
week after the attack ; so the Army, just for taking care of itself, there
was no difficulty, but there was serious difficulty from the point of view
of the civil population.
Now, at the expense of boring you, I would like to read to you a letter
that the Governor wrote to me, unsolicited, as a result of that work.
It shows the attitude that the civil community had towards me. It
reads :
Territory of Hawaii,
Executive Chambers, Honolulu
[3381 23 December 1941.
Lieutenant General Walter C. Shobt
Fort Shafter, T. H.
My Dear General Short : Having noted in the public press that an investi-
gation is being made as to the military preparedness of the Army and Navy in
Hawaii on December 7, 1941, I believe it appropriate that I make to you a
statement as to the state of preparedness of the civil communities of these
Islands for war when they were so insidiously and treacherously attacked on
December 7, 1941.
The citizens of the Hawaiian Islands have always appreciated that these
Islands were important to National Defense from a military standpoint, but it
has been only since your arrival in these Islands on February 5, 1941, that it
has been brought home to the civil population the importance of the part it
would play in the event of a war in the Pacific. On December 7th, the citizens
of these Islands met the hour of their test in such a manner as to make me proud
to be the Chief Executive of these Islands. Tour foresight in urging the popula-
tion to prepare to meet the possible vicissitudes of war and the joint efforts of
the Army and civil population in planning and preparing for this emergency was
m'agnificently rewarded.
It may be of interest to point out in detail some of the plans and preparations
which bore fruit on December 7, 1941 :
184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(1) The enactment of the Hawaiian Defense Act by a special session of
Legislature called for that purpose.
[339] That is what we call the "M Day Bill."
This legislation permits a mobilization of the entire civil economy of the Islands
in the interest of National Defense or in the event of disaster. By virtue of this
act, civilian defense vras planned and many of its phases were brought to such
a point of preparation that they were able to go into action immediately and to
function effectively on December 7, 1941.
(2) The production and conservation of food: Householders were persistently
urged to stock their shelves in canned food. It is estimated that this resulted
in increasing the available food supply of the Hawaiian Islands by more than
twenty percent. Federal appropriation was requested for procurement and stor-
age for food reserve. This appropriation has, since December 7, 1941, been
authorized. By agreement with plantation owners, plans were made for the
procurement and storage of seed and the planting of certain large areas with
quick growing food crops. Agreenjents were also made for the growing, in
normal times, of those crops not usually grown in marketable quantities. In
furtherance of this plan, the War Department was induced to permit the pur-
chase of Island grown potatoes for the use of the Army although the price was
above that of mainland potatoes. In anticipation of the receipt of reserve sup-
plies of food asked for in the emergency, the Army supported a certificate of
necessity for building an adequate wareliouse to meet tliese needs. This ware-
house is now available for the storage of food supply when it arrives.
[340] (3) The medical facilities for the care of the injured and wounded
during any disaster was one of the first things accomplished by the civilians of
these Islands for an emergency. This resulted in mobilizing the entire medical
profession of the Islands with all its medical facilities. Approximately three
thou.sand persons were given training and instrni'tion in First-Aid as required
by the Red Cross. The persons thus trained assisted in carrying out the arduous
tasks of evacuation. Twenty First-Aid units were organized, each unit con-
sisting of personnel of about one hundred and twenty. An ambulance corps
of one hundred and forty improvised ambulances were organized. The per-
formance of their tasks by these groups was one of the highlights of the civil
defense efforts on December 7, 1941.
(4) Plans for the evacuation of women and children and the preparation of
shelters for workers in essential industries had reached a high state of perfec-
tion on December 7, 1941, and the evacuation of women and children from areas
attacked was accomplished in a most admirable manner.
(5) An auxiliary police force to guard utilities and to prevent sabotage was
organized at an early date in our preparation and it was able to function instantly
when called upon to do so on the morning of December 7th. The work of this
force was exceptional and excellent.
(6) Legislation authorizing a home guard was enacted at the special session
of the Territorial legislature. It was well planned and so organized that [S^l]
1400 of such home guardsmen could and were placed on duty thereby relieving
members of the Army for other military duty.
(7) There were many other matters too numerous to detail here which were
planned and accomplished at your instigation. Important among these was the
bringing home to the public the urgent necessity for cooperation and public
service in times of emergency.
All of the foregoing required tremendous effort on the part of the local author-
ities, the citizenry and military authorities. All such efforts have been rewarded
since December 7, 1941, in that Territorial and City Governments and all phases
of the public welfare have overcome all obstacles and have operated smoothly
as a direct result of prior planning and training.
It is my belief that the public has confidence in the military and civil au-
thorities. The fact that the Japanese Government has seen fit to infiict a
treacherous attack has not in any way diminished the faith of this community
in your demonstrated abilities. I wish to state that the magnificent way in
which the Territory of Hawaii met its problem in its crucial hour was in a large
measure due to your foresight. I am deeply grateful for your efforts on behalf
of the Territory.
You are at liberty to use this letter in any way which you see fit.
Very sincerely yours,
(S) J. B. POINDEXTER,
Governor of Hawaii.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 185
[343] I said that I felt that my work with the civil community
was almost equally important with my work with the military as a
preparation for defense; and I have here a much shorter letter that 1
would like to take your time to read. This letter is addressed to
the President, from Honolulu.
(The letter from civilians of Honolulu to the President, dated
December 22, 1941, is as follows :)
We, the undersigned, representing substantial business and social organizations
in Hjlwaii, and liaving liad for many years in many ways a vital interest in
the armed forces stationed in Hawaii, do hereby wish to express our sincere
appreciation of the services rendered to this Territory and to our Nation by
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short.
We have found him at all times to he most cooperative and furthermore he
has exercised a vigorous leadership in causing this community to prepare for
an emergency such as exists at present. Almost a year ago he laid out a plan
for this purpose and has taken all steps practicable toward carrying out such
a plan.
General Short's thorough foresight and his forceful presentation of his ideas
to our "Territorial Legislature", to our local officials, and to our community
in general have been very largely responsible for (a) the enactment of a sound
"M-Day" Bill; (b) for the provision of a Territorial Guard; (c) for the de-
cision "to increase stored food and to produce food; and (d) for the prevention
of sabotage. He has shown a correct and sympathetic attitude toward the prob-
lems of the civil community in assuring cooperation of civilians.
[343] He has maintained a high morale in his C<mimand and has con-
ducted "alerts" from time to time. He has proceeded with preparing his troops
and with plans, now looking for financing from federal funds, for adequate and
safe storage of sufficient supplies and equipment of all sorts for their use in a
probable emergency.
We are encouraged by the fact that a committee has been appointed to go
into various phases of the entire case, believing that the excellent men you have
selected will render a just report, fair to all concerned.
INIeanwhile. we wish to express to yourself and to all concerned our high
esteem and our full confidence in the character and ability of General Walter
C. Short as a citizen and as an officer, whatever his assignment may be.
This letter is prepared without the knowledge or consent of General Short
or any other official, merely in our hope that no unwarranted discredit may
accrue to the record of such a conscientious and able officer, through adverse
publicity or otherwise. This concern is in no way lessened by our vital interest
in the adequate defense of Hawaii and our Nation.
With very best respects and wishes, we are
Yours very truly,
The important part of this letter is the people who si^rned it.
The mayor of the City of Honolulu; the president of the Hawaiian
Trust Company, Limited; the vice-president of Alexander & Baldwin,
Ltd. ; the president of the Oahu Railway & Land Co. ; the president of
Lewers & Cook, Ltd.; Assistant Food Administrator, O. C. D. ; the
Governor of Hawaii; the chief justice of [34-^] the Supreme
Court: the Director of Civilian Defense for Oahu; the President of
Theo PI. Davies & Co., Ltd. ; Executive Vice-President, Bishop National
of Hawaii and Honolulu ; Executive Vice-President, Bishop Trust Co.,
Ltd. ; Executive Vice-President, Hawaiian Sugar Planters Associa-
lion ; President, American Factors, Ltd. ; Treasurer, American Factors,
Ltd. ; President, C. Brewer & Co., Ltd. ; Trustee, Bernice P. Bishop
Estate; Territorial Director of Civilian Defense; Manager, Merchan-
ili.se Department, Alexander t"^ Baldwin, Ltd.
Those of you who know Honolulu know that that list represents
Jiretty nearly all the important business organizations in Honolulu,
and it means much more than the same number of names woidd mean.
186 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in any community in the United States. There is a closer organization
over there. I read it as an indication of what the civil community
thought of the work I had done.
That is all I have, except that I would like to present my conclusions
and I would like to read them — a couple of pages — so as "to give them
rather exact instead of just speaking them, if that is satisfactory.
(The conclusions are as follows:)
1. The radiogram from the War Department through CINCUS Fleet of October
16th emphasized that measures taken by me during the grave situation of tlie
Japanese negotiations should not disclose strategic intention nor constitute pro-
vocative actions against Japan.
The radiogram of November 27th reiterated that action should be carried out
so as "not repeat not to disclose intent," not alarm civil population, and avoid
unnecessary publicity.
l3Jf5] When the War Department was notified that the Hawaiian Depart-
ment was alerted against sabotage it not only did not indicate that the command
should be alerted against a hostile surface, sub-surface, ground or air attack, but
replied emphasizing the necessity for protection against sabotage and subversive
measures. This, taken in connection with the two previous radiograms mentioned,
indicated to me a tacit consent to the alert against sabotage ordered by tihe
Hawaiian Department.
I would like to interpose there that General Gerow's testimony before
the Board showed that there had not been enough check made to even
be aware that an answer had been received.
2. The Hawaiian Department is not provided with an agency for locating enemy
ships in various parts of the world. Such information as it may acquire on this
subject must be obtained from the Fourteenth Naval District or from the War
Department.
The "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier" placed
upon the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District the responsibility for
distance reconnaissance. Annex #7 to the "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan"
provides that when naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search
operations and army aircraft are made available, these will be under the tactical
control of the naval command during search operations. That means that the
army planes receive their missions and all instructions from the naval commander
and carry out the search as he deems necessary in order to carry out his respon-
sibility for distant reconnaissance.
[3^6] "During the period November 27th to December 6th, the Navy made
no request for army planes to participate in distant reconnaissance. To me
this mieant that they had definite information of the location of enemy carriers
or that the number unaccounted for was such that naval planes could make the
necessary reconnaissance without assistance from the army. During this period
I was in fi-equent conferences with the Commander-in-Chief of the United States
Fleet and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and at no time
was anything said to indicate that they feared the possibility of an attack by the
Japanese by air. In fact, the sentiment was expressed by a naval staff officer
that there was no probability of such an attack. With a large part of the
United States Navy in Hawaiian waters and with their sources of information,
I was convinced that the Navy would be able either to intercept any carrier
attempting to approach Oahu or at least to obtain such information from task
forces or by reconnaissance as to make them aware of the presence of carriers
in the Hawaiian waters and of the possibility of an air attack.
3. Action of the War Department on December .^)th, and as late as 1 :.S0 A. M.,
Eastern standard time, December 7th, in dispatching planes from the mainland
to Honolulu without ammunition indicated that the War Department did not
believe in the probability of an early Japanese attack upon Honolulu.
I might add there that General Marshall's testimony stated frankly
that the attack was a surprise to him, and he felt that the greatest
threat was in the Philippine Islands.
[3^7] I felt that I had a right to expect the War Department to furnish
me by the miost rapid means possible information should a real crisis arise in
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 187
Japanese relations. I did not expect that when the crisis arose the desire for
secrecy would be considered more important than the element of time. Had
the message in regard to the Japanese ultimatum and the burning of their code
machines been given me by telephone as an urgent message in the clear without
loss of time for encoding and decoding, etc., I, in all probability, would have
had approximately two hours in which to make detailed preparations to meet
an imimediate attack.
4. I feel that my work in the Hawaiian Department should be judged by my
activities throughout the complete period from the assumption of command on
February 7th until my relief upon December 16th. I believe that any careful
examination of my work during that period will prove that I have worked very
seriously at the job and have accomplished measures of very considerable im-
portance. I do not see how I could better have carried out what appeared to
be the desires of the War Departm>ent unless I was supposed to know more than
the War Department about the danger of Japanese attack and more than the
Navy Department about the location of the Japanese carriers. To have taken
more steps in preparation against a Japanese attack than I did would certainly
have alarmed the civil population and caused publicity contrai'v to War Depart-
ment instructions. I do not believe that I should be found guilty even of an
error in judgment because I did not have the vision to foresee that the War
Department would not notify me of a crisis in the least possible time [3^8]
and that the Navy with its large fleet in Hawaiian waters would not be able to
carry out its mission of intercepting Japanese carriers, or at least detecting
their presence in Hawaiian waters and informing me of the fact.
That concludes my statement, General.
15. General Grunert. Do I understand that in addition to that
verbal statement you have a written statement ?
General Short. I want to submit this (exhibiting). It has every-
thing that I have covered in it except my statement wdth reference to
the statement of General Marshall and of General Gerow, and it has
supporting documents, the letters to the War Department requesting
funds, requesting increases of certain troops, and authority to build
air fields, and so forth, and the action of the War Department; and it
is indexed, so that I think the Board without any difficulty can find
anything it wants.
16. General Grunert, We will take a recess at this time until 2
o'clock.
(Thereupon, at 12 : 18 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2 o'clock
p. m.)
[349] afternoon session
(T^ie Board at 2 p. m. continued the hearing of witnesses.)
17. General Grunert. The Board will please come to order.
I understand that there is a list of names submitted by General Short
of witnesses who possibly have knowledge of the facts. I understood
from his adviser. General Green, that they had no particular reason
to call these witnesses except that they thought they knew of the facts ;
but if there are any particular facts that General Short would like to
have the Board look after and bring out by calling these witnesses, or
when these witnesses appear before the Board, then I suggest that
after each one of those names they list the points that they would like
to have the Board inquire into. The Board will probably do so any-
way, but in that w^ay we shall be sure to cover the ground with respect
to which General Short thinks they have knowledge of facts.
General Short. I think in all cases but probably one that the job
that they are indicated as holding would indicate pretty clearly what
you indicated. Now, Fleming, I think I just showed, was Assistant
G-4, but he was my liaison man with the District Engineer for all the
188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
work that he did for us for the ferrying group, and to a considerable
extent after General Hayes left the Department he was my liaison
man there.
18. General Grunert. I think that the Board gathered that through
your statement this morning and would naturally cover those points.
General Short. Yes.
19. General Grunert. But if you wish to give us a list of those
points on which you suggest that the Board inquire into as far as that
witness is concerned, I shall be glad to have [850] you give a
report of that.
General Short. Yes. The others I think would just logically, from
the jobs they had, inquire into the things that would be pertinent.
20. General Grunert. All right.
21. Colonel West. Do you swear that the contents of that file that
you are about to introduce into evidence are true, to your best knowl-
edge and belief, so help you God?
General Short. Yes.
22. General Grunert. That written statement will be made a part
of the record.
23. General Frank. Should it not be referred to as the exhibit so
and so marked in such and such a manner?
24. Colonel West. I was simply trying to get away from making it
an exhibit so that we would not have to make extra copies of it for
every part of the record. I think if w^e can just incorporate it by refer-
ence in the record and say it was received and made a part of the file
of the Board it would be preferable, sir.
General Green. How many copies are you going to have of the
record ?
25. Colonel West. Five.
General Green. We can furnish them five copies of them when we
get them.
General Short. I can furnish that many.
[Copy]
3141 Southwestern Boulevard.
Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10. 19JtJ,.
Subject : Corrections in testimony.
To : President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.
1. I request that tlie following corrections be made in my testimony before the
Army Pearl Harbor Board :
« 4: « * * 4= «
Page 350, line 25, — after word "can" insert "not".
*******
/s/ Walter C. Short
Walter C. Short,
Major General, U. 8. Army, Retired.
26. Colonel West. Or we can make that an exhibit originally. I
•suggest, then, we mark this Exhibit 1.
General Green. You mark it and give it back. I have to use it.
[SSI] 27. Colonel West. This is the first ofKcial exhibit, then,
Exhibit No. 1.
(Bound file of documents presented b}' General Short and sworn to
by him was marked Exhibit 1 and received in evidence.)
28. General Grunert. All right; we shall proceed.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 189
General Short's verbal statement lias furnished answers to many of
the questions the Board desired to propound. However, I shall pro-
ceed to open up the various topics on my agenda and review the ques-
tions I have on each such topic, .changing some in the light of the
knowledge gleaned, and adding others. Should I ask any that have
been answered in the statement, the witness or members of the Board
will please indicate that they have been so answered, so that we shall
not waste time in repetition. When I have finished with each topic,
after my own questions I will give each Board member an opportunity
to question the witness on that topic before passing to the next.
General Short, will you please state the period during which you
commanded the Hawaiian Department, and whom you succeeded in
command ?
General Short. I commanded the Hawaiian Department from
February 7, 1941, to December 16, 1911. I succeeded Lieutenant Gen-
eral Charles D. Herron.
29. General Grunert. Will you also please state whether you know
how you came to be selected for that command ?
General Short. I was commanding the 1st Corps down at Colum-
bia, South Carolina, and received a personal letter from the Chief of
Staff stating that — I guess that was along about the middle of Decem-
ber— stating that he thought of detailing me [353] to com-
mand the Hawaiian Department. It happened that my wife's father
had been quite ill not so very long before, and she was rather anxious
not to go outside of the country; so I wrote and said to the Chief of
Staff if it wei'e purely a routine assignment I would rather not have it,
but if it were in the nature of anything unusual on account of world
conditions, that naturally I would be glad to go, and he came back
and said I would be sent.
30. General Grunert. Any questions on that particular phase?
(No response.)
Will you briefly state what instructions, if any, you received con-
cerning the Hawaiian Department prior to assumption of command,
particularly as to your mission and responsibilities, if that has not
already been covered in your statement?
General Short. It has not. I came down to Washington just before
leaving the East, I think about the, oh, first week in January, and I
saw the Chief of Staff for a few minutes, but he did not go into par-
t iculars of my mission at all.
31. General Grunert. Any questions?
32. General Russell. Yes, I have some. General.
At that time. General Short, did you have a conference with the
War Plans Division, as it was known at that time?
General Short. I spent two days around the War Department, and
I had a considerable number of conferences, trying to find out what
they had in the way of equipment, whether their equipment was
modern, and, where it was not, when that we were going to get it.
Things of that kind. But I remember I had a conference with Gen-
eral Spaatz about the air equipment over there. I had a conference
with somebody who had been in Hawaii fairly [S5S1 recently,
about the developing of air fields on the outlying islands. I had a
conference with someone about the type of artillery that they had in
190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Hawaii. I think they still, as I remember, had some British 75s
at that time.
I had a number of conferences of that kind trying to find out how
the command Mas equipped and what the prospect was of getting
mor modern equipment. I do not remember the names of a lot of
people. I think I talked with General Gerow, who was in the War
Plans. I know I talked with General Spaatz, and it has been four
years: I don't remember the other people I did talk with. It has
been three years and probably eight months.
There is one thing I remember that I particularly talked with Gen-
eral Spaatz about, because he had just come back from England. I
talked at considerable length with him about the question of disper-
sion and protection of airplanes, because we had not had an awful
lot at that time in this country about it, and he was probably the best
informed man we had.
33. General Russell. Did you know the mission of the Hawaiian
Department at that time, General Short ?
General Short, I think I did. I undoubtedly went over that with
War Plans Division.
34. General Grunert. Will you briefly state what pertinent in-
structions, information, and so forth you received from your pred-
ecessor, particularly as to your missions and responsibilities ?
General Short. He had a very considerable list of things that he
though it would be well — where he kept notes himself — would be
well for me to talk to him about, and we spent pretty much the whole
of an afternoon going over those points.
[S54] 35. General Grunert. Were there any particular points
that now occur to you that stand out in that turnover ?
General Short. Well, I think probably the deficiencies in personnel
and equipment, that he perhaps laid more emphasis on that than
anything else, and there was a problem that I think had been making
him think quite a bit, that at that time they were calling in the drafts,
and the first draft ran about 66 or 67 percent Japanese, and I believe
that the second draft had just come in at that time and that it was
higher. I am quite sure that we called the third draft in later, which
finally got up to 89 percent, but I think that that was one of the
things that kind of worried General Herron a little bit about the
assignment of those people and the employment of the National Guard,
because the National Guard over there was just a cross section of the
population : we had everything in the world.
36. General Frank. What was that?
General Short. The National Guard, which was called out in the
Federal service. It was strictly a cross section of the population :
Hawaiians, Chinese, Koreans, Japanese, and he was a little doubtful
just to what extent we should put those people in various responsible
positions.
37. General Grunert. General Short, do you recall a letter of Feb-
I'uary 7, '41, from the Chief of Staff in which he generally brings to
5^our mind certain conditions about the Hawaiian Defense Command?
General Short. May I take a look at the letter, because it was not
received on that date, and I do not recall it exactly by date.
[355] 38. General Grunert. It starts right there. It is rather
a lengthy one (indicating).
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 191
General Short. Oh, yes. Yes, I recall that very well.
39. General Grunert. Was there anything in that letter that was
new to you, that had not been referred to in your turnover by General
Herron ?
General Short. No. The one thing that that letter emphasized to
me, I think more than anything else, was the necessity for the closest
cooperation with the Navy. I think that that part of the letter im-
pressed me more than anything else.
40. General Grunert. Do you recall this particular expression in
that letter : "The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise
raid by air and by submarine constitute the real perils of the situation" ?
General Short. I remember that letter and remember it generally.
I do not remember just exactly the expression. I remember that
those things were emphasized.
41. General Grunert. About that time or from that time on through
the rest of the summer and into the fall, you have pretty well out-
lined what steps you took toward improving the Hawaiian Depart-
ment defenses, but were you at all deeply concerned as to or respecting
the probability of an attack by an enemy air raid? If so, what did
you do during the succeeding months to minimize the effect of such a
raid if it occun^ed ?
General Short. Because of the information I had from the Navy
and the Navy strength that was there, I was not exercised [3S6]
at any one time as to the possibility of an immediate attack. I realized
that there was a possibility of a considerable part of that navy being
moved out at some time and that the danger would become very acute.
With that in mind, I made a special effort to bring the antiair equip-
ment up to date and to get enough coast artillery personnel that we
would not have to have dual assignments, and to get the aircraft warn-
ing service functioning. As I read to you this morning, I wired the
War Department that I considered the aircraft warning the most
important project in the whole Department.
42. General Russell. General, I do not want to crash in on your
plan there, but General Short has just given an answer here that at-
tracts attention to something that I do not recall having been in the
record before.
General, you stated that you, visualizing a time when the Navy or
a substantial part of it might be away from Pearl Harboi', —
General Short. Yes, sir.
43. General Russell. — that you emphasized then the perfection of
your antiaircraft defense. What part was the Navy playing in the
antiaircraft defense that might be dissipated by the Navy's going
away ?
General Short. They had no landing fields closer than 2100 miles.
They could not, with land planes, attack Honolulu at that time. They
didn't have planes. I figured as long as the Navy was there in such
force that they could not bring the carriers into position from which
they could attack the Island without the Navy either knowing where
they were or getting enough information to know that thej were some-
where in the [3571 vicinity; and with the Navy away, why,
I realized that they could run carriers in, without any question, and
make an attack.
192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
44. General Kussell. Well, I have read since lunch here an extract
from this Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, in two paragraphs of
which are outlined Army and Navy missions, and one of the Navy
misssions was attacking enemy naval forces. The thing that you are
testifying about now is that you thought if the Navy was in there in
carriers they would prevent carriers from approaching within —
General Short. Striking distance.
45. General Russell. Striking distance?
General Short. Yes, sir.
46. General Russell. I just wanted to clarify that.
47. General Frank. I would like to determine, upon what did you
base that assumption? Did you believe that the presence of the fleet
in being at Pearl Harbor constituted a security?
General Short. It did, because they constantly had task forces out,
and they had carriers with those task forces, and they spread their
planes out from the task forces, and it seemed to me that there was
every reasonable chance that they would discover enemy carriers or
get enough information to know that they were dangerous.
48. General Frank. To get into your relations with the Navy : Did
you feel that you always
49. General Russell. Do you not have that somewhere ?
50. General Grunert. That comes in a later topic, but you may
develop these now if you do not go too deeply into it. Since you have
already asked it, go ahead.
51. General Frank. Well, he has just given an answer that
[rSSS] opens up this.
52. General Grunert. Everything will open up everything else.
Go ahead.
53. General Frank. It opens up this question.
Will you please read the last thing I said, Mr. Reporter?
(The pending unfinished question of General Frank, as above re-
corded, was read by the reporter.)
54. General Frank. Did you feel that you always had full infor-
mation on what the Navy was doing ?
General Short. I would like to put it this way : I felt that Admiral
Kimmel and Admiral Bloch, either one, would have definitely given
me anything that they thought had any bearing on my job; that if
they were sure that it was an absolutely inside naval proposition that
did not concern me in any way, they might not have given it to me.
I do not know whether that is in answer to your question, but
55. General Frank. The question as to whether or not you got the
information was placed upon a trust that you had that they would
have given it to you?
General Short. Absolutely.
5fi. General Frank. If they in theii- judgment tliought
General Short. Thought.
57. General Frank. — that you were interested ?
General Short. Thought it was of any value to me or that I was
interested.
58. General Frank. Do you feel that you were secure in that?
General Short. I do not know what other basis you could work on.
I had no right to demand that they give me all information they had.
[359'] 59. General Frank. Did you know each time a task force
went out?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 193
General Short. Not officially. I think I most always did person-
ally because I talked with Admiral Kimmel particularly. I saw more
of him than I did of Admiral Bloch, and whenever I saw him, which
was usually at least once a week, he told me what they were doing.
60. General Frank. A task force could have gone out and back in
a period of a week, however, without your ever knowing anything
about it?
General Short. Oh, yes, and they were sending — they had a task
force out all the time, and it was a routine training with them. Of
course, if we were putting on an air problem with them or if there
was something like a marine landing, as I spoke of this morning,
down at Johnston Island, they were telling me particularly about that
because they would figure I would want to send someone.
61. General Frank. You did not constantly know where task forces
were?
General Short. No, except as we happened to talk about it in a
personal kind of a way.
62. General Frank. And by the same token you did not know how
much of the perimeter of Honolulu was being covered, nor when any
part of it was being covered ?
General Short. Now, what do you mean by "perimeter"?
63. General Frank. The 360 degrees around Oahu.
General Short. No, I did not. I did not know exactly what the
reconnnaissance was. I did know in general terms that it was largely
to the west. I think that they did most of their [S60] task
work to the west, from the north around to the west, to the south;
that if you would go from a little bit east of Midway Island and
draw your circle towards the west through Palmyra, Johnston, Can-
ton, Christmas, that you would cover the area that they felt was most
dangerous and that they operated in the most.
[361] 64. General Frank. Were you advised that there was
a Japanese task force in the Marshalls, between the 25th and 30th of
November ?
General Short. No, sir. In fact, as I remember the thing, I was
led to believe that there was a task force of Japanese out some-
where to the south of Japan, but not in those Islands. My feeling
was that it was more directed toward the Philippines.
65. General Frank. You had no knowledge ?
General Short. At least, I don't remember that I had any. That
is my recollection, that my information was that the Japanese ships
were either in their home ports or had been sent to the south.
66. General Frank. Would you not have been concerned if you
had gotten the information that there was a Japanese force
General Short. In the mandated islands? Yes, yes.
67. General Frank. There was a piece of information that Navy
had that they did not give you ?
General Short. Yes, that may have happened. Did they have defi-
nite information to that effect, or was it rumor ?
68. General Frank. It was information that is reported in the
Roberts report, of which they were sufficiently confident to notify the
Navy Department in Washington.
General Short. In a report from Kimmel, you mean, or from the
Asiatic Fleet ?
69. General Frank. From Kimmel to Washington.
79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1 14
194 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. To Washington? Well, I don't remember it, if
he gave it, and I think I would have remembered it, because I do
remember that we talked about the location of the fleet during that
period, and as I remember it, it was rumored that [362] the
Japanese ships were partly in their home ports, and that what were
not there, they thought were proceeding to the south.
70. General Frank. The basis of your feeling of security then
was the belief that the Navy was effectively at its job?
General Short. I would rather say, a confidence, than a belief — a
confidence that they were working at their job and doing it effectively.
71. General Grunert. The next item I would like to ask some
questions on is that of the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan, which the Board understands was the basic plan for the defense
of Hawaii. Did not that plan charge the commanding general of
the Hawaiian Department with providing antiaircraft defense of
Oahu, with particular attention to Pearl Harbor naval base and naval
forces present?
General Short. I would say, w4th particular attention to the Pearl
Harbor naval base. I don't remember that it mentioned the naval
ships present. I don't know; it may; but I don't remember that it
does.
72. General Grunert. But that brings into question this: Did
the Commanding General keep himself informed as to naval forces
present? If not, why not ? Part of that has been covered. Did you
consider that your job in defending Pearl Harbor as a naval base
was greater when the Fleet was present in the harbor, or when the
major part was not in the harbor?
General Short. I would have considered that the task forces out
lessened my job very greatly, because it made the danger of attack
much less. That is, if they bottled everything up in the harbor, that
my job would be very much more difficult, because I wouldn't count on
the knowledge they would [363] have, and their ability to stop
carriers coming in.
73. General Frank. I would just like to clarify my own mind on
what your inference, there, is. Do you mean by your answer that as a
result of the task forces being out, you felt a certain security, in that
they would have covered the area around, and therefore would have
provided you with negative information that the enemy was not in
the vicinity?
General Short. That was correct. I considered the task forces they
had out at that time would cover 1,200 to 1,800 miles of ocean pretty
thoroughly.
74. General Frank. That was ill part of your confidence in the ef-
fectiveness of the Navy?
General Short. Yes. The more task forces they had out, the less
they had to do with long-distance air reconnaissance.
75. General Grunert. Then you did not consider that you had to
check up on the number of vessels in or out, or going in or out?
General Short. I would say frankly that I imagine that as a Senior
Admiral, Kimmel would have resented it if I had tried to have him
report every time a ship went in or out, and as I say, our relations
were such that he gave me without any hesitancy any piece of informa-
tion that he thought was of interest.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 195
76. General Grunert. Of course, your control post must have
known ?
General Short. They did, in Hawaii ; they knew before the attack.
We had one officer, a "noncom," a lieutenant colonel — I have forgotten
his name — Dingman, or something of that kind — and a sergeant, who
were there, to work chiefly to learn how to [364] work with the
Navy on that, to see what the problem was, and whenever we had any
kind of maneuver, then we increased that to three, so as to have a 24-
hour shift, and during the day hours, that he would be on there, he
would know what came out ; but he wasn't there. One man couldn't
be there 24 hours in the day, and we had only one, except during the
periods of maneuvers.
77. General Grunert. I don't know what it was then, but now, in all
these important harbors, there is an Army officer on duty 24 hours of
the day, whose business it is to act in emergencies, in getting immediate
connection with the commanding officer of the harbor defenses, and be
particularly on the alert. All the harbor defense is particularly con-
cerned whenever there is a convoy or a large number of ships in the
harbor. Now, did that not appear necessary in 1941 ?
General Short. During the period that this officer was at the con-
trol post, he kept up that work with the harbor defense, to tell them
whether they were ships that should be fired on or should not be fired
on. Of course, after the December 7 attack, we had 24 hours a day of a
Coast Artillery officer right there so that he would receive the maxi-
mum information, through the Navy, as to whether that was a friendly
ship or not.
78. General Grunert. But up to that time it was not considered
necessary ?
General Short. The man, the one officer and one man were there
to keep up this touch, and the training, and to keep the Coast Artillery
in touch, so that there wouldn't be anything new when we did put on
three in an emergency.
79. General Grunert, "Well, you produced that Joint Plan.
80. General Frank. There was a Japanese submarine that was
[3SS] attacked on information from the Navy, right there in the
immediate vicinity of Pearl Harbor, on the morning of December 7?
General Short. Yes, sir.
81. General Frank. When were you advised of that?
General Short. I didn't know of it till after the attack. I don't
think I knew it till the 8th.
82. General Frank. Until the 8th?
General Short. Yes. Of course, after the attack, why, it wasn't
of any particular importance. I think it was the 8th when Admiral
Kimmel himself told me about that.
8r3, General Frank. Knowledge of that would have been important ?
General Short. Knowledge of that would have been very impor-
tant, because if I had had it, about 7 : 15, I could have dispersed my
planes. I couldn't have got them into the air, there wasn't time
enough, long enough to get them into the air, but I could have dis-
persed them and lessened the losses.
They did not connect it with the general raid, they thought it was
separate.
196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
84. General Grunert. In protecting the Pearl Harbor Naval Base,
which later referred to the protection of the naval and air base, it
would appear that the idea of protecting that base is to protect what
is inside of that. Now, I just ran across this paragraph, 17-a of this
Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, which reads as follows :
The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, shall provide for —
a The beach and land, seacoast and antiaircraft defense of OAHU with par-
ticular attention to the [SGC] PEARL HARBOR NAVAL BASE and navaJ
forces present thereat, HONOLULU HARBOR, CITY OF HONOLULU, and the
SCHOFIELD BARRACKS-WHEELER FIELD-LUALUALEI area.
General Short. That is the ammunition. I would like to expand.
85. General Grunert. That seems to emphasize the naval forces
"present thereat."
General Short. I would like to expand on that a little. We hadn't
gotten to the degree of coordination of antiaircraft fire where we
took over the antiaircraft fire, or of the ships in the harbor. Now,
that might come any time. With the Marines at Ewa, it came under
air command. There w^ere naval guns, and, through naval guns, the
ships themselves, their antiaircraft facilities did not function under
the antiaircraft commander.
86. General Grunert. That was not tied in with your antiaircraft
defense ?
General Short. No ; we hadn't gotten that far in the coordination,
and I think it would take some time to perfect it to the point where
it would be possible.
87. General Frank. I would like to ask a question. Really, what is
the difference in your employment and deployment, whether the Fleet
is in or out?
General Short. There would be none, as far as our own guns were
concerned, but if you bring in a lot of ships there with a great deal
of antiaircraft on them, then if you were going to be a coordinated
whole, it might affect your dispositions quite a little bit ; but as I say,
our coordination hadn't gotten to the point where that we were plan-
ning a control of [3671 antiaircraft fire of the guns that were
actually — of the ships that were actually anchored in the harbor.
88. General Frank. So far as your mobile antiaircraft artillery was
concerned, it would go
General Short. We made no changes. We were deployed so as to
protect that basin, and the fact that there would be some additional
antiaircraft fire from ships in there did not cause us to change any
89. General Frank. When the Fleet was in ?
General Short. — because we thought that the battle danger was
greater with them in there, and it was also more dangerous to the
enemy, and that there was also the possibility of doing more damage
when they were in there, so it was better to have a greater volume of
fire right there.
I do not know whether that answers your question, or not.
90. General Frank. And the employment of your aircraft was the
same, or different?
General Short. It was the same.
91. General Frank. In both cases?
General Short. Yes, except that we would just add that much more
antiaircraft from the ships that were actually there. -They were,
however, not controlled by us.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 197
92. General Grunert. Under this Joint Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan, wasn't the Army charged with providing antiaircraft intelli-
gence warning services, and the protection of landing fields and naval
installations?
Geenral Short. That is correct.
93. General Grunert. Also with the establishment of an inshore
aerial patrol of the Oahu defensive coastal area, in [368] co-
operation with the Naval inshore patrol and the antiaircraft warning
service for the Hawaiian Islands ?
General Short. The only possible value of the inshore patrol, which
extended not beyond 20 miles, was for picking up submarines. Any
information on air that you got from a patrol at not more than 20
miles out would be worth so little that you might as well not have it.
94. General Grunert. But you were charged with
General Short. We were charged with that, and as I say, it was
of value chiefly as to submarines, and I might add, there, also, that
while 20 miles was the limit on the thing, that most of the time our
patrols were limited to 10 milesc on account of having single-engine
planes, and the Air felt that in peacetime they shouldn't take unneces-
sary risks in flying over the water.
. 95. General Grunert. We will come back again to this question of
reconnaissance and inshore patrol, a little later. Are there any other
questions ? If not, I will go to the next subject.
It appears that on the 24th of January, 1941, the Secretary of the
Navy wrote a letter to the Secretary of War, and he in his reply
stated in effect that all the materiel for the antiaircraft or the air
warning service would be there in Hawaii not later than June, 1941.
This is the Secretary of War's reply of February 7, which, in para-
graph 6, states:
I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding Gen-
eral of the Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the
local naval anthorities in making these measures effective.
[369] Do you recall that?
General Short. I recall that, very well, and we kept after it, try-
ing to get — if you remember, this morning I read you a wire I sent,
in June — I think, June 10 — in which I told him that all this ma-
teriel was held up, and that, largely on account of the priority prop-
osition, and trying to get the priority changed to 1-B. They ad-
vanced it to 1-C, but they never did advance it to 1-B.
96. General Grunert. That letter from the Secretary of the Navy
to the Secretary of War states in part as follows :
The dangers envisaged, in their order of importance and probability, are
considered to be (1) air bombing attack, (2) air-torpedo-plane attack, (3) sabo-
tage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire. Defense
against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have been provided
for satisfactorily.
What definite action was taken, as to taking effective measures?
What dispositions were made, or plans revised, exercises held, or
cooperation with the Navy, to look after those particular points which
the Secretary of War had sent out and ordered or directed that
action be taken ? What was done f oUownig that ?
General Short. In the first place, we kept hammering on that to
get the weapons that had been allotted. For instance, we had 140
or 145 37-mm. guns we were supposed to get, but we never did get but
198 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
20, before December 7. "We were supposed to get some more 90-mm.
guns : we never got them. Now, that is on the question of equipment
sought. We were also trying to get personnel, so we would not have
to have dual assignments. [370] Every Coast Artillery out-
fit practically had to use the same man to man the harbor defenses
and antiaircraft. If you had an attack of both kinds at the same
time, you couldn't possibly specify both means.
Now, on the question of using what we had — we had a minimum.
From March 21, on, we had a minimum of one exercise a week be-
tween the Air of the Army and the Air of the Navy, and worked very
hard at the question of coordination; and I think we learned a lot.
97. General Grunert. What measures would you say bore directly
on these points made, particularly in preparation to combat an air
attack ?
General Short. First of all trying to get the equipment and per-
sonnel.
98. General Grunert. Equipment for what?
General Short. For the antiaircraft.
99. General Grunert. Antiaircraft? What else?
General Short. Equipment and personnel, they were. It was the
aircraft and antiaircraft chiefly. We tried to get more pursuit planes.
We tried to get more long-range bomber planes, so that we could give
them assistance in the distant reconnaissance, and then we worked
with them, as I say, at least once a week, learning how to work to-
gether.
100. General Grunert. Then the air warning service loomed
largely ?
General Short. I believe the General and I considered it the most
important single project we had.
101. General Grunert. Then the interceptor command, which in-
cluded the air warning service and the handling of the anti- [371]
aircraft ?
General Short. I might say that that question of interceptor com-
mand was a brand-new thing in the States. I think it was early fall
before they went to that command in the States, and they had a school,
and we sent two air people. General Davidson and another air officer,
Colonel Powell, of the Signal Corps, and one of his officers, back,
so as to try to institute the very latest thing out in intercepter com-
mand, because the idea was completely new. They ordered, first, two
officers over there, and we wired and asked if we couldn't increase it
to four so we would get the benefit of several points of view.
102. General Grunert. All right, we will develop that subject a
little more, later. We will come first to the Joint Air Operations
Agreement, of March 21, which is one I understand was in effect on
December 7. Under that agreement was the Army charged with the
tactical command of the defense of air operations over and in the im-
mediate vicinity of Oahu ?
General Short. They were.
103. General Grunert. Was that agreement well understood by
both the Army and the Navy ?
General Short. Fully understood. It was maneuvered quite con-
stantly.
104. General Grunert. I want to refer to one of the things brought
out by your statement this morning — control of Army and Navy
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 199
planes over the sea and over the land. As I understood it, when they
functioned over the sea, the Navy controlled, and when they func-
tioned over the land, the land defense generally controlled?
[37£] General Short. I wouldn't say exactly that if they func-
tioned over water in the immediate vicinity of Oahu, then the Army
controlled ; it was a question of whether you were sending out to some
distance to attack an enemy fleet; then it was definitely Navy. If
the enemy's planes were coming in attacking Honolulu, our pursuit
might chase them 20 or 25 miles out there, but they would still be
under Army command.
105. General Grunert. What I am interested in is if you turned
them over to the Navy for attack outside, and then the force keeps
coming in, during that transition period, are they then turned back
to the Army for the main defense?
General Short. Well, if you visualize it, there would probably be
a period there when it would be pretty hard to say who was control-
ling. As I see the thing, what you have suggested would only take
place if the enemy licked the air forces sent out, and chased them
back in; and when the enemy followed them in there, naturally,
everything that the Army had would strike the enemy, and if there
was anything left of the pursuit planes that were being chased by
the enemy, I suppose sooner or later, in a reasonably short time, they
would get under control of the Army; but there would be a period
there where you probably would hardly know who was controlling a
particular squadron, if they were being chased.
106. General Grunert. That would seem to indicate to me that the
joint command would probably have solved the question better than
command by cooperation?
General Short. You mean unity of command ?
107. General Grunert. Unity of command.
General Short. Undoubtedly.
[S73] 108. General Grunert. Was there anything in that joint
agreement, the Joint Air Operations Agreement, that provided who
would track planes from the time they attacked and left the land
defense and went back to their carriers? Whose job was that?
General Short. That was the Navy's job. Now, I don't know
whether the joint plan specifically w^ords that, but it was thoroughly
understood that it was the Navy's job ; and, right during the attack,
General Martin called up and talked with Admiral Bellinger twice,
and asked for a specific mission for tracking, which way he wanted
him to go; and when he didn't get it, he at 11 : 27 sent planes out on
his own mission, because he had not been assigned a mission, and he
had something they could use.
109. General Grunert. In that Joint Air Agreement, what was
the agreement about the reconnaissance?
General Short. The Navy were definitely responsible for distant
reconnaissance.
110. General Grunert. What did you understand "distant recon-
naissance" to mean?
General Short. Anything beyond the 20-mile zone.
111. General Grunert. And what means did the Navy have for
such distant reconnaissance, if the Navy should have happened to be
out?
200 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. There was a certain number of planes, squadrons
that were assigned, that were not supposed to go out with the Fleet.
Of course, that probably would be changed, as the Fleet had differ-
ent missions, but we had talked over that a good deal, and they were
trying, I think, to arrive at enough planes that they could always
leave a certain number of [374-] squadrons under the com-
mand of the 14th Naval District.
112. General Grunert. If you were not satisfied with the Navy
distant reconnaissance, did you feel that it was your responsibility
to do any such distant reconnaissance if it threatened your defense?
General Short. I had only six planes that I could have used for
distant reconnaissance solely.
113. General Grunert. If you had had ample planes, would you
have considered it your responsibility ?
General Short. If I had had ample planes and felt that the Navy
were not doing the job, undoubtedly I would have talked it over with
them, and if they had refused to do the job under those conditions, I
would have asked the War Department to abrogate the agreement,
and go ahead and do it. We had made a very comprehensive study,
because we visualized the Navy's being away to such an extent that
we would have to take over the reconnaissance, and you probably
have seen that study where we arrived at the conclusion we needed
180 Flying Fortresses, and it was a rather well done, rather scientific
study, I thought, and the air people put a lot of thought on it.
114. General Grunert. Did your so-called "close-in" reconnais-
sance mean to you the inshore patrol ?
General Short. That is what it would amount to; yes. We had a
reconnaissance outfit at Bellows Field, and we put in a certain num-
ber of hours every day, training on reconnaissance; and they prima-
rily did that.
115. General Grunert. What value was the inshore patrol to the
Army as a defensive measure ?
General Short. None, except for submarines that might [376]
come to the surface and shell some installation.
116. General Grunert. Did you know whether or not the Navy
conducted its distant reconnaissance regularly, or spasmodically, or
what?
General Short. I knew that they had these task forces out all the
time, with carriers, and that as part of the task force exercise, they
always sent the planes approximately 300 miles each way. I knew
that they did a certain amount of patrolling from Midway and Wake
and Johnston Island, and I didn't know specifically — I don't know
that it was the same thing every day. I don't know what the varia-
tion was. I knew that they were doing that kind of work constantly.
117. General Grunert. Then you did not know whether the 360
degrees of the compass were covered that way ?
General Short. I knew it couldn't be covered.
118. General Grunert. Could not be ?
General Short. Could not be. Nobody had the navy force to cover
it ; it was impossible.
119. General Grunert. Then did you in the absence of information
of any danger consider it necessary to assure yourself the Navy was
giving the 360-degree coverage ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 201
General Short. They couldn't. I was confident that they didn't
have enough to do it. That was one reason we put in theat study on
the question of how many B-l7's it would take to do the job, and that
careful study made it perfectly plain that the combined Army and
Navy didn't have anything like enough.
120. General Grtinert. Then fror your understanding, the Navy
did not have enough to do its full job of distant reconnaissance, and
you did not have enough to do anything on your own ?
[376] General Short. That is correct. I had enough to assist
them some, if they asked for it.
[377] 121. General Grunert. Outside of your knowing
whether a task force was out or not, did the Navy keep you informed
as to what distant reconnaissance they were making ?
General Short. Not specifically. I knew they were making recon-
naissance from Midway and Wake and Johnston, but I did not know
exactly just when it was and what it consisted of. I knew they were
making some all the time with their task forces.
122. General Frank. In the message of November 27, that War
Department message signed "Marshall", you were directed to con-
duct such reconnaissance as you deemed necessary ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
123. General Frank. Did you show that message to the naval
commander ?
General Short. I am quite sure I did ; yes.
124. General Frank. Since, from the point of view of protection
against air attack, close-in reconnaissance was ineffective without
distnat reconnaissance
General Short (interposing). Ineffective in any case, I would say.
It would be in just a few minutes from the time you discovered it.
125. General Frank, (continuing). — did not this order for you
to conduct reconnaissance convey some sort of an obligation to the
naval commander?
General Short. I will tell you what it conveyed to me, and that is
that when that message was written whoever wrote it did not take
into consideration or overlooked our definite agreement that the Navy
was responsible for long-distance reconnaissance. It did not take
that into consideration and did not take into consideration the fact
that we had only six planes [378] that could do long-distance
reconnaissance. So, no matter what I had tried to do would be ap-
parently ineffectual. The only thing we could do was to count on tne
Navy, because they had practically everything there was to do it with.
126. General Frank. At this time the order had gone out; the fat
was in the fire. Was there no reaction on the part of the naval com-
mander to consider that he had some sort of an obligation to conduct
some distant reconnaissance ?
General Short. He got a message, I think, about the same time,
that I am sure made him tighten up a little more, and he had three
task forces out where he ordinarily had two ; and I believe that they
considered their task force was the best possible reconnaissance, be-
cause of the way that they fanned out with practically a 600-mile
front for the task force.
127. General Frank. Here was this agreement for cooperative ac-
tion. On whose shoulders was the responsibility to determine whether
or not distant air reconnaissance should be carried out?
202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. I would say it would be definitely on the Navy.
128. General Frank. Here was a situation in which an order went
out from one of the two major national defense departments of the
government, which ordered reconnaissance on the part of one which
was the responsibility of the other, and that spirit of cooperation
just did not take, did it?
General Short. No ; I do not believe that is a correct way of putting
it. I believe, frainkly, that the man who wrote the wire just did
not realize when he wrote it that the Navy were the responsible parties.
He wrote it without any consideration of that or without any consid-
eration of what we had to do the job with. The order could not be
carried out. You could not [379] carry on any distant recon-
naissance worthy of the name with six planes.
129. General Frank. But the Navy had some P. B. Y. boats ?
General Short. It had lots of them. But I do not believe it was the
intention of the War Department that we abrogate that agreement
with the Navy ; and as long as the agreement was not abrogated, then
the responsibility for doing it was definitely on them.
130. General Grunekt. Did not that message charge you with
informing the Admiral of the Fleet of that message ?
General Short. I furnished him a copy of the message.
131. General Grunert. At that time, did you make inquiries as to
what reconnaissance was going to be made ?
General Short. As I say, I talked things over with him that day
and for several days, as to what task groups they were sending out
for reconnaissance between those islands, but I did not pin him down
and say, "Are you going to send a plane every hour? What is it going
to search? How many degrees? How are you going to do your mis-
sion ?" I did not ask him that.
132. General Grunert. For comparative purposes, in the Philip-
pines we also had an agreement with the Navy for distant recon-
naissance, and the two operations men got together and charted the en-
tire section around Luzon, 360 degrees. They figured just how these
long-range Navy planes would cover certain arcs, and what the Army
planes would cover. It was practically identical with the Hawaiian
situation. But you had no such arrangement, as far as Hawaii was
concerned, for covering the entire perimeter in arcs?
General Short. Did you have an arrangement there whereby the
Army planes were definitely under the command of the Navy
[380] and the Navy assumed full responsibility ?
133. General Grunert. We did not.
General Short. That seems to me to be the difference. They assumed
a definite responsibility, and we passed the command of our recon-
naissance planes whenever they called for it. We went definitely
under their command, so that the planning of the sectors and what each
squadron would search, and everything of that kind, was distinctly a
naval job, and they had such a preponderance of power for the recon-
naissance that it would not have looked very well for us to try to
prescribe the reconnaissance when we had only a handful of planes.
134. General Grunert. In your message of November 27, you say,
"Laiason with the Navy." Just what did you mean by that? How
did that cover anything required by that particular message ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 203
General Short. To my mind it meant very definitely keeping in
touch with the Navy, knowing what information they had and what
they were doing.
135. General Grunert. Did it indicate in any way that you expected
the Navy to carry out its part of that agreement for long-distance
reconnaissance ?
General Short. Yes. Without any question, whether I had sent
that or not, it would have affected it, because they had signed a definite
agreement which was approved by the Navy as well as our Chief of
Staff.
136. General Frank. Some time back in the testimony you stated
that General Martin was in contact with Admiral Bellinger of the
Naval Operations OfSce.
General Short. No; he was Commander of Patwing 2.
137. General Frank. I meant, naval air operations. You were
asking if they had any information on the location of these [381^
carriers ?
General Short. Yes.
138. General Frank. And the Roberts report indicates that at 10 : 30
a. m. they did have information on the location of those carriers, that
they had a bearing of some 357 degrees, or the reciprocal thereof, which
is 178?
General Short. I think 178 was where they thought they were.
But, as a matter of fact, Martin sent his planes to search, as I remem-
ber, from 165 to 190 or 195, something like that.
139. General Frank. With the Navy having search planes and the
Army having at least two
General Short (interposing). We had more than that. We had
six that took off on November 27th.
[Copy]
3141 Southwestern Boulevard,
Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 19U.
Subject: Corrections in testimony.
To : President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.
1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the
Army Pearl Harbor Board.
*******
Page 381, line 14, change "Nov. 27" to "Dec. 7".
*******
/s/ Walter O. Short
Waltek C. Short,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.
140. General Frank. The perimeter of the 360 degrees was certainly
reduced two points. That information was available; was that-givsn
by the Navy to the Army?
General Short. Before Martin sent the planes out, as I understand
it, he had talked with Bellinger twice, but Bellinger apparently did
not have enough information to give him a definite mission. He got
some information from the Interceptor Command as to the direction
that those planes had taken when they left. They may have changed
their direction ten miles out. I think that caused him to take the
204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
direction he did. I know one thing: There had been a report that
there was a Japanese carrier some 40 or 50 miles off Barbers Point,
and he sent out to investigate that at the same time. It was south-
west of Barbers Point. It turned out not to be of any value. Later,
after that mission was finished, there was apparently some little con-
fusion. General Martin, I think, had the im- [382] pression
that they did not operate under the Navy until along about 2 o'clock.
I do not know when it was, because the thing did not come up until
it was too late for me to dig clear down into the files and verify which
statement was correct.
141. General Kussell. We have talked about prior-to-attack recon- *
naissance and a lot about pursuit after attack. General Grunert was
discussing with you the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, where
apparentl}'^ the relations between the Army and Navy touching all
these questions of reconnaissance and defense were set up and worked
out? Is that correct?
General Short. That is correct.
142. General Russell. There is a statement in the official report
of the Roberts Commission which is not entirely clear to me, in para-
graph 5 of that report, and I will read the sentence.
(Excerpt from Roberts Commission report:)
This Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan
I assume they are referring to this document (indicating) —
was intended to become operative upon order of the War and Navy Departments
or as agreed upon by the local commanders in the case of an emergency, a threat
of hostile action, or the occurrence of war.
The plan itself says that this agreement shall take effect at once and
will remain effective until notice in writing by either party of their
renunciation in whole or in part.
My question is this : Was the Coastal Frontier Defense Plan effec-
tive from the date that you and Admiral Bloch signed it? Was it
effective from then on, or did something have to happen thereafter to
make it effective?
General Short. As a matter of fact, we put it into effect for training
purposes right away, and forwarded it to Washington [383]
for approval, and it was approved. I think that the distinction was
that in normal peace times, when there was no danger whatever, these
things would not all be done, but we might agree any time during
that period that we would go into a state of maneuver, and then they
would all be done. If an emergency turned up they went into effect
automatically.
143. General Grunert. Who determined the emergency?
General Short. Just like December 7 — there was no argument that
the emergency was there —
144. General Russell. I want to follow this thought, because I feel
it was material in determining what was going on out there. Let us
deal with prior hostile actions. There had been no attack. We had
been discussing this question of reconnaissance, and you knew about
naval reconnaissance at that time. Was it your impression, or not,
General Short, that reconnaissance was constant from the day you
reached Hawaii on February 7, 1941, until the attack on December 7,
1941?
PROCEEDIl^irGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 205
General Short. I think that there was a very considerable amount
of reconnaissance from February 7th, because they had been to a cer-
tain extent in a state of excitement out there for about two years. The
Navy particularly had had an awful lot of warnings, and they were
conducting their task force so as to give them training and reconnais-
sance all the time, and then when November 27 came along, Kimmel,
as I understand it, tightened up his reconnaissance a very great deal.
145. General Russell. We would like to get some facts, because we
have not gotten any, so far, in this connection on this reconnaissance
by the Navy. Did your predecessor, who was General Herron, out
there, discuss with, you what reconnaissance was being carried on by
the Navy when you arrived there?
[384-] General Short. I do not remember that he did.
146. General Russell. Did he or not tell you that he had been
making efforts for almost a year to determine what they were doing
and had never found out?
General Short. He did not.
147. General Russell. From the time you went in there on February
7 down to December 7 you made no investigation to determine defi-
nitely who was out, as a matter of routine, did you ?
General Short. I did not ask for any formal reports. As I say, I
knew almost constantly what the Navy did have out.
148. General Russell. You did?
General Short. I knew almost constantly what they had out, be-
cause I saw Admiral Kimmel frequently. In fact, our relations were
such that he always talked over what he did have out.
149. General Russell. What did he tell you with respect to your
last conference with him, when reconnaissance was discussed, before
December 7th, as to what he had out?
General Short. He told me what task force he was sending out.
We looked on task forces as the best means of reconnaissance.
150. General Russell. So far as you know, then, prior to December
7, 1941, the only reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy was with
the task forces that were out ?
General Short. No. I knew they were sending planes out from
Midway and Wake and Johnston all the time. I didn't know exactly
what hours they were sending them out, but I knew they were making
reconnaissance.
151. General Russell. Is this an accurate statement, then, that you
did not know whether or not any distant reconnaissance [385]
was being conducted from Oahu ?
General Short. I would say that I knew that there was very little
if any, because it was not an economical way to conduct it, with task
force out on the island bases. When you consider the number of
planes they had I do not think they were sending them a thousand
miles and back.
152. General Russell. Your definite impression was that the only
distant reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy under this agree-
ment was that reconnaissance which was being conducted by task forces
when they went out ?
General Short. And from Midway, Johnston and Wake, and to a
lesser extent, probably, from Panama.
153. General Russell. But none was going out from Oahu?
206 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. No ; I don't think so, because it would have been a
big waste of planes.
154. General Grunert, How much of the 360 degrees did those
reconnaissance planes cover?
General Short. My opinion would be a little over 180.
155. General Grunert. And the task forces covered what?
General Short. I meant the task forces and the islands together.
I could not say. .Possibly Admiral Kimmel can tell you definitely.
I do not think there was much reconnaissance east of Midway or
Christmas. I may be wrong, but it was my impression that that was
true.
156. General Frank. What about north of the Hawaiian group?
General Short. From Midway they went straight north. I do not
think they went much east.
157. General Russell. In this November 27th conference did you
know what task forces were out that clay?
General Short. Yes.
[386] 158. General Russell. Definitely?
General Short. Yes ; I knew what were out, and I got permission to
send an officer with one force that was going out.
159. General Russell. Did you consider the task forces that were
out or that were about to be sent out were adequate for the purpose?
General Short. It was almost all the Navy had except battleships.
It was all the cruisers and most of the destroyers and all the carriers.
So, whether it was adequate or not, it was all.
160. General Russell. Let me come back to this sentence that I read
to you first, because I don't think there is information on this particu-
lar subject in the record, about when this was to become effective ; that
is, when this Coastal Frontier Defense was to become effective.
General Short. When we signed the agreement it was tentatively
effective. Of course, it had to be approved by the Chief of Staff and
the Chief of Naval Operations, and we started carrying it out right
away.
161. General Grunert. The operation become effective according to
the terms of it. When approved, it made the plan effective. But the
provisions of operating the long-distance reconnaissance provided
therein did not become effective except during an emergency?
General Short. That is correct.
162. General Grunert. Who declared the emergency prior to when
hostilities opened ? When did it become effective ?
General Short. As I say, it is my opinion, and I think you can
verify the details by Admiral Kimmel, that probably for [S87]
almost two years
163. General Grunert (interposing). It had been in effect?
General Short. As far as reconnaissance went, it has been in effect,
because for a year before I got out there the Navy had been very
keenly alive to the situation. I think that reconnaissance was about
as effective as they thought they could make it for almost the whole
of two years.
164. General Russell. I want to ask you one or two questions.
You talked about when this plan became effective and that they were
constantly conducting reconnaissance out there. Is it true or not
that you were ordered into an alert prior to the alert of November 27,
or did you go into an all-out alert prior to that?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 207
General Short. We had it along in May as a matter of training.
165. General Russell. But that was not an order from higher
authority ?
General Short. No. We had never received an order from higher
authority with reference to it, but there was no confusion of any kind
as a result of having it. We had, I think, about 12 days of it at that
time.
166. General Grunert. This joint air operations agreement was an
agreement under the Joint Defense Plan ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
167. General Grunert. It appears that there is an addendum No. I
to the Joint Air Operations Agreement which is a joint estimate of
the air action necessary, dated the 31st of March, 1941, and signed by
General Martin and Admiral Bellinger. Were you informed of its
provisions, particularly as to the estimated possible enemy action and
the probability of a surprise [rSSS] dawn air attack?
General Short. I undoubtedly went over all the details of that
with General Martin before he and Admiral Bellinger read the
agreement.
168. General Grunert. In paragraph III of that addendum it says:
(Paragraph III of Addendum No. 1 to the Joint Air Operations
Agreement is as follows:)
(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:
1. A surprise submarine attacl? on stiips in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on Oaliu including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.
Paragraph IV says, in part :
(Excerpt from paragraph IV of Addendum No. 1 to the Joint Air
Operations Agreement is as follows:)
(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to
reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise.
Again, it comes back to reconnaissance. You consider that they
did make such reconnaissance as the means allowed ?
General Short. As far as possible I think they were employing all
of their force.
169. General Grunert. You were fully aware, then, of the possible
surprise air attack?
General Short. Oh, yes.
170. General Grunert. As to paragraph (4) of Section IV of that
addendum, it reads in part as follows :
(Excerpt from paragraph (4) of section IV of addendum No. 1 is
as follows:)
None of the above actions can be initiated by our [389] forces until
an attack is known to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand, when
an attack develops, time will probably be vital and our actions must start with
a minimum of delay. It therefore appears that task forces should be organized
now, missions assigned, conditions of readiness defined and detailed plans
prepared so that coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all
elements when one of the visualized emergencies arises.
Did not the repeated warnings from the War Department and
Navy Department indicate to you a like probability of the imminence
of an attack under which you should have complied with paragraph
(4) of Section IV of the addendum?
208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. We had gone ahead and maneuvered, and we had
it to where it was automatic in case anything happened. The man
in charge of bombers reported. There was no order necessary. He
just reported.
171. General Grunert. Then, what I gather from you is that all
the plans were laid had the judgment been that such an attack was
imminent?
General Short. Definitely.
172. General Grunert. As to Addendum II of that same Joint
Air Agreement which decribes the various states of readiness of planes,
why, under the circumstances, with reference to Material Readiness
E, which meant that aircraft would conduct routine operations for
the purposes of this plan, were not the time and the hours prescribed?
General Short. Because we believed that the possibility of an air
attack was remote, and apparently the Chief of Staff definitely be-
lieved the same thing in his testimony before the [390] Roberts
Commission, and we felt that we required all possible time for train-
ing in the Air Corps, because we had to prepare these teams for
ferrying to the Philippines, Just as soon as we got a trained unit
we lost it by transferring it to the Philippines.
General Grunert. Have the members of the Board any other
questions on that phase ?
173. General Frank. We return again to the point that you placed
your abiding confidence in the belief that the Navy would give you
warning of an attack ?
General Short. Definitely.
174. General Frank. And as it worked out it would seem that your
complete confidence in the Navy was optimistic?
General Short. That is true.
175. General Grunert. How did you size up conditions generally
on the Island of Oahu from the time you took command until early
in November when these things started to develop ? By that I mean,
the nature of the population, conditions as to internal trouble, con-
ditions as to probable sabotage. Give us a picture of that which de-
veloped in your mind during that time.
General Short. It looked to me like with 37 per cent of the popula-
tion Japanese or American-Japanese, 160,000, sabotage at least would
be a very serious thing; that in case of war with Japan, if we were
not alert to the extreme, we might have very serious things happen
in our air and harbor defenses, particularly, and that if it got out
of hand there was even a possibility of an uprising. I did not look
on that as sure, but if we let it get out of hand there was a possibility.
We devoted a great deal of energy to that ; and I believe that had been
true for years out there.
[39 J] 176. General Grunert. Did you inherit this feeling, or
did it develop in your own mind as a result of your experience?
General Short. I am sure that my predecessor had the same feeling,
and I take it that officers who had been there even earlier had the
same feeling.
177. General Grunert. Did subsequent events show your fears were
groundless ?
General Short. It is hard to say, because we kept such a close line on
it that it never had a chance to develop. What would have developed
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 209
if we had been careless about that side of the question, nobody knows.
178. General Grunert. Can you give us the line-up on that, as to
what we might call personalities, in so far as you see fit ? In the civil
government was there any friction, any disagreement, any strong or
weak characters that carried others with them one way or the other,
or were there any such problems as that?
General Short. We had no friction at all. Admiral Kimmel and
Admiral Bloch and I were on extremely friendly terms. I believe
Bellinger and Martin worked very closely together. They were the
two that probably would have more to do with carrying out the agree-
ment than anybody else. I do not think there was anything like that
at all.
179. General Grunert. What about the governor and the F. B. I. ?
General Short. Just as an example, we thought we would be in a
much better local status if we had the governor write us a letter re-
questing us to take over the guarding of all the roads, bridges, and so
forth. He did so without any hesitation at all, and it put us in a better
local status. As to the mayor, when we put the proposition up to him
that there were a number of [39>2~\ roads along the seacoast
which, if an emergency arose, we would have to close, he had an
ordnance passed so that we had authority to close them whenever we
deemed it was necessary for defense. As to the F. B. I., we were on
very friendly terms. There was no friction anywhere between my
headquarters and the Navy or the civilian officials.
180. General Grunert. So far as I can judge from your testimony,
there were no particular obstacles placed in the way of defense by any
particular persons or officials?
General Short. On the contrary, they helped out a great deal. We
worked with the Territorial Eoad Commission, so that if we did not
have the money and we needed a military road, they would frequently
kick through with the money and do the work for us. That shows
how we operated.
[393] 181. General Grunert. Now, during your regime there,
were there any particular changes in missions or responsibilities from
the time you took over up until you were relieved ?
General Short. The biggest change was getting that coordination
between the Army and Navy air, getting the responsibility for recon-
naissance, and pinning the thing right down.
182. General Grunert. That is what I am going into now, the ques-
tion of cooperation, coordination between the Army and Navy and
civil agencies.
Will you describe the method of coordination that was employed in
the Joint Coastal Defense Plan, what mutual cooperation existed
between the Army and Navy prior to and on December 7th ? You have
touched on that in a number of places. Is there anything you can
amplify on that?
General Short. Only, as I said, by people like Martin and Bellin-
ger, who had to work together in case of emergency, working together,
and we had these exercises a minimum of one a week, air exercises,
where we had to work together, but having our coast — our harbor
defense people have a man in the control post and work every day
directly with the naval people there to know what boats were coming
in, and to have them indicate whether they were targets, and every-
79716—46 — Ex. 145, vol. 1 15
210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
thing of that kind, and with the higher command I did most of that
myself. "When I first got there my Chief of Staff at that time, Phil
Hayes, was on most excellent terms with the Navy, and I never went
for a conference without taking him along, because that he had been
doing an awful lot of liaison work, that he was there until about the
first of November; and after that I largely took [394] Major
Fleming and the engineers with me, and I sometimes took General
Martin and his Chief of Staff if there was an air proposition.
183. General Grunert. Would it be feasible for you to give the
Board, for inclusion in the record, a list of the conferences you had
with Admirals Kimmel and Bloch, as to dates and general subjects,
as far as you can remember, between November 25th and December
7th?
General Short. On November 27th I had a conference with them
with reference to the question of reinforcing the garrisons of Wake
and Midway with a squadron each of Army pursuit planes. On De-
cember 1st I had a conference with them with reference to the relief —
we had wires from Washington with reference to the relief of the
marine garrisons by the Army.
On December 2nd Admiral Bloch was not with us. Admiral Kimmel
came to my quarters with a long letter he had prepared covering the
whole subject, and I went over it carefully with him; and then on
December the 3rd we met again, and I had my radiograms ready for
the War Department, and he had his. That was the last formal con-
ference, I believe, that we had; that was December 3rd; but we had
our subordinates : Fleming and Colonel Phyphf f er had a conference
on the 4th.
Now, I don't think on the 5th or 6th that we had any direct confer-
ence. My G-2 was in touch with O. N. I., I know, on those dates, but
I think he was probably the only member of the staff.
184. General Gruxert. That conference, the conference seemed to
be more on the subject of what was to take place farther east. Now,
as to both messages, one that the Navy received on the [o9o]
27th and one you received on the 27th, were they a subject of a confer-
ence ?
General Short. Not of a formal conference. We exchanged mes-
sages, undobutedly talked the thing over, but we didn't get together
for a particular — each one knew what the — each one knew what
185. General Grunert. Well, then, you refer to these conferences as
formal conferences ?
General Short. Those other conferences were where we had some
particular subject we had to make a report to Washington on; we
each one knew what the other fellow was doing in regard to those
messages.
186. General Grunert. You had made a report on the November
27th message, to Washington.
General Short. Of just what I was doing, and I did that before I
saw Admiral Kimmel, because I did that within thirty minutes after
the message came in.
187. General Grunert. Did you discuss with the Navy whether they
considered your Army Alert No. 1 was sufficient ?
General Short. I didn't ask them whether they considered it. I
told them that is what we were on.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 211
188. General Grunert. Did they know what the Army Alert No. 1
was?
General Short. They had ten copies that were furnished to them
on November 5th.
189. General Grunert. Well, you and I know that when you get a
big document, unless the subordinates dig out those things and say,
"These are the important things," why, the high command has not
the time to carefully peruse the document.
[396] General Short. I think the operations officer of the 14th
Naval District did dig into it and knew what it meant.
190. General Grunert. The operations officer of the 14th Naval
District?
General Short. 14th Naval District. I think so. I think that he
knew what it meant.
191. General Grunert. Yes. Then we get into the subject of
alerts a little later on, but in connection with this cooperation : Do you
know of any misunderstanding as to the Navy No. 1 Alert and your
No. 1 Alert, as not considering them the same ?
General Short. Well, I think the Navy, as far as alerts for sabotage
went, that they hadn't been off of it in two years, hardly. They had a
terrifically tight antisabotage guard in the Navy Yard. They went
so far that they would not employ any man of Japanese blood. He
might have been an American citizen for two generations, but they
would not let him in the Navy Yard. They went to greater extremes
than we did.
192. General Grunert. It appears here from some evidence in the
Roberts Commission report that Colonel Phillips, your Chief of Staff —
he was Senior Army Member of the Local Joint Planning Committee
since November 6th?
General Short. That is right.
193. General Grunert. He says that committee never met after com-
munication of November 27. Had they been meeting periodically ?
General Short. No. They met when there was something we
thought a change
194. General Grunert. Necessary?
[397] General Short. A change necessary. The last, the most
important thing out there where there had been a great many meet-
ings, was when we made that agreement in regard to the joint de-
fense of air. Now, I do not know how many meetings they had at
that time. They had any number of meetings. But it was the kind
of a board that only met when there was something to take up in the
nature of a change.
195. General Grunert. Nature of a change of existing plan, in-
structions ?
General Short. That is right.
196. General Grunert. They did not meet when there was any-
thing that might be in the offing ?
General Short. No, sir.
197. General Grunert. Then you took care of that yourself, and
you were accompanied
General Short. I very largely did the liaison work with the Navy
myself.
198. General Grunert. Did your aide accompany you ?
212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. The aide would usually accompany me. He fre-
quently wasn't in the conference, as I say, and as long as Hayes was
my Chief of Staff, because of his experience of over two years with
the Navy I took him with me always.
199. General Grunert. That was about up to October ?
General Short. The first of November, and there was about a
month after he left, and I usually had after that Martin, maybe Mol-
lison of the Air, and Fleming of the Engineers, who was may Assist-
ant G-4, following a great many things the Navy were interested in.
[398] 200. General Grunert. Now, Admiral Kimmel, in the
Roberts report, is reported to have claimed that the Navy was not
informed that this Sergeant Lockhart picked up the approaching
planes, and that this prevented the Navy from trailing them.
General Short. You mean ?
201. General Grunert. What was the understanding as to how
he should be informed, and so forth ?
General Short. Well, as a matter of fact, the Army wasn't in on
that. I think that is the case he is talking about where they picked
them up at 7 : 20 that morning and notified Lieutenant Tyler, who
was the control officer, and he thought it meant nothing but the planes
coming in from San Francisco, and he didn't alert anybody. So the
Navy were not alone in that.
202. General Grunert. Admiral Kimmel also claims here in his
testimony that the furnished the Army information as to ships in and
out of the harbor and that this had been done for months.
General Short. Well, as a matter of fact, I say, not 24 hours of
the day, but we had this Lieutenant Colonel there, and he reported ;
he made a report to G-3, so during the period of the day that he
was there we had the report constantly, and in any maneuver period
we had it for 24 hours of the day, but I do not believe that we got it
except when we had a liaison officer there. It wasn't a liaison officei-
exactly; we didn't call him "liaison." He was on duty with the harlMn-
control post, and during the hours that he was on duty we hr.d ;i
complete report. I do not think we had the complete report \lie
other hours. I might be mistaken, but I don't believe so.
203. General Frank. Would it have done you any good to have
known how many ships were in there ?
[399] General Short. No. It was only worth something in
this way. General : that it was a thing that in time of war you would
have — they would have to carefully observe every ship going in and
out, and the harbor defense would have to know whether that was
a ship that should be fired upon, and that was his job, was to sit right
there with the Navy, and when a ship was spotted they indicated to
him whether it was a friendly ship which should not be fired on or a
ship that should be fired on, you see ; and if the harbor defense were
having drills or exercises, he transmitted that immediately, and they
went through simulated fire on any
204. General Frank. But so far as any change in plans was con-
cerned
General Short. There was no change.
205. General Frank. It made no difference?
General Short. It was no change in plan. It was just simply a
case that when there was an emergency you put three men in there
and you had 24 hours a day in place of 8 hours a day.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 213
206. General Grunert. Now, I am just trying to form a picture
of the cooperation and the information which passed back and forth
between the two commands, to see how that cooperation worked. Here
are several questions I have along that line :
In this testimony before the Roberts Commission Admiral Kimmel
claimed that he was never informed of the measures taken by the
Army after the messages of November 27.
General Short. He was never probably given any formal notice.
As I say, he and I talked together. I am sure he knew exactly what
we were doing because we talked together there [4^0] hours
that week.
207. General Grunert. And Admiral Bloch states he did not know
that radars were not working all the time, nor anything about inshore
aerial patrol.
General Short. Well, he may not have known, but they had a
naval officer working with the Interceptor Command daily, and it was
that naval officer's job to transmit the information, whenever it was
working, to the Navy. So I am sure that somebody in the Navy
knew.
2'08. General Grunert. Here is one : that Admiral Bloch, although
he talked to General Short many times after November 27th, was not
informed that the Army was only alterted to prevent sabotage. He
learned differently only after the attack, that Army Alert No. 1 was
the lowest and did not correspond with the Navy Alert No. 1, which
was the highest.
General Short. He had ten copies. It was his operation officer
that got ten copies of our Standing Operating Procedure on November
5th. If any of his staff officers took the trouble to read them, he should
have known exactly what Alert No. 1 was, or if he had asked me.
It never occurred to me that they didn't understand our Alert No. 1,
because we had furnished the copies with that specifically in view.
2'09. General Grunert. Here is one that may touch on cooperation
with civil authorities. It is stated here that Mr, Angus Taylor,
United States District Attorney, wanted to prosecute some Jap agents
for failure to register under the Alien Registration Act, but General
Short was opposed to this without giving them a notice so to do,
claiming it would react unfavorably to his plan of trying to make
friends and create [401] good relations amongst them.
Now, was that a question of cooperation or a question of judgment
on one part or one side ?
General Short. That was purely a question of judgment. The
question came up. That law had been passed, as I remember, in
'39, and nobody in Honolulu, in the Hawaiian Islands, paid any at-
tention to it. The law required the registration of alien agents, and
after it had been going along for two years and nobody paying any
attention to it at all, probably not — well. Shivers, an F. B. I. man,
said he doubted if more than 10 percent of the agents knew they
were ever supposed to register. He agreed with me, took the point
of view that the fairest thing to do — that we weren't wanting to
create a lot of ill feeling, and if it ever came to a war we would
have this Japanese population to handle; that we didn't want to
create disloyalty. We wanted to create as much loyalty as we could,
and I had no objection to their arresting every one of them, but
I said they ought to give them a period of ten days, or whatever
214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
they wanted to, to register before, and announce it definitely, so all
that were not registered at the end of that period would be arrested
for not complying with the law.
The Navy and Taylor wanted to just go out and arrest them right
now. Shivers and I thought it was not a desirable thing to do,
and I radioed my opinion fully to the War Department, and the
War Department agreed a hundred percent with my stand on the
question. I wasn't making any objection to his arresting them, but
as a matter of fair play and not to create a lot of disloyalty among
the Japanese-Americans who might be loyal, we didn't want to make
it appear that we were just trying to soak [40^] people who
might not know it.
210. General Grunert. In your testimony before the Koberts Com-
mission I have two points on cooperation.
211. General Frank. May I? I would like to ask a question on
this thing.
212. General Grunert. Go ahead.
213. General Frank. Those Japs under consideration for arrest
were nothing more or less than Japanese spies; isn't that correct?
General Short. Some of them probably were. The chances are
that most of them were not. I think it would be more nearly meet-
ing the situation to say that they were largely propaganda agents.
They had, they called them, consular agents scattered all over.
214. General Frank. They called them what?
General Short. Consular agents.
215. General Frank. Oh, yes.
General Short. And the reason I say they w^ere not to any large
extent spies because the Japanesepaper there published a complete
list of them, so it was no trouble to get the list of them. What they
tried to do was to more or less control and influence the Japanese
population, and undoubtedly some of them were spies, and some of
them were perfectly innocent people that were just carrying out
propaganda.
216. General Frank. To control the Japs?
General Short. Controlled by the Japanese consul.
217. General Frank. They were trying to control them in what
direction?
General Short. Well, to keep them pro- Japanese, to bring [4^3]
them up as Japanese rather than just plain Americans, I think. That
would be my estimate of the situation.
218. General Frank. That was an un-American activity, then, was
it not?
General Short. It was an un-American activity; there is no ques-
tion about it. I had no objection to the arrest, but the way the thing
had been conducted. I talked with Shivers. We had a complete list
of them. He said probably not more than 10 percent knew they were
violating the law.
219. General Frank. And they had continued to undermine the
American Government for quite a period of time; isn't that right?
General Short. Probably had.
220. General Frank. And we had condoned it?
General Short. We had paid no attention to the law ; we had done
nothing to enforce the law.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 215
221. General Russell. I would like to ask a question or two on
that.
What evidence did you have against any specific consular agent
that he was undermining the American Government?
General Short. The F. B. I. kept a file on every one of those people,
and the O. N. I. That was their job, and the way the things were
delineated it was their job rather than the Army's in peace time.
222. General Russell. Did they, either of those agencies, indicate
to you the name of one or more of these agents who had been in that
specific job?
General Short. Oh, I know they had two lists: a list they called
an A list that they thought were dangerous enough that [404^
in case of a war they should be confined at once, and we confined
all of those.
223. General Russell. General Short, maybe I can't ask my ques-
tions correctly, but I am certainly not getting much of a specific
answer. The thing I am attempting to show now is whether or not
you were given evidence against specific people upon whom or against
whom you could have brought prosecutions for un-American activities.
General Short. Let me put it this way: that any one individual
that I wanted to know about, the F. B. I. and my G-2, if he had been
implicated in anything, would have a record of him and would give
it to me.
224. General Russell. And that record would indicate specific un-
American acts?
General Short. Whethei- — if he had been in un-American acts,
yes.
225. General Russell. And there were some who had been engaged
in it, and you could have proved it ?
General Short. In all probability.
226. General Russell. Yes. Now, then, General Short, if you
had a list of these people published in a paper, what was to be accom-
plished by registration ?
General Short. Well, it was a Federal law. There might have been
a lot of agents that were not published in that list, don't you see. It
was possible.
227. General Russell. Yes.
General Short. And there was a law making it an offense to be
a foreign agent and not register, and it had been enforced I think
in the Stat'es ; it had never been enforced out there.
[405^ 228. General Grunert. What authority did you have to
enforce it ? Wasn't that an F. B. I. matter ?
General Short. That was F. B. I.
229. General Grunert. That was a Federal matter?
General Short. That was Department of Justice. Yes, it was just
a question — the question came up I think probably — I don't know
whether the Navy or the District Attorney brought it up, and I didn't
think — I was afraid that the way they were going to do it that it would
create a lot of disloyalty among the Japanese-American population
and make it more difficult for us to handle the population. I had no
objection to the arrest if they would make it perfectly plain to these
people that they were supposed to register and if they didn't regis-
ter by a certain date that they would arrest them all.
216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
230. General Grunert. I have two more questions on this subject.
We shall exhaust this subject and then we shall take a recess. If you
have any more I think this subject of cooperation
231. General Russell. I have two more.
232. General Grunert. Well, I will finish up these two, and then
we shall finish your question and then take a recess.
In your testimony before the Roberts Commission there appears
this expression : "The Navy was more secrecy minded."
General Short. I think that is strictly true.
233. General Grunert. Did that prevent them from giving you in-
formation that you should have had ?
General Short. Well, I do not think it would have prevented them
from giving me information that they thought I should have. It
might prevent them from giving me information [W^] that
they thought was strictly of interest to the Navy and that they
shouldn't give to anybody. Now, I think that they give much less
to their staff than we do to ours. I think that is strictly true, that
they have always held things more secret: the same thing would be
more secret to them than to us.
234. General Grunert. But you still had confidence that they would
pass to you what they thought you ought to have ?
General Short. If they thought it was anything of genuine interest
to me, I do not think there is any question but what they would give
it to me.
235. General Grunert. The other one is this, to this effect: You
stated that because of the restricted area of Pearl Harbor, whenever
the fleet was in and naturally was huddled, that adequate protection
from the air was almost impossible — complete protection, we will put
it. Was this ever discussed with Admiral Kimmel or Bloch with
a view to avoiding such huddling or making such a big target?
General Short. No, it was not. Now, I discussed it at some length
with Admiral Standley on the Roberts Commission.
236. General Grunert. All right; go ahead with your question (ad-
dressing General Russell ) .
General Short. As a matter of fact, I think I remember Admiral
Kimmel stating that any time that he thought there was any prob-
ability of an air attack he wanted to get everything out of the har-
bor. I think I remember his making that statement. You know the size
of the harbor there, and I am quite sure that I remember his mak-
ing that statement, that if at any time he was convinced there was
danger of an air attack, that [407] he would want to move
everything in the way of major ships out.
237. General Grunert. All right.
238. General Russell. General Short, you stated that you had very
little time to read this Roberts report?
General Short. That is right.
239. General Russell. Have you read the testimony of your G-2,
who I believe was named Fielder?
General Short. Yes, sir.
240. General Russell. Did you read that ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
241. General Russell. Do you remember the statement in Colonel
Fielder's testimony that prior to December 7th they never received
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 217
any reports giving you information on Japanese activities at all, where
the fleet was, and tilings of that sort?
General Short. I haven't got the question now. That he never
received ?
242. General Kussell. Did you see where Colonel Fielder stated
that they did not get this enemy information or Japanese information
reports at all before December 7, 1941 ?
General Short. Oh, you mean ship movements? Wasn't that
what — was that what you meant ?
General Kussell. Well, I recall it.
General Short. I think that his statement was that we could not
get from the Navy reports of movements of Japanese ships prior to
December 7th, before December 7th, which I think is correct.
244. General Russell. As I recall. Colonel Fielder's testimony was
to the effect that this bureau in the Navy which corresponds to our
G-2 never gave them anything before December 7th.
[4i08] General Short. I am inclined to believe that if you will
look that up carefully that it was just in reference to Japanese ships.
245. General Russell. Well, I will look it up during the recess.
General Short. Because they worked very closely as far as any
individuals went.
246. General Russell. Well, I am not talking about any residents.
I am talking about the activity of the Japanese armed forces
either
General Short. Well, I think as far as the Japanese Fleet goes, that
he made that statement, that that is correct.
247. General Russell. And you never saw any reports as to the
whereabouts of the Japanese ships ?
General Short. All I got was by personal conversation with Ad-
miral Kimmel and
248. General Russell. And they did not send over reports?
General Short. No, we did not get reports.
249. General Russell. All right.
General Short. But I got a great deal from personal conversation.
250. General Russell. One other question on operations, the oper-
ations end : Your alerts were ordered by the War Department ?
General Short. No, sir, not necessarily.
251. General Russell. Could have been?
General Short. They could have been ordered.
252. General Russell. Or you might have originated them?
General Short. Yes. The War Department never did order any
particular type of alert during my time.
[iOO] 253. General Russell. But you had no jurisdiction at all
over ordering the Navy to go on alert ?
General Short. Oh, no, none whatever.
254. General Russell. So you could be on your highest form of
alert, and the Navy could be on no alert at all ?
General Short. Just — yes.
255. General Russell. That is all.
256. General Frank. I would like to ask a couple of questions.
In cooperation with the Navy was there a preponderance of getting
along necessary on the part of the Army, or did you feel that the
Navy was meeting you fully half way ?
218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. I felt that they played the game pretty well. Really,
I felt they played the game better than I had ever seen the Navy play
the game.
257. General Frank. You have stated heretofore that you felt a
certain degree of security because of your confidence about the ef-
fectiveness of naval protection. Do you now feel that you were over-
confident about naval effectiveness?
General Short. Apparently they did not have enough to give com-
plete protection, and they w^ere giving protection in the sectors they
thought most dangerous.
258. General Frank. Do you now feel that you perhaps had mis-
placed confidence in them ?
General Short. I had too much confidence.
259. General Frank. Another thing : Do you now feel that the Navy
withheld from you certain information that they had available that
would have been invaluable to you ?
General Short. I don't believe that they purposely withheld any-
thing from me that they thought really concerned me.
[4^0] 260. General Frank. Don't you think that that informa-
tion about the naval task force with carriers and submarines and
battleships down in Jaluit would have vitally affected you ?
General Short. Yes, possibly.
261. General Grunert. Did the Navy understand your mission and
your responsibility sufficient to be able to be a good judge of what
should be passed to you or what shouldn't be passed to you ?
General Short. Oh, I think they did, definitely.
262. General Grunert. We shall take a ten-minute recess. We shall
begin again directly after 4 : 15.
(Thereupon there was a brief informal recess.)
[^ii] 263. General Grunert. I have a question, here, on the
so-called Plan for Air Defense of Oahu, submitted to the War De-
partment on the 20th of August, 1941, by the Commanding General
of the Hawaiian Air Forces, General Martin, through the Command-
ing General of the Hawaiian Department. Did you know anything
about that particular so-called "plan" of August 20 ?
General Short. Was that the plan for the searching of the 360-
degree sector?
264. General Grunert. Right.
General Short. Oh, yes. I went over that in very great
265. General Grunert. Did you concur in that plan?
General Short. I thought it was an excellent study.
266. General Grunert. Now, we go into these various messages.
Do you admit having received from the Commander in Chief of the
Pacific Fleet a paraphrased dispatch on the 16th of October ?
General Short. Yes, sir; that was the first message I read to you,
today.
267. General Grunert. That is the one which informed all con-
cerned of "the existing grave situation," and which directed the Navy
"to take due precautions" which would not "constitute provocative
action against Japan." If so, what was your reaction thereto, and
what precautions did you require of the Army, in view thereof ?
General Short. We had had all the utilities guarded, all the
bridges, and since we put out our guards on that account, in July, when
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 219
they closed the banks, and when we got that I just simply cautioned
people that were responsible for that guarding to be unusually careful.
We didn't go into any additional alert. It wasn't a formal alert,
but we had all of [U^] the utilities guarded, and we kept them
guarded, since July.
268. General Grunert. Then this "grave situation," what did you
i nterpret that to be ? A grave situation ?
General Short. You mean, in that ?
269. General Grunert. In that particular message.
General Short. Well, if you read that message as a whole and not
any one line of it you will see that they felt sure that Japan was
going to attack Russia, but they thought it was only a possibility they
might attack the United States and Great Britain. Tliere was a
strong possibility that they would attack Russia. It looked as if they
thought something was going to happen, but they were not at all so
sure we were going to be involved in the thing.
270. General Grunert. That was your interpretation ?
General Short. That was my interpretation, considering the mes-
sage as a whole; and that they didn't want to do anything to arouse
Japan and make our situation worse with them.
271. General Grunert. Are there any questions ?
272. General Russell. Yes; I want to follow up on that, on this
one message ; that is all.
General Short, the files in the Adjutant General's office indicate
that the War Department did not agree with that Navy summary,
and General Gerow recommended to the Chief of Staff that they send
you another message in lieu of that one. The message recommended
to be sent to you, by the War Department, was :
Tension between United States and Japan remains strained but no (repeat No)
abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent (end).
[4^3] That is according to this Adjutant General's file. That
order or that statement was sent to you under "No. 266", radiogram
No. 266. Do you recall that ?
General Short. What was the date of that ?
273. General Russell. October 18.
General Short. 18th?
274. General Russell. Yes, sir.
General Short. That was two days after this Navy business?
275. General Russell. The War Department made a study. The
War Plans Division made a study of this Navy message, and they
disagreed with the situation?
General Short. I do not remember that. Apparently this naval
message must have made more of an impression on me that that, that
I got, because I had this definitely in mind and dug it out; and if
I got it — I suppose, if they sent it, I got that message — ^but, as I say,
the Navy message was stronger and it had made more of an impression.
276. General Russell. This is the message, and it is supposed to
have been sent to you under "266," October 20.
General Short. October 20? It may have been, but you notice it
let up. It let up on things, and I naturally would not remember that
as I would one that tightened up.
277. General Russell. Are the records of these messages which
came to you out there from the War Department now in the Hawaiian
Department ?
220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. That is where they would be.
278. General Russell. Would they be available?
General Short. They would be available.
279. General Russell. Therefore, if you received this message
14^4] 266, on October 20, saying that there was no change in
Japanese foreign policy, it would be out there?
General Short. It would be of record, out there; yes, sir; but I
frankly do not happen to remember that.
280. General Russell. You do not remember ?
General Short. It may be because it was easing off.
281. General Grunert. The next message I wish to refer to is the
message from the Navy to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific
Fleet, November 24, 1941, in which it is stated as an opinion that —
A surprise, aggressive movement in any direction is possible.
and in which it was directed not to —
precipitate Jap action
Was this information transmitted to you ?
General Short. I do not think I ever got that message.
282. General Russell. If you never got it, you cannot give us a
reaction thereto ?
General Short. No; I don't remember ever having seen that mes-
sage. Now, it is an outside possibility.
283. General Grunert. You omitted mention of that message in
your statement, so presumably
General Short. Now, I might have seen it, and we might not have
had an official copy given to us, and I might have forgotten about
it. Kimmel might have shown it to me and just handed it to me to
look at, and taken it back, and I might not have remembered it ; I
don't know, but I don't think I have ever seen it.
284. General Russell. So far as you know, then, you didn't
\4i^] take an}^ action on it^
General Short. No.
285. General Russell. So far as the Army is concerned?
General Short. No.
286. General Frank. Had it been made of record in your head-
quarters, would you have known about it?
General Short. Oh, if it had come to my headquarters, I am sure
I would have seen it. I might not have remembered it, but I know I
would have seen it if it came there, because those messages were brought
to me immediately.
287. General Grunert. What was the procedure when the Navy
over there received a message, and they transmitted information to
you ? Did they give you a paraphrased copy of it ? Did they inform
you by word of mouth, or is there a record of such messages as were
transmitted to you in the headquarters of the Hawaiian Department ?
General Short. Normally they would send me, by an officer, a
paraphrased copy, and if I were in my office it would be delivered
to me personally ; if not, it would be delivered to the Chief of Staff.
Now, if it was something that Kimmel thought he ought to discuss with
me immediately before he sent a message back to the Navy Department,
he would probably call me up and ask me if I wouldn't come over to
his headquarters, and then he would read it to me, and we would dis-
cuss it.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 221
288. General Grunert. We go on to the next message, the Navy
message to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, of November
27.
General Short. I feel sure that I have seen that message, although
we could not find a copy of it in our headquarters, [4^^] when
Ave looked for it, for the Koberts Commission's report. That was
during the period when I was down there at Kinnnel's headquarters
every day for three or four days, and in all probability he either read
it to me, or I read it right there, because it is familiar to me ; but we
couldn't find a copy.
289. General Frank. That is the one which says "This is a war
warning."
General Short. "This is a war warning," yes.
290. General Frank. And it anticipates attacks on Guam, the Phil-
ippine Islands, Thai, Kra Isthmus, and Borneo?
General Short. Yes.
291. General Grunert. The testimony before the Roberts Commis-
sion includes the testimony of Admiral Kimmel, in which he says
he definitely remembers sending the "war warning" message to Gen-
eral Short. He says it seems that he handed it to him and discussed it
with him in his own office.
General Short. I think, in Kimmel 's office, rather than mine. I
think there is no question but that I saw the telegram, that I saw the
radiogram, but we did not find an official copy of it in our headquar-
ters. There is no doubt in my mind but what I saw it.
192. General Grunert. What action did you take with regard to
that message, as to the Army preparation ?
General Short. On the same day, I had had this message from the
Chief of Staff, and I took action on the Chief of Staff's message rather
than on that massage.
293. General Grunert. You did not consider the words "a war warn-
ing" as being of such nature as to require you to take more measures
than you did?
[4^7] General Short. The Navy used that expression every
once in a while in their messages.
294. General Grunert. Meaning what, thereby ?
General Short. ( Answer withdrawn by the witness. )
295. General Grunert. I will ask you that question. Do you mean
it is in the line of "crying wolf ! wolf !" ?
General Short. To a certain extent; yes. That may not have been
a fair answer.
296. General Grunert, Are there any questions about that
message ?
297. General Frank. No,
298. General Grunert. We go to the next message, on which I
have a number of questions, so I had better read them, one at a time,
and you can answer them, one at a time.
It is the Chief of Staff's message of November 27 to the Command-
ing General of the Hawaiian Department, in which, in part, the fol-
lowing information was furnished and directive given:
Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any
moment.
222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
And then, again —
If hostilities cannot (repeat Cannot) be avoided U. S. desires Japan commit
first overt act. This policy should not (repeat Not) be construed as restrict-
ing you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.
And then again —
Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such recon-
naissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should
be carried out [418] so as not (repeat Not) to alarm the civil popula-
tion or disclose intent.
If any of these questions were answered in your statement or in
previous questions, here, we will just say "covered."
What reconnaissances were made, and what other measures were
taken ? I think that has been answered.
General Short. That has been answered very fully.
299. General Grunert. What measures did the Commanding Gen-
eral of the Hawaiian Department consider desirable, but that could
not be taken without alarming the civil population or disclosing
intent? In other words, did you consider that you wanted to take
other measures, but you did not take them, because of the restrictions
in that?
General Short. No, sir; I will say frankly that I did not believe,
in view of all the information I had, that there would be an air attack
there, so I didn't — I didn't want to go into alert No. 2.
300. General Grunert, If a defense against attack could not be
undertaken before the commission by Japan of the first overt act, what
preparatory measures could have been undertaken ? Were such meas-
ures taken ?
General Short. Of course, we could have done one or two things
that could have been, the way it worked out, highly desirable. We
could have gone into alert No. 2, that being an instant readiness for
an air attack and a surface and a subsurface attack, or we could have
gone into alert No. 3, under the guise of a maneuver, and moved
everybody to battle positions. Either one would have been very
desirable.
301. General Grunert. You were particularly informed —
This policy should not * * * be construed as restricting [4^9] you to
a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.
In your judgment, wdiat action was necessary to insure your
defense ?
General Short. My judgment at the time was that while the hos-
tilities might take place, the hostilities, in our case, would be in all
probability sabotage, or possible uprisings; and I believe from the
testimony of the Cliief of Staff that he was thoroughly in accord with
that opinion, himself.
302. General Grunert. My next few questions appear to have been
answered, but I will put them in the record.
What report on the measures taken was submitted to the War De-
partment ? That has been answered.
General Short. Yes, but I think I would like to repeat that.
303. General Grunert. All right.
General Short. I refer, by number, Department radiogram, and
identify very definitely their "radiogram No. So-and-So" — I think
it was 472, received, alerted for sabotage, liaison with the Navy. In
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 223
other words, there should have been no possible misunderstanding
to what message that referred, because it identified the War Depart-
ment number.
304. General Grunert. Did the War Department have any com-
ment to make on your report ?
General Short. They never at any time admitted that they knew
what I was doing, or that I was doing too much, or too little.
305. General Grunert. If not, did this lead you to believe that
measures taken sufficed under existing conditions, [4^0] and
that inasmuch as the War Department was cognizant of the situa-
tion, this relieved you of not taking additional defensive measures?
General Short. It lead me to believe that the War Department
was 1007o in accord with my belief, that they approved definitely of
what I was doing.
306. General Grunert. Did you specifically query the War De-
partment on this aspect ?
General Short. No, I had reported on what I was doing, and I
had no further comment for them, except on more sabotage. They
came back, and I thought it was coming up after they had considered
my message — it was the next day — going into detail on sabotage,
stating that —
Be sure not to do anything illegal, etc.
And I went back and told them exactly what I was doing, and the
legal authority I had for it.
307. General Grunert. Did you figure that the War Department
had opportunity to get your report and then send the other message
that you received? Was not this report submitted on the 28th, and
did you not get the other message on the 28th ?
General Short. No; my report was submitted on the 27th, and I
would say that their message came in, as I remember, at 1 : 16 p.m.,
on the 27th, I think that we answered that message within 30
minutes.
308. General Grunert. But you do not know whether it is a fact
or not that it was received ?
General Short. I do not know whether it was actually delivered
to them, but I frankly, from reading Gerow's testimony, I think that
the trouble came that nobody ever took the trouble [4^^] to
follow up and see that I had made the report of action that they indi-
cated, and that they didn't check up and see the number of the radio-
gram that my report referred to. He states frankly that it was the
duty of his division, and it wasn't done.
309. General Grunert. I will ask if it is your testimony, that I
recall, now, you never took into consideration whether or not to
take any additional measures, and if you had taken such measures
it might be against the desires of the War Department ?
General Short. I think if I had done anything to alarm the Japa-
nese population in Hawaii, it would have been decidedly against the
desires of the War Department.
310. General Grunert. It never occurred to you, though, to ask
the War Department whether or not you should take additional
measures ?
224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. I had reported. They gave me a directive to report
the action taken. I reported exactly the action I had taken, and 1
figured if they did not approve, that they would come right back and
say so, or if they wanted me to do more; and they did come back, but
it was just more sabotage, so I thought that they approved of what
I was doing, but wanted to be 100% sure of the details.
311. General Grunert. Before I go into the next one, have you any
questions, any of you ? • x- t
312. General Russell. I think, at the end of your examination 1
will possibly want to ask General Short some questions about this
War Department relation, but I do not think it is relevant to ask it
at this point.
[4^2] 313. General Grunert. I have one separate subject,
here— influences of and conclusions from what I call the warning
message, under which we can carry most everything in that line that
comes up, that we have not covered before.
314. General Russell. I think so, too.
315. General Grunert. We go to the next one, the message from
the Adjutant General, of November 28, 1941. This question of mine
appears to have been answered. "Did you consider this message of
the 28th as a reply to your report of the 28th ?"
General Short. I very definitely did — my report of the 27th.
316. General Grunert. The 27th ?
General Short. Yes, sir; I very definitely did.
317. General Grunert. We go to the next, the report of November
28, by the Commanding General. I still have November 28 as your
report.
General Short. Well, there are two reports. I reported the action
taken, on the 27th. They replied on the 28th, with all this business
about sabotage, and I wrote another report, then, on the 28th, stat-
ing the legal authority that I was given, from the Governor, to do
all these things, and from the Mayor of Honolulu.
318. General Grunert. And that was your report of the 28th to
the message of the 28th.
General Short. That is correct ; and my report of the 27th was to
the message of the 27th. In other words, both messages were an-
swered practically as soon as received.
319. General Grunert. And that just elaborated on your sabotage,
on the measures taken ?
[42S] General Short. And assuring them that I was not taking
any illegal action, because they had been apparently worried about my
doing things that would get the Army in bad with the civil authorities.
320. General Grunert. Now, there appear to be three messages here.
321. General Russell. General, before you go away from that mes-
sage of the 28th, I have something with me.
General Short. I think you have the "work sheets."
322. General Russell. No, I have had this message checked, and
I assumed that you would not remember it, but I am merely calling
attention to it, so we will check it in Hawaii. There is a message which
came out on the 28th, 484. Now, the message that General Grunert
has just been asking you about is 482.
General Short. 482 — that is right.
PROCEEDINCJiS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 225
323. General Russell. This goes to the Commanding General of the
Hawaiian Department, and it is signed "Arnold," and stamped
officially.
General Short. That is the one signed by Arnold. That is the one
that went, practically identical to my message, that went to all the air
stations.
324. General Eussell. You see this one, 482, went to all the air
stations. 484 did not go to the air stations. I just wondered if you
have any point in getting 482.
General Short. Here is 482. It is the one that came to me, and it
says at the end of it —
To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air
stations, but this does not (repeat Not) affect your responsibility under existing
[424] instructions.
Now, that is 482, according to my number. And this is the one that
went — ^yoii see it is addressed "attention Commanding Air Forces.''
It went to Martin, it went to the air station, and he replied to him
three or four days later in great detail.
325. General Grunert. I think the witness is right. That was the
Philippine message,
326. General Russell. I do not think we ought to be partial to
any of these messages. I think we ought to get them all in.
General Short. I have tried to keep straight on all of them.
327. General Grunert. We will go to the next one. It is a message
of December 3, a Naval dispatch of December 3, 1941, from the Navy
Department to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, to the
effect that —
Information discloses evidence instructions were sent to various Japanese
diplomatic and consular posts to destroy certain codes and ciphers and to burn
certain documents.
Was this information transmitted to you ?
General Short. I never saw that message.
328. General Grunert. There were some Navy messages in De-
cember ?
General Short. I say I never saw it. I think it was quoted in the
Roberts Commission's report when it came out, but up to that time
I had never seen it.
[4^5] 320. General Grunert. There were also two messages, one
dated December 4 and the other December 6, from the same source to
the same person, regarding the destruction of their own confidential
documents. Was that information transmitted to you?
General Short. It was not. I got no copy of it.
330. General Grunert. You had none of the information that was
disclosed in those three messages?
General Short. No, sir.
331. General Grunert. Now, we get to the mesage of the Chief
of Staff to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated
December 7, 1941.
General Short. I can locate it for you, I am sure. It is on page 20.
332. General Grunert. It is the message from the Chief of Staff to
the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, December
7, 1941. I think you have given us full information as to that mes-
sage, as to the time of its receipt and everything.
7971G — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 1 16
226 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Is there anything further that you wish to add about that; or
are there any questions that the Board has about that particular
message ? ( No resj)onse. ) There appear to be none.
I will ask you a question about that. In your testimony before
the Roberts Commission you refered to a time-consuming code which
might have been avoided, that is, the time-consuming part, by the
use of the telephone. Had you or had the War Department been
in the past, during your service over there, using that phone for
highly-secret matters ?
General Short. We used it for highly-important matters.
333. General Grunert. Do you consider, with reference to the
message of December 7th, 1941, that the situation at the time
[42(>] might have been aggravated had there been a leak in trans-
mission had they used the phone ?
General Short. I think the time element was the most important
element in that situation.
334. General Grunert. Is this in retrospect?
General Short. I was going to say that if I had been sitting there
in the position of the Chief of Staff I might have done just what
he did. Apparently even at that late date they still thought that
secrecy was more important than the time element, and they did not
visualize any attack on Honolulu at that time.
335. General Grunert. We want to develop, if there is anything
else to be brought out, the conclusions drawn from this series of
messages.
General Short. I read those conclusions to you, if you remember,
because I wanted to be very exact ; and think that is as good a state-
ment of the conclusions as I could make.
336. General Grunert. I will ask you some questions to see whether
or not they have been covered and in order to get into the record
why these messages served to emphasize danger from sabotage and
why not the necessity of taking a state of war readiness, and why
was not the subject of taking a state of war readiness consideried.
I think you have w^ell covered the question of sabotage; but did it
ever occur to you that the warnings in this information necessitated
taking a state of war readiness as compared with a state of internal
security readiness ?
General Short. There were two things involved. One was the
information that I had from the Navy as to what they knew about
naval ships; and, as I say, my confidence that they could prevent the
carriers from getting through. The other was the [4^7"] in-
sistance on the part of the War Department that the public must not be
alarmed and that the intent must not be disclosed and that there must
not be any provocative measures against Japan. I think if they had
been convinced that something was absolutely imminent, the only
thing they would be worried about would be my getting one hundred
per cent ready. They would not have cared whether I alarmed'
the public or what I did so long as I got ready in the least possible time
to meet the situation. If they had been expecting an air attack they
would have said, "Alert for an air attack at once." I do not think
they would have taken any chances.
337. General Grunert. To what extent did the Navy's conclusion
that Japanese carriers were still at home ports influence you to con-
sider that Alert No. 1 was adequate ?
PROCEEDINGS OP' ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 227
General Short. From all we knew of their land planes, they could
not make an attack from land bases; and if the carriers were so
accounted for that they were not of danger to us, it looked as if we
were safe from air attack,
338. General Grunert. What influenced you to believe that the
chances of a raid out there, wdth the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor or
thereabouts, were practical nil?
General Short. The Operations Officer had stated specifically in
answer to a question of Admiral Kimmel that he considered that there
was no chance of a surprise attack.
339. General Grunert. In view of the lack of definite knowledge
as to the intentions of Japan, why were not measures taken to cover
any eventuality?
General Short. If you had taken measures to meet any eventuality,
you would have disregarded other parts of the message. They said,
"Do not alarm the public. Do not disclose [4^81 intent. Do
nothing provocative to Japan."
340. General Grunert. Do you consider that taking defensive
measures of any kind necessarily would disclose intent?
General Short. Under the strained relations, if we were moving
live ammunition to all the guns — remember, in DeRussy everything
was right under the eye of the public. Your guns were just in the
middle of the city, and there is no question but that it would have
given rise to a lot of speculation.
341. General Grunert. How w^ould they know you had live am-
munition ?
General Short. We had antiaircraft guns there as close as from
that window (indicating). If you put the ammunition out people
walking along the sidewalk could read it on the boxes.
342. General Grunert. They knew that the army was kept over
there to defend the island. Are they supposed to be impotent and
not to be trusted to take ammunition out ? I cannot understand the
psychology.
General Short. Taking live ammunition out, I think, in a period
of strained relations like that, is a very different thing from moving
it in maneuvers or on target practice that everybody has been ac-
customed to.
343. General Grunert. You were over there with the intent of
defending the island.
General Short. The papers were writing up the situation and they
were writing scare headlines, and in combination it would have been
just exactly what they told us not to do. They said not to alarm the
public. If the War Department felt as you do about it I do not think
they should have sent out any such instructions.
344. General Grunert. What ground had you to assume that the
[4^9] War Department messages regarding subversive activitiea
and antisabotage and your reports thereon constituted adequate pre-
paratory measures ?
General Short. Because, having received my report as to exactly
what I was doing, they had let ten days go by without ever telling mo
I was doing too much or too little.
345. General Grunert. Did you consider, having made this re^
port and no reply having been received, that it absolved you against
taking other measures ?
228 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. I did. I thought they agreed with me a hundred
percent. And there were other things that influenced me. I pointed
out before certain planes coming in from the mainland without
ammunition and with all guns cosmolined. I can see a definite argu-
ment that they did not consider any great danger in the situation.
346. General Grunert. To what extent, if any, did you develop a
sense of security due to the opinion prevalent in diplomatic, mili-
tary and naval circles and in the public press, that any immediate
attack by Japan would be in the Far East? Was this justified from
a military viewpoint?
General Short. I supposed that perhaps we had all been influenced
over a period of years by the fact that our war plans had always been
against an attack on the Philippine Islands. The war plans had
not been built against an attack on Hawaii. I was very familiar with
those plans. I had been in the far eastern section of G-2 for three
years and had commanded one of those maneuver forces.
347. General Grunert. To what extent, if any, did the fact that
they were planning to send Army troops to relieve marines in the
mandates influence you as to your decision not to take any [4^0\
greater defensive measures than you did?
General Short. That in itself would have had no effect. That
would have indicated to me that they foresaw the ])ossibility of using
Marines for landing forces, and they wanted to get all the Marines
where they would be available. It did not mean necessarily anything
immediate; and, as a matter of fact, it was not exactly an order;
it was a call for a recommendation, and Kimmel and I both recom-
mended that it be put off until certain construction had been com-
pleted.
348. General Grunert. I think you have covered most of the rest
of my questions. I may have one more. Did you not give thought,
or did you give thought, to the policy of the Axis Powers to usually
attack on Sundays and also to the fact that Japan usually attacks on
declaration of war but not waiting until its opponent is advised of
that declaration ?
General Short. I fully expected Japan to attack, but I expected her
to attack the Philippines on account of the presence of the fleet. I
thought she would attack where she would not be confronted with so
large forces.
349. General Frank. Of the 6 messages that were sent to you, three
from the Navy and three from the Army, between November 16th
and 28th, you seem to have been conversant with five of them. Four
of them cautioned to be careful and not do anything that would pro-
voke Japan. Three of them cautioned against sabotage. Was there
any cumulative effect of this sabotage caution ?
General Short. Undoubtedly it caused me to feel that the War
Department agreed with my own judgment that the greatest danger
was internal danger from the Japanese population.
350. General Frank. Did not the provisions of your war plans
[-^^i] and your standing operating procedure provide fully for
defense against all situations ?
General Short. It did. The three alerts made the thing very defi-
nitely provided for.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 229
351, General Frank. Were not the provisions of your war plan
and standing operation procedure known in the War Department?
General Short. Oli, yes.
352, General Grunert. You say, "Oh, yes." But what do you know
about it ?
General Short. They were reported on November 5. I do not
know that anybody had read them.
353, General Grunert. We have had testimony to the effect that
the War Plans Division representatives did not know the S. O. P,
(xeneral Short, That is quite possible; but they were forwarded to
the War Department — just the same as the War Plans Division did
not know that I made a report which they called for,
354, General Russell. Is there record of those S, O. P.'s having
been forwarded to the War Department?
General Short. I think so. There would undoubtedly be a letter
of transmittal.
355, General Grunert. Then are you of the opinion that they
knew what was in your S. O, P, of the 5th of November and knew
your classes of alerts?
General Short. When I sent the message I knew there was a pos-
sibility that the man who got the message would not know what
Alert No. 1 was, so I said "Alert for sabotage." I did not use "Alert
No. 1," because I thought the man who got the message might not
have read the procedure and would have to look it up and spend
some time; so I said "Alert for sabotage."
[4'^2] 356. General Frank. Suppose that instead of all the
provisions that were placed in these messages you had received one
saying "War imminent. Act accordingly."
General Short. I, in all probability, would have gone to Alert
No. 3.
357. General Frank. Why would you have gone to Alert No. 3
in the event of naval advice to the contrary?
General Short, That would have indicated at least that the War
Department were 100 percent convinced that something had happened,
358. General Grunert, Then "War innninent" to the Navy did
not mean the same that "War imminent" would have meant to you?
General Short, Absolutely not, because I knew that expression
had been used frequently in naval messages.
359. General Frank. Now, with respect to the cautions against
provoking the Japs, that was a national policy, was it not ?
General Short. Apparently, yes, without exception.
360. General Frank. While we were refraining from provoking
the Japs in general, what were they doing ?
General Short. I would not know enough of all of their diplo-
matic circumstances to tell you, sir. They were apparently getting
ready to make some preparations to attack, if that is what you mean.
361. General Frank. Do you not think that that was generally
known?
General Short. You mean by our diplomats ?
362. General Frank. Yes.
General Short. I do not know. After an event has happened
many people profess to have known things that they did not know
before.
230 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[433] 363. General Frank. Were you not familiar with Mr.
Grew's reports?
General Shokt. I have read his statement in the State Department
A^Hiite Paper. But the Grew report I think was te nmonth sbef ore.
364. General Frank. That indicated the attitude of the Japs, did
it not?
General Short. Yes; but if it has been ten months or a year, they
might come to the conclusion that Grew had been wrong.
365. General Frank. Further, you were familiar, were you not,
with the activities of the Japanese agents attached to the consulate?
General Short. We felt sure that they were carrying on propaganda
to have people keep their dual citizenship in place of renouncing it, and
things of that kind.
366. General Grunert. Was there anything by way of indication in
Honolulu or about Honolulu to the effect that they were arrogant, that
they despised this nation because of what looked to be a weak-kneed
policy of conciliation?
General Short. No ; I would not say they were. At the time they
closed all the Japanese bank accounts — I guess that was in July — there
was a lot of uneasiness among the Japanese population, a very great
deal of uneasiness, but I do not remember at any time any arrogant
attitude on the part of the population.
367. General Frank. You do not seem to have a feeling that we were
very restricted in our efforts or that we were impeded at all in taking
full-out measures for national defense in our attitude of keeping from
provoking the Japs?
[434] General Short. I think we were to a certain extent. As
I explained a while ago, if we had taken any action; for instance,
suppose at that time we had seized all these consular agents. That
would have been exactly what the War Department did not want us to
do. When we got that message on November 27th about hostilities,
if we had recommended to the District Attorney that he arrest all
those consular agents, I think we would have been doing exactly what
the War Department directed us not to do.
368. General Grunert. If you had not received any message from
the War Department, what would have been your action? AVhat
would you have done or not done ?
General Short. We had been not quite on Alert No. 1 from July on,
from the time the banks were closed. We were extremely watchful.
I think in all probability we would have been on Alert No. 1 with a
careful recheck of all our guards and strengthening where necessary.
369. General Grunert. But still you would not have gone beyond
Alert No. 1?
General Short. No ; I do not think we w'ould, because, as I saw the
thing, I did not visualize an air attack at that time.
370. General Frank. Had you been on sort of an alert ever since
July?
General Short. At least half an alert. We had never taken the
guards off of the highway bridges and utilities. Our guards along the
waterfront were not nearly as strong as they were after November 27.
We put out a lot of additional guards and checked on everything; and
we had gotten all of the gasoline people, all of the public utility people,
as early as July, to build man-proof fences and put flood lights around
the properties \435] so that we could guard them.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 231
371. General Frank. Do you think that this continuous alert had
been carried to such an extent that the command had become apathetic ?
General Short. I do not, because when the attack occurred every-
thing clicked. There was not any confusion of any kind. There was
no clelay, and the troops went into action as fast as anybody could
expect them to.
372. General Frank. Do you recall ever seeing the order that called
for the alert of the previous year, 1940?
General Short. You mean Field Order No. 1?
373. General Frank. No; the order that came from the War De-
partment.
General Short. I think I knew about one that General Marshall
sent out, and I did not tell them whether it was the real thing, or not.
It stayed out for some time. I don't remember the wording of the
alert, but I knew about it; and they were kept on that alert, as I
remember, for some time, not knowing whether it was drill or whether
it was the real thing,
[Copy]
3141 Southwestern BouiJrPAKD,
Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 19U-
Subject : Corrections in testimony.
To : President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.
1. I request that tlie following corrections be made in my testimony before the
Array Pearl Harbor Board :
*******
Page 435, line 15, — omit "I".
*******
* ******
/s/ Walter C. Short,
Walter C. Short,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.
374. General Frank. Did these caution messages have any effect on
the full-out measures that you had taken ?
General Short. They made us extremely cautious about everything
possible pertaining to sabotage. We tightened up and it would have
been very difficult for them to have gotten away with anything.
375. General Grunert, What, short of a War Department order
to do so, would have caused you to take Alert No. 2 or No. 3?
General Short. If they had radioed me that they considered there
was danger of an air attack we would have been in Alert No. 2 in
three minutes. If they had wired me that they considered [4^6]
there was danger not only of an air attack but a possible attempt at
landing, we would have been alerted just as fast, because we were so
organized that all we had to do was to put Alert No. 2 in effect or
Alert No. 3 in effect and there would be no delay and no confusion.
376. General Grunert. If you had never received what we called
a G-2 sabotage alert and the so-called Arnold sabotage alert, would
you still have gone under Alert No. 1 ?
General Short. I went on Alert No. 1 when I received the message
from the Chief of Staff, because I thought it was the thing to do.
If I had received nothing else and gotten no reply after making my
report, I might have wondered more about it. But in view of the
things that came afterward, and the planes that came in without
ammunition, without preparation for defense, I was a hundred per
cent convinced.
232 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
377. General Frank. I would like to develop this thought for just
ca minute. This is in consideration generally of military operations.
Irj estimating the situation with which a military commander is
confronted, our teachngs in the military establishment generally have
been along the lines of taking all information that is available, evalu-
ating it and using it as a guide. Is that correct?
General Short. Yes.
378. General Frank. That is in accordance with our Leavenworth
teaching, our war college teaching and out actual practice in the
organization. Now, in coming to a decision on military disposition
and general practice in the Army, Army teachings, as perhaps Army
tradition, indicate that a commander should prepare for enemy action
of what character ?
[4^7] General Short. The worst.
379. General Frank. The worst. Now, can you tell me why that
was not done in this instance?
General Short. Everything indicated to me that the War Depart-
ment did not believe that there was going to be anything more than
sabotage; and, as I have explained, we had a very serious training
proposition with the Air Corps particularly, that if we went into
Alert No. 2 or 3 instead of No. 1 at the time that we couldn't meet the
requirements on the Philippine ferrying business. Also the fact that
they told me to report the action taken unquestionably had an influ-
ence because when I reported action taken and there was no comment
that my action was too little or too much I was a hundred per cent
convinced that they agreed with it. They had a lot more information
than I had.
380. General Russell. General Short, before asking you some ques-
tions about the relations between the Hawaiian Department and the
War Department, I want to come back to one thing that was brought
up a little earlier in theafternoon, because it is going to be a very
material issue here apparently, and that is the extent of the naval
reconnaissance on the 27th of November and the days thereafter.
I do not want to repeat the questions
(xeneral Short. No.
381. General Russell. or to elicit the answers that have already
taken place here this afternoon; but the statement which you made as
to task forces which were acting at the same time as reconnaissance
parties on which these planes were sent is in conflict with all of the
other facts or statements that I know of about that situation.
[4J^8] General Short. In other words, you do not believe the
task forces were out.
382. General Russell. I have no personal belief about it.
General Short. No, but I mean your information doesn't indi-
cate ?
383. General Russell. My information is that there were a couple
of task forces that had gone out to the east to leave some people on
some islands. That is, as they were returning from this mission, the
planes had been sent out.
384. General Frank. To the east or west ?
385. General Russell. On that way (indicating) ; I don't know
which way that was.
General Short. I think I am correct in stating that there was one
task torce coming back in and that there were two going out, one going
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 233
towards Midway aiid one going to Johnston Island, that landed — I
know in that case it landed just five minutes before the attack. It
got the report of the attack in five minutes after they landed. I had a
staff officer with that one, so I know in regard to that.
386. General Eussell. As a matter of fact, General Short, it may
come to pass that you will be back here tomorrow ; and I think you will
find, or you will find in this Roberts report a statement as to naval
activity on December 7th, and I am merely suggesting that if you desire
it might be well to check that and check that evidence which you have
given this afternoon.
General Short. And I think it would be well to check specifically,
if you have Admiral Kimmel, as to what task forces were out. I am
quite convinced that there was one coming in and two going out.
[4^9] 387. General Russell. Your evidence was this afternoon
that the Navy had out on reconnaissance all of its available
General Short. I think they had every carrier.
388. General Russell. Every one.
General Short. I think there were only about two cruisers that were
in the harbor and just a small number of destroyers. Their battle-
ships were all in.
389. General Russell. Very well.
General Short. I think that is correct.
390. General Russell. You get the sense of the remarks that I am
making?
General Short. Yes.
391. General Russell. My effort is to eliminate from this record
every factual issue that it is possible to eliminate.
General Short. I have no worry of definitely saying that that was
the case, but Admiral Kimmel could give you positive information
on the subject. I think I am definitely correct, and I know that the
one that went south to Johnston Island landed just five minutes before
the attack, because I say I had a staff officer on it.
392. General Russell. Yes. Now, before we leave this subject of
reconnaissance to determine what else could have been done that day,
you had these people on from 4 until 7, on the radar?
General Short. That is right.
393. General Russell. There are statements in the record and
facts as to how effective those radar training or mobile sets were, how
far they would reach, and how accurately they operated. Now, how
far could your radar detect the presence of aircraft?
General Short. That morning they actually detected it at [440]
132 miles, apparently.
394. General Russell. Well, might it not be that they had taken
off from a carrier which was 132 miles away?
General Short. They might have.
395. General Russell. Do you know, General Short, whether or
not they would have detected aircraft any farther away than 130
miles?
General Short. In all probability not with our mobile stations.
Now, we hoped, with those fixed stations that we were building up
as high as 10,000 feet, eventually to get to 200 miles with those sta-
tions, 10,000 feet up. We didn't figure that we could count on more
234 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
than 75 or a hundred miles under average conditions with the mobile
stations. There are times when you get them farther.
396. General Russell. Therefore, the reconnaissance agency
available to you that morning was limited in the detection of aircraft
in the air to 130 miles or so ?
General Short. That was as far as we could expect it, yes.
397. General Russell. The only other reconnaissance measure
which you could have taken would have been in connection with the
distant reconnaissance?
General Short. Distant reconnaissance.
398. General Frank. Something that you have to realize about the
operation of radar is that radar will not operate over the curvature
of the earth.
General Short. That is the reason for going up 10,000 feet.
399. General Frank. Also, the higher the aircraft is flying the
further away it will pick it up, and also the higher the [44^]
radar is above the sea level the further away it will pick it up.
400. General Russell. I understand all those factors, but the thing
that I was attempting to develop was the strength of the radar in-
strument which you were operating.
General Short. I think that 132 miles is about as far as we could
ever hope to get anything with those mobile sets.
401. General Russell. What I had in mind was whether or not
they were to the radar world what the walkie-talkie was to our radio
in the Army.
General Short. To a certain extent. They would not get the dis-
tance that the fixed stations would get.
402. General Grunert. What is the line of the rest of your ques-
tions ?
403. General Russell. In the rest of my questions, I believe, except
some miscellaneous, I am going to talk about or ask General Short
some questions on what he knew about the general hostile situation.
404. General Grunert. I think we have gone about as far as we
can today, and we shall start tomorrow morning on the rest of this
agenda, in which we shall cover interceptor command, aircraft warn-
ing service, A. A. defense, in-shore patrol, command, and staff and
so forth, and there will be an opportunity to get those questions in.
(Thereupon, at 5:25 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of
witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 235
[44^] CONTENTS
SATURDAY, AUGUST 12, 1944
Testimony of — Page '
Maj. Gen. Walter Campbell Short, United States Army, Retired —
Resumed 443
DOCUMENTS
Extracts from Honolulu Newspapers 467
^ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages
of original transcript of proceedings.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 237
\.W\ PEOCEEDINGS BEFOEE THE AEMY PEAKL
HARBOK BOARD
SATUBDAY, AUGUST 12, 1944
Munitions Building,
W ashington^ D. C.
The Board at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the
hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board,
presiding.
Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D.
Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.
Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, and Major Henry
C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder.
General Grunert. The Board will come to order.
(M. R. O'Connor and V. C. Brown, transcribing reporters, were
sworn by the Recorder. )
TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER CAMPBELL SHORT, UNITED
STATES ARMY, RETIRED— Resumed. (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS
COUNSEL, BRIG. GEN. THOMAS H. GREEN, UNITED STATES ARMY)
405. General Grunert. You may proceed.
406. Colonel West. The witness is reminded that he is still under
oath. It will not be necessary t(j repeat the oath.
407. General Grunert. We will take up the combination of Inter-
ceptor Commands and Air Warning Service.
408. General Russell. I have some questions that I did not [4-^4]
finish yesterday.
409. General Grunert. Do you want to take them up on subjects
that we went into yesterday ?
410. General Russell. Yes.
411. General Grunert. All right. We will wait until General Rus-
sell finishes his questions, and take up the topics which I mentioned.
412. General Russell. General Short, when we left off yesterday
we were discussing the reconnaissance which was being conducted by
the Navy on the 6th and 7th of December. There seemed to be some
confusion as to just what was being done. I have had an opportunity
to check the Navy testimony on that. I thought it would be well to
have our record clear on it if it could be made clear.
Captain DeLany of the Navy testified before the Roberts Commis-
sion. Did you know Captain DeLany ?
General Short. Yes.
413. General Russell. He stated that certain of the Pacific Fleet
was in Pearl Harbor, describing it as Task Force 1, giving the number
of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers; also the ships of the base force
238 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
with the Oregon as the flagship, and repair ships. Those were the ships
at Pearl Harbor on the morning of the 7th ?
General Short. Yes.
414. General Russell. He said that out was Task Force 8, the En-
terprise with the addition of heavy cruisers and a squadron of destroy-
ers ; that they were approximately 200 miles west of Oahu.
415. General Frank. When?
[44^] 416. General Russell. They were returning from an ex-
pedition to Wake Island where they had landed a squadron of Marines.
That was on the night of December 6, 1941. It was from that point
that the Enterprise sent 18 or 19 planes out on a definite reconnais-
sance mission. That is one of the forces. The second task force that
was out was No. 12 in which was the Lexington. Is that a carrier ?
General Short. That is a carrier.
417. General Russell. They were approximately 425 miles south-
east of Midway ?
General Short. Yes.
418. General Russell. And their principal mission was landing
a squadron of Marine bombers on that island.
General Short. Did he not indicate that the men went out on
this task force with planes ?
419. General Russell. He makes no reference to any reconnais-
sance launched from the Lexington.
General Short. He might not, because, as I understand it, it was
habitual.
420. General Russell. We will attempt to develop that; but I am
attempting now to get the record straight.
Now, in addition to these 18 or 19 planes that had been sent out
by Task Force 8 from the Enterprise, there were either three or
four patrol planes carrying out the morning search required by the
secuity order in the operated areas to the southward of Oahu ?
General Short. Yes.
421. General Russell. Evidently they had their base at Pearl
[U^] Harbor.
General Short. Did he say anything about any planes that went
to Johnston Island and landed on Johnston Island five minutes be-
fore the Japs struck Pearl Harbor? The mission was commanded,
as I remember, by Admiral Brown.
422. General Russell. Where is Johnston Island ?
General Short. About 900 to 1100 miles southwest of Oahu. I
think it is about 900 miles.
423. General Russell. We will check on that later.
General Short. I am so positive about it because I had a staff
officer with them.
424. General Russell. Yesterday, General Short, you were asked
a hypothetical question by General Frank which, in substance, was
about this : Had you received a message on December 7 saying "War
is imminent. Do the necessary," what would you have done ? To that
question you replied, "I would have gone into Alert 3."
General Short. I think I probably would if I had received such
a message. Of course I did not receive it. It is purely hypothetical.
It would be very difficult to say positively what I would or would
not have done.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 239
425. General Kussell. In all the evidence which was adduced on
yesterday the definite trend, if not the definite conclusion, could be
reached that, based on the information which you had, you had no
confusion in your thinking about the adequacy of going into an alert
for sabotage?
General Short. That is correct.
426. General Russell. There was nothing left in your mind about
that that was uncertain or indefinite.
General Short. That is correct.
[^7] 427. General Eussell. In your early testimony, however,
you referred to the fact that when you received this very important
message of November 27 you did reach the conclusion that the War
Department thought that there was still some possibility of avoid-
ing war with Japan ?
General Short. I thought so from the caution about not taking
any provocative measures against Japan and not alarming the public.
To take the message of the 16th of October and the 27th of November
together, they indicated to me that they were still hopeful of avoid-
ing hostilities.
428. General Russell.#Do you recall that in the message of No-
vember 27 and at the beginnmg of that message, there is language
to the effect that there existed the barest possibility that the Japs
might come back and offer to continue negotiations?
General Short. Yes.
429. General Russell. What effect on your thinking would the
return of the Japanese and the resumption of negotiations have had ?
General Short. That there was a possibility of arriving at some-
thing short of war.
430. General Russell. Did you have from the War Department,
after the message of November 27, 1941. any further information as
to the resumption of negotiations with the Japanese?
General Short. I had nothing. All I had from the War Depart-
ment was the message of November 28 which went into detail about
sabotage.
431. General Russell. From the press or any other source did you
know that between November 27 and December 7 there were [44^]
other negotiations between the Japanese representatives in Wash-
ington and our Government?
General Short. I am sure I knew whatever was in the papers. I
habitually read them.
432. General Russell. If, then, as a m.atter of fact, the Japanese
returned on the 1st, 2nd, or 5th of December, the chances are you
knew about it?
General Short. I undoubtedly knew about it.
433. General Russell. Then the possibility that they might come
back for other negotiations had become an actuality?
General Short. Yes.
434. General Russell. General Short, what if any information did
you have from the War Department from the message in July 1941
to the message of October 16, 1941 ?
General Short. I do not remember anything outstanding. I have
not dug into it, gotten out the messages and gone over them; but
there was a break there where messages struck me as a very out-
240 CONGRESSIONAL IN\^STIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
standing piece of information in July, and the next serious one was
October 16. Do not misunderstand me ; there may have been others
that I do not recalL
435. General Russell. During this period of time you did have
some correspondence with General Marshall, did you not?
General Short. I possibly did, on the question of obtaining things
for the Department. Just what correspondence I had directly with
him at that time I do not recall.
436. General Russell. Did you have any messages from G-2 or
other agencies of the War Department detailing or describing to
you what was going on in our international relations with Japan ?
[4W] General Short. I do not think so.
437. General Russell. "Were you told at some time in September
1941 that General Marshall and others who were in conference with
the Secretary of State had decided that war with Japan was inevitable ?
General Short. I do not think I ever knew of that conference.
438. General Russell. Did you know that the policy of the United
States Government from some time in August or Se})tember of 1941
until the date of the attack was largely one of a delaying action,
playing for time, with the realization Ihat war with Japan was
inevitable?
General Short. I think I knew at the time in an indefinite way.
Later on I undoubledly got that information when I read the State
Department paper that came out a year or so afterwards.
439. General Rl^ssell. Did you know. General Short, as Commander
of the Hawaiian Department, that we were negotiating with the
British and Dutch about coordinated military action in the Pacific
area ?
General Short. I knew nothing that was not in the papers.
440. General Russell. Did you know that an agreement had been
reached with all nations, the effect of which was that if the Japanese
moved forces into Thailand west of 100 degrees east or south of 10
degrees north we would regard that as an act of war ?
General Short. I did not.
441. General Russell. Nobody ever conveyed that information to
you at all?
General Short. If it was not in the papers I did not know that;
and I am sure I do not remember its being in the papers.
1450] 442. General Russell. You would hardly think that that
information would be in the public press?
General Short. I would not expect it to be.
443. General Russell. General Short, suppose you had known this
policy of the American Government and su])pose that it was taken in
association or in conference with those other powers, do you think you
would have been in a better position to have estimated the situation
on the 27th of November when it was brought to your attention that
negotiations had practically ended?
General Short. I think it would have made me more conscious
that war was practically unavoidable.
444. General Russell. And in reply to General Frank's question
yesterday you stated that you would have gone into Alert No. 3 if
you had known that war was unavoidable?
General Short. I do not think that is a good way of putting it. If
T knew it was immediately imminent. Because it might be una void-
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 241
able and go along for a year, and you would not want to go into No. 3
and stay there. But if I had known it was immediately imminent,
then I should think I would have gone into Alert No. 3.
445. General Russei^l. If you had known all these things and then
it had been brought to your attention that these negotiations had
about ended, would or not that have indicated to your mind the pos-
sible imminence of war?
General Short. It would have looked to me definite that the war
was almost upon us,
446. General Russell. General Short did you know that on the
[451] 26th of November the State Department handed to the Japa-
nese representatives a memorandum which G-2 of the AVar Department
at least considered as an ultimatum to the Japanese Government?
General Short. I knew nothing of anything of the kind until a
year or so afterwards, whenever that State Department paper came
out.
447. General Russell. Did you know on the 27th of November,
when you received that message, that the Secretary of State had in
a meeting on the 25th of November told the Secretary of War, the
Secretary of the Navy, and probably the Chief of Staff of the Army,
and Admiral Stark, that the State Department had gone as far as it
could in its negotiations with the Japanese and that the security of
the nation was then in the hands of the armed forces?
General Short. I did not,
448. General Russell. Did you know that in Januaiy of 1941
Ambassador Grew made a report to the State Department or to the
Secretary of State in which he stated that there were rumors in Japan
that in event of trouble with America the Japs would attack Pearl
Harbor ?
General Short. At that time I was not in connnand; but I have
known of that later, I think probably a year or so later. I do not
think I knew anything about it at that time.
449. General Russell, Did you have any information in the period
from November 27 to December 7, 1941, as to the disposition of the
Japanese Fleet?
General Short. I am sure that I talked with Admiral Kimmel and,
from the information, I thought that the Fleet was either in home
ports or that a very considerable number [-^5^] of Japanese
ships had been sent south. As I remember, that was the gist of the
thing. I know my impression was that they were moving more
towards either the Malay Peninsula or the Philippines.
450. General Russell. What was your impression as to what the
Fleet knew about the location of the Japanese Fleet and its various
types of surface ships during the six months immediately preceding
the attack on Pearl Harbor?
General Short. Admiral Bloch was in command of the District
and kept a map locating as many as possible of the Japanese ele-
ments. I do not believe they felt that it was very complete or that
it was accurate enough. I do not believe we were able to have agents
in Japan accomplish much of anything. The means of obtaining
information are not known to me.
451. General Russell. What type of ship would have been of more
interest to yoii as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Depart-
ment ? I refer now to Japanese craft.
79716— 46— Ex. 145, voL 1 17
242 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short, Carriers. Submarines would be second, probably.
452. General Russell. If you had known that during the last six
months prior to December 7, 1941, the location of the carriers of the
Japanese Fleet were unknown to our Navy for 112 out of 180 days,
what effect would that have had ?
General Short. It would undoubtedly have made me feel that the
reports were far from complete.
May I ask. General Russell, whether you mean 112 days in a
stretch, or two-thirds of the days just taking the calendar days, that
they did not know where the ships were ?
[4^3] 453. General Russell. Not 112 days on a stretch, but at
intervals.
General Short. That might have a very different meaning. A ship
might go from one harbor to another and there might be several days
that they would not know anything about it except that it had left
the previous harbor.
454. General Russell. The information seems to be that they were
lost 12 periods and those 12 periods apparently aggregated 112 days.
Now, I have some miscellaneous questions and I shall be through.
It is your belief, as I remember, that information about the Japa-
nese was conveyed to you in talks, informal talks, between you and
the Navy Commanders ?
General Short. Yes; almost wholly.
455. General Russell. Is it your opinion or not that unity of com-
mand would have been more effective than the cooperative agreement
under which you and the Navy were working?
General Short. I think it would.
456. General Russell. With the lack of enemy information. Gen-
eral Short, and the possibility of confusion created by the messages
which you received from Washington, and maybe looking back in
retrospect, do you not think that the situation demanded vigorous
action on your part?
General Short. Very definitely not, from the information I had.
457. General Russell. General Short, on the morning of December
7th the only screening or reconnaissance work that was being done
was by the Navy ?
[4^4] General Short. That is correct.
458. General Russell. You were there with the mission of protect-
ing the Navy.
General Short. I might add one thing. From 4 to 7 we had our
Aircraft Warning Service, which was practically the only thing the
Army had for reconnaissance.
459. General Russell. A moment ago we were discussing what
you would have done in event that you thought war was inevitable
and imminent; and I have some recollection of a statement made
by you on yesterday relating to a discussion with the Navy Com-
manders as to what they would have clone with respect to dispersing
the ships and moving them out of the harbor in the event of war.
General Short. I do not know whether it took place right at that
time, but at some time I talked with Admiral Kimmel about the ques-
tion of procedure in case of an air attack, and I very definitely had
the idea that if he expected any immediate air attack he would clear
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 243
the harbor. Just when that conversation took place — we had so
many — I would not know.
460. General Russell. Yesterday m your testimony, General
Short, you made some comparison of the aircraft available to you for
the protection of Pearl Harbor and the Island of Oahu, with the
number of aircraft that came in from the Japanese carriers. I have
some notes about it, but they are not very complete. Did you form
any conclusion as to the relative strength of the aircraft available to
you and that of the Japs that made the attack?
General Short. We thought that they had somewhere between 160
and 180 planes. I believe the Navy figured possibly a [4^S-]
larger number than that. We had 105 pursuit planes that were modern
enough to fight. We had 6 flying fortresses that were capable of
being used on a mission. We had 10 A-20's, 9 of which were in com-
mission, that were good for a relatively short mission. We had quite
a bunch, probably 50 of the B-18s. It would have been suicide to
send men in them. They were not even fast enough to run away if
he had an idea of doing nothing but going out and looking around
and returning as soon as he liad his information. I believe that is a
correct statement. General Frank. They were so obsolescent that
they were almost useless.
461. General Frank. It depends upon the point of view of the seri-
ousness of the situation and how much you felt you wanted to pay for
the information for which they went.
General Short. I did not mean I would not use anything in the
world, no matter how obsolete ; but they were not modern ships in any
sense.
462. General Frank. No.
463. General Russell. You referred to the number of aircraft that
were available there because of the presence of the Navy; I mean,
Navy aircraft.
General Short. I might say that the ships that I gave you were
not all. I think we had a total of 80 pursuit planes that were in com-
mission. That includes some older types.
464. General Russell. I believe all those details are in your state-
ment. I was just attempting to get your considered opinion as to the
relative strength of the contesting air forces.
General Short. I do not believe we could have mustered as much
strength in modern planes if we had everything we could have
[4^56] put in the air. We would have been quite inferior to the
Japanese.
465. General Russell. Do you include the Navy ships also?
General Short. That is another proposition. The Navy had a con-
siderably greater number of reconnaissance planes than we had. My
recollection is that it was something like 95 for reconnaissance.
466. General Russell. Whatever the relative strengths of the con-
testing forces may have been on the morning of December 7, 1941,
had you been in Alert No. 3 the damage which was done to us out
there may have been greatly lessened?
General Short. Yes. I do not believe that we could have kept
those low-flying planes from getting in, because the antiaircraft
was almost helpless against them. They came in extremely close
244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to the water. The estimates were anywhere from 10 feet to 200 feet
above the water. I believe that antiaircraft men will tell you that
that would be the most difficult target to handle; the angle changes
so rapidly.
467. General Russell. Were those the ships that did the worst
damage ?
General Short. The torpedo planes, as I understand it, did the
real damage. I think the real damage to the ships was practically
all done in the first five or ten minutes of the action.
468 General Grunert. Will you please differentiate between ships
of the air and ships of the Navy so that the record will show which
is which ?
General Short. I will say planes from now on.
469. General Russell, t believe you stated on yesterday that
[4'57] there was no surprise that the Japs would attack without
a declaration of war?
General Short. That is correct.
470. General Russell. Had there been any changes on the Island
proper, under your command out there during the year 1941, which
indicated the imminence of war?
General Short. I do not believe that there were any outward signs
in the Japanese population. The only time that anything was defi-
nitely indicated was when they closed their accounts in the banks.
There was a great deal of restlessness on that account. It practically
stopped the business of the Japanese merchants. There was quite
an upset at that time. I think it was more noticeable then than at
any other time.
471. General Russell. Would it have been possible to have guarded
your aircraft against sabotage even though it had been dispersed?
General Short. Yes; but it would have taken a very great number
of men and it would have interfered very seriously with training.
If we had had the fencing and the floodlights the number required
would not have been so great.
472. General Russell. Were there not frequent arrivals of aircraft
from the United States, in Oahu ?
General Short. Not frequent arrivals. It was considered some-
what a perilous flight. We got in certain groups of flying fortresses
and B-24's, the only time I remember flights coming all the way.
AVhen our pursuit planes were brought in they were brought in on
carriers and took off in some instances and came in maybe the last
200 miles.
473. General Russell. General Short, were there any considerable
number of visitations or inspection trips made by War [4^S]
Department personnel out in your area in 1941?
(xeneral Short. There were several people that came out there.
474. General Russell. What was their purpose?
General Short. I took it that their purpose was to get a look at the
status of things on the Island. As I remember. General Evans of the
Air Corps came out and looked over things ; and the Division Engineer
from San Francisco came out and spent several days and inspected the
Office of the District Engineer, because the District Engineer func-
tioned directly under him.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 245
[Copy]
3141 SOUTHWKSTERN BOUI^EVARD,
Dallas 5, Texas, No. 10, 19U-
Subject : Corrections in testimony.
To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.
1. I request that tlie following corrections be made in my testimony before the
Army Pearl Harbor Board :
Page 458, line 7, change "General Evans" to General Emmons".
4: 4< 4: :«: 4: 4: 4:
/s/ Walter C. Short,
Walter C. Short,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.
475. General Grunert. Who was that ?
General Short. Hannum. He came out and stayed several days and
had two or three conferences with me at the end of his inspection. He
came to tell me what he had found, and so forth.
476. General Russell. Did they bring you any details of the negoti-
ations between the Japs and our Government?
General Short. No.
477. General Russell. On yesterday you discussed the necessity for
arming and equipping these ships to fight, which were on the way to
the Philippines, stopping off at Oahu. Where would they next stop
to pick up gas?
General Short. They were flying then to Midway to Wake and from
Wake to Port Moresby.
478. General Russell. Could they get gas at Midway?
General Short. Yes ; they could get gas at Midway and at Wake and
at Port Moresby ; and then they landed up around Darwin.
479. General Russell. How far was it to Midway, the first stop for
gas?
\_JtS9] General Short. I believe Midway is 1,100 miles. It is
about 900 or 1,000 miles from there on to Wake, as I remember. The
longest jump was from Wake to Port Moresby.
480. General Russell. There has been some discussion about what
would have happened if you had had another hour and a half or two
hours on the December 7 message. I want to ask you two or three ques-
tions now about the condition of readiness. At some place in the
record we have seen that it would require four hours for you to have
gotten your aircraft into the air ready to fight.
General Short. No. There is a type of alert where it would re-
quire it, but in a case of emergency, the very fact that the pursuit planes
were actually in the air by 8 : 50 shows that they did not require four
hours. It would take a little longer for the bombers, but they are not
defensive planes. If they were going to load up with bombs it would
take a little longer, but it would not take that much time. As a mat-
ter of fact, they were actually in the air at 11 : 27.
481. General Russell. The bombers?
General Short. Yes.
482. General Grunert. What was the idea of the 4-hour period?
General Short. On account of personnel. If you had a 4:-minute,
you had to have the personnel right at the planes. If you had a 30-
minute, you had to have the men at the airfield. If you had 4 hours
the crew members could be in their barracks.
246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
483. General Grunert. Under your Alert No. 1 where were the men ?
General Short. In our Alert No. 1 the men that were required for
guarding purposes were all definitely at their [-^-^^l planes.
The crews were not tied down.
484. General Grunert. Someone must have figured 4 hours. Why
did they not make it 3 or 2 ?
General Short. They had a 2 and they had a 4.
485. General Grunert. Individual planes could do some fighting,
but organized fighting in the air would take how long?
General Short. It actually took 55 minutes.
486. General Grunert. Were they organized to fight in the air, or
was it individual fighting?
General Short. It was largely individual. They took off in two or
three, when they got to the field. Most of the officers were spending
their nights in their own quarters at Schofield Barracks several miles
away.
487. General Grunert. My understanding was that the 4-hour
was for perfectly organized fighting in the air ?
General Short. By making it 4 hours it gave the possibility to the
men going ahead with recreation and athletics without being worried
about getting that alert. That could go right ahead with their normal
functions. They might have been out on a problem where it would
take them an hour to get back in.
[461] 488. General Grunert. Well, that was Alert No. 1, was
it?
General Short. Alert No. 1 ; they went right ahead with their
training
489. General Grunert. All right.
General Short. Completed it.
490. General Russell. General Short, a great deal has been said
about the population of Oahu there, the Hawaiian Islands generally.
How many Americans were there there?
General Short. I think there were normally about 20,000, but of
course there were at that time, with the armed services there, approx-
imately close to probably fifty-seven, fifty-eight thousand Army per-
sonnel there, and I would say more than that of the Navy, that is, in
and out with the Navy.
491. General Russell. People who resided there and who were not
in the armed forces, there were about how many?
General Short. Probably about 20,000, but there were a lot of de-
fense workers. I expect the American population had been increased
to 40,000 in that last year, but the normal population of Americans
was rather small.
492. General Russell. General Short, on the 24th of January a
letter originated in the office of the Secretary of the Navy that General
Grunert examined you on yesterday.
General Short. Yes, sir.
493. General Russell. The substance of the letter was that the Navy
was very apprehensive about an air attack on the ships there at
Hawaii.
General Short. Yes, sir.
494. General Russell. Now, in late November, early December,
when you had the conference at which it was stated that the [463]
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 247
possibility of an attack of that sort at Oahu was nil — Do you recall
that?
General Short. Yes.
495. General Russell. Can you account for the change in the
attitude of the Navy personnel between this date of January and
late November toward an air attack?
General Short. One was an attack and the other was a surprise
attack. The question there was whether a surprise attack.
496. General Russell. The question where?
General Short. The question November 27 was the question
whether surprise attack was possible.
497. General Russell. Well, you do not think that the letter of
January 24th related to a surprise attack?
General Short. It might have related to either one, but I mean
the apprehension of the Navy about getting our antiaircraft and
our pursuit defense built up was not just for siu-prise attack but
for any kind of an attack. The Japanese might have attacked them
in superior force. You see, their Navy had been reduced by send-
ing certain elements to the Atlantic Fleet, and they might have
been subject to an attack any time, and if it were reduced too much
they might have been worried alDout being attacked by superior
force, in which case the air business would have been serious. They
were, I think, interested not just from the point of view of surprise
attack but of always having proper antiaircraft defense.
498. General Russell. You think that the general interest inspired
the letter of January 24?
General Short. I think so.
[46S] 499. General Grunert. Before you leave that subject:
Was there a sentiment in the Army and Navy in Hawaii from about
January 1, '41, to July, we will say, in which they seemed to fear
action by Japan against Pearl Harbor, and then from July on they
seemed to have more of a sense of security and did not appear to be
so alarmed about the Japanese attacking Pearl Harbor? Did you
have any knowledge of any such sentiment?
General Short. I don't think so. They were pushing us all the
time on the question of antiaircraft defense and air — and pursuit
defense.
500. General Frank. Who was pushing you ?
General Short. The Navy. They were always talking to me about
the desirability of getting everything that we had coming to us
in the way of antiaircraft guns and getting better guns. They
thought our 3-inch equipment was not satisfactory, and we were
supposed to get some new 90-millimeter guns which we never got.
They felt that our old 3-inch equipment was decidedly inferior to
their antiaircraft guns, and they were anxious to have us build up
our antiaircraft to the latest type, with sufficient numbers.
501. General Grunert. In February 1941 Admiral Kimmel is al-
leged to have been astounded at the existing weaknesses of the Pearl
Harbor defenses.
General Short. That inspection was made before I got there. I
know about it.
502. General Grunert. And he is supposed to have pointed out
the inadequacy of antiaircraft guns, the obsolescence of land-based
248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
aircraft, the lack of aircraft detectors. Now, was that cured so that
the sentiment was different after about the middle [4^4] of
the year, or what?
General Short, Well, we were definitely — we had hoped to have
the antiaircraft warning service, the material delivered by June 30th.
That was the original plan. The Navy probably felt better because
funds had been allotted for that purpose, and there was a definite —
we were definitely trying to get it installed.
503. General Grunert. But as far as you know there was no real
change in sentiment throughout the year ?
General Short. I think the change was that they thought that we
were putting more emphasis on it than had been put on it previously,
that they had a little more feeling of confidence that we were going
in a period of a few months to be better prepared.
504. General Russell. I have one more miscellaneous question:
General Short, this subject of the creation of this Board, of the proper
procedure by the War Department, was on debate in the Congress.
A Representative of one of the States made the argument or took the
position that on the 6th day of December at about noon an intel-
ligence officer from your staff brought to your quarters a deciphered
message which had been intercepted. As I recall, it was a telephone
conversation between some Jap at Oahu and some Japanese official
on the homeland. The Congressman charged that you were engaged
in some sort of social activity and cursed this officer out and ran him
out of the quarters. I do not know that you will come back before
this Board, and I am bringing that representation to your attention
now for any remark that you would like to make about that.
General Short. Colonel Bicknell brought that message to [465]
me at about 7 o'clock, I would say sometime around between 6 : 30 and
7 o'clock, on the evening of the Bth. Colonel Fielder — I don't know
whether he came with Bicknell or whether I sent for him, but we
went — the three of us went over it together, and we were frankly un-
able to get anything definite out of it. I have read it again since I
have been here, and in the light of all events that have taken place it
would be very difficult for me to interpret it today and say, This
means so and so.
505. General Grunert. Do you mean the message was so garbled
that you couldn't understand it ?
General Short. No. It was such general talk that it could mean
anything, and that the only way that you could possibly know what it
could mean would be if you knew that the individuals had agreed
ahead of time. There were certain words in that ; in the light of every-
thing that has happened, there is a possibility that certain flowers
meant certain types of ships, and that we don't know, but at the time
neither Bicknell nor Fielder had a suggestion as to the possible mean-
ing of it. If they had had a month to work on it and had gotten
something further, maybe they could. But nobody was able to say.
Well, that means so and so.
506. General Grunert, As I recall this Congressman's statement,
he stated something to the effect that you cursed this officer who
brought the message, and practically threw him out.
General Short. Bicknell is in town. I think you could verify
that very simply by having him.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 249
507. General Grunert. We shall go into that, but while you are
here and the subject was brought up
[466] General Short. He came, and, as I say, Fielder either
came w^ith him or I sent for Fielder, and the three of us read it, and
Bicknell had liad more time looking over the message than anybody
else, and we first asked him if he had any interpretation he could
make, and he didn't have, and Fielder didn't have, and I frankly
couldn't interpret it.
508. General Frank. Is there or is there not any basis of fact in
the report ?
General Short. There is absolutely no basis of fact, except that the
report was made to me.
509. General Grunert. Such a report?
General Short. And it was discussed with Bicknell, who was the
contact officer, and with Fielder, who was my G-2, and we all ad-
mitted we couldn't interpret it. Now, as I say, they might have come
back if nothing had iiappened : the next week or ten days they prob-
ably would have come back with some kind of a possible interpreta-
tion, miglit not have come back with one that they felt was positive,
but Bicknell was suspicious because he knew something of the man
who did the talking, and he was suspicious on that point. He said
that it just didn't look right to him, that he couldn't make an inter-
pretation of it.
510. General Russell. That is all the questions I have.
511. General Grunert. I have one more question before we go to
the next two topics.
General Short. I might add there that there wasn't any social func-
tion going on at my house, or anything, at the time that he came there.
Just the three of us were in on the thing.
512. General Grunert. As to your possible knowledge of the im-
minence of war with Japan, had you been reading tlie Honolulu
[W] Advertiser?
General Short. I read the Honolulu papers carefully.
513. General Grunert. I quote extracts here on which I would like
to question you :
(Extracts from Honolulu newspapers were read as follows:)
Headline, page 1, Sunday, 80th of November, '41 : Japanese nation ready, may
strike over week end.
General Short. That is November 30th?
514. General Grunert. 30th of November, 1941 :
Japanese May Strike Over Week End
Kurusu bluntly warned nation ready for battle
Then, another headline, page 1, Monday, 1st of December:
Hull, Kurusu in crucial meeting today
Some unofficial quarters asserted that Japanese Premier General To jo's speech
on Saturday indicated that Japan may possibly have decided upon war.
Did such articles like that give you pause for thought as to the
possible imminence of war?
General Short. Undoubtedly, but I didn't look on those things as
authentic, as coming from the State Department.
515. General Grunert. Now, a Mr. Raymond Coll, C-o-1-1, Ha-
Avaiian newspaper editor, is quoted by a Washington newspaper
250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
shortly after submission of the Roberts report January 24, '42, in
substance that General Short and Admiral Kimmel had made clear
by their utterances before December 7, '41, the probability and the
imminence of a Japanese attack at an early date. Is that true?
General Short. I wouldn't say that, at an early date. [4^^]
We had both made repeated talks as to the necessity for the civil
community preparing for war. My first talk was on Army Day on
April 6. I had pounded at them to get them to provide production,
storage of food, to organize their doctors, and to organize an auxiliary
police force, auxiliary firemen. It wasn't preparation for war to-
morrow, but it was getting the community organized so that if any-
thing did happen there wouldn't be confusion, that there would be
efficiency. That had been going on — I started April 6.
516. General Grunert. And when was your most recent talk before
December 7 in that way ?
General Short. I do not think that I had made a public talk for
some time. I could not say what date, but the one talk where that
I got the whole thing before the community and got their interest
and got a very considerable action was on April 6, and we had kept
on pushing the thing from April the 6th on.
517. General Grunert. Your G-2, Colonel Fielder, also made some
talks?
General Short. Colonel Fielder in the last month or six weeks made
a considerable number of talks, made talks in different islands.
518. General Grunert. All right. We shall go ahead with the two
topics.
519. General Frank. I have some questions.
520. General Grunert. Have you some questions before you want
to open up the other two topics ?
521. General Frank. I have some questions about this that we have
been talking about.
[4^9] 522. General Grunert. Go ahead. Finish that, and then
we shall take up the other.
523. General Frank. Did you say that you saw the message from
the Navy of November 27th ?
General Short. I am sure I did, although we could not find the
official copy in the files.
524. General Frank. In that message was the statement generally
along the line, "An amphibious expedition against either the Philip-
pines, Thai, or the Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is indicated
by the number, equipment, and organization of Japanese task forces"?
General Short. Yes, sir, I remember that.
525. General Frank. What was your reaction ?
General Short. My reaction naturally from that was that if there
was an attack going to take place it would more likely fall on the
Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, or that neighborhood over there
than at Honolulu ; that our hostilities in all probability would be in
the nature of sabotage or uprisings, but in any event that
526. General Frank. In other words, that led you away from the
thought of an attack on Honolulu ?
General Short. Very definitely.
527. General Frank. Did you consider the Aircraft Warning Serv-
ice a form of reconnaissance ?
PROCEEDI]SrGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 251
General Short. The best, the only form the Army had of real
reconnaissance.
528. General Frank. Well, then, since that War Department mes-
sage of November 27th directed reconnaissance, why didn't [■W0'\
you make the Aircraft Warning Service reconnaissance more
extensive ?
General Short. It was very, very new. We had very few trained
men. We made it definite for what we considered the most dangerous
period, and they carried on — that was from 4 to 7, and they carried
on training from 7 to 11 and from 1 to 4. The last period was largely
maintenance. We were working the men a good — a very large num-
ber of hours, because it was practically one relief for the thing.
529. General Frank. However, after the December 7th attack they
went on a 24-hour basis ?
General Short. You can work men 24 hours when you are at war.
You can't in peace times continue to work 24 hours indefinitely.
530. General Frank. On the other hand, a year before that, in
the alert that ran from June through to August, they were
General Short. They didn't have any Aircraft Warning Service.
531. General Frank. I know, but they were on a full-out 24-hour
basis at that time so far as working 24 hours was concerned.
General Short. On maneuvers you expect to. We did that in May.
We had the whole command out, and they worked without regard
to hours, but you can't do it indefinitely.
532. General Frank. Did you confer with your staff relative to the
probability of an air attack?
General Short. When I got that message my Chief of Staff and
I talked over carefully what alert we should go into. He had just
finished a month before being G-3, and we talked over [4'^^]
what alert we thought was essential, and I had the G-2 in and talked
with him, and I think he agreed fully with me that that was our
danger. I did not talk it over with the other members of the staff
aside from G-2 and G-3. I talked it over, not asking whether they
thought there would be an air attack, but I talked to the echelon
commanders, particularly I think General Martin of the Air and
General Burgin of the Coast Artillery. I think I personally gave
them the messages and talked about what we wanted done. And I
talked with General Murray. He had control of most of the sabotage
in the Honolulu area, and I imagine that I had at least four or five
conferences with him in the next week, because we were having a
very complete check made by him personally of the guarding of the
waterfront and everything of that kind, and we ran into some things
that we thought had not been as completely done as they should
be, and we made a very considerable number of changes.
533. General Frank. All right. Now, you have given considerable
testimony about how you arrived at your conclusion of the adequate-
ness of Alert No. 1, and in general may we say that you came to this
conclusion as a result of your faith in the effectiveness of naval oper-
ations and the influence of naval opinion and to a certain extent of
the line of thought as a result of what was contained in messages
between the 16th of November and the 27th ?
General Short. Yes, sir. And that was later confirmed by, may I
add, actions of the War Depai'tment in not replying to my message
252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and stating they wanted more, and in sending planes in without any
ammunition.
534. General Frank. All right. Did you feel that the wording
[472] of messages coming in there to you indicated an effort to-
ward a supervisory control ?
General Short. I thought that it indicated very definitely two
things : that they wanted me to be extremely careful and not have an
incident with the Japanese population that would arouse Japan, and
the other thing was not to violate territorial laws in my eagerness to
carry out defensive measures.
535. General E'rank. The question has arisen in the minds of the
Board as to why, when that air estimate anticipated just exactly what
happened, steps were not taken to meet it. I assume that the
answer
General Short. You mean the estimate of the year — you mean the
year before?
536. General Frank. No. The Martin-Bellinger estimate.
General Short. Oh.
537. General Frank. Of 1941.
General Short. Yes.
538. General Frank. I assume the answer is the answer that you
gave to the question asked just two or three questions back.
General Short. Yes.
539. General Frank. How long previous to November '41 was daily
reconnaissance performed by the Army?
General Short. We had a reconnaissance squadron stationed at
Bellows Field that had a regular training program providing for
so many hours of reconnaissance daily. They were the ones that per-
formed it. It was a daily training proposition really. They per-
formed this reconnaissance as part of the training of their squadron
daily.
540. General Frank. Was this going on in November '41 ?
[473] General Short. Yes, sir, this was going on. I think you
may somewhere have maybe the program of Bellows Field which
would show you just exactly what they were carrying on just in their
daily training.
541. General Frank. But this was not being carried on on the morn-
ing of
General Short. Not then on that morning, because it was Sunday
morning.
542. General Frank. Yes. That was a form of reconnaissance?
General Short. It was very definitely reconnaissance.
543. General Frank. That you were carrying on?
General Short. But it was of no particular value where air was
concerned, not like the Aircraft Warning Service. It actually would
have been of real value only against submarines, as I see it.
544. General Frank. All right.
545. General Grunert. That was the only reconnaissance mission
that those training planes had, was it not?
General Short. Yes, the close-in reconnaissance : go out 20 miles.
546. General Grunert. Were they armed, and did they have
ammunition?
(leneral Short. They did not.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 253
547. General Frank. Did you have an official arrangement for
systematic furnishing of information to your headquarters from the
Navy?
General Spiort. The G-2 and O. N. I. were in constant touch, and
they had a teletype circuit that they and the F. B, I. were on. [-^^7]
That worked both ways, so they could instantly exchange information.
We were not getting routine daily reports of the O. N. I.
548. General Frank. What I am trying to arrive at is this : You,
through your testimony, have stated that in your personal contacts with
Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch you were advised at intervals
with respect to when task forces went out, but I am trying to make
it appear in the record that there was no official arrangement for that
kind of information to come into your headquarters.
General Short. No, there were no written reports being transmitted
every day to us as to exactly what was being done, until after the attack.
That went into effect right away on December 7.
549. General Frank. Not only that, but you may or may not have
known when task forces went out; is that correct?
General Short. Yes, I think I probably always knew what they did
have out : I mean, in general terms ; I may not have known the exact
number of ships, but I always knew in general terms what was out.
550. General Frank. Did you always know where they were?
General Short. In general locations, probably whether they were
going towards Canton, whether they were going towards Wake,
whether they were going towards Midway.
551. General Frank. How often did they go into the area north
and east of Oahu ?
General Short. They constantly had them out.
552. General Frank. In the north and east?
[475] General Sitort. Largely north. North and west, you
mean
553. General Frank. No. I mean north and east.
General Short. Oh, you mean to the east of Midway?
554. General Frank. No. I mean straight north and northeast of
Oahu.
General Short. I don't think that they — I think they went straight
north quite a bit. I don't think they went east to any considerable
extent, that they considered that the area to the west was more dan-
gerous and that the great part of their work was done there.
555. General Grunert. Their task forces, the directions that they
went, got to be soit of routine, so that Japanese agents could have
been aware that they seldom went to the north and east?
General Short. I don't — I never knew the exact courses that the
task forces traveled on. I knew where they wound up, but when they
were going to Wake Island I didn't know whether they shot out this
way for a few hundred miles and then this way (indicating) . I never
did know their courses.
556. General Frank. The manner in which this information came
into Army hands, namely, that it was given in more or less of a per-
sonal manner to you, did not made it readily available to your staff for
planning purposes, did it?
General Short. No, except that if I had gotten anything of prime
importance I naturally would have called in G-2.
254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
557. General Grunert. Then there were no periodic meetings
General Short. No periodic.
558. General Grunert. — between the Army and Navy representa-
tives to interchange information or say, "There is nothing doing
[476] today," or what?
General Short. There was practically — there w^as daily contact
between O. N. I. and G-2, and, as I say, w'ith the teletype they could
exchange messages just any minute.
559. General Frank. I know, but the O. N. I. never gave to your
G-2 any information about these task forces ?
General Short. No, they did not, not until after December 7.
560. General Frank. Now let us get back to the method of disper-
sion and protection. Had the bombers at Hickam Field been dis-
persed, either with or without bunkers, and had the crews at critical
hours or in emergency manned the machine guns in the airplanes, that
would have furnished a defense against attack from the air as well
as against an attack by saboteurs on the ground, would it not ?
General Short. To a very limited extent. You probably know
better than I to what range that you would expect them to be effective.
My understanding is that they don't count on the .30 caliber in a fight
much beyond a hundred yards, or the .50 caliber something like two
hundred yards. Is that correct?
561. General Frank. Well, that is correct, but at the height at which
the Jap planes were attacking the fields that morning those machine
guns certainly would have been effective ?
General Short. They probably would have had some effect.
562. General Frank. And just that method that we were recounting
was used the year before ?
General Short. Yes, sir. Now, I'll tell you, our main — with the
heavy bombers our idea was to disperse to the outlying islands. That
was what we were working towards. We couldn't [W7'\ dis-
perse at Hickam Field ; the character of the ground was such that you
couldn't roll the heavy bombers off of the apron and count on getting
them out. When we finally got where we could disperse them, we had
to build bunkers above the ground, because you couldn't dig down on
account of the water, and you had to build runways that were macadam
to a certain extent, and the ground was of such a nature that you
couldn't just run them out promiscuously over the ground.
563. General Frank. You are talking about the B-l7s ?
General Short. Yes.
564. General Frank. But you had only 12 of those ?
General Short. That is correct.
565. General Frank. Out on that morning?
General Short. That is correct.
566. General Frank. Now^ let us pursue this defense against sabo-
tage a little further. Hickam Field was not very extensive ?
General Short. No, not very great.
567. General Frank. It was bounded by the water on the south and
by the channel and the Navy on the west. There was a plan the year
previous to place barbed wire along the exposed boundary to the
north and east of the field, clear the space in front of the barbed w^ire,
and enfilade it with machine guns.
General Short. We had put in in May for money for wire for fenc-
ing the fields and enfilading the fields. We finally got the money in
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 255
September, and on account of the priority proposition, because the
material was not available locally, we had not gotten the material
at the time of the attack.
568. General Frank. For the fence.
General Short. Yes.
[4'/'S] 569 General Grunert. Had you got any other material ?
General Short. What?
570. General Grunert. Did you have barbed wire?
General Short. The amount of barbed wire in Honolulu at that time
was, I would say, extremely limited. The supplies had been used up
there, and the merchants couldn't get anything without priorities, so
anything in the construction line was extremely difficult to get.
571. General Grunert. If they defended that way in 1940, was that
just a plan?
General Short. That was '41. That was just a plan, if you are
talking about that. They didn't have that.
572. General Frank. Yes. A certain amount of barbed wire was
put in place, and the Engineers, in that warehouse at Kamehameha,
had a certain supply of barbed wire?
General Short. We had a certain supply of barbed wire, but that
wasn't what they were trying to fence with, that barbed wire. AVe had
rolls of that we were using for field fortification work. We had dumps
established on that, but that was not what the air people wanted for
fencing the fields. They wanted a
573. General Frank. Well, it was not a question of using it for
fencing, but it was a question of using it as protection against people
coming in for sabotage.
General Short. I see.
574. General Frank. Then, there was an officer by the name of Lord,
of the Corps of Engineers, who designed an armored machine gun box,
and we actually installed one and put machine guns in it, at the angle
at the northeast side of Hickam so that it [-^7^] enfiladed the
area in front of the barbed wire.
General Short. We had regular ground defense organized. We had
infantry organizations detailed to assist in that ground defense. We
had a battalion of 500 airmen trained by infantry officers for that
ground defense.
575. General Grunert. Then, the reason you bunched the airplanes
on Hickam is that there was not room to spread them, or what?
General Short. Two reasons. The first reason was that the ques-
tion of sabotage was, we figured, very much safer, and, as I told you
in my testimony. Colonel Burwell had made a very detailed investiga-
tion for the Air Corps and very strongly recommended that they be
grouped.
576. General Grunert. Well, could they have been dispersed
despite Burwell's report?
General Short. The heavy ones could not. The flying fortresses
could not have been moved off on account of the nature of the ground.
577. General Grunert. What proportion were they of the rest of the
planes?
General Short. They were the valuable portion, you might say.
578. General Grunert. How many? What percentage ?
256 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. I think there ^ve^e 12 of those aiul I think about 54
of the old B-18s, but they were worth decidedly more than all of the
B-18s. And there were some A-20s. There were 10 A-20s, and the
A-20s weren't touched in the attack,
579. General Frank. As a matter of fact, the B-l7s could have
been placed on the runways other than the north-and-south runway,
[4^0] because that was clone before, and if necessary they could
have taken off in a light cross wind, because that north-and-south run-
way was used about 80 percent of the time.
General Short. Yes. Of course, the more you scattered them the
more difficult was your protection.
580. General Grunert. Were these planes on all the fields, as I say,
bunched on your order, or on the judgment of the commanding officer
of the field ?
General Short. They were definitely — it was provided in Alert
No. 1. We had given serious consideration to that. As I say, we
had had this very elaborate study made, and Alert No. 1 — we had
decided very definitely that it was advantageous to disperse them
by fields as much as possible, but to group them on any particular
field.
581. General Frank. How was it anticipated that a sabotage would
be accomplished ?
General Short. In any possible way.
582. General Frank. Well, what?
General Short. We figured that there were enough alien Japanese
on the Island,
583. General Frank. Hand grenades or hand bombs ?
General Short, I wouldn't — you can just visualize anything you
want to, anything from having a man in the Hawaiian Depot that was
working on motors put emery in the motors, or anything. There were
all types of possible sabotage,
584. General Frank, As a matter of fact, if you bunch them all
together and somebody heaves a hand grenade or a bomb in there, he
destroys not one but several.
General Short, Yes, but if you have them grouped it [4^-?]
doesn't take very many men to be sure that nobody can get close
enough to heave in. That was the idea.
585. General Frank. Then, furthermore, if a fire is started and
they are all bunched together, it is almost impossible to get in there
through the heat and get those that are not yet affected away, and
while they are all bunched together you can't man the machine guns
on the interior ones and have them as positive machine gun defense
against the people advancing across the airdrome.
General Short. We were not counting on — we were counting on
the machine gims mounted on the ground for that defense. That is
a strange thing: at Kaneohe Bay all of their planes that were dis-
persed were destroyed without exception, and the ones that were
grouped on the landing aprons were very largely saved. They were
damaged to some extent, but very largely saved, and the others were
all destroyed,
586. General Frank, Were the machine guns in the airplanes
manned ?
General Short, I don't know, I don't image they were, but I
don't know.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 257
587. General Frank. Another thing: there were a certain number
of Air Corps men that were excess at the time because you didn't have
enough available equipment.
General Short. That is correct. »
588. General Grunert. These planes at Kaneohe Bay, what planes
were they ? Navy ?
General Short. Navy planes.
589. General Grunert. It would appear that the Japanese came
over to cripple the Navy more than the Army. Would it have been
[482] possible that they selected those targets which would cripple
the Navy and keep the Navy from going to the Far East ? In other
words, did it appear possible their objectives were Navy objectives
more than Army objectives?
General Short. No. The ones I was pointing out that were not
destroyed there were also naval planes that were up on the landing
field and on the apron, and their losses among them were not so very
great, but my understanding is that in the group that were dispersed
every single plane was lost.
[483] 590. General Frank. It would have been possible, be-
cause there were excess men in the Air Force, to have dispersed them,
and to have had the men protect the perimeter of the flying field and
thus have been protected by dispersion from both air attack and
sabotage ? ,
General Short. Yes.
591. General Frank. But that comes to a question of judgment?
General Short. And also a question that, you see those men were
not just sitting there doing nothing, they were all being trained for
some job, and if you stayed on this Alert No, 1 for a month and
kept those men all around the perimeter of the airfield, you couldn't
do anything else with them.
592. General Frank. Were your personnel being trained to ferry
planes to the Philippines?
General Short. They were. We were definitely responsible for
the ferrying of the planes to the Pliilippines.
593. General Frank. How much did that interfere with your train-
ing for your own war effort ?
General Short. It meant that as far as the B-l7's were concerned
we had to have all of our B-l7's constantly on work training those
crews, and, to make it worse, to keep those planes, we didn't have
spare parts for B-l7's, and to keep them going to the Philippines,
we had to rob six of our planes of parts to keep the others going,
and our orders were such that we felt that our first mission there was
to shove the planes to the Philippines, so we took the parts from six
of our planes, to keep the others going.
594. General Frank. We had testimony that we read in the Rob-
erts Keport that Admiral Bloch, and I am not so sure about [484]
Admiral Kimmel, but Admiral Bloch is distinctly of the impression
that the aircraft warning service was in continual operation. What
led him to that conclusion?
General Short. I don't know.
595. General Frank. Had you reported ?
General Short. No, I had not. They should have known what
was going on. They had a Naval liaison officer in our G-3 section
who knew exactly what was being done, and he should have kept
79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1 18
258 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
them, the right man, informed of details. Lieutenant Burr, of the
Navy, was on duty as liaison officer with the G-3 for the express pur-
pose of keeping Navy informed.
596. General Frank. Here are two letters, one of which is of the
19th of June, that you sent to Admiral Bloch :
It is anticipated tliat the Army Aircraft Yearning Service will be placed in
operation in the near future. Due to interest expressed by the Navy radio oper-
ators in the Army equipment, I will cause arrangements to be effected to afford
such naval personnel as you may desire to inspect the Army.
That is one. Is that correct?
General Short. Now, I must say that we went further than that.
They had a man, a Commander Taylor, who was supposed to be
quite an expert.
597. General Frank. Yes.
General Short. And he assisted us in getting the thing under way ;
so there were at least two naval officers who should have known
exactly what was going on.
598. General Frank. You remember writing this letter?
General Short. I remember the letter ; yes.
[4j8'o] 599. General Frank. And here is a letter.
General Short. Now, may I say, there, that originally the War
Department had stated that we would get delivery of the Aircraft
Warning Service materiel by June 30. We didn't get it, but that was
their original hope.
600. General Frank. Then, on the 5th of August there is another
letter, in which you stated :
The Army's Aircraft Warning facilities for the Hawaiian Department are
rapidly approaching completion.
General Short. We hoped, we kept hoping all the time they would
get that materiel in, and they approved the priority, and they didn't
give it as good a priority as we asked for, but they improved it, and
said that if that did not produce it, the Chief of Engineers would act.
601. General Frank. This quotation from a letter of August 5 is
from a letter that you wrote to Admiral Kimmel ?
General Short. Yes.
602. General Frank. Do you think that these two letters, and espe-
cially this last one, led the Navy to a conclusion as to the operating
effectiveness of the AWS ?
General Short. It was done to try to keep them informed of the
situation, and what we expected. You will notice, in neither one of
the letters did I tell them that we had it, but we were hopeful, when
I wrote those letters, and they were so interested that I was trying to
keep them informed.
603. General Frank. You stated that you didn't expect an air
attack; is that correct?
General Short. That is correct.
604. General Fr^vnk. Now, with respect to that do you want to
[4^6] make any differentiation between an air attack as a part of a
general attack, and an air raid, a hit-and-run proposition?
General Short. I didn't expect either one, frankly, with the infor-
mation I had.
605. General Frank. All right.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 259
606. General Russell. Two or three things, very briefly, General.
There was some discussion about this reconnaissance which was being
conducted by Army personnel as part of the training, from one of those
airfields.
General Short. Yes.
607. General Russell. General Short, when you went out to the
Department and took command, were those reconnaissances being
made as part of training the men ?
General Short. I think in all probability they were, although Bel-
lows Field, ac the time I took command, was relatively little developed.
We had developed Bellows Field and were using it much more, but I
think they had the same small squadron of reconnaissance planes, and
were working on the training of it, probably from Wheeler Field.
608. General Russell. Do you know whether or not it is true that
in the year 1940 the Department was ordered under an alert from the
War Department, and that in the fall of 1940 the War Department
directed General Herron, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian
Department, to discontinue these reconnaissances, except as part of
this training ?
General Short. I do not know, sir.
609. General Russell. You would not know, then, whether that was
set up under War Department order by Herron and carried on under
you, or not ?
[4S7] General Short. I do not.
610. General Russell. General, a great deal has been said about this
November 27 message, and the failure of those men who were on the
radar that morning, when they detected the presence of the incoming
aircraft, to report it. Did the provision in the November 27 order,
that you would disseminate this highly secret information to thcL
minimum number of officers, in your opinion prevent you from pass-
ing it down, so that the officer in the control office that morning, or
the central information office, could have had it ?
General Short. I wouldn't have expected him to have it. He was
just one of a number of 3^oung officers that were being trained in there.
He had only been in there a few days.
611. General Russell. It is quite obvious that if he and the man
on the radar had had the information that an attack might come, they
would not have been so complacent.
General Short. Possibly not, but I think his complacency was
based on his knowledge of our own planes that were coming in.
612. General Russell. A great deal has been said about the instal-
lation of the permanent radar stations out there. Who made the con-
tact for the installations of those ?
General Short. The district engineer.
613. General Frank. Colonel Wyman?
General Short. Colonel Wyman.
614. General Russell. Upon whom was it necessary for you to
rely in order to hasten the installation of those radar stations ?
General Short. As far as the work went, it was necessary to call
upon the contracts of Colonel Wyman. On the other hand, we had
to get back to getting materiel. I do not think [i^8] he was
responsible for the materiel. I do not believe that his contracts had
anything to do with obtaining the electrical materiel and things of
that kind.
260 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
615. General Russell. Upon whom was the responsibility for ob-
taining that electrical materiel?
General Short. I think that the Signal Corps, in the United States,
had ordered those. I think I am correct. I may be wrong about it,
but that is my feeling, that the Signal Corps in all probability bought
those.
616. General Russell. Was that an agency over which you had
control ?
General Short. No control, whatever. All I could do was to cable
the War Department, radio the War Department and ask them to
try to speed things up. Yesterday, you remember, I read you a wire
to the War Department, June 10.
617. General Russell. Yes, sir.
General Short. And I asked for a change of priorities so as to get
the things. I do not know definitely who purchased that materiel,
but it was Signal Corps materiel, so I assume that they did.
(Brief recess.)
618. General Grunert. The Board will come to order.
General Short, I have a number of questions here on the Interceptor
Command, and on an activity of that Command, the Air Warning
Service. I will ask those on the Interceptor Command as such, first.
On the 5th of November, 1941, I understand you put out an SOP,
and in that SOP it referred to an Interceptor Command. Was that
an Interceptor Command actually organized and in [^55]
being on December 7?
General Short. It was actually functioning, but I would say that
it wasn't definitely put in. It was actually functioning, but the Air-
craft Warning Service had not definitely been put under the com-
mand, as a command of the Interceptor Command. It was in the
process of formation.
619. General Grunert. My understanding of an interceptor com-
mand is that it has the Air Warning Service as one of its primary
functions, and it also has the fighter aircraft, and it has control of
the antiaircraft.
General Short. That's correct.
620. General Grunert. Is that the conception of that ?
General Short. May I explain that at that time the idea was quite
new, and we had sent General Davidson and Colonel Powell and two
subordinate officers to the school in the States, and they got back, I
believe, about the 4th or 5th of December, and we were waiting on their
return, to be sure we were fully — we had put this, what we thought
was correct, in the Standing Operating Procedure, and we were wait-
ing on their return to put it in effect, when they would know exactly
what the War Department was doing in the mainland.
621. General Grunert. When did they return?
General Short. I think it was about the 4th or 5th of December.
They had been back only a day or two.
622. General Grunert. And General Davidson was in command
of the Interceptor Command ?
General Short. He was the one who was to — he was in command
of the pursuit, and in all this exercise we had been carrying on ; it was
functioning under him, but the actual [4^0] command of these
units had not been turned over to him, on December 7.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 261
623. General Grunert. Then there was no Interceptor Command,
as such, with a commander ?
General Short. You might say that, formally, but it was all work-
ing just as if it existed. We were trying to get to the point where we
thought we could issue the order.
624. General Grunert. Well, the order was issued ?
General Short. But not made — that part of that Standing Oper-
ating Procedure was more or less suspended till we got General Da-
vidson and Colonel Powell's opinion.
625. General Grunert. Then the component parts of the Inter-
ceptor Command were in existence and functioning, but not the Inter-
ceptor Command, as a whole?
General Short. They were functioning together, you might say,
cooperating and coordinating, but had not been placed definitely under
Davidson's command.
626. General Grunert. And tests and practices were conducted of
component parts, but not as a whole ?
General Short. Yes, they were conducted as a whole, but the ques-
tion of being absolutely under his command, the order had not been
issued.
627. General Grunert. Then, was there Navy representation, there?
Did you participate in tests and practices?
General Short. I am of the opinion that they were there. Whether
they were there constantly, I don't know, but the provision was for
them, and we had had this Naval Commander Taylor working with
them, and I believe it was about the 24th of November that we had
asked the Navy, through him ; had him [4^-?] request the Navy
to have officers there to work with us, as early as possible.
628. General Grunert. There was an actual information center or-
ganized, was there?
General Short. Oh' yes; there was an actual information center
organized, and it was working daily. It was working just the same
as it would have worked if the definite order was issued.
629. General Grunert. Who had charge of that?
General Short. Well, you had your aircraft warning service, there ;
you had your control officer, who was actually in charge of the func-
tioning of it.
630. General Grunert. Who was he ?
General Short. We was General Davidson's recommendation — I
mean. General Davidson's representative.
631. General Grunert. Who had charge of the center?
General Short. Wlien it was functioning, the control officer had
charge.
632. General Grunert. Who was the control officer ?
General Short. I was just trying to think of the Major's name. It
was an Air Corps Major that was representing General Davidson.
633. General Grunert. Was his name Bergquist ?
General Short. I think so, I think so ; and General Davidson, him-
self, was there a great deal of the time.
634. General Grunert. Then it seems to me that it was understood
that Davidson, some time in the future, was to have this, and during
the present, had an interest in being there. Did he ?
262 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. Yes, sir ; very' definitely, he Imew he was [4^^]
going to get it, and that it was just dependent on when he said he was
ready.
635. General Grunert. Where did the Signal Officer, Colonel Pow-
ell, come in ?
General Short. Powell? Well, I should say he was responsible for
the technical functioning of all the stations, and the transmission of
the information to the control room.
636. General Grunert. But he was not in control of the informa-
tion center ?
General Short, No. I would say that Bergquist was more in
charge of the whole thing than Colonel Powell.
637. General Grunert. Wliat was Bergquist's relationship to Gen-
eral Davidson?
General Short. He was General Davidson's man. He was his rep-
resentative.
638. General Grunert. Then, as far as you know, there were some
naval officers interested in the thing, but whether they had actually
been detailed, there
General Short. We had made the request, and Commander Taylor
was working all the time with the outfit. Now, whether they had ac-
tually sent these people that we had asked to have sent, I don't know.
1 was through the place two or three times, and it may be that if Tay-
lor was there, that I thought of him as the Naval representative.
639. General Grunert. AVas the Navy kept informed of its status
all through this organizing state, so that they knew what to depend
upon, and what its status was?
General Short. We had two officers. We had one officer. Lieuten-
ant Burr, who was the liaison man with the G-3, whose [WS]
duty was solely to keep Navy infonned of what we were doing. Then,
we had the other man, who was Taylor, that he was there to help us,
because he was an expert on the thing. It wasn't primarily his duty
to keep the Navy informed. It was Burr's duty to keep the Navy
informed. I think, however, that Taylor probably did keep them
informed, to a considerable extent.
640. General Grunert. Then, whether the Navy was informed as
to its status, was a question of whether Commander Taylor or Lieu-
tenant Burr
General Short. Burr, particularly. Whether Burr did the job
he was detailed for
641. General Grunert. He was detailed under what?
General Short. G-3. He was supposed to know everything, and
he sat in on everything that G-3 had.
642. General Grunert. So far as you know, there was no Navy man
actually detailed as part of the information center ?
General Short. I frankly do not know definitely. I know the re-
quest was made, and I was of the opinion that it was being carried out;
but I can't say, definitely.
643. General Grunert. Part of the testimony before the Roberts
Commission stated :
General Short testified that there were uaval officers at the information center,
but Admiral Kimmel stated that no naval officer had ever been detailed to the
Air Warning Service Center, to keep the Navy advised.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 263
General Short. Well, as I say, I couldn't say definitely. I know
the request had been made, that it was contemplated, and I thought it
had been carried out.
644. General Grunert. Now, referring to the testimony before
[W4] tbe Koberts Commission:
General Short admitted that at the time of the attack the Interceptor Com-
mand had not a definite organization and that he didn't know for sure whether
the Navy knew this.
I think you have covered that.
General Short. That is correct. They should have known from
Burr. Whether they did, I don't know.
645. General Grunert. Then, there is a statement here in that rec-
ord which states :
The Air Force merely cooperated on its own hook.
meaning that they cooperated, when they saw fit, or if they saw fit?
General Short. No, they always had a control officer there.
646. General Grunert. Then, I have a note here to the effect the
Interceptor Command was actually activated December 17.
General Short. I think that is probably correct, that that was the
date when that official order was put out.
647. General Grunert. Now, as to the Air Warning Service, will
you tell us what that consisted of, and what it was intended to consist
of, and what was actually in being in the latter part of November and
early in December.
(xeneral Short. It was intended to consist of the pursuit command,
which was two groups, I think, of seven squadrons.
648. General Grunert. I am talking about the Air Warning Service.
General Short. Oh, I thought you meant the Interceptor Command.
\4^S] 649. General Grunert. The Air Warning Service.
General Short. The Air Warning Service, we actually had mobile
stations. We had no fixed station that was able to function.
650. General Grunert. How many fixed stations were there to be,
and how many mobile stations were there to be ?
General Short. In the original plan, there were to be three fixed sta-
tions. Then that was switched, and Burr changed that, at a later date,
and increased the number to six.
[Copy]
3141 Southwestern Boulevard,
Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 19J,Jf.
Subject : Correction in testimony.
To : President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.
1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the
Army Pearl Harbor Board :
*
Page 495, lines 8 and 9 omit "and Burr changed that".
/s/ Walter C. Short,
Walter C. Short,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.
651. General Grunert. When was that?
General Short. Oh, I don't know. I think that may have been some
time along — well, maybe as late as September, and we were to have six
264 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
mobile stations, and I am inclined to believe — I am not sure whether the
parts for all of those mobile stations had arrived, or whether we were
able to operate only three. I am not definite on the number that we
were actually able to operate.
[W6] 652. General Grunert. Then there were supposed to be
six permanent and six mobile?
General Short. Six mobile and six permanent; that is right.
653. General Grunert. Now we shall take the permanent. How
many permanent were there actually operating or in condition to
operate ?
General Short. None.
654. General Grunert. None. Of the mobile stations how many
were operating or able to operate ?
General Short. I am inclined to think that the parts had arrived
for all of them. I don't know. I visited in that period of ten days,
I think, three of the stations. I can't say definitely whether all six
were operating or not.
655. General Grunert. Wliat seemed to delay first the mobile sta-
tions ? Wliat delayed their installation ?
General Short, The question of electrical equipment.
656. General Grunert. Electrical equipment?
General Short. Obtaining the electrical equipment. We had been
promised it by June 30.
657. General Grunert. They needed no particular' construction?
General Short. No.
658. General Grunert. Except access to the station?
General Short. That was it. The construction that they required
could be done without any great amount of material, because
659. General Grunert. When the Secretary of War told the Secre-
tary of the Navy in February of '41 that all material for the air warn-
ing system would be over there by June, what [W^] did he
mean ?
General Short. I think that he expected
660. General Grunert. For all stations?
General Short. I think that he expected it for all stations.
661. General Grunert. But you said that there were to be three
permanent.
General Short. Yes. Well, I mean at the time he made the state-
ment he would have expected to have the material there for three
fixed, and as it existed.
662. General Grunert. For the project as it existed?
General Short. As it existed, and then it was changed.
663. General Grunert. Then he expected to have the material over
there for six mobile and three permanent?
General Short. Finally, but when he wrote the letter I would say
three fixed and six mobile.
664. General Grunert. All right. Now, why didn't he get the
material there? What were the conditions in June when the Navy
had a right to expect that the Army had its stuflf over there?
General Short. As I read you a wire yesterday of June 10 I sent
to the Adjutant General stating that the electrical equipment and
the cables for the construction had not been obtained, and apparently
a priority was holding it up.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 265
665. General Grunert. Well, now, as to the permanent stations,
what was short there ? Why didn't — ■ —
General Short. Well, the first thing that was short on Kaala, which
was possibly the most important permanent station, was the cable.
666. General Grunert. The cable.
[4^5] General Short. We couldn't even start.
667 General Grunert. You told us that.
General Short. We couldn't even start construction because the
only way to get the material up on top of the mountain was by cable.
668. General Grunert. Was all other material present except the
cable ?
General Short. Oh, no, no. As a matter of fact, on December 7th
you didn't have material for the fixed stations. I think maybe that
it was largely there except motors.
669. General Grunert. Then, the shortage of equipment applied
to both of them ?
General Short. I do not remember the details of just what parts
of the equipment, but I know that the equipment for the fixed stations
had not been completed at that time.
670. General Grunert. Now, in what way were the fixed stations
different from the mobile ?
General Short. They were much more powerful stations.
671. General Grunert. More powerful. How were they run, by
generated electricity or by gas, gas machine, or what ?
General Short. I think that we had contracts for the public utility
companies to run wires so we could use current generated in that way,
and then we had motors so in case that went out we could have an
alternative.
672. General Grunert. Yes. But it was not until June that you
started to get after the War Department ?
General Short. That is right.
673. General Grunert. What happened between February and
June?
\_Jf99'\ General Short. They agreed — we had been told they
would arrive by June 30th. We weren't really expecting them until
right at the end of June, and we didn't find out until early in June
that they were not going to get there, and when we did I sent the wire.
674. General Grunert. When did they actually get all the equip-
ment, if ever, before you left ?
General Short. They did not. I think we got practically all of
the equipment for the mobile stations along maybe the last week in
October or the first week in November, because we set them up as
soon as we got them.
675. General Grunert. Then, all the mobile stations should have
been working on December 7?
General Short. I am under the impression that we had the mobile
equipment. Now, there may be one or two that had not been com-
pletely set up.
676. General Grunert. But how about the equipment for the
permanent ones?
General Short. I am sure that it had not all arrived.
677. General Grunert. So you couldn't operate anything on ac-
count of the lack of equipment ?
266 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. Lack of equipment as far as permanent ones.
678. General Grunert. And you didn't have all the stuff to put on
the inaccessible places, so it was not so much the question of roads and
cables to get the whole thing working, if you didn't have all that
equipment ?
General Short. No, only that we were particularly anxious to get
the construction work all done so when the equipment arrived there
would be no additional delay.
[oOO] GT9. General Grunert. Then, there w^as a combination,
as I see it : the lack of equipment and the lack of materials to construct
cables to get the equipment — to put them in these permanent stations.
General Short. That is correct.
680. General Grunert. After June 10th when again did you go
after the War Department or anybody else?
General Short. I kept in constant touch with the exact status of
the construction of the fixed stations by — I had a liaison officer. Major
Fleming in the Engineers, who was in almost daily touch with the
District Engineers and reported to me on the status of construction.
681. General Grunert. You used Fleming as your liaison with
the District Engineer ?
General Short. With the District Engineer. He was an engineer
and was one of the Assistant G-4, and he was almost in daily touch
with the District Engineer in regard to construction of airfields, air-
craft warning service, and certain construction for storage of am-
munition up in the vicinity of Scofield.
68:2. General Grunert. Was the District Engineer under you?
General Short. He was not.
683. General Grunert. Was he not placed under you along .toward
the fall sometime?
General Short. He was not. He came under me with everything
else on December 7th, or December 8th; when the martial law was
declared, why, naturally he came under me.
684. General Grunert. And to whom did he look for instructions,
and how far could you push him ?
[SOI] General Short. I'll tell you how they worked. Tradi-
tionally, you know, all field fortifications have been carried out by
the Engineers, all airfield construction. He was made responsible
for that by the War Department, and for the construction of these
aircraft warning stations, and I might say also for the construction
of bombproofs. If we had a project like bombproofing a headquar-
ters or providing for gasoline storage, ammunition storage, I talked
over with responsible people what they thought we ought to have. If
it were a question of providing — now, the heavy seacoast giuis over
there, none of them had any protection for personnel. In that case
I would talk it over with the Chief of the Coast Artillery, General
Burgin, have Fleming in on it, have him draw up roughly what we
were after. Then the District Engineer would put his engineers and
his draftsmen on the thing and draw up detailed plans, and then we
would have a conference with the District Engineer, with Fleming
and Burgin, say, and go over the detail plans. If they appeared
to be fully what we wanted, the approval was given to the plan.
685. General Grunert. You approved the plan?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 267
General Short. Approved the plan, and then he got the money
from the Chief of Engineers in Washington.
686. General Grunert. Who decided on when such and such a
thing had to be in ?
General Short. We made the decision as to when we wanted it in.
Of course, you couldn't make a decision that it had to be in because
you didn't know how long it was going to take to get the money
and you clidn't know how long it was going to take to get the material.
[502] 687. General Grunert. Well, at certain times all these
contracts were let and had a completion date at least estimated.
General Short. I think most all
• 688. General Grunert. Who estimated that?
General Short. Most all the contracts, that would have been done
by the dates of the needing. Most all of the contracts of the District
Engineer I think had been let before my arrival. He was working on
those same contracts. Now, some
689. General Grunert. You were interested in getting these defense
contracts completed as of the date of completion?
General Short. That is right, and I had
690. General Grunert. Who extended the date from time to time?
Did you ?
General Short. Often it was force of circumstances, that it was
impossible to get the material, that there wasn't any question of any-
body extending it; it just was an impossibility. I had a confer-
ence
691. General Grunert. From whom did j'Ou get reports that it was
impossible to get the material ?
General Short. I had a conference on an average of every week or
ten days with the District Engineer.
692. General Grunert. From the District Engineer you got the
information ?
General Short. From the District Engineer and with Major Flem-
ing present. He kept me — I probably saw Fleming almost every day
and talked over some of these things with him, and, as I say, the Dis-
trict Engineer came in and made a report of progress probably every
week or ten days and went into his [SOS] difficulties, whatever
they were.
693. General Grunert. If they were not satisfied with that progress,
what was your recourse ?
General Short. To wire the War Department.
694. General Grunert. And ycu did that once in June?
General Short. I did that.
695. General Grunert. On the air warning stuff ?
General Short. I did.
696. General Grunert. Did you make any other complaints to the
War Department as to lack of material ?
General Short. I did. The other complaint, the other things —
well, for instance, the airfields were not going as fast as I wanted
them, but it was anuestion of a.llotment of funds. I was trying con-
stantly to get the allotment of funds. We couldn't do anything until
we got it. We had the approval of the project, but we didn't have the
funds, actual funds, in most cases.
268 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
697. General Grunert. Were you responsible for getting the
things, or was the District Engineer ?
General Short. I was responsible for getting projects approved
and the amount approved, and the funds then were transmitted to
the District Engineer.
698. General Grunert. But as far as the air warning service is
concerned, it wasn't a question of funds ?
General Short. No, it was not.
699. General Grunert. It was a question of getting the air warn-
ing service completed as quickly as possible ?
General Short. That is correct.
700. General Grunert. And you found that the material was not
[504^ going in as you desired or thought it should, so you com-
plained to the War Department ?
General Short. The report that the District Engineer had from
the Division Engineer in San Francisco, he was advised by the Divi-
sion Engineer that there was going to be a very considerable delay
on account of priorities. He felt apparently that if we could get the
War Department to step up our priority, that we would get it very
much faster, and that is what prompted that.
701. General Grunert. And that contractor was dependent upon
the Army getting priorities for him ?
General Short. Very definitely. That is the only way. That is
the only way you could get any priority.
702. General Grunert. And as far as you know there was no fault
or delay on the part of the contractor ?
General Short. I don't know of any delay on his part.
703. General Grunert. Well, now, after June 10th when you made
your complaint, did you then think that everything was O. K., that
they would do it when they could, or didn't you needle them again?
General Short. As I say, I had a conference and got a report of
progress probably on an average of every week or ten days, a per-
sonal conference, and if there was anything we felt could be pushed
faster we tried to have it done.
704. General Grunert. Did you feel it was necessary to go after
the War Department again ?
General Short. We did — not on those particular things. Often we
could get something speeded up by a conference with the District
Engineers.
[60S] 705. General Grunert. Were you satisfied with the prog-
ress made ?
General Short. I wasn't satisfied. I wasn't satisfied very fre-
quently with the progress made.
706. General Grunert. Well, here is from June to December, a
matter of nearly six months, and still the thing is not completed.
General Short. It took about fifteen weeks to get a priority through.
707. General Grunert. Well, you were put on a higher priority
then?
General Short. Yes, but we never did get on — now, the Navy were
on an A-1. We never— and I tried to get this put on a 1-B, and they
put it on a 1-C.
708. General Grunert. You were very much concerned about
this air warning service ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 269
General Short. I was very much concerned.
709. General Grunert. That was really your No. 1 priority con-
struction ?
General Short. That was. It was the thing I looked on as prob-
ably the most 'essential thing.
710. General Grunert. Was it important enough to bring it to the
personal attention of the Chief of Staff?
General Short. I had written a letter about the whole thing to
Chief of Staff sometime earlier, on that. I did bring the question of
priority to the attention of the Deputy Chief of Staff, of the whole
priority, and I got some help from General Moore, who was the
Deputy Chief of Staff. I did not get what I asked for, but I got
some decided help as a result of my direct [606] communica-
tion with him, not on this, but I got authority for creating a lumber
pile so we could have some lumber on hand to build barracks, and we
got a certain amount of hardware material that the District Engineer
was going to need ; that they built up the thing ahead of time. But
I would say the Deputy Chief of Staff had more to do with helping
us on that than anybody else.
[507] 711. General Grunert. Now, I think you referred to
this in your testimony before : General Short wrote Admiral Kimmel
June 19th that air warning service would be in operation in the
near future. Against on August 5, '41, that the air warning service
was rapidly nearing completion.
When did it actually get in operation? That has been answered.
General Short. That is about the first week in November.
712. General Grunert. Why the delay ? In other words, now here
you write the Navy on the 19th, "near future" ; on August 5th, "and
rapidly nearing completion". Then from August 5th to December
7th, September, October, November, four months, the thing isn't
completed yet. And did you again notify the Navy that you were in
error or mistaken about the near completion ?
General Short. They, I am sure, they were. We at least had one
of their officers who was helping set up the whole thing and knew
the exact status of the thing. Now, I don't think I wrote another
letter to them on that. I undoubtedly talked to them about it, be-
cause that project was very dear to their hearts. They were ter-
ribly interested in it.
713. General Grunert. Captain DeLany knew the air warning
service was very unsatisfactory. I say we found that out from Cap-
tain DeLany. And then again it says, "General Short said his S. O. P.
on November 5, '41, was issued as an accomplished procedure." Evi-
dently the
General Short. It was with regard to everything except the Inter-
ceptor Command.
714. General Grunert. Everything but that point.
Again referring to the Roberts Commission : General Short states
that it would have made no difference in his plan if he [508]
had been furnished with all the materials needed; also that if his
radars had all been completed he would still have been operating them
the same way he was doing December 7th, '41. I just have a question
here of why. You mean by that that you would have been operating
just during those same morning hours?
270 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Genenil Short. In all probability my estimate of the situation was
such that I didn't think it required a 24:-hour operation of them.
715. General Gkuneht. Do you suppose it was general knowledge
that you were operating just between those hours : general knowledge
to the public, or that the Japanese agents could have gotten that
information ?
General Short. Japanese agents; it would have been possible for
them to ge that information.
716. General Grunert. Would you suppose that would have influ-
enced them to attack after they presumed that the radar, the air
warning service, had quit for the day ?
General Short. I have no way of knowing.
717. General Grunert. I have a note here that the air warning
service, the mobile unit training, had been in training since November
1st. Do you consider that the mobile units actually installed were
capable of operating on December 7th to a reasonable degree of
efficiency ?
General Short. I think that the men were not experts, but I think
they were getting trained to the point where they could do pretty well.
718. General Grunert. And then it was just a question ol their
operating on that particular day and that particular time?
General Short. Yes, sir.
719. General Grunert. I have exhausted my questions on this
[509] interceptor and air warning, on which you undoubtedly
have a number of questions. I yield to you next.
720. General Frank. I would like to bring out in a little greater
detail some facts about the equipment furnished and that needed.
With respect to equipment furnished, is it a fact that, so far as the
radar themselves were concerned, you had three heavy radar sets
complete and six mobile sets complete ?
General Short. I am of the opinion that we did not have the motors.
Now, Colonel Powell would be very much safer on that answer than
I would be.
721. General Frank. You mean the motor generators?
General Short. Yes.
722. General Frank. Well, if they were hooked up with commercial
current, then you didn't need them?
General Short, You w^ouldn't have had to have them. You do
need them so that if anything went wrong with the current.
723. General Frank. For reserve?
General Short. Yes. But, as I say, that is a feeling I have, but I
wouldn't be safe.
724. General Frank. Well, what I am getting at is this.: from the
point of view of the Secretary of War when he made the statement that
this material would be furnished in June or about.
General Short. It definitely was not. The material I am sure
didn't get there until about November 1st. He thought it. would. I
was told by the War Department, as I remember, that by June 80th,
we would have everything.
725. General Frank. I have a signed letter here from the Signal
Corps which, in answer to some questions that we asked, states as fol-
lows: "All components of one SCR 271 set were turned [^^0]
over by the Signal Corps to the Quartermaster for shipment on the '
26th of May."
iPROCEEDINGS OF ARISIY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 271
General Short. All components?
726. General Fkaxk. Of one.
General Short. Of one set?
727. General Frakk. Yes.
General Short. Well, now, that is a-
728. General Frank. Now, just a minute. "All components of two
SCR 271 were turned over for shipment on the 26th of June, one month
later."
General Short. Yes.
729. General Frank. So there were three sets?
General Short. Yes. Now, you have got to figure they have got
to get priority to ship them.
730. General Frank. Now ; five SCR 270. which are the mobile sets,
were delivered to the Quartermaster for shipment on the 22nd of July.
General Short. Yes.
731. General Frank. It is not so material about the mobile sets
because along in November you had the mobile sets and they were
functioning.
General Short. Yes, they were functioning, and I think
732. General Frank. All I wanted to bring out is this : that it was
not a question as to whether or not you had the radar equipment on
hand. It was a question of having the installation in which you
were going to put it in shape so that you could erect the radar on that
installation.
[611] General Short. In at least one case the question of a
collar was involved.
733. General Grunert. Do I understand, then, that all the perma-
nent radar. equipment to be installed in permanent stations was in
Hawaii and available, except some parts that were still missing?
General Short. I think some of the parts were missing. I would
not know definitely. The only safe way would be to call Colonel
Powell or someone directly responsible. ' But this letter that they had
shipped the equipment would not necessarily mean that it all ar-
rived. If one part failed to arrive it would have prevented the use
of the system.
73-i. General Frank. The shortage of equipment to build roads, to
build emplacements in these sites after you got to them over the roads,
was really what was holding up the installation and operation of the
permanent stations. Is that correct ?
General Short. I believe that the roads and the buildings, except
at Kaala were pretty well completed. That is just memory. I have
no statement as to just the degree. We got reports of the degree of
comjiDletion : but I believe that on the Island of Maui the Hateakala
Station was actually on. I believe that, ihe road construction had
been done.
735. General Grunert. Where would such reports be available for
t he record ?
General Short. I think that the District Engineer and the Depart-
meiit Signal Officer would both know definitely the status.
736. General Frank. As a matter of fact, are you really conversant
with those details?
General Short. No. I knew generally, but as to exactly what had
been received I would not know.
272 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[SJ2] 737. General Grunert. We will develop that later. We
want to find out how much you know, so that if there are some of these
questions that you cannot answer you can say so. We have other ways
of getting the information.
General Short. I would not know except in a general way.
738. General Frank. May we have a copy of the June 10th message?
General Short. It is in this book, 1-E.
739. General Frank. May we also have copies of the letters in which
you asked for priorities ?
General Short. Yes.
740. General Frank. As a matter of fact, while the A. W. S. system
was not completed, with full advantage of the power available. and the
distance obtainable by the permanent station, nevertheless the A. W. S.
system was operative with mobile sets up to a distance of about 130
miles. Is not that correct?
General Short. That is correct. You could not count on 130 miles,
but under favorable conditions you would get it.
741. General Frank. I bring that out to clarify something that
General Grunert spoke about.
Have you any information to give or comments to make relative to
the failure of any contractors on the Hawaiian construction to com-
plete their work ?
General Short. I do not believe that the District Engineer ever
reported to me that the contractor had fallen down on his job. I
think most of the reports he made to me was as to the inability to get
materials so that he could push the contractor.
742. General Frank. Have you any information as to whether or
not any military personnel neglected duties relating to the Hawaiian
construction contract ?
[SIS^ General Short. I have none.
743. General Frank. Do you have any information to give to the
Board on a Mr. Wilhelm Rohl, a German contractor who operated
in Hawaii ?
General Spiort. I have never even heard his name until a few
months ago.
744. General Frank, ^ere you in any way familiar with the. Ha-
waii an defense contract that was let by Colonel Theodore Wyman
to The Hawaiian Constructors?
General Short. It was let before my arrival in the Islands. I knew
that generally The Hawaiian Constructors were doing the work there,
but I was not at all familiar with the details. I might state that
when Colonel Hannum came out from San Francisco he went over
the work that Colonel Wyman was doing, and after he had made an
inspection of the office and the work he came to my office and made
a report to me of what he had found, and seemed to be thoroughly
satisfied with the conditions that he had found.
745. General Frank. Are you familiar as to whether there were any
parts missing on the radar, or were they parts of generator sets?
General Short. I could not say definitely. I had the feeling that
generator sets were missing, but I might be wrong. I am sure that
they were not complete.
746. General Frank. Yesterday in your testimony you gave some
information relative to the state of training of bombardment. That
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 273
was only part of the force that was there available. Wliat was the
state of training with respect to your fighter aviation units?
General Short. We had a bunch of new aviators sent over [-5.7^]
that had just completed their primary training. I think it was 200
hours. None of them had flown the P-40, a much faster ship than
the training ship. As I remember, the air people stepped them up
gradually by putting them on the P-36. I think they may have flown
the A-20's before they went to the P-40's ; but it was a gradual propo-
sition of getting the pilots where they were safe to fly the plane, and
then they were given gunnery, probably, after they had reached that
stage.
747. General Frank. Did you anticipate 24-hour use of the aircraft
warning service just as soon aS your permanent stations were in-
stalled?
General Spiort. Any time that the situation demanded.
748. General Frank. If the equipment could stand it was there any
point in not operating it if a critical situation existed ?
General Short. If a critical situation existed, unquestionably ; but
as a peace-time proposition if there was any critical situation I do not
know whether you would operate it 24 hours a day, or not. We had
not had the experience.
749. General Grunert. Did you not, in answer to my question,
state that it would not have made any difference whether all equip-
ment was there and all stations in, that you would have done the same?
General Short. With the estimate I had of the situation, that is
correct.
750. General Frank. Who determined the hours of operation of the
A.W. S. sets, from5to7?
General Short. In the morning or the afternoon ?
751. General Frank. In the morning.
General Short. 4 to 7 ?
752. General Frank. Yes.
[SIS] General Short. I made the determination, because all
of our studies indicated that they were the most dangerous hours,
that if carrier planes were going to attack they would come in so
that when they returned to their carriers — they would not want to re-
turn before daylight, because they would not dare to turn on lights for
landing on their carriers. They would run in as close as they could
so as to get there near dawn, do their bombing and go back and make a
landing on their carriers. If you will take that study about the 180
B-17's, that is gone into very fully as to the different distances.
753. General Grunert. Then there must have been in your mind
some idea that there might be some little danger of it actually hap-
pening in those hours, or was it just for practice in order that they
might get used to those hours ?
General Short. If there was going to be any danger, definitely
that would be the dangerous time; and also I wanted them to get
accustomed to working, so that in critical periods they would be thor-
oughly familiar with the conditions during that time.
754. General Frank. This No. 1 Alert at this time anticipated that
pilots would be available to fly their aircraft within what length
of time ?
79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1— — 19
274 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. Four hours, I think. That was not a question of
being able to put a plane in the air in four hours, but it was a ques-
tion of making the personnel available.
755. General Frank. In other words, you depended on four hours?
General Short. No. That would be the maximum time. As a mat-
ter of fact, the conditions were such there that 50 per cent of the per-
sonnel, I would say, or more, were always there, unless they were
out on a problem or maneuvers.
[516] 756. General Fraxk. Generally an optimistic estimate of
the range at which the radar was effective was about 130 miles?
General Short. That is really better than we estimate. I think
Ave estimated 75 to 100 miles. It is just like anything else. There
were times when they were perfect. '
757. General Frank. That would enable an approaching force to
get in there well within a half hour?
General Short. Yes.
758. General Frank. Considering that pilots were not to be alerted
except on a four-hour basis and with most everybody else having a
day off on Sunday, why was the A. W. S. operated at all on Sunday?
General Short. Largely because it was new and they needed train-
ing in it more than any other element of the command.
769. General Frank. When we speak of the A. W. S. Ave really
mean construction of the information center and the establishment
of communications betAveen the radar station and that center?
General Short. And the operation of the radar station; yes.
760. General Grunert. Also communication betAveen the center
and the command?
General Short. Any communications; yes.
761. General Frank. All communications.
General Short. Yes.
762. General Frank. Why was it put under the Signal Corps?
General Short. All that technical work had to be done by the
Signal Corps.
763. General Frank. AVhy Avas not the control of its installation
placed under the Air Force Avho were going to operate it?
\517] General Short. At that time AA^e did not think that the
technical training of the Air Corps had progressed to a point AA'here Ave
could count on performance. We thought it was a little better if
the Signal Corps man felt that he had control up to the time he said
his operators Avere in shape to turn over, and things Avould go along a
little faster. It might haA^e been wrong.
764. General Frank. It strikes me that right within the Army itself
you had a situation between the Air Force and the Signal Corps where
this A. W. S. was operating on a cooperatiA^e basis rather than on a
positive command basis.
General Short. Because it had not reached a state of training where
AA'e thought it could AA-ork to the best advantage.
765. General Frank. But if the vast proportion of the people con-
cerned AA'ith its operation were Air Force people
General Short (interposing). Not the technical operation. The
operation of the communications and the radar system is definitel}' for
the Signal Corps.
766. General Frank. But the moment it became operatiA^e it came
under the control of the Air Force?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 275
General Short. Yes.
767. General Frank. Why not put it under control of the Air Force
in the first place?
General Short. Because the Signal Corps thought they could train
them faster to where they were better technical men than if it were
put under the Air Force.
7G8. General Frank. Generally in the United States these installa-
tions were put under the supervision of the Air Force Interceptor
Commander.
General Short. The actual installation?
[518] 769. General Frank. Yes.
General Short. We fully intended, as you notice from our standing
operating procedure, to have them operated by the Air Corps, but the
building up of the stations and all of the technical w^ork we looked
upon as a Signal Corps matter.
770. General Grunert. When they operated during maneuvers and
tests with the Navy, I understood from my reading that the informa-
tion center and such warning service as was in existence actually oper-
ated with the Navy during some of those maneuvers and tests. Who
operated the system then?
General Short. We did not have a system formally set up until —
well, it was pretty close to November 27th.
771. General Grunert. Somebody operated it during maneuvers?
General Short. The Signal Corps undoubtedly operated it.
772. General Grunert. Colonel Powell ?
General Short. Yes. We had not built the control station at that
time.
773. General Grunert. This youngster. Lieutenant Tyler, who ap-
parently in the information center or the control center, whatever
you may have called it — I understood from your testimony that you
considered him as in charge there at the time ; is that right ?
General Short. I did. He w^as the control officer who was there.
774. General Grunert. Under wdiose direction was he then func-
tioning ?
General Short. Under General Davidson's, the actual command for
all operating purposes. It was operating the same as it would have
been if General Davidson had been actually placed in command.
['5W]_ 775. General Grunert. Then it was by and with his con-
sent that he was doing what he was doing, and not by order?
General Short. General Davidson; yes; and he understood that
it would be by order as soon as it got to the point where he and
Colonel Powell thought it would be proper.
776. General Grunert. The next two subjects, Antiaircraft Defense,
and Inshore Aerial Patrol, I think we have covered, unless either one
of you has any particular question that has not been covered on those
two subjects. If not, I will go to the next subject. Command and
Staff. I have some general questions here that I w^ould like to pro-
pound.
Were conferences held by you or your Chief of Staff with the princi-
pal subordinate commanders wherein they were kept informed of
the situation and, in turn, informed you of the measures taken
by them to meet such situations ?
General Short. We had a conference normally on Saturday morn-
iner.
276 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
777. General Grunert. Normally once a week ?
General Short. Yes, sir.
778. General Grunert. Were subordinate commanders informed
of the imminent approach of probable hostilities set forth in the mes-
sages received late in November and early in December?
General Short. G-2 and G-3 and the Chief of Staff were. Whether
all of the subordinate members of the staff were, I am not sure.
779. General Grunert. Were discussions had as to measures to be
adopted in preparation for such an eventuality ?
General Short. My discussions on that were confined to G-2, G-3,
and the Chief of Staff and the Echelon Command.
[Copy]
3141 Southwestern Boulevaed,
Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 19U-
Subject : Corrections in testimony.
To : President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.
1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before
the Army Pearl Harbor Board :
Page 519, line 29, change "command" to "commanders".
if ***** *
/s/ Walter C. Short,
Waxtee C. Short,
Major General, V. S. Army, Retired.
780. General Frank. Who were the echelon commanders?
[520] General Short. An Air Corps officer, General Martin,
General Burgin, and the two division commanders.
781. General Grunert. In the weekly conferences, when the ques-
tion of a plan or order came up, such as your S. O. P. of November 5,
was that generally discussed ?
General Short. Whoever was responsible for the development of
that would conduct a discussion and would outline what was being
done, the state of it, and ask for questions. It would depend on what
the type of project was, what staff officer would have it.
782. General Grunert. With whom did you discuss or from whom
did you seek advice as to whether or not you should put your com-
mand in Alert 1, 2 or 3? Mind you, I do not mean after you would
make a decision, but to get information.
General Short. The Chief of Staff and the G-2, and General Mar-
tin. I think I talked more at length with him, because he had that
ferrying business, and he and I talked at considerable length on that.
783. General Grunert. When you received the message of Novem-
ber 27th from the Chief of Staff, how long was it before you decided
upon what alert to adopt?
General Short. I decided in a very few minutes, because if I wanted
to go further, all I had to do was to say "Go into Alert No. 2 or Alert
No. 3."
784. General Grunert. Then this long conversation with General
Martin was a build-up before that ?
General Short. No. I talked to him. I had him over within
probably an hour after I had made the decision and talked it over
with him that same afternoon; and I think I talked with General
Burgin that same afternoon. I talked with General [521]
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 277
Murray on several occasions, because he had the most serious part of
that sabotage work.
General Grunert. That was after the decision was made?
General Short. Yes.
876. General Grunert. Did you then consider that they had the
right to argue whether or not that was the best for their command?
Or did you change your decision, or was it an accomplished fact?
General Short. As a matter of fact, I believe General Burgin felt
that we might go successively into 2 and 3 and go into a maneuver like
we had in May.
787. General Grunert. You and I will know that it is not a good
thing to have a round robin to get a bunch of opinions, or the opinion
of a group, on which to make a decision, except to seek advice. But
after a decision is made, then everybody carries it out without ques-
tion, and a great many of them feel probably that they have no more
say after the decision is made.
General Short. I do not believe that my higher echelon command-
ers or my staff felt that way about it. If they had any suggestions
which they though were important I am sure they would have made
them.
788. General Grunert. You feel, then, that your subordinate com-
manders and your staff felt free to come to you if they thought that
you may have been mistaken in what you did from the information
you had?
General Short. I am sure they would.
789. General Grunert. Were those commanders and staff officers
informed about the other information you had received from the
Navy concerning what we might call the critical period, or were they
only informed of the November 27th information?
[522] General Short. I am quite sure that they were all in-
formed of the July business and were all informed of the October 16
and November 27th information. Between that I do not remember
anything of sufficient importance from the Navy to give to them in
detail. I may have talked casually about it.
790. General Grunert. The notes on the testimony before the Rob-
erts Commission indicates that General Wilson, commanding the 24th
Division, was never called in conference or consulted regarding the
warning message of November 27th.
General Short. Did he say he got it from the Division Officer ?
791. General Grunert. He said he was never consulted.
General Short. He had the north sector where the anti-sabotage
work was not nearly as serious. While I had repeated conferences
with Murray, I may not have had any with Wilson.
792. General Grunert. Wilson thought the Navy had an inshore
and offshore patrol. Why was he not instructed and informed?
General Short. His job was quite different from that of the other
divisions. While I had repeated conferences with Murray, and I had
Murray personally inspect every post and he came back to me with
recommendations and made a lot of changes
793. General Grunert (interposing). That was in connection with
your Alert 1 ?
General Short. Yes.
278 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
794. General Grunert. But in connection with the possibility of his
giving advice as to any other alert, he, Wilson, did not have any
information ?
General Short. I did not have any conference with him as to
whether he wanted to advise me as to something different.
795. General Grunert. Colonel Fielder says he discussed the
[623] possibility of an attack with the Commanding General in a
purely academic way. I do not quite understand how there is any-
thing academic about discusssing the possibility of an attack.
General Short. I do not. We discussed the possibility, probably
because he was G-2 and was supposed to have some information.
796. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not your Chief of
Staff and your G-2 agreed that you had pulled the right alert?
General Short. I am sure they both fully agreed.
797. General Grunert. General Murray, when he got Alert No. 1,
was not informed as to the seriousness of the existing situation, no
intimation, nothing, although he talked to the Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department, several times between November 27 and De-
cember 7. Why was he not informed?
General Short. I am sure he had all the information that I did.
I may not have given him the idea that we were going out in the
midst of an attack the next day. That may be what he means. But
he probably had as much conversation with General Murray about
what we were doing as anybody in the command, because he made a
tremendous amount of changes.
[Copy]
3141 SOUTHWESTEEN BOUI.EVARD,
Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 19U-
Subject : Corrections in testimony.
To: Presidenr, Army Pearl Harbor Board.
1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before
the Army Pearl Harbor Board :
* * if * * ' *
Page 523, line 19, —change "but he" to "but I".
*******
/s/ Walter C. Short,
Walter C. Short.
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.
798. General Grunert. I think he refers not to Alert No. 1, but to
the general situation and the knowledge you had.
General Short. I am sure he knew the contents of the message.
But I did not go down and talk over with him what his opinion was
as to whether the message meant they were going to attack or whether
he would expect at attack.
799. General Grunert. General Burgin did not know the Inter-
ceptor Command under General Davidson was not working. He
thought it was, because it had been for drill.
[52 Q General Short. That is what I say. It was actually
operating, but lind not been officially organized.
800. General Grunert. You had a conference once a week. Wliat
did you confer on if it were not what the condition of things was
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 279
and what should or should not be done, and so forth ? I do not know
whether this is the truth, but that it what is in the record, and we
will question about it.
General Short. Undoubtedly that is correct. Burgin was not in
on the weekly conferences. I did confer with the staff.
801. General Grunert. Then the weekly conference was a staff
conference and not a conference with subordinate commanders?
General Short. No. We had a conference with subordinate com-
manders on irregular occasions, whenever there was something we
thought we should take up with them.
:. 802. General Grunert. When you wanted to talk to your com-
manders about anything you had a special conference and not a
periodical one?
General Short. That is correct. I had them very often, one at a
time, because they were problems that might be different.
[52o~\ General Grunert. ''Lt. Col. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, in-
formed the staff at a meeting on December 6 that the Japs were burn-
ing papers on December 5. Says it meant that war was imminent,
to him." De he so inform his Chief of Staff or his Commanding Gen-
eral? If so, what conclusions were reached with regard to it?
General Short. I am sure he didn't inform me. I don't know
whether he informed the G-2 of it. On the other hand, we burnt
similar messages every day, so I don't think Colonel Fielder would
have thought so much of it.
804. General Grunert. But this seems to intimate that a member
of your staff, or assistant to a head of your staff, thought that war
was imminent.
General Short. Well, he was decidedly less experienced than
Fielder. He was a Reserve Officer, and he might have taken that
burning of messages as a good deal more serious, and may have been
overlooking the fact that we burn similar messages constantly.
805. General Grunert. That may have been an afterthought with
him, for all I know.
General Short. Yes.
806. General Grunert. But that was in the record.
General Short. It may have been.
807. General Grunert. And General Martin did not seem to know
that the Interceptor Command was not activated until December 17.
General Short. Well, the fact was it was actually operating, and
there was such a technical difference, there that apparently Bergin
and Martin, neither one realized it hadn't gone out as an order. It
was actually operating daily.
[526] 808. General Grunert. General Eudolph, the Command-
ing General of the Bombers, stated that had he had any intimation of
preceding trouble his planes would not have been bunched or concen-
trated but would have been ready for the air. Then, in parenthesis,
"especially on a Sunday morning." Was he not informed by the
Commanding General, or the Commanding General of the Air Forces,
of the warnings of the immediate past?
General Short. I went over the thing very fully with General
Martin, talked over with him at as great length as anybody. I would
imagine that he talked with his subordinate commanders.
280 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
809. General Grunert. There is in the record somewhere, I believe,
that General Martin sent two telegrams, to General Davidson, abso-
lutely telling him to bunch his airplanes.
810. General Frank. One, from Martin, and one from the De-
partment ?
811. General Grunert. I meant that Martin sent one, and he re-
ceived another one, presumably from the Department, to that effect.
General Short. The Standing Operating Procedure definitely pro-
vided for distributing by airfield, but grouping them all on the indi-
vidual airfield.
812. General Grunert. I wondered why, in view of the Standing
Operating Procedure, these telegrams on this particular thing were
necessary ?
General Short. I do not know they were sent.
813. General Grunert. Was there some argument about whether
to do it or not ?
General Short, General Davidson might have asked the [S27]
question; I don't know. Now, I will tell you one thing that might
have caused it. We were having an exercise, maybe a month or so
before that, and I got up to Wheeler Field along about 11 o'clock
at night and found that their planes had not been distributed in the
bunker, and that gasoline had not been put in the bunkers, and that
ammunition had not been put in the bunkers, and the situation was
such that it should have been, in this maneuver; and that might
have caused somebody to ask the question. I did not know that that
had taken place.
814. General Grunert. That is all I have on that particular subject.
Do any questions occur to any one of you two, on what I call the
"command" subject?
I have one question, or a small series of questions, here, on alerts.
The points that you seemed to dwell upon in your testimony before
the Roberts Commission as the reasons for alert 1, and not 2 and 3,
are briefly summarized as follows : Strong possibility of sabotage, no
definite information to indicate an attack by air. Under alert 2, some
bombers would have had to go to other Island. No fence for the
airfields available. The difficulty of constructing the bunkers on
Hickam Field. The interference with training, particularly aircraft
ferrying training. Under alert 2, the aircraft would have been placed
where it could not continue its proper training.
If any of these are incorrect, will you so inform me.
Are those the ones?
General Short. That is correct.
815. General Grunert. Have any of the other Members any ques-
tions to ask on the subject of alerts ?
The next subject I have is "defensive and protective [S28]
measures." A great many of these questions have been answered, but
I would like to go over those that I have, to make sure that I haven't
missed any points that I particular!}^ wanted to have brought out.
In the Roberts Report it referred to a deficiency of materiel. What
particular deficiency was there that interfered with the taking of ap-
propriate defense measures, with the means available? Did the de-
ficiency of any materiel prevent you from taking whatever measures
were possible with what you had ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 281
General Short. No, but it would not have been as effective as it
would have been, if we had all of the materiel.
816. General Grunert. Generally, how would increasing the de-
fense measures curtail the training or virtually suspend same?
General Short. If Alert No. 3 had been ordered, practically every
man in the Department would have gone to his field positions, and all
training would have stopped.
817. General Grunert. Did Alert No. 2
General Short, Alert No. 2 would have practically stopped the
training of the Air Corps and the Antiaircraft Corps. It would not
have interfered seriously with the training of the infantry divisions.
818. General Grunert. Did you have any provisions in Alert No. 2,
where only a certain part of each squadron was to be alerted, and the
rest would come in ?
General Short. When we went to the No. 2, we put all of the Air,
all of the antiaircraft, definitely on the alert, and all of the harbor
defense.
819. General Grunert. Wliile on the subject of alerts, when you
took over, I understand there was just one class of alert [6291
that covered everything to be done ; and some time after you took over,
you established 1, 2, and 3. What was the purpose in establishing
three classes of alert and not continuing what had been done in the
past?
General Short. What had been done in the past was done by what
they call Field Order No. 1, which was highly secret, so nobody knew
what his job was, and when anything went into effect there had to
be all kinds of long-winded orders issued, causing delay and confu-
sion, and what we were trying to do was to eliminate all the secret
stuff from the standing operating procedure and get it so that we
could actually use any alert against any situation without confusion,
and as promptly as possible. That was the basic reason for it.
820. General Grunert. Of course, then, it is a question of judg-
ment as to what alert to adopt, the decision to be made at that time.
Had you had only one alert. Would you then have alerted yourself ?
General Short. If you had nothing but alert 3, you probably would
have gone to alert 3, but if it be provided that every time there was
any kind of an alarm, that you went into your field positions, you
would probably have turned out the whole command.
821. General Grunert. There appear to have been some actions
taken and orders issued since December 7* for instance, at Wheeler
Field, by the Commanding OiRcer,. pertaining to chemical air attack,
on December 9; air-raid instructions, on December 7; distribution
of Claxon horns for air-raid-warning systems; after attack, prac-
ticed air-raid for Honolulu, December 9, and the exchange of old
gas masks for new, December 9.
[SSOI Are these indications that no such, or inadequate, instruc-
tions regarding these measures were issued prior to December 7?
General Short. It simply means that we learned that certain parts
of our plan we thought necessary to improve or change. Now, we,
on the Claxons, were trying sirens, or Claxons, to make them for the
City of Honolulu, that could be heard; and we had been expecting
to get them. We hadn't got them. When this thing came on, we issued
the best thing we had to them.
282 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
822. General Grunert. Somewhere in the report it shows that some
Army officer's wife stated that she did not know what was to be
done in case of an air raid, and that she had never been told what
to do; whether to go out — she did not say this, but the intimation
was — whether to go out and jump into a slit trench, or whether to
go to a certain place for shelter.
Were those matters covered prior to December 7?
General Short. We had a plan for evacuation of all the women and
children from the affected area. We did not have trenches con-
structed, as we did, later. Beginning on the 8th of December, we
actually dug the trenches on the lawns of the officers' quarters. We did
not have them at that time. We had the plan for the evacuation, and
the evacuation started according to plan at 12 o'clock, noon, and
they were moved to school buildings, or cafeterias were set up, cots and
blankets issued, and that all existed by a plan and was carried out
by the civil community.
823. General Grunert. Were there- any black-out regulations in
effect?
[531] General Short. We had had two or three black-out alerts
with the civil community.
824. General Grunert, In the testimony of General Burgin, it was
reported that he stated to the effect that he believed General Short
counted on the Navy for warning from sea approach — that is, Navy
scouting — and that Short expressed himself forcibly that no enemy
ships could get close enough to land a plane. Why this belief?
General Short. I believed that the Navy would be able —
825. General Grunert. Your confidence in the Navy ?
General Short. In my confidence in the Navy.
826. General Grunert. Then there is an expression attributed to
you, which you are quoted as having said —
Frankly, I was more serious about training rather than expecting anything to
happen at that time.
Why this, in view of the messages received ?
General Short. What I meant by that was, on an air attack, in
view of the information that the Navy had given me that the Japa-
nese fleet were proceeding to the south, and all, I foresaw a possible
attack on the Philipppine Islands, but did not think we would have
anything besides sabotage and possible uprisings.
82T. General Grunert. "General Short issued orders for a practice
air-raid on December 10; instructions for protective measures in
Honolulu, December 9; and an SOP on defense against a gas attack,
and a bulletin of information for the conduct of families in an air-
raid, Dec. 7." Were no such instructions issued prior to the attack?
General Short. We had had practice alerts with the civil [532]
community. I couldn't have issued orders to the civil community
until we were under martial law.
828. General Frank. May I ask a question, now ?
829. G^eneral Grunert. All right. Go ahead. I have three more,
here, w^hen I get around to it.
830. General Frank. They had instructions, issued in the studies
by the Office of Civilian Defense?
General Short. I say we had alerts in the civil community, and the
Governor put out instructions, and it was all done at our inspection.
It wasn't a question of our issuing them orders.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 283
[Copy]
3141 Southwestern Boulevard,
Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 19U-
Subject : Corrections in testimony.
To : President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.
1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before
the Army Pearl Harbor Board :
If sa Sf if ■)( * *
Page 532, line 10, — change "inspection" to "suggestion".
*******
'/»/ Walter C. Short
Walter C. Short,
Major General, U. 8. Army, Retired.
831. General Grunert. Under Alert No. 2, "ammunition would
have been at the guns. However, this would have alarmed the public,
contrary to War Department instructions." I am quoting this from
a statement which you made, somewhere in the Roberts Commission
report. I will read that again:
Under Alert No. 2, ammunition would have been at the guns. However, this
would have alarmed the public, contrary to War Department instructions.
Why should this have alarmed the public?
General Short. Because it was something we never did. Now, the
small-arms ammunition was for protection against sabotage, because
all of the guards and everybody of that kind was armed with small-
arms ammunition ; but we never moved out loaded ammunition to
those guns that were set up right in the City.
832. General Grunert. Did it ever occur to you that it might have
been a good thing to have done that with a daily routine, about once
a week, and so forth?
[533] General Short. Not in view of tlie messages I was get-
ting from the War Department not to alarm the public.
833. General Grunert. Did you consider the War Department in-
structions mandatory on this subject, even if it jeopardized your
defense ?
General Short. No, not if it definitely jeopardized my defense, and
if I had thought there was going to be an air attack, everything
would have been out there.
834. General Grunert. "If so, why didn't you ask the War Depart-
ment to O.. K. your going on Alert No. 2?"
General Short. I didn't believe so, and they knew I was on Alert
No. 1, and didn't tell me I was wrong. They had known, for ten
days.
835. General Frank. Might it not have been a good idea from the
very start to have gone into the field periodically with real ammuni-
tion, as a maneuver measure, and that would have eliminated drawing
attention to it?
General Short. I think that everyone who has ever done any ma-
neuvering realizes that one of the things you always do on maneuvers
is to inspect very carefully and make the officer sign a certificate that
there is no live ammunition there, because you don't want to kill the
people in maneuvers. I have never been in a maneuver in my life that
I didn't require certificates from battalion commanders that there was
no live ammunition there.
836. General Russell. General Short, suppose that every week you
had taken all your people and give them live ammunition and run
284 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
them out to these gun positions : what effect would that have had in
developing a "wolf! wolf!" spirit, that has [S34-] been dis-
cussed here quite frequently ?
General Short. Well, I am sure that they would have thought it
was very unnecessary.
837. General Russell. That is all.
838. General Grunert. One question, here. Somewhere in my
notes, here. I have something to the effect that your Chief of Staff,
Colonel Phillips, stated that he was not informed as to what took
place at your conferences with the Admiral. Did you keep him in-
formed, or did you discuss with him what happened ?
General Short. Anything of any importance, I am sure I discussed
with him. We were on a very friendly personal basis, and I am sure
that if I picked up any piece of information that I thought was of any
importance — and 1 know that I talked to him about certain task
forces, because when it came to sending an officer along, why, he would
be the one that would get out the order.
839. General Frank. May I ask a question ?
Might he have come to that conclusion through the absence of in-
formation that even you didn't have ?
General Short. He might have. I don't believe that he intended
to indicate that I withheld information from him.
'840. Genefral Grunert. Vice Admiral Pye, U. S. Navy, stated
before the Roberts Commission that after he took command, after
December 17, he called in General Emmons, and they really got to-
gether on inshore and distant patrolling.
General Short. He had unity of command.
841. General Grunert. The officer states that "now" this is done.
Does that mean that there was no real getting together prior to that ?
[SSS] General Short. No, but it means that beginning Decem-
ber 17 there was unity of command. He could call up General Em-
mons and order him to do things, and that the situation was com-
pletely changed with reference to the command.
842. General Grunert. He states "they really got together," mean-
ing, "They have now really got together for cooperation."
General Short. You had passed from cooperation to unity of
command.
843. General Grunert. Then does that lead you to believe that you
two couldn't get together, without the unity of command?
General Short. We could get together. I am satisfied unity of
command would always be more successful than cooperation.
844. General Grunert. What struck me was that "they really got
together," meaning that in a sense they didn't get together, before.
General Short. The point of view with the fellow that's in com-
mand, when he is in command of the whole thing, would always be,
I think, that he could control things better.
845. General Grunert. I have this question : What evacuation pro-
visions under alert 2 were there? Were there any evacuation pro-
visions under that alert?
General Short. We had elaborate evacuation plans, to be carried
out by the committees in town. They would not be carried out till
the notice was given for them to be carried out. They were not just
developed as part of any one plan.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 285
846. General Grunert. Then in your verbal statement to the Board
at the beginning of the hearings, here, I gathered that [636]
there was a spurt in construction after December 7, compared to de-
lays prior thereto. How did that come about ?
General Short. They gave me a "blank check."
847. General Grunert. A "blank check" ? But your materials, your
priorities, and your shipments, and everything?
General Short. Yes, but we also took over all the material on the
Island, no matter who had it. If we needed it, we took it.
848. General Grunert. Then there was material on the Island that
could possibly have been used before, had you been able to get it ?
General Short. There may have been in the hands of plantations
certain material which we could have used. There may have been, in
the hands of certain contractors ; and beginning the 8th of December
the district engineer was ordered to take over all construction ma-
terial and take over all contractors with their machinery, for war.
In other words, the situation was so changed that we could take any-
thing that was in the Island, no matter whether the man wanted
to give it up or not.
849. General Grunert. Now, the question is whether to continue.
I do not think I have many more questions, here, but I will check them
over. This is on the state of readiness of aircraft, which probably
has been covered, but I want to check it. The questions under that
topic have all been covered. I go to the next one, incidents during the
attack.
Was the attack of December 7 a complete surprise to you ?
General Short. It was.
850. General Grunert. Were you informed of the sinking of one
submarine at about 6 : 45 a. m., December 7, in the prohibited [537]
area off Pearl Harbor?
General Short. I was not. I didn't know about it, until the follow-
ing day.
851. General Grunert. At what time on December 7 did you realize
an attack was on ?
General Short. Practically, when the first bomb dropped, about
7:55. I was not sure till two or three minutes later, when the second
one was dropped, and I ran out and looked ; and at 8 : 03 my Chief of
Staff came in a minute or two afterwards, ran into my house and said
he had messages from Hickam and Wheeler, practically the same
thing.
852. General Grunert. What Naval support was rendered the
Army in its mission of securing Pearl Harbor against hostile attack,
on December 7 ? What did they do to help ?
General Short. All of their ships that were in there, as I understand
it, did antiaircraft fire, and the Marines had certain antiaircraft in-
stallations at Ewa Field, and went into action.
853. General Grunert. This was all part of the plan for defense
under your tactical control ?
General Short. Yes, sir. Of course, now, the guns on the ships were
not under my tactical control.
854. General Grunert. They had not been worked into the scheme
of protection?
286 COXGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short. No. no : we had not gone that far with the coopera-
tion. All of the naval and marine guns ashore operated under our
antiaircraft, but the guns on the ship did not.
555. General Gruxert. "Wliat firing they did aboard those ships
during the attack was on their own ?
[oSS] General Short. It was on their own.
556. General Gruxert. And did they appear to be surprised, also?
General Short. I think they were as much surprised. They had,
I believe, skeleton crews on their guns, and I believe that possibly
two ginis on each battleship had full crews — two .50-caliber guns.
That is just memory. It may be inaccurate.
857. General Gruxert. Under the special items I have two ques-
tions. Did anything provide for the restriction of military persoimel
under your various classes of alerts?
General Short. "We had certain battalions, of which every man
was held right in camp, and there was motor transportation there
to move those battalions: and. of course, the personnel that was on
guard over these various installations were definitely restricted.
S5S. General Gruxert. Let me put it in the line of social gathering.
General Short. There were no restrictions at all except for the
people who were on duty.
859. General Gruxert. There were no restrictions on social gather-
ings, under Alert Xo. 1 ?
General Short. No, sir.
860. General Gruxert. How about 2. and 3?
General Short. "We had not. definitely, but with Alert No. 3, every
officer would have been on duty, and there could not have been any
social gathering. On Alert Xo. 2. it would have been possible for
officers of the infantry division to have attended a social function.
861. General Gruxert. I have no further questions. Has either
[539] of you any questions on any subject?
862. General Russell. I just have two or three brief ones. Is Gen-
eral Short's report on this action of December 7 in that file, there,
as a part of it ?
General Short. It is. Tlie first 50 pages of this report is a state-
ment, first, of events leading up
[-54^] 563. General Eussell. I am rather familiar with it.
General Short. — and then of the events that took place, and then
later on the things, the steps I had taken to improve the defenses and
to improve the possibility of correct action by the civil community.
864. General Eussell. Now, did the Navy have a Pearl Harbor
only two carriers, the Lexington and the Enterprise ?
General Short. They had not a single carrier in Pearl liarbor that
morning.
865. General Russell. I mean if they had all been in. were only
two carriers based at Pearl Harbor?
General Short. I believe that you are right, but I wouldn't be a
hundred per cent positive. But I know there was no carrier in there.
866. General Eussell. That is all.
General Short. There mav have been one. There mav have been
one other. The LEXINGTON and the ENTERPRISE.' Was there
a carrier called the P-a-t-r-o-n by any chance?
867. General Russell. I didn't see a record of it anywhere.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 287
General Short. I know the LEXINGTON and the ENTERPRISE
were there, and I am not sure whether there was anything else or not.
Of course, you understand the cruisers carried a certain number of
planes, so that if a task force was out there was a certain number of
planes available for reconnaissance even if they did not have a carrier.
868. General Grunert. General, do you wish to make any addi-
tional statement in view of what has transpired during your hearing ?
General Short. I do not believe that I do, sir.
869. General Grunert. Do you wish to appear again before the
[541] Board for a rehearing or for such questions as the Board
might have as it develops testimony ?
General Short. If the Board feels that it has developed things
that require my testimony, I do.
870. General Grunert. Would it be more convenient to you to
come to San Francisco in the last week in September, or Washington
the first week in October ?
General Short. I am about half way. It wouldn't matter very
much.
871. General Grunert. Then if the Recorder gets in touch with you
upon our return to San Francisco from Hawaii, we can determine
where to give you an additional hearing.
General Short. Yes. Whatever place the Board would desire me.
I can be there because the difference in time would be very little.
872. General Grunert. All right. The Board thanks you for com-
ing up and giving us 3'our testimony.
General Short. I thank the Board for very courteous treatment.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon, at 12:35 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of
witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 289
CONTENTS
MONDAY, AUGUST 14, 1944
Testimony of— Page '
Brig. Gen. John J. Kingman, U. S. Army (Retired) 543
Maj. Gen. Eugene Reybold, Chief of Engineers, United States Army,
Washington, D. C ± 568
Maj. Gen. Julian L. Schley, United States Army, Washington, D. C__ 635
Maj. Gen. Roger B. Colton, Army of the United States, Washing-
ton, D. C 670
Maj. Gen. Thomas M. Robins, United States Army, Deputy Chief of
Engineers, Washington, D. G 697
DOCTTMENTS
Letter of August 28, 1941, Gen. Kingman to Lemuel B. Schofield 546
Excerpt from letter of July 17, 1944, Honolulu, T. H 557
Excerpt from telegram of June 26, 1944 : 571
List of names furnish by General Reybold 594
Telegram of June 11, 1941, Hawaiian Department to Adjutant General — 602
Telegram of June 17, 1941, Chief of Engineers to Adjutant General 603
Immediate-action letter, May 28, 1941 679
Memorandum from Col. Powell to Gen. Colton, November 14, 1941 688
Letter dated December 31, 1941, Col. Powell to Chief Signal Officer 694
EXHIBITS
No. 3. Letter dated December 31, 1941, Col. Powell to Chief Signal Officer,
Washington, D. C 694
3-A. Chart of detector station records 695
3-B. Chart showing plots of airplane flights 695
1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by bracliets and indicate pages
of original transcript of proceedings.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 1 20
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 291
[^^] PEOCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD
MONDAY, AUGUST 14, 1944
Munitions Building,
Washington^ D. G.
The Board at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on Saturday, conducted
the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen, George Grunert, President of the
Board, presiding.
Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D.
Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, members.
Present also : Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, and Major Henry
C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder.
General Grunert. The Board will come to order.
TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. JOHN J. KINGMAN, U. S. ARMY
(RETIRED)
(The witness wa^ sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. General Kingman, will you state to the Board
your name, rank, organization, and station.
General Kingman. Brigadier General John J. Kingman, U. S.
Army, retired ; Washington, D. C.
2. (jeneral (jrunert. General, the Board, in attempting to get at
the facts, is looking into the War Department background, to get
what information may be gleaned here in the War Department as to
matters which related to the Hawaiian Department. It is hoped that
because of your assignment at the time of the attack • \5J(-Jf\ on
Hawaii and prior thereto, you can give us some facts that will help
us in what we are concerned with and doing.
In order to cover the large field in the short time we have available,
I have had to parcel out special investigations to individual Members
of the Board, although the entire Board will pass on all the subjects;
so General Frank has drawn this special line of investigation, and I
will ask General Frank to lead in propounding the questions. Then,
if General Russell or I have anything to ask in addition thereto, we
will do so. General Frank.
3. General Frank. On what duty were you, in 1941 ?
General Kingman. I was Assistant to the Chief of Engineers.
4. General Frank. In that capacity, what were your responsibili-
ties?
General Kingman, I had under my supervision six sections of the
office of the Chief of Engineers. They were the Military Personnel
292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
section, the Railway section, the Intelligence section; what had been
called the "Construction" section, later for a short time called the
"Fortification" section, and the Operations and Training section. The
other, I cannot think of at the moment.
5. General Frank. Did you have anything to do with the process-
ing of contracts ?
General Kingman. No. I used to sign the papers sometimes, when
General Schley, the Chief of Engineers, was absent.
6. General Frank. In your capacity as Assistant Chief to the Chief
of Engineers, and in your capacity in accordance with the duties that
were assigned to you, would you have had any information relative
to the failure of any contractors on [^45] Hawaiian projects
to complete their work on time ?
General Kingman. None, whatever ; no, sir.
7. General Frank. Did you have any such information?
General Kingman. I did not.
8. General Frank. The several sections that you have referred to
were in that part of the office over which you had supervision?
General Kingman. Yes ; that is right.
General Frank. Did a German by the name of Hans Wilhelm Rohl
ever come to your attention ?
General Kingman. I never met him, that I know of; but I knew
that there was a man named Rohl, I didn't know the rast of his name,
who was a member of a firm of contractors in southern California, that
had the contract for the Los Angeles breakwater.
9. General Frank. On August 28, 1941, you signed a letter request-
ing action on Rohl's citizenship papers, of which this is reported as a
copy ; is that correct ?
General Kingman. I think that is correct ; yes, sir.
10. General Frank. Why was this request made by you ?
General Kingman. .It was signed by me as a routine matter. I
have looked the matter up in the last two days. I have here a photo-
static copy of the file-copy of that letter, with the initials of the officials
who prepared the letter for signature.
11. General Frank. Who were they?
General Kingman. I find that the letter was drafted by an employee
named Benjamin L. Stilphen, who was then in the Contracts and
Claims Branch, Office of Chief of Engineers. Later, he was commis-
sioned in November, and I learned Saturday 1:^4^] that he has
been either retired or discharged for physical disability, and is now
somewhere in New York City. This letter was initialed in the ordinary
routine, and, as you see here, I find those initials "F. T. J." By looking
in the telephone book of the War Department, I was able to locate that
man as now Major Frederick T. Johnson. I talked with him, and he
gave me the information about the letter having been drafted by this
man Stilphen.
The final initialing was by Colonel Earl E. Tresler, who was the
head of the Finance Section, Office, Chief of Engineers. I have no
personal knowledge as to why the letter was initiated.
12. General Frank. Whose initials are those, directly under the
signature ?
General Kingman. Colonel Gesler's. He is now division engineer
of the Middle Atlantic Division, in Baltimore.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 293
13. Colonel West. May I ask at this stage that, if that photostatic
letter has been received in evidence, we have the reporter mark it "Ex-
hibit 2," for purposes of identification.
14. Major Clausen. It has been. It is Exhibit 2.
(The letter of August 28, 1941, is as follows :)
War Department,
Office of the Chief of Engineers,
WasJiington, August 28, 1941.
Lemuel B. Schofield,
Special Assistant, Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization,
Office of the Attorney General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Schofield: [54~] The Hawaiian Constructors, a joint venture
consisting of the W. E. Callahan Construction Co., Los Angeles, Calif. ; Rohl-Con-
nolly Co., San Francisco and Los Angeles, Calif. ; Gunther & Shirley Co., Los
Angeles, Calif., and Ralph E. Woolley, contractor of Honolulu, T. H., are working
on very important defense construction at Honolulu, T. H., pursuant to Engineer
Corps Contract No. 2-414-eng-602.
Mr. H. W. Rohl, 8519 Hollywood Boulevard, Los Angeles, Calif., one^of the
prinoipal stockholders of the Rohl-Connolly Co., applied to the United States dis-
trict court at Los Angeles, Calif., on January 15, 1941, for his final citizenship
papers which have not, as yet, been issued. Mr. Rohl is possessed of outstanding
ability, excellent judgment, and resourcefulness for the management of difficult
construction work. Some of the outstanding woi'k performed by Mr. Rohl was
the construction of the Los Angeles-Long Beach detached breakwater, the con-
struction of the Headgate Dam at Parker, Ariz., for the Indian Service, and mis-
cellaneous dams, tunnels, and other heavy construction in the State of California.
To date, Mr. Rohl's valuable services have not been available for Government de-
fense projects because of his alien status.
The services of Mr. Rohl are of vital importance to the expeditious com-
pletion of the aforementioned defense construction project because of his peculiar
qualifications and scarcity of qualified supervisory personnel. It is the under-
standing of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States is beyond
question. It is therefore requested that the granting of Mr. Rohl's final citi-
zenship papers be [548] expedited.
Your consideration and cooperation will be very much appreciated.
"Very respectfully,
John .T. Kingman,
Brigadier General,
Acting Chief of Engineers.
15. General Frank. Do you know why this request was made to
hurry his citizenship papers ?
General Kingman. Well, I know that it had something to do with
the work going on in the Hawaiian Islands. That is stated in the
letter.
16. General Frank. Did you know Rohl?
General Kingman. I don't think I ever met him. When I was
Division Engineer in San Francisco, his company had the contract on
the Los Angeles breakwater, and I inspected the work on two or
three occasions, but so far as I can recall I never met Rohl. I might
possibly have met him, without recalling it.
17. General Frank. What was the general reputation of that firm ?
General Kingman. They were supposed to be very good contrac-
tors. They did a good job on that breakwater. That is the only
contract that they had, that I ever had anything to do with.
18. General Frank. With so many firms in the United States
whose members were reputable, "1000%" citizens, why were you press-
ing the case of Rohl, a German citizen ?
General Kingman. I didn't know he was a German citizen.
19. General Frank. You signed this letter ?
294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[^4^1 General Kingman. Nothing says that he is a German
citizen in that.
20. General Frank. In order to get citizenship, he certainly had
to be something besides an American ?
General Kingman. Well, he might have been anything, belonged
to any nationality, other than the United States.
21. General Frank. As long as you were signing the letter, did
not your curiosity lead you to question the nationality from which
he was changing?
General Kingman. There was nothing in that letter that aroused
any misgivings in my mind as to the propriety of signing it. I didn't
question it, at all.
22. General Frank. You, therefore, did not know that he was a
German citizen?
General Kingman. I certainly did not.
23. General Frank. At this time, the war in Europe was on, was
it not?
General Kingman. Oh, yes ! We were not in it.
24. General Frank. However, our sympathies certainly were not
neutral, were they ?
General Kingman. Evidently not !
25. General Frank. And yet, here was a man whose citizenship
papers you were trying to expedite, and it never occurred to you as
to what his original nationality was ?
General Kingman. No ; it did not.
26. General Frank. Did you know Colonel Theodore Wyman?
General Kingman. Oh, yes ; I knew him.
27. iGeneral Frank. Did you know anything about his personal
association with Rohl ?
[SSOl General Kingman. No, no; nothing.
28. General Frank. You knew nothing as to whether a friendship
existed there, or what those personal relationships were?
General Kingman. No ; I knew nothing about that.
29. General Frank. It seems a little difficult for me, in view of the
upset in world relations at that time, to reconcile how these steps
could have been taken to get a man by the name of Rohl citizenship,
without being interested to the extent of wanting to know what his
original nationality was. Does it not seem peculiar to you that, on the
verge of war with Germany, the office of the Corps of Engineers was
trying to clear a German citizen for naturalization, so as to give him
war contracts ?
General Kingman. Of course, we knew nothing about his national-
ity ; at least, I knew nothing about it.
30. General Frank. Certainly somebody in the Corps of Engineers
had to know something about his nationality, or he would not have
been asking for citizen papers.
General Kingman. I don't know what other people may have known
about it. I doubt if they knew that he was a German.
31. General Frank. When a man makes application for citizenship,
he certainly has to state his original allegiance?
General Kingman. Well, I presume he must have stated that to
the court. I dare say the FBI and the Department of Justice knew
about it, but the Corps of Engineers, I don't think had been fur-
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 295
nished any information that would arouse any misgivings whatever
in regard to the man's nationality.
32. General Frank. In any event, you were not familiar with it?
[S51] General Kingman. I knew nothing whatever about it. I
was merely acting for the Chief of Engineers in signing a great many
papers ; and I signed this one, in the absence of the Chief of Engineers.
33. General Frank. Are you familiar with the negotiations for
a contract dated the 20th of December 1940 with the Hawaiian Con-
structors for defense projects in Hawaii ?
General Kingman. No, sir.
34. General Frank. Do you know anything concerning the failure
of those contractors to complete the construction of the defense
projects?
General Kingman. No, sir. I thought they had probably done
pretty well, from what I heard.
35. General Frank. Do you have any knowledge concerning
whether any military personnel neglected their duties relating to that
contract ?
General Kingman. No ; I have no knowledge. A day or two ago, I
received a letter that might be of interest to this Board. I do not
know whether it is proper for me to submit it, or not.
36. General Frank. That is all right.
General Kingman. It is from a man that worked for me on Cor-
regidor some thirty-odd years ago, when we were building the fortifi-
cations of Corregidor.
37. General Frank. To what does the letter refer?
General Kingman. It refers to Colonel Wyman. I do not know
whether it is proper to submit it, or not.
38. General Frank. During that period of Wyman's life does this
come in?
[552] General Kingman. December 7, 1941.
39. General Frank. What was your assignment on the 20th of De-
cember 1940? Were you Assistant Chief of Engineers?
General Kingman. Yes, sir.
40. General Frank. And you had the same responsibilities on the
20th of December as you enumerated at the beginning of this inter-
rogation ?
General Kingman. That is correct. That did not include any-
thing to do with making the construction contracts. The Supply
Section came under me, too.
41. General Frank. Did you know during any of this period that
Hans Wilhelm Kohl had been under investigation by a Government
agency for suspicious activities ?
General Kingman. I did not.
42. General Frank. What if any measures should have been taken
by the personnel of the Corps of Engineers for the protection of the
Government against contracting with a person having such a record ?
General Kingman. If they had any reason to question his loyalty,
they should have reported him to the FBI for investigation, I should
think.
43. General Frank. Who, in the office of the Corps of Engineers,
was responsible for looking into a man's reputation, who was handling
Government contracts through the engineers ? Who was responsible
for it, in the office of the Corps of Engineers ? ,
296 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Kingman. I don't believe I can answer that question.
44. General Frank. You signed this letter that you presented
[5SS] to the Board?
General Kingman. Yes, sir.
45. General Frank. You stated you were not familiar with the
details. Somebody in that office certainly had to be familiar with
the details and responsible for the facts in the letter. Who was that?
General Kingman. That would have been Colonel Gesler, with
relation to contracts. He was the one who finally initialed this letter.
46. General Frank, In what part of the office did he serve ?
General Kingman. He was head of the Finance Section.
47. General Frank. Did not the Intelligence Section or the Person-
nel Section come into this, at some place ?
General Kingman. No ; none whatever. They wouldn't have known
anything about it.
48. General Frank. Do you mean to say, if there was a question
relative to the suspicious activities of an individual with whom the
Corps of Engineers was doing business, the espionage or counter-
espionage agency would not have been concerned with it?
General Kingman. That would have been G-2, not the engineers.
49. General Frank. The engineers were the people who had the
direct contact with this man?
General Kingman. That is correct.
50. General Frank. Wouldn't they have reported it?
General Kingman. I don't think they had anything to report — as
far as I know.
51. General Frank. *You are familiar with the Espionage Act
[554] of the 28th of March 1940, are you ?
General Kingman. Yes, sir. I have had no contact with it, at
all ; no duties in connection with it.
52. General Frank. Give us a short resume of that, will you, Major
Clausen?
53. Major Clausen. Yes. This act forbids the employment of
aliens upon a government contract, or making aliens aware of the
details of a government contract dealing with national defense. It
is a penal offence to so do.
General Kingman. I had nothing to do with making these contracts.
54. General Frank. Did you ever receive any notice of any reports
concerning activities in Hawaii of Colonel Wyman that were were
derogatory to Colonel Wyman ?
General Kingman. I never did ; no. I wouldn't have received them,
any way.
55. General Frank. Who would have received them ?
General Kingman. I think General Robins would have received
them.
56. Major Clausen. May I interrupt to say that the Espionage Act
to which my attention was invited was set forth by the War Depart-
ment in Circular 121, in 1940, and then distributed to war installations
of the War Department.
57. General Frank. In your capacity as assistant to the Chief of
Engineers, did you have anything to do with the assignment of
personnel ?
General Kingman. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 297
58. General Frank. Would you know when an officer was relieved
for inefficiency?
[555] General Kingman. Oh, yes !
59. General Frank. Was Colonel Wyman relieved for inefficiency,
from Hawaii?
General Kingman. Well, that was after I retired, I believe, that he
was relieved from Hawaii.
60. General Frank. Were you familiar with the Canol project?
General Kingman. In a general way, in the way everyone of us is.
61. General Frank. With respect to this letter that you have about
Colonel Wyman, what is the tenor of it ?
General Kingman. It is a personal letter to me from a man I knew
years ago, and in it he mentions what happened on the Tth of Decem-
ber 1941. I don't know whether this Board would like to look at it
informally or not.
62. General Russell. Was this man Sisson, about whom you are
talking, and from whom you received that letter, a great big, tall
fellow ?
General Kingman. Yes.
63. General Russell. Do you know anything of his history in the
States ?
General Kingman. I know that after he worked for the Engineer
Department in the Philippines, at the time I knew him, from 1907 to
1910, he went into private practice, I think, for about twenty years,
as an engineer. Then, as I recall it, about 1930 or 1931 he came back
to the Engineer Department and worked in the Ohio Valley Division ;
I think, most of the time in the Huntington District.
64. General Russell. I am only interested in the period. General,
when he was not with the Government, but was out as [556] a
private engineer. Do you know where he was located during that
period ?
General Kjngman. I remember he wrote me that he was in Canada a
part of the time.
65. General Russell. Do you know whether he went into the south-
ern part of the United States ?
General Kingman. No ; I do not.
66. General Russell. His name is George A. Sisson ?
General Kingman. Sisson.
67. General Russell. That is all.
[657] 68. General Frank. Will you read that part of the letter
which is pertinent ?
General Kingman. The letter is dated Honolulu, T. H., 17 July
1944, contains the following :
Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., U. S. A., was District Engineer liere during
tlie most strenuous period and really got things done. He was a real hustler.
Unfortunately, it looks as though someone in Washington has been trying to
make a goat of him. The statement that recently appeared in the papers that
he was drunk on the morning of December 7, 1941, was absolutely false. I was
Area Engineer of the 2nd Field Area with my office at Hickam Field, which,
as you no doubt know, adjoins Pearl Harbor. The Jap planes attacked Hickam
at the same time others hit Pearl Harbor. We had a crew working that morning
and as soon as the attack started an assistant of mine rushed to the phone and
tried to call Lieutenant Colonel B. L. Robinson at his residence to inform him
of the attack, however that line was busy. He then called Colonel Wyman at
his residence. Colonel Wyman answered the phone and was in good condition.
298 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I have talked to employees who were in the district office when he arrived short-
ly afterwards and they stated that he was entirely sober. Colonel Wyman,
being the go-getter that he is, natvirally has stepped on various toes at times, but
he was the man who really got work accomplished. As a matter of fact, he im-
pressed me as being the coolest, most capable [558] officer here at the time
of the "blitz." Wyman, like others, has some faults, but neglecting his duty was
not one of them.
He had made a rather unfortunate choice of the contractors who secured the
fixed-fee contract. I understand that on the Coast the tinns that went in and
formed the Hawaiian Constructors were reliable firms. The trouble was that
they sent their scrub team over here. However, in spite of that they accomplished
a lot of work.
69. General Frank. Of course, it must be realized that that is not
sworn testimony; it is simply an expression of opinion. Nor is it
known how familiar the writer was with the situation where Wyman
was on that morning, because his only contact with Wyman was by
telephone; that is correct, isn't it?
General Kingman. That is correct, yes.
70. General Frank. Yes. So that first paragraph is more or less
in the category of hearsay ?
General Kingman. I should say entirely.
71. General Frank. All right.
72. General Grunert. Who was Chief Engineer at the time you were
Assistant Chief?
General Kingman. Major General Julian L. Schley.
73. General Grunert. When you testified as to the number of activi-
ties in the Engineer office of which you had charge, you said the con-
struction section. Did that construction section have anything to do
with the letting of contracts?
General Kjngman. When the contracts were let by the [559]
necessary engineer they were then forwarded through the Division
Engineer to the Office of Chief of Engineers if it was a large enough
contract to require the approval of the Chief of Engineers, and were
handled by the finance section. That is where this letter with reference
to Rohl was prepared.
74. General Grunert. Did you have anything to do with the check-
ing of the progress under the contracts where they led to construc-
tion?
General Kingman. My construction section did on fortification
work.
75. General Grunert. Would construction mider the Air Warning
Service come under fortification work?
General Kingman. It did for a time under this construction section.
76. General Grunert. Did you know how things were progressing
in Hawaii ? The contracts referred to the defense projects in Hawaii,
including the one of the Air Warning Service.
General Kingman. No, I did not.
77. General Grunert. You did not know anything about those?
General Kjngman. No.
78. General Grunert. And it was not part of your duties to check
that up to see whether the contract was progressing, to see whether
it should be done away with ? Or, in other words, you did not know
anything about that contract ?
General Kjngman. No.
79. General Grunert. Now, what were the regulations as to the
checking of contractors? Here, as I understand, the District Eiigi-
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 299
neer awarded a contract to a contractor or to a number of contractors.
Whose business is it to' check as to the [660'} reliability of said
contractors ? Is it the District Engineer's ? Is it the finance section ?
Or is it nobody's business ?
General Kingman. Well, it would be primarily the District Engi-
neer, and finally the checking would be done in this finance section
handling contracts in the office of the Chief of Engineers.
80. General Grunert. Then, it was up to the finance section of the
Chief of Engineers office to check on the District Engineer?
General Kingman. That organization has been — I am speaking of
the organization as it was at that time.
81. General Grunert. Yes.
General Kingman. It has been so modified since my retirement that
I cannot tell you about the way it is today.
82. General Grunert. Well, what I am trying to get at is this :
Who was responsible that the German citizen was awarded a defense
contract ?
General Kingman. Well, I think someone else could answer that
question a great deal better than I can, because I had no supervision
over this contract.
83. General Grunert. That is what I am trying to get at. Who,
in your opinion, could answer that line of questions?
General Kingman. I think General Reybold or General Robins
could answer that much better than I could.
84. General Grunert. Now, you signed the letter urging the ex-
pediting of citizenship to this man Rohl. You say you signed as a
matter of form or routine. Had you signed similar letters to get
citizenship for other people or hurry them up, or was this the only
case that you remember?
[S61] General Kingman. I think that is the only case I ever
handled — I ever signed as Acting Chief of Engineers.
85. General Grunert. Then, you did not think, inasmuch as no
other cases that you knew of had gone through, that you should look
at it and make inquiries about it ? Did it strike you as anything un-
usual ?
General Kingman. None whatever. As I have stated before, there
was nothing in the circumstances which aroused any misgiving on
my part.
86. General Grunert. Then, it was the custom in the Chief Engi-
neer's office to sign most everything proposed by some other section or
that responsible head; is that the general idea of it? I will not say
signed everything, but you put your signature to a letter proposed by,
initialed by, so and so ; that means you trust him that that is all righ ?
General Kingman. Yes, sir.
87. General Grunert. You did not think you had to go into it any
further, even though it may have referred to something that might
have caused suspicion otherwise ?
General Kingman. So far as I knew at that time, this was a very
unimportant matter.
88. General Grunert. You say you think the Board can get the
best evidence as to the letting of contracts, and so forth, from the
officer who was then finance officer of the Chief of Engineers office?
General Kingman. Yes, sir.
89. General Frank. What was his name ?
300 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Kingman. Colonel Earl E. Gesler.
90. General Grunert. How is Wyman considered as an officer
[562] among his fellow officers?
-General Kingman. Well, he is considered one of the most efficient
officers on construction that we have in the Corps of Engineers.
91. General Grunert. What is he, dynamic?
General Kingman. Very dynamic.
92. General Grunert. Or what is known as a go-getter?
General Kingman. Absolutely.
93. General Grunert. Has he been in trouble before because of
that go-getting attitude ? Do you know ?
General Kingman. Well, he sometimes would ride a little roughshod
over people, and they did not like it.
94. General Grunert. Generally, what were the reports on him
prior to your retirement, that you know of officially, as having charge
of that part of the office ?
General Kingman. He was rated as a superior officer.
95. General Grunert. One other question I have: While you knew
Eohl in California and I believe had awarded a contract to his firm,
was there any inclination on his part to try to entertain you?
General Kingman. So far as I know, I never personally met Mr.
Rohl.
96. General Grunert. As far as you know there was no attempt
on his part to get in your good graces by social entertainment ?
General Kingman. None whatever.
97. General Grunert. I have no further questions.
98. General Russell. Did you have any?
99. General Frank. No.
100. General Russell. I have some, from these notes that I have
[S6S] here :
General, you stated that when this letter, the mimeographed copy
of which has been furnished the Board, was submitted to you for
signature there was nothing in it that indicated to you something out
of the ordinary?
General Kingman. That is correct.
101. General Russell. In that letter there is a sentence that, "To
this date Mr. Rohl's valuable services have not been available for
Government defense projects because of his alien status," That sen-
tence was in there, and that did not indicate to you that his status
was about to be changed so that he could get information on our
defense projects?
General Kingman. I don't know whether I get the import of that
question exactly.
102. General Russell. This letter was for the purpose of changing
his status from that of a foreigner to that of an American.
General Kingman. Yes.
103. General Russell. And the purpose of it was to enable him
to do defense project work.
General Kingzsian. Yes.
104. General Russell. Did that not indicate to your mind imme-
diately, General, that some investigation of that sort of thing should
be made by the Corps of Engineers before they placed their stamp of
approval on this proposed changed status ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 301
General Kingman. No, it did not. This man had been doing work
for the Corps of Engineers for several years.
105. General Russell. Well, now, this job that he had done out
on the West Coast under your supervision, at Los Angeles, I [564-]
believe — did that come in the category of a defense project?
General Kingman, No; it was building a breakwater there.
106. General Russell. So far as you knew, therefore, this was the
first time that a foreigner with the name of Rohl was going to par-
ticipate in a defense project?
General Kingman. That is correct, yes.
107. General Russell. Now, you say that you did not know what
nationality Rohl was. Did that name indicate anything to you ?
General Kingman. Not a thing, no.
108. General Russell. At that time, General, was it difficult to get
competent contracting firms to do the work that the Engineers wanted
done for the Govermnent?
General Kingman. I had nothing to do with that, but I think it
probably was pretty difficult to get them at the outlying places where
we were doing work, remote portions of the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans.
109. General Russell. Then, in these areas that you last described
you did have difficulties in getting contracting firms to go there to
do the work ?
General Kingman. Well, as I say, I had nothing to do with this.
110. General Russell. You just do not know?
General Kingman. I do not know.
111. General Russell. Now, in reply to some question that was
asked by General Frank you stated that you thought the contractors
had "done pretty well," if I recall your language, out at Hawaii. 1
wanted to ask you now, was it generally considered in the Office of the
Chief of Engineers that satisfactory progi'ess was being made by the
firms who were IS65] doing the work out at Hawaii in the year
1941?
General Kingman. I do not know the ans^A er to that.
112. General Russell. Well, what did you mean a moment ago when
you said you thought the contractors had done pretty well at Hawaii ?
General Kingman. Well, that was just the impression that I had
gotten, from no direct connection with the w^ork.
113. General Frank. Casual conversation?
General Kingman. Just casual conversation without any knowledge
of the details.
114. General Russell. But you are not in position now to testify
whether or not they had done pretty well out there ?
General Kingman. No.
115. General Russell. When was this breakwater work done at Los
Angeles ?
General Kingman. Well, it was started, as I recall it, about Sep-
tember 1936.
116. General Russell. And finished when?
General Kingman. It might have been in '38 or '39 ; I am not sure.
117. General Russell. General, do you know whether or not the
request made in this letter of August 28, '41, for speeding up action on
Rohl's naturalization application originated in the Office of the Chief
of Engineers or out on the West Coast ?
302 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Kingman. I found nothing in the file to indicate where it
originated, but I think probably that General Robins or Colonel Gesler
could give evidence on that point.
118. General Russell. You were fairly well acquainted with the
Office of the Chief of P^ngineers in Washington here at that time,
[566] were you not ?
General Kingman. Yes.
119. General Russell. Would there have been any reason for any-
one in this office here to have known of the filing of Rohl's application
for naturalization or the progress which had been made on it unless
such person or persons in the Office of the Chief of Engineers had
been told by someone who was on the scene where the naturalization
application was pending ?
General Kingman. I would say no.
120. General Russell. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that the
interest of the Engineer Corps was first developed elsewhere than in
the Office of the Engineers here ?
General Kingman. I would say that probably this was initiated by
the District Engineer, Colonel Wyman.
121. General Russell. Were you more or less familiar, General, with
the agencies available to the Engineer Corps for expediting work on
contracts such as that which was being done at Hawaii? Do you
know the machinery that w^as used by the Engineers to hurry along
work on the contracts ?
General Kingman. Well, there was no machinery that I know of
other than the offices of the District Engineer and the Division Engi-
neer concerned.
122. General Russell. Who were where the work was being done?
General Kingman. Yes.
[567] 123. General Russell. These contracts were being exe-
cuted in Oahu. What authority did the Commander of the Hawaiian
Department have over that work ?
General Kingman. I do not know.
124. General Russell, Were you not Assistant to the Chief of Engi-
neers at that time ?
General Kingman. Yes. I may have known at that time. If I did,
I have forgotten now.
125. General Russell. That is all I have to ask.
126. General Frank. Were you acquainted with any employees or
officials of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization ?
General Kingman. No, sir.
127. General Frank. This letter, then was brought to you to sign
purely in your capacity as Assistant to the Chief of Engineers ?
General Kingman. As Acting Chief of Engineers.
128. General Frank. Will you differentiate briefly between defense
projects and other projects ?
General Kingman. Defense projects would be those that related to
the national defense.
129. General Frank. The Rohl firm had a contract with the Corps
of Engineers prior to the time that they were considered for defense
projects. What I am trying to bring out is, what kind of projects
were they working on before they were considered for defense
projects?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 303
General Kingman. The only contract that I know of that they had
was this one on the breakwater at Los Angeles.
130. General Frank. What kind of a project do you call that?
General Kingman. A river and harbor project.
[568] 131. General Frank. As distinguished from a defense
project ?
General Kingman. Absolutely.
132. General Frank. That is what I am after. I have nothing
further.
133. General Grunert. There appears to be nothing further, Gen-
eral. Thank you very much for coming.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. EUGENE REYBOLD, CHIEF OF ENGI-
NEERS, UNITED STATES ARMY (ACCOMPANIED BY DOUGLAS I.
McKAY, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, AND
MAJOR LUE LOZIER, J. A. G., ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICE OF CHIEF
OF ENGINEERS)
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Cononel West. Will you please state to the Board your name,
rank, organization, and station?
General Reybold. Eugene Reybold— R-e-y-b-o-l-d ; Major General,
Chief of Engineers ; stationed in Washington, D. C.
2. Colonel West. For the purposes of the record will you also
please state the names and connections of the gentlemen who are
accompanying you ?
General Reybold, Mr. Douglas I. McKay, Special Assistant to the
Chief of Engineers, and Major Lue Lozier, J. A. G., assigned to the
Office of Chief of Engineers.
3. General Grunert. General, the Board is attempting to get at
the facts about the attack on Hawaii, and we are now looking into the
War Department background, together with all the information we
can get that refers to conditions in Hawaii prior [569] to and
during the attack. So we have called you in the hope that we will
get some information that will lead us to facts or that you will give
us facts on which to make a report and judge what to recommend.
In order to cover the large field in the limited time we have available,
individual Board members have been assigned objectives or phases for
special investigation, although the Board itself will pass on all phases.
General Frank has been assigned this particular phase, and I am
going to ask him to lead in pro])ounding the questions, and the other
Board members will fill in and develop the subject.
4. General Frank. What was your assignment during the years
1940 and 1941?
General Reybold. Up until August 1940, 1 was the Division Engi-
neer.
5. General Frank. Where?
General Reybold. At Little Rock, in the United States Engineers
Department, and on about August 1st I was assigned as Acting G-4
of the War Department.
304 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
6. General Frank. That is, in 1940?
General Reybold. That is 1940. On October 1, 1941, I was ap-
pointed Chief of Engineers. So I served as G-4 of the War Depart-
ment from the period of about August 1 — I think it was August 4,
to be specific — until September 30, 1941.
7. General Frank. We are interested in the progress of certain con-
struction projects in Hawaii as identified by job order which cover
the construction of certain aircraft warning service installations in
Hawaii. W^e are desirous of getting information on the progress or
lack of progress of that construction. Are you familiar with those
details ?
[570] General Reybold. I am not familiar with those details,
although I have made some examination of the records existing in the
Office of the Chief of Engineers.
8. General Frank. Was there some delay in the construction of the
aircraft warning service projects?
General Reybold. Apparently the initial job orders issued in con-
nection with three fixed stations were issued in June of 1941. To be
specific, permit me to refer to Job Order 23.1 under date of June 18,
1941.
9. General Frank. All right.
General Reybold. That job order provides for A. W. S. camp,
utilities, and fence, Kokee Road, and was to have commenced on June
23, 1941, with ah estimated date of completion set as September 23,
1941.
10. General Frank. The completion date was September 23?
General Reybold. Yes.
11. General Frank. What happened to it? That is what I am
interested in.
General Reybold. I have a record here which I cannot reconcile,
identified as Job Order 23.1 Revised, dated December 17, 1941, entitled
A. W. S. base camp and field station. It is not in exact agreement
with the project title of 23.1 referred to a moment ago. It is dated
December 17, 1941. But subsequent information was obtained through
a telegram received from the District Engineer in Honolulu on June
26, 1944, fixing the date of completion as 31 December, 1941, indicating
further in this telegram that the time of completion was changed to
that date under date of November 30, 1941,
[571] 12. General Frank. What was the cause of these delays?
General Reybold. All that I can do at the moment is to generalize on
those delays and to quote from the same telegram referred to a moment
ago as having been received from the District Engineer at Honolulu.
13. General Frank. In 1944?
General Reybold. Yes. I quote now from that telegram in response
to inquiry of my office :
(Excerpt from telegram of June 26, 1944, is as follows :)
Chronological sequence causing delay in contstruction cannot be given. Stop.
Causes of delay can be attributed to the following : numerous changes in plan by
issuing agency, difficulty in procuring special items of Signal Corps buildings and
structures from the Mainland, critical situation in shipping facilities, radar equip-
ment required for the operation of stations was to be furnished by Signal Corps
and was late in arriving at its destination in the Islands, inclement weather con-
ditions in the vicinity of stations during construction period delayed work to
some extent stop
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 305
14. General Grunert. Like all generalizations, they do not state
anything in particular as to any one of the delays mentioned there?
General Reybold. That is correct.
15. General Frank. Do you have any first-hand information with
respect to the causes for those delays, or has all this information been
obtained by you from some members of your [57£] organiza-
tion?
General Reybold. That is correct. All the information I have is
obtained from the records and from these few telegrams that have
been dispatched to our present District Engineer in Honolulu.
16. General Frank. Therefore, this information that we are obtain-
ing is repeated information taken from original records that are
elsewhere ?
General Reybold. That is correct.
17. General P^rank. Where are these original records?
General Reyboid. In the Office of the District Engineer in Hono-
lulu; and perhaps some of the original copies are on file in our own
office.
18. General Frank. Are there people on duty now in Honolulu who
are conversant with those original records ?
General Reybold. I would judge that the present District Engineer,
with the assistance of some of his division employees who have been
on duty there since the period under discussion, would be able to fur-
nish valuable information.
19. General Frank. I am interested not only in this Job Order
23.1 ; I am interested in Job Order No. 23 which has to do with the
construction of a road, with addendum 1, 2, and 3, and Job Order 23-1.
I am interested in Job Order 41, which has to do with the construction
of a road on Haleakala, and addendum 1, 2, and 3. I am interested in
Job Order No. 2.1 which covers an access road from Kolekole Pass to
the proposed site of the cableway at Kaala; Job Order No. 2 covers
the construction of the cableway itself; Job Order 2.2 which covers
the construction [573] of the A. S. W. camp and installation
on the top of Kaala ; also Job Order 46, which later was suspended,
covering the road, buildings, and so forth, on the top of Mauna Loa.
Then, in addition, I am interested in Job Order 20.1 covering the
construction, including the fabrication and installation, of 12 50,000-
gallon gasoline storage tanks; Job Order 20.120 covering 6 50,000-
gallon gasoline tanks; Job Order No. 20.130 covering 12 50,000-gallon
tanks ; Job Order 25 : construct, fabricate and install 9 50,000-gallon
gasoline storage tanks, the first addendum thereto; and Job Ordei
21.1 covering 9 50,000-gallon storage tanks, and certain others.
The point arises that all the information that we would get from
you is information that you have collected from original sources, when
those original sources would be available to us. Is that correct?
General Reybold. That is correct.
20. General Frank. Therefore I question the advisability of pursu-
ing the details of this matter further with the Chief of Engineers,
when we are going into the original records in Honolulu.
21. General Grunert. I agree with you.
22. General Russell. I have just one question on that point.
General, I listened to your description of what happened to this
initial job order 23.1. I may be mistaken, but I gathered the im-
79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 1 21
306 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
pression that some of the information which you gave us as to delays
was gathered from original memoranda or data in the Office of the
Chief of Engineers here in AVashington ?
General Ketbold. Xo, sir. That information came to us in the
form of a telegram -which was in response to a telegram [o74.]
that we had sent to our District Engineer at Honolulu under date of
19 June, 1944 : and I will be glad to submit this as part of the record,
and the response, which speaks for itself ; both our telegram and the
reply.
23. General Eussell. That is the second record to which you re-
ferred, the 1944 telegram, and the reply thereto, about which there
was no confusion. But earlier, and in the beginning, you read to us
some other papers which you had in your hand, giving us the history
of the postponements of 23.-1 which involved work on the A. "\Y. S.
station, and I was wondering if all that data was collected from the
Hawaiian office or if some of it was gotten out of the Engineer's office
here.
General Retbold. What I have said up to this time has been taken
from the job order records of Xo. 23.1 and the telegi'am received from
our District Engineer.
24. General Eussell. All those records on 23.1 came from Hawaii ?
General Eetbold. Yes.
[575] 25, General Frank. Do you have a monthly progress re-
port that you require be sent into your office from your district engi-
neers ?
General Eetbold. At that time we had a report generally known
throughout the service as a "monthly report of operations,*' and those
reports are on file in our office.
26. General Frank. Would they cover these job-orders in which
we are interested ?
General Eetbold. Only in a general way.
27. General Frank, We will give you references to these job-orders
and ask, if you please, that you forward us copies of the progress re-
jDorts on these jobs, through to the completion of the project.
General Eetbold. We will be very glad to give you whatever records
we have in that respect. I should like to add that in our search of
these records, the report of operations for the month of November,
in connection with the storage tanks referred to, is missing from our
files.
28. General Frank. Are vou familiar with the negotiations for a
contract. W-414-eng-602. dated the 20th of December. 1940, with the
Hawaiian Constructors, for defense projects in Hawaii?
General Eetbold, Only as I have examined to some limited extent
the contract on file in the office of the Chief of Engineers.
29. General Frank, That was before you were directly associated
wit h the Corps of Engineers ?
General Eetbold. Yes, sir. I was not appointed until October 1,
1941.
[576] 30. General Frank. Are you at all conversant with the
case of Hans Wilhelm Eohl ?
General Eetbold. Only as I have read in the papers and heard over
the radio, and in connection with the report of the Military Affairs
Committee of the House, and what we might term the "squadroom
talk." I never met the gentleman, to my knowledge.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 307
31. General Frank. Do you know whether or not he is at the mo-
ment a government contractor ?
General Reybold. I do not.
32. General Grunert. Could he be, without your knowledge ?
General Eeybold. He might be.
33. General Frank. After all the investigation that has gone on
with respect to his firm, wouldn't it have been normal for you to have
had an investigation in your own establishment, to have uncovered
that?
General Eeybold. It might well have been.
34. General Frank. Whose responsibility is that?
General Eeybold. That's perhaps the responsibility of the Chief
of Engineers, but we have pretty close watch on those things through
the office of the Provost Marshal General, and through G-2, and
through the Service Command headquarters, in this country ; and of
course any individual leaving these shores for a foreign nation is very
carefully investigated prior to his departure.
35. General Frank. However, foreign agents have methods of com-
municating their information without they themselves leaving the
country ; that is correct ?
General Eeybold. Oh, yes
[577] 36. General Frank. Have you any personal or official
knowledge of the reliability of one EohlJ
General Eeybold. I know nothing about the individual, personally.
Going back to contracts, if they be a fixed-fee contract, we have a Con-
tract Advisory Committee sitting in our office, which looks into the
ability to perform, and the financial responsibility of every contractor,
before we award a contract ; and that is equally true of course of a
lump-sum contract ; we examine very carefully into those features.
37. General Frank. What did you call that agency ?
General Eeybold. "Contract Advisory Committee," it is called.
38. General Frank. Did that exist at the time this contract was let?
General Eeybold. That existed, and I have been told — I can't vouch
for this — that this particular contract, at the time of its award, was
referred to that Contract Advisory Committee for its approval prior
to the award.
39. General Frank. Do you know who comprised that committee
at that time ?
General Eeybold. I could readily get that : Mr. Blossom, Mr. Har-
vey, Mr. Dresser, Mr. Talow, now a Colonel in the Army, and Mr. A. L.
Sherman.
40. General Frank. You are conversant with the Espionage Act
that requires contractors receiving defense-project contracts to be citi-
zens of the United States ?
General Eeybold. I am not familiar with it, but I judge that that's
so, all right.
41. General Frank. Well, that is a law.
IS7S] General Eeybold. Yes.
42. General Frank. I am just developing this as a background for
the next question. Whose responsibility would it be to check as to
whether or not a contractor was a citizen of the United States ?
General Eeybold. That would be the responsibility of everyone in
connection with the award of a contract. By that I mean if a contract
be under consideration for award in a district, the district engineer,
308 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and, in turn, if it came forward, the division engineer; and if again
it required the approval of the Chief of Engineers, it would be the
responsibility of the Office of the Chief of Engineers.
43. General Grunert. Is that all set forth in regulations and in-
structions, or is it just understood?
General Reybold. I think that is generally understood.
44. General Frank. So far as you know, then, there is nothing spe-
cific in the regulations about that ?
General Reybold. Nothing specific, but here is a copy of a letter
which may be of interest to the Board, under date of December 12,
1941. The subject is "Counter Subversive System." It is addressed
to "The Commanding Generals, All Corps Areas; and The Chief of
Engineers." With your permission, I will read it. It is brief.
45. General Frank. Proceed.
General Reybold (reading) :
1. Reference is made to the Counter Subversive System which was inaugurated
by the Construction Division of the Quartermaster Corps at the time that the
Construction Division was under the jurisdiction of the Quartermaster General.
[579] 2. In view of the fact that the Construction Division has recently been
placed under the jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers, it is directed that the
Counter Subversive System referred to in paragraph 1 above be maintained by
the Corps of Engineers, and that it continue to function under the control of Corps
Area Commanders in accordance with the provisions of Counter Subversive
Instructions.
By order of the Secretary of War :
E. S. Adams
Major General,
The Adjutant Oeneral.
46. General Frank. Are you conversant with the fact that the firm
of Rohl-Connolly Co. had a contract for building a breakwater in Los
Angeles ?
General Reybold. Only by hearsay.
47. General Frank. In a situation like that, and in accordance with
this system, as outlined in that letter you just read, will you explain
how that counterespionage system would work in determining any
questionable activities of Mr. Rohl ?
General Reybold. Our people in our district maintain very close
contact of course with the Service Command Headquarters, their sub-
versive people, the G-2 people. They, at the Corps Areas or Service
Command headquarters, know what is going on in the line of Federal
work throughout their respective commands, I judge, under the terms
of this letter, and we in turn have an Intelligence Section in our own
office which maintains very close contact with the activities of our
office, and, in turn, with the G-2, and with the Provost Marshal
General.
[580] 48. General Frank. Is there a clean-cut line of operation,
or is it of nebulous positiveness as to the manner in which it works?
General Reybold. There is nothing positive on the books, to my
knowledge, as to a requirement as to looking into the loyalty of a
contractor, prior to Pearl Harbor.
49. General Frank. What if any orders of the Corps of Engineers
required that the loyalty and background of proposed contractors be
investigated before a contract was awarded?
General Reybold. We say, none as to loyalty, As to background,
it was the duty of the Corps of Engineers to be informed about and be
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 309
satisfied with the experience, ability to perform, and financial respon-
sibility of its contractors.
At the time, preceding the award of this contract there was no
occasion for the Chief of Engineers to suspect or doubt the loyalty
of any member of the contracting group. Had there been, the matter
would have been reported to G-2 for appropriate attention. As of 20
December 1940, and before, G-2 was the sole agency within the War
Department charged with the duty of reporting on and conducting
investigations into matters pertaining to loyalty,
50. General Russell. General, was that the 20th of December, 1940,
or 1941 ?
General Retbold. That was 1940. That was the time of the letting
of the basic contract. General.
51. General Frank. In the case of Rohl, are you conversant with
the personal relationship of Colonel Theodore Wyman and Rohl?
General Reybold. Nothing more than what I have heard, and
[S81] read in testimony.
52. General Frank. You have gathered from that testimony that
Rohl and Wyman were intimate or casual friends ?
General Reyrold. I would say that they were pretty close friends.
53. General Frank. In a situation like that, where the friendship
was so close between the man letting the contract and the man receiving
it, a situation could exist where there could be some question about the
loyalty of the man receiving the contract, and the system which was
implemented for determining that being distributed among the Corps
of Engineers, the Corps Area Commander, the FBI, the G-2 of the
War Department, that system might be so diversified as to prevent its
ever being picked up; is that correct?
General Reybold. . It might be.
54. General Frank. Therefore, might it not be logical to draw the
conclusion that the system for determining this was rather loose ?
General Reybold. I would say Yes.
55. General Frank. I think we will go back and take the questions
that we sent over to you, ask you those questions, and proceed with the
development in accordance with the answers that have been prepared
in your office. Just give me a general answer to these questions, and
then I can pursue that later, in view of our understanding.
General Reybold. All right.
56. General Frank. As of the 7th of December, what was the state
of completion of the work on each item contemplated by Contract
No. W^14-eng-602?
[582] General Reybold. Our records are not clear, and I would
suggest that that information be obtained in detail from the district
office in Honolulu.
57. General Frank. That office has the original records ?
General Reybold. It has the original records.
58. General Frank. The next question : When was the work on each
item commenced?
General Reybold. The same answer as (a).
59. General Frank. What were the number and locations of the
permanent aircraft warning stations included within the work of the
contract ?
310 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Eeyeold. The original contract, dated 20 December, 1940,
and approved by the Under Secretary of War, 3 January 1941, did
not specify the number nor the site locations. It provided :
Warning service stations at locations to be determined, specified in Article I, 1.
Article I, IB :
Aircraft warning service stations on the Islands of Oahu, Hawaii ; Maui and
Kauai, involving certain installations, including buildings, roads, trails, cable-
ways, haulage ways and other structures appurtenant to aircraft warning ser-
vice, as directed by the Contracting OflScer.
As of the date of the contract, the War Department had authorized
the construction of the following :
(a) Three fixed stations, as follows :
Mt. Kaala on Oahu
Haleakala on Maui
Kokee on Kauai
[SS'S] (b) Seven mobile stations,
(c) One information center at Fort Shafter.
There is a lot more to this. I do not know whether you want to
hear all this stuff, or not. We have got an awful lot of stuff in here.
It is a sort of summation of that contract.
60. General Grunert. Let us put it in the record. Go ahead. We
may need it, later on.
61. General Frank. Go ahead.
General Reybold. On the 21 April 1941, the District Engineer sub-
mitted revised detail cost estimates on the original program, increas-
ing the estimated costs from $505,000 to $890,804. On 24 May 1941
this office requested allotment of additional funds for this work of
$385,804. On 8 July 1941 the District Engineer^ submitted additional
data regarding costs requested by the Chief Signal Officer 10 June
1941.
[584] The War Department of 8 July 1941 authorized general
changes in the program, including the addition of three more fixed
stations (at Pahoa on Hawaii, Opana on Oahu, and Manawahua on
Oahu) and the reduction of the number of mobile stations from
seven to six (eliminating the Mauna Loa station and changing the
location of some of the other mobile stations), and requesting esti-
mates of cost and report on locations.
The requested estimates of cost and report were forwarded by the
District Engineer 18 September 1941, and were forwarded by this
office 3 October 1941 to the Adjutant General through the Chief
Si^al Officer. The Secretary of War approved the revised Ha-
waiian aircraft warning service program on 4 December 1941, before
which date no construction could have been started on the additional
work covered by the revised program, nor job orders thereon issued
to the contractor.
Accordingly, "the number and location of the permanent aircraft
warning stations included within the work of the contract" on 7
December 1941 were the three fixed stations and the information
center described in subparagraph (4) above, approved by the Secre-
tary of War 4 December 1941.
62. General Grunert. May I develop that a little more? I did
not quite understand from the reading of that. It seems the origi-
nal contracts were awarded. Then they kept changing or asking for
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 311
more money, and this went on from early in '41 until December '41.
What was actually completed in the contract, or are all these per-
taining to the same contract that were not completed or only par-
tially completed? I do not get a clear picture of what was done
except that they kept asking for something else.
[585] In other words, is there any clear-cut thing there to
show, This was a contract to so and so; they did so and so on it by
such and such a time?
We shall have to take each one of these contracts, it seems to me,
and follow it up as to what was done with it. If it was revised, who
asked that it be revised? Who approved the revision? How much
did it cost? Was there money available? Were the materials avail-
able ? and all that. Otherwise I do not get a clear picture of it at all.
It seems building the Air Warning Service was just not done during
that year, and we want to find out why.
63. General Frank. Well, I can explain that.
64. General Grunert. Can you?
65. General Frank. To this extent. There was a master contract
made, and that did not cover the specific projects. As a project
came up, then that particular project was covered by a job order
which became a part of the master contract, and those projects as
covered by these specific job orders were the things to which I
referred when I first started questioning the Chief of Engineers.
66. General Grunert. That is just what I want to get in the rec-
ord, so it will be intelligible to the laymen who will have to study
the thing.
67. General Frank. And we have here a complete record of the
commencement datCj the estimated date of completion, and the vari-
ous revised dates, and the addendum to the original job orders in
each instance.
68. General Grunert. All right, fine. Now, what can Ave get from
the present witness that will help us toward a better [586]
understanding of that when we get to the source of the record?
69. General Frank. That I think will be brought out as we ask
these questions.
70. General Grunert. All right ; go ahead, then.
General Reybold. Without putting this on the record unless you
want it there, General, that is a little confusing. I know this thing is
confusing to me too. But what had been done up to this date when I
quit reading there was to develop facts ; that although there were nu-
merous plans in the mill over there being considered, quite a program :
Navy, Army, and everything else, what you are trying to get at here
was as of December the 7th what might have been completed in the
nature of these air warning stations. Now, that is what you want to
do, and I developed down to the fact that there were three of them
firmly on the books, even though you will find later that that devel-
oped into six fixed stations, six movable stations, and one communica-
tions center.
71. General Grunert. You see what I want: when the record is
completed I want to be able to read it and study the record. Now, what
have we got? What facts have we? When we put in a report, we
cannot bear out all this unless we have something in the record to
show for it, and this talk off the record will not help us a bit when it
comes to thinking back on it.
312 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Reybold. Yes.
72. General Grunert. What I want to do is to get this in the record
so we can study the record and come to conclusions and piece it out by
additional testimony where necessary.
General Reyrold. Well, the last paragraph I wrote there finally
concludes those three stations.
[587] 73. General Frank. All right. That is in answer to what
question, now?
General Reybold. That was c. That was 2 c.
74. General Frank. All right. Now, what were the number and
location of the underground gasoline storage tanks included within
the work of the contract ?
General Reybold. We cannot answer that from the records on file in
the Office of the Chief of Engineers.
75. General Grunert. Can you suggest where we can find informa-
tion on that subject?
General Reybold. That information can be obtained from the Dis-
trict Engineer in Honolulu, who has the original records.
76. General Frank. Which if any of these facilities were completed
as of the 7th of December, '41 ?
General Reybold. None, except at least one mobile station with the
smaller type tower afiixed to a truck, was in operation in a temporary
location in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. As to the status of comple-
tion of the three fixed stations and the information center on 30 No-
vember 1941, see Inclosures 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
Now, that is these things [indicating].
77. General Frank. What do those inclosures show ?
General Reybold. They show the status of completion as of Novem-
ber 30, 1941, of the three fixed air warning stations that had been ap-
proved for construction, and the information center.
78. General Frank. In answer to the original question, "Avhich if
any of these facilities were completed as of the 7th of December, 1941 ?"
what is your answer?
General Reybold. None insofar as the fixed stations are [588]
concerned.
79. General Frank. What was the status of completion of the in-
formation center?
General Reybold. 72 percent on November 30, 1941.
80. General Frank. Do you have information there on the per-
centage of completion of the fixed stations ? They were three in num-
ber, were they not?
General Reybold. Mt. Kaala : the project as a whole was 50 percent
completed, the access road was 97 percent completed, and the cableway
20 percent completed.
Haleakala : project as a whole, 96.4 percent; access road, 100 percent;
power building, 60 percent; barracks and communications building,
99.9 percent complete; detector building and tower, 95 percent
complete.
Kokee : project as a whole was 50 percent completed ; access road, 86
percent; power building, 57 percent; barracks and communications
building, 70 percent; detector building and tower, 84 percent.
81. General Frank. In answer to the following question, "What was
the time fixed by the contract and the job orders for completion of
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 313
each of these facilities?" that information is more readily available
from the original records in Honolulu ?
General Retbold. Yes.
82. General Frank. In the delays in completing the facilities what
were the causes ?
General Reybold. I could give you no further information on that
question than that read from a telegram received from the District
Engineer.
83. General Frank. In Honolulu?
[589'] General Retbold. In Honolulu.
84. General Frank. Therefore, that information should be avail-
able to us in Honolulu ?
General Reybold. Correct.
85. General Frank. Do you know whether or not protests as to the
delays were made to the contractors ?
General Reybold. I do not.
86. General Frank. Do you know whether or not your office was
advised with respect to the delays?
General Reybold. I do not.
87. General Frank. Have you any information as to any of the de-
lays for which the contractors were responsible ?
General Reybold. I have no such information.
88. General Frank. Do you have any information as to any delays
for which the Government was responsible ?
General Reybold. In general terms, it is known that the following
constitute certain sources of delay : (a) Numerous changes in plans by
the using agency.
89. General Frank. What do you mean by "the using agency" ?
General Reybold. Signal Corps if they were going to operate these
installations.
90. General Frank. Or the Aircraft Warning Service ?
General Reybold. Or the Aircraft Warning Service, wherever that
belongs.
91. General Frank. All right.
General Reybold. (b) Difficulty in procuring special items of Sig-
nal Corps buildings and structures from mainland,
92. General Frank. What do you mean by "special items"?
General Reybold. Well, special items of Air Corps [590] in-
stallations and everything, you might say, in connection with building
materials, with perhaps the exception of rock. Crushed rock did not
have to be shipped over from the United States.
93. General Frank. Well, I am trying to be a little more specific
there as to exactly the things to which you refer. Will you state that
again, please ?
General Reybold. Difficulty in procuring special items of Signal
Corps buildings and structures from the United States. Those steel
towers were fabricated in the United States.
94. General Frank. Do you really know whether or not the non-
receipt of those in Honolulu held up construction? Do you really
know that ?
General Reybold. Specifically I do not.
95. General Frank. All right. Proceed with the answer.
General ReybOld. I know in general terms also, there was a critical
situation in shipping facilities, but nothing specific. I am told that
314 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
radar equipment required for the operation of the aircraft warning
service stations was to be furnished by the Signal Corps and was late
in arriving at the destination in the Islands.
96. General Frank, May I ask a question right there : The founda-
tions on which to install this permanent equipment could have been
put in prior to the arrival of this equipment ?
General Reybold. If the location had been definitely fixed.
97. General Frank. If the location had been fixed and if the plans
had been furnished you ?
General Retbold. That is correct.
98. General Frank. Therefore, the nonarrival of the radar
[591] equipment itself need not have held up preparatory con-
struction ?
General Reybold. No, not preparatory construction, if the plans
and the location were at hand.
99. General Frank. Go ahead.
General Reybold. Labor shortage and special difficulty in securing
competent, experienced supervisory personnel.
Earlier competition for labor, and supply priorities, between the
different agencies of the Government engaged in the defense program.
And to some limited extent, which I think you could write off, in-
clement weather, because they will have that under any contract, but
is merely reported from over there. Inclement weather is the last
thing.
100. General Frank. This answer that you have given is all the
information you have as to the causes of the delay in the installation of
this equipment ?
General Reyboi;D. That is all that we have.
101. General Frank. Wliat equipment was furnished for the in-
stallation and the facilities for the underground gasoline storage
tanks?
General Reybold. We have no answer to that question yet, but are
continuing our search of the files.
102. General Frank. Where is information more readily available
on that?
General Reybold. In the office of the District Engineer at Honolulu.
103. General Frank. Do you know when this equipment was deliv-
ered in the Hawaiian Islands ?
Genera] Reybold. I do not.
[592] 104. General Frank. Do you know from whom this
equipment was received ?
(jeneral Reybold. I do not.
105. General Frank. What was the chain of command, so far as the
District Engineer in Hawaii was concerned, from the commencement
of the work under the contract and down to the 7th of December?
General Reybold. The District Engineer reported to the Division
Engineer, and he, the Division Engineer, in turn reported to the Chief
of Engineers.
106. General Frank. The District Engineer in this instance was
Colonel Wyman in Honolulu ?
General Reybold. Tliat is correct. General Hanntim at San Fran-
cisco was the Division Engineer.
107. General Frank. What if any responsibility had the Com-
manding General of the Hawaiian Department in this instance?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 315
General Reybold. Would you state that again?
108. General Frank. Wliat if any responsibility did the Command-
ing General of the Hawaiian Department have with respect to this
construction ?
General Reybold. He had nothing to do with the actual operations,
except of course the District Engineer had the closest contact with
him; but I would judge that in the planning for these installations
which we are discussing here he would have a very great responsibility
in determining the number and locations of the installations.
109. General Frank. What I am after is : To what extent would it
have been possible for him to have taken steps to have expedited
[693] work on any project in a contract?
General Reybold. He might well have gone first to our District
Engineer; and if he did not obtain the results I am sure that a com-
munication either with the Division Engineer or with the Chief of
Engineers would have brought forth results.
110. General Frank. Do you know whether or not that was done ?
General Reybold. I do not.
111. General Frank. Will it be possible for you to furnish the names
and locations of military personnel and supervisory civilian employees
of the Corps of Engineers who were on duty in Hawaii during this
period ?
General Reybold. I have here the record of military personnel on
duty at the time under consideration, but have not a list of the civilian
personnel.
112. General Frank. It is the supervisory civilian personnel we
want. I would rather change that to supervisory civilian personnel.
General Reybold. I would suggest that the supervisory personnel be
obtained from the office of the District Engineer in Honolulu. Now,
would you prefer that we wire and get that for you? We probably
could.
113. General Grunert. It is up to you.
114. General Frank. Yes, we would like to have that list available
prior to going there, so that we shall know where they are. It may
be necessary to contact some of them in the United States.
115. General Grunert. We shall take a recess for five minutes.
(Thereupon there was a brief informal recess.)
[594.] 116. General Grunert. The Board will come to order.
117. General Frank. I should like to have this list of names in-
cluded in the record, but I should like to have after each name the
position that he held.
118. General Reybold. We shall be glad to furnish that information.
(List of names furnished by General Reybold is as follows :)
(Original transcript does not contain above-mentioned list.)
[596] 119, General Frank. Who was the contracting officer with
respect to the mentioned contract during this period ?
General Reybold. Colonel Theodore Wyman.
120. General Frank. What were the duties of the District Engineer
and the contracting officer with raspect to this mentioned contract?
General Reybold. Could I go back and add to that other question ?
"i ou asked who was the contracting officer. I think we should clear
up one point in there that you may want to follow up.
121. General Frank. Yes?
316 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Retbold. I said, Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., signed the
original contract and Supplements Nos. 2 to 10, both inclusive, and
Change Orders Nos. 1 to 6, both inclusive, as contracting officer. These
covered the period from 20 December 1940 to 29 November 1941.
Colonel (now Brigadier General, Retired) Warren T. Hannum, then
Division Engineer, South Pacific Division, signed Supplement No. 1
as contracting officer. Supplements and Change Orders numbered
higher than 10 and 6, respectively, bear dates "after Pearl Harbor."
And then in answer to the question, "Wliat were the duties of the
District Engineer and the contracting officer with respect to the
mentioned contract?" the answer: To administer and exercise general
supervision over the performance of the contract.
122. General Frank. What if any orders of the Corps of Engineers
prohibited the acceptance by the District Engineer and the contracting
officer of favors or gifts from contractors?
[597] General Reybold. Reference is made to Army Regulations
C'00-10, 6 December 1939, which was in effect during this period. Also
to the following provisions of Orders and Regulations, Corps of
Engineers, dated 15 January 1939 :
Par. 17 (c), Officers of the Corps of Engineers shall not engage in any work
outside the duties officially assigned to them that may interfere with the iter-
formance of their official duties or conflict with the duties asigned to the Corps
of Engineers and they shall not, without the prior assent of the Chief of Engi-
neers and the Secretary of War, accept compensation for services from any State,
municipality, corporation, or person that has any interest that touches on the
duties of the Corps of Engineers."
Par. 17 (d). Receipt by officers of pay from State or private interests for
services rendered in connection with the supervision of expenditure of funds
contributed toward river and harbor improvements is not authorized.
Par. 1039.8 (c). The practice of receiving presents from persons not in the
Military Establishment or in the employ of the Government in recognition of
services rendered, through not expressly forbidden, is opposed to the spirit of
the statute and for that reason is not approved by the department.
123. General Frank. Will you state generally from your memory
the provisions of Army Regulation 600-10?
General Reybold. That general paragraph forbids the [555]
acceptance of gifts.
124. General Frank. You may get it and read the language into the
record later.
Would you consider frequent companionship with, frequent enter-
tainment by, and association with a contractor by a District Engineer
as being in compliance with these general provisions ?
General Reybold. Personally I have always tried to avoid that sort
of thing, and I think you have got to know your contractors. There
are contractors who couldn't buy me a sandwich, and there are other
contractors who, out of mere courtesy, could buy me a sandwich so to
speak. In this particular instance it is apparent to me that there was
too much familiarity between the contracting officer and the con-
tractor, only as I observed from what I have heard and what I have
read, and from no first-hand information that I have ever observed.
125. General Frank. What if any orders of the Corps of Engineers
required that the loyalty and background of proposed contractors be
investigated before a contract w^as aAvarded?
General Reybold. None as to loyalty. At the time preceding the
awarding of this contract there was no occasion for the Chief of
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 317
Engineers to suspect or doubt the loyalty of any member of the con-
tracting group. Had there been, the matter would have been reported
to G-2 for appropriate attention. As of 20 December 1940, and before,
G-2 was the sole agency within the War Department charged with the
duty of reporting on and conducting investigations into matters per-
taining to loyalty.
128. General Frank. Has that procedure been changed in any way
[5^9] since December Tth ?
General Reybold. Loyalty investigations now rest with the Office
of the Provost Marshal General.
127. General Frank. Do you consider the present system is suf-
ficiently watertight?
General Reybold. I believe it is now, perhaps more as a result of
the investigation concerning this man Rohl than ever before.
128. General Frank. This still depends upon each of the various
agents concerned doing his part as he sees it in making the necessary
reports ?
General Reybold. That is correct.
129. General Frank. It does not siDecifically require an investiga-
tion into loyalty ; it is a question of a man's individual interpretation
of his duties ?
General Reybold. I would say you are correct insofar as contracts
within continental United States are concerned, but on the other
hand I do believe that contractors going into our outlying possessions,
and particularly to foreign countries, would be very, very carefully
surveyed.
130. General Frank. Do you feel that there is still room for im-
provement of the system of checking on these people ?
General Reybold. It could be strengthened.
131. General Frank. Who was responsible for investigating the
loyalty and background of the contractors in this mentioned contract?
General Reybold. I would say initially the contracting officer.
[600] 132. General Frank. Who was?
General Reybold. Who was Colonel Theodore Wyman.
133. General Frank. What reports with respect to the loyalty and
background of Hans Wilhelm Rohl, of the Rohl-ConnoUy Company
were received by the contracting officer, the District Engineer, the
Division Engineer, and the Chief of Engineers before this contract
was awarded?
General Reybold. None as to loyalty so far as the Chief of Engi-
neers was concerned.
134. General Frank. What attempts were made to get such
reports ?
General Reybold. None by the Office of the Chief of Engineers.
135. General Frank. What if any complaints or derogatory re-
marks as to performance by the contractors were received by the
contracting officer, the District Engineer, the Division Engineer, or
the Chief of Engineers before the Tth of December, '41 ?
General Reybold. None insofar as the Chief of Engineers is
concerned.
136. General Frank. If there were complaints, none of them got
as high as the Office of the Chief of Engineers ?
318 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Reybold. To the best of my knowledge, that answer is
correct.
137. General Frank. In your testimony covering any orders pro-
hibiting the acceptance by the District Engineer of Favors or gifts you
referred to Army Regulation 600-10. Can you give me the provisions
of that Army Regulation?
General Reybold (reading) :
It is impossible to [601] enumerate all of the various outside activi-
ties and interests to which these regulations refer. The following examples may
be regarded as typical :
138. General Frank. Are you reading from the Army Regulation ?
General Reybold. Yes, and the one to which I referred a few
moments ago.
139. General Frank. Yes.
General Reybold. That is all in quotation except, "and the one to
which I referred a minute ago." I mention (a) :
Acceptance by an oflScer of a substantial loan or gift or any emolument from
a person or firm with whom it is the officer's duty as an agent of the Government
to carry on negotiations.
[602] 140. General Frank. Have you any knowledge concern-
ing whether any military personnel neglected duties relating to this
contract ?
General Reybold. None to my knowledge.
141. General Frank. Have you any knowledge as to whether there
was any neglect of duty by not properly investigating the loyalty of
Hans Wilhelm Rohl prior to the award of the contract?
General Reybold. I would say there was none.
142. General Frank. Have you any information as to whether or
not there was neglect of duty by not supervising properly the per-
formance of the contractors work?
General Reybold. None, to my knowledge.
143. General Frank. You have already stated that so far as you
know there was no informing of higher authority of delays and de-
ficiencies.
General Reybold. I have here a telegram received from the
Hawaiian Department, addressed to the Adjutant General, under date
of June 11, 1941.
(Telegram dated June 11, 1941, from Hawaiian Department to
the Adjutant General, is as follows.)
I have been informed by the Division Engineer, San Francisco, that A-l-G
is the priority covering contract W-414 Engineer 784 with Interstate Equii>-
ment Corporation, Elizabeth, New Jersey, materials for cableway to Kaala
aircraft warning station covered by this contract. General Electric has sub-
contract for motor and all electrical equipment. According to Division Engi-
neer a delay of about fifteen weeks in the delivery of this electrical material
to contractor [603] is strongly probable under its priority. As this Kaala
station is most important in our aircraft warning system it is essential that
this cableway be completed early. In this Department this aircraft service is
considered to be the most important single project. War Department assistance
to District Engineer to have priority of this contract changed to A-l-B is
strongly recommended.
To which this office replied, under date of June 17, 1941, to the
Adjutant General, under the heading of Second Indorsement :
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 319
(Telegram dated June 17, 1941, from Chief of Engineers to the
Adjutant General, is as follows :)
1. By telephonic conversation with the Priorities Committee, Army and Navy
Munitions Board, a rating of A-l-C was authorized.
2. The contractor should contact his suppliers to determine if satisfactory
delivery can be made with this rating. If not, he should contact other sources
for early delivery.
3. In the event further assistance is requested instructions in circular letter
Finance No. 144 should be followed.
144. General Frank. Do you know the outcome of that?
General Reybold. I do not, without further search of the records.
145. General Frank. In any event, it was not sufficiently advanced
to enable the cableway to be constructed and the aircraft warning
system to be erected on Mt. Kaala prior to December 7. That is
correct, is it not ?
General Reybold, To my knowledge, that is correct.
[604] General Grunert. May I interject a question there? I
presume, with reference to raising the priority, it was raised when
you put it in 1-C. What does that mean in actual weeks' saving be-
tween one priority and the other, normally ?
General Reybold. I would never be able to answer that.
147. General Grunert. Why was it put in 1-C if it did not make
any difference ?
General Reybold. It would perhaps enable the manufacturer to
secure components at an earlier date than he would otherwise have
secured under the former priority.
148. General Frank. To your knowledge, what information was
given Colonel Wyman to complete these defense projects as speedily
as possible ?
General Reybold. None from my office, to my knowledge. The
presume, with reference to raising the priority, it was raised when
ment Commander.
149. General Frank. What were the functions of the position which
you occupied on the 20th of December, 1940, with respect to this
contract referred to above ?
General Reybold. I was G^ of the War Department.
150. General Frank. Did you have any responsibility in that
capacity for this contract?
General Reybold. Unquestionably there was something concerning
that matter that passed through G-4. What it was I do not remem-
ber at the moment.
151. General Frank. It was a matter of policy rather than one of
operation ?
General Reybold. Yes, indeed.
[60S] 152. General Frank. Have you any memory of anything
passing through G-4 with respect to this contract at that time?
General Reybold. I have a faint recollection of some difficulty in
fixing upon the location of some of the aircraft warning station sites.
153. General Frank. Was that some difficulty that you were hav-
ing with the Department of the Interior ?
General Reybold. Yes. That was mixed up in the affair. I think
the Secretary of the Interior was very insistent upon having locations
of roads and the character of the buildings that were to be installed
320 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
on his reservation placed before him for approval, or his representa-
tives.
154. General Frank. Do you know whether or not that held up
the work?
General Reybold. I do not.
155. General Frank. Can you find out?
General Reybold. I think you would have to obtain that from the
District Engineer's office in Honolulu, because evidence would have
to be weighed as to whether fixing upon the location or the receipt
of the last piece of material and equipment to be installed would be
a governing factor.
166. General Grunert. There is a question that I want to ask there :
Could a contract have been let without the location having been fixed?
In other words, if there was any delay would it have been before the
contract was let, or would that keep the contract from being let until
there was a determination ?
General Reybold. Not in this kind of a contract. General. This
is a so-called fixed-fee contract, and its terms are very flexible. I
might refer, perhaps, to what General Frank stated [606] in
one of his opening remarks, that the contract is very general in na-
ture, and the work was specified by job orders; and until one of
those job orders was issued there could be nothing specific concerning
any individual item.
157. General Frank. You read a radiogram from the Hawaiian
Department asking for a change in priority. Do you have any other
examples or instances in which there was complaint made or help
asked for from Hawaii to assist in completing those projects in
Hawaii ?
General Reybold. I have nothing insofar as our search of the rec-
ords has revealed to the moment. We are continuing our search, and
anything brought to light will be furnished to the Board.
158. General Frank. Will you give us negative as well as positive
information on that ?
General Reybold. Yes.
159. General Frank. So that if you do not find anything we will
be so advised ?
General Reybold. Yes ; I will be glad to do so.
160. General Frank. What means did the District Engineer,
Colonel Wyman, have to prod or drive the contractor or to bring
pressure to bear so that the work would be completed within the time
specified ?
General Reybold. He had full authority.
161. General Frank. What could he have done if the contractor
were not working as fast as he thought he should ?
General Reybold. He could have urged him verbally, urged him
in writing, and advised him that the contract would be canceled unless
he took steps to expedite it.
[607] 162. General Frank. This question has been answered
piecemeal. I will ask it again. What if any measures should have
been taken by personnel of the Corps of Engineers for the protection
of the Government against contracting with a person having a record
like that of Hans Wilhelm Rohl? What measures should have been
taken ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 321
Genef al Reybold. It is a difficult question to answer. If the char-
acter of the individual had in some manner been brought to the at-
tention of the Corps of Engineers, unquestionably the investigation
would have gone deeper; but under the circumstances there was no
reason to believe at that time, as far as I know, that the individual
was a dangerous character. I am told, although I have not looked
up the records, that he had done work for us on a breakwater some-
where on the Pacific Coast and that his services were satisfactory.
163. General Frank. He had been under investigation by the F. B.
I., had he not?
General Reybold. Not to our knowledge.
164. General Frank. That, in turn, indicates looseness in the gen-
eral system, does it not?
General Reybold. Perhaps so; yes.
165. General Frank. What if any rules or regulations did Colonel
Wyman violate in event that he, having been informed that Rohl
was an alien, discussed with him details of a secret defense project
contract ?
General Reybold. What did he violate?
166. General Frank. Yes.
General Reybold. I w^ould say, the rules of good judgment and
common sense.
[608] 167. General Frank. Is there any written regulation or
specific document that covers that?
General Reybold. AR 380-5, to safeguard military informa-
tion, certainly covers it.
168. General Grunert. When was that published?
General Reybold. June 10, 1939. *
169. General Frank. Did you ever receive notice or have knowl-
edge of any reports concerning the activities of Colonel Wyman in
Hawaii that were derogatory to Colonel Wyman ?
General Reybold. No ; I never had any such report.
170. General Frank. Were you Chief of Engineers when he was
relieved from Hawaii?
General Reybold. Yes.
171. General Frank. Did you ever receive notice or have knowl-
edge of a report dated the 14th of February, 1942, by an Army officer
to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to the effect
that Colonel Wyman should be relieved as District Engineer for
inefficiency ?
General Reybold. I do not recall any such thing. There may be
something like that in the record.
172. General Frank. When Colonel Wyman was relieved as Dis-
trict Engineer what were the circumstances ?
General Reybold. I believe that that was done after we had de-
centralized completely all engineer work to the Department Com-
mander ; and that was done by an order or circular letter of the Adju-
tant General of the Army under date of February 28, 1942.
173. General Frank. Do you know whether or not the question of
Wyman's efficiency entered into the matter ?
General Reybold. No. I do know this, that the Department
[SOO] Engineer, who was Colonel Lyman at that time, either wrote
a personal letter to me or to somebody in my office indicating that he
79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 1 22
322 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
could get along without Wyman over there, or perhaps better with-
out him. I am just stating from memory.
174. General Frank. Do you have a copy of that letter?
General Reybold. I do not know. I will have to look it up.
175. General Frank. Please look it up and let us have a copy of it
if it is available.
General Reybold. Yes, sir.
176. General Grunert. Colonel Lyman is deceased, is he not?
General Reybold. That is correct, sir.
177. General Frank. Are you conversant with any Inspector Gen-
eral's report on Colonel Wyman's operations as District Engineer in
Hawaii ?
General Reybold. Some time after Wyman was brought back to
this country and was then in charge of the Canol project, and as a
result of some reports received from that project, together with
some reports that had been received through a Congressman — I think
it was Representative Thomason of Texas — in which a contractor by
the name of McKee was registering some violent complaints about
Wyman and his activities in Hawaii, 1 asked for an Inspector General
to look into the matter, and a Colonel Hunt investigated the activities
in Alaska on the Canol project, and I think he extended his investi-
gation to Hawaii, but to what extent I do not remember. There is
a report from the Inspector General on file that perhaps is available.
178. General Frank. For the purposes of the record I will state
[010] that we have accessible Colonel Hunt's report on that in-
vestigation, and we are calling Colonel Hunt as a witness before the
Board.
Do you have any memory of wiiat the conclusions were of that in-
vestigation ?
General Reybold. To the effect that Colonel Wyman should not be
placed in charge. I do not know whether it said "of public works,"
or "civil works," or "large public works;" but the conclusion was that
he should not be placed in charge of large work in connection with
our works program, or words to that effect. I would rather get the
lecord on that.
179. General Frank. Has he been so placed since that time?
General Reybold. Since the receipt of that report?
180. General Frank. Yes.
General Reybold. No; he has not. He has been in command of a
general service regiment.
181. General Frank. With respect to the assignment of Colonel
Wyman on the Canol project, what if anything do j^ou know concern-
ing a contract or contracts awarded to Rohl's firm on this project?
General Reybold. I do not think that Rohl has ever been on that
project, although, in connection with an extension of the Alaskan
highway from Hanes, I believe it is called, down near Skagway to a
})oint somewhere north and west of Whitehorse, a contract was let
with Foley Brothers, and then I believe that certain equipment which
belongs to the Rohl-ConnoUy organization, was either brought on the
job or an attempt made to negotiate for that equi])nient. There was
some connection in the contract between Foley Brothers and this
particular strip of road to \011] which I refer.
182. General Frank. Was this during your regime as Chief of
Engineers ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 323
General E-eybold. Yes.
183. General Frank. Were yon conversant at that time with tho
AVyman-Rohl contact and intimacy ?
General Reybold. I would have to look up that contract. I do not
know whether Rohl's name appears in it or not, but I have my doubts
whether it appears. I think it was something that was brought to my
attention after that.
184. General Frank. Has there ever been in your mind any suspi-
cion about the association between Rohl and Wyman?
General Reybold. Not a bit, not in my mind.
185. General Frank. Does there now exist any suspicion?
General Reybold. Not in my mind. He is the most indiscreet man
that I ever knew. I would put it that way. I do not know Wvman,
but
186. General Frank. Who was indiscreet?
General Reybold. Wyman, in his business transactions. I do not
know the man" very well, but he is known to me as a "go-getter." In
what he does on the side he evidently is very, very indiscreet.
187. General Frank. When was Colonel Wyman relieved from his
assignment to the Canol project?
General Reybold. It was prior to Hunt's investigation.
188. General Frank. Will you provide that particular informatioii
witli the particulars surrounding his relief in detail?
General Reybold. Yes.
189. General Frank, You have a Colonel Horowitz?
[612] General Reybold. Yes.
190. General Frank. Colonel Horowitz made an investigation of
that situation, did he not?
General Reybold. He made an investigation of the progress of con-
struction in what we called our Northwest Division, and his report was
very derogatory concerning Wyman in his treatment of personnel and
other matters.
191. General Grunert. Is that report available?
General Reybold. I think it is.
192. General Grunert. Do you have a copy of it?
19o. Major Clausen. We have a copy, sir.
194. General Frank. What if anything did you have to do with
Colonel Wyman 's first assignment ?
General Reybold. I had all to do with it. I relieved him from
service in the Northwest Service Command and sent him to a general
service regiment.
195. General Frank. Do you know what has been the nature of
liis services in that regiment?
General Reybold. No; I do not. It was trained at Camp Clai-
bourne, Louisiana, and later went to England, and I do not know just
exactly the service of either himself or his regiment from that date.
196. General Frank. Do you have anything in addition to the
answers to the questions I have asked you that you want to state to the
Board with respect to this situation ?
General Reybold. I have nothing further to state to the Board.
197. General Grunert. General Ru=!sell. have you anv question';?
[613] 198. General Russell. Reference has been made to the
elasticity of this basic contract under which the work was to be
done at Honolulu. I have gotten the impression, General, that
324 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
you entered into a contract in which you paid the contractor for
whatever he did plus some profit.
General Retbold. Plus a fixed fee ; yes.
199. General Russell. You could do anything out there that you
wanted to do under this basic contract?
General Retbold. That is correct.
200. General Grunert. As I understand it, then, this basic con-
tract was awarded in December of 1940, and under that basic con-
tract there were a number of subcontracts which resulted in job
orders, so-called. A job order specifies the actual date of com-
pletion ?
General Reybold. Yes.
201. General Grunert. Why the constant revision and constant
changes of the estimated date of completion? Was there anything
anywhere along the line that pinned down the contractor to finish
the work in a specified time?
General Retbold. Only by the issuance of the job order. You
will find instances in which the job order was revised.
202. General Grunert. Who had the authority .to revise it?
General Retbold. That is all in the hands of the contracting
officer and the District Engineer, who, in this case, were one and
the same.
203. General Grunert. Then if you have contracts which are not
on a fixed-fee basis, and are flexible, the contractor must live up
to it more than in the case of the other kind ?
General Retbold. Yes, sir. If you have what we term a [614-]
firm contract or a lump-sum contract, the time for completion is
definitely specified. But frequently in cases of those contracts there
are delays that cannot be charged to the contractor, and then the
contracting officer, after hearing the evidence, may supplement that
contract and extend the time of completion.
204. General Grunert. Then it is within the judgment of the Dis-
trict Engineer or the one who awarded the contract ?
General Retbold. Yes.
205. General Grunert. It can go on ad infinitum, as far as he is
concerned, if he believes that it is justified?
General Retbold. He could, but in some cases he may have to refer
the contract to his higher echelon, the Division Engineer, or over to
the Chief of Engineers for approval of these extensions.
206. General Grunert. What I am getting at is the picture, as you
see it, just as well as the Board is trying to look at it. Almost a year
had gone by from the time they started the Air Warning Service over
there, and to complete these stations a lot of construction had to take
place, a lot of material had to be furnished. Then came along, in
June, definite contracts, and they were delayed and delayed or revised
until the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Board must find the facts in
the case and must render a report on who is reponsible for these de-
lays. Were they acts of God? Were they created by man, or what?
So far as you know, the Chief of Engineers Office had no control over
those delays ?
General Retbold. No, except that a report may have [6^5]
reached our office to give help.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 325
207. General Grunert. The only report you received to give help
was that one of June 11 ; and you gave such help as you could under
the circumstances ?
General Reybold. Yes. There may be others in our records, but I
cannot tell you until our search is more complete.
208. General Grunert. I wish that search would be as complete as
possible, because I think a great deal depends on whether or not those
who were on the ground and howled to be given help could have done
something themselves.
209. General Frank. The establishment of priorities might have
had some very potent effects on this construction. Is that correct?
General Retbold. Yes. But if I may say this to the Board, upon
the conclusion of the Board's detailed investigation in the field you
may be able to pick up some leads that would be beneficial to us in
running down what we did do over here in response to certain re-
quests that perhaps w^e will not find in our records.
210. General Grunert. General Short in his testimony referred to a
message he sent to the Adjutant General complaining about this fif-
teen weeks' delay before he could get any cable over there ; and so the
action taken here to help in that particular instance ought to be pretty
well traced if we can possibly do it.
What is this system of priorities? Will you explain to the Board
the system of priorities and who makes them and who can change
them so that you could get something done more quickly and get things
done in the time in which they ought to be done ?
[676'] General Reybold. Yes. In the old days that was more
or less wholly within the hands of the Army and Navy Munitions
Board. Then when the War Production Board came into being, I
think that is the ultimate authority now on these higher priorities.
But I firmly believe in those days that the Army and Navy Munitions
Board set the priorities. At least they did a mighty good job on the
screening process to see whether they should be pushed up in priority.
211. General Grunert. Priority on materials, priority on shipping,
priority on raw materials, or what?
General Reybold. Mostly on manufactured goods.
212. General Grunert. If it were a question of cable, what would
that mean ?
General Reybold. That would mean that perhaps the Navy was in
for a vast quantity of cable, that the Maritime Commission might be
in for a vast quantity of cable, and the Signal Corps might be in for a
vast quantity of cable.
213. General Grunert. At that time, if that were the case, and he
asked for priorities, say, on getting cable, whose business was it to
represent to the Army and Navy Munitions Board the urgency of
sending that cable to the District Engineer over there so he could
satisfy the Commanding General ?
General Reybold. In the first place, the Commanding General over
there would make his request, and it was up to us to transmit that right
over to the War Department, which we did promptly, and get it before
the Army and Navy Munitions Board; and probably some of our
people over there appeared in person to try to get it.
[617] 214. General Grunert. Presumably it was done because
you changed the priority ?
326 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Reybold. Yes.
215. General Grunert. Was there any follow-up on this?
General Reybold. I cannot say at the moment.
216. General Grunert. You do not know whether he complained
again or whether your office on its own hook followed up to see whether
or not what you had arranged had actually been acceded to?
General Reybold. I am certain of a follow-up in our office, because
that is one thing that we do pay particular attention to.
217. General Grunert. Suppose this priority is granted: Who
determines whether or not there is shipping space to get the cable to
him ? Where does that come in ?
General Reybold. Through the Transportation Corps.
218. General Grunert. They had their priority question?
General Reybold. In that particular case I think General Hannum,
our Division Engineer out there, did a mighty good job. He was right
behind all those shipments, and I might say also in representing
Wyman in this country in procurement of materials needed for that
vast job over there.
219. General Grunert. If you as an engineer had been in Wyman's
shoes over there and had a job to do — I as Commanding General and
you as District Engineer. Suppose I should say, "Here, Reybold, I
have got to get those stations in. My whole plan depends on it. I
have got to get them in in a hurry. You have the contracts." What
could you do or what would you have done to put those things
through ?
[•618] General Reybold. I certainly would have prepared a tele-
gram for the signature of the Commanding General to the War
Department w^ith all the power I could put behind it.
220. General Grunert. And if you did not get action you would do
it again ?
General Reybold. Yes.
221. General Grunert. Until you were told to stop ?
General Reybold. That is right.
222. General Russell. Suppose you had a different sort of engineer
out there, a .go-getter type, who thinks that the Commanding General
doesn't know what it is all about, anyway, and he doesn't follow up.
What could the Commanding General dp about it?
General Reybold. What I would do would be to report him over
here to the Chief of Staff and have him kicked out of there.
223. General Russell. Would you go over to the War Department?
General Reybold. Yes. Any Department Commander who sent
anything to me and said, "You have a District Engineer who is not
playing the game with me," — ^lie would be out of there on the next boat,
as far as I am concerned.
224. General Russell. You have made rather a careful search and
you have not found one line from Wyman about any other delays out
there ?
General Reybold. We have not found anything here so far. Han-
num was doing everything in the world for Lyman at that time. I do
not know about telephone calls.
225. General Grunert. Right on that line : You referred to Wyman
as a go-getter. Go-getters usually take the sort of [619] action
that you say you think you would take. Why, then, all these delays?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 327
Can you put your finger on why there was a delay at least from June
to December? Have you tried to analyze that in your own mind as
to what caused these delays, priorities, materials, conniving, or what?
General Rfa'bold. I think a combination of factors, General. I am
only giving my opinion, because I have tried to wade into this the same
as you gentlemen have. But I think one of the great delays was inde-
cision as to location, indecision as to how many of these air warning
stations should be adopted in their program.
226. General Grunert. AVlio makes that decision ?
General Reybold. I sho^uld think all the planning was done by the
Commanding General and his Department Engineer. He had a De-
partment Engineer. They did the planning ; also G-4.
227. General Gritnert. The Commanding General would have to
approve those plans and any changes in them before they were ever
adopted as a job order?
General Reybold. All that planning would come up to a certain
point, and when concluded it would be turned over to the District En-
gineer, who was Wyman. If all I hear about Wyman is true — and I
know very little about Wyman personally; I had never served with
him ; but all through the whole Corps of Engineers, if you wanted
soinebody to go get somebody to do something, they would have selected
Wyman. He is a go-getter. How much his ears were knocked back
by the high command over there I do not know; but I do not think
there is anybody that can knock his ears back if he has materials in
there to do a job.
\6S0] 228. General Grunert. Then he was really selected foi"
this job because of that reputation? Is that the reason he was
selected for successive large construction jobs that involved go-gettei"s
to get things done?
[6£1] General Reyb-old. He was, in comiection with the Fort
Peck dam. Now, whetlier he was sent to Hawaii for that purpose, I am
inclined to think that he was due for foi-eign service and was sent to
Hawaii under the old "foreign service jilan."
229. General Russell. Is there any evidence in your records indicat-
ing that this delay could in any way be attributed to slow operations on
the part of the contractor?
General Reybold. No, sir.
230. General Russell. There is no evidence, therefore, that indicates
that he "drug his feet" at all?
General Reybold. No, sir.
231. General Russell. In the event he was operating rather slowly,
do you think the fact that Wyman may have been under some sort of
obligation to the contractor because of extensive entertainment might
have prevented Wyman from "pinning back the ears" of that con-
ti-actor?
General Reybold. Oh, I would doubt that ! I think Wyman is the
type of man that would really "kick anybody down" to accomplish his
mission of consti'uction work.
232. General Russell. Notwithstanding the fact that he may have
been on a liquor party with a man whose "ears" he was going to "pin
bnck," for three or four days prior to that?
General Reybold. Absolutely.
233. General Russell. It would have no effect on him, at all?
328 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Reybold. No, sir ; I do not think it would have a bit of effect
on him.
234. General Russell. And yet you have never served with Wyman ?
General Reybolu. I have never served with him.
235. General Russell. And all of your opinion of Wyman has been
[633] formed on these reports about his disposition as a "go-
getter" ?
General Reybold. That is correct ; by very reliable officers in the
Corps of Engineers.
236. General Russell. Let us go back to the time you made your
basic contract in December 1940. Were you furnished at that time
with any plan by the tactical command out there as to what they wanted
done with respect to an air warning service ? I do not care to go into
the details of the plan. I am attempting to find out if the tactical peo-
ple gave you a plan in 1940.
General Reybold. Only from hearsay. Have you had Colonel
Fleming before the Board ?
237. General Russell. Not yet.
General Reybold. Have you listed him ?
238. General Frank. Yes.
General Reybold. I would judge that he would give you a very good
explanation.
239. General Russell. Was or not this establishment of an air
warning service out there an integral part of the job that these people
were employed to do ?
General Reybold. Yes, indeed ! This is incorporated right in the
contract, isn't it?
240. General Russell. Can you tell us how much of these funds that
were being allotted for your Hawaiian Department contract were
going to be expended on this air-warning-service installation?
General Reybold. I couldn't tell you, unless they came in [623]
with a separate project, for approval.
241. General Russell. The point I make is this. General — that the
engineers in the Chief of Engineers' office did not make the contract
and agree to pay that man an approximate sum of money for an air-
warning service, unless you knew something about the nature of the
service, did you ?
General Reybold. That's correct. The original contract on that
must be based on some sort of estimate; otherwise you couldn't de-
termine his fixed fee.
242. General Russell. And that estimate was based on a plan for the
establishment of an air-warning service?
General Reybold. Unquestionably, as one of the items.
243. General Russell. Do you know how much of a change occurred
in that plan between that date and June ?
General Reybold. No, sir.
244. Geeneral Russell. And yet you testify that in your opinion the
change in the plan by the tactical command was the prime factor in
working delay out there?
General Reybold. No, I didn't testify definitely. ^
245. Greneral Russell. I will ask two or three more questions along
this line. General, you do not know now how many changes occurred
on the part of the tactical commander between December 1940 and
June 1941, as to the establishment of this air-warning service?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 329
General Reybold. No.
246. General Eussell. That would be a matter of record entirely ?
General Reybold. I would think so, yes.
247. General Russell. And the facts would have to be obtained
elsewhere ?
[624] General Reybold. That's true.
248. General Russell. But when you let your initial contract in
December 1940, it was based on a definite plan for the establishment
of an air-warning service out in Hawaii ?
General Reybold. That is correct.
249. General Russell. And therefore the tactical people, who had
been in there before, had worked out a plan for that system, and it
was in existence in December 1940 ?
General Reybold. Must have been; yes,
250. General Russell. And there is, in the Engineer's office, in
Honolulu, a record of all of these changes that had been proposed
by the tactical commander between li^40 and the date of the comple-
tion of the air-warning service?
General Reybold. Must be.
251. General Russell. And we can get that out there ?
General Reybold. That's correct, sir.
252. General Russell. And so far as you know, that is the only
place ?
General Reybold. That is correct.
253. General Russell. You referred to the mobile stations, a mo-
ment ago, and it is your opinion that the engineers had something
to do with the construction of those stations ?
General Reybold. I think we would have built the shelters and
roads into the stations, of course.
254. General Russell. Whatever the causes may have been, General,
not one of these fixed or permanent stations in connection with the
air-warning service had been completed on December 7, 1941 ?
General Reybold. That's correct, although the report [625]
that we had from the field indicated that one of those stations was
fairly well completed on November 30.
255. General Grunert. If not complete, could they have been oper-
ated, do you know ?
General Reybold. I don't know.
256. General Russell. I was going to ask this question in comiec-
tion with that same thought: If they had not been completed, the
engineer people or the contracting people were there, engaged in com-
pleting it?
General Reybold. I can't answer that question.
257. General Russell. Isn't it true that the tactical commander
would have been prevented from moving in and taking over those in-
stallations and beginning their operation, until the work had been
completed and had been approved and accepted by the engineers?
General Reybold. That isn't true in all instances, General, because
we have now in our program, and even during the big program in
this country, what we term "beneficial occupancy," when the using
agencies did move in prior to positive, absolute, 100% completion.
258. General Russell. You do not know whether this system of
"beneficial occupancy" was in effect as respects those permanent radar
stations in Hawaii on the 7th of December, 1941 ?
330 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Eetbold. I do not.
259. General Russell. Is there anywhere that we could determine
whether or not negotiations for that "beneficial occupancy" had been
initiated, and the result thereof ?
General Reybold. Only on the ground, in Hawaii.
260. General Russell. I think we have discussed quite freely
[6£6] with you the opinion which you have of Wyman, and the
sources from which you got your information on which to base that
opinion. Now, General, you testified rather vigorously a while ago
as to his efficiency out there in Hawaii. Was that opinion of Wyman
changed in any way by virtue of Hunt's report?
General Reybold. I really couldn't say. I glanced over that re-
port, General, but I would have to go back and read it. I really don't
know. I suppose that assisted him in the formulation of his judgment
that never again should this man be placed on a big job of construction
and responsibility where he is dealing with contractors.
261. General Russell. You were charged then with the responsi-
bility of arriving at a conclusion about whether or not you would take
him off that sort of work, were you not ?
General Reybou). When I got Hunt's report ?
262. General Russell. Yes.
General Reybold. 1 had him off before that, I think.
263. General Russell. What had happened. General, that made
you change your opinion of Wyman as an outstanding "go getter,"
especially fitted for the big stuff out in Hawaii, taking him off and
sending him to a service regiment ? What were your mental processes 'i
General Reybold. My mental processes were, even though he is a
"go-getter," he just makes too damned much trouble for me to be
bothered with that kind of people, I can find other people who don't
make all that kind of mess, who will go and do a job. Now, that's the
whole thing, in a nutshell.
264. General Russell. Let us sum it up : He could do his job, but he
carried a mess along with it ?
[6i^7] General Reybold. That's right.
265. General Russell. And you wanted somebody who would do
the job and leave the mess at home?
General Reybold. That's right.
266. General Russell. So you put him in the service regiment?
Now, what would be your definition of the "mess" that he made?
General Reybold. Oh, complaints — complaints from his subordi-
nates— and of course these things that have come up in connection
with this contract — that's enough for me. I said the man is indiscreet,
and I would say that he is exceedingly indiscreet in his deahngs with
contractors who are doing work for the Government, if it all be true —
"if it all be true."
267. General Russell. You believed in the reality of those charges
or the truthfulness of those charges to the extent that you decided
to relieve him from that sort of work, didn't you ?
General Reybold. Yes, sir.
268. General Frank. I would like to ask a question, there. You
are his direct superior ?
General Reybold. That's right.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 331
269. General Frank. In the face of all this indiscretion, have you
ever had it investigated, as his superior, with a view to determining
whether or not he should be disciplined ?
General Retbold. That's the reason I sent Hunt up there, or asked
the Inspector General to send an inspector up there.
270. General Frank. If that be the case, then why were not Hunt's
conclusions pursued more vigorously and more intimately ?
General Eeybold. There was nothing in Hunt's recommendation,
to my knowledge, that this man should be brought to trial, or anything.
[628] 271. General Russell. I have no more questions.
272. General Grunert. I have a few questions to clear up, here.
Are delays such as appear to have occurred in these contracts in
Hawaii normal under a fixed-fee contract^ In other words, do a
lot of these contracts hang over, change, and one thing and another,
so that when you figure on something's being done in about three
months it usually takes about six or nine ?
General Reybold. No, sir; that's not common.
273. General Grunert. That is not common ?
General Reybold. No, sir.
274. General Grunert. The causes that you stated that might have
caused delay, here, are those causes common to contracts, as a rule —
priorities, and inclement weather, and those that you enumerated?
Are those particular to that Hawaiian bunch of contracts ?
General Reybold. They may apply, of course, anywhere, but I
think that that group of generalities mentioned by me on more than
one occasion this morning might well bear further investigation to
get down to some of the details. Anj^ contractor on a job, or we
in preparing our plans and specifications and our estimates, and the
time of completion, of course, take into consideration weather condi-
tions. If you start a job, in other words, in a northern territory in
November, you know that you are going to get into difficulties of
weather, but if you start to build in northern New York in May, you
have the season ahead of you and you know your weather pretty well.
275. General Grunert. Usually in making an estimate of the sit-
uation, which is true about your estimate of the date of completion of
the contract, do not the experienced engineers [629] take that
into consideration? They make estimates, and then they have to
reestimate, and sometimes do it a third time? Is that normal in a
series of contracts, or is that quite abnormal ?
General Reybold. It is abnormal, and every contract, in tlie conduct
of its prosecution, would have to be considered on its own merits, and
even every one of these job-orders that you have under consideration
here will have to be considered on its own merits.
276. General Grunert. When it gets to the place where a district
engineer doesn't think his contractors are coming across, can he not
abrogate that contract, can he not give it to somebody else, and get the
job done?
General Reybold. Yes, sir; yes, sir.
277. General Grunert. And none of that was done in this case,
apparently ?
General Reybold. I don't know w^hether it was or not. I doubt it.
278. General Grunert. I do not know of any. We have not gone
332 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
into it thoroughly yet, but I do not know of any case where they say,
"You haven't done this job; we give it to somebody else"; but that is
done, not infrequently, is it ?
General Reybold. Oh, it is very seldom that we have to come to
that ; once in a while.
279. General Grunert. What conditions require or demand that, or
you do take it out of their hands and do it yourself, or get somebody
else to contract?
General Reybold. A breach of contract, or a man who doesn't pro-
gress, doesn't show that he has made any [630] effort to pro-
gress, he hasn't brought any additional equipment on, as required or
as requested by us, and we have played along with him and tried to be
square — then we notify him that he is done, or that if he isn't going to
come across within 30 days we are going to take his contract away
from him.
280. General Grunert. Then it is usually a question of good will
and intent, to a great extent ?
General Reybold. Yes, sir.
281. General Grunert. I think Wyman was decorated with some
sort of decoration. Was that done through your office? If so, for
what reason ?
General Reybold. That was done on the recommendation of General
Hannum, and I think it was for his work in relation to the construc-
tion of those "stepping-stone" airfields, if I remember correctly. We
have a record on that.
282. General Grunert. You mean that would be beyond Hawaii?
General Reybold. Yes, sir.
283. General Grunert. On the way out to the Far East ?
General Reybold. Yes, sir.
284. General Grunert. He was given what — the Legion of Honor,
or the Legion of Merit?
General Reybold. He was given a Distinguished Service Medal. I
will check on that. Maybe you would like to have the citation. Gen-
eral, and the recommendation upon which it was based, for your
record.
285. General Frank. Yes.
286. General Grunert. Together with the time it was actually
recommended.
287. General Frank. Yes — and the time it was awarded.
[63J] 288. General Grunert. One more question. I think it
will probably be of value in checking. This Advisory Committee
that investigates contracts and one thing and another — is there a
chairman of that Advisory Committee, and do you recall who was
Chairman ?
General Reybold. We can find that out.
289. General Frank. I want the name of the one single individual
who is best qualified to give us information on what went on in the
Contract Advisory Committee in the fall of 1940. Can you give us
that name, now ?
General Reybold. Will you let me find out? I know what you
want.
290. General Frank. You will advise us with respect to that name ?
General Reybold. I will.
291. General Grunert. Are there any other questions?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 333
292. General Frank. You called this contract a "cost-plus-fixed-
fee" contract ?
General Reybold. That is right.
293. General Frank. And in this type of contract there usually is
no penalty clause ?
General Reybold. No, there is no penalty clause.
294. General Frank. In a fixed contract, there is a penalty clause,
as a rule, in which event, if the contract is not finished on time, through
the fault of the contractor, he pays a penalty ?
General Reybold. That is correct.
295. General Frank. That is one of the disadvantages of this type
of contract, is it not?
General Reybold. It is; but I doubt whether you could ever
[632] have gotten anybody to go over there on a lump-sum basis,
with so many unknowns attached to a contract, and get it under way.
There was no other way in God's world of prosecuting a contract such
as this, except under this cost-plus-a-fixed-fee basis.
296. General Frank. Who presented the case of the War Depart-
ment to the Priorities Board in order to get a high priority for ma-
teriel for the War Department ?
General Reybold. We will have to furnish that information later,
General.
297. General Frank. What I am after is this : How was its strate-
gical urgency represented to the Priorities Board ?
General Reybold, I couldn't answer that, unless these individual —
I cannot answer that question.
298. General Frank. This thought enters into this situation : it is,
that here was a highly important strategical project that was not
finished in time, so that the permanent aircraft warning service was
effective on December 7. It is possibly conceivable that direct re-
sponsibility can be traced back to the failure to give sufficiently high
priority to the materiel going into that project, is it not?
General Reybold. It is possible.
299. General Frank. Therefore, the details following through to
the conclusion of that priority's being established is something in
which we are interested, do you see?
General Reybold. Yes, indeed ; and I would suggest that the records
of our Division Office at San Francisco, and Colonel Hannum, be con-
sulted very freely in those matters, particularly in connection with
shipping facilities to Hawaii at that time.
300. General Frank. Another thing on which I would like to
[6'33] ask you to make a record is to give us as complete a list as
possible from your point of view of possible reasons of delays that
contributed to the delay in finishing this work at Hawaii.
General Reybold. You want that for the record, or just possible
delays that we might think of, over in our office ?
301. General Frank. I would like to have you, within the next day
or two, send us a written statement of those, will you please ?
General Reybold. I would be glad to do so, and that will relate also
to our Division Office?
302. General Frank. Yes.
General Reybold. In San Francisco ?
303. General Frank. Yes.
334 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Wliat do you know about disciplinary action of Wyman as the result
of the Dawson Creek explosion? Are you familiar with that ?
General Reybold. I am familiar with it to the extent that there was
an explosion. It might be well to have General Worsham of our
present office over here, who was in command.
304. General Grunert. He was your District Engineer in charge?
General Reybold. He was the District Engineer, at that time.
305. General Fraxk. Do you know whether or not there was any
disciplinary action taken against Wyman ?
General Reybold. Xot to my knowledge.
306. General Fraxk. That is what I am interested in.
General Reybold. There is a report. Somebody certainly made a
report on that thing, whether it was our fire-fighting people or whether
it was the Provost Marshal General, or the FBI, or what went up
there. It was on Canadian territory.
[6S4-^ 307. General Fraxk. You would have a report of disci-
plinary action under the 104th Article of War. would you not?
General Reybold. Oh, yes.
308. General Fraxk. By and large — and I have brought this out
before, in testimony — the general system of information with respect
to personnel, activities, G-2 information, and so forth, as it relates to
contracts, is not so clean-cut. would you say?
General Reybold. It is not.
309. General Fraxk. I have nothing further.
310. General Grunert. General Russell?
311. General Russell. Xo.
312. General Gruxert. Thank you very much. General. We took
quite a bit of your time.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
General Gruxert. The Board will recess until 2 o'clock.
(Thereupon, at 1 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2 o'clock
p. m.)
[OSS] afferxoox session
(The Board at 2 o'clock p. m. continued the hearing of witnesses.)
TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL JULIAN L. SCHLEY, UNITED
STATES ARMY
(The witness was sworn by the recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Will you state to the Board your name, rank,
organization, and station?
General Schley. Julian L. Schley, Major General, United States
Army, Retired; called back to active service. My address is 8881
Department of Commerce Building, Washington, D. C.
2. General Gruxert. General, the Board is after facts and. in
view of the position held by you leading up to and during the Pearl
Harbor attack, we hope that you have some facts that will help us
to get down to the bottom of the real picture and throw some light
PROCEEDINGS OF ARIMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 335
on the subject. It is a lar<2:e field that we have to cover, and we
have a limited time in which to cover it. So we have parceled out
the special investigation fields to members of the Board. The entire
Board will pass on evervthin<T for each field, but one member is par-
ticularly looking after certain lines. So General Frank will pro-
pound tlie questions at this time and General Russell and I will
interject when we think somethin2: needs elaboration.
3. General Frank. On what duty were you in December. 1940?
General Schley. I was Chief of Engineers. United States Army.
4. General Frank. When did your tour in that job start and end?
General Schley. It started about September of 1937 and [6.36]
ended, so far as my official duties were concerned, on September 8.
1941. when I entered on a leave of absence.
5. General Frank. What were your responsibilities with respect
to contracts which were entered into by the personnel of the Corps
of Engineers?
General Schley. In a normal case, in normal times. I was the last
authority which signed contracts when they came to me for signature.
Some of them did and some did not. In the case, however, of those
whicli pertained to cost-plus-a-fee which the office had entered into in
considerable quantities in the latter part of 1940. because of the amount
of work then in progress, I signed the papers, but they had to be
reviewed and signed again as final authority by the I'nder Secretary
of War. The diflference between the ordinary contract and these
cost-plus-a-fee contracts I will be glad to explain if you are interested.
6. General Grunert. Yes; I would like to hear your explanation.
General Schley. The usual method of our entering into contracts
for ordinary work is to advertise for bids, which is common in all
government work, and to award the bid to the lowest responsible
bidder. That is the usual government system and it is well adapted
to our government. It gives all contractors opportunity and prevents
partiality as well as giving opportunity. For two reasons that is not
applicable under some conditions. Those two reasons generally are
that if the specifications and drawings are not complete and. therefore,
what you are advertising for bids on is not definite, then a cost-plus-a-
fee contract will allow you to start work right away, and the designing
merely goes along with the work. The second reason for resorting
to that is the failure of contractors to meet [637] competition.
Both of those were true in the emergency period of our building, be-
cause there were hardly enough contractors so that the competition
was not real competition. Also, we were starting construction at the
earliest possible time. So, for both those reasons the United States
turned to cost-plus-a-fee contracts, and that was the system which was
rather closely held in hand by the Under Secretary of War who gave
directions as to how it would be proceeded with.
7. General Grunert. Then the latter class, the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee,
would appear to get the quickest action and it would be more flexible ;
is that right ?
General Schley. Yes. A cost-plus-a-fee contract is almost like a
government representative doing the work himself. He uses the con-
tractor's personnel and his labor and his plant as he sees fit to use it.
336 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
In the firm bid contract form in open competition there are two
particuhir things the contractor bids on. After he reads and fully
understands the specifications and the terms of the proposed contract
he bids on the cost he is willing to be paid for doing the work ; second,
the time at which it will be done. That time is often stated in the
contract. He therefore binds himself to do those two things; finish
at the date set and to be paid this fixed amount of money. In order
to do that he must know very definitely the work to be done.
8. General Grunert, Would the straight contract as distinguished
from the cost -plus-a -fee not encourage more responsible bidders, more
reliable firms, to carry it out than the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee?
General Schley. No. 1 think that that is not true. In fact, I
AYOuld not say the opposite is true, but there is a [638] tendency
in that direction. The private owner of property seldom advertises
broadly for bids, because he only wants to consider contractors of
reputation whom he knows or about whom he can get information.
He might ask selected ones to bid against each other. Irresponsible
men often bid, and the government has to determine which man is
responsible. So you do not necessarily get a better man by competi-
tion. You aften get a man who has not the plant, who has not the
knowledge or the financial responsibility. You have got to guard
against awarding it to him, to the low man who has those charac-
teristics. When you have a cost-plus-a-fee bid you must have some
very good system of preventing the contract being given at the end
to a poor contractor.
9. General Grunert. Under which system do you get more knowl-
edge of the contractor; or are they about equal in that respect?
General Schley. I do not know that I would say there is much dif-
ference there. You do not offer it to the man who is a poor contractor.
10. General Frank. On the other hand, in a fixed-fee contract you
generally have a penalty clause ?
General Schley. For time.
11. General Frank. In the cost-plus contract you have no penalty
clause ?
General Schley. That is correct.
12. General Frank. Therefore you have something ^ery definite to
which to hold the man in the fixed-fee contract ?
General Schley. Yes. And if you have all your specifications and
drawings made so that what you are advertising to be done is very
definite, and you have real competition among the [6S9] bid-
ders, that is the normal way and the best way, all things considered.
13. General Frank. Are you familiar with the negotiations for the
basic contract which is designated by W— 414— Eng-602 dated 20 De-
cember, 1940, which was the basic contract for the construction of de-
fense projects in the Hawaiian Islands with the Hawaiian Constructors
for defense projects in Hawaii?
General Schley. I am familiar with only what the records show in
the office of the Chief of Engineers, because I do not remember the
contract specificall}^, personally. I had occasion to examine the rec-
ords when the Military Affairs Committee was looking into the matter
about four months ago, so that I am now fairly familiar with the
contract and what the record shows as to the steps leading up to it.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 337
14. General Frank. Could you give us your background on that?
General Schley. I have some notes on the subject which came from
the records in the office of the Chief of Engineers which I will refer to.
15. General Frank. You were Chief of Engineers at the time, were
you not?
General Schley. That is correct.
16. General Frank. And this contract came to you for approval?
General Schley. It came to me for approval or, you might say, for
recommendation to the Under Secretary of War for his approval.
17. General Frank. After you signed it, it then went on up to the
Under Secretary of War who, in turn, approved it?
General Schley. That is correct.
18. General Frank. Will you proceed, then, with your discussion
of the contract ?
[640] General Schley. I might preface this by saying that in
my department the selection of the contracting firm originally was
done in the field by the District Engineer, and we attempted to keep
that practice, and all during the time I was in the office we felt that our
men in the field, who had certain districts to work in and who had
been in there for some time, knew the contractors in that area. There-
fore, the recommendation initially came in from the District Engineer
recommending that a certain contractor be given a certain award, a
certain contract. However, we had to get permission first to use the
cost-plus-a-fee system. The records show that application for
approval of a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee form of construction contract was
submitted on the 14th of December, 1940, by Colonel Theodore
Wyman, Jr., who was at that time District Engineer of the Hawaiian
District, and it was forwarded by first endorsement the same day from
the Division Engineer, Colonel J. G. Matheson, Engineer, United
States Army.
If you do not know the organization, I will be glad to explain the
districts and divisions.
There were 40-odd districts into which the country was divided, and
again grouped into about 11 engineer divisions.
19. General Frank. Where was Wyman ?
General Schley. In Honolulu.
20. General Frank. Where was Matheson?
General Schley. In San Francisco.
21. General Frank. How did that contract get Wyman's and Math-
eson's signature on the same day ?
General Schley, Evidently they were together on that date in con-
ference, or otherwise ; I do not know. My record here does not show
whether that was in San Francisco or not that the two \64-i]
were together.
That organization was one of our permanent organizations, because
the Corps of Engineers has public works to do, which are civil en-
gineering construction, as well as some military construction. At
this stage we were in process of taking over additional construction.
We had had only sea-coast fortifications^ and at this time we had been
given fairly recently construction at Air Corps stations in addition,
and we were in process of taking that over from the Quartermaster.
22. General Frank. You were given the construction of other than
Air Corps stations, were you not ?
79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1 23
338 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Schley. Not until about eight months later, I think. On
December 18 a letter to the Assistant Secretary of War was written by
Lieutenant Colonel Earl E. Gesler, Corps of Engineers, Finance Sec-
tion, in the office of the Chief of Engineers, requesting authority for
use of the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee form of contract. This was approved
by the Under Secretary of War by first endorsement December 20,
1940, stating that the Secretary of War had determined that it was
necessary to enter into a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract for construc-
tion and gave authority to enter into negotiations, the contractor se-
lected and the contractor's fee being subject to approval by the Under
Secretary of War,
General Frank. May we have a copy of that submitted to us for our
record ?
General Schley. Those are in the office of the Chief of Engineers
Avhich I have no connection with.
I might explain at that point that there were two features which
the Under Secretary of War watched particularly in the case of these
contracts. The first, for very evident reasons, 1^4^^ was the
contracting firms which we selected ; and one of the things, of course,
Avhich he watched was to see that we used impartiality and used what
he called local contractors. For instance, for work in Baltimore, if
possible the contract would be awarded to a Maryland contractor.
Second, it was to see that the fixed fee was not excessive. He did
not want the fees to climb to unreasonable figures.
On December 20, 1940, Colonel Gesler sent a memorandum to me,
(leneral Schley, Chief of Engineers, and copy of contract dated De-
cember 20 between the United States and The Hawaiian Constructors.
On December 28 Colonel Gesler sent a memorandum to Commis-
sioner Knudson requesting clearance for the award of contract Mr414-
902. This w^as approved by Commissioner Knudson on December 30,
1940.
On December 28 Colonel Gesler sent a letter to the Under Secretary
of War transmitting the contract and giving certain information con-
cerning it. This was approved by Mr. Patterson, Under Secretary,
under date of January 3, 1941, subject to my signing the contract.
24. General Frank. That is the history of the contract?
General Schley. Yes.
25. General Russell. General, you said that the Under Secretary of
War insisted on a local contractor, where possible, being given the
contract. Was that the sole limitation imposed upon the Division
Engineer in proposing the contractor or group of contractors for a
specified job ?
General Schley. No; I w^ould say that the contractor had to be
otherwise acceptable.
26. General Russell. Let us assume that the contractor, whose
[64^] name was submitted to the War Department, was otherwise
acceptable and was also a local contractor. Then the discretion of the
Division Engineer in making the selection was rather broad?
General Schley. Of course, his selection was only a recommenda-
tion. He did the original selecting and that was subject thereafter to
review by all the agencies which reviewed it. In this case it was Mr.
Knudson's office and, latei-, our office and, later, the Under Secretary of
War's office.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 339
27. General Russell. As a matter of fact, General, for that recom-
mendation to have been disapproved it would have been necessary for
one or more of the reviewing avithorities to have established some
factual basis for disapproving the reconnnendation?
General Schley. Yes. Yet, I can tell you what the practice was,
perhaps at that time, certainly later. When Mr. Knudson's oihce was
taken by another office it was called the Construption Advisory Board.
It was located in the Quartermaster General's office. It must have been
established at a later time, because Knudson originally had the author-
ity, and later it was this board. At the time this board was functioning
I happen to remember they built up what you might call a panel of
acceptable contractors in reputation, through good work they had done
or through recommendations of responsible people.
28. General Russell. Let me approach my question, then, from the
other side. What effect, if any, did the recommendation of a contractor
by the Division Engineer have ?
General Schley. First the district and then reviewed by the Di-
vision Engineer.
29. General Russell. I am talking about the Division Engineer.
General Schley. I would say that outside of a place like [64.4-]
the Hawaiian Islands, where probably the number of contractors is
limited, I assume that in a State his judgment would be pretty sound.
At least, I would so consider it in my office. Presumably he knew
and was dealing with men he knew the reputation of. There, of
course, conditions are different because it is a smaller place and there
are few^er contractors to select from.
30. General Russell. Then would it be an accurate generalization
to say that the recommendation of the District Engineer was pre-
sumptively sound and must be overcome by the introduction of some
factual situation?
General Schley. I would not say there is a presumption in that
case, because if our office knew nothing at all about the man we would
write back and say, "Tell us more about it."
31. General Russell. Did your office place upon the District En-
gineer the burden of showing that the man or the firm that he had
recommended was capable of carrying out the contract?
General Schley. I would say that the recommendation initially
would cause him to assume that obligation initially.
32. General Grunert. How many District Engineers have you evei
turned down on a recommended contractor?
General Schley. That is something I cannot say.
33. General Grunert, From your memory were there many or were
there any ?
General Schley. We have had very few such up to this period of
time. Yes ; I can say we have.
34. General Frank. You have what?
General Schley. We have turned down men recommended by
District Engineers.
35. General Grunert. Has the Under Secretary of War turned
[64S] you down on any of your recommendations?
General Schley. I would say that he had, definitely, and also this
Advisory Board.
36. General Grunert. On what ground ?
340 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Schley. Often it was because he felt that there was a con-
tractor in the State, when we had selected one outside the State, feel-
ing that there was no available one in the State.
Another case was where the Advisory Board set up by the Quarter-
master General's office would come back itself if they did not have
the contractor on the list.
37. General Grunert. Suppose a contractor was recommended and
they had no information on him; they did not have him on their
approved list : Who would do what in the line of finding out whether
he was any good and whether or not he should be given any contract?
General Schley. This Advisory Board — naturally I remember
more cases because it was in effect longer — called on our office and
said, "This contractor is not on our list"; and the obligation was on
us to show that it was a proper award to make.
38. General Russell. Generally, if a contractor was well located
geographically, and on the list, the District Engineer approved him
or you would approve him?
General Schley. Yes; afid sometimes w^e found if he was on the
Board's list before we approved. Sometimes I will say that a name
would come in that we did not know ourselves in our office; we had
no record of it. We would go over to the Board and say, "Is this
contractor on your list?" They would say, "Yes, he is on our list."
And we would recommend him if he was recommended by the dis-
trict and the division and the board said he was a good man.
[64.6] 39. General Frank. Do you know anything about the
availability of contractors for work in Hawaii at the time this con-
tract was let ?
General Schley. The contractors resident there?
40. General Frank. Yes.
General Schley. I do not.
41. General Frank. Contractors resident there or contractors from
the United States who had offices and organizations there?
General Schley. No, sir ; I do not.
42. General Frank. Do you know whether or not there were suffi-
cient contractors on the spot in Honolulu to handle this situation?
General Schley. No, I do not.
43. General Frank. Do you know how the particular list of con-
tractors who comprised The Hawaiian Constructors was determined ?
General Schley. No; I do not.
44. General Frank. This was done while you were Chief of Engi-
neers ?
General Schley. That is correct.
45. General Frank. On whom did you depend to determine these
details ?
General Schley. The District Engineer in the field, in the first
instance; the Division Engineer, who was his next superior, in the
second instance.
4(). General Frank. Who w'as that?
General Schley. In this case, J. G. Matheson, of San Francisco.
47. General Frank. And Wyman was the District Engineer in
Honolulu ?
General Schley. Yes. Third, I looked directly to the man
[647] in charge of the branch in my ojBice which handled this work.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 341
His name was Brigadier General Thomas M. Kobins. He, in turn,
was held responsible for all of our construction work along this par-
ticular line ; that is, the awarding part of it and the drafting of the
contracts. Lieutenant Colonel Earl E. Gesler, whose name I have
given you before
48. General Frank. He was the finance man ?
General Schlet. The finance man and contract man in the office.
He, in turn, had Major James B. Newman, Jr., since he had other
forms of contract than this, in charge for him in that part of his
office. He was succeeded on June 4, 1941, by another man whose name
I can give you if you want it.
49. General Frank. Therefore the chain of events went from New-
man to Gesler to Robins to you ?
General Schley. And Robins had this man working on it.
50. General Frank. And then down on the other side to Matheson
to Wyman?
General Schley. I do not understand that step.
51. General Frank. To the division to the district?
General Schley. For the command function ?
52. General Frank. Yes.
General Schley. The command function was from me or Robins,
who was my assistant, to Matheson to Wyman; that is correct.
53. General Frank. Were j^ou at that time aware that there was a
contractor being considered by the name of Hans Wilhelm Rohl?
General Schley. No ; I was not.
54. General Frank. Did you ever hear of the firm of Rohl & Con-
nolly ?
General Schley. No, sir.
I might add, if it is of interest to you, that I know the [^4<5]
other two firms, Gunther-Shirley Company and Callahan Company.
55. General Frank. Were you familiar with the name of McKee?
General Schley. McKee ? I do not know that name.
56. General Frank. Robert McKee Company?
General Schley. No.
57. General Frank. Since you were not aware of the existence of
one Hans Wilhelm Rohl it naturally follows that you did not know
that he was a German agent. Was it the responsibility of the con-
tracting officer. Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., who was also the Dis-
trict Engineer, to check as to whether or not a contractor was a citizen
of the United States?
General Schley. I do not know that there was anything in the
written instructions so requiring, but I would assume that he would
make recommendations for a contractor considering his qualifications
in all regards. I would assume that he would not limit his considera-
tion of the qualifications of the cotnractor in any regard.
58. General Frank. What was the status of the world at that time
with respect to the conduct of war?
General Schley. Well, the stage of the war was such that France
had fallen; and I do not remember just exactly beyond that point
what the stage was. But that fixes it fairly well.
59. General Frank. Britain, France, and Germany were at war?
General Schley. Yes.
342 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
60. General Frank. Would you say that the United States at that
time had very definite sympathies?
General Schley. By that j^iu mean, public opinion as judged
through the press?
61. General Frank. Yes.
General Schley. Yes ; I think there is no question that we [(^W]
had.
62. General Frank. Where were those sympathies?
General Schley. Those sympathies were with the Allied forces.
63. General Frank. With the war raging in Europe and with Amer-
ican sympathies being with the Allies, do you think it a smart move
to consider a German agent a qualified contracting agent to handle
x\merican defense projects?
General Schley. I might say that all defense projects have that
difficulty, which relate not only to the contractor but to the over-
seers, the superintendents, the foremen and the workmen. One of the
veiy serious problems in our work in this country often was to have
those confidential things such as plans, known to as few people as
possible, and only to those that you could trust, if possible. So that
it applies not only to the contractor ; it applies to the foremen as well
and almost to the workmen, because I assume that the best position
for a man to get into is in one of these workmen's jobs if he is seeking
information.
In order to deal with that we have in many cases — I might say, in
most cases — done the work by the form which we call hired labor, our-
selves hiring the labor, instead of letting it out to contractors. So I
would say that that question is everpresent in dealing with fortifica-
tions. It not onl}^ goes to the contractor but to thet foremen, the
superintendent and the workmen.
8-1. General Frank. Did the Corps of Engineers at that time have
any policy with respect to this question ?
General Schley. I would say that the policy has always been to
have those things known to as few people as possible, [6v5^J
and to have responsible people connected with them in defense work.
65. General Frank. Was there any policy with respect to an alieii
being taken into confidence on a construction project?
General Schley. I do not remember in any written instructions
anything which bears on the contractor himself or any of the em-
ployees, but I would say that it is generally understood that caution
is to be exercised in keeping this secret information as confidential
as possible.
66. General Frank. What was the date of the contract, again ?
General Schley. December 20 was the date of the signing by the
Secretary of War.
67. General Frank. Are you conversant with the espionage act of
March 28, 1940?
General Schley. I do not know whether I know it by that name.
Undoubtedlv I do know it.
68. General Frank. Which forbade the hiring or the awarding
to an alien of contracts?
General Schley. Yes.
69. General Frank. Was it the responsibility of the contract officer,
Colonel Wynian, to check as to whether or not Rohl was a citizen?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 343
General Schley. As to whether the hiw would require him to so
report I do not know, but I would say that his natural requirement,
outside of what the law may be, would be to look into things of that
kind which might have an adverse effect on information being gotten
abroad.
7(). General Frank. There is a law, and there should be some
method in any organization in carrying it out, a responsibility at the
start, at a point of contact some place. If it did not l'6Sl] start
with the award it should start at the determination of the responsi-
bility for checking citizenship.
General Schley. I would say that the responsibility for enforce-
ment of the law in our work starts in the field and starts with us ; it
starts with both ends. It is everywhere.
71. General Frank. Here is a specific instance. Wliere does the
responsibility start to determine the citizenship of one Hans Wilhelm
Rohll
General Schley. In this case the question of responsibility would
start with the man in the field, because he made the initial recom-
mendation.
72. General Frank. And that was one Colonel Wyman?
General Schley. He made the recommendation from the field.
73. General Frank. Do you have any information concerning the
failure of The Hawaiian Constructors to complete construction of
the defense projects within the times and in the manner prescribed
prior to the 7th of December, 19-11, as required by the job orders?
General Schley. No; I have not. I attempted to make such a
comparison, because the Military Affairs Committee of the House
asked questions along that line. At that time only limited material
was available. Some had been gotten from the Hawaiian Islands,
but not all; some was found in the office of the Chief of Engineers
here, bearing on the subject.
74. General Frank. Where would that information be available?
General Schley. I understand that all those job orders — and, by
the way, I have now seen them all, but I have not seen all the progress
re]:)orts — I understand that all those job orders w^ere sent from the
Hawaiian Islands to the Chief of Engineers' office in Washington, and
I have seen them all, but I was unable [6i)£] to tie them in to
progress i-eports, because I could not get all the progress reports. I
was able to see enough of it to get an idea of how the thing went, how
it proceeded.
75. General Frank. The original information would be available
in the office of the District Engineer, w^ould it not?
General Schley. Yes. It ought to be of record now in the office
of the Chief of Engineers, and I do not doubt that a group of men
assigned to that investigation could unearth it. But here is one thing
that I suggest you bear in mind, and that is that the contract being
a cost-plus-a-fee contract, not only was the work to be done indefinite
to commence with, but changes were made as the work progressed,
many, many, many changes.
76. General Frank. The job orders will cover that, will they not?
General Schley. Yes. Additions to the work were naturally given
priorities, either before or after something else. So I would say that
whether a particular thing was pressed to completion, comparing its
344 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
priority with other work which was to be done, would depend on three
things, as I have thought the thing through. The first is the impor-
tance placed on it by the contracting officer, Wyman, in connection
with the whole job to be done; second, since it is defense work it is
in a strategically important place. The third would be the availability
of the material or plans to do the job.
77. General Frank. And, fourth, priorities on the equipment and
transportation ?
General Schley. Yes. But I was thinking only of the factual
things. The thing must have relative importance in the mind of the
man who is performing the work ; that is, the District Engineer. So
all those things probably have a bearing.
[6SS] And you must remember that whereas the original con-
tract said 6 months the contractor specifically reserved protection
against the local stand that the work was to be done in 6 months. I
explained that to the Committee over and over again. You will find
that the times of completion were advanced, and sometimes additional
work was thrown in. Instead of one road there would be two roads.
Instead of 1,700 feet of track it would be 3,600 feet of track. There-
fore it is important to get the man who knows those things to see what
influence they had, and also the people who knew what materials were
available.
[654] 78. General Frank. What I am getting at is, the logical
place in which to look for those where there is a greater number of
people conversant with the details is in the office of the District Engi-
neer in Honolulu now ?
General Schley. I am not sure but what those records have been
now sent here. I would search here first, and insofar as the person-
nel are concerned I think you will have to consult those who were in
the Engineers at the time.
79. General Frank. Which includes ?
General Schley. Colonel Wyman and his assistants.
80. General Frank. What is your knowledge in this connection
especially concerning delays in constructing facilities for the air raid
warning system and the underground gasoline storage tanks ?
General Schley. I have no knowledge of that.
81. General Frank. What knowledge do you have concerning
whether any military personnel neglected duties relating to the con-
tract?
General Schley. I have none.
82. General Frank. You would not know whether they failed by
not investigating properly, prior to the award of the contract, the
loyalty of Hans Wilhelm Rohl ?
General Schley. No, I do not.
83. General Frank. By not supervising properly the performance
of the contractors' work?
General Schley. I do not.
84. General Frank. By not informing higher authority of delays
and deficiencies ?
[665] General Schley. I do not.
85. General Frank. Did any complaints come in that came to your
notice ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 345
General Schley. None during the time I occupied the position,
which was up until September 8th.
86. General Frank. To your knowledge, what information was
given Colonel Wyman to complete these defense projects as speedily
as possible ?
General Schley. That I have no knowledge of.
87. General Feank. On December 20, 1940, you were the Chief of
Engineers ?
General Schley. That is correct.
88. General Frank. You have stated your responsibilities with re-
spect to this contract previouslv in the testimony; did you not?
General Schley. The testimony here?
89. General Frank. Yes.
General Schley. I think so.
90. General Frank. Well, if not, will yoti state the function of your
position with respect to the contract?
General Schley. I would say that I assumed responsibility when I
signed it, and I would say that I had the responsibility of its execu-
tion, all of course as the head of a large organization which was
carrying on the expenditure of vast sums of money, and presumably
there would be brought to my attention the things which I needed to
know which didn't normally come to my attention, and I made an
effort to inspect a great deal of the work going on. I did not get to
the Hawaiian Islands to inspect that work.
[656] 91. General Frank. Did you receive any communications
from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, or from Colo-
nel Wyman requesting that you assist in speeding up materials for the
work or assist in obtaining higher priority on materials for the work?
General Schley. No, but that does not mean that the Office of Chief
of Engineers did not. Their records will have to be examined to de-
termine that.
92. General Frank. What was the responsibility of the District
Engineer, Colonel Wyman, to prod the contractors so that the work
would proceed more rapidly?
General Schley. I would say that it was very great, much greater
in the case of a cost-plus-fee contract than in the normal firm-price
contract, because time is not stated as a part of the contract, and
therefore it is up to him to drive the parts which need to be driven.
93. General Frank. Did you know on 20 December 1940 or at any
time that Hans Wilhelm Rohl was then or had been under investiga-
tion by government agency for suspicious activities ?
General Schley. No, I did not even know the name before this
matter came up.
94. General Frank. What if any measures should have been taken
by the personnel of the Corps of Engineers for the protection of the
Government against contracting with a person having such a record?
General Schley. I do not know what that record is, and for that
reason it is difficult for me to answer the hypothetical question, but I
would say that we should know, [657] and so should the re-
viewing board know — who was particularly charged with that work of
reviewing the contractors — they should all know that they were ac-
ceptable in all senses.
346 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
95. General Frank. This is a procedure that is not specified but
which you leave to the good judgment of the District Engineer; is
that correct ?
General Schley. No, I am not sure that it is not specified. I do not
recall specific instructions to the effect. I do not recall them at this
time, and they may or may not have been in existence. If there were
not, however, I would say that at this time there was an obligation
to watch those things.
96. General Frank. If it were not picked up by the District Engi-
neer, was there any general understanding that things like that
should have been watched for and picked up by the Division Engineer?
General Schley. Not specifically. I would say that the entire re-
view should have been made by everyone through whose hands these
things passed and who reconmiended that the award be made. There
were no different instructions to the District Engineer than to the
Division Engineer. Instructions of that kind would be general.
97. General Frank. The placing of definite responsibility was
rather loose, then ?
General Schley. I would not say so, no. I say any such instruc-
tions are general rather than specific as to individuals. Now, in the
Office of the Chief of Engineers I would say yes, there was a definite
place for those things to be looked for.
98. General Frank. Where was that ?
General Schley, I would say it is in this organization here
[6S8] (referring to papers).
99. General Frank. Was that in Newman's office under Robins?
General Schley. Yes, I would say that it is.
100. General Frank. Or is it under Gesler ?
General Schley. Well, they all have exactly the same function, one
reporting to the other: Newman initially, Gesler next, and Robins
third and myself fourth.
101. General Frank. But you did not have any instructions how
to pointedly look for this sort of thing?
General Schley. Well, that may have been. I cannot recall it.
I do not recall it at this time.
102. General Frank. Do you not think that you would remember
it, in view of this Eohl case, had a situation like that existed ?
General Schley. You see, the Rohl case has been recounted to me
only four months ago, so this is a brand-new thought. I had no idea
of a Rohl case in those days when we were issuing instructions, so the
two would not associate themselves naturally in my mind.
103. General Frank. Did you have any instructions in the Corps
of Engineers with respect to discussing with an enemy alien details of
a defense project?
General Schley, Well, I would say that such a thing would be en-
tirely unnecessary. There may have been such instructions, but general
instructions would cover any such matter as that.
104. General Frank. Army Regulations would cover that?
General Schley. Yes, and the fact that all those plans and all those
specifications are marked at least "Restricted" ; and, as I have told you
a moment ago, it goes down much further [6o9] than the con-
tractor himself. The foreman is a very dangerous man because he is
one of many who are on the job.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 347
105'. General Grunert. How can a contractor intelligently bid on or
prepare to execute a contract unless he knows about that contract?
General Schley. Oh, he knows about the contract.
106. General Grunert. Well, do you not have to give him a certain
amount of restricted information in order for him to intelligently bid
or prepare himself ?
General Schley. I do not know what this man knew, but I would
say — when I say "this man'' I mean these men, because there were at
least six members of the contracting firms. Those men need not have
known, in order to accept this contract, anything more than was in
the contract itself, I would say, because it is not a firm bid. They
are not going to be paid that sum of money which you see in that
contract, a million and-odd dollars. They are going to be paid on a
scale of reimbursement to themselves plus a fee. The Government
pays all costs, and in addition to that the contractor gets a fee. So
this estimate in here is nothing but something to give the contractor
an idea of the magnitude of the work and the amount of money he is
going to get, because it is witliin a percent of that is the way you
arrive at your fixed fee, a rough percent. So I would say that reading
that contract alone, now a wise contractor wants usually to see the
site. By that I mean he wants to see what the unloading facilities are
at the place where his stuff is coming in; he wants to see what the
local conditions with respect to labor are, whether labor is plentiful
[660] or whether it is expensive. But that is in the firm bid.
Many take much bigger chances on making a bid on cost plus a fee
because all costs are paid by the Government, the materials bought or
furnished by the Government, the labor rolls, pay rolls.
107. General Frank. Here in this contract is a fixed fee of $52,220.
General Schley. I would say that is the only thing in the contract
that is fixed.
108. General Frank. What is the theory of putting that amount of
fixed fee in the contract?
General Schley. Because that is what the contractor is going to get
over and above his costs, and all he is going to get, and he will take the
contract or refuse it very largely on what that sum is. That is the
profit that is in it for him.
109. General Grunert. No matter what might be developed later
on under the contract?
General Schley. Oh, no. Additional work added by a supplemental
agreement usually adds to the fixed fee, because that is more than he
expected to undertake.
110. General Grunert. Well, this contract originally started about
a million and went up about thirty million, didn't it?
General Schley. I think even bigger than that. At the time I left
it had grown to about forty million, I think.
111. General Grunert. It seemed rather strange that they would
all get together here in Washington to lobby through a contract in
which they were obviously going to divide $52,000, didn't it? You
need not answer that ; it is just a remark.
112. General Frank. Did you ever receive notice or knowledge
[66' 1] of any reports concerning the activities of Colonel Wyman
in Hawaii which was derogatory to Colonel Wyman?
General Schley. No, I did not, that I recall.
348 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
113. General Frank. Did you ever receive notice or knowledge of a
report dated the 14th of February, '42 ? That was after you left ?
General Schley. February '42 I had left the service over a year and
a half.
114. General Fraxk. Oh, yes. When you left the service Colonel
Wyman was still on duty in Honolulu ?
General Schley. So far as I recall, he was.
General Frank. Have you anything further that is pertinent to the
case that you would like to state to the Board ?
General Schley. You might want to know the work which was
taken over by the Corps of Engineers in order to see where this came
in the procedure. On November 20, 1940, the Air Corps station work
was assigned to the Corps of Engineers. At that time it was in
progress under the Quartermaster General's Office. Instructions were
issued that the work would be taken over job by job in order not to
cause any interruption of the progress, so that it took quite a while
before the entire work was turned over. This contract, therefore,
came within that period, and we were setting up — at that time we were
preparing for this vast amount of work which was on the way, and it
was immediately placed under the same part of General Robins' office
in which our civil works had been.
115. General Frank. That is, this Hawaiian defense project was
placed there ?
General Schley. No. I am speaking of the Air Corps [662]
station work, which was new work for us to be doing. All construction
work of the Army was turned over to us December 16, 1941, according
to the record, which was after I left the service. Those dates you
might want to have in mind.
You might also wish to have in mind, if you go into it further,
there was another branch of our office which was interested in this
contract, and that is the part which had always existed and which
handled seacoast fortification work. It was called the fortification
section and came not under the civil construction division, of which
General Robins was the head, but came under the military division of
which Brigadier General John J. Kingman was the head ; and there-
fore you will find progress reports on this contract here in those two
parts of the office. You will find something in the fortification section,
the progress reports, on the seacoast fortification part of the work, and
that on the airfields and other things you will find under the civil
divsion part of the office.
I can give you some idea of how the work was added. Jobs were
added over and above apparently what the contract called for origi-
nally; and a job on Wheeler Field to construct reinforced concrete,
bombproof ammunition and storage structures, for instance, dated
February 24, 1941 (that is one of the early job orders) called for three
bombproof ammunition storage magazines, each of 30,000 cubic feet
capacity. What was called Addendum No. 2, of May 26, 1941, added
two more. There is a job order which presumably was based on one
of the general provisions in the contract which started out to be a
smaller figure. Addenda Nos. 3 and 4 provided for additional work in
[663] this same job order. Addendum No. 5, of July 1, 1941,
called for four more bombproof ammunition storage magazines, each
30,000 cubic feet, over and above what I have just mentioned. Ad-
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 349
dendum No. 6, of August 14, '41, called for two more of 5,000 and three
of 10,000, Addendum No. 7 called for four of 5,000 cubic feet each.
116. General Frank. All those additions, however, do not preclude
the necessity of requiring a termination date on the completion of con-
struction of the first three ?
General Schley. I would say that, as I have found in the job orders,
they all read — they all have their own estimate of time. And that is
another thing I think you would be interested in knowing. Each job
order had an estimated time for completion, and this additional work
was added to each job order.
117. General Frank. Each addendum.
General Schley. Unquestionably their time was extended, and per-
haps those were placed ahead of something which had already been
started, some other job order which was considered less important.
So I think it is going to be quite an undertaking to see how those esti-
mated times of completion were changed as the work went on, because
so much work was added as the job proceeded, and the contract itself
provides for additions, specifically so states.
118. General Grunert. Have you any questions, General Russell?
119. General Russell. Just one.
General, I believe that the operations in the Chief of Engineers
Office have been described to us fairly definitely, but I wanted to ask
this question : There was no plan or no [664] individual or
individuals in the Office of the Chief of Engineers discharging the
function of checking the individuals, the members of firms, the stock-
holders and officers of corporations who might be seeking Government
contracts, to determine their nationality, status of citizenship, or past
criminal record ?
General Schley. No. And I hope you won't take my failure to
recollect specific instructions in existence at the time to be the final
answer of the Office of Chief of Engineers on the subject. I hope
that you will ask the Office to provide you with information which
would be more definite than my recollection of it is.
120. General Russell. It comes to pass, therefore, that if an investi-
gation touching these questions of citizenship, prior individual records
as to criminality, and so forth, were to be made at the instigation of
the Office of the Chief of Engineers, it would be because in some way
information might reach your office indicating that those subjects
should be investigated ?
General Schley. Well, you are carrying on now, I think, if I may
say so, the same thought you originally expressed, and I am in hopes
that you will have the record searched to see what the instructions
were at that time on the subject.
121. General Russell. I have no further questions.
122. General Grunert. Who selected Wyman for the post as Dis-
trict Engineer in Hawaii ? Do you know ?
General Schley. No, I do not, but we had a personnel section which
operated under General Kingman, that is, the office of personnel sec-
tion ; and, this being work Avhich was under General Robins, I do not
doubt that both of them knew. [665] I knew that he w^as going
to go there from Los Angeles where he had been before.
123. General Grunert. Did you know Wyman ?
General Schley. Very well.
350 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
124. General Grunert. What did you think of him ?
General Schley. I first met Wyman in the last war, which was when
he came into the service, and I met him then as an Officer of an engi-
neer combat battalion that was with the Second Division, Engineers
of the Second Division, and he was a very excellent man. If I re-
member correctly he is a graduate of Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology, and he has a very fine technical knowledge of engineering.
He has a reputation of being a very hard driver, that is, of piling
pressure on to do things on a large scale and do them fast.
In Los Angeles he had a very, very big job before he left there, that
he was on the very, very big flood-control project which was to try
to protect the town of Los Angeles and the valuable property which
has been built there in a very unwise location, against those tori-ential
floods, which the Federal Government undertook to participate in.
That was a very big job and one which a great many private interests
wei'e involved in, because it stepped on many toes; it took property
under Government authority to seize property for such construction
work. It ran into bridges, change of bridges, railroad bridges of
private railroads as well as the county bridges. So it was a very
difficult, very ticklish job.
I might say that he steam-rolled a great deal of it, and we had to
sort of deal with the local people in more diplomatic ways than he
often did, but I think they appreciated his work [666] very
much because they asked for his retention there although he had been
there more than our usual tour. We usually did not keep a man more
than four years at one of those public works jobs because we wanted
him to get broader training and we wanted him not to get his roots
too deep in the local soil. He must perfect his federal apprenticeship,
so we usually change him every four years. My recollection is that
he was there five because of the importance of that work. I have con-
fidence in him, in his integrity and in his driving ability.
125. General Grunert. It would seem to me that this step-by-step
processing of a contract, for instance from Newman to Gesler to you
to the Under Secretary — is it possible that each one of you depended
upon the one step below doing all the necessary work regarding the
contract and then did not consider that these various higher echelons
had any responsibility regarding that contract, and therefore passing
the buck down to the lowest man, who seems to be Newman here, as far
as the Chief of Engineers Office is concerned?
General Schley. I do not think so. I think it is very much like a
military command, and I think it probably has evolved from the fact
that there are military men connected with it. I would say that Geslei-
did look to Newman because Newman was the original one in that
scale, and I would say similarly Robins and I looked to Gesler. But
tliat is true of all organizations.
126. General Grunert. But there w^as no particular one that said,
"It is your duty to go and contact the F. B. I. to see if they have any-
thing against this man," was there?
General Schley. I would say that Newman is the man who [667]
had to satisfy himself concerning the contractor, first. Perhaps Gesler
would accept his recommendation unless there was something on the
face of it. But you must remember that we had those other reviews
which were set up particularly for the purpose.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 351
127. General Grunert. What is the advisory board that I hear
about ? What do they do ?
General Schley. The advisory board was set up by Mr. Patterson,
Under Secretary, and it was set up in the Quartermaster General's
Office, but all of us looked on it as Mr. Patterson's board.
128. General Grunert. Well, they were supposed to look into things
to satisfy Mr. Patterson?
General Schley. Its purpose was, I would say, primarily to pass
on the contractor, since it was not usually a government firm.
129. General Grunert, Did they have a preferred list of contractors
or an eligible list, or what ?
General Schley. They had a list of those whom they had already
looked into sufficiently to put them on their panel.
130. General Grunert. Do you know whether Rohl was on this list ?
General Schley. No, I have no knowledge. In fact, this did not
go to that board for review, because that board apparently was not
acting on our cases at the time. It went to Knudsen. I explained
that a little bit earlier.
131. General Grunert. But it seems to me I read in the Congres-
sional report on this thing, or that Committee of [668] Con-
gress that made a report of it in September, to the effect that there
were three or four of them, including Colonel Wyman, who came to
Washington to put this contract through. Now, what is the necessity
of anybody coming to Washington with your scheme of contract ? Is
that usually done with some contracts or all of them, or what?
General Schley. The field man comes rather frequently for confer-
ence on almost anything.
132. General Grunert. Does he bring the prospective contractors
with him to sell themselves, or why did they have to come to Wash-
ington ?
General Schley. I do not know the circiunstances of the trip that
you speak of, but I would say it is not infrequent for the District En-
gineer to come in. He would come in for conferences often.
133. General Grunert. I can imagine that. Then, you know noth-
ing about that particular, what you might call a lobby gi'oup or an
explanatory group, or what, that came here ?
General Schlet. No, I do not know.
134. General Grunert. Do you know of anybody who would know
about that particular? Would Robins know anything about that?
Would Gesler know anything about that ?
General Schley. I would say that Robins would be very apt to
know. Newman certainly would know, and Gesler might.
135. General Grunert. Any other questions?
136. General Frank. Did you have any discussion concerning this
contract with a man by the name of Graf e ?
General Schley. Not before it was awarded. I know Grafe per-
sonally. I have heard him speak of his government contracts [669]
in general, I don't doubt, since that time, and he may have mentioned
it, but I had no conversation with him that I can recall about this
contract before its award.
137. General Frank. Do you know Mr. Connolly, who is an asso-
ciate of Rohl's ?
352 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Schley. I have tried to place him, and I can call up the
Office of Chief of Engineers to have them refresh my memory on some
Connollys that I do know, to see if this was one of them. His name
does not suggest anyone offhand.
138. General Frank, Did you discuss this contract with Grafe?
General Schley. No ; I do not remember any mention of it at all by
anyone to me before it was executed.
139. General Frank. Or Martin ?
General Schley. I do not know Martin.
140. Major Clausen. This Connolly is Tom Connolly of San Fran-
cisco.
General Schley. I know Grafe. I used to know a Shirley. As a
matter of fact, Shirley and I used to know, who is now dead, the con-
tractor whom Grafe was with.
141. General Grunert. Thank you very much. General. We ap-
preciate your coming in and helping us out here. "Wliat we are after
is information and facts, and I think that you have been of consid-
erable help to us.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
142. General Grunert. The Board will take a recess of 5 minutes
and then proceed with the next witness.
(Thereupon there was a brief informal recess.)
[670] TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. ROGER B. CALTON, ARMY OE
THE UNITED STATES
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board your
name, grade, organization, and station?
General Colton. Major General Roger B. Colton, Army of the
United States, Chief of the Engineering and Teclmical Service,
Signal Corps, Armj^ Service Forces, Washington, D. C.
2. General Grunert. General, this Board is making an attempt to
get at the facts, as far as we can, in and around the War Department
as to matters prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. We
hope that in the position you occupy you can help us out in telling
us about matters pertaining to the Signal Corps. In the large field
we cover in the limited time, we have divided special investigation
amongst the three of us, although the entire Board will pass on all
matters. The special investigation on which you are to be a witness
is under General Frank, who will lead in propounding the questions,
and the other members will ask such additional questions as they see
fit. General Frank.
3. General Frank. Will you repeat, please, your present assign-
ment?
General Colton. I am Chief of the Engineering and Technical
Service, Signal Corps, in the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Army
Service Forces, War Department, Washington, D. C. That means
that I am in charge of research and development for the Signal Corps
at the present time.
4. General Frank. What is your responsibility with respect
[671'] to radar equipment?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 353
General Colton. Wliat is it now ?
5. General Frank. Yes.
General Colton. I am in charge of the Signal Corps research and
development of radar equipment.
6. General Frank. Who was responsible for research and develop-
ment of radar equipment in the fall of 1940 ?
General Colton. I was directly responsible for research and devel-
opment of ground radar equipment. At the time I was director of
the Signal Corps Laboratory at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. The
officer in charge in Washington in the fall of 1940 was, as I recall it,
Colonel Hugh Mitchell. The officer in charge at Wright Field for
airborne, if my recollention serves me correctly, was Colonel Gardner,
now General Gardner.
You said 1940, did you not?
7. General Frank. Yes; fall of 1940.
General Colton. Yes.
8. General Frank. Are you conversant with the plan for the loca-
tion of permanent radar in the Hawaiian Islands ?
General Colton. Only through having read the Board reports and
War Department actions. The Board report I refer to is the report
of the Board of Officers that recommended the locations, and that
was a local Board in Hawaii.
9. General Frank. Can you tell us what were the number and
location of the permanent aircraft warning stations contemplated
for the Hawaiian Islands to complete a phase of Contract No. W-414r-
Eng-602?
General Colton. The number and location of permanent [672]
aircraft warning stations- originally contemplated for the Hawaiian
Islands were three 271 and 271-A fixed stations and five SCR-270
mobile stations. The three fixed stations 271 and 271-A were planned
to be located at Kaala, Kokee, and Haleakala. Three of the five
mobile stations were planned to be located at Nuuana Pali, Mana-
wahua, and Mauna Loa. The other two mobile stations were desig-
nated as roving stations. There is no record of the Corps of
Engineers' contract W-414-Engineering-602 in the files of the Chief
Signal Officer, and I have no familiarity with it.
10. General Frank. What equipment was to be furnished by the
Signal Corps ?
General Colton. The equipment to be furnished by the Signal
Corps was three fixed stations 271 delivered complete with shelter,
except for the concrete foundation of the shelter, and also five mobile
radar stations 270 to be delivered complete and ready for operation.
11. General Frank. What priority was placed upon this equip-
ment?
General Colton. The War Department, under date of March 10,
1941, set the priority for the delivery of radio sets 270, 271, and
271-A as indicated in inclosure 1 to the document that I furnished
the Board, and I have a copy here.
12. General Frank. Please state that as a part of your answer.
General Colton. Please state the priority?
13. General Frank. Yes, giving the dates on which each of those
three sets was to be made available for delivery to [673] Hon-
olulu.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 1 24
354 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Colton. For Hawaii two 271's were originally scheduled
to be shipped from the United States during March.
14. General Frank. Of what year? March of 1941?
General Colton. March 1941. And one 271-A was also scheduled
to be shipped during March.
15. General Frank. Of 1941?
General Colton. Of 1941. That priority was set up by the War
Department under date of the 10th of March.
[674] 16. General Frank. We have then two 271 sets for Hawaii
for March, and one 271-A, in March ?
General Colton. That was the schedule. That was a shipment
schedule. General.
17. General Frank. Is that a shipment schedule, or is that the date
on which it was turned over to the Quartermaster ?
General Colton. That is the date on which it was to be turned over
to the Quartermaster for shipment.
18. General Frank. Whether or not it was shipped in that month
is something we will have to determine from the Quartermaster. That
provides for the three sets ?
General Colton. Yes. That was the War Department schedule,
General. They were not actually shipped, then.
19. (jeneral Frank. That was the War Department priority?
General Colton. Yes.
20. General Frank. Two 271 's, in March, and one 271-A, in March ?
General Colton. Yes. And I might point out that Panama was
scheduled to get two sets. We are just pointing out the priority. 1
might put it this way : They were the third and fourth and fifth sets —
the third, fourth, and fifth sets off the production line.
21. General Frank. All right. Now, let us come down to the 270
sets, which are the mobile sets they were scheduled to get. Look at
April and May.
General Colton. April and May, yes. They were scheduled to have
one turned over to the Quartermaster for shipment, in April, and four
to be turned over to the Quartermaster for shipment in May.
[675] 22. General Frank. That made a total of five mobile and
three permanent or stationary sets?
General Colton. Yes, sir.
23. General Frank. How did such priority compare with similar
equipment furnished at about the same time to installations in the
Philippines and Panama?
General Colton. Under the priority furnished by the War Depart-
ment under date of March 10, as I have already stated, Hawaii was
scneduled to get the third, fourth, and fifth sets ; Panama was sched-
uled to get the first and second sets.
24. General Frank. All right. Thank you.
General Colton. That is as regards the fixed stations.
As regards the mobile stations, the relative priorities were, two to
the 1st Air Warning Company; one to the Signal Corj^s Laboratories;
one to the 1st Air Warning Company; four to the 1st Air Warning
Company; one to Hawaii; two to Fort Monmouth; and then four to
Hawaii, completing the priority on that schedule as it stood as of
that time.
25. General Frank. When was the Hawaiian radar equipment ac-
tually delivered to the Quartermaster for shipment?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 355
General Colton. The Hawaiian radar equipment was delivered as
follows, to the Quartermaster, for shipment : All components of one
271-A were turned over by the Signal Corps to the Quartermaster
Corps for shipment by 26 May 19J:1. All components of two SCR-271s
were turned over to the Quartermaster Corps for shipment by 26 June
1941. Foundation plans were furnished in advance of the above dates.
The five mobile stations, SCR-270, were delivered to the Quarter-
master Corps for shipment on 22 July 1941, together [676~\
with one additional mobile station, which had in the meantime been
authorized by the War Department for the Hawaiian Department.
I would like to say in this connection it should be noted that three
additional fixed stations for Hawaii were authorized by the War
Department 28 May 1941, for inclusion by the Chief Signal Officer,
in a supplemental estimate for fiscal year 1942.
26. General Frank. Since they were not authorized until the 28th
of May 1941, to be put in the 1942 fiscal year supplemental estimates,
when might it be expected that those three additional would become
available?
General Colton. Normally it would be nine months to a year. The
i-eason I mentioned that was that I believe they were placed on the
priority schedule, and my recollection is that owing to having some
money left over, we placed the order in advance.
27. General Fbank. They, however, would not be ready until 1943 ?
General Colton. I would think that would be the case — 1942.
28. General Frank. All right, 1942.
General Colton. To be ready in 1942.
29. General Frank. Now, when these were delivered, you say they
included "all components." Does that mean that that included the
towers?
General Colton. Yes, sir; that included the towers.
30. General Frank. Did it include the generator sets?
General Colton. It included generator sets.
31. General Frank. What about extra tubes ?
[677] General Colton. It included the extra tubes. Of course,
they were not contemplated. It was not contemplated that tubes were
to be furnished for the entire life, but spare tubes were furnished.
32. General Frank. For about how long?
General Colton. I don't recall the exact basis, but on a basis that
Ave would be able to keep them in operation continuously, should the
need come.
33. General Frank. After they once went into operation?
General Colton. Yes.
34. General Frank, Was the equipment ready for installation when
delivered?
Cxeneral Colton. The equipment was ready for installation when
delivered. May I go back a moment, General? You asked me only
about the fixed stations, previously? You haven't asked me as to
the readiness of the mobile station.
35. General Frank. Will you state as to the readiness?
General Colton. The previous testimony related to the fixed sta-
tions. The mobile stations were delivered complete and ready for
operation.
36. General Frank. In other words, they could be taken off the
boat, deployed, and operated ?
356 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Colton. Yes, sir.
37. General Frank. Did they have their generator sets with them ?
General Colton. Yes, sir. The dates that I give, here, are the
dates shown by our records for the shipment of the last component.
38. General Frank. If there were delays in furnishing the [678]
equipment, what were the causes?
General Colton. The delay in delivery of equipment was caused
principally by lack of sufficiently high priorities, by which I mean
the manufacturing or production facilities. Up until later than the
11th of July 1941, aircraft detection equipment had a preference
rating no higher than A-l-B, whereas at that time there existed higher
preference ratings, AA, and A-l-A.
39. General Frank. Were protests as to delays made to the manu-
facturer? Was higher authority informed of the delays?
General Colton. Protests as to delay were made to the manufac-
turer, and representations were made to higher authority to obtain
higher preference rating. Higher authority was informed of the
delay.
40. General Grunert, In that, I understand that you mean the
delay in turning them over to the Quartermaster, but these are the
final dates you gave us, on which the}^ turned them over to the Quarter-
master, It included the delay?
General Colton. The dates I gave you are the dates of actually
turning them over to the Quartermaster for shipment. The delays
I refer to are the delays in manufacture.
41. General Grunert. Prior to those dates?
General Colton. Prior to those dates ; yes, sir.
42. General Frank. Was any equipment originally intended for the
Hawaiian Islands diverted elsewhere? If so, by whose authority?
General Colton. Equipment originally intended for the Hawaiian
Department was diverted elsewhere by order of the Secretary of War
from time to time. The most significant change [679] is that
furnished in a document which I have presented to the Board and
which is marked "Enclosure 2," dated the 28th of May, 1941. That
is a new priority list.
43. General Frank. Do you have it, there?
General Colton. I think I have it right here, General. Yes, I
have that with me, a copy of it.
44. General Frank. Will you read it? Read the letter.
General Colton. An "Immediate-action letter", 28th of May, 1941 ;
subject, "Aircraft warning service for the United States Overseas
Departments and Bases" :
To the Chief Signal Officer :
The enclosed copy of a Priorities and Delivery Schedule SCR-270-A and 271
radio sets, approved May 21, 1941, is forwarded to you for your information
and necessary action. You will note that a considetrable amount of modifica-
tion of existing contracts in order to provide the proper type of set may be
required. You will note that there are now authorized for production and in-
stallation in the United States and overseas a total of 218 long-range detectors,
instead of the number authorized in the schedule dated April 5, 1941, and ap-
proved April 11, 1941.
It is desired that you take the necessary action to include in supplemental
estimate, fiscal year 1942, sufficient funds to finance the enlarged program, subject
to a limitation of $20,000,000, in addition to such funds as are now available
to you.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 357
It is further desired tliat every effort be made to expedite delivery of the sets
listed in the attached schedule, as an urgent need exists for this equipment
[680] the various defense and base commands and mobile units concerned.
By order of the Secretary of War :
(s) D. R. Van Sickleb,
Adjutant Oeneral.
1 Enclosure, Priority and Delivery Schedule for SCR 270 and 271 Radio Sets.
Do you wish me to read the priorities ?
45. General Frank. Will you state the manner in which this
changed the priorities ?
General Colton". On the 271, I find no change in the first three. -»
46. General Frank. In other words, the new priority list made no
change in the first three sets going to Hawaii ; they still go to Hawaii,
in March 1941 'i
General Colton. That is correct.
47. General Frank. They were the fixed stations ?
General Colton. They were the fixed station.
Now, the priority for the mobile stations is now given as two to the
1st Air Warning Company.
48. General Frank. Let us stick to Honolulu. State it this way:
In the previous priority, one mobile set went to Honolulu, in April,
and four, in May ?
General Colton. That is correct, sir.
49. GeneraJ Frank. The new priority puts six mobile sets in June?
General Colton. Six mobile sets are set up for June.
50. General Frank. And two additional fixed sets, in Jtme 1941,
and an additional fixed set, in July 1941 ?
[<681] General Colton. That is correct, sir.
51. General Frank. That makes a total of six fixed sets and six
mobile sets destined for Honolulu ?
General Colton. That is correct.
52. General Frank. And you have already testified that three fixed
sets were turned over to the Quartermaster for shipment, one in May
and two in June of 1941, and five mobile sets were turned over to the
Quartermaster for shipment the 22nd of July 1941 ; is that correct ?
Six. That is right?
General Colton. Yes, sir ; except that one additional mobile station
was also turned over on the 22nd of July, making the total of six.
53. General Frank. That would make the correction of six mobile
stations that were turned over in July ?
General Colton. Yes. In preparing to give my testimony here, I
do not believe I looked into that addition of three, because I under-
stood the question to be about the original plan, and it did not appear
to me to be material to the issue, because the fixed stations, even the
first three, did not seem to have been
54. General Frank. We have not pursued it so far as the second
three were concerned, because we did not have the first three installed.
55. General Russell. Was it clear a while ago that these three fixed
sets were not going out there, the last three fixed sets, until 1942 ?
General Colton. No, no. You see, that depends ; if they are set up
in the budget, to be purchased out of funds to be obtained by budgetary
methods, and you do not make any diversions, [6S£] then you
wouldn't get them until 1942 ; but the War Department made a diver-
sion there, you see, which would make them come off the line, accord-
358 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ing to the best information, at the date at which the War Depart-
ment published this document. They would come off the line at the
time that the War Department stated, and would be diverted there.
56. General Frank. This new priority list that we just got through
reading furnished all the sets in 1941.
57. General Grunert. Therefore, naturally, I want to know, were
they prepared for shipment, or not, before Pearl Harbor?
General Colton. I didn't look into the files to determine that ques-
tion, General.
58. General Frank. Proceed with the remainder of the answer to
the question that I asked you, which was : Was any equipment origi-
nally intended for the Hawaiian Islands diverted elsewhere; if so, by
whose authority ?
General Colton.- As I have stated, that most significant change in
the priority list was the one furnished by the War Department, date
28 May 1941, which we have just referred to. This record is from
the office of the Chief Signal Officer, which indicates that that priority
list remained in force until after the Pearl Harbor attack on the 7th
of December 1941.
During this period, some diversions were made, upon the authority
of the War Department, from the priority list. However, the only
significant diversion as regards the Hawaiian situation was the diver-
sion of seven mobile radio sets, SCR 270, to the 1st Aircraft Warning
Company, to replace early production models that had been in the
hands of that organization for a period of nearly one year.
[OSS'] 59. General Grunert. May I ask where the 1st Aircraft
Warning Company was? They were not in Hawaii, were they?
General Colton. No.
60. General Frank, If you will just wait a minute, we will tell you
that.
61. General Grunert. That has been referred to several times, and
I still do not know where it is.
62. General Frank. We will tell you, here, in just a second.
63. General Grunert. All right.
General Colton. The records of the office of the Chief Signal Officer
in this connection are merely as follows. The first paragraph, I quote
from memory, from the file in the office of the Chief Signal Officer :
The 1st Aircraft Warning Company has been made a part of the Gray force.
The War Department has directed that the 1st Aircraft Warning Company be
prepared to fnrnisli long-range warning service and be prepared to embark for
an overseas point by June 10, 1941.
Accordingly, seven radio sets, SCR 270-B, were issued to the 1st
Aircraft Warning Company, early in June 1941, to replace the early
production SCR-270-A radio sets then in the hands of that organi-
zation; and since these early-production sets were not deemed to be
suitable for shipment to Hawaii, there was a resulting delay of ap-
proximately one month in the shipment of the mobile SCR-270 sets
to the Hawaiian Department; and no record has been found in the
files of the Chief Signal Officer to indicate the person in the War De-
partment who conveyed to the Chief Signal Officer the above authority
for diversion.
Does that answer your question, General ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 359
[0'S4] 64. General Grunert. Yes, it answers mine, but I am still
assured that there were six mobile sets turned over to the Quarter-
master, the 22nd of July. They were not diverted, were they ?
General Colton. No; they would just have gotten there a month
earlier, if it had not been for this diversion.
65. General Grunert. That is all.
66. General Russell. 'I think we are going all around the patch.
What I am trying to find out is, when did we send some stuff to Hawaii ?
67. General Frank. He cannot tell us that. All he can tell us is
that it was turned over to the Quartermaster, and I have got to get it
from another agency as to when it was shipped.
68. General Grunert. All right, but is or not the Signal Corps
I'esponsible for delivery to the Hawaiian destination?
General Colton. No, sir.
69. General Russell. Is it the evidence now that this part that you
gave them — six, on July 22 — you immediately took them back and
gave them to the 1st Company ?
General Colton. No, no.
70. General Grunert. That is what I want to get straightened out.
General Colton. I was asked, first, when were they delivered to
the Quartermaster for shipment? and I gave that date, which I be-
lieve was July 22 — wasn't it?
71. General Frank. Yes.
General Colton. Then I was asked about a question of diversion,
and how it affected this situation. I state, in effect, that some sets
were diverted to another organization, [^'*^'5] ''vnd if they had
not been so diverted, Hawaii would have gotten their six sets in June
instead of in July.
72. General Grunert. That is, they may have been turned over to
the Quartermaster in June?
General Colton. I say they would have been turneid over. That
slioulcl have been corrected. Hawaii wouldn't have gotten them, but
they would have been turned over to the Quartermaster for shipment
to Hawaii in June instead of July.
73. General Russell. All this evidence now, about diversions does
not affect the finality of the testimony that the Signal Corps turned
over to tlie Quartermaster on the 22nd of July six 270 mobile sets for
Hawaii ?
General Colton. That is right.
74. General Russell. And it never did take them back ?
General Colton. That is right.
75. General Russell. All right.
76. Major Clausen. Plus the fixed stations.
77. General Russell. There has been no diversion evidence about
them.
78. General Frank. When was the filter information center con-
structed ?
General Colton. No information could be found in the files of the
Chief Signal Officer to show the date the filter information center was
constructed.
79. General Frank. For the information of the record, that was
accomplished by the district engineer in Honolulu, under the supervi-
360 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
sion of tlie Department's Sipial Officer, and we will get information
on that when we get to Honolulu.
80. General Grunert. May I ask you at this time what [686]
particular installation, materiel, and so forth, was furnished for thei
station, and when was that turned over? Was that part of this
shipment?
81. General Frank. That is my next question.
82. General Grunert. Go ahead. I thought you had finished this.
83. General Frank. No.
When was the equipment for the information center furnished?
[687] General Colton. There was no standardized filter or
information center arranged for equipment. Such equipment was
furnished on requisition against project funds.
I want to change the emphasis of that statement. I say, such equip-
ment was furnished on requisition against project funds. I mean to
say that that was the plan set up for it, that it was intended to be
requisitioned by the local authorities against project funds.
In this connection, however, I would like to make reference to a
document that I have here which indicates that information centers
were in operation prior to the 14th of November, 1941.
84. General Frank. Therefore they were equipped with the neces-
sary equipment and in operation in November of 1941 ?
General Colton. Yes, sir; and I may say that I have at one time
or another seen pictures of the installation, but I have no information
as to exact dates.
85. General Frank. In the absence of the installation of the per-
manent stations, were there portable stations to your knowledge?
General Colton. General, may I complete my answer to that infor-
mation question ?
86. General Frank. Yes; go ahead.
General Colton. The document that I refer to is a memorandum to
me from Lieutenant Colonel Powell who was Department Signal
Officer of the Hawaiian Department. Colonel Powell had flown into
Washington and came to my office. I asked him to write the memo-
randum on the 14th of November, 1941, it being a matter of interest to
the Signal Corps as regards the performance of equipment.
[688] (Memorandum from Colonel Powell to General Colton,
dated November 14, 1941, is as follows :)
November 14, 1941.
Memorandum for : Colonel Colton, Chief, Materiel Branch.
In recent exercises held in the Hawaiian Department, the operation of the
radio set SCR-270 was found to be very satisfactory. This exercise was
started approximately 4 : 30 in the morning and with three radio sets in opera-
tion. We noted when the planes took off from the airplane carrier in the oscillo-
scope. We determined this distance to be approximately 80 miles, due to the fact
that the planes would circle around waiting the assemblage of the remainder
from the carrier.
As soon as the planes were assembled, they proceeded towards Hawaii. This
was very easily determined and within six minutes, the pursuit craft wer^
notified and they took off and intercepted the incoming bombers at approximately
30 miles from Pearl Harbor.
It was a very interesting exercise. All the general officers present were highly
pleased with the proceedings of the radio direction finding sets and the personnel
associated with the information centers.
We have had very little trouble with the operations of these sets. When the
fixed stations are installed in the higher mountains surrounding Hawaii, we
expect to have as good an air warning system available for use as is now operat-
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 361
ing for the British on their tight little isfand, as their situation is approximately
the same as ours is on Hawaii.
C. A. Powell,
Lt. Col., Signal Corps,
Department Signal 0-flicer, Hawaiian Department.
[6S9] This document, which was dictated to my stenographer
and signed by Colonel Powell, indicates that the information centers
were in operation on November 14. As I say, I ha^^e seen pictures
of them.
87. General Grunert. Was there more than one?
General Colton. I have only seen the picture of one center. He
speaks of information centers. It is possible that that might be a
little stretching. I think there was probably really one main infor-
mation center.
88. General Frank. What is the range of a set of this type at
Honolulu ?
General Colton. The range, as you know. General, varies with
circumstances; but considering the tactical dispositions used by air-
craft at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, I think it would be rated
normally at something better than 100 miles, and with the different
tactics that are employed the range would be somewhat less, probably,
for the sea-shore sites. I would say that properly in place, though,
corresponding sets today are still rated at 100 miles. That is a nomi-
nal rating. It depends somewhat on circumstances.
89. General Frank. Judging purely from the point of view of the
power and assuming that the aircraft has sufficient altitude to pick
it up at the full extremity of the power range ?
General Coltun. Under those conditions it developed a range of
120 miles, and it met those military characteristics on every official
test.
90. General Frank. Wliat is the range of the 271 ?
General Colton. There is no difference in the range of the two sets
if they are installed at the same height above sea-level; that is, there
is no difference between the 271 and [690] the 270 in range
if the antenna is the same height above sea level or the ground plane.
91. General Frank. Explain briefly, will you, the effect of having
your towers at a higher elevation on the ground and the effect of
airplanes coming in at different altitudes?
General Colton. The height of the antenna of a radar set above
the ground gives two different effects: One is that the higher the
antenna is above the ground for the ground plane, or if the plane in
which you are interested is relatively close to the sea, one effect is
that the height above the plane increases what is called the line of
sight distance. That is, the distance which you can see.
92. General Frank. What kind of sight are you talking about?
Radio sight?
General Colton. No; visual sight. Therefore, since radio waves
follow somewhat the line of sight, you get an increased range some-
what.
There is another intricate reflection effect that keeps the radar set
down closer to visual line of sight the higher you put it up ; so, as a
matter of fact, the effect of increasing the height of the antenna is to
increase the range of detection of the target airplane.
Does that answer your question ?
362 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
93. General Frank. Yes,
General Colton. It will also increase at a given range in height
of the radar set and will enable yon to detect airplanes closer to the
surface of the water. The higher the antenna above the surface of
the water the closer to the water at a given range can you detect the
presence of an airplane.
94. General Frank. Will radar detect beyond a tangent with
[691] the surface of the earth? Does the curvature of the earth
have anything to do with it ?
General Colton. Yes. The curvature of the earth has a great deal
to do with it. Radar sets of the types that we refer to here, the
earlier radar sets, 270 and 271 — I think they were the only radar
sets in those days in existence anywhere in the world — would not
detect below the tangent. They would not go around the curvature
of the earth.
95. General Grunert. The net result is that the reason they used
the permanent one was so that they could put up a higher antenna.
Is that the main reason?
General Colton. The stated reason given to me when we were
developing the set was that they could have better housing and servic-
ing arrangements. The height of the antenna would not come in
to any extent on the 27l's that were scheduled for Hawaii, though
some advantage could have been obtained from the height of the
antenna on the 271-A, because on the 271-A the antenna was, as I
recall it, 100 feet high, and there would have been some advantage
there.
96. General Gruneet. The general effect was that you could get
the same thing out of the 270 mobile as you could out of the per-
manent, approximately?
General Colton. Yes. I would rather have the 270 mobile in
Hawaii.
97. General Frank. I would like to ask another question.
General Colton. Might I just go back and answer General Grun-
ert's question? If you have a low, flat shoreline, if you have a
271-A with a hundred-foot tower, three times the height of the
270, it is advantageous. If you are on an island and if you can
crawl up the side of the mountain the 270 is just as [69^]
good, because the difference of a few feet in a thousand feet is
immaterial.
Does that answer your question?
98. General Grunert. It covers it.
99. General Frank. Let us assume that your set is in place and
one airplane is coming in a thousand feet off the water and another
airplane is coming in 10,000 feet off the water. Is there any differ-
ence in the distances at which eacli can be detected?
General Colton. Yes. The one coming in at 10,000 feet off the
water would be detected perhaps two or three times as far if in
ordinary locations. In fact, I believe almost any location, because
the one that is 1,000 feet off the water drops below the tangent of
the earth's surface sooner than the one that is 10,000 feet off, and
when it drops below the tangent it positively cannot be detected by
the 270 except under the most abnormal climatic conditions.
100. General Frank. You stated that the range of the 270 was
something like from 100 to 120 miles?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 363
General Colton. Under the conditions you gave me, an airplane
flying at 10,000 feet; yes.
101. General Frank. You just got through stating that the differ-
ence in the range at which these two airplanes, one at a thousand
feet and one at 10,000 feet, could be detecteji, was that the one at
10,000 feet could be detected at about three times further.
General Colton. I said, with the ordinary location.
102. General Frank. Does that increase the range any?
General Colton. Will which increase it?
103. General Frank. The altitude of the airplane?
[69S] General Colton. The altitude of the airplane only in-
creases the range by bringing it well above the line of vision.
104. General Frank. The 130 miles is still the maximum range ?
General Colton. I said 120 was the military characteristic range,
and I considered that. May I say that you get very freak results oc-
casionally, but the 120 is a good average maximum range, and it stood
up under that.
105. General Grunert. That does not mean that you can get three
times 120 miles with planes at 10,000 feet?
General Colton. No. At 10,000 feet you would get 120 miles ; but
if the plane was at 50 feet you would have to have a very, very high
antenna site to get him at all.
May I say that it is rather immaterial whether the plane is at 10,-
000 feet or whether your detecting spot is at 10,000 feet. If one is low
and the other is high it reverses the situation. You get similar range
effects.
106. General Frank. In the absence of the permanent system, were
Ihere portable stations? If so, in what quantities? Wlien were they
set up, and where?
General Colton. In so far as the Signal Corps is concerned, the
permanent system was operated in Hawaii sufficiently in advance of
the attack on Pearl Harbor to have been placed in efficient operation
by that date. The portable stations originally contemplated were
also on hand, and it may be concluded that those portable systems pro-
vided an adequate aircraft warning service, in view of the fact that
adequate warning of the impending attack was furnished by this
equipment on the 7th of December, 1941.
In this connection I have a copy of a letter from the Signal Officer,
dated December 31, 1941, which I will now read.
[694] (Letter dated December 31, 1941, from Lieutenant Colonel
C. A. Powell to the Chief Signal Officer, Washington, D. C, is as fol-
lows:)
31 Decembek, 1941.
Subject: Aircraft Warning Service.
I'o : Chief Signal Officer, Washington, D. C.
1. Inasmuch as five out of six radio sets SCR 270 were operating from 4: 00 to
7: 00 A. M. on December 7, 1941, and one station, namely the Opana station, re-
mained in operation thereafter until- 7: 39 A. M.. it is believed that the follow-
ing two inclo.sures may be of some interest:
2. Inclosure No. 1 is a composite based on the written recoi-ds of ranges and
azimuths kept at the following stations: KOKO HEAD, KAAAWA, OPANA,
KAWAILOA, and FORT SHAFTER. Attention is invited to the close agree-
ment of data secured on aircraft north of OAHU between 6 : 48 and 6 : 54 A. M.
3. Inclosure No. 2 is the graphical record made on the OPANA station plot-
ting board. This record discloses the period covered in Inclosure No. 1 and
subsequent hours of December 7, 1941. Attention is invited to the plot begin-
364 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ning at 7 : 02 A. M. near the top of the chart and ending at 7 : 39 A. M. as it de-
veloped that this was the hostile iight which attacked PEARL HARBOR at
8 : 10 A. M.
/s/C. A. POWEIX,
Lt. Col., Signal Corps,
Signal Officer.
(Letter dated December 31, 1941, from Lieutenant Colonel C. A. Powell to the
Chief Signal Officer, Washington, D. C, was marked Exhibit 3 and received in
evidence. )
[695 \ Two charts are enclosed, of which I have photostat copies
here. I may say that the originals, as I recall it, were black on white
photostats and I had these photostat copies made (indicating). 1
have not been able to locate the originals, but I know these to be
correct copies.
107. General Frank. We will incorporate them into the record.
General Colton. I might have add that you have asked me what
the locations of the stations were. The question can be answered by
looking at these charts on which the locations are given.
(Chart of detector station records was marked Exhibit 3-A and
received in evidence.)
(Cliart showing plots of airplane flights was marked Exhibit 3-B
and received in evidence. )
108. General Frank. Have you any record to indicate the location
at which the 270 stations had been set up and were operating on the
morning of December 7, 1941 ?
General Colton. I have a record that shows five detector stations
were located at Kaawa, Opana, Kawailoa, Shafter and Koko Head.
Those were the stations that were in operation on the 7th of Decem-
ber, 1911.
109. General Frank. Wliat permanent and what temporary radar
stations were in position or available for installation on the 20th of
November, 1941?
General Colton. Three primary and six mobile radar stations were
in position or available for installation by the 20th of November,
1941, and five mobile stations were actually in operation from 0400
to 0700 on the 7th of December, 1941, of which one station, namely,
the Opana station, remained in operation thereafter until 0743.
[696] 110. General Kussell. General, you testified a little
while ago that this radar equipment, so far as you knew, was the only
such equipment in the world at that time?
General Colton. No, I said that at that time there was essentially
no equipment of higher frequency. I probably expressed it, that
would detect airplanes at a lower altitude. In other words, all radar
stations as of that date were the same frequency, approximately.
Since that time we have gone into lots of radar equipment which is
much better and of mucli higher frequency and picks up airplanes at
lower altitude. But I thought that the Board was concerned with
conditions as they existed at that time.
111. General Russell. This equipment that was sent out to Ha-
waii and the Panama Canal, and wherever else it was sent, was the
first equipment of that type that had reached those destinations, so
far as you know ? Let us confine it to Hawaii.
General Colton. As to Hawaii ; yes.
112. General Russell. It was necessary, therefore, to train the per-
sonnel out there to operate this equipment, was it not ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 365
General Colton. Yes ; I would say it was.
113. General Russell. It was a new thing?
General Colton. It was new to them.
114. General Russell. That is all.
115. General Grunert. There appearing to be no further ques-
tions, we thank you very much for helping us out.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
[697] TESTIMONY OP MAJOR GENERAL THOMAS M. ROBINS,
UNITED STATES ARMY, DEPUTY CHIEP OP ENGINEERS (ACCOM-
PANIED BY DOUGLAS I. McKAY, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE
CHIEP OP ENGINEERS.)
(The witness was sworn by the recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of AVar 24.)
1. Colonel West. Will you state to the Board your name, grade,
organization, and station ?
General Robins. Thomas M. Robins, Major General, United States
Army ; Deputy Chief of Engineers.
2. General Grunert. General, this Board is after facts. It is
required to go into facts of which you may have knowledge because
of your position in the Chief of Engineer's office. We hope that you
can throw some light on the subject.
General Frank will lead in the questioning, because we have divided
the field into various parts so as to cover the ground as quickly as
possible. The other members of the Board will ask some questions to
help get an understanding of what is brought out. So, General Frank
will lead in propounding the questions.
3. General Frank. What position did you hold in the fall of 1940?
General Robins. I was Assistant Chief of Engineers in charge of
civil works. We also had at that time taken over in my Construction
Division of Civil Works, airport construction or a large part of it.
4. General Frank. By civil works, you mean construction other
than defense projects?
General Robins. That is correct. We had at that time two divi-
sions, so to speak, in the office of the Chief of Engineers, a military
division and a civil division.
[698] 5. General Frank. And you had charge of the civil
division ?
General Robins. I had charge of the civil division ; but we had also
taken over quite a large part of the Air Corps program, as you may
recall, from the Quartermaster, and were carrying that on under my
direction. That did not apply until about October, 1941, on the work
in Hawaii.
6. General Frank. Are you familiar with the negotiations for con-
tract 414-Eng-602, dated the 20th of December, 1940?
General Robins. Not the negotiations.
7. General Frank. Are you familiar with the contract with The
Hawaiian Constructors, for defense projects in Hawaii ?
General Robins. Yes.
8. General Frank. Will you state generally to the Board the man-
ner in which you are familiar with it ?
366 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Robins. It was brought to my attention as a matter of
course in the office of the Chief of Engineers because the Contracts
and Claims Section was operating under my direction, and it came
up in this way, that the Chief Engineer at Honolulu, Colonel Wyman,
came to Washington and recommended that the contract for this work
in question be made with Callahan and Rohl and Connolly ; and I was
familiar to this extent, that those contractors were cleared through the
O. P. M. and that the Contract Advisory Board was consulted and I
knew that the contract at that time was in the amount of something
over a million dollars. That is about the extent of what I had to do
with it at that time.
9. General Frank. Who is O. P.M.?
General Robins. The Office of Production Management, which suc-
ceeded the O. E. M. At that time all contractors had to be cleared
with them.
[699] 10. General Frank. Do you remember the date of this
contract?
General Robins. My recollection is it was December 20, 1940.
[700] 11. General Frank. That is correct. Do you know that
Rohl and Connolly constituted a firm, one of those contractors ?
General Robins. Yes.
12. General Frank. Did you know Hans Wilhelm Rohl ?
General Robins. I did not know him personally. I knew of his
firm. I have known of his firm for quite a few years.
13. General Frank. Did you know that he was a German alien?
General Robins. No.
14. General Frank. What machinery have you in the Engineer
Corps for determining the reliability and loyalty of contractors?
General Robins. Well, we always investigate the experience and the
ability and the financial responsibility of contractors as a matter of
course, as a matter of orders and regulations.
15. General Frank. What about the loyalty ?
General Robins. Loyalty is a matter which we have never been
charged specifically with investigating.
16. General Frank. Then, you can pick up any contractor who has
produced good results from the construction point of view and give
him a contract, if he has done good work, irrespective of his loyalty ?
General Robins. We cannot do that under the law at the present
time.
17. General Frank. What would have stopped you at that time ?
General Robins. Well, at that time, as I understand the law at that
time, you could not communicate any classified information to an
alien.
18. General Frank. Do you remember when the Espionage Act was
passed ?
General Robins. I do not know just which act you are referring to.
General.
[701] 19. General Frank. War Department Circular 121, the
Espionage Act was the 28th of March, 1940. This was prior to the
letting of this contract.
General Robins. Yes, that date is prior to the letting of the contract.
20. General Frank. And the provisions of the Espionage Act
prohibit the letting of a defense work contract to an alien.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 367
General Eobins. I am not familiar with that.
21. General Frank. You are not now familiar with it?
General Robins. I do not know it as an Espionage Act. My un-
derstanding was that the first War Powei^s Act, which revived the old
Trading With The Enemy Act, which was passed shortly after Pearl
Harbor, forbids the awarding of a contract to an enemy alien.
I stated that, as I understood the law at the time that this contract
was let, an alien could not be given any information in connection
with a contract that was considered classified, but as I recollect that
law it said nothing about the awarding of contracts. As far as that
is concerned, none of us knew that Rohl was an enemy or an alien
at that time. He was not an enemy alien. He was an alien, but
we did not know it.
22. General Frank. What do you mean by "none of us knew" ?
General Robins. Anyone that I know of that had anything to do
with negotiating that contract in the office of the Chief of Engineers.
23. General Frank. Well, some people knew it, because we have
documentary evidence to the effect that it was known that he was
an alien.
General Robins. Oh, that was true. The first I knew of it I think
was along in June or July when he applied for citizen- [702]
ship.
24. General Frank. It was necessary for him to be a citizen for his
company to be awarded a defense contract; is that correct?
General Robins. No. I do not understand it that way. He could
not take any active part in the contract or he could not be given any
classified information, and he did not take any active part in the
contract until he was made a citizen.
25. General Frank. If he had been given any information on the
details of the defense contracts in Honolulu prior to his having been
naturalized, that would have been in violation of the Army regula-
tions which prohibit disclosing of secret information ?
General Robins. I understand it would be in violation of the law
to give him any.
26. General Frank. So any information that he got prior to his
becoming a citizen, the man who gave it to him was culpable ; is that
correct, if he got it ?
General Robins. Well I can answer that this way: that anyone
knowing that any Army officer or anybody having anything to do
with it that knew that he was an alien, that gave him that information,
was certainly culpable, law or no law.
27. General Frank. All right. Do you know whether or not Rohl
took any active part in the contract?
General Robins. It is my understanding that he took no active part
in the contract whatever until after he was made a citizen, which was
some time in September, 1941. He most certainly took no part in
the negotiations of the contract, because I was familiar with that.
28. General Frank. Did a representative of his company take
General Robins. No. The man that carried out the [703]
negotiations and who had the power of attorney to do so was Mr.
Paul Grafe, who was the vice-president of the Callahan Construction
Company.
368 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
29. General Frank. Do you remember ever meeting Mr. Connolly,
who was a member of the firm of Rohl-Connolly ?
General Robins. Yes, sir, I remember Mr. Connolly.
30. General Frank. Did you have negotiations with them prior to
the time that Rohl became a citizen ?
General Robins. You mean in connection with this contract?
31. General Frank. Yes.
General Robins. I did not conduct the negotiations for this contract,
but to the best of my knowledge and understanding the negotiations
were carried out entirely with Mr. Gf afe. Now, Mr. Conolly was in
town at that time, but Mr. Grafe represented The Hawaiian Con-
structors in negotiating that contract.
32. General Frank. Did you talk with Mr. Grafe ?
General Robins. About this contract?
33. General Frank. Yes.
General Robins. Yes, he came in to see me and talked about it in a
very general way.
34. General Frank. Did you talk to a Mr. Martin about some nego-
tiations?
General Robins. Not about the negotiations. The first time that I
remember seeing Mr. Martin is when he came in at the time that Rohl
was trying to get his citizenship, and I think about the time that a
letter was written from the office of the Chief of Engineers signed by
General Kingman, Acting Chief of Engineers, requesting that the
citizenship proceedings be expedited.
[704-] 35. General Frank. What was your responsibility with
respect to contracts in the office of the Chief of Engineers at this time ?
General Robins. Well, I was responsible for all the construction
contracts particularly for work which was under me and generally for
the conduct of the Contracts and Claims Division of the office. This
particular contract, the work at that time was under the military side
of the office and not under me.
36. General Frank. You stated, or I get it by inference, that not-
withstanding the fact that Rohl as an alien should not be given secret
information, nevertheless it was all right to give it to his firm; is that
correct ?
General Robins. The way I stated that, I think, General, was that
anyone that knew he was an alien — as far as I know, no detailed in-
formation was given to Mr. Rohl until after he was naturalized and
went over to Hawaii. At the time the contract was negotiated I most
certainly did not know that he was not a citizen of the United States,
and I do not think anyone in the Chief's office that had anything to do
with the negotiations knew that. Rohl and Connolly were well-known
and reputable contractors out there on the West Coast, with a reputa-
tion for doing work as quickly and as cheaply as any other contractors
on the coast.
37. General Frank. Well, somewhere in the scheme of organization
of an astute outfit it strikes me that there should be some sort of
machinery for determining the background of people with whom the
government is making contracts. Was there such a system in the Engi-
neer Corps setup at that time?
General Robins. There was as far as everything in connec-
[TOS] tion with a contractor was concerned except the question
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 369
of loyalty ; there was no machinery, never has been any ; it never has
been considered the duty of the Chief of the Branch of Technical
Service, as they call it now, to conduct a G-2 investigation.
38. General Frank. Well, is there any machinery now for deter-
mining that before the Chief of Engineers lets a contract ?
General Robins. Yes ; as I understand it, now there is. We are re-
quired to report to the G-2 before we disclose anv classified informa-
tion in regard to the letting of a contract and, after a contract is let.
to report that the contract has been let to such-and-such a firm, giving
the names of the people involved.
39. General Frank. Was there any arrangement in 1940 to refer the
contractors' names to G-2 to find out any backgi^ound on them?
General Robins. Not to my knowledge.
40. General Frank. In other words, the question of loyalty never
occurred ; it was simply a question of efficiency ?
General Robins. Yes, that generally. Of course, before the war
the question of loyalty went along severally, without saying, in con-
nection with the responsibility of the man.
41. General Frank. Wlien were you aware that Hans Wilhelm Rohl
was an alien ?
General Robins. As I remember, it was some time in June, 1941,
when the District Engineer wrote in and requested that the office of
the Chief of Engineers request the proper authorities to expedite his
becoming a citizen so that he could go to Honolulu and help to manage
the work there.
42. General Frank. At that time was there any check-up made
[706] with the F. B. I. or any other agency to find out if he had a
background ?
General Robins. As I recollect it, it was the underetanding of the
Acting Chief of Engineers that the F. B. I. knew all about this appli-
cation for citizenship and had cleared it.
43. General Frank. That was an understanding. Was there any
actual determination of fact on it?
General Robins. 1 could not answer that question. General, because
1 did not handle the details of that. My recollection is that that was
stated in a letter. AVliat it was based on, I do not know.
44. General Frank. This letter which is quoted in the Interim Re-
port of the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives,
seventy-eighth Congress, second session, pursuant to House Resolution
30, as the copy of General Kingman's letter, next to the last paragraph
says :
It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States
is beyond question.
Do you konw of any positive efforts that were made to determine
that?
General Robins. No, I do not know what that statement was based
on because I did not draft the letter and I did not pursue that any
further. I assume that if a man was going up for citizenship he would
not be granted citizenship unless his loyalty was investigated and found
all right. In other words, it would seem to me that if he was granted
citizenship there would not be any question about his loyalty.
45. General Frank. Well, this is before the court now. That is what
this letter was, to go up before the Special Assistant to the Bureau of
79716 — 46— .Ex. 145, vol. 1 25
370 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Immigration and Naturalization, and here is a [707] state-
ment of the Acting Chief of Engineers : "It is the understanding that
Mr. Kohl's loyalty is beyond question." I am trying to find out, from
where did they determine that understanding.
General Robins. Well, I cannot answer that question, because I do
not know.
46. General Frank. Furthermore, this letter is under date of August
28, 1941, and the contract in question is under date of the 20th of De-
cember, 1910, and this letter states that this group of contractors "are
working on very important defense construction." Therefore the con-
tract was let to this group of contractors that constituted The Hawaiian
Constructors and included Rohl's firm while he still was a German
alien.
General Robins. That is correct. He took no active part in the con-
tract. He was not an officer of the Rohl and Connolly Company.
47. General Frank. Rohl was not an officer of the Rohl-Connolly
Company ?
General Robins. No. Connolly was president of the company.
48. General Frank. What check did you make that he took no part
in the operation of the organization?
General Robins. Well, I know that Mr. Paul Grafe went to Hawaii
and managed the — took charge of the contract operations there, and
that Rohl did not go to Hawaii until he was naturalized.
49. General Frank. Do you know of any communication or do you
know of any actual effort expended from any place in the Corps of
Engineers to find out anything about Rolil's background?
General Robins. About everything connected with his ability to
execute that contract. I know of no investigation [7081 that
was made to find out whether he was a citizen of the United States
or not, or whether he was loyal or anything of that kind.
50. General Frank. Who was the man in charge of your Finance
and Contract Section at that time ?
General Robins. I think Colonel Earl Gesler.
51. General Frank. That is right ; Colonel Gesler. I take it from
the information that we have had up until now that Colonel Gesler
was the man responsible for writing that letter asking that Rohl's
citizenship papers be expedited. He should be able to shed some
light on this?
General Robins. I think he could, yes, sir.
52. General Frank. Was it the responsibility of the contracting
officer, Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., who was also the District En-
gineer in Hawaii, to check as to whether Rohl was a citizen?
General Robins. It was, under the law, if he was going to give Mr.
Rohl any information whatever in regard to the classified parts of
the contract.
53. General Frank. Do you know anything concerning the failure
of The Hawaiian Constructors to complete construction of the de-
fense projects within the times indicated prior to the 7th of Decem-
ber, '41, prior to the time indicated on the job orders?
General Robins. I have no information on that except the reports
that came in as to the status of completion.
54. General Frank. Do you have any information as to whether
or not those reports indicated delays ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 371
General Robins. Those reports showed incomplete status on many
items of the contract.
55. General Frank. Do you remember anything about the aircraft
[709] warning system ?
General Robins. My recollection is that there were three of those
permanent stations under construction, none of which was entirely
complete. One of them was about 80 or 90 percent complete, and the
others a less percentage complete.
56. General Frank. Do you remember what was holding them up ?
General Robins. I have no direct information as to what held them
up. I know what was claimed in a general way. One thing was the
delay in determining the locations, delay in approval of plans.
57. General Frank. Approval of what plans?
General Robins. That is, plans for the layout and the foundations,
and so forth. Also it was common knowledge that there was great
difficulty in getting men, equipment, and materials. That condition
prevailed in the Hawaiian Islands throughout the whole time of the
contract.
58. General Frank. What is there about the plans of a permanent
radar set that would require change? The towers are already fabri-
cated and fit a fixed-dimensional foundation, and the other stuff is
all fixed. What could change about it?
General Robins. Well, I think there was quite an argument, you
might say. General, about whether the stations were to be fixed or
movable and just what was to be done. Of course, the foundation,
the construction work on one of those stations is very simple, once
you have got the foundation layout for the tower and also for the
power plant building or anything else.
59. General Frank. Well, they determined ahead of time that
there were three of them that were to be permanent. Therefore there
was no question about the fixed nature of those plans, was there?
[710] General Robins. Well, I would hate to answer directly
on that. If I might suggest, that the Board would find the best
and most accurate information on the details as to the delays right
there in the Honolulu office.
60. General Frank. You just got through saying that one of the
delays was incident to the change in plans, and I wondered when
you stated that if you knew what any of those changes in plans were.
General Robins. No, sir, I do not, because, as I say, that work
was handled up until a very short time before Pearl Harbor in the
planning stage by the construction section of the Chief of Engineers'
office, which was not under me.
61. General Frank. I see. In any event, you think that more
accurate and detailed information would be available in the district
office in Honolulu ?
[711] General Robins. Yes, sir. I think that is the only way
you would get at the real facts as to what they had at the time the work
orders were issued, and so forth.
62. General Frank. A copy of the job orders has been sent in from
the district office to the Office of the Corps of Engineers, Honolulu?
Was that the original set, or is there still a copy of the job orders and
the contract in Honolulu ?
General Robins. I am sure the original is in Honolulu.
372 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
63. General Frank. What knowledge do you have concerning
whether any military personnel neglected duties relating to the con-
tract ? Have you any ?
General Robins. No, sir.
64. General Frank. Have you any information as to whether or not
there was any appeal to higher authority relative to delays and de-
ficiencies?
General Robins. No, I know of none.
65. General Frank. By the District Engineer?
General Robins. There were many requests for expediting mate-
rials and equipment and things of that kind that went on continuously.
Whether you would call that an appeal or not, I do not know.
66. General Frank. Can you put your finger on any of those?
General Robins. No, I cannot. I imagine I can go to the files and
pull out a lot of them, because it was a fight to get anything done at
that time. There was a great deal of work going on in Hawaii. The
Navy was doing a lot of work over there, and there was one continual
fight to recruit people and to get equipment and get materials and
get shipping space.
67. General Frank. Can you get in your records and give us a list of
those appeals that were made, those requests? [712] We would
like to have them to indicate the effort that was made to eliminate
delays as they existed in this contract.
[713] General Robins. I would be very glad to have the files
examined.
68. General Frank. But you state that there were a large number of
such messages. I would like to get copies of them. Will you have
that looked up, and furnish a set of those to the Board ?
General Robins. Yes, sir; I will.
69. General Frank. Will you make a note of it, so we won't miss it?
General Robins. Yes, sir.
70. General Frank. To your knowledge, what information was
given Wyman relative to completing these defense projects as speedily
as possible?
General Robins. No, I have no direct knowledge on that.
71. General Frank. What were the functions of the position you
occupied on the 20th of December 1940, with respect to the contract to
which we are referring ?
General Robins. The only responsibility I had was as to the qualifi-
cations of the contractor, seeing that they were cleared by proper
authorities, and the fee that was charged.
72. General Frank. And the "clearing by the proper authorities"
took into consideration, so far as you considered at that time, only his
ability and general reputation for doing good work ; it did not bring
up the question of loyalty ?
General Robins. No, sir. Of course, we didn't know at that time,
and don't know yet, what the 0PM clearance covered, but we were re-
quii'ed to report everyone and get a clearance from them before we
could go ahead. It might well be that some investigations other than
those of just pure ability, [714] experience, and so forth, were
carried out, there, but we certainly did not consider it the duty of the
Office of the Chief of Engineers to investigate the citizenship and
loyalty of the contractor.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 373
73. General Frank. If every other office connected with it had the
same attitude, then nobody looked it tip.
General Robins. As it stands, now, we are not supposed to make
the investigation. General. That is for G-2 and the FBI.
74. General Frank. Somebody has to make it, though ?
General Robins. Well, I imagine that the G-2 at that time was sup-
posed to be keeping track of those kinds of things.
75. General Frank. Do you have any memory of any request from
the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, or from Colo-
nel Wyman, requesting that you assist in speeding up materials for
the work, or assist in obtaining a higher priority on materials for the
work?
General Robins. I know that there was a lot of that done. I can't
quote here any specific instances.
76. General Frank. Are you sure that there was a lot of it done?
General Robins. Yes, I am.
77. General Frank. All right. You are going to furnish us with
such copies of that as you can find.
Did you know on the 20th of December that Rohl was then or had
been under investigation by a government agency for suspicious
activities?
General Robins. No, sir.
78. General Frank. What if any measures should have been
[715] taken by personnel of the Corps of Engineers for the pro-
tection of the Government against contracting with a person having
such a record ?
General Robins. As far as awarding the contract was concerned,
legally I don't think there was any obligation on the office of the Cliief
of Engineers to investigate. As far as furnishing anyone in the firm
with any classified information, then I presume the contracting officer
was bound to investigate.
79. General Frank. I think I asked you this, before: Right now,
who is responsible for looking into the loyalty and integrity of your
contractors ?
General Robins. The G-2.
80. General Frank. Do you have a fixed manner in which they are
requested to do that ?
General Robins. Yes, sir ; we are supposed to, before any informa-
tion is disclosed, secret information, in any way preliminary to making
a contract, we are to clear with G-2 on the people that are going to
be taken into confidence.
81. General Frank. There is a positive system for accomplishing
that ?
General Robins. Yes ; but that was put into effect in 1943.
82. General Frank. What if any rules or regulations of the Corps
of Engineers did Colonel Wyman violate in the event he, having been
informed that Rohl was a German alien, discussed with him details
of the secret contract ?
General Robins. As far as I know, it has been some time since I
checked over all the orders and regulations of the Chief of Engineers.
I don't think there is anything in the orders and regulations on that
subject.
[716] 83. General Frank. In other words, it is all in Army reg-
ulations ?
374 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Robins. Well, if it is in Army regulations, then it is in
O&R of the Chief of Engineers, because that specifically calls atten-
tion to all pertinent provisions of the Army regulations.
84. General Frank. Did you ever receive notice or knowledge of
any reports concerning the activities of Colonel Wyman in Hawaii
which were derogatory to him ?
General Robins. I never received any official reports; no.
85. General Frank. Did you ever receive any reports with respect
to his intimate association with Rohl?
General Robins. Not any official reports ; no, sir.
86. General Frank. Did you ever receive any reports?
General Robins. Letters were written to the Chief of Engineers
after the investigation made out in California by a committee of the
legislature of California, in which many allegations were made against
Wyman in the connection you mention.
87. General Frank. What date was that?
General Robins. It was in 1943, I think. It was during 1943.
88. General Frank. Did you ever receive notice or have knowledge
of a report dated the 14th of February 1942, by an Army officer to the
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, to the effect that
Colonel Wyman should be relieved as district engineer for gross in-
efficiency ?
General Robins. No, sir.
[717] 89. General Frank. Are you familiar with the details
surrounding Colonel Wjmian's relief as district engineer in Hawaii?
General Robins. I am not. I know that there was some corre-
spondence between the Department Engineer and the Office of the
Chief of Engineers to the effect that Colonel Wyman could be released,
and that he was released, but I was not directly connected with the
personnel of the branch office of the Chief of Engineers.
90. General Frank. Do you know whether copies of that corre-
spondence are available?
General Robins. I do not know. I imagine that they are.
91. General Frank. Will you make an investigation of that and
furnish the Board with those copies, please.
Did you have anything to do with the assignment of Colonel Wyman
to the Canol project ?
General Robins. Yes, sir. He was assigned there on my recom-
mendation.
92. General Frank. Let us have the background of that.
General Robins. The Canol project was dumped into my lap one
morning and had to be done in six months, and I went over all the
available engineer officers that could be assigned to duty at that proj-
ect, and I though Wyman was the best man available to go up there
and push it through.
93. General Frank. Why was he relieved from Honolulu?
General Robins. I couldn't answer that question specifically. My
understanding was that the Department Engineer, General Lyman,
wanted to have him relieved, but it was not my understanding that
he was relieved for inefficiency.
[718] 94. General Frank. There has been reported in the con-
gressional investigation a background of association between Rohl
and Wyman. Over a period of years, in Los Angeles, a determined
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 375
effort was made by Wyman to have Rohl's citizenship hastened; a
determined effort by Wyman to have Rohl-Connolly established in
Honolulu. There has been testimony with respect to the close per-
sonal relations of Rohl and Wyman even in Honolulu ; and do you
mean to say that this went on over a period of several years, and no
i]iformation on it ever infiltrated into the Engineer headquarters in
Washington ?
General Robins. It certainly did not get to me. And I knew noth-
ing about Rohl — I knew that Eohl-Connolly had contracts with the
Engineer Department in Los Angeles and vicinity, but I knew nothing
of Wyman's social relations or personal relations with Rohl, whatever ;
it was none of my business.
95. General Frank. Do you know anything relative to Wyman's
activities in awarding contracts to Rohl's firm in the Canol project?
General Robins. Yes, sir ; I do. That was in connection with what
wje called the Hanes cut-off road. Foley Brothers was the firm
selected for that contract, and Wyman wanted Rohl-Connolly in
it only to get the floating equipment that Rohl and Connolly owned,
and which was coming off the job down in Los Angeles, the Los
Angeles breakwater. Wyman told me that, himself.
96. General Frank. There never seemed to be any question in your
mind over the fact that, where Wyman went, there went Rohl and
Connolly, also.
General Robins. No, I never — the only place he ever [719']
went was from Los Angeles to Hawaii, up to that time.
97. General Frank. And from Hawaii to Alaska?
General Robins. Yes; but this was only a very small part of the
work up in the Pacific Northwest, and I asked Wyman why he wanted
Rohl and Connolly, and he gave me that as a reason, and it was under-
stood that Mr. Rohl — by that time, this investigation had started on
Mr. Rohl, and it was understood by all concerned that Mr. Rohl would
not go on the work or have anything to do with the management, that
Foley Brothers would handle the contract, all Rohl had was an interest
in it on account of his equipment. Mr. Rohl never had enything to
do with the management of that contract in any way, shape, or form.
98. General Frank. You seem to exclude Rohl from this Alaskan
venture. However, he walked in so far as reward was concerned, in
the fees for the use of his equipment, certainly ?
General Robins. Certainly. He was a stockholder in Rohl-Con-
nolly Co., and he got his share of the rentals, because it was his equip-
ment.
99. General Frank. That is "the fly in the ointment," so to speak,
isn't it?
General Robins. Oh, I wouldn't think so. We were desperate for
the equipment. We had to have it. That was the only place we could
get it. There certainly was nothing dishonest, or no question of any
classified information, or anything of that kind.
100. General Frank. Did you receive notice and knowledge of any
reports concerning the activities of Colonel Wyman on the Canol
project that were derogatory to him ?
[720] General Robins. Well, the first report that I saw was the
so-called "Horowitz Report." I would say that was derogatory to
him. That was a report made by Colonel Horowitz to Colonel Strong.
376 COXGRESSIOXAL IXVESTIGATIOX PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Horowitz was on duty under Colonel Strong, who was in
charge of the construction division, and Colonel Horowitz' duties were
to go around and inspect all the projects.
101. General Frank. Do you know anything about the Dawson
Creek explosion I
General Kobixs. Yes, I know they had an explosion and killed a lot
of people.
102. General Fraxk. "Was there any action taken with respect to
it?
General Robixs. There was a very thorough investigation made of
that.
103. General Frank. Xobody responsible ?
General Robins. The responsibility was fixed on — to a certain extent,
the contractor was mainly responsible.
104. General Frank. That is. Foley ?
General Robins. Xo, no. No. that was — I have forgotten. There
was a contractor that had the contract with the telephone line, Miller
Brothel^. I think. Foley had nothing in the world to do with it;
neither did Mr. Rohh
105. General Frank. What was Wyman's relation to this?
General Robins. "Wyman was division engineer, at the time, and in
charge of all the work up there.
106. General Frank. Did he have any responsibility with respect
to tliis Dawson Creek explosion?
General Rjbins. He had general responsibility, as div- [7211
ision engineer. My recollection is that the responsibility, as far as
the Government was concerned, was narrowed down to Wyman's
executive officer. Wyman was absent at the time. He was out on the
job somewhere, and Colonel Woodbury and — I am not certain; I
think, the district engineer, and some of the inspectors. Colonel
Woodbury was reprimanded as a result of the investigation.
107. General Frank. Wliy was Colonel Wyman relieved from his
assignment to the Canol project ? Can you state the circumstances
surrounding^ that ?
General Robins. From my pomt of view, because he didn't seem
to be able to administer the job in the way it should be administered.
lOS. General Frank. Was it for inefficiency ?
General Robins. In many ways, he was very efficient. In getting
work done, and shoving the work and everything, he was very efficient.
He was not efficient in keeping a smooth-running organization and
keeping all the administrative matters under control and coordinated.
109. General Frank. How did his administration of the Canol
project compare with his administration in Honolulu?
General Robins. I am not intimately acquainted with his admin-
istration in Honolulu, except I know that he got a tremendous amount
of work done over there. He did the same thing on the Canol project.
110. General Frank. Did you have anything to do with Colonel
Wyman "s present assignment?
General Robins. Xo.
111. General Frank. You did recommend him for the Canol
[722] assigmnent ?
General Robins. I did.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 377
112. General Frank. Have you anything further, with respect to
this case, that you would like to state to the Board ?
General Robins. No, sir. I don't think so. I have simply covered
about everything I could testify on.
113. General Frank. I would like to ask you one question about
something we were talking about, some time back. Did you talk with
Mr. Connolly relative to the negotiations for this contract?
General Robins. No, sir ; I did not. The only man 1 talked to was
Grafe.
114. General Frank. Are your initials on this Exhibit 2?
General Robins. No; I don't see them.
115. General Grunert. Have you any questions. General Russell?
116. General Russell. General, when this contract was negotiated
and entered into on the 20th of December 1940, I believe you state
that Wyman came in to Washington, then ?
General Robins. Yes; he came in. That was customary. "Wlien
he had negotiated a fixed-fee contract, the district engineer came in
ordinarily and sat right down and participated in the negotiations,
because he was the man that had to administer the contract.
17. General Russell. Was there a group of people who came in with
Wyman, representing these contractors?
General Robins. So far as I know, Mr. Grafe, I know, represented
him. He had the power of attorney, aiid he signed the contract.
Whether he had any lawyers or not, I don't know, because, as I said
before, I didn't participate personally in [723] the negotia-
tions.
118. General Russell. As you recollect, it was only Wyman and
Grafe who were in here when that contract was signed?
General Robins. I know that they were both here ; yes.
110. General Russell. You do not remember anybody else?
General Robins. Mr. Connolly might have been in town. I think
Mr. Connolly was in town, at the time.
120. General Russell. But only Grafe and Wyman made
General Robins. Grafe and Wyman, so far as I know, were the only
ones.
121. General Russell. Who was Martin?
General Robins. Martin is a lawyer and an attorney who has repre-
sented Rohl-Connolly.
122. General Russell. As I understood your testimony this man
Martin came to the Chief of Engineer's office, and it was through his
activity that this letter which is known as Exhibit 2 now, and is the
letter in which the Enginner's office here in Washington asked that
action on Rohl's application for citizenship be expedited, was written?
Now, is it true that Martin is the man who came in and had that letter
written and executed?
General Robins. Mr. Martin came in, in that matter. As I recol-
lect it, Colonel Wyman wrote a letter, an official letter to the Chief
of Engineers, asking that such a letter as this be written, and that this
Mr. Martin came to Washington along with that, and came to the
office, because he knew that letter was coming in, and that Mr. Martin
presented all the detailed information, a great deal of which later
came out in the court.
378 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[7£i] 123. General Russell. Do we have a copy of the Wyman
letter to the Chief of Engineers, asking for the expediting of the
application of Rohl to become a citizen ?
General Robins. I think we can get that out of the files.
124. General Russell. Have you any work-sheet down there on
which are contained any data that Martin gave you about Rohl ?
General Robins. I have not.
[725] 125. General Russell. Is there a file down there on this
expediting of Rohl's application?
General Robins. I have never seen the file. A copy of the letter
of course is in the file.
126. General Russell. Would you have your records searched to
determine that?
General Robins. I will be glad to do that.
127. General Russell. There were a number of contractors Avho
organized themselves into a group for the completion of this work
on Oahu ; is that right ?
General Robins. Yes; there were several firms.
128. General Russell. One of them was this Rohl-Connolly Com-
pany ; is f hat right ?
General Robins. That is right.
129. General Russell. So far as you know, Rohl was not an officer
of the Rohl-Connolly Company, was he?
General Robins. No. Connolly was president of the Rohl-Con-
nolly Company.
130. General Russell. His only relation to that company, so far
as you know, was that of a stockholder?
General Robins. My understanding is that before it entered into
this contract — all this I found out afterward — Rohl gave up any
position in the company as an officer and Connolly took over as
president.
131. General Russell. Rohl-Connolly was a corporation?
General Robins. Yes.
132. General Russell. Did this man Rohl have any interest in any
of the other companies or associated companies in doing war work?
General Robins. So far as I know, he had none.
\726] 133. General Russell. So far as you know, the only re-
lation that Rohl had to those organizations was as a stockholder in
the Rohl-Connolly Company?
General Robins. Up to the time he was naturalized.
134. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not Rohl had any
official position in the Rohl-Connolly Company prior to getting this
contract of December 20? Does it appear to you that he just stepped
out from that knowing that he should not be officiating as an officer of
that company when they were engaged in a defense project ?
General Robins. Yes. He was an officer of the company before
that.
135. General Grunert. It appears that he just stepped down well
knowing that he should not stay in there on that sort of work until he
became a citizen ?
General Robins. Oh, yes ; I do not think there is any question about
that.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 379
136. General Grunert. Who selected Wyman to go out to Hawaii ?
General Robins. I think Colonel Wyman went to Hawaii with
troops and was stationed at Schofield Barracks. I have no personal
knowledge of the circumstances but I know that the District Engineer
was sent home and Wyman was right there and he was detailed on
that job.
137. General Grunert. From what you know of his work in Ha-
waii— I believe you said something about the good work he had done
out there, so you selected him to go to the Canol Project — what is there
of record to show the good work he had done out there ?
General Robins. I think he had done a tremendous amount of work
very quickly in connection with the chain of airfields which were put
in just before Pearl Harbor; and he certainly did [727] a tre-
mendous amount of work after Pearl Harbor.
138. General Grunert. Before 1941 the air warning service was
not completed and a number of defense projects were not completed
anywhere near to the estimated completion date. Was that considered
good work ?
General Robins. I think he did lots of other work over there, Gen-
eral. You will find a considerable quantity. The aircraft warning
service, from a construction standpoint, amounted to very little except
getting into the locations.
139. General Grunert. What was the basis of his getting the Dis-
tinguished Service medal?
General Robins. My understanding is that the citation mentioned
particularly Jiis work on the Island Airfields.
140. General Grunert. Who recommended him?
(ieneral Robins. I think that Colonel Hannum did ; also the Di-
vision Engineer recommended him.
141. General Grunert. Then, so far as you remember the citation,
it was mainly about the work after December 7 ; did he work on the
chain of airports or what?
General Robins. My recollection is that the work on the chain of air-
fields was what you might call the outstanding feature of the citation.
I do not think it excluded any work he might have done.
142. (ieneral Grunert. We are quite a bit concerned about the efforts
made by all those concerned, particularly from the Hawaiian end,
about getting these defense projects, particularly the air warning
service projects, stepped up; so I wish you would exert the greatest
effort in seeing what the records of the Engineer's Office can give us
as to any complaints, requests for help to get those projects through,
and so forth, and getting [728] higher priority in procuring
materials and getting prompt shipments, and things of that sort. I
think it would help the Board a great deal if you could give us the
history of that as shown by the records.
General Robins. Very well, sir. We will get everything we can. I
am sure the Board can get a great deal of that in Honolulu in the
District Office. Their files are not quite as voluminous as ours. We
will get everything we can.
143. General Frank. You stated that Wyman did outstanding work
in Honolulu by completing certain projects other than those we have
mentioned. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department
has stated that the project that was on first priority in the Hawaiian
380 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Islands was the aircraft warning service project. If Wyman was so
good at getting results, it would seem that he ought to have gotten
results on the project of first priority. Would you not think so?
General Eobins. Yes ; I would think so. I do not know the reasons
for his lack of progress on these A. W. S. stations.
144. General Grunert. There appearing to be no further questions,
the Board thanks you for giving us your time and helping us out.
General Robins. I was very glad to do so.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon, at 5:44 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of
witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 381
CONTENTS
TUESDAY, AUGUST 15, 1944
Testimony of— Page '
Colonel Robert B. Richards, General Staff Corps, Finance Officer, A. C.
of S., G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C 730
Colonel John A. Hunt, Inspector General's Office, War Department,
Washington, D. C 745
Case B. Rafter, Washington, D. C 778
Brig. Gen. James A. Mollison, Mobile Air Service, Mobile, Alabama-- 790
Brig. Gen. W. E. Farthing, Atlantic Overseas Service Command, Port
of Newark, Newark, N. J 832
H. Ralph Burton, General Counsel for the Committee on Military Af-
fairs of the House of Representatives 848
DOCUMENTS
Excerpts from Form 23 734
Recommendations of Col. Hunt 747
Excerpts from Report of Col. Hunt 747
Conclusions of Col. Hunt 749
Marshall message of November 27, 1941 792
Excerpts from Standing Operating Procedure of November 5, 1941 818
Excerpts from Order Appointing Army Pearl Harbor Board 852
Memorandum for the Judge Advocate General, July 12, 1944, ,By the Acting
Secretary of War 852
Excerpts from letter of Brig. Gen. John J. Kingman 857
Excerpts from Report of interview of February 3, 1944 of John M. Martin 859
4. Summary of job orders, Mt. Kaala 782
4-A. " " " Kokee 782
4-B. " " " Haleakala 782
4-C. " " " Mauna Loa 783
4r-D. " " " Bellows Field 783
4-E. " " " Barking Sands 784
4-P. " " " Morse Field 784
4-G. " " " Wheeler Field 784
4-H. " " " Hickam Field 785
4-1. " " " Punchbowl — 785
4- J. " " " Diamond Head 785
4-K. " " " Kawailoa 786
4-L. " " " FortShafter 786
4-M. " " " Hickam Field 787
4-N. " " " Kamahameha 787
5. Summary, Hawaiian Constructors, W-414-eng-602 789
6. Exhibits Rohl-Wyman Contracts 887
7. Transcript of hearings before the California State Legislature's
Joint Fact Finding Committee on UnAmerican Activities 888
8. Volume 49, Hoffman testimony before House Committee on Military
Affairs, 1/24/44 888
8-A. Volume 50, Hoffman testimony before House Committee on Military
Affairs, 1/27/44 888
8-B. Copy of statement by Robert Hoffman, 4/29/42 888
9. Statement of Olsen, 12/19/43 889
10. Interview of George H. Moody, 4/4/44 889
11. Testimony of Gen. Schley 2/9/44, before House 889
11-A. Testimony of Gen. Schley 5/4/44, before House 889
12. Folder of Hotel Biltmore records 890
13. Statement of Col. Wyman regarding Rohl 890
14. Envelope containing telephone record clips 893
^ Pages referred to are represented by Italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original transcript of proceedings.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 383
\730^ PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD
tuesday, august 15, 1944
Munitions Buildings,
Washington. D. C.
The Board at 9 : 35 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted
the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert. President of the
Board, presiding.
Present : Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D.
Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank. Members.
Present also: Colonel Charles \\ . West, Recorder, Major Henry C.
Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr.,
Executive Officer.
(Colonel Marry A. Toulmin, Jr., was sworn as Executive Officer to
t he Board. )
General Grunert. The Board will come to order.
TESTIMONY OF COLONEL ROBERT B. RICHARDS, GENERAL STAFF
CORPS, FINANCE OFFICER, A. C. OF S., G-2, WAR DEPARTMENT
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Will you please state to the Board your name,
rank, organization, and station ?
Colonel Richards. Robert B. Richards, Colonel, General Staflf
Corps, Finance Officer, A. C. of S., G-2, War Department.
2. General Grunert. Colonel, the Board is after facts, and a
\7S1\ representative of your particular section of the War Depart-
ment General Staff we think should have some facts that we want;
and General Russell will lead in propounding the questions on the
subject on which we expect to get facts from you.
3. General Russell. Colonel, what was your assignment on July 1,
1940?
Colonel Richards. I was Finance Officer, G-2.
4. General Russell. Have you been on that assignment continuously
since that date ?
Colonel Richards. July 1, 1940? I have. I was assigned to that
duty about the 23rd of November, 1939.
5. General Rt'sseix. Have you been on that assignment continuously
since November 23, 1939 ?
Colonel Richards. I have.
6. General Russell. Colonel, the subject which we want to develo]>
by your testimony is the funds made available to the Assistant Chief
384 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of Staff, G-2, for tlie employment of special operators for investiga-
tions and the proportions of those funds which were made available
to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department for the
employment of special operators. I will ask you whether or not these
funds to which I have just referred result from Congressional appro-
priations that are a matter of public record.
Colonel KiCHARDS. They are the result of Congressional appropria-
tions which are a matter of public record.
7. General Eussell. Hence there is nothing which you might give
us in your testimony about appropriations of these funds which would
not be a matter of public record ?
Colonel Richards. No, sir; there is not.
[73^1 8, General Russell. First, we will direct our attention to
the appropriation for the period July 1, 1940, to June 30, 1941. Will
3^ou please state to the Board the amount appropriated for hiring of
special personnel by A. C. of S., G-2, for that period?
Colonel Richards. The appropriation, titled Miscellaneous Ex-
penses, Military Intelligence Activities, Army, in the appropriation
act of the fiscal year 1941 carries language which makes it available
for all purposes of military intelligence, which includes other objects
than the actual hire of, for example, investigation personnel. How-
ever, the military appropriation act, which was signed on the 13th of
June, 1940, was for $125,000. Subsequent to that the second deficiency
appropriation act, signed on the 27th of June, 1940, carried an addi-
tion to this military intelligence appropriation of $135,000. Then the
third supplementary appropriation act, signed on the 8th of October,
1940, carried a further addition to the same portion of the 1941 appro-
priation act of $100,000 ; making a total of $360,000, which was avail-
able for miscellaneous expenses requisite for and incident to the mili-
tary intelligence activities of the Army and maintenance of military
attaches at the United States Embassies and Legations abroad, includ-
ing the purchase of law books, maps, professional books of reference,
and subscriptions to newspapers and periodicals, for the hire of inter-
preters, special agents, and guides, and for such other purposes as the
Secretary of War may deem proper.
The balance of that appropriation act is not particularly germane,
and is outlined in the published act.
9. General Russell. Upon what authority might those funds be
[733] expended. Colonel.
Colonel Richards. By an allotment to the A. C. of S., G-2, of the
funds and the suballotment by him to other agencies of the Army.
10. General Russell. Was it necessary to account for those funds?
Colonel Richards. Yes, sir, except that these funds may be expended
upon confidential voucher which has the approval of the Secretary of
AVar and the details of such expenditures are not disclosed upon the
face of the voucher nor the attached documents which, with ordinary
vouchers, go to the General Accounting Office.
11. General Russell. Were allotments made from that fund to the
Hawaiian Department for the fiscal year 1941 ?
Colonel Richards. Yes, sir.
12. General Russell. Can you tell us briefly the total amount that
was allotted and any directions that were given as to its expenditure?
Colonel Richards. On the 25th of July, 1940 — and, parenthetically,
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 385
I might explain that although that appropriation was available from
the 1st of July, the actual allotments sometimes are not made until
after the 1st of July to us, and we do not make them to, for instance,
the Hawaiian Department, mitil after the 1st of July, but often
advise other agencies to whom we are allotting that the allotment is
being made and they have the authority to expend it prior to the
actual receipt of this document, which is War Department Form 23.
So, on the 25th of July, we allotted to the A. C. of S., G-2, Hawaiian
Department, Fort Sliafter, T. H., the sum of $6,060 from the
[7<?4] appropriation miscellaneous expenses, military intelligence
activities. Army, fiscal year 1941. The limitation placed upon this
sum of $6,060 is carried in the language of the allotting document,
Form 23, which reads as follows :
(Excerpt from Form 23 is as follows:)
For the maintenance of intelligence work, including the hire of civilian per-
sonnel, not to exceed $3,060 for the year. $6,060.
I might explain, however, that the limitation of $3,060 for the year
was placed upon the amount which could be expended for the hire of
clerical personnel out of the total of $6,060 ; thus leaving for other pur-
poses than the hire of civilian personnel, $3,000.
13. General Frank. The $6,060 was for the period from the 1st of
July, 1940, to the 30th of June, 1941 ?
Colonel Richards. That is correct, sir.
14. General Frank. Was this $6,060 to cover the normal routine ex-
penses of clerical personnel permanently assigned to the G-2 office?
Colonel Richards. No, sir. The clerical personnel permanently as-
signed to the G-2 office were drawn from the station complement as-
signed to the Hawaiian Department, and additional clerks were
authorized to be paid for from this appropriation who were engaged
at least 50 percent of their time on counter-intelligence work.
15. General Frank. Why do you call them clerks ?
Colonel Richards. They were civilian clerks, sir. They were not
enlisted investigators.
[735] 16. General Frank. I know ; but why call them clerks at
all ? They really were investigators, were they not ?
Colonel Richards. No, sir. I might explain that investigations
which were being carried on required a great amount of clerical per-
sonnel to type the necessary reports, and, for example, later we esti-
mated that it took one clerk for each three investigators. Reports were
sent to O. N. I., F. B. I., and other agencies.
17. General Frank. Were some of these investigators civilian in-
vestigators
Colonel Richards. That I do not know, sir. The clerks were ci-
vilian clerks and were not investigators.
18. General Frank. If they had had some civilian investigators and
$3,000 was to be paid for clerks, it certainly does not leave very much
money to be spent for investigative purposes in Hawaii, does it?
Colonel Richards. No, sir. I might explain, however, that additions
were made, if I may continue with the further allotments which were
made.
On November 15 an increase was made to the previous allotment of
$1,500, "Increase to cover intelligence activities as per recent radio
from this office."
79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 1 26
386 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
19. General Grunert. Do I understand, then, that $1,500 was for
use in addition to the $3,000 for other purposes than additional clerks?
Colonel Richards. Yes, sir; because in this allotment of $1,500 no
mention was made of any increased authority so far as clerks were con-
cerned. Therefore the original limitation placed upon the Hawaiian
Department in the first allotment [7S6] would hold, namely,
that they were not to spend more than $3,060 during the fiscal year.
20. General Russell. To hurry along, Colonel, because I have gone
over the figures, it came to pass that you sent those people $7,500 out
there for the fiscal year 1941, and toward the end of that fiscal year they
turned back to you $424.79 ?
Colonel Richards. $424.79 w^as returned from the Hawaiian De-
partment.
21. General Russell. So that the Hawaiian Department in the fiscal
year 1941 had $7,500 of these funds and used slightly more than $7,000
of them ?
Colonel Richards. That is correct, sir,
22. General Russell. And a limitation on clerk hire of $3,000 was
placed on the expenditure of the funds ?
Colonel Richards. $3,060; yes, sir.
23. General Russell. Let us talk about the last six months of 1941.
General Grunert. Is that the fiscal year or the calendar year ?
24. General Russell. The calendar year, up to the 7th of December
when the attack was made on Pearl Harbor. The record which you
have shown me. Colonel, indicates that an initial appropriation to
A. C. of S., G-2, for the fiscal year 1942 was $640,000. Is that true ?
Colonel Richards. That is correct.
25. General Russell. And the appropriation act itself was signed
on the 30th of June, 1941 ?
Colonel Richards. Yes, sir.
[7S7] 26. General Russell. And that, by a supplementary ap-
propriation act which was signed on the 17th of December, 1941, was
increased to $239,000?
Colonel Richards. Increased by $239,000.
27. General Russell. Then for that period, July 1st to December
1st 1941, there was available for this fund $640,000?
Colonel Richards. That should be stated from July 1st to and in-
cluding December 17. The supplementary appropriation act was not
signed until the I7th of December.
28. General Russell. Of that money, how much was made available
to the Hawaiian Department ])rior to the attack on Pearl Harbor ?
Colonel Richards. On the 16th of July, 1941, we allotted to the
Hawaiian Department $8,320 for the first and second quarters. The
allotment in the previous year was made for the total year, but this
was $8,320 for the first and second quarters.
29. General Russell. So they had $8,640 made available to them
for the first six months ?
Colonel Richards. $8,320.
30. General Russell. Can you tell us right quickly how much of that
could be expended on clerk hire?
[738] Colonel Richards. $2,430 during the half year. The
limitation placed upon them for clerk hire was for the full year, of
not to exceed $4,860, therefore dividing that by two to arrive at the
figure of $2,430.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 387
31. General Russell; Now, Colonel, a question or two about the
general purposes for which this money was appropriated. I will ask
3'ou whether or not it was to be for the hire of special operators to
secure information in different parts of the world that the War De-
part might be interested in.
Colonel Richards. Aside from the limitations which were placed
upon the expenditure of these funds by the appropriation act,'I cannot
answer that question, sir. It is a G-2 policy matter. However, it
has come under my observation that these funds were spent, have been
spent, for the hire of agents, reimbursement to individuals giving or
selling information. .
32. General Russell. There is reference in the appropriation act to
expenditures in connection with our foreign embassies. AYas it for
the upkeep of the normal costs of those embassies that this'money was
expended ?
Colonel Richards. No, sir. The portion which was expended out
of this appropriation by our military attaches at foreign embassies
and legations was for, in the main, military attache maintenance
allowance which was used for official entertainment and for compen-
sation for the necessary front which the military attache had to
maintain. Also, the military attache was usually authorized not to
exceed a small amount for the purchase of information.
33. General Russell. I think that is all I have.
[730] 34, General Grunert. I do not see just what we have got-
ten, and I would like to develop the thing a little further, and take
Hawaii, for instance. For 1940 and 1941 up to December 7, what
total amount of money was available to the Commanding General over
there through his G-2 to get information that he could not get other-
wise? As I understand it here, approximately $4,500 plus $6,390;
approximately $10,000 ; is that right?
Colonel Richards. If I may make a calculation here, $10,310.
35. General Grunert. Now, what was that command over there?
Did that just take in the Hawaiian Islands themselves, or any out-
lying islands outside of the Hawaiian group itself?
Colonel Richards. That I do not know, sir.
36. General Grunert. You do not know. Now, of these compara-
tively large amounts for military intelligence activities of the Army
of $360,000 and $640,000, was some of that turned back to the Treasury
at the end of the year, or was it all expended? I do not care about
the particular amounts, but was a percentage of it turned back? If
so, the approximate percentage ?
Colonel Richards. That figure I cannot tell you, sir. It is on record
with the Purchase Office of the War Department.
37. General Grunert. According to your memory was it 5 percent,
10 percent, or what ?
Colonel Richards. I think, sir, that comparatively little of the fiscal
year 1941 appropriation was turned back. You understand that these
funds are allotted to a great many agencies. Each one of those agen-
cies wishes to have sufficient funds to [740] take care of all of
their obligations. Thereby, at the end of the fiscal year these turn-
backs of many small amounts foot up to a considerable amount.
38. General Grunert. Did the A. C. of S., G-2, and the War De-
partment General Staff attempt to get more funds than were given to
them ? Do you know ?
388 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel RicHAKDS. I do not believe that in the fiscal year 1941 the
A. C. of S., G-2, made any request for more than the $360,000 which
was appropriated for his purposes. However, in the fiscal year '42 we
had in proj^ress prior to Pearl Harbor the appropriation act of $239,-
000, and also at approximately that same time an appropriation act
of $1,343,000 which was not signed until April 28, 1942.
39. General Gkunert. Do you know whether these additional
amounts were requested for a particular purpose or to supplement these
various allotments that are usually tyiven out?
Colonel Richards. For many particular purposes. The appropria-
tion act is defended in detail for such and such items.
40. General Grunert. Do you knew whether any of those pertained
to an attempt to get more information about the situation in the Far
East, particularly in the mandated islands ?
Colonel Richards. I have no such information ; no, sir.
41. Genei-al Russell. Colonel, vou have testified that in the fiscal
year 1941 $360,000 was made available to G-2 under the appropriation
act which you have already described. Do you know how much of that
money was used by G-2 to hire S])ecial operators to procure informa-
tion, or for the purchase of ['^4^] information?
Colonel Richards. No, sir.
42. General Russell. Is there any way that yoii can determine that
amount ?
Colonel Richards. No, sir. The records are in the offices to which
the funds were allotted.
43. General Russell. None of that money, then, was expended for
the employment of special operators or to purchase infornlation by
the G-2 section directly?
Colonel Richards. That I cannot be sure of, sir.
44. General Russell. Would you follow up this line of investigation
we have indicated and advise us at your convenience as to what you
discover?
Colonel Richards. That, sir, you want for specifically the Hawaiian
Department, or the Army as a whole?
45. General Russell. Both if we can get it.
Colonel Richards. The activities of G-2 included all the corps areas,
the departments, and our overseas offices.
46. General Russell. Could yoii get both for us: Hawaiian De-
partment and the summation of the expenditures as a whole for those
two purposes?
Colonel Richards. I will attempt to.
47. General Grunert. Would the same thing apply to the $640,000,
fiscal year 1942. or half of that fiscal year?
48. General Russell. Yes, it would. I am just wondering if we
were getting into trouble and if there is a lot of confusion in our rec-
ords. I do not know. Would you make the same search with respect
to the $640,000 for the period July 1st— [74£] December 17,
1941?
49. General Grunert. 7th; not the l7th.
50. General Russell. They got some money on the l7th.
51. General Grunert. All "right.
52. General Russell. They used up the $640,000 by December 16th.
Colonel Richards. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 389
53. General Grunert'. I would like to develop just one more point.
I believe you said you did not know just to what extent the Hawaiian
Department extended in the use of this so-called G-2 money, whether
it extended outside of the actual Hawaiian group or not.
Colonel Richards. No, sir, I do not know the limitations that were
then placed upon the activities of the Hawaiian Department.
54. General Grunert. Was there any allotment of funds to any
agency that would or could cover the mandated islands ?
Colonel Richards. That I do not know, sir. I have no recollection.
55. General Grunert. Do you know if any activities were carried
on directly by G-2 that covered matters that did not pertain to any
particular department or corps area in which these funds were
allotted?
Colonel Richards. I have no such knowledge, sir, no.
56. General Frank. May I ask a question now: Do you have any
information as to how these United States appropriations compare
with funds appropriated for similar purposes by England, Russia,
Germany ?
Colonel Richards. No, sir.
[743] General Frank. Japan ?
Colonel Richards. No, sir.
58. General Frank. Have you any way of looking that up?
Colonel Richards. I think that some of our records might show, but
I can assure you that the information that we had from Japan and
Germany would not show any breakdown for military intelligence.
59. General Frank. Well, the G-2 Department was out there for
the purpose of getting information. Suppose you look and find out if
they got any information along the line of the question that I just
asked; will you, please?
Colonel Richards. Yes, sir.
60. General Frank. All right.
Colonel Richards. You would like England, Russia, Japan, and
Germany ?
61. General Frank. Yes. Just make a comparison to see what they
were spending to get information on world situations.
Now, we will say that the Hawaiian Department was given $16,000
for a year, and that out of that they were authorized to spend about
$5,000 for the year for extra clerks.
Colonel Richards. Correct.
62. General Frank. That left $11,000 for agents for investigative
work?
Colonel Richards. Yes, sir.
63. General Frank. About what do they pay those agents?
Colonel Richards. I do not know, sir.
64. General Frank. Well, were they hired — do they pay $2,000,
$3,000, or what?
[744] Colonel Richards. I do not know, sir.
65. General Frank. Well, we shall assume that they pay them
$2,500, and that would give them $11,000, we will say five agents.
Colonel Richards. On that basis, yes, sir.
66. General Frank. Roughly speaking. We have, I think, from
the Roberts Commission a report to the ett'ect that there were attached
to the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu something like 80 Japanese
390 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
agents gathering information on us in the Hawaiian Islands. It
varied from time to time, as I understand, but the figure 80 seems to
hang in my mind. Now, on tlie relative basis it would seem that a lot
greater effort was being taken by Japan in going out after and getting
information than was evidencetl, as least by the money spent, by the
United States.
Colonel EiCHARDS. May I explain, sir, that the enlisted investigators,
Corps of Intelligence Police, Avere paid from pay of the Army, and
only such civilian investigators as might be hired were paid from
these allotted funds, in addition to which certain extraordinary ex-
penses of the enlisted investigators might be paid. Therefore, the
measure
67. General Frank. Might be paid from where ?
Colonel Richards. From these same funds.
68. General Frank. Other than these ?
Colonel EiCHARDS. No, sir. From these funds.
69. General Frank. Yes?
Colonel Richards. In other words if they had, as you suggest, five
civilian agents, or say four civilian agents, they [74^] may
have had a great many enlisted agents who were paid from pay of the
Army, and only their extraordinary expenses in connection with their
investigations would be paid from these funds.
70. General Frank. Do you know how many enlisted agents they
had in Honolulu?
Colonel Richards. I do not ; no, sir. It is a matter of record, how-
ever, I believe.
71. General Frank. That is all.
72. General Russell. That is all I have.
73. General Grunert. All right, Colonel. Thank you very much
for coming.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
TESTIMONY OF COLONEL JOHN A. HUNT, I. G. D.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you state to the Board your name,
rank, organization, and station?
Colonel Hunt. John A. Hunt, Colonel, I. G. D. Serial number?
2. Colonel West. No, sir; we do not particularly need that. War
Department ?
Colonel Hunt. That is right.
3. Colonel West. You are on duty in the Inspector General's Office?
Colonel Hunt. Inspector General's Office.
4. Colonel West. War Department, Washington, D. C.
5. General Grunert. Colonel, the Board is after facts both [74^]
as to the War Department background and viewpoints prior to and
leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack, and anything that may have a
bearing thereon. We have asked you to come up here to tell us about
some records and to give us such other information as you may have
that will lead us to the facts if we do not develop the facts from you.
General Frank will lead in propounding these questions, and the
Board will fill out where they see fit.
Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 391
|5. General Frank. Colonel Hunt, were you chaged with making
an investigation of Colonel Wyman?
Colonel Hunt. I was, yes, sir.
7. General Frank. At what time did you start on this ? How long
did it take?
Colonel Hunt. It started about the middle of April, as I recall it,
1943, and took about two months, I believe, to complete it. I did not
check on the period, but I understand that the Board has a copy of
my report, and the period is indicated there.
8. General Frank. Isthisacopy of your report (indicating) ? Will
you identify it ?
Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir; that is my report.
9. General Frank. That is your report?
Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir.
10. General Frank. And the supporting papers comprise sworn
testimony that you took in the case ?
Colonel Hunt. That is right, and documentary exhibits.
11. General Frank. Will you state to the Board the conclusion,
[74''/'] the recommendations at which you arrived^
Colonel Hunt. Only the recommendations?
12. General Frank. Yes.
(Recommendations of Colonel Hunt in re-investigating of Colonel
Wyman are as follows:)
Colonel Hunt. I recommended:
a. That in the future, Colonel Wyman be not entrusted with the dii'ection of
expensive public works involving the administi'ation of contracts.
b. That the recovery from the Hawaiian Contracting Company of $9,100 paid
them for obsolete, worn-out and useless equipment be promptly initiated.
c. That in the renegotiation of Contract W-414-Eng-602, full consideration be
given the fact tha^ a substantial part of the $123,411 paid the Hawaiian Con-
structors on the one percent per month equipment recapture provision was a
profit over and above the fixed fee stipulated.
13. General Frank. Will you state to the Board the instructions
that you received with respect to making this investigation ?
Colonel Hunt. I suppose you would like to have that checked with
the record ?
14. General Frank. That is right. What was the purpose of the
investigation?
(Excerpt from report of Colonel Hunt in re investigation of Colonel
Wyman is as follows :)
Colond Hunt (reading) :
That part of the investigation conducted in [7^8] Hawaii had to do with
the administration of construction work in the Hawaiian Department by Colonel
Theodore Wyman, Jr., CE, and was based originally upon the complaint of Mr.
Robert E. McKee, a contractor of El Paso, Texas and Los Angeles, California,
transmitted by letter dated 1 March 1943, to the Honorable R. E. Thomason,
Member of the House of Representatives from Texas. This complaint inclosed
newspaper clippings which strongly implied that Colonel Wyman had accepted
lavish entertainment from Mr. Hans Wilhelm Rohl, a contractor of Los Angeles,
California, who lately headed the Hawaiian Constructors, a group of contractors
acting as co-adventurers under a contract covering construction works in Hawaii
and in the South Pacific Area of considerable magnitude. It was implied that
the award of that contract and the virtual elimination of Mr. McKee and other
independent contractors) from participation in War Department construction
in the Hawaiian Lslands, excepting as subcontractors arose from the friendly
relations existing between Mr. Rohl and Colonel Wyman, rather than from
392 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
consideration of the Government's best interests. Mr. McKee's letter also stated
that according to rumor, Colonel Wyman was inebriated most of the time.
That in substance is the origin of my investigation of Colonel
Wyman.
15. General Frank. All right. Now will you read to the Board
your conclusions as a result of your investigation ?
[749] Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir. And in so doing I believe it
would probably be pertinent to indicate that in the course of the
investigation certain additional allegations arose, conclusions respect-
ing which are a part of the detailed conclusions included in my report.
16. General Frank. All right.
(Conclusions of Colonel Hunt in re investigation of Colonel Wyman
are as follows :)
a. During the years 1936-1939, Colonel Wyman, as District Engineer, Los
Angeles, maintained a close personal friendship, as distinguished from a business
friendship, with Mr. Hans Wilhelm Rohl, which was inappropriate on the part
of a United States Army officer administering costly works on which the said
Mr. Rohl was engaged as contractor. This relationship extended so far beyond
the need for ordinary cordial business relation as to give rise to such presump-
tions of impropriety as formed, in part, the basis of this investigation. In main-
taining that relationship, Colonel Wyman was not sufficiently mindful of that
unquestionable reputation for integrity and impartiality which it was the duty
of a man in his position to cultivate at all times.
b. The flattery of Colonel Wyman personally and professionally, which was
bestowed upon him by his wealthy associate, Mr. Rohl, evoked in Colonel Wyman
so complete a confidence in the former as to lead him to an unwise acceptance
of Mr. Rohl's judgment and [750] advice during their subsequent associa-
tion in Hawaii. He thereby relinquished to some extent that independence of
judgment required of an officer in charge of the Government's interests, as
indicated in his too ready acceptance of Mr. Rohl's recommendations relating
to equipment purchases and appraisals.
c. It is not established that the relationship in question had a direct bearing
upon the exclusion, excepting as subcontractors, of Mr. Robert E. McKee or
other independent contractors from participation in construction work in Hawaii,
after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The available evidence is to the effect that
an honest decision had been reached that singleness of management was impera-
tive and that the conduct of business through a single control agency, such as
the Hawaiian Constructors, met that requirement, where other arrangements
would not.
d. Charges that Colonel Wyman was drunk a large part of the time in Hawaii
are not supported by the facts. The evidence indicates that the close personal
friendship between Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl continued after Mr. Rohl
arrived in Hawaii, and there, as in California, gave rise to undesirable comment,
but that while they occupied adjoining rooms in the Pleasanton Hotel occasion-
ally there were appropriate reasons in justification thereof.
e. Colonel Wyman did not act in the Government's best interest when in
purchasing Rolii-Connolly equipment [75/] at a cost of $166,423.17 against
the appraised value of $131,411.03, he failed to fully justify for the record, the
pa.vment of the larger of the two amounts. There is no definite proof that any
dishonesty was involved, nor that the Government was charged more for the
equipment than its true worth.
f. Colonel Wyman did not act in the Government's best Interests in the pur-
chase of equipment from the Hawiian Contracting Company at a cost of $156,000,
in that he based that payment upon a prejudiced appraisal, and failed to take
such action as would insure that the equipment purchased was actually required,
was in good condition and useable and was worth the amount paid. As a result
of tills failure, tlie United States paid $9,100 for equipment which was not re-
quired, was obsolete and was not useable.
g. The inefficiencies charged to the management of construction matters in
Hawaii actually existed, but it is impossible to determine the extent to which
such conditions were due to acts or omissions by Colonel Wyman, if at all. The
various types of inefficiency were inherent in the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee form of
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 393
contract and in surrounding conditions over which the District Engineer had no
control. It is not at all clear that they progressed further under Colonel Wyman
than they would have under any other management.
h. The payment of the one percent per month of rental, over the net value
of equipment, upon its recapture, was not a violation of the contract, despite
[752] the fact that it represented some profit to the contractor in excess of
the stipulated fee.
i. The chartering of the yacht Vega, so far as Colonel Wyman was concerned,
was honestly initiated. There is no ground for the charge that the vessel was un-
suited for the use for which it was chartered.
j. Colonel Wyman's attitude toward many subordinate ofiicers and toward many
of the civlian key employees of various contractors
I would like to say that the remaining conclusions relate to Colonel
Wyman's work in Alaska, and ask if the Board wants that.
17. General Grunert. I think we had better hear all the conclusions
so that we can judge whether there is anything that refers to those
points that we are looking into.
Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir.
Resuming the reading of my conclusions where I left off :
in the Northwest Engineer Division, was characterized by an undesirable
aloofness and by such a manner of disdain, superiority, lack of consideration and
at times of humiliating treatment as to alienate that wholesome respect which
it is the duty of any officer to encourage and foster, to the detriment of morale
and performance.
k. Colonel Wyman gave inadequate attention to important administrative
functions relating to the work of the Northwest Engineer Division, specifically
the proper organization of his own forces, the delegation [75^] to them
of specific responsibilities and commensurate authority in connection therewith,
and the proper correlation of Engineer and Contractor forces. This failure
contributed largely to the growth of a chaotic and confused condition in the
administration and operation of contracts. The presence on his staff of two
officers specially skilled in organization and administration was not an ac-
ceptable explanation of this inattention on his part to one of his most important
duties.
1. Living quarters for the personnel of the Northwest Division office were
unconscionably extravagant, considering the temporary use contemplated. This
waste was a direct result of Colonel Wyman's inattention to the administrative
phases of his duties.
m. The charge that Colonel Wyman procured the employment of his wife at
a substantial salary for unimportant duties is untrue.
n. The faults herein assessed against Colonel Wyman cannot be charged to
lack of- devotion to duty nor to lack of energy in the i>erformance of duty, in
both of which respects he acted commendably. These faults must be charged
to personal characteristics contributing to a poorly balanced appreciation of the
human aspects of large endeavor and the necessity of recognizing and attending
to the larger details of administration. Pi'ossessing these characteristics. Colonel
Wyman is considered to be poorly adapted to the supervision of large construc-
tion projects.
[7-5^] 18. General Frank. Will you state, if you can, as the re-
sult of your investigation, what was the nature of the advice that
Wyman got from Rohl.
Colonel Hunt. I can recall having in mind, in the writing of that
report, or in the making of that investigation, no specific advice. I
do know that Colonel Wyman claimed that Mr. Rohl was a man of
vast experience in heavy contracting work, particularly excavation.
I believe I recall that Colonel Wyman indicated that he relied some-
what on Mr. Rohl's advice with respect to "mining operations," mean-
ing by that excavation in rock ; and also with respect to where heavy
construction equipment might be located, obtainable for that work.
394 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
19. General Frank. Did this advice redound to the advantage of
Rohl?
Colonel Hunt. I am sure that I could find no case in which it did,
unless it had to do with the chartering of Mr. Rohl's or his wife's
yacht VEGA, but inasmuch as that yacht was chartered to the Gov-
ernment for a consideration of $1.00 a year, together with the under-
standing that the Government would stand the cost of any modifica-
tions to the boat, and the cost of replacing it in its original condition
when they got through using it, I think that there was no personal con-
sideration redounding to the benefit of Mr. Rohl.
20. General Frank. Did these provisions with respect to putting
the boat back in shape result in any appreciable amount of money
being paid to Rohl for that purpose ?
Colonel Hunt. As I recall it, the matter, at the time I was making
the investigation, was in the hands of the division engineer at San
Francisco. I talked with General Hannum and [7SS] his as-
sistants, and my recollection is that the entire cost of the chartering
of the boat and of its maintenance during the period of its charter
was $37,000.
21. General Frank. Do you consider that a reasonable amount ?
Colonel Hunt. There were items of that cost that I didn't consider
reasonable.
22. General Frank. Do you remember what they were ?
Colonel Hunt. I recall that one of them was a matter of white uni-
forms for the crew.
23. General Frank. What period of time did this $37,000 cover?
Colonel Hunt. The vessel was chartered early in October IDil, as
I recall it, and was in Hawaii until some time early in March 1942,
at which time it was ordered returned to the mainland and the charter
terminated.
24. General Frank. Do you know whether or not it was used ?
Colonel Hunt. I do not think that it ever performed any of the
functions for which it was chartered.
25. General Frank. Then it turned out to be an extravagance ?
Colonel Hunt. "Hind-sight" extravagance; yes, sir; although I
foelieve, in all fairness, the fact might be considered that this vessel
could have performed the function of sailing to the islands east and
south of Hawaii where they proposed to study the possibility of build-
ing additional air bases, and that it could do that without oil; also
also I think it is fair to consider the fact that any vessel at that time
was a pretty hard thing to get hold of. The Navy had gobbled up a
great many of them, I believe that if the thing had been done as
originally conceived, as I see that conception, it would not have been
a disadvantageous arrangement for the 1756'] Government.
26. General Grunert. Was there anything during your investiga-
tion which disclosed that Wyman used this vessel for otlier purposes
than originally intended, and was there anything in the evidence to
show that he used it for his own personal use and not official?
Colonel Hunt. There was not. I believe that the testimony taken
by me does not include anything on that subject. My idea in that
matter was that it would be a waste of time, since I had made informal
inquiries of a vast number of people, a great number of people, about
that boat, and nowhere could I get even the slightest hint that it
had been used for any purpose whatsoever after getting to Hawaii.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 395
27. General Grunert. Do you know whether, in accepting boats at
a nominal rate such as a dollar a year, it is usual to include in that
agreement that the boat be put back in the same shape as that in
which it was accepted ?
Colonel Hunt. That is true; yes, sir. That is customary.
28. General Frank. Will you briefly give us the history of the pur-
chase of Rohl's equipment, and the difference of opinion with respect
to the price that the Government was to pay for it, including Parker's
appraisal of it, and the amount that eventually was paid.
Colonel Hunt. I believe you are asking me something, there, Gen-
eral, that I can very easily get confused and tangled up about, unless
I refer to the record.
29. General Frank. You know the information that I am after ?
Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir.
30. General Frank. You may refer to your supporting papers.
[757] Colonel Hunt. Some time just prior to the 9th of De-
cember, 1941, the need for more construction equipment became evi-
dent as increased operations to the south of Hawaii became necessary.
Colonel Wyman knew that the Rohl-Connolly Company owned cer-
tain equipment which was then idle at the Caddoa project, in Colo-
rado. He made arrangements with the Rohl-Connolly people where-
by this equipment would be shipped to Los Angeles, there overhauled,
and then transshipped to Canton Island, Christmas Island, and other
points in the Pacific.
Apparently a great deal of that arrangement was verbal, and no
written instructions covering such an agreement were found. Efforts
to trace the movements of the equipment failed, although it was deter-
mined that some reached Canton Island, some was en route to Christ-
mas Island on the 7th of December, when the ship which was carrying
it was diverted by Navy orders. Some of it reached Honolulu.
By a letter dated the 11th of March 1942, which was signed by
Mr. Rohl on behalf of the Hawaiian Constructors, he requested the
district engineer to purchase certain listed equipment from the Rohl-
Connolly Company. The records of the district engineer's office
were in a state of rather terrible confusion, and the exact items of
equipment included in the original verbal agreement could not be
identified. However, there was a list of specific items referred to
by Mr. Rohl in his letter of the 11th of March, and they had been
appraised by Mr. M. G. Parker, a civilian employee of the district
engineer. He reported, on his findings, a value of $131,411.03. That
was done by letter dated the 11th of March 1942.
On the 12th of March, Mr. Parker was ordered to report [758]
to Colonel Wyman's operations officer, who was Colonel B. L. Robin-
son. According to Mr. Parker's testimony. Colonel Robinson referred
to a table, at which were sitting Mr. Rohl, Mr. Ralph E. Woolly, and
Mr. H. P. Benson. The latter two had been taken in as co-adven-
turers along with the Rohl-Connolly Company and others of the
Hawaiian Constructors. A discussion was held in which apparently
Mr. Rohl attempted to convince Mr. Parker that his appraisal was
wrong, that it was too low. Mr. Parker, however, refused to recede
from his stand and continued to claim that the fair value of the equip-
ment was only $131,411.03, as he originally stated.
In talking to Mr. Woolly and Mr. Benson, separately, they both
testified that they had no part in that discussion. Colonel Wyman
396 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
expressed complete ignorance of the fact that they had had such a
discussion. However, on the 13th of March, which I believe was
two days before he left the Islands, Colonel Wyman directed the
Hawaiian Constructors to purchase the equipment at the exact price
named by Mr. Rohl. Colonel Wyman's subordinates went through
with that purchase and paid the price asked by Mr. Rohl.
31. General Frank. Just a minute. Who purchased the equip-
ment ?
Colonel Hunt. Colonel Wyman's subordinates.
32. General Frank. Did the Hawaiian Constructors purchase the
equipment ?
Colonel Hunt. They purchased it on behalf of the Government;
yes, sir.
33. General Frank. The Hawaiian Constructors purchased this
equipment for the Government?
[759] Colonel Hunt. That is right.
34. General Russell. What was that price, again?
Colonel Hunt. $166,423.17. General Frank, I would like to say,
here, that the statement last made is correct to the best of my
memory. I believe that at the time this purchase was made, the
purchase order was actually issued in the name of the Hawaiian
Constructors; but under the contract, which required them to pur-
chase all necessary material and equipment, they were also required
to maintain records of the possession of the equipment, and later
to turn them over to the Government. I know that the engineers
disbursed the money for that purchase, but whether that was a
disbursement in reimbursement of the contracting company or a
direct reimbursement of Rohl-Connolly, I could not be positive
now. It may be that the purchase orders are in here as exhibits.
If that is the case, I think they would illustrate that. I think it
is immaterial, because it was bought either by the Constructors or
by the district engineer's own forces.
35. General Frank. It was being paid for, however, by Govern-
ment money?
Colonel Hunt. By Government money ; that is right.
36. General Frank. And the payment of the advanced price was
directed by Wyman?
Colonel Hunt. That is right.
37. General Frank. And he had authority to do so ?
Colonel Hunt. That is true ; yes, sir.
38. General Frank. Are there any other questions on that?
General Grunert. Not on that; no.
39. General Frank. In your conclusions and in speaking of the
[760'\ association of Rohl and Wyman, you stated that there
was some criticism of their living in adjoining rooms at the
Pleasanton Hotel in Honolulu, but that there was justification for it.
What was that justification?
Colonel Hunt. This all occurred after the 7th of December, I
believe, at which time Mr. Rohl was the general manager of that
contracting organization, or occupied the top position, although that
may not have been his exact title. Colonel Wyman, as district en-
gineer, was the top Government man in connection with that con-
tract; in other words, their being together was a necessary part of
the contractual relation whereby the two top men of the respective
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 397
contracting parties had to deal daily and almost momentarily, on
large changes to the original contract, as they came up. I do not
believe that my report indicated that there was any truth to the
expression used in the allegation, that Mr. Rohl and Colonel Wyman
"lived" in adjoining rooms.
It developed during the testimony that was taken there that
Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl probably on a limited number of
occasions after working all night and all day did not depart to
their respective homes, wherever they may have been. I believe
that Colonel Wyman's was in the Pleasanton Hotel. Mr. Rohl's
was elsewhere. He lived with a Mr. Winne; but, having spent all
of the day and most of the night at actual work — and I wajj
thoroughly satisfied that that was the case — Mr. Rohl merely and
probably bunked in a room adjoining the one in which Colonel
Wyman bunked, for a brief period of sleep, until work started the
following day.
40. General Frank. Another statement in your conclusion —
1761] conclusion "G" as I remember it — is that there were ineffi-
ciencies over which the district engineer had no control.
Colonel Hunt. That is right.
41. General Frank. Why?
Colonel Hunt. Well, if the Commanding General of the Hawaiian
Department had directed that steps be taken immediately to build a
runway or a landing strip at a point where there then was none, the
lack of ability to go out and rent the best type of equipment for it, to
take the time to secure competitive bids, to take the time to have it
sent over from the mainland on some slow ship because the freight
rate was low, and the inability to shop around and select and eliminate
until you had only the most efficient of the available workers — all of
that would represent waste which was unavoidable either on the part
of Colonel Wyman or any other man ; and it was inefficiencies of that
nature, which were totally unavoidable, to which I had reference in
this conclusion.
42. General Frank. This investigation of yours was primarily as a
result of a letter that was written by McKee?
Colonel Hunt. That is true.
43. General Frank. Are you conversant with the general reputa-
tion of the McKee firm ?
Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir; I am. I have known them for years.
44. General Frank. Do you know and are you conversant with the
reliability and the efficiency of the work performed by the McKee
firm?
Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir; I believe I am, about as well as anybody.
45. General Frank, What was that reputation ?
[762] Colonel Hunt. He had a reputation, and with me it was
more than a reputation because I had administered contracts which he
had performed, but he had the reputation of being a thoroughly hon-
est and highly efficient contractor, who performed his work for the
Government at prices low enough to win the dislike of competing con-
tractors; in time, rapid enough to be a source of great satisfaction to
the Army — that is, that part of the Army that was interested — and
with an attitude toward his work such that should any failure develop
even long after the period of its guarantee had expired, he would come
back and rectify it without cost to the Government.
398 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I believe in all respects the War Department agencies in contact
with Mr. McKee in any way agreed that he was a very fine, very up-
standing, honest, efficient contractor.
46. General Frank. Highly reputable ?
Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir.
47. General Frank. Previous witnesses before this Board have indi-
cated that there was a scarcity of reputable contractors, in Hawaii.
Mr. McKee had an organization in Hawaii about the time these
Hawaiian Constructors were organized, did he not ?
Colonel Hunt. He did ; yes, sir.
48. General Frank. Were there any other contractors in Honolulu
who were there, available, who held good reputations, who were not
included in the Hawaiian Constructors organization ?
Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir ; there were.
49. General Frank. Who were they ?
Colonel Hunt. E. E. Black, an individual as distinguished from a
company or a partnership, was a very substantial contractor, and
he could have undertaken projects such as were later \_763^
done over there, after December 7, running into several millions of
dollars, I feel quite certain.
50. General Frank. Were there any others?
Colonel Hunt. There were a number of others who were consid-
erably smaller. One I believe was W. S. Ching, a Chinese contrac-
tor; but I do know that he had some good construction equipment.
He had a very good organization, although not a large one, and he
was well adapted to take on, oh, any project such as the development
of Bellows Field. I feel very sure that if they could have taken that
man in and told him, "We want you to build this — can you do it?"
he would have said "Yes," and he would have done so with complete
satisfaction to the Army.
51. General Frank. How did it happen that these people were not
given an opportunity to participate ?
Colonel Hunt. Colonel Wyman claims that they were given such
an opportunity. I could not find any evidence of that either in the
files of the district engineer's office, which would not indicate very
much, because the files were so terribly disrupted, nor from ques-
tioning people who should have been in a position to know, like Colonel
Wyman's chief clerk, Mr. Chew; but I did talk to the various con-
tractors, and when I asked them if they had been approached by
Colonel Wyman with a view to their taking over some part of the
work that was then in view, as I recall it, every one of them indi-
cated that they had never been approached by Colonel Wyman with
such a view.
[764] 52. General Frank. Yet he went out of his way to go
over and bring the Rohl-Connolly firm into Honolulu when, prior to
his interest in them, they had never built anything in Honolulu. Is
that correct ?
Colonel Hunt. Part of that is correct. Just how much Colonel
Wyman went out of his way I do not know. As near as I can de-
termine from the record — I am sure this part of it is quite correct—-
General Hannum, the Division Engineer in San Francisco, was con-
vinced of the fact that some large cost-plus-a-fixgd-fee contractor was
the sort of an outfit that ought to do that job. The contract was
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 399
signed right here in the Chief of Engineers Office in Washington;
and I do know that other contractors had been called upon by Gen-
eral Hannum to come in and bid, and they indicated that they were
interested. Just how far afield Colonel Wyman and General Han-
num went to talk to other possible bidders and contractors I do not
know.
There was very little record kept; there was no record whatever
kept of the minutes of negotiations by which the contract finally was
entered into, either here in Washington, San Francisco or elsewhere.
All that could be clone was to rely on memory ; and as near as I could
make out it was probably Wyman's recommendation, with approval —
although I could not prove that. I believe that it was more than
just the elimination of other contractors as unfit that resulted in
Rohl-Connolly going over there and heading up that organization.
53. General Frank. In your investigation did you run across any
difficulties between the McKee Company and Wyman?
Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir ; I did.
54. General Frank. What were they?
[7Go] Colonel Hunt. I believe there was none until after the
attack, on December 7; but at that time a number of contracts that
Mr. McKee and his outfit had under way were terminated or, rather,
suspended, in their then incomplete state of completion.
55. General Frank. By Wyman?
Colonel Hunt. By order of the Department Commander as given
to Wyman and by him given to the McKee forces. Thereafter Wy-
man, wanting to get into the one big contractors' organization all of
the available talent, asked Mr. McKee's representatives to come in
as part of the Hawaiian Constructors on a sort of subcontract basis,
and there was a great deal of discussion over that. There was even
a little difference of opinion between several of the top men of Mr.
McKee's organization then in Hawaii. At any rate, Mr. McKee
resented the idea of himself, a successful independent contractor,
being handed anything so humiliating to him, as he would see it, as
a subordinate position in another man's outfit. He declined to do
it, although he offered to do anything that the Government over there
might see fit to ask him to do otherwise, and without any regard to
cost or profit.
56. General Frank. Did the proposition anticipate his coming in
on a lower level than Rohl and Connolly and the rest of them ?
Colonel Hunt. If he had come in as a subcontractor he would have
been on a lower level. But if he had come in as an associate cion-
tractor, as a co-adventurer, he would have had a say in the organiza-
tion's business in proportion to the amount of capital he put in.
57. General Frank. But he was not given opportunity to come
[766] in as a co-adventurer; is that right?
Colonel Hunt. That, according to Mr. McKee's statement, is correct.
58. General Frank. For purposes of the record and to indicate
your own background as a basis for expressing an opinion, I would
like to have you state for the record how you came to be familiar with
contracting facilities in Honolulu. What had been your experience
in Honolulu prior to this time ?
400 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Hunt. I see the object of the question. Before 1917 I had
earned my living in the construction industry in various capacities,
from pushing a wheelbarrow up to superintendent of construction.
In 1917, after enlistment, I was placed in a construction organization
of the Construction Division of the Army and I remained in that as
constructing quartermaster or utilities officer at various posts and
then until July 194:0, when I was assigned to the Inspector General's
Office, and in the course of such duties I was constructing quarter-
master at Hickam Field, Hawaii, from early in 1938 to June 1940.
59. General Frank. In that capacity you became familiar with con-
tractors and methods of construction in general in the Hawaiian
Islands ?
Colonel Hunt. That is true; yes.
60. General Frank. All right.
61. General Russell. Colonel, I have noticed with some interest
your testimony about the association between Rohl and Wyman out
there, especially that part of your testimony which described their
bunking near each other when they were rather [767] weary
after a lot of hard work. I rather got the idea that Rohl was a high-
pressure man and worked very hard on the Islands.
Colonel Hunt. That part of my testimony related only to a ques-
tion having to do with their occupying adjoining rooms in the Pleasan-
ton Hotel for a brief period. Aside from that brief period I was not
asked. A great deal was said about Mr. Rohl's work or lack of atten-
tion to work.
62. General Russell. Definitely, what was that?
Colonel Hunt. Mr. Rohl, while living at the Moana Hotel, during
the earlier part of his presence in Hawaii
63. General Russell. Prior to December 7, 1941 ?
Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir — according to witnesses that I interrogated
over there, was, on various occasions, filthy drunk and for rather
extended periods of time.
64. General Frank. Who was this?
Colonel Hunt. Hans Wilhelm Rohl. And as to Mr. Rohl's activity
in supervising the work, I believe that the testimony that I took over
there convinced me that until the attack on Pearl Harbor he did not
contribute much ; that he was pretty drunk a large part of the time.
65. General Russell. Do you remember about when he went out
there. Colonel ?
Colonel Hunt. He did not go out there until after he received his
citizenship papers, and that was September 15, 1941, I believe. I
believe that immediately thereafter he went over there.
66. General Russell. In the application for citizenship and in the
endorsement which the Chief of Engineers gave to him in [768]
connection with that application, as I recall the reason for the interest
of the Engineers in having him made an American citizen, it was to
make it possible for him to go out there to the Islands and exert his
executive capacity in connection with hastening the work out there.
Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir ; I believe that is true.
67. General Russell. Your conclusions, based on the evidence
which you took, indicate that the reasons for his going out there were
not any too good ; is that so ?
68. General Frank. Were not fulfilled, you mean ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 401
Colonel Hunt. Of course I cannot answer for the actual intention
that was in Colonel Wyman's mind. Colonel Wyman testified that
he got him out there because of his executive ability, because the work
was not going any too well, and he was positive that when Bohl got
over there he would get things going. I believe that in that opinion
Colonel Wyman and the next top man of the Rohl-Connolly Company,
Mr. Paul Grafe — or, rather, he was of the Callahan Construction
Company, but Paul Grafe believed that that was all "eye wash" ; that
he was not being delayed ; he was doing all he could and all anybody
else could.
69. General Russell. Are the names of the witnesses from whom
you obtained the evidence as to Rohl's conduct prior to December 7
in this record which you have on the table ?
Colonel Hunt. Yes. There is a list of witnesses there appended
as a part of this report, and all witnesses that were interviewed upon
the record. I talked to a great many other people informally concern-
ing these matters, and if they [7S9] obviously could contribute
nothing to the record, I did not take their sworn testimony.
70. General Russell. Passing from Rohl's executive ability, you
gave an answer earlier in your testimony to the effect that there were
delays in the Hawaiian construction which were necessarily incident
to any undertaking or construction project under the form of contract
prevailing in Hawaii at that time. Will you develop that for us ?
Colonel Hunt. I believe that the General put a narrower view on
what I had to say than I meant to convey. It was not due to the fact
that it was a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee type of contract that these delays
and inefficiencies occurred. Had they had a fixed-price contract I
believe the same thing would have resulted, the same inefficiencies
and delays, because the contractor, knowing the consequences of the
demand for speed, would have had to protect himself in his bid by
adding unknown costs so that he would not go broke giving the Gov-
ernment something for which he would not get enough money to
pay the costs.
71. General Russell. I did place that sort of construction on your
answer. Let us take for a moment the type of contract under which
those partners were operating out there. Is it your opinion, based on
the investigation which you made, that delays in the work did occur?
Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir ; some delays did occur, undoubtedly.
72. General Russell. Can you assign any reasons for those delays?
[770] Colonel Hunt. Well, one of the reasons that I have
already touched upon was the fact that when they ordered equipment
over there it was on the high seas, some of it, on the day of t.he attack
on Pearl Harbor. Some of it was ordered back to the mainland by
the Navy. Now, whatever work it was planned to do, that particular
equipment must have been delayed by the delay in the delivery of
the equipment that was going to be used in the work.
73. General Russell. I think my question probably was unfor-
tunate, in view of the issue here, and was probably too broad, and I
will ask the question in another way.
Do you believe that any of the delays which existed or that you
discovered out there were the result of the inattention or drunkenness
of this man Rohl ?
79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 1 27
402 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Hunt. I have no cause to believe that that was the case
after my investigation. No, sir; I do not.
74. General Russell. Did you have any evid_ence that there were
any positive acts on the part of this man Rohl which had for their
purpose delaying the construction work in Hawaii ?
Colonel Hunt. No, sir. On the contrary, I believe the testimony
that I have bearing on that at all, either directly or indirectly, was
to the effect that whenever Mr. Rohl was active he was very active,
and that he tolerated no argument on anybody's part, and he tolerated
no excuses. That was the general reputation of the man, as I got it,
relating to the times when he was sober and attending to iDusiness. "
75. General Russell, Let us pass to the period following Decem-
ber 7.
[771] 76. General Grunert. May I put in a question there ?
77. General Russell. Certainly.
78. General Grunert. When Rohl was incapacitated or partially
so, on account of his personal habits, do you know whether or not the
work slackened or stopped because of such incapacity?
Colonel Hunt. No, sir. I do not know that.
78. General Grunert. There is an intimation that when Rohl was
on the job and sober, he was a go-getter, and was a driver, and so
forth. Does that mean that when he was not so on the job the work
was delayed and waited for him to again get in such capacity, or what?
Colonel Hunt. T did not mean to give any impression of that
nature, I do not believe that to be the case. I found no evidence
that such was the case. I found plenty of evidence to the effect that
whether Rohl was there or not in an advisory capacity primarily, it
was Wyman's purpose to drive everybody, even to the point of driving
them crazy. He was a driver ; there is no doubt about that. I doubt
very much if there is anything in the record or any testimony any-
where to the effect that Mr. Rohl's condition of sobriety or lack of it
at any time over there had any delaying effect on any part of the work.
That is my opinion of it.
80. General Grunert. So, as far as it came to your attention dur-
ing your investigation, you did not run across any delays that you
attributed to Rohl's intention to cause such delay so as to handicap the
work in its ultimate completion or as to the date of completion?
[772] Colonel Hunt. No, sir; I did not.
81. General Grunert. Had other contractors been on the job, in
your opinion, from what you have learned, would they have had the
same labor troubles, the same troubles in getting priorities on mate-
rials, the same troubles about getting priorities on shipments, and so
forth, or do you have any reason to believe that others could have
gotten materials more quickly and have done the job more quickly?
Colonel Hunt. I doubt very much if any other contractor over there
would have had any better hick with priorities or shipments than the
contracting company that had the work in charge.
82. General Grunert. If any local contractors had been given con-
tracts, did they have any equipment or material locally that could
have been used on the contract that were denied to the Hawaiian
Constructors who did the job?
Colonel Hunt. I do not' believe they had any equipment that would
have been denied to the Hawaiian Constructors.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 403
83. General Grunert. How about material that the Hawaiian Con-
structors had to get from the States ? Did local contractors have any
such material on hand?
Colonel Hunt. No, sir; I am sure they did not, because the mate-
rials that had to come from the States would not be material that they
would carry in stock.,
84. General Grunert. A great deal of the material did have to come
from the States, in your opinion ?
Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir, and would have in any event, regardless
of who the contractor may have been. The Hawaiian [TTS]
Constructors came into existence over there early in the year 1941
at a time when the amount of work contemplated to be done was
only a matter of a million or a little over a million dollars. It was
known at that time by the Corps of Engineers that additional work
was coming up, but to what extent additional work was coming up
I doubt if anybody knew, since the bulk of it came up after the
attack. But I have no doubt — to finish the answer to the original
question — that had Colonel Wyman so desired he could have made
far greater use of the local contractors, their personnel and organiza-
tions, or their equipment, than was done.
85. General Grunert. And if he had done so, have you reached
the conclusion or have you considered whether or not that would
have sped the completion date?
Colonel Hunt. General, that question is so broad that I do not
think any man on earth could ever answer it. It involves a philos-
ophy of management, the difference between cost-plus work and
bid-price work. My own way of attempting a job of that nature
would have been very, very different from Colonel Wymian's. At
the time I was there — and I left in 1940 — I knew that the volume
of work then on hand was creating a labor problem. Before that
labor problem ever arose I was very keenly aware of it, because we
were about to do work which, when I estimated it and estimated
the labor required, I saw that there was more work than there was
labor to do it. The Navy was doing a lot of work, and I did not
want to be left there in a difficult position and, for that reason, ex-
tended myself to the limit that I could go within the law and regu-
lations to get all of the local contractors corralled and working
[774] on our work so that we would have available their equip-
ment, their technical supervision, and their labor. I believe that
that could have been extended ; and I know that in the middle of
1941 there had been a great decline in the total volume of Army work
under way. Seen in that light, if I had had the work to do that
had then been given to the District Engineer to do, I would have
bent every effort to get these good lump-sum contractors at work on
lump-sum work, so that there would not have been involved at that
time, unless over my dead body, any cost-plus-fixed-fee contract.
As to what score I would have made by using my method as com-
pared with the score that Wyman made using his method, I am not
the proper referee.
General Grunert. During your investigation did you happen to
find out much, if anything, about the contract that covered construc-
tion connected with the Air Warning Service ? Do you know whether
that was considered on a high priority, or did you find out much, if
anything, about that particular phase of the contract?
404 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Hunt. I found out initially nothing about that particular
phase. It was entirely apart from instructions under which I was
working, and in the course of that investigation no hint of anything
in connection with that work ever reached my ears. Therefore I had
no allegation to justify my investigation of that angle. I was inter-
ested in it, of course, and talked outside of office hours with friends
of mine over there, as a matter of curiosity, and I seem to recall some
comment by somebody to the effect that there was a -great deal of
difficulty in getting over there men who were [775] sufficiently
familiar with the work to do it properly, and also some difficulty in
getting over the equipment that was involved in the work. That was
wholly unofficial. Technical equipment to be used in the warning
service system.
87. General Gruneet. Were the personnel you referred to, by "tech-
nical equipment," to operate such a system or to set it up?
Colonel Hunt. No, I believe not. As I recall it, it was persons who
were familiar with the assembly of various parts of a warning unit,
how it was to be put together in a proper way and function properly.
88. General Frank. This was largely hearsay evidence, however,
on your part, wasn't it ?
Colonel Hunt. That is true. However, I believe that it was Colonel
H. B. Nurse from whom I got that information. I would not even
be positive of that, because it was not in the scope of my investigation
and was purely personal interest.
89. General Gruneet. That finishes my line. You may continue
with yours.
90. General Russell. Just one other question, Colonel. I want to go
back to this period following December 7 where apparently Wyman
and Rohl worked long hours and very hard. Was that the impression
that you had convey^ or attempted to convey earlier in your testi-
mony ? ^
Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir, as a part of an answer to some other ques-
tion probably ; but to put it directly, I will say that I was very defi-
nitely convinced by a great deal of testimony, by people who knew,
that Mr. Rohl and Colonel Wyman, his operations officer Colonel
Robinson, Colonel Howard Nurse, and other top men in that construc-
tion organization did work what would amount [776'] to two
full ordinary days every day for rather prolonged periods. I was
particularly interested in the last five days that Wyman was there.
It had been alleged before the Tenney Committee (as a matter of fact,
it was a matter of sworn testimony before the Tenney Committee) that
Wyman lay dead drunk in the Pleasanton Hotel for the last five days
he was there. Well, one of the allegations I was investigating had
to do with the statement that Wyman was inebriated most or at least
a large part of the time over there. I was very careful to find out
what happened, and I was absolutely convinced, and I think anybody
who wishes to look at rhe record thoroughly will be convinced, that
Rohl and particularly Wyman worked indef atigably during those five
days. I could find nobody to indicate that he had been drunk at any-
time during those five days. I saw the physical evidence of the work
that he did, the letters that he wrote, the directives that he had started
long before but had not completed and which he then completed, which
must have taken his very careful and concentrated attention for long,
long hours. Really I am amazed at the amount of work that that man
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 405
did during those five days, and if he was drunk he was certainly an
amazing man.
91. General Russell. Now, in order to get the record straight.
Colonel, you referred to doing two days' work almost every day, by
Rohl and Wyman. I will ask you whether or not that description
refers to the period after December 7, 1941.
Colonel Hunt. It does ; yes, sir. I know that he kept two shifts
of office personnel.
92. General Russell. It does not refer to the period prior to
[771] December 7, 1941?
Colonel Hunt. As I stated it, it does not.
93. General Russell. Yes.
Colonel Hunt. That may have been done before December 7 ; I do
not know. I doubt it, but I did not mean to indicate it had been
done.
94. General Russell. All right; that is all.
95. General Grunert. Any further questions ?
96. General Frank. Did you investigate Wyman's conduct with
respect to the use of liquor while you were over there ?
Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir; I did.
97. General Frank. Wliat were your general conclusions on that?
Colonel Hunt. My general conclusion was that he was a two-
fisted drinker and that he drank on every appropriate occasion for
drinking, and some that were not appropriate, but that he did not got
drunk, I mean to the point of being visibly drunk to an observer.
98. General Frank. Did it interfere with his work ?
Colonel Hunt. I feel quite certain that it did not.
99. General Frank. At any time?
(Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir. I was unable to unearth a single instance
in which that man interrupted or delayed or slowed down his work
as a consequence of drinking.
100. General Grunert. Do you know whether the drinking that he
did do incapacitated him from using good judginent in doing that
work ?
Colonel Hunt. Well, sir, I thirik the man used some execrable
judgment, but whether that was due to any liquor he [778']
drank or the mental constitution of the man, I do not know. I con-
sidered that he considered himself a Napoleon of construction and
industry, and was intolerant of other people's views; his alone were
good. Now, whether that was a matter of an exalted ego that had
always been there, or of an exalted ego inspired by liquor, I do not
know. I rather think that it was constitutional with the man, and
I doubt if his drinking had much to do with it.
101. General Frank. That is all.
102. General Grunert. There appear no further questions.
Thank you very much for the giving of your time and helping us out.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
TESTIMONY OF CASE B. RAFTER, WASHINGTON, D. C.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Will you state to the Board your name, address,
and occupation, please?
406 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Eafter. Case B. Rafter, 2434 Thirty-ninth Street, Northwest,
Washington, D. C. I am a project manager at the Veterans' 'Admin-
istration, Construction Service.
2. General Grunert. Mr. Rafter, the Board wants facts, and I be-
lieve you have some facts about records that we would like to get.
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
3. General Grunert. Are you going to ask the questions. General
Frank?
[779] 4. General Frank. Major Clausen will ask them.
5. General Grunert. The Assistant Recorder will ask you some
questions about some records which I wish you would tell us about.
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
6. Major Clausen. Mr. Rafter, your superior is Colonel Tripp ?
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
7. Major CLausen. And your services were made available to the
Board for the purpose of analyzing the job orders and the contract
with which we are concerned?
Mr. Rafter, Yes, sir.
8. Major Clausen. And in pursuance of that you have selected from
the various job orders those that pertain to the air raid warning
system ?
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
9. Major Clausen. The underground gasoline storage tanks and
certain other installations in the Hawaiian Islands; is that correct?
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
10. Major Clausen. You have prepared for us and the Board sum-
maries of these various job orders which I hold here in my hand ; is
that correct ?
Mr, Rafter. Yes, sir.
11. Major Clausen. Now, so that the Board may know, what has
been your schooling in doing work of this kind ?
Mr. Rafter. I have been in construction work since graduation
from Lehigh University in 1913, and for the past 13 years I have been
with the Veterans Administration, Construction Service. Prior to
that I was in private practice [780] as a consulting engineer on
construction work.
12. Major Clausen. Now, Mr. Rafter, without taking each one of
these up separately, I am going to ask you whether the summary that
is attached to the respective job orders correctly sets forth the infor-
mation that has been received from the job orders.
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir. That is a summary of the information given
in the job orders, and it sets forth the items which General Frank
asked to have listed as shown on the front of each summary.
13. Major Clausen. Would you just take one (this is the Mt. Kaala
having to do with the air raid warning system) and indicate to the
Board just what you have done with regard to that particular Mt.
Kaala project, and I do not think we shall have to go through the
rest,
Mr, Rafter, This job order where the job orders were numbered
14. General Frank. What job order is this?
Mr. Rafter. Oh, I see: the United States Engineer Office of Hono-
lulu issued job orders under Contract No. W-414-Eng-602, and this
particular contract covered construction of aircraft warning system ;
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 407
and job order No. 1 was a proceed order to construct 9,000 feet of access
road from Kolekole Pass Road to the proposed site of the cableway
at Mt. Kaala, and then under direction I put down the estimated cost.
15. General Frank. Which you got from the job order?
Mr. Rafter. Which I got from the job order, our addenda thereto,
the commencement date, the estimated date of completion, and the
name of the supervisor or, in case he was not named, [75i] his
title, as the Area Engineer of the 3rd Field Area in this case was J. J.
Kestly.
16. Major Clausen. These various job orders to which you refer
are the job orders that were handed you by General Frank and
myself ?
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
17. Major Clausen. These job orders (indicating) ?
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
18. Major Clausen. And in turn, for the information of the Board,
we have a whole file drawer full of them, but these are the ones that
we selected as bearing upon the matters in which the Board is
interested.
Mr. Rafter. May I amplify my answer, in that I went through
the files too, to see if there were any other job orders pertaining to
these subjects which have not been given me. I found none.
19. Major Clausen. Mr. Rafter, I hand you the summary concern-
ing Mt. Kaala and ask you, did you prepare that summary from the
job orders that are attached to that summary?
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
20. Major Clausen. And it is all correct, is it?
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
21. Major Clausen. That refers to Job Orders 2.1, 2.0, and 2.2;
is that correct?
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
22. Major Clausen. All right. We will suggest that this will be
the exhibit next in order, which would be No. 4.
Colonel West. The reporter will please mark the document Exhibit
No. 4.
[782] (Summary of job orders in re Mt. Kaala was marked
Exhibit No. 4 and received in evidence.)
23. Major Clausen. Now, Mr. Rafter, I show you the summary
referring to the Kokee air raid warning system which refers to Job
Orders 23.0, 23.1, and ask you, did you prepare that summary from
those job orders?
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
24. Major Clausen. And the summary is correct, is it, from the
information ?
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
25. Major Clausen. All right. We offer t-his as exhibit next in
order.
26. Colonel West. These are all related. We may make this 4-A.
27. Major Clausen. All right, sir.
(Summary of job orders in re Kokee was marked Exhibit No.
4r-A and received in evidence.)
28. Major Clausen. Now, Mr. Rafter, I show you the summary
referring to the Haleakala air raid warning system which covers
408 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Job Order 41.0, and ask you whether the summary is correct and refers
to that job order.
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir, it does.
29, Major Clausen. I ask that this be marked 4-B.
(Summary of job order in re Haleakala was marked Exhibit No.
4r-B and received in evidence.)
30. Major Clausen. Now 1 show you the summary referring to the
Mauna Loa air raid warning system, referring to Job Order 46.0,
and ask you if you prepared that summary from that job order.
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
[783] 31. Major Clausen. Con-ect, is it?
Mr. Rafter. That is correct.
32. Major Clausen. I ask that this be marked 4-C.
(Summary of job order in re Mauna Loa was marked Exhibit No.
4-C and received in evidence.)
33. Major Clausen. I show you the summary referring to the Bel-
lows Field underground gasoline storage tanks and Job Orders 20.1,
20.120, 20.130. In addition to that you have affixed Job Orders 20.140
and 20.150. Did you prepare that summary?
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
34. Major Clausen. Referring to those job orders?
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
35. Major Clausen. And the information on there is correct?
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
36. Major Clausen. I ask that this be marked as the next exhibit.
(Summary of job orders in re Bellows Field, etc., was marked Exhibit
No. 4-D and received in evidence.)
37. Major Clausen. This (indicating) is the summary referring to
the underground gasoline storage tanks for Barking Sands, Job Order
21.1. Did you prepare that summary from that job order?
Mr. Rafter, Yes, sir.
38. Major Clausen. And is it correct ?
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
39. Major Clausen. I ask that that be marked as the exhibit next in
order.
[784] (Summary of job order in re Barking Sands was marked
Exhibit No. 4— ^^1 and received in evidence.)
40. Major Clausen. This is the summary referring to Morse Field
underground gasoline storage tanks. Job Order 25.0 [indicating].
Did you prepare that summary ?
Mr, Rafter. Yes, sir.
41. Major Clausen. Referring to that job order, and is it correct?
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
42. Major Clausen. I ask that that be marked the exhibit next in
order.
(Summary of job order in re Morse Field was marked Exhibit No.
4r-¥ and received in evidence. )
43. Major Clausen. I show you this summary referring to Wheeler
Field bombproof ammunition storage structures, Job Order 5.0, and
ask you whether you prepared that summary from that job order.
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
44. Major Clausen. That is correct, is it?
Mr, Rafter. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 409
45. Major Clausen. I ask that this be marked the next exhibit.
(Summary of job order in re Wheeler Field was marked Exhibit No.
4— G and received in evidence.)
46. Major Clausen. Hickam Field is this next summary that I
show you, referring to magazines, Job Orders 7.0, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, and
ask whether you prepared that summary.
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
47. Major Clausen. Referring to those job orders?
[786] Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
48. Major Clausen. You got that information from them, and is it
correct ?
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
49. Major Clausen. I ask that this be marked the next exhibit.
(Summary of job orders in re Hickam Field was marked Exhibit
No. 4r-H and received in evidence.)
50. Major Clausen. This (indicating) is the Punchbowl fire con-
trol station, summary Job Order 14.0: I ask you whether you pre-
pared that summary.
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
51. Major Clausen. From that job order, is that correct?
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
52. Major Clausen. And the information on there is correct?
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
53. Major Clausen. I ask that be marked the next exhibit.
(Summary of job order in re Punchbowl was marked Exhibit No.
4-1 and received in evidence.)
54. Major Clausen. This is Diamond Head fire control station
Job Order 15.0 (indicating). Did you prepare that summary?
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
55. Major Clausen. Based on that job order?
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
56. Major Clausen. And it is correct, is it?
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
57. Major Clausen. I ask that be marked as the next exhibit.
(Summary of job order in re Diamond Head was marked Exhibit
No. 4-J and received in evidence.)
[786] 58. Major Clausen. And this is Kawailoa Camp, power
house, Job Order 13.0. Did you prepare that summary ?
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
59. Major Clausen. Referring to that job order?
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir. '
60. Major Clausen. And is that information correct?
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
61. Major Clausen. From the job order?
Mr. Rafter. From the job order.
62. Major Clausen. I ask that be marked as the next exhibit.
(Summary of job order in re Kawailoa Camp was marked Exhibit
No. 4r-K and received in evidence.)
63. Major Clausen. This (indicating) is the Fort Shafter radio
transmitter station, Job Order 17.0. Did you prepare that summary
on that job order?
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
64. Major Clausen. And the information is correct as taken from
the job order?
410 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
65. Major Clausen. I ask that be marked as the next exhibit.
(Summary of job order in re Fort Shafter was marked Exhibit No.
4r-lj and received in evidence.)
66. Major Clausen. Hickam Field : armament, fire control, supply
and repair building, Job Order 29.0. Did you prepare that summary
from that job order?
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
67. Major Clausen. And it is correct, is it, as taken from the job
order?
[787] Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
68. Major Clausen. I ask that be marked as the next exhibit.
(Summary of job order in re Hickam Field was marked Exhibit
No. 4-M and received in evidence.)
69. Major Clausen. This is Fort Kamehameha, Job Order 24.0.
Did you prepare this summary ?
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
70. Major Clausen. And it is correct as taken from the same?
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
71. Major Clausen. All right.
(Summary of job order in re Fort Kamehameha was marked Exhibit
No. 4-N and received in evidence.)
72. Major Clausen. Now, with regard to completion dates, Mr.
Rafter, did you prepare, for the House Committee on Military Affairs,
a study which is set forth on pages 39 and 40, giving various esti-
mated dates of completion, by dates and percentages, which I hand
you?
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir, I prepared the original.
73. Major Clausen. And from where did you get the information
to prepare the data which are set forth in that document?
Mr. Rafter. That information was supplied to the Committee; it
was at the office of the Committee on Military Affairs, supplied by
the Army Engineer Office.
Pardon me. Shall I go into detail, just what the sources were?
74. Major Clausen. I would like 3^ou to do that.
Mr. Rafter. The percentage dates, the estimated dates set forth
in these sheets, that I was asked to go through the [788] rec-
ords and find the percentage which was complete at the date set forth,
and also the percentage completion reported of December 1st. The
reason for selecting December 1st, the reports were made monthly
and they were made up in order to establish the amount of fee due
the contractor, so that that would be paid him, and it was paid on
the percentage of completion of the work; and I went through the
file in the same manner in which I went through to arrive at these
summaries and got these figures off and tabulated them, and this
schedule was made up from that information.
[789] 75. General Frank, The job-orders from which you made
these reports that have just been submitted in evidence were from the
official files of the Corps of Engineers, is that correct?
Mr. Rafter. They were so stated, in the letter of transmission,
sir.
76. General Frank. So they constitute authentic records of the job-
orders, which really were the contract for doing the work in Hawaii ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 411
Mr. Eafter. May I explain and amplify the answer? The con-
tracts set forth certain work to be done in a certain time, after order
to proceed was given. The job-order constitutes the order to proceed
and describes the work to be done under that order.
77. Major Clausen. I think it might be advisable to offer in evi-
dence this summary, contained on pages 39 and 40 of this House Mili-
tary Affairs Committee Report. Unless there is objection, I will ask
that it be marked as Exhibit 5, that being just the summary.
(The Summary referred to was marked as Exhibit 5, and received
in evidence.)
78. General Grunert. Are there any further questions ?
General Frank. No.
79. General Grunert. There being no further questions, thank you
very much for coming over here to help us.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Whereupon, at 12:25 o'clock p. m., the Board recessed until 2
o'clock p.m.)
[790] AFTERNOON SESSION
(The Board, at 2 o'clock p. m., continued the hearing of witnesses.)
TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. JAMES A. MOLLISON, MOBILE AIR
SERVICE COMMAND, MOBILE, ALA.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. General, will you state to the Board your name,
rank, organization, and station.
General Mollison. Brigadier General James A. Mollison, Mobile
Air Service Command ; Mobile, Ala.
2. General Grunert. General, the Board is attempting to get at
the facts and viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor
attack. We hope from your testimony to get some leads, or to throw
some light on this subject. With that in view, I have a few questions
to ask you, and then I think General Frank has a few that relate to
some special subjects which he is investigating.
Will you tell me what your position was in Hawaii in 1941 ?
General Mollison. I was Chief of Staff of the 7th Air Force.
3. General Grunert. And who was in command of that Air Force?
General Mollison, General Frederick L. Martin.
4. General Grunert. In the Roberts Commission report there is one
statement to the effect that General Short says he talked with Admiral
Kimmel and Admiral Bloch for two or three hours on November 27,
and that General Martin and his Chief of Staff, Colonel Mollison, were
there.
General Mollison. That is true, sir.
5. General Grunert. Can you from your memory tell us about
\791] what happened during that 2- or 3-hour conference? What
was talked about ? Wliat did they confer on ?
General Mollison. The purpose of the conference was to show the
Navy the radiogram that General Short had received from the War
Department, and to discuss with them their plans, and to inform them
of the plans of the Army.
412 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
6. General Grunert. Do you recall just what Admiral Kimmel or
Admiral Bloch told General Short, General Martin, and yourself, as
to their plan ?
General Mollison. I don't believe I can give a verbatim report on
that. It generally dealt with the provisions of the radios, which con-
sisted of advising that war was imminent, that we should be particu-
larly watchful for acts of sabotage, that nothing should be done to
excite the civil population ; under no circumstances were we to com-
mit the first overt act. Considerable of this conversation had a bear-
ing on Army planes that were supposed to be sent to Wake, P-40s,
and from the general tenor of thing it appears that the Army had
offered the use of these P— 10s at Wake.
We had at the time discussions as to how they could be landed, from
carriers, and so forth, put them off of carriers some 200 miles at sea.
The one point was brought up — in fact, I brought it up — that sending
our P-40s to Wake was contrary to our mission, which was the defense
of Oahu. I recall distinctly one piece of conversation between Ad-
miral Kimmel and, at that time. Captain Mc Williams, who was Plans
Officer.
7. General I'rank. Was it not McMorris?
General Mollison. No, McMorris is a different man. This is either
Williams or McWilliams, who was the Chief of Plans [792] for
Admiral Kimmel ; and in sort of glossing over that reason for keeping
P-40s, Admiral Kimmel asked this chap, "What do you think the
chances of a surprise attack on Oahu would be?" and this chap stood
up and said, "None, Admiral — none!"
8. General Grunert. The evidence that we have had before us so
far indicates that that was Captain McMorris, who gave that infor-
mation to the conferees at that time.
General Mollison. I may be wrong on that. General, but it seems to
me that it was either Williams or McWilliams.
9. General Grunert. I think it might be well if I read you this
message of November 27, in order to refresh your mind, and then ask
some questions concerning those things about the message that might
have been discussed. The message, under date of November 27, reads
as follows :
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with
only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and
offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possi-
ble at any moment. If hostilities cannot (repeat Not) be avoided the United
States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This i)olicy should not comma
(repeat not comma) be construed as restricting you to a course of action that
might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed
to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but
these measux'es should be carried out so as not comma repeat Not comma to
alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should
hostilities occur you vpill carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five [793]
so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret in-
formation to minimum essential officers.
(signed) Maeshajx,
Did they discuss under that what action both the Navy and the
Army were going to take?
General Mollison. I know that Eainbow 5 was discussed at the time.
That is 2^ years ago, and it is a little bit difficult for me to remember
the exact statements that were made.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 413
10. General Grunert. Did General Short explain to Admiral Kim-
mel what his decision was, and what action the Army was going to
take ?
General Mollison. I don't believe he did, at that time, General. My
recollection of that is that we went back to Department Headquarters,
and there. General Short made the decision that we were going on alert
No. 2, as provided by SOP, Hawaiian Department.
11. General Grunert. Alert No. 2, or No. 1 ?
General Mollison. Alert No. 2.
12. General Grunert. I think probably your memory does not serve
you correctly, because they went on alert No. 1. Wliat was the alert
that they went on ? What did that encompass ?
General Mollison. That was the antisabotage alert.
13. General Grunert. That happens to be alert No. 1.
Was the question of the reconnaissance to be undertaken discussed ?
General Mollison. I don't recall that it was, General.
14. General Grunert. Aside from that opinion or judgment ex-
pressed by the staff officer of the Navy, to Admiral Kimmel, [794.]
that the possibility or probability of a surprise attack was practically
nil, was there any discussion about a possible air attack?
General Mollison. There was none, that I recall. No. I don't re-
call any discussion about any surprise air attack. We had been train-
ing for that, for some period of time, but I don't recall that that was
discussed.
15. General Grunert. You stated that after the conference. General
Short went back to his headquarters and there made the decision to
go on the alert against sabotage ?
General Mollison. Yes, sir.
16. General Grunert. Was there any other discussion as to whether
or not to go on any other alert — for instance. No. 2, that envisaged air
attack, or No. 3, that envisaged an all-out attack?
General Mollison. No, sir. No, sir; I don't recall any discussion
of that kind.
17. General Grunert. On behalf of General Martin or yourself, was
there any question in your mind as to whether or not other measures
than going on a sabotage alert should be taken ?
General Mollison. No, sir. I recall stating to General Martin
on our way back to Hickam Field that under the circumstances it
appeared to me that General Short had made a very good decision.
18. General Grunert. Were you aware of any other messages that
had been received prior to that, through the Naval sources, as to what
might be considered a warning of things that might come ?
[7951 General Mollison. Only this general talk. In fact, there
were several messages in connection with increasing the defenses of
Wake and Midway.
19. General Grunert. Did you have any knowledge of a message
on the same date, November 27, received by the Navy, which said,
"This is a war warning"?
General Mollison. Yes, sir. The Navy read that to us.
20. General Grunert. Was that discussed on that same day?
General Mollison. That was.
21. General Grunert. What was their conclusion as to the "war
warning" message? that it was not a "war warning for Hawaii?
General Mollison. I think that they considered it a war warning.
414 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
but for some unknown reason — that is, I can't say "for some unknown
reason," but it is unknown to me — something came out, that there was
an attack expected against Malaya, on December 2.
22. General Grunert. But it did not occur to any of you, at that
conference — or did it!? — that that war warning message, in connection
with the Chief of Staff's message, constituted a warning to you people
in Hawaii to be prepared for anything, not only sabotage but for any-
thing else ?
General Mollison. It could not be construed as anything else but a
war-warning message, there is no question about that.
23. Genera] Grunert. What did "war warning" mean to you?
General Mollison. That means that a state of war practically exists,
or, if it does not exist, it was imminent. However, the information
that our A-2 was getting daily from this Naval [796] Intelli-
gence Commander Layton, indicated that they were pretty well con-
vinced that they had the location of every Japanese ship. In fact, if
that statement was made once to me it was made a half a dozen times.
24. General Frank. Did the Navy give you those locations ?
General Mollison. No.
25. General Frank. Or did they just tell you that they had it?
General Mollison. They said they knew where they were located.
26. General Grunert. Then in your own mind, did you have every
confidence in the Navy to the effect that if anything was coming near
Hawaii, you would be duly informed?
General Mollison. Yes, indeed ! They were also charged with off-
shore patrol, which was supposed to give us warning in plenty of time,
in the event that anything was moving in.
27. General Grunert. As far as the Air Force Command was con-
cerned, under alert No. 1, the sabotage alert, how much time under that
alert would it take you then to'go to another alert and be ready to take
the air to fight ?
General Mollison. That could be done inside of an hour, to get the
planes in dispersed position. They would not all be. We wouldn't be
armed with our bombs in that lenglh of time, but we could get them all
to the dispersed position. I should say it would take two to three hours
to arm the planes and have them on their way.
28. General Grunert. Then as far as you were concerned, you
thought that the alert for sabotage was sufficient ?
General Mollison. I thought it was a good decision, General, be-
cause we were very short of experienced troops in [7P7] our
air force. We had under this SOP certain positions that we had to
guard — down-town, and so forth — which had been modified some-
what ; but if we had to take up positions, guard the bridges and the
electric plants and the waterworks, and so forth, it would have left us
in pretty bad shape ; and if you could move all of your stuff' in, it ap-
peared to me that it was a much better plan than dispersing your
airplanes all over the different airdromes ; and I think it was a good
plan, with the instructions that we had.
29. General Grunert. Now, either one of you go ahead, if anything
occurs to you. I did not know how far this subject might lead.
Had you not gone on alert No. 1, what would have been your condi-
tion to meet an attack ?
General Mollison. I do not think it would have been a bit better,
with the exception of the fact that they disabled a good many planes
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 415
on the ground that perhaps might have been unhurt or undamaged if
we had had them in dispersed position.
30. General Grunert. But ordinarily, without going on alert No.
2, would your planes have been more dispersed than when you went
on alert No. 1?
General Mollison. No, no.
31. General Grunert. Would they have been less concentrated than
they were under alert No. 1 ?
General Mollison. No; that was just the place. They had them
on the ramps tied down in their normal positions.
32. General Grunert. What did the SOP require of you in the line
of taking care of your own, if not instructed to go on alert No. 1 ? In
other words, there was Field Manual 100-5, I [798] believe,
that made each separate Commander responsible for his own safety,
including danger from the air?
General Mollison. Well, that is very true. We would have had
these planes in dispersed position, which would have required — oh,
I would say it would take about, perhaps five times the number of
guards to properly safeguard them from sabotage. They would have
been safer from air attack.
33. General Grunert. Hasn't each plane a ground crew?
General Mollison. That is true.
34. General Grunert. Ordinarily, is it the responsibility of the
ground crew to take care of that plane, under all circumstances?
General Mollison. That's true, General. They are supposed to
maintain them and furnish incidental protection to them, but that
would mean that you would have to keep these people on the go 24
hours a day, which is hardly practicable ; so you would have to have in
addition to the combat crews and the maintenance crews, additional
guards.
35 General Grunert. Were not the fields themselves normally
fairly well protected against sabotage?
General Mollison. No, they were not. There were no perimeter
fences. We had a little strip of barbed wire, which we got through a
fluke, around the perimeter, or the vulnerable perimeter of Hickam
Field. Wheeler Field was wide open, as well as Bellows. They didn't
have man-proof fences or even barbed wire around either of the other
two fields.
36. General Grunert. General Kussell?
37. General Russell. General, in the interest of clarity in the
record, I wanted to ask some questions, here, about the [799]
time required to get your fighter planes in the air and to engage the
enemy. On this day, December 7, 1941, were the weapons in your
fighter planes ?
General Mollison. Yes, indeed!
38. General Russell. Was there any ammunition in your fighter
planes ?
General Mollison. In some of them ; not in all of them.
39. General Russell. Wliat is your estimate of the time that would
have been required to have gotten the ammunition into all of the
planes, or do you have that data ?
416 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Mollison. I haven't that data. I can say this, that within
eleven minutes after the members got to some of the planes, they were
in the air.
40. General Russell. We have had testimony to the effect that if
the personnel was at the plane, then the plane could have been gotten
into the air in four minutes.
General Mollison. That's true; I think you can "scramble" your
planes in four minutes.
41. General Russell. We have also had testimony to the effect that
if you had the personnel at the airfield, but not in the planes, it would
have required thirty minutes to have gotten the planes in the air.
General Mollison. That is about right.
42. General Russell. Then, we have had testimony to the effect
that if the troops were away from the field, offices, and headquarters,
and the troops, in the quarters, or with routine training in progress,
or with recreation in progress, to have gotten that personnel to the
field and into the planes would have required four hours, and to have
gotten the [800] planes into the air?
General Mollison. Well, that is normal procedure for us. We feel
that, either on the 30-minute alert, the 1-hour alert, or the 4-hour alert.
43. General Russell. Then is it true. General, that in estimating
the time element to get your planes in the air and in contact with
hostile aircraft or other targets, there would have been two factors,
out there — the time to get your personnel to the plane, and, second,
the time to get the ammunition into the plane?
General Mollison. Well, I don't think that that would normally
hold, General. You have certain planes that are on the alert. That
means, ready to go, right now. Other planes are on 2-hours notice;
others, on 4-hour notice. Those that are supposed to go, right now,
are supposed to be ready, with everything.
44. General Grunert. Is that normal, to have some ready all the
time ?
General Mollison. Oh, yes, yes; indeed!
45. General Grunert. Were they set aside, or were they grouped
with the rest of them ?
General Mollison. Generally, they do that by squadrons, General.
The squadron is on the alert. That's the "alert squadron" or the "alert
squadrons." Certain ones of them are given a little more relaxation,
to be ready after two hours, and others, four hours.
46. General Grunert. Did these alerted planes in each squadron
get in the air and put up a fight ?
General Mollison. No, sir ! The only place that we got [801']
in the air came from a field that the Japs didn't know we had —
Haleiwa. There were several that tried to take off from Bellows, but
they were shot down on the take-off. These planes were over the
fields before anybody knew that they were coming. The first that I
knew of it was when the bombs were dropping.
47. General Russell. General, I have been attempting to recreate,
or to create, in my mind, the picture of Oahu, had General Short
elected, on the 27th day of November, to have gone to alert 2;
which, as I understand alert 2, provided for the men to be at the
planes, with the ammunition in the planes, ready to go, to repel a
surprise air attack.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 417
48. General Frank. 1 think that is alert 3.
49. General Russell. As I understood, it was 2. I may be con-
fused on it, as I understood, alert 2 provided against an air attack;
but let us assume we had gone to 3, in order that you could have
been in position to have met the surprise attack that did come in,
there. This message came on the morning of November 27, that
General Grunert discussed with you. The attack was made on the
morning of December 7, which was nine or ten days later. Now, to
have remained on the major alert, from the Air Force standpoint,
with the men at the planes, for a period of ten days, what sort of
tax on your personnel would that have been?
General Mollison. Oh, it is difficult, it is really difficult, to keep
your people constantly on the alert for that period of time; and
frankly, we didn't have the people over there at that time, in either
pilots or in maintenance crews, to keep them on the alert all that
time.
[802] 50. General Grunekt. Wliat was done after December
7th ? Were they not then on alert all the time ?
General Mollison. They were, indeed; but we had to break the
period and put a lesser number of planes available for the alert
for the first three days, until Wednesday I should say, because no-
body got any sleep and they were all completely worn out by Wed-
nesday and Thursday, and we had to revamp and revise the whole
scheme.
51. General Russell. Did I understand you to say that in re-
vamping the scheme you reduced the number of planes that were
on the major alert?
General Mollison. Yes.
62. General Russell. And thereby gave some of the personnel time
off?
General Mollison. A chance to rest.
53. General Grunert. Then, Alert No. 2 did not visualize what you
had to do after December 7. In other words, it did not visualize that
the alert might last for a considerable length of time, and therefore
you had to get up a scheme that you could carry into effect effectively.
General Mollison. That is right.
54. General Grunert. Alert No. 2 is primarily against an air raid,
whereas No. 3 combines with No. 2 in getting the infantry out. That
is the primary difference, it is not ?
General Mollison. Yes, sir.
[SOS] 55. General Grunert. And Alert No. 2 did visualize an
air attack ?
General Mollison. Yes, sir.
56. General Frank. Did General Martin have any conversation
with Short relative to the type of alert on that morning that you went
back to General Short's office and to the Navy?
General Mollison. Yes, sir.
57. General Frank. What were General Martin's comments to
General Short on that?
General Mollison. The decision was made by General Short. The
first we knew of it we were out in General Hayes' office, and they came
out and said we would go on this alert.
58. General Frank. Was this before General Martin had any con-
versation with him about the alert whatever ?
79716 — 46— Ex." 145, vol. 1 28
418 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Mollison. He had had no conversation other than this
general conversation over at the Navy Yard.
59. General Frank. Was General Martin in full agreement with
this No. 1 Alert?
General Mollison. Yes ; I think he was.
60. General Frank. That carried with it some sort of a conviction
that there was not going to be an air attack ?
General Mollison. That is right, too.
61. General Frank. Was that the general feeling?
General Mollison. That was the general feeling.
62. General Frank. How far down ?
General Mollison. I should say, through all the echelons. Nobodj
in Hawaii felt that there would be a surprise attack on Hawaii.
63. General Frank. What led you into that frame of mind ?
General Mollison. I think, the confidence and optimism of
[804.] the Navy more than anything else.
64. General Frank. That had to be supplemented by your belief
in the effectiveness of the Navy for you to have had a similar feeling ?
General Mollison. That is very true.
65. General Frank. Did you have confidence in the effectiveness
of the Navy ?
General Mollison. I had this confidence. General, that if they knew
the location of every ship of the Japanese Fleet we would certainly
have sufficient warning before there would be a surprise attack.
66. General Frank. Had they assured you that they did know the
position of all the ships of the Japanese Fleet ?
General Mollison. Yes, sir.
67. General Frank. That is all that you had — just the general in-
formation that they had the information ?
General Mollison. That is correct.
68. General Frank. You did not yourself know where these Jap
ships were, did you ?
General Mollison. We had asked many questions of the Naval In-
telligence which they were very chary about supplying to us, stating
that this was information that they knew about and that were not
in a position to pass out any details. That occurred not only as to the
location of the Japanese Fleet, but on many other items.
69. General Frank. Who in particular gave you the assurance that
you were so well covered by the Navy ?
General Mollison. Colonel Rayley was our A-2 at that time. He
was working directly with Commander Layton, who was the Naval
Intelligence Officer.
70. General Frank. Layton, of the Navy, was the man who gave
3'ou the assurance that they knew what they were doing ?
General Mollison. Yes, sir.
71. General Frank. Did you by any chance know that between the
25th and the 30th of November there was a Japanese task force down
in the Marshall Islands?
General Mollison. No, sir; I did not.
72. General Frank. Commander Layton did not tell you about
that?
General Mollison. No, sir. I am sure he did not tell Rayley or any-
body else, because that is the first time I have ever heard that men-
tioned.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 419
73. General Frank. What would have been your feeling had you
known that there was a Japanese task force at Jaluit ?
General Mollison. I would have had an entirely different idea of
the whole picture. That is within striking distance of Hawaii. I
think we would have tightened up our belts considerably.
74. General Frank. You knew that the Navy was sending out task
forces from time to time ?
General Mollison. Yes, sir.
75. General Frank. Did you know when they went out?
General Mollison. No, sir.
76. General Frank. Did you by any chance know where they went?
General Mollison. No, sir.
77. General Frank. You mentioned some time back something
about there being air troops on guard at installations down town.
General Mollison. We had certain obligations to fulfill as far as
Eolicing and guarding was concerned, in the first [806] Police
district of Honolulu.
78. General Frank. At the same time you stated that you were
short of trained troops to accomplish the air work that was necessary
at your air station ?
General Mollison. That is right.
79. General Frank. How did it happen that you could spare troops
for ground guard duty downtown?
General Mollison. We could not, General.
80. General Frank. Who made that decision ?
General Mollison. That was General Short's decision.
81. General Frank. How many troops were involved?
General Mollison. Total Air Force troops?
82. General Frank. Yes.
General Mollison. Approximately 7,500.
83. General "Frank. 7,500 were turned over for ground duty?
General Mollison. No, sir ; 3 battalions of 500 men each.
84. General Frank. 1,500?
General Mollison. Yes, sir.
85. General Grunert. Was this normal procedure or under Alert 1 ?
General Mollison. That was under Alert 1.
86. General Frank. Let us get to this massing of planes on the
apron. At Hickam Field you had about 36 P-18's and about 12
B-17's?
General Mollison. Six B-l7's in commission; six out of commis-
sion.
87. General Frank. There were 12 dispersed ?
General Mollison. You might say 10, General, because there were
two that were ))ietty well cannibalized. I do not think you could
have moved them.
88. General Frank. There was room at Hickam Field to have
[807] dispersed that number of planes?
General Mollison. Plenty of room.
89. General Frank. You had barbed wire along the north stretch
and down to John Roger Airport ?
General Mollison. That is correct.
90. General Frank. You had machine guns enfilading the area in
front of the barbed wire ?
General Mollison. Yes, sir.
•i20 COXGRZSSIOXAL IX^TSTIGATIOX PIL\EL HL\HBOR ATTACK
91. General J'raxk. Had you dispersed your planes and put the
crews sleeping in the planes, with maehine-gtm ammunition at the
gruns. so that in case of attack the guns in the planes could have been
manned, the ground and air crews could have taken care of those
planes by having the men sleep in the vicinity of the planes, cotild
they not ?
General Moixisox. I do not believe. General, that that would have
been considered an adequate defense. I would not consider it so.
92. General Fraxx. If the planes had been dispersed the machine
guns in the planes could have been used for the ground defense as well
as air defense in case of attack ?
General Mot ttsox . That is true.
93. General Feaxk. And the barbed wire entanglement with the
machine-gim defense covering the front of it woiild have deterred
saboteurs from coming onto the field, would it not ?
Greneral Moixisox. It would deter them, yes : but it wotdd not stop
them.
94. General Feaxk. Had you had Hickam Field's proportion of the
ground personnel that was downtown guarding streets to have pro-
tected Hickam Field, it would have been possible, even from your
point of view, to have dispersed the planes and still had [808]
protection f
General Moixisox. I think I have given a misconception of the
things. On this particular alert our troops were not pulled out. On
the next alert that would have been given they were supposed to be
pulled out.
95. General Feaxk. What do you mean by "pulled out" ?
General Moixisox. Pulled out away from the Air Force to take
over this policing of the First Police District.
96. General Fea2vk:. You had these troops then ■
General Mollisox. We had them. That is one reason why I
thought it was a good alert. We were left with all our people.
97. General Feaxk. Then you had people that could have been
made available to have protected your perimeter ?
General Moxlis-jx. That is true.
9S. General Fean-k. Tou did not have to worry about the Xavv-
side ?
General Moixisc'X. Xo. sir.
99. General Fp^axk. And you did not have to worry about the Pearl
Harbor entrance side ?
General Moixisox. Xo. sir.
KX). General Fraxk. You did not have to worry about the Kame-
hameha side ?
General Moixisox. That is a pretty wide open field.
101. General Feaxk. Kamehameha could have taken care of it,
though ?
General Moixisox. Yes. sir.
102. General Feaxk. So that left you only the narrow strip at the
east end and the north side which had barbed wire ?
General Moixisox. All this area that comes right up through this
slough [indicating on map]. All of this was wide [809] open.
And as to this point below Kamehameha. there is not a thing down
there to keep people from infiltrating acro^ there. (Indicating)
PROCEEDINGS OF .\RMT PEAEL HAPvBOR BOAPJ) 421
The wire only went down perhaps half a mile beyond the limits of
our field.
103. General Frank. You still would have preferred to have had
your planes destroyed there than to have had them dispersed and
taken care of tliis way, then, I take it ^
General ^Iollisox. I think that every man weighs those things in
the balance. If he felt that there was an air attack coming, certainly
the planes would have been dispersed. If he feels that with 40 per-
cent of the population of the place in which he is living are poten-
tial enemies, he will take steps to guard his property against sabotage.
And that was our reasoning — to be particularly watchful for sabo-
tage ; and we felt that if war was declared or started by either side, the
first things that would be done would be acts of sabotage by the na-
tionals that were living in Oahu.
104. General Fil\xk. Did the contents of these messages have any
influence upon your estimate of the immediate presence of hostile ac-
tivities? Do you remember reading the messages?
General Mollisox. Yes.
105. General Frax'k. Do you remember the contents of them ?
General Moixisox. I remember them generally. I knew them
ciuite well at that time: but I do not believe that anyone felt either in
the Army or Xavy that in the event war was declared the first push
would be across the Pacific. We were pretty well sold on an attack
against Malaya.
106. General Fraxk. The Xavy, you felt, had implicit confidence
in themselves to be able to give warning of an impending attack?
[810] General Mollisox*. Yes, sir.
107. General Frax-k. And that confidence was relayed rather com-
pletely to members of the Army ?
General Mollisox'. Yes. sir.
108. General Fraxk. Are you conversant with the estimate of the
situation that was prepared and signed by General Martin and Ad-
miral Bellinger?
General Mollisox. Yes. sir: I am generally familiar with it. but it
would be hard for me to quote it at the present time.
109. General Fraxik. You remember the estimate of the situation
described and anticipated just exactly what happened in this attack?
General Mollisox. We had been working on that for months, Gen-
eral.
110. General Frax'k. If you anticipated and described it in your
estimate of the situation, why was it that you did not give it sole con-
sideration when you were notified that it was a war warning?
General Mollisox. Well, here is a part that I can speak only for my-
self on. because I do not know that General Martin felt the same as I
did. We had this offshore patrol. P. T. Y.'s going out every morning
just at the crack of dawn, supposedly taking care of all of the offshore
patrol. Their warning in the event that anything was coming in coidd
have reached us in sufficient time so that we could have moved our air-
planes aroimd in any way we saw fit.
111. General Fraxk. You were conversant with the fact, however,
that they did not have enough P. B. Y.'s to cover Oahu by 360 degrees?
[811] General Mollisox. That is very true, sir: but they were
not attempting it by 360 degrees.
422 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
112. General Frank. Then Avhy did you feel such security?
Genei-al Mollison. That was supplemented, of course, by carriers
that were out on patrol. However, we did not know where they were
patrolling or what areas they w^ere covering.
113. General Frank. Then, just on the assurance of the Navy you
were blindly confident that they were "delivering the goods"?
General Mollison. That is about what it amounts to. We were all
so sold on the idea that the Navy had this picture, and that with the
fleet in Pearl Harbor they would not dare to attack.
114. General Frank. Do you believe that the presence of the fleet
in being at Pearl Harbor, with the traditional strategic defense that
that offered, contributed in any way to the complacency that existed ?
General IMolijsgn. I do not doubt at all but what it contributed to
an erroneous feeling of safety on the part of the Army.
115. General Frank. Was there a reconnaissance squadron at Bel-
lows Field?
General Mollison. Yes, sir.
116. General Frank. How often did it conduct reconnaissance?
General Moixison. I should say, daily, General.
117. General Frank. Was that for reconnaissance purposes or train-
ing purposes, or both ?
General Mollison. Both.
118. General Frank. Did it operate on Sundays?
General Mollison. Not to my knowledge. I am sure it did
[8 J 2] not. It may have on this Sunday, but I doubt very much
if it did.
119. General Frank. What did you have by way of reconnaissance
in addition to this reconnaissance squadron at Bellows Field?
General Mollison. The only thing that we had in the way of recon-
naissance was occasional missions of B-18's within the inshore patrol
area.
120. General Frank. Would you have considered an advisory mili-
tary mission to have sent B-18's to be used on patrol where they would
have contacted Japanese Zeros ?
General Mollison. No, sir. That is suicide. Is just no defense
against any reasonable fighter plane,
121. General Frank. In a B-18?
General Mollison. That is right. Of course, they were not used
for that. General. They were used only for the inshore patrol, which
is within 20 miles of Oahu.
122. General Grunert. What were they reconnoitering for?
General Mollison. Submarines.
123. General Grunert. Were they armed ?
General Mollison. Yes, sir; but their armament is so small they
had practically nothing.
124. General Frank. That is, practically nothing in the light of
present day armament of modern bombers ?
General Mollison. That is true.
125. General Grunert. You are speaking of both B-18's and recon-
naissance planes?
General Mollison. That is true.
126. General Frank. What was the reconnaissance plane.
General Mollison. C-47.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 423
127. General Frank. That is a single engine airplane?
[813] General Molmson. Yes.
128. General Frank. Even prior to the message of November 27
reconnaissance was conducted by the Hawaiian Department?
General Molltson. Yes, sir.
129. General Frank. And that continued ?
General Molltson. Swede Munson came over to see us about this
and I complained bitterly about using B-18's on this reconnaissance.
In the first place, it is a very bad airplane for that purpose. You should
be able to see directly down, and with your B-18 it is pretty hard to
pick up anything in the water. You are looking at an angle.
130. General Frank. A man in the nose could see straight down ?
General Mollison. Yes; but he is the only one. By the time he
looks for about an hour his eyes begin getting pretty fuzzy, if he is
really looking hard. I thought perhaps there were other types of
planes that might be made available that could be used to better
purpose on this inshore patrol.
131. General Frank. With respect to the aircraft warning service,
are you conversant with that ?
General Mollison. Yes, generally speaking.
132. General Frank. Wlio was the main authority on the location
of the permanent sites?
General Mollison. The main authority on that was Colonel Powell.
^133. General Frank. The plan for the defense of the island with
271's, or permanent installations, called for three, one on Kaala, on
Haleakala and one on Kokee. Do you remember when they were
received in the Hawaiian Department ?
General Molltson. I cannot remember exactly. It was in the spring
of 1941 some time.
[814] 134, General Frank. Spring or summer?
General Mollison. Not before spring; I know that.
135. General Frank. Do you remember when the mobile sets, the
270's were received?
General Mollison. I could not give you any exact time on it, but
it was about that time.
136. General Frank. The mobile sets were deployed and operated
General Mollison. Not very effective. I do not think any of our
on maneuvers or on exercises prior to the December 7th attack?
General Mollison. Yes.
137. General Frank. Was their operation effective ?
General Mollison. Not very effective. I do not think any of our
radar over there was worth nmch.
138. General Frank. What do you mean by "not worth much"?
Compared with what ?
General Mollison. We were getting so many fixed echoes on them,
or echoes of some kind, that they got to seeing airplanes all over the
place when no airplanes were in the air. Apparently they did not
know enough about the installation of them or the operation to leave
anybody with any confidence in them.
139. General Frank. Who made these reports to you with respect to
the unsatisfactoriness of these sets?
General Mollison. Generally, my conversation with Powell on
them. You see, they had been turned over to us, to the Air Force at
424 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION" PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the time the war started. There was a lot of bickering and wrangling
about the things. Our Signal Officer attempted to take hold of them
and he could not, and Powell did not want to give them up, and he
did not, and so forth.
140. General Frank. Here is a chart which is already part of the
record of the Board (handing chart to the witness), which shows how
the radar picked up the incoming attack and followed [SIS'] it
in. That would indicate a degree of effectiveness, would it not?
General Mollison. Do we have a scale on this. General, showing
the distances?
141. General Frank. That is about 120 miles.
General Mollison. I would be inclined to think, and I always have
thought, that that was our own B-17's coming in. I cannot prove
that to you, but that is my feeling.
142. General Fraxk. The radio stations were in operation, were
they not ?
General Mollison. Yes, sir.
143. General Frank. If the radio stations were in operation did
not the B-17's coming in have radio equipment so that they could hold
on to the radio?
General Mollison. Yes, sir; but some of them came in from just
exactly that direction (indicating).
144. General Frank. Do you know whether or not there was any
dissatisfaction with respect to the rapidity with which the radio sta-
tions were being built ?
General ]Mollisox. I do not think it was expressed at any time over
there in my presence, General. They were having difficulty with one
of them, but that was in the getting of some equipment to put the
elevator in up there.
General Fraxk. A cableway?
General Mollison. Yes. sir.
[816] 146. General Frank. Were there any underground gaso-
line tanks at Bellows Field?
General Mollison. There were none of sufficient size to amount
to anything.
147. General Frank. There was gasoline storage over there, how-
ever ?
General Mollison. Yes, sir; that is right. Later on we put in
quite an extensive underground system at Bellows, after the war
started.
148. General Frank. Do you know whether or not on the morning
of December 7th a lack of gasoline prevented any take-offs?
General Mollison. At Bellows ?
149. General Frank. Yes.
General Mollison. No, sir, I do not. I could not subscribe to
that, because there were only about three planes that tried to get
off over there, and they were promptly shot down on take-off.
Kaneohe and Bellows were hit just about at the same time, these
planes right above them.
150. General Fraxk. Have you any information other than that
that has been brought out that is pertinent to the situation, that you
can offer to the Board ?
General Mollison. I saw the number of planes that were wrecked
over on Ford Island after the attack was over, and it looked to me
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 425
as though that was every PBY that was in the Department; and,
while I could not swear to it, I do not think any PBYs went out that
morning for offshore patrol, and I think that that had quite a bearing
on the whole thing if it is true that those PBYs did not go out that
morning.
151. General Frank. Do you know whether or not it was habitual
[817] for them to go out every morning ?
General Mollison. Yes, sir. They took off right by my quarters.
General, about 5 : 30 to 6 o'clock in the morning. On this particular
morning I did not hear them, but sometime you get in the habit of
this noise and it doesn't disturb you, but I don't believe — I didn't see
any PBYs trying to come back in during or after the attack.
152. General Frank. Did the Navy prior to this time habitually
conduct reconnaissance on Sunday mornings?
General Mollison. I could not say as to that, sir.
153. General Grunert. When they do go out, do they cover all
the directions of the compass ?
General Mollison. I think that they were covering in sectors oi'
somewhere in the neighborhood of 140 degrees.
154. General Grunert. Did that include the arc in which the
attack was made?
General Mollison. Yes, sir. Almost all of our plans were worked
out on patrolling this area to be able to pick up anything suspicious
at the 600-mile limit, and we figured on normal carrier speeds and
plane speeds, that if we could get them at the 600-mile limit we
could be ready for them by the time they came into Hawaii. With an
800-mile limit you were just that much more better off; if you have
any kind of visibility at all, you ought to be able to pick up anything
that is in there in force.
155. General Grunert. Even if you were in a concentrated posi-
tion on the field, such as Alert No. 1 carried, you could have gotten
in the air if you had picked them up at 600 miles ?
General Mollison. Yes, sir.
[818] 156. General Grunert. I want to clear up one point. I
understood you to say that if you were in Alert No, 1 your men were all
present, and if you had been in Alert 2 there would have been a
number of them off in civil communities doing guard work; is that
right?
General Mollison. Yes, sir ; that was the plan, that we had trained
some of these 500-man battalions of ours to go into different locations
for the defense of Oahu.
(Excerpts from standing operating procedure of November 5, 1941,
were read, as follows:)
157. General Grunert. I want to read to you the pertinent parts of
the S. O. P. of the 5th of November on this subject.
Paragraph 6 states :
Security. — Every unit is responsible for its security at all times from hostile
ground or air forces. See paragraphs 233 to 273, inclasive, FM 100-5.
That is under the subject of "General."
"Alerts," 14 a : Alert 1 :
This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the
islands, with no threat from without.
426 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
And under paragraph f of "Alerts" :
The Hawaiian Air Force will :
(1) Protect all vital installations on posts on Oahu garrisoned by air forces.
(2) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local
base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 14 g.
[819] 14 g reads as follows :
The District Commanders, assisted by the air corps detachments within the
districts, will:
Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage,
and maintain order in the civil community.
Therefore, under Alert No. 1 you would have had that distribution,
and maintained order in the civil community.
Now, Alert 2 :
This alert is applicable to a condition more serious than Alert No. 1. Security
against attacks from hostile , sub-surf ace, surface, and aircraft, in addition to
defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided.
Under that, in paragraph f :
The Hawaiian Air Force will :
(1) Maintain aircraft and crews in condition of readiness as directed by this
headquarters. See paragraph 17.
(2) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.
(3) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival
thereat, disperse on fields.
(4) Disperse bombers with crews.
(5) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.
(6) Protect all vital installations on posts on Oahu garrisoned by air forces.
(7) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying [820] islands by coopera-
tion of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 15 g.
15 g provides :
The District Commanders, assisted by the air corps troops detachments within
the districts, will :
Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage,
hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.
Therefore, that direction about maintaining order in civil com-
nmnities is applicable both to 1 and 2.
General Mollison. That is right.
158. General Grunert. So in either case, following these instruc-
tions, you would have had some air corps troops in civil commmiities,
and not only in one case or the other, but in both cases ? That is the
point I want to get straightened out.
General Mollison. That is right. That is true on the outlying is-
lands, General. That is all that applies to. Before, we were supposed
to take over these specified spots in Honolulu, but I think that was
changed just before the — what is the date of that. General? Is that
November ?
159. General Grunert. November 5, 1941.
General Mollison. I believe that was changed.
160. General Grunert. Which was supposed to be the "bible" at
that time.
General Mollison. That is right.
161. General Grunert. You interpreted, then, this, "The District
Commanders, assisted by the air corps troop detachments within the
districts, will maintain order in the civil community" — you interpreted
that to mean just on outlying islands?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 427
[8211 General MbLLisoN, Yes, sir ; that is the way I interpreted
that.
162. General Grunert. But that is under both 1 and 2, so it would
be under sabotage alert and alert against air raid.
General Mollison. That is right.
163. General Grunert. I interpret that to mean on Oahu as well as
outlying islands. But, as you say, you may have received different
instructions; I do not know.
164. General Russell. Did you actually have these three battalions
out on this alert that was begun on November 27th ?
General Mollison. No, sir ; we did not.
165. General Frank. You said that under normal conditions you
had a certain number of the planes in each squadron, or certain squad-
rons that were designated as alert squadrons ?
Gene^^al Mollison. That would not be under normal ; that was under
alert conditions, I should have said. General: under conditions of
alert.
166. General Grunert. But not under conditions of Alert 1 ?
General Mollison. Yes, sir.
167. General Grunert. Sabotage?
General Mollison. Yes, sir. There were alert squadrons, alert
crews.
168. General Frank. How long did it take you to get those planes
off the ground in case of emergency ?
General IMollison. Those were supposed to be ready to go in thirty
minutes. General. You see, that is Alert A or Condition of Readiness
A
169. General Frank. Where did the crews sleep?
General Mollison. The crews slept in tents or hutments [822]
immediately adjacent to the planes when the bombers were in dis-
persed position. Wlien they were on the line they slept in the opera-
tions rooms and hangars.
170. General Frank. Is that where the pilots also slept?
General Mollison. Yes, sir.
171. General Frank. So there were certain pilots and crews sleep-
ing on the line ?
General Mollison. Yes, sir. May I add that that could not help
matters at all that morning during the attack because these things were
on everybody before there was a possibility of doing anything about
it ; they were just going down the line.
172. General Russell. The 4-minute alert would not have helped
you, would it. General?
General Mollison. A 5-second alert would not have helped, because
if they are on top of you you can't take a plane off without being shot
down if you have got a bunch of Zeros sitting up there waiting for you
to take off.
173. General Grunert. Then, the only effect, as far as I can gather
from your testimony, is that the difference between Alerts Nos. 1 and
2 as to protection against what happened, would have been a certain
amount of dispersion ?
General Mollison. That is all. It would not have helped a bit,
unless you had warning of from 30 minutes to two hours before these
people are going to attack you, because when they are sitting up there
looking down your throat you can't take an airplane off the ground.
428 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
174. General Grunert. Then, your only source of warning would
have been the air warning service or information from the Navy ; is
that correct?
[823] General Mollison. Yes, sir, that is true.
175. General Grunert. Or possibly such as your own inshore recon-
naissance might have given had it been in the air?
General Mollison. Well, that would not do any good because, you
see, that is limited to 20 miles from the shore line. Inshore patrol is
absolutely valueless to you because by the time you radio a message in,
that 20 miles is covered by a Zero in about five minutes.
176. General Grunert. Of course, they can see farther ; if they are
out 20 miles they can probably see what? 50 or 60 more?
General Mollison. It is all according to your altitude and your
visibility. I would say generally you can see about 10 to 12 miles. If
you see airplanes in the air 10 to 12 miles away you are doing very well.
177. General Grunert. Are there any other questions ?
178. General Eussell, Yes ; I have two or three, very briefly.
Were you out there in 1940 ?
General Mollison. Yes, sir.
179. General Russell. You recall the alert which was an all-out
alert that was instituted about the 17th day of June, 1940 ?
General Mollison. Yes, sir.
180. General Russell. That alert just dwindled out, didn't it?
General Mollison. It did.
181. General Russell. Now, along at the tail end of that alert and
probably in the fall do you recall an order to the Air Force which
required reconnaissance for this inshore patrol only as a matter of
training ?
General Mollison. I do not recall that now.
[5*24] 182. General Russell. Do you know. General, whether or
not beginning there sometime in October, as I remember, of 1940 and
extending on till the time of this attack on December 7, '41, that the
air people, the air forces, did maintain an inshore patrol largely as a
matter of training?
General Mollison. That would be a token payment only.
183. General Russell. I was interested in the testimony which you
gave a moment ago about the planes on Ford Island. I have never
served over there, and have labored somewhat under a handicap here.
Wliere is Ford Island ?
General Mollison. This is Ford Island here (indicating on map).
184. General Russell. I looked all over those maps and I could
not find it.
185. General Grunert. The place you indicated is practically in the
middle of Pearl Harbor?
General Mollison. Yes, sir. It used to be our old Luke Field, but
we turned it over to the Navy completely.
186. General Russell. Do you know how many planes the naval
people had in there, General?
General Mollison. Well, I talked to Captain Davis, the aviation
officer on Admiral Kimmel's staff, and I had the impression that he
had somewhere in the neighborhood of 100 PBYs.
187. General Russell. Was that a fighting plane or a reconnais-
sance plane, or what is it ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 429
General Mollison. It is a reconnaissance plane.
188. General Kussell. Purely a reconnaissance plane?
[8£5] General Mollison. Long-range patrol bomber; that is
what it is.
189. General Grunert. Did that pertain to the l^leet or to the
District?
General Molijeson. That was the District. This is under the Dis-
trict, Patwing 2 and Patwing 1.
190. General Grunert. Patwing what?
General Mollison. I think they turned them over to the Fleet at
some time. It was either just before or just after the war started ; I
think it was just after the war started.
191. General Grunert. What do the letters p-a-t mean?
General Mollison. Patrol wing. "Pat" is patrol.
192. General Grunert. Patrol ?
General Mollison. P-a-t is for patrol ; yes, sir.
193. General Russell. General, how many other types of aircraft
did the naval people have there at Pearl Harbor at the time of this
attack ?
General Mollison. I would not know, General. They had several
other types there, but I wouldn t even know how to
194. General Russell. Where were they? On the carriers or
cruisers or where ?
General Mollison. Well, of course they have the carrier typ-e planes
and their cruiser type planes. They had also some of the smaller
utility planes as well.
195. General Russell. I was attempting to develop, and probably
I should ask it that way, the effective fighting force that the Navy had
in aircraft out there ?
General Mollison. Well, they had one squadron of marine fighters,
which I think was the one that was sent to Midway [8£6] and
to Wake in place of our P-40s, and that is about all they had land-
based. They had them at Ewa for a while.
196. General Russell. Something has been said in the testimony
here to the effect that the Navy had some of its planes dispersed and
they were all destroyed.
General Mollison. Well, they hit Ewa, of course, and they hit
Kaneohe. I think they destroyed almost everything at Kaneohe.
197. General Russell. You do not know whether those were dis-
persed or not ?
General Mollison. I do not think they were dispersed.
198. General Russell. You say you heard these PBYs going out on
this morning patrol. How many did they send out ordinarily?
General Mollison. Oh, it would be an estimate, but I should say
about 25 or 30.
199. General Russell. Now, a moment ago, in reply to a question
from General Frank, you stated that you could not prove it but you
had a pretty strong idea that planes that were followed in the morning
of the attack were our planes, by that AWS station.
General Mollison. Well, this lad that landed — I can't remember his
name but we can get it from the records over there — that landed at
Kahuku, he came in from almost directly on that course at just about
that time. I think General Landon's course was considerabLv north of
430 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Oahu, and he turned almost directly south. There were several that.
I talked to that seemed to think that that is just about the direction
that they came from.
[8£7] 200. General Kussell. The Navy had a lot of new tanks
out there for storing oil or gas, did they not? Do you know about
that?
General Mollison. No, sir, I do not know.
201. General Kussell. You have no information ?
General Mollison. I have no information on it.
202. General Russell. I think that is all.
203. General Grunert. These planes of ours that came from Hamil-
ton Field to Honolulu or Oahu, I understand they came in groups of
six each. Did all the first group get there ?
General Mollison. No, sir. They started out with 12 planes. Gen-
eral, and I had a call about midnight from Colonel Howard Ramey.
He said, "Don't look for 12. Look for 11 planes." One of them
turned back and landed at Hamilton Field about midnight, midnight
of our time, so he was only probably out or gone an hour. So they
took off at intervals of perhaps 10 minutes, and they started in arriv-
ing in Oahu just about 8 to 8 : 15. I called the tower at 7 : 45 and asked
if they had made any contact or had heard anything of our B-17s,
and they told me that they were in contact with some of them but the
static was so bad that they could not make out what they were trying
to say.
204. General Grunert. You do not know how many planes were
supposed to be in the Japanese attack that hit there about that time
from that particular direction ?
General Mollison. From the number of planes that were over
Hickam Field on that first wave I should say that there were some-
where between 60 and 80. That is just my estimate.
205. General Grunert. Would not the Air Warning Service radar
show the difference between 11 planes and 50 planes coming from
[828] approximately the same direction ?
General Mollison. I do not believe they can, General, at a distance.
206. General Frank. Another thing about this, these B-17's were
arriving singly ; they were not arriving in a formation.
General Mollison. That is right.
207. General Frank. If they arrived in the manner in which they
departed from Hamilton Field, they would arrive at about ten-minute
intervals.
General Mollison. Yes. Well, there were several of them that
came in there right together. General, at about 8 to 8:15.
208. General Frank. In formation ?
General Mollison. Well, they were not in formation, bnt they were
pretty close together. They made a pass at Landon as he was coming
over Bellows, just about Bellows Field, and this doctor that he had
with him, who was killed, thought that that was somebody trying
to play, and he got up there in one of his blisters and got this camera
out, and this Jap just took off as if he were being shot at. But there
were about three or four planes that landed about the time that
Landon did, and of course Landon's plane was hit just as it hit the
runway, and they happened to hit him right in the pyrotechnic com-
partment, and he just burned in two and the tail stayed here and the
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 431
front end rolled on up here (indicating) , We saved all the engines on
that one, but the medico was killed. And there were several others
that these Jap planes made a pass at, but they got away. They could
move away from them : they had enough speed to get awaj^ from them.
209. General Grunert. General, what is the estimate now by
[829] the air people as to the number of hostile aircraft partici-
pating in that attack?
General Mollison. Well, my own estimate on the thing, which most
of the Army people seem to agree with, was about 180 planes total.
It may have run a little higher than that or a little less, but you see
these high-altitnde horizontal bombers going by you in 9-ship forma-
tions, and you see all of these zeros and dive bombers and your torpedo
bombers; it looked to me as though there were probably 180 to 200
planes.
210. General Russell. Suppose that you people had had ample
warning of the approach of these hostile aircraft but there had been
no interference with their take-off from the points from which they
did depart: did you have any defensive means to have repelled the
attack of dive bombers on the naval craft, navel ships?
General Mollison. Oh, I think we could have done a lot of damage
to them. I think that we could have kept almost all of those slow-
moving torpedo bombers out. Those things were just like shooting
fish ; they were going along at, I should say, a hundred and ten miles
an hour. They didn't look to me as though they were a bit faster
than that. The dive bombers were faster. They were probably 160
to 170. And the zero, the little fighter, was a good fast airplane.
211. General Russell. What type of aircraft produced the great
damage to our naval ships ?
General Mollison". The torpedo bomber was the one that caused the
most damage to the largest number of ships. The most positive dam-
age that was done was done by high-altitude horizontal bombing on the
battleship Arizona. They just [830] happened to get some
lucky hits down the stack of the Arizona, and she went up.
212. General Russell. Those were the people who were 10,000 feet
up?
General Mollison. They were, I should say, between eight and ten
thousand feet. All of our antiaircraft was hitting way below and
behind these planes.
213. General Russell. The question the General has stated is that
if ample warning of the attack had been given the effect of the attack
could have been greatly minimized, if not completely eliminated.
General Mollison. I think there is no doubt about that. If we could
have put 50 fighters in the air that morning and we could have if we
had had ample warning — I do not think we could have done a thing
against them offensively as far as their carriers were concerned ; we did
not have the type of aircraft with which to do it. But we could cer-
tainly have raised cain with their formations that came in if we had
60 fighters in the air.
214. General Russell. And you had more than 50 fighters available ?
General Mollison. We had 105 ; 103 P-40s and we had something
like 22 P-36s, but, strangely enough, that P-36 would not have been
any good at all, but the chap in the P-36 did shoot down one plane. We
had about 14 fighters in the air that morning, total.
432 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
215. General Russell. How did the Japs happen to miss on one
airfield ?
General Mollison. The Haleiwa does not look like an airfield, Gen-
eral. You would guess a long time before you would [<§<?-/]
think that it was one, and these people were over there for maneuvers
and gunnery practice, and of course the Japs didn't know they were
there.
216. General Russell. That is all.
217. General Grunert. Have you any further questions?
(No response.)
There appear to be no further questions. Thank you very much for
coming up.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
218. General Grunert. We shall take a five-minute recess.
(Thereupon there was a brief informal recess.)
[832] TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. W. E. EARTHING, 07122,
ATLANTIC OVERSEAS SERVICE COMMAND, PORT OF NEWARK;
NEWARK, N. J.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. General, will you state to the Board your name,
rank, organization, and station.
General Farthing. William E. Farthing, 07122, Atlantic Overseas
Air Service Command, Port of Newark; Newark, N. J.
2. General Grunert. General, this Board is after facts and also
after the background and viewpoints prior to and leading up to the
Pearl Harbor attack. Particularly, I want to develop what you
know about the attack, the conditions prior thereto, in your assigned
position. What were you, and what were your duties in Hawaii, late
in 1941 ?
General Farthing. I was Commanding Officer at Hickam Field.
3. General Grunert. As Commanding Officer of Hickam Field,
what did you do at Hickam Field in compliance with this paragraph
of the Standing Operating Procedure of the Hawaiian Department?
6. Security. — Every unit is responsible for its security at all times from hostile
ground or air forces. (See Paragraphs 233-273, inclusive, FM-100-5).
General Farthing. We took the necessary steps to prevent sabotage
of our equipment.
4. General Grunert. Will you explain to me what weapons and
ammunition you had for defense, particularly against aircraft; and
what other protective measures, such as air-raid shelters, or slit
trenches, or fire-fighting measures. If so. was there an SOP on it?
Also tell us how your defense tied in with the [833'] general
antiaircraft defense of the Department.
General Farthing. I was Base Commander of Hickam Field, and
had taken command on the 27th day of November, the Tactical Com-
mander being General Rudolph. As Base Commander I had the
housekeeping of the field, not the tactical defense of the field. As a
Base Commander we drew the airplanes in at night, and we would
put a guard around them and lights around them, and there was a
perimeter, a guard.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 433
5. General Frank. It was a perimeter guard around the perimeter
of what — the airplanes, or the field.
General Farthing. Of the airfield — of both places. That guard
was under Colonel Herman. We had some few machine guns. We
had no antiaircraft artillery, and at the time of the attack, to the
best of my memory, there were no slit trenches.
6. General Grunert. There was no antiaircraft defense of the field ?
General Farthing. The antiaircraft defense of the field was a part
of the antiaircraft defense of the Hawaiian Islands.
7. General Grunert. Of the area ?
General Farthing. Of the area.
8. General Grunert. But you did have the machine guns set up
for local defense ?
General Farthing. We had some machine guns. Some of the ma-
chine guns were sighted for the defense of the airplanes. The Air
Corps did have some few machine guns in its table of organization,
and those guns were used, were out. Most of the machine guns as
I remember it were sighted for the defense of the airplanes against
sabotage.
9. General Frank. Were they on mounts so that they could be
l834] used for either air or ground defense ?
General Farthing. I don't remember. I think they were on the
ground, and they were not sighted as for air defense. We were de-
fending against sabotage and not air attack.
10. General Grunert. If you had not been put on alert No. 1 what
would have been your defense normally of Hickam Field?
General Farthing. We would have dispersed our aircraft over the
field.
11. General Grunert. But how about your weapons? How would
you have used them ?
General Farthing. The weapons were on the airplanes, of course.
Some of them are capable of being sighted for anti-aircraft fire. The
Air Corps didn't have very many machine guns for that purpose;
some few .50s — I have forgotten the exact number.
12. General Grunert. Outside of the actual crew and the ground
crew for the plane, did you have a guard for the station, itself, which
handled the various sorts of weapons for defensive purposes ?
General Farthing. Yes, we had a guard for the field itself, as a part
of the base command.
13. General Grunert. What did that consist of ?
General Farthing. I have forgotten the exact numbers, but about
300 men, I believe it was, that we had taken from the other air units
there. We had no defense command, set up as such, that was organized
as such.
14. General Grunert. What were these 200-odd men doing, nor-
mally?
General Farthing. They were the post guard.
[835] 15. General Grunert. They were armed with machine
guns, were they?
General Farthing. No, they were not. They were armed with
pistols.
16. General Grunert. Were there any machine guns available to
them?
General Farthing. No.
79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1 29
434 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
17. General Grunert. Ordinarily, the Standing Operating Pro-
cedure is the type of instruction that tells people what to do under
various circumstances. Now, what were the orders of this guard in
the line of defense ? What did they have to do ? How did they defend
the Post, or how were they supposed to defend the post ?
General Farthing. There was a plan in existence. These guards
were on their posts, the regular plan for the guard.
18. General Grunert. Was most of the guard for materiel, or how
much of it should be used for actual defense ?
General Farthing. The guards for the materiel were furnished by
the tactical units. They guarded their own materiel.
19. General Grunert. And you had 200 men that could be used for
defensive purposes?
General Farthing. No, sir. General. They were the guards. They
were the guards that were used for the guarding of the Post and the
patroling of the Post, and so forth. I am wrong — wait a minute. At
that time we had taken 500 men from the tactical commands and had
trained them into detachments. That was done prior to the time that
I was Base Commander.
[8S6] To get my story clear, I had better start back. When I
went to Hawaii, I was Commander of the 5th Group, a heavy bombard-
ment outfit. It was under the command of General Frank. In
September I left Hickam Field and went over and took command of
Bellows Field on the east side of the Island, and I was there until
November 27th. Then I was brought back to command Hickam Field.
Prior to the time that I left Hickam Field, the tactical units, they had
taken these people out of the tactical units and had trained them for
defense duties, and I think there were something like 500 of 'them, and
they have positions to go, and they did have these places, and on
top of the hangars were part of them. Out in the fields they had
machine-gun places.
20. General Grunert. They could be used against ground or air
attack ?
General Farthing. Yes, sir ; that is correct. I was wrong before.
I was talking about the other boys.
21. General Grunert. How did they perform when the attack came
on?
General Farthing. I couldn't answer that question. When the
attack came on, I was in the tower and in position to have observed
that, and I saw the attack start. I was waiting in the tower to receive
that reconnaissance squadron from Hawaii that had been following
the flight across the ocean, till 12 o'clock, and it was due in between
"5 : 30 and 6, and I went down to the tower with Colonel Chaney Bert-
holf , to see that it was received.
I saw the attack start, saw it coming in, saw it develop, and took most
of it. The attack — but that is volunteering [837] information.
I will go back to your question.
The airplanes were flying all over the field. There was a lot of
firing. Now, as to exactly what the effect of that firing was, I
couldn't tell you. Within a short time, not too short, an hour's time,
antiaircraft artillery did arrive at the Post, and there was much
firing.
22. General Grunert. When you took over, what protective meas-
ures did you find there ? Did they have any air-raid shelters ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 435
General Farthing. No,
23. General Geunert. Were there any slit trenches? Were there
any fire-fighting measures, in case of an attack? Generally, what were
those conditions in that line?
General Farthing. They were building some, getting ready to build
some revetments for the airplanes.
24. General Grunert. That is what they call "bunkers"?
General Fai^thing. "Bunkers," yes.
25. General Grunert. There were women and children on the Post,
were there not ?
General Farthing. That is right.
26. General Grunert. What measures were taken for those, in case
of emergency? What were the plans for taking care of them and pro-
tecting them ?
General Farthing. There was a plan, the "Hawaiian Plan." I have
forgotten exactly what it was, at this time.
27. General Grunert. But what was done right after the attack, in
that line?
General Farthing. As quick as I got back, we got all the women and
children off the Post and sent them into the hills.
[838] 28. General Grunert. Was that according to plan?
General Farthing. No, sir. That was not according to plan.
29. General Grunert. Wliat protective measures were taken as an
afterthought, after the attack, to avoid anything like that happening
again ?
General Farthing. The guard — everj^thing — our whole idea there
was, we thought it was going to be sabotage, and we expected the
natives to uprise and come in. The heavy guard was put around
the perimeter, and a guard put around; there were cane fields, one
side, very close, and that part of the field had hea\'y guards around.
30. General Grunert. Did they construct any air-raid shelters
afterward ?
General Farthing. Yes.
31. General Grunert. Did they dig any slit trenches?
General Farthing. Yes. We used every entrenching, ditch-dig-
ging machine we could get.
32. General Grunert. Do you know why those measures had not
been taken before, instead of afterward?
General Farthing. We did not expect an attack.
33. General Grunert. True, you did not expect it, because you
put on a sabotage alert; but ordinarily, for self-defense, suppose
they put you on No. 2, or No. 3 alert, then what? You could not
do that overnight. You could not prepare yourself in a short time.
Just because you were not alerted 2, or 3, you were just alerted for
sabotage, then these measures were taken afterwards. It would
appear that they should have been taken before.
[5JP] General Farthing. That is correct; they should have
been.
34. General Grunert. They were not taken?
General Farthing. They were not taken.
35. General Grunert. Wlio was in command of the field, before?
Who was the Base Commander before you ?
General Farthing. General Rudolph.
436 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
36. General Grtjnert. At the time of the attack, Rudolph was in
charge of the command of the tactical bombers ?
General Farthing. On the wing ; yes, sir.
37. General Grunert. Wliose responsibility was it to have these
measures taken for the general protection of the field — the Base Com-
mander, or the Tactical Commander, or both, or what ?
General Farthing. We were a part of the Hawaiian Air Force. By
that answer I am not trying to escape any responsibility on my part.
38. General Grunert. But you took over, November 27?
General Farthing. Yes, sir.
39. General Grunert. Prior to that. General Rudolph was in com-
mand ?
General Farthing. Yes, sir.
40. General Grunert. Then, after you took over, you were still
under Rudolph's command, or were you a separate command, directly
under General Martin?
General Farthing. I was under General Martin, sir.
41. General Grunert. Are there any questions ?
42. General Russell. General, the answer you gave a minute ago in-
dicated that after this attack had developed at Hickam Field, anti-
aircraft artillery arrived.
General Farthing. It did.
[840] 43. General Grunert. Wliere did it come from?
General Farthing. It happened to be that there was a Major of
the Antiaircraft Field Artillery spending the night on the Post, and
he spent the night with Colonel Bertholf. I can't recall his name.
He was there when the attack occurred, and he went to the phone and
ordered his battalion ready and to move immediately, and he met
them and brought them into the field.
4. General Russell. Where did they come from?
General Farthing. They came from Shafter.
45. General Grunert. Was there an antiaircraft position on or
near the field, that was in the general scheme of antiaircraft protec-
tion, that he could occupy that position, or was he doing that on his
own, or what, do you know?
General Farthing. I think that he was according to plan.
46. General Russell. They came back for two additional attacks
after this Major got in there with his antiaircraft?
General Farthing. No, I didn't say that. I said that the anti-
aircraft arrived later. Exactly when that antiaircraft arrived, I
do not know.
47. General Russell. But you did say that there was considerable
shooting after it got there?
General Farthing. I said there was. considerable shooting after
the attack started, and shooting after. There was shooting during
the attack.
48. General Russell. Did this man get there in time to get in on
the shooting ? That is the part I wanted to clear up.
General Farthing. I think he did. I am not certain on that point.
49. General Russell. That is all.
[84 J] 50. General Grunert. Have you any questions. General
Frank?
51. General Frank. Yes. It was not an easy thing to dig trenches
at Hickam Field?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 437
General Farthixg. Hickam Field is on a coral foundation, filled,
and you can't dig with a shovel, you have to dig with power equipment,
or with the "bulldozer." We dug a lot of them.
52. General Fraxk. With mechanical, compressed-air equipment!
General Farthixg. Mechanical; that's correct.
53. General Grunert. Then the slit trenches as such were prac-
tically out?
General Farthix'g. They were out, sir. You couldn't dig them
overnight.
54. General Grux"ert. In lieu thereof, you would have to put up
revetments to afford protection, would you?
General Farthixg. Hickam Field was just a very few feet above
the water, and when you dug down any distance at all you got into
the water, and when we had to put our revetments up for our bunkers,
for our airplanes, we had to bring the dirt in.
55. General Gruxert. The same thing would apply if you had
individual protection ?
General Farthix^g. Yes, sir; if you dug down, you would go into
the water.
56. General Frank. You stated a little while ago that you did not
anticipate the attack.
General Farthixg. No; I did not anticipate a bombing attack.
57. General Fraxk, Why?
General Farthixg. I had just completed a study, a short time be-
fore. Until we had gone into the thing and gotten the [84^]
Post — the G-2, anyway, had — where the Navy said that they knew
where everyone of the ships were, we constantly were on the alert, or
off the alert. Every time they said that they had lost a carrier, or
lost a battleship, and every time they lost a Japanese ship of any
t3^pe, we went on the alert until that was located.
58. General Gruxert. You mean, lost track of them ?
General Farthixg. Yes, sir; and for the whole period, there, we
were on alert, or off the alert — just one endless thing; part of the
time sleeping imder the wings of the airplanes, or with everybody on
alert. It was a continuous thing.
59. General Fraxk. You felt confident, then, that you were secure
in the protection of the Navy^ ?
General Farthixg. No, sir.
60. General Fraxk. Then why did you think that there would not
be an airplane attack?
General Farthixg. I didn't think that we had enough equipment
over there to be confident of it. It was a daring plan that was carried
out. It was not according to the information furnished us, which
was supposed to have been reliable, that there was nothing in the
vicinity, that they knew where it all was.
61. General Fraxk. Then you did have confidence in the Navy?
General Farthixg. I have never had confidence in the Navy !
62. General Fraxk. What led you to the belief that there would
not be an attack ? There must be some logic behind it.
General Farthixg. Yes. This is not Monday, but it is Tuesday :
and I am a "Monday man" of the quarterbacks — ^I now know that I
was wrong.
[843] 63. General Frank. You were wrong?
438 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Farthing. I was wrong. Anybody that thought we would
not be attacked by the Japanese Air were wrong ; circumstances proved
that.
64. General Frank. You still have not answered why you believed
that you would not be attacked.
General Farthing. I didn't think they could do it. I didn't think
they had that ability. I thought, I really thought, that we knew
where most of their carriers were. I personally thought they knew
where most of them were, although prior to this time I wrote and
conducted a map maneuver, just shortly after you left, where we
pulled this same thing that they did on us, and then we talked it all
out and had a big critique about it, and General Herron ; one of his
, last official things before he left. General Martin had just taken
over. General Ryan, then Colonel Ryan, was his Chief of Staff.
We let the ships come in with carriers just like that, and did the same
thing, in a maneuver, and handled our Air Force, too, to try to counter
it; and we sent our troops out and took their positions.
65. General Frank. Wliat really led you to the conclusion that
there could not be an attack was, in the first place, that you did not
think that the Japs could do it, because you believed you were suf-
ficiently well protected by the Navy ?
General Farthing. That is right.
66. General Frank. Is that correct?
General Farthing. Yes, sir.
67. General Frank. I am having a hard time getting that. Who,
in the Navy, told you that they knew where the Japanese naval
[8^4-} craft were ?
General Farthing. I can't quite answer your question as to that, I
don't remember who told me, but the Navy has their information serv-
ice— I mean their G-2 — and in making this study, we made these
investigations, and they said that they knew where they were.
68. General Frank. How close would the Japanese carrier force
have to be for you to be apprehensive about it ?
General Farthing. 900 miles. If they were coming in, 900 miles,
we would be in danger. We should be apprehensive if you don't
know where they are, any time that you lose track of it.
69. General Frank. Do you believe it was reasonable to be appre-
hensive, if they had discovered a Japanese force at Jaluit in the
Marshalls ?
General Farthing. I think we should be very apprehensive. That
is a little bit beyond that range.
70. General Frank. Do you think that the presence of the Jap-
anese carrier force in the Marshalls, at Jaluit, would have been reason
to be very apprehensive ?
General Farthing. That wasn't its normal station.
[845] General Frank. The Navy did not turn loose any infor-
mation with reference to a Jap force of several carriers, between the
25th and 30tli of November ?
General Farthing. If they did, sir, it would have gone into the
tactical command, and I was not told aoout it.
72. General Frank. These maneuvers of which you spoke just a few
minutes ago — when were they held? In the spring of 1941?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 439
General Farthing. You can help me refresh my memory on that.
Martin got there at what time ?
73. General Frank. He got there in November.
General Farthing. They were held before Christmas, then.
74. General Frank. Before Christmas of 1940 ?
General Farthing. Yes, sir. That was one of the first jobs I had
to do.
75. General Frank. Did you disperse your airplanes during that
maneuver ?
General Farthing. Yes, sir. General Street was my assistant, and
General Walker, deceased, was my other assistant. We drew the whole
thing up.
76. General Frank. Did the Navy ever tell you, or did it come to
your attention, anything about the frequency with which they sent out
task forces?
General Farthing. They sent them out frequently. Wlien I was
tactical commander we were all the time going out trying to locate
them. That was a regular occurrence.
77. General Frank. But when they went out on reconnaissance to
determine the location of any Japanese craft, did they ever tell you
where they went?
General Farthing. No, sir; they did not. I do not know that
answer.
[8^6] 78. General Frank. Did any information sent over by
the Navy ever reach your A-2 in your group ?
General Farthing. No, sir.
79. General Frank. Do you know how many planes there were in
the Japanese attacking force, as an estimate ?
General Farthing. I do not. I would say there were something
like a hundred. They came over in many waves. Would you care
for me to tell you exactly what I saw from the tower?
80. General Grunert. Go ahead.
General Farthing. We were at the tower watching for this recon-
naissance squadron to come in. It was a little late.
81. General Frank. A reconnaissance squadron of B-17's?
General Farthing. Yes, sir; 13 of them coming in. They missed
the island. Part of them, of course, were chased in by the Japs.
They came in on the beam. While we were in the tower we saw many
Navy ships, or what we took to be Navy ships, flying off the island
and coming around to the Navy base to the east of the island, and
we heard a bunch of airplanes diving in, coming from about 10,000
feet with the clouds. We knew they were not Army planes, and we
thought it must be Marines. They dived down on Pearl Harbor.
I saw a black object leave the first and hit with an explosion. The
first airplane turned its wings up and I could see the Rising Sun
on its wings. That airplane immediately came to Hickam Field.
I was in the tower. Colonel Bertholf gave the alarm at that time.
When he went down to give the alarm I went down from the tower
and arrived just after this airplane was coming up at about 25 feet,
firing 25-mm. cannon, and he hit No. 3 motor on a B-17 and set it
afire. The burning oil dropped down on the rubber tires. He set
some B-18's afire at the same time. The planes were so [Sp'^
close together that you could not taxi them out. They tried to get
440 COXGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
them in as small bunches as they could, with lights under them.
Thev caught fire. The Jap went off and turned and came back. I
was"^the only person out on the mat at that time. They turned and
came back across the field and fired at me, and there were other air-
planes coming in at the same time. About that time another airplane
came in with bombs. He came in from Kam and started bombing the
roadside. There were no bombs — I think I am correct in tliis — that
were dropped on the flying field proper. That had a very important
bearing on what we did afterwards, because they made no effort to
destroy our landing field; and all the hangars that were bombed
were the roadside hangars. "We were continually getting machine
grun bullets of all the planes that dropped their bombs on Pearl
Harbor.
After this attack was over, then came the torpedo attack. The
ships were not too fast; they leisurely came in over Kam across our
field. They went to the Xavy from the vicinit}- of our main gate, very,
very low, and dropped their torpedoes. We got their machine gun
bullets, too.
Then came a high level attack. Throughout this whole attack there
were airplanes at high altitudes, and they bombed Pearl Harbor ; and
at the same time this one was going on
82. General Gruxert. This high-level attack?
General Farthixg. Yes — a low-level attack came in against
Hickam. This was the principal bombing attack at Hickam, and
it started from Kam. "While on the mat I saw the commanding officer
of the 3Sth Recomiaissance Squadron. He was shot down and landed
right on our mat. His co-pilot ran to him and the following Jap
ship killed them. He failed to pull up and hit [84^] the
ground, crushing his belly tank. He had given the sliip the motor,
I was close enough to see its numbers. Later on that ship was brought
back into the field. It had crashed mto the mountams.
After this attack was over I caused a survey to be made of the field
and every bomb crater to be plotted. The location did not make
sense to us ; so we figured that if we put it on some of our old maps
they might make sense. Going back about two years we found a
set of blueprints that they fit. It showed that the last two hangars
were not built and that the control tower was an officers' club. The
control tower got no fire and the last two hangars got none. All the
lest of the hangars were shot at. So that, in my mind, dates their
information. Every bomb that they place definitely had its target,
and the man knew where it was going to be put. The attack was made
so low that there was no possibility of missing. They just flew right
above the buildings and turned loose. They learned something that
we had not learned — that if you hit your objective j'ou do not have
any splinters.
b3. General Gruxert. If there are no further questions, we thank
you very much, General.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 441
TESTIMONY OF H. RALPH BURTON, GENERAL COUNSEL FOR THE
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRE-
SENTATIVES, WASHINGTON, D. C. (ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN H.
WEINER, INVESTIGATOR FOR THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MILI-
TARY AFFAIRS AND RICHARD WINFREY)
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Will you state to the Board your name, address
and occupation?
[849] Mr. Burton. H. Ralph Burton. I am general counsel
for the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives
and, in such capacity, I have charge of investigations conducted by
the Committee under H. R. Resolution 30.
2. General GruisTert. Mr. Burton, the Board is after facts and wants
to get a background on the various things that it has been charged
to do. One of those is to look into such phases of the interim report
of the House that may have connections with the attack on Pearl
Harbor. With that in view, we thought it would be wise for the
Board to have you give us such background so that we could more
intelligently approach the problem with which we are charged. Major
Clausen, who has been detailed as Assistant Recorder to the Board,
having a greater knowledge of what has gone before in connection
with this particular phase, will lead in propounding the questions, and
then the other members of the Board will fill in with such questions
as occur to us.
3. Major Clausen. You are an attorney at law?
Mr. Burton. Yes, sir.
4. Major Clausen. And you have practiced in Washington how
many years, sir?
Mr. Burton. Since 1908.
5. Major Clausen. As a matter of fact, you were born in Washing-
ton : is that correct?
Mr. Burton. I was ; yes, sir.
6. Major Clausen. You are the general counsel for the House Mili-
tary Affairs Committee?
Mr. Burton. That is right.
7. Major Clausen. And have been for what period of time?
Mr. Burton. I can only approximate that, sir — about two [SSO}
years.
8. Major Clausen. Before that time you have investigated for the
Senate and the House, on occasions, with regard to other committees?
Mr. Burton. Yes, sir. I was with the Senate Campaign Expendi-
tures Committee in 1908 and conducted investigations in Kentucky,
Arkansas, North Dakota, Maryland, Indiana, and other States that I
do not now recall.
I might very briefly add that subsequent to that I was with the Ap-
propriations Committee of the House of Representatives and con-
ducted an investigation into W. P. A. activities in New York City
and New York State. Later I was with the Senate Campaign Ex-
penditures Committee, in 1940, and conducted investigations in a
number of different States.
442 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
9. Major Clausen. You liave shown me hei-etofore in your office
various documents which back up the Committee's report. I wonder
if you will produce at this time the volume which contains certain
exhibits consisting of affidavits, interviews, and, I believe, in part,
some testimony ?
Mr. Burton. Yes, sir.
10. Major Clausen. In addition to that volume you also showed
me other volumes. I will commence with this particular document
(indicating). I believe that has as its first exhibit an affidavit dated
the 18th of December, 1943, by Alice Anstey. Is that correct?
Mr. Burton. Yes, sir.
11. Major Clausen. For the information of the Board, the docu-
ments in this volume that Mr. Burton is now examining are set forth
on Exhibit A of the study which I have made and which has already
been submitted to members of the Board.
[851] There are various ways to proceed. I might ask Mr.
Burton to lead portions of the documents or the whole of the docu-
ments, or it might be that we can take the volume, if Mr. Burton will
make it available, and read it at our leisure later on. Whichever way
the Board wishes to proceed I will follow.
There were some of these documents, for example the first affidavit
that I just referred to, which I have on my list, and there is one which
pertains to the activities of Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl at the Bilt-
more Hotel in Los Angeles. The next is on a different subject and so
forth. The third statement in there is the statement of Mr. Connolly,
a paitner of Mr. Rohl.
Mr. Burton. That is an important statement.
12. Major Clausen. For example, the 15th document in there is the
interview of John N. Martin. Mr. Burton could read these statements
into the record now — I think they are all pertinent — or, if you wish,
you could consider them read.
[552] (Excerpts from order appointing Army Pearl Harbor
Board were read, as follows :)
13. General Grunert. Mr. Burton, this Board was appointed to as-
certain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese
armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on the 7th of December,
1941, and to make such recommendations as it may deem proper.
That order was amended to include :
will consider the phases which related to the Pearl Harbor Disaster of the
report of the House Military Affairs Committee, as directed by the Acting
Secretary of War in his memorandum for the Judge Advocate General, 12 July
1944.
Memorandum for the Judge Advocate General of July 12 reads
as follows :
(Memorandum for the Judge Advocate General, July 12, 1944, by
Acting Secretary of War, was read as follows:)
Subject : Report of House Military Affairs Committee alleging neglect and mis-
conduct of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., and others, concerning Hawaiian and
Canadian Defense Projects.
1. The recommendations contained in paragraph 5 of the memorandum dated
July 10, 1944, of Major Henry C. Clausen, J. A. G. D., to Mr. Amberg, Special
Assistant to the Secretary of War, on the above subject, are approved. Major
Clausen is directed to continue his investigation of the above matter and to co-
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 443
operate with the House Military Affairs Committee in its investigation of this
matter in the way described in paragraph 5 of Major Clausen's memorandum.
2. Immediately upon the appointment of a board of officers pursuant to Public
Law 339, 78th Congress, to investigate the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor
[852-A] catastrophe, the phases of the present matter relating thereto will
be referred to such board for investigation and such other action as may be
proper uuvler the directive appointing such board. As it is understood Major
Clausen will be detailed as assistant recorder of this board, he will continue
in that capacity to coordinate the activities referred to paragraph 1 hereof
with the activities of the Pearl Harbor board in the present case.
(Signed) Rob^t P. Patterson,
Acting Secretary of War.
[853] That, then, limits this Board to those phases which related
to the Pearl Harbor Disaster of the report of the House Military Af-
fairs Committee, and we do not want to wander afield in that report,
and we would like to have you understand on behalf of the House
Committee that we shall only go into such phases as are related there
to Colonel Wyman. We have power to ask for witnesses, but we have
no power to demand them nor to subpoena witnesses. So we want you
to realize, please, the limitations of this Board: as much as we can
find out of the matters which relate to the Pearl Harbor Disaster, yes.
Wherever any information is contained in your investigation that
will throw light on those phases that pertain to the Pearl Harbor Dis-
aster we consider it our duty to go into it. Except for those, phases,
we shall not. I do not consider that the Board's duty is to complete
your investigation insofar as Hawaii is concerned. There are prob-
ably many things that the House Committee would go into that do
not pertain directly to those phases. So we do not want you to expect
too much of this Board in the line of developing matters that do not
pertain to the Pearl Harbor Disaster.
Now, anj^hing you may have there that will bear directly on the
phases which we are charged with going into, we should have, and
those matters that are extraneous to that particular mission, we have no
power to go into, and our report will probably not cover such other
phases.
Now, with that in view we would like to have any background that
will assist us in going into those phases. I just wanted you to under-
stand thoroughly the limitations of our Board and what we are
charged with. That is why I wanted to get that IS54-] part in
the record.
14. Major Clausen. Mr. Burton, will you just give a statement with
such references to the basis for the statement as you deem pertinent,
please ?
Mr. Burton. Sometime early in 1943 it came to the attention of the
Committee on Military Affairs that a contract had been entered into
between the War Department and the group of contractors known as
the Hawaiian Constructors, and that the dominant company was the
Rohl-Connolly Company of Los Angeles, California ; that the domi-
nant factor with the Rohl-Connolly Company was Hans Wilhelm Rohl,
who at the time the contract was signed on December 21, 1940, was
an unnaturalized German alien. That aroused the interest of the
Committee, and when certain other information was brought to our
attention coming from various confidential sources, I was instructed to
proceed with an investigation and instructed to ascertain the facts
444 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
surrounding the awarding of that contract and what took place in
reference to it afterward.
I ascertained definitely that there was a contract entered into be-
tween the Hawaiian Constructors, composed of the Rohl-Connolly
Company, the Gunther & Shirley Company, and the W. E. Callahan
Company; that that contract was entered into on December 21, 1940.
It was recommended and negotiated by Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
who had been instructed by General Hannum, then Colonel Hannum,
to come to the mainland from Hawaii to negotiate the contracts for
defense projects for the Territory of Hawaii.
I then began to look into the background of Hans Wilhelm Eohl,
and I found that he came to this country in 1913 from [866]
Germany, that he was born and educated in Germany; that al-
though he had several times filed — at least once filed — application
for naturalization papers, he had never pi.irsued it; that he had
represented himself on various occasions as a citizen of the United
States, particularly in income tax returns; and I then called upon
the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization to supply me with
a complete record of Hans Wilhelm Rohl, which they did, and I
would like to submit for the record the letter from the Bureau of
Immigration and Naturalization, which is contained in the docu-
ment before me, if it is approved by the Board.
15. General Frank. How long is it?
Mr. BuKTON. It is four single-space printed pages altogether, in-
cluding the statements which were submitted by the Bureau at the
time that Hans Wilhehn Rohl's case was heard on September 15,
1941.
16. General Frank. Can you give us a digest of it here now ?
Mr. Burton. I think so, sir.
The records show that Hans "Wilhelm Rohl, who sometimes signs
the translated name of John William Rohl, did reside at 8159 Holly-
wood Boulevard, Los Angeles, California. He filed a petition for
naturalization in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of California on March 10, 1941. That was under the pro-
visions of Section 310 of the Nationality Act of 1940. I will say,
without reading, that that permitted him to file a petition upon the
ground that he was married to an American citizen, and it very
much short-cut the final granting of the petition and did not require
the usual period of five years.
[SSd] In that petition he stated that he was a contractor, that
he was born at Lubeck, Germany, on September 29, 1886, and that
he was of the German race and German nationality. He alleged that
on August 26, 1925, at San Francisco he was married, that the name
of his wife was Floy Edith, that she was born in lola, Kansas, on
October 27, 1890, and that she then resided with him.
This petition also showed that he had lived with a woman prior
to that, he claimed, as his common-law wife, by whom he had sev-
eral children; that he entered into an agreement to take care of the
children before he married his present wife.
17. General Frank. But all of these things do not affect the con-
sideration of the Pearl Harbor situation?
Mr. Burton. Well, it is very difficult, sir, to eliminate all of these.
I am going to tell in a very few words the rest of this.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 445
The petition, as you will see when you read it, referred to a
number of exits and entries into the United States of which there is
no record. It shows that he bought several yachts, and finally
owned the Vega, and then the reports goes on to show that he did
appear in Court on September 15, 1941, and that then he was
admitted to citizenship in the Federal Court.
I think it should be mentioned here that there is in the record a
letter from John J. Kingman, Brigadier General, dated Augiist 28,
1941, urging the admission.
18. General Frank. We are familiar with that.
Mr. Burton. You are familiar with that ; yes, sir.
19. General Eussell. I believe you said, Mr. Burton, it would not
trouble you to be interrupted.
[857] Mr. Burton. Not at all, sir.
(Excerpt from letter of Brigadier General John J. Kingman was
read as follows:)
20. General Russell. There is in the letter of General Kingman a
statement,
It is the understanding- of tliis office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States
is beyond question.
The committee has been concerned somewhat as to what facts or
representations were made to these people about that, and we have not
developed that as yet. We may be able to develop it on our own ac-
count, but I am asking you if you have made any investigation to
determine upon what facts that statement was made.
Mr. Burton. I have not inquired of General Kingman because
he has not been before the committee, and I have been unable to elicit
from any of the witnesses with whom we have talked any recollection
of Hans Wilhelm Rohl at all.
21. General Russell. Definitely, what we had in mind was who con-
veyed to the Chief of Engineers' office here any statements as to
Rohl's loyalty to the United States, and we wondered if your investi-
gation had explored that.
Mr. Burton. I have talked with a number of officers, among them
General Schley and I think it is Colonel Gesler, and others I don't
recall right now, in an effort to ascertain what they could tell us
about the negotiations leading up to this contract and the inquiries
conducted by the Engineers' office as to Hans Wilhelm Rohl, but so
far that has drawn a blank.
22. General Grunert. In your investigation did the name of one
Martin come up ?
Mf. Burton. In the investigation the name of John Martin, at-
torney for Hans Wilhelm Rohl, came up.
[858] 23. General Grunert. Does it show anywhere in your
investigation that he came to the Chief of Engineers' office advocating
the naturalization of Rohl ?
Mr. Burton. No, sir, not in our investigation.
24. General Grunert. And you do not know, as far as he is con-
cerned, whether he, Martin, had anything to do with this statement?
Mr. Burton. No, sir, I do not know. I know that we asked Gen-
eral Schley, who was the Chief of Engineers at that time, if he could
recall any of the details concerning the negotiations, but he could
not.
446 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
25. General Eussell. We have gone over that ground very
thoroughly, Mr. Burton, and we were hoping that maybe you had
discovered something that Ave had not. Apparently not.
26. Major Clausen. May I ask Mr. Burton to turn to that volume
if he wants to, and there is a statement in there by John M. Martin}
whether there is anything in that statement on the subject, par-
ticularly a statement about arranging for that letter from General
John J, Kingman referred to on page 5 of the committee's report.
Mr. Burton. I do not see, unless I do not read it properly.
27. Major Clausen. Let me see the statement.
28. General Eussell. While probably we shall have it after a little,
you seem to have no independent recollection of it, and I do not see
why we should disturb you.
Mr. Burton. As I remember it, Mr. Martin told me, either in
this statement of record or off the record, that General Kingman
did write such a letter, but I think that is all that he told me
about it. I then made inquiries from the Bureau of [859']
Immigration and Naturalization and obtained a copy of the letter
which is in the report.
29. General Eussell. Well, I am sorry I disturbed you.
Mr. Burton. No disturbance at all, sir.
30. General Grunert. I wanted to get that point straightened out
anyway ; I had some questions. Will you proceed ?
31. Major Clausen. It is right here, sir.
32. General Frank. We want to clear this up on Martin.
33. Major Clausen. There is a reference right at the bottom of
this page over here where he saw General Eobins and General
Kingman.
Mr. Burton. As I say, if it is in here, why, then
34. General Frank. Will you identify the paper, first?
Mr. Burton. This is the record of an interview dated February 3,
1944, at which there were present Herman J. Galloway of the firm
of King & King, lawyers, John M. Martin, H. Ealph Burton, and
Joseph G. Colgan; and on page 6 Mr. Martin, speaking, said:
(Excerpts from report of interview of February 3, 1944, of John
M. Martin were read as follows:)
I advised Mr. Rohl he shouldn't attempt to assume responsibility for a
secret project at a time when he wasn't a citizen of the United States. Mr.
Rohl asked me if I would explain to General Robins why Mr. Rohl was not
obeying that request of Colonel Wyman. I told him I would and I think
there was a lapse of probably several months. Other subsequent requests
had been made by Colonel Wyman who apparently was rowing with Paul
Grafe, in which Rohl was again requested to come to the Islands and it
drifted along until about August 1941 when I had come to Washington
[860] and handed to General Robins a photostatic order directing that
Rohl go to the Islands and I believe that Colonel Lorence and a civilian at-
torney for the Chief of Engineers named Stelphen were there. It is ray recol-
lection that General Kingman, who was then Acting Chief of Engineers, was
brought into the discussion and that Kingman thereupon wrote a letter to
Mr. Schofield
And then he says :
Was it Schofield? The letter was dated about August 28, 1941, and Mr.
Schofield was head of the Department of Immigration in which General King-
man stated that there could be no question of Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United
States ; that his services were badly needed in the islands ; and that he under-
stood he had a petition pending with the court in Los Angeles for his naturali-
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 447
zation and would they do what they could to expedite the hearing on its merits
by the Federal Court.
35. Major Clausen. There are other pertinent references in that
statement to December, 1940, that the Board might want to consider
at another time.
36. General Russell. Well, as I got that, Mr. Burton, as I heard
the reading of that, it is a memorandum which purports to set forth
the substance of a conference between these people who are named,
and states rather emphatically that General Kingman came into that
conference and as a result of his participation in the conference he
wrote a letter to Mr. Schofield. Now, is that what that says ?
37. Major Clausen, That is what it says; yes, sir.
38. General Russell. That is what I thought.
39. Major Clausen. We have arranged to follow that up, sir.
[861] General Russell. All right.
40. Major Clausen. And was that a sworn statement or a signed
statement of Mr. Martin ?
Mr. Burton. This statement of Martin's is one that was — I don't
recall whether it is signed or initialed by Martin.
41. Major Clausen. Pardon the interruption. I just wanted to
call attention to the fact, I recall having read it and it is my memo-
randum. I think you might proceed at the point that you were going.
Mr. Burton. After finding out about the background of Mr. Rohl
and the things which I have just mentioned to the Board, it seemed
to me very pertinent to ascertain as much as possible about the rela-
tionship of Rohl and Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., so I began in-
quiries in the city of Los Angeles. John H. Weiner of our staff went
to Los Angeles for that purpose, following leads which I gave him,
these having been received by the committee from varied sources.
[862] And one of the first affidavits he obtained is that of Alice
Anstey. I can read just a part of that, and then with the permission
of the Board, submit that for the record. She states that she lives in
Los Angeles, and that she had been employed as a hotel maid by the
Biltmore Hotel for 15 years, and was still employed in that capacity.
During the last four years, she has been working on the ninth floor,
where there are apartments, as well as suites. I will now quote :
I first saw Hans Wilhelm Rohl about four years ago, when he used to occupy
Apartment Z. He usually would have dinner at about 8:30 P. M. About four
years ago last February, I know Rohl gave a big dinner party in Apartment Z,
and I know the man whose picture you now show me was present. (John H.
Weiner shows picture of Theodore Wyman, Jr., to affiant, with Wyman's name
covered). I don't recall any other men at that party except Rohl and Wyman,
who became extremely drunk. The liquor was brought up there by the case.
During the course of the evening there were about 20 young girls who kept
coming in and out of the apartment all evening, and the party was still in
progress when I left to go off duty at about 10 : 30 p. m. The girls appeared to
be cheap, commercial party girls of the type that frequent the Main Street
bars and night places.
After this first party, I saw Rohl and Wyman on a great many occasions
when they had wild drinking parties of the same general type. The same cheap-
looking type of young girls paraded in and out all evening.
I will just read extracts, if that is what the Board [86r3] ap-
proves.
At these subsequent parties, there would usually be four or five girls during
the evening. While the parties were under way, I could never get into the
448 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
bedrooms because they were always locked. Mr. Rohl always called Wyman
"Ted" or "Teddy". On each and every occasion when these parties occurred,
I have seen girls sitting on Rohl's lap and Wyman's lap, and all the indications
that would naturally lead me to believe that these girls were simply being hired
to cater to the sexual whims of the two men, because different girls were used
from time to time, and as I was maid on that floor, I went in to take fresh supplies
of towels and had ample opportunity to observe what went on. * * *
That is signed "Alice Anstey," on December 18, 1943.
I now read from an affidavit of one Juanita Blackwell:
Juanita Blackwell, first being duly sworn, deposes and says :
I went to work for Hans W. Rohl approximately 16 years ago, on Rodeo
Drive in Beverly Hills, then to Shaddow Place, then to the Talmadge Apartments,
then to their present residence. I was cook and cared for the house. At 8159
Hollywood Boulevard, Theodore Wyman, Jr., was a guest. Mr. Rohl often
spoke of Wyman when we were living in the Talmadge Apartments in about
1936. It was shortly after we had moved from the Apartments that Mr. Rohl
took Dr. Lewis and his wife on a cruise abo'ard the yacht "Vega," to the
Hawaiian Islands. Major Wyman never remained overnight. He usually dis-
cussed business with [SG4] Mr. Rohl during these visits, and used to stay
for dinner. Every other day or so Major Wyman would telephone Mr. Rohl,
and I would answer the phone, and he would, of course, tell me who he wias.
Major Wyman frequently was driven to the Rohl residence by a soldier in an
a liny car.
Werner Plack used to telephone infrequently, would ask for Mr. Rohl, and
would, of course, tell me his name when I answered the telephone.
Many times after Wyman went to Honolulu, he and Mr. Rohl would talk for
quite a long time on the long-distance telephone, and I have heard Rohl swear
at him during these conversations. Rohl certainly wasn't afraid of Mr. Wyman
at all. During these long-distance conversations Wyman and Rohl would discuss
business, and I heard Rohl speak of hangars, runways, and landing-fields. Mr.
Paul Graf e also used to phone Mr. Rohl from Honolulu about business, too.
I would like to make a statement at this point about this affidavit.
This affidavit was taken in the presence of Jolm A. Weiner and W.
Bruce Pine, a resident of Los Angeles, a man of considerable means,
who became very much interested in the investigation concerning Pearl
Harbor, but who was associated principally with what is known as the
Tenney Committee, or Joint Fact-Finding Committee of the Cali-
fornia Legislature. And the affidavit was subscribed and sworn to
before R. E. Combs, who was the counsel for that State Fact-Finding
Committee on un-American Activities, and as such authorized by the
legislature of California to take acknowledgments as a notary.
At a later date, in order to get probably a little better-written affi-
davit— this is written in longhand — and for certain [86S1 other
reasons, I asked Mr. Weiner to get a second affidavit and to have it
acknowledged before another notary, who had taken other affidavits.
He did go out to take that affidavit, but because the notary was not
present, I did not use that affidavit. Mr. Weiner took it to the notary
who was accustomed to taking acknowledgments — I am speaking of
the second affidavit — and because it was practically a duplicate of this
affidavit, she took the acknowledgment, but when I heard that she was
not present I rejected that affidavit and kept the original one, even
though it was handwritten and on foolscap paper.
I say that because it is very possible that some witness may bring in
a copy of the second affidavit and attempt to confuse the Board ; but
this is the exact explanation, and this is the original affidavit, and the
one which is used in the report.
I think it might be well at this point to say to the Board that we
have original copies of telephone slips, which show the conversations
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 449
between Hans Wilhelm Rohl and Colonel Wyman, the length of the
conversation, the dates, and the other details of a telephone ticket.
With the Board's approval, I would like to submit these photostats
of those tickets for the use of the Board.
42. Major Clausen. Jtist one question : Do some of these reflect
telephone conversations between Colonel Wj'man, in Honolulu, and
Mr. Kohl, in Los Angeles, during the early part of lOil ?
Mr. Burton. They do. Originals of these photostats are in the
committee tiles, and at any time, if the Board would like to have them
exhibited, we would be very glad to do so.
I think at this point we should refer to other affidavits just briefly,
on the relationship between Rohl and Wyman. I [866] quote
now from an affidavit of Cyril J. Harrington, of Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia, who was emj^loyed by the Biltmore Hotel from September 20,
1936, to November 5, 1940, as house officer. He states that he knows
Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., and while at the Biltmore Hotel he
had occasion to meet him and Hans Wilhem Rohl, whom he also knew.
1 now quote from the affidavit :
Question. Do you know of your own knowledge if Mr. Rulil had, from time to
time, been a guest at the hotel?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Would Mr. Rohl retain a room or a suite?
Answer. It would be a suite or apartment — an apartment, if available.
Question. Did you develop quite an acquaintance with Mr. Rohl?
Answer. Yes.
Question. For that reason, you had many opportunities to visit his suite?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Did you ever see Colonel Wyman there?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What would usually be the condition of Mr. Rohl and Colonel
Wyman on your visits?
Answer. I would say that Rohl, most of the time, was apparently drinking.
Of course there was always liquor there and usually Rohl and Wyman would
be in conversation.
Question. Have you ever seen girls in Mr. Rohl's suite or apartment?
Answer. Numerous times — many times.
[867] Question. Would these' parties last late?
Answer. Yes, because I didn't go on duty until 11 : 30 p. m.
Question. Do you know Mr. SvendrupV
Answer. Yes.
Question. Will you please state the time or times that you saw Mr. Svendrup,
while he was registered at the hotel, in the company of Mr. Rohl or Colonel
Wyman?
I think I should state here that Svendrup is Lief J. Svendrup, now
Colonel Svendrup, of the Engineer Corps of the United States Army.
Colonel Svendrup was a member of the firm of Svendrup & Parcels,
Architectural Engineers, St. Louis, Mo. That firm received a great
many contracts from Colonel Wyman in connection wdth architectural
engineering in Hawaii and in the Pacific Islands. There will be more
brought out in the report, but I mention that now in order to identify
Colonel Svendrup.
Answer. Mr. Svendrup was in Mr. Rohl's apartment and he called requesting
that his suite be cleaned during his absence. Ray Moore, handyman around
the hotel, was sent to Svendrup's room to clean it and he found a purse. Ray
Moore called me and I found approximately .$3 in the purse, and I knew that
Mr. Svendrup and the girls were visiting in Mr. Rohl's apartment., I took the
purse to Rohl's apartment and turned it over to them and Svendrup was very
much perturbed, saying that I should have left the purse in his room and that
79716— 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1 30
450 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACIt
I should not touch anything in the room. At this point, Mr. Rohl ordered Mr.
Svendrup.to leave his apartment and go back to his own room and take his girl
friend. Mr. Rohl resented the fact that, Mr. Svendrup talked to me the way
he did.
[868] Question. Did Mr. Svendrup leave and take his girl friend?
Answer. I don't know that he left at tliat moment, but he did leave shortly
thereafter.
Question. Had you seen these girls around the hotel previously?
Answer. Yes, three or four times.
Question. What would you say the occupation of these girls might be?
Answer. My opinion is that they were good-time girls. I had seen them in the
rooms of Rohl and Svendrup at different times.
Question. Did you ever see (.'olonel Wyman in Svendrup's apartment?
Answer. To the best of my knowledge. I only saw him there once.
Question. Do you recall about what time it was?
Answer. About 7 a. m.
Question. Had he been there all night?
Answer. Apparently.
Quetion. What was his condition?
Answer. He had been drinking, of coui-se, I wasn't employed at the hotel at
this time, but I had been at the hotel the night before and had met Svendrup
who had told me to be at his apartment at 7 the next morning, stating that he
wanted to talk to Mr. Rohl about a position I was to get in Honolulu and the
reason I had to be there so early was because Svendrup told me he was leaving
the city early.
[869] That affidavit is signed by Cyril J. Harrington and
acknowledged before a notary on December 22, 1943.
I read now from the affidavit of Mrs. Gertrude Marcus :
I reside at 2007 W. Third Street, Los Angeles ; have been employed for the
last 17 years by the Biltmore Hotel. Los Angeles; for the last four years have
been desk clerk assigned to the ninth floor.
I have known Hans Wilhelm Rohl for several years as a patron ; he most
usually requested quarters on my floor, since one of the suites has a refrigerator.
He most always was drunk, and it was a conmion practice for him to have cheap-
looking girls visiting him ; they would stop at my desk for directions, but after a
while they got wise and came up the back elevator.
His male companion on these parties was the man whose picture Mr. Weiner
showed me. Mr. Rohl would soujetimes call him "Ted" and sometimes "Mr.
Smith." I now know his name is Colonel Wyman, but I have not seen him
recently. When Wyman and Rohl would leave together, they would be pretty
"plastered." When Mr. Rohl was here about a month ago the bellboy, Charles
Hays, said :
"You ought to see how Rohl is bleeding ; you know he was operated on for gall
bladder."
That was signed before a notary public, December 24, 1943, by Mrs.
Gertrude Marcus.
I read from an affidavit of Lt. L. M. Staub, Los Angeles, Calif.,
U. S. Naval Reserve :
I first met Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., about 1938 : I have seen him on
H. W. Rohl's yacht, the VEGA, four [870] or five times, and on each
and every occasion Wyman was so drunk tliat he was utterly obnoxious and)
incapable of transacting any business: when I was first introduced to him.
Colonel Wyman criticized my appearance and was very insulting to ine; he
would pour whisky on the floor and drop his burning cigarettes on the carpet.
Mrs. Floy Rohl—
That is Mrs. Hans Wilhelm Rohl—
once stated to me that she didn't like Wyman, but that H. W. Rohl, her husband,
had to tolerate him for business reasons.
I was acquainted with Werner Plack, having met him in about lOS.'') or 1936.
and know that he spent most of his time at Gert Von Gundhardt's home in
Beverly Hills. Plack also told me that he visited at Frank Morgan's home in
Beverly Hills.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 451
That was signed on the 24th of December, 1943, by L. M. Staub.
I think it should be stated for the record, here, that Werner Plack
was a German official, that he was connected with the German Con-
sulate in Los Angeles, and evidently moved about quite a bit in social
circles in Los Angeles. An examination of the files at the State
Department by the Committee showed that he left California with
a number of other Nazi representatives in 1940, that they went by way
of Japan, and that certain documents were taken from them by the
FBI and returned to them on their departure from Japan. There
isn't any question, from the inquiries which were made by the com-
mittee, that he was a Nazi official.
This is a statement of Emil Zucca, of San Bernardino, [871]
Calif. He was interviewed by John H. Weiner, investigator for the
committee. He states that his name is Emil Zucca, that he resides
in San Bernardino, Calif., is employed by the San Bernardino Air
Service Command as Senior Aircraft Mechanic, and that he was an
employee of the U. S. Engineer Department, South Pacific Division,
Los Angeles, and that his duties were those of chauffeur, assigned to
Major Theodore Wyman, Jr. ; that he started in February 1936 and
worked until 1942, and drove for Major Wyman for 3 years and 7
months, and that it was a government car he drove.
He states that he was acquainted, with the first Mrs. Wyman, Ella
Wyman, and the second Mrs. Wyman, Ruth Wyman, and that he
knows Hans Wilhelm Rohl; had occasion to drive Major Wyman
in the evenings and early mornings. I will now quote :
Q. Did you ever have occasions to drive Major Wyman to the Biltmore Hotel?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What would be these occasions?
A. On different occasions, I have gone to Mr. Rohl's apartment to take Major
Wyman cigarettes, and his brief case — on occasions.
Q. Who would be in the apartment on these occasions?
A. Mr. Rohl, Major Wyman, sometimes would be alone ; and on other occa-
sions, there would be Mr. Svendrup, and Paul Grafe.
Q. As a rule, would you have to wait for Major Wyman?
A. Yes.
[S72] Q. How late, if you remember, would you have to wait for him on
some occasions?
A. Oh. anywhere from 9 until 2.
Q. Where would you then take him?
A. Home.
Q. Do you remember the address?
A. 221 Woodruff, West Los Angeles.
Q. It was also customary, was it not. for you also to drive Major Wyman and
his friends around to the various night clubs?
A. I have, on occasion. Yes.
Q. Please name some of the night clubs that you have taken Major Wyman
and his guests.
A. Earl Carroll's, Cafe La Maze, Little Jane Jones' Club, the Trocadero, and
the Ambassador Hotel.
Q. Who would usually be along on these parties?
A. Mr. Rohl, Major Wyman, Mr. Svendrup, Captain George Withers, Captain
Clatterbos, Paul Graffe. There was also one man whose name I don't remember —
medium build.
O. On these trips, Mr. Zucca, you always used the government car, did you
not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Would you then have to wait until the party was over and take them
home?
A. Most of the time.
452 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Q. How late would yon have to wait to take the parties home?
A. Around midnight or one o'clock.
' Q. But there have been occasions that you just took [813] out Mr. Rohl
and Major Wyman to the same type of places?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Would you be paid extra for this work?
A. Occasionally I received a tip.
Q. I'lease state the various night clubs or country clubs where you took Mr.
and Mrs. Rohl and Major and Mrs. Wyman?
A. The Bel-Air Country Club. D ffei-ent hotels. It is impossible for me to
remember all the names.
That is the end of the quotation, there.
He also states that he took Mrs. Wyman shopping, and they used tlie
govei-nment car for that pur])ose; he gives the names of the various
banks wliere he took Major Wyman or Mrs. Wyman. I quote again :
Q. On your visit to Mr. Hold's apartment in the hotel, while Major Wymau and
these men were there, did you see evidences of liquor?
A. I have, on occasions.
Q. Have you ever driven Major Wyman down to the Los Angeles Yacht Club?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know who he was to meet there?
A. I presume, Mr. Rohl.
Q. Have you ever been on the VEGA V
A. No, but I have seen it.
Q. Have you ever taken Major Wyman from the hotel to homes other than his
own?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know whose homes you took him to?
[87^] A. I drove him to INIr. Rohl's home, and Captain Clatterbos' home, atid
Captain Withers'. Those are the only ones that I recall.
Following the development of these facts, I tho'ught it advisable to
make inquiries of those who were connected in a business way witli Mr.
Rohl, so we sought an interview with Mr. T. E. Connolly, his partner,
and that interview was lield bv ^If- Weiner, December 11, 1948. The
statement is signed by T. E. Connolly, but not acknowledged. It is
witnessed by .John H. Wyman.
In this, Mr. Connolly states : That he lives in San Francisco ; that he
first met H. W. Kohl some time \)r'un- to 19i^5, he does not remember
the exact date, or circumstances ; that he knows Colonel Theodore Wy-
man, Jr., and that he does not recall the year and date, but he first met
him when he came to Los Angeles as a Captain of the IT. S. Army
Engineers, and was in charge of construction activities in that area.
Now, I will quote :
Q. Do you remember who introduced you to him?
A. It was very possible that I introduced myself. If a formal introduction was
arranged, I don't think that was so. I would rather say that I went over there
to get some plans or offer a bid. I certainly met him in his office in an official
capacity.
Q. In other words, it is possil)le that you went over to discuss with him con-
tracts, and so forth?
A. Certainly. I have done that many times.
Q. It is a fact, it is not, that you are a stockholder in the Rohl-Connolly Co., a
Nevada corporation [87.5] doing business in California?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where is the principal p'ace of business?
A. Los Angeles. (\Tlif.
Q. Wasn't it formed in 1932 by Frank S. Cliff, F. E. Leader, and a man named
Peterson? Who are these gentlemen?
A. I don't know. Of course, it was formed in Nevada — they may be the attor-
neys, those must be the qualifying directors — absolutely unknown to me.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 453
Q. Isn't the corporation's principal place of bnsiness 511 N. Carson Street,
Carson City, Nevada?
A. It might be so recorded, but our principal place of operations has been Los
Angeles.
Q. Didn't the California Commissioner of Corporations in May of 1932 issue a
permit for the sale of 40,000 shares of the capital stock of the concern to H. W.
Kohl, Irma Dickey and yourself?
A. If so. I don't think that was acted upon. My recollection is there is only
120,000 shares out.
I will sto)) the quotation there, and merely state that there were some
questions following, that had to do with the corporation.
4o. General Frank. Did you ever look up to find out who owned
that stock?
Mr. BtiRTox. Yes, sir; it is all a matter of record, here. I mean we
have a full record of the ownership.
44. Major Clausen. Doesn't Mr. Connolly state, or Mr. Martin?
Mr. Burton. I think it is Martin in his interview that [876]
gives that.
45. Major Clausen. Martin gives all those facts.
[877] Mr. Burton. I quote again:
Question. Did Rohl ever state to you that he knew Wyman prior to meeting
you ?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Was it your general custom to confer with Rohl from time to time
on important projects in which your fii-m was engaged?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Are you acquainted with General Virgil Lee Peterson of Washing-
ton, D. C?
Answer. I met General Peterson, who was then Colonel Peterson, when he
was in charge of the Los Angeles District when we bid our first section of the
Los Angeles-Long Beach breakwater.
Question. Were you in Washington on December 18, 1940?
Answer, Yes, sir.
Question. Were you in Washington on January 17, 1941?
Answer. I was tliere on the evening of that day. I was in a plane from-
Los Angeles to Washington during the day January 17th.
Question. Were you in Washington, January 21, 1941?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. While you were in Washington on these dates, Mr. Connolly, isn't
it a fact that you were there discussing the contracts that you had in the
Hawaiian Islands?
Answer. No, sir. When I was there in December we were discussing the
Hawaiian contracts. When I was there on January 17th to appear before the
naval board on January [878] 18th regarding the building of naval bases
and Bermuda installations was mentioned, but we had gone there to try and
obtain construction of a dry dock at San Diego. We prepared questionnaires
and on January 22nd we appeared before the naval board and made our sub-
mission regarding the construction of the dry dock at San Diego and refused
our consideration of any work in Bermuda or Newfoundland.
Question. While you were in Washington, did you receive any long distance
calls from Mr. Rohl?
Answer. Whether I received them or Tiot — I talked to him. If I didn't receive
them, I made them.
Question. During your visits to Washington to either negotiate or conclude
government contracts fof your firm for installation of fortifications in the
Hawaiian Islands, Mr. Rohl called you in Washington?
Answer. I had telephonic communications with Mr. Rohl when I was in
Washington concerning these contracts. Whether he called or I called, I can-
not state, but we did have telephone conversations.
Question. Regarding the contracts?
Answer. Yes. The first knowledge I had of a potential contract in the Hawaiian
Islands was on Monday, December 16, 1940, when I was called in Denver, Colo-
454 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
rado by Mr. Rohl from San Francisco who stated that Colonel Wyman was here
from the Hawaiian Islands seeking contractors to perform certain work over
there and that he, Rohl, wished me to meet a certain plane at Cheyenne and
go on east with Colonel Wyman and endeavor to get the contracts. I asked what
type of contracts they were and Rohl answered that the Colonel would explain
that to me. I was unable to [879] get on a plane at Cheyenne so I flew
to Chicago and got on a plane with Colonel Wyman and ttew from Chicago down
to Washington. We went to the Carlton Hotel where we could get no rooms and
we were expecting Mr. Paul Grafe. He had not arrived so we occupied his room.
I met John Martin, Mr. Rohl's attorney, who told me he was in Washington in
the interests of acquiring citizenship or further citizenship applications for Mr.
H. W. Rohl. When I thought that there was a likelihood that we would acquire
the contract I further thought that I should have Mr. Rohl resign as an officer
of the Rohl-ConnoUy Co. and substitute myself and so I phoned him and it was
so done, and he was neither officer nor a director of the Rohl-ConnoUy Co, until
after he obtained his naturalization papers.
Question. In other words, Mr. Connolly, at your insistence he resigned as an
officer or a director of the company?
Answer. That's right.
Question. But he still retained his stock?
Answer. That is right.
Question. Subsequent to receiving the contract for the Hawaiian Islands, did
Mr. Rohl discuss with you the nature of the contract, etc.?
Answer. No. There was no detailed discussion of this contract at all. Per-
sonally I never saw a written description of it or a blueprint on any part of it.
Rohl and I discussed the necessary financial arrangements, advancement of
moneys because after all we were financing this. We were building certain
airfields. We knew what that meant, just simply movement of materials and
stabili- [880] zation of a base without a blueprint at all. When you are
told to run a 7500 runway we knew what it takes.
Question. But it would be most usual for him to discuss with you the nature
and type of contract that you received for the Hawaiian Islands?
Answer. Yes. I don't doubt but what we mentioned building an airport there.
I don't think that we ever got into some of these installations out there, I don't
think Rohl and I ever discussed anything of that nature. We talked of those'
warning stations because I was curious as to what they were. That's all that
I know that we ever got into any detail about.
Question. I believe that's all, Mr. Connolly.
46. General Grunert. It seems to me that everything I have heard
so far I have read before. Apparently it was all referred to in this
report. Is it not wasting your time and ours to reread these things ?
If you just tell us about what the gist is, and then refer to the evidence,
that can be made available.
Mr. Burton. Yes, sir. The reason I read some in full was that they
are not quoted in full in the report. Some things have been left out.
But I would like to submit it for the record.
47. General Grunert. If the documents are submitted for the record
AVe must study the record, anyway. I have gotten a ver}^ good idea
by just reading this report. If there is anything additional to be
pointed out that we can go into ourselves, it would probably save your
time and our time if you did not have to read such lengthy papers, if
they are available for us to go over.
48. Major Clausen. The next document is one that I think is
[S81] quoted in the report. Tlie following one is an interview with
Colonel Gesler.
49. General Grunert. That is new to me.
50. Major Clausen. I would suggest that Mr. Burton read that, if
he will.
There is a certain affidavit here, and it might be well for the Board
to hear it before we proceed with other testimony by the witness.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 455
51. General Grunert. ' How long is it going to take to finish it ?
52. Major Clausen. It will take some time, sir.
Mr. Burton. Which document do you have in mind ?
53. Major Clausen. The next is Colonel Gesler. It follows the
statement of Mr. Foley which follows Mr. Connolly's statement.
Mr. Burton. Here is the Foley statement and here is the Gesler
statement (producing documents).
54. General Grunert. Are these things to be made available for the
Board ?
Mr. Burton. Yes, sir; this entire book (indicating).
55. General Grunert. Then, of what value is Mr. Burton's evidence
except to give us a narrative form that we cannot get out of the evi-
dence shown to the Board ?
56. General Russell. I was wondering if Mr. Burton had gone out
to Hawaii and got any evidence about what developed out there as a
result of these relations. We are interested in that. I have not seen
nnything on that.
57. General Grunert. If we can get from Mr. Burton anything that
is not contained in the documentary evidence that we can read and
digest, or if he has any particular thing that he wants [882] to
call our attention to. without consuming much time, he may do so. .
Mr. Burton. I submitted a request to the War Department for per-
mission to send a member of our staff to Hawaii, and that he be fur-
nished transportation, indicating that we would like transportation
by air; and it was my intention to send a member of the staff who was
an engineer and an accountant. The answer came, first, that they re-
fused permission. Later on the request was renewed, and permission
was granted for a staff representative to go by water to Hawaii. It
was then too late, for a number of reasons, to accept that. It would
require too long a time for a man to go by such transportation. So
we never did send a representative to Hawaii. However. I called for.
copies of the contracts. There was a basic contract, the one that was
signed on December 21, 1940, and there have been 53 supplements fol-
lowing that. The first 43 supplements have to do largely with con-
struction. Those running from 44 to 50, if I remember correctly, or
51, were subsequently eliminated. Supplements 52 and 53 had to do
with contract termination and final settlement.
I examined these contracts very carefully and then concluded to
obtain the services of an engineer, and I made a request for Mr. Case
B. Rafter, of the Veterans Bureau, whom I knew to be a qualified en-
gineer and to have been an engineer officer in the First World War
After he had analyzed these contracts I then asked him if he would
specify just what, documents should be called for in order to determine
the character of performance of those contracts. I then prepared a
letter to the War Department and called for the documents that were
necessary. They were analyzed. The results are shown in the report,
[883] and I believe that the Board is well acquainted with what
the job orders and the progess charts show. I will be very glad to
state what I know about it if you care to have me do so.
58. General Grunert. I believe, General Frank, that you have all
that information and will follow it up to a conclusion.
59. General Frank. At Honolulu.
456 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. BuETOisr. I think it might be well for me to state, gentlemen,
that I made a number of inquiries relative to warning stations. The
results of them are not of record in detail, because they consisted of
conversations. I finally reached the conclusion that there was a vast
difference between what might be termed a temporary aircraft warning
station and a permanent warning station. I know the committee sup-
ports me in this, that the difference between the permanent air raid
warning station and the temporary one is that the permanent station
has more complete service so far as electrical equipment is concerned;
that it has 24-hour personnel assigned to it ; that it is usually located in
a strategic position, such as high elevation, and that, above all, it has
telephone communication, in this case, to every part of the Islands,
so that instant warning could l)e given. I think it is unnecessary to
say to you gentlemen that the higher the elevation the wider is the
range; and I think you will find in the testimony that the stations
which were to be placed in the most strategic positions were the ones
that wtre the farthest from completiion. That is the reason why it was
felt that had the contractors been required to complete the contract
for air raid warning stations and for gasoline storage tanks within the
time specified in the contract, the basic contract of December 21, 1940,
the Army would have been in better position to defend Pearl Harbor at
the time of its attack, [S84] because it would have been warned
of the approach of planes and gasoline would have been accessible.
As the reports will show, the completion date was repeatedly moved
up by the engineer. As a matter of fact, the job orders to begin con-
struction of the air raid warning stations — some of them were not issued
until nearly six months after the original contract, and that was the
time when this contract should have been completed.
There were 24 gasoline storage tanks to be completed, if I remember
correctly, and there were not any of them completed.
60. General Frank. Did your committee have any information to
the effect that aircraft operations were held up or prevented because
of the lack of installation of any underground storage tanks ? Did you
have any information of flights which were prevented from taking off
because of the lack of those tanks?
Mr. Burton. There was some testimony by Robert Hoffman to that
effect, and the transcript of record will be submitted for the use of the
Board.
61. General Grunert. Do you have him on your list ?
62. Major Clausen. He is supposed to be in Mexico. The testimony
that is referred to is on my list and is in one of the documents that I
want Mr. Burton to read.
63. General Grunert. Do you contemplate putting his testimony in
as an exhibit to the record ?
64. Major Clausen. I was goiiig to take this up in order. After Mr.
Burton concludes his statement I would like to ask him for specific
documents and then ])ut the documents in as exhibits so that we will
have them in continuity.
65. General Grunert. That will not require him to read them, will
it?
[885] 66. Major Clausen. No, sir.
67. General Russell. I was very much interested in the last state-
ment, because I think Mr. Burton's line of reasoning is following along
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 457
the same channels that the Board has been following m the last two or
three days. But I was particularly anxious to know whether or not
the committee had gathered specific evidence indicating that the delays
out there were caused by those contractors of whom he states that this
man Rohl was the dominant personality and apparently dominated the
entire situation. We had arrived, Mr. Burton, at somewhat the same
general conclusions, or were thinking along the same lines that you are.
68. General Grunert. We have not arrived at any definite con-
clusions as yet. These are just objectives to be investigated so as to
give us data on which to arrive at conclusions.
(59. General Rissell. But we were following the same train of
thought. What we were attempting to ascertain was whether or not
you had any specific evidence.
Mr. BiRTox. There are two affidavits, one by King and the other
by Wickiser, which I think are very definite evidence of delay and
inefficiency and indifference on the part of the contractors and of
the engineers in charge.
70. General Grunert. That will also be covered by you, will it?
71. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. They are on General Frank's list.
Mr. Burton. The}^ are included in this volume which I am submit-
ting to the Board.
72. General Grunert. Mr. Burton, do you wish to continue your
statement, or has your statement been concluded, and may we de-
velop it further [886] by questioning?
Mr. Burton. I think I have covered the principal points and that
anything else coidd be very easily brought out by questioning. I will
be glad to answer your questions.
73. General Grunert. Then I will give give General Russell and
General Frank a chance to ask such questions as occur to them now.
74. General Russell. I think I have no questions.
75. General Frank. The history of the job orders, in so far as
we have been able to pursue them here, has indicated that the work
on the job orders was not concluded on the estimated completion date.
Was your committee enabled to determine the cause of the delay?
Did they know whether or not priorities interfered? Did they know
whether or not shipping was available? Did they know whether
or not materials could be obtained or whether there was any delay
in obtaining them?
Mr. Burton. I made a special inquiry of the War Department as
to whether or not any complaint had ever been made on tlie part of
the Engineer Corps of the Army about the delavs, and the answer
was in the negative, that they had not. There has been no evidence
submitted by the War Department one way or the other about either
the lack of materials or the difficulty in obtaining them. I submitted
to them a direct question as to when the instruments for the air raid
warning stations had been received on the Island, and that question
they have never answered. I had in mind, too, that there might have
been some delay, but there has never been any evidence submitted to
the committee nor any evidence developed by the committee, so far
as that is concrned. I think it would be a matter of judicial notice
on the part of the committee that anything required by [887]
the Army for national defense woidd receive the highest priority,
458 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and that instruments for aircraft warning stations would be brought
by air if necessary.
76. General Frank. They are too big.
77. General Grunert. All those phases will be gone into. In-
quiries are already started and will be prosecuted to completion.
That is why your testimony is of such value to us, to give us leads
and to show us how much of the ground has been covered by the
committee.
Mr. Burton. I have, since this report was filed, obtained a com-
jDlete list of all of the equipment which was purchased by the Ha-
waiian Constructors, amounting to pretty close to $2,000,000 worth,
if I remember correctly, leased by the government and then recap-
tured ; and there was evidently no difficulty about getting all of that
heavy equipment to Hawaii. So that it would seem rather unrea
sonable that the equipment for permanent aircraft warning stations
could not be received on time.
78. General Frank. I have no further questions.
79. General Grunert. Will you. Major Clausen, continue your de-
velopment of this jnatter, and then the Board will determine whether
there are any additional questions.
80. Major Clausen. May the record show that Mr. Burton hands
me this volume from which he has read affidavits and statements
which are contained in my Exhibit A to the memorandum from Mr.
Ambero;, dated July 10.
I offer this volume as our Exhibit No, 6.
(Volume entitled "Exhibits Rohl-Wyman Contracts" was marked
Exhibit No. 6 and received in evidence.)
I will ask Mr. Burton to hand me the transcript of hearings before
the California State Legislature's Joint Fact Finding [8881
Committee on UnAmerican Activities in the Matter of Hans Wilhelm
Rohl.
May the record show that Mr. Burton has handed me the transcript
referred to, and I offer it as our Exhibit 7.
(Transcript of hearings before the California State Legislature's
Joint Fact Finding Committee on UnAmerican Activities was marked
Exhibit No. 7 and received in evidence.)
I will ask Mr. Burton to hand me the testimony of Robert Hoffman
before the House Committee on Military Affairs, given on 24 January,
1944, which includes his statement of 29 April, 1942, which has been
referred to in the testimony.
May the record show that Mr. Burton hands me two transcripts.
Volumes 49 and 50, of testimony given on January 24 and 27. 1944,
by Robert Hoffman, and a copy of a statement by Robert Hoffman,
Area Superintendent, Fifth Field Area, Bellows Field, dated 29 April,
1942, which I offer as Exhibits.
(Volume 49 of testimony of Robert Hoffman before House Commit-
tee on Military Affairs was marked Exhibit 8 and received in evi-
dence.)
(Volume 50 of testimony of Robert Hoffman before House Com-
mittee on Military Affairs was marked Exhibit 8-A and received in
evidence.)
(Copy of statement by Robert Hoffman dated April 29, 1942, was
marked Exhibit 8-B and received in evidence.)
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 459
Will you hand me the statement of the witness Olsen made in De-
cember, 1943?
Mr. Burton. I will have to have photostats made of that. You can
mark it as submitted, and I will sent it to you tomorrow.
81. Major Clausen. ]May the record show that the witness hands
.\889] me the original of this statement of Olsen, dated the 19th
of December, 1943, and I ask that it be received as Exhibit No. 9.
(Original of statement of Olsen dated December 19, 1943, was not
marked but was received in evidence as Exhibit 9.)
Will you hand me the transcript of the testimony of George H.
Moody.
Let the record show tliat the witness has handed me transcript of
interview of George H. Moody dated April 4, 1944, wliich we offer as
Exhibit 10.
(Original transcript of interview of George H. Moody, dated April
4, 1944, was not marked, but was received in evidence as Exhibit
No. 10.)
May I have the two volumes of testimony of Major General Julian
L. Schley given before the House Military Affairs Committee on
9 February, 1944, and 4 JMay, 1944.
May the record show that the witness has handed me these two
volumes which we offer in evidence.
(Two volumes of testimony of Major General Julian L. Schley,
respectively dated February 9, 1944, and May 4, 1944, were respec-
tively marked Exhibit No. 11 and Exhibit No. 11-A and received in
evidence.)
I now ask for the folder of the Hotel Biltmore records showing
the withdrawals of funds and accounts of Colonel Wyman and Hans
Wilhelm Rohl.
Mr. Burton. You can enter them and I will see that copies are
supplied to you.
82. Major Clausen. May the record show that tlie witness has
handed me a folder containing the records to which I have referred,
and I will offer it as our Exhibit 12.
[890] (Folder of Hotel Biltmore records was marked Exhibit
No. 12 and received in evidence.)
Will you hand me the statement of Colonel Wyman with regard to
having never trusted Rohl, because of having sold out his country,
and so forth ?
Mr. Burton. I have that here. I will have to make a copy of that
and give it to you.
83. Major Clausen. May the record show that the witness has
handed me this statement which is indicated as a lead, and we offer
this one page. I do not know what the rest of the document is.
84. Colonel West. Can you describe that a little more particularly ?
85. Major Clausen. Yes. It is a statement to the effect that there
has been an admission by Colonel Wyman that he made while drunk
or had been drinking with some people in the spring of 1942, to the
effect that he should never have trusted Rohl; that Rohl sold out
our country to his German friends and that what he should do is to take
his service revolver and go out and shoot Rohl and then shoot himself.
(Statement of Colonel Wyman with regard to Hans Wilhelm Rohl
was not marked, but was received in evidence as Exhibit No. 13.)
46U CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The documents that you have now handed me are photostatic copies
of telephone calls?
Mr. Burton. These (indicating) are the telephone calls between
Rohl and Wyman from Honolulu to Los Angeles.
86. Major Clausen. Do you have sets of telephone calls of Mr. Rohl
to Washington during December, 19-iO?
Mr. Burton. They will appear on the Biltmore photostats.
[891] 87. Major Clausen. I see. In other words, the folder j^ou
have already handed me. Are there any of these others
Mr. BurtCn. Now. just off the record.
(There was colloquy off the record.)
88. Major Clausen. Well. then, for the present purposes, you have
handed me an envelope with some stubs of telephone calls.
Mr. Burton. They are photostats of original telephone tickets,
record slips.
89. Major Clausen. All right, sir. We offer these as our exhibit
next in order.
(Envelope containing telephone record slips was marked Exhibit
No. 14 and received in evidence.)
Mr. Burton. I submit as an exhibit photostat copies of the ac-
counts of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr.. and Paul Grafe at the Carlton
Hotel in December of 1940. showing that a bill amounting to $16.50 of
Colonel Theodore Wyman was charged to the account of Paul Grafe
and later paid by Paul Grafe. who was the attorney in fact for the
three companies participating in the Hawaiian Constructors and who
was the representative of the Hawaiian Constructors in Hawaii later.
90. General Frank. May I ask a question there : Did you take any
steps to find out whether or not at a later date Grafe was reimbursed
by Wyman for his share of the bill ?
Mr. Burton. No. sir, I did not. but that is set forth in the Interim
Report of the Committee which was filed on June 14, 1944, and to this
date there has been no denial.
91. General Russell. Has any investigation been made of this
Colonel Wyman's income tax returns and bank accounts to determine
whether or not he flourished at any period during his [892]
late years?
Mr. Burton. A rather complete investigation of Colonel Wyman's
bank account was made by the Committee, and photostat copies of
what was found are in the Committee files, and photostat copies of
those will be submitted to the Board if desired. They do not show
any unreasonable affluence at any time, although it is very evident from
the accounts and from a general survey of what Colonel WjTuan spent
that he could not have stayed within a Major's income.
92. General Grunert. Does that show wlietlier he had any outside
income outside of his Army pay?
Mr. Burton. Quite the contrary, sir, because when he purchased a
liouse and it became necessary for him to make a payment, he cashed
a bonus certificate. Pardon me. Is that what it is at the Veterans
Administration ?
93. Major Clausen. I think so.
Mr. Burton. A bonus certificate.
94. Major Clausen. Or insurance.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 461
Mr. Burton. Ancl lie received some insurance, in order to make up
the amount necessary to pay on the house, and he also borrowed $500
from an individual in order to make up the full amount.
95. Major Clausen. Do you want to tell the Board anything about
large withdrawals of cash bv Mr. Rohl from the hotel, running as
high as $5,000 a month ?
Mr. Burton. The records of the Biltmore Hotel indicate that Rohl
was in the habit of drawing very large sums of money in cash at the
desk in the Biltmore Hotel. For instance, on November 28, 1942, he
drew $500, on the 30th of December he [_893] drew $300, Feb-
luary 28 he drew "a thousand dollars, and March 23 he withdrew $300,
7th of July, $500, and so on, running through his account over quite
a long period and beginning in 1941.
96. General Frank. Do you think those are excessive amounts for a
man to draw who is worth a million dollars?
Mr. Burton. I would say they were rather large amounts to go to
to the hotel desk and draw in cash, and evidently^ they were drawn
during the periods when these parties were being held.
97. General Frank. It certainly indicates his credit was good.
Mr. Burton. There isn't any (question about Mr. Rohl's credit. He
has had enough Government contracts, and if you would follow
through, as I have, the payments to him and the settlements that have
been made to him, you would not wonder that he had all the money he
needs.
98. General Frank. That is correct. But his financial standing is
such that perhaps his drawing a $300 clieck was like my drawing a $3
check.
Mr. Burton. Well, you understand, (xeneral, that this is not from
the bank.
99. General Frank. Yes, I understand.
Mr. Burton. That these are: he walks up to the desk on the 5th of
November and draws a thousand dollars, ancl four days later five
hundred, and a few days later two hundred and fifty, and a little while
later five hundred ?
100. General Frank. Yes, but as long as he had the money to pay
it, how is that incriminatory?
[SOJ).'] Mr. Burton. It is not, sir. There is no allegation so far
as the Committee is concerned that there is anything criminal on the
part of anyone, and the entire report is for the purpose of bringing
to the attention of the public and the War Department the relation-
ship which was cultivated by Mr. Rohl for Colonel Wyman over a
long period of time, and that as a result of that cultivation of relation-
ship, of relations, between Mr. Rohl, who was a contractor seeking
Government contracts, and Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., who was
an engineer who had the contracts, who was in a position to give the
contracts, and to show that the contracts were given to Mr. Rohl's
companies as against the whole field — that is the purpose of the
report; and that he was a German alien. General, at the time.
101. General Frank. I know. We know all this.
Mr. Burton. Yes, sir.
102. General Frank. We know all this.
Mr. Burton. But I am just answering you why we filed the report.
103. General Frank. But I am trying to tie a fact with some definite
462 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
connection with Wyman. Now, has there been followed any connec-
tion between these withdrawals of money by Rohl to Wyman ?
[89S] Mr. BuKTON. No, sir, but I would venture that if Mr. Rohl
wanted to give any money to Colonel Wyman he would not do so by
check.
104. General Frank. That is very true, but a man is not convicted
on inference ; he is convicted on fact.
Mr. BuKTON. That is true, sir, but there is no attempt on the part
of the committee to convict anybody. The committee is a fact-finding
committee and has no other jurisdiction, but when it gathers facts of
this kind which, taken together, present a quick picture which is
dubious at least, all it can do is to put those facts together with a
degree of continuity and coordination and relationship so that the
War Department can at least deduce that all is not just as it should
be and proceed with its investigation as it should do. That is all
the committee can do. It has no power to convict; it has no power
to render an opinion, or rather, to render a verdict or a judgment.
It does not attempt to do that, sir. Only presents the facts as it finds
them.
105. General Russell. Mr. Burton, I may be mistaken in following
the statement that you made some time earlier. We were discussing
the delay out in Hawaii.
Mr. Burton. The what, sir ?
106. General Russell. Some delay in the work in Hawaii which
might result from this man Rohl's association with the work out
there. As I recall, you stated that there were these general deduc-
tions that we did discuss, and then you made some statement about
having talked with a number of people, and I think it was in con-
nection with this possible delay in Hawaii.
Mr. Burton. I think you refer to my having stated that I talked
with a number of persons about the difference between [896]
a permanent air raid warning station and a temporary one.
107. General Russell. Yes.
Mr. Burton. As to its efficiency and its value so far as receiving
the warning and communicating it to the various military posts is
concerned.
108. General Russell. Well, possibly that was the follow-up on
that.
109. General Grunert. Are there any other questions? (No
response. )
Mr. Burton, the Board very much appreciates the leads you have
given it in what the committee has done with a view to paving the
way where we can do as we are required to do so. We thank you for
coming down and helping us out and being so generous with your
records.
Mr. Burton. Well, on behalf of the committee, sir, I want to say,
and in behalf of the chairman, Mr. May, I wish to say, that they
were very definite in their desire, in their expressions of desire, to
cooperate with the Board, and instructed me to submit any evidence
which was in the files of the committee that the Board might desire
to have.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 463
110. General Grunert. All right. Thank you very much. As I
have tried to make clear to you, so that the connnittee would also
have that understanding, we are limited as to our scope and limited
as to our time. I believe you understood that, Mr. Burton.
Mr. Burton. Yes, sir; I appreciate that very much.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon, at 6:25 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of
witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 465
CONTENTS
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 16, 1944
Testimony of— Page '
Maj. Gen. William Bryden, U. S. Regular Army ; Separations Board ;
Washini?ton, D. C 898
Col. Erie M. Wilson, Washington, D. C 910
Col. Earl E. Gesler, Corps of Engineers ; Division Engineer, Middle
Atlantic Division, Baltimore, Maryland 932
Col. Eugene B. Walker, Coast Artillery Corps, United States Army 965
DOCtJXIENTS
Excerpts from construction contract 958
' Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original transcript of proceedings.
79716 — 46-^Bx. 145, vol. 1 31
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 467
VS98] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 16, 1944
MuNinoxs Building,
Washington, D. C.
The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the
hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board,
presiding.
Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D.
Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.
Present also : Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C.
Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin. Jr..
Executive Officer.
General Grunert. The Board will come to order.
TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM BRYDEN, U. S. REGULAR
ARMY; SEPARATIONS BOARD; WASHINGTON, D. C.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
Colonel West. General, will you state to the Board your name, rank,
organization, and station.
General Bryden. William Bryden, Major General, U. S. Regular
Army; stationed here in Washington, on duty in the Secretary of
War's Separations Board.
2. General Grunert. General, the Board, in an attempt to get at the
facts, is looking into the War Department background and viewpoints
prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor [899'] attack. It
is hoped that, because of your assignment at that time, as Deputy Chief
of Staff, you can throw some light on the subject. In order to cover
so large a field in the limited time available, individual Board Mem-
bers have been assigned objectives or phases for special investigation,
although the entire Board will pass on all objectives and phases. Gen-
eral Russell has this particular phase, so he will lead in propounding
the questions, and the other Members of the Board will assist him in
developing it. So I turn you over to General Russell.
3. General Russell. General Bryden, what was your assignment in
November and December 1941 ?
General Bryden. Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army.
4. General Russell. How many Deputy Chiefs of Staff were on
duty at that time ?
General Bryden. I think Gen. R. C. Moore was the additional
Deputy at that time, and whether or not General Arnold had been
designated as another Deputy, I do not remember. He was designated
at some time.
468 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
5. General Eussell. Were vou Senior among these Deputy Chiefs
of Staff?
General Brtden. 1 was considered as such, although Moore ante-
dated me by a day or so, I think, in promotion.
6. General Eussell. The point at issue is : Who was Acting Chief
of Staff' in the absence of the Chief from Washington?
General Bryden. Yes, I was, when the Chief went away.
T. General Eussell. Was that true on the 27th and 28th days of
November 1941, that you would act as Chief of Staff in the event Gen-
eral Marshall was away ?
\_900^ General Brydex. Yes.
8. General Eussell. Do you recall whether or not General Mar-
shall was away on the 27th of November 1941 ?
General Brydex. No, I don't remember.
9. General Eussell. General, I believe that it has been testified by
General Marshall that he left Washington, on the afternoon of Novem-
ber 26, and was in the Carolina maneuvers on the 27th of November.
If that testimony is true, then you would have been Acting Chief of
Staff, on the 27th. On that day, a message was sent out to General
Short, of the Hawaiian Department, which message is being investi-
gated b}' the Board. It contained certain enemy information and cer-
tain directives or instructions to General Short. Are you familiar with
that message?
General Brydex. No, I don't remember the message.
10. General Eussell. In the testimony of General Gerow, before
the Eoberts Commission, he stated that it was prepared by himself and
a^Colonel Bundy, and thereafter, a conference was had on that message.
He names, as people at the conference, the Secretary of AVar, Secretary
of the Navy, and Admiral Stark. The Board was anxious to know
whether or not you were at that conference?
General Brydex. I don't remember being at any such conference
as that.
11. General Eussell. If a message, later on that clay of November
27, 1941, was sent to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian De-
partment, signed "Marshall." and if General Marshall was away from
Washington at that time, should you have seen that message, or did it
lie within the power of General Gerow \.901'\ to send it out,
without submitting it to you?
General Brydex^. I had not been concerned with any such messages
before, and he might have shown it to me, or he might not. He could
have sent it on his own authority from General Marshall, if he had
such authority.
12. General Eussell. That is the point — do you know whether or
not he had such authority ?
General Brydex. No, I don't know. General Marshall dealt, very
frequently, directlv with the War Plans Division; in fact, with all
the G's.
13. General Eussell. Would you" say, or not, that there was vested
in General Gerow, as Chief of t:he War Plans Division, authority to
send messages over the signature of General Marshall, without the
necessity of discussing such messages with General Marshall, or, in
his absence, with the Acting Chief of Staff?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 469
General Brydex. A for sending them without, if General Marshall
were present he undoubtedly would have taken them up with him,
although I am not familiar with just how General Marshall worked
with the War Plans Division in such cases. As I say, he worked di-
rectly with them. In case General Marshall were away and any ques-
tion would come up in Gerow's mind, whether or not to send it, he
probably would have seen me about it ; but if he felt that he had author-
ity to send it, he would have sent it, if General Marshall had told him.
14. General Russell. The answer, therefore, to the question which
I asked, as to whether or not Gerow, as Chief of the War Plans Divi-
sion, had authority to sign General Marshall's name to messages, is,
that you do not know ?
\9(B] General Bryden. I don't know what instructions General
Marshall may have given him.
15. General Russell. You knew of no such general instructions as
that?
General Bryden. No.
16. General Russell. General Bryden, I will show you the original
message, to see if, by reference to it, you can refresh your memory and
tell us whether or not you saw that message before it was sent.
17. General Frank. Is that the original AVar Department message
of November 27?
18. General Russell. Yes.
General Bryden. It is so dated.
I don't remember whether I saw that before, or not, whether I had
seen it before, or not. You see, I wasn't working on those subjects at
all, and if it was shown to me, at the time General Marshall was out, I
may have seen it, I may not have seen it; I can't say, now.
19. General Russell. Did you have certain limits on your activities
there, or was a certain part of the work assigned to you?
General Bryden. Well, I carried on the routine work, you might
say, of the War Department, and that concerned with mobilization in
this continental United States, with the exception of the supply end
of it, which was handled by General Moore, as Deputy; and General
Arnold handled the Air part of it. That was the way of dividing it,
when they had the three of us as Deputies.
20. General Russell. It may have been, then, that General
[903] Marshall left some specific directions with General Gerow,
under which he was acting at the time that this message was prepared
and sent?
General Bryden. He undoubtedly must have, because it was nothing
that I had a part in working up, and if it was shown to me while
General Marshall was away, it didn't make" any particular impression
upon me.
21. General Russell. Now, General, the message which you have
just read, being No. 472, dated November 27, 1941, directed the Com-
manding General of the Hawaiian Department to report measures
taken. On the same day, November 27, 1941, a message was received
from General Short, addressed to the Chief of Staff, in which he
stated that the Department had been alerted to prevent sabotage, and
liaison with the Navy had been established.
I want to show you that message from General Short. It has en-
dorsed on it the initials of Secretary of War Stimson, then it has a
470 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
stamp, "Noted: Chief of Staff," and under that, "Noted: AVar Phnis
Division, LTG" — General Gerow. Do you temember seeino; that
report as it p'assed throuo;h the office of the Chief of Staff?
General Brtden. No ; I do not remember seeintj this.
22. General Russell. AVere you familiar with the practice, if in
fact there Avas such a practice, in the office of the Chief of Staff, by
whicli his stamp was placed on papers?
General Bryden. The stamp was placed on there when a paper had
been shown to him. That's what that stamp would mean to me.
23. General Russell. It indicates that General Marshall had
1904] seen the report?
General Bryden. Yes.
24. General Russell. But you did not see this?
General Bryden. I don't remember it, now.
25. General Grunert. By whom is that stamp usually placed on
thei"^? by Marshall, himself, or by his secretary?
General Bryden. No, he wouldn't put it on, himself, but some of
the secretaries outside, or — I imagine there are several of those stamps
around there: there used to be six — put on by some clerk.
26. General Grunert. When he sees a thing in person, does he
initial it, as a rule, do you know?
Genera] Bryden. I think he usually does,
27. General Grunert. Do his initials appear on that particular
message ?
General Bryden. No; I don't see them. I don't know that — that
.stamp might not have been placed on there until after he had seen it.
I don't know when it was put on.
28. General Russell. General Bryden, the fact that I, at least, was
attempting to establish, is whether or not it was the practice for
papers to be stamped this w^ay, which the Chief of Staff had not seen.
General Bryden. Well, they were not supposed to be, because that
is supposed to mean to the Office that he has seen it. Now, whether
anybody was using that stamp loosely or not, I can't say.
29. General Frank. May I ask a question ? Was it the normal prac-
tice to sign a message "Marshall" and send it out. when [905]
he wasn't in the office, as on this occasion ?
General Bryden. Yes, I think so, as long as he was in the country,
within close touch.
30. General Frank. In other words, we Avill assume that General
Gerow i^repared this message. It was a vital wartime message, and
it was perfectly normal for this message to have been signed
"Marshall"?
General Bryden. Yes.
31. General Frank. And sent out, without his ever having seen it?
General Bryden. I think so; yes.
32. General Frank. All right.
33. General Grunert. Does the signature that appears on the mes-
sage signify anything? For instance, if a message is signed by the
name of the Adjutant General, or the name of the Chief of Staff, does
the name of the Chief of Staff signify anything in the importance of
the message, or what was the practice ?
General Bryden. Well, I think that, to my mind, a message signed
by "Marshall" would be considered of more importance than one
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 471
signed by the Adjutant General, especially in a case of instructions
to commanders.
34. General Grunert. But there were instructions given to the
Commanders, such as a Department Commander, that were signed
l)y the Adjutant General, were there not?
General Bryden, There must have been.
35. General Kussell. General Bryden, do you recall having had
to do with any other messages that went out to General Short, on or
about the 27th or 28th?
General Bryden. No ; I don't remember any.
[906] 30. General Russell. And thus it is a fair generalization
to say that those matters which were handled between the War De-
partment and the Hawaiian Department on the 27th and 28th of
November were not brought to your attention, and you did not par-
ticipate in them?
General Bryden. I don't remember participating in the making
up of those messages, and whether or not they were shown to me
before they went out, I don't remember, but normally the War Plans
Division worked directly with the Chief of Staff on such matters, and
he might not have felt it necessary to bring them to me, because I
wouldn't have known the background, or couldn't have helped him.
37. General Russell. You were more or less acquainted with the
details of the situation in the Far East, were you not?
General Bryden. No, I was not. I didn't see any secret communi-
cations they had with reference to the situation out there. I was
concerned with things in this country.
38. General Russell. I think those are all the questions I have on
that subject.
General Bryden, on the 28th of November, a message was sent by
the Adjutant General to various installations throughout continental
United States, and some overseas installations, in which Commanders
were directed to take precautions against sabotage, and in which
security was stressed. There were directions in this message that no
illegal measures should be taken, and that such measures as were
taken would be limited to security. To connect the message up a
little further, historically, it was proposed by General Arnold, for
the Air Corps, submitted to G-2, and some discussions took place be-
tween Air [907] Corps representatives and officers in the office
of G-2. The question now is, did you participate in any of the con-
ferences leading up to and which resulted in Sending the message
which I have briefly described?
General Bryden. I don't remember any such conference, but, if
there had been a disagreement between the Air Forces and G-2 in
the wording, they might have brought it to me and I might have
participated. I can't remember at this time.
39. General Russell. It might be helpful if you could read that
message, which is numbered 482, dated the 28th of November, directed
to the Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii, and
signed "Adams."
General Bryden. I do not remember whether I saw that when it
went out, before it went out, or not.
472 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
40. General Russell. You do not remember any discussions with
these Generals whose names have been given as having prepared the
message ?
General BRYtex. I don't remember ; but, as I say, it is quite possible
that if there had been a disagreement on the wording, they might
have brought it down to my office and we decided on the wording,
although I do not remember. Normally, I was not working on those
subjects, and it would not necessarily have come through me.
41. General Russell. As a matter of fact. General, if you had
not been shown the confidential data relating to our relations in the
Pacific, you would not have been in a position to pass very intelligently
on these questions?
General Bryden. No, no; it would have been just a question of
getting the wording so it was clear, or something [908] of that
kind, and getting a compromise solution between the two people
concerned, to get the message out. No, I didn't have the information
for background on those things.
42. General Russell. That is all.
43. General Grunert. There is a subject in which the Board is
interested, on which you might be able to throw some light and that
is the state of mind of the War Department regarding the possibility
or probability of an attack on Hawaii, late in November, or early in
December. In other words, do you know whether or not the War
Department thought that such an attack was highly improbable, and
whether or not that attack came as a surprise to the higher-ups in
the War Department ?
General Bryden. Those communications, which were secret, were
kept pretty tight. I never saw them, and the matter would not have
been discussed in my office. "Personally, the attack on Hawaii was a
surprise to me. I had no information upon which to go, to presume
that there was going to be one.
44. General Grunert. Are there any other questions ?
45. General Frank. Do you feel that that was the general state of
mind of the people with whom you were associated in the War Depart-
ment?
General Bryden. I think that with the people in my echelon, lower
down, who were not engaged in that particular work, that was prob-
ably the idea ; but as to the people that were concerned with working
on that subject and had access to whatever secret files there were,
I don't know what their state of mind was,
46. General Frank. In other words, they did not expect a Japanese
attack at that time on the Island of Oahu ?
General Bryden. I cannot sav what other people might have
[909] thought.
47. General Frank. But that was your feeling about it?
General Bryden. Personally, it was a surprise to me when it was
l^ulled off; but those secret communications were kept very tight.
48. General Grunert. There appearing to be no other questions,
thank you for coming up and assisting us.
General Bryden, I am afraid I am not much help.
49. General Grunert. Our next witness is scheduled for 11 o'clock.
(Brief recess.)
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 473
[910] TESTIMONY OF COLONEL ERLE M. WILSON,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Colonel, would you please state to the Board your
name, rank, organization, and station?
Colonel Wilson. Erie M. Wilson, Infantry, Retired, on active duty,
Washington, D.C .
2. General Grunert. Colonel, the Board is after facts, that is, prior
and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is hoped, because of
your assignment in Hawaii at that time, that you can throw some light
on the subject.
What was your assignment during 1941 up to and possibly includ-
ing December 7, 1941 ?
Colonel Wilson. I had two assignments. First, I was Chief of
Staff of the Hawaiian Division, which was inactivated October 1st.
3. General Frank. The year ?
Colonel AViLsoN. 1941. After that I became Commanding OiRcer
at Schofield Barracks, from October 1, 1941, until February 17, '42.
1 had had a prior tour of duty in Hawaii from July '36 to July '38.
1 arrived in Hawaii September '40.
4. General Grunert. Then, you were Post Commander of Schofield
Barracks. What was Schofield Barracks used for? What did the
garrison consist of ?
Colonel Wilson. That is a matter of record, of course, but from
memory I can only tell you generally.
5. General Grunert. Generally speaking, what was at Schofield
Barracks?
Colonel Wilson. It was the home station of the new 24th [911]
and 25th Divisions and certain other troops which just prior to Decem-
ber 7 and after December 7 were arriving there in considerable
numbers.
6. General Grunert. Where was it located with respect to Hono-
lulu?
Colonel Wilson. About 18 or 20 miles to Honolulu, up towards the
north shore, in the generally central part of the Island and on the
plateau between the north and south shores.
7. General Grunert. Then, the garrison there had a number of
tactical units who had separate commanders, over whom you had no
control, or the troops you had no control over ; is that right ?
Colonel Wilson. Yes.
8. General Grunert. Who were they, the higher commanders ?
Colonel Wilson. The 24th Division ws commanded by General
Durwood Wilson, the 25th Division by General Maxwell Murray.
9. General Grunert. Then you had the post activities not connected
with tactical command; is that correct?
Colonel Wilson. The only tactical functions that I had were the
interior guard of the post and post facilities; close-in guard, thev
call it.
10. General Grunert. Then, you had command of the defense
Colonel Wilson. Of Schofield Barracks proper.
474 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
11. General Grunert. Of Schofield Barracks proper; that is right.
Now, in that defense what plan of defense was there? Did you
have an S. O. P. showing what should be done in an emergency or
an attack?
[912] Colonel Wilson. Oh, yes. That was really routine. They
went into that, oh, in various maneuvers while we were over there.
12. General Grunert. What was your condition as to preparedness
to meet any attack, in the defense of that post ? Just what were some
of the provisions for such defense ?
Colonel Wilson. Well, a battalion of one of the divisions, I forget
which now, but the battalions alternated from time to time, were
assigned to that duty.
13. General Grunert. What preparations were there made in the
line of air raid shelters or slit trenches or special measures regarding
fire fighting? Were there any special measures or what were the
instructions regarding those things that are necessary for a defense
in case of an air raid ?
Colonel Wilson. For fire fighting we had the ordinary fire equip-
ment there at Schofield Barracks which was considerable, consisted of
a number of vehicles and engines. I forget; I couldn't name that
equipment, but it was considerable : the average equipment of a post
that size. And then the force they employed there : it was a fire chief
and, oh, half a dozen employees, civilian employees; and then in
addition to that that was augmented by the assignment of a number
of the internees. We operated an internment or a selective service
training. Trainees I should have said. And the fire department
was augmented by the detail from time to time of, oh, 50 or 60 of
those boys.
14. General Grunert. What preparations were there in the line of
defense against an air attack?
Colonel Wilson. Machine gun emplacements on the roofs of
[9131 various barracks throughout the post. There were some em-
placements located at the best positions.
15. General Grunert. Were there any air raid shelters, as such?
Colonel Wilson. Yes.
16. General Grunert. What were they ? Any special construction ?
Colonel Wilson. Special trench, trench construction. It was
varied.
17. General Grunert. Is that in the line of slit trenches, or what?
Colonel Wilson. In some cases, yes ; I remember one place distinctly
where there was a slit trench dug and machine guns mounted, sand-
bagged.
18. General Grunert. What were the instructions about the non-
combatant population of Schofield? What were they to do in case
of an air raid ? What were the instructions in that respect ?
Colonel Wilson. Well, only the general instructions that were pro-
vided for their evacuation to Honolulu.
19. General Grunert. And there were provisions to evacuate the
noncombatant personnel from Schofield to Honolulu?
Colonel Wilson. Schofield Barracks to Honolulu.
20. General Frank. This was on the assumption, however, that you
would have some notice of an impending crisis?
Colonel Wilson. That is right.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 475
21. General Frank. And upon such notice, that you would accom-
plish this ?
Colonel Wilson. That is right.
[914] 22. General Grunert. Did you anticipate the possibility
of an air raid ?
Colonel Wilson. I don't think it was ; I did not personally. I think
that I am no exception in rather feeling that we would have an hour
or more's notice of an impending attack.
23. General Grunert. Where were you to get that notice?
Colonel Wilson. From the department headquarters.
24. General Grunert, The department. Were you actually raided
atSchofield?
Colonel Wilson. Actually raided? Yes, indeed.
25. General Grunert. And were there some casualties there?
Colonel Wilson. No casualties. I don't know why. I have often
marveled at it.
26. General Grunert. In the defensive measures had there been
practice and drills in taking defense positions against aircraft?
Colonel Wilson. Oh, yes. Machine guns were firing on the planes
within, I would say, a very few minutes.
27. General Grunert. What measures did you take after December
7th that had not been taken prior to December 7th?
Colonel Wilson. On December the 7th we began to dig slit trenches,
and slit trenches were dug.
■ 28. General Grunert. Then, there were no slit trenches before that?
Colonel Wilson. No slit trenches dug before December 7.
29. General Grunert, Before that: Were there air raid shelters
before that ?
Colonel Wilson. Only at machine gun positions; that is all;
[OlS] the ones that I mentioned,
30. General Grunert, Then, why did they take these measures
afterward and not before December 7th ? Who ordered such measures
taken ?
Colonel Wilson. I do not remember that.
31. General Grunert. You do not know who ordered the measures ?
Colonel Wilson, I do not remember whether it was taken on my
initiative or whether we received orders from headquarters. I cannot
remember that. I know it was done.
32. General Grunert. Are you familiar with the provisions of
Field Manual 10-5 which charged each such camp, post, and station
with its own security ?
Colonel Wilson. Yes, I think I am.
33. General Grunert. Then, there were measures taken after De-
cember 7, '41, which were considered necessary for defense, which were
not taken prior thereto ?
Colonel Wilson. Yes,
34. General Grunert. Did that indicate that there appeared to be
more danger after December 7th than there was before or on Decem-
ber 7th?
Colonel Wilson. Well, their need was a great deal more apparent
after December 7th than it was prior to December 7th.
35. General Grunert. Then, it seems to indicate that the powers
that be, whoever ordered the measures taken after December 7th, were
476 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
more conscious of the necessity of such measures than they were before.
Colonel WiLSOx. I presume that is a fact.
36. General Gruxert. Do you know whether or not some of these
[916] instructions for measures to be taken after December 7 came
from the department^
Colonel Wilson. I could not answer that. I think, however, it
would be a matter of record.
37. General Gruxert. Has the Board any questions ?
38. General Eussell. Colonel, I understood an answer a moment
ago to one of General Grunert's questions by you was to the effect that
the machine guns fired in a few minutes after the planes appeared.
Colonel WiLSOx. Yes, sir.
39. General Russell. You are discussing now the machine guns
which were
Colonel "WiLSOx. Right around Schofield Barracks.
40. General Russell. Just in the perimeter ?
Colonel AViLSOx. Yes.
41. General Russell. Within the realm and scope of your fire?
Colonel WiLSOx. Yes.
42. General Russell. Those machine guns were under your control
and manned by post complement personnel ?
Colonel WiLSOx. Well, yes, they were. They were manned by cer-
tain guard, the interior guard.
43. General Russell. It was a function of the interior guard, then,
to man these antiaircraft machine guns ?
Colonel WiLSOx. In the immediate vicinity.
44. General Russell. In the immediate vicinity, yes. Was any dam-
age done to the Japanese aircraft by your machine guns ?
Colonel WiLsox. Yes, there was some. One aircraft was hit and
grounded and burned near the deep well that is over in [917]
the outskirts of Wahiawa.
45. General Russell. AVas considerable damage done to the post?
Colonel WiLsox. To the post?
46. General Russell. By this attack, Jap plane attack.
Colonel WiLsox. Schofield Barracks proper, no, I would say not.
There were several motor vehicles hit. Every high ranking officer's
house was either bombed or machine-gunned. My own, for instance,
I live — I don't know whether you are familiar with Schofield Bar-
racks or not, but those of you who are, there were three houses in the
generals' loop. I lived in one. the aide lived on the other flank, and the
old Division Commander lived in the center one. Apparently his set
of quarters was aimed at but was not hit. There was a bomb landed
in front of my set of quarters, which was right next door, about 75
feet from the house, I guess. Fragments of the bomb went into the
house, and a number of machine-gun bullets were found later in the
roof of my set of quarters. They, a few days after, had a rain, and
they sent a man up on the roof to repair the roof, and he came down
with a pocketful of machine-gun bullets, fragments. The aide's house
on the other side was hit. Trees in the yard were hit by shell fragments
and machine-gun bullets. The foliage of the planting around my
house was clipped off in some places like you had taken a pair of
shears. We didn't notice it for several days after, until the branches
began to wilt.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 477
47. General Russell. What conclusions if any were drawn by the
military personnel at the barracks as to the information which the
invading force had of installation on the barracks, at Schofield Bar-
racks ?
\9J8] Colonel Wilsox. I don't know; that is the only indica-
tion that I have, I believe that thej^ knew quite well where the high
lanking officers lived.
[919] 48. General Russell. General Grunert asked you a ques-
tion about measures taken after December 7.
Colonel Wilson. About the onlj^ measures that were taken after
December 7 that were not taken before December 7 were the digging
of slit trenches.
49. General Russell. After the attack everybody was a little more
conscious of the possibility of an attack?
Colonel Wilson. There is no question about that.
50. General Frank. At the time of this attack what was the status
of defense with respect to the existence of an alert? Were you on
some sort of an alert ?
Colonel Wilson. We were on what was called an alert against sab-
otage. I think it was Alert No. 1; but that is a matter of record.
That identifies the alert we were on.
51. General Frank. To what extent were you familiar with the
acuteness or tenseness of the international situation between the
United States and Japan ?
Colonel Wilson. Well, not to any particular extent. The division
commanders had been warned, I know.
52. General Frank. Had been Avarned about what?
Colonel Wilson. About the tenseness of the international situation.
I know they had been called to headquarters and had been warned
about the tenseness of the situation.
53. General Frank. Had you been advised that war was probable?
Colonel Wilson. I knew generally that it was ; yes.
54. General Frank. You felt that war with Japan was imminent?
Colonel Wilson. I think we were notified. It is very difficult for
me to separate just what was in mind on [930] December 7th
from what thoughts I had on the subject since December 7th. Any
evidence I am giving you now I give with that thought in mind.
We had general information that things were not going any too well
in Washington, and I think there was some caution about not taking
any action that might bring on international complications. There
was that feeling.
55. General Frank. Did you feel that an acute situation existed?
Colonel Wilson. Yes, I did. I felt that we were getting into fairly
deep water; but I did not feel that the situation was nearly as acute
as it was. I do not know whether that is much help or not.
56. General Frank. Since you had been ordered into an alert
against sabotage you must have felt that there was some tenseness
about the situation?
Colonel Wilson! Oh, yes; that is right. There was a tenseness.
Everybody had a tenseness.
57. General P'rank. If acts of sabotage were about to take place,
an act of sabotage would be an act of war, would it not?
Colonel Wilson. Yes.
478 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
58. General Fraxk. Then, if there were about to be an act of war
take place, it was about to be manifested by an attack some place. Did
Tou not feel that way ?
Colonel Wilson. The attack came as a distinct surprise to me—
if that is what you are trying to get.
59. General Fraxk. If that attack came as a distinct surprise did
you not feel that war with Japan was in the oifing?
Colonel WiLsox. ]SIy first sensation on December 7, which may
have sometliing to do with my answer to your question, was that
General Short had sprung a surprise maneuver on us, because we
were used to being alerted over there ; an alert was a routine matter
over there.
60. General Fraxk. If General Short had sprung
61. General Russell. I think you ought to let the Colonel follow
out that line of thought. I think the witness is entitled to finish his
answer, in fairness to the witness.
Colonel WiLsox. I am in the hands of the Board.
62. General Fraxk, Would you mind letting me handle the an-
swers to my questions, please ?
63. General Russell. I think the witness ought to be protected.
64. General Gruxert. Complete your answer to the last question.
Read the last question and answer, Mr. Reporter.
(The question and answer referred to were read by the reporter, as
above recorded.)
65. General Gruxert. Did you complete your answer?
Colonel WiLSox. I was going to add to that, that just previous to
that I had knowledge that some arrangements were being made to
acquire some pineapple land between Wlieeler Field and Waianae
Range for maneuver purposes. I had no knowledge that the ar-
rangements had been consummated. When the first bomb dropped it
was about eight o'clock. I jumped out of my bed. I had been in bed
two days with a cold and was just feeling sorry for myself and was
going to hole in and have [92B] Sunday in bed. But I jumped
out of my bed and looked out the front window where I could see
toward the Waianae Mountains, and I saw a stick of bombs falling
from a plane. My first impression was, "My God ! They are getting
too close to Wheeler Field." That was when I thought, Well, the
land deal has gone through and a surprise maneuver or an alert has
been ordered. They are getting too close to Wheeler Field. Then,
when the bombs landed and the smoke rose I could see they were on
Wheeler Field ; and then I turned to my wife and said, "This is the
real thing."
I believe that every military -minded person or generally informed
person felt that war was imminent.
66. General Fraxk. Will you go back to my former question, Mr.
Reporter, and read it.
(The reporter read as follows :)
If that attack came as a distinct surprise did you not feel that war with
Japan was in the offing?
Colonel Wilson. I feel that everj^ person who was military-minded
or who was generally informed felt that war was impending.
67. General Fraxk. Did you or did you not know that there had
been some warning messages received from the War Department ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 479
Colonel WiLSOX. I knew through hearsay that one warning message
had been received.
68. General Frank. As a student of military history were you
familiar with the manner in which Japan had traditionally started
wars, namely, by attacking and having the attack constitute a declara-
tion of war?
Colonel Wilson. Yes. That is the way they began the war with
Russia.
[92^] 69. General Frank, If war with Japan were imminent,
where did you think the initial attack was going to be made ?
Colonel Wilson. This is only my opinion, but I thought probably
they would hit the Philippines.
70. General Frank. This is opinion, of course, and I realize that,
but in preparing for any emergency the commander in any theater
in any area is responsible for the steps taken for defense. In deter-
mining the steps to be taken he assembles all the information that is
available and, in one way or another, establishes an estimate of the
situation. That is traditional in military procedure, is it not?
Colonel Wilson, That is right.
71. General Frank. Then, having determined the situation, he
makes his decision. In making that decision it is normal for him to
determine the steps that the enemy can take against him. Is that
correct?
Colonel Wilson. That is the first thing you would consider in an
estimate of the situation.
72. General Frank. The steps that the enemy can take against him ?'
Colonel Wilson. Yes, sir.
73. General Frank. And in making preparations to meet the steps
that the enemy can take against him, our military teachings and prac-
tice generally lead us to take w^hat steps — steps to meet what situation
with respect to the enemy ?
Colonel Wilson. To counter the most dangerous steps that the
enemy may take.
74. General Frank. That is exactly what I am after.
Colonel Wilson. Let me add to tliat. That is what was [924]
done, to my knowledge, from 1936 to 1938, and from 1940 to 1941,
while I was- over, there, and just what j^ou have said resulted in
the various defense plans that were made for the defense of Oahu
upon which all of the maneuvers over there during those periods, to
my knowledge, were based. That is exactly what was the basis of
those defense plans.
75. General Frank, In this situation what was the most dangerous
thing that the enemy could do to the force in Oahu? Was it this
r-ttack or something similar to it?
Colonel Wilson. Yes; but the nature of the attack I do not think
was as well defined prior to the attack as it was on December 7th
or 8th,
76. General Frank. The point I am trying to make is this : Normal
military preparations call for determining the most dangerous thing
that the enemy can pull and then taking steps to meet it; is not that a
fact ?
Colonel Wilson. That is correct.
480 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
77. General Frank. Was that done in this case?
Colonel Wilson. Yes; I think it was. I think the precautions that
■were determined by the best minds in Oahu, to my knowledge, from
1936 to 1940, were taken.
78. General Frank. If steps had been taken to have met this kind
of a raid that happened, would not an alert where fighter planes would
have been immediately available to take off provided better protection ?
Colonel Wilson. I have always wondered why there were not planes
in the air. I thought it was common procedure always to have planes
in the air, and especially the dawn patrol. I do [926] not know
whether there were or not, of my own knowledge.
79. General Frank. Do you know what Alert 3 would have pro-
vided?
Colonel Wilson. Only very generally. The men would have physi-
cally been in their battle positions and physically been on their arms
and had their ammunition with them, and a certain quota of am-
nmnition in position.
80. General Frank. And the planes would have been dispersed and
ready to take off?
Colonel Wilson. That is right ; and I think there would have been
planes in the air.
81. General Frank. That would have been a more effective defense,
would it not ?
Colonel Wilson. In my opinion, yes.
82. General Frank. That woulcl have been a measure to meet the
worst thing that the Japs could have done ?
Colonel Wilson. If in the judgment of the Commander that was
liis estimate of the situation, it would have been.
83. General Frank. But an alert purely against sabotage and not
against such an attack did not provide against the most dangerous
action of the enemy, did it ?
Colonel Wilson. As it proved ; looking at it with hindsight, I would
say it did not.
84. General Frank. That is all.
85. General Russell. I think there is something in the record that
should be straightened out. General Frank asked you if an act of
sabotage was not an act of war, and you replied yes.
Colonel Wilson. I would like to change that reply. No.
[926] 86. General Russell. I wanted to give you an oppor-
tunity to do that.
Colonel Wilson. Yes ; I would like to change that reply to "No," be-
cause we were constantly on the qui vive for sabotage, regularly so, and
we could not tell whether it was an effort to sabotage or whether it was
just some crank. I know that sometime before December 7 there were
some cases. The Catholic Chapel was desecrated, and we did not know
whether that was sabotage or not. I do know that there were some
rumors from Wheeler Field that w'e took seriously enough to put our
G-'2s on, where it was thought that there was an effort made to tamper
with the gasoline in some places. I do not know whether that ever
materialized or not, but I know we took all the steps that were available
to use in G-2 to try to deal with it, such as setting traps for them and
that sort of thing.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 481
87. General Russell. Acts of sabotage on the part of individuals
connected directly with the Japanese Government would be an act of
war?
Colonel Wilson. That is correct.
88. General Fkank. Do you think that an act of sabotage that could
be connected with the Japanese Government would be an indication of
impending war?
Colonel Wilson. I think the question is hypothetical. I think that
you have got to have it definitely determined whether or not the
Japanese Nation is connected with it. That is just what we were try-
ing to determine over there for some time. We had our facilities right
on the heels of some very suspicious things that were happening over
there on the [927] defense positions and all sorts of places.
My G-2 talked with me over several occurrences that were quite sus-
picious. We came near capturing a civilian. We did not get close
enough to get him, but we came very near getting him.
89. General Frank. Wliat had he done?
Colonel Wilson. Just acting suspicious around gun positions up on
the north shore, enough to excite suspicion. I think there is no ques-
tion but what there were spies over there, and that is generally
admitted. We thought we were right behind one, and I believe we
were. What we would have done with him if we had gotten him I do
not know.
90. General Grunert. Were you surprised when you went on Alert
No. 1 that it was not No, 2 or No, 3 ?
Colonel Wilson, No, sir,
91. General Grunert. In view of the information you had as to the
tenseness of the situation, from at least one warning message that you
referred to, were you not surprised that they did not take an alert of
greater protection than No, 1 ?
Colonel Wilson. No, I was not surprised at all, because I felt that
the powers that be were being informed of the situation to a much
greater degree than I was. Certainly I had no direct line of informa-
tion. I had to look to the department heads for my information.
92. General Grunert. One more question. How frequently did the
department staff come to Schofield to look into the defense measures
taken for local protection, if at all ?
Colonel AViLSON. The department staff were frequent visitors at
Schofield.
[92S] 93. General Grunert, Did they examine into your plans ?
Colonel Wilson. Oh, yes.
94. General Grunert. Did they test out those plans as to whether
or not they were workable ?
Colonel Wilson. Yes, they did. General Short arrived over there
about in the spring, I think it was, of 1941, It is hard to tell. There
are no seasons over there, and there is nothing to tie to; but it was
early in 1941. As soon as he got over there he was very active. He
made an intensive active study of the defenses of the Island, to orient
himself, I am quite certain. Prior to General Short's designation
there had been a continuity of command in the department command-
ing generals. For instance, I went through a period with General
Drum, who was relieved by General Moses, and General Moses having
had a tour in command of the division there, he was relieved by Gen-
79716 — 46— Ex. 145, voL 1 32
482 COXGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
eral Herron who, in turn, had commanded the division just previously.
So there was a continuity of thought and a chain of command. Gen-
eral Wilson, who, following that scheme out, would have been in com-
mand of the department, was over age and was retired. So General
Short was sent over. So, after this intense period of orientation — I
judge that is what it was — he made frequent visits all around. His
staff did the same thing. Then there was a period through which the
defense plan was translated into standard procedure, and that con-
sumed some time.
95. General Gruxert. You were there, then, during the time that
they had just one type of alert, and did not have three i
Colonel WiLSOx. Yes, sir.
[929] 96. General Grunert. And then later, after General
Short came, they had three types of alert, Nos. 1, 2, and 3?
Colonel Wilson. Yes, sir.
97. General Gruxert. Wliich do you think answered the purposes
of defense the better : the 1 type or the 3 type ?
Colonel Wilson. That is a question purely of opinion. I think
they both were adequate.
98. General Grun^ert. If you had been alerted at all under the
Xo. 1 type of alert would you have gone into all-out alert?
Colonel WiLSox. Yes, sir.
99. General Gruxert. And under the Xo. 3 it was a question of
decision as to who ordered it?
Colonel Wilson. Yes, sir.
100. General Gruxert. Do you have anything else that you desire
to offer to the Board which may be of help to it? If so, you may
proceed.
Colonel Wilson. Shortly following General Short's arrival over
there was the regular time for the annual maneuvers. Those maneu-
vers were held, but they differed from the ordinary maneuver in
this respect. The period that was assigned to the regiments and
brigades to take regimental and brigade maneuvers was assigned
to the actual construction of defenses. They did not have the maneu-
vers. They dug where they thought the various defenses should be
located. The locations of these defenses were verified. They were
all prescribed by the plan of defense, and they were verified by
intensive reconnaissances on the part of the department staff, division
staffs, and the commanders determined their locations. The first
period of the maneuver was devoted to digging. The [930]
only maneuver period that was used in the ordinary sense was taken
advantage of to test out, actually test out, those various positions.
The digging could not be completed in the time specified, but at the
conclusion of the maneuver General Short orderecl that this digging
was to be continued until completed, regardless of other duties.
That was given first priority.
In the construction over there I noted a vast improvement, in my
estimation, in the defenses of the Island. Wlien I got back there in
1940 changes had been made in the plan, which change, I thought,
in my own estimation, was an important change.
When General Short came and went through this period of dig-
ging, the Army reserve supply of sand bags, wire, and that sort
of thing — certain parts — ^began to get pretty scarce. General Short
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 483
was able to do a great deal; J think he was in position to do more
than any other department commander, because of the fact that
things were getting easier to get. He turned out this war reserve
and augmented it by the purchase of sugar sacks, and even went
to the extreme of using refuse, crushed cane stalks, and that sort of
thing, to see whether they would do for revetment, and absolutely
denuded all of the dumps over there from Pearl Harbor, Schofield
Barracks, and all of the Army posts, in search of revetment mate-
rial. Things were not as easy to get as they are now. They were
not allowed to dig every place, because many of the smaller works
are in people's front yard and occupy ground used for sugar land
and pineapple land and that sort of thing, and there was a great
\931] deal of opposition to that on the part of the Big Five and
the owners of the properties. But arrangements were immediately
instituted to get that land, and they were more or less successful in
Bome of that.
From then until the time I left over there on February 17 they
were still perfecting many of these defense works, and I am sure
that General Emmons continued that when he came on, on December
15, or whenever it was.
101. General Grunert. All right. Colonel. Thank you very nmch
for coming over and helping us out.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon, at 12 : 05 p. m. a recess was taken until 2 o'clock of
the same day.)
[932] AFTERNOON SESSION
(The Board, at 2: 25 o'clock, p. m., continued the hearing of wit-
nesses.) ^ •
General Grunert. The witness has arrived. The Board will come
to order.
TESTIMONY OF COLONEL EARL E. GESLER, CORPS OF ENGINEERS;
DIVISION ENGINEER, MIDDLE ATLANTIC DIVISION; BALTIMORE,
MD.
(The witness was sw^orn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. (ieneral Grunert. Colonel, the Board, in attempting to get at
the facts, is looking into the War Department background and view-
point prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. We hope
that you can throw some light on the situation because of your assign-
ment in Washington in 1940 and possibly in 1941. General Frank
will lead for the Board in propounding the questions, and the Board
will supplement his inquiry. General Frank.
2. General Frank. Colonel Gesler, on what duty were you, on or
about 20th of December, 1940?
Colonel Gesler. I was Chief of the Finance Section, Office of the
Chief of Engineers.
8. General Frank. What were your duties at that time?
Colonel Ge8ler. As Chief of the Finance Section, I reported to
General Robins, and had charge of activities in finance accounting,
auditing, cost accounting, civilian personnel, and contracts and claims.
484 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
4. General Fraxk. Do you remembeK a ontract identified as W-414^
eng-602, which was drawn with the Hawaiian Constructors, which
was the base contract for certain defense contracts for [dSS]
the Hawaiian Islands, at that time ?
Colonel Gesler. I remember there was such a contract. I would
have to refresh my memory, though, to talk in detail about it.
5. General Frank. That contract was consummated in "Washington
on December 20. 1940. Did you participate in the final drawing up
of that contract ?
Colonel Gesler. Xo. sir; not in the preparation of the contract,
itself.
6. General Fraxk. Well, did you have anything to do with it?
Colonel Gesler. My duties required the review of the contract
after it had been prepared and before submitting to the Chief of
Engineers for approval.
7. General Frank. Do you remember having conferences with any
of the contractor personnel that were interested in the contract?
Colonel Gesler. Xo, sir.
8. General Frank. Do you remember meeting a Mr. Paul Grafe?
Colonel Gesler. I do not remember meeting him. It is possible
I met him, but I never conducted any business with him.
9. General Frank. Do you remember ever meeting Mr. Martin,
who was an attorney for one Hans Wilhelm Rohl ?
Colonel Gesler. I don't remember.
10. General Frank. Did you ever meet Mr. Rohl?
Colonel Gesler. Xo, sir.
11. General Frank. Did you ever meet Mr. Connolly, of the Rohl-
Connolly Company?
Colonel Gesler. Xo, sir. The same remark applies to those. I
might have met them, but I have never conducted any business
[93i] with them.
12. General Frank. And there is nothing about those names that
brings back anv memory of having done business with them, at that
time?
Colonel Gesler. Xot from business. I know tlieir names, because
of their association with the contract.
13. General Frank. Exactly what did you do with respect to the
contract?
Colonel Gesler. I examined what my assistants had done, to see
that the proper people had seen it, and checked it over generally to see
that it conformed to policy and principle.
14. General Frank. Do you remember of a letter having been writ-
ten in your section about expediting the citizenship papers of one
Mr. Rolil ?
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.
15. General Frank. Here is a photostat copy of that letter that was
written. It has already been introduced as evidence. "Will you look
at that and tell me if that is the letter to which you refer ?
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.
16. General Frank. Are those your initials at the bottom, there ?
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.
17. General Frank. I suggest you read it, to yourself, there, in order
to refresh your memory.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 485
You have a memory of that letter, now, do you?
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir ; I remember it.
18. General Frank. You will notice, down in next to the last para-
graph, it states :
[935] It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the
United States is beyond question.
On what was that based ?
Colonel Gesler. I can only give you general impressions on that,
now, sir. That letter was prepared by a lawyer on my staff.
19. General Frank. Wliat is his name ?
Colonel Gesler. Mr. Stilphen.
20. General Frank. Where is he, now ?
Colonel Gesler. The last I heard, he was retired from tlie Navy as
a commander — Benjamin L. Stilphen. I think I discussed it with
him. 1 know I discussed it with someone, at the time, and I believe
Mr. Stilphen discussed it also probably with that gentleman to whom
it is addressed, in the Department of Justice. We were not taking
the attitude that we were certifying to his "loyalty," I believe it is,
but rather that that information was in the Department of Justice.
They had been investigating him in connection with his final clearance
or final papers, and that therefore what we requested . was that he
would have those papers expedited.
21. General Frank. Colonel, this sentence reads :
It is the understanding of tJvis office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States
is beyond question.
"This office," in this instance, is the Office of the Chief of Engineers,
and this letter was signed by General Kingman, as Acting Chief of
Engineers; and General Kingman, before this Board the other day,
referred to you as the officer under whose immediate jurisdiction the
letter had been prepared.
Colonel Gesler. That's right. It was prepared by Mr. [936]
Stilphen, on my staff.
22. General Frank. Whose immediate responsibility was it that the
statements in this letter were according to fact?
Colonel Gesler. I initiated it. I believe it is according to fact,
there; yes, sir.
23. General Frank. It was your responsibility, then?
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.
24. General Frank. Wliat background did you have for making this
statement about Rohl's loyalty ?
Colonel Gesler. I am not saying anything about his loyalty. I re-
peat, the information we got I believe was based on a telephone con-
versation between Mr. Stilphen and the Department of Justice, and the
purpose of this letter was to ask them to hurry up on the handling of the
case, with the information they had, and it was our understanding as
the result of that conversation that there wasn't any question about
his loyalty at the time.
25. General Frank. Now, wait a minute. This letter is not written
to the Department of Justice. It is written to the Bureau of Immigra-
tion and Naturalization, asking them to expedite the issuance of Mr.
Rohl's citizenship papers.
486 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Gesler. Well, that's my error, then. It is this Department
I am referring to.
26. General Frank. And this statement in this letter, prepared
under your jurisdiction, is :
It is the understanding of tliis office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United
States is beyond question.
Now, there seems to be a finalitv about that, does there not '.
Colonel Gesler. In my opinion it is, as I stated, that \9^'\ it
did not represent a separate investigation by our office; otherwise,
we would have said so.
27. General Fr^xnk. Did Rohl or any agent of his see Stilphen prior
to or during the writing of this letter '\
Colonel Gesler. I doubt it.
28. General Frank. Did you ever know a Mr. Martin, who was
Rohl's attorney %
Colonel Gesler. I don't remember him ; no, sir.
29. General Frank. Mr. Stilphen was a civilian ?
Colonel Gesler. At that time; yes, sir.
30. General Frank. What responsibility did he have ?
Colonel Gesler. Well, he was in charge principally of labor-relations
cases in the Contracts and Claims branch, particularly those cases un-
der the Bacon-Davis Act, and this seemed to be more or less his type of
work and involved contacts which he had, and therefore he handled it.
31. General Frank. Did you ever have any other instances of trying
to give a foreigner citizenship so that you could give him Government
business '\
Colonel Gesler. I don't believe so. I don't remember any. May I
correct that statement, just a little bit, though, General \ We were not
trying to give him citizenship. We were asking this Department to ex-
pedite their action on it, whether positive or negative.
32. General Frank. I think the witness is mistaken.
Read paragraph 2 of that letter.
Colonel Gesler. All right.
33. General Frank. And read the last sentence of paragraph 3.
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.
\938\ 34. General Fr.4nk. Wliat you are asking for is the ex-
pediting of positive action on that, is it not?
Colonel Gesler. That's the tenor of the letter; yes, sir.
35. General Frank. Then you w^ere trying to get citizenship for
this man so you could give him Government business ?
Colonel Gesler. That's right. He couldn't do that business in
Hawaii without his citizenship papers.
36. General Frank. Is it within your power to throw any light on
the background that you got for this statement about his loyalty being
beyond question?
Colonel Gesler. Well, at this time, the only impression I have is
that Mr. Stilphen discussed it Avith this Department. I believe we
also had a letter addressed to us from the Pacific Division, asking us
to assist in processing, getting the Department of Immigration and
Naturalization to expedite the case.
37. General Frank. Do j^ou think you could locate that letter?
Colonel Gesler. No, sir; I don't believe I can. I know they have
searched for it over in the Chief of Engineers' Office, and it has not
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 487
been found, and I say that is my impression. I might even be wrong,
tTiere.
38. General Frank. Who would have written such a letter?
Colonel Gesler. The division engineer of the Pacific Division,
Colonel Hannum.
39. General Frank. Where did Stilphen come from?
Colonel Gesler. I can't answer that, sir. He is in this general
locality, I believe.
40. General Frank. Was he an American citizen ?
[9S9] Colonel Gesler. I believe he was ; yes, sir.
41. General Frank. Did General Newman (then Major Newman)
have anything to do with this letter?
Colonel Gesler. Possibly, I don't know. He was busy on other
things, and it's a possibility he didn't see it.
42. General Frank. Kecently, have you investigated the circum-
stances surrounding the writing of this letter ?
Colonel Gesler. I have discussed it with the Office, Chief of En-
gineers, and I was told they couldn't find anything else in the file
concerning this letter,
43. General Frank. Who told you that?
Colonel Gesler. Mr. McKay — Mr. Douglas McKay.
44. General Frank. You said you checked the contract to see if
it conformed to policy. What policy ?
Colonel Gesler, The use of the "cost-plus-fixed-fee" contract, a War
Department policy in existence at that time, including the question
of fees involved, and the general nature of the clauses which were
required under statute and War Department regulation,
45. General Frank, What subordinates of yours worked on the
contract, whose work you checked ; do you remember?
Colonel Gesler. I don't remember. In the normal course of work.
Major Newman would be that one. He was the Chief of that Con-
tracts and Claims branch,
46. General Frank. Was there any question, as you remember,
about the contract, when they came?
Colonel Gesler, No, sir.
47. General Frank. Do you know whether or not Mr. Stilphen was
acquainted with Hans Wilhelm Rohl ?
[9^0] Colonel Gesler. I don't know, but I wouldn't think he
had any connection with him.
48. General Frank. Do you know whether or not Mr. Stilphen
knew Mr. John Martin, who was Mr. Eohl's attorney?
Colonel Gesler. I doubt it.
49. General Frank, Do you know whether or not Mr, John Martin
had any contact with Mr, Stilphen prior to Stilphen's preparing
this letter?
Colonel Gesler. I don't know,
50. General Frank. Was there nothing unusual about a German
alien's getting citizenship so that he could be given Government busi-
ness, that would require you to look into this situation to a greater
extent?
Colonel Gesler. The only purpose of getting his citizenship papers
was to permit him personally to go to Hawaii to supervise some of the
work. I do not believe there was any government policy which pre-
488 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
vented award of contracts to domestic corporations, some of whose
officers might have been aliens.
51. Greneral Frank. I think at that time Mr. Rohl w^as, or he just
had been, president and principal stockholder in that organization,
so he was not a casual member of it.
Colonel Gesler. I understand that's the case, yes, sir — prior to
this particular contract.
52. General Frank. I have no further questions.
53. General Grunert. I have one, here. Did you expect that letter
that was signed by General Kingman to influence the immigration
authorities either toward actually granting the citizenship or toward
merely expediting action thereon ?
Colonel Gesler. Well, that's hard to say, General.
[94^] 64. General Grunert. Why was the letter written?
Colonel Gesler. To get action on it so that we could use him, or
else learn definitely he was not going to be available.
55. General Grunert. If that letter liad not been written, would
there have been delay? Do you know whether there would have
been a delay in getting that citizenship, or whether there would have
been a question about giving it to him?
Colonel Gesler. I do know that it had been pending for some time.
56. General Grunert. In other words, can you tell us whether or
not a letter from the Office of the Chief of Engineers would assist
in influencing those who granted him citizenship ?
Colonel Gesler. I do not believe so. I believe they would use in-
dependent judgment, there, sir.
57. General Grunert. You do not think, then, the letter would
liave any influence? If so, why was the letter written ?
Colonel Gesler. To ask them to give it attention and get it through
just as soon as possible. It was holding up work in the Hawaiian
Islands. As Mr. Rohl was known to be a very fine operator, as that
letter indicated, and if his services with his company were to be of
any value, he should have gone over.
58. General Grunert. Well, was the contract not progressing rap-
idly enough? He at that time apparently was not an active official
in the company operating in Hawaii. Did you have any reports that
the progress on the contract was slow, or could not proceed without
him?
Colonel Gesler. I can't answer that from the record, [94^]
General, but I believe that was the general impression.
59. General Grunert. I have no further questions.
60. General Frank. You stated that the process of obtaining citi-
zenship for Rohl had been pending for some time?
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.
61. General Frank. Do you know why it had been pending for
sometime?
Colonel Gesler. No, sir ; except I have read your report, there, that
would indicate that there were certain things which the Immigration
authorities were aware of.
62. General Frank. In the face of that, do you think that there
was sufficient investigation made of him to warrant the writing of
this letter ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 489
Colonel Gesler. Well, in my opinion, the letter, itself, was not
advancing any theory of the War Department, or giving any informa-
tion which the Immigration Department didn't have better alread3^
63. General Frank. Then why did you write that letter?
Colonel Gesler. To ask them to hurry it up. The naturalization
was being made by that Department. They had all the information.
There was nothing which we would require, provided he were made a
full citizen. That, in itself, would establish his qualification.
64. General Frank. Then why were you giving it your moral
support?
It is the uuderstanding of this office tlaat Mr. Rohl"s loyalty is beyond question.
Colonel Gesler. That was our general understanding.
65. General Frank. What steps did you take to find out?
[943] Colonel Gesler. We had no other steps, except this in-
formal conversation which I believe Mr. Stilphen had with the Immi-
gration Bureau.
66. General Frank. You do not know?
Colonel Gesler. No, sir.
67. General Frank. Yet you initialed the letter as giving it au-
thenticity from your section?
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir; because after discussion with him, I was
satisfied that it was all right.
68. General Grunert. In this conversation that he had with the im-
migration authorities, did they ask him to present such a letter?
Evidently, you had a conversation with them over the phone. Why
wasn't that sufficient, without the letter? Or did they want it backed
up by a letter from the Chief of Engineers? Do you remember
whether that conversation included that?
Colonel Gesler. I really don't remember, but that's a logical con-
clusion. General.
69. General Grunert. Nothing more.
70. General Russell. You discussed Mr. Rohl, a moment ago,
Colonel, stating that he was regarded as a good operator.
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.
71. General Russell. Did you know that, when you initialed the
letter seeking to hasten his citizenship application?
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.
- 72. General Russell. And that letter was written,- as I recall, in
August 1941, this letter that w^e are discussing.
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir,
73. General Russell. Now, how long had you had the information
\d44''] that Mr. Rohl was a good operator ?
Colonel Gesler. Well, I personally never had had any relations with
that contracting firm, but I knew of the reputation of it along the
Pacific Coast.
74. General Russell. And that reputation had existed in the Office
of the Chief of Engineers over some years ?
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.
75. General Russell. And you knew then that this man, Rohl,
was the dominant character in that operation?
Colonel Gesler. That was my impression ; yes, sir.
490 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
76. General Russell. Now, I believe you say that your responsi-
bility in connection with the execution of contracts, of which this is
a type, was to check largely for form.
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.
77. General Russell. The substance of the contract, including the
negotiations and the compliance with the specifications, and things of
that type, was the function of some other division or section of the
Chief of Engineers' Office ?
Colonel Gesler. Well, in a very general way, I checked the terms
of the contract, what the Government was getting out of it, but I had
legal assistants to take care of the details.
78. General Russell. It came to you as a completed, executed
contract ?
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.
79. General Russell. And before it became effective and binding
on the Government, it had to have your approval ?
Colonel Gesler. Well, the approval of the Chief of Engineers ; and
he approved it, on my recommendation, as a rule.
[94^] 80. General Russell. Do you know where this contract is
signed, on behalf of the Hawaiian Constructors?
• 81. Major Clausen. That is four pages from the last.
82. General Frank. "Paul Grafe."
83. General Russell. It was signed by a man named Grafe?
Colonel Gesler. Just one individual.
84. General Russell. "Hawaiian Constructors, W. E. Callahan
Construction Co., contractor, by Paul Grafe," and business address.
Is there anything out of the ordinary in the execution of that, Colonel ?
Colonel Gesler. Well, it is not exceptional to have one indiviudal
authorized to sign for two or three companies. That can be arranged,
and, I believe, it must have been arranged in that case.
85. General Russell. Did you consider it as extraordinary that Ha-
waiian Constructors would appear, and then one of the group, to-wit,
the W. E. Callahan Construction Co., and that the other two of the
group, to-wit, Gunther & Shirley Co., and the Rohl-Connolly Co.,
and Ralph E. Woolley, three of them, were left off of this execution,
or were left off of the part of the contract in which the execution
occurs ?
Colonel Gesler. I don't quite understand. You mean the question
about its being complete?
86. General Russell. In the recitation at the beginning of the con-
tract it is "Hawaiian Constructors," and these other people are given
under there as constituting the Hawaiian Constructors.
Colonel Gesler. Yes. sir.
87. General Russell. I am just wondering now if in checking the
form of this contract you concluded that the Hawaiian [946]
Constructors had any legal existence, at all.
Colonel Gesler. Well, we determined that, before it was signed,
I am sure.
88. General Russell. Apparently, if "Hawaiian Constructors" was
neither a partnership nor a corporation nor an individual, the Govern-
ment was signing a contract with some non-existent something.
Colonel Gesler. It is a co-adventure, and we have handled those.
89. General Russell. You know what it takes to constitute a valid
contract, do you not?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 491
Colonel Gesler. I think so.
90. General Kussell. The Contractor is the Hawaiian Constructors.
They consist of Callahan — there is your legal entity ?
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.
91. General Kussell. Gunther & Shirley Co. is a legal entity ; Kohl-
Connolly Co. is a legal entity, and Kalph E. Woolley is an individual.
Now, when the contract is executed, it is executed in the name of the
Hawaiian Constructors. Immediately under that is one of the entities
comprising that, the Callahan Construction Company, as a contractor,
signed by Paul Grafe ; but it occurs to me as rather peculiar that the
contract should not have been executed in the name of the people
who were parties to it. I am asking these questions without being
thoroughly cognizant of all of the terms of the contract, just drawing
the conclusion from those things that I have seen on the contract.
Colonel Gesler. I know that practice has been followed, and the
principal purpose is to avoid delay in getting many [947] sig-
natures on one instrument; and it is arranged by some separate paper
which gives this individual authority to sign for each of them.
[948] 92. General Kussell. Now, I take the position, or I am
asking you if it is true, that the Kohl-Connolly Company is not bound
by that contract as it was executed there on the 21st day of December,
1940.
Colonel Gesler. Well, that is a legal opinion. General. I am not a
lawyer, but in my opinion, however, I think it is all right.
93. General Kussell, Didn't you have some lawyers on your staff?
Colonel Gesler. Oh, yes. They checked it.
94. General Kussell. And approved it as to form ?
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.
95. General Kussell. Do you happen to know whether the power
of attorney for this man Grafe to sign for whomever he did sign for,
is in this file ?
Colonel Gesler. It must be somewhere, the General Accounting
Office or anywhere else.
96. General Kussell. Now, Colonel, did you know the Callahan
Construction Company ?
Colonel Gesler. Only by name, sir.
97. General Kussell. You knew nothing of their responsibility or
reputation as operators ?
Colonel Gesler. Well, except in a general way ; I knew they had
been large contractors on the West Coast.
98. General Kussell. Similarly with the Gunther-Shirley Com-
pany?
Colonel Gesler. Which one, sir ?
99. General Kussell. Gunther & Shirley Company.
Colonel Gesler. I don't know that name, reallv.
[949] 100. General Kussell. Or Kalph E. Woolly ; do you know
anything about him ?
Colonel Gesler. No, sir.
101. General Kussell. In this entire group of the Hawaiian Con-
structors the one firm or corporation which stood out as operators
on its reputation in the Office of the Chief of Engineers was the
Kohl-Connolly Company; is that true?
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.
492 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
102. General Russell. And the dominant factor in, the Rohl-
Connolly Company was a man named Rohl ; did you know that
then?
Colonel Gesler. I cannot say I knew that much in detail.
103. General Russell. Yes. Now, Colonel, did Rohl come to
Washington when this contract was made?
Colonel Gesler. I undei'stand he did.
104. General Russell. Did you see him?
Colonel Gesler. No, sir.
105. General Russell. Have you ever seen him?
Colonel Gesler. Not to my knowledge.
106. General Russell. In answer to a question by General Frank
a little while ago, you stated that you knew that it was contrary
to law to grant or to give to a nonresident alien work on a defense
project.
Colonel Gesler. That is not exactly what I said, General.
107. General Russell. Well, what did you say?
Colonel Gesler. I said that there was nothing in the law which
prevented awarding a contract to a domestic corporation some of
whose officers may be alien.
108. General Russell. Yes. Well, now I will ask you the other
question: Did you know that it was contrary to law to give to
[950] an individual who was a nonresident alien a contract to
do defensive work, work on defensive projects?
Colonel Gesler. I believe that is true, yes, sir.
109. General Russell. I am asking you what you knew about it
at the time of the execution of this contract on December 20, 1940.
Colonel Gesler. I am trying to express it as what I knew in 1940.
I think that is what I knew then.
110. General Russell. All right. You knew two things then:
that you could not give the sort of work that was going to be done
under this contract to a nonresident, or to an alien ; you knew that ?
Colonel Gesler. As a contractor.
111. General Russell. As a contractor. But you knew that you
could give it to a corporation in which he was an not officer but
was a stockholder?
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir. We do that all the time.
112. General Russell. You have contracts that you grant to cor-
porations with alien stockholders?
Colonel Gesler. We never question stockholders in corporations.
113. General Russell. Did it occur to you as peculiar that Rohl
was no longer an officer in the Rohl-Connolly Company when you
gave this contract ?
Colonel Gesler. I do not believe I knew that at the time, sir.
114. General Russell. Well, did you know Rohl was an alien
then?
Colonel Gesler. No, sir.
[951] 115. General Russell. When did you first
Colonel Gesler. That question never came up. I don't remember
now that I had any knowledge of it, that it meant anything at the time.
116. General Russell. Now, just as a matter of policy down in the
Engineers Office, would it make any difference in granting to a cor-
poration a contract if you knew that the president of that corporation
and the dominant figure in that corporation was an alien ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 493
Colonel Gesler. It probably would now. In 1940 that question
was never raised.
117. General Russell. I want to get clear on this, Colonel. In
1940, had it been known that Mr. Rohl was continuing as president
of the Rohl-Connolly Company, the dominant factor, the principal
operator in that corporation, seeking to get a contract to do defensive
work in Hawaii, you would have granted it to the corporation?
Colonel Gesler. I believe we would at that time. Not only that,
but you remember that all contractors at that time were cleared by
two War Department boards here, the Construction Advisory Com-
mittee in the Office of Quartermaster General at that time, and another
board; I have forgotten the exact title of it. I know Mr. Harrison
is a member of it. General Harrison.
118. General Russell. Now, isn't it true that General Knudsen was
clearing those contracts then ?
Colonel Gesler. He probably was too. There was a time when he
was doing it.
[9S2] 119. General Russell. I want to go back to the execution
oi this contract for a minute. Colonel. Were you present when it
was signed ?
Colonel Gesler. By General Schley, you mean ?
120. General Russell. No. When it was signed by this man Grafe.
Colonel Gesler. I don't remember; no reason why I should have
been present.
121. General Russell. I want your opinion on the form of the exe-
cution. It occurs to me on a second reading that the name of W. E.
Callahan Construction Company was written and then stricken from
the contract (handing document to witness). Does it appear that
way to you ?
Colonel Gesler. It looks like that on the photostat. You would
have to see the original to see what that really was, I believe, sir.
122. General Russell, If that is true, what occurred was that this
term "Hawaiian Constructors" was written on the typewriter; there-
under was written, "W. E. Callahan Construction Company," which
appears on the sceond line in describing the contractors, and then that
was written out.
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.
123. General Russell. For some reason. So it left only the Hawai-
ian Constructors there. Now, you believe that this letter here origi-
nated as the result of a request from the field ?
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir. And I think it was a written request,
although I am also under the impression I had a telephone call from
the West Coast.
124. General Russell. Do you think it came from — was he [953]
Colonel Hannum at that time ?
Colonel Gesler. Yes.
125. General Russell. From Colonel Hannum or from Colonel
Wyman ?
Colonel Gesler. I believe Wyman was in Hawaii at the time. I
believe it must have been Colonel Hannum.
126. General Russell. Colonel Hannum. Do you remember
whether about this time this man Martin, who was an attorney for
the Rohl interests, was in Washington ?
494 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Gesler, I have heard he was, but I don't remember Mr.
Martin at all.
127. General Russell. He did not come into your section about
that time ?
Colonel Gesler. Not that I remember, no, sir.
128. General Russell. You could not state definitely whether this
letter of request for hastening Rohl's citizenship papers was brought
into your office or into the Office of the Chief of Engineers by this
man Martin ?
Colonel Gesler. I do not know, I do not believe it could have
been, though.
129. General Russell. You think it reached you through the mail*
Colonel Gesler. As I remember, it was the regular mail.
130. General Russell. Reached you through the mail ?
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.
131. General Russell. We are interested in this man who did the
operating in your branch in connection with promoting this citizenship
application. His name was Stelphen ?
[954] Colonel Gesler. Stilphen, S-t-i-1-p-h-e-n. He was acting
under my instructions. He was not promoting it, I wouldn't say, sir.
132. General Russell. He did the actual work in connection with it ?
Colonel Gesler. Yes.
133. General Russell. And, you think, rang up these people, or a
Mr. Schofield who had to do with them ?
Colonel Gesler. Yes.
134. General Russell. Now, Colonel, after all is said and done, did
it occur to you as being a matter which deserved the most serious con-
sideration by the Chief of Engineers, having a man who had been in
this country for a number of years, to promote his application for
citizenship in order that he might go into work which was very impor-
tant from the defensive standpoint?
Colonel Gesler. My impression there, sir, is that this was his third
and last paper. He had been in the country some time ; he had done
some very fine contracting work; he could help us in the present con-
tract by his presence in Hawaii, and his citizenship was being held
up only on a technicality that should be cleared promptly so that he
could be put to work.
135. General Russell. With the risk of repetition in the record, I
want to propound the question which General Grunert asked you a
little while ago : There was a definite impression, then, in the Office of
the Chief of Engineers that the work out there in Hawaii was lagging
and needed attention ?
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir. I cannot say that from any recorded
progress, but we were attempting to help any [955] contractor,
any District Engineer, in those days, who needed help and asked for it.
136. General Russell. I think you ran around me a little bit.
Colonel. I am asking not about your general policy of helping the
engineer in the field. I am asking about this specific case. Was there
such lagging or such delay out there that you felt called upon to sign
this letter upon a telephone conversation, making the German avail-
able to go out there ? Didn't that indicate that there was pretty bad
lagging in Hawaii ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 495
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir; that is what it indicates, and that must
have been the story. I don't recall definitely what the story was, but
it must have been that there was need for expedition.
137. General Russell. And it indicates that the Hawaiian Con-
structors needed very badly the driving power of this German, Rohl?
Colonel Gesler. That is right.
138. General Russell. I believe that is all.
139. General Grunert. Are there any other questions ?
140. General Frank. Just a minute.
Did you ever serve on the Pacific Coast with the Engineers ?
Colonel Gesler. No, sir. I visited the Pacific Coast but never served
there.
141. General Frank. You did not know Rohl ?
Colonel Gesler. No, sir.
142. General Frank. With respect to this Paul Grafe signing the
contract, some one individual had to be designated to sign the con-
tract?
[956] Colonel Gesler. That is true, unless all of them signed.
143. General Frank. Yes. And normally it would be a man who
was interested in the firms constituting the Hawaiian contractors?
Colonel Gesler. Well, not only that one line; it would have to be
interested in all of them, the Hawaiian Constructors as a separate
group, yes,
144. General Frank. Yes, but the point I am trying to make is, if
he didn't belong to the Callahan firm he would have belonged to some
other firm ?
Colonel Gesler. He would have belonged to one of those firms
listed, yes.
145. 'General Frank. What is Stilphen's first name and present
address?
Colonel Gesler. It is Benjamin L. Stilphen. I do not know his
present address. The last I heard he was in New York.
146. General Russell. Colonel, there have just been called to my
attention certain changes in this contract of December 20, 1940, where
the initials P. G. and T. W. appear. A hasty survey indicates that
that is true in some five places here on two pages. Was it possible
for this contract to be amended in the field by the District Engineer
T.W.?
Colonel Gesler. The minor amendments could have been made
before it was finally filed.
147. General Russell. I do not get what you mean, "before it was
finally filed."
Colonel Gesler. Before it was finally filed with the General Ac-
counting Office.
148. General Russell. Now, this became a binding contract upon
[957] the Government and the Hawaiian Constructors on the date
of its execution ?
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.
149. General Russell. Thereafter Wyman representing the Gov-
ernment, and the proper party representing the Hawaiian Construc-
tors, could amend this contract without reference to Washington?
496 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Gesler. I dichi't mean that, sir. Those amendments,
initials were made undoubtedly before they were sent in to the Chief's
office for distribution.
150. General Russell. Before the execution?
Colonel Gesler. Before distribution. Our procedure then was to
have the main contract signed, and if there were only minor amend-
ments the Chief of Engineers would approve it, but in our instructions
to the field we would point out that minor irregularities should be
corrected. Those irregularities are corrected and initialed, and all
the copies required in Washington were processed through the Office
•of the Chief of Engineers. We sent the one on to the General Account-
ing Office. Those initials should have been added, of course, before
the original signature, but it could have been done the other way too.
151. General Russell. Wliere was this contract prepared?
Colonel Gesler. I understand it was prepared in Washington, sir.
152. General Russell. In Washington?
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.
158. General Russell. So as a matter of fact wasn't there quite a
group of people who came into Washington about the [958]
time that this contract was made, in connection with promoting the
interests of the Hawaiian Constructors and giving the contract?
Colonel Gesler. I believe there was, yes, sir,
(Excerpts from construction contract were read as follows:)
154. General Russell. Here is the first one. I will read it merely
as an example :
Rent actually paid by the contractor at rates not to exceed those approved by
the contracting office.
Xow. that is the changed contract?
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.
155. General Russell. I am merely exploring the contract on the
spot, as it were.
Now, the language which has been stricken was,
mentioned in the schedule of rental rates to Appendix B hereto attached and
made a part hereof, except as hereinafter set forth.
Now, to get just what Wyman was doing to this contract possibly
we had better read the unamended contract and then read the amend-
ment and see the difference. The unamended contract, prior to the
time that Wyman initialed it, was in this language :
Rent actually paid by the contractor at rates not to exceed those mentioned
in the schedule of rental rates in Appendix B hereto attached and made a part
hereof, except as hereinafter set forth.
Now, as amended it reads this way :
Rental actually paid by the contractor at [QoD] rates not to exceed
those approved by the contracting oflBcer.
Now, isn't the effect of that amendment to abolish the rates estab-
lished in the appendix, as qualified, and make Wyman. the contracting
officer, the judge as to what rates would be paid (
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.
156. General Russell. In other words, Wyman amended the con-
tract so he could change the price of rentals at least ?
Colonel Gesler. Well, he amended the contract by the authority of
the Chief of Engineers, though, sir.
proceedin;gs of army pearl harbor board 497
157. General Russell. Where would that authority be?
Colonel Gesler. The signature of the Chief of Engineers on ap-
13roval indicates that it has been approved.
158. General EussELL. Where is that old contract?
159. General Frank. The changes in the contract put power in
Wyman to determine rates and compensation of the contractor, didn't
they?
Colonel Gesler. To put wliat is that again, sir?
160. General Frank. Gave Wyman the power to determine rates
and compensation to the contractor ?
Colonel Gesler. That is right ; yes, sir.
161. General Russell. Now, Colonel, to go back to what we were
talking about, the approval by the Chief of Engineers of these changes,
I am not sure that what you exhibited to me approved such changes as
are initialled here. Will you go back and explain that to us, please, sir ?
Colonel Gesler. The instrument as it stands, I believe, [9(>0]
is a proper legal document, and it shows approval by the Chief of
Engineers of everything in there, these changes.
162. (Tenei'al Russeil. Now. the Chief of Engineers could not ap-
prove a change before it was made, could he ?
Colonel Gesler. Well, not exactly that, sir, but we indicate the
changes which will be requii'ed before it will be accepted by the Office
Chief of Engineers. This change is not necessarily one that Wyman
himself wanted. What you read first there is the standard form of
contract which they had in those days and applicable to work in this
country. For some reason it was probably understood that that clause
would not be practical for work in Hawaii, so that alternate phrase
was inserted. Since the standard form was changed — I believe this
is probably a mimeographed form that was changed — it required
initial.
163. General Grunert. Why didn't the Chief of Engineers intial
the change? He signed the contract, didn't he?
Colonel Gesler. Well, he only approves it; he doesn't intial every
change.
161. General Grunert. Only approves it?
Colonel Gesler. The Chief of Engineers only approves the entire
contract. His name appears only once.
165. General Russell. -Colonel, the thing we are attempting to get
in the record, and I don't think there should be any equivocation about
it — I mean by that, I don't think there should be confusion about it —
it was possible and it did happen that this man Wyman took that
contract, made changes in it, initialed it, and thereby made those
changes effective as between him and the other contractors, between
the Government [961] and the contracting parties, didn't he?
Colonel Gesler. That is impossible without the knowledge of the
Chief of Engineers, sir.
166. General Russell. How did the Chief of Engineers come to
know that Wyman had made these changes in that contract?
Colonel Gesler. Our procedure provided either that this was fixed
up before General Schley signed it or, if there were some very minor
changes which were called for, to save sending papers back and forth
to the field ssveral times, by administrative direction in our endorse-
ment to the field we indicated the changes which would be required,
Z9X16 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1 3.3.
498 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and those changes were put in there and initialed by the parties in the
field and returned to our office before we distributed it. That did not
become a proper contract until it was ready for distribution to the
General Accoiuiting Office.
167. General Kussell. Now, let us be careful. Is it your testimony
now that before one of these changes was made, before any one of
them was made by Wyman, that he had directions from the Chief of
Engineers to make that change ?
Colonel Gesler. Either directions or approval of the Chief of En-
gineers to make it.
168. General Russell. Is the approval or direction attached to this
contract ?
Colonel Gesler. It is indicated by the document itself, sir, because
the Chief of Engineers has approved it.
169. General Russell. Where?
Colonel Gesler. Just the mere fact that the Chief of Engineers?
signature is there, I believe, also covers everything that is above it.
[962] ■ 170. General Russell. When was the Chief of Engineers'
signature placed on that contract?
Colonel Gesler. December 28, I believe it is, 1940.
171. General Russell. December 28. The contract was signed De-
cember 20th, 21st. Now, had that contract gone to the field and had
these changes made with Wyman's initials and come back here and
then approved by the Chief of Engineers?
Colonel Gesler. That is possible, unless it were made here in Wash-
ington, as I believe it was, in which case all those changes were pre-
pared and initialed before it was submitted to General Schley.
172. General Russell. All right. Now, the final question that I
want to ask you is this : Is it your evidence that Wyman was without
authority to change and initial this contract and thereby make it
effective as against the Government?
Colonel Gesler. That is true; he is without authority on his own
responsibility.
173. General Russell. And each specific change has been approved
by the Chief of Engineers?
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.
174. General Russell. Do you regard the approval of the contract
on the 28th day of December, 1940, by the Chief of Engineers as that
approval ?
Colonel Gesler. Yes. sir: approval of everything in the contract.
175. General Russell. Changes made thereafter, what would be
their status?
Colonel Gesler. Unless he had been directed to make changes by
the Chief of Engineers before returning the contract [963] for
final distribution, no such change could be made. It would have re-
quired a change order or supplemental agreement.
176. General Russell. Would there be in the files of the Engineers
this correspondence granting to Wyman authority to make changes in
the contract?
Colonel Gesler. If that was what was required, there would be. I
suspect that the contract was negotiated in Washington and all those
changes were inserted before it was submitted for approval,
177. General Russell. Was Wyman here?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 499
Colonel Gesler. I understand he was.
178. General Russell. Why were Wyman's initials put on there if
the Chief of Engineers was going to approve the changed contract?
Colonel Gesler, Because Colonel W,yman was the contracting offi-
cer. Both the contracting officer and the contractor have to initial all
changes.
179. General Grunert. It shows here that on behalf of the United
States of America Theodore Wyman signed the contract and Paul
Grafe signed the contract. Then it was approved by the Chief of
Engineers. So Wyman represented the United States in making the
contract. I didn't know that.
180. General Russell. I knew that and was not surprised about it,
but what I was interested in was whether or not after he got into the
field he could continue to contract with these people without reference
to the Chief of Engineers Office.
181. General Grunert. I presume that the changes made here and
initialed by the two contracting parties, Wyman and Grafe, were made
prior to the approval of the Chief of Engineei's?
[964] Colonel Gesler. That is right.
182. General Gruxert. That is the assiumption?
Colonel Gesler. That is right.
183. General Grunert. If any changes were made after that ap-
proval, unless the Chief of Engineers authorized such changes to be
made, in a document so stating, it would not liave been according to
Hoyle; is that right?
Colonel Gesler. That is correct.
184. General Frank. As a matter of fact, we have testimony from
witnesses from the Office of Chief of Engineers that Wyman was in
here when the contract was signed.
185. General Russell. Yes; the Colonel said he was.
186. General Frank. Furthermore, I think that we shall find that
there were 53 supplements to this contract, 53 supplemental agree-
ments.
187. General Grunert. This is just the basic contract.
188. General Russell. You wanted to know where and when those
changes were made.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
[965] TESTIMONY OP COLONEL EUGENE B. WALKER, COAST
ARTILLERY CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY
(The witness was sworn by the recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 21.)
1. Colonel AVest. Colonel, will yoii please state to the Board your
name, rank, organization, and station?
Colonel Walker. Eugene B. Walker; Colonel, Coast Artillery
Corps ; at present on duty with Army Ground Forces, as Editor of the
Coast Artillery Journal.
2. General Grunert. Colonel, the Board is endeavoring to get at
facts, both as to the background and what led up to the Pearl Harbor
attack; in fact, about the attack itself. Because of your assignment in
Hawaii it has called you as a witness with the hope that you can throw
some light on the subject. Just what was your assignment in Hawaii
during 1941 ?
500 CONGRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel "Walker. I Tvas commanding officer of the harbor defenses
at Pearl Harbor.
3. General Gruxeri . Just what did that embrace ? Any particular
posts ?
Colonel Walker. It included Fort Barrett, Fort Weaver, and Fort
Kamehameha. with outlying observation posts around the entire per-
imeter of the Island, with the exception of one end on the north coast
which had not been fully develoi^ed. That is it. in general.
4. General Gruxert. During what period was this : what dates ?
Colonel AValker. From the date I arrived there, which was in Oc-
tober, until I left in April. 1942.
5. General Gruxert. Who was your immediate superior?
Colonel Walker. General F. Q. C. Gardner.
6. General Gruxert. Who was your immediate superior just
[966] prior to Pearl Harbor? Or is he still your immediate
superior ?
Colonel Walker. Xo, sir; he had departed just shortly before that ;
and at that tune, General Burgin. I have forgotten his first name.
7. General Gruxert. AMiat was his position ?
Colonel Walker. At that time he was commanding officer of the
Coast Artillery brigade and operating directly tmder the Department.
8. General Gruxert. Then yoti. as commanding officer of the harbor
defenses, were directly under General Burgin ?
Colonel Walker. Yes, sir.
9. General Fraxk. How do you spell that name?
Colonel Walker. I think it is B-e-r-g-u-n.
10. General Gruxert. It is B-u-r-g-i-n.
What light can you throw on the state of the defenses of your com-
mand abotit the latter part of November or early in December in the
line of preparedness to defend your command from outside aggres-
sion, just generally speaking? I will develop the subject a little more
later on.
Colonel Walker. As far as training wa's concerned, I would say
they were excellent and superior; that is, in the tactical and technical
training with their weapons as coast artillerymen.
11. General Gruxert. Did that include antiaircraft weapons?
Colonel Walker. I do not remember the inclusive dates, but for a
while we had dual assignments in certain of the batteries. The bat-
ter}' at Fort Barrett and Fort Weaver had 12-inch barbette gims and
had dual assignments. We were very short of personnel. In case of a
major air threat we were to drop the sea coast batteries and run to the
antiaircraft batteries and man those. If the sea coast threat was the
major threat we would [967] drop the antiaircraft and man
the sea coast batteries. However, the antiaircraft defense was taken
out from under the coast defense and operated under its own personnel.
12. General Gruxert. Then you no longer had command of it from
approximately what time in 1941, prior to or after Xovember 27?
Colonel Walker. I would say it was prior to Xovember 27 that the
antiaircraft command was turned over. I do not recall the date.
13. General Gruxert. Then you no longer had that dual mission ?
Colonel Walker. I did not.
14. General Gruxert. Then you cannot give me any information as
to the preparedness of the antiaircraft batteries themselves?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 501
Colonel Walker. I was only indirectly concerned with observing
them as they were on my own post.
15. General Gruxert. Under you, you had various posts and post
commanders ; is that right ?
Colonel Walker. They were not posts in the full sense of the word ;
that is, they did not have the staff that we normally expect on a post,
of Adjutant General, Quartermaster, and so on. They were sub-posts
under me as artillery commands only. For instance, at Fort Barrett
they had a six-inch gun battery. Commanding there was the senior
officer present. He had no administrative duties other than those
devolving on a commander. We supplied ammunition, and so on. The
same as Fort Weaver.
16. General Grunert. In addition to your duties as harbor defense
commander, you were a post commander also i
Colonel Walker. I was.
17. General Grunert. Of which post ?
Colonel Walker. Fort Kamehameha,
[968] 18. General Gruxert. Can you tell me now about the
posts in general under your supervision, and particularly about Fort
Kamehameha. as to its state of preparedness to defend itself from the
air and the ground, and what measures were taken to assure that
defense ?
Colonel Walker. The only protection we had against air attack
was the antiairci-aft batteries which were located on our post, and the
.50-caliber machine guns wliich were maimed by one of the batteries.
At that time we only had. as I remember five .50-caliber machine guns
available.
19. General Grunert. Was that for the entire harbor defenses or
for your pai-ticular post ?
Colonel AValker. For the entire harbor defense. We were very
short.
20. General Grunert. Had you received any Department instruc-
tion— and bj^ that I mean Hawaiian Department instruction — as to the
measures you should take in preparation for defense, or was that left
to you to take such measures as you saw fit ?
Colonel Walker. That was left to me. I recall no order at that
time giving any requirement or direction about preparation for defense
against air attack.
21. General Grunert. After the attack on Pearl Harbor on Decem-
ber 7th did you receive such instructions ; and, if so, what, generally,
did they cover ?
Colonel Walker. Wliat instructions I received would have come
down through the Coast Artillery brigade ; and I recall no specific
instructions, but merely general instructions to guard our own installa-
tions and to prepare ourselves to resist, with the batteries we had,
against air attack.
22. General Grunert. Had you, prior to December 7 or there-
[969] after, constructed or provided for air raid shelters for the
protection of personnel, or slit trenches or any other measures, includ-
ing the evacuation of personnel, in the line of protective measures?
Colonel Walker. I cannot remember the date when we dug
trenches. I feel sure that no trenches were dug prior to December 7.
That was done after December 7.
502 COXGRESSIOXAL IXVESTIGATIOX PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
23. General Gruxert. Then you did not consider it necessary in
your own command to take particular steps in the protection of vour
command and the noncombatants in rour command; or did vou^
Colonel Walker. "We had made plans for taking care of the non-
combatants on the post itself. There had been no plans either by
other commands or our own for evacuating, although I understood
that plans had been discussed of making some central camp to take
care of them. But nothing had been done. Our plans were to take
all the noncombatants. in case of a surprise, and put them in a mortar
battery, which was the only protection we had at Fort Kam, or evacu-
ate them into the interior ])arts of the Island.
•24:. General Gruxert. How was that plan carried out during the
attack ( First, tell me this : Were you attacked ?
Colonel Walker. Well. I will modify what I have to say on that.
I was not actually on the post during the air attack; I was up in the
Waianae Range, in the Waianae pocket, so that what I can state with
regard to the attack is what I observed when I returned to the post.
The fort itself had not been attacked. There had been some minor
damage done. One bomb had hit in the road, a small bomb, and
made a hole probably four inches deep and a foot and a [970]
half across. Another one had hit the eaves of my quarters but had
done no damage. It was hard to find even where the fragments had
gone. Otlierwise. I do not thiiik any of the damage that occurred was
due to hostile action. There was damage in one of the barracks and
in one of the sets of quarters, but I think that was due to antiaircraft
fire by naval personnel.
25. General Fraxk. Were your quarters the only quarters on the
post that were hit (
Colonel Walker. Yes ; and that was a small bomb that liit the eaves
and burst right in the patio. There was no mark. One of the frag-
ments went into the kitchen and lodged in the ice box. That was the
only one I could find.
26. Greneral Gruxert. So far as you were concerned, was this at-
tack on December 7 a surprise to you ?
Colonel Walker. Yes. in the fact that it occurred just as it did.
I will go back and say this, that we had discussed the thing in the
family in a sort of joking way. but. at the same time, with a little
seriousness behind it. in June. The Honolulu paper had a weather
report, and even back as far as June there was a remark in the paper —
we cut it out : I have it at home — to the effect that "'We hope if the
Japanese ever attack they will attack some day other than Wednesday
or week-ends." And at home we said we agreed with that thoroughly.
We agreed that if an attack came it should come on a Sunday. Of
course, we did not select the Simday for that. But the attack itself, of
course, was a big surprise to everybody, because we could not believe
that our sources of information were so meager that we would not have
knowledge of the approach of any hostile fleet.
27. General Gruxert. What information did you have and what
[971] sources of information could you expect information from ?
Colonel Walker. The only sources we had were through official
channels, and none was forthcoming as regards that attack until the
attack was delivered.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 503
28. General Gkuxert. Did General Burgin ever discuss the pos-
sibility or probability of an attack, or did he transmit or inform you
of any warning or information that had been received in late Novem-
ber or early December i
Colonel Walker. 1 was present at a conference in which it was
stated that the situation was serious and that we would go on alert, as
1 remember. No. 8, which was merely a sabotage alert in which we were
to protect our installations within the Island.
29. General Gruxert. Are you sure it was No. 3 or might it have
been No. 1 ?
Colonel Walker. I think at one time it was No. 1, and then later on
it was changed to No. 3 ; but whatever the number was, it was a sabo-
tage alert against internal sabotage and not against external violence.
30. General Grunert. In view of the information you had, were
you surprised that they should go on just a sabotage alert and not on
one of greater gravity ?
Colonel Walker. Yes; I was; but I thought that the situation was
justified from the fact that sources of information must have been
open to the Navy, with its surface and sub-surface ships, and to the
War and State Departments. 1 presumed it was information which
made the situation secure so far as we were concerned. So that none
of us expected the attack when it came.
31. General Gruxert. Did you know that in such a situation, in
view of the lack of information, or no information, the defense
[972] command should be prepared to meet the gravest emergency ?
Colonel Walker. That I presume is theoretical and ideal.
32. General Gruxert. Thank you very much for coming down,
Colonel.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon, at 3 : 55 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of wit-
nesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 505
\jm\ C O N T E N T S
THURSDAY, AUGUST 17, 1944
Page '
Testimony of —
Lt. Col. H. E. Brooks, Replacement School Command, Birmingham,
Alabama 974
Sergeant George E. Elliott, Headquarters Company, Station Com-
plement, Camp Lee, Virginia 994
First Lt. Joseph L. Lockhard, Signal Corps, United States Army, Esler
Field, Louisiana 1014
Vice Admiral William S. Pye, United States Navy, Retired 1035
Commandei- William E. G. Taylor, Quonset Naval Air Station, Charles-
tov^^n, R. I 1071
Lt. Col. Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps, Orlando, Florida ; Army Air
N^. 15. Radar plotting sheet of December 7, IJMl 1 1002
EXHIBITS
No. 15. Radar plotting sheet of December 7, 1941 1002
' Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original transcript of proceedings.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 507
V97J^\ PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD
THURSDAY, AUGUST 17, 1944
Munitions Building,
Washington^ D. C.
The Board at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted
the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the
Board, presiding.
Pi-esent: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D.
Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.
Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry
C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr.,
Executive Officer.
General Grunert. The Board will come to order.
TESTIMONY OF LT. COL. H. E. BROOKS, REPLACEMENT SCHOOL
COMMAND, BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA
(The witness was sworn b}' the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Will you state to the Board your name, rank,
organization, and station?
Colonel Brooks. Lieutenant Colonel H. E. Brooks, Replacement
School Command, Birmingham, Alabama.
2. General Grunert. Colonel, the Board is after facts relating to
the background and viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl
Harbor attack. Because of your assignment in [97o'\ Hawaii
we thought that you might have information or leads that would
assist the Board in its mission.
Tell us, first, what your assignment was in Hawaii in 1941.
Colonel Brooks. In 1941 I was Battery Commander, Battery A,
15th Field Artillery Battalion, in the 24th Division, the streamlined
division.
3. General Grunert. Stationed where?
Colonel Brooks. Schofield Barracks.
4. General Grunert. Between what dates were you at Schofield
Barracks ?
Colonel Brooks. From July — I do not remember the exact date in
July, but somewhere around the middle of July 1941 — until the war
broke out ; and although Schofield Barracks was my station, from that
time on I was actually out in the woods until about the 18th of August,
1942.
508 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
5. General Gruxert. Then you were present during the attack on
December 7, 1941 ?
Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir.
6. General Gruxert. You were actually at Schofield Barracks?
Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir.
T. General Grux'^ert. Can you tell the Board the feeling among the
junior officers as to the imminence of war in the latter part of No-
vember or early December^ AVhat was the impression among the
junior officers?
Colonel Brooks. I do not think they realized that the war was
about to happen, sir. That is, not the fact ; that is the impression.
8. General Gruxert. "\^^iat did you have to base such an [976]
opinion upon ?
Colonel Brooks. The fact that they did not talk about it very much.
If there was an impression that there would be a war, I believe, sir,
it would be this way, that they felt that a war was coming on, but they
did not know how soon, and I do not believe any of us felt that
Hawaii would be hit at that time.
9. General Gruxert. What was the particular assignment of your
batterv in the defense of Schofield or in the defense of the Island of
Oahu?
Colonel Brooks. We had the mission of going north, back from the
north shore, and we had a battery position selected and we were to
stay in tliat position and to fire upon the beaches and a short distance
out to sea.
10. General Grunert. What was the armament of your battalion?
Colonel Brooks. At that time we had British 75 guns. Four of
those were to be separated from my battery and assigned to the in-
fantry for direct fire, and four were to be retained by my battery
and were to be used in ordinary field artillery missions back 3,000
yards, approximately, from the h^hore, so as to protect the landing
beaches.
11. General Gruxert. Tell me what you know of the classes of alerts
that were in effect at the time.
Colonel Brooks. The alert that was in effect at the time — I do not
know the exact number of it, but it was an alert to prevent sabotage,
and it entailed having guards around cable stations, around planes
at the airfields, and around installations around the post and about the
post that might be military objectives.
[977] To go further on that. I believe it was 50 percent of the
officers that had to be on the post at all times. However, we were all
on the post and all our guns and ammunition, and so forth, were on
the post.
12. General Gruxert. What provisions had been made or what in-
structions existed as to the actual defense and protection of Schofield
Barracks itself?
Colonel Brooks. That I am not positive of, sir, because I was not
detailed on that. My mission was to go into the field, away from
Schofield Barracks, and protect the short.
13. General Gruxert. Were you married and did you have a
family ? ? .
Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir.
14. General Grux'ert. Where were they?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 509
Colonel Brooks. They "were at Schofield Barracks with me.
15. General Grunert. Did they know what to do in case of attack?
Colonel Brooks. My wife knew she had to go to the hospital and
have a baby right away.
16. General Grunert. I mean, for her own protection againt bomb-
ing or an attack on the post.
Colonel Brooks. No, sir ; there was no provision.
17. General Grunert. Did they have any air raid shelters?
Colonel Brooks. No. sir.
18. General Grunert. Any slit trenches ?
Colonel Brooks. No, sir.
19. General Grunert. Any scheme to go to the hills in a hurry?
Colonel Brooks. They may have had that scheme worked out, sir.
I did not know about it. They probably did.
[978] 20. General Grunert. If anything broke and you left to
go to your position, your family would not have known exactly what
to do ?
Colonel Brooks. Well, sir, they had the plan worked out, evidently,
because they took care of that when it happened. I went out into the
field, but there were officers detailed to take care of the families, and
they took them and put them in concrete buildings, on the gi'ound
floor.
21. General Grunert. That had been worked out beforehand ?
Colonel BiiOOKs. Yes, sir. However, I had no knowledge of it. It
was taken care of as soon as this happened.
22. Genei-al Grunert. It was taken care of, but the information was
evidently not given to the families to know just what to do when it
happened, without being told afterwards?
Colonel Brooks. That is right, sir.
23. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not any other pro-
tective measures were taken after December 7 that had not been taken
before ?
Colonel Brooks. Many mea-sures were taken afterwards away from
the post. First, they strung barbed wire, dug foxholes, dug gim em-
placements. That had not been done before. Some had been, but very
few ; and the ones that were dug in could not be used, in many cases,
because they were in the wrong places.
24. General Grunert. You and your family had no fears of attack
at that time?
Colonel Brooks. Not on Hawaii ; I can say that.
25. General Grunert. You mean, the Island of Oahu ?
Colonel Brooks. AVe were too dumb to realize that they might hit
the Island, sir. I think there was a feeling that [979] war was
imminent, but not at Hawaii.
26. General Frank. I would like to go back to the answer that you
gave in wliich you stated or inferred that one reason you did not feel
that war was imminent was because there was no conversation about
it among the senior officers.
Colonel Brooks. No, sir ; the junior officers.
27. General Frank. Did you hear any conversation among the senior
officers ?
Colonel Brooks. Not about war in Hawaii, sir. We did talk about
war being imminent, yes, sir; but not about war being immment m
Hawaii.
510 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
28. General Frank. You say "we talked about it." Whom do you
mean ?
Colonel Brooks. Junior officers, sir,
29. General Frank. What contact did you have with the senior of-
ficers i' Did they advise you or analyze the situation for you in any
Avay ?
Colonel Brooks. No, sir, not more than you would get in casual con-
versation. AVe had our standing operating procedures, however, in
case of war, so that we should know exactly what to do with our equip-
ment and where we would go when we occupied the positions.
30. General Frank. There was no attempt on the part of the top
control to develop or instill a war attitude?
Colonel Brooks. I believe you are correct, sir; I think you are very
correct the.re.
31. ■ General Frank. Did you know that the period in late November
and early December w^as a very critical international [9S0] pe-
riod between the United States and Japan?
Colonel Brooks. Yes. sir.
32. General Frank. You realized that?
Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir; I did, because I read Time magazine.
33. General Frank. The junior group generally realized it?
Colonel Brooks. I believe so. Maybe I have not made myself clear,
sir. I believe the junior group realized that war was imminent,
because we of course read magazines. However, they did not believe
in any case that Hawaii would be involved.
34. General Frank. Why did your conclusions lead yovi to believe
that Hawaii would not be involved ?
Colonel Brooks. The reason for that, sir, was that it just did not
come up. We did not believe that the Japanese would come that far.
Our idea was that the attack would be made in the Far East. We
seemed too far away from Japan. We at that time had the idea that
Japan was not much of a nation.
35. General Frank. Let us go back a moment. We had a pretty
good-sized force in Hawaii, did we not ?
Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir.
36. General Frank. All arms of the Ground Army, all components
of the Air Force, and all components of the Fleet ?
Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir.
General Frank. And you had a lot of plans for the defense of
Oahu?
Colonel Brooks Yes, sir.
37. General Frank. Did you ever stop to think, in the presence of
all that background, that there must have been some sort of an appre-
hension among the high command of an attack on l^Sl] the
Island ?
Colonel Brooks. It w^as not evident, sir, to the junior officers. If
there was apprehension it w^as not made evident to us. As a matter
of fact, it was just the other way. As you know, sir, someone said that
the Air Corps could stop any Japs that were coming in, and also the
Coast Artillery, I believe — No, it was the Air Corps and the Navy.
That came out in the papers over there. I think that is the evidence
which tended to make people too complacent, perhajis. It seems as if
we were well set up and that no attack would be made on the Island of
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 511
Oahu. Perhaps we thought this, sir, that if war started, eventually
they might hit Hawaii, but that did not seem to be the first focal point,
and we did not believe it would be.
38. General Frank. There was nothing said or done to develop a
warniindedness in the command?
Colonel Brooks. That is right, sir.
39. General Frank. Do you think that would help ?
Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir.
40. General Frank. In what way ?
Colonel Brooks. Well, sir, we went ahead and did our work in the
morning, the normal work, and that included regular drill, going out
in near-by areas, and mock problems, and so forth ; but there was no
digging in, no warlike attitude in the division. In most cases the men
were put on fatigue duties in the afternoon. We retained most of our
non-coms. We had to give them schools of some sort. We did not
have any working force; we had no one to work with, but' we would
give ^[982] ■ the non-coms some sort of gunnery schools. But
there was no warlike attitude. It was just a peacetime attitude that
we had all the time. In fact, because it was in the tropics we did very
little work in the afternoon. It was just the opposite of a warlike
attitude.
41. General Grunert. The actual things that went on in the military
line would be like anything in the United States?
Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir.
42. General Frank. Did you have any blackouts ?
Colonel Brooks. Not before the attack, sir, I do not believe — Yes,
they did, sir. They had a few alerts and they had a few blackouts.
Just for a short time they had some practice blackouts; I remember
now.
43. General Frank. Do you remember when they were ?
Colonel Brooks. No, sir, I do not, very well. I think they happened
three or four times for a few hours each.
44. General Frank. However, you knew what to do in case of a
blackout ?
Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir; we all knew what to do. The families
were told about it, too.
45. General Russell. Colonel, what was your grade?
Colonel Brooks. I was a permanent Captain, sir,
46. General Russell. Commanding this battery?
Colonel Brooks. Battery A of the 15th Battalion, Field Artillery.
We had British 75s.
47. General Russell. The estimate that was placed on the part they
would play in case of an invasion was rather a third-line defense?
Colonel Brooks. Apparently, from what the papers said that
[983] came out over there, the Air Corps would be our first-line,
the Navy the second, and ground troops the third.
48. General Russell. You were getting all your military informa-
tion of what was going to happen from the newspapers ?
Colonel Brooks. We did get our broad picture from them ; yes.
49. General Russell, The battalion commander, the regimental
commander, and the high officers did not tell you that, did they?
512 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Brooks. Sir, I went up to my battalion commander a few
times and talked this over. I knew my battalion commander fairly
well, and he seemed to have about the same information as I had.
50. General Russell. Were there any rumors among the junior
officers on the battalion level or company level that the negotiations
between the Japanese Ambassador and his representatives in Wash-
ington and our Government were rapidly deteriorating in late No-
vember or early December, 1941?
Colonel Brooks. I think there was probably some small talk on that,
sir; just what we got from newspapers and things.
51. General Russell. But through military channels nothing was
brought to your attention or to the attention of the other junior
officers about these negotiations ?
Colonel Brooks. No, sir.
52. General Russell. But the public effect of the negotiations be-
tween the two governments, and thereafter the possibility of war —
none of that came from official sources at all?
Colonel Brooks. No, sir. The only thing that was done [984-]
there was that we were called in and told the classes of alerts and
what to do in case of various types of alert. We were given those
instructions thoroughly. Those were part of our standing operating
procedure. We did have that down, but as to the talk, no, we did
not get it.
[985] 53. General Russell. Were there any Japanese people
around Schofield Barracks?
Colonel Brooks. Oh, yes, sir ; many of them.
54. General Russell. Colonel, you have testified that no informa-
tion reached you from official sources indicating just what was going
on in our relations ^with Japan, or nothing was done to inculcate into
the minds of the junior officers the war spirit. You were very definite
about that ?
Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir.
55. General Russell. Did anything reach you from official sources
which impressed on the junior officers the necessity for being very
careful not to offend the Japanese population or do anything which
might disclose to them that you thought war might be probable?
Colonel Brooks. The only thing that came up, sir, in regard to us
and the Japanese, was that we were told to be very careful of any
military information, to see that our family and ourself did not re-
jjeat any information we might happen to have, in the presence of
the Japanese, as a number of the families had Japanese servants, and
there were Japanese servants at the club ; and we did have that down.
That was the only thing that came up with us in our relations with
the Japanese.
56. General Russell. But there were no instructions issued down,
that told the junior officers to tread softly in their relations with the
Japanese?
Colonel Brooks. No, sir.
57. General Russell. There was a feeling of security among the
junior officers that any attack which the Japs might [986] at-
tempt to launch against Oahu could be successfully met by the Air
Forces of the Navy ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 513
Colonel Brooks. I probably gave a little wrong impression, there.
That's what the papers said. I don't believe that came up. I know
that a few of the jmiior officers, at least, believed that we should
have more field training and get our positions prepared. Now, I do
not believe that was for the protection of Hawaii, though. I am a
little confused, there. I think we did not feel that there would be
an attack on Hawaii, but we felt we should have more war training
and be going out into the fields more; but I believe we probably
thought, if we had thought about it at all, that probably the Air
Corps and the Navy would stop them, or at least give us sufficient,
time so that we would be ready for them.
58. General Russell. How far were your defensive gun positions
from the barracks ?
Colonel Brooks. Just about twenty miles, sir.
59. General Russell. You were motor-drawn at that time?
Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir. We had been issued a number of new
GMC trucks. They had just been broken in. In addition, we had
most of our old Dodges, so we were well taken care of as far as motor
vehicles were concerned.
60. General Russell. How long did it take you after the attack on
December 7 to get into position?
Colonel Brooks. We didn't leave the post until about 12 noon.
61. General Frank. Where, on that map, was your battery posi-
tion?
Colonel Brooks. There (indicating) is Schofield Barracks.
[987\ This is the Ashley Station road. Up in here you can see
Kawailoa Camp and Waimea Camp. My position was just opposite
Waimea Camp, up in here; this being Schofield Barracks.
62. General Russell. Now, when you left Schofield Barracks at
noon that day, how long did it take you to get into position and get
ready to fire ?
Colonel Brooks. To get really ready to fire, sir, it took me, I would
say, about 4^^ hours, for this reason : There was no road to my position.
It had been selected just a few days before. I had taken my battery
out to see the position, on foot, and I had surveyed the position in,
about two days before. I had gone out in the afternoon and taken
my noncommissioned officers and surveyed the position in, so we knew
that road, but there was no road to the position. I had to go ahead
with my trucks, and just dig a road out as I went along ; and so that is
why it took me about 41^ hours before I was ready to fire. I had the
first gun in position in about an hour and a half to two hours.
63. General Russell. Had you never been in a maneuver prior to
December 7, in which your battery discharged its mission in connec-
tion with the defense of Oahu ?
Colonel Brooks. We had gone out a number of times, sir, and occu-
pied what was then our normal position, and assimilated fire missions.
We couldn't fire at that time from those positions, because of safety
regulations, but we did occupy positions. It just happened, in this
case, that I had been given a new position just before that time. My
old position was still there, and could have been occupied.
64. General Russell. How far was it from the new position ?
[OSS'] Colonel Brooks. The old position was about 3 miles from
the new position, sir.
79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 3 34
514 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
65. General Kussell. Had this change in your position for tlie de-
fensive mission been a part of a reworking of the entire defensive
plan, or was the change applicable only to your battery?
Colonel Brooks. I think probably it was a change of position for
the artillery of that division.
66. General Russell. Involving all elements of the artillery?
Colonel Brooks. Of the 24th Division. There were a few changes
made, sir, but I believe that they had gone over that plan for the artil-
lery, and so on ; and the Battalion Commander and I went out on recon-
naissance. We were told to find the best positions, so that's why I
think it was part of a general artillery plan of the division. We went
out and found this position in, just before Pearl Harbor, and I im-
mediately went to work and orientated my men as to where it was and
as to where all the installations would be, and went out and surveyed
it right away — and very fortunately ! because Pearl Harbor happened
before we expected anything.
67. General Russell. How many times had you taken your battery
into the old positions that you expected to occupy prior to this change
in position ?
Colonel Brooks. I imagine a half a dozen times, sir. They knew
them thoroughly, and they could have functioned at night, right away,
in the old position.
68. General Russeli.. You made some suggestion a moment ago.
Colonel, that in your opinion other maneuvers, or more maneuvers,
looking to the defense of Oahu, would have been beneficial to the
organizations, there.
[989] Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir. Here is the reason for that:
I was trying to bring out a point, sir. We did not expect Hawaii to
be attacked, but we realized that war was imminent. We felt we
needed more training so that we could properly conduct a war.
69. General Russell. Just what type of training, Colonel ?
Colonel Brooks. War training, sir, to get out into the field. We
were having plenty of gun drill and things around the barracks, but
we didn't get into the field enough.
70. General Russell. You mean, for maneuvers involving the tac-
tical employment of the artillery?
Colonel Brooks. Out in the field; yes.
71. General Russell. Now, you state. Colonel, that you were out
in the woods with your battery, from December 7 until you were re-
lieved from duty, as I understood your evidence.
Colonel Brooks. Well, sir, until I was relieved as a Battery Com-
mander, sir. I was in this position, moved to one other position, and
then I was put on a battalion staff; but I was in the woods all the
time; yes, sir.
72. General Russell. The point I was attempting to develop is
this — that after the attack of December 7, and until you left Hawaii,
your division was out in defensive positions?
Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir; all the time.
73. General Russell. You remained out there all the time?
Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir.
74. General Russell. And that was for how long, after Decem-
ber 7?
Colonel Brooks. I left about the 18th, I believe it was, of August,
sir, and it was still out there then.
PROCEEDINGS OP ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 515
[990] 75. General Russell. Now, Colonel, between the date of
November 27 and December 7, if you can fix that time definitely; if
not, we will say from the middle of November until the attack, was
there any change at all in your operations ?
Colonel Brooks. Just the alert, sir, that we were put on.
76. General Russell. And that was when ? On or about the 27th ?
Colonel Brooks, Yes, sir; on or about; some time around there.
Now, these figures I gave you, about 50% of the officers staying on
the Post, may have been wrong; it may have been that 90% had to
stay on ; but I knew that a certain percentage had to stay on the Post
at all times,~and that was part of our alert plan.
77. General Russell. To what extent did this sabotage alert affect
or interfere with your normal training, such as it was at that time ?
Colonel Brooks. It did not interfere at all, sir. We went right
ahead with the training, and if we had to go off the Post that was all
right, because we had our guns and everything with us.
78. General Russell. I think those are the only questions I have.
That is all.
79. General Grunert. On this selection of a new position, was it
normal to select new positions from time to time, in order that, in
case the old positions might have been located by Japanese agents,
the new positions would have been available, or were these new posi-
tions selected because they gave a better field of fire and gave you a
better chance to carry out your mission?
Colonel Brooks. Well, sir, I think we would call this [991]
more or less a continuing process. Occasionally we would go out on
trips with the Battalion Comander, or without him, and the Battalion
Commander would go out by himself, and we would search the area
for battery positions. We had to do that in many cases where we
could not occupy the positions, because, as you know, many of them,
much of the land was field — sugar cane and pineapple and things like
that — and we couldn't go through those areas. However, we could
select battery positions that we might occupy in the future, and we
did that; and it just happened that in the first field, on one of these
trips, we found this very fine location for a battery position, the Bat-
talion Commander and myself. We immediately made arrangements
to use it, although I doubt that we would have been able to use it in
peacetime, because they would not let us. That is why we could not
build the road. We had to go through private property.
80. General Frank. From time to time, the crops would change, and
you had to change your plans accordingly, is that correct?
Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir. Very fortunately, this position we se-
lected, being a very fine one, did not depend upon the crops, sir. This
was one of the few that it wouldn't make any difference whether the
cane was there or cut down,
81. General Grunert. I have one more question, I believe you
stated, or you gave me the impression, that you got most of your infor-
mation about the international situation and the imminence of war
from the papers.
Colonel Brooks, And magazines; yes, sir,
82. General Grunert, It was stated that in one of the Hawaiian
papers, on November 30, there appeared a big headline to the [992]
effect that there might be an attack on Hawaii within the next week ;
516 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
which is practically what happened. Do you happen to recall that
scare headline?
Colonel Brooks. I don't recall that one, sir, but I realized that
things like that had been said. I don't believe any of us realized how
true that was.
83. General Frank. Did you know how naval operations fitted into
the defense picture ?
Colonel Brooks. No, sir; just in a very general way. No, sir; I
didn't know that.
84. General Frank. Was there some understanding or belief with
respect to that ?
Colonel Brooks. I understand only, sir, that the Navy made their
patrols, and they had one third of their force at sea at all times. I
did know, because I talked to some naval officers.
85. General Frank. Was there some understanding or belief among
the rank and file of the officers, that the naval patrols were sufficiently
effective, that you could expect a warning of an impending attack?
Colonel Brooks. No, sir; I didn't ever believe that, sir.
86. General Frank. Did you think you would get some sort of
warning before an attack came?
Colonel Brooks. I will say I would think that there would be a
good chance of that, but not definite; no, sir.
87. General Frank. I am trying to analyze a little bit this state-
ment that you made in which you said that you just didn't ever think
that there would be an attack on Oahu.
Colonel Brooks. An original attack; that's right sir. [99o]
We thought if there was an attack it would be made somewhere else,
first, and might develop to Hawaii. We did not realize the initial at-
tack. In other words, we felt we had plenty of time to prepare the
ground defenses, if we thought much about it, at all, but because of
the fact the attack would be made somewhere else, first: That was
perhaps the prevailing thought, there; and, as I say, that is just an
impression. I may be wrong, but I think that is the way most of
them thought.
88. General Frank. For the air defense, was your aviation operat-
ing ? They had to have some sort of warning ?
Colonel Brooks. We knew of their patrol, sir. We saw these" PBYs
flying around on their regular patrol, and we knew that they made
these dawn patrols all the time.
89. General Frank. Did you see those ? You felt that they were go-
ing out almost daily?
Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. We had been told they were.
That is, not officially, but I had been told. I talked to the aviators.
We all swam at the same pool, and so forth, and they talked about
their dawn patrols, these PI3Ys, and how they went around there. In
fact, the lieutenants were very sure that nothing could happen, be-
cause they had their PBYs out "there.
90. General Grunert. What was the feeling about Sundays? Wa?
that an off day for everybody ?
Colonel Brooks. We didn't work. We would play tennis and var
ious other things. Yes, sir ; it was.
91. General Grunert. Did you see any PBYs making reconnais-
sances on Sunday ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 517
Colonel Brooks. I saw planes flying, many a Sunday; [W]
yes, sir.
92. General Grunert. Did you see any flying, that Sunday, De-
cember 7 ?
Colonel Brooks. Not before that time. The first plane — well, I
wasn't out, sir; I wouldn't know. I didn't come out until I heard
some explosions and looked out ; and they were Jap planes that I saw.
93. General Grunert. Are there any other questions? There ap-
pear to be none. Thank you very much for coming up and giving us
what you know about that picture.
We will meet again in about ten minutes, when the next witness
comes.
(Brief recess.)
STATEMENT OF SERGEANT GEOEGE E. ELLIOTT, HEADQUARTEES
COMPANY, STATION COMPLEMENT; CAMP LEE, VA.
(The witness was sworn by the Kecorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Sergeant, will you state to the Board your name,
rank, organization, and station.
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir. Sergeant George E. Elliott, Head-
quarters Company, Station Complement; Camp Lee, Va.
2. General Grunert. Sergeant, this Board is attempting to get at
the facts, both as to what happened before and as to what led up to
Pearl Harbor. Through a study of the congressional hearings on a
resolution which indirectly brought this Board into being, we found,
there, a reference to your name and your assignment in Hawaii at
the time, and we understood from that reference that you, at the time,
were connected with the Air Warning Service, and probably were
with Sergeant [995] Lockard at the radar station known as
Opana.
Sergeant Elliott. That is right, sir.
3. General Grunert. So we asked you to come up here to tell us
about that, and to answer our questions concerning it.
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.
4. General Grunert. General Frank will ask you some questions,
and we hope to get at some facts through those questions.
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir. Sir, I would like to make one correc-
tion. Sergeant Lockard was not a Sergeant at the time. He was a
private.
5. General Grunert. He was a private, at the time?
Sergeant Elliott. At the time of "Pearl Harbor ; yes, sir.
6. General Grunert. All right.
7. General Frank. Sergeant, what was your rank, on the morning
of December 7, 1941?
Sergeant Elliott. I was a private, sir.
8. General Frank. To what organization did you belong?
Sergeant Elliott. I belonged, sir, to the Signal Company, Aircraft
Warning, Hawaii.
9. General Frank. What were your duties on that morning?
Sergeant Elliott. That particular morning, we had a problem, and
my duties were to plot the approach of targets that we picked up on
518 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
our detector — to plot them and send them in to our information center.
10. General Frank. Let us be a little more specific as to what
your duties were. Did you operate the machine called the oscillo-
scope ?
Sergeant Elliott. No, sir; I did not.
[W6] 11. General Frank. You were the plotter?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.
12. General Frank. From whom did you get your information, to
make your plots ?
Sergeant Elliott. I received information from Private Lockard,
as to the plots I would make.
13. General Frank. How much training had you had?
Sergeant Elliott. I had two weeks' training on plotting, at that
]:)articular time.
14. General Frank. Did your assignment require you to have any
technical knowledge of the operation of the radar equipment.
Sergeant Elliott. No, sir ; it did not. I might add, sir, that having
technical knowledge would make one a better operator.
15. General Frank. But it did not affect your plotting?
Sergeant Elliott. No, sir.
16. General Frank. How frequently had you been on this duty?
Sergeant Elliott. Well, sir, I had only been on it the two weeks
previous to Pearl Harbor.
17. General Frank. How many times had you been doing this
work?
Sergeant Elliott. I might clear that up, sir, by saying that I had
only been in the outfit for about three months, and actually, on a
detector, I had only had about two weeks, actually, in operation.
18. General Frank. As a plotter?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir. The other time was spent in setting
up the unit and doing regular compan}^ duty, [997] previously
to that.
19. General Frank. Prior to the morning in question, how much
activity had you had in the operation of the station? How much
daily activity had you had, early in the morning?
Sergeant Eliott. Well, ^ir, I didn't operate every day, but at that
time we were operating three hours a day.
20. General Frank. On the days on which you operated, how much
activity did you have early in the morning?
Sergeant Elliott. Sir, do you mean as to the targets that were re-
ceived ?
21. General Frank. Yes, as to the number of planes that were out,
that you picked up.
Sergeant Elliott. Well, sir, I don't exactly remember.
22. General Fr^vnk. What I am trying to ascertain is whether, on
the morning of December 7, there was more activity than usual, or
whether there was less activity than usual ; or was it average?
Sergeant Ellio'i^t. Well, sir, during our problem, on Sunday, there
was practically no activity, at all.
23. General Frank. Prior to this time ?
Sergeant Elliott. Prior to 7 o'clock ; yes, sir. We had no plots to
send in to our information center, and had no targets.
24. General Frank. That is, on this morning of December 7 ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 519
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir. Previously, on days before that, there
were, I would say, probably around 25 targets sent in. I don't re-
member for sure, but just a guess.
25. General Frank. That is, on weekdays ?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.
[998] 26. General Frank. There was general conversation
around the operating room as to the manner and the satisfactoriness
of the operation of the set, was there ?
Sergeant Elliott. No, sir ; the set was operating satisfactorily dur-
ing the problem. However, we had had trouble with the oil pump on
the generator, previously ; that is, the day before Pearl Harbor ; and
from the time we reported on the air, which was about 4 : 15 in the
morning, till 7 o'clock, we had no discrepancies in operation.
[999] 27. General Grunert. Was that oil pump just a tempo-
rary disability?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.
28. General Grunert. That could easily be fixed and was fixed ?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.
29. General Frank. That was an oil pump on the engine of your
generating set ?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir, on the engine, to generate power.
30. General Frank. Yes. How did your communications work be-
tween 3'our radar set and the information center ?
Sergeant Elliott. Very well, sir. We had direct communication.
We had two lines of communication. We had a tactical line on which
we sent the plots in directly to the information center, and we also had
an administrative line.
31. General Frank. Did you communicate the plotted positions?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes.
32. General Frank. Or did somebody else do that?
Sergeant Elliott. Well, sir, at that time there were no plots to send
in, as I remember.
33. General Frank. But when there were plots to send in, you did
that?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir. The plotter has the head set that is
connected with the information center.
34. General Frank. There were no difficulties with your 270 radar
set on that morning ?
Sergeant Elliott. None that I know of, sir.
35. General Frank. All right. It was operated by motor [^000]
generator rather than by commercial current ?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.
36. General Frank. Had your motor generator been working all
right except for that oil pump trouble the day before?
Sergeant Elliott. Previously, yes, sir.
37. General Frank. Do you know whether or not that were plenty
of spare parts and spare tubes for the set?
Sergeant Elliott. That, I am sure there were, sir.
38. General Frank. Did you consider the set dependable?
Sergeant Elliott. Very much, sir.
39. General Frank. Where was the location of the set at Opana
Point with respect to the Kahuku Point radio station?
520 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Sergeant Elliott, I believe, sir, it was between two and three miles.
40. General Frank. Back toward the hills ?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.
41. General Frank. Was it on an elevation so that the line of sight
was above the Kahuku Point radio towers ?
Sergeant Elliott. I believe it was, sir. Yes, sir. It was 526 feet
above sea level.
42. General Frank. All right. There was no interference with
the Kahuku Point radio station, with the operation of the set ?
Sergean Elliott. That, sir, I can't answer that, although there
may possibly have been, at that particular azimuth.
43. General Frank. Who was operating the set ?
Sergeant Elliott. At what time, sir ?
44. General Frank. Who was operating the set when you first
[lOOl] picked up any planes ? You stated that it was very quiet
and you didn't pick up any airplanes prior to about 7 o'clock?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.
45. General Frank. And who was operating the set when you did
pick up some airplanes ?
Sergeant Elliott. Well, that, sir, is: after our problem was over
at 7 o'clock, I was to get further instruction in the operation of the
oscilloscope, and at that time I was at the controls. However, Lock-
ard was instructing me as to the different echoes that I would see,
and it was at that time that the flight was noticed by Private Lockard.
46. General Frank. Well, when he first noticed the flight did he
take over the operation of the* oscilloscope, or did he leave you with it?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir; he took over the operation of the
oscilloscope because it was just something completely out of the
ordinary.
47. General Frank. And unusual?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.
48. General Frank. All right. And you remember about what
time that was ?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir; by our clock at the unit it was two
minutes after seven.
49. General Frank. Was a plotting made of the planes that they
picked up ?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir. After insisting for quite some time
on my part, there was a plot made.
50. General Frank. Well, who made the plots ?
Sergeant Elliott. I made the plots, sir, and sent them [10021
in. I spoke to the switchboard operator at the information center.
I spoke over the administrative telephone line.
51. General Frank. Will you look at that (indicating) ? Is that
a copy of your plot sheet ?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir; this one starting here (indicating a
plot).
52. General Frank. You made that on this morning?
Sergeant Elliott. This one particular flight, yes, sir. The others
were entered after this particular flight was marked.
53. General Frank. And after you went off duty?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 521
54, General Frank. We shall mark that as the next exhibit and put
it in the record.
Please have the record show that this is the same plotting sheet
to which General Colton referred in his testimony, and the witness has
testified that he made the plot starting from north of Oahu at 7 : 02
a. m. and extending down to 7 : 30 a. m.
(Radar plotting sheet of December 7, 1941, was marked Exhibit
No. 15 and received in evidence.)
55. General Frank. Will you please give a description of the se-
quence of events as they developed from the time you picked up that
flight coming in?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir. After picking up the flight Private
Lockard took over the controls of the oscilloscope. I went to the plot-
ting table and asked Private Lockard to give me a target on it,
which he did. After getting the plot I suggested that we send it in
to our information centers ; and [1003] since our problem had
been over at 7 o'clock. Private Lockard looked at me and laughed and
told me I was crazy for wanting to send m that reading.
56. General Frank. Why ?
Sergeant Elliott. That I do not know, sir. I presume, sir, that
it was because our problem had been over at 7 o'clock. But I kept
talking about the plot and sending it in ; and, as an example, I stated
that even if it was the Navy planes coming in, that if the Army was
to send up interceptors to intercept those planes it would make a fine
problem. And finally, after talking about it for a while, why, he
told me to go ahead and send it in if I wanted to, which I did.
I called the information center on the administrative line and spoke
to the switchboard operation at the information center, who was
Corporal McDonald. He was Private McDonald at that time. I
explained to him what we had picked up, and he stated that he didn't
know what to do about it, as there wasn't anybody at the information
center. I asked him to get somebody that would know what to do.
So with that we hung up.
Later, Private McDonald called back to the unit. At this time
Private Lockard answered the phone, and he spoke to the officer
referred to in the Roberts report ; and the information given Lockard —
it was told to me through Lockard — was to forget it; and after he
was given that information to forget it, he wanted to shut the unit
down.
57. General Frank. Who wanted to shut it down ?
Sergeant Elliott. Private Lockard wanted to shut the unit down,
and since I was to get the instruction on it I wanted to continue opera-
tion. Finally, after insisting on that, we did [1004-1; continue
the flight and completing the flight on this chart which you have just
shown me before, sir, and we followed the flight all the way in until it
was approximately 15 or 25 miles from the Island of Oahu, and the
flight was lost. It was lost due to technical reasons, that it was an
impossibility to detect it any further.
The oscilloscope, from the beam that is sent out, has a back echo,
and at that particular spot the oscilloscope is blank, and it is impos-
sible to pick up any flight whatsoever at that particular point, and
that was as far as we could follow the flight, and at approximately
522 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
7 : 39 is when Ave started to shut down the unit, and at 7 : 45 our truck
came from our camp (incidentally, which was nine miles away from
the unit) to pick us up to take us to breakfast, and upon arriving at
the camp, why, we had found out what had happened at Pearl Harbor.
58. General Frank. What had happened ?
Sergeant Elliott. Well, the Japanese had struck, sir.
59. General Frank. Did you make any attempt to look for the
planes in the direction in which they had come in on your plot from
the Opana position?
Sergeant Elliott. No, sir.
60. General Frank. You didn't have any suspicion?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.
61. General Frank. That they were Japanese planes ?
Sergeant Elliott. Well, at the time, no, sir, we didn't have any
suspicion they were Japanese planes, although it was just something
out of the ordinary and did create a curiosity in us; and, however,
we did, as I remember it now, go outside of the unit, and tried to
see planes from our location at the [lOOS] unit, although we
couldn't see any.
62. General Frank. Well, if there was no suspicion of their being
Japanese planes, and you wanted to get instruction in the operation
of the oscilloscope, why did Lockard take it away from you?
Sergeant Elliott. Well, that, sir, I do not know, because I never
went back to the oscilloscope until after.
63. General Frank. If it was instruction that you were after, that
was a right good opportunity to get it, wasn't it ?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir. Incidentally, sir, the reason why I
could not get the instruction during the problem was the fact that
it would take an experienced man to operate that unit and pick up
those flights efficiently. But I was just as pleased, sir, to be able
to plot it, because it actually was the first flight that was out at
that distance that I was able to plot.
64. General Frank. How far out did you pick it up; do you
remember ?
Sergeant Elliott. Well, at the very beginning, sir, it was 137
miles.
65. General Grunert. Are there any questions?
66. General Kussell. Sergeant, was there any interruption in the
operation of the oscilloscope that morning?
Sergeant Elliott. None that I know of, sir.
67. General Russell. Then, it would be a legitimate conclusion
that just as soon as these planes came within range you would pick
them up?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir,
68. General Russell, The point I was attempting to make
\1006] definite is that there wasn't any period of time there be-
tween the end of the problem and your continued practice when the
oscilloscope was not functioning.
Sergeant Elliott. No, sir, there was no time. I am sure there
wasn't. Another point, sir, that I might bring out, our clock at the
unit I said showed 7:02 at the time that we sent in the first plot.
However, when I was ordered, over the plotting set while we were
operating the problem, to shut down, the time by the clock there
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 523
was 6 : 54, and I can't remember as to whether we had made any time
check whatsoever that morning.
69. General Russell. Now, Sergeant, had you been on any Sunday
problem prior to this morning of December 7th?
Sergeant Elliott. I really can't recall whether I was, sir. I don't
believe so.
70. General Russell. Could you tell the Board on how many prob-
lems you had been, on any days prior to December 7, 1941?
Sergeant Elliott. I believe, sir, that that actually was the first
problem that I had been on, although I had operated.
71. General Russell. At this same station?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.
72. General Russell. Well, about how many other mornings had
you operated?
Sergeant Elliott. Well, the only time that I operated, sir, was
when I was having regular instruction after the operating time of
the problem.
73. General Russell. Then, that would be after 7 o'clock?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.
[1007] 74. General Russell. Early in your testimony you re-
ferred to the fact that on other occasions — t believe you described
those occasions as ordinary days.
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.
75. General Russell. — you would pick up as many as 25 targets?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.
76. General Russell. Had that been true on all of the other occa-
sions when you had been receiving instruction out there?
Sergeant Elliott. Pretty much, sir. Yes, sir.
77. General Russell. Do you know what those targets were that
you had picked up on these other days ?
Sergeant Elliott. Well, no, sir, other than that they were just
routine flights and planes in the air.
78. General Russell. About how long were those periods when you
would pick up as many as 25 targets ?
Sergeant Elliott. Well, sir, I would say that was wnthin a 2- or
3-hour period.
79. General Russell. Beginning after 7 o'clock each time?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.
80. General Russell. Then, you had not been on one of the operat-
ing sets prior to 7 o'clock before this morning of December 7th ?
Sergeant Elliott. No, sir. My memory isn't quite clear on that,
but I don't believe I was, sir.
81. General Frank. But you had been a plotter?
Sergeant Elliot. Yes, sir, I had been a plotter.
82. General Russell. Do you know why you were sent out on this
particular Sunday morning. Sergeant?
\1008] Sergeant Elliot. Yes, sir. We were sent out there on
Saturday afternoon. We were sent out there for the purpose of —
well, at that time during peacetime it wasn't guarding the unit,
although we had a firearm out there ; we had a .45 pistol and I believe
it was seven rounds of ammunition, but the purpose in our being out
there was just to be on the unit in case any prowlers or anyone should
come around. It wasn't a regular guard post or a walking post or
524 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
anything of that nature, but it did call for two men to be present at
all times at the unit.
83. General Rossell. The equipment was left out there continu-
ously, then ?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.
84. General Russell. Your presence was antisabotage, was it?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.
85. General Russell. Now, how long had that set been in at this;
point, if you know ?
Sergeaiit Elliott. We had started putting it in, sir, about two weeks
before Pearl Harbor. No, sir. We moved out to that location in
November, the early part of November, and setting up the unit took
about two weeks, and the other two weeks was previous to Peail
Harbor.
86. General Russell. Now, how long had you been with this signal
outfit?
Sergeant Elliott. Well, just a period of three months before Pearl
Harbor, sir.
87. General Russell. Do you recall when the first mobile sets were
received and installed?
Sergeant Elliott. That, sir, I couldn't answer, as I was [1009]
in the Air Corps at that time, and when I was transferred to the signal
company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii, they had already had some oi
their location picked out and other units in operation.
88. General Russell. When was that?
Sergeant Elliott. Well, upon my transfer it was the 15th of Sep-
tember in '40, sir ; '41.
89. General Russell. When you were transferred over to the signal
outfit from the Air Corps — I want to get this definite and know that
you are accurate in the statement — some locations had been selected
and some of the units were in operation ?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir; they were.
90. General Russell. And that was in September ?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.
91. General Russell. Sergeant, in reporting these flights or targets
that you had discovered out there on ordinary days, did you know or
were you told what any of these flights were ?
Sergeant Elliott. I don't quite get your point, sir. You mean?
92. General Russell. You discovered the flights after 7 o'clock?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.
93. General Russell. Every target that you had discovered or
worked out here before had been after 7 o'clock in the morning?
Sergeant Elliott. I am sure it was, yes, sir.
94. General Russell. And this is the first target that you had ever
discovered before 7 o'clock, because it Avas the first time you had been
on duty before 7 o'clock ?
Sergeant Elliott. You are referring, sir, to the enemy [lOlO]
planes that we picked up on the morning of the 7th?
95. General Russell. Yes, sir.
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir; I think it was shortly after 7 o'clock,
sir.
96. General Russell. Yes, but prior to this morning you had never
been on duty before 7 o'clock ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 525
Sergeant Elliott. I am sure that I wasn't sir.
97. General Frank. Do you mean that this is the first time that
you ever went on duty around 4 o'clock?
Sergeant Elliott. I am sure it was ; yes, sir.
98. General Frank. Well, what time were you on duty this morn-
ing?
Sergeant Elliott. You see, sir, we were on duty from 4 until 7
operating the unit, but we had been out at the station since Saturday
afternoon at 12 o'clock, the day before Sunday.
99. General Frank. Do you know whether or not this unit was
operated daily?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir, it was.
100. General Frank. Starting at what time?
Sergeant Elliott. Well, at that time I don't remember, sir, just
how long we had been operating from 4 to 7. I don't believe it was
long. But that was the operating time that we had been operating.
101. General Frank. I'rom 4 to 7?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.
102. General Frank. But you had not been out there before at
4 o'clock?
[1011] Sergeant Elliott. No, sir.
103. General Frank. Were you a regular plotter ?
Sergeant Elliott. No, sir; still in the process of learning. This
covers a period of two weeks that I learned the plotter's dut3\ This
two weeks' time, sir, was during the daytime when there was no prob-
lem scheduled where it called for experienced men to be operating.
104. General Frank. Oh. Well, then, you were not the regularly
assigned plotter? You just happened to be there getting instruc-
tion; is that correct?
Sergeant Elliott. Well, I had had my instruction ; I was a qualified
plotter at that time.
105. General Frank. But you were not the regular, assigned
plotter for that station ; is that correct ?
Sergeant Elliott. Well, no, sir. We never actually had a regular,
assigned plotter, sir. The men that had the duty were just men that
were assigned. They may not be assigned at the same time each time
they were assigned. It was just those that were called to make up
a crew for the particular time that we oj^erated. We didn't have
enough men to make complete groups.
106. General Frank. I have nothing further.
[10121 107. Colonel Grunert. The problems you referred to
were the exercises between 4 and 7 each morning; is that correct?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.
108. General Grunert. The rest of the day was spent in instruction
and training, quite often spent on the set; not particularly engaged
in trying to get any particular thing out of the air or any problem
out of the air ?
Sergeant Elliott. No, sir, other than just for purposes of training.
109. General Grunert. As a plotter at the radar station it was none
of your business to be informed as to what was in the air, whether
Navy, Marine, or Army craft ?
Sergeant Elliott. No, sir.
110. General Grunert. You plotted everything you found there?
526 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Sergeant Elliott. That is right, sir.
111. General Grunert. And sent tliat to the information center,
and it was tlieir business to know what was in the air, whether it was
friendly or enemy craft?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir. At the information center, sir, they
had officers from the Navy, the Army, the Coast Artillery, and so forth,
and Air Corps officers, and so forth, and they all had information as
to the flights that their particular branch was sending out. But after
that is plotted on the plotting table, any flight that they cannot account
for, any one of the different branches, it is considered an enemy plane.
That was the procedure. We were never notified out there as to what
the target was that we had picked up. '
112. General Grunert. Can you tell from the radar how many
[1013] planes there are in a certain flight ?
Sergeant Elliott. No, sir.
113. General Grunert. Can you tell whether there are a lot of planes
or just one?
Sergeant Elliott. In the case of the morning of the 7th, when there
was such a large flight, we knew it was a large flight.
114. General Grunert. How did you know it was a large flight if
the machine did not tell you ?
Sergeant Elliott. Just by the appearance on the oscilloscope, sir.
115. General Grunert. Then jou can tell whether it is a volume of
planes or a single plane ?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir. At particular distances, sir, if there
was only one or a few planes we could tell they were only a few. How-
ever, if there is a large number of planes we could tell that there was a
large number of planes and know that it was not just a few.
116. General Grunert. Do you suppose that that is what excited
Lockard when the machine showed there was a large number of planes
and he took it over for himself ?
Sergeant Elliott. Sir, as to exactly what happened there : The oscil-
loscope has a main pulse. That main pulse to the extreme left is the
zero point in the mileage scale ; and what Lockard thought that morn-
ing was that the mileage scale was off, and he went to check it from
the main pulse and found that what he thought was the main pulse
was this flight, and he checked it and rechecked it and found that it was
not the main pulse; that it was actually a flight. It was from then
on that [^014] Private Lockard operated.
117. General Grunert. One more question : Did you know any-
thing about some bombers or planes expected from the mainland on
that morning?
Sergeant Elliott. No, sir ; we did not know that. I did not know
it at that time.
118. General Grunert. Thank you verj^ much for coming up,
Sergeant, and giving us that information.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
TESTIMONY OF FIRST IT. JOSEPH L. LOCKARD, SIGNAL CORPS,
UNITED STATES ARMY
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Will you state to the Board your name, rank,
organization, and station?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 527
Lieutenant Lockaed. Joseph L. Lockard, First Lieutenant, Signal
Corps, 01634176, 934th Signal Battalion, Esler Field, Louisiana.
2. General Grunert. The Board is trying to get at the facts about
what happened before or just prior to and leading up to the attack on
Hawaii. We understand, from reports of the Roberts Commission,
that you have information that will be of assistance to the Board,
particularly as to what happened at the radar station, known, I believe,
as Opana ; and that you have some information about the information
center of the air warning system in Hawaii at that time. In your
testimony please be careful to give us what you actually remember of
that time, and not colored by what has happened since.
[lOlS] Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir.
3. General Grunert. General Frank will propound the questions.
4. General Frank. What was your rank on the morning of Decem-
ber 7, 1941 ?
Lieutenant Lockard. I was a third-class specialist, sir.
5. General Frank. A private?
Lieutenant Lockard. Under the old specialist system I had a third-
class specialist rating.
6. General Frank. To what organization did you belong at that
time?
Lieutenant Lockard. S. C, A, W., H. — Signal Corps, Aircraft
Warning, Hawaii, was all the designation we knew at that time.
7. General Frank. What were your duties on that morning? Did
you have any regularly assigned duties?
Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir. Under the hours we were working at
that time, Sundays and holidays called for operation from 4 until 7
o'clock ; that is, a. m. I was assigned, and Private Elliott and myself
were sent to operate the station for that particular Sunday, those
particular hours.
8. General Frank. How long had you been on duty with that
station ?
Lieutenant Lockard. We moved that station from Schofield Bar-
racks and set it up around Thanksgiving time. I cannot give you
the exact date.
9. General Frank. Was it in September or October?
Lieutenant Lockard. It was in November. It had formerly
[10 16] been set up in Schofield, and they were planning a more
appropriate coverage with the equipment,
10. General Frank. Do you remember when those sets arrived from
the mainland?
Lieutenant Lockard. I cannot be exactly definite about that. It
was the latter part of July or the first part of August. That is the
first I knew.
11. General Frank. That is the best your memory serves you?
Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir.
12. General Frank. How long had you been there ?
Lieutenant Lockard. I landed there on the 10th of December.
1940.
13. General Frank. How long had you been on this type of work ?
Lieutenant Lockard. Since we ha'd the equipment.
14. General Frank. How much training had you had ?
528 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Lieutenant Lockard. As far as any school was concerned, we did
not have any.
15. General Frank. How did you get your instruction?
Lieutenant Lockard. Instruction was by actual work with the
equipment.
16. General Fraxk. Somebody must have explained it to you.
Lieutenant Lockard. Well, sir, there were three or four that knew
the equipment, and they trained the rest of the crews in the operation
of it.
17. General Frank. At Schofield Barracks?
Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir.
18. General Frank. When did you start on this work?
Lieutenant Lockard. You mean, on operation ?
\10tr\ 19. General Frank. Yes.
Lieutenant Lockard. Around the first part of August.
20. General Frank. You had been in training and operating it
since August?
Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir.
21. General Frank, The set itself had been set up and in condition
to be operated for how long?
Lieutenant Lockard. This particular set ?
22. General Frank. Yes ; up until the 7th of December.
Lieutenant Lockard. The one at Opana ?
23. General Frank. Yes.
Lieutenant Lockard. We installed it right around Thanksgiving,
in November, and of course it was in operation from then on.
24. General Frank. Had they had some exercises or maneuvers
along the first part of November in which they used this set?
Lieutenant Lockard. I do not know whether they had maneuvers.
I know we were making special tracks.
25. General Frank. Were you the regular assigned operator of the
set, or only one of several who operated the set?
Lieutenant Lockard. Well, sir, that particular unit had a crew of
six.
26. General Frank. Six operators, or six total ?
Lieutenant Lockard. Total, sir.
27. General Frank. How many operators?
Lieutenant Lockard. They were all operators and everything else
too.
28. General Frank. You were all under training for those jobs?
Lieutenant Lockard. Well, sir, at that time we were S^1018'\
getting in some more men from other units whom we were supposed
to train to the extent of our knowledge.
29. General Frank. Was the set operating efiiciently?
Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir; it had been said before that it was
the best operating set of the seven that we had.
30. General Frank. How did your communications work from the
radar site at Opana to the information center ?
Lieutenant Lockard. They seemed to work all right, sir.
31. General Frank. No difficufty?
Lieutenant Lockard. No, sir ; we had field wire down to the high-
way where it tied in with one of the cables.
32. General Frank. Did you have any difficulty with the 270 radar
set itself?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 529
Lieutenant Lockard. At that time ?
33. General Frank. Yes.
Lieutenant Lockard. Well, minor difficulties: yes, sir. It was
rather a crude set, and there were certain little things that they prob-
ably had not been able to see beforehand which made operation a
little difficult at times.
34. General Frank. You are saying it was a rather crude set ?
Lieutenant Lockard. I did not mean it exactly that way, sir.
35. General Frank. That is in the light of your having seen much
better sets in the meantime, is it not ?
Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir.
36. General Frank. At the time you were operating it you thought
it was a pretty good set, did you not ?
Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir.
37. General Frank. Was it operated by commercial current or
[lOW] by current from the motor generator?
Lieutenant Lockard. We had commercial power installed when we
first went there. When we first went up there to that site we were
operating off LeEoys, but shortly after that we got commercial power.
38. General Frank. Shortly after what?
Lieutenant Lockard. Shortly after we were completely set up.
39. General Frank. On what date were you completely set up ?
Lieutenant Lockard. Around Thanksgiving.
40. General Frank. On December 7 was the set being operated by
commercial current or current from a motor generator ?
Lieutenant Lockard. Commercial current.
41. General Frank. Sergeant Elliott was a witness here a few
minutes ago, and he stated that they had some trouble with the set
the day before. That would be on the 6th of December. He said the
oil pump went out on the motor generator.
Lieutenant Lockard. Oh, yes, sir. I think it was the battery gen-
erator; I am not sure. I cannot say for sure, sir, which it was.
42. General Frank. What I am trying to get at is this : Were ypu
operating with a motor generator or were you using commercial
current ?
Lieutenant Lockard. We had to run the generator; we had to keep
it in operating condition. We had to run it every day.
43. General Frank. But it was not in continuous operation, was it?
Lieutenant Lockard. No, sir.
[1020] 44. General Frank. Did you have plenty of spare parts
and spare tubes for your radar sets ?
Lieutenant Lockard. No, sir ; we did not. Some of the most essen-
tial parts were rather scarce on the Island, such as the rectifier tubes
and transmitter tubes.
45. General Frank. Did you ever have to put the set out of com-
mission for lack of spare parts or for lack of tubes ?
Lieutenant Lockard. We did not put it out of commission, sir.
We had a rectifier tube go out on us, and we ran it on one rectifier
tube, which it will do. You only get about 6 kva out of it, but it did
give us some operation until we could get down to Kawela and get
a tube.
46. General Frank. There were spare parts and tubes on the Is-
land, were there not ?
79716— 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1 35
530 CONGRESSIOXAL IX\'ESTIGATIOX FEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Lieutenant Lockard. I do not know. sir. All I know is that we did
not have one. There was some sort of an arrangement whereby, if the
tubes went out, as they went out the stations that were least important
would be shut down and those other stations would use their tubes.
47. General Fr.\nk. Let us ^et back to another question I asked
you. Did you ever have to close down that station or that set because
of the lack of spare parts or tubes? Do yo^i remember?
Lieutenant Lockakd. I do not think I can truthfully say one way or
the otlier, sir.
48. General Frank, ^'ou do not remembei-. that is, ever having been
closed down for lack of spare parts or tubes?
Lieutenant Lockard. Xo. sir.
40. General Fraxk. Or do you ?
[1021] Lieutenant L<jckard. I cannot sa}', sir.
50. General Fraxk. You do not remember ?
Lieutenant Lockard. Xo, sir.
51. General Fraxk. Did you consider the set a dependable set?
Lieutenant Lockard. At that time?
52. General Fraxk. Yes, of course.
Li e^^itenant Lockard. Yes, sir ; I thought it was pretty good. I think
everybody else did.
53. General Frank. How high above sea level was the site on wliich
the set was installed?
Lieutenant Lockard. H?/) feet. sir.
54. General Fraxk. "Was that high enough to get it above the
Kahuku Point radio tower ?
Lieutenant Lockard. Do you mean above the towers themselves ?
55. General Frank. Yes. Was there anything in front of you to
blanket the set ?
Lieutenant Lock.vrd. Directly in front ?
56. General Fraxk. Any place in front of you. that would blanket
the set.
Lieutenant Lr)CKARD. Well. sir. we had back and side echoes, no mat-
ter which wa}' the antenna was pointing, and it would produce a dead
area approximately, bearing upon the azimaith. from 14 to 22 miles. It
would strike the mountains around us and cause this area of deadness.
57. Geneial Frank. l>ut tlie Kahuku Point ladio towers did not
blanket your set, did they^
[1022] Lieutenarit Locicard. Xot that I can remember, sir.
58. General Fraxk. Did the location of the set at Opana Point re-
sult in any unusoial radio phenomena ?
Lieutenant Locklard. About the only thing that would be unusual
about it was our reception. Most of the men were in accord that it
probably was the best site they had.
59. General Frank. Was there any interference from planes taking
off from the Kahuku Field?
Lieutenant Lockard. Xot any interference ; no. sir.
60. General Frank. That was right in front of yo^a. was it not?
Lieutenant Lockard. Xo, sir ; it was not right in front of us. My
geography is a little hazy.
61. General Frank. It was in your line or sight, was it not?
Lieutenant Lockard. May I look on the map ?
62. General Frank, Yes.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 531
Lieutenant Lockard (after referring to map). I cannot recall its
presenting us with any problem,
63. Genera] Frank. Yon were at the set on the morning of December
7, were you ?
liieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir.
64. General Fraxk. When did you go there ?
Lieutenant Lockard. We went up the night before.
65. General Frank. Did the set start operating on the morning of
December 7th?
Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir. We started operation.
66. General Frank. What time?
Lieutenant Lockard. Around foiir o'clock.
[102S] General Frank. Who operated the set? Who was at
the oscilloscope?
Lieutenant Lockard. I was.
68. General Frank. From what time until what time ?
Lieutenant Lockard. The whole period.
69. General Frank. When did you start?
Lieutenant Lockard. At what time?
70. General Frank. Yes.
Lieutenant Lockard. Around four o'clock.
71. General Frank. What was picked up that morning and at what
times, so far as your memory will serve you ?
Lieutenant Lockard. It was a rather dull morning. There was
not much activity.
72. General Frank. Up until what time? Did you pick up any
planes before seven o'clock?
Lieutenant Lockard. If we did, sir, it was one or two or a small
number.
73. General Frank. When did you pick up this flight that was
coming in from the north ?
Lieutenant Lockard. Around 7 : 02.
74. General Frank. What were the circumstances surrounding the
situation as it existed? Were you at the oscilloscope, or was Elliott?
Lieutenant Lockard. I was still at the oscilloscope, sir. We were
going to close down, but we figured that we might as well play around,
because the truck had not come in yet to take us back for chow. So I
was just checking the adjustments and was t^oing to let Elliott operate
them a while. He had not been in the outfit very long; he was a new
man with [1024-1 ^^s. I was going to let him operate. To me
it looked like two main pulses. That is why I thought there was
something wrong with the equipment, and I was checking to see if
there was anything wrong. Apparently there was not.
75. General Frank. Proceed and tell us what happened.
Lieutenant Lockard. Well, I showed it to Elliott. I fooled around
some more trying to determine exactly whether it was something
coming in or whether it was a defect in the equipment, and finally
decided that it must be a flight of some sort. Since it was the only
activity we had had that morning, I decided to plot it. Elliott
plotted it.
76. General Frank. Who did the plotting?
Lieutenant Lockard. Elliott. We picked it up at 136 miles, and
when it got to 132 we called the information center — it was just a few
532 CONGRESSIOXAL IX^TISTIGATION PE.\EL H.\RBOR ATTACK
minutes after seven — and there was no one. I knew the switchboard
operator there, and I asked if there was anyone around.
77. General Fraxk. You called the information center, or did the
other man ?
[1025] Lieutenant Lockaed. Xo, sir. I was watching the track,
and he made the phone call, and the switchboard operator told us
there was no one around ; so we asked him to look around ; and, con-
trary to regulations, he left the switchboard and looked, and he found
someone : but first, we told liim about what we had, and he told this
individual.
78. General Fraxk. Do you know who that was ?
Lieutenant Lockard. Xo, sir ; I had never seen him.
79. General Fraxk. You do not know whom he told ?
Lieutenant Lockard. I know his name. I think I know his name.
80. General Fraxk. "What was it ?
Lieutenant Lockard. Miller. I believe he was a liaison officer.
81. General Fraxk. Miller, or Twler ?
Lieutenant Lockard. The best that I can remember, sir. it was
Miller.^
82. General Frax'k. All right.
Lieutenant Lockard. This individual — well, the switchboard op-
erator came back and said that, ''O. K. — it's all right," something to
that effect. I can't tell you the conversation any more, because I
haven't too good a memory ; and we insisted — I asked —
83. General Fraxk. You insisted what?
Lieutenant Lockard. I asked the switchboard operator if I couldn't
speak to this person ; which I did ; and I gave him all the informa-
tion that we had — the direction, the mileage, and the apparent size
of whatever it was ; and that was about the end of it, right there.
[1026] 8L General Fraxk. What did he tell you?
Lieutenant Locelard. Well
85. General Gruxert. You are not incriminating anybody. Tell us.
What did he tell you i Did he say, "'Forget it," or that it did not
amount to anything, or what ?
Lieutenant Lockard. Something to that effect. I mean, "O. K."
86. General Fraxk. Did he tell you to forget it, or what did he
Lieutenant Lockard. Well, he didn't — he wasn't very committal.
He just said, "O. K.," or something to that effect — "You needn't"
87. General Fraxk. When you picked it up and had followed it,
so that it had come from 137 or thereabouts down to a shorter distance
from the sight, what did the oscilloscope show? Did it show that it
was a single plane, or that it was a large group of planes ? What was
your interpretation of it ?
Lieutenant Lockard. Well, sir, it was the largest group I had
ever seen on the oscilloscope. It looked, as I said, like a main pulse,
and that is why I was confused, at first, as to whether it was a flight
or not. I had never seen one. It maybe was the exceptional recep-
tion in that particular spot, but it still produced the largest echo
on the 'scope that I had seen.
88. General Fraxk. Did you tell the man, then, at the information
center, that it looked like an unusually large number of planes ?
Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 533
89. General Frank. And that didn't seem to excite him in any
[1027^ way?
Lieutenant Lockard. No, sir.
90. General Frank. "What followed from then on? Did you con-
tinue ?
Lieutenant Lockard. "Well, sir, we went as far as we thought was
reasonably safe in our argument.
91. General Frank. "What do you mean? In your argument with
whom ? "With the man at the information center ?
Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir.
92. General Frank. All right.
Lieutenant Lockard. Then we continued to follow the flight, and to
plot it, till it got within about 22 miles — 20 to 22 miles of the Island,
at which time we lost it in this blacked-out area. Then we pro-
ceeded to close down the station and go back to Kawailoa for break-
fast. The truck had arrived — or, had not arrived, yet, but there
was nothing else working.
93. General Frank. Ihere were no additional targets in the dis-
tance behind that, were there? Do you remember whether or not you
attempted to find out if there were any additional planes in the
distance?
Lieutenant Lockard. "Well, we more or less concentrated on this one
flight. We looked around a little, but as I recall. I don't believe we
noticed anything else. "We would have plotted it, I believe, if we had.
94. General Frank. Do you remember whether you attempted to
find out if there were any more coming in ?
Lieutenant Lockard. Oh, we looked around somewhat.
95. General Frank. "Would you know the plot if you saw it? ]
show you Exhibit 15. Is that the plot of the planes coming [i(9^5]
in, that morning? I refer to the one starting at the top, at 7:02.
Did 3^ou see the plot, that morning, that Private Elliott was making?
Lieutenant Lockard. I glanced at it, sir; but I didn't give it any
particular
96. General Frank. Attention?
Lieutenant Lockard. attention ; no, sir.
97. General Frank. And you would not remember whether or not
that was the plot, then?
Lieutenant Lockard. This plot (indicating) ? Well, I know it is
the plot.
98. General Frank. The witness identifies the plot in this Ex-
hibit 15.
When did you find out that there had been an air attack on Pearl
Harbor?
Lieutenant Lockard. When we got to Kawailoa, sir.
99. General Frank. Did you connect the air attack on Pearl Harbor
with this flight that you had traced in ?
Lieutenant Lockard. Almost immediately. Sergeant Elliott and
myself almost simultaneously seemed to connect it with what we had
previously picked up.
100. General Frank. Did you go back to the station?
Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir; immediately. We passed the rest
of our crew, going to the station, as we were coming back. They
had all their field equipment, and we blew the horn for them to stop,
534 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
but they paid no attention, they kept right on going; so we thought
something was queer, but we had no idea what it was until we got to
Kawailoa.
,101. General Frank, As soon as you got breakfast, you went
{1029^ backtoOpana?
Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir.
102. General Frank. Was the set operated the rest of the morning?
Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir ; it was operated from then on.
103. General Frank. When did you act as an operator after that?
Did you act as an operator any more that morning, or do you not
remember ?
Lieutenant Lockard. I went up and operated in my regular shift,
then.
104. General Frank. When did your shift start, do you remem-
ber?
Lieutenant Lockard. Well, sir, each group had four hours on, and —
let's see — we were divided into three groups, four hours on and eight
hours off: but we had four hours on the 'scope, then four hours
guard, then we had four hours off.
105. General Frank. Did you operate that again, that morning?
Lieutenant Lockard. I didn't operate it in the morning ; no, sir.
106. General Grunert. Are there any other questions?
107. General Russell. How long were you out there, Lieutenant,
after December 7?
Lieutenant Lockard. I left, the 22nd of February, sir.
108. General Russell. Did you continue in the work with radar,
from then on ?
Lieutenant Lockard. Up till about two weeks, three weeks, before
I left; we got seventy some men in our camp area, there, which was
an old, deserted pineapple plantation. There was Sergeant
Hilton
108. General Russell. That is not of very much in-
terest, \^1030'\ Lieutenant. I just wondered if you stayed on
radar from then on until you left.
Lieutenant Lockard. I was ; yes.
110. General Russell. Do you remember receiving, out there, there-
after, or prior to the time that you left, any of those permanent radar
sets?
Lieutenant Lockard. The radar permanent, 271 ?
111. General Russell. The 271s?
Lieutenant Lockard. I know they were putting one at — I am not
quite certain, sir. They were taking them out, taking the equipment
out of the vans, and making permanent installations out of them.
They had that pretty well accomplished when I left Opana.
112. General Russell. 271s? Did you operate a 271 before you
left, out there ?
Lieutenant Lockard. No, sir.
113. General Russell. Have you remained in radar work until
now?
Lieutenant Lockard. No, sir.
114. General Russell. You quit radar work when you left the
Island?
Lieutenant Lockard. It amounts to that, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 535
115. General Russell. Some time prior to December 7, you testified
as far back as August, these mobile sets had been set up and had been
operated at different points on the Island ?
Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir.
116. General Russell. You had been on duty with them con-
stantly, or considerably ?
Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir.
[lOSl] 117. General Russell. You had tracked flights of
planes previously ?
Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir.
118. Greneral Russell. Had you been on duty, on Sunday mornings,
prior to December 7, 1911 ?
Lieutenant Lockard. I may have been, sir. There was no — I can't
say definitely.
119. General Russell. You cannot remember that ? Now, had you
been on duty prior to December 7, 1911, between 4 and 7 a. m., on
any morning?
Lieutenant Lockard. I don't believe so, sir.
120. General Russell. Do you think that this is the only morning
that you had ever been on between 4 and 7 o'clock ?
Lieutenant Lockard. As nearly as I can recall.
121. General Russell. You had been on, on other mornings, after
7 o'clock in the morning ?
Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir ; we started out at 7 in the morning,
on weekdays.
122. General Russell. Did you pick up a lot of targets on these
other mornings, after 7 o'clock ?
Lieutenant Lockard, Yes, sir ; we usually had quite a bit of activity.
123. General Russell. What was that activity, do you know ?
Lieutenant Lockard. The purpose of it ?
124. General Russell. Yes.
Lieutenant Lockard. Well, there was a patrol that used to fly.
125. General Russell. A patrol?
Lieutenant Lockard. The CLIPPER we used to track all the
[10S£] time.
126. General Russell. You followed the patrols and CLIPPERS.
Now, what else ?
Lieutenant Lockard. The practicing aircraft, which may fly to
another island, or around the immediate vicinity.
127. General Russell. How far out would you follow these patrols ?
Lieutenant Lockard. LTntil we lost them, sir.
128. General Russell. How far would that be ?
Lieutenant Lockard. It varied anywhere from 60 to 110, 120 miles,
depending upon their altitude over the water.
129. General Russell. Were these mobile sets set up with cover and
camouflage ?
Lieutenant Lockard. No, sir. They had started sandbagging them.
They didn't start that, though, until after the war started.
130. General Russell. On this particular morning, Lieutenant, did
you pick up any patrol aircraft at all, on the morning of December 7 ?
Lieutenant Lockard. Not that I could identify as such. There may
have been.
536 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
131. General Kussell. Did you pick up any flight, from 4 o'clock
that morning until you came off at 7 : 42 or 7 : 43, whenever you did
come off ?
132. General Frank. That was going away from the Island ?
Lieutenant Lockard. That was going away? Not that I can
remember.
133. General Russell. As nearly as you recall, the only flight that
you picked up, on this morning, was this one flight that [1033]
you have described to us ?
Lieutenant Lockard. The question was asked, before, and as near
as I can remember, there may have been one or two flights.
134. General Grunert. If there were, they were recorded, were
they ? Were they plotted and sent in to the information center ?
Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir.
135. General Grunert. And they should be of record there, if those
records have been kept ?
Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir.
136. General Russell. But you have no independent recollection ?
Lieutenant Lockard. I can't remember, sir.
137. General Russell. I have one more question. Lieutenant, you
were at that time a noncommissioned officer, were you ?
Lieutenant Lockard. On the 7th, sir ?
138. General Russell. Yes.
Lieutenant Lockard. I was not a noncommissioned officer, sir. I
was in charge of my particular shift. I had a "third-class, specialist."
139. General Russell. You knew nothing about the imminence of
war, and you had not been directed to be on the lookout for Japanese
or other hostile planes in that vicinity ?
Lieutenant Lockard. No, sir.
140. General Russell. In other words, you were not "in the know" ?
Lieutenant Lockard. I was not "in the know."
141. General Grunert. All right. Are there any other questions?
Thank you very much. We appreciate your coming up here to help
us out.
[1034] (The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
142. General Grunert. The Board will take up other work, now,
until the witness comes, at 2 o'clock.
(Thereupon, at 11:18 o'clock a. m., a recess was taken until 2
o'clock p. m.)
[103S] AFTERNOON SESSION
(The Board at 2 p. m. continued the hearing of witnesses.)
TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIEAL WILLIAM S. PYE, UNITED STATES
NAVY, EETIRED
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24. )
1. Colonel West. Admiral, will you state to the Board your name,
rank, organization, and station ?
Admiral Pye. William S. Pye, Vice Admiral, United States Navy,
Retired; at present on active duty as President of the Naval War
College, Newport, Rhode Island.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 537
2. General Grunert. Admiral, the Board, in an attempt to get at
facts, is looking into the background and viewpoints prior to and lead-
ing up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is hoped that because of your
assignment with the Pacific Fleet, I understand, in 1941, you can tlirow
some light upon the subject. Our inquiries are limited to a large
extent to any happenings that pertain to the Army, and with that in
view we shall go ahead on some of the questions that have come up in
our study of the Roberts Commission report, together with what testi-
mony we have had heretofore.
Will you please state to the Board just what your position was with
the Pacific Fleet, giving the dates, from any time in 1941 up to and
including December 7 ?
Admiral Pye. On January 31, 1941, I was appointed Commander
Battle Force, United States Pacific Fleet, having been for the year
previous Commander Battleships. I was still acting in this capacity
and, as such, second in command of the Fleet on December 7. In a
previous order issued by the [10361 Commander-in-Chief of
the Pacific Fleet primarily concerning operations I was also detailed
as Commander Task Force 1.
3. General Grunert. During the latter part of 1941, we will say
from about the middle of November until the attack on December 7,
the Fleet was based on Honolulu, Pearl Harbor, was it?
Admiral Pye. It was so based, but a large part of the Fleet was at
sea during a portion of this period.
4. General Grunert. That Fleet I understand at that time had
three task forces.
Admiral Pye. Yes, sir.
5. General Grunert. In any of this testimony you give, Admiral,
if that testimony would be of value to the enemy in future operations,
I wish you would bring that to our attention before you put it in the
record. All this will be secret, of course, but the more we can guard
that the better, by having conversation off the record if necessary. I
just thought I would bring that to your attention. I do not think
anything will come up, but it may.
Admiral Pye. I do not consider that it would be of any advantage to
a future enemy or to the present enemies in this war.
6. General Grunert. Now, were these three task forces in and out of
Pearl Harbor from time to time during that latter period?
Admiral Pye. Yes, sir. The schedule as arranged was that one task
force was at sea practically all the time, that is, one of the three task
forces, leaving a period normally of about eight days at sea and about
fourteen days in port. The [1037] task forces were organized
primarily for training purposes.
Task Force 1, which I commanded, consisted of battleships, cruisers,
and destroyers, and the primary mission of the commander of this task
force was the development and practice in tactics for the conduct of
a major action. The schedule usually provided that one of the other
two task forces was at sea with me for one or two days of the period
my task force was at sea, in order that we might have more forces for
the conduct of tactical exercises.
Task Force 2 comprised carriers, cruisers, and destroyers. This
task force was primarily to train in the use of carrier-based aviation.
The 3d Task Force consisted of one battleship division, the heavy
538 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
cruisers of the Fleet, and one squadron of destroyers. Their task was
primarily to train for the work of reconnaissance for which the
cruisers were designed.
7. General Grunert. How about aircraft carriers? Were they
part of the task force or assigned to task forces ?
Admiral Pye. As I said, sir, the aircraft carriers were part of
Task Force 2.
8. General Grunert. Task Force 2 ?
Admiral Pte. Yes, sir. And their principal mission was the train-
ing of the carrier-based aviation, but we worked that in such a way
that when my task force was out I would have the carrier force with
them. Task Force 2, maybe one or two days so that we could work
the carriers in with the battleships. The next time I would go out
I would have the cruisers with me one day out of the time, in order
to work the cruisers in. Usually at some period in each six weeks the
schedule was so arranged [1038'] that all task forces would
be at sea simultaneously for exercise and fleet evolutions.
9. General Grunert. There were, I understand, three of such air-
craft carriers, were there ?
Admiral Pte. On December 7 there were actually only two in the
force, the sum total of which comprised the third. One, assigned to
the task force, was on the West Coast under overhaul.
10. General Grunert. Have you any knowledge of the responsi-
bility for and the scheme of distant reconnaissance as far as the plans
for defense of Hawaii were concerned? In other words, who was
charged with that distant reconnaissance? Was it the Fleet Com-
mander or the Naval District Commander ?
Admiral Pye. I should prefer not to give my opinion on that, as I
was never in a position to be concerned with it. The base defense,
including the reconnaissance which was by aircraft under the base
defense officer, was entirely an independent command.
11. General Grunert. AVlien these task forces went out did they do
any reconnoitering of their own as a general security measure, or just
for the problems you were then engaged in ?
Admiral Pte. Depending upon the nature of the operations, the
battleships and heavy cruisers carried observation planes. These
planes were used at times for reconnaissance work, but most of the
time for training in connection with the actual operations being per-
formed by the vessels of the task force, either as gunnery observation
or antisubmarine observation or in exercises that were of that par-
ticular nature.
12. General Grunert. Then, they appeared to be primarily
[1039'] for your own purposes ?
Admiral Pte. For our own purposes. A reconnaissance was carried
out over the operating areas by the patrol planes.
13. General Grunert. The PBYs were long-distance patrol air-
craft?
Admiral Pte. Yes, sir. There were no PBYs under my command.
14. General Grunert. And do you know whether or not the PBYs
l^ertained to the Naval District Commanders?
Admiral Pye. Yes, sir.
15. General Grunert. Do you know whether the Naval District
Commander, in his scheme of distant reconnaissance, considered the
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 539
areas operated in or occupied by the task forces as being reconnoitered
to the extent that he would not have to cover that same ground, or
same sea?
Admiral Pye. I think that he did feel that he should cover the same
ground with the available aircraft of the patrol type, and the areas
in which the Fleet units were operating were patrolled by PBYs,
patrol aircraft, within the reasonable limits of the available aircraft.
16. General Grunert. Do you know whether this was a rather con-
stant patrolling, or periodic?
Admiral Pye. I believe it was constant within the limits of the
• aircraft available : usually a morning patrol and, if aircraft were
available, an evening patrol.
17. General Grunert. Would it have been reasonable to assume, in
the areas in which a task force operated, that the enemy could not well
approach with aircraft carriers to make an [^0^0] attack on
the mainland?
Admiral Pye. I think there was no particular reason to believe that
those areas would have been more useful to an enemy than other areas
in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands. I think it should be recalled
that we were not in a state of war and that the patrol was primarily
to determine the possible presence of submarines.
18. General Grunert. Then, the patrol was primarily for sub-
marine ?
Admiral Pye. Yes, sir.
19. General Grunert. And if we were not in a state of war, what
danger was there from submarines?
Admiral Pye. I will explain the difference there. An attack by a
submarine, if fired when the submarine is submerged and the sub-
marine is not definitely sighted, cannot be proven. If attacks had
been made by submarines, and the submarine not sighted or sunk or
captured, there would have been no way for us to prove definitely
that it was not an internal explosion in the ship rather than a torpedo.
In addition to that there was always the possibility that German
crews might man Japanese submarines or might, in the last analysis,
even bring their submarines to the Hawaiian Islands in order to try
to force us into war. It was therefore considered that the possibility
of submarine attack was greater than any other form of attack, of
which the nature could not be uncertain.
20. General Grunert. Admiral, were you acquainted with or in-
formed of the message from the Navy Department to the Commander-
in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet on November 27 which started out b}^ say-
ing, "This is a war warning," and which was [-IO4I] directed
to be transmitted to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian De-
partment? Were you generally acquainted with that message?
Admiral Pye. I was at sea with my task force at the time this mes-
sage was received by the Commander-in-Chief. I should like it to be
noted that this message had two addressees: Commander-in-Chief
Asiatic Fleet as well as Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet.
Upon the receipt of that message my Commander-in-Chief informed
me by radio that there was possible danger of attack, and to take all
essential measures for the defense of my task force at sea. These meas-
ures were fully carried out, and my task force returned to port on
Thursday. I have to check whether that is about the 29th. Have you
any dates there ?
540 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
21. General Grunert, I might be able to find it in your testimony.
Admiral Pye. I think it was two days later, having exercised all pos-
sible precautions against attack during the period we were at sea.
( Excerpt from testimony of Admiral Pye before the Roberts Com-
mission is as follows :)
22. General Grunert. Your testimony here in the Roberts report
says,
I was cognizant of it after it had been received for about four days. My task
force was at sea at that time.
Will you proceed ?
Admiral Pye. Well, I was going on to explain that. It was received
by him, as I recall it, by the 27th ; I think that was Tuesday. On a
Thursday I returned to port with my task force, but I was not informed
of this message until the following [^042] Saturday. That
was four days, as I recall it, from the time it was received. On that
Saturday morning I was not called to see the Chief of Staff, but I went
to see him in relation to some work to be undertaken during the follow-
ing week, and was shown this message.
23. General Frank. May I ask just a question there?
24. General Grunert. Go ahead.
25. General Frank. While you were still at sea with your task force,
however, you were warned of a tense situation ?
Admiral Pye. I cannot tell you the exact message — I have no copy
of it — but the implication to me and to my staff was that there was
great danger of a submarine attack. We had had during the period
of operation there several occasions in which destroyers picked up con-
tacts which they thought might be enemy submarines. There were
definite rules for procedure when those contacts were made, and it was
my impression, until I saw the message on the following Saturday,
that the nature of the information was similar to that which on several
occasions before had been the cause of instructions to take particular
care concerning enemy submarines.
26. General Grunert. Did you consider your task force in less
danger while in the harbor or while out at sea ?
Admiral Pye. Much less danger in port, primarily because there
could be no submarine attack while we were in port, with the entrance
to the channel guarded by nets and patrol craft.
27. General Grunert. Then, it would appear from what testimony
we have had to date that the Army was sabotage-minded and the
Navy may have been submarine-minded.
Admiral Pye. I think there is no question but what the [^04^1
Navy was submarine-minded.
28. General Grunert. Now, while your vessels are in port, on what
do you depend for warning as to the imminence of an attack by air?
Admiral Pye. The instructions in force under our base defense order
issued by the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet stated that the com-
mander of the base defense, the Commandant of the 14th Naval Dis-
trict, would advise the senior officer embarked as to the condition of
readiness to be maintained.
29. General Frank. That is the condition of readiness of the Fleet
units ?
Admiral Pye. Of the antiarcraf t battery in the Fleet, yes.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 541
30. General Grunert. Were the batteries aboard your vessels in-
tegrated in the antiaircraft defense on short, do you know, at that time ?
Admiral Pye. I should say not ; only to this extent ; that we antici-
pated receiving from the shore the necessary warnings. There were
orders to maintain certain guns manned, ready for action, and certain
sectors assigned to the ships in port which they were particularly to
guard against attack.
31. General Grunert. Then, you looked to the 14th Naval District
and to the Army to give you warning of the approach of aircraft ?
Admiral Pye. We did.
32. General Grunert. What at that time was your understanding
as to the ability to give you such warning ?
Admiral Pye. It was as my understanding that the Army had many
observation posts in the periphery of the Island from [1044^]
which it would be possible to sight any approaching aircraft, and that
we in the ships in port could certainly count on from three to five
minutes' warning of any possible aviation attack. We had had air-raid
drills in which the notice of the approach of aircraft had always been
received from the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. This was
the standard practice.
33. General Grunert. You received that information from the 14th
Naval District?
Admiral Pye. Yes, sir.
34. General Grunert. You had no means of getting it directly f roii i
the Army air warning system ?
Admiral Pye. No, sir.
35. General Grunert. You do not know where the 14th Naval Dis-
trict got its information ?
Admiral Pye, No, sir ; I should prefer not to answer any questions
with relation to that.
36. General Grunert. Did you understand that these observation
posts were ground observation posts : that was as distinguished from
the radar system of observation?
Admiral Pye. Up to the time of the attack my only knowledge as
regards the Army radar was that the installation was in progress and
that various Army personnel were being trained in the radar in the
ships.
37. General Grunert. This information that you got through drills
and practice, from the 14th Naval District, do you know where that
came from, whether from the Army air warning system or from these
ground observation posts ?
Admiral Pye. I cannot tell you, sir.
38. General Frank. May I ask a question ?
[1045] 39. General Grunert. Yes.
40. General Frank. You said that the Army personnel was getting
training in the radar in the ships. You mean in the Naval craft?
Admiral Pye. Yes. We had a radar for some time in the ships.
In order to facilitate this training, we had offered the services to
train the radar personnel in the ships.
41. General Grunert. You took over command of the Pacific Fleet
after the attack, didn't you, a little later ?
Admiral Pye. Yes, sir; I think it was the 13th of December, and
retained it for two weeks until Admiral Nimitz arrived.
542 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
42. General Grunert. Did you receive any such warning on De-
cember 7 as to the incoming Japanese planes ?
Admiral Pye. I ^Yas not on board my flagship on the morning of
December 7 until about 8 : 40. My Chief of Staif , hoAvever, reported
to me that no such warning had been received.
43. General Grunert. Since December 7 has the same system of
having task forces go out, or certain ones in and certain ones out, been
kept up, or after the attack did they keep them out of the harbor most
of the time ?
Admiral Pye. They were kept out of the harbor fairly continuously
for a period of about two weeks until it became fairly certain that the
attacking force had retired from the immediate area. From that time
on it became absolutely essential to permit the task forces to remain
in port for periods up to a week or ten days in order properly to over-
haul their materiel and receive supplies.
[104^] 44. General Grunert. Do you know anything else that
might assist the Board in getting facts about the Army that you would
like to tell us, any leads on anything? We are after facts and we
want to find out where they exist.
Admiral Pye. May I express personal opinions ?
45. General Grunert. Absolutely.
Admiral Pye. I have served three times on the Joint Army and
Navy Planning Committee. I served on the first Joint Army and Navy
Planning Committee that was ever formed, which was in 1919. I
served again from 1924 to 1927 on that committee. I was director of
War Plans of the Navy in 1934 and Assistant Chief of Naval Opera-
tions and, as such, a member of the Joint Board from 1935 to 1937.
I assisted in the first write-up of joint Army and Navy action in 1925,
and again in 1935 I assisted in revising it. I have always been a great
believer in unity of command and, in all these periods, continuously
attempted to obtain a definite statement that in time of war the
Hawaiian Islands would be put under unity of command. That was
brought up before the Joint Board on several occasions, but we were
never able to obtain a definite plan and put it into effect in advance of
an act of war. I consider that the mutual cooperation which was in
effect on December 7 was possibly as good as the Departments might
have had reason to expect. I believe that there was very little differ-
ence between Admiral Kimmel and General Short as to their respec-
tive functions. Admiral Kimmel and his predecessor. Admiral Rich-
ardson, and, in fact, I think possibly all their predecessors in the
Pacific, appeared to be of the opinion that a war in the Pacific could
be fought from a ship as headquarters. I for many years had been
constantly opposed to that idea and had continuously {10Ji.7~\
advocated that they recognize that in a war on the Pacific the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet would be merely a deputy of the
Chief of Naval Operations in the Pacific Area. I had so advised
Admiral Richardson while he was in command and advised him to
move ashore and get at least one Army officer on his staff. He was re-
lieved shortly thereafter, and when Admiral Kimmel took command
I advised him the same thing. After about two or three months in
command he became convinced that even with the approach of war he
could not handle the necessary communications and the many details
from the PENNSYLVANIA as his headquarters. He thereafter
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 543
moved his headquarters to the Submarme Base, and I became primarily
responsible, as the senior officer afloat, for the training of the fleet.
That was my particular function, to which I devoted all my time. I
feel that the moving of the Commander-in-Chief's headquarters ashore
greatly facilitated the cooperation between General Short and Admiral
Kimmel, and that by Admiral Kimmel's direct order assigning the
Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District as Base Defense Officer
he definitely assigned further responsibility for coordination with the
Army in matters affecting base defense. Admiral Kimmel also, with
General Short's concurrence, did much to improve the cooperation
between the respective air forces.
I should say, then, that in my opinion had unity of command been
put into effect at least six months earlier, the coordination of forces
would have been better, and I believe that the system of receiving
intelligence would have been coordinated so that one officer, the officer
exercising unity of command, would have been the sole receiver of
intelligence from the two Departments.
In other words, I think that the thing that was done [IO48]
immediately upon the outbreak of war should have been done at least
six months earlier.
46. General Grunert. Assuming that they had unity of command,
just what is in your mind when you say conditions could have been
miproved ? You mentioned intelligence. Is there anything else be-
side intelligence, or is that the main thing that would have been im-
proved ?
Adiniral Pye. I think it would have forced the two Departments to
have gotten closer together had they had one man to deal with out
there. In my opinion, the dealing of the naval officer with the Navy
Department and the Army officer with the War Department left many
things that could not be transmitted each to the other, and that con-
sequently neither the General nor the Admiral was fully conversant
with the situation as it appeared in Washington. I do not believe
that the War Department and the Navy Department themselves had
a common understanding of the situation. I think that had they had
unity of command it would have forced the adoption of the system
of the joint chiefs of staff of the Army and Navy and we would have
had a better understanding of the situation.
47. General Grunert. Then the instruction to the Army or the
Navy officer who had command under unity of command would stem
from a joint source here, which would have been the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and not from their respective Chiefs of Staff or the Chief of
Naval Operations ?
Admiral Pye. Of course, the Joint Board was supposed to have a
function. Along that line they could make recommendations which,
if ajDproved by the Secretaries, went into effect.
48. General Grunert. Still, on November 27 a message went to the
Navy and on November 27 a message went to the Army. If
[10i9] there had been unity of command there ought to have been
one message to the Commander-in-Chief over there ?
Admiral Pye. Those two messages — I never saw the Army message
until after December 7th — certainly gave entirely different implica-
tions.
544 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
49. General Grunert. It was testified before this Board that a war
warning to the Navy did not carry with it the import that, if they
had used the same wording, it woidd carry to the Army. In other
words, was that term used more frequently in the Navy ?
Admiral Pye. I do not think that the term had any peculiar signifi-
cance. It was not a standard term ; but as early as the Secretary of
Navy's visit to the fleet in September, 1940, when he first came out
there, he was always telling us that we were going to have war. On
several occasions other messages came which indicated a very serious
situation, and yet nothing happened. The reason that I put in my
statement that that dispatch had a multiple addressee is that it af-
fected the Asiatic Fleet. A war warning would have a broader appli-
cation, due to the necessity for neutrality.
There was no question in our minds but what there was danger of
war, but there was not necessarily danger of war between Japan and
the United States. Yet, as applied to the Commander-in-Chief, Asi-
atic, with his fleet, even though we remained neutral, he had certain
duties that he must carry out and must recognize the nature of the
situation. To my mind the words "war warning" meant nothing
really significant, when everybody knew that there was danger of
war. The implication to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, to my
mind, was much more important than it was to the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific. Had the message stated "War with Japan appears
imminent", there [JOSO] could have been no misunderstanding.
50. General Frank. Were you familiar. Admiral, with the arrange-
ments for reconnaissance that had been worked out by the joint agree-
ment between tlie two commanders?
Admiral Pye. Not sufficiently to be able to give any testimony with
regard to it. My particular work was in training the fleet, and par-
ticularly the task force we had, and I had my hands full doing that.
There are ofiicers whose testimony would be much more accurate along
that line than mine would be.
51. General Grunert. May I put a question in there in order that
I may better understand the organization in the Navy? Take the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet: When that fleet, or part of it,
is in the Fourteenth Naval District, is the Fourteenth Naval District
then directly under the Commander-in-Chief, or if he goes out, is it
under the Commander-in-Chief? I do not quite understand the
relationship between the district and the fleet.
Admiral Pye. The District's only responsibility in regard to the
fleet is in assisting in its entry and sorties from home. They provide
an air cover and antisubmarine local units of minesweepers, and
everything like that. As soon as the fleet gets out of the channel, it
becomes a responsibility of the Task Force Commander. The Com-
mander-in-Chief when he was afloat oftentimes would not take tactical
command. Several times he did operate in the task force of which
I had command; and before he had gone ashore permanently I was
commander of the task force and had full tactical control. He would
issue no orders whatsoever unless he returned it to himself by sig-
nalling "Commander-in-Chief now assumes tactical control." The
minute the units [1051] get outside of the channel, the tactical
control is in the task force commander.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 545
52. General Grunert. The Admiral of the fleet being ashore and
the District commander being ashore, in this system of cooperation
and coordination it is then up to the Army commander to coordinate
with both of them, or has he one naval man to look to for that coopera-
tion for the Navy?
Admiral Pye, I should say he would have two functions.
5o. General Grunekt. Where is the division of functions, as far
as the Xavy is concerned between tlie Admiral of the fleet and the
Admiral of the District?
Admiral Pye. Just about the same, I should say, as it probably is
between General Eisenhower and General Bradley. The Commander-
in-Chief is the over-all man for policies, organization, and general
directions.
54. General Frank. Even when the fleet was in Pearl Harbor and
was under the slielter of the District commander, the Commander-in-
Chief of the fleet would still have commanded his fleet?
Admiral Pye. The trouble is that Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet
is a misnomer. If you will try to think of it, as to his functions and
duty, as actually Deputy Chief of Naval Operations in the Pacific,
because the fleet has been broken up into units so that no one can com-
mand them. Each task force commander is given an order before
he goes out on a mission, as to what he has to do, and he is responsible
for doing that.
At the time that we had these exercises, frequently those forces
would be put under me, as I mentioned, for further training, such as
the training of the air force. I was the one that did it. Although I
was not Commander-in-Chief of the fleet, [10S2] I was in
command of all those forces at sea, and once or twice, even when the
Commander-in-Chief went out with us, he simply rode around and I
acted as tactical commander. The title of Commander-in-Chief of the
Fleet was all right before the war. He was afloat. But the minute he
moved ashore he really became Deputy Chief of Naval Operations.
55. General Gkuxkih". There were two commanders ashore that the
Army commander had to cooperate with?
Admiral Pye. I should say that the Commander-in-Chief, as re-
gards policies, and the Commander of the Naval District as regards
coordination of activities.
50. General Grunert. But he looked to both of them apparently to
get information.
Admiral Pye. You mean, the Commander-in-Chief looked to both
of them ?
57. General Grunert. No ; the Commanding General of the Hawai-
ian Department looked to both of them to get information. They both
had information services, did they not?
Admiral Pye. Yes; but the information service of the Commandant
of the Fourteenth Naval District was a comparatively local service,
whereas the intelligence service of the Commander-in-Chief was a
broad picture.
58. General Grunert. When the Commander-in-Chief was afloat
and went out, how then did the Army get information from that intel-
ligence service?
Admiral Pye. That is one reason it would not work, and nobody
else could get it — because oftentimes you have to have radio silence.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 1 36
546 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Wlien they could send things to him he could not send anything back
without giving away his position. That is the reason why many of
us fully realized within the last 20 [1053] years that in a war
in the Pacific the man that was going in over-all control out there had
to be ashore where he could receive communications and where he
could send them and where he could have a place and staff big enough
to handle the work. There is not on board ship adequate space for the
commander of a force of that nature.
59. General Grunert. Then there could have been times when intel-
ligence that the Navy had could not be transmitted to the Army
promptly or at all ?
Admii-al Pye. I think that would have been, of course, entirely up
to the Commander-in-Chief, if they were at sea, as to whether he desired
to break radio silence. If he thought it was of sufficient importance
to break radio silence it could unquestionably have gotten to him.
In addition to that, most information that came from the Navy De-
partment came multiple addressed to the Commandant of the Four-
teenth Naval District. I presume he had orders to keep the General
informed of wliat he had received.
60. General Grunert. If the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet were
out with his staff, including his intelligence, then the source for the
Army to look to was the District?
Admiral Pye. After he realized the difficulties that were going to
be attendant on carrying out operations in the Pacific he immediately,
after he moved ashore, enlarged his staff, and when he went to sea
after that he took only about four of his staff officers with him in the
ship and left the others ashore.
61. General Grunert. You being the first naval witness who has
appeared here, we are likely to go far afield in getting our information
from you.
62. General Frank. I think I asked you the question, when I
[10S4] started. Admiral, if you were familiar with the agreement
between the Army commander and the Navy commander out there
with respect to the responsibility for reconnaissance.
Admiral Pye. It was two years and eight months ago ; and whether
I knew that before December 7th or not I do not know, but I certainly
knew it on December 7th.
63. General Frank. You were familiar with the fact that in accord-
ance with that agreement the Navy took over responsibility for distant
reconnaissance ?
Admiral Pye. Yes.
64. General Frank. And the Army conducted close-in reconnais-
sance which extended not more than about 30 miles from shore?
Admiral Pye. Yes.
65. General Frank. It therefore was the responsibility of the Navy
to give information of any source beyond a distance of about 30 miles?
Admiral Pye. I should say you could interpret it that way.
66. General Grunert. We might say, aside from the Army's own
way of getting information tlirough its own facilities, meaning radar.
67. General Frank. I would like to develop a little bit for our own
information the naval reconnaissance system. The Navy were send-
ing out task forces continuously, were they not ?
Admiral Pye. Yes.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 547
68. General Frank. They were under the commander of the fleet?
Admiral Pye. They were operating under orders from him, each.
however, when at sea, directly under the responsibility of the task
force commander.
69. General Frank. But the task force commander's immediate
superior was the fleet commander at Pearl Harbor?
[1055] Admiral Pye. The Commander-in-Chief; yes.
70. General Frank. And in addition, the Navy was conducting a
patrol with P. B. Y. boats?
Admiral Pye. That is correct.
71. General Frank. And they were under the District commander?
Admiral Pye. They were under the District commander; yes,
72. General Frank. What I would like to find out if I can is this:
Did you depend primarily on P. B. Y, reconnaissance for the purpose
of information and security against hostile attack, or primarily on
surface reconnaissance of the task forces, or both ( Do you see what I
am trying to get ?
Admiral Pye, I see what you are trying to get, but I think you are
assuming that a condition of war existed, whereas it did not. I do
not feel that tliere was any set definite reconnaissance against liostile
attack other than observation to determine if possible the presence
of enemy submarines. But you liave riglit here Admiral Bloch, who
was the Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District, and Admiral
Bellinger, who is available, as commander of the air force.
73. General Grunert. You are the first one from the Navy that has
appeared before us here.
Admiral Pye'. If you want to go into details on that, you have wit-
nesses available who are more capable of giving you information than
I am, because, as I say, I was not primarily concerned with that part
of it.
74. General Frank. In view of the fact that the Navy was respon-
sible for this distant reconnaissance and in view of the fact that
you have just stated that you thought that unity of command would
have helped this situation, I would like to ask [1056] this ques-
tion: How do you think a unity of command situation would have
altered the circumstances of the attack to have prevented it from being
a surprise ?
Admiral Pye. Only insofar as I feel quite convinced that had there
been unity of command there the two departments also would have
been better coordinated in the materiel and forces which they made
available to their respective commanders ; and in addition, there were
available in Pearl Harbor several squadrons of B-24's which were
perfectly capable of assisting the Navy and did assist the Navy from
December 7th on, in making reconnaissance flights. These, though,
were not used before December 7th because of the contention of the
Air Force Commander that they were inadequately trained for long-
distance reconnaissance,
75. General Frank, That is, the Navy air force commander?
Admiral P^^:. The Army Air Force Commander, These were
B-24's,
76. General Frank. The Army had B-24's ?
Admiral Pye. Yes. You better check that up ; but I am quite cer-
tain that there were some there that were not used.
548 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
77. General Frank. I think the testimony indicates that they had
something like 8 or 10 B-l7's.
Admiral Pye, It was B-17's, not B-24's.
78. General Frank. Admiral, you made a point of the fact that
war had not been declared.
Admiral Pye. That is correct.
79. General Frank. And we were still at peace. Do you know
whether or not the officers of the Navy generally were familiar with
the warning messages that had been sent from Washington to the fleet
commander about the critical situation and imminence of war?
[1057~\ Admiral Pye. I do not know to what extent the Com-
mander-in-Chief had informed other responsible Commanders.
80. General Frank. What I am leading to is, what in your opinion
was the frame of mind of the rank and file with respect to the immediate
possibility of war, as to an immediate attack ? Were they war-minded,
at that time?
Admiral Pye. I should say no, they were not. I think their reason
for this was due to the attitude taken by both the War and Navy De-
partments in respect to the requests for additional forces for the Pa-
cific. Although, as early really as April 1941, the situation was said
to be serious, in June of the same year the Navy Department detached
from the Pacific Fleet one battleship division, one light cruiser division,
and two destroyer divisions, to send into the Atlantic. It hardly
seemed to the Commanders in the Pacific that if the situation was as
bad as it was said to be, that was the time to be moving a large portion
of our Fleet into the Atlantic, when the British Fleet, itself, was many
times superior to the available German ships.
During this same period it became most difficult for the Commander-
in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet to obtain patrol planes or even to obtain
carrier planes, and, up to December 7, not even all of the carriers were
equipped with their normal number of planes.
81. General Frank. That is, with their full complement?
Admiral Pye. Their full complement. They did not have them. All
of these failures to indicate the importance, by acts rather than by
words, I feel quite certain, led to the ahnost uniform opinion that
while war probably was in the [10S8] offing, if it came, it would
be upon the initiative of the United States.
82. General Frank. Were you familiar with the fact that, along
somewhere between the 25th of November and the 1st of December,
the Navy knew there was a Japanese task force at Jaluit?
Admiral Pye. I never have heard that.
83. General Frank. You did not know that?
Admiral Pye. No.
84. General Frank. And at that time you were second in command
of the Fleet?
Admiral Pye. I do not know whether the Commander-in-Chief
knew it, or not. I don't recall its ever having been mentioned to me.
85. General Frank. I have nothing further.
Admiral Pye. There is one point that I would like to make, just as
long as this is a general discussion of the thing.
There are quite a few people who seem to feel that the situation in
Honolulu was quite similar to that which existed at the beginning of
the Russo-Japanese War, at Port Arthur. I would just like to point
out that there were several differences in the situations.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 549
In the first place, even at Port Arthur, the Japanese had broken off
diplomatic relations with the Kussians, on February 6, two days before
tlie attack at Port Arthur, and, in the letter breaking off those diplo-
matic relations, they informed the Russian Government that they
reserved the right to take such independent action as they might deem
necessary, or words [10S9] to that effect. In other words, ade-
quate notice was given, both of the fact that the negotiations were at an
end, and that the Japanese Government intended to take independent
action.
The second great difference waSj that the Japanese, in order to
obtain their objective, had to land in Korea, or in the vicinity of
Port Arthur. The only forces which could oppose these landings
effectively were the Russian ships in Port Arthur and at Chinnampo.
Therefore, the attack on the fleet was a necessary and decisive tactical
victory, which led to a favorable strategic situation; whereas the
attack on the United States Fleet at Pearl Harbor, although a tactical
victory, was the worst thing that they could do, from the point of the
long or broad strategical point of view, because it aroused the United
States in a way in which no other action could have done. With
the very uncertain political situation existing in the United States
previous to December 7, it is quite possible that had the Japanese
avoided attacking the Fleet in Honolulu or the Philippines, many
months would have gone by before the United States would actually
have entered the war.
It was also different in this respect, that under the conditions
existing in the Philippines and in the Australian and New Zealand
areas, in regard to fuel oil, it would have been impossible for the
United States Fleet to operate in the vicinity of the Philippine Is-
lands in such a way as to have assisted in its defense.
The fact that they did attack our Fleet was to my mind the big-
gest psychological blunder that any nation ever made, [1060]
because it united our Nation in the war effort to an extent which
made their ultimate victory impossible.
86. General Grunert. In that line, do you think it was necessary
to have a disaster? If the attack had not been so successful as it
was but had just been an attack with a certain amount of damage,
do you think that it would have aroused the Nation to the extent
necessary to make that a strategical error ?
Admiral Pye. In all probabnity. I am not stating that we had to
lose all those ships, in order to have that effect. I do consider,
though, judging it from the point of view of enemy intentions, that
it was a capability, but it was not one which one would normally an-
ticipate their using if their psychology was the same as ours. I can-
not conceive that we would have done such a thing, even from the
point of view of its ill effect on the ultimate results of the war.
87. General Grunert. We are delighted to get all this, but possibly
General Russell has some things more to the point.
88. General Russell. There are two or three subjects I wanted to
develop.
Admiral, in your appearance before the Roberts Commission, you
discussed this subject of obtaining information on the movements of
the Japanese Fleet and possible Japanese action at a distance away
from Honolulu, in the Mandate Islands, and in the homelands of
the Japanese, and you expressed, there, the sentiment or the belief
550 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that it was a great handicap to the American operations, not to know
what was going on in the Mandate and in the Japanese homeland.
Admiral Pye. It has been two years and eight months since that
testimony, General !
[J06'J\ 89. General Russell. Well, let us get out of that meeting
and get back Uj the Pacific, and see what we can work out.
Admiral Pye. Was that in relation to our inability to visit those
islands during that long period in which they were preparing their
defenses ?
00. General Russell. Yes. This approaches this particular prob-
lem from another angle entirely.
Is it true, or not, that if a Japanese convoy in w^hich there might
be as many as six carriers should get to within a distance from
which planes could be launched for an attack on the Hawaiian Islands,
is it not true that reaching that point with a relatively large number
of carriers and fighter planes would insure more or less a successful
opei'ation to the Japanese?
Admiral Pye. You mean under the conditions that existed in so
far as defense is concerned, on December 7 ?
91. General Russell. Under the conditions that existed at Hono-
lulu, if they could get to within 200 to 300 miles of the Islands with
175 to 200 planes on six carriers, and could launch those before being
discovered, is it not a fact that they might expect a reasonable degree
of success from that operation?
Admiral Pye. Yes; I think so.
92. General Russell. Then is it nr^t true. Admiral, that there was
placed upon the Navy a veiy serious burden or mission of preventing
a convoy of that kind from reaching a point from which this attack
could be launched?
Admiral Pye. That also is true on the assumption that you are
anticipating such an attack, and that you have [lOO^] ade-
quate material with which to do it. I tried to point out that I believe
the minds of the military people in Honolulu were exactly the same
as it was in Washington. I do not believe the people in Washington
expected the attack any more than the people in Honolulu.
93. General Russell. Do you mean to say, Admiral, therefore, that
the reason a convoy of that sort was permitted by the Navy to reach
a point so near Hawaii was because you just did not expect that sort
of convoy to come there?
Admiral Pye. I don't think we could have stopped it. General, if
we had expected it, because there were not enough planes available,
and for a month, the Commander-in-Chief had been trying to get more
planes, so tlnit, if tlie situation did ai'ise, he woidd hav(; enough; but
there certaiidy were not enough, there, for several months.
After the attack, when we did try to extend the air patrol out to
800 miles, we did not have planes enough. We could not get planes
enough to be sure that every sector was covered. We on all oc-
casions had to use short-range ])lanes for anywhere fn^n a third to
a half of the circle. Achniial Bellinger can give you the figures as
to the re(iuired number of planes to complete such a I'ecoiniaissunce
each day, but it was far in excess of what the Navy had available
on December 7.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 551
94. General Russell, Then as tlie situation existed in November,
from the standpoint of equipment and materiel, it could have been
reasonably anticipated that the Japanese could reach, with a convoy,
a point near enough to Pearl Harbor to enable them to launch this
attack ?
Admiral Pye. Anticipated as a thing they didn't do.
[I06S] 95. General Russell. I do not think we are talking about
the same thing, Admiral. You state it was impossible to have de-
tected such a convoy moving to within striking distance of the Ha-
waiian Islands, because you just did not have the reconnaissance means
to search it out and locate it ?
Admiral Pye. No, General, I did not say it was impossible, had you
happened to send out your reconnaissance planes that were available
in that particular area. I said that there were an inadequate numbet
of planes to assure that all the areas from which such an attack could
be made were covered.
96. General Russell. Then we come back to my question : Every-
boy in the conferences between the Commanding General of the Ha-
waiian Department and the Commanding General of the Pacific Fleet,
in their estimate of Japanese possibilities and probabilities, must
have known that it was barely possible, but not probable, that the
Japanese could get within striking distance of us, and we would not
have known ?
Admiral Pye. My personal opinion is in accord with yours ; but as
long as you have both of those gentlemen available for witnesses, I
think you should ask them.
97. General Russell. Admiral, you were commanding that Fleet,
out there, at the time, and, later, you became the Commander of every-
thing out there, did you not ?
Admiral Pye. I was not in command of anything that pertained to
the reconnaissance. I had nothing whatsoever to do with it.
98. General Russell. When you put your ships into the Port at
Pearl Harbor, you did not lose interest in the possibility of their being
destroyed, I am sure.
[1064] Admiral Pye. I didn't lose interest in that. I lost confi-
dence in the people whose job it was.
99. General Russell. Whose job was it?
Admiral Pye. The Commander in charge of the Pacific Fleet, of
course, had the overall responsibility, so far as the activities of naval
forces were concerned. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District
was in charge of all of the activfties of the planes, including the availa-
ble patrol planes. Under him was Admiral Bellinger, Commander of
that portion of the Naval Air Force based on the shore. Those are the
three who had direct responsibility for the reconnaissance.
100. General Russell. Now, Admiral, to return to the possibility of
the Japanese attack, do you think it was important, in determining
what the Japanese might do, for the Navy or the Army, one or both,
to have conducted rather active reconnaissance in the mandated
islands ?
Admiral Pye. Under the conditions that were existing at the time,
no. I think that such an effort could or may have been made by the
direct order of the Navy Department, but it might reasonably have
been interpreted by the Japanese as an act of war.
552 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
101. General Kussell. Why would looking at what was going on in
the mandated islands by us have been an act of war?
Admiral Pte. Primarily, because of the fact that for fifteen or
twenty years the Xavy Department had asked the State Department
to get the Japanese permission for some of our ships to visit the Man-
date Islands, and those requests had been constantly refused by the
Japanese Government ; and even at the time of the search for Amelia
Earhart, they became very [106-5] much put out because some
r.f our planes entered that general area.
102. General Russell. Admiral, in your appearance before the
Roberts Commission, you testified, discussing the Mandates :
We had certain free ports, but Admiral Standley can verify that when we
tried to get ships in there, we didn't have any luck. They were "free iwrts," but
not to us.
Admiral Pte. That is correct. According to the treaty under which
the mandates were given to Japan, we had the right to visit those
places, but the State Department never stood up to our rights, and
always, when a request was made for permission, it was turned
down — time after time.
103. General Russell. So as a fact. Admiral, it had come to pass
that in those months prior to December 7. 1941, because of the experi-
ences which you have just narrated, the Xavy made no effort to deter-
mine what was going on in the mandated islands?
Admiral Pte. To the best of my knowledge, no particular efforts
were made, with the exception, which I would like to have verified by
Admiral Bellinger, that, on several occasions. I believe we did get
the Pan American people to get off their course a little bit to see what
they could see on their way down to Guam : but we never got very much
from it.
104. General Russell. In your testimony, discussing this matter
with General Grunert or with General Frank, you stated that yon
needed three to five minutes' notice of the approach of a hostile air
force. In estimating this time requirement, did you have in mind the
condition of readiness of your ships, on [1066] the morning
of December 7?
Admiral Pte. Yes. The Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet
had issued an order. I could not state the date, but it was early in
the spring of 1941, he issued an order that certain antiaircraft gims
should be manned, ready for action. That number was for two
5-inch guns and two machine guns on each capital ship. These guns
and their control were manned in this respect, that the crews were on
deck though not immediately at the guns, and were allowed to per-
form duty in the immediate vicinity of their guns. The ammuni-
tion for the guns was in ready boxes on the same deck, so that they
were brought into action in a very short period of time. It was esti-
mated that all of the ships had their guns operating in less than five
minutes: some of them, much earlier.
105. General Russell. Xow, one other subject. Admiral. You state
that on the 27th of November, or thereabout, with your task force
at sea, you received an order from, the Commander-in-Chief, directing
that you take some action; and I believe that in j^our testimony
before the Roberts Commission you referred to that as "going onto
No. 3" defense, that was the lowest of the three. Do you recall that?
Admiral Pte. No, I don't recall that.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 553
106. General Russell. I hand you the record of your testimony,
and I will ask you to state whether or not that refreshes your recol-
lection on that matter.
Admiral Pye, That condition 3, it is true, is the lowest condition of
readiness, but that is a condition which applies to the ships at sea
and it is not the same as this condition of readiness of the base.
Condition 1 is the ''all battle stations [1067] manned ;" con-
dition 2 required half of the battle stations to be manned, including
the main battery; and condition 3 required antiaircraft defense, but
it did not require the main battery to go in.
107. General Russell. This was not particularly familiar to me,
and I am asking now if it was this defense 3 which you went into a«
a result of the message of November 27 ?
Admiral Pye. Yes.
108. General Russell. And that was "antiair?"
Admiral Pye. "Antiair;" and of course those are doubling up their
guns, and constitute for the most part the same defense against sub-
marines, if you get a chance to shoot at them, although 3^our primary
defense against submarines of course is the destroyer torpedo, itself;
but that is true, so far as the battleships are concerned.
109. General Russell. Admiral Pye, up to the time that an ap-
proaching attacking force reached the limit of the reconnaissance of
the Army forces, the task or the job of discovering and attacking that
force was the mission of the Navy, was it not ?
Admiral Pye. Yes, I think that can be stated.
110. General Russell, That is all.
Admiral Pye. There is one thing along that line, though, that I
think should be definitely pointed out — tliat the Army observation
posts are fixed posts, supposed to be constantly manned, whereas recon-
naissance by airplanes is not a permanent thing, and it can only be
carried out to the limit of the facilities immediately available.
111. General Grunert, I have one more question.
On the assumption that the attack, under the conditions [106S]
in consideration of the means available, could not have been prevented,
is it not reasonable to assume that with adequate preparedness meas-
ures the enemy carriers after the attack could have been located and
destroyed ?
Admiral Pye. Hardly, within the capacity of the forces available.
I think he stated the number of B-l7s was something like eight or ten,
and the number of Navy patrol planes was practically nil, after the
attack. It was a very great question whether, even if the force could
have been located, it could have been seriously damaged.
[1069] 112. General Grunert. The reason I put that question is
that we have had some testimony or something read to the effect that
various ones were being blamed for not back-tracking these returning
attacking planes ; and if nothing could be done about it, what is the use
of back-tracking them ?
Admiral Pye, There were other forces at sea : the two carriers of
Task Force 2 which was several hundred miles to the westward of
Pearl Harbor on the morning of this attack. One of those carriers
had been out to Midway to put in some marine fighting planes, and
the other one had been to Wake. Had we been able to locate the
Japanese force of ships after the attack, it is quite possible that these
two carriers would have been able to intercept them. One of the car-
554 COXGRESSIOXAL IX'V'ESTIGATIOX PE.\RL HARBOR ATTACK
riers did send up her planes for a complete reconnaissance, and late
in the afternoon one of the planes reported contact with an enemy car-
rier. Upon receiving this report all bomber and torpedo planes of
the carrier were lamiched to make the attack, but they found that the
report was erroneous and the object which had been reported was in
effect a low cloud on the horizon, rather than an enemy carrier.
Up to this time not many attempts had been made to land bombers
and torpedo planes on board ship after dark, and these planes, when
it was discovered that there really was no enemy there, were ordered
to proceed to Pearl Harbor, and that is the group which, you may
receive testimony, was fired upon by our own ships as they came in that
night.
113. General Grttxert. Are there any more questions ?
114. General Fraxk. Admiral. I take it from your testimony that
you did not anticipate this attack, that it was a surprise.
[1070] Admiral Pte. It was.
115. General Fraxk. Was that generally the situation among of-
ficers in the Navy ?
Admiral Pte. I think so.
116. General Fraxk. Another thing I gathered was that, from your
viewpoint, the Xavy did not have adequate means to prevent a surprise.
Admiral Pye. I believe that to be true, yes. In confirmation of my
previous statement that I thought the attitude of the officers of the
Fleet was just about the same as the attitude of the War and Navy De-
partments. I happened to be the first person to meet Secretary Knox
upon his arrival in the Hawaiian Islands about the 10th of Decem-
ber, and the first thing he said to me was, "No one in Washington ex-
pected such an attack — even Kelly Turner.'' Admiral Kelly Turner
was in the War Plans Division, was the most aggressive-minded of
all. I believe that to be confirmation of the situation as it existed here
in the Departments, and I do not think it was very far different than
what existed in the Fleet.
117. General Grttxert. Admiral, thank you very much. We appre-
ciate your coming over.
Admiral Pte. Thank you. sir.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
[1071] TESTIMONY OF COMMANDER WILLIAM E. G. TAYLOR,
QUONSET NAVAL AIR STATION, CHARLESTOWN, R. I.
( The witness was sworn by the Eecorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Commander, will you state to the Board your
name. rank, organization, and station ?
Commander Tatlor. Commander William E. G. Taylor, attached
to the staff of Commander Fleet Air, Quonset Xaval Air Station,
Charlestown. Ehode Island.
2. General Gruxeet. Commander, this Board is making an attempt
to get at the facts as to the background and what led up to and what
happened in the attack at Hawaii. Through reading of the Roberts
Commission report we assume that you have some facts that will be of
value to us, primarily along the line of your assistance to the Army,
your being loaned to the Army, I believe, to assist in putting in the air
warning service and toward the interceptor command.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 555
Commander Taylor. Yes, sir.
3. General Grunert. And General Frank -will lead in propomiding
the questions, and the other members will try to keep from butting in
until he gets through, but then we shall expand on it if necessary.
4. General Frakk. To what organization in the Navy did you belong
in October, November, December of 1941 ?
Commander Taylor. I was attached to the Bureau of Aeronautics
and was on temporary duty with Admiral Halsey's staff.
5. General Frank. You were associated with the Army in Honolulu,
in Hawaii, in the establishment of the aircraft [lOT^] warn-
ing service, were you not ?
Commander Taylor. Yes, sir, at the request of the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Air Force.
6. General Frank. "Were you over there for full time or part time,
or just what was the arrangement?
Commander Taylor. The arrangement was verbal and informal.
I was told to report to Interceptor Command by Admiral Kimmel's
staff, and I worked with them full time there.
7. General Frank. With whom particularly did j'ou work in asso-
ciation over there ?
Commander Taylor. I worked very closely with the Operations
Officer of the Interceptor Command ; his name was Captain
8. General Frank. Bergquist?
Commander Taylor. Bergquist ; yes, sir.
9. General Frank. Tindal also?
Commander Taylor. Yes, sir.
10. GeneralGRUNERT. Captain Powell?
Commander Taylor. There was one Captain of the Signal Corps
whose name I can't recall. Is that he?
11. General Frank. Powell.
Commander Taylor. Captain Powell.
12. Major Clausen. He is a Colonel now.
Commander Taylor. He may be.
13. General Frank. He was then Captain, now Colonel, Powell.
Commander Taylor. Yes, sir.
14. General Frank. When did you go over to assist the air force?
Commander Taylor. It was somewhere in the second week of
[107S] November, sir. I am not sure of my dates.
15. General Frank. At that time had the permanent radar sets, tbe
27ls, arrived ?
Commander Taylor. No, sir. They had, I think it was, five 270s
around the Island, no 271s. They were on their way; they had not
arrived.
16. General Frank. I see. Where was the information center?
Shafter?
Commander Taylor. The information center was off the reservation
at Shafter. They had set up a special temporary information center.
17. General Frank. Just where was it? Underground? Above-
ground ?
Commander Taylor. No, sir ; this was above-ground, across the main
road from Shafter, a temporary wooden house.
18. General Frank. Over in the antiaircraft cantonment?
Commander Taylor. No, sir; it was, I thought, a special cantonment
of its own.
556 CONGRESSIOXAL IX\^STIGATIOX PE.^RL HARBOR ATTACK
19. General Frank. They did have a certain number of 270 sets ?
Commander Taylot. Yes. they had five, as I remember.
20. General Frank. They had been placed in position?
Commander Taylor. When I joined the Interceptor Command they
were in position. They had just been sighted. They had crews who
were just learning to operate them. The communication lines "were
either all in, between the radar sets themselves and the information
center, or were within the next few days ; and there were a combination
of either commercial land lines or Signal Corps field lines that were
laid in.
21. General Frank. So that they could be operated with [1074-]
commercial current ?
Commander Taylor. Yes, sir.
22. General Frank. All of them ?
Commander Taylor. There were all in. "Within 2 or 3 days of the
time I got there there were communications established between the
sets themselves and the communication center.
23. General Frank. And could they all be operated with commer-
cial current ?
Commander Taylor. That I do not know, sir. I think they were
almost all operated at that time with auxiliary power,
24. General Fp^ank. Yes. When was the first test at which time
an effort was made to determine whether or not they could operate as
a system, an integrated system ?
Commander Taylor. There was never a complete test run, sir.
imtil after the attack, because we never had all the positions manned.
We had practice tests ; I don't remember from what date.
25. General Frank. That is what I mean.
Commander Taylor. I can approximate it from the date of a
meetinjr that I have the briefs of here (referring to papers).
On the 24th of November we had a meeting consisting of Colonel
Murphy, Acting Signal Officer of the Hawaiian Department; Lieu-
tenant Conmiander Coe, from Patrol Wing 2; Major Tindal. ISth
Bombardment Wing; myself; Captain Bergquist, 14th Pursuit Wing;
Lieutenant "\^Tiite, Signal Corps, Hawaiian Department; Lieutenant
Harville, 53rd Coast Artillery; and Lieutenant Thomas, 86th Obser-
vation Squadron (Support Command).
At the time of this meeting on 24 November the five 270s were
operating with a skeleton crew. Communication lines were [1075]
established between the 270s and the information center itself, but
there were no communication lines from the information center itself
to the various outlying activities.
26. General Frank. That is, to the operating?
Commander Taylor. The operating. They had one main line to
the switchboard at Wheeler Field, but the other lines were not in.
They had positions for all of the liaison officers.
27. General Frank. There were no lines in to the Navy and to the
Anticraft and to Hickam Field, and so forth?
Commander Taylor. No, sir. We had. I think, a sufficient number
of plotters to man two watches only, who were untrained, and the
number one object was to get those men to start training at once.
The first difiiculty we found with the setup at the information
center was, it was too large for the area that we could cope with. In
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 557
other words, it was set up very much like the Boston or the New York
information center, which is a general air warning system rather than
a combination air warning system and interception system. The
main plotting table had the — ^I think they had a radius of roughly
200 miles, which was well outside of the radar search area. The plot-
ting table itself was too small in scale to make interceptions on; so
that we first of all had to make an overlay on a smaller scale of the
Oahu area, and I imagine that it took something in the neighborhood
of another week after 2i November before we got the new overlay
painted on the table and got the plotters in for our first practice.
From that time on we spent as much time plotting the aircraft in the
vicinity, [1076] giving the i)lotters practice, giving the radar
operators at the different 270s practice. We went to each one of the
270s in turn and discussed the method of reporting to the information
center.
28. General Frank. Were positive, vigorous efforts being made to
train as rapidly as possible all of the people concerned with the opera-
tion of the A. W. S. ?
Commander Taylor. As much as then Captain Paul Bergquist and
mj^self could do. We had to spend a great deal of time in conferences
with practically every activity in Hawaii, trying to get a general
liaison between all of the activities that were being tied in with the
information center, and to get the manpower to run it.
29. General Frank. Were the plotters enlisted or civilian?
Commander Taylor. They were enlisted, sir.
30. General Frank. Was any effort made to get girls?
Commander Taylor. Not at that time, sir. I do not think the
question of bringing in girls had come up at that point.
31. General Grunert. I am afraid I shall have to butt in here with
one thing. I am afraid I will miss the opportunity.
Had you known that war was in the offing or that the enemy might
strike early in December, by working day and night or what was neces-
sary to get that thing in shape, could it liave been in shape?
Commander Taylor. Yes, sir. In this brief here we figure that if
we had the manpower and the effort behind it we could have had the
information center going satisfactorily within two weeks' time. There
was only one weak point.
32. General Fr^vnk. Within two weeks' time from when?
[1077] Commander Taylor. From the date of this conference,
which was on 24 November.
33. General Frank. That would have put the ultimate date when?
34. General Russell. December 8th.
35. General Frank. With respect to this meeting that you had for
the purpose of organizing the details of the A. W. S. and coordinating
its activities, will you give us a resume of what was covered at that
meeting ?
Commander Taylor. Yes, sir. It was decided that, although con-
siderable equipment was on order and planned for the operation of
the information center, the equipment would not be available for
some time to come. Therefore every effort should be made to make
the best use of the equipment on hand by the proper coordination
of all various military and naval and civilian activities and equipment.
558 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
36. General Frank. What equipment was it that was not going to
be available ?
Commander Taylor. It was mainly the proper permanent com-
munications system for the air warning system, the permanent derax
stations, the permanent communication lines, and mainly the physical
communications throughout the radar equipment.
It was felt that the information center could be made to function
adequately within the next two weeks. We found after that, after
this, to qualify it, that that would be except for the air-to-ground
radio communications. We learned that we could not keep contact
with the fighter aircraft more than five miles offshore with the com-
munication equipment we had at that time.
37. General Frank. That was for intercepts ?
[1078] Commander Taylor. Yes, sir. It was agreed that the
function of the Information Center was of sufficient importance that
the watch officers representing the various activities in this area should
be carefully selected as principal, rather than excess officers, when
assigned. In other words, they were willing to give us their excess
officers if they could find them, but we wanted principal officers.
38. General Frank. You wanted good ones 'i
Commander Taylor. Yes, sir. It was felt that intelligence and
training in the Information Center, rather than age, rank and expe-
rience, would be desirable in the selection of these officers.
It was realized that a great deal of detail work is necessary to
get the Information Center coordinated with outlying activities. It
was therefore desirable to have the Information Center manned at
the earliest possible moment so that all hands would be trained.
It was felt that the then present mobile R. D. F. equipment was
not all that might be hoped for, and it was agreed that the antiaircraft
equipment might be tied in to it.
It was brought out that considerable confusion during recent exer-
cises had been caused by the great number of airplanes operating
around the Island at all times. They were not identified. It was
felt that this could be brought under control in three ways :
(a) By having all aircraft flights reported to the Information
Center by parent units through their Operations Rooms.
(b) By enforcing the Aircraft Approach Procedure.
(c) By requiring all planes approaching the Island of Oahu to
report their position at least 60 miles at sea, before [1079] com-
ing in.
39. General Frank. In other words, to bring them under permis-
sive control of the Interceptor Command ?
Commander Taylor. Yes, sir. There was no other means of iden-
tifying him.
In this connection, it was brought out that the Commander-in-
Chief, U. S. Fleet, had ordered radio silence of all aircraft during
joint exercises. It was suggested that this be discussed with the
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, for decision as to the value of
radio silence as security.
The question of IFF was raised as a possible solution to eliminate
confusion in determining whether aircraft approaching the Island
were friend or foe.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 559
40. General Frank.. "IFF" means Identification, Friend or Foe?
Commander Taylor. Yes, sir. It was realized that it would be a
very long time before all aircraft could be equipped with IFF, in
addition to which it was believed that the present IFF did not operate
on all these RDF frequencies, and it was therefore decided that this
was not a reliable solution for some time to come.
It was brought out that considerable equipment had been with-
drawn from the Interceptor Command and the Hawaiian Air Force
for the use of the Ferry Command. This was mainly radio equip-
ment.
41. General Frank. I do not believe it is quite plain about IFF.
Will you explain that very briefly as to the use of IFF so as to clear
up the fact that through IFF you could identify the airplanes?
Commander Taylor. The airborne IFF is an electrical transmit-
ting device used for the purpose of identifying friendly [1080]
aircraft. In November, 1941, there were several various types of IFF
in use, each one taking a special type of interrogating or challenging
device.
It was decided of value to investigate the possibility of using the
Information Center to operate Ferry Command, to eliminate any
duplication and make available as much of this equipment as possible.
42. General Frank. What was the nature of the equipment?
Commander Taylor. It was mainly radio equipment powerful
enough to operate the device offshore. It also had direction-finding
equipment.
43. General Grunert. By whose authority was this equipment so
changed ?
Commander Taylor. I do not really know who did it, sir.
44. General Grunert. You do not know whether it was the Com-
manding General of the Air Force or the Commanding General of
the Department ?
Commander Taylor. No, sir. I do remember that at that time
the Ferry Command enjoyed a very powerful and secret position and
was able to get better equipment and that the Interceptor Command
was not.
Without knowing all of the details of the Ferry Command's prob-
lems, the possibility of using the Information Center for this purpose
was not clear. However, it was felt that the Information Center was
probably better equipped to handle Ferry Command flights. In this
connection it was brought out that Ferry Command operations are
• carried on under conditions of great secrecy. This was held to be no
obstacle, as the Information Center could be operated with the great-
est degree of security at all times.
[1081] The questions of gun control of ships in the harbor dur-
ing air raids was discussed, and it was decided that this question
should be taken up with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific
Fleet.
It was felt that the air-to-ground radio equipment at present avail-
able was not the best that could be hoped for, and it was therefore
decided to investigate the possibility of utilizing other Army, Navy,
Coast Guard or civilian radio facilities in the event of an emergency,
if not at present.
560 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
As there had been some difficulties in the procedure for requesting
telephone circuits for the Information Center, that is, requests had
to be made of each of the many activities on the far end of the circuits,
this question was presented to Colonel Murphy. Colonel Murphy
agreed that all requests for circuits should and could be made by the
Information Center.
It was agreed that all air-to-ground and air-to-ship radio proce-
dure, of fighters at least, should be standardized. In view of a recent
Bureau of Aeronautics, Navy Department letter to this effect, it was
believed that all naval fighter squadrons were using the British
system.
It was decided that communications liaison was vitally important
and therefore all activities should be approached with a view of co-
ordinating communications facilities to the best advantage of all con-
cerned.
It was decided to investigate the probability or possibility of using
naval ship-board radar to supplement the land-based RDF under all
conditions of emergency; also to determine the most efficient method
of communications between the Ships Warning Net and the Informa-
tion Center.
45. General Frank. Generally speaking, what was the situation
[1082'] with respect to equipment and training, on December 7,
with respect to the A. W. S. ?
Commander Taylor. On December 7 the plotters were reasonably
well trained to watch and able to do checking without any controller
on the plane. The only source of controllers we could find was to see
the Squadron Commander of the Pursuit Squadrons at Wlieeler Field.
They were themselves very busy training their squadrons and had just
received new, green pilots and were trying to get them into shape and,
therefore, could not spend much time learning their complicated or-
ganization. We had no liaison people to man any of the positions.
Therefore none of them were trained.
46. General Frank. What about equipment?
Commander Taylor. The equipment itself? On December 7 all
the communication lines were in ; the radar stations ; the Derax equip-
ment was working satisfactorily enough to give air warning and pos-
sibly to make interceptions. The air-to-ground radio equipment was
not satisfactory for interception work, but it was possible that enough
advance information could be given to pilots so that they could come
back without being intercepted.
47. General Frank. The radio equipment that would have enabled
control through interception a reasonable distance offshore had been
given to the Ferry Command?
Commander Taylor. Yes, sir.
48. General Frank. What was the situation with respect to the
supply of spare parts and spare tubes for the radar equipment?
Commander Taylor. That I do not know, sir. The Derax statien
seemed to be operating satisfactorily during the periods we were
operating. There were a few Marines Corps 270's on the Island, which
we later got hold of and put into place the train- [1083'] ing.
We put one of them actually into operation. They had some source of
supply there. I do not know how great their source of materials and
supplies was at the time.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 561
49, General Frank.. Generally speaking, then, the situation with
respect to the organization and operation of the A. W. S. system was
that it was about two weeks off ?
Commander Taylor. Two weeks off. The only thing that was not
carried through after this meeting to bring the thing into operation
at the end of two weeks was the manpower to operate it.
50. General Frank. And the training of that manpower?
Commander Taylor. And the training of the manpower; yes, sir.
61. General Frank. Do you feel that under the circumstances it
was proceeding under normal conditions in a satisfactory manner ?
Commander Taylor. Not entirely, sir. We had a great deal of
difficulty getting the proper impetus to get any material or personnel.
We had nobody to head it up, and we ourselves then did not carry
enough power to get the equipment and get the manpower we wanted.
52. General Frank. Was that because that at that time it was op-
erating under both the Signal Corps and the Air Corps ?
Commander Taylor. That could be, sir, except that the two junior
officers of the Signal Corps and the Air Force were both working very
closely together; but it was never headed enough by enough power
to give it impetus so they could get it going.
•^3. General Frank. What about General Davidson?
Commander Taylor. He was in the United States the early part of
the time. I do not remember what date he got back to [1084-]
Hawaii.
54. General Frank. I think it was the fifth.
Commander Taylor. The fifth of what?
55. General Frank. December.
Commander Taylor. It was pretty late by that time.
56. General Frank. What was the general attitude toward the ne-
cessity for use of this against the enemy ?
Commander Taylor. I do not think that anybody except possibly
officers Bergquist and Powell, who had been to the Information Cen-
ter School at Mitchel Field, realized exactly how important it was.
It was something new. They did not understand a great deal about it ;
and it was sort of a foster child at that time, we felt.
57. General Frank. Was there any feeling among the rank and
file as to the immediate possibility of war ?
Commander Taylor. It is very hard to recall. You would find that
quite a good deal of it with the young aviators and with some staff
officers, but each department had some special job they were preparing
for, and this was a sideline. As an example, the Bomber Command,
air support, or antiaircraft would be mainly concerned with training
and the Information Center was another thing that took more of their
manpower and more of their time.
58. General Frank. The time had not arrived when the aircraft
warning service and the Information Center were ready to go into
operation on a regular schedule ; is that correct ?
Commander Taylor. Yes, sir.
59. General Frank. It had not?
Commander Taylor. No, sir.
60. General Frank. Did you know that on the morning of [108S']
December 7 a flight offshore a distance of about 130 miles had been
picked up by the Opana Station ?
79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1 37
562 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Commander Taylor. I knew that afterwards; yes, sir. I did not
get to the Information Center that morning until about 8 : 30 or 9
o'clock.
61. General Frank. The report on that flight was made to the In-
formation Center, but because of the fact that it was on a training
basis rather than on a regular operating basis, the people to handle it
were not there, and they had not even been regularly assigned to the
organization. Is that correct?
Commander Taylor. Yes, sir. There ordinarily would be just a
skeleton crew, a house-cleaning crew after 7 o'clock, because of in-
structions which came, which I understood General Short gave, to
operate the Derax station only between 0400 and 0700, and the flight
was picked up after that time by an operator that was operating the
equipment in violation of orders, and the officer who picked up the
information in the Information Center was a Squadron Commander
serving his first tour of duty and he knew nothing about the set-up in
any sense of the word. In addition to that, it would be impossible
for anybody to decide whether a flight picked up 130 miles away was
a Japanese attack, one of our own carrier groups coming in, or a flight
of bombers from the United States. As a matter of fact, one of them
did come in at the same time and just added to the confusion. If we
had had the information center completely manned there would have
been some method of identification. Anybody could have told what
that flight was.
62. General Grunert. I believe that in your testimony before the
Roberts Commission you said something to the same effect, that this
flight, if it was made, would not have meant anything [1086\\
to you?
Commander Taylor. Yes, sir.
63. General Grunert. Was it not sufficiently organized at that time
so that the representatives of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Corps
knew what flights they had in the air and could tell whether or not
the interception of the flight meant that that was one of theirs?
Commander Taylor. No, sir. At the time of the attack we had no
liaison officers for the different aviation activities at all, and there
was no liaison between their own operations and the Information
Center. There was no procedure or system of identification estab-
lished.
64. General Grunert. You were talking about your conference.
This conference was held about November 24 ?
Commander Taylor. Yes, sir.
65. General Grunert. Wliy was it not held on August 24 or
September 10? Why November 24? Why did they wait that long
to hold a conference on this important matter?
Commander Taylor. I do not know, sir. I called this conference.
66. General Grunert. When did they call on the Navy to give
them assistance?
Commander Taylor. I think, not more than a week before that,
sir.
67. General Grunert. Then you had no connection with it before
about the middle of November, at the earliest ?
Commander Taylor. No, sir
PROCEEDINGS OP ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 563
68. General Grunert. And then you did not know what should
have been done or what might have been done before you got there ?
[1087] Commander Taylor. No, sir. As a matter of fact,
when I arrived I went straight to Wheeler Field, and the Informa-
tion Center itself had just been completed. It was a question of
two or three days one side or the other.
69. General Grunert. Wlio did you find there that knew enough
about it to take action before you got there ?
Commander Taylor. There were only two officers, Captain Powell
and Captain Bergquist who had been through the Information
Center School of Mitchel Field. But that school was at that time
fairly sketchy for the scope of the work they had to accomplish.
70. General Grunert. Then it would not have made much dif-
ference if all the material had been on hand and all the stations
ready; there was no personnel to actually organize it and operate it?
Commander Taylor. No sir.
71. General Grunert. What caused you to say you would be
ready in two weeks? Was there any one cause that determined
two weeks ? Why not ten days ? Why not five days ?
[10881 Commander Taylor. We took a wrong figure. We
probably could have had it going in two weeks or ten days, prob-
ably less. It is mainly a question of the minimum time we thought
we could train people in order to get it going. In two weeks it
would have meant a great deal of improvising.
72. General Grunert. But if somebody came down there and said,
"We have got to get this thing going; anything is liable to pop
any minute," you might have shortened up the time?
Commander Taylor. I think that both Bergquist and Powell had
that attitude, but, unfortunately, we could not get that much in-
terest out of the people we dealt with.
73. General Grunert. Could not Bergquist or Powell, or you, as
far as the Navy was concerned, have had access to the Chief of
Staff and said, "The most important thing is lagging; we have got
to get it operating" ?
Commander Taylor. We saw every Chief of Staff, but we found
that somebody else was always responsible.
74. General Grunert. So they were not sufficiently impressed
to make this their business or push it in comparison with all the
other things they had to do?
Commander Taylor. No, sir. They lacked the powerful backing
to get it going.
75. General Grunert. General Short expressed himself as most
concerned about getting this in. It seems to me, if you had ap-
proached him, he would have been able to do something about it.
Do you know whether or not permanent radar equipment had been
on the Island awaiting construction projects, such as roads, cables,
and so forth?
[1089] Commander Taylor. It could be, sir, but not according
to the Signal Corps. My information is from the Signal Corps offi-
cers on the station.
76. General Grunert. You could not have operated those perma-
nent ones, anyway, unless they were in position?
Commander Taylor. No, sir.
564 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
77. General Gruxert. There were no naval officers attached to that
center at that time, were there?
Commander Taylor. No, sir.
78. General Frank. Other than yourself?
Commander Taylor. I was just loaned to help set it up.
79. General Grunert. There was one remark that set me back when
I saw it in your testimony. You said you never saw Short. Was he
not the Commanding General and was he not around there?
Commander Taylor. I saw his Chief of Staff. I saw his Opera-
tions Officer. We were very closely tied in with his staff and the Air
Force staff.
80. General Grunert. You also were afraid it was breaking down,
and I think you said you changed to the auxiliary power equipment?
Commander Taylor. I did not say that, did I, sir?
81. General Grunert. It states in the record that the auxiliary
power equipment was breaking down, and General Short's order was
that the operation should be from 4 to 7 in the morning.
They did not install the commercial power?
Commander Taylor. I had forgotten that. I do not remember it
now, sir.
[1090] 82. General Grunert. You did operate with the aux-
iliary power?
Commander Taylor. I know we operated with auxiliary power in
at least three of the places, because there were no land lines out there.
83. General Grunert. I understand from your testimony that the
permanent sets were the same as the mobile sets?
Commander Taylor. Yes, sir.
84. General Grunert. And it was some time before commercial
power would be put in. Was there no commercial power hook-up for
radio stations at that time?
Commander Taylor. No, sir.
85. General Grunert. You said that telephone equipment had not
arrived from the United States and that it would take two weeks to
a month. That was equipment in addition to the complete radar
itself?
Commander Taylor. That was the permanent telephone equipment
necessary for intercommunication within the information center
itself.
86. General Grunert. Could not that equipment have been taken
out of some less important place and used ?
Commander Taylor. The equipment we were using was more or
less the last war type, field service equipment which, although not
perfect, could be made to work.
87. General Grunert. Were you aiming at the ultimate, or only the
best of what you had?
Commander Taylor. We were improvising; we had to improvise.
88. General Russell. Where had you gotten your experience?
Commander Taylor. My experience. General, was mainly [1091]
from the point of view of a fighter pilot, two years in England, one
year with the British Navy, and one year with the Air Force.
89. General Russell. In the American Army this was a new de-
velopment, was it not?
Commander Taylor. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 565
90. General Kussell; And the only people you found around the
Hawaiian Islands who were capable, from the standpoint of training,
to carry on, were those two men whose names you gave?
Commander Taylok. Yes, sir.
91. General Russell,, Did you know that General Davidson, to-
gether with other officers, had been sent to the mainland to study this
very thing and work out plans to set up what you were working out
when you got there ?
Commander Taylor. Yes, sir ; I did know that.
92. General Russell. There was not very much impetus at all being
given to the establishment of this center until you arrived on the scene
and organized it ?
Commander Taylor. No, sir.
93. General Russell. So far as you know, everything was awaiting
the return of General Davidson?
Commander Taylor. I would like to qualify that, sir, because the
impetus was actually supplied, what there was it, by Colonel Bergquist,
at whose request I was loaned from the Navy.
94. General Russell. You were sent up there simply because you
knew the subject and they did not?
Commander Taylor. Yes, sir ; at the request of Captain [1092]
Bergquist.
95. General Russell. It has occurred to me in reading the testimony
that General Grunert referred to, and in hearing your testimony this
afternoon, that you have taken the position that a condition precedent
to the successful operation of this system in picking up enemy planes
at sea was the existence of some means for identifying aircraft?
Commander Taylor. I do not understand your question.
96. General Russell. In other words, if you picked up ships and did
not know whether they were friendly or hostile, the information was of
little value?
Commander Taylor. That is correct.
97. General Russell. You did state that there was a type of equip-
ment by which this could be done?
Commander Taylor. Yes, sir.
98. General Russell. Do you know when that equipment reached
the Hawaiian Department?
Commander Taylor. The equipment at that time was of two or
three different types, so that it would be of very little value. The
Army was sure that the equipment could be delivered from the Army
equipment, but it would not work the Navy equipment, and vice versa.
99. General Russell. How long did you stay out there ?
Commander Taylor. I was out there for four months, November
to February.
100. General Russell. When you left in February had equipment
for identification purposes been received in the Islands?
Commander Taylor. No, sir.
[1093] 101. General Russell. It had not been ?
Commander Taylor. No, sir.
102. General Russell. Therefore in February you did not have a
satisfactory air warning service out there?
Commander Taylor. No, sir.
566 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
103. General Grunert. Was it not possible in the information cen-
ter, through organization and having liaison officers there, to know
what was in the air, after it was well organized ?
Commander Taylor. Yes, sir. That was organized and did work
once the emergency was there.
104. General Russell. The people who were to give the information
indicated by General Grunert could only give you information on their
planes, the ones they knew about, could they not?
Commander Taylor. Yes; but we had to get all the activities to-
gether and get some coordination. We could not get them together.
\_109Ji\ 105. Geaieral Grunert. Could there be any friendly
planes that somebody did not know about ?
Commander Taylor. Occasionally, after the attack, when we had
the identification system; but occasionally a friendly airplane would
come in, in violation of the proper approach system, and they would
then send an interceptor out to intercept it. In any case, we did not
let it come in, and we would not use the air-raid siren ordinarily.
It was not working 100%, but it worked very satisfactorily.
106. General Russell. It was not essential?
Commander Taylor. No, sir ; it was not essential.
107. General Russell. All right. I asked you if it was essential,
and you said Yes.
Commander Taylor. I am sorry, sir.
108. General Frank. As a matter of fact, that is true, even in Eng-
land, where it is very highly organized ?
Commander Taylor. Even now, it doesn't work. '
109. General Russell. That is all I have.
110. General Grunert. Is there anything else?
111. General Frank. No.
112. General Grunert. Thank you. Commander. We appreciate
your coming in and helping us out.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Brief recess.)
{loos'] TESTIMONY OF LT. COL. KERMIT A. TYLER,
AIR CORPS, ORLANDO, FLA., ARMY AIR FORCE BOARD
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 21.)
1. General Grunekt. Colonel, the Board is trying to get at the facts ;
that is, as to things leading up to what happened at Pearl Harbor. We
asked you to come here because of your assignment to duty the day
of the attack, with reference to the Air Warning Service, or the in-
formation center of the Interceptor Command. General Frank will
lead in propounding the questions, and then the other members of
the Board will fill in wherever tliey see fit. General Frank. •
2. General Frank. What was your assignment ?
Colonel Tyler. My duty on that morning was "pursuit officer."
That was the assignment that was written on the order assigning.
3. General Frank. I know, but on what duty were you ? What was
your permanent assignment at that time?
Colonel Tyler. I was second ranking officer in the 78th Pursuit
Squadron. It was then "pursuit", now "fighter".
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 567
4. General Frank. How long had you been in Honolulu ?
Colonel Tyler. On that duty, sir ?
5. General Tyler. No. When did you arrive in the Hawaiian
Islands ?
Colonel Tyler. On the 22nd of February 1941, sir.
6. General Frank. You had been there about six months ?
Colonel Tyler. More than that, sir; almost ten months.
7. General Frank. They had a practice of sending officers down to
the information center, to break them in in the various duties to
which they would be assigned, when the information [10961
center became operative, is that correct ?
Colonel Tyler. Sir, I believe that that was the intention, on the
morning of the 7th, when I was assigned, there. I had been assigned
there, one previous date, but there was only one other person there
besides myself, and that was the telephone operator.
8. General Frank. So you got little or no instruction on the previ-
ous date?
Colonel Tyler. That is right, sir. I had, however, been through
the information center, once before. They took a tour of officers.
9. General Frank. Were you familiar with the detailed operation
of the information center?
Colonel Tyler. Well, I understood how the thing worked; yes,
sir. I think I understood it quite well.
10. General Frank. Had you had any instructions on the duties
of a pursuit officer in the information center?
Colonel Tyler. I had no instruction before I went on this first
tour of duty. At that time I reported for duty, and, there being only
a telephone operator and myself, I called the operations officer, then
Major Bergquist, now Colonel Bergquist, and asked him what my
duties were, then, because, obviously, it seemed to me, I had no rea-
son to be there, if there wasn't an operator there.
11. General Grunert. May I interrupt, here? Will you explain
what a "pursuit officer in an information center" is? I know what
a control officer is, but just what is a "pursuit officer in an informa-
tion center"?
Colonel Tyler. At that time, the pursuit officer's duty [1097]
was to assist the controller in actually controlling the planes m the
air. The pursuit officer is the one who would give the actual instruc-
tion of the fighter planes after they were ordered off. A controller's
job, however, was to order the planes off.
12. General Frank. To be a little more specific, when an enemy
plane was sighted, instructions were issued from the information
center to provide what — an interception?
Colonel Tyler. The instruction that would come to me would be
from the controller, to order a certain number of flights off, from
such and such a squadron.
13. General Frank. To accompish what?
Colonel Tyler. To take off and make interception.
14. General Frank. And from the time that they left the ground
until the interception was made, who was giving them instructions?
Colonel Tyler. That was the pursuit officer's duty, sir, except at
such time as the controller might.
15. General Grunert. That is what I wanted in the record.
568 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Frank. So on this morning, you were assigned there for
instructional purposes, to learn about being a pursuit officer ?
Colonel Tyler. Yes, sir.
16. General Frank. Who was there, this morning, to teach you
anything about that?
Colonel Tyler. I was the senior — in fact, I was the only officer there,
and all that I could learn would be what I would learn by observing.
By that I mean, there were about five or six plotters placing the plots
(arrows) on the board, and there [1098] was a
17. General Frank. Was it a very well organized activity for
the purpose of giving vou instruction ?
Colonel Tyler. I would say that the previous tour that I had
through the information center was clear enough in giving me a
set-up of the thing, but actually, there being no officers there to
identify plots, nor no senior controller there, then, I wouldn't say
that I was very well instructed that morning.
18. General Frank. All right. Was the aircraft warning service,
including the information center, operating that morning?
Colonel Tyler. Yes, sir; it was.
19. General Frank. Were there any plots made on the board
prior to 7 o'clock?
Colonel Tyler. I am quite sure there were, sir. There were a
number of plots around the Island. As to whether they were just
before 7, or started appearing about 7, 1 am not certain as to that.
20. General Frank. Do you remember the occasion on which a flight
from the north was picked up by the Opana station ?
Colonel Tyler. Yes, sir.
21. General Frank. You remember that ?
Colonel Tyler. Yes, sir.
22. General Frank. Will you give us the circumstances surround-
ing that ? Can you give us a narrative concerning it ?
Colonel Tyler. Just as a matter of interest, I saw this lad who was
keeping the historical record. Ther-e is a record made of every plot
that comes into the station, and I had not [1099] yet observed
that activity, so I went over to see what he was doing, and it happened
to be just about 7 o'clock, or roughly thereabout; and he had these
plots out probably 130 miles, which I looked at, and there were other
plots on the board at that time. It was just about 7, or a little bit
after, I think, and then, right at 7 o'clock, all the people who were
in the information center, except the telephone operator, folded up
their equipment and left. There were just the operator and myself
again ; and about 7 : 15, the radar operator from Opana called the
telephone operator to say that he had a larger plot than he had ever
seen before, on his 'scope, and the telephone operator relayed the
call to me; so I took the call, and, inasmuch as I had no means of
identifying friendly plots from enemy, nor was I led to believe that
there would be any occasion to do so, I told him not to worry about it.
And the next warning I had was about 5 after 8, when we received a
call that there was an attack on.
23. General Frank. What did you assume this was that was com-
ing in ? It might have been what ?
Colonel Tyler. As far as I was concerned, it could. I thought it
most probable that it would be the B-17's which were coming from
the mainland.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 569
24. General Frank. You knew there was a flight of B-17s due in ?
Colonel Tyler. I didn't have official information. You see, I had
a friend who was a bomber pilot, and he told me, any time that they
play this Hawaiian music all night long, it is a very good indication
that our B-17s were coming over from the mainland, because they
use it for homing; and when I [llOO] had reported for duty
at 4 o'clock in the morning, I listened to this Hawaiian music all the
way into town, and so I figured then that we had a flight of B-l7s
coming in ; so that came to my mind as soon as I got this call from
him.
25. General Frank. Did you give any thought to the fact that
it might be. planes from a navy carrier ?
Colonel Tyler. Yes, sir. In fact, I thought that was just about
an equal probability of the two.
26. General Frank. What did you do, from then on ?
Colonel Tyler. Well, there was nothing to do between the call,
until the attack came.
27. General Frank. Where were you when the attack came?
Colonel Tyler. I was awaiting relief. I was due at 8 o'clock to
be relieved, and there being nothing going on, I just stepped outside
of the door. There was an outside door, there, and I got a breath
of fresh air, and I actually saw the planes coming down on Pearl
Harbor; but even then, I thought they were Navy planes; and I saw
antiaircraft shooting, which I thought was practicing antiaircraft.
28. General Frank. The last connection that you had with this
station was when you told the operator up at Opana to "forget it,"
so to speak?
Colonel Tyler. Yes, sir.
29. General Kussell. How long had you been in the Air Corps, then.
Colonel?
Colonel Tyler. I was first commissioned in 1937. I had it, just a
little over four years, sir, at that time.
30. General Russell. You knew something about the mission of
fighter airplanes, did you?
[J 101] Colonel Tyler. Yes, sir.
31. General Russell. And you knew that the pursuit officer in that
informaition center was there to get planes in the air, to intercept
incoming hostile planes if they appeared, did you ?
Colonel Tyler. Yes, sir.
32. General Russell. And you knew the only thing you had to do
was to get in touch with the people who could put those planes up,
isn't that true ?
Colonel Tyler. That is not exactly true, sir, because we had noth-
ing on the alert. We had no planes.
33. General Russell. Well, if you had had some planes on the
alert, then your job was to call for the commander of those planes
and tell him, "Here come some enemy planes — ^go get them !" Wasn't
that your job, as the pursuit officer?
Colonel Tyler. That would be my job if I had any way of telling.
There was no means of identifying.
34. General Russell. There seemed to be a lot of mystery about a
pursuit officer and your not being trained as a pursuit officer, and
I am trying to see if I can solve that mystery. You had a telephone
570 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in that place, on which you could talk to the commanders of the air-
craft on the Islands ?
Colonel Tyler. Well, my next hif^her, the first one there called
would have been Major Bergquist. I would have called him in his
quarters, I presume.
35. General Russell. Then he was to tell the people to get into the
planes and go get the enemy ?
Colonel Tyler. That was his duty ; yes, sir.
36. General Russell. So it was a rather simple job, after all, wasn't
it, Colonel ?
[1J02] Colonel Tyler. That's right; it would have been.
37. General Russell. The only mystery about it was the fact that
you did not know that there were any Jap planes coming in, there?
Colonel Tyler. Yes, sir.
38. General Russell. And you had the information from this boy
at the Opana radar station that he had picked up the biggest flight
that he had ever picked up, is that right?
Colonel Tyler. Yes, sir.
39. General Russell. Did he appear somewhat excited over the
flight that was coming in ?
Colonel Tyler. I would say that he seemed more than normal. Of
course, I didn't know the fellow up there, but he seemed — I would
say he was interested in it, all right, sir.
40. General Russell. He had found something out there, that had
impressed him to quite an extent ?
Colonel Tyler. Yes, sir.
41. General Russell. And you said, "Don't worry about it — don't
bother"? That was your decision, is that right?
Colonel Tyler. Yes, sir.
42. General Russell. Now, to go back to these other people who
had been there, and who had folded up and gone away at 7 o'clock.
It was their job. as I understand this information center, to evaluate
the incoming information?
Colonel Tyler. No, sir; their job was to present it to the Board for
evaluation by them.
43. General Russell. Who was the man, there, to evaluate that
information?
Colonel Tyler. The Navy liaison officer and the bomber [IJO-S]
liaison officers.
44. General Russell. They were the people who would evaluate any
information from one of these operating stations out on the Island?
Colonel Tyler. Yes, sir.
45. General Russell. Were they there at all, that morning?
Colonel Tyler. No, sir.
46. General Russell. They never had been ?
Colonel Tyler. No, sir.
47. General Russell. So there wasn't anybody there whose job it
was. or whose duty it was. to evaluate this incoming information?
Colonel Tyler. That's right, sir.
48. General Russell. Well, why were you up there, at all?
Colonel Tyler. Sir, I really don't know.
49. General Russell. You were not to go into action as the pursuit
officer, until these other people, who were going to evaluate the in-
Proceedings of army pearl harbor board 571
formation, had evaluated it and told you that hostile aircraft was en
route to the Island ; that is the situation, isn't it ?
Colonel Tyler. That is right, sir.
50. General Russell. Therefore, it wasn't your job to evaluate this
information, at all ?
Colonel Tyler. No, sir ; it wasn't.
51. General Russell. I was niterested, merely as a matter of in-
formation, in what you said as to the report of this chap out at that
station, that he had "a big" something, and I missed that part.
Colonel Tyler. I don't know whether he said "a large [1104-]
flight of planes," or "an indication," or "a large blip on his radar."
That is the word that is used, and that I have used considerably, since
then, so I am not sure whether he said "blip."
52. General Russell. "A large blip" indicated a lot of planes?
Colonel Tyler. Yes, sir. It means one and the same thing, sir.
53. General Russell. That is all.
54. General Grunert. You say you were detailed to go up there as'
a pursuit officer, and you were to remain until 8 o'clock. Was it nor-
mal to relieve officers at 8 o'clock, or was that the end of the tour?
Colonel Tyler. There was a schedule made out. I think that in-
formation center was manned from the preceding Wednesday, and I
know it was manned during all off-duty periods, and on holidays,
starting at 4 a. m. I believe that there were officers on duty from 4
a. m. till 7 or 8 o'clock every day.
55. General Grunert. Every day? But that was the end of that
tour for that day ?
Colonel Tyler. Well, on Sunday, this being a holiday, then there
was an officer who was due to relieve me.
56. General Grunert. There was an officer due to relieve you?
Colonel Tyler. Yes.
57. General Grunert. At 8 o'clock?
Colonel Tyler. Yes, sir.
58. General Grunert. He did not show up, did he ?
Colonel Tyler. No, sir ; I didn't see him.
59. General Grunert. But the rest of the personnel of the
[1105] center left at 7?
Colonel Tyler. Yes, sir.
60. General Grunert. And there was nothing for you to do, there,
between 7 and 8, but twiddle your thumbs ?
Colonel Tyler. No, sir ; there was nothing to do.
61. General Grunert. Then it appears that the organization seemed
to be faulty, and its instruction faulty, and there seemed to be a lack
of organization and common sense and reason on this. You went up
there to do duty as a pursuit officer in the information center. There
was nobody to do the work with, because the controller was not there,
and the Navy liaison man wasn't there, and probably some others
were missing, so you couldn't do your duty, as a pursuit officer, be-
cause there was nobody to do duty with ; and then, at the end of the
tour, at 7 o'clock, everybody disappeared except the telephone operator
and you ; and the telephone operator remainder there for apparently
no reason. You had no particular duty, did you ?
Colonel Tyler. No, sir ; we hadn't.
572 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
62. General Grunert. It seems all "cock-eyed", to me— and that,
''' Are There Lny other questions ? Thank you very much for coming.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon, at 5 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses
for the day, and proceeded to other business.)
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 573
[1106] CONTENTS
TRIDAY. AUGUST 18, 1944
Testimony of— Page »
Colonel Walter C. Phillips, General Staff Corps, Myitkyina, North
Burma 1107
Resumed 124U
Fulton Lewis, Jr., Radio News Reporter, Mutual Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Washington, D. C 1161
Colonel Kenneth P. Bergquist, A. U. S., Washington, D. C 1186
Brig. Gen. Jacob H. Rudolph, Retired, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 1221
EXHIBITS
No. 16. Volume of broadcasts 1178
17. Documents selected from folder relating to Canol Project 1178
18. Documents selected from personal file 1178
1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original transcript of proceedings.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 575
[1107^ PEOCEEDINGIS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD
FRIDAY, AUGUST 18, 1944
Munitions Building,
Washington^ D. C.
The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted
the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the
Board, presiding.
Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D.
Kussell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.
Present also : Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C
Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr.,
Executive Officer.
General Grunert. The Board will come to order.
TESTIMONY OF COLONEL WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
CHIEF OF STAFF CORPS
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your
name, rank, organization, and station.
Colonel Phillips. Walter C. Phillips, Colonel, General Staff Corps ;
serial number 07314. I am now G-3 in General Stilwell's staff,
Myitkyina, North Burma.
2. General Grunert. Colonel Phillips, what was your position and
assignment in the Hawaiian Defense Command, December 7, 1941 ?
Colonel Phillips. I was Chief of Staff, sir.
\^1108^, 3. General Grunert. How long had you been Chief of
Staff?
Colonel Phillips. I became Chief of Staff on November 5, that year.
4. General Grunert. You had served on the Hawaiian Department
Staff prior to that, had you ?
Colonel Phillips. That is right ; yes, sir, I was G-3.
5. General Grunert. For how long?
Colonel Phillips. I believe, sir, I arrived in Hawaii in March of
that year, and I had rotated through the various staff sections, in order
to become thoroughly acquainted with the General Staff's set-up. I
had been in G-o, 1 believe, since July of that year.
6. General Grunert. Then General Short really brought you over
there to groom you to become Chief of Staff, did he ?
Colonel Phillips. That is correct.
576 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
7. General Grunert. What was your military background prior to
your going to Hawaii, in which you became qualified to become a De-
partment Chief of Staff ?
Colonel Phillips. I had been G-3 of the First Division — I came
from the First Division — for about three years prior to going there.
8. General Frank. Where was that ?
Colonel Phillips. At New York; Fort Hamilton, N. Y. I had just
completed the first two Army maneuvers, and the maneuver in Lou-
isiana. We moved the First Division to Fort Benning.
9. General Grunert. And in what capacity ?
Colonel Phillips. G-3.
10. General Grunert. Had you had any G-1, -2, and -4 [1109]
experience ?
Colonel Phillips. I had had G-2 experience here in the War De-
partment, and also I was Assistant G-2 in the Ninth Division in the
last World War. I have also had G-4 experience; not G-1, except
Adjutant of a Kegiment.
11. General Grunert. The relation of a Chief of Staff to a Com-
manding General is that of "right-hand bower," his advisor, his con-
fidential assistant ?
Colonel Phillips. That is correct.
12. General Grunert. The Board, by the study of documents and
the hearing of testimony, has gotten a pretty thorough and broad
picture, and also has gotten considerable details of various parts of
that picture. With your help we hope to round out that picture,
develop new facts, and possibly get some new leads to other facts.
This morning I am going to approach the bringing out of this testi-
mony in a bit different manner. Instead of asking questions about
the component parts, I will take the problem as a whole and then take
it apart, to see how it "ticks."
The Hawaiian Islands, on account of their location, constitute a
strategic outpost for the United States. They lie across any path of
attack against our west coast and against the Panama Canal, and they
also afford a base for offensive action ; hence they are of great impor-
tance. And, in that the Hawaiian Islands are an outpost, and an
important one, they in the past have had high priority in getting
equipment, materiel, and personnel, in preparing them for defense.
We started in with a Joint Army and Navy Plan made here in
Washington, then that was followed by a Joint Army and Navy
\1110] Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. You know of
that?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir ; I was familiar with that.
13. General Grunert. That plan was supplemented by a Joint
Air Operation Plan. Now, why is the Army in this outpost ? What
is its primary mission ? Can you tell me the primary mission of the
Army in Hawaii ?
Colonel Phillips. General, I would like to introduce, right now,
the fact that it has been two years and a half since I have read those
plans, and all that I can state in the way of anything concrete or
definite from those plans is from memory.
14. General Grunert. I will attempt to help you out. Is it your
remembrance of that mission that it is "to protect Pearl Harbor naval
and air base, the installations thereat, and the ships therein?"
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 577
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir; that sounds very familiar. I believe
that is correct.
15. General Grunert. Now, suppose we attempt to break this down
into Avhat they are out there to defend against. First, you might say,
an attack from within; next, an attack from the air; then, next, sur-
face attack, or a combination. Hence, probably that is why they had
three alerts — No. 1, against attack from within, in the line of sabo-
tage; No. 2, against air plus sabotage; and No. 3, against surface, air,
and sabotage ?
Colonel Phillips. That is right.
16. General Grunert. You recall'those three alerts?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. I wrote the Standing Operating Pro-
cedure on that, sir.
17. General Grunert. Now, the first, "against attack from
[Jlll~\ within," mainly sabotage, apparently was well covered.
They were alerted against sabotage, and so far there has beten no
evidence of sabotage at that time.
As to the third, "against surface attack, or a combination, sabotage,
air, and surface," there appeared to be no threat.
That leaves the second, which I might break down again into three
parts: The defense against an air attack. That, I will break down
into information, air (meaning air forces), and antiaircraft; and
permeating all three of these there avouIcI be the cooperation and co-
ordination with the Navy.
So the nubbin of this whole thing appears to be. Why Alert 1 and
not Alert 2? We will start with that and its many related matters,
and my first question will be. Why was Alert No. 1 chosen, and why
not Alert No. 2?
Colonel Phillips. As I recall — I say. General, I have no notes, have
kept no file or anything on this, whatsoever, it is purely from memory
over a period of 2i/2 years — as I recall, November 27th, we received a
message at the headquarters, to the effect that we would take pro-
visions to prevent sabotage. There was a possibility of sabotage,
with 165,000 Japanese in the Territory, and the alert. No. 1, or the
sabotage alert, seemed to be just the thing required. It was the
General's opinion at that time.
As soon as we got the message, we had a staff meeting.
18. General Grunert. Let me identify this message. Is that the
message from the Chief of Staff, or the so-called "G-2" message to
your G-2 over there ? I can refresh your memory by reading 3'ou this
message. This is a message from the Chief of Staff to the Command-
ing General of the Hawaiian Department, [1112^ 27 November
1941 :
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes
with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come
back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile ac-
tion possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot (repeat NOT) be avoided,
United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should
not (repeat NOT) be construed as restricting you to a course of action that
might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed
to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary
but these measures should be carried out so as not (repeat NOT) to alarm the
civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities
occur you will carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow Five as far as they pertain
to Japan. Limit discussion of this highly secret information to minimum es-
sential officers.
79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1 38
578 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Was that the message which you got ?
Colonel Phillips. That is correct.
19. General Grunert. Now, that message has nothing in it about
sabotage ?
Colonel Phillips. No, sir.
20. General Grunert. But the sabotage alert was decided on ?
Colonel Phillips. The sabotage alert was taken up as, at that time,
deemed sufficient ; and it was a very simple matter to change from one
to the other. It was merely adding more troops.
21. General Grunert. Were you present at the conference that
[IJl^] they had on this message with the Navy, do you recall?
Colonel Phillips. I was not, sir.
22. General Grunert. Do you know how soon after that confer-
ence the report was made on the action taken ?
Colonel Phillips. I cannot say. I am under the impression that
it was very shortly thereafter. I mean that day or, at the latest,
the next. I am not sure.
23. General Grunert. But when the Commanding General returned
from his conference with the Navy, the testimony before the Roberts
Commission appears to show that he called you in and the decision
was made to adopt Alert No. 1, the sabotage alert.
Colonel Phillips. That is correct.
24. General Grunert. Was there anybody else in on that at the
time they had the discussion ?
Colonel Phillips. I informed the heads of the General Staff sec-
tions.
25. General Grunert. You informed them?
Colonel Phillips. No, we had a little informal meeting in my office.
26. General Grunert. Prior to the decision?
Colonel Phillips. Not prior to the decision; no, sir. We were an-
nouncing the decision.
27. General Grunert. When the decision was made?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
28. General Grunert. How about the other Commanders, such as
the Antiaircraft, the Air, the Division Commanders? Did they con-
fer before or after the decision was made ?
Colonel Phillips. I cannot say as to that, sir.
29. General Grunert. But you do recall the conference with
[1114-] the Commanding General, in which that decision was
made?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
40. General Grunert. Was anybody present except you and the
Commanding General, then ?
Colonel Phillips. I cannot say as to that. I believe the General
Staff section heads were there. I am not positive about that.
41. General Grunert. Then it Avas just a question of judgment as to
which alert to take up at that particular time?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
42. General Grunert. And you say that you could have changed to
the other two alerts in a short time ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir; a very short time.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 579
43. General Grunert. Was there any discussion as to the other two
alerts ?
Colonel Phillips. I cannot say definitely as to that, sir, but I be-
lieve there was.
44. General Grunert. During that discussion, or prior to the Com-
manding General's making his decision, was there any expression of
reasons for making that decision ? If there was any discussion or any
question as to whether or not it shoyld go into 1, 2, or 3, then there
must have been something argued, or else he just made the bald deci-
sion that he would go into the sabotage alert, wthout any discussion.
Colonel Phillips. General, I cannot say. Those notes and the rec-
ords of that were very clear to me 2i/2 years ago, but I just cannot say
at this time. I can't give you those details. I don't remember.
45. General Grunert. Do you recall having received or having
[1116] gotten information from the Navy on that same date,
November 27, as to a message received from the Navy Department
to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, which message started
out to the effect that "This is a war warning," and it wound up by
saying, "Transmit this information to the Army" ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. That message was received by the Gen-
eral, and I believe it was read to us all. I am not positive about that,
though.
46. General Grunert. I will read that, so as to put it in the record,
and so it can be considered. This is a paraphrase of the dispatch :
Chief of Naval Operations, to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Novem-
ber 27.
Consider this dispatch a war warning. Negotiations with Japan in an effort
to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make an
aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against
either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo is indicated
by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their
naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for
carrying out all tasks assigned in WPL — 46 only. Guam, Samoa, and the conti-
nental districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabo-
tage. A similar warning is being sent by War Department. Inform Naval
District and Army authorities. British to be informed by SPENAVO.
Now, the only reference to sabotage in either of those messages is
in this message, here, in which it states : [1116] "Guam, Samoa,
and the continental Districts have been directed to take appropriate
measures against sabotage." You recall that message, and that the
Army was informed ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
47. General Grunert. And also, on that same date, there was a G-2
message from the War Department G-2 to G-2 of the Hawaiian De-
partment. That related primarily to sabotage ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
48. General Grunert. Do you know when that was received ?
Colonel Phillips. I can't say the hour. As I recall, it was the same
day.
49. General Grunert. The same day ? But the decision on the sab-
otage alert was made as a result* of the conference on the two messages
that I have read ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
50. General Grunert. Right after that ?
580 COXGRESSIOXAL IXVESTIGATIOX PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Phillips. Yes. sir; I believe that is correct.
51. General Geuxlet. Does any Member of the Board vrant to de-
velop the alert question any further (
TTliat can you tell us about the state of mind of the Army and Navy
particularly the higher commanders and statf. as to the probability oi
possibility or imminence of war ?
Colonel Phillips. In my opinion. General, avc were all thoroughly
aleit and fully conscious of the, possibility, the Xavy as well as the
Army. I do not speak for the Xavy.
b'2. General Gruxe^t. Did you expect an attack on Hawaii ^
Colonel Phillips. Did 1 1
o3. General Grfxert. Yes. Yoti had better tell me what you ex-
pected, and not talk for the rest.
[1117^ Colonel Phillips. I was fully aware of the possibility
of such a thing. It struck me as possible.
54. General Gkttxlet. But still you concurred with the decision of
the Commanding General as to alerts, that the alert against sabotage
was the proper one ?
Colonel Phillips. That was his decision, sir. "We discussed the
tiling, as I recall, quite fully.
55. General Gritxert. You discussed the pros and cons ? Can you
tell me the pros and cons of the discussion ?
Colonel Phillips. I cannot tell you the details of that discussion;
it is just too long ago.
56. General Gruxprt. All right. General Eussell.
57. General Eussell. TThen you were discussing these probable
enemy actions or hostile actions which the Japanese might inaugurate,
which led yoti to this Xo. 1 Alert, did you tell General Grunert. a
little while ago. that you had both General Marshall's message of the
27th and the Xavy message of the 27tli before you ?
Colonel Phillips. If f did that. I cannot be positive that that was
the case. I cannot be positive about the naval message. We kne^v
of the naval message, but whether we had General Marshall's here,
and the naval message here [indicating, at his right and at his left],
at tliat time. I cannot say.
5S. General Eussell. How long did it take you and General Short
to analyze this Marshall message on the 27th. if you did analyze it ?
Colonel Phillips. I can't tell you about that. sir. You want facts.
Those are details, sir. that I had.- two years and a half ago, but I do
not retam them. I have made no notes, [1118'\ I have no file,
and I do not know.
59. General Eussell. Xow. Colonel, is it not a fact that very shortly
thereafter, certainly withm ten days, you had a very destructive at-
tack out there ?
Colonel Phllllps. That is right.
60. General Eussell. Is it not a fact that the selection of Alert
Xo. 1. and ordering the department into that alert, contributed largely
to the destructiveness of that attack? Is the question clear to you ?
Colonel Phillips. Xo. •
61. General Eussell. Suppose you had adopted Alert Xo. 3 instead
of Alert Xo. 1, would you not have been in a much better position to
repel that attack on the morning of December 7?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 581
Colonel Phillips. It is a matter of opinion, sir ; I don't know. I
would say I don't know about that; it is purely a matter of assumption.
G2. General Eussell. You have no idea now about whether No. 3
would have been a more effective alert than Xo. 1 ?
Colonel Phillips. From the results we obtained that morning,
during the attack, with the number of planes that were shot down,
the estimated number of course, we thought we had done a very good
job. Xo. 3 alert, or the entire all-out alert, was ordered, immediately,
and it would be a matter of assumption to say what alert. I don't
know.
[1J19] 63. General Russell. I am afraid I am branching out too
far at this, place in our investigation.
Xow, when General Short analyzed this message of the 2Tth, do you
recall your discussing the possibilities of the ending of negotiations
here in Washington on the international situation, and its relation to
the imminence of war ?
Colonel Phillips. I am sure that was discussed.
64. General Russell. What was said?
Colonel Phillips. I cannot sa^'.
65. General Russell. Were you out there when the Japs came in
and launched that attack?
Colonel PmiiLiPs. I most assuredly was, sir.
66. General Russell. How does it come to pass, then, if you had
such a vivid and depressing experience shortly thereafter, that it did
not leave on your memory some impression as to what went before ?
Colonel Phillips. General, I had it very clearly at that time. I
stated a while ago, sir, that much has intervened. I have been very busy
for the last two j'ears and a half, and those details of the discussion or
the documents that we had at that time were directly in front of me,
and what the details of that discussion were at that particular time I
am unable to say right now specifically.
67. General Russell. I know, Colonel, but since that time it has
not been so very easy for Pearl Harbor and the incidents leading up to
Pearl Harbor to get away from you, has it ?
Colonel Phillips. Xo, sir. Xot very easy; no, sir. But, sir, you
are asking specific, definite questions which I am unable to answer from
memorj'.
[1120] 68. General Russell. Well, you have no way to refresh
your memory ?
Colonel Phillips. Xo, sir, I have no notes.
69. General Fraxk. Have you any notes any place in the world, on
this subject?
Colonel Phillips. Xo, sir. '
70. General Frank. Did you ever have any ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes. sir.
71. General Frank. ■V\niat did you do with them ? .
Colonel Phillips. I left Hawaii, sir : they are in the file. You will
doubtless find a complete story in the file in Hawaii. We had quite
a line-up of testimony for the Roberts Commission, before whom I
appeared at that time.
72. General Russell. Colonel, I will ask you whether or not the
contents of this critical message of Xovember 27 from the Chief of
Staff were passed on to anyone other than to you and General Short.
582 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Phillips. It was passed on to the General Staff section
chiefs, as I recall it, sir.
73. General Russell. Are you positive about that ?
Colonel Phillips. I think so.
74. General Russell. Do you think you read or showed this mes-
sage to G-2, for example ?
Colonel Phillips. I think so ; G-1, 2, 3, and 4.
75. General Russell. Now, was any injunction issued then as to the
dissemination of the information in that message on down to these
Commanders, the Division Commanders and the Antiaircraft, the Air
Commander ?
Colonel Phillips. The General handled that himself [11£1~\
directly, and I definitely instructed the section chiefs that it was highly
confidential and that it would go no further.
76. General Russell. Therefore, you have no information as to
whether these interested commanders knew of this message and its
contents ?
Colonel Phillips. Except, I have no definite information right now
if they did.
77. General Russell. But it was treated as a highly confidential
document, and j^ou instructed these General Staff officers not to divulge
its contents ?
Colonel Phillips. That is right.
78. General Russell. And so far as you know they were the only
people to whom the contents of this message were given ?
Colonel Phillips. As far as I know, sir.
79. General Russell. Have you any questions. General?
80. General Frank. Yes.
Are you a product of the Army school system ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes. sir. Leavenworth.
81. General Frank. Well, then yoii are familiar with the method
of estimating the situation ?
Colonel Phillips. That is right ; yes, sir.
82. General Frank. And determining action to take ; is that correct ?
Colonel Phillips. That is correct ; yes, sir.
83. General Frank. In estimating the situation and determining
action to take, what is the procedure?
Colonel Phillips. Well, of course it is all in the book.
84. General Frank. I want you to tell me.
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. You estimate the situation. [11££]
of course : the enemy's capabilities, what he has, what it is possible for
him to do, with your means at hand and his means, and after a general,
thorough discussion and or a consideration, I mean, you arrive at a
definite decision so far as you possibly can, considering the capabilities,
your means, and so forth.
85. General Frank. What do you consider with respect to the
enemy ?
Colonel Phillips. His capabilities and the means, the means avail-
able to him, as far as you can. •
86. General Frank. To do what ? The means to what ?
Colonel Phillips. His means that he has to attack or do the worst
to you that he possibly can.
87. General Frank. Now you are getting down to it : to do the worst
that he can to you.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 583
Colonel Phillips. That is right.
88. General Frank. And in coming to your decision of steps to be
taken, what action do you assume the enemy will take?
Colonel Phillips. The worst action.
89. General Frank. The worst action?
Colonel Phillips. Absolutely.
90. General Frank. You were Chief of Staff to General Short?
Colonel Phillips. That is correct.
91. General Frank. You were his adviser?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir, in that capacity.
92. General Frank. When this question came up of action to be
taken, as a result of these messages of November 27, was there an
estimate of the situation considered at that time ?
Colonel Phillips. I think there was, sir; certainly no written esti-
mate. There was no written estimate prepared, but [1123] of
course we would naturally form an estimate, make an estimate of
the situation, any phases of the situation.
93. General Frank. This was one of the most critical situations
with which you had been confronted ?
Colonel Phillips. That is correct.
94. General Frank. When these messages arrived, did you advise
the Commander of various steps that the Japs might take, and did
3'ou give him any advice on the things that j'ou considered necessary
by way of action that should be taken by the Commanding General ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir; that was thoroughly discussed at the
time, but the detail of that — certainly the advice I was capable of
giving was included in the discussion.
95. General Frank. Did you concur with the Commanding Gen-
eral, or did you specially recommend Alert No. 1?
Colonel Phillips. I most assuredly concurred after his decision was
made.
96. General Frank. Prior to his decision did you recommend it?
Colonel Phillips. Prior to his decision, as I recall, sir, all angles of
the situation were discussed and gone into rather very thoroughly.
Very thoroughly. Three alerts were discussed, possibility, the capa-
bilities of the enemy, and a decision was arrived at after, I should say,
a very thorough estimate of every phase of the situation.
97. General Frank. As vital as that has been to the American pub-
lic and as prominent as it has been before the people, do you mean to
say you have forgotten what you thought about it at that time ?
Colonel Phillips. I haven't forgotten, sir. I haven't [1124-]
forgotten, but I cannot recall specific questions that you ask which
require a yes or no answer. I cannot go into that that thoroughly.
98. General Frank. Have you forgotten whether or not you con-
sidered the No. 1 Alert satisfactory ?
Colonel Phillips. That was satisfactory, sir. The sabotage alert
was adopted by the General, and I concurred.
99. General Frank. What advice did you give him on it ?
Colonel Phillips. General, I cannot say specifically, other than the
general discussion which we covered in discussing the entire situation.
I advised him as to the possibility, and the possibility of an attack —
of course it w^as jDossible — and we went into the thing, the pros and
cons, very thoroughly, but specifically I cannot say.
584 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
100. General Frank. You stated a minute ago that the normal pro-
cedure for a Commander in meeting a military situation is to make
an estimate of the situation, consider the worst thing that the enemy-
can do to you, and make your decision to meet it.
Colonel Phillips. That is correct.
101. General Frank. Do you feel that that was done in this case?
Colonel Phillips. The worst thing that the enemy could do was
certainly considered. That was the possibility of an attack on the
Hawaiian Islands. But that was the worst possible thing that could
occur.
102. General Frank. You haven't answered my question.
Colonel Phillips. Excuse me, sir. I misunderstood.
103. General Frank. Do you consider that steps were taken to meet
the worst situation with which the Japs could confront you ?
[1125] Colonel Phillips. I am thinking now in retrospect. I
am going back from here. That is a very difficult question to answer,
sir. At the time the General made a decision to put in the sabotage
alert I thoroughly agreed with it.
104. General F'rank. You just will not answer that question, will
you?
Colonel Phillips. I can't answer it specifically, sir.
105. General Frank. Do you mean to tell me that, had Alert No.
3 been in effect, the damage would have been as great as it was ?
Colonel Phillips. It is a matter of assumption. I don't know. I
am not in position to say.
106. General Frank. You were Chief of Staff, weren't you ?
Colonel Phillips. Exactly.
107. General Frank. How long would it have taken the planes to
have gotten into the air had they been on No. 3 Alert?
Colonel Phillips. I can't say as to that. It wouldn't have taken
as long as it did take, of course.
108. General Frank. It would take about five to seven minutes ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
109. General Frank. And if the fighters could have gotten in the
air, around 80 of them, to have met this attack, do you think it would
have been as devastating as it was?
Colonel Phillips. Undoubtedly not.
110. General Frank. All right. Then, had you made the decision
to go on No. 3 Alert instead of on No. 1 Alert, you would have been in
a better position to have met this, the woj-st type of attack that could
have happened under the circumstances ; is that correct ?
[11^6] Colonel Phillips. I would say perhaps you are right,
sir.
111. General Frank. Yes. All right. Then, you did not follow
the normal procedure in assurning the worst thing that the enemy
could do, and meet it, did you?
Colonel Phillips. In making the estimate of the situation we con-
sidered the worst that the enemy could do, yes, sir.
112. General Frank. Well, you didn't take steps to meet it, though ?
Colonel Phillips. That's
113. General Frank. Did you ?
Colonel Phillips. The sabotage alert was put in by -the General,
sir, in the situation.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 585
114. General Frank. I know all this.
Colonel Phillips. Yes.
115. General Frank. But in considering the worst thing that the
enemy could do, which was an attack of this kind, you did not take
steps to meet it, did you ?
Colonel Phillips. At that time it was the — it was our decision •
116. General Frank. I know what your decision was.
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
117. General Frank. You tell me you are a graduate of Leaven-
worth ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
118. General Frank. You are a part of the school system?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
119. General Frank. You know the theory of arriving at these
decisions ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
[1127] 120. General Frank. Either you know or you don't.
Colonel Phillips. Sir ?
121. General Frank. Did you or did you not take steps to meet the
worst situation that the Japs could bring against you ?
How long did it take the airplanes to get in the air, all massed on
the apron as they were, from a No. 1 Alert ?
Colonel Phillips. I don't know about that, sir. It would take
some time.
122. General Frank. It says from two to four hours.
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. Well, I don't know about that.
123. General Frank. And in this situation you needed to get them
in the air within a matter of a few minutes ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
124. General Frank. Therefore, did you take the best measures to
meet this attack by prescribing No. 1 Alert?
Colonel Phillips. Apparently not, according to that. That was —
the No. 1 Alert
125. General Frank. We know what the No. 1 Alert was.
Colonel Phillips. Yes.
126. General Frank. Do you know what it was ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
127. General Frank. Do you know what No. 3 Alert was ?
Colonel Phillips. I think so, yes, sir.
128. General Frank. Had No. 3 Alert been in effect, your fighter
l^lanes could have gotten off in a matter of five or seven minutes?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
[112S] 129. General Frank. They could have met the attack?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
130. General Frank. Therefore, you would have taken steps to
have met this, the worst situation that the enemy could bring against
you?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
131. General Frank. And you didn't do it, did you?
Colonel Phillips. Subsequent messages
132. General Frank. Now wait a minute. You didn't do it, did
you?
Colonel Phillips. Not at that particular time, sir.
586 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
133. General Frank. No.
Colonel Phillips. No, sir.
134. General Frank. Well, that is the time that I am talking about,
is that particular time.
Colonel Phillips. The subsequent message from G-2 seemed to
confirm our action as what was required. That had a great deal of
weight in confirming the action that the General had taken at thai
time.
135. General Frank. Yes, but you did not follow all this Leaven-
worth teaching that you were talking about here a little while ago,
did you?
Colonel Phillips. That is correct, sir.
136. General Frank. Now, did you consider a Jap attack of this
nature possible ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
137. General Frank. Did you consider it probable?
Colonel Phillips. Not probable.
138. General Frank. What was your attitude toward such a
[1129] possibility? Why was it not probable?
Colonel Phillips. Due to the distance.
139. General Frank. From where?
Colonel Phillips. From Japan; the fact that we had our Navy
there, and many aspects of the thing, many facts that we had at
hand, including those that I have mentioned, induced me to believe
that an attack Avas, of course, possible, but not immediately probable.
I discussed
140. General Frank. Did you so advise General Short?
Colonel Ppiillips. No, sir, I did not. This is when I first went to
Hawaii. I made my decision — I made my estimate of the situation
as a G-3 at that time in regard to the possibility of the attack, the
probability.
141. General Frank. Did you so advise General Short at that time!
Colonel Phillips. I advised him that the attack was possible.
142. General Frank. AVell, did you advise him that it was not
probable ?
Colonel Phillips. I did not.
143. General Frank. You weren't very positive as a Chief of Staff,
were you ?
Colonel Phillips. I tried to be, sir.
144. General Frank. Is your memory in general, good or bad?
Colonel Phillips. Fairly good.
145. General Frank. In making your estimate as to whether this
attack was probable or not, what information did you have from
the Navy ?
Colonel Phillips, I can't say definitely what information
[1130] we had at that time or that I had myself in my estimate.
I had the plans available, and in my office as G-3 there was a naval
officer there that was a liaison man with the Navy, and we discussed
the plans. I discussed it with the staff as — this is prior to my taking
over the position of Chief of Staff — as G-3. I discussed it with the
Navy staff, and we had conferences back and forth very frequently,
the chief thing being to acquaint me thoroughly with the situation in
Hawaii.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 587
146. General Frank.' I have no further questions at this time.
147. General Grunert. I would like to have some more informa-
tion about the discussion which led up to the decision to adopt the
sabotage alert and not the alert which would be defense against air,
or the all-out alert. Now, probably I can refresh your mind a bit
by giving you a concise summary of General Short's conclusions as to
the radiogram of November 27.
He dwelt on not disclosing intent, not alarming the public, avoid-
ing publicity. In his report to the Chief of Staff's message of No-
vember 27, which was sent from Hawaii that same afternoon of No-
vember 27, he dwelt on the fact that the War Department did not
indicate other action except sabotage, which he considered as tacit
consent to the report. And again he dwelt upon: He must obtain
information from the Navy, that the Navy was responsible for dis-
tant reconnaissance, that the Navy feared no Jap attack nor a probable
attack, that he had confidence in the Navy, that planes were sent,
presumably by the War Department, from the mainland without
ammunition, that the attack was a surprise to the Chief of Staff of
the Army, that he received no oceanic telephone warning from the
War Department, that the War Department failed to notify him, and
[JlSl] that the Navy failed to give him information.
Now, with those leads, can you refresh your memory as to what
the discussion was ?
Suppose we take "disclose intent." Was that discussed as to
whether or not, if you took a more vigorous and more protective alert
than Alert No. 1, sabotage, that that might disclose intent? If so,
what was in your mind or the mind at the conference, that any more
vigorous action might disclose intent or alarm the public? Do you
recall anything on those subjects?
Colonel Phillips. Well, the G-2 message subsequent to this time
prior
148. General Grunert, Yes, but the decision was made on the Chief
of Staff's message.
Colonel Phillips. Exactly. I do not know what the General re-
fers to in that.
148. General Grunert. Well, the report rendered by the War De-
partment— did you or the General expect the War Department to come
back and tell you what to do ?
Colonel Phillips. Not at all, but we — the General, after receiving
the subsequent report from the War Department, and the G-2, assum-
ing that that was official, took that as tacit approval of his action.
150. General Grunert. Then, you mean that G-2 report or the
message to G-2 over there was taken as an indication of the War De-
partment's tacit approval of your going on a No. 1 Alert, sabotage?
Colonel Phillips. Sabotage alert, yes, sir; that was the General's
opinion.
'[IIS^I 151. General Grunert. Were you influenced, in the ad-
vice you gave to the Commanding General on the subject of what alert
to take, by any way the Navy looked at this?
Colonel Phillips. I was not at the time, sir.
152. General Grunert. Did you have confidence in the Navy as
to their protective measures as far as keeping anybody away from
the Islands that you had to defend was concerned ?
588 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Phillips. I did. I had absolute confidence in them.
153. General Grunert. What was that based upon ?
Colonel Phillips. Knowledge of their plans, and various and sun-
dry discussions with various and sundry members of their staff.
154. General Grunert. Knowledge of their plans ?
Colonel Phillips. I was convinced that they w^ere on the job.
155. General Grunert. I realize now that you cannot remember
details — I don't expect you to — but I expect you to remember the
larger events and generally what happened, and why. Was it your
understanding that the Navy did not fear any attack or did not ex-
pect any attack, did not consider it probable ?
Colonel Phillies. It was not.
156. General Grunert. At the time the decision was made to go
into an alert for sabotage and not one of the other alerts which w^ould
have been more protection against an air attack, the planes coming
from the mainland with no ammunition — was that brought up in dis-
cussion to decide what alert to go on?
Colonel Phillips. I am not sure that that was disciissed at that
time, sir, the planes. That was a routine
[113S] 157. General Grunert. Was the command war conscious,
or peace-minded, or both ?
Colonel Phillips. I think they were thoroughly war conscious, sir.
158. General Grunert. But you evidently thought war was in the
distant future sometime ?
Colonel Phillips. Some did, perhaps ; I did not.
159. General Grunert. You apparently were more afraid of sabo-
tage and attack from within than from without ?
Colonel Phillips. That is true. We had reorganized the entire
Army garrison. The old Hawaiian Division had been broken down,
as I recall, in October. In September we had reorganized and made
two divisions, filling up all divisions and getting replacements, filling
up the units ; and that was occupying a great deal of our time, thought,
and effort ; and preparation for war and defense of the Island. We
were doing everything possible.
160. General Grunert. The preparation w^as for war in the distant
future, and not right around the corner, was it not ?
Colonel Phillips. Just as rapidly as we could prepare.
161. General Grunert. It has been brought out that there was con-
siderable training activity and preparation taking place ; but we are on
the subject of why an alert against sabotage when there were warn-
ings of not only a possible but almost a probable attack, and still the
mind over there appeared to dwell only on sabotage at that particular
time. Can you think of anything else that may throw light on this
subject ?
Colonel Phillips. We had 165,000 Japanese there.
162. General Grunert. Had they been perpetrating acts of
[1134] sabotage ? Were they not sort of a bugaboo ? You were
afraid that something was going to happen, but you did not know
what, and because there were a lot of Japanese nationals there you
were afraid that they might turn you out of house and home ?
Colonel Phillips. It was believed that they were the most probable
danger.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 589
163. General Grunert. If you had gone on Alert 2, defense against
air, which included defense against sabotage, or if you had gone on
Alert 3, which is an all-out defense, that also would have included
defense against an air attack and against attack on the Island under
the surface. That also includes sabotage, does it not ?
Colonel Phillips. That is right.
164. General Grunert. It would appear that jou reached the de-
cision or opinion, or at least concurred in the decision to take just the
alert against sabotage. Why ? Plainly because you thought it would
interfere with training?
Colonel Phillips. That was one matter that was considered. That
entered into the decision,
165. General Grunert. The interference with training was mainly
against training of what ? Air ?
Colonel Phillips. Training of air, training of ground troops ; train-
ing units to operate as a triangular division.
166. General Grunert. Did not training against sabotage take more
ground troops than ordinarily ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes; that in itself.
167. General Grunert. I am just trying to see how you argued your-
self into a certain frame of mind so that you would give the advice
that you gave, if you did, or that you would concur. [IISS] Of
course you understand, and your teachings have shown you, that- a
good staff officer, no matter what his position, will give his commander
the best he has and, if possible, will argue his points until the com-
mander understands. Once the commander has made his decision
there is nothing else to do. That is understood.
Colonel Phillips. That is correct.
168. General Grunert. But apparently you had nothing to argue
about except what was in favor of what was decided.
Colonel Phillips. As I said a while ago, sir, all phases of the situa-
tion were discussed and considered at the time, as I recall.
169. General Grunert. That is what I am trying to get. What
were the phases ?
Colonel Phillips. Training ; the presence of Japanese — those were
two of them, at least — and the possibility of attack was positively dis-
cussed.
170. General Frank. What kind of attack?
Colonel Phillips. Landing, which was of first importance to us.
171. General Frank. Wliat do you mean by "landing"?
Colonel Phillips. Landing in the invasion of Oahu.
172. General Frank. Was it not well known that since the Euro-
pean War started many landings were preceded by an air attack ?
Colonel Phillips. That was discussed also.
173. General Frank. If you were apprehensive about landing, why
were you not also apprehensive about an air attack?
[11S6] Colonel Phillips. That was discussed at the time, sir.
174. General Frank. What were your responsibilities as Chief of
Staff ? Let us get down to the basis of this thing.
Colonel Phillips. Those were prescribed.
175. General Frank. You were Chief of Staff, were you not?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
590 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
176. General Frank. Wliat were your responsibilities?
Colonel Phillips. I was to coordinate all staff activities, advise the
General of everything that was going on in his command, and be as
near to the General as I possibly could in thought and action, where
possible.
177. General Frank. And to advise him and to take responsibility
for advising him?
Colonel Phillips. Exactly.
178. General Frank. Therefore you did have some responsibility,
did you not ?
Colonel Phillips. Great responsibility, sir.
179. General Frank. Did you ever, during the time that you were
Chief of Staff, make any positive recommendations to him?
Colonel Phillips. I am sure I have, sir.
180. General Frank. Did you make any positive recommendations
to him with respect to what the action should be to meet this par-
ticular crisis that was shown to be developing by the messages of
November 27 ?
Colonel Phillips. I cannot say as to that, sir. I am positive that
I discussed all angles of the situation, or as many as we had at hand
there ; everything that we had in mind and at Jiand. The possibilities
of the entire situation were thoroughly discussed with the General,
the pros and cons, as I [1137] nave said before. As to what
specific recommendations I made to him, I merely brought to his at-
tention the possibilities of attack, the reasons for this, that, and the
other thing. We discussed it thoroughly, and the General arrived
at his decision to go the sabotage alert.
181. General Frank. With or without your assistance?
Colonel Phillips. Of course he had my assistance, as I was dis-
cussing it with him ; but the workings of his mind, how they went on,
sir, I cannot say. Whether it was with my assistance or not, he was
my Commanding General and he made his own decisions.
182. General Grunert. Was he inclined to encourage advice and
argument from his staff officers, or was he inclined to make decisions
without seeking such advice and opinions ?
Colonel Phillips. He made decisions at times, sir, on his own.
At other times my opinion was requested and the opinions of various
staff officers. We had frequent staff meetings.
183. General Grunert. Did you, prior to this discussion with him,
consult the General Staff heads, particularly G-2 and G-3, for their
opinion and their advice and their information, so as to give you
something on which to base yours?
Colonel Phillips. That was a running affair, General, from day to
day. We kept very close staff connections there.
184. General Grunert. But here comes a radiogram from the Chief
of Staff that has certain directives, certain warnings, certain instruc-
tions in it, that could not have been discussed in the ordinary routine.
I know it is routine, and it ought to be, in a staff, to do those things.
But here is something that comes up like this radiogram, and you
would immediately summon [11S8] the members of the staff,
G-2, G-3, and what-not, and get the latest information and get their
advice from every angle. Was that done?
Colonel Phillips. We did that immediately, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 591
185. General Grunert. Immediately?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
186. General Frank. What period of time was consumed in making
this decision ?
Colonel Phillips. I cannot say as to that.
187. General Frank. Was it two hours or five minutes?
Colonel Phillips. Oh, no; it was perhaps an hour and a half.
There was thorough discussion. I do not know how long, now.
188. General Frank. After the attack, by whom and when was the
all-out Alert No. 3 ordered on December 7 ?
Colonel Phillips. The General ordered the all-ourt alert at about
8 o'clock. It was immediately after the attack. 7 : 58, as I recall, was
the time of the dropping of the first bomb.
189. General Frank. Did you, all the time you were Chief of Staff,
ever make a decision without referring it to the General?
Colonel Phillips. On major matters, no.
190. General Frank. On what sort of matters would it have been
possible for you to make a decision ?
Colonel Phillips. Any minor staff matter, sir.
191. General Frank. Such as?
Colonel Phillips. All personnel matters. Everything came through
the headquarters. Ordinary personnel matters, transferring small
units from this station to that station.
\1139'\ 192. General Frank. Like an Adjutant could make?
Colonel Phillips. Well, something similar to that.
193. General Frank. What was your last answer ?
Colonel Phillips. Something similar.
194. General Frank. As Chief of Staff what steps did you take to
see that the actions ordered by General Short pursuant to the radio-
gram of November 27 were carried out? Do you know what was in
that radiogram ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. I had my G-2 and G-3, G-3 particu-
larly, turn out his entire office to see that the alert for sabotage was
put into effect. He inspected the positions that were afterwards oc-
cupied. They remained there for daily inspection from that time on.
195. General Frank. You had antiaircraft available in the Hawai-
ian Department ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
196. General Frank. Air force ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
197. General Frank. Aircraft warning service ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
198. General Frank. To what extent did you use those units in any
sabotage activities when they were sent there and primarily trained
for antiaircraft purposes, for fighting in the air, and the aircraft warn-
ing service for detecting units coming in from the sea ? How did you
use them for antisabotage ?
Colonel Phillips. I am not sure of the detail of that, sir. The anti-
sabotage consisted mostly of ground forces.
199. General Frank. As a matter of fact, it would have been very
easy to have carried on this antisabotage activity and, at [1^4-0]
the same time, have used the antiaircraft and air force and air warn-
592 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ing service on an active alert so as to have been prepared for this air
attack, would it not ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes. I am sure that could be done.
200. General Frank. Did you think of that, as Chief of Staff, and
so advise the Commanding General ?
Colonel Phillips. It was Alert No. 2, as I recall.
201. General Frank. And Alert No. 3?
Colonel Phillips. And 3, where most of those units were used.
Yes, sir; that was discussed.
202. General Frank. How did you advise your Commanding Gen-
eral with respect to that?
Colonel Phillips. It was covered in the selection of the alert by the
General, what we covered in Alert No. 2, what we covered in Alert
No. 3, the number of troops out and required under those alerts. We
went into more or less detail.
203. General Frank. Each time you come back and revert to what
was done by the General.
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
204. General Frank. We are particularly interested in things
that were done by the Chief of Staff, right now.
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
205. General Frank. Did you not feel that j^ou had some respon-
sibility ?
Colonel Phillips. I did, very much, sir.
206. General Frank. This message of November 27 carried the
instruction —
Take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.
[114-i] What reconnaissance was ordered?
Colonel Phillips. I do not recall that any reconnaissance was
ordered, sir.
207. General Frank. Did you have any reconnaissance squadrons ?
Colonel Phillips. In the Air Corps?
208. General Frank. Yes.
Colonel Phillips. We had some heavy bombers used for patrolling.
According to the naval plan they were turned over to the Navy for
distant patrolling.
209. General Frank. Did you not have a reconnaissance squadron
at Bellows Field?
Colonel Phillips. P-40 ?
210. General Frank. No. 0-47s, I think they were.
Colonel Phillips. I am not positive about that, sir. The Air Corps,
under General Martin, handled that.
211. General Frank. Was there any report made to you with respect
to instructions for carrying out the directives in the radiogram of
November 27? Did you require reports to be made to you on the
i9:Structions that you gave?
Colonel Phillips. As to putting on the sabotage alert, most as-
suredly, sir.
212. General Frank. Is that the only thing you did — just order a
sabotage alert in answer to that message ?
Colonel Phillips. We required ordinary staff reports. We re-
quired reports from the units, and also, as I said, the positions were il)'
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 593
spected, the troops were inspected on position. They were there for 24
hours.
213. General Frank. I asked you this: Did the order to institute
Alert No. 1 comprise the only thing you did in compliance with
\J14^] the direction in that radiogram?
Colonel Philijps. That was one thing we did, sir. I cannot recall.
I do not understand your question exactly. We required reports.
Alert No. 1 was instituted and put into effect. I required reports
when they occupied positions. We inspected the positions to see that
the General's decision for the institution of Alert No. 1 was carried
out to the letter.
214. General Grunert. I believe you stated that the message received
by your G-2 you considered as sort of a tactic approval by the War De-
partment of the action taken under the Chief of Staff's message of
November 27 ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
215. General Grunert. Is not a G-2 message a sort of staff com-
munication which is not considered as a command decision ?
Colonel Phillips. It might be so considered. However, coming
from the War Department we considered it came with authority.
216. General Grunert. With reference to the attack by air and the
alert taken to meet the attack, I broke that down into the necessity
of having information, which includes a number of points. It in-
cludes your air warning service, and then the next breakdown would be
air, and antiaircraft. Tliose are the three principal means of defense
against air attack. That all integrated into an interceptor command
when and if established. Now I want to see w^hat condition they were
in had they been ordered into Alert 2.
Wliat was the condition of the information service as far as the air
warning service was concerned ? What was the condition of that to
function for such an alert ?
[1143] Colonel Phillips. We were merely starting that, sir.
217. General Grunert. Why were you merely starting it, when back
in February 1941 air attacks were visualized by the Secretary of the
Navy and concurred in by tlie Secretary of War, and the Commanding
General out there was instructed to get together with the Navy and
take as rapid action as possible and be prepared for such an attack,
and it was stated that by June the air warning equipment would be
there to be installed ? Do you know when it arrived ?
Colonel Phillips. I do not.
218. General Grunert. Do you know what action was taken from
time to time to speed up that very necessary element of defense?
Colonel Phillips. I know that all possible staff action was being
taken, through the Signal Corps people as well as the Air, to speed the
installation.
219. General Grunert. Do you know how many times the Com-
manding General took it up with the War Department, if ever ?
Colonel Phillips. I do not.
220. General Grunert. Is not that part of the Chief of Staff's
business, to advise the Commanding General of delay and advise
action to overcome delay, especially in such an important thing as the
air warning system whose function is to detect incoming aircraft so
that you could defend against them ?
79716—46— Ex. 134, vol. 1 39
594 CONGRESSIONAL IN\^STIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Phillips. Yes. sir: that is correct.
221. General Gruxert. Whose particular business was it in j^our
staff to look after that phase of it ?
Colonel Phillips. The Signal people. The Engineers were install-
ing it, and the Signal people were providing equipment.
222. General Grunert. How about your general staff? The
[114i} general staff' supervises the activities of all those things
that pertain to certain functions. '\"Miat general staff officer should
have gotten on their necks and pushed it through ?
Colonel Phillips. It was a G-4 proposition, and also G-3.
223. General Gruxert. G-4, in the line of getting materiel, and so
forth ; and G-3, in the line of getting the thing in operation ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
224. General Grunert. Did they come to you and tell you, "This
thing is not going rapidly enough. We are not getting material. We
can't get this thing started."?
Colonel Phillips. That was done; yes, sir. At various and sundry
times we discussed the matter. There were many things being pushed
at that time in the Hawaiian Department.
225. General Gruxert. But this was one of the most important?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
226. General Gruxert. And the most important thing should be
pushed the hardest and the most often. Of course all those things
were discussed, but what was done? Did you go to the Commanding
General and impress him with the seriousness of this matter ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
227. General Grux^ert. Did you prepare radiograms for the War
Department and the Chief of Engineers, or what-not, in pushing it?
Colonel Phillips. Tliat is a matter of record, sir. I am not sure
what specific action was taken.
228. General Grunert. Do you know when the majority of the
equipment arrived? Do you know who was put in charge of
the [ii-f^] actual installation? Do you know what the
progress was from month to month ?
Colonel Phillips. I cannot say now, sir. That is also in the record,
I am sure.
229. General Grunert. We will go to the next subject. I believe
you told me that you had a hand in or supervised the preparation of
the S. O. P. of November 5 ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
230. General Grunert. In which you outlined what would be done
under certain circumstances, what this alert was, what that alert was,
and so forth?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
231. General Grunert. And in which, tentatively at least, you estab-
lished an interceptor command. Also, in Alert No. 1, the sabotage
alert, it provided that the planes be concentrated, presumably to better
guard them?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
232. General Grunert. That particular phase of it comes in
strongly, because the airplanes were bunched and many of them were
destroyed by fire of weapons and by fire itself. What discussion was
had of the subject of dispersion or concentration ? Why did you say
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 595
they should be concentrated instead of dispersed so as to give them
more protection ?
Colonel Phillips. The concentration was done to provide or allow
for an easier method of guarding them.
233. Greneral Grunert. An easier method ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, and for fewer troops. Not easy in that
respect, General, but for fewer troops. We did not have sufficient
troops at that time to even fill the units.
[114-6] 234. General Grunert. You appear to have had sufficient
troops to order the Air Force to provide guards for civil installations.
Colonel Phillips. That was because we did not have sufficient
troops to provide for guarding other units.
235. General Grunert. Did you have sufficient infantry at Scho-
field? You were strictly on a sabotage alert. Did you not have
sufficient infantry at Schofield that, for the time being, was not so
necessary as the Air Force? We will take it for granted that the
Air Force should be trained.
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
236. General Grunert. Trained to do various things, trained to be
able to man their equipment so as to have protection against attack?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
[1147] 237. General Grunert. But still you provide in the SOP
that the Air Force troops shall be used for guarding and taking care of
the civil population?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
238. General Grunert. You have elements that would not be neces-
sary in Alert No. 1, because they do not come, practically, until Alert
No. 3, except so far as sabotage is concerned?
Colonel Phillips. That is right.
239. General Grunert. There was no reason for using the troops
that you were trying to get ready, that you were trying to train, and
use those for sabotage purposes?
Colonel Phillips. That is right.
240. General Grunert. Did the. Air Force Commander protest, do
you recall, that part of the SOP? Was he in on it, in making it up?
Colonel Phillips. I am sure he was in on the discussion before the
adoption of that. That was, as I recall, the decision of the Command-
ing General, that the Air Force assist.
241. General Grunert. Presumably, that decision must have been
based on there being sufficient Air Forces to do their own work and
that work in addition.
Colonel Phillips. I cannot say as to that.
242. General Grunert. As to antiaircraft, in that scheme of defense,
especially in Alert 2, defense against an air attack, how were the anti-
aircraft positions? Were they pretty well distributed in and arounri
Pearl Harbor, on the perimeter ?
Colonel Phillips. They were ; yes, sir.
243. General Grunert. Why would it have alarmed the public by
allowing those forces to have live ammunition where they [114^]
could grab it and get to work ? That was brought up in the testimony,
and I want to get your slant on it. Why couldn't they have been
trained from time to time to make that a routine affair to have ammuni-
tion at their emplacements where their guns were, instead of having to
596 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
lug it from some distant place and thereby delay their putting fire on
incoming aircraft? Had it ever been thought of that you should
deceive tlie public by having the stuff in a truck nearby, or by having it
camouflaged as "beans" or anything else? Did those things never
occur, in the line of avoiding alarming the public, instead of placing
uncased, live ammunition right next to the guns? Those things were
possible, were they ?
Colonel Phillips. They were possible ; yes, sir.
244. General Grunert. Then, mainly, the idea of not having the live
ammunition close to the guns themselves was a question of alarming
the public, showing intent, is that it?
Colonel PniLLirs. That perhaps was the chief reason.
245. General Grunert. Were you not also afraid, and did you not
always have in the back of your mind, "Sabotage ! They are liable to
sabotage ! They are liable to do this to the guns ! They are liable
to do this to the ammunition ! or what not ?"
Colonel Phillips. I do not believe that was true.
246. General Grunert. Were- you not sabotage-minded, and not
war-minded ?
Colonel Phillips. I do not think so, entirely, sir. I do not think
that is entirely correct.
247. General Grunert. If you were war-minded, where did you
think an attack was going to come?
Colonel Phillips. Well, our mission was to defend Oahu
[114^] from attack. The attack was coming on Oahu, if it came
at all — the possibility.
248. General Frank. Then why in the world did you not prepare
for an attack?
Colonel Phillips. That was considered.
249. General Frank. What did you think you had ? You had some
8-inch guns, and you had some British T5s, and you had a lot of in-
fantry around there ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes.
250. General Frank. You had those 8-inch guns and the British
75s, and all your infantry mortars, and the AWS system, and the
bombers, and the fighter planes, and your antiaircraft shore defense
batteries — and you think that was all put there against sabotage, do
you?
Colonel Phillips. No, sir. That was for Alert 3, sir.
251. General Frank. You say you were war-minded ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
252. General Frank. And you had all these facilities to prepare for
a war situation, and yet you did not prepare for a war situation, did
you?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
253. General Frank. Did you ?
Colonel Phillips. Well, we adopted a sabotage alert, sir.
254. General Frank. That is not a war situation ?
Colonel Phillips. No.
255. General Frank. It is a local sabotage?
Colonel Phillips. That is right.
256. General Frank. In this message of November 27, it says :
The United States desires Japan to commit tlie first [1150] overt act.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 597
Di^l you fjive any consideration to what that meant ?
Colonel Phillips. Oh, yes; yes, sir.
257. General Frank. All right — what Avas it ?
Colonel Phillips. Well, just exactly what it said — just exactly what
it said.
258. General Frank. I know that is what it said. What was the
consideration that you gave to it ?
259. General Grunert. In other words, what was your conclusion
as to what it meant ?
Colonel Phillips. Well, that brought up the possibility of the at-
tack, of course, on Oahu, but it was considered to be, by the General,
not probable.
260. General Frank. What did you think about it — you, as the
Chief of Staff, one of whose duties it was to advise him? What did
you think about it ?
Colonel Phillips. At that time, I agreed with the General, sir,
thoroughly.
261. General Frank. You agreed with him, but did you advise him?
Colonel Phillips. I did.
262. General Frank. What did you tell him?
Colonel Phillips. I told him of the possibility of an attack.
263. General Frank. And what ? A'Niiat was the result of your con-
sideration of this statement in the message :
The United States desires Japan to commit the first overt act.
Colonel Phillips. Well, of course, we considered at that time, as 1
recall the attack, an attack on the Philippines [llSl] was
most likely,
264. General Frank. In other words, you did not expect war in
Oahu ?
Colonel Phillips. Possible, but not probable.
265. General Frank. You thought it was not probable ?
Colonel Phillips. I agreed. I brought the possibility of attack on
Oahu to the General.
266. General Frank. Yes? _
Colonel Phillips. In his opinion, it was not probable.
267. General Frank. What was your opinion ?
Colonel Phillips. My opinion was that it was not probable, at that
time agreeing with him.
268. General Frank. All right. Did he agree with you ?
Colonel Phillips. I don't know.
269. General Frank. Did he have a chance ?
Colonel Phillips. Did he have a chance ?
270. General Frank. Yes. Did you present him with an opinion,
so it was possible for him to agree with vou ?
Colonel Phillips. I gave him no definite opinions.
271. General Frank. Yet that was your duty as Chief of Staff, was
it not ?
Colonel Phillips. Exactly ; if he desired it.
272. General Frank. Now, there is another statement, referring to
the words of the message.
The United States desires Japan to commit the first overt act,
which says:
598 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that
might jeopardize your defense.
Now, any alert except No. 1 would have pursued a course of
\ 11-52] action that would not so completely have jeopardized the
defense aoainst air attack, would it not?
Colonel PniLLirs. Yes, I believe so.
273. General Frank. Did you analyze the statements in this message
of November 27?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. As I recall, they were all gone over
very thoroughly and an effort made at least to analyze them.
274. General Frank. I would like at some time in these proceedings
to go into this AWS.
275. General Grunert. All right, you may go into it now.
276. General Frank. Was the aircraft warning system operative on
December 7 ?
Colonel Phillips. Not entirely so.
277. General Frank. What do you mean by that ?
Colonel Phillips. On December 7, as I recall, we had one mobile
station opei-ating on a schedule, chiefly for instructional purposes, in-
structing operators.
278. General Frank. Are you sure about your information, now ?
Colonel Phillips. The record of that is also in Hawaii, sir. I am
not positive about this. It is purely from memory. I recall we had
one station called the Opnna station, on northern Oahu, operating that
morning. I am not positive about that.
279. General Frank. Well, did you not have a series of portable
radar, identified as 270 sets, that were in position around the Island?
Colonel Phillips. I think that was so^ibsequent to December 7.
\1153'\ 280. General Frank. Had you not had an exercise in
which the aircraft warning service participated?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. These were mobile sets, however.
281. General Frank. I know that.
Colonel Phillips. We had no permanent installations at that time.
282. General Fra'nk. But your mobile sets ?
Colonel Phillips. Mobile sets; yes, sir.
283. General Frank. How many of those did you have operating,
do you know ?
Colonel Phillips. I am not sure about that.
284. General Frank. Do you know when they arrived ?
Colonel Phillips. I do not.
285. General Frank. Do you know anything about whether or not
there was any delay in the installation of your permanent sets by the
contractors ?
Colonel Phillips. I knew nothing at all about that, sir.
286. General Frank. Do you remember whether or not there were
any complaints made about delays?
Colonel Phh.lips. I do not.
287. General Frank. Do you know whether or not there were any
contractors under suspicion for holding up completion of the work ?
Colonel Phillips. There were none to my knowledge.
288. General Frank. What was the state of training of the personnel
for operating the information center and the radar stations?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 599
Colonel Phillips. At that time?
illdl^\ 289. General Frank. Yes.
Colonel Phillips. I should say it was very mediocre. Every effort
was being made to improA'e the situation.
290. General Fkank. Was sufficient personnel available and trained
for the continuous use of the AWS with portable stations on De-
cember 7 ?
Colonel Phillips. I cannot say as to that, whether there was suf-
ficient personnel. As I recall, there was insufficient personnel, trained
personnel. We were making every effort to train them.
291. General Frank. Were you familiar with the hours of opera-
tion of the AWS ?
Colonel Phillips. I don't recall the schedule that they were operat-.
ing on at that time. It was Inore a training schedule than anything
else.
292. General Frank. It was not operated with any consideration of
protecting the Island against an air attack ?
Colonel Phillips. It was a training schedule, due to the fact that
we did not have adequate trained personnel.
293. General Frank. Did it start operating on December 7 ? Was
it operating on December 8 %
Colonel Phillips. I feel sure it was.
294. General Frank. Then it could have been operating on Decem-
ber 6, could it not %
Colonel Phillips. Not in full strength, I do not believe. I am not
acquainted with those details.
295. General Frank. Who directed the specific hours of operation,
do you know ?
Colonel Phillips. I believe General Davidson, of the \1155'\
Air ; I am not sure.
296. General Frank. Our information indicates that those instruc-
tions came from the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian De-
partment.
Colonel Phillips. I am not sure about that. That is also in the
record. It was operating under the Signal Officer, and with the Air,
under General Davidson. Now, who gave the instructions, I do
not know.
297. General Frank. General Davidson had just returned, on De-
cember 5, from a trip to the United States, had he not?
Colonel Phillips. I do not know about that, sir.
298. General Frank. He had not been present, until December 5,
since the radar equipment had become operative in the Department?
Colonel Phillips. I don't recall that, sir.
299. General Frank. Wlio, if anybody, had been following this
AWS project and using pressure to complete it?
Colonel Phillips. Signal Officer Colonel Powell.
300. General Frank. Had any information been given out indi-
cating a necessity for readiness of that at any particular time?
Colonel Phillips. I do not know.
301. General Grunert. Was not the Navy much concerned in get-
ting that thing started, and did they not put that up to the Army to
push it along?
600 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACit
Colonel Phillips. I cannot say as to that, sir.
302. General Frank. Did you know whether or not there was a
Commander Taylor loaned by the Navy to the Army to help them?
Colonel Phillips. I knew Commander Taylor.
[1156] 303. General Frank. Yon knew he was assisting the
Army to install this station, did you not?
Colonel Phillips. I believe I recall him ; yes, sir.
304. General Frank. In the operation of the AWS after the attack
was there any evidence of an effort on the part of the local Japanese
radio stations to conduct "jamming" activities that interf erred with
the operation of the AWS ?
Colonel Phillips. I do not believe there was, certainly not reported
•to me.
305. General Frank. Do you know? It was not reported to you?
Colonel Phillips. It was not reported to me.
306. General Frank. Do you have any knowledge concerning the
failure of the contractor, Hawaiian Constructors, to complete con-
struction of the defense projects within the time limits prescribed?
Colonel Phillips. I do not.
307. General Frank. Do you have any knowledge concerning the
air-raid w^arning system's not having been completed on schedule ?
Colonel Phillips. I do not.
308. General Frank. Do you have any knowledge as to whether any
military personnel neglected their duty relaitng to this contract?
Colonel Phillips. I don't.
309. General Frank. Was any pressure given by Hawaiian Depart-
ment headquarters to the district engineer to complete these defense
projects as speedily as possible?
Colonel Phillips. I recall no specific pressure.
310. General Frank. Did you have any relations with Colonel
Wyman ?
[11S7] Colonel Phillips. He was the district engineer ?
311. General Frank. Did you have any relations with him ?
Colonel Phillips. I knew him quite well.
312. General Frank. Still, did you have any official relations with
him?
Colonel Phillips. I did not, except to be acquainted with the various
projects that he was installing, and the airfields, and so forth, he was
building. He worked directly with General Short.
313. General Frank. He did not coordinate his activities with the
Chief of Staff, at all?
Colonel Phillips. Not generally.
314. General Frank. Did you read the Air estimate prepared by
General Martin and Admiral Bellinger ?
Colonel Phillips. I do not recall. Undoubtedly I did. I can't
say definitely.
315. General Frank. It was submitted to the Department. It is a
thing of a tactical and strategical nature ?
Colonel Phillips. That is right.
316. General Frank. And if you had been going through the Gen-
eral Staff positions out there is certainly ought to have come to your
attention.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 601
Colonel Philijps. I ,don't know the date that that was submitted,
and I cannot say whether I even saw it. I wasn't, I don't believe, in the
position of Chief of Staif at that time. I am not sure.
317. General Frank. Prior to that time, however, you had been in
the position of G-3 ?
Colonel Phillips. G-3, G-2, and G-1.
[IJSS] 318. General Frank. You should have known what the
plans were for the defense ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes ; I undoubtedly saw it. I can't say.
319. General Frank. You do not remember ever having seen such
a document ?
Colonel Phillips. I cannot say definitely that I have ever seen it.
320. General Frank. You have no memory of it ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, I do have a memory of it. I remember it, but
I can't say specifically what date, or that I have definitely read it. I
feel sure that I have.
321. General Frank. Those things usually are prepared as a guide
or advice, and to point attention to the possibilities of development, are
they not ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
322. General Frank. That estimate anticipated an air attack by the
Japs exactly along the lines and in the manner in which it happened,
and since that was a part of the evidence in the files of the Hawaiian
Department, it constituted a recommendaion for the defensive action
to be taken in a critical situation, did it not ?
Colonel Philips. Yes ; undoubtedly.
323. General Frank. Shouldn't you then, as Chief of Staff, have
been conscious of it?
Colonel Phillips. I undoubtedly should have known of it, but I
must say again that I cannot recall ever having seen it.
324. General Frank. And yet it was one of the outstanding plans,
which, if carried out, would have prevented this catastrophe. And
you don't remember it ?
[1169] Colonel Phillips. 1 don't think that I have seen it, sir.
I don't believe I was in, as Chief of Staff, at that time. There was
some other staff capacity. I don't recall that I have ever seen it, sir.
325. General Frank. It still was a part of the plans for the defense
of the Island ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
326. General Frank. How often had you had alerts in the Depart-
ment ?
Colonel Phillips. I believe, while I was there we had three maneu-
vers, and, I believe, two alerts ; I am not sure ; maybe more.
327. General Frank. Did you have any blackouts?
Colonel Phillips. I believe we did.
328. General Frank. You don't remember?
Colonel Phillips. I am not positive about that.
329. General Frank. Had your alerts and maneuvers come suf-
ficiently frequent to have become monotonous ?
Colonel Phillips. Not at all ; they were highly instructive.
330. General Frank. In dealing with the different commands, and
considering the probabilities of attack, was air attack ever empha-
sized to you or to General Short ?
Colonel Phillips. The possibility of air attack? Yes, sir.
602 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
331. General Frank, And you concluded that it was possible, but
not probable, is that correct?
Colonel Phillips. Possible, possible, an air attack.
332. General Frank. You concluded it was possible but not prob-
able, is that what j'ou concluded ?
[1160] Colonel Phillips. That's right.
333. General Frank. And that was your conclusion ?
Colonel Phillips. Agreement with the General.
334. General Grunert. We have another witness coming at 11
o'clock. I suggest we dismiss this witness, at present, and recall him ;
and as we have an extra hour this afternoon, we will recall him at 4
o'clock. The Board will recess. We will dismiss this witness, and
request him to return at 4 o'clock.
(Brief recess.)
(The witness was excused until 4 o'clock p. m., with the request that
he return at that time for further questioning.)
[1161] TESTIMONY OF FTJLTON LEWIS, JR., WASHINGTON, D. C.
(ACCOMPANIED BY FRED MORRISON)
(Theodore A. Huntley, Major, A. C, Bureau of Public Eelations,
entered the hearing room.)
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Mr. Lewis, will you state to the Board your name,
address, and occupation?
Mr. Lewis. Fulton Lewis, Jr., Mutual Broadcasting System.
Business address?
2. Colonel West. That is right.
Mr. Lewis. 1627 K Street, Washington, D. C. ; radio news reporter.
3. General Grunert. Mr. Lewis, it came to the Board's attention
that some time in the past you, as a radio news commentator, I think
they called it, put out a series of broadcasts in which you reviewed
the activities or some activities in Hawaii that concerned one Colonel
Theodore Wyman. Unfortunately I never heard it, but it was called
to my attention, and I asked the Board whether or not by having you
in to testify before the Board we might get leads whereby we can get
facts. That is the reason we requested that you come, to see if you
could give us facts that we may not know and give us leads to facts
that we may be able to get in our investigation, and you were kind
enough to come up here.
So I shall ask General Frank to lead in propounding the questions,
because this subject is so broad and our time is so limited that it is
necessary to sort of parcel these special [1162] investigations
out to members of the Board, although the entire Board will pass on
all questions.
One more thing before going ahead : we, of course, shall want you
to consider this as absolutely confidential, and not use it in any of
your future work or make any mention of your having been here
unless you get the P. R. O. War Department O. K. on mentioning
that you have been a witness.
Mr. Lewis. All right, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 603
4. General Grunert. And anything that occurs here, to not men-
tion it, because we have no authority to make this public. I think you
understand that.
Mr. Lewis. I understand it perfectly, sir.
5. General Grunert. A Board member also suggested that I ac-
quaint you with how this matter came up before this Board. This
Board is a fact-finding body insofar as the attack on Hawaii is con-
cerned. We had no sooner gotten started on that than we had added
to us another burden, that of looking into so much of the so-called
Wyman case as might have a bearing on the attack on Pearl Harbor.
So we were directed to consider the interim report of the House of
Representatives and take that and go into such phases thereof as
pertain to the attack on Pearl Harbor. So we shall be a fact-finding
board insofar as the so-called Wyman case pertains to the attack on
Pearl Harbor, and no further.
Mr. Lewis. And your interest in any testimony that I might have
confines itself to the connections of Wyman or anyone else in the
Pearl Harbor picture ?
6. General Grunert. In the Pearl Harbor picture, plus possibly a
bit of background that leads up to that Pearl Harbor [1163]
picture, but nothing subsequent thereto.
Mr. Lewis. All right.
7. General Frank. Also, we are interested in the possible results
of any of the association of Wyman and one Hans Wilhelm Rohl that
might have affected construction work in Hawaii. As General
Grunert has said, this is a Board investigating the circumstances sur-
rounding Pearl Harbor.
Mr. Lewis. That is right.
8. General Frank. Therefore, in considering this we are trying to
confine our consideration to those phases of the Wyman case that
affect the Pearl Harbor situation.
With that as a background, will you give us a statement telling us
information along the line that we have just indicated ^
Mr. Lewis. General Frank, my first knowledge of the name Hans
Wilhelm Rohl, which led subsequently to my investigations and re-
porting on the subject of not only Mr. Rohl but Colonel Wyman, came
as a result of a news broadcast I did in the latter part of October
1943, October of last year, at which time I made a factual report of
certain investigations and hearings by the Truman Investigating
Committee into the Canadian Canol project.
The next day I received a telephone call from a young man by the
name of Bruce Pine who lived in Beverly Hills, California, who is
an investigator at a dollar a year, I believe, a gentleman who is very
well to do and who had contributed his services as a patriotic service
to the so-called Tenney Investigating Committee of the Legislature
of the State of California.
[1104.] Mr. Pine asked me if the contractors on the Canol project
included any of certain names, they being Rohl, Paul Grafe, Bechtel,
or Callahan, and I didn't know. I contacted the Truman Committee
and found out that they did contain certain of those names, they being
Callahan and Bechtel and Grafe (Grafe being Callahan) the Calla-
han Company.
I then called Mr. Pine back and told him that they did, and he said
that in that event he believed that he had some very valuable further
604 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
information on the subject; that the Tenney Investigating Committee
had brought out in the course of hearings some months previous there-
to information which the press had rather spurned and for some reason
or other had never published except in a most desultory way, and the
news had never been carried on the national news services at all.
That was on Tuesday before Thanksgiving of last year, and the
following day Mr. Morrison and I set out for Los Angeles, and w^e
arrived there on Sunday. We spent all day Sunday and all of a sub-
sequent week in a very, very intensive review and study of the hear-
ings and the testimony that had been adduced before this Tenney
Investigating Committee, and throughout that week I reported over
the air what had been found out.
That is the background. I give it to you to show you how I got
into it.
Obviously, at that stage of the game it was almost impossible for
us to do any personal investigation ; w^e had to confine ourselves very
largely to the Tenney report. Subsequent thereto, however, we both
of us did a very considerable amount of personal investigation. I
think it is unnecessary here to [116o~\ clutter the record with
any summarization of what I reported in those broadcasts, because
we have the exact transcripts of them here, sir ; unless you feel other-
wise. I shall be perfectly glad
9. General Frank. You have transcripts that you will make avail-
able to us ?
Mr. Lewis. Yes, sir; you may have the exact transcript of all those
records. And of course, as j^ou know, the complete transcript of all
the hearings of the Tenney Committee is available to you. You prob-
ably have them. Therefore it seems unnecessary to merely repeat and
paraphrase my paraphrasing of the certain essential parts of the
Tenney Committee report.
As we went on through this procedure, as we presented these reports
over the air, there began to come in an immediate flow of reports,
letters, tips of all conceivable kinds from all over the State of Cali-
fornia and all over the West, for that matter : individuals who said that
they had worked on the Hawaiian projects, people who knew Rohl and
who knew Wyman, people particularly in Southern California and in
Beverly Hills and in the movie colony who had known these two
characters, who had seen them around, because in their days when
they were in Los Angeles they did considerable drinking and perekgri-
nation around the night clubs and the fast spots of Hollywood and the
Los Angeles area.
George Murphy, a movie actor, was one who reported having seen
the two together on many occasions. Bruce Pine himself had known
Hansie Rohl, as they called him, and had known Wyman. There were
many parties that Mr. Rohl had put on at which [1166] Colo-
nel Wyman was present, and we gathered a general series of first-hand
reports from the people who had been on those parties. It seemed un-
necessary to use that material in the broadcast, because essentially their
testimony was that Colonel Wyman was a very heavy drinker and so
was Mr. Rohl, and they were just usual stories of wild parties, and I
saw no reason to clutter up the radio broadcast with such material as
that. Insofar as it was possible we tried to either trace down ourselves
or turn over to the Military Affairs Cemmittee of the House of Repre-
■PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 605
sentatives, who in the meantime had sent an investigator there, all of
the letters and all of the leads that came in to us throuoh the mail or
through telephone conversations or through telegrams. We have
here a file of letters, telegrams, and so forth. These two folders here
comprise our complete permanent file except for just straight fan mail,
which I am sure the committee would not want. It is a pile this high
(indicating), and it doesn't contribute anything.
These two folders and the envelope there I think comprise essen-
tially the important material that we received other than that which
we turned over to the Military Affairs Committee. I am delighted
for this Board to have the benefit of everything there is in here. I
would want the file protected ; I mean, so far as I am concerned I would
want it available to me for my own future reference, but it can be all
photostated, or if there is any way that the Board can take them and
use ehem on loan, I am delighted to have you do that.
There may be still further leads in those letters that you would want
to trace down. The way in which the Military Affairs [1167]
Committee got into it was that after the second of these broadcasts I
had communicated voluntarily on my part with Senator Truman be-
fore I went out there, telling him what I was going to do and suggest-
ing that I would be delighted to make any reports to him that he might
want, and suggesting that he may not need any. I had no idea whether
the story was going to materialize into anything, and that perhaps
Fred and I were just going out on a wild goose chase as you frequently
do in news work.
Then after we got out there, after the second broadcast, or perhaps
even the first, I received a telephone call from the counsel of the Mili-
tary Affairs Committee staying that he was very much interested and
was sending an invesigator out there, Mr. John Weiner, who did arrive
about Wednesday or Thursday, and I assume that Mr. Weiner either
will be or has been called before this committee. He made a very
extensive personal investigation of the matter.
10. General Frank. May I ask a question there ?
Mr. Lewis. Yes. And if I am not carrying a train that you want,
by all means guide me.
11. General Frank. In your perusal of this did you ever run across
the name of Werner Plack ?
Mr. Lewis. I did, sir.
12. General Frank. Any information that you have, will you please
include it?
Mr. Lewis. Tr these broadcasts there is mention of Werner Plack, as
you will see. We were told by Mr. Pine — I think he had several other
friends there who also corroborated this — that Rohl and Werner Plack
had been very close and intimate friends, that they had been seen to-
gether at night [1168]- clubs on frequent occasions. The
Tenney Committee was never able to get any admission out of Rohl
that he had known Werner Plack. I think, as a matter of fact, he
denied it, although these witnesses specifically stated that he had been
present.
Now, there was Harry Flannery of the Columbia Broadcasting
System, who had been in Germany just prior to the war; a very re-
liable radio news reporter, by the way. He had been in Germany
just prior to the war. He was one of the last of the correspondents
606 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to leave Berlin, and he reports that Werner Plack came back to
Berlin after havino; left the West Coast and the associations of Rohl.
He had stopped at Hawaii on the way out, had then stopped at Japan,
and then had gone on into Germany ; that when he got back to Berlin —
it seems that Mr. Plack was somewhat of an addict to these spiritous
liquors — that when he got back to Berlin, however, despite his ardent
use of alcohol, he was given a job in the foreign office, and the corre-
spondents there were rather amazed at the importance that the Ger-
man Government seemed to attach to him.
That was all purely circumstantial. We had no facilities for in-
vestigating it further. But we were informed by the Committee
representatives out there that Mr. Plack's effects had been searched
by the F. B. I. a couple of times on the way across, and I believe some
seizures had been made.
That is about all the light, sir, that I can throw on the matter
of Werner Plack. Within my own conviction and from the people
that I talked to in Southern California, Mr. Rohl's testimony to
the contrary notwithstanding, I personally am satisfied Mr. Rohl
did know Mr. Werner Plack and knew him quite [11691 well,
and they were more or less frequent drinking companions and night
club companions.
13. General Frank. Were you able to draw any conclusions as a
result of your investigation, from the governmental official point of
view, that the association of Wyman and Rohl was not a healthy one?
Mr. Lewis. Oh, yes, sir; unquestionably, I should have said. I
should say it was a most unhealthy, and not only that, a most un-
savery one. Here was a picture of an Army officer who had control
of the award of contracts, and very important contracts, vital con-
tracts. There were plenty of contractors, and excellent ones, on the
West Coast, just as good, with just as fine standing and just as fine
records of performance, and in most cases far better than Hans
Wilhelm Rohl.
Here was a personal association — a pickled personal association so
to speak — between an Army officer who had control of the award
of these contracts, and the contractor. The fact remains that there
were plenty of other contractors on the West Coast about whom
there was no question of their fidelity, about whom there was no
question of their sobriety, about whom there was no question as to
their nationality and their allegiance; and as against that, for some
still unexplained reason, the Government officer in charge of the award
of these contracts continued to have only one person, and that was
a man who even at that time was not even a naturalized American
citizen, who was a German alien, and who had had an opportunity
since 1924 to become a naturalized American citizen if he had any
loyalty to this country. And Mr. Morrison reminds me, a very out-
spoken critic of democratic processes, a violent critic [1170] of
the President. There are others who are, but it comes with far less
grace from a German alien at a time when the country is distinctly
at odds with Germany than it does from American citizens, and I
have yet to hear an American citizen say any of the things about
the President that Mr. Rohl is reported as having said.
14. General Grunert. Have you read the interim report of the
Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives on
their investigation?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 607
Mr. Lewis. I cannot say, sir, that I have read every word of it. 1
am familiar with the contents of it.
15. General Grunert. Much of what you have been telling us is
just the line along which their report seems to go.
Mr. Lewis. Exactly, sir.
16. General Grunert. I was wondering, if you had read it, whether
there were any particular points that will elaborate on what they
report, or any new points that they possibly did not touch upon. Do
you know whether your news reports bring that to light? Of course,
we have not read them.
Mr. Lewis. My news reports at that time, sir, are almost — oh, I
think entirely embodied in the report. I do not think there is any
information that we had originally in the original series of stories that
we did that is not contained in this report.
There is one phase of this question that I do not think is quite com-
pletely covered in that report. Are you familiar with the name of
Kobert Hoffman?
17. General Frank. . Yes.
[1777] 18. General Grunert. The name appears among those,
and also his evidence is shown in this report. That is all we know
about it, and we hope if he can be located that he will be a witness.
19. General Frank. He is the man who is now in Mexico City.
Mr. Lewis. Yes, sir.
20. Major Clausen. Sir, we have his testimony given before the
Committee.
21. General Grunert. We also have all the records that the House
Committee has, which we have not yet been able to examine
thoroughly.
Mr. Lewis. If that is the case, I rather assume that you have all the
information about Mr. Hoffman that I have. Mr. Morrison and 1
went to Mexico City. Mr. Hoffman was rather an elusive and mys-
terious figure in this case. He first came to light in an anonymous
telegram that was sent to the Tenney Committee, and that telegram
said, "If you want the full background story and the complete story
about the Pearl Harbor contracts, get hold of Bob Hoffman. He
knows it all and will spill his guts," or words to that effect.
They couldn't find out who Bob Hoffman was or where he was or
anything else, and efforts were made to trace the telegram back. We
couldn't find out who had sent the telegram, but the telegraph office
that sent the telegram said that at the same time another telegram ha'd
been sent by the same individual to Mr. Paul Graf e, and that telegram
was signed by the same name and told Paul Grafe that they had just
tipped the Tenney Committee to find Bob Hoffman. It would seem
to have been a bit of needling on the part of someone.
[1172] But subsequently we still couldn't — neither the Tenney
Committee nor I or Fred could find out who Mr. Hoffman was. We
subsequently got a letter signed by the same initials as had sent the
telegram, a mere fan letter to me in Washington, saying that there was
one person who could tell the whole story on this ; he was a very fine
person, that he had been superintendent in charge of construction;
telling about his background, his past experience, and so forth, and his
name was Robert Hoffman, and that I would find him in Mexico City
at such and such an address.
608 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Morrison and I got on an airplane and went to Mexico City and
did find him there and persuaded him to come back and testify before
the Military Affairs Committee of the House.
Incidentally, there is one thing that I do not believe came out in
his testimony before the Committee. He said that he was asked to
make a report as to his personal opinions and his personal impressions
of the performance of Colonel Wyman and the contract procedure at
Pearl Harbor, that he made this report, turned it in to Army sources,
and that some Army officer subsequently came to him and said that
the report was not satisfactory and it couldn't be in the files of the
Army.
Now, the anonymous letter that 1 received said that one copy of that
report was still in Hoffman's hands and it was in a trunk in Los
Angeles. That is one of the chief reasons that Mr. Morrison and I
went to Southern California — to Mexico City. Hoffman said that
there was such a report, that he had made it, that he had been told that
the report should not be in the Army's files. He said it was a very
critical report, and we [1173] finally persuaded him to go by
way of Los Angeles on his way to Washington and to get the copy of
the report and bring it here, and I believe he turned it over to^ie
made it available, at any rate, to the House Military Affairs Committee.
I do not want to editorialize and I do not want to give second-hand
opinions. The counsel for the committee said that he was rather dis-
appointed when he went over the report because he didn't find anything
of particular importance in it, even though he got some engineers to
sur.vey. it, and they couldn't find anything of particular importance
in it.
22. General Frank. Did your investigations at any time indicate, as
a matter of fact, whether any advantage accrued to Wyman through
this association ?
Mr. Lewis. To this extent, sir; we never were able to attain the
slightest evidence of any kind that any financial benefit, any actual
payments, any bribes, or anything of the sort had ever been paid to
Colonel Wyman. I would like Mr. Morrison to express his own per-
sonal opinion on this, because this is opinion that you are asking for,
and on this point I am merely giving my opinion. So far as I am
concerned, I saw no concurrent circumstantial evidence to that effect.
In other words, if a person is receiving bribes he is likely to live in a
very much more profligate manner than he would if he is still living
on his own salary, but there was no evidence that I was able to pick up
that any such thing had happened. It unquestionably is true in my
mind that Colonel Wyman received tremendous social benefits and
tremendous emoluments of .luxurious living. He was kept in liquor;
many, many favors [1174] and courtesies, if you will. Such
emoluments were certainly bestowed upon him in a most generous
and lavish manner.
After all, sir, if you were in Hawaii in the early days of the war,
when we were so short of ships and whatnot that we could hardly
protect ourselves, and you were a little short of the liquor that you
liked, and a yacht under escort came all the way from San Francisco
to Hawaii, and its sole cargo was liquor — that, after all, is something
of an emolument.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 609
23. General Frank. Did your delving into this situation result in
any lead that would indicate any effort to delay the construction for
which the Rohl Company had contracts ? It is leads that we are after.
Mr. Lewis. Hoffman's testimony and his information are material
which, to me at least, are grounds for tremendous suspicion. That
would be, in my language, a lead that we would have followed up had
there been any way for us to follow it up.
24. General Frank. Hoffman is the main lead along that line?
Mr. Lewis. Yes, sir; and these various individuals who had charge
of laying runways and tearing them up and relaying them and tearing
them up again, and building hills and cutting them down, and then
building them up again and cutting them down.
May I enlarge just one sentence, sir? To me, as a reporter, the
preponderance of that evidence indicated that either there was the
grossest sort of mismanagement and misdirection or that Rohl pos-
sibly was using Wyman as a dupe to deliberately delay the perform-
ance, or both,
25. General Frank. Is there any evidence as to whether through
the alleged inebriated nature of that association they caused [117S~\
any delay in the construction ?
Mr, Lewis. Yes, sir. From Hoffman's testimony and from the tes-
timony of the other people who were first-hand witnesses on the scene
there there seems to be no question, in my mind, as to that.
26. General Frank. Did you get any information on the result of
any of Plack's operations?
Mr. Lewis. No, sir. Plack still remains the mysterious figure;
Plack still remains an amiable, almost always inebriated picture of
a fat German who loves to live well and who was either a very stupid
oaf or a very clever individual, one of the two.
27. General Frank. Did you ever meet him ?
Mr. Lewis. I never did.
28. General Frank. As to this association of Eohl and Wyman, do
you have any impression of over how long a period it extended ?
Mr. Lew^is. That is all in the record, sir; eithe)r 1935 or late 1934,
when Wyman was first sent to Southern California in charge of that
district. It began at that time. Rohl's first big contract, and the
one that he made his first stake on, was the Long Beach breakwater,
and that contract was awarded to him by Wyman.
29. General Frank. What I am getting around to is this : To your
knowledge, this association had been continuing over a period of
several years?
Mr. Lewis. Oh, yes ; continuiiig consistently.
30. General Frank. Do you know whether or not it had ever come
to the attention of any of Wyman's superiors ?
Mr. Lewis. I do not know, sir; nor do I know whether Wyman's
escapades had ever come to the attention of his suiDeriors.
[1176] As of what date ? I am not sure that I got your question
quite right.
31. General Frank. As of any date, up to the point of your investi-
gation.
Mr. Lewis. Yeit, Oh, yes. I think tliere was definite evidence that
Wyman's condition n Hawaii had come to the attention of superior
officers, and in WasLington.
79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1 40
610 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
32. General Frank. Have you anything to indicate that his su-
periors were conversant with this, and what action they took, if any ?
Mr. Lewis. I have not ; and I do not know to what extent they were
conversant with the details. I do not think there is any evidence in the
record to show.
33. General Frank. Have you any information as to the date on
which Plack left the United States and when he reached Berlin?
Mr. Lewis. I can dig it out for you, sir. It is in these files here
(indicating). It was before Pearl Harbor, a considerable period of
time before that, and before Germany's attack on Russia. It was a
good long time.
34. Major Clausen. Mr. Lewis, you said that Rohl had a chance,
since 1924, to become a United States citizen. Should that be 1913,
sir.
Mr. Lewis. Well, I would say yes. I was thinking about 1924 as
the time when he went back. I think it was 1924 that hd went back to
Germany and came back. I should say 1913 ; yes.
35. Major Clausen. Have you any leads or information concern-
ing a Mr. Enright ?
Mr. Lewis. The name does not click with me.
[1177] Major Clausen. Could you make a search of your office
mail and fan mail to see if possibly you had received a communica-
tion from a Mr. Enright ?
Mr. Lewis. Yes, sir. Can you give me his first name?
37. Major Clausen. I believe it is William Henry.
Mr. Lewis. Those were not the initials on that communication to
which I have referred. -I do not know him.
38. Major Clausen. Do you know anything of the activities of Mr.
Rohl during the first World War ?
Mr. Lewis. I do not.
39. Major Clausen. Did you get any leads on his possible activities
during that time?
Mr. Lewis. Not that I remember. I have no recollection of ever
having heard about it.
40. General Grunert. The F. B. I. investigated him. The records
there might show.
41. General Frank. Do you know whether or not Plack passed
through Hawaii while Wyman and Rohl were there, or before ?
Mr. Lewis. He passed through before they went in on this particu-
lar series of contracts. It was some months before that. Wyman and
Rohl may have been there incidentally. Rohl was going to Hawaii on
pleasure visits. I could not say about that. That is a matter of dates,
and I am rusty on them.
42. General Frank. May we have those papers ( indicating) to put in
evidence?
(The witness handed two volumes of correspondence to Major
Clausen.)
43. Major Clausen. At this time we offer as Exhibit No. 16 the
broadcasts that have been identified by Mr. Lewis.
[1177-\A] addenda
The Board at a meeting on 13 October, 1944, decided that Exhibits
Nos. 16, 17, and 18, having served their desired purpose of furnishing
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 611
leads to evidence, directed tliat the mentioned Exhibits be withdrawn
from the record and returned to the witness who furnished them,
Mr. Fulton LeAvis, Jr., by the Assistant Recorder.
[11781 (Volume of broadcasts identified by the witness was
marked Exhibit No. 16 and received in evidence.)
44. Major Clausen. At this time we offer in evidence the folder that
Mr. Lewis has identified as the Canol Project folder, subject to the
elimination of any unnecessary documents.
( Documents selected from folder of documents relating to the Canol
Project were marked Exhibit No. 17 and received in evidence.)
45. General Frank. Have you anything further, Mr. Lewis, that
you want to submit '?
Mr. Lewis. This (indicating) is a folder of notes, letters, memo-
randums, and references from the personal files of my own office in
regard to Colonel AVyman and Mr. Rohl and the projects in which
they were involved.
46. Major Clausen. I offer this file in evidence as Exhibit No. 18,
on the same basis as that on which Exhibit No. 17 was offered.
(Documents selected from personal files of the witness Wxjre marked
Exhibit No. 18 and received in evidence).
47. General Frank. Have you anything further, Mr. Lewis?
Mr. Lewis. I was just asking Mr. Morrison if there is anything
tliat comes to his mind.
There is one thing that did not appear in the record, a very small
matter, perhaps, in a way. Perhaps it would not be germane because
it was a relationship subsequently on Colonel Wyman's part to the
Canadian Project, and not out in Hawaii.
48. Major Clausen. Unless it is related indirectly.
Mr. Lewis. I will be glad to tell it to you.
49. General Frank. Suppose you narrate it. "
[1179] Mr. Lewis. Mr. Hoffman told Mr. Morrison and told
me that
50. General Frank. Mr. Morrison is your associate ?
Mr. Lewis. Yes, sir; he is my associate. It was in Mexico City.
He told us that a Mr. Turnbull, of Cleveland, who was one oi the
consultants on the Canadian Project — and let me interject here that
this was apropos a question that we asked similar to the one you have
asked, as to whether or not there was any evidence of Colonel Wyman's
accepting any specific emoluments — that Mr. Turnbull, of Cleveland,
who was one of the consultants on the Canadian Project, had come to
him and had said that he certainly would like to do something for
Colonel Wyman, but he did not know what to do, and Mr. Hoffman
said that that was entirely up to Mr. Turnbull; it was not his affair.
The net result of it was that Mr. Turnbull gave Colonel Wyman's wife
a very handsome mink coat.
I do not know whether that is of any interest to you or not. The
two cases, the Hawaiian contracts and the Canadian contracts on
which both of these people worked, are so interwoven in my mind,
as the reporter who worked on them, that it is difficult for me to
extricate them for your individual purposes.
51. General Frank. Is that the Turnbull Engineering Co. of
Cleveland?
Mr. Lewis. Yes, sir.
612 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
52. General Russell. Mr. Lewis, when you went west did you make
any iuA^estigation of these other corporations and individuals who
have been identified as of the Hawaiian Constructors? I will name
them so that you may refresh your memory :
W. E. Callahan Construction Company; Gunther & Shirley; Ralph
E. Woolley.
[1180] Did you make any investigation of those people in con-
nection with your western visit ?
Mr. Lewis. Yes, sir. I did not make any investigation of Woolley,
but I investigated Gunther and Shirley and the Callalian Construction
Company. Mr. Callahan was a very distinguished and much respected
citizen of Dallas, Texas; in fact, I knew him. I had the pleasure of
meeting him several times there. I believe that Mr. Grafe was his
son-in-law, or some relative — his son-in-law, I think. I think Mr.
Grafe married Mr. Callahan's daughter. Mr. Callahan had in recent
years turned the company over to Mr. Grafe, who was a comparatively
young man and was trying to build the company up. He seemed to
be trying to get what business he could get.
I also investigated the Gunther & Shirley Company. I found that
they all had their offices on the same floor of the same building. Mr.
Morrison went down there personally and looked it over. Perhaps
he could answer the question better, General, than I could, in so far as
that specific phase is concerned.
53. General Russell. There was a definite question to which I was
attempting to get an answer, and that is that if you did make an inves-
tigation of these other contracting parties, state whether or not those
people professionally and financially could have carried on this work
irrespective of the association of the Rohl-Connolly Company with
The Hawaiian Constructors.
Mr. Lewis. I am afraid I am incompetent to answer that question,
except by way of an impression, if that is all right. My impression
is that they were certainly competent to carry it on.
54. General Russell. It is in the record that this man Rohl
[1181] did not go out to Hawaii until September, and that some
time in August Army authorities intervened to hasten his citizenship
application on the theory that Rohl's driving power and his capacity
as an executive were needed to hasten along this construction work in
Hawaii.
The questions which I have asked you heretofore were largely in-
tended to determine whether or not it was necessary to have Rohl out
there at that time, and I was wondering whether or not you developed
that there were people among those other contractors who could have
carried on the work out there without Rohl.
Mr. Lewis. I think there is no question of that, sir. The simple
fact remains that when they had the Canadian jobs to do they were
able to find contractors that were competent to do it. Rohl was
brought in merely as a very, very secondary sub-contractor and only
because Colonel "VVyman insisted that he be brought in, even then.
55. General Gruxert. The contract had been let and was being
executed in Hawaii. The idea was that apparently things were not
going along as they should, so they demanded that Rohl come out and
push things. It was not a question of getting other contractors,
was it ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 613
Mr. Lewis. I think you will find that they began trying to push
things for Rohl at the particular time that the contract was let. They
did not have time to find out when they began pushing Rohl's citizen-
ship whether the contract was going along satisfactorily or not.
56. General Russell. I am going another step in the Hawaiian end
of this situation. If the Callahan Company, the Gunther & Shorley
Company, or whoever was operating for them, and Ralph 11182]
E. Woolley, as an individual, were all out there participating in the
construction work in Hawaii, I have been wondering just how this man
Rohl, from an operating base on the west coast, could dominate that
situation to the point that those three other contractors would delay
the work out in Hawaii from the time they went to work until Rohl
got out there in September.
Mr. Lewis. I could not look into their minds, sir; I cannot answer
that factually, I can only give you my own deduction.
57. General Russell. Do you think that those other contractors
were the type of people that would permit Rohl to stay in Los Angeles
and cause them to tear up and rebuild runways and things of that sort
in order to slow down the construction work in Hawaii ?
Mr. LE^\^s. Rohl unquestionably was the dominant figure in The
Hawaiian Constructors.
58. General Russell. We are talking about two things all in one
sentence. The Hawaiian Constructors was a group of contractors.
The Rohl-ConnoUy Company was a corporation. You have hit on
the very part of the information that I am attempting to get. Did
Rohl dominate The Hawaiian Constructors, or did he dominate the
Rohl-Connolly Company ?
Mr. Lewis. From the evidence we have, and all of the testimony
and all of the interviews we have, there is no question about the fact
that Rohl dominated both the Rohl-Connolly Company and The Ha-
waiian Constructors, through his association with Wyman. He was
the contact man ; he was the person who was close to the Colonel in
charge.
59. General Russell. Mr. Lewis has gone through the Tenney in-
vestigation in California and the investigation by the Con- [1183]
gressional Committee here, and he has been out there and made a
first-hand investigation of these other people, and I think it is ex-
tremely material to have in the record his impression of those people,
such as the relation between Rohl and Wyman. All oi those things
I think are equally material in determining the major issue here.
Did Rohl's association w^th that outfit slow down construction in
Hawaii ?
Mr. Lewis. Will you, so that I may answer your question and give
you exactly what you want, ask it a little more specifically. General ?
60. General Russell. I thought I had asked the question, but I
will repeat it so that there can be no doubt.
[1184] Do you think, based on your investigation and what you
know of Callahan Construction Co., Gunther & Shirley Co., and
Ralph E. Woolley, that Rohl could have dominated those other con-
tractors to the point that they would have delayed the work which
they were doing for the Government on the defensive projects in
Hawaii?
614 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Lewis. If I may insert, there, "delayed, for one reason or an-
other," I would be delighted to answer that question specifically.
I don't want this answer to imply any final conviction on my part
as to whether Kohl deliberately, from a sell-out-of-the-United-States
standpoint, delayed those projects, or whether he delayed them in
order to build up a high-cost job; because that, I don't know, and I
am no one to pass judgment; but allowing the benefit of that doubt,
my answer, sir, is that there isn't the slightest question in my mind
at all that Eohl dominated these two concerns ; first, the Rohl-Con-
nolly Company, and then the Hawaiian Constructors, to the extent
that he could do anything — he could have them do anything he wanted
to do out there.
61. General Russell. And he could do that by telephoning from
Los Angeles ?
Mr. Lewis. Yes, he could do that by telephoning from Los An-
geles; and the record shows that there were repeated telephone calls
all through the summer and the early fall between Rohl and the proj-
ect out in Hawaii, despite the provisions of law to the contrary.
62. General Grunert. Do I gather from your last answer that in
your own mind you are convinced there were delays ?
Mr. Lewis. Yes, sir; unnecessary delays.
[1185] 63. General Grunert. From the information that you
have ?
Mr. Lewis. Yes, sir. ^ _ • _ ^
64. General Grunert. From your viewpoint, without positively
knowing all about what might have caused them ?
Mr. Lewis. That is right — from the information that I have.
65. General Frank. And all that information has been made avail-
able to us?
Mr. Lewis. All that is still in my hands, all that I haven't already
turned over to the Military Affairs Committee of the House for their
purposes; which of course is still available to you through them.
66. General Grunert. Mr. Lewis, I assume that you gather infor-
mation primarily for news purposes ?
Mr. Lewis. That is correct, sir ; solely for news purposes,
67. General Grunert. We must have evidence of facts on which
conclusions can be drawn, for possible recommendations.
We appreciate your assistance in giving us a picture, and the data
from which we may adduce evidence, or have a lead toward that goal.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, sir.
68. General Grunert. We thank you for coming, and appreciate it
very much.
Mr. Lewis. If there is anything further I can do, I would be
delighted to do so.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon, at 12 : 18 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m.)
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 615
[1186] AFTERNOON SESSION
(The Board at 2 p. m. continued the hearing of witnesses.)
TESTIMONY OF COLONEL KENNETH P. BERGQUIST, A. U. S.,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your
name, rank, organization, and station?
Colonel Bergquist. Kenneth P. Bergquist, Colonel, A. U. S., with
the Army Air Forces ; Executive Officer to the Assistant Chief of Air
Staff, Operations, Commitments, and Requirements.
2. Colonel West. That is Washington, D. C.
Colonel Bergqtjist. Washington, D. C. ?
3. General Grunert. Colonel, the Board is attempting to get at
the facts as to the background and the viewpoints prior to and leading
up to the Pearl Harbor attack and also during the attack itself. We
hope that you can throw some light on the subject and the position
and assignment you occupied while in Hawaii during the latter part
of the year 1941. General Frank will conduct the hearing, and the
other members will ask such questions as they deem necessary to help
develop the subject. General Frank.
4. General Frank. On what duty were you in the latter part of
November and the first part of December 1941 ?
Colonel Bergquist. I was Operations Officer of what was then
known as the Hawaiian Interceptor Command.
5. General Frank. Of what did the Interceptor Command consist?
Colonel Bergquist. It consisted of the two fighter [1187]
groups, and later on it had operational control over all the air warning
service.
6. General Frank. Just at that time the Signal Officer was in charge
of the A. W. S.?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
7. General Frank. But you were working in there and using it ?
Colonel Bergqxhst. Yes, sir.
8. General Frank. On a sort of cooperative basis?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
9. General Frank. What were the number and locations of the per-
manent A. W. S. stations?
Colonel Bergquist. Before the 7th, sir? Before the 7th of Decem-
ber?
10. General Frank. Yes.
Colonel Bergquist. I don't know for sure now. I can't recall ex-
actly, but if my memory is correct I believe we did not have any per-
manent radar stations set up at that time ; they were all mobile.
11. General Frank. Do you know what the locations were in which
the permanent sets were to be installed ?
Colonel Bergquist. I will give it as well as I can remember, from
my memory of it. I believe one was to be at Kokee over on Kauai, as
a permanent installation. One was to be up on a point on the northern
shore of Kauai : Kilauea, was it?
616 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
12. Colonel West, Yes, sir.
Colonel Bergquist. Kilauea Point. I am not sure; I believe that
Avas to be perhaps a mobile one. We were to put [J 188] one on
top of Kaala in Hawaii, which is the highest point in Hawaii.
13. General Frank. You mean on Oahu.
Colonel Bergquist. I mean on Oahu, yes, sir. We were to put one
up on near Kahuku Point, just back of Kahuku Point on some high
ground. I have forgotten what we called that location. We were to
put one on Mokapu Point. That is the point near Kaneohe Bay, as
distinguished from Makapuu Point.
14. General Frank. One is Mokapu, and the other is Makapuu.
Colonel Bergquist. That is right. This is Mokapu.
We were to put one back up from Barbers Point. Now, I don't recall
very well which were to be mobile and which were to be fixed. I believe
I do have a chart which would indicate it to me, in my files.
15. General Frank. When they were going to put three fixed ones
up, where were the three fixed ones going to be ?
Colonel Bergquist. One on Kaala, one on Haleakala, and one on
Kokee.
16. General Frank. That is right. You stated that none of those
sets was yet installed on the 7th of December ?
Colonel Bergquist. As far as I know, that is correct, sir.
17. General Frank. Had they arrived in the Department?
Colonel Bergquist. I don't think so, sir. I don't recall. I didn't
check on that.
18. General Frank. Do you know?
Colonel Bergquist. I do not know.
19. General Frank. Did you have any 270 mobile sets in the Depart-
ment at that time ?
[J189] Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
20. General Frank. How many? You had at least how many?
Colonel Bergquist. We had at least five.
21. General Frank. When did they arrive?
Colonel Bergquist. Oh, I would say about July or August of 1941,
as far as I can recall.
22. General Frank. When were they set up and operating?
Colonel Bergquist. Well, as I recall, I think it was in perhaps July.
They may have arrived a little sooner than July, but I believe it was
approximately July or August when I conducted the first practice
runs with two sets, one of which we had operating over at Waianae,
and the other of which we had operating at Haleiwa, but I can't recall
the exact date, sir.
23. General Frank. All right. But did you have an exercise in
which you had four or five of them operating later in the fall ?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
24. General Frank. AYlien was that ?
Colonel Bergquist. That was
25. General Frank. In November?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir ; in November we did that.
26. General Frank. Will you look at that chart showing the Island
of Oahu with those crosses on it (handing chart to the witness) ? Was
the location of those crosses generally the points where the mobile
sets were set up ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 617
Colonel Bergquist. That is correct, sir.
27. General Frank. Well, will you state about where those were?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir. We had one at Haleiwa, [llOO]
one at Kahuku Point, one at Kaala, and one at Koko Head, and one
back up in the rear of Fort Sliafter.
28. General Fraxk. All right. Were they effective?
Colonel Bergquist. They were effective to a degree. We had not
calibrated them all. There were a considerable number of loopholes,
as we found out later when we did attempt to calibrate them, to find
out every weakness we could about them. But they were effective to
a fair degree.
29. General Frank. How far?
Colonel Bergquist. I would say a maximum range of approxi-
mately 130 miles.
30. General Frank. That might vary more or less under different
conditions ?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
31. General Frank. All right.
Colonel Bergquist. And also with respect to the altitude of the
target.
32. General Frank. How were they operated? By motor genera-
tor sets or by commercial electricity?
Colonel Bergquist. No, sir; at that time we were still operating
them with the motor generator set, and we were attempting to get
commercial lines put in.
33. General Frank. Did you have plenty of spare parts and tubes ?
Colonel Bergquist. I do not know the exact situation of that, sir.
34. General Frank. Were you ever held up in operations for lack
of spare parts?
Colonel Bergquist. As I recall, I believe we were.
[1191'] '35. General Frank. To any extent?
Colonel Bergquist. No, sir. No, I would say not, offhand. It is
not clear in my memory.
36. General Frank. Was your information center organized ?
Colonel Bergquist. No, sir.
37. General Frank. Was it operative?
Colonel Bergquist. No, sir, it was not operative as an information
center should be.
38. General Frank. Could it have been used?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
39. General Frank. Actually was it used on December 8 ?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
40. General Russell. 7th ?
41. General Frank. As a matter of fact, it did get some informa-
tion on December 7th, didn't it?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
42. General Frank. Will you make a statement to the Board cov-
ering generally the state of training of the men assigned to the Air-
craft Warning Service both for operation of the radar sets and for
(>peration of the information center?
Colonel Bergquist. Well, I think we had had the sets operating in
practice a sufficient length of time so that the radar scope operators
that we had were fairly well trained. We had plotters and information
618 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
center personnel of the Signal Corps fairly well trained. I was in
the process of training what I called pursuit officers, which is one of
the positions on the board — on the control platform, that is — by run-
ning a roster of the fighter pilots in the Interceptor Command in
[1192] order to do two things : to both train them to function as
pursuit officers on the control board and to acquaint them with the
workings of the board in order to better carry out instructions that
they received from the board on flying missions. The only controllers
that we had, we considered, that could operate, that were trained
sufficiently, were myself, Major Tindal — I mean Colonel Tindal; he
was a Major at that time — and I did have with me at that time Com-
mander William E. G. Taylor of the Navy. The other positions on
the control platform, we did have an antiaircraft liaison officer, and
had conducted problems with them so that they were in a fair state
of training. We had not been able to get the Navy liaison officers
assigned, so there was no one trained in that. The same applies to
the bomber command liaison, the liaison officers with the Hawaiian
Department headquarters.
43. General Frank. What about civilian defense ?
Colonel Bergquist. And also the civilian defense.
44. General Grunert. What was the second one you named after
the Navy? Navy, headquarters, civilian defense, and what was the
fourth one?
Colonel Bergquist. The bomber command. We were making all
efforts to get the people assigned to man all these positions in order
that I could train them and thus operate. We had a conference on the
24th of November, of which I have the notes, in which we had repre-
sentatives from the Department Signal Office, Colonel Murphy I
believe ; we had Commander Coe from the Navy, who was then Opera-
tions Officer for Patwing 2, I believe it was ; and we had Commander
Taylor of the Navy, who was working with me ; and we had Colonel
Tetley and a couple of [1193] other officers. I forgot their
names ; I can't recall now. But at that time we brought out the fact
that we wanted to get it on 24-hour operation as soon as possible. We
asked that the Navy take the matter up immediately to get their liaison
officers, and that the other agencies do likewise.
45. General Frank. To whom was that communicated ?
Colonel Bergquist. This was to be handled by each of the repre-
sentatives whom we had there, to be handled verbally with their own
organization to get it. There were no requests put through in writing
that I recall.
46. General Frank. Did you get any results out of this thing?
Colonel Bergquist. After the 7th, sir.
47. General Frank. You got no results before the 7th ?
Colonel Bergquist. That is right, sir.
48. General Frank. And the 7th was just about two weeks later,
wasn't it?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir. If you like, I can
49. General Frank. How much cooperation did you get from the
Department headquarters ?
Colonel Bergquist. You want my opinion on that, sir?
50. General Frank. Yes.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 619
Colonel BergquIst. Very little. I would like to state that perhaps
the main reason for lack of cooperation from mostly the higher head-
quarters was a lack of education as to what air defense was and what
it could do and what the setup could do.
51. General Frank. Were you having difficulty putting your
[1194] program through?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
52. General Frank. What was the nature of that difficulty ?
Colonel Bergquist. Getting the radar stations set up and operating.
53. General Frank. You mean the permanent ones ?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir ; the permanent as well as the necessary
power and facilities for the mobile ones.
54. General Frank. That is the commercial power for the mobile
ones ?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir; getting the proper interest by the
various agencies that had to cooperate with us on setting up and making
this go; such as furnishing liaison officers, getting them to agi^ee to
putting operational control in our hands, in the hands of the Intercep-
tor Command in the person of the controller to operate all the various
agencies involved, such as the antiaircraft not only of the Army but of
the Navy in Pearl Harbor, and controlling all the radio stations, com-
mercial radio stations, controlling the movements of all aircraft ; not
so much to the exact telling of them what to do — for instance, the
bmbers — ^but to insure that they abide by the principles that we oper-
ated under, in that we would know at all times where they were so that
we could filter out any plots that we received.
55. General Frank. No only who they were but where they were?
Colonel Bergquist. That is right, sir.
56. General Frank. With whom were you having difficulty putting
this across?
[1195] Colonel Bergquist. All the Signal Corps activity was
mostly handled — as far as I was concerned, my contacts were mainly
with Colonel Tetley, occasionally with Colonel Murphy.
57. General Frank. He is now deceased ?
Colonel Bergquist. That is right, sir. And occasionally with Colo-
nel Powell, the Department Signal Officer.
58. General Frank. Who was your Commander at that time?
Colonel Bergquist. General Davidson.
59. General Frank. Where was he ?
Colonel Bergquist. At T\Tieeler Field.
60. General Frank. Was he at Wheeler Field in November ?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir. I was too.
61. General Frank. Well, when did he come back to the United
States?
Colonel Bergquist. He didn't come back to the United States
until
6S. General Frank. Didn't he come back to the United States for a
course of instruction ?
Colonel Bergquist. He came back to observe a maneuver, as I recall
now ; that is right. And I believe he arrived back in Hawaii on the 5th
of December, just in time to be there.
63. General Frank. Well, did you ever make representations to
him of the difficulties that you were having?
620 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Bergquist, Occasionally, yes, sir. I tried to do most of this
work of getting this up by verbal contacts and plugging along by
myself, which was perhaps a lack of knowledge on my part ; experi-
ence, rather.
64. General Frank. Was the fact that this was not progressing sat-
isfactorily ever taken up with Department headquarters to [1196]
get some backing on it ?
Colonel Bergquist. As I recall, I do not know definitely but I
believe that General Martin had some discussions on it with the
Department headquarters.
65. General Frank. Get any results ?
Colonel Bergquist. Very little as far as I could determine. One
of the big arguments was: we wanted to take over the radar stations
and get them set up and operating. The Signal Corps said no, that
was their job; they wanted to set them up and get them operating
and then turn them over to us for our operational control. The
Department headquarters decided in favor of the Signal Corps.
66. General Frank. Do you think that that delayed the ultimate
completion of the system ?
Colonel Bergquist. My personal opinion is that it did.
67. General Frank. By how much ?
Colonel Bergquist. I don't know, sir.
68. General Frank. Well by five days, two months, or what?
Colonel Bergquist. Oh, I would say perhaps a month, thirty days.
69. General Frank. About a month. All right.
What was the status of training of the enlisted personnel in the
information center and in the radar sets, or was that under the Signal
Corps?
Colonel Bergquist. That was under the Signal Corps, sir.
70. General Frank. Well, are you conversant with the status of
training?
Colonel Bergquist. I can only judge by the results we [1197]
obtained and from the operations which I was directly connected
with, and my opinion on that is that they were fairly well trained
at that stage of the game.
71. General Frank. How many did you have? Wliat I mean by
that, could you operate three shifts? Did you operate three shifts
after December 7th?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
72. General Frank. Well, the proof of the pudding is in the eating
of it.
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir ; we did, but we were short. As I recall
now, we were short of operators, trained operators, and some of the
boys were ruining their eyes because we had to keep them on too long.
I recall that now very clearly, that we were short of trained operators.
73. General Frank. Were you having any trouble with your gaso-
line engines, power engines, folding up?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
74. General Frank. Well, was it just ordinary engine trouble which
was repairable in a short length of time, or was it serious trouble?
[1198] Colonel Bergquist. I think it was rather serious. In
fact, as I recall, the design of the engine was not quite what it should
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 621
have been and was not able to hold up in the continuous operation that
was required.
75. General Frank. Where were you on the morning of Decem-
ber 7?
76. General Grunert. May I interrupt right there?
77. General Frank. Certainly.,
78. General Grunert. I have an extract here from the Roberts
Commission report in which it appears that you stated that you
wanted to have 24-hour service by November 24, that the mobile units
could have stood it; the main failure was not the detector but the
gas engine running them; had sufficient personnel to run 24 hours
and could have run even with the gas engine failure.
I just wanted to recall that to your mind. That was the testimony
you gave while it was still fresh in your mind.
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir. We were having trouble with the
engine, and I think my statement in there was correct, that we could
have operated. Some of our stations may have gone out but still
others could be operated.
79. General Frank. Where were you on the morning of December
7th?
Colonel Bergquist. At 7 : 55, sir, I was in bed.
80. General Grunert. A. M. or P. M. ?
Colonel Bergquist. A. M., sir.
81. General Frank. What were the hours of operation of the
A. W. S. at that time?
Colonel Bergquist. At that time, in accordance with an order that
the air warning signal officer had received, as I [1199] under-
stood it, from Department Headquarters, they were to operate the
detector stations from 4 to 7 in the morning.
82. General Frank. Had you ever made any recommendation with
respect to the hours of operation ?
Colonel Bergquist. Only from a training point of view.
83. General Frank. Not from an operating point of view?
Colonel Bergquist. No; not from a warning point of view.
84. General Frank. There was an officer there by the name of
Tyler, was there not?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
85. General Frank. How did he happen to be there?
Colonel Bergquist. He was on the roster of officers which I made
up and had at the Information Center. The primary purpose was
to train this officer to be a pursuit officer, to acquaint him with the
system, and to be on hand during the time that the warning sta-
tions were operating. When I was infol-mecl that they had received
orders to operate the stations from 4 to 7, I took it upon myself to
have an officer down there, because I could see no reason why they
should just operate the station and not do anything with the infor-
mation that they got. So I did have an officer there each morning.
My schedule was from 4 to 8, or the first watch.
86. General Frank. Did you take any steps to give them any
instructions as to their duties?
Colonel Bergquist. My only instructions to them, as I recall, were
that the main purpose was to go down there and to learn as much
as they could about the setup during the time they were on. I do
622 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
not recall specifically whether I pointed my finger at them and said,
"Call me if anything comes up", but I had it in the back of my mind
that if they got into trouble [1200] they should call me.
87. General Frank. We had Lieutenant Tyler up here before the
Board. He was the only officer down there, I think, on the morning
of December 7.
Colonel Bergquist. I believe he was; yes, sir.
88. General Frank. And the nature of his duties and responsi-
bilities was pretty vague in his mind.
Since you were sending officers down there to become familiar
with the system and to teach them to be pursuit officers, why did
you not make a regular scheduled course of instruction to teach them
about the system and give them a regular course of instruction on
the duties and responsibilities of being pursuit officers?
Colonel Bergquist. I ran a school in October, sir. We began a
school in October. I have the outline of that in my briefcase. I
called it the Air Defense School, in which I included as many of
the pursuit officers as I could. I also had Marine Corps officers in
this school.
89. General Frank. Had Lieutenant Tyler been a member of that?
Colonel Bergquist. I do not recall whether he had or not, but I
think he was. I do not recall definitely whether he was or not, but
I think he was.
90. General Frank. For the Army Air Force were you carrying
the load in an effort to get this thing in shape and operating?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
91. General Frank. Aside from what the Signal Corps was doing?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
92. General Frank. Did you receive any complaints, or did you
have any complaints about the tardiness in the construction of these
permanent sets and the failure of the constructors to get [1201]
them finished on time?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, I did; I was continually harping -to the
Signal Corps people to get the stations up and get them operating.
I do not know of having put anything down in writing on it.
93. General Frank. You made your complaints to the Signal
Corps?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
94. General Frank. Did you ever make any complaints to your
own immediate headquarters through channels?
Colonel Bergquist. Verbally, I kept General Davidson informed
as to what I was doing.
95. General Frank. Do you know whether or not he followed it
up and made any official complaints ?
Colonel Bergquist. I do not recall. I also worked through our
own headquarters on Signal Corps matters with Colonel Hoppough,
in the Air Force Headquarters.
96. General Frank. Did you ever find out who was responsible
for delays?
Colonel Bergquist. No, sir.
97. General Frank. You know that there were some delays, do you
not?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 623
98. General Frank. Was the communication between the radar sets
and the Information Center satisfactory ?
Colonel Bergquist. It was not good. Those on Oahu, where you
could connect them up by telephone, were fairly good. Those on the
other islands, where you had to rely on radio, were fair and improved
greatly when we installed the F.M.'s, which was after December 7th.
[1£02] 99. General Grunert. Were there five mobile sets on
Oahu?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
100. General Grunert. I have not heard any evidence yet that there
were any in active operation.
Colonel Bergquist. That is right, sir. Before the 7th of December
there were not, as I recall.
101. General Frank. Could hostile planes have been detected from
any direction coming into Oahu ?
Colonel Bergquist. No, sir. There were some blank spaces.
102. General Frank. In what direction ?
Colonel Bergquist. I would say generally north of Molokai, about
due east of Makapuu Point in a sector of about 20 degrees, perhaps.
That was pretty much of a blank space. As I say, we had not had all
those sets calibrated before the 7th, and we did not go definitely into
the blank spaces. I am speaking now of what I found out afterwards
when we did get them all set up and operating and began running
checks on the stations.
103. General Frank. You state that the Signal Officer was respon-
sible for installing the equipment and training the Signal Corps per-
sonnel ?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir; that is my understanding.
104. General Frank. And then turning it over to the Air Force ?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
105. General Frank. At the same time you were charged with the
control of such operation as was incident to the training of your
fighters, working with the A.W.S. ?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
106. General Frank. Was there ever ahy confusion because of this
dual control ?
Colonel Bergquist. No, sir. I . do not remember that I ever
[1203'] received any orders to do it. We just went ahead and did
it. Colonel Tetley and I worked together very well. I think that if
anyone built the whole business up it was Tetley and I ; and we just
went ahead and worked, and worked out our problems. He was very
much interested in radar. I was very much interested in the whole
system of getting the devices set up and handling problems, and we
just went ahead and set up schedules and worked out problems and
went ahead with our training.
107. General Frank. Did you ever get any of the permanent sets in
place and operating before you left ?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir. I believe the one at Halakeala was
put in and operating.
108. General Frank. "\A'Tiat was the difference between the perma-
nent set and the mobile set at that time ?_
Colonel Bergquist. There was practically no difference, only one
was on a fixed base and the other on a mobile base.
624 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
109. General Frank. What was the advantage of the fixed station?
Colonel Bergquist. The advantage of the fixed station was that you
could construct it in a more inaccessible place, and I think you could
perhaps get it calibrated more accurately.
110. General Frank. You could get it higher so that you had less
interference ?
Colonel Bergquist. That is correct. I am not too well acquainted,
or I do not recall now the technical differences. I think I knew them
at one time, but I have forgotten them now.
111. General Frank. What was your feeling with respect to the
probability of an air attack at that time? AVere you surprised?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir; I was surprised.
112. General Frank. Did you think an air attack was probable?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes. sir.
[1204] 11'^- General F'rank. You thought it was probable?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir ; I thought it was. Generally, my view
was that it was probable. That is why I was trying to get the thing
operating on a 21:-hour basis if I could.
114. General Frank. Did you know at that time that there was a
tense situation existing between the United States and Japan?
Colonel Bergquist. I did not know it was as tense as I do now. I
did not realize it was that tense.
115. General Frank. Was there any information passed down from
higher military authorities at that time with respect to that period
being an acute period ?
Colonel Bergquist. Not that I know of, sir.
116. General Frank. With respect to this alert, what is your point
of view with respect to the advantages, so far as protection of air-
planes against sabotage is concerned, of an alert where the planes
were all massed on an apron as compared with dispersing the planes
reasonably with the crews sleeping in the vicinity ?
Colonel Bergquist. Well, if it was a matter of. guarding the air-
planes, it naturally is much easier to have them all together there.
You do not have to have so many guards, particularly if the crews
are not going to sleep with the airplanes, which they were not required
to do at that time. If you have them dispersed with the crews ac-
tually at their alert huts, as we call them, then I believe that you would
have sufficient guards to prevent saotage, although a determined
saboteur would have a much easier time if the airplanes were dis-
persed, because he could come in out of the bushes near the edge of
the field.
117. General Frank. You do not have to disperse them all right
[1£05] around the edge of the field.
Colonel Bergquist. No. That is where we had our dispersal point
set up at that time, right back off the edge so we could operate from
any position.
118. General Frank. It would have been possible, however, to have
provided a reasonable amount of defense against a saboteur and still
have had the planes dispersed ?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
119. General Frank. It would have been possible to have had the
crews sleeping in the vicinity, would it not?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 625
120. General Kussell. You stated that you went on duty 24 hours
a day with the Interceptor Command as of December 8th?
Colonel Bergquist. As of December 7th.
121. General Russell. After the attack on December 7th.
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
122. General Russell. Did it function fairly well?
Colonel Bergquist. It took a few days, sir, to get everybody in
there operating and get a roster gong and get the people there trained.
123. General Russell. How many days?
Colonel Bergquist. I do not recall, sir.
124. General Russell. A week?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir; I would say probably a week.
125. General Russell. Was the problem to get them in or to get
them trained, after December 7?
Colonel Bergquist. The first problem was to get them there.
126. General Russell. How long did that take?
Colonel Bergquist. As I recall, it only took me a day or \^1206'\
two to do that. After the 7th I just had to snap my fingers and I got
what I wanted.
127. General Russell. You had your Information Center, and then
your stations in th field?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
128. General Russell. Roughly, those were the two groupments of
operations?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
129. General Russell. You had no trouble on December 7 about the
training of the people at the operational stations in the field; you
had trained those people, had you not ?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir; they were fairly well trained.
130. General Russell. Now, with reference to the Information
Center, I have got the impression that you had a pursuit officer at
one part of the Center, and then you had another group there which
I understand consistecl of the liasion officers for these organizations
and the control officer you referred to. Is that correct?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
131. General Russell. Who else?
Colonel Bergquist. May I have permission to show you a diagram ?
132. General Russell. No; I do not want to get confused. I am
trying to get straightened out. I know these diagrams.
Colonel Bergquist. This diagram will show you the exact people.
133. General Russell. Leave it out and us look at it. You had
these control officers and this pursuit officer. Those were your com-
missioned people ; is that right ?
[1207] Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir; a controller and a pursuit
officer; and we had two antiaircraft men. One controls the search-
light and one controls the guns. Then we had a Navy liaison officer
and a bomber command liaison officer. All those were commissioned
officers. Then we had a Hawaiian Department Headquarters liaison
officer.
134. General Russell. What training did these liaison men have
to have?
Colonel Bergquist. I hatl to train them on the job.
135. General Russell. But what did they have to do?
79716— 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1 41
626 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Bergquist. The antiaircraft officer-
136. General Russell. Is he a liaison officer?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir, in that he advises and suggests actions
to the controller. The controller is the boss, however. He tells him
when certain areas are released from antiaircraft fire.
137. General Russell. He is just an ordinary liaison officer?
138. General Frank. No; he is not. He is not supposed to be.
He is specially trained in the system to function in accordance with
the method of operating. You cannot take any "bohunk" and put
him in there and expect to get the desired results.
139. General Grunert. One just hangs around and gets something
to transmit, but these liaison officers in the Information Center have
almost a constant job of transmitting information from the Control
Officer; is that right?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
140. General Frank. They were operators.
Colonel Bergquist. Another important thing he does is this: The
antiaircraft have stations all around Oahu, so they [1^08]
have a lot of men who are lookouts and who send in information if
they see an airplane, a submarine, or anything else. In other words,
they are feeding information which also comes in through this liaison
officer into the controller.
141. General Russell, I think I know what a laison officer is. Now,
who was the controller?
Colonel Bergquist. The controllers were the ones I had selected
and had to train on the job to be controllers. I was the first controller.
142. General Russell. Where were you going to get them? All
from the Air Corps ?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
143. General Russell. It was the Air Corps' job to select them and
train them?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
144. General Russell. And you did not have to go any further
than that to get them ?
Colonel Bergquist. No, sir.
145. General Russell. These other people who were liaison officers :
You went to the heads of the respective branches to get them, including
the Navy ?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
146. General Russell. That gives us the big picture at the Informa-
tion Center ?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
147. General Russell. In about a week you were able to train them
and get them going ?
Colonel Bergquist. I believe so.
148. General Russell. The problem up until then had been getting
people into this place?
[1209] Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir. I had been sent to the
Air Defense School, at Mitchel Field, in April of 1941.
149. General Russell. Who sent you there — the Air people or the
Hawaiian Department ?
Colonel Bergquist. It came as an order from headquarters here in
Washington, I believe. They set up a school and got people from all
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 627
over, from Hawaii, Panama, and all the continental air forces. They
went to Mitchel Field to be instructed in the air defense system which
had been developed by the First Fighter Command as a result of their
operations and training in England; and that was the system then
that was put in all over. These people went from the school out to
the continental air forces ; some went out to the Philippines and to the
south Pacific ; and Colonel Tetley went back out to Hawaii.
150. General Russell. When did you get there ?
Colonel Bergquist. I left there on March 17 and arrived back on
April 15.
151. General Russell. When was the order for you to go over and
take charge of this Information Center issued in Hawaii ?
Colonel Bergquist. I did not quite get your question.*
152. General Russell. When you got back out there in April, did
you immediately go on duty with this outfit ?
Colonel Bergquist. No, sir.
153. General Russell. How long thereafter was it before you went
on duty ?
Colonel Bergquist. May I just recite what I did? I got back there
in April and was placed on approximately two weeks special duty to
write up a report on what should be done in Hawaii. I did that and
submitted it, and I have never seen it since. I do not know whether
you have it, or not. I was then [1210] issued orders that I was
relieved to go back to normal duty. I was at that time still supposed
to be in command of a fighter squadron. That was about in May, the
first part of May. About the 22nd of May we started the Hawaiian
Department maneuvers. I was with my squadron that morning ready
to start operating with my squadron when about 10 o'clock I was
called up to the Group Headquarters and asked to take control of
operating the device. I relinquished command to my next senior in
the squadron and went up and set up what was perhaps the first In-
formation Center. It was not much, because I set it up in one hour.
It was not really an information center ; it was a fighter control center.
I than operated during maneuvers that way.
154. General Russell. All of the people that operated there were
Air Force people ?
Colonel Berquist. That is right, sir. After the maneuvers I was
then assigned to the Wing as Assistant Operations Officer. I then
began building on my own hook a little information center in the
base of the headquarters building at Wheeler Field. I wanted to get
something started so that we would have some kind of an information
center going in case of attack. That was my idea. We set up this
little information center down in the basement. It was not really
authorized. We had an awful time trying to get equipment for it;
but by the usual methods of chiseling here and there I got the stuff
and that was when I had my first contact with actually putting some-
thing in w^riting, because I put in a request for some headsets for the
controller and the pursuit officer to use, and got an indorsement back
from headquarters of the Air Force asking me by what right I was
setting up an information center. I mean, this was addressed to the
commander, of course. They said I could not have the equipment.
[1211] I wrote up a 2-page endorsement for General Davidson
to sign, which he did, which explained the position, that we had
628 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
one, that was the only one that was ready to operate, such as it was,
and they also stated in their letter from the headquarters of the Air
Forces that the Signal Corps was setting up an information center,
and I knew that that one wasn't going to be ready for about six months,
so that was my first contact I had with writing, and they did approve
then my going ahead with this, and that was my first opening wedge
to have a chance to educate headquarters, the Air Forces, at all, as to
just what it was all about, and especially the Signal Officer, Colonel
Hoppough.
Then I attempted this : We ran experiments down there, ran prob-
lems, with our fighters. I sent out airplanes to act as target air-
planes. I worked with Colonel Tetley at that time, and we had two
of his sets set up, and we began working problems.
155. General Grunert. Who was Tetley?
Colonel Bergquist. Tetley was in the Signal Corps, in the De-
partment Signal Office, and was in charge of the radar. In fact, at
that time I believe he was still up at Schofield Barracks in charge of
this little plotting outfit they were training as plotters, and getting
these radars set up.
15G. General Russell, When did j^ou amalgamate those operations,
yours and Tetley's ?
Colonel Bergquist. That's right. Well, then we began. Tetley
then told me that they had finally gotten an authorization to build
an information center down near Fort Shaffer. I then worked with
him, and I drew up the design for the [121.2] information
center, and the Signal Corps went ahead and built it. Then, I guess
it was probably in November, when we finally got the thing built and
began putting in our communications into it. I am trying to get
to your original question of when I took over. Actually, it wasn't
until the 7tli of December, maybe the 8th. You can say "the 7th, be-
cause I went down there on the 7th, and, from then on, operated.
157. General Russell. When did you move physically into this new
building, which was completed in November ?
Colonel Bergquist. We completed it in November, and we began
running practice problems. In other words, we would go down there
and open it up and operate it, to train and qualify them.
158. General Russell. But you were merely representing the Air
Forces, then?
Colonel Bergquist. That's right. Then, we actually moved our
headquarters down, in December, after we started operating.
159. General Russell. I want to connect up one link that is missing
in my mind ; it may be, in the record. When you went to this school,
in April, I believe I asked you, but I do not remember the answer,
were you sent there as a representative of the Hawaiian Department
or by the Air Forces, or was tliat an Air Force school, or what sort
of school was it?
Colonel Bergquist. It was an Air Force school. We did represent
the Hawaiian Department. It was the Hawaiian Department issued
the orders.
160. General Russell. Were all those in that school Air Force
people ?
Colonel Bergquist. No, sir,; there were some Signal Corps
[12 IS] and antiaircraft people.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 629
161. General Russell. Now, Colonel, the problem out there was to
take away from these various branches those elements which were
going to operate as part of this entire whole that we are discussing,
now; is that true? You got some people from the Navy, some from
the antiaircraft people, and some from other services, there ?
Colonel Bergquist. That was a small part. They had to furnish a
liaison officer, but they also had to agree to the method of operation,
whereby I had control.
162. General Russell. And that placed the command of relatively
large elements of the Navy and of the other branches under the com-
mand of this coordinator?
Colonel Bergquist. The controller ; yes, sir.
163. General Russell. You stated a moment ago that there was
opposition to turning over the command of these units to this central
cofnmander, who would have been General Davidson?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
164. General Russell. That is one of the problems you had?
Colonel Bergquist. That was one of the problems; yes, sir.
165. General Russell. And in so far as the naval elements went,
that was a matter of cooperation, because there was not unity of com-
mand ?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
166. General Russell. Now, radar, as I understand your testimony,
was more or less new, at the time?
Colonel Bergquist. Very much so; yes, sir.
167. General Russell. These sets which arrived out there some
time in the summer of July, August, or September, whenever they did
arrive, were the first to appear on the Island ?
[1214] Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
168. General Russell. And it was necessary to start training from
the ground up ?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
169. General Russell. Most of the training of operating person-
nel for the field stations was done by the Signal Corps?
Colonel Bergquist. That is right, sir.
170. General Russell. Did Colonel Tetley "play ball," out there,
with you ?
Colonel Bergquist. Colonel Tetley? Yes, sir — to the utmost.
171. General Russell. And I believe he was finally on the Staff of
the Department ?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
172. General Russell. And he represented the Department Com-
mander in the development of the Interceptor Command?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
173. General Russell. One other question. We are now dealing.
Colonel, with a good deal of philosophy, apparently. Had you had
a complete set-up, with all of the people trained, and all of the com-
mand chain established, if they had been off duty beginning at 7
o'clock that morning, they would not have been helpful in this situa-
tion ?
Colonel Bergquist. That's right; but your supposition that we
had everybody, and had them alf trained, would mean that we would
be operating 24 hours a day.
630 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
174. General Kussell. I am bringing a supposition in, too, that
they were all in bed, after 7 o'clock that morning, and it would have
been to ho effect ?
Colonel Bergquist. Well, if they had been, yes ; but as I [1215]
stated, on this confereiice we had on the 24th of November, I wanted
to get them on 24-hour duty.
175. General Russell. That is all.
176. General Grunert. Did the lack of progress in getting the in-
formation started stem into the lack of being air-warning-service-
minded, in the high command, do you suppose ; or what ?
Colonel Bergquist. I think that was the trouble, to a great extent.
177. General Grunert. We hear the expression quite frequently
among the witnesses that they "made all efforts" to do so-and-so.
Apparently the all-out effort they made after December 7 amounted
to something because there was unity of purpose after that, caused
by the attack.
Colonel Bergquist. That is right ; yes, sir.
178. General Grunert. Apparently, before that, there was not the
realization of the necessity nor the unity of purpose to push the
things through that there was after December 7. Was Davidson air-
warning-service-minded ?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes. sir ; I believe he was.
179. General Grunert. Was Rudolph so minded?
Colonel Bergquist. Perhaps to less extent. I do not think so. I
think they say, in that, he was not.
180. General Grunert. He was the liaison officer, up there?
Colonel Bergquist. That is right. He was not educated into what
it could do and what it meant. There was a stock phrase that I got
from him.
181. General Grunert. Whose business was it to put this thing
across, in the line of education ? Was that Davidson ? Was it Mar-
tin ? Somebody had to educate the Department Commander and his
staff, so that it could be pushed. Or was it the [1216] De-
partmental Commander's Signal Officer who should have been the
air-warning-service man ?
Colonel Bergquist. I believe, sir, it should have started with the
report that Colonel Tindal and myself drew up when we got back,
and turned in to the Air Force Headquarters.
182. General Grunert. Then it would appear that sending you
two to the United States to go to a school was just another school
detail, but when you came back and put in your report, there was
nothing happened for several months ?
Colonel Bergquist. That is right, sir.
183. General Frank. What did you say General Rudolph's stock
phrase was ?
Colonel Bergquist. I was trying to get the liaison officers, and the
stock phrase was, and the answer was, they "couldn't be spared."
184. General Grunert. There appears to have been issued on the
6th of November an SOP in which there was set up an Interceptor
Command. Now, somebody had sold it to the Department Com-
mander and to the Staff that got up this SOP that they put in there —
There will be an Interceptor Command
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 631
and they stated, I think, as I remember it, what it was; and it was
well stated.
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
185. General Grunert. But it was not implemented until, really,
December 7 ?
Colonel Bergquist. That is right, sir.
186. General Frank. It really was not effective until December
17, was it %
Colonel Bergquist. The name was changed from — let's see —
[i^i7] "The Hawaiian Interceptor Command" — that is right; I
believe it was the I7th of December that it was officially changed from
the Wing designation to the Interceptor Command designation.
187. General Grunert. But this November 5 SOP, when you read
it, looks as if this goes into effect as soon as that order is received;
and it appears, according to the testimony, to have misled the Navy
into thinking that it was in being, when it was not really activated.
Although it did operate December 7, it was not really activated finally
until December 17.
Now, do you suppose some of that delay was caused by a sort of
little jealousy between the Air Corps and the Signal Corps as to
the Signal Corps' giving up something?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir; I believe that contributed to it.
188. General Grunert. Or was it because they did not think the
Air Corps, being a new and growing branch, was to be trusted with
something as important as that; or was it a combination of that?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
189. General Grunert. Tell me about Tetley.
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
190. General Grunert. We are going to have Powell as a witness,
but Tetley had not come into the picture, so far as I have seen. Who
can give us the best information on the Signal Corps end of this Air
Warning Service ? * * * Qn the record, again :
Do 3^011 know anything about the sites for the permanent radar?
Have you been on those sites ? Do you know what [1218'\ dif-
ficulties there may be in getting to them, doing the construction
work, and installing the permanent radar sets ?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir; I do. I was on the Board that
selected the sites.
191. General Grunert. Do you know of any physical reason why
those sites should not have been prepared prior to December 7, even
if you did not have the permanent radar equipment ? I mean, as to
access to the sites, and the roads. In one place, they had a cable
with which to haul stuff up to the top side.
Colonel Bergquist. I believe that some of those sites that we
selected were very inaccessible and would require considerable time
to put the stuff up in there. I am not in a position, I do not knowi
enough of the facts or the engineering data, to know whether or not it
could have been done before December 7.
192. General Grunert. I have forgotten whether you said they
were there when they were completed, or not; but when the impetus
was back of it, after December 7, the dirt started to fly and they got
there, did they, or didn't they ?
632 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Bergquist. Well, you might say Yes, but they had started
on the jvork before, and there Avere just men finishmg it up. Now,
naturally everyone was working a little harder after that, and perhaps
it did get done a little faster.
193. General Grunert, Are tliere any other questions?
194. General Russell. Yes.
What happened to that report which you made when you came back
from the school ?
Colonel Bergquist. It was turned in to the Air Force [1219]
Headquarters, and I have not seen it, since.
195. General Russell. You do not know where it went from there?
Colonel Bergquist. No, sir.
196. General Russell. Do you know who wrote the SOP section
for this Interceptor Command?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir. If I recall correctly. Colonel Paul
was the Air Corps Liaison Officer, in the G-3, the Hawaiian Depart-
ment, at that time, when that was written up. He had received con-
siderable information on what an "interceptor command" was and
what it did, from me, as well as information through the normal chan-
nels, because Colonel Paul was the Operations Officer of the Fighter
Wing at Wheeler Field, and I was his assistant from May through
Sej)tember.
197. General Russell. Did he write that SOP section?
Colonel Bergquist. I am not sure; but I think he did.
198. General Russell. When were the selections for the permanent
radar sites made?
199. General Frank. Were preparations made for the selection of
those sites back in 1939?
Colonel Bergquist. No, sir; not that I know of. I didn't know
what a radar was until I came back from the school, in 1941,
200. General Frank. Or 1940?
Colonel Bergquist. I wasn't acquainted with that, sir.
201. General Russell. When did your group make these selections ?
Colonel Bergquist. We made selections during the midsummer, I
believe, of 1941, and then I believe they had to go back to the War
Department for approval, and I don't know what the final date was
when that actually was approved.
[1220] 202. General Russell. Were they eventually installed
at the sites that your group selected ?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir; I believe most of them were.
203. General Grunert. Thank you very much for helping us.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Brief recess.)
[1221] TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. JACOB H. RUDOLPH, RETIRED,
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. General, will you state to the Board your name,
rank, organization, and station?
General Rudolph. Jacob H. Rudolph, Brigadier General of the
Army, Retired. I am at my home now.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 633
2. Colonel West. Is that in Washington ?
General Eudolpii. No. In Milwaukee, No. 14.
3. General Grunert. General, this Board is attempting to get at
the facts and looking into the background and viewpoints prior to
and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack and what happened there ;
and in view of your assignment at the time as Commanding General
of a bomber wing — was it ?
General Rudolph. 18th Bombardment Wing.
4. General Grunert. Of a bombardment wing. — we thought you
could throw some light upon the subject.
Now, we have developed this subject considerably, so we are piec-
ing out to a great extent, and so I will ask you some definite questions
on what I gleaned mainly from the Roberts Commission report to-
gether with the testimony that has been brought out so far.
Your assignment was what while you were on duty in Hawaii?
General Rudolph. At that particular time I was just Commanding
General of the Bombardment Wing; I had nothing to do with the
post or any housekeeping duties.
5. General Grunert. You were tactical commander, then?
General Rltdolph. Yes, sir,
[1322] 6. General Grunert. Then, you will not know anything
about the security measures that were taken at the post? You had
nothing to do with that ?
General Rudolph. Well, I wouldn't say that I didn't know any-
thing about it, because I did see the preparations, but it did not come
directly under me.
7. General Grunert. It is stated in the testimony here that, about
the measures taken for protection of materiel and personnel after the
attack, there were certain measures taken, and it states: similarly
measures were taken by General Rudolph at Hickam Field since
December 7th as to blackout instructions, the issue of gas masks and
sirens for air raid alarms, also regarding cooperation with the Navy
on patrol.
Does that intimate that the things done at Hickam Field had not
been done prior to December 7th, and this was something new ? They
were just starting in to wake up and do things?
General Rudolph. No. We had quite a series of alerts when every-
body would be confined to the field, when all the combat crews would
sleep right in the hangars. This was before December 7th.
8. General Frank. May I interrupt? You say "we." Do you
mean
General Rudolph. I mean the 18th Bombardment Wing, by "we."
9. General Frank. Was this alert just in the 18th Bombardment
Wing, or the whole Department ?
General Rudolph. Well, the whole Department. I beg your par-
don. The whole Department, yes.
10. General Grunert. Now, what is that reference there : [1223]
"also regarding cooperation with the Navy on patrols after Decem-
ber 7" ? Was there no such cooperation prior to December 7th ?
General Rudolph. Well, after December 7th the Navy took us over
body and soul,
11. General Grunert. And used you on distant patrol ?
634 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Rudolph. We did exactly as tliey ordered us to. We were
part of their naval air force so to speak.
12. General Grunert. Prior to that had there been any bombard-
ment used for patrolling purposes ?
General Rudolph. Not in the way it was used after December 7.
Now, we had many maneuvers with the Navy, and I will say here
before you gentlemen that they gave me the UTAH for three solid
months, to bomb night and day, and they had a big teakwood covering,
superstructure, that covered the whole deck; and as far as bombing
practice is concerned, I don't think any bombardment wing in the
whole air force had as fine practice as the 18th Bombardment Wing.
We had many maneuvers, I sat in time and again with the naval
officers there on maneuvers, and we worked with them. I thought the
cooperation was very good.
13. General Grunert. From an air point of view it is not considered
good practice to use bombers on reconnaissance missions, is it?
General Rudolph. Well, at that time we had one squadron that
was called a reconnaissance squadron, as a part of the wing. That
was the organization.
14. General Grunert. I see.
15. General Frank. What kind of airplanes ?
[1224] General Rudolph. We had B-17s and B-18s.
16. General Grunert. Now, while your bombers were in training did
they have any reconnaissance mission prior to December 7th?
General Rudolph. Yes, one squadron had a considerable amount of
reconnaissance training.
17. General Grunert. And was that worked into daily reconnais-
sance of certain areas, or was it just training?
General Rudolph. That was just training. We didn't cover the
360 degrees prior to December 7th as we did after, when the Navy
took us over, but we did go out to Midway, we did go out to Wake,
we went to Palmyra, we went to Christmas, on reconnaissance
missions.
18. General Frank. Before December 7th ?
General Rudolph, Oh, yes.
19. General Grunert. On definite assigned reconnaissance missions ?
Who made those assignments ?
General Rudolph. I had to get the squadron ready that went to
the Philippines in September, and they had to know their navigation
training combined with reconnaissance in those long overwater flights
getting them ready to go to the Philippine Islands.
20. General Grunert. Then that was just a matter of training? It
was not, then, a definite reconnaissance mission, was it ? What I mean
is now, the understanding that I have is that the Navy was charged
with distant reconnaissance.
General Rudolph. True. Very true.
21. General Grunert. And any mission that you had for distant
reconnaissance should have been assigned by the Navy ?
General Rudolph. That is right.
[1225] 22. General Grunert. So that was not an assigned re-
connaissance mission as such.
General Rudolph. I understand you now.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARlSlY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 635
23. General Grunert. Now, when those bombers went out training
toward the latter part of '41, were they armed and prepared to protect
themselves ?
General Rudolph. Some were and some were not.
24. General Grunert. What was the theory back of that, or what
were the instructions? You gave them to them. Was there any fear
of an attack or a possible interference while they were on such train-
ing mission, that they might have to take care of themselves?
General Rudolph. We had no such feeling, but there were some of
the B-l7s that came over without guns, and we had to fly them with-
out guns until the guns arrived. Then we put those on to train the
men in holding against the blast of the ship in flight.
25. General Grunert. I have a question here : Were the command-
ers of major units — and by major units I mean such commanders as
General Martin of the Hawaiian Air Force, yourself of the Bomber
Command, Davidson of the Interceptor Command, Burgin of the
Antiaircraft, and so on. Were the commanders of such major units
kept informed of the War and Navy Department so-called warning
messages that were received ? Were you kept so informed ?
General Rudolph. Personally I was informed of nothing. I don't
know about General Martin.
26. General Grunert. Even ujd to the day of the attack?
General Rudolph. I know nothing of the others, but [1£26]
certainly no one gave me any information of the condition of affairs.
27. General Frank. May I ask a question ?
28. General Grunert. Yes.
29. General Frank. Did you have no information that the Depart-
ment Commander had received notice of a critical situation existing?
General Rudolph. If I did, I do not recall it.
30. General Frank. There was nothing communicated down to the
lower echelons ?
General Rudolph. I am honest in my statement that if it was com-
municated to me I have forgotten it.
31. General Frank. You were placed on an alert ?
General Rudolph. Many times.
32. General Frank. Well, on the 27th of November?
General Rudolph. Well, I couldn't remember definitely, we had
so many of them.
33. General Frank. Well, the last alert before December 7th ? You
were on an alert on December 7th, Alert No. 1, for sabotage?
General Rudolph. That is right.
34. General Frank. Well, what was your reaction to that alert at
that time ?
General Rudolph. I don't know just what you want.
35. General Frank. Well, did you feel that there was real cause for
it, or it was just another alert?
General Rudolph. Oh, no, no. We thought it was just another one.
We had had so many of them that throughout my [1227'] com-
mand there was a feeling that it was getting rather binding, one alert
after another, and we didn't know the underlying reason for all the
alerts because no one pointed out to me personally that the conditions
were very critical.
636 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
36. General Grunert. Now, this is a general question to see what
the form of command in the Department was. Were conferences held
by the Commanding General of the Department or his Chief of Staff
of the principal subordinate commanders wherein they were kept in-
formed of the situation and in turn informed their commanding gen-
erals of the measures taken by them to meet such situation?
I w411 read the whole thing to give you the idea :
Were subordinate commanders informed of the imminent approach
of probable hostilities as set forth in messages received late in Novem-
ber and early in December ?
Were discussions held as to measures to be adopted in preparation
for any such eventualities ?
Were they questioned as to the adequacy of plans, S.O.P.s, and so
forth?
Was the question of the type of alert to be taken discussed with
them ?
Were reports from them required as to their respective states of
readiness to meet any anticipated eventualities ?
In general, were such conferences held in the interests of keeping
commanders informed, for the issuance of understandable instruc-
tions, and the preparation of adequate defenses ?
General Rudolph. We did have conferences over at Fort Shafter.
I attended quite a few of them.
[J22S] 37. General Grunert. Do you recall wdiat those con-
ferences were about toward the latter part of November or early in
December, if any were held during that period ?
General Rudolph. Well, we had to explain our training, what we
were doing, and the type of airplanes we had ; but I don't remember
that the seriousness was brought out at any of these conferences or
that we were particularly enjoined relative to taking every possible
measure for the protection of our equij^ment.
38. General Grunert. You have testified that you don't recall hav-
ing been informed as to anything particularly alarming, or informa-
tion of the international situation along about that time, so evidently,
if that were the case, in the conference you had at that time it was not
impressed on your mind.
General Rudolph. That is very true. Now, we did have many other
conferences, of course, with General Martin. There was a scheduled
weekly or bi-weekly conference,
39. General Grunert. Did he bring forth any such situation ?
General Rudolph. If he did, he failed to impress me with the seri-
ousness, because I do not recall that. We had, sir, a great many con-
ferences on the squadron going to the Philippines, and its training and
getting it ready. We sent a squadron along in the fall, I think Sep-
tember, the last of September or early October.
40. General Grunert. I see hero that you stated before the Roberts
Commission something to the effect that you had no information as to
the existing serious international situation. Evidently that was fresh
in your mind at that time when you [1229] testified there.
General Rudolph. Much more so then than now.
41. General Grunert. Now, on the 27th of November, '41, the De-
partment Commander ordered the Command to go into an alert
known as No. 1, which is what they call the sabotage alert, and in that
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 637
alert under the instructions as I understand them airplanes on airfields
were bunched, presumably in order to require a lesser number of
guards to protect them from sabotage. Do you recall those instruc-
tions and that you bunched your airplanes for that purpose?
General Rudolph. Very definitely. It was very specific, to protect
against sabotage from within, with no thought of an attack from
without. We were directed to bunch them as tightly as we could and
to throw out various different lines of resistance from that rectangle
of airplanes, so that small hand bombs and what-not could not be
tossed into this assembly of airplanes.
42. General Grunert. Those were definite orders. If you had been
on your own, as I might call it, left to use your owai judgment, would
that have been the best method to handle your planes against
sabotage ?
General RuDOLni. It doesn't appear so now.
43. General Grunert. How were you as to personnel ? Could you
have distributed them and still have protected them against sabotage?
General RuDOLrn. We would have had roving patrols
44. General Grunert. It might not have given the same protection ?
General Rudolph. — on concentric lines of approach, [1230~\
instead of a lot of fixed points.
45. General Grunert. Did you have sufficient area in which to dis-
perse your planes in case they had not been ordered bunched ?
General Rudolph. We had a good big area which we used immedi-
ately after we were bombed.
46. General Grunert. Now, in the Roberts report you stated as
follows. I have a note which says, "That he had had no intimation of
preceding trouble, and if he had then his planes would not have been
bunched or concentrated, but would have been ready for any emer-
gency, especially on a Sunday morning."
I have a question : Did not the Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department, or the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force,
inform you of warnings that had been received in the immediate past?
It all goes back to almost the same line of questioning.
General Rudolph. If they did, they failed to impress me with the
seriousness of it.
47. General Grunert. Now, as to concentration versus dispersion,
how much more personnel would have been required had you dispersed
your planes in order to guard them against sabotage? Would it have
been 10 percent more, 20 percent, or what?
General Rudolph. Well, with our movin,g and roving patrols I
think I had personnel enough to take care of aircraft I had, because I
was nowhere near up to strength. Nowhere near.
48. General Frank. Up to strength in what? Personnel or
aircraft ?
General Rudolph. Aircraft. You see, we never filled up the group
to the number of the airplanes it should have had; [12S1] I
mean the wing.
49. General Grunert. Go ahead. General Frank.
50. General Frank. You had been reading the papers, the Hawaiian
papers, newspapers ?
General Rudolph. The little Hawaiian Advertiser.
638 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
51. General Frank. They were giving you certain information
about the Japanese conferences being held in Washington, between
our Government and the Japanese representatives ?
General Rudolph. True.
52. General Frank. There were things coming out in the headlines
of the papers which indicated this sort of situation. Did that tend to
build up any apprehension about the situation ?
General Rudolph. If it did, it never came to my attention officially.
It was not discussed among us.
53. General Frank. I don't mean officially. I mean did it instill
any apprehension in you personally t Was there a reaction in your
mind about the newspaper headlines ?
General Rudolph. There may have been a reaction.
54. General Frank. Well, did you discount it to a certain extent
because you had not received anything officially ?
Greneral Rudolph. It didn't strike me as very forcibly alarming.
55. General Frank. All right. Now, can you tell me, did you
anticipate an air attack ?
General Rudolph. I did not.
56. General Frank. Why didn't you anticipate it ? Let us have the
reasons.
General Rudolph. Well, I guess I felt like a great many others did,
that Japan would never dare to.
[WS^] 57. General Frank. Well, what built up that state of
mind ? That is what I am after. Whose responsibility was it to give
you a warning of an approach from a distance ?
General Rudolph. It certainly should have come from higher
authority.
58. General Frank. Well, was it the Army or the Navy ?
General Rudolph. I say the Navy, because they had the long range
patrol boats.
59. General Frank. To your knowledge were they conducting
patrols constantly ?
General Rudolph. On that particular Sunday morning I under-
stood they didn't have k boat out — an airplane, seaplane.
60. General Frank. But generally were they more or less continu-
ously conducting reconnaissance to some distance ?
General Rudolph. To some distance.
61. General Frank. Do you know what that was?
General Rudolph. I don't think they ever went over 200, 250 miles.
62. General Frank. Did you have any confidence in the positive
security that the Navy furnished ?
General Rudolph. Not with those old slow-going boats they had.
63. General Frank. Did you feel that they had positive means to
give you adequate warning ?
General Rudolph. They could within their range of those boats.
64. General Frank. Had they been out?
General Rudolph. Had they been out, certainly, 250, 300 miles.
[1£3S] 65. General Frank. But you understand that they were
not out on that morning ?
General Rudolph. So I was informed.
66. General Grunert. If they had been patrolling they could not
have covered 360 degrees, could they ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 639
General Rudolph. Certainly not. They could not cover it when
they took everything I had.
67. General Frank. What was it operated to build up this frame
of mind that led you to the belief that "it can't happen here" ?
General Eudolph. I guess I was like a great many others. I never
thought Japan would dare to do it.
68. General Russell. You understand they did not have a boat out ?
General Rudolph. That was the report there at that time.
69. General Grunekt. When you speak of boats, you mean flying
boats ?
General Rudolph. The P.B.Y.'s.
70. General Russell. Where did you get this report ?
General Rudolph. It was common. They were all bunched right
on the apron at Pearl Harbor, and they got every one of them.
71. General Grunert. On Ford Island?
General Rudolph. Yes; just like mine were caught, only they were
worse off ; they did not save any of them.
72. General Russell. Was that just common talk?
General Rudolph. Yes ; that there was not a P.B. Y. out.
73. General Russell. Can you recall any specific Navy man who
told you that ?
General Rudolph. No, sir ; I cannot. I will qualify that. Later on
I had a liaison officer with them all the time, and he [12S4] re-
ported to me. They were changing frequently ; I do not know which
one it was. But one of those liaison officers said they did not have
any patrol out on that Sunday morning.
74. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not it was hearsay?
General Rudolph. He worked right with them all the time.
75. General Grunert. Before December 7th ?
General Rudolph. Some before and all the time after.
76. General Grunert. What was his name?
General Rudolph. I do not remember now. I tried to think of it.
I had several of them. I used to rotate them, so I do not remember
just who was the liaison officer, because we used to rotate them for ex-
perience.
77. General Russell. General Rlidolph, after this attack or this
series of attacks on the morning of December 7, did you visit Ford
Island in Pearl Harbor ?
General Rudolph. I do not remember definitely how soon after, but
every officer of my wing visited Pearl Harbor and saw all the battle-
ships on the bottom and turned upside down, and the P.B.Y.'s burned
up on the apron of Ford Island.
78. General Russell. You, along with your officers, went there and
personally saw just what you have described?
General Rudolph. Yes.
79. General Russell. Based on the P.B.Y.'s that you saw on the
apron of the field at Ford Island, what was the conclusion reached by
you as to the number of P.B.Y.'s out on reconnaissance on the morning
of December 7, 1941?
General Rudolph. There could have been precious few, because, if
my memory serves me correctly, there were about 20-odd P.B.Y.'s
640 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
burned up and that was most of the airplanes they [1235] had
for patrolling.
80. General Russell. Did they not have as many as a 100 P.B.Y.'s
on Ford Island ?
General Rudolph. I do not think they had at that time. They
brought over a lot right after that, when they started the 360-degr8e
patrolling.
81. General Frank. Were you familiar with the aircraft warning
service and the Information Center?
General Rudolph. I had quite a bit of contact wdth them after; not
much before. I did work a lot with the antiaircraft, Colonel Burgin's
outfit. We worked a lot with him.
82. General Frank. But you had no bombardment liaison officers
in training for the Information Center prior to December 7 ?
General Rudolph. If I did, I do not recall them. He may have
had some one individual on that work, but I know it was emphasized
decidedly afterwards.
83. General Frank. Prior to December 7 were you very familiar
with the details of the aircraft warning service ?
General Rudolph. No; I was not.
84. General Frank. Had there been any effort on the part of the
top command to explain its operations to you or to the officers in
general ?
General Rudolph. We did have at the point just east of Honolulu
harbor — before we got the B-18's we had to dip the wing of the old
B-17 three times to let them know we were friendly aircraft.
85. General Frank. But you did not know anything about the de-
tails and method of operation of the Information Center ?
General Rudolph. No ; I did not.
There is one thing I would like to say, General. We were [M36\
having a course in the identification of aircraft by a naval officer who
taught at the tactical school after Browning. I have forgotten his
name. But he gave me two afternoons a week on his own time. At
four o'clock when his day's work was over, they let him come over,
after his day's work was done, and every one of my younger officers
who had never had that course were having that course of instruction
by this Navy officer in the identification of our battleships, naval ves-
sels of all kinds, and the Japanese vessels.
86. General Grunert. That had no connection with the air warning
service ?
General Rudolph. Not a bit.
87. General Frank. What was the state of training of your combat
crews ?
General Rudolph. Of course, we were shy of .50 caliber guns in the
beginning; and the first lower turret on the B-17 never did work.
They had to throw it out because dirt would get under the collector
ring and short-circuit it, and they had to throw them all away. They
did not prove feasible.
88. General Frank. Let us get back to the training of the crews.
General Rudolph. It was the gunners that we were trying to train.
I do not think any wing had the opportunity to train that the 18tb.
Bombardment did, for we bombed three months, night and day, againsi:
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 641
a moving battleship, and the pilot never knew which way the skippei*
was going to kick the rudder,
89. General Frank, There has been some testimony before the
Board to the effect that there was difficulty in completing the training
of the crews to fly the B-17's.
General Rudolph, Not the jiilots; the co-pilot and engineer.
[1237] The gunners were the ones who did not have training in
gunnery,
90. General Frank, You had plenty of pilots, did you ?
General Rudolph, I only had a few ships, I had more pilots than
I had airplanes. We were flying that Sunday morning, or we were
getting ready to fly, some of the youngsters who had not finished B-18
training. That is how they happened to kill 22 in one hangar and cut
the legs off the other two. There were 2i in one hangar getting the
ships out. They were due out at 8 o'clock, and a little before 8 the
Japanese attacked and killed 22 outright. They were going up at 8
for one extra hour. All you have to do is to look at the record and
see the number of hours they were flying.
91. General Frank. The squadron that was sent to the Philippines
in September still left you plenty of trained personnel ?
General Rudolph. Of course I must be honest and say that I picked
the best of the whole wing to go in that squadron, the pick of the
whole wing.
92. General Frank. But you were not handicapped in your opera-
tions from lack of trained people except gunners ?
General Rudolph. No; we were not. We went to San Francisco
and ferried them over. We brought them over and we did not lose
a ship.
93. General Grunert. One of the reasons given for going on Alert
1, the sabotage alert, instead of a more protective alert, such as 2 or 3,
was that if they had gone on 2 or 3 it would have taken Air Corps
personnel away from their training, especially those who were being
trained to take B-17's, I believe, to the Philippines. So we got the
impression that that training was for the purpose of getting enough
of them trained to put on the B-17's to take them across. That is
the reason [IBSS] for our interest in knowing about this par-
ticular training.
General Rudolph. I would like to qualify that just a little. That
was my first priority, to get that squadron ready for the Philippines.
Everything else was secondary,
94. General Grunert. What squadron was that?
General Rudolph. The one that was selected to go to the Philippine
Islands with the B-17's,
95. General Frank. But you had others that were going to this
school later on ?
General Rudolph. Yes. It could not help but hurt, because I picked
the best out of the wing. You could not help but hurt your command,
picking out the best of the wing. That was a crack outfit. We kept
right on training. All you have to do is to look at the records of the
training hours. They were piling up hundreds of hours.
96. General Grunert. How much would you have been handicapped
had you gone on Alert No. 2, which was against air attack, plus sabo-
T9716— 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1 42
642 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tage? How much would it have handicapped you in carrying out
the mission you had of training crews to take the B-17's across ?
General Rudolph. I was never one to believe n^uch in being handi-
capped. We had a first priority and we were going to shove it through.
If we had changed to another alert we would have changed the guard
system. They would not have so much fixed ; we would have had much
more roving. There was a lot of growling and grumbling about this
and that. It never made much of an impression on me. I felt we
should work hard. This was long before any threat at all.
97. General Grunert. How much would that sort of an alert, Alert
No. 2, which is the alert against an air attack, have [1239] re-
tarded your training? What training could you have done while on
such an alert ?
General Rudolph. We could go right ahead flying. We were flying
on all the alerts. But the crews slept right in the hangar. We went
on with our flying training. Some of the ground men had to watch
the ships. We had to take members of the crew and rotate, them. We
had to keep one man on every airplane, just the way they are doing
now.
98. General Frank. Alert 2 or 3 would not have impeded your
training in any way ?
General Rudolph. If it had, it would not have been such that I would
have been crying over it at all. We would have gone ahead with the
training.
99. General Grunert. How much did Alert 3 after December 7
handicap your training ?
General Rudolph. They trained all the time, night and day. Every
ship we could get into the air would be out, and they came in at all
hours of the night to the limit of their gas capacity. We lost one
or two.
100. General Grunert. And they kept it up right along ?
General Rudolph. Until I left there in February. We could never
keep enough in the air to satisfy the Navy, because those youngsters
were burning up tires faster than they could ship them over to us, and
they were comparatively new ships. Additional parts were coming
out, but they were not coming over to us. The Navy was displeased
at times, I know, because I could not get enough parts to keep more
planes in the air. We would rob one and get five going, in spite of
General Martin's orders not to. He came over and said, "I can see that
3^ou have to do it."
[1240] 101- General Grunert. Thank you very much. We ap-
preciate your coming here to help us out.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
TESTIMONY OF COLONEL WALTER C. PHILLIPS, CHIEF OF STAFF
CORPS— Resumed
335. Colonel West. The witness is reminded that he is still under
oath. It will not be necessary to repeat it.
336. General Grunert. Colonel, I have a few subjects that I want
you to open up, and then I want to skip around here and there to check
up on some facts stated in the Roberts Commission Report.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 643
On the subject of Coordination and Cooperation, were there any
vStaff meetings between the Navy and the Army staffs ? I do not mean,
between the two commanders, but between you as Chief of Staff and
the correspondinor officer of tlie Navy and members of the Army Staff
and members of the Navy Staff.
Colonel Phillips. Not a meeting as a whole ; no, sir. Individually,
yes, sir.
337. General Grunert. Was the fleet staff ashore or afloat ?
Colonel Phillips. I believe they were ashore. They had head-
quarters ashore, I believe.
338. General Grunert. Then the District staff was ashore ?
Colonel Phillips.. Yes, sir; Admiral Bloch's staff,
339. General Grunert. With which did you' have the most business,
the fleet or the district?
Colonel Phillips. We worked with both staffs, sir. I do not
know which' we had the most to do with. The fleet was out a good
deal. I would expect, perhaps, we had the most to do with the
district staff.
340. General Grunert. In the testimony before the Roberts
[124-J] Commission you stated that you never consulted the Navy
between November 27 and December 7; you never asked the Navy
regarding their distant reconnaissance, and you never knew whether
the fleet was in or out. Is that still your recollection?
Colonel Phillips. After November 27?
341. General Grunert. Prior to December 7.
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. But I do not recall that testimony, sir.
It must have been correct if I stated it at that time.
342. General Grunert. Admiral Kimmel testified that he received no
information from the Army regarding measures taken by the Army
after November 2?, presumably as a result of the Chief of Staff's
message of November 27. Do you know anything about that?
Colonel Phillips. I have always been under the impression that
General Short advised the Navy as to everything we had done.
343. General Grunert. Admiral Bloch, the District Commander,
says he did not know anything regarding the Army inshore air patrol,
whether it was actually patrolling, or not. He also stated that he
did not know what Alert 1 meant. He thought Alert 1, which is
antisabotage, but did not know whether it meant the same as the
Navy's Alert 1 which corresponded to the Army's all-out alert. No. 3.
He apparently did not know that.
Colonel Phillips, We had a naval officer on duty on our staff,
G-3, whose sole duty it was to inform the Navy of everything,
particularly of an operational nature.
344. General Grunert. What was his name ?
Colonel Phillips. Lieutenant Burr.
345. General Grunert. Did you figure that anything the Navy
should know as far as the Army was concerned would be transmitted
to the Navy by your liaison officer ?
[124^] Colonel Phillips. That was my understanding. I
thought that was his job; I believe it was. We had also an officer
from G-3 Coast Artillery Corps. I cannot recall his name, because
they were changed from time to time, and at the same time he was
on duty with the Navy. That was their daily task.
644 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
346. General Grunert. Did this subject ever come up for discus-
sion or consideration ? There being two Navy staffs, the fleet and the
district, and an Army staff in the same general locality, that they
should establish joint headquarters and cooperate by close association?
Did that ever come up ?
Colonel Phillips. For discussion? Not to my knowledge, on my
tour of duty, sir.
347. General Gruxert. It never occurred to any of you to get closer
cooperation. It would seem as if that would be about the closest you
could get.
Colonel Pliillips. Yes; it certainly would be.
348. General Grunert. You recall S. O. P. No. 5 which described
the various alerts and other things. I believe you said you had a hand
in getting it up ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
349. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not the Navy was
supplied with that S. O. P. ? Was it informed as to its contents ?
Colonel Phillips. I feel sure that it was ; yes, sir.
350. General Grunert. It appears here that your G-2 on December
6th reported in a staff meeting that the Japanese Consulate Avas burn-
ing papers, and he said that no attention was paid to his report. That
is according to the Koberts Commission report. We have not seen
him yet. Do you recall a report to that effect ?
[124^] Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
351. General Grunert. He said no attention was paid to it. What
did you do about it ?
Colonel Phillips. I cannot deny his statement, but it is not correct.
The General was informed of that situation, and it was given much
consideration as to the reasons for that.
352. General Grunert. Do you know the conclusions reached as to
that information ? This was on December 6th. What did the Com-
manding General decide ? That the information was of no particular
significance ?
Colonel Phillips. I do not recall the decision on that. He was
informed of it.
353. General Grunert. Do you recall what you thought of it at that
time ?
Colonel Phillips. It was far from routine. It was a matter that of
course increased our apprehension.
354. General Grunert. I have some questions as to your handling
of the staff. Did you hold staff meetings ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
355. General Grunert. How often did you hold them? Were they
periodic, or when needed, or what ?
Colonel Phillips. I had a staff meeting of the general staff and of
administrative staff heads every week, and we had staff meetings of
the general staff heads — we were all in the same building, and they
oftentimes occurred two or three or four times a day, for that matter.
356. General Grunert. Was each staff head required to perform his
assigned functions without special dictation from higher up? In
other words, were they given a job and were they then free to do it,
or were they told what to do frequently ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 645
[1244] Colonel Phillips. No, sir ; they were given a job and they
did it.
357. General Grunert. Did the heads of the general staff sections
have access to the Commanding General on special occasions, if
necessary^
Colonel PjiiLLiPS. Yes, sir; at any time.
358. General Grunert. Did they make use of that frequently?
Colonel Phillips. They did.
359. General Grunert. Was the G-2 required to submit periodic
estimates of the situation ?
Colonel PfiiLLiPS Yes, sir.
360. General Grunert. After November 27 were they increasing
or were tlie^^ just as they had been before ?
Colonel Phillips. I cannot say as to that.
361. General Frank. Were there any regular G-2 estimates of the
situation prepared by your G-2?
Colonel Phillips. I am positive there were ; yes. I may be wrong
on that, but I do not believe, sir, we had regular G-2 periodical reports.
362. General Grunert. Who had general supervision, so far as the
Ha'waiian Department was concerned, concerning air warning signal
installations ?
Colonel Phillips. The District Engineer, I believe.
363. General Grunert. Do you mean the Department Engineer?
Colonel Phillips. It was the District Engineer, Colonel Wyman at
that time.
364. General Grunert. I mean, as to the radar installations of the
air warning service. Who had charge of that?
Colonel Phillips The District Engineer, I believe.
365. General Grunert. Are you sure that your Signal Officer did
[1245] not have charge of it ?
Colonel Phillips. The Signal Officer had general supervision. He
was supplying the equipment; but the exact arrangement between the
two I cannot state now. I have known it, but I do not recall it now.
366. General Grunert. Wliat section of the General Staff had
supervision of constructions in which the Commanding General was
particularly interested? In other words, when the Commanding Gen-
eral wanted to follow up constructions, on whom did he depend; what
staff member ?
Colonel Phillips. G-4.
367. General Grunert. What was his name?
Colonel Phillips. Marsden, who was the Signal Officer.
' 368. General Grunert. Had the Commanding General expressed
any anxiety concerning the air warning service and the progress being
made on its installation?
[124.6^ Colonel Phillips. I believe he did. I cannot recall
definitely.
369. General Grunert. Who in the Staff contacted and followed
up the work of the district engineer on matters that were vital to the
defense ? Was there any particular member of the staff charged with
that?
Colonel Phillips. G-4 was charged with construction work, in
that, and G-3, of course, inspected the progress on such work as forti-
fications.
646 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
370. Greneral Grunert. What staff inspections and observations
were there of tests, tactical maneuvers, defense preparation, follow-up
of orders and SOP, on the subject of defense?
Colonel Phillips. We liad, I believe a total of three maneuvers dur-
ing my time in the Territory, and that was of course all with the idea
of improving the state of training, with the object of defense of Oahu.
371. General Grunert. Did the Staff spend most of its time at
headquarters, or most of the time out among troops and installations ?
Colonel Phillips. In the field entirely, the large maneuver.
372. General Grunert. Entirely? You mean at maneuvers?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
373. General Grunert. I mean generally.
Colonel Phillips. Generally, we were ; particularly G-3 was out of
the ollice much of the time. G-o was assisting us. AVe had assistance
for that.
374. General Grunert. How about you? Did you get out much?
Colonel Phillips. I did.
\_12Jf7'\ 375. General Grunert. Or, was the Commanding Gen-
eral out most of the time, and you, in most of the time ?
Colonel Phillips. In \\\y capacity as G-3, sir.
376. General Grunert. As Chief of Staff.
Colonel Phillips. As Chief of Staff? I didn't get out a great deal
as Chief of Staff. It was rather exceptional that I. got out of the
office.
377. General Grunert. Was the General Staff called upon, or free
to advise as to defense measures and means, as to their contact with it,
and so forth?
Colonel Phillips. They were free to advise, at any time; yes, sir;
had access to the General at all times.
378. General Grunert. Now, on the subject of cooperation, Admiral
Pye testified. He said that after he became Commander-in-Chief of
the Pacific Fleet — this was after December 7 — he said, speaking about
himself and Emmons :
"We really got together."
Now, there is an intimation, there, that there wasn't sufficient "get-
ting together" prior to December 7.
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
379. General Grunert. How long did you remain as Chief of Staff,
after December 7 ?
Colonel Phillips. Till December 18. I was Deputy Chief of Staff,
thereafter, under General Emmons, at his request, for ten months.
380. General Frank. Who was Chief of Staff ?
Colonel Phillips. Colonel Collins was Chief of Staff. He relieved
me at the time that General Emmons came.
381. General Grunert. General Emmons brought him as Chief of
imS'] Staff?
Colonel Phillips. He brought him as Chief of Staff, December 18.
He was later relieved, during my tour, by General Boyd.
382. General Frank. In your testimony you have stated that there
was an interchange of information between General Short and various
officers of the Navy ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 647
383. General Frank. Did you, as Chief of Staff, have any system
for checking the interchange of information between General Short
and the Naval top command, so that there would be some official record
of it?
Colonel Phillips. I did not, sir. I did not. General Short and
Admiral Kimmel were very friendly, on friendly terms. Admiral
Kimmel's family I believe was not present in Oahu, and he would
call on the Shorts, officially, I know. The General has called me
in, once or twice, in the evenings " when he would come socially.
They would start official conversations. They also played golf in-
frequently. I have played, making up a foursome, once or twice.
384. General Frank. But still there was no record to indicate what
exchange of information there was?
Colonel Phillips. That is correct.
385. General Frank. Whatever exchange of information there
was, it did the command no good, because it didn't get down into
the Staff?
Colonel Phillips. Ordinarily, the General would inform the
staff — myself, as well as the Staff.
386. General Frank. He would inform you of what?
[1^4^] Colonel Phillips. As to the outcome of his conferences.
387. General Frank. Well, what about this information that he
exchanged with Admiral Kimmel on all these occasions?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir; sometimes we were informed of their
conferences ; other times, I don't know.
388. General Frank. As a matter of fact, you do not know how
much you were informed, and how much you were not, do you, if
you didn't keep any record of it ?
Colonel Ppiilltps. That is true, we had no record. We had no
system of making records, at all, in regard to the exchange of infor-
mation between the Staffs.
389. General Frank. You stated that the engineers were charged
with the installation of that equipment. As a matter of fact, the
Signal Corps had the technicians, and the only technicians, who
were familiar with that technical equipment, and who could install
it?
Colonel Phillips. That is correct ; yes, sir.
390. General Frank. And therefore, in order to get it straight in
the record, the engineers constructed the installations of buildings,
and the foundations, and so forth ?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
391. General Frank. And the Signal Corps made the technical
installation of the technical equipment, is that correct?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir ; I think that is right.
392. General Frank. Now, there was some kind of operating order.
393. General Grunert. I have it, here. I can ask that question,
because I have the name and everything, ri^ht here.
394. General Frank. All right. Go ahead.
395. General Grunert. The record of the Roberts Commission
[1250] shows that you were Senior Army Member of the Local
Joint Planning Committee, since November 6 ; is that right ?
Colonel Phillips. That is right; by virtue of office; by virtue
of being Chief of Staff.
648 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
396, General Grunert. All right. Now, go ahead.
397. General Frank. What were the duties of that Board?
Colonel Phillips. As I understood it, sir
39^. General Frank. You were head of it.
Colonel Phillips. That is right. And my duties were passed on
to me by Colonel "Phil"' Hayes, whom I relieved, and it was a joint
board to consider any changes or modifications of the plans that were
then in existence.
399. General Frank. Concerning what?
Colonel Phillips. The Joint Army and Navy
400. General Frank. Cooperation?
Colonel Phillips. — cooperation; yes, sir.
401. General Frank. Here was a time when a crises was about to
take place. Was there any meeting of that Board held?
Colonel Phillips. We never convened the Board, so far as I know,
during my time.
402. General Frank. And yet, here was a situation that arose,
when you had a war warning?
Colonel Phililps. Yes, sir.
403. General Frank. And hostilities were about to commence ; and
you still had no meeting of the Board?
Colonel Phillips. I do not believe the Board met. I am sure the
Board never convened with me as head of the Board. The matter
was taken up at the time.
404. General Frank. You were responsible for calling the meetings
[12S1] of the Board, weren't you?
Colonel Phillips. At the direction of the General; yes, sir; and
that matter was taken up at the time.
405. General Frank.' Now, why do you always reason back, and
side-step the General? Why don't you back him up, instead of
stepping out from under him?
Colonel Phillips. I want to back him up, sir.
406. General Frank. All right.
Colonel Phillips. I did, from the very beginning. I am sorry I
gave that impression.
407. General Frank. All right.
408. General Grunert. May I interpose, here, to suggest, that
committee may have been the same as the committee I have now in
the Eastern Defense Command. That committee is called upon when
any changes of any sort in the plans or agreements between the Army
and Navy are up for consideration. The duties do not pertain to
cooperation except when one party or the other proposes some change
in the then existing set-up.
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
409. General Kussell. I want to ask one question. This morning,
you testified. Colonel, that you served in the First Division, for a
time?
Colonel Phillips. That is right.
410. General Kussell. That was as G-3 ?
Colonel Phillips. That is right.
411. General Russell. Was General Short the Commanding Gen-
eral of the First Division during any of that period of time ?
Colonel Phillips. He was.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 649
412. General Russell. For about how long?
[J£52] Colonel Phillips. I should say, about the first year and
a half of my service, there; perhaps the first, maybe two years; I am
not positive.
413. General Russell. Then, for about a year and a half or two
years, you served in the same division with General Short, as his G-3 ?
Colonel Phillips. That is hight.
414. General Russell. That is all.
415. General Grunert. Are there any other questions? There
appear to be none.
Thank you very much for helping us out.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) •
(Thereupon, at 4:42 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of
witnesses for the day, and proceeded to other business.)
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 651
{1253'\ CONTENTS
SATURDAY, AUGUST 19, 1944
Testimony of — Page ^
Colonel Robert J. Fleming, Jr., Corps of Engineers, United States
Army, Fort DuPont, Delaware 1254
* Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original transcript of proceedings.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 653
\_m5ii\ PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD
SATURDAY, AUGUST 19, 1944
Munitions Building,
Washington, D. G.
The Board at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the
hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the
Board, presiding.
Present : Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D.
Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.
Present also : Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C.
Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr.,
Executive Officer.
General Grunert. The Board will come to order.
TESTIMONY OF COLONEL ROBERT J. FLEMING, JR., CORPS OF
ENGINEERS, UNITED STATES ARMY
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24. )
1. Colonel West. Will you please state to the Board your name,
rank, organization, and station?
Colonel Fleming. Robert J. Fleming, Jr., Colonel, Corps of Engi-
neers, Serial 01795, Headquarters 22, Fort DuPont, Delaware.
2. General Grunert. Colonel, the Board is after facts, both as to
what happened before and what happened at the attack on Pearl
Harbor in 1941, on December 7. Through the testimony [1255]
that the Board has had, your name came up as having occupied a posi-
tion and as having been liaison officer for General Short in connection
with certain construction work, and so forth. So we want you to throw
some light on this subject; and General Frank will propound the
questions and the other members of the Board will later question you.
3. General Frank. On what duty were you in November and
December, 1941 ?
Colonel Fleming. I was on the General Staff at that time, sir. I
was placed on the General Staff in August 1941, ostensibly in the
G-4 section. Actually I did very, very little formal G-4 work, but,
under then Colonel Hayes, who was Chief of Staff, I was given more
or less of a special section on all Army construction work, the planning
phase of it and the supervision of the execution.
If I may go into a little bit of the development of this, the Corps
of Engineers took over from the Constructing Quartermaster the con-
struction on airfields. At that time the Engineers had no staff engi-
neer set up in the air force units. At that particular time I was
Assistant Department Engineer.
654 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
4. General Frank. Assistant to Colonel Lyman ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir; the Department Engineer being a dual
assignment. Colonel Lyman was Department Engineer in name, but
was Regimental Commander of the 3rd Engineers at Schofield
Barracks.
5. General Grunert. How do you spell his name ?
Colonel Fleming. L-y-m-a-n. That is L. K. Lyman, who died in
September of 1942.
ll£o6] He was at Schofield Barracks and spent all his time out
there. I was Engineer representative at headquarters. When this
transfer of Air Force construction engineers took place there was
no Air Force Engineer, and at that time I was made, in addition to
all my other work, what amounted to Air Force Engineer on the
planning phase of it, and the job developed from that, sir.
6. General Frank. Let me hook you into the Air Force phase of
this matter. As Air Force Engineer did you work as adviser to the
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force ?
Colonel Fleming. No, sir. General Ryan was the Chief of Staff
of the Air Force when this started, and General Flood was the G-^
of the Air Force, and on all the planning between the Engineers and
the Air Force people the three of us. General Ryan, General Flood
and myself, used to act together. I would find out what they wanted
from an Air Force standpoint and work out the preliminary plans
and take them down to the District Engineer in Honolulu and the
thing from the engineering standpoint would then be planned.
7. General Frank. What I am trying to clear up is this : You said
you were the Air Force Engineer. What you meant was that you
were the Engineer on the staff of the Department Commander handling
Air Force construction projects?
-Colonel Fleming. That is right. There was no Air Force Engineer,
sir, until later on.
In the development, due to the shortage of engineers over there,
this thing developed so that eventually General Short pulled me out
of the Department Engineer's office and had my [-?^^^] orders
extended to stay over there and, under Colonel Hayes, Chief of Staff
at that time, I headed up more or less a special section on the staff
which handled all sorts of construction matters for the Department
Commander. It also developed into the handling of all Navy liaison
matters as related to construction, because before the war began there
was a tremendous increase in the construction program over there,
and the Army and Navy found themselves competing for workmen.
The Navy was bringing them in on one boat and we would be bringing
them in on another boat, and there was a tremendous amount of
potential conflict between the two services on matters of wage rates,
■ conditions of employment, and such things as that.
So that is how this job developed, sir. Ostensibly I was a member
of the G-4 section but actually never did any G-4 work.
8. General Frank. Were you a member of the group that selected
the sites for the permanent Aircraft Warning Service?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. That started, I think, about February
of 1940, and the first board on that consisted of Colonel Van Deusen,
now General Van Deusen, of the Signal Corps, who was Hawaiian
Department Signal Officer. General Lynn of the Air Force, I think
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 655
was the Air Force member. I was the Engineer member. I do not
know whether there were any other members or not.
9. General Frank. Will you tell us the sites that were selected
at that time ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. We had very little information;
[126S] no one had any information about the technical aspects
of this A. W. S. equipment, and the only information we had from tlie
War Department was that Hawaii would be allotted, depending on
what the board finally recommended, about eight of these sets. That
was their tentative study on the matter. We were also told that the
characteristics of this device were that it was more or less a beam line
of sight proposition. It went out the same way that light did, but
not the same wave lengths, and therefore the range that it would be
effective would depend entirely upon the height of the station. Of
course you know that horizon distance is the function of the height
above sea level. The range at that time was supposed to be 90 miles,
and the Signal Corps liad promised that it would be developed up to
a range of about 120 to 140 miles. So our instructions were to locate
feasible locations for it and, of course, since the range depended upon
altitude, to pick those places as high up as we could get them.
The only site on the Island of Oahu which met those considerations
was on top of Mt. Kaala ; and we got into a terrific argument with
various people around there because they said it was feasibly uneco-
nomical to get up on top of that mountain. But we finally got that
through in the board.
The next primary one would have been on top of Haleakala. On
the Island of Hawaii there were to be two stations, and we recom,-
mended one at Mauna Loa, on the upper slopes of the military camp on
Pahoa; one at a place called Kokee, and another one on Oahu at Pali;
another one on Maui on tlie road leading up to Haleakala.
10. General Frank. That finally resolved itself down, in 1941,
\_1259~\ into how many main stations ?
Colonel Fleming. Three. They had another board. They came
in and reviewed it. They learned more about this thing. It resolved
itself into the main stations being at Kokee. Kaala. and Haleakala,
one on Hawaii at a place called Pahoa, and another one about 20 miles
north of Morse Field. In addition, they had mobile stations put in at
various other places to cover the spread.
11. General Frank. At that time there were allotted to the Hawai-
ian Department how many fixed stations?
Colonel Fleming. The one at Kokee was to be fixed. There were
four, sir.
12. General Frank. There were four sites picked, but how many
sets were allotted at that time ?
Colonel Fleming. None, sir. I do not think any were over there.
13. General Frank. At what time?
Colonel Fleming. To the best of my recollection — I was not in on
the Signal Corps end of it — I do not think any of the fixed equipment
was delivered until well after October of 1941.
14. General Frank. Do you remember that it did arrive ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir; it did arrive. Whether it was all there
or not I do not know ; but I base the statement that it did arrive on
remembering that the power unit that the Signal Corps supplied was
656 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
an old poAver unit that somebody picked up, and it only operated on
white gasoline. I remember before the war we were having a lot of
discussions around about these power units. If anybody would buy
anything they expected it to operate on white gasoline. We finally
got that changed [1260] by going out through Engineer
channels and buying some Diesel 25-kw^ sets.
15. General Frank. Do you remember when the 270 mobile sets
arrived ?
Colonel FleHhing. I would not be sure of the dates, but they were
there on the Island at least four months before the war started.
16. General Frank. Before December 7?
Colonel Fleming. Yes ; because they were playing around with them
at that time, and I remember having seen one of them.
17. General Frank. They arrived, then, about in July ?
Colonel Fleming. About then ; yes, sir.
18. General Frank. Do you remember about contracts having been
let for the construction of base camp facilities for Kokee, Kaala, and
Haleakala? If so, will you discuss the accessory work that had to be
done, such as roads leading into the sites, cableways, who received the
contracts, and any changes that were made in the contracts, and the
necessity therefor ? Do you have sufficient memory of the situation to
discuss that?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir ; ], think I have.
At Kaala, in order to get on top of the mountain, it was necessary
to build a cableway which was about 7,000 feet long. This (indicating
on map) is the Kolekole Pass Koad, and right here (indicating) the
road took off at Firebreak. The top of Mt. Kaala is here (indicating) ,
and from a point about here on the map — this is about an inch and
a half on the map — we had to build a cableway, and the only place
was about 1,500 feet. It was probably about 1,900 feet from this point
up to the top. That cableway had to be designed to carry a ton per
hour, and [1261'] we had to build a road from this point (in-
dicating) all the way around in through there (indicating). It was
a rather difficult range. The trail wound around, and over here (in-
dicating) we improved that Firebreak trail. One of the points that
delayed it a little bit was the fact that this take-off point of the cable-
way was right at Schofield Barracks artillery range, and there was
much discussion about where we would locate this take-off point and
whether it would interfere with artillery fire. So, finally we had to
guarantee to them that we would put this in beyond their target limit
and then splinter-proof the installation so that there would be no
damage. The cableway having been selected and designed, had to be
procured, and about that time steel was critical, and it took some time
to get it over there. This material started arriving for the cableway
sometime in October 1941. To the best of my knowledge the thing was
not finished before the war, although it was well under construction.
I base that statement on the fact that there was a very bad accident that
occurred on this cableway, killing about three or four men at the upper
terminus, and I think that happened along about in February or
March, 1912. At that time it was in operation. It took a considerable
amount of time to build it, so I would say it was about half or 75 per-
cent completed at the time the war started.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 657
19. General Frank. Aside from the delay in procuring the material,
in your argument with the Artillery about its interfering with their
range, was there any other delay? Was there any delay in building
the road along the Firebreak road ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. This is entirely a matter of opinion,
but I think that the people who executed this went in [W62]
built a much more elaborate road than would have been necessary.
20. General Frank. Do you remember who had the contract for
that particular installation?
Colonel Fleming. I do not believe there was a special contract for
that, sir. I would like to go into the contract if I may, sir.
The Engineers took over this work and it was decided to open up
a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract. The reason for having a cost-plus-a-
fixed-fee contract at that time was that the restrictions on Government
procurement were so rigid that we could not get anything done in a
hurry. That was the experience all over the country. In buying equip-
ment, for example, the contractor could buy the equipment, just
exactly what we needed, and have it delivered to the Engineers
somewhere in about ten or fifteen days, and we could get it on a
rental-purchase agreement. If we had to do it otherwise, we
would have been restricted to certain kinds of equipment and sur-
rounded with a lot of red tape. So the Engineers and the Constructing
Quartermasters went into these contracts all over the country. To
the best of my knowledge I think that the contract that the Engineers
had over there was a blanket contract; that the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee
contract entered into by the District Engineer's Office and approved
directly by the Chief of Engineer's Office was a blanket contract which
covered not only this aircraft warning project but all other engineering
work that we had to do over there.
21. General Frank. We have had a history of that and an explana-
tion of it before the Board. It was a blanket contract, and then specific
contracts were covered by job orders?
[l^SS] Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir; job orders under this con-
tract.
22. General Frank. The blanket contract was made with the Ha-
waiian Constructors ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
23. General Frank. There were various firms who were co-adven-
turers in the Hawaiian Constructors, were there not ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
24. General Frank. And those firms were the W. E. Callahan Com-
pany, Gunther & Shirley, the Rohl-Connolly Company, and Ralph
E. Woolley?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
25. General Frank. When a job order was drawn up do you know
whether or not that job order was given to the Hawaiian Constructors
as one organization, or whether the job order was given so that some
•one of these firms was responsible for the construction as a firm?
Colonel Fleming. I have no definite knowledge of that, sir. I had
nothing to do with the execution and operation of the contract. But
the best of my information, from talking with other people that did,
is that it was given to the Hawaiian Constructors as a firm and not
sublet,
79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 1— — 43
658 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
26. General Frank. You do not know how the determination was
made as to exactly who was going to do what work ?
Colonel Fleming. It was more or less dependent upon the character
of the work, sir.
27. General Frank. Do you know what contractor was on this road
and cableway construction going into Kaala ?
Colonel Fleming. The details of it, no, sir. I just know that the
Hawaiian Constructors did the work. There was [^2641 ^
subcontract let on the cableway.
28. General Frank. To w'hom ?
Colonel Fleming. I believe, the Roebling Wire & Cable Company ;
but it could have been some of those special cableway people. Gen-
eral Electric makes them, and Roebling makes them.
29. General Grunert. Do I understand that the subcontractor was
to furnish the material but not to do the work?
Colonel Fleming. In this particular case, General, the cableway
was a separate thing, but you had to hire a special engineer to do
it. The people who furnished the material sent over engineers to
supervise the work.
30. General Frank. Do you know when this station was finished ?
Colonel Fleming. It was never finished, sir, to the best of my
knowledge. I left Hawaii in September 1943, and up to that time
it had never been used as an aircraft warning station. That was
not due to the incompleteness of the facilities, but after we got this
station in operation we found out that the preliminary information
we had had from the Signal Corps technical people that the range
depended on the height was in error, apparently. It would get out
to the horizon the higher we got it, but when you got up into higher
altitudes there was too much interference. When we put it up on
one of these high mountains, instead of picking up an airplane or
ship at sea, it would pick up to many reflections from secondary
waves from the surrounding terrain. The station at Haleakala was
completed first, and they took a mobile station up there, one of these
Army portable units.
31. General Frank. The 2T0s?
[1265] Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. They tried that for a while,
and that did not work well. So they then installed all of the fixed
equipment. There was a great argument about that fixed equipment
on Mt. Haleakala, by the way. The board never wanted it. We
wanted a mobile set there. When they got that over there the Signal
Corps worked and worked and worked; they had special radar
people over. They would come back from England; and then they
had some people called electronics experts who came out and talked
very wisely about this thing, but they could never get the station
to work. The reason for that was that the station at Haleakala was
right up on Kolekole Peak.
[1266] 32. General Frank. There was already a road up there,
wasn't there ?
Colonel Fleming. There was a road up to the observation tower,
sir, and then we had to build a road that was about a mile long up on
top of that one little knob that stuck up. The elevation on this knob
Avas ten twenty-five, and there was another one over here ten four-
teen or something like that. But anyway, this station, you could ac-
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 659
tiially see the horizon from this point all the way around except for
being blanketed by the high ground on the Island of INIolokai; so the
only dead space theoretically on the station was a little core that came
out along through there (indicating) and went up the windward side
of Oahu.
Theoretically, then, this station up here (indicating) was ideal.
You could go up there and you could use this in any direction, almost
360 degrees traverse on that thing. But it never worked out, because —
1 am not an expert on radar, but what the Signal Corps explained to
me was that when your main beam that went out this way there was
an auxiliary beam that went out of this thing; another node went
out of this thing, and that one went out to the rear from this an-
tenna, and as this thing swung around in trying to pick up
a plane, say in this direction (indicating), these auxiliary beans would
pick up these high mountains on the Island of Hawaii, and there was
so much difference in the terrain between this one little bump up here
on Haleakala and these high mountains out in here (indicating) that
as that thing swung around and the secondary beams picked up these,
what the Signal Corps call echoes, they could never chart them into
the oscilloscope on this device: [l^iST] they could never get
them entered in there as standard interferences and eliminate them.
So as a result of that they finally decided to abandon the station on
Haleakala ; and just on a guess that they would find the same condi-
tion on Mt. Kaala, they never put the aircraft warning station up
there. The decision on Kaala and also on Haleakala to abandon those
was also based upon the fact that they had developed a supplemental
communications equipment which was a direct-talking telephone sys-
tem to pursuit planes, and also a very ultrahigh-frequency telephone
communication between the various islands, and both of these places
became key points in the communications network ; and, as the Signal
Corps and the authorities apparently wanted them for that purpose,
why, neither of them was ever used as an aircraft warning station.
33. General Frank. So that the money expended to develop them
did bear fruit because, while they were not used as radar stations, they
were used as communication centers ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. In fact, the people told me that the de-
velopment of those as communication centers, as far as fighter control
and also talking back and forth for permanent use, was probably much
more valuable than radar ; that the radar could pick the stuff up by
duplicating a station down below, but you wouldn't be able to dupli-
cate them for communications.
34. General Frank. All right. Did you have any direct contact
with Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
35. General Frank. Did you have any complaints to make with re-
spect to delay in construction ?
Colonel Fleming. On this particular project, sir?
[1268] 36. General Frank. On any defense project. Did you
have any complaints to make with respect to delays in construction
of the A. W. S. system any place, at any time ?
Colonel Fleming. What do you mean by "complaints," sir?
37. General Frank. Complaints. Well, did you consider that any
part of this construction was being unnecessarily delayed?
660 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Fleming. By the constructing people, sir ?
38. General Frank. Yes, sir.
Colonel Fleming. No, sir. I knew the factors which were facing
those people and the things that they were — the things that all of us
were trying to do in spite of delays. Some of those things, for ex-
ample, were the Army-Navy competition. As far as labor was con-
cerned it was a sellers' market; we were importing labor as fast as
we could. We had a terrible time with the Engineers, the Army
Engineers, and the Navy public works people ; we had a terrible time
building up organizations to do this work.
39. General Frank. Do you feel that there were delays that in
normal times could have been eliminated ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
40. General Frank. Will you make a list of those ?
Colonel Fleming. Well, one I think was the procurement —
41. General Frank. Take your time there and enumerate them, and
then we will put them in the record.
Colonel Fleming. One was the procurement of labor ; two was pro-
curement of materials ; three were transportation.
42. General Frank. From the mainland?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir; transportation trans-Pacific. Four I
think was this question of priorities back on the [1269^ main-
land, and five was the question of approvals.
43. General Frank. Where and by whom?
Colonel Fleming. By the War Department, sir.
44. General Frank. Were there delays in those approvals?
Colonel Fleming. To those of us sitting out there, we thought
there were, yes, sir.
45. General Frank. Were complaints made to the headquartei's
who had those approvals in hand ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
46. General Frank. Complaints were made?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
47. General Frank. When you made complaints did you get action ?
Colonel Fleming. In the majority of cases, yes, sir.
48. General Frank. Well, then the delays in approvals were not so
serious ? Or were they ?
Colonel Fleming. I think they were, sir, some of them. I mean
that is just a worm's-eye opinion, sir. For one thing, let us take the
case of Haleakala. That station was located in a national park. We
had to get on top of this mountain, which unfortunately was the most
visible thing in the national park, and there was a long delay in there
about getting the right of entry.
49. General Frank. From whom?
Colonel Fleming. From the National Park Service, sir.
50. General Frank. Department of Parks?
Colonel Fleming. Department of the Interior.
51. General Frank. ^Yho was Secretary of the Interior? Do you
remember ?
Colonel Fleming. Mr. Ickes, sir. The local man out there [1370]
in charge of that park was a man named Wingate. Mr. Wingate.
52. General Frank. He was in charge of all national parks in the
Hawaiian Islands?
' PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 661
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir; the one on Haleakala and then the one
down in
53. General Frank. At Ha;\vaii ?
Colonel Fleming. The one down at Hawaii. There had been a
considerable amount of contacts back and forth with Mr. Wingate by
the Army. For instance, the Air Corps wanted a bombing range
down at what is known as the Kan Desert down in the Island of Ha-
waii, right in through here (indicating on map) . I think that all this
area is just absolutely worthless as far as anything except scenery is
concerned. It wasn't very good for scenery because there were no
roads into it.
54. General Frank. They were all old lava beds ?
Colonel Fleming. All old lava beds. You couldn't go through
there. I think you could walk through there. And I remember before
the war we were trying to get that bombing range in there from the
National Park Service and had a tremendous amount of difficulty on.
that. I don't think we ever did get it, unless we got it with so many
restrictions that we couldn't use it.
But when we wanted to get in Haleakala, when we wanted to start
work up there, the question immediately came up as to what damage
this installation was going to do to the scenery in view of the Hawaii
National Park. And that started before General Herron left the
Islands, and he left in February 1941, I think; February or" early
March; and we wrote letters back and forth about this thing and
tried to get Mr. Wingate to agree, [li271] and every time we
would write Mr. Wingate a letter he would apparently refer it back
to his people in Washington, and it dragged on and on, and the only
commitment we could get was that we would have to design this sta-
tion completel}^ and submit all plans, architectural drawings of the
buildings, and everything like that to Mr. Wingate, who would then
forward them to the National Park Service people so they could pass
on them from an architectural standpoint.
Well, obviously, if we were trying to build something in a hurry we
couldn't wait around until the National Park Service approved these
plans from an architectural standpoint. So we finally resolved that
argument: I remember General Short sent a special telegram (it was
one of these "eyes alone" telegrams) to General Marshall asking him
to please secure the necessary permits to proceed with the construc-
tion of that station ; and as a result of that appeal, why, we got au-
thority to go into Haleakala and start work building the road and
constructing buildings and submit the plans later on ; that we would
guarantee to make the buildings look like what the Park Service
wanted us to, provided we could put the buildings where we wanted to.
55. General Grunert. When did you get that permission?
Colonel Fleming. I don't remember. General. I think to the best
of my knowledge it was sometime after General Short got there, and
he arrived in February. I think that exchange of radios probably
took place abeut in, oh, I would say in May of 1941, because I remem-
ber I had to explain this thing in great detail to General Short, to give
him all the background and show to him that we had exhausted the
local possibility of getting the thing done, before he would sign the
radio.
[1£72] 56. General Frank. What about Kokee?
662 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Fleming. Kokee we didn't have any trouble with, sir.
That is on the Island of Kauai, and it was located, fortunately, in
territorial land. We had excellent relationships with the Territorial
Department of Forestry, I think it was, controlled it.
57. General Frank. Was there any delay in the construction of
that once the job order was let?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
58. General Frank. What was it?
Colonel Fleming. The delay on that was that originally the fixed
stations — and this is the reason we didn't like the fixed stations, sir —
the fixed stations were supposed to be built with the detector building
and the detector tower, the antenna gadget, all in the same building.
In other words, the framework for the building was made sufficiently
strong to hold this tower up on the top. Well, in furnishing the first
people in this board we had no idea — we suspect that nobody else
had any idea — ^how this thing was going to work. We thought we
might have to move it maybe a hundred feet or a couple of hundred
feet in various directions to get the best place to locate it. Also we
had no detailed plans for the footings of the supports for this tower.
The buildings sort of stuck up like this, of course, with the tower
coming out where my pencil does (indicating), and that building
and the tower were supported by heavy steel members inside of the
building.
The only thing we had was the location of where the tower was,
on the top of the building, and where the concrete [12731 foun-
dations would 'have to go to support this structure. Of course, in
building construction we have to have a lot more detailed information
than that. You have got to either have your detail design of the
footings of that tower so you can cast your bolts in the concrete
when you pour it, or else you have got to have a template accom-
panying this thing.
Right in the middle of that one they found out that this gadget
would not measure height or something on approaching planes, as I
recall it, with the tower which was only 35 feet high, so they
increased
59. General Frank. What do you mean by "this gadget"? What
gadget? The tower?
Colonel Fleming. The radar, sir.
60. General Frank. The radar?
Colonel Fleming. The radar.
61. General Frank. The oscilloscope ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
So they increased the height of the antenna to a hundred-foot
tower at this one particular station. And I don't know how long it
took us to get the actual detailed design of the footings of that tower
so we could start pouring that concrete. I remember that there was
a lot of correspondence back and forth about that, trying to find
out just exactly how that tower should be poured and what the rela-
tionship between the tower and the buildings was going to be after
the hundred-foot tower was decided on.
62. General Frank. Who determined those details that you needed
to make this change in construction that was causing [^^74}
the delay?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 663
Colonel Fleming. That was done somewhere in this country, sir,
63. General Frank. What branch of the service? Signal Corps?
Colonel Fleming. Signal Corps; yes, sir.
64. General Frank. It was the Signal Corps' responsibility to pre-
pare the plans and specifications on which you should proceed with
the construction?
Colonel Fleming. It was our responsibility, sir, for preparing the —
rather, the Engineers'. I was the General Staff Officer, but it was
the Engineers' responsibility for designing the buildings in the thing
and making all the layout except for this one building, the detector
building.
65. General Frank. Yes.
Colonel Fleming. That was a specially screened building. The
Signal Corps furnished the tower and all the equipment that is in it,
furnished everything complete for it.
66. General Frank. Well, who was responsible for the plans that
caused the delay?
Colonel Fleming. I think the Signal Corps was, sir.
67. General Frank. All right. Now, you have told us about the
delays at Kokee and the delays at Kaala and the delays at Haleakala.
In any of these delays were the contractors in any way responsible for
those or any other delays ?
Colonel Fleming. I don't think so, sir. There may have been
inefficiencies in management which would decrease the speed at which
the work was going on, but I don't think there were any particular
delays that the contractor had to do with. [1270] For exam-
ple, the contractor couldn't proceed with that Kaala cableway until
the thing had been designed and he was told where to put it.
68. General Frank. Did you have any delays in getting plans from
the Engineers?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
69. General Frank. Where?
Colonel Fleming. On that Kaala cableway.
70. General Frank. What Engineers?
Colonel Fleming. That was the District Engineer down at Kam
in Honolulu, sir.
71. General Frank. Well, give us the background of it.
Colonel Fleming. Well, I just thought in there that I remember
on that one particular thing that we had given them from our pre-
liminary design dope what we wanted. We wanted a cableway which
would haul about a ton every hour up this inclined railway,
72. General Frank. How much of a concentrated load would it
carry ?
Colonel Fleming. I think the ultimate in load on that, sir, was
1,500 pounds, but I am not sure. I remember in order to get this
equipment up over the cableway it had to be broken down into loads
which didn't exceed a certain amount; I think that figure is 1,500
pounds. The rate of flow was a ton per hour up it.
73. General Frank. Well, get back to this delay in plans caused
by the Engineer Office,
Colonel Fleming, Well, after we gave them this original [1276']
dope it seems to me, just as I recall it, that the experts to design this
thing, after we gave them the starting point, the terminal point, and
664 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the rate at which we wanted it to go in — that the experts to actually
do the design work were not called in as soon as thej^ could have been.
74. General Frank. Do you know the intervening period there
between the time that you gave them your requirements and the time
the experts were called in?
Colonel Fle^ming. I don't remember, sir. I remember that we
reconnoitered there.
75. General Frank. What?
Colonel Fleming. We reconnoitered that route, sir, and got every-
body to agree to it. Colonel Van Deusen and I reconnoitered that
thing in, oh, I would say along about July or August of 1940.
76. General Frank. Did that District Engineer's office, because of
the nature of its operations cause any other delays?
Colonel Fleming. I don't think so, sir. As I mentioned before,
I think that the quality of the road that they put in from this point
out on Kolekole Road until they got around to the take-off point was —
it was a much finer road than the needs required. That delayed it a
little bit.
77. General Frank. Were you ever in the District Engineer's
Office?
Colonel Fleming. No, sir.
78. General Frank. You were never in his office ?
Colonel Fleming. Did I ever work there, sir ?
79. General Frank. No. Did you ever visit it? Did you [1277]
ever go there ?
Colonel Fleming. Oh, yes, sir, I was down there about, I would
say, on the average of four or five times a week.
80. General Frank. Was it well organized ?
Colonel Fleming. I think so, yes, sir.
81. General Frank. In your opinion ? Orderly?
Colonel Fleming. Before the war, yes, sir. It was located in two
places. Before the war it was located down at Pier No. 2 in Hono-
lulu, and the top floor of the Alexander Young Building. It was
orderly and appeared to be well organized. The clerks, for example,
the Civil Service clerks they had over there, a large number were
Chinese. They had Chinese stenographers, Chinese-Hawaiian
stenographers, and I think it was efficiently and well organized.
82. General Frank. Did you know Colonel Wyman ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
83. General Frank. Very well ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
84. General Frank. Did you get along well with him ?
Colonel Fleming. Officially, sir?
85. General Frank. Yes.
Colonel Fleming. Well, I was in a very peculiar spot. As I said
before, the Department Engineer was Colonel Lyman, A. K. B. Ly-
man ; and the District Engineer from about — I don't know when he
went down there, sir. I don't remember whether it was in August
86. General Frank. What do you mean, "he went down there"?
Was he on duty up in the Engineer Regiment ?
[1278] Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. Wyman came over there
originally and went to duty at Schofield Barracks. I believe that he
was at Schofield in the ;5rd Engineers when Colonel Lvman arrived in
J
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 665
the Department. I am pretty sure he was ; I think he was out there
under Colonel Hodges, and Lyman and Wyman had known each other
before, and when Colonel Lyman arrived over there to take command
of the regiment, why, I remember all of us junior officers were sort of
laughing about this thing.
87. General Frank. Why?
Colonel Fleming. Well, because they didn't get along so well to-
gether, and we more or less had a pool up as to how long Wyman WQuld
.stay on the regiment, how long it would take him to get out from
under Colonel Lyman, and it didn't take him very long. I think he
went down to become District Engineer in Honolulu about, oh. some-
where around September of 1940. Colonel Lyman arrived in Hawaii
about in June of 1940.
Well, that, frankly, as far as the Engineers were concerned, put me
on the spot because Lyman was ostensibly my boss, although he didn't
get down there very often, and Wyman down in the District Engineer's
Office, and ther« was supposed to be cooperation between the Depart-
ment Engineer, of course, and the District Engineer. AVell, I found
myself the middleman in a feud, and that lasted for quite some time.
So I say I know Colonel Wyman very well. I have known him since
1934.
88. General Frank. Did that feud result in any delays?
Colonel Fleming. Oh, it would certainly prolong discussions, Gen-
eral. There happened to be another Engineer [1279^ officer
down on duty, down on the District Engineer's, who was AVyman's
executive officer.
89. General Frank. Who was that ?
Colonel Fleming. A man named Robinson, sir. Bernard L. Robin-
son. He went out to Australia, and he is out there now. He has been
out there ever since shortly after the war began.
90. General Frank. What about him?
Colonel Fleming. Well, I know Robbie very well. In fact, we had
been fairly intimate when we were younger. And he would get the
job of listening to the feud from the Wyman side, and I would listen
to it from the Lyman side, and occasionally we would switch and get
caught in this thing, but Robbie and I were working back and forth
on the thing. Now, as I say, it delayed things because I think there
was an undue amount of time taken up while we heard what the
difficulties with the other party in the feud were, but at the same time
it didn't — it was just one of those situations that we were in, sir.
91. General Fr.\nk. Was there any relationship between Robinson
and Wyman ?
Colonel Fleming. Robinson was Wyman's immediate subordinate,
sir.
92. General Frank. No. I am talking about personal relationship.
Was one of them somebody's brother-in-law ?
Colonel Fleming. No, sir. Robinson married a girl from Spokane.
93. General Frank. Robinson was not Wyman's brother-in-law ?
Colonel Fleming. No, sir.
94. General Frank. How long did this feud last ?
[1280] Colonel Fleming. Until Colonel Wyman's relief from
the Department, sir.
95. General Frank. Until Colonel Wyman's relief?
666 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. They remained in that position of •
Department Engineer and District Engineer until about — well, I
would say about March or April of 1942.
96. General Frank. When did Wyman leave there?
Colonel Fleming. About April of 1942, sir.
97. General Frank. What caused his relief? Do you know?
Colonel Fleming. General Emmons had been over there long
enough then to size up the situation very well, and I just think he got
a little bit annoyed at the situation, and he decided that one of the
two of them would have to leave the Islands for the peace of mind of
everybody concerned, and Wyman was relieved at that particular
time.
98. General Frank. How did it come to be Wyman instead of
Lyman that left? Do you know?
Colonel Fleming. Well, Wyman is not the world's greatest diplo-
mat, sir. He is a bull in a china shop, and he zigged when he should
have zagged more than once. He just got himself crosswise in an
awful hurry.
99. General Frank. Did this relationship between Lyman and
Wyman ever come to General Short's attention ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
100. General Frank. Did he ever have a conference with them
to try to straighten it out ?
Colonel Fleming. I don't know whether he had a conference or not,
sir, whether he had them both in. I know that just [1281] be-
fore the war started — I have a remembrance there it was just before
the war started. General Short called me in one day and asked me about
this thing and what I thought about each one of the two officers, and
frankly I demurred on answering his question and told him that I
didn't think it was up to my place to criticize my superiors, and so
he told me that he had been talking it over with both officers and
knew that I had a pretty fair knowledge of both of them, and wanted
to get a private opinion, which I gave to him. Now, that would indi-
cate to me that General Short was cognizant of the situation and was
trying to straighten it out. This was just before the war started.
[1282] 101. General Frank. Do you know whether or not he did
anything about it ?
Colonel Fleming. I am pretty sure he talked to both of them, sir. I
don't think he ever took any official action. He may have written some
personal letters back to people in the War Department requesting
changes, or something like that ; but I don't know.
102. General Frank. What was your personal opinion that was
given to Short ?
Colonel Fleming. To the best of my recollection, sir, I told both
General Short and Colonel Hayes that Wyman had a reputation of
getting the work done, but that he was about the most impossible
persons personally that we had in the engineere: that he was just one
of those people who made everybody mad at him being always — he
was just a "bull in a china shop."
103. General Frank. You say that General Short had a talk with
Wyman and with Lyman?
Colonel Fleming. I assume that he did, sir, because I know he asked
me my opinion, because he was very cognizant. He was apparently
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 667
cognizant of the difficulties between the two of them, these personal
difficulties, and had apparently given enough thought to it that he
called in a very junior officer to ask him his opinion. He asked me
my opinion of both of them.
104. General Fraxk. Well, he called you in with little considera-
tion of your being a junior officer, but because of your position and of
your intimate knowledge, as his representative cfealing with the two
of them ; isn't that correct ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. I remember at the beginning of the
conversation I told him that I thought it was putting me in a rather
embarrassing position, because I was discussing [1283] my
superiors.
105. General Frank. How long had General Short known of this
feud, do you know?
Colonel Fleming. I would say it got very bad, sir, oh, around the
1st of November, 1941.
106. General Frank. Do you know of any specific projects that were
held up as a result of this feud ?
Colonel Fleming. No, sir ; I don't think any were held up as a result
of it. I think that the only thing it resulted in was making my work
and making Colonel Robinson's work a lot more difficult than it other-
wise would have been.
107. General Frank. Were you on friendly terms with Wyman?
Colonel Fleming. Not socially, sir. I was, officially, and I think I
got along with him well.
108. General Frank. What was his reputation ?
Colonel Fleming. Socially, sir ?
109. General' Frank. Yes.
Colonel Fleming. Well, his reputation socially, sir, just wasn't good.
He had the reputation of being a person who was absolutely without
any polish. When he went to a party you always felt rather embar-
rassed for what might happen next, and I think all of the engineer
officers over there at that particular time avoided contact socially as
much as we could.
110. General Frank. What was his reputation with respect to
drinking ?
Colonel Fleming. He has had a very bad reputation for drinking,
sir. I would like to amplify that statement, however. I think that
was one of the reasons why Wyman got out of the Third Engineers.
Lyman had had previous knowledge of \J2S4] Wyman's
drinking. Of course everybody else had, too. We knew he liked to
"hoist one" every once in a while, but I think that Lyman must have
found Wyman with too much aboard one time and just gave him hell.
I know that Colonel Lyman told me that he had discussed it with
Colonel Wyman, and that Wyman had signed the pledge. I think he
had enough on him that he just about had to.
Well, to the best of my recollection, then, sir, when he came down
from Schofield to Honolulu, frankly, I do not know whether he ever
drank to excess or not, because we weren't with him socially, and we
were not on the same kind of parties, and I think, however, he had
Xjretty well laid off the heavy drinking by that time — as far as his repu-
tation was concerned.
668 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
111. General Frank. As the result of your having been down there
so frequently, did it ever occur to you that his drinking was interfering
with the performance of his duty ?
Colonel Fleming. I don't think so, General.
112. General Frank. Not at any time during the period that he was
over there?
Colonel Fleming. Before the war, sir?
113. General Frank. At any time during the period.
Colonel Fleming. I don't recall any time at which I could say that
Colonel Wyman's drinking was affecting his duties.
114. General Frank. When was this discussion about signing the
pledge?
Colonel Fleming. That was about — oil, around about October or
November 1940, sir.
115. General Frank. 1940?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
116. General Frank. That was the year before Pearl Harbor.
[1285] Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. It was about the time that
Wyman was relieved from the Third Engineers and sent down to
Honolulu as the district engineer, down there.
117. General Grunert. When you say "the pledge," you mean a
pledge not to drink to excess, or what ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir ; a pledge not to drink to excess, sir.
don't you know ?
Colonel Fleming. I don't know, sir.
119. General Grunert. I wanted to get it in the record, as to what a
' "pledge" is, that was all. It referred to drinking.
Colonel Fleming. All I know is that Colonel Lyman told me that
118. General Frank. Not to drink, or not to drink to excess? Or
he had this discussion with Colonel Wyman, and that he thought that
he would stop drinking to excess.
120. General Frank. Do you know whether or not General Short
knew about this?
Colonel Fleming. No, sir ; I don't think he did, sir. That happened
before General Short came over there, and Wyman stayed pretty well
"up to the pole," sir, until after the war began. That is the best of
my knowledge. I never saw him on any "wild toots," and I never
heard of him being on, and I think he was fairly well "up to the pole,"
until after the war started.
121. General Frank. And after the war started, what?
Colonel Fleming. Well, I was at one party out at General Tincher's
quarters, when there was some liquor going around.
122. General Frank. And what?
Colonel Fleming. And that was just shortly before Wyman
[1286] was relieved, sir.
123. General Frank. Did he become intoxicated, in your opinion?
Colonel Fleming. He had too much to drink, sir, and made some
very regrettable statements, which caused certain newly arrived Air
Generals to get extremely irked at the engineers, I remember.
124. General Frank. Wlio were those Generals ?
Colonel F'leming. It was General Hale, sir, and it was a welcoming
party for General Hale.
125. General Frank. Do you remember what those statements were?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 669
Colonel Fleming. 'Y'es, sir.
126. General Frank. Wliat were they ?
Colonel Fleming. The party was called, sir, to celebrate the open-
ing of the ferry project, this southern airways route to Australia, and
Wjanan ended up by making some "crack" indicating that the engi-
neers were the only outfit in the Army, and that any time General Hale
got in trouble with his new command, why, just to call on Colonel
Wyman, and he would come over and help him, and run it for him.
Well, I don't think Colonel Hale appreciated it very much, and neither
did I, because I was trying to stop the conversation.
The only members present at that party, sir, were — General Tincher
and Colonel Mollison gave the party, and what they wanted it for
was to get General Hale and Colonel Wyman together, and they used
this excuse of completing the southern' airways route. I think General
Tincher had just about come back from the inspection of it at that
time, and the people present were General Tincher, Colonel Mollison,
who was the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Hale, General
Tincher's aide [1287] and myself.
127. General Frank. Now, during the period that you were over
there, did you ever run onto a man by the name of Hans Wilhelm
Rohl?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. I had known Mr. RoM by reputation
only, sir, and to the best of my knowledge I never met him before
the war started. The executive officer of the Hawaiian Constructors
Contracting Company —
128. General Frank. Wliat was — ?
Colonel Fleming. — who was a man naved Paul Grafe —
G-r-a-e-f-e — and I met Mr. Grafe several times at — oh, just the
usual backyard barbecue party. I thing he was at a couple that
the Robinsons gave. My wife and I and the Robinsons were fairly —
we got to know each other fairly well.
129. General Frank. The Robinsons now lived up in the Nuuanu
Valley?
Colonel Fleming. No, sir; the Robinsons lived on Kahala, and we
lived on Kaimuka, fairly close together, so it was one of those ar-
rangements where we would get together and we played bridge in
the evening, stuff like that; and I met Grafe a couple of times over
there at the Robinsons'. They had backyard barbecues at which
they cooked steaks on the fire.
130. General Frank. Grafe was a member of what firm?
Colonel Fleming. I don't know, sir. I think that he belonged
to the Callahan outfit, although that is just my recollection of it;
but as far as I knew, Grafe was the man who was chairman of that
executive committee until — well, after the war started. I don't
know when he disappeared, and I never saw Mr. Rohl until — I had
heard about him, but I didn't [1288] meet him until after the
war.
131. General Frank. After the war?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
132. General Frank. Was he in Honolulu?
Colonel Fleming. He had been in Honolulu prior to that, sir. I
know he was there in October.
670 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
133. General Frank. You said you had heard of hhn, by reputa-
tion. Wliat was that reputation?
Colonel Fleming. Just as the Rohl-Connolly Constructing Cor-
poration, sir, and a rather prominent contractor.
134. General Frank. Did you know anything about him, other
than his being President of that organization?
Colonel Fleming. No, sir.
135. General Frank. Did you ever meet him?
Colonel Fleming. I met him, after the war, sir.
136. General Frank. How did you come to meet him?
Colonel Fleming. In the course of my business down there with
the district engineer's office, I met him several times, and my atten-
tion was particularly called to Mr. Rohl, I think it was — well, near,
probably around February 1942. No, it was earlier than that, sir.
He had been back to the mainland. He had been back and forth,
and Colonel Wyman was trying to get him an air priority on a
CLIPPER to come back to Honolulu, and the first time Mr. Rohl
was ever particularly brought to my consciousness was the fact when
Wyman called me up this one time and wanted some help in getting
Mr. Rohl a priority back on the CLIPPER, and he rather em-
phatically stated his case and told me I had better, a damned sight,
get the priority on the CLIPPER out of the Navy. The Navy, by
the way, was [1£89] controlling priorities on the CLIPPER.
They didn't know who Mr. Rohl was, and they had a lot of people
they wanted to bring back. That was, I think, in early January
or February 1942, the first time I particularly came to know of Rohl.
137. General Frank. What was the relationship between Rohl
and Wyman ? Was there any relationship ?
Colonel Fleming. I only am familiar with that by hearsay, sir.
138. General Frank. Well, what is your hearsay ?
Colonel Fleming. There has been a lot of discussion in the en-
gineers, sir, for years, on the fact that a lot of people have always
believed that Colonel Wyman was a little bit too familiar with the
contractors.
139. General Frank- With the contractors?
Colonel Fleming. With contractors on these varioug jobs, sir.
He had been district engineer in Kansas City, and from there he
went out to Los Angeles. I was in Los Angeles at the same time that
Colonel Wyman was. He was the district engineer in Los Angeles.
The engineers were running the relief business out there. General
Donald H. Connolly was then Lieutenant Colonel, and was the ad-
ministrator of the Works Progress Administration in southern Cal-
ifornia. We were sent out there for four months' temporary duty.
140. General Frank. Were you with General Connolly?
Colonel Fleming. I was with General Connolly, with the WPA,
sir. We stayed there for 3I/2 years, and I left there to go to Hawaii.
Wyman came over about a year later. I know that in Los Angeles
there had been discussions. I heard that from General Connolly,
that they didn't get along very well in the [1^00] relationship
with contracting people. They thought that he had too many social
relationships with the various contractors on the jobs.
141. General Frank. What was the reputation of that social re-
lationship between Wyman and Rohl in Honolulu ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 671
Colonel Fleming. I don't know what it was before the war, sir.
142. General Frank. What was it after the war?
Colonel Fleming. After the war — well, I think after the war a
lot of people thought that they were together too much of the time.
143. General Frank. Were they drinking?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
144. General Frank. To excess?
Colonel Fleming. I don't know, sir. I never saw them.
14.5. General Frank, What were the reports circulating about that
drinking ?
Colonel Fleming. Oh, there were all sorts of reports circulated
about it, sir, but I think everybody in the Territory was mad at
Colonel Wyman, about that time.
146. General Frank. Everybody was what?
Colonel Fleming. Was mad at Colonel Wyman.
147. General P>.ank. Well, let us get back to what were the re-
ports about that drinking.
Colonel Fleming. There were rumors that there was excessive
drinking going on. Personally, outside of that one time that I
thought Wyman had too much, when he was talking to General
Hale, I personally never saw him.
148. General Frank. About how many times did you ever come
in [1£91] contact with him?
Colonel Fleming. I think prior to the war, sir, when he came over
there, that was about a year and a half, from the summer of 1940
until December. I don't believe I saw Colonel Wyman socially at a
party more than five times, in all that time, with the one at Schofield,
I remember, and there was another one down-town, and we gave a
cocktail party at our house one time and invited them, but I would
believe five times would be the limit.
149. General Frank. Were these five large or small affairs?
Colonel Fleming. Mostly large, sir,
150. General Frank, Was Kohl at any of these parties?
Colonel Fleming. Not that I know of, sir. To the best of my
knowledge I never met Eohl until after the war started,
151. General Frank. Did you ever meet him at a party?
Colonel Fleming. After the war?
152. General Frank. Yes.
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
153. General Frank, You met Rohl at a party ?
Colonel Fleming, I met Rohl at a party, after the war; yes, sir.
154. General Frank. How often?
Colonel Fleming. He was going back and forth between there and
the mainland quite frequently, sir. I remember particularly seeing
him at a party down at the Pleasanton Hotel. I also saw him again
the night that Colonel Wyman left. We had a farewell "luau" party,
and I saw Mr. Rohl at that.
155. General Frank. At the Willows ?
Colonel Fleming. No, sir ; it was at the Pleasanton, which \_1292']
is a hotel up near Punahou.
156. General Frank. When the Hawaiian Constructors first started
to operate, who was the representative between the Hawaiian Con-
structors and the District Engineer ?
672 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Fleming. There were two of them, sir. There was Mr.
Grafe, who was chairman of this executive board, and the man by the
name of Middleton, I believe, who was more or less a local manager,
personnel manager, in Honolulu.
157. General Frank. Did Mr. Kohl ever come into a dominant
position in Hawaiian Constructors?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
158. General Frank. When ?
Colonel Fleming. After the war, sir, to the best of my knowledge.
He may have had the controlling interest, and Grafe may have been
just his man over there; I don't know; but I do know that after the
war started, Rohl — this thing was apparently a syndicate, sir, and I
think Rohl had a very large interest in the syndicate. Grafe may have
been an employee. I don't know when he went in, whether he was
or not; but after the war started, Grafe more or less disappeared from
this executive-committee business. I don't know where he went, and
Rohl came over and sat down right there in Hawaii and was more or
less the contractors' man, the one with final authority.
159. General Frank. Did Rohl have an office near Wyman's?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir; the contractors had a building in the
Puuhale campus. The engineers took over the Puuhale school and.
the entire area, as I was advised, and one of the buildings on Puuhale
campus was an office of this Hawaiian Constructors.
\_1293l^ 160. General Frank. Was there anything ever said about
Wyman's leaning on Rohl for advice, or about Rohl's having special
influence with Wyman on construction projects, that you learned?
Colonel Fleming. I think there was plenty said about it, sir ; but I
don't know whether there was any truth to it, or not.
161. General Frank. Well, what was being said?
Colonel Fleming. Well, there was a lot of talk about it, but gen-
erally—
162. General Frank. What was it? What was the tenor of it?
Colonel Fleming. The tenor of that talk was that Rohl, over there,
as a local man in the Hawaiian Constructors, would have to approve
of one of these projects, or approve of some of the questions before the
Hawaiian Constructors would start pushing it. Now, unless you
knew the set-up, sir, it would be difficult to explain what it was. The
personnel, for example, would be hired by the Hawaiian Constructors.
The Government was paying all of the pay roll of that outfit except for
certain key individuals; and all their laborers, and everything like
that, were actually paid directly on a government pay roll. The Gov-
ernment paid directly all the bills for purchases of materials on this
contract, and bills would have to be certified by the Hawaiian Con-
structors, and then they would have to be approved by the contracting
officer; and the rumors, the talk was to the effect that Mr. Rohl was
the boss man, or, over there in the Hawaiian Constructors, he w^as
actually running the show.
163. "General Frank. How was he running it. Was he having
[/^.94] an undue influence on Wyman?
Colonel Fleming. I don't think so, sir. I don't know. I wasn't
around him, but I know Colonel Wyman.
164. General Frank. What was your feeling, and wiiat was the
general feeling with relation to the question as to whether or not the
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 673
association of Rohl and Wyman was a healthful one for the
Government ?
Colonel Fleming. It was entirely personal, General, but I felt
that it was not a healthful one.
165. General Frank. That it was not a healthful one?*
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
166. General Frank. Why?
Colonel Fleming. Well, I just don't believe that in — I was trained
in the engineers by officers with a little bit different viewpoint.
167. General Frank. With higher standards, you mean ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir — General Larkin and General Con-
nolly— and I know darned well that neither one of those two would
have been so intimate with one of their contractors.
168. General Frank. Was there any indication at any time of any
graft or illegal profit?
Colonel Fleming. On the Hawaiian Constructors, sir ?
169. General Frank. Yes, sir.
Colonel Fleming. I don't think so, sir. I think there were indica-
tions of an awful lot of inefficiency in the set-up. That is a fault which
is inherent in those "cost-plus-fixed-fee" contracts. They were grand
things, and they were very necessary for the progress of work, as long
as we had a big job to do. If we had a lot of big construction work,
like building an [1B9S] airport, that organization could have
done it. It was to our advantage, to the Government's advantage, to
have that contract, just to avoid this business of the "red tape," that
we never could have gotten this work done if we had been hampered
by all the procurement regulations.
The minute that our work in Hawaii changed from concentrating
on several, but still a relatively small number, of large projects, and
our engineering work over there shifted to doing at one time and
pushing a lot of small jobs all over the Island, and trying to get them
all pushed at the same time, then that contract I believe became in-
herently— it became inherently inefficient, because those people down
there among the contractors' employees, they just weren't interested
in it. For instance, we, from a military engineering standpoint,
would be trying to get a water line, just a %-inch water line, run off to
some company, to furnish them water, and trying to get these con-
tractors to do 'it. They wouldn't do it. All this little, small, piddling
stuff that they couldn't go out and make a big organization of, was
neglected. They still wanted to do the big contracting jobs, but of
course we didn't have many of that kind of work after that, and there
was a whole lot of little jobs being pushed and rushed just as fast as
we could do it, and that organization wasn't suited. The minute it
became that sort of program, then the contractor was out of the
picture — should have been out of the picture.
[12961 170. General Frank. A cost-plus contract, therefore,
requires more than the usual reliance upon the honestry of the con-
tractor ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, I think it does, sir. The contractor is not
spending his own money. He does not get cost plus a percentage.
This was cost plus a fiat fee. In a cost plus percentage I do not think
there is any tendency to be dishonest unless there is a hook-up between
the contractor and one of the purchasing people. But there is cer-
79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 1 44
674 COXGRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATION PEAKL HARBOR ATTACK
tainlv not the care in operating under these contracts as there would
be if the contractor were spending his own money.
171. General Frank. "Was TTyman having difficulty with Grafe ?
Colonel FLEiiiXG. I do not know, sir ; I was never close enough to
. see. I do not think he was.
17£*. General Fraxk. Do you know of any rumors that Wyman
wanted Rohl in Hawaii because Wyman was rowing with Grafe ?
Colonel Fle^iixg. Xo. sir: I do not know anything about that.
173. General Fraxk. Wliat was Eohl's reputation for drinking?
Colonel Flemixg. He had a pretty good reputation too. sir.
174. General Gruxert. A pretty good reputation or a pretty bad
reputation \
Colonel Flemixg. He had a pretty good reputation for his capacity.
He could take on quite a bit.
175. General Fraxk. Did it incapacitate him?
Colonel Flkm:ixg. I never knew him well enough to find out.
176. General Fraxk. Were there any rumors as to his being inca-
pacitated prior to December 7th because of his drinking ?
\1297^ Colonel Fle^iixg. I never heard any, sir. I did not
know him before December 7th.
177. General Fraxk. Do you know whether or not Rohl and Wyman
lived anywhere near each other?
Colonel Fi-EAnxG. Xo. sir. Wvman at that time lived in the Nuvanu
VaUey.
178. General Fp^xk. Do you know whether or not they had ad-
joining rooms at the Pleasant on Hotel ^
Colonel Flemixg. Yes, sir. They did that. I think, after the war
started.
179. General FpuAXK. Did the Armv take over the Pleasanton
Hotel?
Colonel Flemen'G. Xo, sir. That was another thing that we got
into trouble about, that Pleasanton Hotel, more trouble than anything
I know about. Actually it was taken over by the Hawaiian Con-
structors. They took it over to provide living accommodations for
certain of their employees. The hotel was owned by a Jap family.
I would call it in those days a second-class hotel, right near the
Xapua.
180. General Fraxk. Diagonally across?
Colonel Flemixg. Yes, sir. The Hawaiian Constructors took over
the hotel for the benefit of their employees, and then they ran a cafe
in the place and rented out rooms to Army officers who had been
evacuated from their houses. Wyman's room and Kohl's room were
not absolutely adjacent. They were on the second floor of the hotel,
and Wvman had a room in one corner and Rohl one in the other corner,
and between the two were two rooms that they used as offices. I would
say the [1298] entrances of the rooms were maybe 75 feet
apart. They were the only two people in that particular section of the
building. Colonel Robinson had another room on that floor, but he
was in the back.
The Pleasanton Hotel is just one of those things. It was a swell
idea; the contractor had to take care of his employees, and that, tmder
the terms of the contract, I think, was one of the things that was
reimbursable as far as the Government was concerned. But the
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 675
Government got into the hotel business indirectly by paying the bills
of the Hawaiian Constructors. There have been more investigations
into that hotel than anything I know of.
181. General Frank. Do you know anything about the results of
those investigations ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. One of the results was that General
Emmons took it .up and they changed a lot of the setups down there
and found a lot of details that the Constructors were doing which
did not agree with Army reguhitions. and a lot of expenditures being
made and receipts not being collected, and the usual deficiencies that
you would expect to find when a bunch of people like that go into
the hotel business without any regard to Army regulations.
182. General Frank. Was Rowe there?
Colonel Fleming. Yes. sir; he was the Inspector General at that
time. Colonel Ely. or Colonel Baldwin — I think it was Colonel Ely,
who was the Department finance officer — put in all these transfers.
One of the transfers was made after the war started. Mixed up in
the transfers was Quartermaster work for [1299] the Engi-
neers, and the Quartermaster trying to back up their accounts, and
also a transfer in the Engineers' disbursement system. Up to that
time the Engineers had always done their own financing, but in this
streamlining business they transferred all the financing over to the
finance people. These arguments came up because the new disbursing
officer would not pay the bills. I am pretty sure Colonel Ely was the
finance officer. That is where the thing started.
183. General Frank. Do you know where Rohl was between the
6th and 8th of December?
Colonel Fleming. No, sir.
[1300] 184. General Frank. When the war started was there
any change in the method of handling the contracts; do you know?
Colonel Fleming. Not in the contracts, sir. I don't know about
the method of handling the contracts, sir. There was a very definite
change in the Engineer setup ; yes, sir.
185. General Frank. What was it?
Colonel Fleiniing. Colonel Lyman then had been spending more
and more time at Shaffer. I was pulled out of the Department En-
gineer Office, as I said, in August of 1941, and from that time on
Colonel Lyman began spending more and more time at Fort Shafter,
and in all the war plans immediately on the outbreak of the war, why,
the Department Engineer would assume control over all construction
work in the Department.
186. General Frank. Because thev were principally defense proj-
ects?
Colonel Fleming. Defense projects then ; yes, sir. So General Short
immediately authorized us to put that into effect.
187. General Frank. To put what into effect ?
Colonel Fleming. The previous organization, sir, which set the
Department Engineer up as the ruling boss of everything, of all these
military construction and all civilian construction under him, or
rather, civilian-executed construction ; and the District Engineer be-
came a subordinate of the Depart?nent Engmeer.
188. General Frank. That was starting when?
Colonel Fleming. It was as of December 7th, sir.
676 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
189. General Frank. Then on December 7th Wyman became a
[1301 ] subordinate of Lyman ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. I dictated the order, and I think on the
7th. or the 8th, as soon as we could get around to it, we formalized it.
And, however, the District Engineer was a part of the Engineer De-
partment setup.
190. General Frank. What Engineer Department?
Colonel Fleming. The Engineer Department, sir ; I mean that the
Engineer Department is organized under the Corps of Engineers.
The Chief of Engineers is the head of it, and he has these Division
Engineers all around the country, and District Engineers under the
Division Engineers. Now, Wyman's immediate superior was the
Division Engineer in San Francisco, and he was never under the
command of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. His
orders were to just cooperate with him. That same setup was true in
Panama. It wasn't true in the Philippines. In the Philippines the
Department Engineer was actually the District Engineer also.
So, while over there in Hawaii in putting into effect this war plan
Wyman came under Lyman, it ^^as not a complete command arrange-
ment because Wyman was still responsible through his Engineer De-
partment channels, through the Division Engineer, and back to the
Chief of Engineers, and that was not finally changed until about
March of 1912 when the War Department issued instructions that
all Engineers in the theaters of operations would be directly under
the Commanding Generals of that, and they wiped out the Engineer
Department channels at that particular time, and it was at that time
that Colonel Wyman was relieved. General Emmons decided that since
he had orders to consolidate the thing and he could pick — the orders
were, or [1303] the instructions from the War Department
were, when that thing came out, that by statute — certain things by
statute have to be done by a person called the District Engineer.
Those are rivers and harbors projects and flood-control projects, and
on those two particular things the Chief of Engineers is directly
responsible to Congress, not through the War Department ; he is more
or less separate from the War Department. And when the order came
out the Chief of Engineers — or rather, the War Department stated
that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department would
pick his Engineer and that the Chief of Engineers would then turn
around and make whoever the Commanding General picked — would
make him the District Engineer so he could continue handling these
purely
191. General Frank. Statutory projects?
Colonel Fleming. Statutory projects. And it was at that time that
Wyman was relieved and sent back to the mainland, and I think
that was about in March. There was about a three months' time,
sir, that
192. General Frank. That was in March?
Colonel Fleming. That is right.
193. General Frank. However, immediately after December 7th
the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department issued orders
to bring the District Engineer under the Department Engineer?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 677
194. General Frank. He did that without any authority from the
mainland ?
Colonel Fleming. Without any direct authority; no, sir. How-
ever, that was part of the Hawaiian Department Defense Plan, or
whatever it was ; I forget the name of it.
[1S03] 195. General Frank. Could that have been done prior
to December 7th?
Colonel Fleming. I don't know, sir. I think that if the question
had ever been raised possibly the War Department would have ap-
proved it. I don't think that they woulcl have changed the rela-
tionship between the District Engineer, the Division Engineer, and
the Chief of Engineers prior to the war because I said it took them
from December until sometime in March to make that change.
Wyman, even after the war started, was still getting instructions
direct through his Engineer channels. There was one project before
the war, the only project to the best of my knowledge — there was
only one project for which the Commanding General was made di-
rectly responsible, and that was for the construction of what I call
the ferry project, and that is the construction of this chain of air
bases from Hawaii to the Philippines, and in that —
196. General Grunert. May I develop that a little bit ?
197. General Frank. Just let me ask one question.
Go ahead. You were going to say something.
Colonel Fleming. In that project the directive came out stating
that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department was re-
sponsible for all the construction down to and including Australia.
The Commanding General of the Philippine Department was re-
sponsible for all construction north of Australia and into the Philip-
pines. And our instructions in Hawaii were that the District
Engineer had been given orders by the Chief of Engineers to place
himself at the disposal of the Commanding General for that one
project.
198. General Frank. When war started — that was from Decem-
ber [1304-] 7th on — did all contracts merge in the Hawaiian
Constructors on recommendation of Colonel Wyman?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
199. General Frank. That was a change, then?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir, it was a change.
200. General Frank. What did that change involve?
Colonel Fleming. At that time, sir, I said we were taking over
the Quartermaster work. Now, my memory is not entirely clear
on all of these things. We had taken over all of their contracts be-
fore the war which had to do with Air Corps construction on air
force posts. The next thing we took over was the work of the Quar-
termaster as far as rentals, leases, and utilities; and then the next
thing which was transferred, and we got orders on this transfer I
think just before the war — I may have had my chronology or my
time a little bit wrong here, but just before the war we got orders
to take over all other Constructing Quartermaster's contracts. There
was a lot of them going on. There was a big housing program for
the increase in the antiaircraft garrison. There were several per-
manent projects under construction; two great big barracks at Fort
Shafter, I remember. And when that turnover occurred the war
678 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
came along then and of course added to the difficulties of transferring
these things from the Quartermasters over to the Engineers.
Certain types of projects were stopped. We stopped all of the per-
manent type of construction and continued tlie temporary types of
construction ; and on the termination of contracts the work of certain
of these old Constructing Quartermaster contractors was just stopped.
The other work, in order to — [1305] well, I don't know why it
was done, but anyway the other temporary type of work was even-
tually closed out under the contracts which had previously been in
force, and some of it was picked up by the Hawaiian Constructors. I
do not think, sir, that it was a question of actually transferring a job
from the Quartermaster contractor over to these Hawaiian Construc-
tors. As I recall the thing, we stopped practically all of them, and they
were all stopped for about, oh, I would say anywhere from two to three
months, and then the picture clarified. We went back and picked up
some of them again, see ; so when they picked them up the Hawaiian
Constructors picked them up rather than the old Quartermaster con-
tractors.
201. General Frank. All right.
202. General Grunert. When the District Engineer was placed
under the Department Engineer as of December 7, was that part of
the approved war plan, that that would be done in time of war ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. That was in the Engineer Plan ; I don't
know whether the Mobilization Plan or the Hawaiian Department
Defense Project.
203. General Grunert. I see. For all purposes except those deter-
mined by law, which required a decision in Washington and which
was made a directive after the war started?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir; made about March 1942. Later than
that : about March or April.
204. General Grunert. Then, even if the Department Commander
was merely concerned about construction projects during the
[1S06] imminence of war, that could not have been done ex-
cept by Washington ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir; it would have required War Depart-
ment approval, sir.
205. General Grunert. Had that approval been requested?
Colonel Fleming. No, sir. • I am sure I would have known had it
been requested. It had not been requested.
206. General Frank. Now, there was something brought out about
the general knowledge of Colonel Wyman's constant and intimate as-
sociation with Mr, Rohl over a period of years.
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
207. General Frank. You knew about that?
Colonel Fleming. I didn't know about it, sir, until after the war oc-
curred. I never met Mr. Rohl before the war. 1 went back afterward
and talked to my friend Colonel Robinson down there; and just chew-
ing— well, just gossiping the way people will, I then found out that
this Rohl-Connolly Corporation I think is a Los Angeles corporation.
208. General Frank. Yes.
Colonel Fleming. And apparently there had been plenty of rela-
tionships between Mr. Rohl and Colonel Wyman when Wyman was
the District Engineer in Los Angeles, but when I was" in Los An-
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 679
geles with General Connolly we had no relationship with the district
office other than furnishing them relief labor. They were our biggest
customer actually for the employment of labor in the Los Angeles met-
ropolitan area.
209. General Frank. Well, you had known of this personal asso-
ciation from the time that you had been in Southern California with
Connolly ?
11S07) Colonel Fleming. Not with Mr. Kohl, sir.
210. General Frank. You didn't?
Colonel Fleming. Not with Mr. Rohl as an individual, sir. I think
I said a little while ago that I had had personal knowledge that in
my opinion Colonel Wyman associated too much with contractors.
211. General Frank. Oh, yes.
Colonel Fleming. I didn't intend to convey the impression that I
knew about any relationship with Mr. Rohl and Colonel Wyman prior
to that time.
212. General Frank. After December 7th was there any talk or
discussion about the association of Wyman and Rohl?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir, there was plenty of
213. General Frank. Did you have something further to say?
Colonel Fleming. I was just going to explain that statement, sir.
214. General Frank. Go ahead.
Colonel Fleming. There was plenty of talk about it, sir. That is
when I first got to know Mr. Rohl. As I said, the first time I knew
anything about Mr. Rohl was when I was getting in that airplane
priority, trying to, out of the Navy. But there was a lot of discus-
sion, and I think that was one of the reasons why General Emmons
finally decided — when this unification of the Engineer setup was
made, why, he finally decided to request Colonel Wyman's relief.
215. General Frank. Was there any curiosity or wonderment as to
why higher authority allowed this intimate association of Rohl and
Wyman to continue ?
Colonel Fleming. I don't think so, sir. Rohl was not a [13081
well known figure in Hawaii until after the war started. As I said,
there was this investigation of the Pleasanton Hotel business, for
example. Well, that brought out a lot. That made General Emmons
rather concerned about the whole situation, to put it mildly; and
later on there was the incident of the famous yacht YEGA, and about
that time I think that — I don't believe that General Emmons ever
wrote to the War Department asking for Wyman's relief, but I know
that he talked it over with Lyman and that Lyman wrote a personal
letter to the Chief of Engineer's Office stating that General Emmons
considered Wyman to be no longer officially welcome, and suggesting
they get him out. He was relieved on that then, and that all hap-
pened just about the time this unification business came down.
216. General Frank. What do you know about the VEGA?
Colonel Fleming. I was introduced to the VEGA very sharply and
abruptly, sir. There is another VEGA. To make my story clear in
this thing, there are two ships called the VEGA. One of them is this
yacht, ancl the other VEGA is a Navy supply ship called — well, like
the SIRIUS and that crowd, we had it over there in Hawaii before
the war.
217. General Frank. I would like to know about this yacht.
680 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Fle^iing. The yacht VEGA ? Well, I never heard of the
vaclit VEGA until suddenly General Emmons called me in one day
and wanted to know what I knew about the VEGA, and I told him
the VEGA just arrived in the last convoy and it was towing over a
dredge that belonged to us, and the General told me that maybe I
had better go down and look at the VEGA. So I went down
11309] and took a look at the VEGA and it was this yacht. It
was about a 75- or 80-foot 3'acht, sailboat.
Well. I had seen the names on the convoy list, and I used to keep
Genera/1 Emmons advised as to what was coming in in the convoy,
and this thing was in a very slow convoy, a 4-knot convoy, and we
had been having arrangement with the Navy to get a dredge towed
over from San Francisco or San Diego or some place like that, and the
Navy had been planning on towing this dredge with their boat, the
VEGA, which is a supply ship. When I saw the name of the VEGA
in the convoy list it never occurred to me to investigate what the
VEGA was ; I thought it was this supply ship.
Well, apparently at that time we had not completed but at least
opened for traffic this southern route of airways. Those things all
ran down from Hawaii here, or rather Oahu — the Island of Christmas
on this may would be right up in here (indicating) — to Christmas
and Palmyra. The next jump was down to Canton here, then down
to Nandi and Suva, which is right there (indicating) ; New Caledonia.
Our field in Australia was at Townsville. We had finished that thing,
but there was a rather defensive attitude in the whole Pacific at this
particular time, and they were afraid particularly that the field at
Canton would be knocked out and the one at Fiji would be taken
out. So they wanted to get a still further south air route which
would be farther away from the Jap bases, and the only way of
doing that — the map is not complete, but south of Christmas there is
another island called Penrhyn, and another south of that called
Aitutaki, and by going a jump [13J0] to those two we could
then jump from there down to Tonga and into New Zealand and into
Australia that way. That was the southern and easternmost airline.
They wanted somebody to go down and make a survey of this par-
ticular route. Apparently Colonel Wyman had decided he needed a
boat for it, and the boat that they selected to bring over to Hawaii
to make this survey, for the survey party, and put them on, was this
yacht VEGA.
Now, the VEGA didn't officially belong to Mr. Rohl: it belonged
to Mrs. Rohl. It was registered in her name. And it came over in
this convoy, this 4-knot convoy, and suddenly appeared in Honolulu,
and I don't think General Emmons knew anything about it. Nobody
had said anything to him about it. I clicln't know the thing was
coming over. As a matter of fact, I didn't know it until General
Emmons chased me clown to look at this VEGA that was supposed to
be towing over a dredge, and here it was this 80- or 100-foot yacht.
Well, the deal on the thing was that Mrs. Eohl would rent that
to the Hawaiian Constructors for one dollar per year, and the Hawai-
ian Constructors would then hire the crew and pay the insurance
and pay the operating expense, of course all this expense being reim-
bursable by the Government because all of their expenses were reim-
bursable by the Government on this cost-plus-fixed-fee contract; and
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 681
the Hawaiian Constructors in turn would rent this boat to the Gov-
ernment for this tour around these islands, Penrhyn and Aitvitaki and
down in through that area.
When General Ennnons found out about that he was really irate,
and not only ordered the contract or agreement with [^311] the
Hawaiian Constructors for the yacht be terminated but ordered that
it be sent back to the mainland by the next available convoj^, and
refused to authorize any of the expenses for it, and the yacht left
about — well, I think it was over there for about two weeks, sir, tied
up at one of the piers in Honolulu. It was that yacht incident and
a few other things that I had in mind when I said there had been
quite a bit of discussion about the relationships.
218. General Feank. Was the yacht ever used ?
Colonel Fleming. No, sir.
219. General Frank. Did they every have any j^arties on the yacht?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir; I think they had several parties on
the yacht. I never went to them.
220. General Frank. Who had the parties ?
Colonel Fleming. I think Mr. Rohl had them, sir.
221. General Frank. What was the cargo when it came over?
Colonel Fleming. Well, it had quite a lot of stuff on it, sir. There
were several cases of liquor aboard.
222. General Frank. Had a good cargo of liquor ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
223. General Frank. Was that part of the stocking of the boat
or was that a consignment ? Do 3' ou know ?
Colonel Fleming. It wasn't consigned to anybody, sir; it was
just — it wasn't stocking for the boat, no, sir. I never saw the boat
unloaded, but from what I hear they had cases of liquor in about every
available place thej could stick it on the boat. I don't know how
much there was, but there was a considerable amount of liquor came
in on that ship, and it wasn't a cargo vessel, sir.
[131:2] 224. General Frank. I know.
Colonel Fleming. It was purely a pleasure vessel. As I get the
story all the staterooms were filled with the stuff, and every place
they could stick it on board.
225. General Frank. Have 3^011 anything else that concerns the
operations of the Hawaiian Constructors, Colonel Wyman's opera-
tions and behavior, or anything about Eohl that you can state to the
Board that has not been brought out ?
Colonel Fleming. I would like to bring out the fact that I don't
think that that contract when it was entered into, the Hawaiian Con-
structors' contract, was ever approved or referred to the military
people over in Hawaii. I think that was an arrangement directly be-
tween the Engineer in Hawaii, going right back to Engineer Depart-
ment channels, and was approved in the Chief of Engineer's Office.
226. General Grunert. You mean the basic contract?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. Now, the War Department ordered,
on all of these cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts, a running inspection by
an Inspector General, and I remember that the Hawaiian Depart-"
ment was ordered to put an Inspector General on the routine check-
ing and — well, you couldn't call it an audit, but it was a routine
check of that contract, and we had one officer specially detailed in
682 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
our Inspector General's Department before the war for that purpose.
To the best of my knowledge I don't believe that the Commanding
General of the Hawaiian Department had anything ofiicially to do
with the operation of that contract until after the Engineer channels
were completely eliminated and the whole thing was put under his
command, because I remember after that time these change
[131S] orders used to come up and we would have to analyze
those, the change orders and the additions, eliminations, and things
like that, in the contract.
227. General Frank. Was there any inspection, either from the
Division Engineer's Office or froin the Chief of Engineer's Office here
in Washington, of the activities of the District Engineer in Hono-
lulu?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
[ISU] 228. General Frank. Who made those?
Colonel Fleming. General Hamium, sir — ^Warren T. Hannum — was
the division engineer in San Francisco, and I know that General Han-
num was over in Hawaii several times before the war started.
229. General Frank. Did anybody from Washington ever come out
to look over the activities?
Colonel Fleming. I don't remember, sir. There may have been, but
I really don't remember.
230. General Frank. After the Department Commander took over
the control of the district engineers, did tliat result in considerably
closer supervision and a general tightening up on the activities?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. That resulted, as you say, in closer
control and tightening up ; and also, you might say, as a development
of time, there had grown up this feeling among several of us who had
anything to do with it, that that contract should have been terminated.
The actual termination work on the contract was started by Colonel
Lyman after Wyman's relief and return to the mainland. For in-
stance, they cut out more and more their work on the small jobs and
started to do those by force-account directly. The big jobs were not
terminated, however, and the contractors were still on that. Lyman
was working along this line, when he died very suddenly. He died ;
I don't remember whether it was in August or September, 1942. He
had just been nominated to be BG, and it was announced — he was a
Hawaiian, of course; he was born in the Island of Hawaii — and he
went down to Hawaii on a Friday on an inspection trip, and this thing
was published while he was down at his [131S] "old home
town" island. Well, of course it was quite a celebration. He had had
a pretty bad heart, anyway. He came back and died Sunday night
or Monday morning, I don't know which ; so he was starting on that
at the time of his death.
231. General Frank. Wlio was Wyman's successor, when he left?
Colonel Fleming. Wyman's successor was Lyman, sir.
232. General Frank. Oh, Lyman took over?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. They just abolished, sir, the district
engineer, completely, and General Emmons cut Lyman in on the whole
works, and so Lyman went down there and started running that
contract.
233. General Grunert. They did the same thing they did in the
Philippines, where the Department engineer was the officer and the
district engineer.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 683
Colonel Fleming. l?'es, sir. And Lyman, as I say, was put right in
the middle of this thing. General Kramer came over, some time after
that, and Kramer finally closed out those contracts, oh, I think about —
he got there and got onto his job and onto the details of it very hur-
riedly, and they were closed out either late in 1942 or early in 1943, sir.
234. General Frank. Do you know what were the regulations about
bringing liquor into Hawaii ?
Colonel Fleming. I do not know that there were any regulations
about bringing it in, sir.
235. General Frank. You do not know ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. I know I don't think there were any
regulations about bringing it in. Hawaii was being run by the Mili-
tary Governor. We didn't have anything such as import require-
ments, or anything like that. There was an [ISIS] office set
up under the Military Governor. They called it, down there, the
"Division of Priorities and Planning," I think, and it was run by an
Army officer, and he had the job of determining. From the Hawaiian
Department we allotted tonnage. We worked under a system of allo-
cations, and figured out, and got word from San Francisco, how much
tonnage was going to be available for the next succeeding month, or
their best "horseback estimate" of that. We then allocated to the
various supj^ly branches the amount of tonnage that they could have
coming over there, and also allocated to tlie civilians what amount
they could have. The loading, back in San Francisco, was then
controlled by the allocations which we made. The civilian allocations
were controlled, the sub-allotments were controlled by this Division
of Planning and Priorities, under the office of the Military Governor,
and he issued the actual shipping permits.
236. General Grunert. Who was the Military Governor?
Colonel Fleming. General Emmons was the Military Governor.
General Emmons' organization over there, sir, after he got there, he
had a "three-cornered hat." He was the Office of Military Governor,
and General Green was the executive down there. He was also the
Tactical Commander, and he had a command post there, where the
Chief of Staff was located, and then he was the Administrative and
Base Commander for the Hawaiian Department, and that was run as
what we called a "rear echelon department headquarters," and G-4,
and G-1 section was back there ; and the other people were up in this
tunnel ; and General Emmons as an individual headed each one of those
sections; but there wasn't a close — the tactical side of the [1317]
picture knew nothing at all about the Military Governor's picture,
and he didn't have an awful lot to do with us, back in the supply end
of Supply and Construction.
237. General Grunert. How do you suppose, if it was handled on
a tonnage basis, and if it was not authorized by a priority, that liquor
was put aboard the VEGA and brought over to Hawaii ?
Colonel Fleming. Because the priority, sir, only applied to ships
which were loaded under the supervision of the General commanding
the port of embarkation. That is why I said I knew particularly there
was no prohibition against bringing or shipping liquor in. I don't
think they violated any law by bringing it in, because the tonnage
wasn't under our control. However, there were no other imports of
684 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
liquor into the Department at that time, except what the Navy was
bringing over.
238. General Frank. All right.
239. General Grunert. General Russell, have you some questions?
240. General Eussell. Assuming, Colonel, that it had been desired
to concentrate on the completion of these Air Warning Service sta-
tions, what would have been necessary, to have gotten additional people
to work on them?
241. General Frank. Would additional people have expedited it, or
would it have required something else?
Colonel Fleming. Not on those three projects — the ones you have
been talking about. I do not think additional people would have
expedited it.
242. General Russell. I will enlarge the question, then. What
would have expedited work on those stations ?
Colonel Fleming. Faster work on the design of that cable, in the
erection of it. We couldn't do anything at the top of [1318]
the mountain, sir, until we got the cable.
243. General Russell. Is it true or not. Colonel, that after these
three permanent stations that had been selected, and which you de-
scribed in considerable detail, had been completed, it was discovered
that all three were impracticable as radar stations?
Colonel Fleming. No, sir. We discovered that one of them was
impractical. That was the one at Haleakala. To the best of my
knowledge, when I left there that was the only place that they had
actually tested the equipment in, and discarded it; and on the basis
of the results at Haleakala, the Air Force, who at that time had taken
over the radar system, decided they did not want them to do the same
monkeying around with a station on Mt. Kaala. However, a station
at Kokee was put into operation and always operated, and they never
had any trouble with that.
. 244. General Russell. Now, I wanted to get some dates in connec-
tion with this Lyman-Wyman feud, if I could. Wyman was under
Lyman, so long as Wyman was in the Hawaiian Department, under
Department command ?
Colonel Fleming. No, sir; no, sir. Wyman came over to Hawaii,
to the best of my knowledge, about in November 1939. He went out
to the regiment at Schofield Barracks and served out there.
245. General Frank. Commanded by whom?
Colonel Fleming. Commanded by Colonel Hodges. Colonel Ly-
man came over to relieve Hodges in July 1940. That is when we were
betting how long the relationship would continue. I think then that
Wyman went down to take over the district [1319] down in
Honolulu al3out in November 1940. So he was probably under Ly-
man's command, oh, for possibly three months, out at Schofield bar-
racks. Then, when he went down to be the district engineer, Colonel
Lyman had no more to do with him officially — I mean he wasn't under
his command; they were in a cooperating relationship — up until
December 7; and after the declaration of war, then, by just issuing
an order putting the war plan into effect, Wyman then became a sub-
ordinate to Lyman again.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 685
246. General Russell. But all of this time you were in the Hawaiian
Department, and you and Lyman had substantially the same relation
to Wyman?
Colonel Fleming. I do not understand your question, sir.
247. General Russell. And during all that time, you were repre-
senting the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department in the
supervision of construction, there, td the extent that he could super-
vise it, and you and Lyman therefore had substantially the same re-
lation toward Wyman; that is, just a cooperative relationship?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. My relationship with Wyman was not
the same as Lyman's relationship to Wyman, because, while ostensibly
up, until August 1941 I was the Assistant Department Engineer, and
supposed to be working for Colonel Lyman, actually I did all my work
directly for the Commanding General of the Department. That
was both for General Herron and Greneral Short, and it continued.
248. General Russell. General Short and General Herron relied on
you for their contacts with Wyman much more than they relied on
Lyman, is that right?
Colonel Fleming. On the detail of the contracts? Yes, sir;
[1320] because Lyman wasn't at the headquarters daily, I know,
until after I got relieved from the Engineer Office in August 1941.
249. General Russell. Now, I think General Grunert asked some
question a little while ago about whether or not the Hawaiian Com-
mander made a request to have the district engineer placed under his
control, prior to December 7, 1941.
Colonel Fleming. I am sure he did not, sir.
250. General Russell. Do you know whether any such relationship
as that existed in the Army before December 7, 1941 ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir ; it did. There was one place only, and
that was in the Philippine Department of the foreign service depart-
ments, at that time. We had the three — Panama, Hawaii, and the
Philippines. Li Panama there was no district engineer. The en-
gineers ran the Panama Canal. The Governor of the Panama Canal
was the engineer officer. The Governor of the Panama Canal and the
engineer for maintenance down there were not under the control of
the Commanding General of the Panama Department, until there was
some slight difference developed, there. I don't remember when it
was. I wasn't in Panama, although I remember some talk about it.
In the Philippines, there was no river-and-harbor work under the
American Government. There was some being done under the Phil-
ippine Government, and we had engineer officers over there who had
been loaned to the Philippine Government. One of them was General
Cla}^, who is now over here in the Service Forces; and General Casey
went out to the Philippines to replace General Clay, I think, shortly
before the war ; but those were loans to the Philippine Government.
The only work that there was in the Philippine Department,
[1321] by the Federal Government, all our work for which the
enghieers were responsible, by statute or law or Army regulations, was
the maintenance and repair and construction of fortifications ; so there
was no district engineer over there. The Department engineer was
re]Dresenting not only the Commanding General but also the Chief
of Engineers in the discharge of it.
686 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
In Hawaii we had a district engineer's office. We were different
from the otlier two.
251. General Russell. Was that because of the difference in the
character of the work to be done there ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir ; there had always been, since Honolulu
was one of our major American ports, there had always been a dis-
trict, a river-and-harbor district^ in Honolulu ; at least back since the
last war, at any rate.
252. General Frank. In other words, the organization there was
just the same as if it had been a part of the mainland of the United
States?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. The organization was exactly the same
as if it had been San Francisco, sir, with the Department Head-
quarters sitting at the Presidio, and the district engineer for San
Francisco, doing cooperative work for him, but not under the command
of the General.
253. General Russell. And that maintenance of a separate engi-
neering office, under a division engineer, was dictated by the character
of the work that was to be done ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. It was the result of paralleling the
organization over there which had been in existence on the mainland.
254. General Grunert. However, most of these contracts that
[1S^£] we had been speaking about during 1941 were defense con-
tracts, in which the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Depart-
ment was most definitely concerned, and it might have been expedient
or desirable on his part to have more of a direct control over the district
engineer ?
Colonel Fleming. It might have been ; yes, sir.
255. General Russell. In your contacts with the Department Com-
mander out there, did you tell him that the delays were occurring in
that construction work because of this feud between Lyman and
Wyman ?
Colonel Fleming. I think I did.
256. General Russell. Did you not testify in answer to a question
by General Frank that no delays were occurring on that account ?
Colonel Fleming. I testified to General Frank, sir, that I don't think
any delays were occurring in the prosecution of the work. I may
misunderstand your question to me. I undoubtedly discussed the
thing with General Short and told him that we were having a lot of
trouble on account of this fued.
257. General Russell. That was about when, that you and Short
were talking?
Colonel Fleming. I would say somewhere between, oh, the 1st of
November and the beginning of the war, sir, because it was after the
development of this ferry project, this southern airways route over
to the Philippines.
58. General Russell. You had not discussed the interference with
the work, if any existed, because of the Lyman and Wyman feud,
prior to November 1, 1941, with General Short?
Colonel Fleming. I don't think so, sir.
[1S23] 259. General Russell. You were his representative, were
you, not, in supervising; the details of construction ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir : I think I was.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 687
260. General Kussell. You thought no situation had arisen, prior
to November 1, 1941, therefore, which required your going to General
Short about it ?
Colonel Fleming. No, sir ; because up to that time Colonel Lyman
had not been down there, sir. You see, I had been running the engi-
neer office, sitting right at Fort Shafter, since July 1, 1939, I was not
pulled out of that office and placed on the General Staff, until, I would
say, about August 1941. About that time, in August 1941, that is when
Colonel Lyman started coming down there more.
261. General Grunert. From where?
Colonel Fleming. From Schofield barracks, sir. He maintained his
residence at Schofield barracks, and continued in command of the
Third Engineers. He still had a dual assignment. He was the divi-
sion engineer, out there, and lived out there. Now, there was an officer
came over and replaced me in the engineer office. Obviously, so much
of this work depended upon knowing who said what, to whom, some
time ago; so when I went up on this station, although my position
changed, and my title changed, I was still doing essentially the same
kind of work, and instead of going into the G-4 office, where I think —
I don't know what General Short intended on this thing — at least
that is where I was assigned — I never did any G-4 work at all. I
kept tied up with the special stuff.
Now, it took between about August and, I say the date was Novem-
ber— it may have been in October somewhere, along in there —
\1S24] for Colonel Lyman to come down and start picking up.
It took him about that long to get onto all this background stuff, and
also for the thing to develop to the point where, instead of cooperating
like this, they were now swinging around, and this fued was coming
around in its infancy.
262. General Russell. That was some time in October or November,
1941 ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. I remember we had the discussion.
General Short and I had a discussion, when he asked me frankly what
my opinion of the two of them was, and the only way I can date it
now, sir, is by knowing it was some time after we started building that
air route. We got the directive to build that air route to the South
Pacific. Up to that time, I went in to see General Short only when the
Chief of Staff told me to go in and take a paper in to be signed. After
that time, I don't know, I guess I was up there.
263. General Russell. You talked about this man Grafe.
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
264. General Russell. He dominated the situation out there until
Rohl came out?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
265. General Russell. What was your impression of that man as an
executive of the contracting group ?
Colonel Fleming. I don't know enough about him officially to have
an opinion of him as an engineer.
266. General Russell. I was not talking particularly about his tech-
nical ability, but about his ability to get work done, as an executive.
Was he a strong man, or a weak man ? How did he impress you ?
688 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
\^1325'] Colonel Fleming. My impression, there, sir, would be,
I would say, negative.
267. General Russell. That he was of the negative type?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. I don't think he was particularly a
strong man. I don't know enough about him to say, as an individual,
but just from meeting him at these casual parties, I don't think he was
a man that would get up and hammer on the desk, and stuff like that.
268. General Russell. He was entirely different from Rohl and
Wyman — very cool?
Colonel Fleming. He was entirely different from Wyman. Rohl.
I think, was very positive, but Rohl was never brusque. He was never
rude.
269. General Russell. This contract grew considerably, and much
work was being done under it, after December 7, that was not con-
templated when the basic contract was signed in December 1940, isn't
that true. Colonel?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
270. General Russell. Did those people continue to operate on
this fixed-fee basis afterwards?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir ; but their fee was reduced.
271. General Russell. Where was the contract on the fees made —
out there, or here in Washington ?
Colonel Fleming. The initial fee, sir, was made here in Washington,
or whereever it was, whatever channel it went through. After the
termination of that engineer department or engineer cliannel rela-
tionship between the district engineer, out there, and the chief of
engineers, in Washington, then all the changes in that contract began
■coming through the Department \^1526'\ Commander, through
command channels ; and every time an addition or a change order or
something like that was made in this particular contract, which in-
creased the total value of the work to be done, or estimated value
of the work to be done, then there had to be a readjudication of the
fee to be paid, and that fee was on a sliding scale — the more of the
work, the less the percent.
272. General Russell. To one of General Frank's questions, the
effect of which question was.
Did you think tliat Wyman was influenced by Rohl?
as I recall, you began to answer that question in substantially this
language :
I don't think that Colonel Wyman was influenced by Rohl.
You hesitated, and another question on another subject was
answered, and I am not sure that that full answer has been gotten
into the record. Now, what is your impression of the influencing of
Wyman by Rohl?
Colonel Fleming. I do not have any direct knowledge of the rela-
tionships between Wyman and Rohl. I started to answer General
Frank's question. I think it was a question with a connotation as
to whether that influence had resulted in any delay, sir. I can answer
it that way. I do not think that the relationship between Wyman and
Rohl resulted specifically, or that as a result of that specific thing,
there were delays in that contract, in the prosecution of the work.
In the other question, I think somebody asked me what my general
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 689
opinion of that relationship was. I can say this, that I do not believe
that that relationship ever should have existed. I do not think it
^Yas the kind of relationship that a [1327] contracting officer
should have ^Yith a contractor.
273. General Russell. That is all.
274. General Grunert. In your position, representing the Depart-
ment Commander, you could ]ust cooperate and coordinate, but you
could not direct ; is that right ?
Colonel Fleming. That is correct; yes, sir.
275. General Grunert. You were reall}^ a liaison officer, to find
out what was going on, and you could not tell them what to do, even
if you found out something was not going according to the Department
Commander's wishes?
Colonel Fleming. I could report that to the Department Com-
mander, sir.
276. General Grunert. Were there any such times that you found
out things were being delayed or not pushed, that you did make such
reports to the Department Commander?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
277. General Grunert. Do you remember any particular occasion,
any particular type of work, or any particular work order?
Colonel Fleming. No, sir; I don't remember the particulars. I
remember one thing, I got involved in an argument with the district
engineer's office on the design of some fortification structures, on which
I did not agree with their design.
278. General Grunert. Were there any occasions wliere you had
to make such a report to him regarding the installations pertaining
to the Air Warning Service ?
Colonel Fleming. About delaj^s in the district engineer's office,
sir?^
279. General Grunert. Delays in construction, so as to get that
Air Warning Service in shape to operate ?
[1328] Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir; I think there were. There
were some cases undoubtedly in there, which I reported. The one
thing I do remember as a specific instance, sir, was the question of that
road. I still maintain that the road they built from that Kolekole
road around the firebreak, there, was a highway with banked curves
and a grade limited to 4 percent, and we didn't need anything like
that. The rate that the stuff could be delivered by the cable way, as
long as it worked on that trail, there, we could have hauled it up there.
The specifications on that road were entirely much more refined than
the job required.
[1329] 280. General Grunert. Did General Short give you any
particular instructions which evidenced his concern about the slowness
in getting that construction work that pertained to the Air Warning
Service done and getting the system started?
Colonel Fleming. Specifically, I do not remember the General ever
having mentioned that particular project, sir. I do know that we
kept for him and he used to look through in detail a series of charts
which showed the exact status of all these projects as closely as we
could find out.
281. General Grunert. All those construction projects had to do
with defense. Did General Short ever discuss with you anything to
79716—46 — Ex. 145, vol. 1 45
690 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the effect that "We have got to get these things completed ; the inter-
national situation is tightening up"?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
282. General Grunert. What did you then attempt to do to ex-
pedite these things ?
Colonel Fleming. I used to run the inspections. That is why I
used to be down at the District Engineer's Office four or five times a
week.
283. General Grunert. Did these people work every day ? Did they
work Sundays ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
284. General Grunert. And at nights?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
285. General Grunert. Did they have double shifts in order to try
to get these things completed ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir; most of them. We had double-shift
work, and finally pushed it into three-shift work.
[ISSO] 286. General Grunert. This was prior to December 7?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. Construction work at night on a thing
like that is very inefficient, unless you have all the lights in the world ;
and we did not. I can tell you this, sir, that as far as being emphatic
in speeding some of these things up, I think that that was General
Short's main interest over there.
287. General Grunert. And then, when things were not appar-
ently speeded up, what action did he take ?
Colonel Fleming. He used to call on Colonel Wyman.
288. General Grunert. And then what?
Colonel Fleming. He usually got action.
289. General Grunert. The action that was gotten was satisfactory
to General Short and, in your opinion from an engineer's viewpoint,
was satisfactory as to progress ?
Colonel Fleming. We are talking about this particular project, sir?
290. General Grunert. I am talking primarily about the defense
construction, particularly the air warning service construction, prior
to December 7.
Colonel Fleming. Particularly the air warning service?
291. General Grunert. Yes.
Colonel Fleming. The air warning system has received a lot of pub-
licity lately in the papers; but that project was only one of the very
small things we were doing over there. Certainly General Short
never mentioned it to me, and I don't recall his having called me in
and saying anything about this particular thing, without at the same
time bringing in another project, because, coupled with the air warn-
ing system [1S31] was also the development of other defense
projects in the Islands. The main one was the development of air-
fields, sir. At the beginning of the war there was only one airfield in
the entire Hawaiian Department from which a bombardment plane
could operate. That was also true on the day of December 7th. There
was only one runway in the entire Department from which a B-17
could take off, and that was at Hickam Field. On the afternoon of
Thursday, following December 7, whatever date that may be, they
had a 5,000-foot runway at Bellows Field, on a field which was never
authorized or approved by the War Department.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 691
292. General Grunert. When was that started ?
Colonel Fleming. That was started long before the war, sir. In
August, I would say, 1940.
293. General Grunert. It appears that as far as the rapidity of
construction work on defense projects was concerned, they did a great
deal more in less time after December 7 than they did before. Is that
your experience ?
Colonel Fleming. No, sir.
294. General Grunert. It is not?
Colonel Fleming. No, sir. I think they did a lot more before De-
cember 7th. They caught up some places after December 7th.
295. General Grunert. In the record somewhere we have had testi-
mony, or intimation at least, that there were changes made. For in-
stance, somebody said something about the tearing up of runways and
their relocation elsewhere, which caused delay. Do you recall any-
thing of that sort ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
296. General Grunert. How did that come about?
[1332] Colonel Fleming. I would like, before answering that
question, to expand somewhat on my preceding answer.
297. General Grunert. If it is pertinent to the issue. We do not
want to learn all that you know about the Engineers in the Hawaiian
Department in the last two or three years. But if it is pertinent to
the question I asked you, you may proceed.
Colonel Fleming. I would like to state this: You asked me if
General Short had ever been satisfied w^ith the progress that had
been made, and I asked you if you referred specifically to this par-
ticular project.
298. General Grunert. I referred more to the progress of the
work.
Colonel Fleming. I do not think that General Short ever was satis-
fied with the progress that was being made. He was continually push-
ing all the time on those projects. I would also like to state, sir, as
far as this particular project that we have been talking about is con-
cerned, the aircraft warning project, that I do not remember his having
singled that particular one out. He was always on me about all the
work, the airfields, and that matter, and various other jobs we had.
. 299. General Grunert. Was he on the neck of the War Department
where help could be obtained from this end ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. We wrote letter after letter from the
Hawaiian Department trying to get approval of the project for addi-
tional airfields. We were told time and time again that we would
get money appropriated for ten additional airfields in the Hawaiian
Department.
[1333] 300. General Grunert. When you did not get quick ac-
tion by letter, did you cable and radio ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. We telegraphed. They kept promising
that it would be in the supply bill.
301. General Grunert. Is there any record of those communica-
tions and those radiograms?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. There are records in the Hawaiian
Department.
692 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
302. General Grunert. They ought to be available in the Hawaiian
Department ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
303. General Grunert. Xow, we go back to the question of the
intimation we have had to the effect that runways were built and
then they woiild tear them up and start another. Do you have any
information on that?
\_133Ii\ Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. That actually happened in
an airfield up at Mokuleia. The day that General Emmons arrived
there, sir, we took him out — he was interested in airfields, and we
took him out and said, "Here is a swell place to build an airfield."
He said, "All right. Go to work." So we started it. We built it
in an awful hurry. After it was built it was found that the drain-
age conditions through there (indicating on map) were very bad.
They actually used it for three months before the drainage started
interfering with it.
304. General Grunert. That was used after December Tth ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
305. General Grunert. How about prior to December 7tli?
Colonel Fleming. Prior to December 7 the only airfield we had
started on, we did not have any funds for. General Short started
to build this at Bellows Field. It is located right here (indicating
on map). We improved it without any War Department approval.
That is why I say that the only runway, the second runway in the
Department, that could be utilized had been started prior to December
7 and was ready five days afterward.
306. General Grunert. The intimation is that somebody did not
use good judgment in doing this and it was all love's labor lost, and
they had to tear it up and start somewhere else, as if somebody was
doing that so as to cause intentional delay. Do you know anything
about that?
Colonel Fleming. I do not know of any such instance. The only
runway that we were working on before the war, to the best of my
knowledge, was this one right here (indicating) at Bellows Fielcl.
We were also doing a little work down at South Cape.
[1-J3'j] 307. General Grunert. You stated that delays were
due to labor?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
308. General Grunert. How could such delays due to labor be
avoided ? Could they have used .engineer troops in lieu of other labor,
because of the shortage of labor?
Colonel Fleming. We were using all the engineer troops we had
available, sir. We had written to the War Department and asked
them to send over additional engineer troops, because it was our
opinion that in training the Army back on the mainland they would
go through and just get training, but over in Hawaii we could actu-
ally use them on work projects.
309. General Grunert. You a^jked for them. Did you get them or
did you not?
Colonel Fleming. We got one battalion of aviation engineers.
310. General (Jrunert. Let us take it seriatim. With reference to
materials, who obtained materials? Who was responsible for get-
ting materials? Was the District Engineer responsible for that?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 693
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. The District Engineer bought those
materials through this cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract. The Procure-
ment Office was operated in San Francisco, and I believe it was op-
erated by the Division Engineer's office.
311. General Grunert. Did the Division Engineer, so far as you
know, use due diligence in going after materials and pushing to try
to get them?
Colonel Fleming. I think he did; yes, sir.
312. General Grunert. Do you think we could get more informa-
tion on that subject from the Division Engineer's office in San
Francisco?
[lo3G] Colonel Fleming. I think you will have access to the
files, sir, showing constant telephone calls and radiograms.
313. General Grunert. As to transportation, who was responsible
for shipping delays, if there were any^ Who handled that matter?
Where was it handled — in Washington, San Francisco, or where?
Colonel Fleming. I think that was handled through the Division
Engineer's office in San Francisco, arranging for space on any kind
of vessel he could get.
314. General Grunert. Then we can get more detailed information
from the Division Eno;ineer's office in San Francisco?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
315. General Grunert. Now, as to priorities. Who prescribed the
priorities and who could change them?
Colonel Fleming. I meant by priorities the old system of priorities
that the Office of Production Management had.
31(5. General Grunert. They prescribed them, and you got them
through the Chief of Engineers' office?
Colonel Fleming. It was a purchase priority. You could get a
priority A-1 or A-l-j.
317. General Grunert. If they made any change it had to come
through the Chief of Engineers?
Colonel Fleming. We could write up priorities over there. We
had a priority assigned to the project. We could then write a pur-
chase order or a purchase certificate, citing the priority number of the
project. I blame priorities for some of the delays, because it got the
point under O. P. M. that everything became an A-1 priority, and
while you could write them you could not buy anything with them.
[1337] 318. General Grunert. Did the government as repre-
sented by the District Engineer have to get materials for the contrac-
tor, or what was the contractor's responsibility in getting materials
to work with ?
Colonel Fleming. Actually, sir, most of the procurement, or a
large part of it, was done by Engineer channels. The Engineers
would go out and purchase ordinary materials, like cement, asphalt,
and stuff like that. The contractor purchased the machinery. Where
we had to advertise for bids and give specifications and all that sort
of thing he purchased the material, and he would turn around and rent
it on a rental-purchase agreement. If they needed a certain piece of
machinery for a job, the contractor would get it and rent it to the
government on his rental-purchase agreement. Lumber, for example,
was bought direct by the government.
694 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
319. General Grunert. Where did the delay come in? In what
the contractor got or what the government got for the contractor?
Colone Fleming. The delay came in, on those materials, sir, through
the fact that everybody was trying to get materials. Materials were
awfully short. For some time, as I recall it, before the war we were
constantly in a state of emergency because we were always lending
lumber to the natives. The natives would run out of it and borrow
from us, and we would run out and borrow it back from the natives,
because we could not get it over there fast enough.
320. General Grunert. Do vou know anything that would indi-
cate that the contractors as sucli delayed completion of these projects
through their failure in getting materials ?
Colonel Fleming. No, sir.
321. General Grunert. You have nothing on that ?
Colonel Fleming. No, sir.
[1338] 322. General Grunert. Or as to delay due to approval?
That means the approval of those work sheets or job orders under the
general contract.
Colonel Fleming. No, sir. You mean, delays in approval by the
War Department ?
323. General Grunert. Delays in the time it took from the time you
sent your requests in to the time they got back.
Colonel Fleming. I am not talking about the contract, sir. I am
just saying that there were a lot of things that the people in Hawaii
knew should be done, which had been planned for years, and we had
been talking about them, and we would never get authority from the
War Department to proceed.
IVfay I expand a little on that, sir ?
324. General Grunert. Expand, but make it a general expansion.
Colonel Fleming. On the airfield project, we knew we needed a field
on the Island of Kauai. On the Island of Oahu we had one runway
that could take a bombing plane. That was Hickam Field. But there
was so much dirt kicked up that it ruined the motors all the time. We
had a field on Molokai, but no gasoline storage. The Municipal-Ter-
ritorial Airport was a Navy and Army development, and we had no
authority to proceed on that. We finally got authority through the
Civil Aeronautics x4.uthority. On the Island of Hawaii we had three
fields.
325. General Grunert. I understand you had a number of pro-
jects ; but was it mainly a matter of money ?
Colonel Fleming. I think it was mainly, sir, not money, because they
were all the time throwing money around. I think it was mainly that
Hawaii itself had a low priority compared with the Philippines and
Panama, sir.
[1339] 326. General Grunert. For what ?
Colonel Fleming. For construction work.
327. General Gruntert. This is the first time I have heard — I do not
know about the other members of the Board — that Hawaii was not on
the highest priority, and that the only thing that was a lower priority
as comparec^ with the Philippines was the matter of getting some
B-l7's ferried across.
Colonel Flejhng. I do not know, sir, whether anyone else had a
higher priority, but we started work on those 10 airfields, and with all
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 695
the money the government was spending we never did get any state-
ment that that money was included and we never got any appropria-
tion. General Short authorized me to go ahead with two projects, on
his own authorization, using other money.
328. General Grunert. Did he ever put someone in a plane and send
him over here and tell him to find out whether the War Department
understood the problem, why they could not get action on these things,
whether it was a question of money or whether it was a question of
understanding what was needed, or not? Or was everybody content
with just writing letters?
Colonel Fleming. I do not know, sir. I was not high enough in the
hierarchy to know about that.
329. General Gkunert. Now I want to open up one or two other
subjects.
As to this feud which has been mentioned : Did they delay getting
action in the line of approval or in the line of cooperation, or in the
line of getting work started ? Did it delay progress in the work because
of the fact that the Department Engineer and the District Engineer
did not like each other?
Colonel Fleming. I do not think it delayed the work, sir.
[IS40] I answered General Russell that I thought it made my
work actually more difficult.
330. General Grunert. You testified something to the effect that
Rohl, as head of The Hawaiian Constructors or one of their prin-
cipal officers, had to approve what The Hawaiian Constructors did,
how they pushed the work, or something like that. Do you know
of any evidence to the effect that Rohl purposely delayed the
prosecution of the work?
Colonel Fleming. I have no knowledge of it.
331. General Grunert. Do you have any suspicion that he did?
Colonel Fleming. No, sir. I think there was a lot of difficulty in
dealing with them, but I do not think there was any delay caused.
332. General Grunert. Do you know that a congressional investi-
gation committee intimates in its report that such was the case, that
Rohl, through pressure, attempted to delay or did delay defense
projects in Plawaii ?
Colonel Fleming. Yes; I know that. I was interviewed by that
committee.
333. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not, during your
time over there, he did or did not?
Colonel Fleming. I have no knowledge of whether he did or did
not. My opinion is that he did not.
334. General Grunert. Were there manj^ changes that wete made
that would interrupt the progress of a project, for instance, by hav-
ing to use the machinery or materials on another project?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
335. General Grunert. That would cause delay in getting the
original project done?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
[13^1] 336. General Grunert. Who was responsible for such
changes?
Colonel Fleming. I will say, just the run of events, sir. For
example, to take one thing : I know there was a lot of publicity about
696 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the Bellows Field pa vino- job. We had a lot of asphalt plants over
there to pave the field. The rock supply ran out and we could not
get any more rock around there, so we had to open up another
quarry some place else, near Wheeler Field. We had a clelaj^ while
we moved the asphalt plant over to Wheeler Field.
337. General Grunekt. You spoke of a comparatively long delay
where authority from Washington had to be procured in order for
3''ou to construct something in connection with a park system. Was
that delay material in eventually getting the installation in the place
you wanted it?
Colonel Fleming. No, sir.
338. General Grunert. In other words, was there somebody to
blame here wdio prevented the Hawaiian Department from doing
something in the defense line that was material to the Pari Harbor
disaster ?
Colonel Fleming. No, sir. The particular place I am talking
about, they found that that particular radar set never w^ould work.
339. General Grunert. Did they know at the time that the delay
took place that it definitely would not Avork?
Colonel Fleming. No, sir.
340. General Grunert. I am interested in the estimated dates of
completion. I find in the record that there is a job order saying that
the estimated date of completion will be about six months hence,
and that is extended about three months more. What generally, was
the reason for those extensions, generally speak- [1^4^] ing?
Can you throw some light on that ?
Colonel Fleming. The question of materials was one, sir. Take the
Bellows Field runway: We had a joint contract with the rock quarry
out there, the Navy and the Army, the Navy developing Kaneohe air
base and the Army developing Bellows Field.
34:1. General Grunert. It is quite natural under that sort of a con-
tract and iob order to have some delay, is it not?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. On another big project for gasoline
storage we changed the design,
342. General Grunert. Have you ever thought that if you had been
District Engineer and had had this construction wT)rk to do, you oi-
anyone else of good engineering ability could have done a better job
than was done, or a quicker job than was done?
Colonel Fleming. That is a difficult question to answer, sir.
343. General Grunert. It is a matter of opinion. If you answer
it yes, I will ask you why.
Colonel Fleming. I do not have ability as an engineer. I am a
very junior officer. I think that if somebody with ability as an engi-
neer had been District Engineer and could have been quick to find
out what the military side of the picture had been, I think some of the
things might have been speeded up a little bit.
344. General Grunert. Here was Wyman, who, from what we can
find out, w^as what was known as a "go-getter" and the Chief of Engi-
neers' office apparently thought highlj^ of his ability to get things done.
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
345. General Grunert. Here he was. Unless there was something,
[1343] that delayed him, why could somebody else do a better
job than he did if a better job could be done ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 697
Colonel Fleming. Sir, somebody with equal engineering ability
could have at times been more cooperative with other people,
346. General Grunert. Then, in your opinion, it was not his engi-
neering ability; it was his lack of being able to get along with other
people? _ ..^^^^.
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir,
347, General Grunert. That answers my question. Thank you
very much. We appreciate your coming.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon, at 12:26 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of
witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 699
[13U'\ CONTENTS
MONDAY, AUGUST 21, 1944
Testimony of— Page'
Maj. Gen. Durward S. Wilson, Commanding Southeastern Sector,
Eastern Defense Command, Raleigh, North Carolina 1345
Brig. Gen. Roland Walsh, Army of the United States ; Commanding
General, Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot 1381
Col. Russell C. Throckmorton, Infantry, Camp Breckinridge, Kentucky- 1387
Col. George W. Bicknell, Military Intelligence, G-2 M. I. S. ; Washing-
ton, D. 0 1413
DOCUMENTS
Message, November 27, 1941, Chief of StafC to Hawaiian Department.. 1347-1395
EXHIBITS
No. 19. Items appearing in the Honolulu Advertiser 1373
19-A. " " " " ■" Star-Bulletin 1379
20. Letter of August 18, 1944, from Gen. Miles to Gen. Grunert 1442
* Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original transcript of proceedings.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 701
Usm PEOCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD
MONDAY, AUGUST 21, 1944
Munitions Building,
Washington, D. C.
The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on Saturday, conducted the
hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board,
presiding.
Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D.
Russell and Maj. G«n. Walter H. Frank, Members.
Present also : Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder ; Major Henry C.
Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr.,
Executive Officer,
General Grunert. The Board will come to order.
TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL DURWARD S. WILSON, COMMAND-
ING SOUTHEASTERN SECTOR, EASTERN DEFENSE COMMAND,
RALEIGH, N. C.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board your
name, rank, organization, and station.
General Wilson. Durward S. Wilson, Major General, commanding
Southeastern Sector, Eastern Defense Command; Raleigh, North
Carolina. ,
2. General Grunert. General, the Board is after facts, as to what
took place both before and during the Pearl Harbor attack. We hope
that because of your assignment in Hawaii in 1941, and during the
attack, you may be able to throw some light on the [i^^6'] sub-
Just what was your assignment, position, and station, while in
Hawaii in 1941 ?
General Wilson. On October 1, 1941, the Twenty-Fourth Infantry
Division was organized, and I took command of that. Prior to that
time, in 1941, I had been commanding the Twenty-First Infantry
Brigade, and at the time of the Japanese attack, I was in command of
the Twenty-Fourth Infantry Division.
3. General Grunert. That was stationed where?
General Wilson. At Schofield Barracks.
4. General Grunert. Was that an independent tactical command,
directly under the Department Commander, or was it under someone
else?
General Wilson. Directly under the Department Commander, sir.
5. General Grunert, Then you were, as Commanding General of
702 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the Twenty-Fourth Infantry Division, directly under General Short,
the Department Commander?
General Wilsox. Yes, sir.
6. General Gruxert. Were the Commanders of major units — and
by "major units" I mean your unit — kept informed of the War Depart-
ment and Navy Department messages, that you might call "warning
messages, that came to the Department, from about November 24 to
about December 6 ?
General Wilsox. Yes. sir.
7. General Gruxert. You were informed of their contents'?
General Wilsox, I was informed. Now, I cannot state that I
was informed of all of them, because I do not known what the De-
partment Commander received, but I distinctly remember, on U34-7~\
about the 29th of November, General Short sent an officer courier out
to Schofield Barracks, who orally delivered a message to me.
8. General Gruxert. Do you recall that message?
General Wilsox. Yes, sir; the purport of it. It was, that informa-
tion had been received from the War Department that negotiations
with the Japanese had reached a deadlock, and that our Government
would take no aggressive action ; in other words, to use a slang ex-
pression, they would "stand pat," and await whatever action the Japa-
nese took.
9. General Gruxert. That was the gist of it ? This is the Chief of
Staff's message to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Depart-
ment, November 27, 19-il. I want you to listen to it carefully, because
I am going to ask you questions about it, as to whether or not you
knew of the contents of this message, and whether or not this is the
message to which the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Depart-
ment probably referred :
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes, with
only the barest i)0ssibility that the Japanese Government might come back and
offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile action possible
at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United
States desires that Japan commit the first overt act This policy should not,
repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might
jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to
undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but
these measures should be carried out [ISJfS] so as not, repeat not, to alarm
the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostili-
ties occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five as far as they
I)ertain to Japan. Limit discussion of this highly secret information to mini-
mum essential officers.
Is that the gist of what was given to you ?
General Wilson. Yes, sir. The message as delivered to me did not
cover as many details, as I remember it, as are given there; but the
purport was in general as you have indicated, there.
10. General Grunert. Do you recall whether the message said, or
whether you were informed, that —
If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the L'nited States desires that
Japan commit the first overt acf
General Wilson. I think so, sir. My recollection is that if there was
any action taken, they preferred to let Japan commit the first act.
11. General Gruxert. And did you know anything about this par-
ticular phrase ?
This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course
of action that might jeopardize your defense.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 703
General Wilson. General, I cannot state about that.
12. General Grunert. See if this is approximately the idea that
was conveyed to you :
The negotiations have practically fallen by the wayside. Now, we just have
to sit back and wait, until [1349] Japan commits the first overt act.
General Wilson. To wait. In other words, not necessarily that
Japan would do it, but that if a hostile act was going to be committed,
we were to allow the Japanese to do it first.
13. General Grunert. Do you remember whether or not you were
directed to take any reconnaissance or any other measures in pre-
paring for the future, as a result of that particular message ?
General Wilson. No, sir ; not as a result of that particular message ;
but we had plans that had been formulated in advance of that, and
we were working at all times under one of the alerts.
14. General Grunert. Do you recall having received, or did the
Commanding General of the Department transmit to you, information
about a Navy message received on the same day, which was passed
to him, in which occurred the phrase — •.
Consider this dispatch a war warning?
General Wilson. No, sir; I did not receive that information.
15. General Grunert. I will read the rest of that Navy dispatch,
because I want to find out whether or not the gist of it was transmitted
to you, or whether or not it may have been that the information trans-
mitted to you was intended to cover both these messages received.
This dispatch of November 27, 1941, from the Navy to the Commander-
in-Chief of tlve Pacific Fleet, reads as follows :
Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an
effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan expected to make
an aggres- [1350] sive move within the next few days. An amphibious
expedition against either Philippines, Thai, or the Kra Peninsula, or possibly
Borneo, is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the
organization of their naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deploy-
ment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL— 46 only. Guam,
Samoa, and continental districts have been directed to take appropriate measures
against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department.
Inform naval districts and Army authorities. British to be informed by
SPENOVA.
Did you get any information along those lines?
General Wilson. No, sir ; information in reference to that message
was not furnished to me.
16. General Grunert. When was your command alerted as against
sabotage ? That was the No. 1 alert.
General Wilson. I cannot remember, General, just when that took
place. We had been under an alert for some time prior to December 7,
and at the time of the Japanese attack, we had been functioning under
the sabotage alert, for some time.
17. General Grunert. In view of the information you had, did you
consider that a sabotage alert covered the ground demanded, or pos-
sibly indicated, by the warnings received?
General Wilson. In so far as we were concerned, I felt that it did,
because our measures primarily consisted of the guarding of bridges
and the patrolling of our sector ; and by those means, plus the plan
which had been prepared for the defense, we were in a position to
704 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
occupy our defensive positions [1351] in a very short period
of time.
18. General Grunert. "What was that short period of time, ap-
proximately ?
General Wilson. Well, a few hours, sir,
19. General Gruxert, And how much of that plan did yoii carry
out during the attack ?
General Wilson, Oh, we actually moved into position, just as soon
as the Japanese attacked. And I had estimated that with the air
patrols — I didn't know what they were, but with the air patrols and
the naval inshore and offshore patrols, it would be impossible for the
Japanese to make a land attack suddenly; and since our plans had
all been perfected and our emplacements actually constructed, on
December 7, we had machine-gun emplacements constructed all over
the northern sector and the southern sector. We had done that in
the period between May and December; so, in so far as our troops
were concerned, I felt that with the patrol action we were taking,
that was all that was essential,
20. General Grunert. You had nothing to do with the Air?
General Wilson. No.
21. General Grunert. Or with the anti-Air?
General Wilsox. Xo, sir.
(B)"ief recess.)
[1352'] 22. General Grunert. The Board will come to order.
Then, as I understand you, you were not particularly concerned
about any immediate danger because your part in the defense of the
Islands, the part of your unit, consisted in taking positions to ward
off a surface attack ; is that right ?
General Wilson. That is right; yes. sir.
23. General Grunert. And therefore an alert position at that time
seemed to be all right to you ?
General Wilson. Yes, sir.
24. General Grunert. That is, alert position against sabotage at
that time seemed to be all right to you ?
General Wilson. In other words, General, I personally did not
feel that it was necessary for us to go out under Alert 3, which would
have been to go out, occupy our positions, and stay constantly in
the field. With our patrols and the feeling that in case of a land
attack we would most certainly have some warning and we would be
able to occupy our positions well ahead of time, I did not feel that it
was-essential.
25. General Grunert. What was the basis of your expecting warn-
ing? Where was it to come from, in what form was it to be, and
approximately what time would it take to get it to you?
General Wilson. You mean warning as to a condition, a change in
alert ? From Department Headquarters, sir?
26. General Grunert. Yes, but you said you felt that you would
get that notice.
General Wilson. Yes.
27. General Grunert, Now, did you know of your own knowledge
whether or not there was actual distant reconnaissance, whether there
was actual information being received from the Navy?
[1353] General Wilson. I did not, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 705
28. General Gruxert. You did not?
General Wilson. I assumed that it was in effect. I was not
informed on it.
29. General Gruxert. You assumed that everything was being
done, that you would get ample warning from the Department in
order to be able to carrj' out your assigned mission.
General Wilsox. That is right ; 3'es, sir.
30. General Grunert. Now, normally what was the status of the
ammunition as to your troops, as to its availability, as to Avhat was in
the hands of the troops ; and if you didn't have enough in the hands
of your troops how were you going to get it, to turn out in a hurry?
General Wilson. The infantry ammunition, General, as nearly as
I can remember, we had a sufficient amount on hand readily accessible
for the troops to take right into the field. The artillery had a limited
amount, but I remember distinctly that on December the 7th after
we went in the field we continued to haul ammunition. There was
no difficulty at all in supply features ; that had been arranged so that
we could promptly get it. But it takes a considerable period of time
to put in an adequate amount of artillery ammunition in field posi-
tions.
31. General Grunert. Now, your unit, the 24th Infantry Division,
was a triangular division, was it?
General Wilson. That is right ; yes, sir.
32. General Grunert. And its component parts consisted of
infantry and artillery, and anything else? What calibers of artillery?
{135If] General Wilson. 105s.
33. General Grunert. 105s. You had nothing to do with defense
against air except you own local troojjs?
General Wilson. That is right. We had some 75s also that we
used for beach defense.
34. General Grunert. Then, by the time you got to your assigned
position could you then have gotten the ammunition from the source
it was supposed to come from to the positions in order to fire when
you were in position with your artillery ?
General Wilson. Initially, yes.
35. General Grunert. Initially.
General Wilson. We w^ould have taken it right out with us. But
I mean, to lay in the supply that you would want in defense, you
had to continue to haul ammunition. We did actually continue
hauling.
36. General Grunert. And you do not think the ammunition situa-
tion as far as your division was concerned proved to be acute in any
way
General Wilson. No, sir.
37. General Grunert. Or might have been acute had there been a
real surface attack?
General Wilson. AVell, General, had the Japanese been able to
make a land attack without our knowing a thing until they landed, I
still think that we would have been able to meet the situation, but it is
entirely possible that — I can't conceive of that situation, though, such
a situation happening, their coming in, even with the events as they
did happen; I can't conceive of a land attack being made until we
knew, without our knowing a thing about it.
79716 — 46— tex. 145. toL 1 46
706 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[135S] 38. General Frank. Did you conceive of this air attack
happening ?
General Wilson. No. No, I did not.
39. General Grunert. That seemed to be beyond the conception
of most everybody.
"What is the difference between an air attack and a surface attack.
in the line of your getting more advanced notice ?
General Wilson. Well, of course, in order to bring troops in, sur-
face troops, it takes ships to bring them in, and they come in more
slowly, whereas planes can come in from a distance and make an air
raid in a very short period of time.
40. General Grunert. There was no attempt made, was there, dur-
ing this air raid to land any troops of any kind?
General Wilson. No, sir. It might be interesting in that connec-
tion, sir, to state that as soon as we got wind of this attack by the
bombing, my Chief of Staff, who got to the command post a few
minutes ahead of time — we both, of course, as soon as the attack
started, went to the command post, and he immediately gave direc-
tions for the troops to move into the field. We didn't wait then for
instructions from Department Headquarters. However, instructions
from Department Headquarters did come in a very short period of
time, that we would go into Alert No. 3, which was an all-out defense.
41. General Grunert. As far as j'ou were concerned, did it make
any difference in carrying out your mission or in minimizing the
danger to your command whether they had been on Alert 2 or 3 ?
[1356] General Wilson. I don't really think so. General.
42. General Grunert. AVas your ammunition assigned to your
division ?
General Wilson. That is right.
43. General Grunert. Now, as to whether or not you were kept in-
formed or sufficiently informed, were conferences held by the Com-
manding General or his Chief of Staff with the principal subordinate
commanders wherein they were kept informed of the situation and
in turn took measures to meet such situation? In other words, what
Avas the scheme of informing the Commanding Generals of large sub-
ordinate units, and how was it done, not this particular time but gen-
erall}^ about that time ?
General Wilson. I understand, sir. General, it is very difficult for
me to remember. I know after Pearl Harbor that there were several
conferences of senior commanders at Department Headquarters. I
cannot state that conferences of division commanders were not held
prior to Pearl Harbor. The best I can state is, at this particular time I
cannot remember conferences that were held. In other words, we
knew what the alerts were, and there were certain things laid down
that we were to carry out during those alerts, and we had quite elab-
orate maneuvers. We worked constantly from May. Up until May
we had no fortifications, infantry fortifications, in Hawaii. General
Short started us in in ISIay during the department maneuvers digging
in, and we continued that right up to December the 7th and of course
after that added to it. So that at the time of the attack infantry
machine gun emplacements and other type automatic weapon emplace-
ments were [1357] actually constructed. We had no money to
do it with. We went to the jsalvage yards and got all the material we
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 707
could, but we actually had them, and General Short personally made
inspection of them, aiid I have talked to General Short, but I cannot
remember specifically^ conferences that were held. But I do remember
this officer courier coming out to see me personally in the evening on
about the 27th, 28th, or 29th : I cannot remember the exact date.
44. General Grunert. Well, the fact that an officer courier came
out to you to convey this message to you would sort of indicate that
you had not attended a conference on that subject, would it not?
General Wilson. Oh, I am sure we didn't have any conference in
reference to this message. No, sir, we did not. The information I
gained was, just as I indicated, through an officer courier who gave
it to me by word of mouth.
45. General Grunert. Then, j^ou were not in on any discussion as
to whether to take Alert 1, 2, or 3, or what ?
General Wilson. No, sir. Tliat was decided by the Department
Commander.
46. General Grunert. Were you in on any discussions as to the
adequacy of the plans or the S. O. P. that they put out, or did you get
the thing as an accomplished fact without having been consulted about
the terms of plans and S. O. P.s ?
General Wilson. No, not in reference to the S. O. P.s. I have talked
to General Short about the plans, because at the time the northern
sector, for which I was responsible, was in my opinion very, very weak,
and I used to talk to General Short about it. I talked to him about it
at times, and he said that [13S8] he realized it but the troops
were just not available. Our regiments were under strength, and some
had to be held in central reserve.
47. General Grunert. Now, in your testimony before the Roberts
Commission it is recorded that you stated that you had never been
called into conference or consultation regarding the warning message
of November 27th.
General Wilson. That is right, sir,
48. General Grunert. Also that you felt safe because of the patrol
system, knew nothing about it, that you thought the Navy had an
inshore and offshore patrol, and the Navy had an inshore and offshore
patrol ?
General Wilson. I did think so, sir.
49. General Grunert. Yes. You thought then that if all these things
were working that you should get ample information in order to carry
out your jjart of the mission ?
General Wilson. Yes, sir.
50. General Grunert. Have you any questions ?
51. General Frank. Yes.
Were you there wh^n General Herron w^as in coinmand?
General Wilson. Yes, a short time. General Herron left a few
months after I arrived.
52. General Frank. Did you know of the arrangement he had for
liaving a meeting every week with the next layer of his commanders?
General Wilson. I am not certain. It seems to me I do remember —
I, of course, was a subordinate then and not directly under him —
it seems to me I do remember that the then Division Commander
of the Hawaiian Division did go down for a conference [1359]
with him once a week.
708 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
53. General Frank. Every Monday?
General Wilson. That is right.
54. General Frank. What I am trying to arrive at: Was there
any such arrangement that General Short had ? When the Hawaiian
Division that was there when General Herron was there was later
split up, it became two divisions?
General Wilson. That is right.
55. General Frank. And at that time, instead of there being one
commander at Schofield, there were two commanders of which you
were one ?
General Wilson. Two tactical commanders ; that is correct.
56. General Frank. Was there any arrangement whereby every
M'eek you had a conference with the Commanding General of the
Hawaiian Department ?
General Wilson. There was not.
57. General Frank. Or did you go to him regularly in any interval
of time?
General Wilson. No, I did not. You see, there was only a period
there of two months after the first of October to the first of December
when I was an independent commander under General Short. I
have a vague impression that prior to that time General Short did
hold meetings similar to those that General Herron held, but after
the Hawaiian Division was split up into two triangular divisions, I
do not remember ; I am certain that there was no specified period of
time when we went down ; I am sure, though, that during the period
of time between October the first and December there must have been
at least one occasion on which I did attend a conference at \1360^
General Short's headquarters.
58. General Frank. Did you have any antiarcraft weapons in the
divison ?
General Wilson. Well, we had only the normal .50 caliber machine
guns and .30 caliber machine guns. We had some of those for anti-
aircraft purposes.
59. General Frank. Were they in position on the morning of
December 7th?
General Wilson. No, not in the division.
60. General Frank. Sabotage alert would not require them to be in
position ?
General Wilson. That is right.
61. General Frank. How long did it take you to get into your field
positions ?
General Wilson. Well, that is rather difficult to say.
62. General Frank. Well, about how long?
General Wilson. I would say three or four hours for all of the
troops to get out.
63. General Frank. Being a lower echelon, you assumed that thor-
ough and efficient efforts were being made to provide you with any
adequate warning?
General Wilson. That is correct.
64. General Frank. Wlien the air attack came without warning,
what was your reaction?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 709
General Wilson. Well, one of great surprise that the Japanese could
have gotten in for an air attack without our having some warning
of it. That was followed by immediate action to get our troops out.
[ISOl] 65. General Grunert. If you had your units in your battle
positions under Alert 3 when the air raid took place, what could you
have done toward stopping that raid or minimizing its effect?
General Wilson. In my opinion, General, nothing.
66. General Grunert. That is because you were an infantry division
and really had defensive j^ositions to repel a surface attack, was it?
General Wilson. That is right, sir. And the reason we went out
was, we didn't know but what this air attack was preliminary to a
surface attack, so we wanted to get into position promptly. But had
we been in position, I think we would have gained nothing.
67. General Grunert. What was your state of mind as to the prob-
ability or possibility of an attack on the Island by either air or surface
or a combined attack by Japan on the Island of Oahu at about that
time it did happen?
General Wilson. I did not think it would take place, sir.
68. General Grunert. What governed that line of thinking?
General Wilson. Well, that was mainly from my feeling about the
big picture. I did not think for a moment Japan would attack the
United States. That was my personal opinion.
69. General Grunert. But the Island of Oahu and that group of
islands is an outpost to protect the mainland, isn't it?
General Wilson. Yes, sir.
70. General Grunert. And on an outpost our teachings have always
been that we must be on the alert no matter whether they are asleep at
home or not.
General Wilson. Yes, sir.
[1S62] 71. General Grunert. In other words, an outpost is out
there in order that that people at home can go to sleep.
General Wilson. And our plans were complete for the all-out attack
by the Japanese. Of course we were quite weak in strength, but com-
plete plans had been perfected.
72. General Grunert. Well, plans, of course, are good if you im-
plement them ; if you don't, they are not worth a damn. Now, suppose
you had gone into Alert 2 or 3 ; then they might have had some chance
of warding off this attack, might they not ?
General Wilson. Well, General, I can only express my personal
opinion about the other activities or tlie other defensive measures.
73. General Grunert. You were not concerned in Alert 2 except
that it meant sabotage also?
General Wilson. That is correct.
74. General Grunert. But you were concerned in Alei't No. 3 ?
General Wilson. Yes, sir.
75. General Grunert. And if they didn't go into Alert No. 3 it
really didn't make much difference to you except you had to take care
of sabotage ; is that correct ?
General Wilson. Well, I wouldn't say it didn't make any difference
to me. I mean, insofar as the accomplishment of my mission was con-
cerned, I felt that the measures that had been taken were adequate. I
still feel so, insofar as I am concerned.
710 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
7G. General Gkuxert. Have you ever asked yourself that, had you
been Commander of the Department, you would have taken Alert 1, 2,
or 3. or what you would have done?
General Wilsox. Well, I'll tell you, I would not— I mean [1363]
I have, of course, thought about that, but I don't know just exactly
what information General Short had.
77. General Gruxert. Then, it would have depended on the infor-
mation he had. But if you knew that war was imminent or suspected,
as an outpost weren't you supposed to be prepared to meet any emer-
gency, even if you had no information ?
General Wilsox. Yes, sir. Of course, it is very easy, sort of as
hindsight, to say it would have been much better if 1 had planes.
78. General Grux'ert. Looking forward to what your command may
be in the future, and if you are given no information, you must be
prepared to meet what?
General Wilsox'. Meet any situation, of course.
79. General Gruxert. That is not hindsight; that is looking
forward.
General Wilsox'. No, but I meant just talking now as we look back
on this situation.
80. General Gruxert. But that is a military axiom.
General Wilsox'. Oh, yes. Yes, sir.
81. General Grux'ert. General Russell.
82. General Russell. Do you recall any information which was
brought to your attention, General, in the middle of October relating
to the relations between the Japanese Government and the American
Government ?
General Wilsox'. I do not.
83. General Russell. You had become a Division Commander
[1364-] about October 1 ?
General "VYilsox. October 1st ; that is right.
84. General Russell. So you were under the immediate command
of the Department Commander from that time. Had you been on
alerts prior to Xovember 27th, '41 ?
General Wilsox*. Oh, j^es. I couldn't tell you just how far back.
General, we had been on one of the alerts, but for some time prior to
the attack,
85. General Russell. Prior to the alert which was in force at the
date of the attack, had there been any other alerts out there in which
you had participated?
General Wilsox. I know we had had patrols out and we had been
guarding bridges for quite a while prior to the attack by the Japa-
nese, and my impression is that at one time — I am not quite certain —
at one time the air force had their planes spread out. but at the time
of the attack, as you know, we were functioning directly under a
sabotage alert.
86. General Russell. Was there anything on the Island, the con-
duct of the native Japanese people or anything else, which indicated
to you that the relations between the Japanese Government and the
American Government were growing more tense : if as a matter of fact
it was growing more tense?
General Wilsox. No, not in reference to the Japanese population.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 711
87. General Russell, General, I rather got the impression from the
replies that you made to General Grunert's questions that you were
somewhat familiar with the general situation, and from that you had
made a deduction that an atta^ck on Oahu or any [lS6o~\ island
in the Hawaiian group probably would not occur.
General Wilson. That w^as just my personal opinion.
88. General Russell. Wel^ now, what do you mean by familiarity
with the general situation ? What do you mean by "general situation" ?
General Wilson. Well, I meant the over-all picture, that I didn't feel
that the Japanese were strong enough to go to war with the United
States.
89. General Russell. In other words, on the morning of December
Ttli prior to this attack by the Japs you didn't believe that war was
imminent?
General Wilson, No, I did not. However, I would like for it to
be made clear here that insofar as the operation of my division was
concerned we were prepared to meet any eventuality, because we had
our plans complete, we had practiced them, we had had maneuvers in
which we moved troops from one place to another. We had the em-
placements constructed, range cards prepared. In other words, wo
were ready to meet anj^ eventuality.
90. General Russell. But the information which was brought to
your attention by the courier in late November was not of such nature
as to change your thinking about the general situation and to convince
you or to lead j^ou to think that w^ar might be imminent?
General Wilson. No, I didn't think so.
91. General Russell. General, you had considerable experience from
the time that you went out with the troops of the divisions, first the
Hawaiian Division and then later as the commander of [1366]
one of the triangular divisions. Were new troops constantly coming
into those divisions, or was the personnel fairly fixed all along?
General Wilson. The personnel was pretty well fixed.
92. General Russell. From the beginning?
General Wilson. From the time I arrived there; and of course
. we had good men going back to the United States and a certain num-
ber of men replacing them, and officers, too ; but in general, to answer
your question, our troops were well trained, we thought. That is, our
organization was.
93. General Russell. You did not have any big burden of recruit
1 raining during that period of time ?
General Wilson. No, sir.
94. General Russell. If you had gone on Alert No. 3 in the spring
of 1941, the time you went oiit there, and remained on it until December
1941, what effect on the morale and training of the troops do you think
that would have had?
General Wilson. It would have had a very adverse effect. We
found that after December Tth our troops were in the field and stayed
in the field constantly, and we soon found that the troops were
getting rusty in their training. That was brought to the Department
Commander's attention, and by and by a scheme was arrived at to
use certain battalions from his reserve — the 34th Infantry was avail-
able— that would come in and take over a battalion sector and let us
bring that battalion back into Schofield and put them in training
712 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
again. Also, it was a fine morale factor, too, in that they got a chance
to get hot baths in barracks, and have some recreation, and so on.
But the principal thing was that training suffered by virtue of the
fact that out there in the field they were digging and perfecting
dug- [1367] outs for themselves, construction work, and so on,
and the training suffered.
95. General Grunert. "What training was there to suffer?
General Wilson. All of the technique, General. They even got
to the point where they got rusty on the use of their weapons, be-
cause, while they were out there and had their weapons in position,
the ammuition question was quite acute then so that we could not
get it for firing purposes, and they needed to be whipped back into
shape.
96. General Grunert. Could they not have done that part of it
while they were in position?
General Wilson. They were constantly in position in small groups.
We would have them on the firing line. There were a number of
machine gun emplacements with three or four men there con-
stantly, day and night, on the alert, and we put so many men on that
type of work that it had a decided adverse effect on training.
97. General Grunert. That is what you were out there for, to be in
that sort of work. Of course it interferes with nicely-planned
training where all conditions are what they ought to be. But from
December 7th they had to carry on, and I presume they are still
carrying on to a great extent.
General Wilson. We did as much training as we could, but noth-
ing like as much as we needed. While we had the installations for
the weapons, we had no quarters for our men.
98. General Grunert. That is not supposed to be a hardship, is it?
General Wilson. If you have troops and put them in the field
and keep them constantly there, rained upon, and so on, you know,
of course, that it is going to have an effect.
[136S] 99. General Grunert. Unless they actually have a
chance to do some fighting?
General Wilson. That is right. Actual work along that line was
started as soon as possible.
100. General Eussell. General Grunert has discussed with you
the wisdom of regarding Hawaii and the other islands as an out-
post to protect the western coast and the necessity for being con-
stantly on the alert out there, to accomplish the maximum and to
meet the woi^st. If that policy had been followed from the begin-
ning of 1940 until December, 1941, with the troops constantly on
the alert for two years waiting for an enemy which did not come,
and being deprived of the type of training about which you have
been speaking, what effect on the command's morale and state of
efficiency would such a long and continuous alert have had?
General Wilson. I just answered that. General, for a shorter period.
Of course, for a longer period it would have the same effect, an
adverse effect.
101. General Grunert, Would it have been necessary to have all
the troops always in position? Why could they not have been
elerted without always occupying positions or without a hundred
per cent being in position ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 713
General Wilson. They probably could have, sir.
102. General Grunert. Could they not have been alerted with
one-third of them in position and thus have taken away the strain
and the effect on training and morale? I realize that you cannot
keep troops in one place doing the same thing over and over again.
But that is why we have senior officers; they have to look at tliose
things and do what they can with what they have.
[1369] General Wilson. General, Ave did do that during our
training periods. For instance, in May, 1941, when we had our De-
partment maneuvers, General Short very definitely and deliberately
made them very strenuous. He felt — and I think he is right — that
prior to that time our maneuvers had not been strenuous enough ; and
we had maneuvers of the strenuous type. Following that, up and
until December 7, we had our groups occupy their sectors as part of
their training for short periods of time.
103. General Russell. Could you have operated under Alert No. 3
with only a third of 3^our people in the field?
General Wilson. No.
" 104. General Russell. In other words, if you had to become effec-
tive to the maximum you had to turn out the entire personnel ?
General Wilson. Yes, General, because the sectors were so big and
the strength of the troops in my sector, the northern sector, at the
time of the attack was, in my opinion, too small; but it was the best
that could be done under the circumstances.
105. General Grunert. What information did you get from the
local newspapers or newscasts or broadcasts from the United States
about the state of international relations between the United States
and Japan during this so-called critical period from about November
24 to Djecember 7 ? Did you not get any information ?
General Wilson. Oh, yes. I read the papers, sir, and listened to
broadcasts.
106. General Grunert. But they did not impress on you that war
was imminent?
General Wilson. No, General.
107. General Grunert. Or did they impress you that there might
[1370] be war, but it would not come to you ?
General Wilson. I have to be honest about it. I did not feel that
the Japanese would attack the United States.
108. General Grunert. But, still, that was what we were in being
for — to be prepared in case they did.
General Wilson. I would like to make one thing clear in that con-
nection. That was my personal opinion. Of course I was working
under a directive from Department Headquarters, and I wish to
repeat that I did not go on my personal opinion. In other words,
being a soldier, I realized that we had to be prepared for any
eventuality.
109. General Grunert. You considered yourself pretty well pre-
pared as far as your own unit was concerned ?
General Wilson. Yes. In so far as the troops we had were avail-
able I felt that we were ready to meet any eventuality.
110. General Frank. In the message of November 27 from the War
Depai'tment to General Short is this statement :
There measures sbould be carried out so as not to alarm the civil population.
714 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Was anything said to you about that ?
Genera? Wilson. Yes ; I remember that.
111. General Frank. You remember it ?
General Wilson. I remember something about in whatever meaS'
ures we took to avoid alarming the civil population.
112. General Frank. We have a file of Honolulu papers in the oflEice,
and" there have been copied the headlines from Sunday, the 30th of
November, through to Sunday, the 7th of December. Read just the
first line under each date heading, please, to refresh your memory.
Read the top line on each one (handing ])apers to the witness).
[1-371] General Wilson (after reading as requested). Yes, Gen-
eral.
113. General Frank. Those headlines read, consecutively from the
30th of November to December 7 :
Japanese May Strike Over Weekend.
The next day :
Hull, Kurusu in Crucial Meeting Today.
On Tuesday :
Japan Still Hopeful of Making Peace With U. S.
Wednesday :
Huge Pincer Attack on United States by Japan, France Predicted.
The fifth of December :
Pacific Zero Hour Near ; Japan Answers U. S. Today.
The sixth of December :
America Expected to Reject Japan's Reply on Indo-China.
Another headline on the same day :
Japanese Navy Moving South.
Again on Saturday, the ()th :
Detailed Plans Completed for M-day Setup.
Sunday, the 7th of December :
F. D. R. Will Send Message to Emperor on War Crisis.
As a result of those newspaper headlines is it or is it not your opinion
that the civil population were somewhat stirred up?
General Wilson. Oh, Yes,
114. General Frank. Through the newspaper headlines generally
the civil population had been alarmed, then, had they not ?
Genei'al AVilsjn. I think so.
115. General Frank. If they were already alarmed through the
[1S73] newspaper headlines, what advantage did the military
people have in playing down the situation ?
General Wils )N. I am not in position to answer that. In other
words, the message that came to General Short telling him to avoid
stirring up the civil population — I don't knov». They sought, perhaps,
to make the situation as ea.sy as possible and not stir things up. But
what I t:liink of it is immaterial, of course. These instructions were
given by higher authority.
116. General Frank. The civil population was already stirred up?
General Wilson. Certainly.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 715
117. General Frank'. Wliile the commercial newspapers were stir-
ring up the population, do you think, or have you any opinion, as to
whether this attitude that the military establishment had had any
effect of any sort in calming the military population?
General Wilson. I do not quite understand your question.
118. General Frank. While the newspapers were stirring up the
pot, do you think that the military efforts were influential in cahning
them?
General Wilson. They may have had some effect on it.
119. General Frank. Did the absence of any information coming
from higher authority to you on this situation, when there was so much
comment in the newspapers, cause any reaction on your part?
General Wilson. Oh, yes. I thought about the matter, of course,
as a commander having the responsibility for a sector; but, as I have
stated before, I felt that the plans that we had made, with the troops
we had available, enabled us to meet any situation that might arise
as well as we could with the number [137J] of troops we had.
I Avould have felt much better at that time had we had more troops.
120. General Frank. What was the state of mind of the rank and
file of the military personnel with respect to the probability of war?
General Wilson. It would be very difficult for me to express an
opinion on that. My impression at this stage, after three j'ears, more
or less, is that a great many people felt that while the situation was
critical, the Japanese probably would not attack the United States.
121. Major Clausen. May the record show that the witness has
been reading from a document consisting of three pages, headed
"Items Appearing in the Honolulu Advertiser," which we offer in
evidence as Exhibit 19.
(Document headed "Items Appearing in the Honolulu Advertiser"
was marked Exhibit No. 19 and received in evidence.)
122. General Russell. General Frank has read to you certain head-
lines that purport to have appeared in one of the local papers in Hono-
lulu beginning Sunday, November 30th, and extending through De-
cember 7th. This paper is identified on the document from which
you read as The Honolulu Advertiser. It is my impression, based on
certain facts which have developed during the investigation, that
The Honolulu Advertiser was the big paper out there?
General Wilson. That is right.
128. General Russell. And it had a larger circulation, probably
I'eached more people on the island, than any other periodical or publica-
tion there; is that true?
General Wilson. I imagine it did. It was one of the lead- [1374^
ing papers there.
124. General Frank. Was it a morning or afternoon paper?
General Wilson. A morning paper, as I remember it.
125. General Frank. Was there an afternoon paper?
General Wilson. I have forgotten — yes; they had a morning and
an afternoon paper.
126. General Frank. Was that The Star Bulletin?
General Wilson. I am not certain.
127. General Frank. The Star Bulletin had a large circulation,
too, did it not?
General Wilson. Yes.
716 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
128. General Russell. General, the effect, as you told General
Frank, on the population, including the Japanese elements of the
population, of these headlines, was to make them conscious of the fact
that the relations between the Japanese Government and the American
Government were becoming more critical or were not entirely all that
could be desired. I believe you told General Frank also that the effect
of these news items on the population was to more or less excite them,
or stir them up?
General Wilson. I would imagine so. That is only an opinion.
129. General Eussell. It is not based on facts, but is joist an as-
sumption from a process of reasoning?
Genera] Wilson. Yes.
130. General Russell. If the Japanese elements on the island
which the Department was instructed not to excite were already war
conscious, do you think that manning the guns, hauling out live
ammunition and turning out all the troops to a position of readiness
to avert whatever might come along would have added to the excite-
ment and the tenseness of the local situation, or [1375] would
it have had some opposite effect?
General Wilson. I think it probably would.
131. General Russell. Would what?
General Wilson. Would have added to it.
132. General Russell. Which would have been to an extent in
violation of the order to avoid alarming the civil population?
General Wilson. I do not personally think that. General. You
have got to use your own discretion about the application of that
provision on exciting the population. In other words — and this is
my opinion — if the Department Commander felt that the situation
justified going into Alert 3 and moving his troops into the field,
he would have ignored the possibility of exciting the civilians.
133. General Russell. You, then, take the position that it might
not have added to the excitement, but a situation might have arisen
where going into Alert No. 3 was more important than refraining
from alarming the population?
General Wilson. That is right.
134. General Russell. With reference to this injunction about
not disclosing intent, a situation might have risen where it was better
to disclose intent and take positive action ?
General Wilson. Yes. But I do not think they had to disclose
intent by occupying the positions, and so on.
135. General Russell. Based on j'our experience out there, General,
what is the meaning in this message of the words "Do not disclose
intent"?
General Wilson. I would like, if I might, to have that message
read again.
136. General Grunert. You may read it for yourself. It starts
at the bottom of the page (handing a paper to the witness) .
[1376] General Wilson. I do not know how to answer that
question about intent, unless it has reference to our putting into effect
a full defensive organization. But surely the Department Com-
mander, if, as I said before, he felt it was necessary to go into Alert 3,
would not let the alarming of the civil population or the intent to
take defensive measures against outward attack interfere with his
doing it.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 717
137. General Russeli,. Since we are speculating, General, suppose
you had received a message in which, prior to hostilities, you were
told that you should carry out any measures that you deemed neces-
sary, referring specifically to reconnaissance as one of those measures,
but that the^v should not be carried out so as to alarm the civil popula-
tion : What, in your opinion, would that injunction to carr}' out the
measures so as not to alarm the civilian population have meant?
General Wilson. Well, for me to attempt to interpret a message
that came from higher authority, of course I- — might have one idea
and you might have another ; but there is a possible restriction there,
3'ou might say a theoretical restriction against General Short doing
what he thinks he ought to do.
138. General Grunert. Had you been commander and had you
received that message, what would be your mental reaction to what
was required?
General Wilson. My idea of what they meant is not to go into an
all-out defense; in other words, make such reconnaissance you need,
but hold your troops more or less intact so as to avoid alarming the
population and to avoid knowledge that you had gone into a full
defense.
139. General Grunert. How do you, then, interpret this :
[1377] This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to
a course of action which might jeopardize your defense.
General Wilson. General, in other words, that message, to me, is
telling him at one time don't do so-and-so, but of course we don't
want to restrict your action. In other words, that is somewhat incon-
sistent, and I think General Short should have been free to do what-
ever was necessary.
140. General Grunert. If there were inconsistencies did not that
lea ve him free to do what he thought was necessary ?
General Wilson. I would think so, sir; yes. ' '
141. General Grunert. In other words, you got do's and you got
don't's, and therefore in the last analysis you had to decide?
General Wilson. Yes.
142. General Russell. General, this message deals with what is to
be done in the event of hostilities, and says :
If hostilities cannot be avoided, tlie United States desires that Japan commit
the first overt act.
143. General Grunert called your attention to the fact that that is
not to be required to the point where it restricts defense, that is, in
the event of hostilities; that we must not commit the first overt act.
You were out there and cognizant of the situation and knew what was
going on. What do you think that meant i
General Wilson. I think that means definitely that we should not
go seeking the Japs out and attacking them by air or surface or
whatnot.
144. General Russell. Do you think it was necessary to tell the
Department Commander not to start a war on Japan ?
[1378] General Wilson. The impression I gained when that
message was given to me was that it was simply informative, that our
government had decided that, not that they had expected anybody
out there to do it, but to let them know what the policy of the gov-
ernment was.
718 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
145. General Russell. Did it impress you when the courier officer
came to you that the main reason for moving out was the breakdown
in the negotiations between the Japanese Government and our govern-
ment?
General Wilson. Yes, and to inform General Short of the situation
and alert him.
146. General Russell. The alerting was necessary because of the
breakdown in the negotiations between the two governments?
General Wilson. Yes.
147. General Russell. General Frank has read to you these head-
lines from the Honolulu Advertiser. Did they not indicate very
clearly that the negotiations were being continued after this message
was received ?
General Wilson. Oh, yes; and it was definitely understood that
a representative of the Japanese Government was on his way to Wash-
ington, and later arrived in Washington, and, if I remember correctly,
he was supposed to have been in discussion with the President when
the attack took place.
[1S79] 148. General Russell. General, was the normal chain of
command, by which you were advised of the enemy situation, through
the Hawaiian Department, or through the ADVERTISER?
General Wilson. Well, of course, the Department Commander kept
us informed.
149. General Russell. That is all.
150. General Frank. We have, here, a resume of the headlines in
the Honolulu STAR -BULLETIN, from the 29th of November
through to the 6th of December, copied from a file of Honolulu papers
that we have here in the office. Those headlines read as follows :
Saturday, 29 November:
U. S. Waits Japan Reply.
Monday, 1 December:
U. S. Army Alerted in Manila, Singapore Mobilizing as War Tension Grows.
Monday, 1 December, again :
Japan Envoys Resume Talks Amid Tension.
Monday, 1 December, again :
War Fears Grow in Philippines.
Thursday, 4 December:
Japan Spurns U. S. Program.
Saturday, 6 December:
Singapore on War Footing.
Saturday, 6 December:
New Peace Effort Urged in Tokyo.
Saturday, 6 December:
Civilians Urged to Leave Manila.
151. Major Clausen. We offer, as the exhibit next in order, 19-A,
this document from which General Frank just read, consisting of two
pages.
(The resume of headlines referred to, was marked as Exhibit 19-A,
and was received in evidence.)
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 719
[1380] 152. General Frank. Do you remember generally hav-
ing read those items?
General AVilson. I am not certain that I read those particular items.
I certainly read the papers during that period.
To3. General Frank. You remember having gained the impression
that they convey?
General Wilson. I can't remember the impressions given by any
specific paper, but I read them at the time and I probably read that,
because my impression is that I took both the morning and the after-
noon papers.
154. General Frank. Do you remember generally having gained
the impression that those headlines convey?
General Wilson. Yes.
155. General Grunert. General, in the last analysis, is it not true
that if Alert 2 or Alert 3 had been ordered it would have at least mini-
mized the effects of the attack?
General Wilson. General, my impression is that we were operating
under Alert No. 2. As I remember it, protection from sabotage was
Alert 2. That is tli£ one under which we were operating, as I
remember it, — Was it 1 ?
156. General Grunert. That was really Alert No. 1. The alerts,
as they ran, were :
No. 1 w^as the so-called "sabotage alert."
No. 2 was, to be prepared for Air attack, plus sabotage.
No. 3 was, to be prepared against surface attack, air attack, and
sabotage, or the "all-out" defense.
General Wilson. I see. Well, I don't think there is any question.
General, but what, had we been under Alert 2 or [1381] Alert
3, it would have minimized our losses. I think that is obvious.
157. General Grunert. That is primarily because you then would
have been more ready to repel an air attack?
General Wilson. That is right. The planes would have been scat-
tered, for instance,
158. General Grunert. There appear to be no more questions.
Thank you for coming down.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
159. General Grunert, We will go, now, to other business,
(Thereupon, at 10 : 40 a, m., the Board concluded the hearing of
witnesses for the morning, and proceeded to other business.)
afternoon session
(The Board, at 2 o'clock p. m., continued the hearing of witnesses.)
General Grunert. The Board will come to order.
TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. ROLAND WALSH, ARMY OF THE UNITED
STATES; COMMANDING GENERAL, PHILADELPHIA QUARTER-
MASTER DEPOT
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board your
name, rank, organization, ancl station,
720 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Walsh. Koland Walsh, Brigadier General, A. U. S. ; Com-
manding General, Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot.
2. General Grunert. General, the Board is after facts, both as to
background and viewpoints, prior to and leading up to the Pearl
Harbor attack. We hope that because of your assignment [1382]
in Hawaii in 1941 you may throw some light on the situation or may
give us some leads from which we can develop more facts.
What was your assignment in Hawaii, in 1941?
General Walsh. I w^as commanding the Hawaiian Quartermaster
Depot. That included the post of Fort Armstrong.
3. General Grunert. What defensive measures against air attack,
or any other sort of attack, were prescribed for Fort Armstrong?
General Walsh. We were on an alert on the 7th, and had been, for
about ten days. As I remember it, it was what we called the "No. 1
Alert" against sabotage.
4. General Grunert. Now, what protective measures had you taken,
or what measures were prescribed, at Fort Armstrong, to protect your
own garrison, under the Field Manual 100-5, which, in effect, says that
each command shall take care of itself ?
General Walsh. Of course, my troops, as you understand, were
Quartermaster troops. There were two truck companies and two
maintenance companies ; one light company and one heavy. Most of
my people were civilians — I am answering this question by a little
preliminary — and in an alert, all we could do was to put on additional
sentries, and have cars move around, or trucks, with men armed on
them, that would go around the warehouses and around the Post.
We had no equipment for antiaircraft.
5. General Grunert. You had no defensive equipment for antiair-
craft ? Did you have any other means of protection outside of small
arms ?
General Walsh. No other equipment, whatsoever.
6. General Grunert. Was there any plan prescribed, either by
[138S~\ the Department or by the commancl, that would inform
the personnel of the command just what to do in the event of any kind
of alert?
General Walsh. We had a regidar "SOP", as they called it — a
Standing Operating Procedure.
7. General Grunert, Was that your own, or was that the De-
partment's ?
General Walsh. That was my own plan. It was drawn up, of
course, under orders from the Department, but it was my own plan.
8. General Grunert. What were some of those measures that j^ou
took, that that SOP required ?
General Walsh. As I mentioned before, it was a question of put-
ting the additional sentries on.
9. General Grunert. But how about the noncombatants on the
Post ? What did they do ? How were they protected ?
General Walsh. There was no real plan to take care of the non-
combatants on the Post. There were very few, of course.
10. General Grunert. Did they have air-raid shelters?
General Walsh. They had no air-raid shelter. Fortunately, at
my post we had a battery tiernen, which is an old mine-defense bat-
tery, two 3-inch guns, and in there, of course, there was some pro-
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 721
tection against bombs. This place was ordinarily used as a mortuary,
but it could be and was used as a shelter against bombs.
11. General Grunert. Of their own volition, or according to plan?
General Walsh. Of their own volition.
12. General Grunert. There were no slit trenches ?
[1384] General Walsh. No trenches.
13. General Grunert. Could they have been dug on the Post?
(jeneral Walsh. Yes, sir.
14. General Grunert. Did your protective measures, such as your
warehouses, and so forth, envisage any additional fire hazards that
should have been planned for, and that 3^ou did plan for ?
General Walsh. We had pretty good protection against fire. We
had sand at some places. We had our own fire engine, just one, but
for the depot we had one fire engine, and it was tried out very fre-
quently, and we could get to a fire in just a few moments.
15. General Grunert. Was there any thought in your mind as to
whether an attack was probable or possible, or not to be expected ?
General Walsh. If you want to complete my ideas on it, I was more
afraid of sabotage, myself, than anything else; and of course, being
an officer responsible for government property, and having but a few
troops under me, all that I could do was to protect against sabotage.
16. General Grunert. Were you kept informed of the international
situation, or were you given any information that was sent to the
Commanding General of Hawaii, that might show the existent condi-
tion, along the latter part of November and in December?
General Walsh. That is a pretty hard question for me to answer.
I, of course, felt the tension, and I w^as informed of the growing ten-
sion, and the need to be more and more on the alert.
[ISSS] 17. General Grunert. How did you get that informa-
tion— from the newspapers, from official sources, or what ?
General Walsh. We were told, about November 27, I should say,
to be on a very strict alert.
18. General Grunert. By a "strict alert," jou mean what ?
General Walsh. I meant an alert against sabotage.
19. General Grunert. Then everybody seemed to be sabotage-
minded but not actually warminded, is that true?
General Walsh. I do not know exactly what you mean by the "war-
minded."
20. General Grunert. In other words, you did anticipate and had
instructions to be sure to guard against sabotage^ but you did not
envisage anything beyond sabotage, did you ?
General Walsh. That is correct.
21. General Grunert. AMiat was your source of official informa-
tion ? With what section of the General Staff did you deal ?
General Walsh. It usually came to me from the Department Quar-
termaster.
22. General Frank. Who was that?
General Walsh. Colonel William R. White, now Brigadier General.
23. General Grunert. Have you any questions ? Is there anything
else, General, any information you have that might give us leads or
throw some light on our mission to find out what happened prior to
and during the attack? We want to exhaust every possible source,
79716— 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1 47
722 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and so we took a chance on your having some information which yon
might impart to us.
General Walsh. I don't think that I have anything that woukl
assist you.
[1386] 24. General Fraxk. Were you totally surprised by the
attacks ?
General Walsh. Yes.
25. General Frank. Did you have the least conception that there
would be such an attack ?
General Walsh. I did not,
26. General Frank. Did you feel a tension in the international
situation at that time ?
General Walsh. Very definitely.
27. General Frank, u^iat caused it?
General Walsh. One of the outstanding things that caused it was
the Japanese ships' not putting into Hawaii any more. That, to me,
was a definite sign that the tension had increased considerably.
28. General Frank. Do you remember the newspapers, about that
time?
General Walsh. Well, I can't say that I remember anything specific
about that.
29. General Frank. What I am trying to bring out is whether or
not this tension was caused by information that you got through
official sources or through other than official sources.
General Walsh. It was from both; both the newspapers, and in-
formation that came from the headquarters.
30. General Frank. And from your general observations of the
Port?
General Walsh. Yes.
31. General Grunert. When did the Japanese ships cease coming
into the harbor, approximately, do you remember? Was it in the
summer, or in the fall ?
[1S87] General Walsh. I would say it was about two months
before. That is a very rough estimate — about two months before.
32. General Grunert. Prior to that they made regular stops in
there ?
General Walsh. That is correct.
33. General Grunert. Does anybody else think of anything?
That appears to be all. Thank you xevj much.
General Walsh.* Thank you.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.
(There was a brief recess.)
TESTIMONY OF COLONEL RUSSELL C. THROCKMORTON, INFANTRY,
CAMP BRECKINRIDGE, KENTUCKY
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Colonel, wnll you state to the Board your name,
rank, organization, and station?
Colonel Throckmorton. Russell C. Throckmorton, O5140, Colonel,
Infantry, Commanding Camp Breckinridge, Kentucky.
2. General Grunert. Colonel, the Board is after facts, and you,
having been a general staff officer of the Hawaiian Department
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 723
General Staff in 1941, may help us in developing facts and giving us
leads as to where we can probably dig up some more.
"V\niat was your assignment in 1941 ? And give us the dates.
Colonel THROCKMORTOisr. My assignments in 1941 from July 28 —
well, General, may I give you my entire General Staff history, because
from July 9, 1940, I was G-4.
3. General Grunert. Of what ?
[1388] Colonel Throckmortox. Of the Hawaiian Department,
and then on Septembei' 16, 1940, 1 became (t-3 of the Hawaiian
Department, and then on July 2<S I became G-1 of the Hawaiian
Department.
4. General Frank. Still 1940?
Colonel Throckmorton. 1942.
5. General Russell. 1941.
Colonel Throckmorton. From July 9 to September IG I was G-^.
From September 16 to July 28, 1941, I was G — July 9 to September
16 I was G-3, and from September 16 to July 28 I was G-1.
6. General Frank. But you left out the 3-ears there.
Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir.
7. General Frank. That is rather confusing.
8. General Grunert. Yes. Go over that again and give the year
each time.
Colonel Throckmorton. From July 9, 1940, until September 16,
1940, I was G-4, and from September 16, 1940, until July 28, 1941,
I was G-3, and from July 2'8 until departure from Hawaii May 24 I
was G-1.
9. General Grunert. May 24, 1942?
Colonel Throckmorton. 1942.
10. General Grunert. I think you were G-1, then, from September
of 1941 until May of 1942 ; is that right?
Colonel Throckmorton. Well, approximately so, General. Actu-
ally it was from July 28. 1941 .
11. General Frank. And what was your assignment just prior to
the G-1 assignment ?
Colonel Throckmorton. I was the G-3 for a period of ten
[1389] months from September 16, 1940, to July 28, 1941.
12. General Grunert. Were you the Assistant Chief of Staff G-3
and the Assistant Chief of Staff G-1, or were you the Assistant to the
Assistant Chief of Staff?
Colonel Throckmorton. I was Assistant Chief of Staff G-4, G-3,
and G-1.
13. General- Grunert. Then, you served under two Chiefs of Staff,
did you ?
Colonel Throckmorton. That is correct, sir.
14. General Grunert. The first one being Colonel Hayes and the
second one Colonel Phillips?
Colonel Throckmorton. And then even a third. General. I served
under General (now General, tlien Colonel) Joseph Collins.
15. General Grunert. While Colonel Phillips was Chief of Staff
did he hold any staff conferences?
Colonel Throckmorton. On Saturday mornings there was a gen-
eral meeting. It was standing operating procedure that a staff con-
ference would be called on Saturday mornings at 8 o'clock, and all
724 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
staff members contributed items tliat might be of interest to the staff
in general. That included the special staff as well. That was a carry-
over from a policy Colonel Hayes, now General Hayes, followed.
16. General Grunert. And that was a routine matter to have a
staff meeting once a week ?
Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir.
17. General Grunert. Did you have any particular staff meeting
on November 27th or thereabouts? Were there any special staff meet-
ings outside the routine in the latter part [1390] of November
and early in December ?
Colonel Throckmorton. Not to my knowledge, as a result of that
radio which we received on November 27. However, I as an individual
Avas informed of its content by Colonejl Phillips. Now, as to whether
or not he held subsequent staff meetings relative to it, I am unable
to say.
18. General Grunert. And you do not know how many were so
informed as you were informed?
Colonel Throckmorton. I do not, sir.
19. General Grunert. That message of November 27th ended up
with the following sentence :
(Excerpt from radio message of November 27, 1941, is as follows:)
. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential
officers.
Then, you do not know how many officers were so informed on that
directive, do you ?
Colonel Throckmorton. No, sir, I do not, but it appeared to be
common knowledge among staff officers who should know about such
things.
20. General Grunert. l\niat was your particular interest in that
message ? As G-1 ?
Colonel Throck:morton. ]\Iy particular interest was the strength
of the Department. Our authorized war garrison at that time, as I
remember the figures now — I may be in error one way or another —
was 19-4,000. and we had not approached those figures at that time,
that strength.
21. General Grunert. Then, this message was just of information
for you ? You had no particular specific duties [lodl] there-
under ; is that right ?
Colonel Throckmorton. That is correct, sir.
22. General Grunert. Now, to go back about how that staff was
handled : Were you allowed a free hand in following out your duties
in G-1 ? By "a free hand" I mean were you required to perform your
assigned duties without specific dictation or numbered instruction
as to just how you shovdd do it?
Colonel Throckmorton. As long as general policies had been estab-
lished I felt that 1 had a free hancl, though I was inclined at all times
to keep the General Staff informed of what actions I had taken.
23. General Grunert. Did you have access to the Commanding
General when you thought it was necessary that you bring something
to his particular attention?
Colonel Throckmorton. I never had the feeling that I thought I
was withheld from seeing the Commanding General. That question
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 725
has never occurred to me, but it seems now that if I had asked to see
the Commanding General I would have been permitted to have seen
him.
24. General Grunert. As G-3 and following then as G-1, did you
have any particular occasions to confer with the naval staff of the
District or of the Fleet on any particular things?
Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir. When I took over the duties of
G-3, the framework for the joint agreement had tentatively been de-
cided upon by my predecessor representing the Army, Colonel Carl
Banks. Having taken over my duties as G-3, 1 followed through the
joint agreement to its completeness and finally its signature by all
people concerned, that is, both the Navy and the Army.
[1S92] 25. General Grunert. Who" relieved you as G-4?
Colonel Throckmorton. There was an interchange in those two
staff sections : Colonel Banks was G-3 ; he became G-4, and I became
G-3.
26. General Grunert. Then when you were relieved as G-3, who
became G-3?
Colonel Throckmorton. Colonel Phillips.
27. General Grunert. Phillips?
Colonel Throckmorton. For a short period of time.
28. General Grunert. And then who followed him ?
Colonel Throckmorton. Colonel AVilliam Donegan.
29. General Grunert. Then, you were in G-3 during the time of the
preparation of the Hawaiian joint coastal frontier defense plan?
Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir.
30. General Grunert. And were you also G-3 when the joint air
operations agreement with the two addendums was put into effect?
Colonel Throckmorton. As I remember it, the joint air was a part
of the joint Army-Navy agreement.
31. General Grunert. It was a part of that?
Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir. That is, my memory places it so.
32. General Grunert. Was the General Staff called upon or free
to advise the Chief of 8taff and the Commanding General as to the
defense means and measures and as to their accuracy?
Colonel Throckmorton. I should say so, General. General Short
for the most part took the initiative on that sort of thing; and so that
I should say that there was considerable. [1S93] liaison between
the Staff and the General.
33. General Grunert. Were you present at the discussion, if there
was a discussion, as to what should be done under the Chief of Staff's
message of November 27th ?
Colonel Throckmorton. I was not, sir. I was informed of the
decision that had been made.
34. General Grunert. That was to what effect?
Colonel Throckmorton. That was that we would assume defen-
sive measures under Standing Operating Procedure No. 1, which was
sabotage defense.
35. General Grunert. Had you previously been kept pretty well
informed of the international situation, particularly that which dealt
with the negotiations with Japan ?
Colonel Throckmorton. I believe so. I remember that I was per-
sonally interested in it and by means of press and radio, and so on,
726 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
kept myself informed; and such secret docmnents as came through
I perused and kept myself informed. I believe I did.
38. General Gkuxert. Did 3^ou know or have you seen or been in-
formed of the message of November 27th that came to the Navy, and
in that message it was directed the Army be informed, and the mes-
sage started out to the effect that, "This is a war warning"? Do you
remember that ?
Colonel Throckmortox. I cannot testify to that personally. Gen-
eral. I heard that such a message was received by the Navy, but I
neither saw it nor was I officially informed of it.
37. General Grunert. From what you did learn from these vari-
ous sources, and having been G-3 and having been concerned
[1394] in the various plans, did you think the decision to go on
Alert No. 1 filled the bill ?
Colonel Throckmorton. In view of one provision of the message
which came to the Army on November 27, I felt that General Short's
decision in that case was more or less restricted to a sabotage status, a
defense-against-sabotage status.
38. General Gruxert. What gave you that impression ? What par
ticular part of the message gave you that impression?
Colonel Throckmortox. As I remember it, there was a statement
made in it that no measure would be taken which might arouse local
apprehension, or something to that effect. Then, too, having read
over the plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Department for a
number of years, there crept into all the plans references to periods
or a period of strained relationship. Perhaps some of us were indoc-
trinated with that. So that when the message on November 27th
came, I know myself I felt that. Here is a period of strained relation-
ship, and particularly after the caution in the radio that no action
would be taken which might arouse public apprehension.
38. General Fraxk. In other words, they were preparing for war
in accordance with a pattern ; is that right ?
Colonel Throckmortox. Well, I apply that to myself only. Gen-
eral, and not to any of my contemporaries. If they felt as I did, I
don't know. I speak only for myself, sir.
40. General Gruxert. I shall refresh your memory on this message
of the 27th of November, '41. This says :
[1395] (Radio message of November 27, 1941, is as follows :)
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes
with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come
back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile
action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, rei^eat cannot, be avoided
the United States desires that .Japan commit the first overt act. This policy
should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action
that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are
directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem
necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not,
to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should
hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so
far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret
information to minimum essential officers.
That states in there:
If hostilities cannot be avoided. United States desires Japan to commit the
first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting
you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 727
Did it ever occur to you that just going on alert against sabotage,
doing that and nothing more, might jeopardize the defense.
Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir ; I can see how it would.
[l'W6] 41. General Frank. The answer is not quite clear to me.
42. General Grunert. I understood the answer to be
43. General Frank. He can see how it would. How what would
do what?
Colonel Throckmorton. How that a sabotage alert onl}' would
jeopardize the defense of the Hawaiian Islands 'under the provisions
of that radio.
44. General Frank. All right.
45. General Grunert. Then, it appears that over there you all
were sabotage-minded but liardly war-minded; is that about a correct
statement ?
Colonel Throckmorton. I can speak only for myself. General,
and I must say that I felt that that statement in that radio fitted
right into the old doctrine which permeated practically all of the
plans.
46. General Grunert. But there was nothing in the message about
sabotage?
Colonel Throckmorton. No, sir, there isn't, but it would seem
to have gone any further than we did might haA'e violated the pro-
visions in there that nothing would be done which might — to quote
the radio, in the presence of that.
47. General Grunert. What measures in that respect would in
your opinion have alarmed the public if you took Alert 2 or Alert 3 ?
Where would the alarm of the public come in ?
Colonel Throckmorton. Well, it would have required more move-
ment of troops to have gone into the next phase.
48. General Grunert, Had not troops been moving right along ?
49. General Frank. I didn't get the answer to the question
[1397] before. Would the reporter read it, please?
The Keporter (reading) :
General Gkunekt. But there was nothing in the message aboiit sabotage?
Colonel Throckmoeton. No, sii', there isn't, but it would seem to have gone
any further than we did might have violated the provisions in there that nothing
would be done which might — to quote the radio, in the presence of that.
50. General Frank. Tliat left the answer in the air.
51. General Grunert. To quote that part of the radio, that referred
to what?
52. General Frank. Yes.
Colonel Throckmorton. That referred to the alarm or the appre-
hension. I am not choosing the words of the text there; that is all;
'because I don't know them.
53. General Frank. The alarm or apprehension of the civilian
pojoulation; is that what you mean?
Colonel Throckmorton. Yes.
54. General Frank. All right.
55. General Grunert. All right. Now would you read the last that
you have, Mr. Reporter?
Tlie Reporter (reading) :
General Grtjnebt. What measures in that respect would in your opinion have
alarmed the public if you took Alert 2 or Alert 3? Whex'e would the alarm of the
public come in?
728 CONGRESSIOXAL IN^^STIGATIOX PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Theockmobton. Well, it would have [1398'\ required more move-
ment of troops to have gone into the next phase.
General Geu>ebt. Had not troops been moving right along?
56. General Gruxert. Had not troops been moving right along dur-
ing maneuvers?
Colonel Throckmortox. Yes. sir, they had.
57. General Gruxert. Did that alarm the public whenever the
troops moved ?
Colonel Throck:m!ortox. Apparently not. But to have gone into
their next phase from the status we had at the time the radio was re-
ceived would have meant the occupation of gun positions, antiaircraft
gun positions, the dispersion of planes on the field ; but aside from that,
under the standing operating procedures the Department was just
about as well prepared for the defense of the Island as it could other-
wise have been.
58. General Gruxert. If you had gone into Alert 2. for instance,
that Alert 2 covered preparations to meet an air attack; it also cov-
ered sabotage?
Colonel Throckmortox. Yes, sir ; it was a continuation.
59. General Gruxert. Continuation, yes. Then, the alarming of
the public or the fear of alarming the public or aggravating a situa-
tion appeared to be uppermost in your mind, at least ?
Colonel Throckmortox. Well, General, as I observe it now, I be-
lieve that in trying to turn over in my mind the cause or the basis
for General Shorts decision, it was based on that; I would have
thought it was based on that, though I never discussed it with him.
Being a G-1, I had no occasion to [1-399] discuss it with him.
60. General Gruxert. I was banking on your past knowledge of
G-3 more than your present knowledge of G-1, as to whether or not
you considered that that filled the bill.
Colonel Throckmortox. Yes, sir.
61. General Gruxert. (Addressing Board Members). Have you
any questions ?
Colonel Throck^iortox. May I answer that more fully General ?
General Gruxert. All right.
62. Colonel Throckmortox. At any time I didn't question it. Of
course, in the light of subsequent events I realize that it was wrong.
63. General Fraxk. AVere vou reading the newspapers along about
then?
Colonel Throckmortox. Yes, sir.
64. General Fr^vxk. "Were not the newspapers carrying plenty of
headlines to alarm the public with respect to the situation?
Colonel THROCKiiOETox. I think they were, General ; yes, sir.
65. General Fraxk. Well, the civil population already was aroused,
then, wasnt' it ?
Colonel Throckmortox. I quite agree with you, sir.
66. General Fraxk. Well, was there any point in taking military
measures to calm them down?
Colonel TiHJOCKMORTOX. Nothing had happened or they had com-
mitted no overt act which indicated that there was any required at that
time.
67. General Russell. Colonel, you were there when the attack
[IJ/JO] occurred; is that true?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 729
Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir,
68. General Russell. You had been G-3 for a time, and gone from
that office into G-1, and you were serving as G-1 at the moment of the
attack?
Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir.
69. General Russell. Did 3'ou observe the operations of the troops
in and about Honolulu at the time of the attack?
Colonel Throckmorton. At the time of the attack?
70. General Russell. Yes, and subsequent, shortly thereafter?
Colonel Throckmorton. Xo, sir, I did not, because I was tied down
to my desk pretty well, handling personnel matters. "We were very
short of officers to carry out a 24-hour tour, and it was necessary to get
sufficient reserve officers immediately available, called to active duty,
and fit them intg places where they were best qualified to serve; and
the late afternoon of the day of the attack General Short gave me a
directive to have all the women and children evacuated from the posts
of Hickam Field, Wlieeler Field, and Schofield Barracks, and that
that would be accomplished by Monday morning.
[J4OI] 71. General Russell. Did you have plans for that prior
to the attack?
Colonel Throckmorton. There was a plan being worked up by Col-
onel Lyman, the Department Engineer, that had not been delegated
to me as my responsibility, but I believe that the basis for that was the
fact that it required considerable public relationship, and Colonel
Lyman being native-born and a native Hawaiian, the General prob-
ably thought best to turn that job over to him, the formulation of the
evacuation plan. It was not completed, however, when the attack
took place. Such plans as we actually carried into effect to get the
women and children oil' to those posts were done almost on the spot.
72. General Russell. When did the preparation of this plan for the
evacuation of the women and cliildren begin?
Colonel Throckmorton. I cannot answer that, General, but I can
say that I heard it discussed some three or four months prior to the
date of attack.
73. General Russell. General Grunert talked to you about the
message which is identified as the message of November 27, and you
seemed to understand the message that he was talking about?
Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir.
74. General Russell. I do not know that I followed your answer<i
well in that connection. There is one sentence in that message as to
what was to be done before hostile Japanese action, and only one.
It says:
Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertalie such recon-
naissance and otlier measures as you deem necessary, but tliese measures
should be carried out so as not to alarm the population.
And then it. says to report the action taken. The other says
[1402] to report measures taken. Those two sentences seem to
relate to what went on prior to Japanese action.
You said that there was tenseness, and you thought that during
this state of tenseness antisabotage was what was indicated. Is
that right?
730 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Throckmorton. The term used, General, was "a period of
strained relationship." That is the term that was used throughout
all the plans.
75. General Russell. Even in the "prior to hostile action*' sentence
there is a statement emphasizing recomiaissance measures. Did you
interpret these restrictions or limitations as in any way limiting ac-
tion of the Department Commander about reconnaissance measures?
Colonel Throckmorton. As a matter of fact. General, I did not
give that particular point consideration, but I do not believe now
that it shoud.
76. General Russell. You had been G-3 ?
Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir. I think perhaps, General, if I
may digress here a bit, that if I had still been G-3 and had had access
to a copy of that radio, with the privilege of sitting down and study-
ing it, I might have come to a different conclusion. It was almost
wholly a G-3 problem. That did not mean that I was not interested
at all ; but when I heard about it I was given the message and I read
it over once, maybe twice — I have forgotten ; it has been so long
ago — and "then I did not have an opportunity, though I suppose I
could, if I had asked for it, to read it again. But I do not believe
that I read it again. I remember that the Chief of Staff sent for me
and informed me of the receipt of it and let me read it. Whether I
read it once or read it twice, I at least did not [140-3] digest
it. And then he told me of the decision of the Department
Commander.
77. General Frank. The decision had already been made before
you read the message?
Colonel TiiROciiMORTON. It had already been made; yes, sir. I be-
lieve that because I was not intimately concerned with it, perhaps, I
was not taken into the picture too nuich, except just in an informative
way.
78. General Grunert. Can you think of anything else that would,
through your long and varied experience with the general staff in the
Hawaiian Department throw more light on the situation? Have
you anything in mind that you think the Board ought to know or
ought to consider, from such experience?
Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir; I have.
79. General Grunert. Will you tell us, please?
Colonel Throckmorton. Though I do not think it would have
affected the final outcome of what took place, as I feel that there was
a state of frustration, at least in my own mind, due to the fact that in
October of 1941 — and the attack took place only two months later —
the Hawaiian Division, the old square division, was reorganized from
a square division to two triangular divisions, the 24th and 25th. That
was done from forces immediately available. This took place when
I was G-3. Every attempt was made by General Short to triangulate
the old square division into two, and it finall}^ got down to the point
where the War Department granted him authority, but would not
give him additional troops. I felt that it was poor judgment to
skeletonize those two divisions in order to create the two divisions.
I felt that our mission in Hawaii could be well and efficiently per-
formed under the old setup, perhaps more [-/-^O^] efficiently
performed. With war imminent it hardly gave an opportunity for
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 731
the troops of the new divisions to get oriented or settled down, and
particularly when there was such a tremendous shortage of strength
within the two. The defense of the Island did not require a war
maneuver except for local reserves, or perhaps one general reserve; so
that the benefit of having two triangular divisions was defeated, it
seems to me. I think that it was a poor choice at that particular
time. I think the decision was made, however, before General Short
ever reached Haiwaii, and I think he was encouraged by his Chiei
of Staff.
80. General Frank. Which one ?
Colonel Throckmorton. Colonel Pliillips.
Then there was another thing that took place about that time of
which I disapproved, though not voilently, but as much as I thought
I dared.
When Colonel Phillips came to Hawaii there was no vacancy for
him in a position where General Short apparently wanted to use him.
81. General Frank. Which was that ?
Colonel Throckmorton. He was sent in as my assistant in the G-3
ofHce. Not as such; that is, the orders did not read that way, but
we looked on him as sort of a tactical aide. I felt that he spoke the
General's mind.
The first thing, or one of the early things, that he wanted to do was
to change Field Order No. 1, which in itself was the standing oper-
ating procedure. F. O. No. 1 was based on the thought of some of the
best military brains we had ever had in Hawaii. I am sure that i1
dated back to the time of General Drum, General Connor, maybe.
General William R. Smith, down through, perhaps, General Bryant
Wells' time. It was in the [i-^Oo] process of modification or,
rather, revision, to bring it up to date when I took over the G-3 office-,
and I remember that I completed the job. I felt that to throw that
out at that particular time was a bad idea, because everyone was so
familiar with the old F. O. No. 1; and the talking point or
argument of the Chief of Staff was that they wanted standing oper-
ating procedures. In my opinion and in the opinion of everyone to
whom I talked F. O. No. 1 was a standard operating procedure, though
it was not called that ; but in effect, it was.
82. General Grunert. And that Chief of Staff was Colonel Hayes ?
Colonel Throckmorton. No. That was Colonel Phillips.
83. General Grunert. You started out talking about his coming
in as assistant to you.
Colonel Throckmorton. If I may go back. General : Colonel
Phillips as the General's representative in the G-3's office, awaiting
Colonel Phillip Hayes' departure as Chief of Staff. Colonel Hayes'
department was delayed somewhat, and for a considerable period
of time; and during that period Colonel Adam E. Potts, who was the
ihen G-1, left the Department headquarters, and I took over his job.
84. General Frank. As what?
Colonel Throckmorton. As G-1 ; whereupon Colonel Phillips went
pp to become Chief of Staff, and one of my other assistants. Colonel
William E. Donegan, became the G-3.
85. General Frank. Was not Colonel Phillips G-a?
Colonel Throckmorton. He was, for a very short period of time,
General. From the time I went into the G-1 office until Colonel
Hayes left, he was G-3.
732 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
86. General Frank. About how long?
[I4O6] Colonel Throckmorton. I would be guessing, sir, but it
would be about two months.
87. General Frank. Will j^ou proceed with the development of
F. O. No. 1?
Colonel Throckmorton. I do not believe I know just what your
question is, General. Proceed with the development of it?
88. General Frank. Yes. Or had you finished ?
Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir ; I thought I had completed that
picture.
89. General Grunert. Then I will develop it somewhat. It was
Field Order No. 1 that you considered just about the right thing at
the right time, but instead of having Field Order No. 1 they go out
some standing operating procedures. Under Field Order No. 1 were
there three types of alett?
Colonel Throckmorton. Three types of alert ; yes, sir.
90. General Grunert. Suppose Field Order No. 1 had been in
existence and in force as of December 7: Would it have made any
difference ?
Colonel Throckmorton. It would not have affected the decision
made.
91. General Frank. There would have been only one type of alert
in effect, and therefore the aircraft would have been alerted to meet
an attack,
92. General Grunert. That is what I expected his answer to be,
but he told that under Field Order No. 1 there were three types.
Colonel Throckmorton. As I remember the old field order, the
first phase was that of alert ; that is, sabotage alertness.
93. General Frank. Are you sure about that ?
Colonel Throckmorton. As I say. General, as I remember it.
[i4^7] It has been a long time ago.
94. General Grunert. Then you do not recall the S. O. P. that
brought three kinds of alert into existence. We were given to under-
stand that formerly there was one type of alert, and one only; there
was no sabotage, no air, no surface; it was all just one alert, to get out
and be ready for business. Then they came along with three types of
alert. You do not know just when they came in, do you ?
Colonel Throckmorton. This is the first thought that I have given
this particular question for a long time. General. I hate to discuss
things that I do noto remember and am not too sure of ; but now that
you have brought up the point, there was a phase in the field order —
1 believe it was the white phase — which had to do with security
against riots and that sort of thing. So that what you say may well
be true, sir. It had been so long ago that I do not remember.
The reason that I brought the point up of changing F. O. No. 1
was because at that particular time I thought it was a bad idea to
change over when everyone was familiar and indoctrinated with Field
Order No. 1. It seemed quite a useless thing to do.
95. General Grunert. Now, taking a square division and making
two triangular divisions of it — that did not seem to make any differ-
ence as far as just what happened on December 7 was concerned,
did it?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 733
Colonel Throckmorton. No, sir ; I cannot say that it did.
96. General Grunert. Again, these shifts in the general staff : "Was
there any ill feeling about the shifts taking place? Was the staff
a united and working staff, or did it have a few cliques in it and a
little bitterness? I am just wondering [I4O8] whether that
was actually the fact, or not.
Colonel Throckmorton. There was no feeling on my part when
Colonel Banks was interchanged with me, and 1 am sure that there
was none on his part. We both agreed that it was just "one of those
things", and we made no attempt to try to figure out why.
97. General Grunert. Was it General Short's policy to switch his
general staff heads periodically?
Colonel Throckmorton. No, sir; not as a routine matter, not as a
matter of education of individuals.
98. General Grunert. I gather from what you have told us that
he brought with him one Phillips whom he was going to place, pre-
sumably later on, as chief of staff', and he eventually did so?
Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir.
99. General Grunert. And in the meantime he used him as assist-
ant G-3 ?
Colonel Throckmorton. That is correct, sir.
100. General Grunert. And then when the opportunity came he
made him Chief of Staff?
Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir.
101. General Grunert. Would you care to express your opinion on
Phillips as Chief of Staff as compared with other chiefs of staff
under whom you have served?
Colonel Throckmorton. I never at any time. General, felt that
Colonel Phillips was qualified to perform those important duties.
I felt that he neither had the temperament nor the sense of judgment
nor, perhaps, the basic knowledge; and I am frank to say that I
never had a great deal of respect for him in his capacity as chief of
staff, as compared with Colonel [140d'\ Hayes and others of
my acquaintance.
*102. General Frank. Who had been chiefs of staff?
Colonel Throckmorton. Who had been chiefs of staff; yes, sir.
103. General Frank. The fact has not come out yet that General
Grunert started after, which is this : Was that general staff a happy
family ?
Colonel Throckmorton. I would say it was. General, for the most
part. Of course, on every staff you have little differences of opinion,
but they are just a daily routine. There was nothing deep-rooted, as
I remember. When Colonel Hayes was Chief of Staff he insisted
always that we get along, and I think we did. I think we har-
monized beautifully, and I think Colonel Hayes will feel that we
did. Such disharmony as existed under Phillips I do not think was
of a serious enough nature to have affected what happened on De-
cember 7. I mean, it was not to the extent that anyone failed to give
their cooperation, and so on.
104. General Grunert, Did the cooperation of the Navy suffer, or
was there any change from the time that Phillips took over as com-
pared with when Hayes was in there ?
734 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Throckmorton. I had very little, if any, opportunity while
I was G-1 to observe the relationship between the Navy and the
Army staffs. T can speak only of when I was G-3, and I feel that
there was complete liaison between our G-3 office and the Operations
office of the Navy. There was a time when considerable pressure had
to be brought to get the Navy to sit down at a table with us and
actually put the framework of the joint agreement into writing and
then get Admiral Bloch to sign it. Captain Gill — I do not remember
his first name or \^llfl0'\ middle initial — was the Operations
Officer.
105. General Frank. For tlie Fourteenth Naval District?
Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir. I felt many times that he vacil-
lated to the extent that one day General Herron asked me when I was
going to get the joint agreement signed, and I told him how many
times I had been down, and that the next time that I went I expected
to make the proposal that the Army write the agreement, and then
submit it to the Navy to see if we could not hasten things. Wlien I
made the proposal to Captain Gill he was delighted. So the Army
wrote the agreement without the aid of the Navy and I took it down
and, with just a few minor changes, Admiral Bloch signed it, General
Herron having signed it previously.
106. General Grunert. In thorough agreement with its terms?
Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir.
107. General Grunert. It was not a question of disagreeing on
terms, but just a question of somebody doing the work. Was that it?
Colonel Throckmorton. That was the idea.
108. General Frank. Did the Army on its own initiative put the
provision in that joint agreement to turn all its heavy bombardment
over to the Navy ?
Colonel Throckmorton. That was approved by the Department
Commander.
109. General Frank. The Army did that on its own initiative before
it ever went to the Navy ?
Colonel Throckmorton. There had been a long period of discussion
about the provisions of the joint agreement, and when it was finally
written it was written to conform with what all concerned seemed to
liave agreed upon. The Navy was rather hard [lltll^ to get
anything out of in those days. General.
110. General Grunert. Have you any knowledge of the amount of
information received from Naval Intelligence? You had never been
G-2 or had any connection with them?
Colonel Throckmorton. No, sir ; I have no knowledge of that.
111. General Grunert. What did the staff think of Colonel Fielder,
theG-2?
Colonel Throckmorton. I can only speak for myself. General. I
felt that they had a better G-2 in Colonel Marsden than they, did in
Colonel Fielder.
112. General Grunert. Tell us about Colonel Donegan, who was
G-3 at the time the attack took place and shortly before that. Will
he be a good source of information for the Board?
Colonel Throckmorton. I think he will be a very good source.
113. General Grunert. Marsden was G-4. You thought highly of
him, did you ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 735
Colonel Throckmorton. Very highly.
114. General Grunert. Yon knew them both quite intimately, did
you not ?
Colonel Throckmorton. I knew all the members of the staff rather
intimately.
115. General Grunert. Did you know one Colonel Wyman, District
Engineer, intimately ?
Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir ; I did.
116. General Kussell. Did vou know the Assistant G-2, Colonel
Bicknell?
Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir ; I knew him quite well.
117. General Russell. Did you rate him along with Marsden?
\^llf-12'] Colonel Throckmorton. I thought he was a capable
man. I would not rate him with Marsden.
118. General Russell. A safe, sound fellow ?
Colonel Throckmorton. I think so ; yes, sir. I think he made Mars-
den an excellent assistant.
119. General Russell. As G-2 ?
Colonel Throckmorton. As Assistant G-2. He stayed on with
Fielder, after Fielder took over.
120. General Grunert. Do you think of anything else that might
assist the Board, now that we have opened up your mind a little bit
here and there ? ^
Colonel Throckmorton. General, those are the only two items that
I feel morally obliged to report to the Board, those that I have told
you about.
121. General Grunert. There appears to be no more questions. We
thank you very much.
(The witness was excused with the usual admonition )
ilJ^lS^ TESTIMONY OF COLONEL GEORGE W. BICKNELL, MILI-
TARY INTELLIGENCE, G-2, M. I. S. ; WASHINGTON, D, C.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you state to the Board your name,
rank, organization, and station.
Colonel Bicknell. George W. Bicknell, Colonel, Military Intelli-
gence. My present station is G-2. JNI. I. S., Washington.
2. General Grunert. Colonel, the Board is after facts and leads in
this matter, and from one thing in the report of the Roberts Commis-
sion, here, I decided that I wanted to ask you on that subject. There
may be others, as they develop, and I liope you can give us some leads.
This particular thing referred to the time that you were Assistant
G-2 of the Hawaiian Department. Werej^ou such?
Colonel Bicknell. Yes.
3. Genera] Grunert. Between what dates ?
Colonel Bicknell. I was Assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Depart-
ment in charge of counter intelligence, from October 1940 until April
1943.
General Grunert. And, just prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, and
during, and shortly after that, who was your immediate chief?
736 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel BiCKNELL. Colonel Fielder, Department G-2.
5. General Grunert. There is shown, here, in the Roberts report,
a statement to the effect that Lt. Col. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, head of
the Hawaiian Department, informed the staff, at a meeting on Decem-
ber 6, 1941, that the Japs were burning papers on December 5, 1941,
saying it meant to him [1414\ that war was imminent. Do
you recall that testimony that you gave to the Roberts Commission?
Colonel Bicknell. Yes, sir.
G. General Grunert. Now, as to that, tell us about what happened
at that staff meeting — who w^as present, and just what was the infor-
mation, and what happened about that information, if anything.
Colonel Bicknell. There was a practice in the Hawaiian Depart-
ment of General Short's having a meeting of his entire staff, including
his special staff, every Saturday morning, at which time any points of
information or of interest that had occurred during the past week,
were brought up for discussion for the benefit of the staff. General
Short did not attend those meetings, but his Chief of Staff, Colonel
Phillips, officiated, and on that morning of December 6 I did make the
statement that I had received information to the effect that the Japa-
nese consuls were burning their papers; and to me that had very
serious intent; it would at least show that something was about to
happen, somewdiere.
That statement was made before all of the staff officers; and as to
what happened to it, after that, I don't know.
General Grunert. Was your immediate chief there, Colonel
Fielder?
Colonel Bicknell. Yes, sir.
8. General Grunert. Did he discuss it with you afterwards? Did
he go into it, do you know, as to whether or not what you had heard
was a fact, or had anything to back it up ?
Colonel Bicknell. No't to my recollection.
9. General Grunert. Was there any discussion of it while [^4^5}
in the staff meeting ?
Colonel Bicknell. No, sir.
10. General Grunert. Then it was just a routine report that ap-
parently was not taken seriously at the time ?
Colonel Bicknell. It was just that — just a routine report.
11. General Grunert. No one said, ''AVe burn papers every day —
why shouldn't the Japanese consul burn any papers"?
Colonel Bicknell. Didn't raise any discussion ; no, sir.
12. General Grunert. Can you give us any more of an insight
into just what that information was that you got? What sort of
papers were they burning? Who found them burning papers, and
so forth?
Colonel Bicknell. The information came to me through the FBI.
13. General Grunert. From whom, in the FBI?
Colonel Bickneli>. The Chief of the — a special agent in charge of
FBI in Honolulu, Mr. Shivers, out there.
14. General Grunert. Mr. Shivers gave you that information?
Colonel Bicknell. Yes, sir.
15. Generni Grttnert. Why did he give it to you ;iud not to Fieldei-,
directly?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 737
Colonel BiCKNELL. Because the set-up Avas that I handled all mat-
ters pertaining to counter-intelligence. They were handled by me,
and we had our offices
IG. General Grunert. Did Mr. Shivers express himself as to what
he thought the intent or the seriousness of this was?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Well, he made the same statement to me that I
had made, that this looked as though something was about [1^16]
to happen pretty soon.
17. General Grunert. And did you tell him that you were going
to take it up with the staff?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes, sir.
18. General Grunert. Did he afterwards ask y(ju what happened
when you took it up with them, or didn't it come up again?
Colonel BiCKNELL. I don't think that came up again. That ended
it.
19. General Grunert. All right. Are there any questions on that
particular phase ?
20. General Russell. Did you talk to Colonel Fielder about this
report from the FBI before you went to the staff meeting?
Colonel BiCKNELL. No, sir.
21. General Russell. Did you talk to him after you came back?
Colonel BiCKNELL. No, sir.
22. General Russell. Was your office with Fielder ?
Colonel BiCKNELL. My office was not located physically with Colonel
Fielder's. Mine was located down-town in the same building with the
FBI, in adjoining offices, and all of our counter-intelligence activities
were handled in tliat downtown office, commonly known in those days
as "the contact office," and was not at Department headquarters.
23. General Frank. Did you wear a uniform, or civilian clothes?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Civilian clothes.
24. General Russei-l. Did you come immediately from your down-
town office to this staff meeting?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes, sir.
25. General Russell. So there was no occasion for you to
[U17^ talk to Colonel Fielder about it?
Colonel BiCKNELL. No, sir.
26. General Russell. Do you know whether or not the burning
of papers by the Japanese people in their consulate was something
unusual?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes, sir.
27. General Russell. And with no evidence prior thereto of their
having burned papers?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes. sir.
28. General Russell. That is all.
29. General Grunert. On another occasion, did you take a mes-
sage to General Short, something similar to this message, to his
house ?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes, sir.
30. General Gru^^ert. Tell us about that occasion, and what
happened.
Colonel BiCKNELL. About 4 o'clock on Saturday afternoon, De-
cember 6, Mr. Shivers, of the FBI, telephoned to me at my home and
said that he had something of immediate importance, and asked me
7971G — ^4G--Ex. 145, voL 1 48
738 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to come to town as soon as possible. I went to Honolulu immediately.
I did not even stop to change clothes.
31. General Frank. Wliere did you live?
Colonel BiCKNELL. At Aeia Heights. And Mr. Shivers handed
me a transcript of a telephone conversation which had taken place
between one Doctor Mori, a Japanese dentist in Honolulu, and a cor-
respondent of a newspaper in Tokyo. This telephone call had orig-
inated in Tokyo, and Mrs. Mori, Doctor Mori's wife, had done most
of the talking. This call had been intercepted by the FBI, trans-
scribed on records, and had taken place some time \J4I8] dur-
ing the early morning of December 5. The records had been trans-
lated from Japanese into English, and finally transcribed in English ;
and that had not been completed until Saturday afternoon.
This conversation, to me, was very irregular and highly sus-
picious. They asked questions regarding the flying conditions that
day. They asked whether or not any planes were flying at night,
whether the searchlights were turned on during the night flights,
how many soldiers were seen around town. Were there many ships
in Pearl Harbor? and many other points. I don't remember all of
them at the present time. And then suddenly in the midst of this
conversation the party in Tokyo asked Mrs. Mori, "What flowers are
blooming in Hawaii, today?" Mrs. Mori said, "Poinsettias and
hibiscus." Then there was considerable discussion by the party in
Tokyo as to how poinsettias could be blooming in Hawaii today?
They could understand the hibiscus, but the poinsettias — that was a
very strange thing to them.
Then the conversation went on with more details regarding the
weather; and after reading this message it was impossible to prop-
erly evaluate it. I just received it. Just from my G-2 sense, it
sounded to me as though there was something very significant about
this; so I phoned to Colonel Fielder, it then being about 5 or 5: 15,
and told him that it was very necessary that I come and see him,
with General Short, immediately, that I had something that I
considered to be of the utmost importance.
Colonel Fielder called me back and said that he and General
Short were going to dinner to Schofield Barracks, and they were
mi9] all ready to go, and the thing had better wait until to-
morrow; and I stated that I thought it was too important to wait
until tomorrow, I had to see them, right now! So I was finally
told that if I could get out there in ten minutes, they would wait;
and I made it in ten minutes, and I handed this message to General
Short, and Colonel Fielder also read it; and I stated, at the time,
that I could not evaluate the message, it was new, but it was highly
suspicious, and it had to me every indication that something was
"in the wind," I didn't have any idea what, but from an intelligence
angle I did feel that the message did have some portent in it which
we were not able at the moment either to unravel or decipher.
Both Colonel Fielder and General Short seemed to feel that I was
rather perhaps too "intelligence conscious," and that this message was
quite, quite in order, that it did describe the situation in Hawaii as it
was, and that possibly there was nothing very nnich to be excited
about in the content of the message ; and that was all that happened
to it.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 739
32. General Grunekt. In the hearing before the House on the
resohition which called iov investigation by the Army and Navy, if
1 recall it correctly, there was a statement made that when this mes-
sage was delivered to General Short's house there was a party going
on, and that General Short "cussed out" the messenger and practically
threw him out. Is there any truth in that ?
Colonel BiCKNELL. That is absolutely untrue.
33. General Grunert. How long was this message? Was it of
considerable length ?
Colonel BiCKNELL. It was of some considerable length. [14^0^
1 don't remember exactly the length, but I, off-hand, would say that
it ran about, if I am not mistaken, five or six pages of double-space
typewriting.
34. General Grunert. Did General Short and Colonel Fielder go
into a huddle, to discuss each part of this message?
Colonel BiCKNELL. No, sir.
35. General Grunert. Or did they look at it in a hurry and then
"beat it" to their party ?
Colonel BiCKNELL. They read it through. General^ Short said that
he thought it was quite an ordinary message, he didn't see that there
was anything very bad about it ; and then they handed it back to me,
and went their way.
36. General Grunert. At any time afterwards, before the attack
occurred, was that message called for again, and examined, or studied?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Not to my knowledge ; and I had it with me.
37. General Grunert. Are there any questions on that phase?
38. General Russell. I have two or three.
Did you and General Short and Colonel Fielder go over to Fielder's
office to look at that message, or where did you go, to look at it?
Colonel BiCKNELL. No, sir; we went to General Short's house.
No, I beg your pardon — it was Colonel Fielder's house, because they
lived next door; and General Short came to Colonel Fielder's house.
39. General Russell. Oli, Short came over to Fielder's house,
did he?
Colonel BiCKNELL. They are right side-by-side, the [^4^^]
three of them.
40. General Russell. The three of you did not get together and
go over to Fielder's office, at headquarters, and talk about it?
Colonel BiCKNELL. No, sir.
41. General Russell. How long did the conference last, in which
this message was considered, Colonel?
Colonel BiCKNELL. The actual telephone conversation?
4i2. General Russell. No. After you got in touch with Fielder and
Short, how long did you people consider this message, before they
handed it back to you and went their way?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Oh, maybe five minutes.
43. General Russell. Not over five minutes?
Colonel BiCKNELL. I shouldn't say so.
44. General Russell. You were very closely in touch with the FBI ?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes, sir.
45. General Russell. You were then the military representative of
the Department to whom messages from the FBI would have been
given ?
740 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes, sir.
46. General Russell. And you were in there for some months prior
to December 7?
Colonel BicKNELL. Yes, sir.
47. General Russell. You were there in that connection, and mak-
ing contact with the Army ?
Colonel Bicknell. Yes, sir.
48. General Russell. Now, Colonel, consider carefully this answer.
Tell us whether or not, prior to December 7, you [^4^'^] re-
ceived from the representatiA^es of the FBI other messages relating to
information which the FBI had intercepted on telephone or radio calls
to Japan — stolen information from telephone calls.
Colonel Bicknell. To fhe best of my knowledge, I can't remember
but one other instance, and that did not in any way enter into the
national security picture. It was simply on an individual case of a
suspect, where some information had been picked up from an inter-
cepted telephone conversation.
49. General Russell. Do you remember a message which reached
the Hawaiian Department some time after the attack out there, in
which there were certain signs and symbols that the Japanese used ?
Colonel Bicknell. That was not a telephone message, sir. That
was a radio message. That was a message that we seized on the
morning of December 7, after the war had started. I went down and
commandeered the files of the Radio Corporation of America for all
messages which had been sent by the Japanese consul to points in
Japan, and all messages he had received from Japan, and there was
a sheaf, a large number of radio messages, all in code, which we ob-
tained. Those were taken out to the Field Intelligence Officer, and
he had made some progress on breaking the Japanese code, and one
of those messages was the one to which you refer, in which there was
mention of the same case that I mentioned before, the Otto Kuhn
case, where Kuhn had arranged this system of prearranged signals
which he had given to the Japanese consulate, and they had in turn
transmitted it to Japan, as a suggestion from Kuhn as to how infor-
mation could be sent from the Island.
50. General Frank. To whom ?
[14^3] Colonel Bicknell. To anyone offshore.
51. General Frank. Who was Kuhn?
Colonel Bicknell. Otto Kuhn is the German who is now sentenced
to life imprisonment on this case, an espionage case; a German resi-
dent, down there at Lanikai.
52. General Frank. Was he a citizen ?
Colonel Bicknell. No, sir. But that didn't come from the FBI,
sir. That came through the messages which were intercepted, copies
of messages which the Japanese had sent, and it was decoded by the
Navy Intelligence people.
53. General Russell. Colonel, all of these messages in this group
that you are talking about now were messages that had been sent
previously, of which copies had been retained by the Japs and not
destroyed, and you seized them after the war started?
Colonel Bicknell. We got some of those that we grabbed, and we
also subpoenaed or demanded the actual carbon copies of messages on
file with the Radio Corporation of America which had been trans-
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 741
mitted for the Japanese ; so that we had not only those in the material
which came from the Japanese consulate, and in which we found a por-
tion of a code book; there was enough material to add to what the
Navy already had to make possible the decipherment of these messages.
54, General Russell. Where are those messages now, do you
know ?
Colonel BiCKNELL. There is quite a file of them. The FBI has a
complete file.
55. General Frank. Where?
Colonel BiCKNELL. The OWI has a complete file, too.
IWi] 56. General Frank. Where, in the FBI Department?
Colonel BiCKNELL. I imagine they have them here, sir. We also
have them. They were in my files in Honolulu when I left.
57. General Russell. Do you think we should be able to get our
hands on those translated messages when w^e get out there ?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes, sir; yes, sir.
58. General Russell. Now, Colonel, so far as you know, however,
and I go back to that question, this one message here is the only one
that had been delivered to you by the FBI prior to the attack on
December 7?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes, sir,
59. General Russell, Will you glance over the message, a copy of
which I have just handed you, and identify that, if possible, as the
message about which you have testified, or state that it is not that
message ?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes, sir; I think this is the message.
60. General Russell. Did you tell General Short what you thought
that message meant?
Colonel BiCKNELL. I told him, sir, that I couldn't evaluate the
message. I had the paper in my hand.
61. General Russell. I believe you testified that you could not.
Now, in the light of the subsequent history out there, referring to
this conversation about "flowers," have you reached any conclusions
as to what might have been meant by the two types of flowers that
were blooming there, and the expression of surprise by the man in
the homeland as to one type of flower being in bloom ?
[14-25] Colonel Bicknell, I have reached a theory, as it might
be called, I don't think we will ever know the answer, unless, after
this war is over, we get the story from the Japanese ; but one "hypoth-
esis", I might call it, hit me in the eye, and the thing that impressed
me more than anything else were these "poinsettias" and "hibiscus."
My wife tells me that, on the morning of December 7, when I stood
on the lanai, watching this attack, she asked me, the next time I saw
her, some week later, she said, "What in the world were you mumb-
ling about these 'poinsettias and hibiscus' while all this fighting was
going on?" It suddenly came to me — again, this has nothing to base
it on, but the fact that the "poinsettias" and the "hibiscus" might have
been types of "ships". The cruisers were all in, that morning, or a
large proportion of the cruisers were in, as well as the battleships, but
no carriers were present. Now, a Navy man might say, "Why are
those cruisers there, and no carrier? It doesn't make sense." That
was perhaps to some extent corroborated by the information which
was contained in the submarine data which was obtained after this
742 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
submarine had been sunk at Pearl Harbor, in which they had marks
on their chart, their observations that they had taken, and it con-
firmed the fact that no carriers were in Pearl Harbor on the morning
of the attack.
As I say, that is simply a thought, there is nothing that I can tie
it up to and say it is true, but that thought did run through my mind,
62. General Russell. Now, Colonel, this transcript of the telephone
conversation has written on it, w^ith red pencil, here :
[1426] Of December 3, 1941. between a citizen in Honolulu and a military
or a naval officer in Tokyo; tninsliited, and available to military, until * * ♦
December 5, 1944.
There is something there that is illegible.
Now, this attack occurred on the morning of the 7th, and this con*
versation took place on December 3 ; is that true ?
Colonel BicKNELL. That I won't say. I don't remember enough
about it to be sure of the dates.
63. General Russell. You cannot identify it ? That would be about
four days?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Four days.
64. General Russell. That is, between the date of this and the time
the planes arrived at Honolulu ?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes, sir.
65. General Russell. Colonel, without divulging any of the secret
means used to get this message, would you explain to the Board why
this type of message, which now seems to have been a very important
one, should have been selected and picked up? Was it a matter of
accident, in the operations, out there*
Colonel BiCKNELL. You mean the actual picking up of that par-
ticular message?
66. General Russell. Yes. Were there other messages, and was
this selected by the FBI because they considered it more pertinent or
material than other messages?
Colonel BiCKNELL. No, sir; I think that that was due to the fact
that they were just getting into a position where they were technically
able to do it. This was one of the first really successful intercepts of
that type.
67. General Russell. Had they been making efforts prior [^4^7]
thereto, to intercept those messages?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Such efforts had been made; yes, sir.
68. General Russell. Thereafter, between December 3 and Decem-
ber 7, 1941, no other important message was picked up?
Colonel BiCKNELL. No, sir.
69. General Russell. Were those efforts continued, from December
3 on to December 7 ?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes, sir ; not only that, but I also supplemented
them with my own; and I am positive that nothing came out of the
consulate by talking, from that date on.
70. General Russell. A lot of this message, as a matter of fact.
Colonel, was perfectly inane, innocuous, and meaningless?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes, sir. There is one part that it might be of
interest to bear in mind about that message. I think that General
Short asked me about that, afterward, a.nd that was the fact that he
brought out, that this message, this conversation, took place between
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 743
Tokyo ;iii(l Hawaii. I I'diiiiided the General that that was quite true,
and that this messaije was also "scrambled,'" but the Japanese had the
"unscrambler" in Tokyo to "unscramble" this commercial message, and
there is no reason to believe that they didn't have another "unscram-
bler" aboard any task force that might be in the vicinity, which was
perfectly able to intercept that message and withdraw from it any in-
formation which would be of use to them.
71. Qeneral Russell. Do you know whether or not there have been
any other studies made of this message, except the one made by you,
in an effort to determine what it meant ?
Colonel BiCKNi^LL. I don'^t believe there are, sir ; not to my knowl-
edge.
[14^8] 72. General Eussell. I want to identify for the purpose
of the record this message about which we have questioned the Colonel.
^Discussion off the record.)
[14^d] 73. General Frank. Are you through ?
General Russell. Yes.
74, General Frank. Was this conversation radio or cable?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Radio telephone.
75. General Frank. Radiotelephone?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes, sir.
76» General Frank. It could have been picked up, then, by stations
at less distance from Honolidu than Tokyo ?
Colonel BiCKNELL. True.
77. General Frank. Following the attack was this message eval-
uated further to tie into the attack ? You said you talked to General
Short about it another time ?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes, we talked about the message, and he said,
"Well, Bicknell, you couldn't prove anything by that, that it meant
anything."
"Well," I said, "I still can't prove anything by it. I can't prove any-
thing now, and we never will be able to."
78. General Frank. You never did evaluate the message fully?
Colonel BiCKNEUL. Couldn't. There wasn't any — enoitgh to be
done ; no, sir.
79. General Frank. Yes. Now, down there in your capacity as
contact officer did yon ever run across a Mr. Hans Wilhelm Rohl ?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Oh, yes,
80. General Frank. Did you ever determine whether Rohl knew
this man Kuhn or not?
Colonel BiCKNELL, He did not know him.
81. General Frank. He did not know him ?
Colonel Bicknell. No, sir.
82. General Frank. What is the story on the information that you
had on Rohl?
[I43O] Colonel BiCKNELL. To the best of all the investigations
that we carried out on Rohl, plus those that the F, B. I. carried out
in Hawaii, Rohl was a no-good drunkard but had committed no sub-
versive acts that we could discover, or took no subversive action at
all. He was badly mixed up in irregularities, and the case was turned
over by me to the Inspector General for handling in his office, as it
was not a subversive case.
83. General Frank. What kind of irrejrularities?
744 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel BiCKNELL. Mostly financifil, together with a Department
Engineer and the contractors, and all mixed up in funny business.
84. General Frank. Did yon ever run across a Werner Plack?
Colonel BicKNELL. Werner Plack? I don't remember.
85. General Frank. P-1-a-c-k.
Colonel BiCKNELL. No, sir ; I don't remember.
86. General Frank. If he had shown up in the investigating ac-
tivities, would there be a record of him in Honolulu'^
Colonel BickneLl. Yes, sir ; he w^ould be in the card file.
87. General Frank. You stated that Rohl's drinking activities were
well known to you ?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes, sir.
88. General Frank. Did you know Wyman ?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes, sir.
89. General Frank. What was his reputation with respect to
drinking ?
Colonel BiCKNELL. I never knew at any time of Colonel Wyman or
General Wyman ever being addicted to drinking.
90. General Frank. No.t Lyman.
Colonel BiCKNELL, Wyman.
91. General Frank. Wyman?
[14S1] Colonel Bicknell. Yes ; Ted Wyman.
92. General Frank. As a matter of fact, your assignment had prin-
cipally to do with civilian activities?
Colonel Bicknell. Civilian and subversive activity; yes, sir.
93. General Frank. Yes.
Colonel Bicknell. The only dealings I ever had with General
Wyman when we
94. General Frank. Colonel Wyman.
Colonel Bicknell. Colonel Wyman at that time. — suspected sabot-
aging of a dredge down there. That was the only time I came in con-
tact with him.
95. General Frank. What did you find out about that ?
Colonel Bicknell. Well, he ordered us off the job and said he
wouldn't have any G-2 investigation of it.
96. General Frank. Colonel Wyman ?
Colonel Bicknell. That is right.
97. General Frank. Who directed you to go on the job?
Colonel Bicknell. I went on the job because it was sabotage and it
fell under our jurisdiction for subversive activities.
98. General Frank. Well, did you go to Department headquarters
to get authority to go back on again ?
Colonel Bicknell. I reported it to the Department headquarters.
99. General Frank. To whom in Department headquarters?
Colonel BicNELL. Fielder. Colonel Fielder.
100. General Frank. What was done about it?
Colonel Bicknell. The matter was referred to Washington.
101. General Frank. And what happened to it?
Colonel Bicknell. Eventually two months later we got the
m^^] case back and we were told to reopen it, and we told them
it was too late, too cold; we couldn't do anything two months after-
ward.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 745
102, General Grunert. Why was it necessary to refer that case to
Washington ?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Because the Department Engineer
103, General Grunert, District Engineer?
Colonel BiCKNELL. — was not under the jurisdiction of the Depart-
ment commander,
10-1, General Frank, I have nothing further.
General Grunert, I have one more subject here:
The Board heard something about a report that you are alleged to
have made or information gathered about certain social activities in
or about Honolulu or the Hawaiian Department which, so far as I can
gather, you were going to send to the United States, but you had
trouble in getting it out of the Department, What is that all about?
Colonel BiCKNELL, I don't quite understand, sir,
105, General Grunert, Unless my information is not accurate, I
understand that there w^as some sort of a report on social activities in
Honolulu or the Hawaiian Department that j^ou attempted to get out;
why, I don't know, but you had trouble in getting it out, and finally
you mailed it to yourself and in that way got it out. What is that all
about, or is that news to you ?
Colonel BiCKNELL, That is a brand new one to me, never heard of
it before. *
106, General Grunert, Then we shall drop this question. I know
nothing else about it, but your name was mentioned as probably being
the one. You know nothing about it?
[14-'^3] . Colonel Bigkxell, No, sir,
107, General Grunert, Well, neither do I,
Are there any other questions ?
108, General Frank. Do you know anything as to whether Rohl's
use of intoxicating liquor incapacitated him to do his work?
Colonel BiCKNELL. It did.
109, General Frank. It did?
Colonel BiCKNELL. There were many days I tried to get him at the
office ; we couldn't even get him out of the hotel ; he was just-
110, General Grunert, Well, did that stop the work or delay the
work, or just incapacitate him personally?
Colonel BiCKNELL, That incapacitated him personally. As to what
it did
111, General Gri^nert, But the work went on apparently?
Colonel BiCKNELL, The work went on.
112, General Grunert, As far as you know,
113, Major Clausen. General Frank has asked that I ask a few
questions.
When did you first receive that information?
Colonel BiCKNELL, AAHiich information?
114, Major Clausen, About Rohl's drinking.
Colonel BiCKNELL, Oh, this case came up early in '1:2, I believe,
when we got on Rohl's trail for — I can't remember the dates, but
when he finally got — he had made the statement that he was an Ameri-
can citizen, and I asked the F. B. I, to check the veracity of that state-
ment. We found that he was not ;in American citizen, and then shortly
after that his citizenship did come through in San Francisco, and I
tried to get him into the office to have talks with him, and that was
746 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Avhen I ran into [14^4] this difficulty about liis drinking, be-
cause he just was in no condition to get him in anywhere.
115. General Frank. Where did he live?
Colonel BiCKNELL. He lived out at the Moana Hotel.
116. Major Clausen. Did you see him before the 7th of December:
Eohl?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Never even knew the man before the 7th of
December.
117. Major Clausen. And the infornnition j^ou had about his not
being a citizen was received after?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes, sir. It came up in the course of our check-
ing u]) on all /Termans to see what theii' status w^as after the war
started.
118. Major Clausen. Had you known theretofore that he was a
Cxerman?
Colonel BiCKNELL. I knew that he was either a naturalized Ameri-
can or was — I knew he was German born.
119. Major Clal^sen, Did he talk with a German accent?
Colonel BiCKNELF.. I don't think I ever heard him talk normally;
I don't know what accent he had. He was usually prett}^ well under
the influence when I did see hiuL and I didn't notice any accent at
that time. •
120. Major Clausen. During, extending over wdiat period of time
was he in this drunken condition ?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Oh, he didn't go out for a w^eek or ten days at a
time.
121. General Frank. After Decemlier 7th?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Oh, yes.
122. Major Clausen. And this was over what period of time?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Oh, I should say we were interested in
[JJ^35] the case for a matter of a couple months.
123. Major Clausen. And during that whole time he Avas in that
condition ?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Well, he wasn't in that condition during the
entire time, but there would be si)ells of a week oi- ten days, and
maybe a week he would be all right, but most of my information about
him came through one of the local contractors who was A^eiy closely
connected with Rohl, and I would ask him in what condition he
was and whether it was worth while calling him up, and he would
say yes or no.
124. General Frank. Who was that?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Ralph Woolley.
125. Major Clausen. Did this condition continue then during this
period of the same two months after the 7th of December!'
Colonel BiCKNELL. That was the time that I was interested in it,
that it was so.
126. Major Clausen. Did you make a report to the Department
concerning it?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Did what?
127. Major Clausen. Did you make a report to your Department
concerning the drinking?
Colonel BiCKNELL. No reason to.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 747
128. General Franiv. Didn't lie head up the Hawaiian Construc-
tors?
Colonel BicKNELL. Yes.
129. General Frank. He was responsible for their getting the work
out?
Colonel BicKNELL. The w^ork was going on. It was not dependent
on Rohl's ability to do any work as to whether the job progressed or
not. He had plenty of other people there [14^6] that were
carrying on the work.
130. Major Clausen. Did you meet a Colonel Hunt of the I. G.
when he made an investigation in Hawaii?
Colonel BicKNELL. I don't remember that name.
131. Major Clausen. That is all.
132. General Grunert. Anything further? (No response.)
Is there anything that occurs to you that you can tell the Board
so as to throw more light on the situation in Hawaii prior to and
leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack that might give us leads or
give us more information on the subject? In other words, something
in your mind that you can tell us that we have not brought out by
actual questions?
[14'37~\ Colonel Bicknell. I think there is one thought that
should be borne in mind throughout as having a great bearing on our
activities in Hawaii, that being the fact that we had a very limited
view of this entire picture, and the only picture that we could draw
on the larger international situation was what meager bits of informa-
tion we could pick up from sources in Hawaii or sources coming to
Hawaii ; and to make any evaluation of a situation as serious as this
without the benefit of at least all of the story which was available in
Wshington was an extremely difficult job.
133. General Grunert. Then, I assume that you didn't get periodic
information from G-2 sources in Washington that would assist you
in your work ; is that a correct assumption ?
Colonel Bicknell. There was never enough information from
Washington as to what was going on in the other theaters other
than the Hawaiian theater. We had very little that came to us on
the activities in Manila, that is, the intelligence activities.
134. General Grunert. What information would you have liked
to have had if you could have said, Give me information on this or
that?
Colonel Bicknell. I would have liked to have kiiow^n more informa-
tion about the sudden cessation of Japanese shipping in the Pacific.
135. General Grunert. Whereabouts particularly in the Pacific?
Colonel Bicknell. We knew, of course, that they were not coming
into Hawaii, but I would like to have known whether or not the
Japanese shipping to South America had either stopped [14S8]
entirely or had diminished or was discontinued.
136. General Grunert. Did it ever occur to you that you might
get that if you asked for it ?
Colonel Bicknell. I think that request was made.
137. General Grunert. Through Fielder ?
Colonel Bicknell. No, sir. That request was made by the F. B. I.
138. General Grunert. To their F. B. I. sources here, presumably?
Colonel Bicknell. Yes, sir.
748 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
139. General Grunekt. To their F. B. I. sources in Washington?
Colonel BiCKNELL. There is one great advantage in speaking of
this F. B. I. business in Hawaii that might give a little better picture
of our activities.
140. General Frank. One advantage or disadvantage?
Colonel BiCKNELL. One great advantage, was the fact that when
the F. B. I. came to Hawaii in '39 I was then in civilian capacity but
still greatly interested in G-2 from the last war, and I worked with
Mr. Shivers on the establishment of his outfit down there, and he was
very gracious in taking the suggestions as to the method of building
up his system in Hawaii, and I worked on the basis that if war ever
came it would be absolutel}^ imperative that we be able to have complete
coordination between the investigative agencies of the War Depart-
ment, the F. B, I., and O. N. I. ; and going on duty in 1940 we instituted
a series of weekly conferences that were attended every Aveek by the
District Intelligence Officer of the Navy, by Mr. Shivers of the F. B. T.,
and myself; and all of the [1439] information and all of the
methods of obtaining information and all the plans were coordinated
between the thi'ee agencies long before there was any direct evidence
of hostilities coming out to Hawaii,
It was done so completely that even our plans for the seizure of
suspect aliens and Japanese had been completed and was filed, copies
sent to Washington, early in November under three alternate i^lans.
Plan 3 was put into effect at 3 o'clock on the afternoon of December
7th and was completed by midnight. The contact office of the Army
had been placed physically in the same building with the F. B. L,
in adjacent offices, and with the declaration of martial law the F. B. I.
became a ])ortion our Intelligence. Under martial law it became a
part of G-2 to all intents and purposes, their people working with me
and for me, and Ave immediately augmented our counter-intelligence
staff by taking over the F. B. I. in toto. So that it was often very
possible to get more information through the F. B. I. due to the fact
that they had almost daily telephone conversations with Washington ;
and if we wanted something in a hurrj^ it was possible to get it — the
F. B. I. to call Washington and get it by phone, whereas the Army
radio circuits were so cluttered up that if we sent a radio we wouldn't
get an answer for three or four days.
141. General Frank. Did the A.rmy ever give you any information
after you asked for it ?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Well, we didn't get any great amount that I
could find. There is a record in Hawaii ; I believe it is early in No-
vember in my weekly intelligence summary : the [Ij^O] state-
ment was made that from all information which had been gathered in
our office in Hawaii it looked as though hostilities could be expected
either by the end of November or, if not, then not until spring.
142. General Grunert. That evaluated information was passed to
your Chief ?
Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes, sir.
143. General Grunert. Did he make an estimate and send it to his
Commanding General ; do you know ?
Colonel BiCKNELL. I don't know, sir. I know that it went out to —
I made those weekly summaries, which were mimeographed, and
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 749
there w(^re some fortj^ Copies distributed to the Army, the Navy, and
the F. B. I.
144. General Grunert. Those were your personal summaries, or
who else collaborated with you in making such summaries?
Colonel BicKNELL. They weie the collaboration of my officers and
noncommissioned officers. I had one noncommissioned officer who
had had a great deal of experience with Japanese and spoke the lan-
guage fluently. I had two Japanese officers who were very good.
And also this information was always worked out in collaboration
with the F. B. I.
145. General Frank. How many civilians did you have working
in your office for you ?
Colonel BicKXELL. You mean civilians as such?
14C). General Frank. Yes.
Colonel BicKNELL. Or C. I. G., men in civilian clothes?
147. General Frank. No; I am talking about civilians now, first.
[144^] Colonel Bicknell. Oh, about eight.
148. General Frank. How many military personnel, total, did you
have working for you in your counter-intelligence work ?
Colonel Bicknell. In December, on the morning of December 7th
I believe I had 39.
149. General Frank. That made a total, civilian and militarj^ of?
Colonel Bicknell. 47.
150. General Frank. 47.
Colonel Bicknell. 48. That figure later went up to around 125.
151. General Grunert. That appears to close the subject, unless jou
can remember something else that you think might help us.
Colonel Bicknell. I think that perhaps a careful examination of
the G-2 files or the counter-intelligence files in Hawaii might be
worth while.
152. General Grunert. And how much of a job would that be?
Colonel Bicknell. I don't know the condition of the files now, but
I would say it would probably be maybe three or four hours' work.
153. General Eussell. Where would these files be, Colonel?
Colonel Bicknell. They would be in the Dillingham Building.
154. General Russell. Downtown?
Colonel Bicknell. Yes, sir.
155. General Russell. They Avould not be at the G-2 office in
Hawaii?
Colonel Bicknell. No, sir.
150. General Russell. Do you know who is out there operating
IIU^] that office now?
Colonel Bicknell. I believe there is a Major Meurlott, M-e-u-r-
1-o-t-t.
157. General Russell. How long would it take to go through them
if we had them? Are there a lot of them? That is what I was after.
Colonel Bicknell. A lot of them. Practically all of tlie informa-
tion that is in those files, of importance, is also in the F. B. I. files
here. I don't know whether you have access to those.
158. General Russell. That is all I have to ask.
159. General Grunert. There appear to be no more questions.
Thank you very much. Colonel.
750 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
General Grunert. We have a letter from General Miles under date
of 18 August 1944, in reference to his testimony of 8 August 1944,
starting on page 91, which will be marked Exhibit No. 20.
(Letter of August 18, 1944, from General Miles to General Grunert
was marked Exhibit No. 20, and received in evidence.)
(Addendum to General Miles' testimony will be found on page
132-A.)
(Thereupon, at 5:40 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of
witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 751
[im'\ . CONTENTS
TUESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1944
Testimony of — • Page '
Col. Louis W. Truman, Chief of Staff, 84th Division, Camp Claiborne,
Louisiana 1444
Sergeant Lowell V. Klatt, Battery A, 509th Gun Battery, semimobile^_ 1454
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Ai-my (Retired) on Active Duty as a
Member of the General Board 1469
DOCUMENTS
Navy Message of October 16, 1941 1503-A
Navy Message of November 24, 1941 1503-C
Navy Message of November 27, 1941 1505
KXHIBITS
No. 21. Transcript of telephone conversation of December 3, 1941, between
Dr. Mori and Tokyo 1468
1 Pages referred to ai"e represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original transcript of proceedings.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 753
{UWX PROCEEDINGS BEFOEE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD
TUESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1944
Munitions Building,
W ashington^ D. C.
The Board at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted
the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, president of the
Board, presiding.
Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D.
Kussell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.
Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C.
Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr.,
Executive Officer.
General Grunert. The Board will come to order.
TESTIMONY OF COLONEL LOUIS W. TRUMAN, CHIEF OF STAFF,
84TH DIVISION, CAMP CLAIBORNE, LOUISIANA
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Will you state to the Board your name, rank, or-
ganization, and station ?
Colonel Truman. Louis W. Truman, Colonel, Chief of Staff, 84th
Division, Camp Claiborne, Louisiana.
2. General Grunert. Colonel, the Board is after facts about what
happened prior to and during the attack on Pearl Harbor, and we hope
that through your assignment at that time you may [144^] pos-
sibly give us some facts or give us some leads toward other facts.
What was your assignment while you were on duty in Hawaii in
1941?
Colonel Truman. I was assigned as Aide to Lieutenant General
Short. On the 1st of March, 1941. I arrived in Hawaii on the 28th
of February, 1941, and from that time until the 28th of February,
1942, I was assigned as Aide-de-camp. I returned to the mainland
with General Short on the 12th day of January, 1942.
3. General Grunert. Is it true that he always took you with him
when he went to have conferences with the Navy ?
Colonel Truman. It is true, sir. I can remember no time that
General Short went to a conference without my going along. I will
say this, however, that I did not sit in on the conferences. I went with
him to all Navy conferences and usually stayed out with the flag
lieutenant.
4. General Grunert. Then you do not know what they conferred
about ?
79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 1 49
754 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Truman. I do not, sir.
5. General Gruxert. IVliere were these conferences usually held ?
Colonel Tru^ian. The conferences were held in Admiral feimmel's
office at Pearl Harbor, as well as at Admiral Bloch's office.
6. General Grunert. Their offices ashore?
Colonel Truman. Their offices ashore ; that is right, sir.
7. General Grunert. And you were not in on the conferences ?
[144^] 8. Colonel Truman. I was not, sir.
General Grunert. Were you informed of what took place at the
conferences ?
Colonel Truman. Only one time, and that was when they were
planning a photographic mission over the Marshall Islands.
9. General Grunert. That was the only time he discussed with
you what took place at the conferences ?
Colonel Truman. That is correct, sir.
10. General Grunert. How frequent were those conferences; do
you recall?
Colonel Truman. I have been trying to remember that, sir. I
would have to give an educated gTiess, because I have no way of telling.
From the time that the radiogram was received, either on the 27th
or 28th of November — I do not remember the exact date — there were
conferences held in Admiral Kimmel's office at which General Short
attended and, as I remember, he took his G-3 or his Chief of Staff
with him. These conferences, one in particular, I remember, lasted
well over an hour. That was in Admiral Kimmel's personal office. I
remember that Captain Smith, the Chief of Staff of Admiral Kim-
mel, was in on that conference, as well as other officers.
11. General Grunert. Do you recall whether General Martin was
there?
Colonel Truman. I believe that he was ; j^es, sir. I believe he was.
To the best of mj^ recollection, I believe that he Avas, sir.
12. General Grunert. Was it your understanding that that confer-
ence was being held to discuss messages received either [1447]
by the Navy or General Short as to the situation over there at that
time?
Colonel Truman. I cannot definitely state exactly what the pur-
pose of the meeting was. It was my understanding at the time, though,
that it was for the purpose of conferring on such a matter; yes, sir.
But for me to state definitely that it was called for that purpose, I
cannot do that ; I do not remember. It was my understanding, though,
that they were conferring on that matter. I do not know what went
on inside the room, sir.
13. General Grunert. Do you recall how many conferences, either
of General Short with Admiral Kimmel or of General Short with
Admiral Bloch, were held after the November 27th conference up to
the date of the attack?
Colonel Truman. For me to state definitely, sir, I cannot, sir. I
believe there was more than one; I believe there were about three.
But if I may state this : that when the Roberts Commission was com-
ing over there. Colonel Fleming and I sat down and prepared a state-
ment for General Short, and in tliat statement are the times and tlie
dates that these conferences were licld. I cannot state detinitelv. I
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 755
believe there was more than one. I do not believe there were more
than three.
14. General Grunert. Did General Short and Admiral Kimmel, or
General Short and Admiral Bloch, oet together freqnently, aside from
those formal conferences?
Colonel Trumax. Yes, sir. The}^ played golf numerous times on
Sunday mornings.
15. General Grunert. All three of them ?
[144^] Colonel Truman. At one time I believe Admiral Bloch
and Admiral Kimmel played golf with General Short. I am certain
that Admiral Bloch played golf with General Short on Sunday morn-
ings more than once. I know that Admiral Kimmel played golf with
General Short on Sunday mornings, because I was a member of the
foursome. The relations between General Short and Admiral Kimmel
were always friendly, and the same as far as Admiral Bloch was con-
cerned. As far as I can determine — and I have thought over it many
times since then — there were never any strained relations between
them ; none whatsoever, sir, that I could determine.
16. General Grunert. We had hoped that you knew something
about what took place in those conferences; but apparently you do
not.
Colonel Truman. No, sir ; I do not.
17. General Grunert. Is there anything relating to this matter that
you think might be of assistance to the Board or that you would like
to bring to the Board's attention ?
Colonel Truman. The only thing that I can state, sir, is that as
far as I can determine, and as far as I know, there were no strained
relations between the Army and Navy in Hawaii. I believe — this is
my own personal opinion — that they got together.
18. General Grunert. Were you in a position to know to what
extent they got together ?
Colonel Truman. None more than I believe that had there been any
strained relations I would certainly have known about it, sir.
19. General Grunert. Outside of wanting to know, of course,
[14-4^] how they got along, we would like to know how much
getting along was being done.
Colonel Truman. I cannot state that, sir ; I do not know.
20. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not they had fre-
quent conferences between the respective staffs ?
Colonel Truman. They had a liaison officer over at Department
Headquarters practically all the time.
21. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not they had fre-
quent or infrequent gatherings of the various members of the staff
to discuss this or that ?
Colonel Truman. It is my opinion that the gatherings were be-
tween General Short and Admiral Kimmel. With him, of course, at
different times was General Martin, the Air Commander over there,
sir.
22. General Grunert. Do you know anything about a discussion
that took place, if one did take place, as to what type of alert to take
as a result of this message of November 27 ?
Colonel Truman. There was a meeting in the office of the Chief of
Staff around two-thirty on the day that that message was received.
756 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
At that time the members of the General Staff and Special Staff were
there. I was present.
23. General Frank. This was on Saturday?
Colonel Truman. As soon as they received the message, sir.
24. General Grunert. It was after the receipt of that message?
Colonel Truman. Yes, sir.
25. General Grunert. Was it after the conference had been held
with the Navy ?
Colonel Truman. That, sir, I cannot say; I do not remember.
[14^50] 2(1 General Grunert. All right. Go ahead.
Colonel Truman. The General and Special Staffs were notified of
the seriousness or, rather, of the strained relations, and at that time
it was decided that Alert No. 1 would be put into effect.
27. General Grunert. Was General Short present at that con-
ference?
Colonel Truman. I believe he was, sir. He might have been in the
other room. Again I will have to state that it is rather hazy in my
mind.
28. General Grunert. Was there a discussion about what measures
should be taken, or was it just an announcement of the decision?
Colonel Truman. An announcement of the decision, as I remember
it, sir.
29. General Grunert. This staff meeting was an announcement of
the decision?
Colonel Truman. That is right, sir.
30. General Frank. It was not a discussion as to what they
should do?
Colonel Truman. I believe they had a discussion before I got there,
sir. When I arrived they were giving their decision. I am sure
there must have been a staff meeting before.
31. General Grunert. You do not know whether there was any
discussion about the type of alert?
Colonel Truman. I am sure there was not, sir. I will have to admit
that my knowledge of exactly Avhat these meetings were concerned
with — I did not get in on any of them, except O^Ol] that I do
know that there were meetings held between the Army and Navy,
between General Short and Admiral Kimmel, and between General
Short and Admiral Bloch.
32. General Frank. I would like to ask a couple of questions. Did
Admirals Kimmel and Bloch ever come over to General Short's
headquarters for conference?
Colonel Truman. Yes, sir; reasonably frequently, sir. I would
say once every week or two weeks. There were numerous times when
they came over to the Shafter headquarters, as well as General Short
going over to Pearl Harbor to Admiral Bloch's and Admiral Kim-
mel's offices.
33. General Frank. Who was the naval liaison officer at Depart-
ment Headquarters? Was it Lieutenant Burr?
Colonel Truman. Yes, sir.
34. General Frank. Did you know him?
Colonel Truman. Keasonably well; yes, sir.
35. General Frank. Was he an active, alert, "go-getting" liaison
officer, or was his presence over there more in the nature of a token ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 757
Colonel Tkuman. I do not believe it was token at all. When we
were on the maneuvers he was quite active. I don't believe he was
a "deadhead."
36. General Frank. He was sufficiently active so that he was alive
to things that were happening to such an extent that you feel he
would go out of his way to see that the Navy got everything that
happened at Department Headquarters?
Colonel Truman. I think so, sir; and I also think that the G-3
would have thrown him out if he had not been.
[i^^] 37. General Frank. What G-3?
Colonel Truman. Colonel Donegan, who was the G-3 of the
Department. He worked in the G-3 office.
38. General Russell. Colonel, do you remember General Short's
going to a dinner at Schofield Barracks on the night of December 6 ?
Colonel Truman. Yes, sir.
39. General Russell. Did you go with him?
Colonel Truman. No, sir.
40. General Russell. Do you remember about what time he left
home.
Colonel Truman. I would say he arrived back about nine-thirty
that night, sir. I think he went to Colonel Roosma's that night at
Schofield Barracks.
41. General Russell. I Avas not interested in that end of it.
Do you remember Colonel Bicknell?
Colonel Truman. Yes, sir; very well.
42. General Russell. Were you present when he came out late
in the afternoon of December 6 to have a conference with General
Short and Colonel Fielder?
Colonel Truman. No, sir; I was not present. I might have been
in the headquarters, but I was not present at any conference they
had.
43. General Russell. Did you live over at General Short's house?
Colonel Truman. No, sir; I lived next door, at Department Head-
quarters. I had quarters No. 10.
44. General Russell. General Short came home about nine-thirty
that night?
[14^S] Colonel Truman. As I remember, he did.
45. General Russell. Who went with him?
Colonel Truman. I believe that Mrs. Short went out there with him.
46. General Russell. That is all.
47. General Grunert. There is nothing else that occurs to you
that you think might help the Board?
Colonel Truman. No, sir. The only thing I can say is that I be-
lieve there were no strained relations between the Army and Navy
at that time. I am certain of that, sir.
48. General Grunet. Thank you very much for coming. We are
sorry that you cannot give us more information.
Colonel Truman. I am too.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(The Board took a brief recess, at the conclusion of which the
following proceedings took place:)
758 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[L'M I TESTIMONY OF SEKGEANT LOWELL V. KLATT
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Sergeant, will you state to the Board your name,
grade, organization, and station?
Sergeant Klatt. First Sergeant Lowell V. Klatt, Battery A, 509th
Gun Battalion, Semimobile.
2. General Grunert. Sergeant, the Board is after facts as to what
happened prior to and during the Pearl Harbor attack. Now, the
reason I asked that you be sent here was that it appeared in the Roberts
Commission report that you had been a witness and that you made
some statements here on which I want a little more information.
What was your actual assignment or position, in what organization,
and where, during the attack of December Tth?
Sergeant Klatt. Well, I was Communications Sergeant at the time,
sir, in Headquarters Battery, 1st Battalion, 98th Coast Artillery, then
stationed at Schofield Barracks.
3. General Grunert. Schofield Barracks?
Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir.
4. General Grunert. Who was your immediate Commander, and in
what regiment did you serve ?
Sergeant Klatt. The regiment I was in was the 98th Coast Artil-
lery, and Colonel
5. General Grunert. Well, if you have forgotten his name, it doesn't
make much difference.
Sergeant Klatt. It slips my mind just now, sir.
6. General Grunert. And that organization was an anti-
\^lJtS5^ aircraft organization, was it?
Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir.
7. General Grunert. And what did the organization consist of?
Was there a full regiment with a certain number of battalions?
Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir; it was a regiment of antiaircraft guns,
searchlights, and automatic weapons.
8. General Grunert. And they were stationed at Schofield, were
they?
Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir.
9. General Grunert. What did the plans call for that they were
to do in case of an attack?
Sergeant Klatt. Well, we had our field positions set up around
Wheeler Field, also at Schofield Barracks there, and in case of attack
our job was to go man those field positions.
10. General Grunert. Then, as I understand, Wheeler Field is near
Schofield?
Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir, just about a mile and a half below Scho-
field Barracks ; it is still in the same reservation.
11. General Grunert. And then when your notice came you were to
go down in positions already selected in and about "Wlieeler Field?
Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir.
12. General Grunert. To ward off any air attacks primarily?
Sergeant Klatt. Right, sir.
13. General Grunert. Now describe to us a little bit what your
equipment was for antiaircraft purposes.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 759
Sergeant Klatt. Well, the gun battalions at the time were 3-inch
guns. Shortly after the war started we received 90-millimeter, and
we had searchlights and .50-caliber machine 11Jy56^ guns, .30-
caliber machine guns, for antiaircraft defense.
1-4. General Grunert. Just what did you have charge of ?
Sergeant Klatt. I was in charge of the communication section for
the 1st Battalion, sir.
15. General Grunert. And in that communication section what
equipment was it necessary to move down or near position, or what
equipment did you have to move and where did you have to move
it to in order to get into action ?
'Sergeant Klatt. I had communication lines strung to each battery
gun position from the Battalion C. P., which was located at Wahiawa,
just on the outskirts of Schofield Barracks, in an old C C. camp.
16. General Grunert. Then you had your communications equip-
ment in, but you had to go from Schofield to that C. P. to start
operating ?
Sergeant Klatt. That is right, sir.
17. General Frank. May I ask him a question ?
General Grunert. Yes.
18. General Frank. How many battalions in this regiment?
Sergeant Klatt. Three, sir.
19. General Frank. What were they?
Sergeant Kjlatt. Two gun battalions and a searchlight and auto-
matic weapon battalion.
20. Feneral Frank. Two of the large antiaircraft, 3-inch ?
Sergeant Klatt. That is right.
21. General Frank. Two 3-inch gun battalions.
Sergeant Klatt. Two 3-inch gun battalions, and then another bat-
talion made up of automatic weapons and searchlights.
22. General Frank. How many batteries in the gun battalions?
[14^7] Sergeant Klatt. There were six gun batteries.
23. General Frank. Per battalion?
Sergeant Klatt. No; that was three per battalion, and a head-
quarters battery, each battalion.
24. General Frank. Three gun. batteries. And how many guns in
a battery?
Sergeant Klatt. Four, sir.
25. General Frank. So that was 24 guns?
Sergeant Klatt. That is right, sir.
26. General Frank. Now let us get down to the other battalion.
What was in it ?
Sergeant Klatt. That was made up of one battery of searchlights.
27. General Frank. How many searchlights?
Sergeant Klatt. I believe there were 32, sir. And the other three
batteries were made up of automatic weapons : that would be .50-
caliber machine guns, and at that time we had the 37-millimeter
rapid-firing antiaircraft guns.
28. General Frank. How many batteries of machine guns?
Sergeant Klatt. Well, the batteries were made tip of four 37-
millimeter and four .50-caliber machine guns to each battery.
29. General Frank. And how many batteries?
Sergeant Klatt. Three batteries of those, sir.
760 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
30. General Frank. Three batteries of 37-millimeter?
Sergeant Klatt. That is right.
31. General Frank. And three batteries of .50-caliber?
Sergeant Klatt. No, sir. The .5U-caliber and 37-millimeter went
together in each battery.
[14^8] 32. General Frank. Therefore you had how many bat-
teries in that battalion?
Sergeant Klatt. In that battalion there was one searchlight battery
and three gun batteries.
33. General Frank. That is four batteries?
Sergeant KLA'ra\ Four batteries altogether; right, sir.
34. General Frank. Plus the headquarters battery?
Sergeant Klatt. Plus tlie headquarters battery.
35. General Frank. All right. Now, in which battalion were you?
Sergeant Klatt. 1st Battalion, sir.
'36. General Frank. Wliat did they have?
Sergeant Klatt. They had the 3-inch guns.
37. General Grunert. Did you have to take any equipment from
Schofield to the command post in order to operate ?
Sergeant Klatt. No, sir, we did not. Our equipment was all out
there at the time.
38. General Frank. In position?
Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir. It was set up in this old C. C. camp.
39. General Grunert. Now, we have this statement of yours before
the Roberts Commission to the effect that you said that your switch-
board and the battle post telephone were in the supply room, not
installed.
Sergeant Klatt. Well, sir, that was a precautionary measure
against theft. We had our wires all in, all tagged, ready to set up.
It took a matter of maybe three minutes to connect all telephones and
switchboards up ; three to five [14j59] minutes was all ; and
that is the only reason we didn't have the telephones and switchboard.
In other words, it was a matter of theft, because we didn't want them
stolen, because we did not have equipment guards.
40. General Grunert. Then all the equipment w^as not actually
installed ? Soine of it Avas in the supply room ?
Sergeant Klatt. That is right.
41. General Grunert. Where was the supply room?
Sergeant Klatt. The supply room was at our battery position in
Schofield Barracks.
42. General Grunert. Schofield Barracks. And you had, then, to
take the switchboard and certain telephone equipment down to the
C. P. to install it and get it operating?
Sergeant Klatt. That is right, sir.
43. General Grunert. Then about how long did that take?
Sergeant Klatt. It didn't take long. We had our equipment on
our trucks and were down there in, oh, I wouldn't say over twenty
minutes at the most, to get to our position.
44. General Grunert. Had you practiced getting that stuff out in
a hurry and making hurried connections?
Sergeant Klait. Yes, sir, we had. We had been doing that for
weeks previous.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 761
45. General Grunert'. That is one reason I wanted to question
you. If your switchboard and your battle post telephone equipment
was stored some place, it didn't look as if you were on the alert as far
as being prepared to take immediate action was concerned. That was
one reason I wanted to ask you these questions.
[14^0] Now, then, under Alert No. 1, the so-called sabotage
alert, it did not require you to occupy your positions, did it?
Sergeant Klatt. No, sir.
46. General Grunert. Therefore, you didn't occupy them until
after the attack started, and vou were then under Alert 3; is that
right?
Sergeant Klatt. That is right, sir.
47. General Grunert. We will say the attack took place approxi-
mately at 7 : 55 on Sunday morning. About when were you instructed
to go to battle position under Alert 3 ? About what time ?
Sergeant Klatt. My communications officer notified me — well, we
slept very close together there. He notified me, oh, I would say about
twenty minutes or twenty-five minutes of eight, Sunday morning, to
get my stuff together an dhit the field,
48. General Grunert. Twenty-five minutes of eight?
Seargeant Klatt. Yes, sir.
49. General Grunert. And that was before actual bombing
started ?
Sergeant Klatt. I believe it was, sir.
50. Gefneral Gunert. Do you know what source of information he
ha:d that something was going to happen ?
Sergeant Klatt. I do not, sir.
51. General Frank. Who was he?
Sergeant Klatt. Lieutenant Saltsman.
52. General Frank. Saltsman.
53. General Grunert. About when did you actually get in
[14^1] position to start firing?
Sergeant Klatt. Well, sir, it wasn't our job to get into position for
firing. My job was communications, and I was set up and ready
for communications. I had communications to each battery befoi-e
the batteries were there with their guns in the field themselves.
54. General Grunert. Do you recall at about what time the guns
were got in position so that you had communications, all of them,
ready for action?
Sergeant Klatt. Well, that exact time, sir, I couldn't say to now.
55. General Grunert. Was there any actual action after you were
all ready?
Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir.
56. General Grunert. Did the battalion actually do any firing?
Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir, they did. We were strafed at approxi-
mately eight o'clock at our battery position by some planes that had
dumped their bombs on Wheeler Field, and our battery battalion
C. P. was in a direct line with the Wheeler Feld runway, because they
came down the runway along right over our battalion C. P., and a
couple of them had strafed us.
57. General Grunert. Did you get in action against those planes?
Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir. The communications officer, Lieutenant
762 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Saltman, and I were both fortuimte oiioiio-li t() knock one of them
down with B. A. R. fire.
.58. General Grunert. B. A. K. fire. How effective was that ^
[1^6'^] General Frank. What does that stand for'^
59. General Russell. Browning antomatic rifle.
Sergeant Klatt. Browning antomatic rifle, sir.
60. General Grunert. How eftective was this antiaircraft action
against low-flying aircraft ?
Sergeant Klatt. Yon mean of onr hirge gnns, sir ?
61. General Grunert. Of all the equipment yon had.
Sergeant Klatt. Most of it was over before they got into i^osition
and got ammunition, and so forth, to really do any firing. The firing
that the battalion did was done that night on a sabotage alert or attack-
that happened that night, later in the day, evening.
62. General Grunert. Have you any questions. General Russell?
63. General Russell. Sergeant, this movement into the gun posi-
tions and bringing up tKe ammunition : I believe you state that it was
probably that night before they were ready to fire?
Sergeant Klatt. That is right, sir. It was later on, late that after-
noon and early evening, before they were ready to really fire, because
I know they had difficulty getting ammunition, or something like that.
64. General Russell. Now, the guns were actually out and set up ;
is that true '( You left the guns in position ?
Sergeant Klatt. No, sir ; the guns were in the barracks.
65. General Russell. They had to be taken out ?
Sergeant Klatt. They had to be taken out to the gun positions;
yes, sir.
66. General Russell. How were they mounted?
Sergeant Klatt. They were a double bogie wheeled mount,
[1463] towed by prime movers.
67. General Russell. Prime movers ?
Sergeant Klatt, Yes, sir.
68. General Frank. The 3-inch guns were in the barracks ?
Sergeant Klatt. They were'nt in the barracks. They were in the
gun park area, which was up in the barracks area.
69. General Frank. I mean the barracks area.
Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir.
70. General Russell. Now, do you happen to know where the am-
nnmition was?
Sergeant Klaitt. Yes, sir. The ammunition was stored at the
Schofield ammunition warehouses, which were in lower Schofield,
down in the ammunition dumps.
71. General Russell. How^ far were the guns from the ammunition
warehouses ?
Sergeant Klatt. You mean after they were set up in the field
positions, sir ?
72. General Russell. No. In the gun park.
73. General Russell. The ammunition warehouse.
Sergeant Klatt. About one mile down, sir,
74*. General Russell. And then these guns had to go various dis-
tances to get into the different positions?
Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sii-.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 763
75. General Russell. Now, you said you had a prime mover. What
capacity was it ? Do you know ?
Sergeant Klatt. I believe it was around a 41/2- or 5-ton prime
mover, sir. I believe that it what we had at that time. They were
Corbetts.
[14-6i] T6. General Russell. The men were all in the barracks
when this alert came or when the orders came ?
Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir ; they were in the barrack area somewheres
around, sir.
77. General Russell. And they had to assemble the units and form
them and then get the guns and get the ammunition and get into
position ?
Sergeant Klatt. That is correct, sir.
78. General Russell. Sergeant, was there a night attack, or were
you just shooting a little bit?
Sergeant Klatt. I believe it was just a shooting scare, sir.
79. General Russell. Just started shooting at something?
Sergeant Klatt. Somebody got the idea there was something over-
head and came over with the A. A. S., and they opened fire with gun
batteries.
80. General Russell. Did you have more than one attack up where
those gun positions were that day ?
Sergeant Klatt. Well, it all happened in the morning. There were
about three different attacks that hit Wheeler Field, and then they
strafed up]3er Schofield that morning ; probably three different waves
of planes, I believe.
81. General Russell. Now, you did not fire in one of these three
daylight raids?
Sergeant Klatt. Not with the large guns, sir, no.
82. General Russell. Just this automatic stuff?
Sergeant Kxatt. Yes, sir.
83. General Russell. It must have been flying rather low for
[14-6S] you to have gotten them with the B. A. R., wasn't it?
Sergeant Klatt. It was, sir. It was maybe about a hundred feet
high and not over one hundred and fifty feet away from us.
84. General Russell. How long had you been on duty out there in
the Islands?
Sergeant Klatt. Oh, I had arrived over there around July 11, sir,
of 1941.
85. General Russell. Had there been any other alerts prior to this
alert which began sometime in the latter part of November?
Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir. We had been out in the field positions
at that time. We had been moved out into field positions, and we
had stayed there several days.
86. General Russell. How many times from the date of your
arrival until this one in late November had you been out in the field
to stay ?
Sergeant Klatt. Well, we had been out on a couple of maneuvers
where we had gone out in the field, set up established positions, main-
tained communications and everything else with the other gun bat-
teries and moved in. They were only of a day or two duration, and
then late in November I know we went out and we stayed several
764 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
days, because I remember it rained like the devil the whole time we
were out.
87. General Russell. So you recall three times you had been out?
Serjreant Klatt. Approximately, sir. Yes, sir,
88. General Russell. Yon do not know whether there was a gen-
eral alert in the Island or whether it was for the purpose [14^0]
of training that antiaircraft outfit that you were in?.
Sergeant Klatt. No, sir ; I do not.
89. General Russell. That is all.
90. General Grunert. The ammunition that was in storage at Scho-
field, was there no ammunition that went directly with the guns to
the position?
Sergeant Klatt. No, sir; we had no ammunition, no live ammuni-
tion with the guns.
91. General Grunekt. So wdien the guns went to their position did
they have to stop and get ammunition, or was ammunition hauled
directly to the guns from storage ?
Sergeant Klatt. The guns went directly to their field positions,
and then the ammunition was hauled from the ammunition dump
to them.
92. General Grunert. Then, whatever delay there was in getting
guns in position so they could fire was getting ammunition to them,
was it ?
Sergeant Klatt. I believe that took the longest, sir; yes, getting
the ammunition to the guns, because it didn't take long for the guns
to reach their position and it doesn't take long to set up a gun battery
to fire.
93. General Grunert. In your description before the Roberts Com-
mission as to bringing down the plane by B. A. R. fire, it seems here
that when you examined the plane brought down, between you and
Lieutenant Saltsman you determined that the motor was of an Amer-
ican make.'
Sergeant Klatt. It was n Wright engine, sir.
94. General Grunert. Wright engine. And that the parachute
[i.^6V] was of an American manufacture?
Sergeant Klatt. I believe it was, sir.
95. General Grunert. You didn't by chance bring down one of
our own planes, did you?
Sergeant Klatt. No, sir ; it was a Japanese plane.
96. General Grunert. The plane, as far as you could determine
had an American motor and an American propeller?
Sergeant Klati-. That is right, sir. It was a Hamilton Standard
13ropeller or a propeller made under American patents in Japan.
97. General Russell. They weren't Americans in it, were they?
Sergeant Klatt. No, sir; they weren't.
98. General Russell. How many w^ere in it?
Sergeant Klatt. Two.
99. General Russell. They were both killed in the crash?
Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir.
100. General Grunert. Any other questions?
101. General Russeijl. No.
102. General Grunert. Colonel, can you think of anything?
103. Colonel Toulmin. No, sir.
' ^ PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 765
104. General Grunert. Colonel West ? •
105. Colonel West. No, sir.
106. Major Clausen. We offer in evidence a transcript of the tele-
phone conversation that occurred on December 3, 1941, between a
citizen in Honolulu, a Dr. Mori, and a person in Tokyo, which was
referred to yesterday by Colonel Bicknell of G-2, as the exhibit next
in order.
\lJi68\ (Photostatic copy of transcript of telephone conversa-
tion of December 3, 1941, between Dr. Mori and Tokyo, was marked
Exhibit No. 21 and received in evidence.)
107. General Grunert. Now, at this point the Board proceeds to
other business.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon, at 11 : 25 o'clock a. m., the Board proceeded to other
business.)
\llt69'\ AFTERNOON SESSION
(The Board, at 4 o'clock p. m., continued the hearing of witnesses.)
General Grunert. The Board will come to order.
TESTIMONY OP ADMIRAL CLAUDE C. BLOCK, U. S. NAVY (RETIRED) ;
ON ACTIVE DUTY AS A MEMBER OF THE GENERAL BOARD
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Admiral, will you please state to the Board your
name, rank, organization, and station.
Admiral Bloch. My name is Claude C. Bloch ; Admiral, U. S. Navy ;
retired ; on active duty as a member of the General Board.
I understand my rights, and do I understand that this evidence can
be used in judicial proceedings against me, in the Navy?
2. Colonel West. That would be a question for the Navy Department
to determine.
Admiral Bloch. You told me it was. You just told me it was. I
would like to know if that is correct.
3. Colonel West. As a general proposition, any voluntary admis-
sions are admissible before courts and boards. Now, I am not pre-
pared to say whether some statutory provision or regulation of the
Navy Department might exclude this.
Admiral Bloch. All right.
4. General (jrunert. That is our procedure in the Army. Whether
it applies in the Navy or not, I know not.
5. General Russell. I think the construction of that is that you
cannot take that and introduce it into evidence so that it would become
binding, but you can use anything he says in his testimony here as a
basis for cross-examining him, to ask him if he did not so testify. In
other words, it is not '[llijlO'] confidential, but it is not evidence
to be introduced in the other trial and used, as stated by the Colonel,
Admiral Bloch, but it may be used as a basis for impeachment. That
is what it amounts to.
6. General Grunert. Admiral, the Board is attempting to get at
the facts as to what happened, both prior to and leading up to the
attack and during the attack at Pearl Harbor, and we hope that be-
766 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
cause of yoiii- assignment at" that time yon will be able to throw some
light on the subject and give us some facts, and give us probably some
leads to other facts.
Now, will you please state to the .Board your assignment and gen-
erally your duties thereunder during the year 1941, giving the dates.
Admiral Block, I went to Pearl Harbor in April 1940. My duty
was Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and also Commandant
of the Navy Yard. As Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, I
had a dual status under general orders of the Navy Department, in
that I was a Commandant of the District, acting under the orders of
the Navy Department, and also I was an officer in the Fleet, available
for assig-nment by the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, in task groups,
as he saw fit.
7. General Gruneet. As Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval
District, what was your official relationship to the Commander-in-
Chief of the Pacific Fleet, and to the Commanding General of the
Hawaiian Department'^
Admiral Bloch. At that time I was a Rear Admiral in the Navy.
The Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet, who was also the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, was an Admiral. He was
physically present from the time that he assumed com- [14-71]
mand, in February 1941, until the date that he was detached, in mid
December 1941. In my duties as an officer of the Fleet, he w^as my
immediate superior in command and I was his subordinate.
The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department was Lt.
Gen. Short. He took command of the Hawaiian Department early
in February 1941. General Short, as Commander of the Hawaiian
Department, and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District,
were cooperating with the view to attaining the best results in the
joint coastal frontier defense.
8. General Frank. Admiral, j^ou stated that, as Commandant of
the Fourteenth Naval District, you were available for assignment by
the Admiral of the Fleet; but, as Commandant of the Fourteenth
Naval District, did that situation make the Admiral of the Fleet
responsible for the operation of the Fourteenth Naval District ?
Admiral Bloch. The Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet com-
manded the Fleet. I was an officer of the Fleet. In one of my dual
statuses, I was an officer of the Fleet, so he was my superior in that
respect. All of those assignments as an officer of the Fleet were en-
tirely related to the preparations for offensive and defensive, action
in time of war ; to military matters, purely.
9. General Frank. Who was your next superior with respect to
administration of the District?
Admiral Bloch. I was supposed be a decentralized Navy Depart-
ment for local affairs, acting under the instructions of the Navy De-
partment direct. That work related almost entirely to administra-
tive things like plans, buildings, work of the [1472] navy
yard, repairing ships, buying land, building houses, and construction,
and things like that.
10. General Grunert. But, in so far as the defense of the naval
installations at Pearl Harbor was concerned, you were directly under
the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 757
Admiral Bloch. I don't want to burden you with more details of
this complicated set-up.
11. General Grunert. No, we just want to get an understanding of
it.
Admiral Bloch. And I have avoided mentioning the Hawaiian
naval coastal sea frontier, which is another thing of which I had the
command and was supposed to have a force for; but I think it is
better to leave that out because I don't think it has much bearing.
What we are concerned with in this matter, as I see it, is my duties
as an officer of the fleet, with the Commander-in-Chief preisent at
all times, and I being his subordinate.
Now, I was also the Commandant of the District as related to the
routine administrative duties — pay, and all those things; buildings,
grounds, and all that, and my subordinates there in the Navy Depart-
ment; and the Commander-in-Chief had little or no interest in the
Department, but he did have an extreme interest in all the things that
related to the base — its weapons, its facilities, its storage things, food,
its logistics, oil, docks, water, protection ; and such services as I could
render in the way of mine-sweeping, antisubmarine patrols, and
things like that; and I had some small forces for that purpose. I
think that's about as clear as I can put it.
12. General Grunert. Could he have relieved you as Commanding
[i^7'c?] General, or as Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval Dis-
trict, on his own authority, without reference to the Navy Depart-
ment ?
Admiral Bloch. No. I think he could have done it, but he would
have had to have the approval of the Navy,
13. General Grunert. Then he could only use you in your location,
there ^
Admiral Bloch. That is correct, sir.
14. General Grunert. He could not have suddenly ordered you out
with the fleet, and assigned the district to somebody else, could he?
Admiral Bloch. No ; he could not.
15. General Grunert. As Commander of the Fourteenth Naval Dis-
trict, do you recall having made a Joint Hawaiian- Coastal Frontier
Defense Plan with the Army ?
Admiral Bloch. Yes.
16. General Grunert. Do j^ou recall when that plan was made op-
erative, when it was made effective?
Aclmiral Bloch. It was never made operative. It was effective as a
Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan from the date of signature by
General Short and mj^self, and I think that was in the latter part of
March 1911, or thereabout — effective as a plan, but it was never made
operative, until December 7.
17. General Grunert. By its terms it provided that this plan
should become operative upon M Day ?
Admiral Bloch. M Day, or, the order of the War and Navy Depart-
ments, or the mutual agreement of the local commanders.
18. General Grunert. So, that plan, except as a plan, and except
for agreements what to do, prior to its becoming oper- [i^74]
ative, was just a question of agreement between the two of you?
768 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Block. Not exactly, not exactly. The plan was never
operative as a plan, because the War and Navy Departments never
ordered it to become operative, either in part or in whole. The local
commanders never mutually agreed to have it become operative, in
part.
19. General Gkunekt. Could that have been done at any time up to
the time hostilities demanded it be done ?
Admiral Blocii. I think that is a provision, a part of the plan. It
is in the plan; but the plan carried with it further implications in
this respect : That plan was prepared in pursuance to the directive of
the Kainbow War Plan. That is the reason we made it, because the
Kainbow War Plan, which was a joint Army and Navy plan, directed
us to make it. And we were duty-bound to have contained therein the
provisions which were laid down in joint action by the Army and the
Navy, in 1935, which were the over-all policies of the functions and
agreements between the Army and the Navy, as to their relative
responsibilities of the joint coastal frontier defense, and they had to
be a part of that plan.
20. General Grunert. Do you recall that there was a Joint Air
Operations Agreement, as of March 21, 1941, entered into between
General Martin, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force,
and Admiral Bellinger, of the Navy ?
Admiral Bloch. I think that was entered into by General Short
and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.
21. General Grunert. What was Admiral Bellinger's official posi-
tion at the time?
Admiral Bloch. Admiral Bellinger was an officer of the [147S]
fleet. He commanded the patrol. He was with the fleet. He also
had some other titles, but he was generally known as Commander of
Patrol Wing 2.
22. General Grunert. And ho was not a direct subordinate of
yours ?
Admiral Bloch. Well, no ; he was not a direct subordinate. There
was a tie-up between us, in this respect, that this joint air defense
plan which was signed by General Short and the Commandant of the
Fourteenth Naval District somewheres around the 1st of April —
I don't remember the dates
23. General Frank. Who was the Commandant of the Fourteenth
Naval District at the time?
Admiral Bloch. It was I. That agreement was first taken up under
a directive from the Commander-in-Chief, IT. S. Fleet, and the object
was to remove the overlap between the Army and Navy Air Forces,
that would always occur where the Army would go this way, and
the Navy would go this way; but for each specific function there were
some other divers instructions, such as barrage balloons, smoke screens,
antiaircraft warning systems, and so forth, and so on, and the harbor
patrol boats. As I recall it, they had about five or six committees, and
Admiral Bellinger was loaned to me by the Connnandev-in-Chief to
act as my representative in negotiating an agreement about the Air
Avith General Martin.
There was somebody from the fleet loaned to me to help me with
the arrangement about the balloon barrages, and somebody from the
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 769
fleet was loaned to help me with the arrangement about the smoke
screens and the antiaircraft warning. There were a number of com-
mittees, with each committee confining itself to [1476] a cer-
tain part of this agreement, and when it was all drawn up, when all
the agreements were agreed upon, it was brought to the Joint Plan-
ning Committees and to General Short and myself, and we went over
it, and we signed it as an agreement.
24. General Frank. What was your relation to Patrol Wing 2?
Admiral Bloch. My relation to Patrol Wing 2 enters into this situ-
ation a little later on, in this respect : We had something they called
a "Base Defense Air Force," and the Base Defense Air Force was
connnanded by Admiral Bellinger, who was the Connnander of
Patrol Wing 2, and he brought his patrol planes into this Base De-
fense Air Force. Now, the Base Defense Air Force wasn't a firm
force. All the aircraft in that force had their own duties, their own
missions, their own tasks, and their own jobs to do; but when we
sounded an air-raid alarm, they all got together, and they became
this thing, and went out for search, attack, or air combat. Do I
make myself clear i' They were what you might say, in a crude sort
of way, a "volunteer fire department." You sounded an air-raid
alarm, and all these planes, coming off these various forces, and each,
through command forces, with their own duties, their own tasks, their
own missions, they came over to Bellinger's, and all the fighters went
to Martin; and from the air-raid alarm, all of Martin's bombers
came over for search and attack.
25. General Frank. Were the PBYs habitually under the Four-
teenth Naval District, or habitually under the fleet ?
Admiral Bloch. The PBYs — the Fourteenth Naval District didn't
have a patrol plane or any other aircraft except possibly one or two
utility planes at the air station.
26. General Frank. Under whom did this Base Defense Air Force
[1477] _ operate?
Admiral Bloch. Under Admiral Bellinger, insofar as it related
to the part under the Navy's tactical command, and under General
Martin, insofar as the pursuit planes and fighters,
27. General P^rank. And in that capacity, who was Bellinger's
next superior?
Admiral Bloch. He didn't have any superior. I think that the
order said that I had supervisory control to coordinate operations
for the Army through him. I think that is the way the order read,
to coordinate operations with the Army and Navy through the Com-
mander of Patrol Wing 2.
28. General Grunert, Then, as I understand it, under this joint
agreement, entered into on behalf of the Navy by you, and on behalf
of the Army by General Short, the Air Forces that were primarily
land fighters came under the jurisdiction of Short through his Air
Force Commander, and what you might call "sea fighters" and patrols,
or "over-the-sea," came under you, using Admiral Bellinger as the
Commander of that force?
Admiral Bloch, I would prefer you state they came under Admiral
Bellinger.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 1 50
770 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
2i). General Grunert. But Admiral Bellinger looked to whom di-
rectly for instructions or directions or supervision^
xVdmiral Blcch. I had supervisory control over him, insofar as
related to coordinating his operations with the Army, but his O. P.
plan for this force was drawn, and we had drill after drill, along
the line tliat it was required to take, in order that the acts and opera-
tions of this Air Force would be automatic and it would not be neces-
sary to take valuable time to give orders in case of emergency.
[J4'^8] 30. General Frank. When did this joint defense plan
become o])erative?
Admiral Bloch. Now, which one are you meaning, sir — which
joint plan ^ The joint air defense, or joint coastal frontier defense^
31. Genei'al Frank. Well, what I am trying to find out is this:
Did it require hostile action for this air plan to go into effect?
Admiral Bloch. I think I can explain that.
32. General E'rank, The next question I want to ask is this : What
effect did the joint plan have on operations preparatory to hostile
action ? Do you see what I am driving at?
Admiral Bloch. Yes, I see what you are driving at. I think I
can probably do it, if I stick to the line of the question. There were
two joint agreements. The first is known as the Joint Coastal Fron-
tier Defense Plan. That was based on the War Plan, and joint action ;
that was known as JCD-42. That is a Navy designation of it.
The joint air force was an additional joint agreement, signed by
General Short and myself, that had to do with the joint use of air-
craft, barrage balloons, smoke screens, aircraft warnings, and a lot
of other things. That was signed by General Short and myself, 1
think, even prior to JCD-42. I think that was the first one that we
agreed on and signed.
Now, when JCD-42 was signed, we made this air agreement an
appendix of JCD-42. It was known as "Appendix 7." Ordinarily
it would not be operative, unless the various conditions which I have
recited before were effective; but I think that General Short and I
had mutually agreed to put in so much of that, [1479] into
effect, as related to the use of these air forces intei'changeably between
the Army and the Navy, at once; .uid I t'aink General Martin, repre-
senting General Short, and Admiral Bellinger, representing the Navy,
got up their own estimate of the situation, their own OP plan for
that.
Is that what you wanted to know?
33. General Frank. Yes. What I was after was, there was a pro-
vision in the plan for these combined operations to become effective
when there was fear of an im])ending attack, rather than having to
wait for hostile action to take place?
Admiral Bloch. There was a provision in the War Plan about that,
yes. The War Plan, Rainbow 5, says :
In case of strained relations, INI Day can be declared, without hostilities.
Now, they can say "M Day" three weeks before a war, five weeks, or
two weeks, and the minute they sa}' "M Day," JCD-42 is in operation ;
and that mav have been what the people expected.
34. General Frank. That is all.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 771
35. General GRUXERt. Then there was no actual M Day ever
declared ?
Admiral Block. Not till December 7.
36. General Grunert. Then how, under the existing cooperative
plans, could the necessary reconnaissances and other protective meas-
ures be taken, except on your own initiative in behalf of the Army and
the Navy ?
Admiral Block. Well, I don't know whether the Army had any
orders, or not; but I do know, in February 1941, the Commander-in-
Chief of the fleet got out a confidential letter, [^4^0] which he
called "2-CL-41," and that letter was also revised under date of
October 14th or 15th, 1941, and I don't think there were any substan-
tial changes in it; and in that letter, of which some 20 or 30 copies
were sent to the Commanding General, he states he proposes to sup-
port the Army in their defense of the naval base at Pearl Harbor.
37. General Grunert. Then all of these maneuvers and tests and
drills that were held between the combined air forces were merely
practice, so that in the event M Day was declared it could be put into
force ; is that the idea ?
Admiral Block. No ; that particular air-agreement feature was in
effect the whole time, from the time the agi^eement was signed.
38. General Grunert. But, as part of the agreement, were not the
Navy's responsibilities outlined, and the Army's responsibilities out-
lined, likewise? Were they not so outlined?
Admiral Block. I think "joint action" gives the functions of both
the Army and the Navy, not specifically for Hawaii, but for the over-
all— everything. And I think those same functions were taken out of
joint action and put into the joint agreement, JCD-425 specifically for
Hawaii.
39. General Grunert. Under this joint Air agreement, was the
Army charged with the technical control of Air operations over Ha-
waii, itself?
Admiral Block. Well, I would rather refer to the agreement. I
think the document is the best evidence you can get on that, sir.
40. General Grunert. Did the Navy ever check to see whether such
control was being fully and satisfactorily exercised by [i-iSlI
the Army ?
Admiral Block. I don't know; I don't know. Is that a part of
the agreement. General? I am quite "at sea" as to what you want
to know.
41. General Grunert. Paragraph 2 of the agreement states, in part,
as follows :
Defensive air operation over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be
executed under the tactical command of the Army. The naval base-defense
ofBcer will determine the navy fighter strength to participate in these missions.
With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter
aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force
will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat, or for the
maintenance of the required alert status, imtil, due to a change in the tactical
situation, it is determined by the Navy base-defense officer to revert to Navy
control.
Admiral Block. Is that in the joint agreement, sir?
42. General Grunert. That is in the joint agreement of the 20th of
March 1941. Now, whose business was it, on the part of the Navy,
79716— 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1— -51
772 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to check to see whether the Army was prepared to meet their re-
sponsibilities under that agreement ?
Admiral Bloch. I didn't think Navy undertook any check of the
Army for their responsibilities. This was turned over to the tactical
control of the Army.
43. General Grunert. Wasn't the Navy concerned about whether
or not the Army could fulfill its part of the agreement ?
Admiral Bloch. I don't think the Navy lacked confidence
[14^2] in the Army's ability to take the tactical control of the
fighters.
44. General Grunert. Under this agreement, I believe that the
Navy was charged with what we call "distant patrolling." As far as
you know, did the Navy have sufficient means to carry out its re-
sponsibility in that respect ?
Admiral Bloch. Now, are you referring to this same agreement,
or to other agreements?
45. General Grunert. This same agreement.
Admiral Bloch. I don't remember that, in that same agreement.
I remember it in the joint coastal frontier agreement.
46. General Grunert. I think probably you are correct that it does
have a reference to it in paragraph 1 of the Joint Air Agreement,
. by saying :
Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the
tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the
Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission,
and so forth.
Admiral Bloch. I think it might clarify the situation to say that
this Joint Air Agreement, and the naval base defense air force, was
for the purpose of breaking up an air raid which had happened, was
happening, or which was imminent of happening, when the air-raid
alarms sounded.
47. General Grunert. What I am trying to get at is this :
In guarding against attack, any preparatory measure to be taken,
which in itself really constituted a strained relation, during the period
of strained relations, such measure should be taken for the defense of
the Navy and the defense of the Army; while the Joint Hawaiian
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, [^l^'S] under paragraph 18,
'^NAVY,"says:
The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall provide for :
a. An inshore patrol.
6. An offshore patrol.
G. An escort force.
d. An attack force.
— and so forth.
Now, in fact, was this plan operative to the extent that the Com-
mandant of the Fourteenth Naval District did provide offshore patrol ?
Admiral Bloch. Offshore ? The only offshore patrol that was pro-
vided— and I want to be sure that you liave got your term right. Gen-
eral. You mean the second one, "a" to "d", and this one, here?
48. General Frank. Yes.
Admiral Bloch. In order 2CL-41, the Commander-in-Chief stated
wjiat the inshore patrol was to consist of, and where the forces were
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 773
to come from. I think you will find that in paragraph 3 (a), "Con-
tinuous Patrols," "inshore patrol."
[14^4-] This states what the inshore patrol shall do and where
the forces shall come from; that is, 3 (B) intermittent patrols. The
first is destroyer offshore patrol. That is supplied by the fleet under
command of the task force concerned. Then, under intermittent pa-
trols are certain air patrols which are prescribed, and under 3 sweeping
for mines. This was under the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval
District.
49. General Grunert. Did that apply both to surface vessels and
aircraft ?
Admiral Bloch. Wliere it says surface vessels, they were surface
vessels ; where it says aircraft, they were aircraft.
59. General Grunert. Then, according to the instructions under
which you were functioning you had no responsibility for distant air
reconnaissance ?
Admiral Bloch. There was no distant air reconnaissance ordered in
that order. That is the only order that I know which was operative.
51. General Grunert. But, actually, was there some distant air
reconnaissance being made from time to time or continuously ?
Admiral Bloch. I do not know. I do not know whether there was
or not. That would not be under me.
52. General Grunert. It was not your responsibility to see whether
there was or not ?
Admiral Bloch. Not at that time. I was supposed to have under
my command 108 P. B. Y.'s for the purpose of performing distant
reconnaissance. I had asked time and time again for them, but the
Nayy had never furnished them. So I had no implements to perform
distant reconnaissance in the Fourteenth Naval District force :
53. General Grunert. The P. B. Y.'s that were furnished were
[^4^5] under whose jurisdiction?
Admiral Bloch. Rear Admiral Bellinger's. They were fleet
planes.
54. General Grunert. The P. B. Y.'s are land-based?
Admiral Bloch. No, sir; they are seaplanes.
55. General Grunert. But what I mean is that they are land-based ;
they are not carrier-based, are they?
Admiral Bloch. No; they are based at an air station.
56. General Grunert. Where were they kept in the Fourteenth
Naval District? "What was their base there?
Admiral Bloch. We had two air stations, one at Kaneohe and one
Ford Island. Some were based on Kaneohe and some on Ford Island. '
57. General Grunert. If any reconnaissance was made or supposed
to have been made on the morning of December 7th, so far as the
Navy was concerned it was under the jurisdiction of Admiral
Bellinger?
Admiral Bloch. I think Admiral Bellinger would get his orders
from the Commander-in-Chief to conduct it. Although Admiral
Bellinger had command of the patrol craft he could not order them
on any mission or task that he saw fit, because that directive would
come from the high command.
774 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
58. General Griineht. But the directive did not process through
you; it would go direct from high command to Admiral Bellinger?
Admiral Bloch, I think so.
59. General Grunj:rt. Do you know whether or not any such in-
structions are covered in this document which you just mentioned?
Admiral Bloch. So far as I know, this reconnaissance was not
mentioned. The only place that any kind of search is [1486^
mentioned under my duties is where it says :
The following procedure shall be followed by the task force,
and so forth.
Then it provides for air search for enemy ships. That would be
this volunteer air force.
60. General Grunert. But that was only in the event of an attack?
Admiral Bloch. That is right, sir.
61. General Grunert. That was not preliminary?
Admiral Bloch. That is right, sir.
62. General Grunert. Then, so far as you know, there were no
instructions concerning a probable attack, in case of strained re-
lations, or in anticipation of a probable attack?
Admiral Bloch. Not so far as I know.
63. General Frank. Whose responsibility was it to provide that
reconnaissance? It must have been somebody's.
Admiral Bloch. I suggest that you ask the Commander-in-Chief.
Has he been before you?
64. General Frank. No.
Admiral Bloch. I think he can answer those questions better than
I. I am just giving my understanding.
65. General Russell. Now, Admiral, on the joint agreement, or
the two joint agreements we have gotten in the record so far : In tliis
joint agreement for air operations, signed between you and General
Short, was reconnaissance mentioned at all?
Admiral Bloch. I do not think it is.
66. General Russell. The other agreement was this coastal defense
plan in which missions were outlined and agreements on reconnais-
sance were reached?
[14^7'] Admiral Bloch. That was a major responsibility if the
plan became operative.
67. General Russell. But while the plan was effective from early
in the spring of 1941, it was never operative until December 7th, 1941 ?
Admiral Bloch. That is correct, sir.
68. General Russell. So that respecting missions of the Army and
Navy, according to your construction of the agreement, reconnais-
sance missions were not effective until December 7, 1941 ?
Admiral Bloch. Under the circumstances that obtained, that is the
way it happened. I will say that I accepted the responsibility in that
agreement for distant reconnaissance for the Navy, and I did my
utmost to imj^lement my responsibility by demanding patrol planes
for that purpose, but I never had any ; I never had one.
69. General Russell. Admiral, what do you mean by "I accepted
my responsibility" under the joint plan?
Admiral Bloch. No • I said, when I signed it.^ I signed that joint
agreement as Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. I think
that is the way it reads.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 775
70. General Kussell. J. C. D, 42 you are talking about now?
Admiral Bloch. Yes. First, it says what the Hawaiian Depart-
ment accepts as their responsibility, and then what the Navy accepts
as its responsibility. As to the Army, it says that the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department, shall provide for — and then it went
along with 15 or 20 things for him to provide, and then came the
Navy:
The Commandant, the Fourteenth Naval District, shall provide for —
[I4S8] and under Item I, it says :
Distant reconnaissance.
Having accepted that responsibility, the Commandant of the Four-
teenth Naval District — in this agreement which I signed I did my best
to implement that distant reconnaissance by patrol planes.
71. General Russell. Admiral, I do not know that we understand
each other. We are talking about J. C. D. 42 ?
Admiral Bloch, I think it is.
'72. (jeneral Russell. You and General Short signed that ?
Admiral Bloch. Yes.
73. General Russell. And it was not to become operative until cer-
tain conditions were met ?
Admiral Bloch. I will show you that. Have you seen it?
74. General Russell. Yes ; I have seen it. That was to become opera-
tive when certain conditions were met. In the meantime, between the
date of the execution of J. C. D. 42 and the coming of war and the
reaching of an agreement, which is the condition precedent making it
operative in so far as the resj^ective reconnissance missions were con-
cerned, both you and General Short accepted the missions and at-
tempted to put them into effect immediately, before the plan became
ojDerative ? Is that the testimony ?
Admiral Bloch. I did not say that, sir. I do not know what anyone
else had said.
75. General Russell. What do you say about that now ?
Admiral Bloch. I say that General Short and I signed this agree-
ment, J. C. D. 42, in which the Army shall provide for certain things
and the Navy shall provide for certain things, and that I, being the
Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, [14^9] did my
utmost to get the various craft, implements of all kinds, to meet my
obligation, and I never was able to get them all. I never got a single
patrol ])lane, although I had 108 promised.
76. General Russell. When did you think under this agreement
as you construe it your obligation for distant reconnaissance became
binding?
Admiral Bloch. My obligations for distant reconnaissance would
not become binding until that plan was operative.
77. General Russell. I think I understand you.
78. General Frank. To whom did those P. B. Y's that were there
belong, if they did not belong to you ?
Admiral Bloch. They belonged to the patwings of the United States
Fleet, Patwing 1 and Patwing 2, both under the command of Rear
dmiral Bellinger; and he was of the echelon of command of the Com-
mander-in-Chief.
79. General Frank. The commander of the fleet afloat had a patrol
wing that was under his command that had to be based on land ?
776 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Block. Yes, two of tliem. One and two. They could be
based on tenders when they went away. There were a number of
tenders present ; and if they went out to Samoa or to the Marshalls or
some place where there was no place to land, they would have to base
on tenders.
80. General Frank. You signed this agreement, the Joint Coastal
Defense Plan, with General Short, and you did not have the facilities
with which to carry out your part of the agreement. Did you ever
tell that to General Short ?
Admiral Bloch. I think General Short knew it perfectly well.
81. General Frank. But did you ever tell him that you did not
[14^0] have the equipment with which to do it ?
Admiral Block. I cannot say that I have never told him and I
cannot say that I did tell him.
82. General Frank. A little while ago you stated that you never
checked up on the Army to see if they were carrying out the things
with which they were charged. If General Short had the same atti*
tude of never checking up to find out whether or not the Navy was
carrying out its responsibilities or whether it had the equipment with
which to do it, if he never asked and if, on the other hand, you never
told him, he did not know, did he?
Admiral Block. I think we are at somewhat of a disagreement about
that. General. In the first place, the question you asked me was
whether I checked up combat efficiency of the fighters that were turned
over to the Army for flying overland for the protection of Oahu, and
I said I did not. That related entirely to this joint air agreement
where the Navy fighters went to the Army for the defense of Oahu.
I had complete confidence in the Army's ability to handle those planes
in attacks. Every day the Army supplied the Navy with a list of
bombers and, vice versa, the Navy supplied the Army with a list of
fighters. I am not a flier. I could not tell you whether a fighter was
doing a thing in the proper way or not. I did have very definite ideas.
I knew how^ many fighters the Army had and I knew how many bomb-
ers the Army had; I knew whether they were modern or obsolete.
So far as my knowledge is concerned, it related to numbers and types ;
but I feel quite certain that General Short had the same information.
83. General Frank. Was there a carefully detailed, worked-out
system of operations between the Army and the Navy in this [-?4^-?]
defense situation?
Admiral Block. I do not quite understand your question, sir.
84. General Frank. This Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was
signed; and what I am trying to find out is whether this agreement
was just a state of mind or whether there existed some place a care-
fully-detailed, worked-out system of operations that were arrived at
by the working people sitting down around a table and determining
what to do each with the other.
Admiral Block. Of course that question is a question on which I
could not, necessarily, have the information you want ; but I will say
it is my belief that General Martin, General Rudolph and General
Davidson, and Admiral Bellinger and his subordinates — I do not
remember their names — were very, very close to one another, and I
further know that on several occasions a carrier came in from sea.
There was a position indication — this was a drill — and in such cases
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 777
they would have to search for her and they would find her and they
would bomb her, and they had the usual things that you probably
remember when you were there. There were some obscurities in com-
munications and operations. Those were all carefully noted, analyzed,
and remedied. So I believe that within the limits of our intelligence
and ability we tried to make the thing a working scheme. But it had
the limitation of being only for an air attack, in the case of a raid
or where we knew we had positive information and knew what was
coming, presuming we had some information.
85. General Grunert. It seems that this joint plan made between
you and General Short in certain respects, certainly as far as
air search and distant reconnaissance are concerned, [14^2^
should have been made between the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet
and General Short, inasmuch as you had nothing with which to
implement that part of the agreed-upon plan ?
Admiral Bloch. You are talking about the joint agreement?
86. General Grunert. Yes.
Admiral Bloch. Had that plan become operative, we will say,
'on the 4th day of December, and the fleet had left there — suppose the
fleet had all pulled out and taken everything with them — in our plan
Admiral Kimmel had made a provision that two patrol squadrons
belonging to the fleet would be left there for me to perform my obliga-
tion of distant reconnaissance. Of course you know two squadrons
of patrol planes cannot perform a 360-degree reconnaissance a dis-
tance of 800 miles. It cannot be done. But that was what they were
to leave me when that war plan went into effect. But I do not think
he gave me a small force just because he wanted, but because he did
not have a larger one. He did not have any more to give me.
87. General Grunert. Did General Short understand the condi-
tions, first, the organization, then the responsibility as pertained to
the Navy, as you have outlined it to us, and then did he understand
that you did not have the means to carry out your responsibility
under that joint plan?
Admiral Bloch. I think General Short had better answer those
questions. But I will say that I knew his deficiencies.
88. General Grunert. In this cooperative plan, it would appear
necessary that both the commanders fully understand the situation
in each conunand so as to be able to cooperate ; and unless such things
are explained by the commanders thereof it is difficult for the other
commander to get an insight into what is being done or what can be
done ?
[14^3] Admiral Bloch. General Short had access to the Com-
mander-in-Chief at all times, and he had conferences many, many
times when I was not there ; and while I believe that the Commander-
in-Chief made a tremendous effort to tell us what was taking place, as
to whether he omitted to tell me anything, I know that the Commander-
in-Chief and General Short were in close contact all the time.
89. General Grunert. That is what is difficult for me to realize,
what did and did not take place. Here is the comminding general of
the Department and here is the commander-in-chief of the fleet, and
ihere is the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. Just what
ihe should do in relation and in cooperation and coordination with the
;fleet, as to what he should do certainly with you as Commandant of
778 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the Fourteenth Naval District, do you think was clearly understood
by General Short ?
Admiral Bloch. I cannot answer for General Short, but I do know,
or it is my firm belief, that the cooperation was extremely good be-
tween the Commander-in-Chief and General Short. I know it was
good between General Short and myself, from my side of it, and I
hope he reciprcates the same feeling.
90. General Grunert. Does cooperation include a thorough under-
standing of the capabilities of all those commands ?
Admiral Bloch. I felt quite sure that I understood his capabilities,
sir, and his deficiencies.
91. General Frank. I have one question about the lack of patrol
planes. Actually, Hawaii was without sufficient air patrol planes to
provide adequate reconnaissance ?
Admiral Bloch. Yes. I say yes, and I am not an air man and I
have not made the computations myself, but I heard someone say,
who had made the computation, that to conduct a 360- [-?4^4]
degree reconnaissance for 800 miles, which is necessary for finding
aircraft, it would require ITO aircraft and 350 |)ilots. I believe those
are the figures. I might say further that I understand that a number
of P. B. Y.'s that we had there were of a new type, and they were
deficient in spare parts, and they were having difficulties with certain
mechanical features. What, I do not know.
92. General Grunert. Did they make such reconnaissances as the
available means permitted?
Admiral Bloch. General, you better ask the Commander-in-Chief
about that. I had no control over those things.
93. General Grunert. As far you know, you do not know whether
they did or did not ?
Admiral Bloch. I do not know whether they did or did not, sir.
94. General Grunert. Do you know on the morning of the 7th of
December whether any such planes were in the air on any reconnais-
sance mission ?
Admiral Bloch. I heard planes taking off. I do not know exactly
what missions they were on, but there were planes in the air.
95. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not many of the
P. B. Y.'s were caught on the ground and destroyed ?
Admiral Bloch. I understand that some were.
96. General Grunert. But you do not know of your own knowledge ?
Admiral Bloch. No, sir.
97. General Grunert. TheP.B. Y.'s were not your planes?
Admiral Bloch. They were not under my command, my responsi-
bility.
98. General Grunert. Whose responsiibility was it to initiate
[149-5] and coordinate efforts against a hostile attack ? Was it the
Army's or the Navy's ?
Admiral Bloch. I do not quite understand you.
99. General Grunert. In case there was a hostile attack, as there
was on December 7th, whose responsibility was it to initiate the offen-
sive side of the defensive ? In other words, as to aircraft, was it under
the Navy, under the Army, or under both ?
Admiral Bloch. I cannot answer that question. It is hypothetical,
and I do not understand it.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 779
100. General Grunert. In case of a hostile attack, with reference to
the plan that we call the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan, which became operative when there was a hostile attack, did the
Navy and the Army have separate defenses, or attacks, yon might call
them? Were they initiated of their own accord, or was the Navy
charged with meeting the attack, and then when it came over the Island
of Oahu itself, then it became the Army's responsibility to take care
of what was in the air? Was there a clear nnderstanding of just how
such a defense would be initiated and how it was to be carried out ?
Admiral Bloch. I am sorry ; I have not the operation order on the
Air Force, but it was covered in there. When the air raid alarm
sounded there were two primary things to do : First, the aircraft that
were going under the Army's control had to go to them, and vice versa,
the Army aircraft that came under Navy Control had to come to them.
The Navy called it search and attack. They went out and looked for
carriers to try to find them and hit them, and the Army concentrated,
according to their plans and doctrines, their pursuit ancl fighter planes
to drive off and break up attacks of enemy planes; ancl I think
[^4^0] it even went so far as to specify that they were to trail them
back to their carriers so they could inform the Navy where the carriers
were. Which was first, I do not know.
101. General Grunert. Does not that seem to indicate that had
there been one distinct plan under unity of command there might
have been better results ?
Admiral Block. I think so. That is a hypothetical question.
102. General Grunert. Then it appeared to be the Navy's mission
to locate and destroy a hostile navy task force ?
Admiral Bloch. Yes, sir.
103. General Grunert. And when the attack came, it was the Army's
business to conduct the defense ?
i\.dmiral Bloch. Yes.
[i^P7] 104. General Grunert. I believe you told me you were
kept informed of the Army's defensive measures ; is that correct ?
Admiral Bloch. I do not know whether I said that or not. What do
you mean by "measures," sir ?
105. General Grunert. Well, did you know just how the Army in-
tended to carry out its mission to defend Pearl Harbor by its installa-
tions, by its antiaircraft locations, by its interceptor command, includ-
ing the air warning service, and so forth? Were you generally
familiar with that setup ?
Admiral Bloch. I was familiar with that. I knew the locations of
the guns.
106. General Grunert. Did the Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department, inform you as to any special measures he proposed to take
or had adopted as the result of these so-called warning messages that
were received late in November, early in December ?
Admiral Bloch. I believe that General Short told me that he was on
alert, and I think he said he was on Alert No. 1, and there is a possi-
sibility that I may have confused his Alert No. 1 with our Condition
No. 1, because our Condition No. 1 is the most rigid, and his Alert No,
1 is the most less rigid.
780 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
107. General Gruneet. That was quite another subject I had:
whether or not you thoroughly understood that his Alert No. 1 was
merely against sabotage.
Admiral Bloch. Well, I do not know what I knew at that time. I
know now, of course.
108. General Grunert. I believe that you testified before the Roberts
Commission.
Admiral Bloch. I think I told the Roberts Commission that
[1W8] I believed I knew they were on alert but I might have been
mixed up in whether it was Alert 1 or Alert 3, because our numbers are
different. I think I told them that. I am not sure.
109. General Grunert. As I recall your testimony, it was to the ef-
fect that you knew they were on Alert No. 1, but you understood or
just thought that that was the same as your Alert No. 1.
Admiral Bloch. Well, something to that effect.
110. General Grunert. And that you really didn't find out that they
were on the lowest form of alert, while you were on the highest, until
after the attack.
Admiral Bloch. Possibly. That is the idea. There was some con-
fusion in my mind about the thing.
111. General Grunert, Now, did the Fleet Commander keep you
informed of the international situation and of the knowledge that he
gleaned as to the Japanese Fleet from time to time ?
Admiral Bloch. I think the Commander-in-Chief tried to show me
all the telegrams and correspondence that he had, but I do not want
this Board to believe that the information he got represented the
political situation, because it did not.
112. General Grunert. Did you know of the presence of a Japanese
task force in the vicinity of Jaluit between November 27th and 30th ?
Admiral Bloch. We had received an intelligence report from Wash-
ington which referred to the presumed presence of certain types and
numbers of ships in the. Marshall Islands in the vicinity of Jaluit.
This intelligence was the best that I [i^^^] had or that the
Navy Department had, but I believe that its correctness is subject to
some question.
113. General Grunert. Do you know whether this information was
furnished to General Short?
Admiral Bloch. No, I do not.
114. General Russell. Were carriers indicated as being in that
force? Did that message indicate that carriers were in that task
force ?
Admiral Bloch. My recollection is that the intelligence dispatch
stated that there were one or two carriers present there and that the
remainder of the carriers, some eight or ten, and the capital ships,
were in home waters, meaning Empire waters.
115. General Grunert. Were you kept advised of the movement of
this force, and did you have knowledge of its whereabouts after
December 1st ?
Admiral Bloch. This same intelligence report detailed very heavy
movements of men-of-war, including one division of battleships to
Indo-China and Thailand ; also included large numbers of transports.
After December 7th I had no knowledge of where they had gone ox
what had taken place.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 781
116, General Grunert. Would it be out of consideration to figure
that a task force would come to the Marshall Islands in order to go
down toward Thailand or the Kra Peninsula ?
Admiral Block. Well, if I were running a task force, I wouldn't
go to the Kra Peninsula via the Marshall Islands.
117. General Grunert, Was General Short kept informed of this
naval intelligence ; do you know ?
[ISOO] Admiral Bloch. I do not know whether he got it from
the Commander-in-Chief or not, sir,
118, General Grunert, He did not get it from you ?
Admiral Blooh. So far as you know, I gave him some, I gave
General Short some intelligence. On occasions he would come to my
office and ask specific questions, and if I had any intelligence on the
subject I would give it to him.
119, General Grunert. Wliat was the customary procedure in pass-
ing out this intelligence ? Only on request, or how ?
Admiral Bi.och. Well, we had two types of intelligence. One type
was handled by the Office of Naval Intelligence, and I believe that
there was free interchange between this Intelligence and Military
Intelligence, and that everything we got the Army got, and everything
the Army got we got. This latter type of intelligence we have been
speaking of had a very high secrecy classification, and only necessary
people in the naval establishment were told even of its existence.
120, General Grunert, Then, normally the command would not be
informed of this type of intelligence?
Admiral Bloch, I think he was informed a great deal, sir. I think
he was informed, but it was not sent in the mail or anything like
that.
121. General Grunert. Well, as to such intelligence, who was the
judge as to what would be told to General Short ?
Admiral Bloch. Well, so far as I was concerned, I usually gave
intelligence to General Short of this nature in response to inquiries.
What the Commander-in-Chief gave him or the Commander-in-
Chief's intelligence officer gave him, I cannot [1501'] testify;
I don't know,
122, General Grunert, Then, normally were his sources of infor-
mation both the Commander-in-Chief, the Commander-in-Chief's
intelligence force, and your headquarters and your intelligence officer?
Did he have those dual places to get intelligence from, or was what-
ever he got passed down through you to him ?
Admiral Bloch. No, I do not think it was passed through me to him.
123. General Grunert. Then, he had several sources to look to ?
Admiral Bloch. He had sources : I think he got intelligence from
the Commander-in-Chief, I cannot say that he did and I cannot say
that he didn't, but I believe he got information from the Commander-
in-Chief, I gave him intelligence on one or two occasions that I
remember, in response to inquiries. There was free and routine setup
for interchange of Naval intelligence and M. I, D. intelligence. That
was done through the respective intelligence officers.
124. General Grunert. But such matters as the issue we have just
been discussing were not routine ?
Admiral Bloch. No,
125. General Grunert. That was ultrasecret ?
Admiral Bloch, That was not routine.
782 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
126. General Grunert. And ordinarily that would not be passed
out except on special requests or on the initiative of those who had the
intelligence, as to whether or not the other party should have it?
Admiral Bloch. I think that is correct, sir.
[1502] 127. General Frank. This type of information was
picked up by an installation that was a part of the District, wasn't it?
Wasn't that one of your activities as a Naval District Commander?
Admiral Bloch. It was known as the District Combat Intelligence.
128. General Frank. It therefore would come to you first and
through your District Combat Intelligence to the C.-in-C. of the Fleet?
Admiral Bloch. No; the Commander-in-Chief as a rule got it as
soon as I got it, maybe sometimes sooner. It was sent to him
immediately.
May I say for the understanding of the Board that this same type
of intelligence is collected by the Army too and available to the Army.
Whether they sent it to General Short or not, I do not know. They
had all this same information here in Washington.
129. General Grunert. Do you know whether General Short ex-
pected better sources of information from the Navy than he had of
his own?
Admiral Bloch. I do not know. There is no reason why he should.
130. General Grunert. But with your District Intelligence setup,
isn't it more probable that he should get such information about other
naval forces from the Navy rather than from the Army ?
Admiral Bloch. I believe all the same information w^as possessed
here in Washington by the Army Intelligence and was available for
distribution by them in the same way that we got ours.
[1503] 131. General Grunert. But originally that intelligence
came from Naval sources ?
Admiral Bloch. No, sir. I don't know where it came from.
132. General Grunert. Well, do you know what efforts were made
by the Navy to secure information of possible Japanese naval activity
in the mandated islands?
Admiral Bloch. I don't know, but we didn't have any luck.
133. General (trunert. But you did have some information appar-
ently about the Japanese being in home waters. Where did that
come from?
Admiral Bloch. That was one of these speculative intelligence
matters.
134. General Grunert. Did that come from Washington?
Admiral Bloch. From Washington.
135. General Grunert. Or from your own sources?
Admiral Bloch. It came from Washington; same source that the
"fleet in Jaluit" came from.
136. General Grunert." Now, as to cooperation and so-called co-
ordination— two overworked $64 words — did you know whether or
not the Army's air warning service was in operation, and did you know
the details thereof ?
Admiral Bloch. I had some information which I tliought to be
good.
137. General Grunert. Did you make inquiries regarding it?
Admiral Bloch. Yes.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 783
138. General Grunert; Had you received General Short's standing
operational procedure of November 5th about the types of alert and
the interceptor scheme of operation?
Admiral Block. I don't know. I don't think so, I am [1503-A ]
not sure. I never saw it at that time.
139. General Frank. Had your liaison officer, Lieutenant Burr,
over at Hawaiian Department Headquarters, obtained copies of tliat
at your establishment, would they have been delivered ?
Admiral Bix)Ch. I believe they would have been delivered to the
war plans or operations officer.
140. General Frank. And that need not necessarily have been
brought to your attention ?
Admiral Bloch. That is correct, sir.
141. General Grunert. Lieutenant Burr is a subordinate of yours
is he?
Admiral Block. He was then.
142. General Grunert. He was. And then he was the liaison man
with the Army for the 14th Naval District, and not for the Fleet
itself?
Admiral Block, No; he was the 14th Naval District liaison officer.
143. General Grunert. Now, some questions as to these various
messages received from October to December. There is one here
October 16th, From that date, do you i-ecall what that was ?
Admiral Block. Well, I think the 16th is about the fall of the
Cabinet. That is when the Matsuoka Cabinet fell.
144. General Grunert. The Navy message of October 16th:
(Navy message of October 16, 1941, was read as follows:)
The following is a paraphrase of a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions which I have been directed to pass to you. Quote :
Japanese cabinet resignation creates a grave [1503-B~\ situation. If a
new cabinet is formed it probably will be anti-American and strongly nationalistic.
If the Konoye cabinet remains it will operate under a new mandate which will
not include rapprochement with the United States. Either way hostilities between
Japan and Russia are strongly possible. Since Britain and the U. S. are held
responsible by Japan for her present situation there is also a possibility that
Japan may attack those two powers. View of these possibilities you will take
due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose
strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan.
Do you recall that message ?
Admiral Block. I remember the message.
145. General Grunert. That came to you through the Commander-
in-Chief, or you were informed through the Commander-in-Chief?
Admiral Block. I don't remember whether it was addressed to me as
an information addressee or whether he gave me a copy of it, but I
saw it,
146. General Grunert. Do you know whether General Short was
informed as to that message ?
Admiral Block. I think he was. I didn't but I think the Com-
mander-in-Chief did send it to him.
147. General Grunert, Now, the Navy message of November 24th,
which reads as follows :
784 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[1S03-C] (Navy message of November 24, 1941, was read as
follows :)
There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with
Japan. This situation coupled with statements of Nippon Government and
movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a sur-
prise aggressive movement in any direction including an attack on the Philip-
pines or Guam is a possibility. The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch and
concurs and requests action.
Inform senior Army officers in respective areas utmost secrecy is necessary in
order not to complicate the already tense situation or precipitate Japanese
action.
Do you know whether that message was transmitted to General
Short or he was informed as to its contents ?
' Admiral Bloch. I do not think that message was addressed to me,
even. I think that was shown to me by the Commander-in-Chief. I
believe he showed it to General Short. I don't know, of course.
148. General Grunert. Now, the Navy message of November 27,
which starts out somewhat to the effect that, "This is a war warning."
Do you recall that message ?
Admiral Bloch. Yes, I recall it.
149. General Frank. This last message is from CNO to CINCPF.
Admiral Bloch. That is the Commander-in-Chief Pacific.
150. General Grunert. Now let me ask you what that meant to the
Navy : "This is a war warning." Did that mean to you naval people
that war is in the immediate offing, or what ?
[ISO4.] Admiral Bloch. I never heard it used in that sense be-
fore, sir.
151. General Grunert. Had it been used before ? Is that a common
expression in the Navy, or for certain purposes, or what?
Admiral Bloch. I don't know. I never heard it before, used in
that sense.
152. General Frank. In what sense?
Admiral Bloch. "This is a war warning," beginning a dispatch.
The obvious conclusion is that that is naval phraseology, and it is not
naval phraseology insofar as I know.
153. General Frank. Well, if you had never seen it before, what
did it mean to you ?
Admiral Bloch. Well, this dispatch was received late afternoon
27th of November. Admiral Kimmel telephoned for me. I was not
available. My Chief of Staff got it and delivered it to me that night.
This was one of many dispatches of the same tenor, and the next
morning I believe, the 28th of November, Admiral Kimmel had a —
I went over, and he had a number of officers in his office. This dis-
patch was discussed, what we should do, and so forth, and Admiral
Kimmel made his decisions, what he would do and what the decision
of the Commander-in-Chief would be in regard to all measures.
154. General Frank. That is Admiral Kimmel ?
Admiral Bloch. Admiral Kimmel, the Commander-in-Chief. I
had no reason for reaching any independent decision. I accepted
Admiral Kimmel's decision; and furthermore, I had no information
other than what he had, or any information that caused me to disagree
with his conclusions.
[1S05] 155. General Frank. Well, you certainly had some pro-
fessional reaction, having been in the Navy for 35 years.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 785
Admiral JJloch. Longer than that, sir.
(Message of November 27, 1941, was read as follows:)
166. General Grunert. This particular message of November 27th
starts out by saying,
Consider this dispatch a war warning.
and continues :
Negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have
ended. Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days.
An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula
or possibly Borneo is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops
and the organization of their naval task forces. You will execute a defensive
deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 only.
Guam Samoa and Continental Districts have been directed to take appropriate
measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Depart-
ment. Inform naval district and army authorities. British to be informed by
Spenavo.
Do you know whether this message was transmitted or the informa-
tion therein transmitted to General Short ?
Admiral Block. The message was not addressed to me. I think in
the body of the message it directs the Commander-in-Chief to show
it to the Commanding General.
157. General Grunert. Was General Short present at any [1506]
discussion of this message ; do you know ?
Admiral Bloch. I believe he was at a subsequent date, not on the
27th.
158. General Grunert. That was on the 27th ?
Admiral Bloch. No ; it came late in the afternoon.
159. General Grunert. Do you recall the Army message of No-
vember 27th ?
Admiral Bloch. I have seen it.
160. General Grunert. Which reads as follows :
(Army message of November 27, 1941, was read as follows :)
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with
only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and
offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action pos-
sible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United
States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not,
repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeap-
ardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to under-
take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these
measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population
or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will
carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan.
Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential
oflScers.
[1507] I understand there was a conference held on November
27, at which Admiral Kimmel and you, and, I believe. General Mar-
tin and Colonel MoUision were present. Do you recall that confer-
ence ?
Admiral Bloch. I believe there was a conference held on the fore-
noon of the 27th.
161. General Grunert. Do you know whether at that time this mes-
sage had been received ?
Admiral Bloch. It-had not.
162. General Grunert. It had not?
Admiral Bloch. No.
786 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
163. General Grunert. Had the message of November 27 been re-
ceived ?
Admiral Bloch, No, it had not,
164. General Grunert. Then why the conference? What was it
about?
Admiral Bloch. Oh, something about island bases.
165. General Grunert. Then that was a discussion of the extension ?
Admiral Bloch. Something about planes, and soldiers going down
and taking the place of the Marines' guns at Canton.
166. General Frank. That was something about Midway and Wake.
Admiral Bloch. And these conferences were frequently called by
the Commander-in-Chief, with an agenda, but it was never confined
to that agenda. Before we got through, we had usually talked and
"boxed the compass."
167. General Grunert. Were these two messages of November 27,
the Navy mesage, which starts out "consider this a war warning," and
this Army message, which I have just read to [1508] you, ever
the subject of a conference on that date, or subsequent thereto, that
you know of ?
Admiral Bloch. I don't believe I ever saw the Army message, un-
til the Navy Department repeated it to the Commander-in-Chief ; and
then I was furnished a copy.
168. General Grunert. That Navy message of the 27th said that
the Chief of Staff, or the War Department — something to that effect —
"is sending a similar message to the Army" ?
Admiral Bloch. That is correct.
169. General Grunert. Evidently, this message of November 27 was
intended to be that "similar message"?
Admiral Bloch. Yes, sir.
170. General Grunert. Although differently worded?
Admiral Bloch. Yes, sir. I think we got that on the 28th. We
got it repeated by the Chief of Naval Operations to us on the 28th,
dnd I believe that on November 28, a conference was had in the office
of Admiral Kimmel, when the Navy dispatch of November 27 was
discussed, and he reached his decisions as to wdiat he would do.
171. General Grunert. .We have had testimony to the effect that
immediately after the conference on November 27, the Commanding
General of the Hawaiian Department, General Short, went back to his
headquarters and made a decision on this message which we just read,
and decided to go on Alert No. 1 for sabotage.
Admiral Bloch. Well, my recollection is that the Navy dispatch did
not arrive at Pearl Harbor, until somewhere around 4 or 4 : 30 in the
afternoon, Honolulu time, and it is also my recollection that the con-
ference was held in the [ISW] forenoon of the 27th, and
stopped about noon, or a little after noon.
172. General Grunert. Then neither one of these messages could
have been received at that time ?
Admiral Bloch. That is my belief, sir; and I believe the conference
was held the next day.
173. General Grunert. Are you pretty well convinced that that
conference was held on the morning of the 27th, and that there was
no conference held on the afternoon of the 27th ? "
Admiral Bloch. That's my belief, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 787
174. General Grunert: And what seems to convince you that your
memory is correct on that subject?
Admiral Bloch. Because I had to go to Queen's Hospital, at 3 : 30
in the afternoon, to visit a patient; and I left the Yard at 3 : 30, and in
my absence, the Navy message arrived. And I didn't know it, until
my return from the hospital.
175. General Grunert. When did you first know of this November
27 Army message ?
Admiral Bloch. I don't believe that I saw that until the Navy
Department repeated it to the Commander-in-Chief.
176. General Grunert. Then, as far as you know, there was no
discussion of the two messages in conference ?
Admiral Bloch. I wouldn't say that, because I am quite certain
that General Short sent Admiral Kimmel a copy of the Army dispatch ;
but I don't believe he sent me one.
177. General Grunert. What I am getting at is your reaction to
these two messages in conference, which I understood tluey discussed in
conference. If you do not recall any such conference, I can't get that
reaction.
[ISIO] Admiral Bloch. I recall a conference on November 28,
and I remember that discussions were had about the navy message,
and particularly there was some doubt in the minds of someone present
as to what a "defensive deployment" was, because we do not use that
term in the Navy. That is not one of the precise terms that we use in
the naval tactics, I remember that incident, and I believe that Ad-
miral Kimmel had made his decisions at that conference; in fact, I
know he made his decisions at that conference, and decided that he
would pursue the same schedules of employment that he had already
had in fprce; which was along the lines of intensive training, material
upkeep, and operations. Whether the Army message was discussed
by analogy, or in comparison, I have no recollection about that; and
1 can't supply you any information with regard to that.
178. General Grunert. Then you have no recollection of the
measures taken by Short, on the Army message being discussed at
that November 28th conference ?
Admiral Bloch. On the November 28 message ?
179. General Grunert. No, the November 28 conference.
Admiral Bloch. Oh, I believe General Short declared his alert on
the 27th, late in the afternoon.
180. General Grunert. He did, but that was a matter of discussion
with the Navy, later on?
Admiral Bloch. I don't recall that.
181. General Grunert. That is, as to its adequacy, or as to whether
or not it covered what you Navy people thought ought to be done?
Admiral Bloch. He didn't discuss it with me. I have no
[ISll] recollection. I know that I knew the Army had an alert
No. 1, and I have said before that I think, as I recall it, there was some
confusion in my mind, that I thought maybe it was something else ; but
I knew it was Alert No. 1.
182. General Grunert. Certainly the Commander-in-Chief of the
Pacific Fleet and you, as Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval Dis-
trict, had an interest in the measures taken by the Army to protect
Pearl Harbor, and I thought possibly that might have been discussed
' 79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 1 52
788 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in conference, as to whether General Short's actions in taking Alert
No. 1, which was just for sabotage, was enough to protect your Navy
and the fleet, or what variations of it there might be in Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Block. I think that the Commander-in-Chief's reactions
on this should be obtained from him, sir.
183. General Grunert. But your reactions?
Admiral Block. I have no recollection of any. discussion dn that.
184. General Grunert. Are you at liberty to tell us about WPL-46,
or would that disclose information that might be of value to the
enemy ?
Admiral Block. Well, so far as I remember it, I can tell you. I
think it is secret, but I don't think it has any particular bearing on this
war, now.
185. General Grunert. In other words, this message of November
27 says :
You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the
tasks asigned by WPL-46 only.
So it is of interest to the Board to know what "defensive deployments
only" you could take.
\_1612^ Admiral Block. Well, the Army, like the Navy, is a serv-
ice in which they necessarily must use very precise terms, very precise
terminology, particularly those relating to tactics and movements, in
the Navy. It is very important because, moving ships, if they are
not governed with great definiteness, it will do a good deal of damage.
So far as I know, the term "defensive deployment" has never been
used in any textbooks, tactical books, or tactical instructions and
orders that I know of, in the Navy.
WPL-46 is a Joint War Plan. It is not only joint between the
Army and the Navy, but it is based on mutual understanding with
the Allied Nations; and you must have a copy of it; and while your
tasks would be the Army tasks, in our WPL we have the Navy tasks,
and they took the Navy Department WPL-46, and the Commander-
in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet had to break that down, to get the Pacific
Fleet separated in their idea. Then, I had to break it down, to get
my share in it; and so forth, all the way down.
186. General Frank. This is the first time we have run across
that phraseology.
Admiral Block. Now, I don't know whether you would call that
the same name. The real name is "Rainbow 5." You know it by that
name, unquestionably.
187. General Grunert. Well, that answers our question.
188. General Frank. That answers our question. This is the first
time we have had that cleared up.
189. General Grunert. There appear to be three more messages
about which I would like to ask some questions, all three of them
from the Navy to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific [1S13^
Fleet, and dated December 3, December 4, and December 6.
Admiral Kimmel said, here :
On 3d December we have,
"OpNav informs" —
this is a paraphrase, you understand, sir.
* * * "—informs CinC Asiatic, CinCPac, Combat 14-16 that highly reliable
information has been received that instructions were sent Japanese diplomatic
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 789
and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Washington, and London
to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn secret documents."
Do you recall that message ?
Admiral Bloch. Yes, sir.
190. General Grunert. Do you know whether that was transmitted
to General Short, or the information given ?
Admiral Bloch. I did not transmit it. I do not know whether
Admiral Kimmel did, or not.
191. General Grunert. Do you recall having had a conference on
December 3 with Admiral Kimmel and General Short?
Admiral Bloch. Well, it is pretty difficult to set the days. As I
recall it, we had a conference on the forenoon of the 27th; I think
there was a conference on the forenoon of the 28th — that was on Fri-
day— I think there was a conference in Admiral Kimmel's office, on
December 1. Now, I believe on December 2 and December 3 Admiral
Kimmel went to General Short's office, and I didn't accompany liim.
That is the best of my recollection.
192. General Grunert. Now, there is also contained in the report
ctf the Roberts Commission the following reference :
The Navy Department sent three messages to the Com- [1514] mander
in Chief of the Pacific Fleet :
The first, of December 3, stated it was believed certain Japanese consulates
were destroying their codes and burning secret documents.
The second, of December 4, instructed the addressee to destroy confidential
documents and means of confidential communications, retaining only such as
were necessary, the latter to be destroyed in the event of emergency (This
was sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet for information only) ;
and.
The third, of December 6, directing that in view of the tense situation, the
Naval command on the outlying Pacific Islands might be authorized to destroy
confidential papers, then, or later; that under conditions of greater emergency,
those essential to continued operation should be retained until the last moment.
Do you recall those three messages ?
Admiral Bloch. I think I do.
193. General Grunert. Or words to that effect ?
Admiral Bloch. Yes ; I think I do.
194. General Grunert. You were concerned when it came to the
possible destruction of documents, and so forth ?
Admiral Bloch. Not very much, sir.
195. General Grunert. Not as much as the Fleet Commander, I
presume ?
Admiral Bloch. Well, I can't speak for him, but I wasn't much
concerned.
196. General Grunert. By that I mean, did you have in your pos-
session certain things that should be destroyed, to keep [1515^
them from getting into the possession of an enemy ?
Admiral Bloch. I had thousands of them. I was the distributing
agent.
197. General Grunert. But you were not concerned about their
getting into the hands of the enemy ?
Admiral Bloch. I had no orders to destroy any of mine.
198. General Grunert. Those were not orders, but they weye cau-
tions, in a way ?
Admiral Bloch. No, they were applied to a different locality.
790 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
199. General Grunert. You understood that did not apply to the
Island of Hawaii ?
Admiral Bloch. I don't think so. I think it applied to Guam and
some other place — outlying islands.
200. General Grunert. Is Hawaii considered an outlying island?
Admiral Blocii. Oh, no.
201. General Gri xert. It is not part of the mainland.
Admiral Bloch. Well, it is a })rimary Heet base, at any rate.
202. General Frank, It states, here, this was sent to the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet ''for information only."
Admiral Blocii. Which one was that?
203. General Grunert. That referred to the one message, evidently.
204. General Frank. Yes.
Admiral Bloch. The one to Guam?
205. General Frank. "The second, of December 4, 1941, instructed
the addressee to destroy confidential documents and means of confi-
dential communication, retaining only such as were [lol6'~\ nec-
essary, the latter to be destroyed in the event of emergency (This was
sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet for informatioQ
only) ;"
206. General Grunert. That seems to run the gamut of all the mes-
sages received that are of record.
Now, did that create any particular alarm in your mind, or what
was your reaction to this combination of messages received, and of
information received ?
Admiral Bloch. Well, our method of disposing of obsolete and
compromised codes is to burn them. Many of- them expire on certain
dates, and they are burned. Moreover, although the dispatch says
"categoric and authentic information," and so forth, I didn't know
what the nature of the codes were, exactly where, or what the circum-
stances were, and I could make no intelligent deduction.
In Hawaii, located as I was, mx horizon expired at the navy yard's
wall. My perspective wasn't very big. I was submerged in local mat-
ters— matters of considerable importance locally. I had supreme con-
fidence in the fact that if the Xavy Department got infromation, knew
the sources, and the reliability of the sources, that they would evalu-
ate it and tell us what it meant.
207. General Grunert. Then you didn't consider these messages
sent as doing that which you envisaged ?
Admiral Bloch. No, sir. Furthermore, the dispatches to Guam
were perfectly natural dispatches to send, because two or three times
in these warning dispatches they had mentioned the possibility of
Guam and the Philippines. In the dispatch of November 27 that was
mentioned. Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, was never [lol7] men-
tioned. The mere fact that they mentioned Guam and the Philippines,
the only United States possessions, and didn't say anything about any
other place, excluded them. Now, Guam had beeii mentioned several
times. We knew it had no fortifications. We knew it was bound to
fall. It was the only natural thing, if they had a war, to get rid of the
cipher and codes. It didn't make any impression on me, at all.
208. General Grunert. Now, about the message. Did you consider
this a war warnino;?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 791
Admiral Block. That is the one I was talking about — the 27th of
November. It says :
Consider this a war warning.
And it went ahead, to say —
They are going to have the war in southeastern China, witli possibilities of tlie
Philippines and Guam.
209. General Grunert. And you just considered that as a general
notice that —
A war is likely to take place, but not necessarily ; and this warns you that a
war is likely to hit you in Hawaii?
Admiral Block. It didn't warn us, at all. It was not sent to us spe-
cifically. It was sent to four or five people, and it wasn't sent to
"Admiral Kimmel,'' it was sent to "Admiral Kimmel, Commander-in-
Chief of the Pacific" ; it was sent to "Admiral Hart, Commander-in-
Chief, Asiatic;" and it was sent to "Admiral King, Commander-in-
Chief. Atlantic." And it went to all of them.
210. General Grunert. Well, in the Army we are taught that in
case you have no information, you ought to be prepared for -the
[1518] worst ; and in an outpost like Hawaii they are always sup-
posed to be awake and prepared for anything — that is why it is an
outpost, so that people on the mainland can go to sleep.
Admiral Block. Well, mind you, I am not defending anything that
took place, there. I am telling you what I recollect about this thing as
fully and truthfully as I can, and the people to decide are someone else.
211. General Grunert. The gist of these messages did not create a
particular war consciousness on your part ?
Admiral Block. Not to me.
212. General Frank. Was the attack a complete surprise to you ?
Admiral Block. Yes, sir.
213. General Grunert. Now, I have a question, here, on the subject
of conferences and coo]3eration. In framing it, it was not intended to
hurt anybody's feelings, but I would like to get the reaction.
Is it a fact that you and General Short nuitually, whilst maintaining
the utmost in cordial personal relationship, felt such a delicacy as to
interest in one another's affairs that neither of you really got down to
the details of your respective responsibilities and inquired into each
other's business, so that there was a lack of true teamwork and coopera-
tion based upon definite factual knowledge of exactly what was hap-
pening?
Admiral Block. I can't speak for General Short, of course. I can
speak for myself. When I wanted to know anything, I asked him.
While I felt that our cooperation was close, and while I thought our
personal relations were extremely cordial, we many times had differ-
ences of opinion on a thing. I then had no more reason to believe that
I was right than he — a [1519] difference of opinion.
214. General Grunert. As far as you were concerned, you felt that
you had all the information you needed to carry out your responsibili-
ties as to what the Army knew and was doing, is that right?
Admiral Block. Well, I don't know whether I did or not. It is a
pretty broad question. I felt that I knew the Army's capabilities.
792 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
For example, I knew that they didn't have the personnel that the Com-
manding General wanted. I didn't believe they had sufficient, either
in numbers or types, of antiaircraft guns. I felt that they were de-
ficient in bombers, numbers and types. I didn't think they had enough
pursuit planes, in certain types. I think General Short knew that
those were my sentiments, and I think that he tried to get the condi-
tions improved. I don't think he tried to do it because I asked him
about it, and he and I talked about it, but I think he was making an
effort to do it.
Now, I want you to understand that Admiral Kimmel had a great
deal of contact with General Short, and, after all. Admiral Kimmel
was an Admiral, and General Short is a military general, and I was
a rear admiral; and while General Short and I would have been the
same level of echelon if it hadn't been there, because I had been the
senior man in the Navy, and he had been the senior in the Army. He
did have access to Admiral Kimmel, and Admiral Kimmel had access
to him freely, and I have no criticism, in the world to make of that. I
think it is perfectly right and proper that they should ; but, frequently
about some thing he would come to me; sometimes I would talk to
Admiral Kimmel about something before I would take it up with
[15^0] General Short, and I was sure not to get my "wires crossed."
I don't think there was any reluctance on the part of either of us to
talk freely and fully and frankly, if that is what you mean.
215. General Grunert. That is partially what I mean, but the gist
of the thing, more than anything else, is to know each other's capabili-
ties and limitations, actually what can be done and what will be done
under such capabilities and limitations. In other words, in ordinary
language, outside of getting along well together and not having par-
ticular fights or anything, did you actually know each other's business
to that extent where it might affect your business ?
Admiral Bloch. Well, I think that I had a very good understand-
ing of his business as General. I couldn't understand the details of
it, but in a general way, I understood his business.
216. General Grunert. You would not have had any hesitancy in
asking him ? You didn't feel that "well, that's none of my business, I
ought not to butt into his," if you really throught you ought to know
something for your own responsibility ?
Admiral Bloch. Oh, no ; I wouldn't.
217. General Grunert. Have you any question ?
218. General Frank. I would like to ask one, about Bellinger.
Who was Bellinger's next superior ?
Admiral Bloch. Bellinger's next superior was Vice Admiral Brown,
Commander of the scouting force. Now, I may be in error, there,
because at some time, Bellinger's entire command was set up in a task
force — I think, task force 9 — in which case he would come under
Admiral Kimmel, direct — that is, for [1521'] operations.
Administratively, he would be under Vice Admiral Brown.
219. General Frank. In conducting this base defense air force,
under whom did he operate ?
Admiral Bloch. He was under my supervisory control, but his di-
rectives were contained in that older order, 2CL-41, I think, and he
got out his operation order and his plan of operations for that base
defense air force, and that was a joint agreement between Bellinger
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 793
and Martin, and I appr.oved it, and I passed it, I authenticated it,
passed it on to the Commander-in-Chief.
[1522] 220, General Frank. Let us assume that he had violated
some of the provisions of that agreement under which he was oper-
ating : Who would have taken action against him ?
Admiral Block. Well, it would not be under me to take disciplinary
action ; it would be under the Commander-in-Chief.
221. General Frank. But the Admiral in command of the Four-
teenth Naval District was the man who was responsible for carrying
out the task that Bellinger was charged with carrying out, was he not ?
Admiral Bloch. Bellinger had a task, you see ; he had the task, and
I had a supervisory control over him. Bellinger was an air man. He
knew the technicalities of it. He and Martin drew up the joint esti-
mates; he and Martin drew up the joint operations, and I passed it on
•to the Commander-in-Chief and approved it, and he approved it.
The whole thing was approved all the way through.
222. General Frank. Bellinger did not report to you ?
Admiral Bloch. Oh, I had certain supervisory duties in connection
with him. I was called upon to designate to condition of readiness of
the aircraft. That was one of my duties. My duties were specified
very clearly in that order,
223. General Frank. In what order?
Admiral Bloch. 2-CL-41. I think you will find it in paragraph
G-6.
224. General Grunert. Who would the Conmiander-in-Chief of the
Pacific Fleet hold responsible in case something went wrong? Would
he hold you or Bellinger?
Admiral Bloch. I do not know,
225. General Grunert, That never happened?
Admiral Bloch. If there was some error or omission of [1S23]
mine he would probably have held me. If it was on the part of
Bellinger he would probably have held him.
226. General Grunert. You do not think that he would hold you
for something that Bellinger did?
Admiral Bloch. No; I do not.
227. General Kussell. Admiral, I want to be very clear on this
matter of reconnaissance. I believe I understand the situation. I
am just going to repeat it for the purpose of confirming what I am
thinking about.
The only prescribed reconnaissance to be conducted by naval forces,
either from Pearl Harbor or by the fleet based on Pearl Harbor,
was described and set forth in this letter 2-CL-41 ?
Admiral Bloch. I think that is correct, sir.
228. General Russell, That letter was issued as routine in the
chain of command in the Navy?
Admiral Bloch, Issued by ihe Commander-in-Chief ; yes, sir,
229. General Russell. It was not based on any agreement with
the Army?
Admiral Bloch. No, except the air agreement.
230. General Russell. The air agreement you testified earlier
made no reference to missions of the Army and Navy for recon-
iiaissance,?
794 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admirtil Bloch. That is right.
231. General Kussell. Therefore, the portions of this letter 2-CL-
41 which relate to reconnaissance had no application to any agree-
ment with the Army at all ?
Admiral Bloch. So far as I know, the word "reconnaissance" is
not used in that letter anywhere.
232. General Russell. Patrol?
Admiral Bloch. Patrol, search.
[JS24] 233. General Russell. What does an air patrol go out
for?
Admiral Bloch. There is a difference between distant reconnais-'
sance and an air patrol, because an air patrol may be restricted or
may be extensive.
234. General Grunert. Does the word "search" cover distant recon-
naissance or both close and distant?
Admiral Bloch. It might be distant and it might be short; it might
be anything.
235. General Russell. Is there anything in the letter 2-CL-41
which ]:)rovides for obtaining information at a distance from Hawaii —
call it distant reconnaissance or distant patrol or what?
Admiral Bloch. I think not. May I look at that just one second?
236. General Russell. Certainly (handing a paper to the witness).
Admiral Bloch. No. So far as I know, the word "reconnaissance"
is not used in that order.
237. General Russell. Is there any language used in there relating
to patrols that might be analogized to distant reconnaissance?
Admiral Bloch. Yes; in paragraph (B) I think, it says that Patrol
Wing 2 shall search assigned operating areas and vicinity prior to
entry therein by operating forces in early morning, and that an air
patrol shall be established at least two hours prior to the sortie of
the first heavy ship, and so forth.
238. General Russell. But the distant patrolling which maj be
analogized to distant reconnaissance was directed under the provisions
of this letter 2-CL-41 for the protection of the fleet, \_1S25] or
elements of the Pacific Fleet, after it had gone away from the base
at Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Bloch. I do not quite get that, sir.
239. General Russell. I was just quoting what you referred to a
moment ago.
Admiral Bloch. That is done every day; that is something that is
done every day.
240. General Russell. These planes went out every morning, then ?
Admiral Bloch. Yes, sir. I think three patrol planes went out
every morning and searched the operating areas for enemy vessels
and submarines. But I would not call that reconnaissance because
I think probably 200 miles or 300 miles would cover the whole radius.
241. General Russell. And the purpose of that patrolling was to
clear areas in which elements of the fleet were going to operate?
Admiral Bloch. Yes, sir.
242. General Grunert. It had no particular relation, then, to pa-
trolling: for the defense of Hawaii ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 795
Admiral Bloch. No; it was for a specific purpose. I might say
that if you have a distant reconnaissance, as I understand it, it is
something that you send out during a period every day. You start
it out as early as you can in the morning and run it out 600 or 700
or 800 miles and turn them around and they would come back and form
a pattern. That would be predicated on a mathematical solution of
a problem. But if you went that far, or if there were any enemies
seen, they could not possibly get in to attack you before you started
out the next morning.
\lo£6] 243. General Grunert, That is my conception.
Admiral Bloch. And that is my conception of a distant reconnais-
sance. That was not done, and I was not the person to do it, because
I did not have the tools to do it.
244. General Russell. Wliere is contained the agreement that the
Army's and the Navy's mission is to search for hostile transport or
movement of troops and destroy them ?
Admiral Bloch. I am not acquainted with that mission. Where
is that, sir ?
245. General Russell. I understood you to testify in answer to a
question by General Grunert that it was the mission of the Navy to
discover hostile convoys at a distance from Hawaii and to destroy
them.
Admiral Bloch. I do not remember that, sir.
246. General Grunert. The question I asked was this : Was it the
Navy's mission to locate and destroy hostile naval task forces ?
Admiral Bloch. And I said that when the air raid alarm sounds
all of the fighters went to the Army and all of the heavy ships went
to the Navy, and the Navy went out to search and to attack the naval
force, and the Army planes broke up the air attacks that came over-
land. That was my answer.
247. General Russell. Let us talk cases for a moment. Let us as-
sume that there was a hostile task force in the Marshalls and that
that task force left the Marshalls for a point at which it could launch
airplanes and attack our naval base. Wlien did it become the Navy's
duty to search out that task force and destroy it, if ever?
Admiral Block. Would we know whether it left the Marshalls?
248. General Russell. Assuming that you did not know that it
[1S27] had left the Marshalls?
Admiral Bloch. Then our knowing the presence or imminence of
an attack would depend on the information we got as to when this
task force arrived at some given point.
249. General Frank. Actually, there had not existed a reconnais-
sance defense of Oahu at any time, had there?
Admiral Bloch. I think we had done it in fleet maneuvers and exer-
cises and found that the number of P. B. Y.'s we had could not do it.
They would break down and we would always lose a lot of them. We
did not have enough. Of course at this particular time you are dis-
cussing now there was a squadron of planes and they did make a
reconnaissance on this very same Sunday forenoon. Admiral Halsey
had a task force some 200 miles west of Oahu, and I believe that he
had a large reconnaissance fleet of his own out searching. Admiral
Brown was 400 miles southeast of Midway, and he conducted recon-
796 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
iiaissance with aircraft. So there were reconnaissances in particular
localities going out.
250. General Frank. But those two task forces were making recon-
naissances which were a part of the operation of those two task forces?
Admiral Bloch. Yes; clearing the waters for themselves; that is
right.
251. General Frank. But so far as there having been a reconnais-
sance for the actual protection of Oahu, such continuous reconnais-
sance had not been done ?
Admiral Bloch. That is correct; and that was a matter subject to
the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. I think that might as well
be clear. He would be the man to order that, in my opinion.
252. General Russell. Admiral, just one other subject that I
[1S^8^ want to ask you about. When witnesses are asked about
making reconnaissance with regard to the mandated islands they
always say that they had no success at all, that they could not get in
there. I am just wondering if, in your experience out in the Pacific,
you were ever interested in efforts to get into the mandated islands
and find out what was going on there.
Admiral Bloch. General, I would like to get the premises straight-
ened out. You are talking about reconnaissance, and the question
was asked me, did we ever get intelligence from them. We may mean
the same thing, but they are different words.
253. General Russell. I think we have dealt with premises too
much. I can state what I am thinking about without quibbling.
Admiral Bloch. You mean, somebody to go ashore in the mandated
islands and get some information ?
254. General Russell. That is right.
Admiral Bloch. That information, when it comes to us, is intelli-
gence.
255. General Russell. But that is not what I was asking you about.
I was asking you as to efforts which had beeil made under j^our super-
vision to get such information in the mandated islands.
Admiral Bloch. I do not think that I was ever in a position to make
an effort to get such information in the mandated islands. I know
that an effort was made to get information from the mandates with-
out success.
256. General Russell. Do you know what those efforts were ?
Admiral Bloch. I know that the Navy Department asked the Gov-
ernment of Japan to permit certain ships going to the westward and
coming to the eastward of Hawaii, to the Philippines, to go in there
and anchor, calling attention to the fact that [IS'29] we per-
mitted them to have tankers and things come to Hawaii and Oahu ; but
they always refused to permit us to go in there.
257. General Russell. Were those applications made directly by
the Navy Department, or did they go through the State Department?
Admiral Bloch. Through the State Department.
258. General Russell. And that was a general application to be
permitted to use those ports?
Admiral Bloch. No ; I think it was a specific application for spe-
cific ships at specific times.
259. General Russell. And those applications were always turned
down?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 797
Admiral Bloch. Yes. I think we did get a ship in there around
1929 or there abouts. I believe one of the cruisers got into one of the
ports in there at some time.
260. General Russell. That was about 12 years prior to the attack
on Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Bloch. Yes.
261. General Russell. Admiral, I have been interested in the line of
questioning of General Grunert about the cooperation out there be-
tween the Army and Navy, the actual tactical cooperation. Were you
out there in 1940?
Admiral Bloch. I arrived there in April, 1940.
262. General Russell. At some time in July the Army forces went
on an all-out alert, in 1940 ?
Admiral Bloch. Yes.
263. General Russell. Do you remember that?
Admiral Bloch. I remember all about it.
264. General Russell. The Navy did not go on an alert at that time ?
[15S0] Admiral Block. No.
265. General Russeijl. 'It came to pass that the Army would operate
on a defensive all-out alert, and that the procedure in the Navy would
not be changed at all?
Admiral Bloch. I do not know about that feature, but I will say
this, that in the summer of 1940 the Commanding General came to me
one day and said he had received instructions from the War Depart-
ment to go on an all-out alert against a raid from the west or north-
west. He said, "This is not a drill ; I do not think it is a drill. It is
the real thing, because it came from the Chief of Staff, and I want to
know what you know about it." I said, "I have never heard of it."
He said — and I think you better listen to this, because it is right up the
alley you have been inquiring about.
266. General Russell. I am listening.
Admiral Bloch. He said, "I think we ought to have a distant recon-
naissance." I said, "I agree with you, but I cannot order it. We will
go to see the Senior Officer Present." The Commander-in-Chief was
at sea, so we took a car and went to see Vice Admiral Andrews, and I
told him what I thought in general terms, and told him about this, and
Admiral Andrews gave the order for, I think, a 600-mile reconnais-
sance. I do not think he had enough aircraft to make it all the way
around, but he made it to the north and northwest where the attack was
indicated. That was ordered and put into effect by the Senior Officer
Present, and the Commander-in-Chief, who was at sea, was informed
and he flew in that night. He did not know about it, and he came in.
He did not know where he stood. He sent a dispatch to the Navy
Department, told them the circumstances and asked them about it, and
to the best of my belief and knowledge [ISSlJi they never
answered him.
267. General Russell. To make this illustration that we are think-
ing about a little clearer, on November 27 the Commander-in-Chief
had a war warning message. A few hours earlier General Short had
received a message of November 27 telling him that anything might
be expected. Each was supreme in his own sphere then to place such
interpretations as they might see fit and take such action as they saw
fit, without respect to the other ?
798 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Block, That is what the Roberts Commission said.
268. General Russell. I am asking you if that is what happened.
Admiral Block. I do not have all the evidence before me that the
Roberts Commission had.
269. General Russell. Do you know^ whether or not the Commander-
in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and the Commanding General of the
Hawaiian Department took those messages and pursued separate
courses without reference to the other ?
Admiral Block. I do not know. But I will say this: It is very
simple to sit here today, two and a half years later, with the facts no
longer clear in your mind — and I have only a fair memory, not any
too good — and to say what you would have done or what somebody
else should have done. But I was out there at the time. I knew
Admiral Kimmel very well. I had known him for years, and I saw
him very frequently. I do not know of any man who had worked
harder or more devotedly. God knows he spent enough time with
General Short, and if they did not understand each other I don't
know why.
270. General Russell. The last question I asked was not directed
to that point. It was merely to illustrate the fact, if it is a fact, that
each was free to act on the information which he received without
reference to what the other did.
[153£] 271. General Frank. As had been done in the year
previous.
272. General Russell. As had been done in 1940.
Admiral Block. And it was clone afterwards.
273. General Russell. Then that was the situation ?
Admiral Block. Well, I find that I know very little about this
thing. I only told what I know myself, but I was really quite a small
element of the whole big thing.
274. General Frank, To get back to distant reconnaissance again,
Admiral: In this Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, paragraph 18,
treating of the responsibility of the Navy, it says :
The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall provide for :
(a) An inshore patrol.
(6) An offshoi'e patrol.
And in paragraph i it says :
Distant reconnaissance.
You have stated that you could not provide distant reconnaissance
because you did not have the planes with wdiich to do it ?
Admiral Block, I did not have any planes assigned to the local
defense forces.
275. General Frank. What happened immediately after December
7? * _
Admiral Block. I believe a search or daily reconnaissance was made.
They used everything they had, Army B-17's, Navy P.B.Y.'s, anything
they had ; and I think they even used those old B-18's by putting them
in the southeast sector where they only had to go a couple of hundred
miles.
276. General Frank. Were there any additional Navy planes fur-
nished from the mainland ?
[1S3S] Admiral Block. Oh, yes.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 799
277. General Frank.. Do you remember about liow many?
Admiral Bloch. No; I do not. That would not come under me.
I know some came out, and a lot of B-17's came out almost imme-
diately.
278. General Frank. Did not the Navy give you some P. B. Y.'s
from the coast with which to conduct this reconnaissance immediately
after December 7th ?
Admiral Bloch. Almost immediately after December 7th the prin-
ciple of unity of command went into effect. I think just a few days
afterwards the Navy began to send P. B. Y.'s out, and a great many
of them that had been damaged on December 7th were repaired and
made serviceable. The Army sent quite a number of'B-lT's out. I .
cannot speak authoritatively, because this did not come under lue at
that time, even though the war was on — I think Admiral Bellinger
was told to run these in, and I think he did.
279. General Frank. What I was about to bring out was the fact
that there were planes made available right after December 7 which,
had they been available prior to December 7, would have made it
possible for reconnaissance to have taken place ?
Admiral Bloch. That is correct. But the dis<«nt reconnaissances
that we made after December 7th were made jointly with Army and
Navy planes. If they had had those planes prior to December 7th
they could have made reconnaissance had they so desired.
280. General Frank. But prior to December 7tli there was not a
defensive reconnaissance in force ?
Admiral Bloch. That is correct, sir.
281. General Grunert. Then, even though that joint plan was
[ISSi] signed by you, when they cauie to carry it out you had no
say about the distant reconnaissance ?
Admiral Bi^och. That is right, sir. As a matter of fact, I did no*!
have a staff or facilities for doing it. It took a great big staff, a lot
of communications and facilities. We had those facilities under
Rear Admiral Bellinger, and it would have been stupid to set up
another duplicate thing. /
282. General Grunert. I have a general question, a question of
opinion. Had the staff of the Admiral of the fleet and the staff of the
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department sat alongside of
each other, as they probably had to do under unity of command, would
there have been better results, in your opinion?
Admiral Bloch. Of course they never did sit alongside of each
other. They could not get any establishment large enough to take
them and have it located in a position
283. General Grunert (interposing). I really meant the heads.
Admiral Bloch. We got a directive from the Wai* and Navy De-
partments to establish a joint operating center, I believe it was
called, and we used some tunnels in a hill up at Aliamarru. I had
a tunnel up there and had some officers up there and some communica-
tions. They have been in operation now since February, 1942. I
do not think they have ever been worth ten cents. I think that the
stimulus we needed was to get geared for war; and we got that on
December 7th.
\
^^800 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
284. General Gruneut. Have you anything else that you can think
of which might contribute any assistance toward getting at facts,
anything which you think the Board should know and consider out-
side of what you have given us already ?
[1S3S] Admiral Bloch. Well, we have discussed numbers of
features relating to distant reconnaissance, joint air plans, and tele-
grams, and whether I knew about the capabilities of the Army and
whether they knew about my capabilities. Of course I can't answer
that question, but I don't know what else you want to know. General
Grunert. There may be some other things, but I can't think of
anything else at this time.
285. General Gruneet. I did not know but what something stood
out in your mind as something special or peculiar or something that
probably you thought that an Army Board might think of to go into.
I do not mean about naval operations or anything like that, because
we want to get information about the facts insofar as the Army is
concerned and anything that is connected therewith which will give
us light on this subject. That is all.
Admiral Bloch. Well, I think that it is pertinent to say here that
all my views — and my views are rather expansive on the number of
antiaircraft guns that were required to defend a given place — have
been altered greatly. One of our big battleships today probably car-
ries more barrels of antiaircraft guns than they had in all Hawaii
on the 7th of December. That may be a slight exaggeration. I think
that one of our battleships has 170 barrels. Maybe the Army and
Navy together, they had more than 170 barrels together. Two battle-
ships would probably meet the bill.
286. General Grunert. Admiral, it may not be so much what they
had ; it is what they did with what they did have.
Admiral Bloch. I agree with you there, sir. I agree with you
there.
[1S36''] 287. General Grunert. If there are no other ques-
tions
288. General Fran,k. From whom did you have to ask for these
planes for your force there?
Admiral Bloch. You mean the patrol planes ?
289. General Frank. Yes. The Navy Department?
Admiral Bloch. Yes, the Navy Department instituted what they
called a 15,000-plane program. I think it was in 1940 when they
got the money for the 15,000-plane program. You would probably
know that better than I. And in that 15,000-plane program they
had so many PBYs, and to the 14th Naval District they allocated
I thmk 108, and to the Fleet I think they allocated 150 or something
like that. At that time the Fleet only had 81, 1 think.
Now, the planes for the 14th Naval District, I was quite persistent
in trailing them, pursuing them, and trying to get them, and every-
body knew, the Commander-in-Chief knew; all the correspondence
went through him, because that was a line of business that I con-
ducted thirough him, and he supported me. The correspondence
went to the Navy Department asking for these planes, and I was
told repeatedly they would be given to me but they would not be
given to me until sometime that was indefinite in the"^ future.
290. General Frank. That was a question of appropriation?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
801
Admiral Bloch. No, it was not a question of appropriation. It
was a question of priorities : The war was in Atlantic ; Pacific wasn't
in the war. That is the expression of war plan. They say it in
the war plan : The war is in the Atlantic ; the Pacific is a more or
less quasi-defensive until they get around to it.
[1SS7] 291. General Grunert. Well, Admiral, we appreciate
very much your giving us of your time and assistance.
Admiral Block. Thank you very much. I hope I have been of
some assistance, and I hope I have made myself understood.
292. General Grunert. I think you have.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon, at 6:35 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of
witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
X
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