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Given By
U, S. SUPT. Ul- DOCUMENTS
3^
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
' BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOK ATTACK
CONGEESS OF THE UNITED STATES l2>%7
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS , 9^-
FIRST SESSION / ^O
PURSUANT TO //«//
S. Con. Res. 27 ^^-
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 28
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
O
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
//■
HEARINGS
C^,'^^ - • . ■ DEFOKE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
conCtEess of the united states
SEVENTY-NIXTH CONGRESS
FIItST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
''J>761
A CONCUKFvENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 28
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1943
«• «• SUPtRimwoWr Of OOCUMENTS
AUG 13 1946
"-2)767
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HAIJBOR ATTACK
ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from
SCOTT W. IjUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa-
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Mielii- tive from California
gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin
North Carolina
COUNSEL
(Through January 14, 194G)
William D. JMitchell, General Counsel
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel
JULE M. Hanxaford, Assistant Counsel
JOHN E. ;masten, Assistant Counsel
(After January 14, 1946)
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel
Samuel H. Kaufman. Associate General Counsel
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel
LOGAN J. Lane, Assistant Counsel
HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
Pages
Transcript
Hearings
No.
pages
1
1- 399
1- 1058
Nov.
. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2
401- 982
1059- 2586
Nov,
. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945,
3
983-1583
2587- 4194
Dec.
5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4
1585-2063
4195- 5460
Dec.
14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5
2065-2492
5461- 6646
Dec.
31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6
2493-2920
6647- 7888
Jan.
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7
2921-3378
78S9- 9107
Jan.
22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946.,
8
3379-3927
9108-10517
Jan.
30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9
3929-4599
10518-12277
Feb.
7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10
4601-5151
12278-13708
Feb.
15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11
5153-5560
13709-14765
Apr.
9 and 11, and JNIav 23 and 31, 1946.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
No.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22 through 25
26
27 through 31
32 through 33
34
35
36 through 38
39
Exhibits Nos.
1 through 6.
7 and 8.
9 through 43.
44 through 87.
88 through 110.
Ill through 128.
129 through 156.
157 through 172.
173 through 179.
180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
Roberts Commission Proceedings.
Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
Army Pearl Harljor Board Proceedings.
Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
Clau.sen Investigation Proceedings.
Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse-
ments.
Ill
IV
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
<J
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Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
1I1IIIII1III1— (COC5lllll(MI
iiiiiiiiiiiiiOKM^iiiiilMi
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i(N 1 CC lO 1 1 1 1 1 — 1 1
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Hi 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 (M 1 00 T 1 1 1 1 1 O 1
liiiiiiiiiiiiiOiCOCOiiiiiOi
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149 J
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
1 I 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lo I 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ii-J II
S, 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 !
III 1 1 -Tt< II
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
64'
194
59-63
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarlte
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aui^.
4, 1945)
Vol.
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
"660-688'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
3105-3120'
2479-2491
4022-4027"
148-186
2567-25S0"
3972-3988
2492-2515
1575-1643"
3720-3749'
1186-1220
1413-1442'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
Juno 15, 1944)
1 1 1 1 CO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -rf 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 iCO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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^1 1 1 1 lOi 1 .-1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 lOO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.-I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberta
Commission,
Dec. IS, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
Pages
203-209
1127-1138
1033-1038
1719-1721'
1219-1224'
"888-951'
1382-1399
"'377-389'
1224-1229
"'314-320'
6
a
%
Allen, Brooke E., Maj
Allen, Riley H
Anderson, Edward B., Maj
Anderson, Ray
Anderson, Walter S., Rear Adm
Anstey, Alice
Arnold, II. H., Gen
Asher, N. F., Ens
Ball, N. F., Ens
Ballard, Emma Jane
Barber, Bruce G
Bartlett, George Francis
Bates, Paul M., Lt. Comdr
Beardall, John R., Rear Adm
Beardall, John R., Jr., Ens
Beatty, Frank E., Rear Adm
Bellinger, P. N. L., Vice Adm
Benny, Chris J
Benson, Henry P
Berquist, Kenneth P., Col
Berry, Frank M., S 1/c
Betts, Thomas J., Brig. Gen
Bicknell, George W., Col
Bissell, John T., Col
INDEX OF WITNESSES
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INDEX OF WITNESSES
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VIII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
Pages
"""4797-4828
403-457,
551-560,
605-615,
5367-5415 i
4221-4300
26-34, 36-38,
40-49, 55-73,
75-79, 82-92,
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
428-432
414-417
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
2i2-2i3
ioo-ioi
182
""ioo-ioi"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1915)
Vol.
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
,'Oct. 19, 1944)
O 1 1 1 1 O 1 1 1 1 1 1 (M 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 _ 1
t-- 1 1 1 1 CO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lO 1
2 O 1 1 1 1 TtH 1 1 1 1 1 1 l^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 00 1
^^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1
-e 1 1 1 1 1 ^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 C.0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 CO 1
ft<0 1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 1 1 ICO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1^ 1
l>-iiii^ t^iiiii iiOOi
O 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 t 1 1 1 II 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
2030-2090'
3957-3971
""24i-274"
""267-240"
2934-2942
2200-22i4
1914-1917
""745-778"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
4 i 7-430
Joint
•Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
iiiiii-^iiiioiicoiii iiii
iiiiiK^iiiit-iit^iii IIII
« 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 1 1 1 1 CO 1 1 '* 1 1 1 IIII
g, 1 1 1 1 1 1^ 1 1 1 IrH 1 1 1 1 1 1 IIII
e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 01 1 1 1 IIII
f^ ,-tiiii-:t<iiCOiii IIII
liiiiit^iiiicOii'^iil IIII
10 1 1 1 ICO 1 1 III IIII
3
Hamilton, Maxwell M., State Dept
Hannum, Warren T., Brig. Gen
Harrington, Cyril J
Hart, Tliomas Charles, Senator
Rayes, Philip, Maj. Gen
Heard, William A., Capt., USN
Henderson, H. H., Lt., USA
Herron, Charles D., Maj. Gen
Hill, William H., Senator
Holmes, J. Wilfred., Capt., USN
Holtwick, J. S., Jr., Comdr
Hoppough, Clay, Lt. Col
Hornbeck, Stanley K
Home, Walter Wilton
Howard, Jack W., Col
Hubbell, Monroe H., Lt. Comdr
Huckins, Thomas A., Capt., USN
Hull, Cordell
Humphrey, Richard W. RM 3/c
Hunt, John A., Col
IngersoU, Royal E., Adm
Inglis, R. B., Rear Adm
INDEX OF WITNESSES
IX
I I I I I I 1 I I I cc
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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
.Joint
Congressional
Comniittec,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
OiiiiiiOGOiii Ill _.- -O 1 1
CO OCO Sn^oii
LOiiiiiiOCOiii E2?TiMii
loiiiiii-^i 11 ^^5"^''
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ciO 1 1 1 1 1 ilMCO 1 1 1 1 1 1 2^1:- 1 1
tiiio 00 1 1 1 1 1 2 2-1 1 1
lO -* 1 °„^''
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
Mav 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
541-553
182-292
""140^142"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
103
107-112
186
219-222
102
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
^1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 II
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
904-918
628-643
"734-740"
"852-885"
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
2665-2695"
3028-3067
1161-1185"
2787-2802"
1014-1034
1678-1694
3226-3250
2362-2374"
2-54"
T. S. 2-52,
192-226
3126-3152
1816-1913
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
214-22.5
363-367
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
Pages
1146-1156"
1156-1171"
4-32"
1068-1095
1272-1285"
""500-504"
1793-1805"
"320-352,"
1648-
1659
i
Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN
Kroner, Hayes A., Brig. Gen
Landreth, J. L., Ens
Lane, Louis R., Ch. W/0
Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col
Laswell, Alva B., Col. USMC
Lawton, William S., Col
Layton, Edwin T., Capt., USN
Leahy, William D., Adm
Leary, Herbert F., Vice Adm
Lewis, Fulton, Jr
Litell, S. H
Locey, Frank H
Lockard, Joseph L., Lt., USA
Lorence, Walter E., Col
Lumsdcn, George, Mai
Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN
Lynch, Paul J
Lynn, George W., Lt. Comdr
Mac Arthur, Douglas, Gen
Marshall, George C, Gen
Marston, Morrill W., Col
Martin, F. L., Maj. Gen
INDEX OF WITNESSES
XI
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XII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
.Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
Pages
5210
4933-5009
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt .
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
""387-388"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
14S
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov- 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
COi -H 1 (Nil it^ii
Tfi 1 1 111 1 1 00 1 CO 1 1 1 1^ 1 1
£ 1 1 1 1 1 1 11.^ 1 (Nil Mil
^LO II 111 III 1 II 1 ci> 1 1
O-* 1 1 ,11 . lO 1 11 It- 1 1
fil 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1> 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1—1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Joint
Committoc
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarice
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1914; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
,o 1 ' ' III III 1 111 1 1 1 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
140
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
1 1 lO 111 111 _r-r-j-(N^~t-'~(N 1 1 CO 1 1 00 00
1 ici I^r^iPoocoio 1 1^ 1 lOO
1 1 IT 111 111 Tc^^s;:;: i iT I i? ^
«3iil:- III III *-^',rlill|iit^ iiOOl
I I'* III 111 c^'og^S 1 I'* 1 I^^O
II III 111 1— li— It— III IIT— 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
1107-1160,"
1240-1252
3636^3640
2375-2398,
3990-3996
3153-3165
2923-2933
3885-3915
1968-1988'
1035-1070
778-789
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
147-169
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to .Ian. 23, 1942)
1 Ik-'I-'^ I 1 CO 1 -r.-roo 1 1 ieo-rt< 1 1 1 1
1 itr(»<7J 1 1 lO liS^Sc^ ' ' lOOOO 1 1 1 1
« 1 i^IlNiQ 1 1 CO iSr^Tj< 1 1 it-OO 1 1 1 1
^||CN|,_,,,,^|C0^ , 111— Ijllll
(^ 1 i^^4. 1 1 i :^g ' 1 iciS 1 1 1 1
a
Pettigrew, Moses W., Col
Phelan, John, Ens
Phillips, Walter C, Col
Pickett, Harry K., Col
Pierson, Millard, Col
Pine, Willard B
Poindexter, Joseph B., Gov
Powell, BoUing R., Jr., Maj
Powell, C. A., Col
Powers, R. D., Jr., Lt. Comdr
Prather, Louise
Pratt, John S., Col
Pye, William S., Vice Adm
Rafter, Case B
Raley, Edward W., Col
Ramsey, Logan C, Capt., USN
Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm
INDEX OF WITNESSES
xm
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XIV CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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IxNDEX OF WlTXKbSES
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•XVI CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
.loint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
M M Mi 1 1 i ; i i M ; i i 11 1
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 , i'^ 1 .
c 'CO 1 AcOl
C^ Ol ,1 1 1 1 i^O 1
1 M M i" i i M i i M ! i M"" i
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
iiiiiiOiiiiiiCDC0(NiOiii 1
1 ^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 00 lC O 1 lO 1 1 1 1
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f^iiiiiiOOiiiiiiI^-^OliTfiiii 1
COi COiOiOirfiiii 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
187-189
105-106
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ^ 1 1 1 1 1 , , 1 , , 1
1 1 1 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , , , 1 1 II,,, u
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lo i 1 1 1 1 1 1 I I
1 1 05 , 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 lO
1 i ; i i i ! : i : ; iS ! 1 i i i I i ; i
1 1 1 00 i 1 1 1,11, 1
1 1 , 1 , , 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 1 , , 1 1 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
2722-2744
3120-3124
198^2667"
2456-2478
134.5-1381"
910-931
3663-3665
3677-3683'
3750-3773
3357-3586"
2580a-2596
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
""279-288"
379^382
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
toJan. 23, 1942)
Pages
1311-1329
496-499
1830-1842
1334^1340"
""247-259"
1525^1538'
1683-1705
S
Wells, B. II., Maj. Gen
West, Melbourne H., Lt. Col
Whaling, William J., Lt. Col
White, William R., Brig. Gen _._
Wichiser, Rea B
Wilke, Weslie T
Wilkinson, T. S., Rear Adm
Willoughby, C. A., Maj. Gen
Wilson, Durward S., Maj. Gen
Wilson, Erie M., Col
Wimer, Benjamin R., Col
Withers, Thomas, Rear Adm
Wong, Ahoon H
Woodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR
Woodward, Farnsley C, Lt. (jg), USN_
Woolley, Ralph E
Wright, Wesley A., Comdr
Wyman, Theodore, Jr., Col
York, Yee Kam
Zacharias, EUis M., Capt., USN
Zucca, Emil Lawrence
PROCEKDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 803
[76.m CONTENTS
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 23, 1944
Testimony of — Page'
Benjamin L. Stilplien, 109 Jaroleuiou Street, Broolclyn, New York 1539
1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original transcript of proceedings.
79716 — 4G — Ex. 145, vol. 2 2
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 805
[1539-] PKOCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 23, 1944
Munitions Building,
Washington, D. G.
The Board at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted
the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the
Board, presiding.
Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D.
Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H, Frank, Members.
Present also: Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and
Colonel Harry A. Toulniin, Jr., Executive Officer.
General Grunert. The Board will come to order.
TESTIMONY OF BENJAMIN L. STILPHEN, BEOOKLYN, NEW YORK
Major Clausen. Sir, the Recorder will not be here for a little while,
so I will act as Recorder.
(The witness was sworn by the Assistant Recorder and advised of
his rights under Article of War 2-1.)
1. Major Clausen. Will you state to the Board your name?
Mr. Stllphen. Benjamin L, Stilphen.
2. Major Clausen. And your address?
Mr. Stilphen. My address is 109 Jarolemon Street, Brooklyn, New
York.
[IBl^O] 3. Major Clausen. What is your occupation ?
Mr. Stilphen. I am handling industrial relations with the Sinclair
Oil Corporation.
4. Major Clausen. In 1941, Mr. Stilphen, were you employed by
the United States Engineering Department?
Mr. Stilphen. The Office of the Chief of Engineers ; yes, sir.
5. Major Clausen. What were your duties specifically in August
1941?
Mr. Stilphen. My duties were somewhat varied. I was generally
sort of a "trouble-shooter" and expediter in handling the labor field.
I was classified as a lawyer, but the law had a small part in what I did.
1 was a liaison labor man; that is what I was. I also did expediting
and "trouble-shooting" for them.
6. Major Clausen. Are you. admitted to the bar?
Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir. I am a member of the District Court here
in Washington, D. C, and of the Court of Appeals.
7. Major Clausen. Were you acquainted in August 1941 with one
HansWilhelmRohl?
Mr. Stilphen. No, sir.
806 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
9. Major Clausen. Were you acquainted at that time with Theodore
Wyman, Jr. ?
^Ir, Stilphen. No. sir,
10. Major Clausen. Were you acquainted with a John Martin,
[15411, attorney for Mr. Rohl?
Mr. Stilphen. I met Mr. Martin.
11. Major Clausen. Wlien did you meet him?
Mr. Stilphen. It was sometime in tlie summer of 1941.
12. Major Clausen. Do you recall exactly, with regard to August
28, 1941, when you met Mr. Martin?
Mr. Stilphen. Well, I was sitting at my desk, and Colonel Lorence
and Colonel Gesler sent a message out and asked me to come into their
office ; and Mr. Martin was with them.
13. Major Clausen. He was in the office with Colonel Gesler?
Mr. Stilphen. And Colonel Lorence.
14. Major Clausen. Could you tell me approximately when that was
in 1941 ?
Mr. Stilphen. I have not the slightest idea. It was in the summer-
time sometime; that is all I can remember.
15. General Frank. Who was Colonel Lorence? .
Mr. Stilphen. Colonel Lorence was Walter E. Lorence ; he was the
assistant to Colonel Gesler in the Office of the Chief of Engineers. It
was the finance section.
16. Major Clausen. Mr. Stilphen, I show you our Exhibit No. 2,
which is a photostatic copy of a letter, and ask you whether you have
seen the original of that before.
Mr. Stilphen (after examining copy referred to). It sounds sus-
piciously like something that I might have written.
17. Major Clausen. Do you recognize that as having been prepared
by yourself?
Mr. Stilphen. Frankly, I do not, but I have a general idea that I
wrote it ; yes, sir.
[154^] 18. Major Clausen. Can you tell me whether the talk
you had with John Martin was before the letter was prepared?
Mr. Stilphen. Oh, j^es.
19. Major Clausen. About how long before ? You said you met him
in the summer of 1941.
Mr. Stilphen. I do not know. Several days elapsed, because I had
to investigate a case between the time I met Martin and the time this
letter was written.
20. General Frank. What was Martin's mission in there?
21. Major Clausen. I was just going to ask that. General.
When you met Mr. Martin you say he was in the office of Colonel
Gesler and Colonel Lorence. Tell us what was said by those officers
to you and Mr. Martin at that time.
Mr. Stilphen. I was called in and introduced to Mr. Martin and, in
substance, they said that a Colonel Wyman, whose name I knew but
whom I had never met personally, who was in charge of certain con-
struction for the Corps of Engineers in Hawaii, had written, wired,
telephoned, or communicated in some way with the Office of the Chief
of Engineers stating that this man Mr. Martin represented — that his
services were necessary to completion of these projects out there; that
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 807
he was one of the foremost construction engineers of tlie worki, and
they had to have liim out there.
Mr, Martin was introduced as counsel for this man Rolil, and said he
was back here on other business but had been asked by Mr. Rohl, after
a consukation in some way or another — I don't know how — that
"VVyman had been asked to come down to the War Department to see
the officers in charge to see if sometliing \J'543] could be done
about getting Rohl's citizenship papers expedited, because at that time
there was some sort of a regulation that an alien could not leave the
country. So he had to have citizenship papers.
I might add that Mr. Martin, I was told, Avas back here on other
Imsiness and stopped in to see what could be done about this thing.
22. Major Clausen. Who told you that, Mr. Stilphen — Colonel
Gesler or Colonel Lorence ?
Mr. Stilphen. I think it was Colonel Lorence, if I am not mistaken ;
I would not be too sure about it.
23. Major Clausen. What were your instructions with regard to
this?
Mr. Stilphen. To take Mr. Martin out and find out from him his
idea of the case, what it was all about, and then to see if I could not
do something about it.
24. Major Clausen. What did you do?
Mr. Stilphen. I took Mr. Martin out to my desk and sat him down
and got Rohl's full name, his address, and his background, on paper,
and then I called the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Immigra-
tion and Naturalization. I am very hazy about this business. I will
try to recollect it the best I can. If I remember correctly, I could not
get hold of anybody at that time. I talked to some girl. So I told
Martin that I would take care of it, but I could not get hold of anybody
then.
25. Major Clausen. Did you ask Martin why he did not go down
to the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization himself and do this?
[1S44] Mr. Stilphen. No, sir. My instructions were to do sonip-
thing about it.
26. Major Clausen. Was anything said at this meeting as to why
John Martin should not go down himself and take care of getting hi.=!
client's citizenship papers expedited if he could?
27. General Fkank. Who gave you these instructions — Lorence or
Gesler?
Mr. Stilphen. It was one of them, or both. I think it was Lorence,
as a matter of fact.
28. Major Clausen. Did Mr. Martin tell you why it was that while
the petition for naturalization was filed on January 15, 1941, here it
was August 1941, and still it had not been granted?
Mr. Stilphen. I found that out. I found out that that was the usual
paper work procedure.
After I did get hold of the proper party at the Department of
Justice, I was informed that his papers were in final form, but that the
usual red tape — he was in a certain line of precedence. At the time he
filed his application here there might be ten other people filing their
applications, and fifteen might be before him. His case was completed,
but it was a question of taking his papers off the top of the stack and
putting them on the bottom of the stack.
808 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
29. Major Clausen. But nothing other than that?
Mr. Stilphen. That is correct ; that they had completed the investi-
gation and had nothing against him.
30. Major Clausen. Who told you that?
Mr. Stilphen. Somebody in the Bureau of Immigration and Nat
uralization. I have not the slightest recollection of who [^^4^]
it was.
31. Major Clausen. Was it the Commissioner?
Mr. Stilphen. I talked to somebody in his office.
32. Major Clausen. Do you recall whether John Martin told you
that there was nothing against this Hans Wilhelm Rohl ?
Mr. Stilphen. First of all, we had a recommendation as to Rohl's
character from Wyman.
33. Major Clausen. What kind of a recommendation was it?
Mr. Stilphen. That he was of excellent character, above reproach,
et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
34. Major Clausen. Was that in writing?
Mr, Stilphen. It was some sort of a communication ; I do not know
whether it was in writing, telegram, or telephone conversation.
35. Major Clausen. Did you hear that over in the Office of the
Chief of Engineers?
Mr. Stilphen. I remember getting that in the Office of the Chief
of Engineers.
36. Major Clausen. From whom?
Mr. StiLphen. The impression I have is that I got it from Colonel
Lorence. Whether he had the document or whether he had a tele-
phone call from Wyman, or what it was all about, I don't know.
37. Major Clausen. If you got it from Colonel Lorence, was
Colonel Gesler there ?
Mr. Stilphen. I cannot remember.
38. Major Clausen. Did you have other talks before you went to
the telephone to phone the Bureau ? Did you have other talks with
either Colonel Lorence or Colonel Gesler concerning it?
[154-6] Mr. Stilphen. Not outside of my original talk that I
have already mentioned.
39. Major Clausen. You must have gotten this information while
you were in that office.
Mr. Stilphen. I would say that would be a reasonable inference.
40. Major Clausen. Is that the first case you ever had of getting
citizenship papers for somebody?
Mr. Stilphen. Yes ; it was the first case of that kind.
4L Major Clausen. It was very unusual for you to ask for citi-
zenship expedition ; is that correct ?
Mr, Stilphen. I did not consider it unusual. I just thought it was
another routine matter at that time. It was in August of 1941, and
people were not quite as excited then as they are now.
42. Major Clausen. But you had never had that kind of a routine
matter presented to you, had you ?
Mr. Stilphen. No, sir.
43. General Grunert. Have you had any since ?
Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.
44. General Grunert. In your same position ?
Mr. Stilphen. No, sir. That was with the Navy Department.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 809
45. Major Clausen. Did Mr. Martin tell you that Hans Wilhelm
Rohl had falsely documented some vessels and would have to pay a
fine of $25,000 before he could receive favorable consideration?
Mr. Stilphen. No, sir ; he did not tell me anything about that.
46. Major Clausex. Did he tell you anything at all about an
[154?] investigation by the F. B. I.?
Mr. Stilphen. No, sir; he did not.
47. Major Clausen. After you had this first talk with this unknown
party down at the Bureau of Immigration, what did you next do ?
Mr. Stilphen. I waited to hear from them again. They were go-
ing to look up the case, and I subsequently heard from them, and, to
the best of my recollection, I was informed that this case was all com-
plete ; it was just a matter of routine paper work.
48. Major Clausen. You mean you had, then, only two telephone
calls?
Mr. Stilphen. I think I went over there in person once, if I remem-
ber correctly.
49. Major Clausen. When you went over in person whom did you
see?
Mr. Stilphen. I cannot remember.
50. Major Clausen. Did you go down to the Department of Justice
Building?
Mr. Stilphen. I went down to the Department of Justice Building.
51. Major Clausen. Did you report back to your superiors what
you had been informed?
Mr. Stilphen. Yes. By the way : Parden me if I am interrupting
you, but the reason for that letter was that I was requested to write
that letter by whomever I talked to in the Department of Justice.
52. Major Clausen. When you went down to the Department of
Justice were you told substantially the things you have set [1^4^]
forth in this letter?
Mr. Stilphen. I would say so, yes. In other words, I brought out
that Colonel Wyman had said it was essential to have Mr. Rohl in
Hawaii for the completion of these defense projects; and I imagine
I went into his background, and so oil.
53. Major Clausen. In connection with the letter itself, you knew
that this work that was to be done by Mr. Rohl was secret work?
Mr. Stilphen. I knew it was defense work of some sort. I did not
know what type it was.
54. Major Clausen. I invite your attention to this sentence of the
letter :
It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States
is beyond question.
What was the basis for that, Mr, Stilphen ?
Mr. Stilphen. The statements by Wyman, and then this investiga-
tion that I found out about that had been completed over at the
Department of Justice.
55. Major Clau.^en. It says in the letter that the petition was filed
on January 15, 1041. This letter is dated August 28. Do you know
whether or not Wyman made more than one request?
Mr. Stilphen. I do not know that, sir.
56. Major Clausen. Do you know when the first request was made
by Wyman?
810 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Stilphen. No, sir.
57. Major Clausen. Did you talk about this with General Robins?
[15Jf9'\ Mr. Stilphen. No, sir.
58. Major Clausen. Did you talk about it with General Kingman?
Mr. Stilphen. No, sir.
59. Major Clausen. In connection with the sentence which I just
read :
It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United
States is beyond question.
Is it your intent to say that the investigation that was made resulted
in that conclusion?
Mr. Stilphen. The investigation and the recommendations of Wy-
man, and this investigation that I made that I just previously men-
tioned, about the Department of Justice.
60. General Frank. Did the instructions to you convey the thought
that they wanted this matter gotten through in a hurry?
Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.
61. General Frank. Was a result of that the lack of thorough inves-
tigation of Rohl before this letter was accomplished ?
Mr. Stilphen. That is rather a difficult question to answer specifi-
cally. I would say that the Corps of Army Engineers would not have
adequate facilities, in my opinion, to thoroughly investigate Rohl. It
would have to take somebody else's opinion. Those opinions would be
of people that knew him personally or had been associated with him,
such as Wyman; and then the investigation made by the Bureau of
Immigration and Naturalization, whose business it is to investigate
these people, these aliens.
62. General Frank. Did you realize at that time that this man
[]550'\ was a German alien?
Mr. Stilphen. Oh, yes ; I recognized that.
63. Major Clausen. Did you also realize that the letter would be
presented to the Court and would have very persuasive power with the
Court in granting the petition?
Mr. Stilphen. No. My idea ,of using the letter, as I previously
mentioned, was that I was requested by the Department of Justice,
Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, that they would like to
have a letter requesting that these papers be expedited. That was the
reason for that letter.
64. General Frank. Were you in this position, that you were called
in and told something about this as a "go-getter," and you were then
operating under two controls, namely, to get something done about
this, if possible, and write that letter, or, rather, first to find out the
story about Rohl, and then to write the letter?
Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.
65. General Frank. Could you, in the zealousness of haste have
slighted somewhat the question of the investigation of Rohl before
you wrote that letter?
Mr. Stilphen. Generally speaking, that is a fair statement; but
when I received my instructions there was no question at that time of
writing a letter. The idea was to get this thing fixed up if possible,
and the letter came up after I investigated the matter over at the
Department of Justice, because they wanted a letter. But I of course
would not be competent or qualified and would not have the necessary
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 811
facilities to investigate Eohl. I was not in a position to be able to
investigate Rohl personally. I would have to rely uj^on [7557]
other agencies and other people.
66. General Frank. Did the fact that yon in person were not going
to sign the letter, but it was somebody else's onus, lead you to be
careless at all about what you put into it 'i
Mr. Stilphex. No. If I was writing a letter for someone else's
signature it would be the same as writing it for my signature. I
would never worry about the onus.
67. General Grunert. While we are on the subject of that particular
paragraph of the letter about RohPs loyalty, why did you consicler
it was necessary at all to put that in, if you were just going to write
a letter to attempt to expedite the consideration of his case?
Mr. Stilphen. I suspect you would call that a little "window-dress-
ing," General.
68. General Grunert. A little persuasion or a little influence, in
a way?
Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.
69. Major Clausen. So that there will not be any mistake about
it, up in the upper right-hand corner are the initials "B. L. S."
JNIr. Stilphen. Those are my initials.
70 Major Clausen. You have no question in your mind now that
you prepared that letter, have you?
Mr. Stilphen. I am convinced of that.
71. Major Clausen. Let me invite your attention to this sentence:
The qualifications of Mr. Eohl are of vital importance to the expeditious
completion of the general construction project because of his [1552] pe-
culiar qualifications.
AVhat peculiar qualifications were you informed that Mr. Rohl
possessed ?
Mr. Stilphen. He was one of the foremost construction engineers
in the world, I was told, and it w^as absolutely necessary that he be
sent to Hawaii for the completion of these so-called defense projects.
72. Major Clausen. Who told you that?
Mr. Stilphen. I got that by somebody from AVyman. I don't
know whether I got it from this communication of Colonel Lorence,
but from somebody around there somewhere.
73. Major Clausen. Did you get it at the time you had this pre-
liminary meeting with Mr. Martin, Colonel Gesler, and Colonel
Lorence ?
Mr. Stilphen. Yes.
74. Major Clausen. Is your memory refreshed at all as to when
the conversation occurred with respect to the date of this letter,
August 28, 1941 ?
Mr. Stilphen. It might have been perhaps a week before or two
weeks. I seem to be able to associate it with the fact that the letter
was written — some sort of a period of time elapsed between the meet-
ing and the writing of the letter. It might have been a period of
days or a ])eriod of a week or two weeks; I just can't remember.
Too many things have happened since that time.
75. Major Clausen. At any rate, on the date when you had this
meeting, was Martin there when you phoned the Department?
Mr. Stilphen. Yes ; he sat at my desk.
812 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
76. Major Clausen. Was it in this telephone conversation that
[loo3] you M^ere askerl to go down and see the Immigration De-
partment?
Mr. Stilphen. No, sir. I could not get hold of the proper party;
he was not in, or something. I talked to a girl — I remember that —
and stated that I wanted to get some information about an immigra-
tion case. I think she said that I would have to "come down here."
So nothing more was said on the telephone.
77. Major Clausen. When did you go down?
Mr. Stilpiien. That day. If I remember correctly, this meeting
occurred in the morning. That is wdien I first met Martin and
was called in to Colonel Lorence's office. 1 don't think he sat any
longer at my desk than perhaps five or ten minutes. I got Kohl's
full name and his address from him, and tried to develop something
from him about his background, as to the kind of work he did, and
what projects he had worked on. So I am sure it did not take longer
than ten or fifteen minutes.
78. Major Clausen. Then you went down there in the afternoon?
Mr. Stilphen. Yes.
79. Major Clausen. This party tliat you saw in the afternoon:
Do you remember his title ?
Mr, Stilphen. I don't remember a thing.
80. Major Clausen. You told General Grunert that you had other
cases afterwards. Did you see the same party afterwards?
Mr. Stilphen. I did not have other cases afterwards in Washing-
ton, D. C. I had other cases v/hen I was with the Navy at New York.
81. Major Clausen. In any event, inviting your attention again to
this letter, it says :
It is therefore requested that the granting [155.'/] of those final citizen-
ship papers be expedited.
Was that the topic of discussion in this conference you had with
Colonel Gesler, Colonel Lorence, and Mr. Martin ?
Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.
82. Major Clausen. In other words, they wanted the application
granted ?
Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, they stated it was
very important to get it done.
83. Major Clausen. The question of investigating to see whether
it should be granted before you wrote the letter was not brought up ;
is that right?
Mr. Stilphen. I would not say that exactly. If I remember cor-
rectly, I was to look up the case to see what it was all about and, if it
was possible to get it done, to get it done.
84. Major Clausen. After you had this first talk down at the
Department of Justice, did you ever see this party again that you
talked with?
Mr. Stilphen. No ; it was a telephone conversation.
85. Major Clausen. I thought you said that you went down there
after the telephone conversation.
Mr. Stilphen. I did.
86. Major Clausen. The next thing that happened was when you
prepared this letter?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 813
Mr, Stilpiiex. That is right.
87. Major Clausen. How long did you talk with this party, Mr.
Stilphen ?
Mr. Stilphen. I was down there at the Department of Justice on
all kinds of business in those days. I had a tax [1S55] case in
Alaska. They had some school tax law where they could imprison
people that did not pay, and they had half of the construction force
in jail. I was down there on that, and I was down on all sorts of
things.
88. Major Clausen. It sticks in your mind that Mr. Martin was
in your office for only five minutes?
Mr. Stilphen. I just happened to remember that?
89. Major Clausen. In any event, did you have any other com-
munications with the Immigration authorities following the telephone
conversation, the visit down to see this party, the subsequent telephone
conversation, and the writing of this letter?
Mr. Stilphen. I would not say so, sir.
90. Major Clausen. Did it ever come to your knowledge later on
that Mr. Rohl had illegally entered the country and had paid a fine
of $25,000 for violating a law with regard to immigration matters?
Mr. Stilphen. No, sir; I never heard of him since that time. I was
never concerned with him, except when I read about it in the papers
here, when i\Ir. Truman brought it up.
91. Major Clausen. Were you ever asked by your superiors to do
any checking up after you had written this letter?
Mr. Stilphen. No, sir.
92. Major Clausen. That is all.
93. Colonel Toulmin. JMay I ask a question ?
94. General Grunert. Yes.
95. Colonel Toulmin. You have stated that the Corps of Engineers
had no means of investigating IVIr. Hold ; is that correct?
[15S6] Mr. Stilphen. I said that in my opinion they had no
means. They do not have an investigative agency themselves. I
suppose if they wanted to investigate Mr. Rohl they could have gotten
Army Intelligence, the F. B. I., or any other such agency. But I
meant specifically the Coips of Engineers.
96. Colonel Toulmin. In this case did they make any investigation,
to your knowledge, prior to your writing this letter?
Mr. Stilphen. What is very strong in this case, to me, at least, and
I assume
97. Colonel Toulmin. I am asking for the fact now, not for your
opinion.
Mr. Stilphen. To answer that question, I wanted to bring out
that Colonel Wyman recommended this man — not only recommended
him, but he wasthe particular one that wanted him. Colonel Wyman
was the District Engineer, and he certainly had means at his disposal
to know about this man. I understood he had worked with him for
years and knew all about him. To me, at least — and I am sure the
same would apply to Gesler and Lorence — that would be very
important.
[1567] 98. Colonel Toulman. Well, did you see yourself the
recommendation of Colonel Wyman about Rohl? ■
814 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Stilphen. Well, I cannot remember whether I did or not, sir.
I heard it. I know I heard it. Whether I saw it afterwards or not,
I can't remember.
99. Colonel Toulmin. So that the total extent of investigation by
the Corps of Engineers was the Wyman recommendation, so far as
you know?
Mr. Stilphen. And my inquiries at the Department of Justice.
100. Colonel Toulmin. But I am confining it now.
Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir; as far as the Corps of Engineers go, that
policy, that is a correct statement.
101. Colonel Toulmin. And the other investigations were made by
the Department of Justice and the Bureau of Immigration; is that
right?
Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.
102. Colonel Toulmin. Well, doesn't it strike you as strange that
you write a letter of strong recommendation, such as this document
of the 28th of August, 1941, on behalf of the Corps of Engineers,
certifying as to this matter, when you did not have any means of
investigation except Wyman's recommendation, and you were writing
the letter to the people who did have the opportunity of making
investigation? Isn't that rather the reverse of what is ordinarily
done ?
Mr. Stilphen. Well, other letters of recommendation had been
written, I don't suppose about citizenship papers, but I was asked to
write a letter requesting that this case be [1'5S8~\ expedited
by the agency that had cognizance of it; and, as I said before, any-
body that makes a recommendation in the Corps of Engineers
through the Chief of Engineers out in the field, usually his recom-
mendation, unless it is very, very wrong, would be accepted ; I don't
care what the matter would be. I mean, if a man is out in the field
he knows what he is talking about ; unless it is way out of line,
obviously, and at that time I do not think anybody thought it was
out of line.
103. Colonel Toulmin. Well, you have a letter here, Mr. Stilphen,
which you wrote on August 28, 1941, in which you give a very ex-
tended and positive recommendation of Mr. Rohl to the people who
had made the actual investigation, and it is just puzzling, I think,
to us why the people who knew the least should be doing the recom-
mending to the people who knew the most.
Mr. Stilphen. Well, that, sir, I am afraid I can't answer; and if
Colonel Wyman and my superiors in the Corps of Engineers wanted
that man over there, and it had to be done that way, as far as I was
concerned it was going to be done that way. They had the perfect
liberty to change that letter. As a matter of fact, I have written lots
of letters for all the gentlemen involved, and they have no doubt
changed a great many of them before they got into the final form.
104. Colonel Toulmin. All right. Now that brings me to the next
question : Was this letter, which was drafted by you originally, finally
signed in this form without change from your original draft, or was
it revised by anybody ?
Mr. Stilphen. I couldn't answer that. I wouldn't know.
[J'559] 105. Colonel Toulmin. You don't remember?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 815
Mr. Stilphen. I don't remember, no, sir.
106. Colonel Toulmin, It was customary to have your letters re-
vised, Avas it not, when you submitted them for somebody else's
signature ?
Mr. Stilphen. It wasn't customary, but if they didn't like some-
thing they could change it ; I had no pride of authorship.
107. Colonel Toulmin. You don't remember it in this case, whether
anybodj^ changed this letter?
Mr. Stilphen. No, sir, I do not.
108. General FpvAnk. Might not your initials up there in the corner
indicate that the letter was not changed ?
Mr. Stilphen. That didn't mean anything at all. That didn't
mean anything at all as far as office procedure Avent. In other words,
if I drafted the letter originally and it went through, and say they
wanted to change one sentence here or add something, or had any-
thing that should be changed, it would come back again and be typed
again, and my initials would still go out on it.
109. Colonel Toulmin. That is all I want.
110. General Russell. So either Gesler or this other Colonel who
was out in the outer office that morning, the office into which you went,
introduced you to this man Martin as Rohl's attorney?
Mr. S'hlphen. Yes, sir.
111. General Russell. Do you know how long Martin had been out
there with these gentlemen?
[1660'] Mr. Stilphen. No, sir. I do not.
112. General Russell. At this conference you were directed by one
or both of these Colonels, whose names you have given, to follow a
certain procedure and accomplish a certain purpose?
Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.
113. General Russell. The decision that the Corps of Engineers
would expedite, insofar as it could, this application for citizenship
by Rohl had been made, therefore, when you were called in ?
Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.
114. General Russell. Do you know how long Martin had been in
conference with these two Colonels before you went into that room ?
]VIr. Stilphen. No, sir, I do not.
115. General Russell. Was anything said between Martin and
those two Colonels after you went into the conference room ?
Mr. Stilphen. No, I couldn't — if I remember, if I can possibly
remember, I think that I was introduced to him, and he was identified,
and then the statement was made about Wyman and the construction
project, and it was necessary to get him over there, and would I see
to it, take all steps to see that it was done. Would I take Mr. Martin
in tow, as it were, and get what information I needed and then go to
work on it.
116. General Russell. The instructions which were conveyed to
you by these two Colonels, one or both of these Colonels, at that con-
ference, indicated very definitely that your only job was to expedite
those papers?
Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.
[ISGl] General Russell. They, in other words, had adopted
whatever had been sent in by this man Wyman or information they
816 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
had from other sources, and had decided to go along in getting Rohl
these naturalization papers ?
Mr. Stilphen. Yes. I was to investigate the case.
118. General Russell. Well, that is what I am getting at. How
much investigating were you to do ?
Mr. Stilphen. Well, I was to look up and see what the status of
the case was. Obviously, if I found out by looking it up that the man
was some sort of notorious citizen, I would report that back to them
just as a matter of doing my job; but if there was nothing wrong,
why, get him out of there.
119. General Russell. Then, your activities were to be along two
lines: First, an investigation was to be conducted; and, second, if
that investigation was favorable to Rohl, you would press his
application ?
Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.
120. General Russell. Then, you did have a burden of investigat-
ing Rohl's desirability as an American citizen ?
Mr. Stilphen. No, sir. I wouldn't say that, sir. My part in this
was to look up the status of his papers at the Bureau of Immigration
and Naturalization, which was far from an investigation of whether
Rohl would make a desirable citizen or not. The burden of proof was
not upon me for the investigation or to determine his desirability. I
was merely to determine the status of his citizenship papers at the
Department of Justice.
121. General Russell. Now, is that what we are going to stay by ?
Is that the only thing that you were to investigate, the [1562']
status of his papers?
Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.
122. General Russell. Tlierefore, your evidence now is that you
were not to make any investigation to determine his desirnbility as
an American citizen?
Mr. Stilphen. Oh, absolutely. I had no instructions as such.
123. General Russell. Did you discuss this situation with General
Kingman ?
Mr. Stilphen. No, sir.
124. General Russell. You never talked to him about it?
Mr. Stilphen. No, sir.
125. General Russell. I may have asked you this; I am not sure.
But do you recall how long you were in conference with these two
Colonels and where Martin was present that morning?
Mr. Stilphen. Oh, not more than five minutes, I would say.
126. General Russell. How did it come that this problem was in
Washington at all?
Mr. Stilphen. Well, the way I get it, or I got it, was that it came —
how it came about, I don't know, but Martin, I was told, was back
there on business, some other business.
127. General Russell. Well, let me approach it another way: Is
it true or not that this application for the granting of citizenship to
this man Rohl was pending in a Federal Court on the West Coast?
Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir, I think it was.
128. General Russell. It would be in that proceeding, therefore,
that all of the evidence would be, and there is where the [1563]
judicial conclusions would be reached and the decision made?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 817
Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.
129. General Russell. By the Federal Judge out there?
Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.
130. General Russell. Now, 1 am just ignorant on these immi-
gration matters, but there was a file here in Washington relating
to this West Coast application?
Mr. Stilphen. Well, now, I don't know that, whether it would
be a file here or whether they called or telegraphed out to the Coast.
If I am not mistaken, I have a hunch but I certainly wouldn't swear
to it; I just can't recollect; I think they wired out there regarding
this case, or telephoned.
131. General Russell. When you were over talking with these
people in the Department of Justice, did they have a Rohl file there?
Mr. Stilphen. No, sir. As a matter of fact, it took them several
days to get the information that they wanted, if I remember correctly.
132. General Russell. Now, you don't remember whether they
showed you a telegram or a letter from the West Coast in which this
information was set forth?
Mr. Stilphen. They showed me nothing, sir. They showed me
nothing.
133. General Russell. I may be confused, but as I remember you
said that 3"ou had a telephone conversation and then immediately
and on — not immediately, but then4)n the same day you went over
to the Department of Justice and talked with them?
Mr. Stilphen. That is right.
134. General Russell. And Avhen you were .over there did they
[1564] have a record or information that Rohl was seeking citi-
zenship in a Court on the West Coast of the United States ?
Mr. Stilphen. I think I stated the case to them orally at the time
I went over there, and told them what we were after. Then I left
there, and they in turn got the information. At no time did I see any
papers of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization on this man.
135. General Russell. What information did the Department of
Justice get from the West Coast ?
Mr. Stilphen. I suyjpose Hie status of his papers out there, along
the lines that I have brought out.
136. General Frank. Do you know?
Mr. Stilphen. Do I know? No, sir, I don't.
137. General Russell. Now, when you were in all of your confer-
ences with this Department of Justice group here in Washington,
what information did they convey to you about Rohl ?
Mr. Stilphen. AVell. the nub of it, the way I recollect, was that
their investigation of him had been completed.
138. General Russell. Now, "their investigation." What do you
means by "their investigation"?
Mr. Stilphen. The Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization.
139. General Russell. That was their Washington office?
Mr. Stilphen. Yes. I speak of that as the office for the country ;
I don't speak of it just as specifically the Washington office, because
I know as well as you know that they operate through field offices and
that they would have to, naturally would have to, couldn't all just be
down in Washington.
818 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
140. General Kussell. All right. Go ahead now. Give me the
facts if you have them as to what they told you.
[1665] Mr. Stilphen. Well, I don't have an awful lot of facts,
sir. It was a long time ago, and I am trying to do my best to recol-
lect this thing. There has been a lot of water over the dam since
that time.
141. General KnssELL. Well, let me ask you this question: Is it true
or not that, had the Office of the Chief of Engineers not intervened
in this thing, would the Washington office either of the Department
of Justice or the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization have ever
known anything at all about Rohl's application?
Mr. Stilphen. Well, that is a point of procedure I wouldn't know
about. That would be a procedure between the field office of the
Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization and the Washington office
of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. Now, whether
they clear their papers with the Washington office, I don't know.
142. General Russell. You are not informed as to whether or not
these people in routine procedure here in Washington, whom I have
named a moment ago, normally know what is going on in District
Courts throughout the United States relating to naturalization?
Mr. Stilphen. I am not informed, sir.
143. General Russell. But it is your impression now that when
you contacted the Washington offices of these two Departments it was
necessary for them to go to the West Coast to find out what was going
on, including the desirability of Rohl to become a citizen ?
Mr. Stilphen. Well, I would go so far as to state it w^as [1566']
necessary for them to go somewhere and get some information, be-
cause, as I recollect it, it took them several days to get the informa-
tion. In other words, they couldn't give me an answer right away.
144. General Russell. And they didn't give you memoranda or
other writings in wdiich such information was conveyed to them?
Mr. Stilphen. No, sir.
145. General Russell. Did they give it to you in the office or over
the telephone ?
Mr. Stilphen. Gave it to me over the telephone.
146. General Russell. Did they tell 3^ou in that conversation over
the telephone that Rohl's loyalty to the United States could not be
questioned ?
Mr. Stilphen. No sir, I don't think they said that.
147. General Russell._ Wliat did they say about his desirability
as a citizen, to become a citizen?
_Mr. Stilphen. As far as I can recollect, they said that he had filed
his papers, that everything was completed about it. and that all that
had to happen was that he had to take his turn to get into the District
Court to take his oath to become a citizen. That was a question of
routine red-tape procedure.
148. General Russell. You are not acquainted with these naturali-
zation proceedings in the Federal District Court?
Mr. Stilphen. I am not. I have a very small knowledge of them.
I am certainly no authority on them.
149. General Russell. It did come to pass, as a result of the
[1567] Office of the Chief of Engineers intervening, that all this
machinery was set in motion in Wasliington : the Bureau of Immigra-
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 819
tion and Naturalization and the Department of Justice, and these
three offices cooperating together were responsible for influencing the
Western District Court to call up Rohl's case and dispose of it rather
quickly ?
Mr. Stilphen. Well, that is the conclusion you are draAving, sir.
I assume it is correct.
150. General Eussell. Well, you are on the inside to know what
the facts are. Is that conclusion correct or not ?
Mr. Stilpiien. Well, I would say it is a fair statement. In other
words, the way the field offices operate, if they get some instructions
from Washington they usually do it. See?
151. General Russell. But all of this machinery that was put into
action here in Washington, the Office of the Chief of Engineers, the
Department of Justice, and the Bureau of Immigration and Natural-
ization
Mr. Stilphen". May I interrupt you, sir ?
152. General Russell. All resulted from the appearance of one
Martin in the Office of the Chief of Engineers, and his selling those
people down there on the desirability of pressing it along?
]\Ir. Stilphex. Yes, sir. I just make one statement there. I don't
know whether Martin sold them or not. I don't know anything about
that, but this chain started upon the appearance of Martin. You can
put it that way. As far as I am concerned it started with the appear-
ance of Martin.
And there is one thing, just for the record. You are [ISSS]
calling it the Department of Justice and the Bureau of Immigration
and Naturalization. They are one and the same thing. That is, the
Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization at that time was in the
Department of Justice.
153. General Russell. I think that is all.
154. Major Clausen. Who was Colonel Lorence?
Mr. Stilphen. He is colonel Walter E. Lorence, L-o-r-e-n-c-e. He
was the assistant to Colonel Gesler.
155. Major Clausen. You say Walter ?
Mr. Stilphen. E. Lorence, L-o-r-e-n-c-e.
156. Major Clausen. What was said, Mr. Stilphen, in this talk
that you had with Colonel Gesler, Colonel Lorence, and yourself and
Mr. Martin concerning the contract that was entered into in Decem-
ber 1940?
Mr. Stilphen. Nothing was said.
157. Major Clausen. Well, you didn't get this information out of
the thin air that is in the first paragraph. You got the contract num-
ber and the information that the contractor was doing very important,
as you say, defense construction at Honolulu.
Mr. Stilplien. That is right.
158. Major Clausen. Well, from whom did you get that?
Mr. Stilphen. Well, on the statement that he was necessary on
this work, I went to the files and got the number of the contract out.
159. Major Clausen. Did you discuss that with anyone?
Mr. Stilphen. No, sir.
160. Major Clausen. You mean you just had a five-minute con-
versation with Colonel Gesler, Colonel Lorence, and Mr. ^ [1569]
Martin, and then see these instructions, and undertook all this action?
79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 2 3
820 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Stilppien. Well, my instructions were that way; yes, sir.
161. Major Clausen. Now let me invite your attention to this letter.
Exhibit 2. Alono;sicle your initials are some others. What are those
initials, Mr. Stilphen ?
Mr. Stilphen. There was a man there that was head of the — the
Corps of Engineers, the finance section was divided up into a legal
section. I was assigned to the legal section, but I didn't really report
to him ; I reported directly to Lorence and Gesler on this labor stuff,
and I was separate from the labor men on this legal section, but I did
do legal work for him too, when I had some spare time, and I think
these initials are of the man that was the head of that section. His
name is Ralph — I can't think of his last name, but he would be known ;
I know that. He was head of that legal section if I am not mistaken.
It looks like the last initial is "H" to me, and I think his name begins
with an H, but I can't remember now.
162. Major Clausen. You say, head of the legal section of the labor
division ?
Mr. Stilphen. No; he was head of the legal section of the finance
division of the Corps of Engineers at that time. It was Ralph some-
body ; I can't think of his last name.
163. Major Clausen. Let me invite your attention to these initials
underneath the date. Do you know whom they represent?
Mr. Stilphen. You mean this mark here (indicating) ?
164. Major Clausen. Yes.
Mr. Stilphen. I can't even decipher it.
[1570] 165. Major Clausen. Now, referring to these initials
ending in "H", was that an officer or a civilian ?
Mr. Stilphen. It Avas a civilian.
166. Major Clausen. Then on the second page there are three sets
of initials. Can you tell me whom they represent?
Mr. Stilphen. I think Gesler had a funny little thing; I think that
is Gesler's, but now I wouldn't swear to it yet. I remember he had a
funny little O. K. You see, the way when these letters went out, I will
show you ; I might give you an idea of the procedure :
I would draft the thing, and then there was a fellow in the section
I was in ; it wovdd go to him, and he would read it and initial it if it
was all right with him. Then from him it would go to the head of this
legal section I just mentioned, and he would initial it, and then it
would go to Lorence and tlien to Gesler, and then it would start going
up channels to the assistants to the Generals and to the Generals.
I mean it would go through nine or ten or fifteen hands.
167. Major Clausen. They didn't go down that way to you, though,
did they?
Mr. Stilphen. You mean tJie letters ?
168. Major Clausen. No. I mean your instructions didn't come
down that way ?
Mr. Stilphen. Oh, no.
169. Major Clausen. In this case they went direct to you?
Mr. Stilphen. That is right.
170. Major Clausen. Did you ever see Mr. Martin again after this
occasion ?
[1571] Mr. Stilphen. No, sir.
171. Major Clausen. Did you ever hear from him again?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 821
Mr. Stilphen. If I remember correctly, I got a letter from him,
tlianking me.
172. Major CLAUSE>r. Thanking you?
Mr. Stilphen. Saying that the papers had been granted, and thank-
ing the Corps of Engineers and me for the assistance, in the letter.
173. Major Clausen. That was about when?
Mr. Stilphen. Oh, golly, at least a month and a half, I guess, or
two months.
174. Major Clausen. Addressed to you personally, was it?
Mr. Stilphen. Addressed to me at the United States Corps of Army
Engineers, yes.
175. Major Clausen. Personally?
Mr. Stilphen. Personally.
176. Major Clausen. Did you keep that?
Mr. Stilphen. "Benjamin L. Stilphen, Office of the Chief of Engi-
neers, War Department."
177. Major Clausen. I say, you kept that, did you ?
Mr. Stilphen. I think I kept it for a while, but when I sold my
house here in Washington I went with the Navy and moved down to
New York. I went down there on the Normandie job. I had a lot of
files, and I don't know whether I cleaned them out or destroyed them
or not.
178. Major Clausen. Was your action on this letter extracurricular
or was it official ?
Mr. Stilphen. My action on this letter?
179. Major Ci-ausen. Yes.
[157'2] Mr. Stilphen. I would say my action was — wait a min-
ute. I don't know what exactly you mean, "official." I signed no
correspondence myself.
180. Major Clausen. You say you got a letter from Mr. Martin di-
rected to you, and that you kept it for a while and didn't put that in
the files of the Engineering?
Mr. Stilphen. It was a personal letter.
181. Major Clausen. Was your action in going down to Mr. Scho-
fielcl a personal matter or was it official, in your mind?
Mr. Stilphen. It was official.
182. Major Clausen. Well, then when you got the letter from Mr.
Martin did you take that and show it to anybody there?
Mr. Stilphen. I showed it to Colonel Lorence.
183. Major Clausen. I see. Anybody else? Did Colonel Lorence
get one ; do you know ?
Mr. Stilphen. I don't think so.
184. Major Clausen. Colonel Gesler?
Mr. Stilphen. I don't think so. It was, if I remember — I can
remember it; it was about one sentence. It said: Mr. Rohl's papers
were granted so-and-so date, and we want to thank you and your
associates for your cooperation in this matter, or something on that
order.
185. Major Clausen. That is all.
186. General Grunert. I have a few questions. The first one is to
get me straightened out on that organization. Was the Bureau of
Immigration and Naturalization at that time a part of the Depart-
ment of Justice?
822 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir. It had been recently transferred US7S]
from the Department of Labor to the Department of Justice.
187. General Grunert. And the F. B. I. was also a part of the De-
partment of Justice ?
Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.
188. General Grunert. Now, in your investigation when you went
down to the Department of Justice did you in any way know what was
in the F B. I. files about this man Eohl?
Mr. Stilphen. No, sir.
189. General Grunert. From your investigation could you person-
ally vouch for Kohl's loyalty ?
Mr. Stilphen. No, sir.
190. General Grunert. You didn't, then, have enough information
as to be able to vouch for his loyalty ?
Mr. Stilphen. I personally, no.
191. General Grunert. Now, who passes on it, or what is the pro-
cedure in an alien getting American citizenship? Does the Court
grant it ?
Mr. Stiphen, The Court grants it. He files
192. General Grunert. Where does the Bureau of Immigration and
Naturalization come in? Do they investigate and recommend to the
Court?
Mr, Stilphen. Yes, sir.
193. General Grunert. Now, did it occur to you that the wording
of the letter you drafted could have influenced the granting of citizen-
ship because of the fact that the Government appeared to want and
need this man badly, and because the Government appeared to vouch
for this man's loyalty?
Mr. Stilphen. I would say that is the tenor of the letter.
[1574] 194. General Grunert. Now, do you know whether this
letter itself ever got to the knowledge of the court or whether it just
ended at the Bureau of Immigration and liad its influence there?
Mr. Stilphen. That I don't know, whether it got to the Court
or not, sir.
195. General Grunert. Are there any other questions ?
196. General Frank. You stated to General Russell that your in-
structions from Colonel Lorence did not obligate you to look up Rohl's
loyalty. Then, why did you put this in here about his loyalty was
beyond question ?
Mr. Stilphen. My instructions were to investigate the status of
Ilohl's case at tlie Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. After
I hud determined that there was nothing against him, and on the basis
of Wyman's recommendation, that was put in there, as previously
mentioned, to lift the letter up, to
197. General Frank, Window-dress it?
Mr. Stilphen. Window-dress it.
198. Colonel TouLMiN. Selling?
Mr. Stilphen. Selling.
199. General Frank. As a matter of fact, you were the legman in
this?
• Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 823
200. General Frank. And you were trying to do everything that you
could to carry out the expediting instructions that you had gotten from
Colonel Lorence ?
Mr. Stilphen. That is right, sir. If it had been Mae West I would
have done the same thing, or anj'one. The idea was, if [1575']
they needed her out there — him or her or anybody out there — to help
the war, the idea was to get it done. That is what I tried to do.
201. General Frank. That is all.
202. Major Clausen. What was your employment prior to the time
you went to work for the Chief of Engineers ?
Mr. Stilphen. I was in the office of the Solicitor of the United
States Department of Labor.
203. General Grunert. There appear to be no more questions.
T hank you for coming.
Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.
(The witness w^as excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon, at 10 a. m., the Board concluded the hearing of wit-
nesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 825
il57k'\ CONTENTS
THURSDAY, AUGUST 24, 1944
Testimony of — Pag* '
Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. Navy ; Commander, Air Force,
Atlantic Fleet, Adroinistx-ative Office, Norfolk, Virginia 1575
Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, U. S. N., on duty at Chief, Naval
Operations, Washington, D. C 1644
Mrs. Mary B. Kogan, Washington, D. C 1673
Col. Walter E. Lorence, Corps of Engineers, United States Army,
Columbus, Ohio 1678
Rear Admiral Walter S. De Lany, United States Navy 1695
^ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original transcript of proceedings.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 827
[1575} PKOCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD
THURSDAY, AUGUST 24, 1944
Munitions Building,
Washington, D. C.
The Board, at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted
the hearing of witnesses, Lt, Gen. George Grunert, President of the
Board, presiding.
Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D.
Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.
Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C.
Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Ex-
ecutive Officer.
General Grunert. The Board will come to order.
TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL P. N. L. BELLINGER, U. S. NAVY;
COMMANDER, AIR FORCE, ATLANTIC FLEET; ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE, NORFOLK, VA.
(Admiral Bellinger was accompanied by Captain Logan C. Ramsey,
U. S. Navy, Chief of Staff to Commander, Fleet Air, Norfolk ; Admin-
istrative Headquarters, Norfolk, Va.)
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Admiral, will you please state to the Board your
name, rank, organization, and station.
xVdmiral Bellinger. Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. Navy ;
Commander, Air Force, Atlantic Fleet ; administrative office at Nor-
folk, Virginia.
[1576] 2. General Grunert. Admiral, the Board is after facts
as to what happened prior to, leading up to, and during the attack at
Pearl Harbor. It is primarily interested in those things that per-
tained to or could have been connected with the Army. From your
assignment during that time, the Board hopes you will be able to give
us some light on the facts, and also, possibly, leads to where we can
get other facts.
Will you please state to the Board your assignment, and generally
your duties thereunder, during the year lOil, giving dates as far as
you can remember.
Admiral Bellinger. On December G, 1941, and for several months
prior thereto, my duties were as follows:
Commander, Hawaiian Based Patrol Wing, and Commander, Patrol
Wing 2. Included in the larger command were the patrol squadrons
and aircraft tenders attached to Patrol Wings 1 and 2.
828 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Commander, Task Force 9. This comprised Patrol Wings 1 and 2,
plus other units, as assigned by Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,
for the conduct of specific operations.
Commander, Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor. The responsibil-
ities of this function included administrative authority in local mat-
ters over all fleet aircraft actually based on the Naval Air Station,
Pearl Harbor.
Liaison witli Comjnanclant, 14th Naval District, for aviation devel-
opment within the District, including Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and
Johnston Islands.
Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force.
In connection with the above duties, I functioned under [1677]
the following seniors :
Commander, Aircraft Scouting Force, who. as Type Commander
for patrol wings, was based at San Diego.
Commander, Scouting Force, the force command of which Patrol
Wings 1 and 2 were a part.
Directly under the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in my capa-
city as Commander, Task Force 9.
Under Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in his capacity as
Commander, Naval Base Defense Force, when performing my duties
as Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force.
Comanders of fleet task forces 1, 2, and 3, for operation of patrol
planes assigned to those forces for specific operations.
If I may, and it is the desire of this Board, I would like to continue
giving further information.
3. General Grunert. You appear to have some sort of prepared
statement, and, if it will enlighten the Board and put its feet on
the ground, I think it would be a good thing if you went ahead with
your statement, and then we will piece it out with such additional
information as we may want. Is that all right with the Board ? All
right. Proceed.
Admiral Bellinger. On December 6, 1941, and for several months
prior thereto, in addition to my basic naval duties as enumerated above,
I had the title of Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, under
the then Commander, Naval Base Defense Force, who was Admiral
Bloch, the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. A change
in my sta^jis was contemplated in what was tlien the current Navy
War Plan. Under its provisions, the [157S] units of my naval
command were expected to make an early move to bases in the outlying
islands, Midway, Wake, Johnston, and Palmyra. My own head-
quarters were to be at Midway.
Reverting to my status on Oahu, the most complicated of mv duties
consisted of those in connection with the air defense of Pearl Harbor.
About 1 March 1941, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, directed
me to report to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to pre-
pare an air defense plan in conjunction with the Commanding General,
Hawaiian Air Force. I so reported, and proceeded with the assigned
task, working directly with Major General F. L. Martin, U. S. Army,
Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, who, incidentally, was
senior to me.
The operation plan for the Naval Base Defense Force included
several subsidiary plans. The most important of these was the opera-
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 829
tion plan of the Naval Base Defense Air Force. In it was outlined
the proposed employment of all units made available to the Naval Base
Defense Air Force. In so far as Naval and JMarine Corps Air Units
were concerned, it was an order requiring definite action when appli-
cable.
Orders from Army sources covering the function of air units in
the Naval Base Defense xA.ir Force were the guides for these aircraft.
Both Army and Navy orders on this subject were based on the estimate
of the situation, dated March 31, 1941^, and signed by both General
Martin and myself. That estimate was based on the conditions as they
existed at the time it was drafted. Changes in the Naval Air Station
between that date and December 7, 1941, were not of sufficient sig-
nificance to warant a reestimate, and my information on the Army
Air Force [1579] indicated an analogous condition. The esti-
mate I believed and still believe to be sound, but the order based on
that estimate, like a precept of international law, lacked sanction;
and the missing sanction in this case was the absence of unity of com-
mand.
Specifically, the organization was designed to function through mu-
tual cooperation between the Army and Navy for the defense of Pearl
Harbor against air attack. As such the Naval Base Defense Air Force
could function only in the event of an actual emergency or when
proper authority so directed. The composition of the Naval Base
Defense Air Force varied from day to day with the number of aircraft
made available to it by the various air commands, both Army and
Navy. The determining factor in this tactical availability was the
daily employment schedule of aircraft belonging to the various air
units. Aircraft reported as available were subject to the operational
control of the commander. Naval Base Defense Air Force, or of the
Army Pursuit Commander, in the prevailing category of readiness,
only when the Naval Base Defense Air Force was in a functioning
status.
The normal procedure used for vitalizing this organization for drills
was for the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in his capacity
as Commander, Naval Base Defense Force, to send a dispatch reading :
Drill. Danger of air raid on Pearl Harbor exists. Drill.
This placed the search-and-attack groups in a functioning status.
On receipt of this message, I in turn, as Commander, Naval Base
Defense Air Force, sent a dispatch to all air units . [1S80] which
made planes available to that organization, except Army pursuit units,
ordering them to place all available aircraft in the highest degree of
readiness. At this point, during such drills, searches were immedi-
ately started by planes initially in a high degree of readiness, and
their efforts were supplemented by orders to other aircraft as they were
reported ready for flight.
The term, "Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force,"' was actu-
ally a misnomer, due to the limited composition of that portion of
the Air Forces under my operational control, which included only the
aircraft for scouting to locate enemy surface units and to attack them
when located. It did not include fighter aircraft, radar detection de-
vices, or antiaircraft guns. The term "Commander, Naval Base De-
fense Air Force," was even more of a misnomer, as it implied authority
830 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
over operating units to a degree which did not exist. Tliis authority
was nonexistent until an emergency was apparent, or until appro-
priate authority placed the Naval Base Defense Air Force in a func-
tioning status; and when so called into existence, was limited in scope,
in that it consisted only of operational control over Army units based
upon mutual cooperation.
In addition, my authority, limited as it was, extended only over the
search-and-attack groups of the Naval Base Defense Air Force, and
was non-existent so far as Army pursuit aviation and Navy fiighter
aviation were concerned, which were to function under the operational
control of Brigadier General H. C. Davidson, U. S. Army.
To illustrate the lack of numerical strength of aircraft available
to the Naval Base Defense Air Force, attention is [1S81] in-
vited to the report of a Joint Army and Navy Board, dated 31 October
1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation
of aircraft operating areas in the Hawaiian area. Paragraph 4 (a)
of this report, which was signed by Major General Martin, as Senior
Army member, and myself, as senior Navy member, reads as follows :
Paragraph 4. The problem confronting the Board as pertains to Army aviation
was summed up by the Army representatives as follows :
a. The mission of the Army on Oahu is to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval Base
against all attacks by an enemy. The contribution to be made by the Hawaiian
Air Force in carrying out this mission is :
(1) To search for and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action
by bombardment aviation.
(2) To detect, intercept, and destroy enemy aircraft in the vicinity of Oahu,
by pursuit aviation.
It was pointed out that under the Army 54 Group Program, 170
B-l7s and two groups of 163 Pursuit planes each, would be assigned
to fulfill the above missions.
Naval planes called for 84 patrol planes and 48 VSO planes, to be
directly under the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to sup-
plement or function in lieu of the 98 patrol planes of Patrol Wings 1
and 2, which might be ordered to advance bases on the outlying Islands
of Wake, Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra. Further, the planes actu-
ally present on Oahu were not free until ordered to concentrate on the
naval ba.se Air Defense. Both Army and Navy were in the process of
receiving replacements of obsolescent planes. Army B-18s were being
replaced by the [1S82] more modern B-17s, and Patrol Wings
1 and 2 PBY-ls, -2s, and -3s were being replaced by PBY-5s. The
new types were subject to the usual shake-down difficulties and main-
tenance problems.
The placing of the Naval Base Defense Air Force organization into
a functioning status would have necessitated the substantial cessation
of training activities in order to concentrate on defense. With the
patrol planes constantly scouting to a maximum range, and the bomber
aircraft standing by for attack missions, a situation would have been
soon reached wherein the Navy planes would have been greatly reduced
in material readiness and their combat crews approaching an opera-
tional fatigue point, while the Army pilots would have been in need
of refresher training. Hence, as pointed out in the Martin-Bellinger
estimate, the problem resolved itself into one of timing with respect
to the current status of our relations with Japan and the necessity
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 831
for specific information as to the expectation of an air attack within
I'ather narrow time limits.
The Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, did not have the
authority to place that organization in a functioning status, except in
the case of an actual emergency. The Naval Base Defense Air Force
assumed a functioning status immediately after the start of the attack
on December 7, 1941, without orders from higher authority. Orders
to planes in the air were sent and received by 0805, and a message —
Air raid Peai-1 Harbor. This is no drill.
was ordered broadcasted at 0758 that morning.
4. General Grunert. Did the Naval Base Defense Air Force have
anything to do with the outlying islands, Wake, Midway, and so
forth?
[1S83] Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.
5. General Grunert. That was not part of the responsibility of
defense or air action of the Naval Base Defense Air Force?
Admiral Bellinger. The Naval Base Defense Air Force was based
on the joint estimate.
6. General Frank. The joint air estimate?
Admiral Bellinger. This joint estimate, prepared by General
Martin and myself does not state, "air estimate," but it is based pri-
marily on air, this joint estimate covering joint Army and Navy air
action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu, or fleet units
in the Hawaiian area.
7. General Grunert. The Hawaiian area did not include anything
outside of the Hawaiian Islands proper, did it?
Admiral Bellinger. No.
8. General Grunert. Now, the Board is interested in the terms
used, when the plan is "effective," and when iti is "operative." These
plans became effective when they were signed, but as I understand,
you say they were not to become operative until an emergency arose,
and then, I believe, that they could be ordered to become operative
by the Army or the Navy Department, or by local commanders, when
so agreed upon. Is that your understanding?
Admiral Bellinger. The question is, who were the "local com-
manders"— the senior Army and senior Navy officers present?
General Grunert. Are you familiar with the Hawaiian Coastal
Frontier Defense Plan of approximately February 1941, to which
this air operational plan was a sort of supplement or appendix? I
have here what is known as the "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan," which was dated as of 11 April 1941, and [ISS^] in that
plan, paragraph 15 (c) , (2) , it states :
Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior
to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed
upon by local commanders.
Now, just who are referred to, there, as "local commanders," the
Board has not yet determined. At least, I do not know who are meant.
I would interpret it off-hand to mean that the "local commanders" in
Hawaii would be the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, whether or
832 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
not it went down below that. But what was your understanding as
to when the joint air agreement became effective and operative?
Admiral Bellixger. In this joint estimate signed by General Martin
and myself, in paragraph 5(e), the first sentence reads as follows :
Establish a procedure whereby the condition of readiness to be maintained
by each unit is at all times prescribed by the senior oflBcers present of the Army
and Navy as a result of all information currently available to them.
10. General Grunert. I thought I understood you to say, in your
statement, that this naval air plan functioned only during an emer-
gency ?
Admiral Bellinger. Or when set into the functioning status by
proper authority. Now, the question is, what is "proper authority"?
My understanding of it is that the Commander, Naval Base Defense
Force, could issue an order. Whether it would be complied with
completely by the Army, lacking an [loSS] emergency, would
depend on the iniderstanding of the Army commander, whether that
was a state of emergency which required concentrating on that type
of work. That question, as I say, never came up except in connection
with drills, and when a drill was held it was arranged by mutual con-
sent prior to the time of the drill, in order to make sure that the forces
involved, particularly with the Army, would be available to take part
in the drill.
11. General Grunert. Then, for each such drill or maneuver, it
required cooperation for that particular period, and did not extend
beyond that period ? Is that right ?
Admiral Bellinger. During the joeriod of the drill, the cooperation
existed ; yes.
12. General Grunert. That was because the two senior commanders
agreed upon having such a drill and maneuver?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
13. General Grunert. To your knowledge, did the Commandant
of the Fourteenth Naval District and the Commanding General of the
Hawaiian Department agree at any time prior to December 7 to make
this joint air operation agreement effective as an emergency?
Admiral Bellinger. I remember a situation wherein the Army
were having a 3-day period of drills, in which the Navy cooperated
in these drills, to get both Army and Navy forces working together.
This was subsequent to the plans and directives, and this estimate we
have just been discussing, which were in effect.
14. General Grunert. That, again, does not answer the question.
[1580] Admiral Bellinger. Excuse me — may I continue ?
15. General Grunert. Go ahead.
Admiral Bellinger. The first day, the operations were carried out
under the plans of the Naval Base Defense Air Force. That night, I
received a dispatch from Army headquarters, stating that the bomber
command was no longer "under my command," or "operational
control" — I have forgotten the term used in the dispatch. I wondered
what caused that dispatch, and what it meant. It arrived late at
night. The next morning, there was an air-raid drill in connec-
tion with these operations scheduled, and in carrying out the plans
for this drill the question, to me, was, was the Army Bomber Command
going to function, or not?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 833
About 5 o'clock in the morninir. the Wiuo- Commander. Colonel
Farthing, called me up and asked if we were going to ask for the
Ai-niy to assist the Navy. I said, "No; I don't know of any plan to
do that," that I was not the one to ask for the Army to assist the Navy ;
that would be for the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, if they
wanted the Navy to ask for the Army to assist the Navy. He said
to me that they would like to work in this problem. Well, I said I
would like very much to, and that I would keep them informed, and
they could carry out their directives, as they might think, acting on
the information I gave them, as they saw fit, in accordance with their
directives.
In checking later to find out why this dispatch was sent, changing
the plan, so to speak, I was informed that it related to the provisions
of joint action, which, in my understanding, were superseded, to the
extent as indicated, in the plans [1587] embodied in the de-
fense of Pearl Harbor.
After that, I proposed a letter to General Short, for the signature
of Admiral Bloch, to endeavor to straighten that situation out, and I
believe it was more or less straightened out in so far as I could see
from the preliminary phases of it; the idea being that if an emer-
gency did exist and was present, then it would not require authority
or sanction of Greneral Short for the Bomber Command to function;
and it was in that way and in that echelon that I am speaking about,
now.
16. General Grunert. Did the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet
ever indicate his approval of that joint air agreement as signed by
Admiral Bloch and General Short ?
Admiral Bellinger. I assume he did approve it, because Admiral
Block functioned under the Commander-in-Chief in his capacity, in
the defense of Pearl Harbor.
IT. General Grunert. Now, of course, that was an incident in the
case of straightening things out so you could cooperate. What I want
to start in with is to get down to the basis. This Joint Hawaiian
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was based on joint action of the Army
and Navy, as agreed to in Washington. Under paragraph 9 (b)
thereof, is reads :
Operations of Army and Navy forces will be coordinated by exercise of unity
of command in tlie following cases :
1. Where ordered by the President ; or,
2. When provided for in joint agreements between the Secretary of War and
the Secretary of the Navy ; or,
3. When Commanders of Army and Navy forces agree tliat the situation re-
quires the exercise of unity of command, and further agree as to the service that
shall [ Z5SS] exercise such command.
Was there at any time, up to December 7, any discussion as to the
necessity for agreeing on the exercise of unity of command, under the
conditions that then existed?
[loS9] Admiral Bellinger. I had mentioned it. In other words,
I was not satisfied with the setup under the estimate and directives
concerning the Naval Base Defense Air Force. I thought that it was
necessary to have a unity of command to make such an operation a
success.
18. General Frank. You mean a unity of command before some-
thing happened ?
834 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Beixinger. Yes.
19. General Frank. Rather than when it happened?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
20. General Grunert. Up to December 7th was there ever a period
that in your mind made it necessary to brin^ that thing to a head be-
cause things were about to happen? In other words, an imminence
of possible attack? You apparently in your estimate figured that an
air raid or attack was highly possible, if not probable. Now, was there
such a period that it seemed to be more necessary than ever to bring
that to a head?
Admiral Bellinger. I would like to point out this : that this joint
estimate is based on
21. General Frank. Between 3?ou and Martin?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes; the joint estimate signed by General
Martin and myself.
22. General Grunert. But approved by the 14th Naval District and
by the Admiral of the Fleet?
Admiral Bellinger. This estimate (indicating) ? I assume so. I
was directed to cooperate with the Army and work out a plan.
23. General Frank. By whom?
Admiral Bellinger. By the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet,
[1S90] Admiral Kimmel. I was directed to report to the Com-
mandant of the Naval Base to do this, who was Admiral Block ; and
the most logical procedure w^as first to make an estimate of the situa-
tion, and this was the first step in the effort to bring about a plan of
action, but this estimate, as you see, was based on in the event of a
sudden hostile action against Oahu and fleet units in the Haw^aiian
areas. It was not an estimate of Japanese war plans.
24. General Frank. Doesn't that estimate state that a surprise Jap
air attack was the most probable action expected ?
Admiral Bellinger. "It appears that the most likely and dangerous
form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack," is a quotation from
the estimate. You asked me, Was this estimate approved. In carrying
out my instructions, the estimate and my directive for carrying out
the Navy end of the estimate, the decisions of the estimate, w^ere sent
to the Commander Naval Base Defense Force, who was my superior
in command.
25. General Frank. That was Admiral Bloch ?
Admiral Bellinger. Admiral Bloch. I assumed that General
Martin sent his copies to General Short, and the agreement between
General Martin and myself was that on the basis of this estimate he
would get out a directive for his part of the forces involved, and I
would get out a directive for my part of the forces involved, and that
was done.
26. General Grunert. Presumably it was approved, because it was
done?
Admiral Bellinger. Beg pardon ?
27. General Grunert. The presumption is that it had the approval
of higher headquarters because action was taken in [1591] get-
ting it out ?
Admiral Bellinger. I am sure it had the approval. I am sure it
had the approval because I was complimented on the cooperation as
indicated between Army and Navy.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 835
28. General Grunert. I want to get this fact: But that was not
to become operative until an emergency was on your neck, but I want
to find out if there wasn't a period of imminence there in which those
concerned should have tried to force to a conclusion to make it opera-
tive now or to have declared a state of affairs so that unity of com-
mand could have been put into effect, and you said you had that in
mind but that it was not done ?
Admiral Bellinger. No. Pardon me. That could have been done
at any time by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, who was
Commander Naval Base Defense Force, if it was approved by and
agreed upon by General Short.
29. General Grunert. That is what I want to get at. Why didn't
they get together and agree upon it?
Admiral Bellinger. Or it could have been put in effect by General
Short if proposed by him and agreed upon by Admiral Bloch.
There was one point I wish to raise, though, in that: that naval
planes that were scheduled and which were made available when
available to function under this Naval Base Defense Air Force were
not separate and distinct from other functions for which they were
assigned, which the Commander had a great deal to do with, the
Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet.
30. General Grunert. But this is the thing that confuses me : the
Naval Defense District and the Commanding General of the [1592]
Hawaiian Department could get together and agree to do this and
that, and then suddenly the Comander-in-Chief of the Fleet comes
in and he may issue orders that are not in consonance with the agree-
ments that General Short and Admiral Bloch had. In other words,
he got out an instruction which was late — I don't know — in October,
and whether or not that was in consonance with the Hawaiian defense
plan and with the air operational agreement, I do not know, but
where does the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet come in on these
agreements between the District and the Department? Does he have
to approve them? If he doesn't approve them, he has most of the
means or some of the means that will be involved therein.
Admiral Bellinger. In view of the fact that Admiral Bloch func-
tioned under the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, for those pur-
poses I am sure that what was done in preparation of the plan had
his approval.
31. General Frank. For what purposes? You said, "for those pur-
poses." I am trying to get what they were.
Admiral Bellinger. For the Pearl Harbor defense force.
32. General Frank. I would like to ask a question here.
33. General Grunert. Go ahead.
34. General Frank. Will you give us a little explanation of your
official relationship to Admiral Bloch and to the Commander of the
Fleet?
Admiral Bellinger. My direct relation with Admiral Bloch was by
a directive from the Commander-in-Chief to report to him for duty
in connection with the preparation of a plan coordinated with the
Army for the air defense of Pearl Harbor, and as such and in con-
formity with such I reported, and then as a result of [15931
that I became what was known then as Commander Naval Base Air
79716 — 4G— Ex. 145, vol. 2 4
836 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Force functioning- under Admiral Bloch, tlie Commandant of the
14tli Naval District.
35. General Frank. All right. Now, as that Commander what were
your responsibilities to Admiral Block and what were they to Admiral
Kimmel ?
Admiral Bellinger. Admiral Kimmel had super authority over all
the rest of the Navy, and my forces could be removed at any time on
any million that he saw fit to assign them ; and as an instance, about
December 4th there were two squadrons of planes, one at Wake and
one at Midway, in connection with an operation which the Commander-
in-Chief Pacific had directed. Those planes were subject to being
utilized in the Naval Base Defense Air Force when available.
36. General Geunert. When and if they were available. When
they are ashore and available, they could be used for that defense, but
he. Admiral Kimmel, could pull out anything that pertained to the
fleet at any time needed ?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
37. General Frank. Who was responsible for this Martin-Bellinger
agreement, the next higher man? Admiral Bloch or Admiral Kim-
mel, or both, or you ?
Admiral Bellinger. The joint estimate signed by Martin and Bel-
linger was the result of the initiative taken by Admiral Kimmel. It
was signed by General Martin and myself. Therefore we are re-
sponsible for the joint estimate.
38. General Frank. We know who was the next man above General
Martin, and it was General Short, and there is no question about it ;
but I still do not know who was the next man above you to [-?<^^4]
be responsible for this thing.
Admiral Bellinger. Admiral Bloch was the one who was responsible
above me in connection with the Naval Base Defense Air Force.
39. General Grunert. But Admiral Kimmel at any time could butt
into Admiral Bloch's business in the defense line and sort of disrupt it
by taking out some of his means ?
Admiral Bellinger. That is correct. The naval war plans in ex-
istence at that time required me to base at Midway and my patrol
planes to operate from the four islands, Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and
Johnston, and possibly some at Oahu.
40. General Grunert. Here in this case through the direction of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet he initiated or he told you to
get bus}^ on that estimate, and as a result of that estimate there came
about this joint air operations agreement which was signed by General
Short and by Admiral Bloch, but in that agreement it envisaged using
air forces that pertained to the Fleet, and your use of them was only
when they were ashore, and they could be taken out from under you
at any time as far as the actual defense of Hawaii was concerned ?
Admiral Bellinger. Correct.
41. General Frank. They could be taken out from under you as
Naval Base Defense Air Force Commander ?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes, but not
42. General Frank. But you still would have them under jouv
command ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 837
Admiral Belijngek. As Commander Patrol Wings, Hawaiian Area.
43. General Frank. In which event you no longer Avere under
[1595] Admiral Bloch?
Admiral Bellinger. No. I was under Commander-in-Chief Pacific
in that capacity. That was what I tried to indicate when I answered
the first question, and I think you will find that very clearly put as an
answer to the question.
44. General Frank. Now I would like to ask this question. Let us
assume that somebody did say that, "Here is unity of command."
AVith the forces that you had wliat would you have done about it ?
Admiral Bellinger. As unity of command in connection with the
Naval Base Defense Air Force?
45. General Frank. With the whole situation, unity of command;
suppose that were on December 1st.
Admiral Bellinger. In that case whoever had unity of command
would be responsible for all phases of action which he initiated.
Therefore, if he took planes av/ay for one purpose, he is responsible.
If he takes, sets the planes for one purpose at another place, he is
responsible there. In other words, if he has a certain amount of forces,
he would be responsible for the distribution of those forces.
46. General Frank. I know, but what I am trying to get at is this :
In view of the lack of equipment, assuming that you had had com-
mand of it as a result of the Navy having command under the principle
of unity of command, what could you have done?
Admiral Bellinger. I do not know that I could have done any-
thing more unless — that is I.
47. General Frank. Yes.
Admiral Bellinger. The Commander who had unity of command
may have done more, yes, because he would be in a position, as
[1596] I say, to make distribution of forces, complete distribu-
tion, as he saw necessity therefor.
48. General Frank. Were you familiar with the messages that ar-
rived along the Ifith of October up through the 27th of November?
Admiral Bellinger. 16th?
49. General Frank. October 16th, and November 24th and 27th.
Admiral Bellinger. 1 6th of October ?
50. General Frank. Yes.
Admiral Bellinger. No, I never saw any of those messages. I do
not remember one on the 16th.
51. General Frank. Well, there was one on the 16th.
Admiral Bellinger. That is, I never saw these messages prior to
December 7th.
52. General Frank. Well, there was a message on the 16th, a Navy
message. In effect it said, "Take due precautions including such pre-
paratory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor con-
stitute provocative action against Japan." That was the Navy message
as of the 16th of October.
Admiral Bellinger. I do not remember, sir.
53. General Frank. You did not know anything about that ?
Admiral Bellinger. No. There was a conference in connection
with the reinforcement of Wake and in connection with Midway, and
in the first tentative plan it was contemplated that Army pursuit
planes might be put out there. Then that was not agreed upon, so
838 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Marine planes were put out there. I attended a conference in the
Commander-in-Chief's office. I have forgotten the date. It may have
been on the basis of that dispatch. I do not remember ever having
seen that dispatch.
54. General Frank. On the 24th of November there was another
[1597] message : Caution relative possibility of surprise attack on
Guam or Philippine Islands.
Admiral Bellinger. Never saw it. I never saw it prior to Decem-
ber 7. My statement with regard to not having seen these dispatches
refers to prior to December 7.
55. General Frank. Did you know that they had arrived?
Admiral Bellinger. Not prior to December 7.
56. General Frank. You did not.
Then there was one of the 27th of November : War warning. Guam
Samoa warned re sabotage . Jap action versus Philippines, Thai, or
Kra Peninsula, Borneo, expected. You did not know anything about
that?
Admiral Bellinger, Not prior to December 7.
57. General Frank. And the Army sent out a message. Since then
you have known that those messages had gone out ?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
58. General Frank. But at that time you knew nothing about it?
Admiral Bellinger. I did not.
59. General Frank. Did you know that there was a tense situation
existing?
Admiral Bellinger. The paper indicated quite a tense situation.
As a matter of fact, the tense situation had been rising and falling,
as you remember yourself, out in that area for some time. It caused
me to write considerable letters trying to build up my forces and to
get action. I realized thoroughly that it was a tense situation, and as
I say the papers indicated a tense situation, but I had no knowledge
of [1S98] secret dispatches at that time prior to December 7th.
60. General Frank. How many P. B. Y.s did you have then?
Admiral Bellinger. We had a total of 81 P. B. Y.s in the Patrol
Wings 1 and 2. And when I say "we had" that included those that
were at Midway as well.
61. General Frank. How many did you have right there in Pearl
Harbor and Kaneohe ?
Admiral Bellinger. On what day ?
62. General Frank. December first to seventh.
Admiral Bellinger. On December 5th one squadron that had been
away, that is, a squadron of 12 planes that had been away for over
a month or so, basing on both Midway and Wake, returned, and one
squadron was at Midway on December 6th.
From December 1 to 5 we had 57 P. B. Y. planes.
63. General Frank. OnOahu?
Admiral Bellinger. On Oahu or in the Hawaiian area.
On December 5 to 7 we had 69, with 9 out of commission.
Excuse me. I have to check this a little bit. I have got figures to
show all this, and I want to make sure that I am right on this.
64. General Frank. Well, you have the records of the exact number
of planes, haven't you ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 839
Admiral Bellinger. On December 7th we had at Kaneohe 36 phmes,
at Pearl 33 planes, and at Midway 12 planes, making a total of 81
planes.
[ISW] 65. General Frank. What I am getting around to is
this: What kind of reconnaissance or patrolling did you carry out
between November 27th and December 7th ?
Admiral Bellinger. There was a requirement by a directive from
the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, to patrol wings — not Naval Base
Air Defense, but patrol wings — to search fleet operating areas in the
early morning at sunrise.
66. General Frank. Those are task force operating areas?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes. That was a daily occurrence.
[IGOO] 67. General Frank. About how many planes did you
send out?
Admiral Bellinger. From three to six, depending on the amount of
area covered by these assigned operating areas.
68. General Frank. Is that the total number that went out during
the da}', or did thej^ relieve each other ?
Admiral Bellinger. The search was in the early morning, and
when that was accomplished, that was the search for that day on
that particular job.
69. General Grunert. What was the purpose of the search?
Admiral Bellinger. To guard against submarine attack, primarily,
or Japanese ships in the area.
70. General Grunert. And that was primarily done in order to
know that in that area a task force could operate with comparative
security ?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes; from surface or sub-surface craft.
71. General Grunert. It had nothing to do with searching or mak-
ing reconnaissance for the defense of Oahu ?
72. General Frank. Against a surprise attack?
Admiral Bellinger. No. Excuse me. There was patrolling being
carried on from Midway.
73. General Frank. What I would like to know is this: Was any
patrolling being done as a prevention against a surprise attack?
Admiral Bellinger. Only in the vicinity of Midway. There was
a movement in connection with putting these planes that I spoke
about, these Marine planes, on Midway and Wake, and in connection
with the movement of the carrier task force which was charged with
that job we had patrol planes on Midway and Wake that did certain
security patrol which was in connection with the security of the task
force at sea.
74. General Frank. What instructions did you receive with
[10011 respect to conducting patrols or reconnaissance for security
purposes ?
Admiral Bellinger. The ones I spoke about, which required a
search of operating areas in the early morning each day.
75. General Frank. You had no instructions from anybody to con-
duct any search against a force to protect you from a surprise attack?
Admiral Bellinger. We had had on specific occasions, when there
was some apparent reason for doing so. That instance had occurred
for one or two different periods during the year.
840 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
76. General Frank. Was Naval Combat Intelligence information
made available to you ?
Admiral Bellinger. That depends on the echelon or kind of in-
telligence.
77. General Frank. During this period?
Admiral Bellinger. Those dispatches were not made available to
me.
78. General Frank. Did you have any information about a Japanese
task force with carriers in the Marshalls about the first of December?
Admiral Bellinger. No ; not to my knowledge.
79. General Frank. Such information would certainly put you on
your high horse to get busy, would it not ?
Admiral Bellinger. In order for me to get busy I would have to
initiate some proposition to higher authority; that is, to get busy
lacking some definite actual emergency.
80. General Frank. If you had gotten that information would you
not have done some recommending?
Admiral Bellinger. That is something that I would like to
say [1602] yes to. I hope I would have done so. But this
IS post-Pearl Harbor, and then was ante-Pearl Harbor when we were
at peace. But I think I would have.
81. General Frank. But at the time 3^ou knew nothing about it?
Admiral Bellinger. No.
82. General Grunert. I would like to go back to the subject of
what we call distant reconnaissance. You may call it patrol or
whatnot. If you had received instructions to do some distant recon-
naissance or patrolling with a view to finding out whether there was
any air force that might come in to attack Hawaii, in the line of
discovering the location of carriers, from whom would you have
received that directive for such a reconnaissance.
Admiral Bellinger. Either Admiral Bloch, by his status as Com-
mander, Naval Base Defense Force, in which case I assume he would
have conferred with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific prior to
issuing the order, or I might have received it direct from the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific.
83. General Frank. All the planes that you had to perform any
missions as Commander of the Naval Base Defense, Air Forces, were
sent over there from the fleet, were they not ?
Admiral Bellinger. Will you repeat that, please?
84. General Frank. You had a series of six hats that you wore.
Among them was Commander of the Naval Base Defense Force,
which was under Admiral Bloch; but Admiral Bloch, as the Com-
mander of the Fourteenth Naval District, had no airplanes. There-
fore any airplanes that were made available for work as such in the
Naval Base Defense Air Force were sent over there from one of these
several units?
[1603] Admiral Bellinger. Or else the Army Bomber Com-
mand.
85. General Frank. Therefore, as long as the commander of the
fleet left the planes there. Admiral Bloch and. in turn, you — but
principally Admiral Bloch because you belonged to both of them —
Admiral Bloch 's plans for carrying out his missions were secure;
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 841
but if the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet wanted to pull some of
those planes away, that left Admiral Bloch high and dry, so far as
carrying out the missions he wanted carried out was concerned. Is
that correct ?
Admiral Bellinger. That is correct. In other words, the planes
comprising the Naval Base Defense Air Force were a "movable
feast". In other words, there was no stable organization set aside
to form the Naval Base Defense Air Force prior to December 7th.
After December 7th, and on Deecember 7th, the main mission became
Naval Base Defense Air Force, and all planes functioned on that
duty, unless otherwise specifically directed by the Commander-in-
Chief, who also took cognizance, and direct cognizance, of the activi-
ties of the Naval Base Defense Force.
May I inject one thing on this matter? As I said before, the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, initiated the formation of this
Naval Base Defense Force, including the Naval Base Defense Air
Force. He did it, so I understand, in order to endeavor, with the
forces available, to prepare the best plan, considering all the other
factors involved in operation, and to bi'ing about some kind of
coordinated effort through mutual cooperation, utilizing what existed
or might exist in case the need for it arose.
86. General Frank. One question I would like to ask about this
agreement. I asked you who was the one man in the Navy [1604-]
responsible for the execution of the Martin-Bellinger Agreement. We
have three names, Bloch, Bellinger and Kimmel. Under which of
the three shells do we find the peanut?
Admiral Bellinger. General Short was — —
87. General Frank (interposing). I say, just in the Navy.
Admiral Bellinger. It was not within my authority to start the
Air Defense Force unless there was an emergency existing. In other
words, it could not be started by me to meet a thought that I might
have of danger, unless there was some definite reason to indicate it, in
which case I would have had to get some sort of backing from General
Martin in order to present this idea to higher authority, because it
would have to be a mutual agreement to start it, by General Short and
Admiral Bloch.
88. General Frank. That is what I am getting at. We knew to
whom Martin would go ; tliere is no question about that. He would go
to Short. But to whom would you go? You would go to Bloch or
Kimmel ?
Admiral Bellinger. With reference to the Naval Base Defense Air
Force I would go to Bloch. He was my boss.
89. General Frank. All right. Thank j'ou.
90. General Grunert. I want to exhaust two subjects before we go
on with another, in so far as they are exhaustable with the present light.
Let us continue what we might call this command phase. Here we
have the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan executed between the
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant
of the Fourteenth Naval District. Therein, as agreed to and appar-
ently approved all around, it is provided, under [1605] para-
graph 18, that
The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, shaU provide for —
842 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
{ind it runs from A to P and paragraph I thereof is "Distant Recon-
naissance". It is agreed that the Navy shall provide distant
reconnaissance.
As far as the Navy is concerned, in the signatures to that there is
the signature of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. He is
to provide for something, but apparently he has nothing to do that
providing with, unless he can get it from his senior, who happens to
be the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. If he is not given the means
A\ herewith to do that, what was the use of having him agree to do it?
Admiral Bellinger. It sounds a little bit worse than it actually
might have been, in view of the fact that Admiral Bloch was responsi-
ble and functioned under the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for
that purpose. The Commander-in-Chief did have an onus in con-
nection with that also, because Bloch was his man for that purpose,
91. General Grunert. This is my understanding of it. Here is the
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. That is not only Hawaii :
it is the Pacific. He has his headquarters at the same place as that
of the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. Therefore,
he is in command, and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval Dis-
trict is his subordinate and under him, and he is charged with the
defense of the Hawaiian Islands. They make an agreement as be-
tween the Army, which is charged with defense, and the Fourteenth
Naval District, which is charged with defense, and he agrees to do
some distant reconnaissance. [1606] He has no means, appar-
ently, for this distant reconnaissance, or he did not have except such as
the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet saw fit to make available to him.
In the absence of sufficient aircraft to meet all the demands there neces-
sarily was a sort of pool, and that pool was primarily for the fleet
and secondarily for the District. Ordinarily, most of the time the
fleet used it and it could not be made available to the District if the
fleet was going to use it. So it resulted in what? It resulted in your
being put in command of practically all the air forces and the activi-
ties of all the air forces, and you had four or five or six different
propositions and you had three or four people to go to : You had the
Commander-in-Chief of the fleet; you had the District Commander,
and you also had some task force commanders, I believe.
Admiral Bellinger. The task force commanders came into the pic-
ture when the task forces were operating.
92. General Grunert. So, about the only thing you could do, ap-
parently, was to agree with the Army Air Force commander and say,
"We will do what we can with what we have got; and in order to
know what we have got, my part of the plan is seaward, and your
part of the plan is over the land or nearby." And you agreed on
what each other would do, and you agreed that when the time came
the fighters of the Navy would be turned over to the Army, and what
we may call the reconnaissance of the Army would be turned over to
the Navy. That is, generally speaking. So each day, or periodically,
you made reports to each other as to what was available ?
Admiral Bellinger. Each day.
93. General Grunert. And, therefore, you agreed that
When and [1607] if the time comes that we may have to put this plan
into effect, that is our working scheme.
Is that generally a fair statement?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 843
Admiral Bellinger. Generally speaking, I would say that is
correct.
94. General Grunert. Without any details.
Now, apparently the inherent weakness in making such plans is the
question of their not becoming operative in time to meet an attack?
Is that true?
Admiral Bellinger, That is correct. In other words, it is not
operative until made operative.
95. General Frank. It depended on a period of strained relations?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes. There was dependence on information
that indicated that it was very advisable to put it into operation ; and
then that required, I would say, mutual consent from Admiral Bloch
and General Short in which the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, would
have a good deal to do about it with reference to how many planes
could be used for that. For instance, he might send planes away.
As I say, these two squadrons of planes that went to Midway and
Wake were on the direct order of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.
96. General Frank. It could have been put into effect, that is, this
unity of command, by direction from Washington in accordance with
joint Army and Navy action?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
97. General Grunert. Washington did not direct it.
The only way you had an idea of whether or not this prepared plan
would work would be by a number of drills and exercises, which I
understand were had ?
\16'08] Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
98. General Grunert. But there was no period of imminence of
war that impressed itself upon the minds of those present to decide
to get together to make this plan operative and to do it every day
until something broke ?
Admiral Bellinger. Apparently not.
99. General Grunert. Would it then have been better, and would
it have given a better chance to meet an attack on December 7, had
that plan been made operative as of the 27th of November, and from
that time on you had exercised daily ?
Admiral Bellinger. As a result of hindsight and the proper selec-
tion of a sector for distant reconnaissance, I would say yes. The ques-
tion which has to be taken into consideration in looking back now,
with out minds built around ante-December 7 days, is this, and I would
like to bring this point out: We were in the process of getting new
planes; in other words, replacements with new planes, and between
28 October, 1941 and 23 November, 1941, we received 54 new types of
planes.
100. General Frank. P. B. Y.-5's?
Admiral Bellinger. P. B. Y.-5's ; and those planes were experienc-
ing the usual shake-down difficulties, and we were hampered in main-
tenance by almost a complete absence of spare parts. We also were not
overstocked with personnel. One of our main problems, as I know it
was in the Army at that time, was what we termed expansion training,
with the idea of endeavoring to develop an additional and adequate
number of combat air crews. So that when this was put into effect,
in so far as the Navy planes were concerned, that would have to be
taken into consideration.
344 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[1609] 101. General Geunert. Those are what you might call
handicaps under any condition ?
Admiral Bellinger. That is correct.
102. General Grunert. But if it had been decided that the emer-
gency was such as to go all out in preparedness, then, under existing
conditions, would it not have been better to have made that decision
before anything happened and not have to implement a plan upon a
hostile attack?
Admiral Bellinger. There is no doubt about that, because the
whole basis of the plan was to discover the enemy before it could make
an attack.
103. General Frank. I would like to ask a question there which
is pertinent to that. Had unity of command been in effect and had
the whole Army and Navy been in the same frame of mind that they
were on the 7th of December with unity of command in effect, what
difference would it have made ?
Admiral Bellinger. That is rather difficult to answer, because there
are so many questions of command relations from the highest echelons,
which I am not familiar with, and you would know as much about
that as I do. One man who has got the responsibility and the author-
ity to make decisions, instead of trying to influence another man to
think as he thinks, is the better plan.
104. General Grunert. If one man had to make the decision and he
could get better action, then if two men had to make decisions by coop-
eration, even with the same means available, do you think you could
have gotten better action?
Admiral Bellinger. I think undoubtedly unity of command would
have brought better action, starting from the day unity [16101
of command was established.
105. General Grunert. Then if any mistake was made in not estab-
lishing unity of command, it may have been made by the Powers
That Be in Washington or could have been made by joint agreement
between the commanders out there. Even unity of command, under
the Joint Army and Navy Agreement here in Washington that I
read
106. General Frank. But the frame of mind, the attitude toward
the situation, would have been the same in any event, would it not?
Admiral Bellinger. That I am unable to answer, because I do not
know what attitude of mind Admiral Kimmel and General Short had.
107. General Frank. Do you think that any information was avail-
able in the hands of either of the supreme commanders that would
have led to different action had either one of them been supreme?
Admiral Bellinger. If I answered that question it would be en-
tirely supposition on my part ; and I do not think that I am competent
to really answer it.
108. General Frank. It is just a matter of logic.
Admiral Bellinger. Logically speaking, starting back in August,
1941, 1 felt that to place something into existence that was then based
on mutual cooperation would be much better if they had unity of
command; and I still persist in that.
[1611] 109. General Grunert. We hear considerable about the
question of cooperation and the lack of it, and so forth, versus unity
of command, and what might have been done thereunder; but this
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 845
joint action of Army and Navy, as promulgated here, is part of the
'"bible" here among the Army and the Na^y, from Washington on
down, on which this Hawaiian Defense plan is predicated. It says,
as I read it, in paragraph 8, B (3) :
Operation of Army and Navy forces will be coordinated by the exercise of
unity of command in the following cases, 1, 2, and 3.
The third one is :
When the Commanders of Army and Navy forces agree that the situation re-
quires the exercise of unity of command, and further agree as to the service
that shall exercise that command.
That unity of command could have been put in force any time those
Commanders out there thought the situation demanded it ; and ap-
parently they did not think the situation demanded it?
Admiral Bei.lixger. ]\Iaybe one did, and the other didn't ! I don\
know.
110. General Grunert. Have you any more questions on this sub-
ject of command ? We can go to another subject, now.
111. General Russell. Admiral, as I understand it, Bloch's function
as Base Commander in connection with these islands was limited to
the islands and the waters adjacent thereto. The Pacific Fleet, on
the contrary, operated over a very immense area, relatively speaking;
is that true ?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
[J612] 112. General Russell. The Commander-in-Chief of the
Pacific Fleet had all of this area away from the islands, and Bloch
had this narrow area about the islands, as his immediate concern:
is that true ?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes: under the Commander-in-Chief.
113. General Russell. Well, of course, he was in the chain of com-
mand. You were immediately concerned with and in command of
all the aircraft with the Pacific Fleet, and that which may have been
assigned to the Base Commander, with what exceptions'?
Admiral Bellinger. In the first place, the fleet planes that I had
command of in the Naval Base Air Defense Force consisted of those
that were made available to me.
114. General Russell. Well, let us not jump the track. Admiral.
That is the trouble we are having.
Admiral Bellinger. Well, but you have to come down to "brass
tacks" on this, because it is too confusing.
115. General Russell. Let me state my question, and see if it can
be answered.
Admiral Bellinger. All right.
116. General Russell. What aircraft in the Pacific Fleet or in the
Fourteenth Naval District did you not have command of?
Admiral Bellinger. The Fourteenth Naval District had under
it certain air stations, and there were certain small utility-type planes
attached to them, and those planes were directly and specifically undc^
the commanding officer of the air station, and they were directly under
the Commandant of the Naval District.
117. General Grunert. That is what you call "housekeeping"?
1161S] Admiral Bellinger. That is correct.
Now, there was a utility wing. The utility wing was not under me,
118. General RussEiii,, What was that?
846 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Bellinger. That was a wing composed of various types of
planes, to do service to the fleet, such as towing targets, drone control,
and various other utility works for the fleet. Also, the carrier planes
based ashore were not under me, except when they were made avail-
able to me, and when based ashore, and only those, of those based
ashore, that were made available to me.
119. General Frank. And the carrier planes available?
Admiral Bellinger. Those carrier planes were attached to aircraft
carriers, and while on board the carriers I had nothing to do with
them. Wlien they were on shore, those that were made available to
the Naval Base Defense Air Force, with the exception of the fighter
planes; certain ones of those that were available were made available
to the fighter command. General Davidson, in the same method and
means as the bomber and scouting planes were made available to me
as Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force. And in addition to
that there was a Marine group, which was not under my authority
except as the planes were made available to me for the Naval Base
Defense Air Force; likewise, the fighter planes of that outfit were
made available to General Davison of the fighter command.
Does that answer your question?
120. General Russell. Yes.
Now, we are dealing with four groups. Admiral; certain utility
planes that were available to the installation command- [^^^4]
ers, and utility planes available to the sea units; the carrier-based
planes, when they were on the carriers ; and the Marine group. Now,
those were the types of planes out in that area, that only on occasions
were under your command ?
Admiral Bellinger. Eight.
121. General Russell, And probably the utility planes were never
under your command?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
122. General Russell. Because they were "housekeeping"?
Admiral Bellinger. No, they were under my command for that
purpose — for this purpose only — Naval Base Defense Air Force
purposes.
123. General Russell. Now, let us think about that third group,
there, the carrier-based planes. Those were the ones on the two car-
riers, the LEXINGTON and the ENTERPRISE, operating out of
Pearl Harbor ?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
124. General Russell. About how many carrier-bnsed planes did
each of those carriers have?
Admiral Bellinger. Normally, they carried at that time, I believe
their complement was 93 planes.
125. General Russell. 93 each ?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
126. General Russell. That would give them 186 ?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
127. General Russell. Now, let us go to the Marine group. Where
were they, and what were they ?
Admiral Bellinger. The Marine planes were at the Ewa base and
they functioned under the Commander of Carriers of the Pacific Fleet
at that time, was his title.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 847
[161S] 128. General Russell. How many were there?
Admiral Bellinger. I don't remember how many planes they had.
It was something about, as I recall, one squadron of bombers, one
squadron of scouts, and about two squadrons of fighter planes, perhaps.
I am not sure whether that was their full complement or not.
129. General Russell. And where were they, from November 27 to
December 7, 1941 ?
Admiral Bellinger. Some had been moved to Wake. A fighter
squadron had been moved to Wake, and I think it was a squadron of
dive-bombers that was at Midway.
The remainder of the planes were at Ewa air station.
130. General Russell. Was there any plane arrangement or agree-
ment which regulated the functioning of the planes under your com-
mand, the planes with the carriers, and the Marine planes, for recon-
naissance purposes ?
Admiral Bellinger. Either reconnaissance or for attack purposes ?
131. General Russell. Let us talk about reconnaissance.
Admiral Bellinger. When the Air Defense Force was functioning,
they automatically came under my command. Those planes were
available and received orders as required, either for scouting or for
bombing. In other words, standing by for attack. We did not intend
using them normally for scouting, because their range was entirely too
short.
132. General Russell. Let us go back to realities, from November
27 to December 7. Now, there were these planes with the carriers,
there were these planes under your command, and the planes of the
Marine people. There was no plan in existence, [1616] then
which coordinated the reconnaissance functioning of these three groups
of planes out there?
Admiral Bellinger. The plan for reconnaissance was primarily for
the patrol planes to carry out reconnaissance. In other words, they
were the only ones trained and capable of carrying it out, and these
54 new planes that I am speaking about as having arrived after 28
October were supposedly the best aircraft we had for reconnaissance
out in Hawaii.
133. General Russell. Under whose command, then, between No-
vember 27 and December 7, were all of tlie planes in the areas which
we have discussed, capable of conducting patrol missions?
Admiral Bellinger. That is a question you have got to elaborate
on to get a practical answer. Now, speaking from practical experi-
ence, after December 7.
134. General Frank. In the first place, they were all under the
Commander of the fleet, at the top side, were they not ?
Admiral Bellinger. All fleet planes are subject to the orders of
the Commander-in-Chief, as he sees fit, and they each have different
commands, but the reconnaissance planes were the PBYs and the
4-engine bombers of the Army,
135. General Russell. We are not talking about the Army, now.
Admiral Bellinger. They were used, and proved the best for re-
connaissance work in practice, after December 7.
136. General Russell. We are not talking about that, and I will
approach it from another angle. Were there any planes out there
848 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
which you have described as "Marine planes," on reconnaissance duty,
prior to December 7, 19-11?
Admiral Bellinger, You mean, under me, functioning?
137. General Russell. No, sir. I asked you a simple question.
[1617] Admiral Bellinger. Well, yes; there were.
138. General Russell. Were those planes on reconnaissance?
Admiral Bellinger. They were going to Midway for that purpose.
139. General Russell. They were functioning, then, on reconnais-
sance ?
Admiral Bellinger. They went to Midway to do jobs at Midway
which would i-equire reconnaissance as well as combat.
140. General Russell. All right. Then you did have Marine planes
doing reconnaissance from Midway prior to December 7?
Admiral Bellinger. I did not have, no. I just happened to know
that they were there.
141. General Russell. Do you know of any of the other Marine-
commanded planes that were doing reconnaissance or patrol prior to
December 7, 1941, except those at Midway ?
Admiral Bellinger. No. Their planes were not actually designed
for reconnaissance work, unless perhaps they were operated from a
carrier. They at one time used these planes for operating from
carriers, and when they were so operated they did carry out reconnais-
sance duties from the carrier; but from land their range was not
satisfactory for that sort of work.
142. General Russell. So, therefore, from land bases their range
was not satisfactory for that; then their operations from Midway
would not have been satisfactory, because they would have been land-
based, there?
Admiral Bellinger. Early information is very desirable. Now,
the question is, how early can you get it. If you get information 100
miles away, it is better than having it from 20 miles away. Therefore,
they did carry out, I know, [767<S] reconnaissance work within
their limitations, when they were based on islands; and I don't think
any commander who is in charge of an island base would hesitate to
use some sort of plane, even a fighter plane, to try to get early informa-
tion of an attack, or an approaching enemy.
143. General Russell. What would have been the range of those
planes based at Midway, that were from the ISIarine Corps?
Admiral Bellinger. As a matter of fact, those planes flew from
Honolulu to Midway with special tanks on them. It was stretching
it pretty far, but they did it.
144. General Frank. That is around 1100 miles?
Admiral Bellinger. Midway to Oahu, I think, is 1200 miles, isn't it?
145. General Frank. That is near enough.
Admiral Bellinger. It is 1138 miles,
146. General Russell. Do you know where all of these Marine
planes were disposed, or where they were based, on 7 December?
Admiral Bellinger. Those in the Hawaiian area were based at Ewa.
147. General Russell. Do you know about how many there were,
there?
Admiral Bellinger. I am not positive.
148. General Russell. Do you know how many were at Midway?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 849
Admiral Bellinger. I think it was one squadron of 18 planes. I
am not positive of that, but I think so.
149. General Russell. Where could we get that information, Ad-
miral, as to where the Marine planes were?
Admiral Bellinger. That is two years and four months ago, Isn't
it? I am trying to think where you could get it, now. [16191
If IS only just by luck I have certain papers.
150. GeneralRussELL. All right. Now, let us think about the third
group.
Admiral Bellinger. Excuse me. Perhaps you have gotten the
wrong impression, when I said that the Marine planes flew from Oahu
to Midway. As I say, that was with special gasoline tanks and spe-
cially loaded, as lightly as possible, to get the maximum range possible,
the normal range combat load — "normal radius of action," you might
say, practically, was about 175 miles, the radius of action.
151. General Russell. Then they would be available for recon-
naissance from their bases, 175 miles out, and return, or 87 miles out
and 87 miles back?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
152. General Russell. Which one? They go out 175, and come
back, or they go out 87, and come back ?
Admiral Bellinger. If you wanted them for reconnaissance work
you would take off some of the load and put more gas on, and get more
distance. Normally speaking, I think the plane could search a sector
of a radius of 100 miles.
153. General Russell. Then, as a matter of fact, it is a mere gen-
eralization to say that the Marine planes were capable of only rela-
tively close-in reconnaissance?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes. As a matter of fact, that was an auxiliary
mission.
154. General Russell. Now, let us discuss the planes that were on
the carriers at that time, 93 on each carrier. Those planes were avail-
able to these two carriers?
Admiral Bellinger. Available to them.
[16W] 155. General Russell. Yes. I mean, they had been
issued. They had them ?
Admiral Beli.inger. Yes.
156. General Frank. They were their complements ?
Admiral Bellinger. They were either on the carriers, out at sea,
or, when the carriers get in, the planes, the air group, are based ashore.
157. General Russell. Now, the LEXINGTON, that morning of
December 7, was about 200 miles westerly of Oahu, isn't that true?
One of them was with a task force ?
Admiral Bellinger. One of them was returning. The ENTER-
PRISE was returning.
158. General Russell. They had with them, or should have had,
these 93 planes?
Admiral Bellinger. 1 am not familiar with all the details of this
operation, because I did not have charge of it.
159. General Russell. You do not know ?
Admiral Bellinger. I don't know for a fact, no. I know from cer-
tain information what was going on, and I knew it at the time, but
this is two years and some months since then.
850 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
160. General Frank. Did you have any authority over or anything
to do with the airplanes on the carriers ?
Admiral Bellinger. Not on the carriers ; no.
161. General Frank. Did you have anything to do with, or any
authority over, the Marine planes.
Admiral Bellinger. Only when the Naval Base Defense Air Force
functioned, and then I had operational control over those that were
made available to me. You must remember that these various com-
mands had commanding officers. They had the [1621] job of
running them.
162. General Russell. The point I was attempting to illustrate,
Admiral, is, that there were certain planes out there that you did not
command, and that did not confuse your operation, simply because
they were somewhere else, doing something under another command.
Those were the utility planes, the marine planes, and the planes that
were with the carriers. They did not trouble you, because you had
nothing to do with them except when they were attached to your com-
mand, isn't that true ?
Admiral Bellinger. No, they didn't trouble me.
163. General Russell. With respect to the planes which you had
under your command, it did not confuse you a lot, whether you were
operating under orders from Kimmel or whether you were operating
under orders from Bloch, if you understood your orders ?
Admiral Bellinger. No, it didn't confuse me, so long as I got
orders.
164. General Russell. But there was no plan set up, and operative,
by which you were working with the Army planes, out there, prior to
December 7 ?
Admiral Bellinger. You say there w^as no plan operating ?
165. General Russell. Operative.
Admiral Bellinger. A plan was made operative, at times.
166. General Russell. From November 27 to December 7, was it
operative ?
Admiral Bellinger. Oh, excuse me. I beg your pardon, was that
question from November 27 ?
167. General Russell. I was going to limit it, so Ave could not take
in so much territory. From November 27 to December 7, [1632]
were any of those plans operative?
Admiral Bellinger. They were not in a functioning status.
168. General Russell. Is there a great difference between "oper-
ative" and "in a functioning status," please, Admiral ?
Admiral Bellinger. There is a great misinterpretation of words in
the English language, and I want to make sure that it is understood
that this plan was not actually functioning at that time.
169. General Russell. Well, I like your language, and we will just
adopt it. That will avoid a lot of trouble.
Admiral, on the morning of December 7, 1941, how many Navy
planes were available on the Island of Oahu, or in the Avaters immedi-
ately adjacent thereto, to have aided in repelling this Japanese attack?
170. General Frank. That is, for reconnaissance, as well as for
fighting purposes ?
171. General Russell. For fighting. I am going into the fighting.
Admiral Bellinger. That is a question which is entirely under the
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 851
control of the Commander of the fighter group, U. S. Army, as they
made their reports to him. They were not under me.
172. General Russell. Then your answer is that you do not know
how many naval aircraft were available on the Island of Oahu and the
waters adjacent thereto, on the morning of December 7, 1941 ?
173. General Frank. That is something to get from Davidson.
Admiral Bellinger. In accordance with the estimate of the situa-
tion, signed by General Martin and myself, it was \^1623'\
agreed that there would be daily reports of planes that were avail-
able to the various commands ; and on the afternoon of December 6,
I received a dispatch from the Marine Air Corps 21, which stated :
Availability as follows. Ei;;hteen scout bombers, three condition four ; fifteen
scout bombers, condition five ; applicable for December 5, 6, and 7.
I sent this dispatch to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air
Force :
Seven fighters, five condition five; nine scouts, three condition four, six con-
dition five.
Now, those planes were presumably marine planes that were re-
ported to me available, and the scouts w^ere reported because they
functioned under the fighter command, the pursuit command, in the
normal plan we had drawn up, with the idea that they might be able
to track the planes from a hostile air raid back to the carrier, and
thereby give the position of the carrier.
[162If\ 174. General Eussell. Now, were the Marine planes all
that were available there at Oahu, or were there some Navy planes in
addition thereto available for fighting?
Admiral Bellinger. The regular air groups that were out there
were available.
175. General Frank. By that you mean that they were on the car-
riers?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes. I am practically sure that there were
no other planes of that type or of that general size except the Marine
planes.
176. General Russell. So there was nothing there available from
the Navv aircraft for the defense of the Island that morning, at Peai'l
Harbor?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes; those that I just spoke to you about and
mentioned.
177. General Russell. I though you described those as Marine
planes.
Admiral Bellinger. I think they are Marines.
178. General Frank. Those are Navy planes.
Admiral Bellinger. But they are Navy planes. The}'^ came in the
same category,
179. General Russell. All right. I will ask you if there were any
other planes except
Admiral Bellinger. Excuse me one second. You must remember
that the condition of readiness that existed and was in the state of
being on the morning of December 7th was Baker 5. Now, that meant,
that is for the defense air force setup.
180. General Russell. Yes.
79716—46 — Ex. 145, vol. 2 5
852 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
\_1625^ Admiral Bellinger. Now, you understand what Baker
5 is?
181. General Russell. We understood it to mean, Admiral, that
condition of readiness.
Admiral Bellinger, So when you speak of readiness, that is the
readiness that they were in.
182. General Russell. We are trying to count the planes out there
from the Navy that were available to this defense. That was all?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
183. General Russell. And those that you have given me are all?
Admiral Bellinger. That is all I know of.
184. General Russell. Yes.
185. General Grunert. I would like to find out what Baker 5 is.
Is that four hours' readiness ?
Admiral Bellinger. Baker 5 is one-half of aircraft in four hours'
readiness. Now, that was a reciuirement
186. General Grunert. They could be used in the air?
Admiral Bellinger. Excuse me. That was a requirement by the
order by the Commander Naval Base Defense Force. It did not mean
necessarily that all planes were only kept in that condition, because
planes were not standing by for this [indicating] except within the
category that was demanded. In other words, there was a lot of work
to be done both by the Army Air Force and myself as well as all the
rest of them out there, and that was being done ; and if they didn't
set this at a lower, a priority which would permit this work to go on,
why, it would have been a question of standing by and no work being
done.
\^1626^^ 187. General Grunert. Then, after notice was given, in
four hours you could furnish the number of planes that the General
was talking about?
Admiral Bellinger. If they still were in 5.
188. General Frank. Such other work as was to be done, one of the
things would be training?
Admiral Bellinger. Training was one of the big jobs.
189. General Russell. That was what you were discussing, Ad-
miral, some time ago, that maintaining a constant high state of alert
out there w^oukl produce a weariness of personnel and obstruct other
necessary work?
Admiral Bellinger. It was a question of whether we were to im-
prove our conditions out tliere or take a status quo and never be
better than that for some time and rather deteriorate, rather than
to improve.
190. General Grunert. Of course, had you known the attack was
coming December 7th, it would not have been a long period in which
to be on the alert, would it ?
Admiral Bellinger. If anyone knew the attack was coming, why,
I assume they would have been in a functioning status.
191. General Grunert. Then, if you had received the intelligence
that you learned of after December 7th, would that not have given
you an idea of the imminence of something coming that would have
been greater than attempting to perfect yourselves in training, but to
do the best that you could with what you had? I do not mean as to
your knowledge about the attack, but I mean as to your knowledge
PROCEED! iSfGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 853
as to the information that was available to create in your mind a
question at least [1627] as to the imminence of an attack.
Admiral Bellixger. In other words, you mean if I had had access
to all dispatches, would I have recommended that the Naval Base
Defense Air Force be put in a functioning status?
192. General Grunert. Yes.
Admiral Bellinger. As I said before, I hope I would have.
193. General Grunert. All right.
Admiral Bellinger. But that is making a statement two years and
four months subsequent to December 7, as an aftermath and not as an
ante bellum.
194. General Grunert. Admiral, Avill you. tell us the number of
planes that were available to you as of December 7th for your, we will
say, functioning responsibilities?
Admiral Bellinger. As Commander Xaval Base Defense Air Force ?
195. General Grunert. Right.
196. General Frank. Did you contemplate using B-18s for any
purpose ?
Admiral Bellinger. B-18s had a very limited range, so it certainly
was not in a good position for reconnaissance. It was hoped that they
could make a bombing attack if a carrier came in, in within their
radius of action.
197. General Frank. On the other hand, they had very little de-
fensive armament ?
Admiral Bellinger. Correct. As a matter of fact, also they were
used as well as various other types that were not considered suitable
for distant reconnaissance but which we sent out in order to find out
anything that we ma}^ be able to find out within their radius of action
on December 7th.
[1€38] Answering the former question by General Grunert, data
contained in reports which were sent in accordance with provisions of
the joint estimate for the Naval Base Defense Air Force indicate that
there were 66 VP planes, 11 utility planes, and from the Army 8 B-l7s,
21 B-18s and 6 A-20s. These planes were reported in various con-
ditions ranging from condition of readiness 5 and less.
198. General Grunert. That means what in thne?
Admiral Bellinger. Condition 5 means ready in four hours. I
would like to bring one point out, though : that the Commanding Gen-
eral, Hawaiian Air Force, had their conditions in w4iat was termed
Easy 5. "Easy" means E-5, and E-5 states that, "All aircraft con-
ducting routine operations, none ready for the purpose of this plan,"
in Condition of Readiness 5, that is, within four hours.
199. General Grunert. You mean to say any reported number of
planes would not be ready within four hours ?
Admiral Bellinger. The report means to me that these planes were
conducting routine operations, which I assume were carrying out his
normal jobs, and they were not ready for the purpose of the Naval
Base Defense Air Force plan, but that they could be made ready in
four hours.
200. General Grunert. All right. Then they are within four
hours? Four hours after they got back?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
854 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
201. General Grunert. What I am trying to get at is how many were
available.
Admiral Bellinger. I am interpreting, because I assume that is
what he meant, in other words, because that differs \1629]
from the other reports. That is, material readiness Easy or E was
different from the others; and, as I say, that "E" means,
AH aircraft conductiug routine operations, none ready for the purpose of this
plan.
202. General Grunekt. Meaning, then, that after they got through
with the operation they would be made ready in four hours, after
they get back ? Is that the operation ?
Admiral Bellinger. My interpretation was that they were con-
ducting exercises or else were doing something else, but they were
not standing by for this plan, but that they could be made ready in
four hours.
203. General Grunert. You were not actually able to make the
plan function on December Tth, were you ? Or did it function ?
Admiral Bellinger. The plan began functioning with planes that
were available, insofar as scouting was concerned, immediately by
radio to the planes that were in the air, and by instructions to get
other planes going; and of course the planes that were not in the air
were gotten going at various times, some very quickly.
204. General Grunert. Will you tell me how many there were in
the air?
Admiral Bellinger. And some, a great many of course, were
damaged.
205. General Grunert. Do you know, can you tell me approximately
how many were in the air on a scouting mission at the time when
the attack first struck or shortly before that, and what their scouting
mission was?
I will change that: Were any planes on distant reconnaissance
[16S0] that morning?
Admiral Bellinger. There were no planes on distant reconnais-
sance in the true sense of the term "distant reconnaissance." Seven
planes were conducting search between 120 to 170 degrees to 450
miles from Midway. Four planes were on the surface at Midway,
armed each with two 500-pound bombs and on ten minutes' notice.
These four planes took departure at 10 : 30 and covered a sector from
east towards north. Four planes were in the air conducting intertype
tactics with submarines.
206. General Frank. At Midway?
Admiral Bellinger. Off Oahu. Captain Ramsey informs me it
was off Lanai.
Therefore, considering Midway and Oahu, Patrol Wings 1 and 2
had 14 planes in the air, 7 of which were on search from Midway.
58 were on the surface at Kaneohe or Pearl Harbor ready for flight
within four hours or less. 9 planes were undergoing repairs, making
a total of 81 planes.
207. General Frank. How many were destroyed in the attack ?
Admiral Bellinger. 38 were completely destroyed. 38 were never
able to be repaired.
208. General Frank. What about the rest of them ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 855
Admiral Bellingkr. 57 planes were put out of commission either
temporarily or completely. 38 of those were not able to be put back
in commission.
209. General Frank. You then had 24 available after the attack?
You said you had 81 and you lost 57. That leaves 24.
Admiral Bellinger. Captain Ramsey says we only had 12 at
Midway.
[1631] 210. General Frank. Well, it leaves 12 in commission
at Oahu after the attack?
Admiral Bellinger. I am informed by Captain Ramsey that that
is correct.
211. General Grunert. Now, a few questions on intelligence. I
believe this question was answered. If so, why, we will just say,
''answered," but I wanted to make sure that it was understood by you :
Did you know of the presence of a Japanese task force in the vicinity
of Jaluit between November 27th and 30th?
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.
212. General Grunert. You did not. Nor were you kept advised
as to anything about that force later than that, up to December 7th?
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.
213. General Grunert. Now, what was the customary procedure
insofar as what we would call air intelligence was concerned? Was
that a separate intelligence from other intelligence?
Admiral Bellinger. No.
214. General Grunert. It was not?
Admiral Bellinger. No. Naval Intelligence.
215. General Grunert. Do you know whether the air part of the
Naval Intelligence was transmitted to the Army Air Forces?
Admiral Bellinger. I do not know. I w^as not informed.
216. General Grunert. Do you know of any efforts made by the
Navy to get intelligence, including intelligence about aircraft or car-
riers that may have been in or about the mandated islands?
Admiral Bellinger. The Navy is very seriously interested
\1632] in intelligence, and they have an intelligence branch of
the Navy whose job it is to get all intelligence they can get, and un-
doubtedly everyone in the Navy is interested in getting the maximum
amount of intelligence they can get.
217. General Grunert. Your definite interest, though, was pri-
marily, I presume, to know about the possible opposing aircraft and
carriers?
Admiral Bellinger. That was something in which I was very
much interested.
218. General Grunert. Did you get any such information?
Admiral Bellinger. But, as I said before, my war plans job was
to base at Midway. Therefore, with my forces on the various islands
including Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston, I would therefore
be very much interested in all information about Japanese air effort.
219. General Frank. But you didn't have any that morning?
Admiral Bellinger. I beg pardon.
220. General Frank. You didn't have any on the morning of De-
cember 7th ?
Admiral Bellinger. December 7th I didn't have any inforinatiou
about a task force in Jaluit, you say ?
856 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
221. General Grunert. Yes, or the Marshalls. I will put it both,
222. General Frank. When is the first time since then that you
have heard of that'?
Admiral Bellinoi.r. 1 think it is today.
[16331 223. General Grunert. If you were based on Midway
then it would be more than that ?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
224. General Grunert. Anxiety as to information about the man-
dated islands would be greater?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
225. General Grunert. Did you ever needle the powers that be to
give you more information than you had? You apparently had not
known about it. Did you ever get after them and say, "Here, in order
to do my work in the future I have got to have information" ?
Admiral Bellinger. As to this information about a task force in
Jaluit, I do not remember anything about it. This is my first infor-
mation about that, now, that there was information about this task
force in Jaluit. Certainly I am interested and was interested in every
form of readiness which includes naval intelligence. As a matter of
fact, we were discussing this subject with General Martin and others
some time considerably prior to this, wondering if we would have
intelligence on the movement of a Japanese force.
226. General Grunert. My understanding is that you did not get
any information about the movement of Japanese forces in or about
the mandated islands ?
Admiral Bellinger. I remember nothing about it at the present
time, and I do not think I ever got it.
227. General Grunert. Did you take any positive action in at-
tempting to get such intelligence from the Navy or from any other
source? Not that intelligence, but any intelligence about the Jap-
anese Navy?
[1634}. Admiral Bellinger. We were supposed to be kept in-
formed, as a force commander or commander of an operating out-
fit, and presumably information of that kind would be distributed
as it was known to have been distributed in the past. I do not remem-
ber any special efi'ort or special demand for information that I ever
made to the Navy Department. When it came to demands it was
mainly demands for increasing the material readiness. But I do not
know of any particular definite specific demands for naval intel-
ligence.
228. General Frank. You assumed that if it was available it would
be given to you?
Admiral Bellinger. I assumed that and I expected that.
229. General Grunert. We will go to a different subject now.
Were the submarines of the fleet or of the naval district, if any,
used for reconnaissance purposes? Did they fit into your scheme
of reconnaissance?
Admiral Bellinger. The submarine force was not under me. We
worked that submarine force in various ways. For instance, we had
drills to work out with submarines and we had something to do
with operations connected with reconnaissance duties.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 857
23Q. General Grunert. Were they ever used in a scheme of distant
reconnaissance? While you did not have quite enough planes to
cover 300 degrees, there were certain areas that might be covered by
subs. Was that ever done ?
Admiral Bellinger. They were not put in the scheme of things con-
nected with that, presumably because they would be used offensively
rather than on defensive missions.
231. General Gruxert. Any intelligence they might furnish would
be incidental to other duties?
[lG3o] Admiral Bellinger. Submarines have been used for in-
telligence work in war games and in plans. Whether any submarines
had been sent out for any specific intelligence work, I do not know.
That was not under me.
232. General Grunert. They were not under the air reconnaissance?
Admiral Bellinger, They were not working under me and were
not in the picture in connection with the defense of Pearl Harbor,
233. General Grunert, It is the Board's understanding that these
task forces that went out from Pearl Harbor had no definite job in
distant reconnaissance for the defense of Oaliu ; that they scoured the
areas for security purposes and then were used by the task forces for
their own purposes, and not for distant reconnaissance purposes for
the defense of Oahu, Is that your understanding ?
Admiral Bellinger, I do not think that any task force was sent out
as a job for the security of Oahu, Some task forces that were oper-
ating at that time, that I have spoken about, were in connection with
Midway reinforcement and Wake reinforcement. When on those
missions, of course they conducted search to the maxinmni of their
capabilities; and in addition to that we had patrol planes that were
tliere for that purpose, too. That is what the squadrons were out
there for.
234. General Grunert. The patrol search was intended primarily
to safeguard from subs, to look for subs primarily, and any air recon-
naissance was incidental as far as protection for Hawaii was
concerned ?
Admiral Bellinger. Not being the task force commander, I
[16S6] cannot say; I do not know. Submarines were there on
December 7th and for many days after that. Aircraft were there on
one day.
235. General Grunert. Let me put it this way : As Navy Defense
Air Force commander, j^ou had no assignments made for any air mis-
sion so far as the task force was concerned? In other words, they
were not given any assignments in so far as your job as the Naval Base
Defense Air Force commander was concerned ?
Admiral Bellinger. No. In my status as commander of Patrol
Wings 1 and 2, in that capacity I furnished planes as directed, or
squadrons as directed, by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to
work with that task force in accordance with the plans of that particu-
lar task force commander.
236. General Grunert. How was the so-called cooperation between
you and General Martin ? Was it satisfactory to you ?
Admiral Bellinger. I should say it was very close, friendly cooper-
ation. I have a high opinion of him and I think he is a very fine
officer and gentleman.
858 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
237. General Grunert. Outside of his being a fine officer and gen-
tleman, did you get out of him what you needed to carry on your work,
and did he get out of you what he needed to carry on his work?
Admiral Bellinger. I think so, because shortly after he arrived — I
had arrived just shortly before he arrived, and we immediately agreed
to endeavor to work out exercises together and we conducted many
exercises which were entirely arranged between him and me, and then
we would have a critique over at the Naval Air Station where several
Army officers came over to attend, I think for a while those exercises
took place once [16S7] a week, and maybe later once every two
weeks, and then finally when this Naval Base Defense Air Force came
into being the exercises were planned more in accordance with that.
238. General Grunert. Then the gist of the whole thing is that you
got along well together officially and socially. Aside from unity of
command, do you think you got about as much as the two of you could
get by cooperative action?
Admiral Bellinger. That can never be attained, because
239. General Grunert (interposing). \1 say, aside from that, did
you get as much of cooperation as you think the two of you could have
gotten short of unity of command ?
Admiral Bellinger. I do not see how we could have. Cooperation
is fine, but there is always the responsibility of one man to one boss and
the other man to the other boss.
240. General Grunert. You did not have that; but did you get as
much out of it as you expected, short of that?
Admiral Bellinger. I was thoroughly satisfied with the cooperation
between General Martin and myself.
241. General Grunert. Did you know what action the Army took,
or General Short took, as a result of a message which he received from
the Chief of Staff on November 27 ? The Army went on what they
called Alert No. 1, sabotage alert. Were you informed that the Army
was on such an alert?
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.
242. General Grunert. You did not know anything about that ?
Admiral Bellinger. I cannot remember knowing anything about it.
One second ; excuse me. This was a long time ago. (xVfter a pause :)
I do not recall knowing about it; at least, if I knew about it, I did not
know about it officially.
[16S8] 243. General Grunert. Would it have affected your re-
sponsibility one way or the other had you known ?
Admiral Bellinger. That is, that the Air Force was on an alert?
244. General Grunert. The entire Hawaiian Defense Command
was on Alert No. 1, which is an alert against sabotage. They went on
that Alert on November 2Tth. My question is, did you know about it?
You say you did not know about it.
Admiral Bellinger. I did not know the reasons for it. If I knew
. they were on their alert, I did not know it officially.
245. General Grunert. Would it have made any difference whether
they were on alert or not as far as your responsibility was concerned?
Admiral Bellinger. It would depend on for what reason they went
on thq alert. That I knew nothing about.
246. General Grunert. And you knew nothing about the message
received by the Army from the Chief of Staff, or the message received
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 859
by the Navv wliich started with the words ''Consider this a war warn-
ing?"
Admiral Beixinger. No.
247. General Grunert. You were not informed of that?
Admiral Bellinger. No. sir.
248. General Grunert. Tell us what you know, if anything, about
the Army's Interceptor Command which included its air warning serv-
ice and its ability to operate December 7. What did you know about
it and what was your opinion of it?
Admiral Bellinger. It w^as my understanding that it was in the
process of building up; that they needed more ]:)ersonnel, more equip-
ment, and more experience.
[1639] 249. General Grunert. Did you have any confidence in
its ability to operate ?
Admiral Bellinger. I had never had any definite experience that
would give me that assurance.
250. General Grunert. Did you have any similar scheme within the
Navy itself, such as was contemplated in the Interceptor Command,
where one officer, the controller of the information center, controlled
the operation of the device in the air or controlled antiaircraft and
controlled the radar? Did you have any such thing to control your
antiaircraft aboard ship ? li not, how were they handled in the Navy ?
Here was a bunch of antiaircraft on each ship, with quite a bit of fire
power, and you had radars. "Were the}' each independent on the ship,
or was there some coordinated system of handling all that intelligence
and operation while they were together ?
Admiral Bellinger. You are speaking about ships at sea, I
presume ?
251. General Grunert. Yes. In handling your aircraft was it nec-
essary for you to have any such system as the Army established as an
Interceptor Command ?
Admiral Bellinger. Apparently it was not practical to do that. I
have forgotten whether this was subsequent to December 7 or prior to
it, but I know that efforts were made to try to see whether radar on
ships in harbors, with the interference of the surrounding land, would
prevent the radar from being effective.
252. General Grunert. Presumably the radar on ships in the har-
bor did not operate while in the harbor ?
Admiral Bellinger. They did not function very satisfactorily
[1640] at that time. I am speaking now about approximately that
time. I am not so sure whether this was before December 7 or after
December 7, because the radar on ships was something that was just
coming into being and every effort was made to try to get them on the
carriers first.
253. General Grunert, After the attack occui'red on Pearl Harbor
of course the Interceptor Command scheme was broadened so as to
weave into the antiaircraft defense those guns aboard ship while in
the harbor. They supplemented the land-based antiaircraft, and then
it was all woven into one whole. Up to that time, as far as you
know, those had not been included in the antiaircraft scheme ? Is that
right?
Admiral Bellinger. The effort to utilize the ships in the harbor wdth
their guns was placed in effect in conjunction with the effort for the air
860 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
defense, and came into beinfr under the Naval Base Defense Force,
commander.
254. General Gkunert. Was that prior to December 7 ?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
255. General Grunert. But it had not been woven into the Inter-
ceptor Command control?
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. It was not under the Interceptor Com-
mand control; it was under the control of the operating staff of the
Naval Base Defense Force. There was a requirement which the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific, had in effect at the time, and had for some
time, with reference to the manning of gun crews continuously. There
was a regular scheme laid out for their control, so far as practicable,
by the ships that were in the harbor, by the senior officers in certain sec-
tors of the harbor. That was a different situation, maybe, eveiy day.
We [IG4I] hoped it Avas a scheme that would work and fit con-
ditions that existed on any day. But the general phms and instructions
for manning the guns were in effect.
256. General Russell. After November 27, 1941, did you receive any
part of the record which indicated to you, as Commander of the Air
Force which j^ou then commanded, that there was a tightening up in
the operations in the Navy with respect to reconnaissance or being on
the alert for impending attack or trouble with Japan ?
Admiral Bellinger. No.
257. General Russell. There were no new instructions, therefore,
that reached you on November 27 or thereafter, which you could inter-
pret as meaning that the relations between the Iavo powers were be-
coming more strained ?
Admiral Bellinger. No, not officially ; only through newspapers.
258. General Russell. As a result of what you saw in the news-
papers did you take any different action from what you would have
taken had you not read the newspapers?
Admiral Bellinger. The question is how to interpret the news-
papers. As a result of the newspapers, I took no special action. We
were in a condition of trying to get ready to such an extent that I was
endeavoring to indoctrinate the aircraft in my patrol wings, 1 and 2,
that if they were on a flight and they got word that war was on they
would be ready in their training point of view, combat crew disci-
plined and the equipment in the planes to carry out the job that might
be assigned. That was the kind of training that were trying to
perfect.
259. General Russell. So you did not regard the newspaper in-
[1642] formation as changing your operations at all?
Admiral Bellinger. As a matter of fact, I was laid up a few days
from December 2nd to the 6th, and I saw ncAvspapers.
260. General Russell. You testified a little while ago that certain
planes were operating from Midway to a distance of approximately
450 miles, and you gave the directions of those operations by language
with which I am not familiar. I wonder if you could tell me this:
Were you operating those planes to the north, the east, the west, or to
the south?
Admiral Bellinger. In regard to Midway, the sector covered was
to the southeast from MidAvay. After word was received out there
at Midway the four planes that were remaining and ready for flight
were on a sector towards the northeast,
PROCEEDIIsrGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 861
261. General Russell. Do you have another copy of that map which
is before you ?
Admiral Bellikger. No. This is an original and is the only one I
have.
262. General Russell. Yon Avould not want to give it to us?
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir,
263. General Frank. If one of those planes had met with some
Zeros it would have been too bad?
Admiral Bellinger. It would have.
264. General Frank. If all four together met with Zeros it would
have been too bad?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes; although patrol planes have "shot it out"
with some Jap planes.
265. General Grunert. Is there anything else that occurs to you
that you thinlc; might be of assistance to this Board in getting at facts
or getting leads towards sources of such facts? [164S^ If so,
if you could add it now to your testimony we would appreciate it.
Is there something that sticks in your mind that ought to be consid-
ered, outside of what we have covered in our questions and your
answers ?
266. General Frank. Let me ask this question : The general activi-
ties of the Navy operating out of Pearl Harbor were in what direction
from Oahu?
Admiral Bellinger. On December 7?
267. General Frank. No ; in the period prior to December 7, in
November and up to December 7.
Admiral Bellinger. Toward the northwest and west. On the
routes toward Midway and Wake there were two task forces of sur-
face craft and aircraft that went out in connection with the rein-
forcement of those two islands, Midway and Wake, by Marine air-
craft. These forces were operating in that area going out and coming
back.
268. General Grunert. You do not think of anything else that you
think ought to be put before the Board ?
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. I think it has been covered as far as I
can see. I know of nothing more to bring out.
269. General Grunert. Thank you very much for giving us of your
time and assistance.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon, at 1 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m.)
[164-4] AFTERNOON SESSION
(The Board, at 2 o'clock p. m., continued the hearing of witnesses.)
General Grunert. The Board will come to order.
TESTIMONY OF COMMANDEE JOSEPH J. ROCHEFORT, U. S. N.; ON
DUTY AT CHIEF, NAVAL OPERATIONS; WASHINGTON, D. C.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Commander, will you state to the Board your
name, rank, organization, and station, please.
862 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Commander Rochefort. Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, U. S. N.,
on duty at the Chief, Naval Operations; Washington, D. C.
2. General Grunert. Commander, this Board is after the facts, both
as to what happenned prior to, leading up to, and during the attack
at Pearl Harbor. From a study of the Roberts Commission's report,
we find that you were in a position, by reason of which I think you can
give us some information that will help us.
First, then, will you state to the Board what your assignment was
in the latter part of 1941, and then explain what the duties of that as-
signment Avere, so that we may get clearly just what your position was
and how you fitted into the picture.
Commander Rochefort. About June 1941, 1 was ordered from duty
as intelligence officer of the Scouting Force to combat intelligence at
Pearl Harbor. This combat-intelligence assignment was to an office
which was a field unit to the home office, which was in Washington ;
the other field unit being in Cavite, and operating under the Sixteenth
Naval District. I was attached to the Commandant of the Fourteenth
Naval District, and theoretically had no connections with the Com-
mander-in-Chief [164S] or with any other organization, there.
The duties of the office were extremely technical in nature, and had
nothing to do with ordinary intelligence; it was primarily radio in-
telligence. The method of operating was, we were given assignments
by the head office in Washington as to the type of work they wished us
to work on.
3. General Grunert. Before you go any further, let me see if I un-
derstand that. You w^ere then the combat-intelligence officer, in mat-
ters pertaining to the Fourteenth Naval District; at least, you were
attached to that district for combat-intelligence work?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.
4. General Grunert. There existed also a fleet-intelligence officer?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.
5. General Grunert. And a district intelligence officer ?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.
6. General Grunert. There was also an Army intelligence officer ?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.
7. General Grunert. Those were the other echelons of intelligence
work going on at that time ?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.
8. General Grunert. You had nothing to do with local intelligence,
nor with the ordinary intelligence that the fleet needs ; you had to do
with special intelligence work?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.
9. General Grunert. That was mainly in the line of radio intercep-
tion ?
[1646] Commander Rochefort. Radio interception. I might
say, General, that when I first went there it had no name whatever.
It was called the "radio unit" of the district, but we changed it
after I went there and called it "combat intelligence," and then en-
larged it to include such things as providing situation maps for
the Commander-in-Chief, and plots of all vessels in the Pacific, and
so on, and so forth; and generally we consisted of an intercept
station, a radio-direction-finder station, and, in the crypto-analytical
units in Pearl Harbor, proper.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 863
10. General Grunert. If there is anything, in answering any of
our questions and in explaining anything to us, that may be of future
value to the enemy, we had better consider what should be on, and
what should be off, the record; so keep that in mind in answering
these questions.
Just what is the set-up, so that you could perform the duties that
you were required to perform out there?
Commander Rochefort. I don't understand your question, by
"set-up," sir.
11. General Grunert. All right. Now, there is radio intercept?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.
12. General Grunert. You spoke of direction finders; and now,
what is the physical set-up? How do they do that. Give us an un-
derstanding of that.
Commander Rochefort. We had what we termed the "'intercept
unit," which during 1941 was located at Heeia, at an old naval
radio station.
13. General Grunert. That is on an island in the Hawaiian
[lOIf':"] group ?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. That is just beyond Waialua
over on the other side.
14. General Grunert. That intercept station works by itself? It
doesn't have to have anything farther out, does it?
Commander Rochefort. No, sir. It might be understood a little
more clearly, sir, if we called it a monitoring station. I believe that
is what the FCC calls it — a monitoring station. In other words, we
intercept any traffic that is going, either way.
15. General Grunert. In any direction?
Commander Rochefort. In any direction ; yes, sir.
16. General Grunert. All right. Now, I understand it. What
are your "direction finders"?
Commander Rochefort. The task of the direction finders was to
take bearings on transmissions of vessels or units in which we were
interested.
17. General Grunert. That requires more than one station, does it?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir; that does require more than one
station,
18. General Grunert. Did you have charge of those stations, or
were those independent groups, too?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. In addition to the combat in-
telligence unit at Pearl Harbor, there was established in 1937 what
we called the "Mid Pacific strategic direction-finder net," which were
all high-frequency direction finders, and those direction finders were
physically located at Dutch Harbor, Samoa, and Pearl Harbor, plus
one at Guam, which for administrative [-?6'4<?] purposes came
under the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, but who took bearings
for us, so we had four stations which were included in the Mid
Pacific net.
19. General Grunert. Was the direction finding primarily for the
fleet, or was that incidental in following up your radio-intercept, and
so forth?
Commander Rochefort. That was incidental to the radio intelli-
gence job, sir. The function of that, or rather the mission of that
864 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
was to tell the Commander-in-Chief and any other interested parties
where certain units of any nation, other than our own — and our own,
if so directed — were.
20. General Grunert. That is, w^here they were physically located ?
Commander Rochefort, Yes, sir.
21.General Grunert. Although you might have picked it out of
the air about their being there, but you located them through the
direction finder?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. That was the function of the
radio direction finder.
22. General Grunert. To whom was this information you got
through the radio intercept and direction finding transmitted?
Commander Rochefort. That came into the office which was
located in the administration building in Pearl Harbor, and was
evaluated there with other information, and was disseminated to
the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet by means of a daily
bulletin, which included locations of enemy vessels and estimates
and evaluations regarding future operations. Also, if anything
of any importance was determined that was sent by radio to a group
of addresses, a standard group of addresses, which included the
Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
the Commandant of the [164^^ Sixteenth Naval District.
23. General Frank. That was in Manila?
Commander Rochefort. That was Cavite; yes, sir; plus the Com-
mandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet.
24. General Grunert. Did you have any responsibility as to any-
thing sent by direct transmission to the Army in Hawaii ?
Commander Rochefort. No, sir.
25. General Grunert. If that was transmitted, it was somebody
else's business?
Commander Rochefort. Our relations with the Army in Pearl
Harbor were more on the personal basis. We had no directives to
my knowledge, to do such and such, with Colonel Fielder. He hap-
pened to be my opposite number, there. I worked through Colonel
Fielder; but everything that was done was on a personal basis, and
if we determined anything or heard anything, it would be delivered
to Colonel Fielder, personally.
26. General Grunert. But it was not your responsibility to keep
him informed?
Commander Rochefort. I did not consider it was; no, sir.
27. General Grunert. Was most of this work that you were doing
considered to be of a high degree of secrecy ?
Commander Rochefort. It was considered to be the very top, sir.
28. General Grunert. Therefore, you were probably limited in
the dissemination?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.
29. General Grunert. And he was not on your list for dis-
semmation ?
[1650] Commander Rochefort. No, sir ; we were not permitted
to deal with anybody other than the Commander-in-Chief of the
fleet.
PROCEEDlNCiS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 865
30. General Grunekt. And the Commandant of the District? All
right.
Now, on all diplomatic or consular stnif, could you "pick" or
"butt into" that?
Commander Rochefort. No, sir. In this allocation of work that 1
mentioned before, the diplomatic and consular work was done by
the unit in Washington; and, to a certain extent, it was assisted
by the unit in Cavite.
31. General Grunert. But if it were in the air, could you not pick
it out ?
Commander Rochefort. We could have, sir, if it was in the air;
but — it may sound funny, now — it was not our job, sir.
32. General Frank. When you refer to "the unit in Washington,"
do you mean the naval unit in Washington ?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir ; in so far as we were concerned,
it was tlie naval unit. Actually it was both the Army and the Navy
here, together, but in so far as we were concerned.
33. General Grunert. Was it against the law for you to pick
that up?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.
34. General Grunert. And trying to decode it ?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir ; it was.
35. General Grunert. Now, we get down to cases. This informa-
tion that you got was furnished by daily summaries to the fleet and
the District?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.
30. General Grunert. And to other people, but not directly to
[165 1^ the Army?
Commander Rochefort. No, sir.
37. General Grunert. If you got any special information, I sup-
pose it was furnished to the same people ?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. The arrangement we made.
General, was again on a personal basis, that anything pertaining to
the islands, themselves, in so far as I was concerned, was the function
of the district intelligence officer and of the Army ; anything pertain-
ing to outside of the islands was my job, and the arrangement I had
was that if any information such as — oh, say an unauthorized radio
transmitter, perhaps, on the Island of Oahu, if that came up, I would
communicate that information to the district intelligence officer and
to Colonel Fielder.
38. General Grunert. And they would handle the local matters?
Commander Rochefort. They would handle the stuff in the island,
proper. In other words, they were interior, and I was not at all inter-
ested in anything that went on, on the beach, or within the island.
I didn't consider that part of my job.
39. General Grunert. But suppose you picked up something a way
out to one side, you then could not be the judge as to whether it was
Navy, Army, or the district ?
Commander Rochefort. Then I dealt only with the Commandant
of the District, sir.
40. General Grunert. What I am trying to find out is, if it had
to be transmitted to the Army, that would be transmitted on his
judgment?
866 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir; either by the Commandant, the
Commander-in-Chief, or by the Chief of Naval Operations, here.
[1652] 41. General Grunert. All right, now; I tlijnk I under-
stand the set-up.
Along about the latter part of November, or, I believe, as testified
by you before the Roberts Commission, along about the 1st of Novem-
ber, you started picking up some stuff which appeared to be of great
interest and probably some question, and then, along about tlie latter
part of November, you picked U]) some stuff that showed concentration
of Japanese vessels. Now, will you give us the story to that, from the
beginning to the end, until you lost it, or Igst part of it, or whatnot.
Give us that story, please.
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. Well, in any of this radio intel-
ligence work, sir, by experience, trained men or trained officers can
make a very, very good estimate of what the intentions will be of the
enemy, by means of just a study of the^ traffic, itself; and from our
experience in Hainan, the movement which had happened about nine
months before, and watching the traffic during the late fall of 1941,
it became apparent that the Japanese were preparing for a major
operation. As time developed, and along about the 20th or 25th of
November, things had progressed to the point where our views crystal-
lized, and we accordingly prepared an estimate, which was sent to all
the addresses that I mentioned previously.
42. General Grunert. That was in the form of a summary, was it ?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir; you call it a "summary." We
call it a "summary."
43. General Frak. How was that sent — by radio ?
Commander Rochefort. That was sent out by radio, sir. [1653]
The procedure was that it was sent by radio to a single addressee,
which included Chief of Naval Operations, two Commanders-in-Chief,
and the two District Commandants involved. That summary indi-
cated to us that the Japanese were engaged in a major operation,
which w^ould start in the immediate future, and that it was composed
generally of two task forces; and Ave gave the location and the com-
position and the general heading. In addition to that, there appeared
to be a very strong concentration in the Marshalls ; as I recall, we said
at least one third of the submarines, and at least one carrier division
unit — at least that. We sent that out, as I recall, about the 25th or
26th of November.
44. General Grunert. Would you tell me what a carrier-division
unit consists of, how many carriers ?
Commander Rochefort. Normally, two, sir, w^ith the Japanese. II
could be three, but normally, two.
45. General Grunert. And the submarines, you said about a third?
Commander Rochefort. About one third of the submarines. They
were as I recall two squadrons, which would be probably about 15 to
20 submarines.
46. General Grunert. Were there any battleships in that force?
Commander Rochefort. Not that we noted, sir ; not that we noted.
47. General Grunert. All right. Go on.
Commander Rochefort. That summary was sent out about the
25th or 26th of November, and the reply was received from the Asiatic
unit, the so-called "Cavite unit," in which they agreed with us in prac-
PKOCEEDIN(JS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 867
tically all particulars, other than the location of the carriers in the
Marshalls.
11654] Their reaction was that they did not have sufficient
evidence that would indicate there were carriers in the Marshalls.
Aside from that, they agreed with us.
48. General Grunekt. They had a similar unit to yours, in Cavite?
Commander Rociiefgrt. Yes, sir, the only difference being the
type of work that they were working on, the type of stuff that they
were working on.
49. General Grunert. Then, what happened, after the 25th, after
that summary?
Commander Rociiefort. After the summary, sir, why, things got
very quiet, and there was considerable action and traffic and indica-
tions in the area generally to the westward of the Empire; that is,
between the Empire and Indo-China, which made it very clear that
the Japanese were moving in that area. There was some traffic indi-
cating a move down toward the Philippines.
50. General Grunert. Was there anything indicating that this
force which vou had estimated or figured out to be in about the Mar-
shalls had left the Marshalls?
Commander Rochefort. No, sir; there was not. Aside from those
t wo groups or forces that I have mentioned ; that is, going toward the
Philippine«, and toward Indo-China, there was no information of
any sort available from a study of radio traffic that indicated any
move to the eastward from the Empire, or any move out of the
Marshalls.
51. General Grunert. About when was it that, from all the evi-
dence, this force in the Marshalls dropped out of existence?
Commander Rociiefort. About the latter part of November,
[16S5] I would say, sir ; perhaps in the last five days of November.
52. General Grunert. You could not get anything on the carriers,
or you could not get anything on any part of the force, or what?
Commander Rochefort. They were not transmitting. That is, if
they were transmitting messages, we were not hearing them.
53. General Frank. They were on radio silence, completely ?
Commander Rochefort. Apparently so, sir ; apparently, they were
on radio silence.
54. General Grunert. Was that indicative to you there was some-
thing serious in the air?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir; there was; but not toward the
eastward.
55. General Grunert. Did you enquire of Cavite again to find out
whether they got anything more on them ?
Commander Rochefort. There was a series of dispatches between
Cavite and ourselves and Washington, beginning with our message,
about the 25th. I don't recall any specific message though, or what it
said, but we had been for months of course in constant communication ;
but whether any of the messages subsequent to that asked that specific
question, sir, I don't recall.
56. General Grunert, You did not have any reaction, though, from
Washington, on your summary?
Commander Rochefort. No, sir. There was no reply.
79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 2 6
868 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
57. General Grunert. There was no reaction, indicating that they
believed in it, or disbelieved in it ?
Commander Rochefort. No, sir ; there was no reply from [16561
Washington, sir,
58. General Frank. Did you get anything from Dutch Harbor or
Samoa ?
Commander Eochefort. No, sir ; I didn't get anything from Dutch
Harbor and Samoa, General. They only had either three or four
radios, and they were merely a direction-finding unit, that was all, and
they were supposed to be trained direction-finder men ; but that's about
all they were good for.
59. General Grunert. In this radio intercept stuff about the force
being in the Marshalls, did you get the names of any of the vessels?
Commander Rochefort. No, sir.
60. General Grunert. Do you know whether this force that you
located in the Marshalls was the force that attacked Hawaii?
Commander Rochefort. We believed it was, afterwards, sir.
61. General Grunert. What led you to believe that? What led you
to believe that they were the same vessels ?
Commander Rochefort. We were reasonably sure, sir, in so far as
the submarines were concerned, because we had, of course, numerous
submarines off Pearl Harbor, beginning on or about the 7th of Decem-
ber, and the logical place for them to come from was the Marshalls,
particularly in view of the fact that the force commander of the sub-
marines was in the Marshalls during November and remained there
during December and probably January.
62. General Grunert. Was there any talk in the air by radio, later
on, from Japanese sources, that gave you information as to where they
had been, or what they had done ?
Commander Rochefort. No, sir. We knew, of course, who had
come to Pearl Harbor, but where they had come from, we didn't
[16r57] know.
63. General Grunert. There was something I did not quite under-
stand, in your testimony before the Roberts Commission. The Chair-
man said something to the effect,
Now, you had information on Wednesday —
I presume that is the 3rd —
that the consul here was burning his papers, did you not?
You replied.
We are the ones who gave that to Washington.
He appeared to be surprised, and said, "Oh!" And then you said:
We talked — we told them he was. They told us that London and Washington
were burning papers.
Presumably that was the 3rd of December, Wednesday ?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.
64. General Grunert. Now, was that information from Washing-
ton that the consulates in London and Washington were burning
papers transmitted to your district commander?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.
65. General Grunert. And to the Chief?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 869
Commander Rochefort. It was transmitted to the District Com-
mandant, sir, by me, personally, and it was transmitted to the Com-
mander-in-Chief, by reason of the fact that he was an addressee. In
other words, all of those dispatches were automatically addressed to
the Commander-in -Chief, but whether or not he personally saw them,
of course, I couldn't say.
66. General Grunert. And you do not know whether that informa-
tion got to the Army, or not ?
Conmiander Rociiefort. No, sir; I do not. There were some of
those messages. General, which indicated that, "Please show to the
Department commander," or, "Please inform the Army authorities
of this decision."
[1658] 67. General Grunert. Those were some messages that
came from the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy?
Commander Rociiefort. Yes, sir. Some of those dispatches indi-
cated that he was to confer with the Army authorities.
In conection with that diplomatic situation, sir, if I may clear up
that one point, the task, as I have indicated, of the diplomatic stuff,
was being done in Washingon on a joint basis. I think it was Mr.
Sarnoff who came out to Honolulu, September, October, or something,
and we had been endeavoring to my knowledge since 1925 to get some
of this traffic, unsuccessfully. Mr. Arnoff indicated we should get it.
68. General Grunert. Mr. Sarnoff was acting in what position?
Commander Rociiefort. He was head of the RCA, at the time, sir,
President of the RCA. It was suggested we make some sort of effort,
and, on a personal basis, with the district intelligence officer, he gave
me some of the traffic which he had obtained. It was very recent
traffic, and that is how we sent that one dispatch to Washington, indi-
cating that he was burning the stuff, because of some stuff, there.
69. General Grunert. That has covered all the ground I wanted
to cover. Have you some questions?
70. General Russell. Did you know anything about the effective-
ness of the radar which was in possession of the Navy at Pearl Harbor ?
Commander Rociiefort. No, sir ; I did not.
71. General Russell. You did not know whether they could search
out anything with those radar installations?
Commander Rochefort. No, sir ; I did not.
72. General Russell. You state that you were not permitted
[16-59] to pick up or evaluate information intercepted from the
consular service, is that what you said ?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir ; that is correct.
73. General Russell. You were precluded by law from doing that?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.
74. General Russell. Didn't you have to get some of it, before you
knew whether it was consular, or not ?
Commander Rochefort. Well, actually, general, it had been ob-
tained, but it was being done by people other than us. That was part,
again, of the allocation of work. In other words, we had, say, five
jobs to do. AVashington, we will say, would handle two, and they
would give us two, and they would give Cavite the fifth one, ancl
we would work on them ; and if any information was obtained from
one of the other jobs, that would be passed on to us; but we were not
supposed to work with that type of traffic.
870 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
75. General Russell. So, as soon as it was distributed by your
operators, then they lost interest?
Commander Rochefort. No, sir. We didn't cover those "printers"
on which it would be sent.
7G. General Russell. I understand. ,
Commander Rochefort. In other words, we were only interested
in one thing, in Pearl Harbor. We were interested in the Japanese*
Fleet. That's all we cared about.
77. General Russell. You were interested only in what?
Commander Rochefort. In the Japanese Fleet. That's all we
were interested in.
78. General Russell. Now, you say there was a summary, about
[16601 the 20th of November, in which this task force in the
Marshalls was discussed?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.
79. General Grunert. You say the 20th ?
Commander Rochefort. The 25th, sir.
80. General Russell. The 25th?
Commander Rochefort. About the 25th.
81. General Russell. Do you know whether or not a copy of that
estimate is in existence, in Hawaii ?
Commander Rochefort. A copy should be available, sir, in the
office of Naval Communications. That would be the normal cus-
todian, in the Office of Naval Communications.
82. General Grunert. Here, in Washington?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. They should be the custodians
of all that traffic.
83. General Grunert. Is there any record of it in Hawaii, do you
know ?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. Yes, there would be a record,
there.
84. General Russell. Now. about this task force with the carrier
unit in it, would it be divulging anything that you should not divulge,
if you told US where you first picked that up?
Commander Rochefort. That would be very difficult to answer, Gen-
eral. In estimating these things, it was more by sense than by any-
thing else. I used to explain it by saying that in any major operation
started by the Japanese there would be three definite stages. There
would be the stage of a large flurry of traffic ; that is, messages, and
one thing and another; and then there would be a stage of apparent
confusion, in which [1661] they would send a message to Gen-
eral Soandso, and Admiral Soandso, and they would say, "He isn't
here, send it somewhere else" ; and quite a bit of confusion, which was
caused apparently by the regrouping of the ships and the units. That
would be the second phase. [1662] The third phase was radio
silence, and when radio silence started then you knew something was
up. So we could always tell by these various conditions or phases
they would go through just about how far advanced they were in this
thing. And I think the estimates that were made by both the unit
at Pearl Harbor and Cavite were accurate in everything except one
respect, that is, that one task force from Pearl Harbor. Everything
else was absolutely correct. The make-up of them, the composition,
we knew that.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 871
85. Greneral Grunert. There was one other question I wanted to ask
you : In that force going clown to Hainan, had any of that force ever
assembled as far away as the mandated islands in order to go down
to the southeast ?
Commander Rochefort. No, sir.
86. General Grunert. Then did it seem strange that they should
be assembling in the Marshall Islands in order to go southeast?
Commander Rochefort. No. As I recall, General, we said in our
summary that that force might possibl}^ be a force that was to cover
the flanks. I believe we made such a statement as that, something
.-similar to that. It was our assumption at the time that that group of
submarines there, with or without the carrier group, would be used
to secure the flanks against any possible move on the part of the
United States.
87. General Grunert. Now, at that time was your service I'ather
new?
Commander Rochefort. The service in Pearl Harbor, sir, was rela-
tively new.
[1663] 88. General Grunert. What I am getting at is, did the
rest of the Navy believe in what you were doing and what you could do ?
In other words, how much credence did they give the output of what
you did, in your opinion ?
Commander Rochefort. The naval officers who had access to the in-
formation believed in it very strongly, sir, but those were only a frac-
tion of one percent, possibly, of the naval officers. That is, for reasons
of security we were not permitted to discuss the matter with anybody
or to show them anything. So that Admiral Kimmel came over very
frequently and discussed matters with us, but whether he discussed
them with members of his own staff or not, referring to our work, I do
not loiow.
89. General Grunert. Did you consider that force a threat against
Hawaii?
Commander Rochefort. Personally, no sir.
90. General Grunert. Although it had aircraft carriers in it that
could strike at Hawaii or most any other near-by point ?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. The organization that we had
identified, General, is not a type of organization you would have for
a striking force. In other words, it lacked two elements: it lacked
either cruisers or destroyers, and it lacked a supply, that there were
no indications of tankers there, no indication of any cruisers or de-
stroyers. For that reason it did not seem that it was coming to the
eastward, because they would not move carriers and submarines.
91. General Grunert. Of course, that was none of your business?
You picked the information up and gave it to them in a summary, and
it was up to them to figure it out?
[1664] Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir, because we had nothing
else available, sir, no other information available aside from that we
gathered by radio.
92. General Grunert. All right. General Russell, have you fin-
ished?
93. General Russell. I am a little bit intrigued about their moving
out there to protect the flank, the southern movement of a major por-
tion of the Japanese forces. What was on the flank that they should
have been troubled about ?
872 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Commander Rochefort. The United States Fleet, sir.
94. General Russell. Where ?
Commander Rochefort. Pearl, sir.
95. General Russell. Pearl Harbor ?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.
96. General Russell. Where would it have been easier for them to
have destroyed that fleet ?
Commander Rochefort. Well, if I were Admiral Yamamoto, sir,
I would like to have them in the Marshalls somewhere.
97. General Russell. Would it have been better to have attacked
them or attempted to have destroyed them w^hen they were in battle
formation moving to the west, or when they were not steamed up and
lying in the harbor at Honolulu ?
Commander Rochefort. Probably when they were out to the Mar-
shalls, I think it would be easier.
98. General Russell. If they had a force out there to have fought
it out with these naval forces in the Marshalls ?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. I think probably it would have
been better from the Japanese point of view to have had us in the
Marshalls.
[1665] 99. General Russell. With no cruisers, no destroyers,
no battleships ?
Commander Rochefort. No ; all they would need there, sir, would be
the air bases.
100. General Russell. Oh, you mean move in with the land-based
planes ?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.
101. General Russell. As it developed, that was not what they were
thinking about.
Commander Rochefort. No, sir, that was not in their mind at all.
102. General Russell. Wasn't it true that this report that you had
in the latter part of November indicated the names of the carriers
that you had contacted ?
Commander Rochefort. I am not sure of that, sir, but I do not
believe that it did.
103. General Russell. Is it true or not that the radio stations or
the sending sets, if that is the accurate description of what the trans-
mitter is, on the carriers were relatively weak and could not be de-
tected for a long distance ?
Commander Rochefort. Oh, no, sir. No, sir ; that is not true.
104. General Russel. That is not true ?
Commander Rochefort. No, sir, that is not true.
105. General Russell. That when these carriers went into port they
changed the type of radio set that they operated with, and you lost
sight of them?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.
106. General Russell. So long as the carriers then were in [1666]
liome ports you had very little way of checking on them ?
Commander Rochefort. We had what we called collateral, sir. We
do the same thing. Everybody does the same thing. When a ship
goes into port it usually utilizes the communication facilities of that
navy yard or naval base, whatever it is going to be. In other words,
he may send his messages by blinker or land-line or telephone or any-
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 873
thing else. When he is at sea, of course, then he has to transmit his
own.
I might say in passing that at that time, though, we got relatively
few dispatches transmitted by a certain vessel as transmitted from
that vessel. "We got them on the second or third or fourth transmis-
sion. In other words, the carrier might send a message to Tokyo. If
that carrier were close to Truk he would probably transmit it to the
station at Truk, and then Truk would transmit it on up to Saipan
or perhaps direct to Tokyo, and we would get it on what we called the
second or third or fourth bounce ; and then if there was an informa-
tion addressee in it, possibly Ominato, Tokyo would put that on the
air again for Ominato ; and by means of that information which we call
collateral you could usually determine where a vessel was or where
a unit or a commander was.
107. General Russell. Do you know an officer of the Navy by the
name of Layton ?
Commander Rochefurt. Yes, sir.
108. General Russell. What was his function out there at this time?
Commander Rochefort. Layton, Lieutenant Commander Layton at
that time, was the fleet intelligence officer for the Commander-in-Chief.
[1667] 109. General Russell. Did he have an independent
agency for collecting data on the Japanese fleet? By "independent" I
mean different from the agency which you were operating.
Commander Rochefort. I am not sure that I understand, sir. Lay-
ton received all radio intelligence pertaining to the Japanese from me,
to whicli he added other types of intelligence that he might have re-
ceived from other sources, perhaps from documents or letters or some-
thing of that nature from someone else. His radio intelligence was
received from us.
110. General Russell. Therefore such information as he had about
the location of the different elements of the Japanese fleet during the
year 1941 probably came from you ?
Commander Rochefort. It probably came from us, yes, sir.
111. General Russell. Is it true or not that during the year 1941,
or to limit that period a little further, during the six months next
preceding December 7, 1941, there were a great many periods of time
when you had little or no information on the Japanese Navy?
Commander Rochefort. I think
112. General Russell. Let me ask you this, Commander : Have you
seen the statement which was furished by Lieutenant Commander Lay-
ton to the Roberts Commission ?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir,
113. General Russell. Have you made a study of that table that
was there?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.
114. General Russell. I am confining this question purely to the
accuracy of the table, and not to any construction that was placed on it.
Do you regard the information in that table [1668} as accu-
rate?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir; the statements made there are
accurate.
115. General Russell. Well, did that table, or not, indicate that
there were relatively long periods of time during the six months
874 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
preceding Pearl Harbor when there was little information about the
Japanese fleet available to you?
Commander Rochefort. The information contained in the table
indicated that there were relatively long periods in which we did not
have positive information of the location of some specific unit or
task force, but from collateral information or other information we
did not consider that we had lost those units or forces.
116. General Russell. I want to ask you one thing as a matter of
information before I discuss this table in one or two of its details
with you. There is an entry which I could not interpret; I do not
know what it means. The entry was: Cruisers second fleet less the
word c-o-n-d-i-v or -u.
Commander Rochefort. C-o-n-d?
117. General Russell. C-o-n-d-i-v. What is that?
Commander Rochefort. "Com."
118. General Grunert. C-o-n-d-i-v. What is it? It is a part of
the fleet?
Commander Rochefort. It would be a portion^ — it would be cruisers
of the second fleet less the Nachi or Chikumi or Toni or something of
that sort, sir.
119. General Russell. Then there is an entry relating to that same
word which describes it as "seven, very active on detached service."
Nothing positive about that,
[1669] Commander Rochefort. Seven, sir?
120. General Russell. Seven condivs, if that is what it is.
Commander Rochefort. Crudivs.
121. General Russell. Crudivs?
Commander Rochefort. Crudivs is probably what it should be,
sir : cruiser divisions.
122. General Russell. Crudiv?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. Crudivs. That would be seven
cruiser division. We call it crudiv seven.
123. General Russell. Well, being enlightened, I want to ask you
about the carrier situation as reported in this table.
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.
124. General Russell. The report was that the carriers with the
crudivs out
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.
125. General Russell. That there were 134 days in the last six
months when the Navy was uncertain as to the location of the Jap-
anese carriers, that the periods when they were lost during those six
months numbered twelve, and that these periods varied from nine to
twenty-two days. It seems that the 22-day period was in July 1941.
Now, do you have any independent recollection of those carriers being
lost all of those days ?
Commander Rochefort. No, sir. I believe that the table is correct.
The construction to be placed on those remarks I believe is incorrect.
In other words, while it is true we did not have any concrete evidence
of a unit or units for periods of from nine to twenty-two days, it
did not mean that we were uncertain as to their whereabouts. It
merely meant that we had nof heard them. In other words, we still
had not lost them.
PKOCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 875
[1670\ 126. General Russell. But you were very well satisfied
that you knew soniethino- about them or knew a great deal about them
during these periods when yon heard nothing from them?
Connnander Rochei-ort. Yes, sir.
127. General RusselI;. And the table, then, reflects periods when
you just didn't have anything?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir, when we did not hear them. Either
they had not transmitted or, if they had, it was over circuits that we
did not hear.
128. General Russell. Now may I develop briefly, and I will be
through, the remark which you made in reply to some of General
Grunert's questions about identifying the submarines in the waters
near Oahu in the Hawaiian area, that you knew were based out in
the Marshalls ?
Commander Rocheedrt. Yes, sii .
129. (jeneral Russell, As I recall, your logic there was that you
discovered the commander of this submarine group in the Marshalls.
Commander Rocheidrt. Yes, sn.
130. General Russell. You knew the commander of the group oper-
ating in the Hawaiian waters was there. Did your station, intercept
station, operate during the attack and immediately thereafter on the
morning of December 7th ?
Commander Rochee'ort. Yes, sii .
131. General Russell. Could you tell us briefly what information
you picked up that would give you identity as to the vessels operating
there, the craft operating in that attack ?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. I would say by 1000 we had
determined that the officer commanding the striking force . [1671]
was comcardics, Commander Carrier Divisions, what we call Com-
mander Aircraft. We had determined the fact that he had carriers
with him, cruisers, and destroyers, and with one bearing that we had
obtained we determined his bearing from Pearl Harbor. The sub-
marines did not show up until that evening and the next day, aside
from the midget submarines. The regular submarines, the fleet sub-
marines, did not show up until that night. I would say, sir, that by
noon of the 7th we had fairly well identified the surface forces.
132. General Russell. How many carriers do you think were in
that convoy ?
Commander Rochefort. Four, sir.
133. General Russell. Four ?
Commander Rochefort. Yes.
134. General Russell. The complement of each was about how many
aircraft, or do you know that ?
Commander Rochefort. About sixty, sir; sixty to sixty-four.
135. General Russell. Then they could have had a total striking
force of aircraft of some 250?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.
136. General Russell. And cruisers or destroyers that appeared in
the task force there ?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. They had enough — they had one
division of cruisers, as I recall it, and approximately one squadron
of destroyers.
876 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
137. General Kussell. What time did you begin operating that
day? On the morning of the 7th what time did you begin operating?
Commander Rochefort, We were on a 24-hour basis.
[1672] 138. General Russell. And you picked up nothing in
tlie night preceding the attack?
Commander Rochefort. No, sir.
139. General Russell. So they moved in with radio silence?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. We were on a 24-hour basis then,
sir, seven days a week, and had been for about four or five months.
140. General Russell. Of course, you had no means for detecting
aircraft in the air?
Commander Rochefort. No, sir.
141. General Russell. By radar operation?
Commander Rochefort, No, sir.
142. General Russell. That was not part of your function?
Commander Rochefort. No, sir, that was not part of our function.
143. General Russell. I think that is all.
144. General Grunert. General Frank ?
145. General Frank. No.
146. General Grunert. Colonel Toulmin ?
147. Colonel Toulmin. Nothing, sir.
148. General Grunert. Colonel West ?
149. Colonel West. No.
150. General Grunert. Major Chiusen?
151. Major Clausen. No, sir.
152. General Grunert. That appears to be all. Thank you very
much for coming.
We shall take a brief recess.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
[1673] (There was a brief informal recess.)
TESTIMONY OF MRS. MARY B. KOOGAN, WASHINGTON, D. C.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of her rights
under Article of War 24. )
1. Colonel West. Mrs. Kogan, will you state to the Board your
name and address, please?
Mrs. Kogan. Mrs. Mary B. Kogan, 1340 Taylor Street, Northwest,
Washington.
2. Colonel West, Are you employed now, Mrs, Kogan ?
Mrs. Kogan. I was up until two months ago, with the Corps of
Engineers here in Washington.
3. General Grunert. Mrs. Kogan, the Board is after facts regard-
ing the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and anything that may
have led up to that or what happened at the time. Now, it has come
to the knowledge of the Board that you have some information that
may assist the Board in its investigation. That is why we asked you
1 o come here.
Now, will you please state to the Board where you were just prior
to and during the attack on Pearl Harbor ?
Mrs. Kogan. In bed.
4. General Grunert. Where was the bed ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 877
Mrs. KoGAN. We lived in Wahiawa, which is about three or four
miles from Schofield Barracks. The Barracks was unable to house all
of its officers due to the great impetus or influx of new officers.
5. General Grunert. Then you did not live on the post of Schofield
itself?
Mrs. KoGAN. Not until after the attack.
[1674'] 6. General Grunert. Now, information has come to the
Board that you, in an article which appears in the Washington Star
of March 23, 11)42, stated in effect, "that the warning of a Hawaiian
newspaper a week earlier than the attack predicted the attack"; also,
"that prior to December 7th we hadn't even been told what to do in
case of an air raid."
Now, is this substantially true?
Mrs. KoGAN. We had never been advised what to do in the event of
an air raid.
7. General Grunert. You mean you had never been told, you had
never been instructed, as to where to go, where to seek shelter?
Mrs. KoGAN. That is right.
8. General Grunert. Where to get food, how to take care of your-
selves, or anything of the kind ?
Mrs. KoGAN. Absolutely.
9. General Grunert. Now, do you know whether those on the post
of Schofield itself knew or had been told ?
Mrs. KoGAN. I feel confident that they did not know.
10. General Grunert. They did not know. How long after the
attack were such instructions given to you, if ever?
Mrs. KoGAN. To my knowledge, they were never given.
11. General Grunert. They were never given?
Mrs. KoGAN. Immediately after the attack we drove — or I might
say this : that my husband was in the Dental Corps, of course which
was a part of the station hospital, and after hearing all of the commo-
tion he went to the phone and called the hospital to learn what was
happening, and the person who answered the phone at the other end
said that he didn't know, [1675'] but whatever was happening,
real ammunition was being used.
That didn't add up, so we called a number of friends, and they didn't
know what was happening. The radio was still playing lovely church
music, and that didn't help, so we went out in front of the house
and saw a lot of planes in the sky that were flying quite low, and
they started to machine gun us, and we thought, well, that is a crazy
thing for maneuvers to be doing, and we saw the rising sun insignia,
dashed back into the house, and the radio became silent for a few
minutes, and when it went back on again an announcer advised all
military personnel to report to their various stations.
12. General Grunert. To report to what?
Mrs. KoGAN. Military stations. Living off of the post, that meant
that we were to go to Schofield Barracks. So we dashed over there,
and I went to the hospital and helped with surgical dressings while
my husband assisted in other ways, and at about two o'clock we were
placed — the women and children were placed in different quadrangles
of Schofield, and we waited there until about ten o'clock at night not
knowing what was going to happen to us and in complete blackout.
We were put ijito busses not knowing where our destination was to be,
878 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and we were driven over the hig-hway past Pearl Harbor. And I
might add, at that time there were lots of tracer bullets flying through
the sky and lots of people milling around on the highway, and it just
seemed like all hell had broken loose again. The bus that I was in
turned off about a quarter of a mile from Pearl Harbor, and several
hundred of us were put into a little schoolhouse in Kalihi Valley. We
just did what we were told to do; we followed the leader, and that
was the only instruction, [1676] that was momentary and im-
pulsive, as to what to do in the event of an air raid.
lo. General Grunert. And had you ever discussed with your hus-
band what should be done in the event of an attack? In other words,
did he know what to do if you didn't ?
Mrs. KoGAN. I don't believe he did.
14. General Grunert. Well, let us get back to this article which
appeared in the Washington Star in which apparently you had some
information that a warning had been given in a Hawaiian newspaper,
something about predicting an attack. What was that about ?
Mrs. KoGAN. Well, I think that time is approximate, and the exact
reading of the headline I don't recall. However, a short time before
the attack I remember that an extra paper appeared, and the headlines
were very startling to us, and I was terribly frightened by them, and
we dashed over to friends of ours and sort of went into a huddle, I
think, and the essence of it was what I said there. Now, I can't recall
the exact words of that headline.
15. General Grunert. All right. Who were your friends that you
went into a huddle with?
Mrs. KoGAN. A Captain and Mrs. Rosen, in the Dental Corps.
16. General Grunert. And as a resnlt of that huddle did the alarm
spread ?
Mrs. KoGAN. No.
17. General Grunert. Or did everybody else think that there was
going to be an attack in a week ?
Mrs. KoGAN. I don't know that they thought of it that seriously,
but we felt that there was something in the air.
[1677'] 18. General Grunert. You didn't know any of the
higher-ups that pooh-poohed it or agreed, or anything, do you?
Mrs. KoGAN. No. Of course, an awful lot of rumors ran rampage
all over the place, such as General MacArthur having sent a telegram
the night before the attack advising something was in the wind, and
to go on hundred percent alert. Another rumor had it that the alert
that was on was called off at seven o'clock that morning and all the
planes were supposedly unloaded, that is, tlie anumuiition, and the
guaixl was slackened up.
11). General Grunert. Do you know whether any of these rumors
^vas every traced down to find out what its origin was?
Mrs. KoGAN. No, I can't say that I do. I couldn't substantiate any
of them.
20. General Grunert. Has the Board any questions?
21. General Russell. No.
22. General Grunert. General Frank?
23. General Frank. No.
24. General Grunert. Anybody else? (No response.)
All right; thank you very much for coming down.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 879
Mrs. KoGAN. Yoli are welcome.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
[1678] TESTIMONY OF COLONEL WALTER E. LORENCE, CORPS
OF ENGINEERS, UNITED STATES ARMY
{The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you state to the Board your name,
rank, organization, and station?
Colonel LoRENCE. Colonel Walter E. Lorence, Corps of Engineers,
Chief of the Maintenance Division, Military Supply, Office of the
Chief of Engineers, stationed at Columbus, Ohio.
2. Major Clausen. Colonel, what w^ere your duties and assignment
in August, 1941?
Colonel LoKENCE. Assistant Chief of the Finance Section, Office of
the Chief of Engineers. I believe the reorganization had not gone
into effect at that time. I believe I was still under Colonel Gesler,
at that time, in 1941.
3. Major Clausen. About that time do you recall having met one
Hans Wilhelm Rohl?
Colonel Lorexce. I do not remember.
4. Major Clausen. Did you ever meet Hans Wilhelm Rohl?
Colonel Lorence. I don't know whether I have or not, because in
those days we processed prett}^ nearly — well, the peak of our personnel
action was 50,000 people a month.
5. Major Clausen. Do you recall having met an attorney by the
name of John Martin who had an office in Los Angeles and represented
;his party, Hans Wilhelm Rohl?
Colonel Lorence. No; I do not. That is, I do not definitely recall,
unless I have something in the record of the business I was doing at
; hat time.
6. Major Clausen. I show you our Exhibit 2 and ask you if you
recognize that as having been before you or discussed with [1679]
you at one time ?
Colonel Lorence. Yes ; I remember it.
7. Major Clausen. Will you exi^lain the circumstances?
Colonel Lorence. May I read the rest of it first?
8. Major Clausen. Yes.
Colonel Lorence. (after reading Exhibit 2). Yes; I remember
this particular communication.
9. Major Clausen. Will you tell the Board how you recall that
communication ?
Colonel Lorence, I don't know all the details of this particular one,
but as near as I can remember — because you have to bear in mind that
I was receiving pretty nearly a thousand letters a week pust like that
from people looking for jobs, and so forth. That was in the midst
of very heavy construction. Most of them were before Pearl Harbor,
not after Pearl Harbor. We were recruiting. We had recruiting
offices throughout the entire country recruiting for our construction
program in the United States and for overseas. We handled all
recruitments for overseas; and my recollection of this is that Mr.
880 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Rohl, if I am not mistaken, was wanted by the Hawaiian Department
for work in Hawaii, and of course all assistance that we could render in
the Chief's office, with reference to clearing and moving them overseas,
of course we did. I believe there was a question of whether or not he
was a citizen at the time.
10. Major Clausen. Do you recall that he was supposed to be a
German alien?
Colonel LoRENCE. I don't know, at that time. Of course I don't
know all the details of this, any more than any of the other thousands
of items we were handling at that time ; but my [1680] recol-
lection is that they were anxious to get this man to work on this
project; that he had worked with the Hawaiian Construction pre-
viously in their activities; that the Hawaiian Constructors was then
getting this work overseas, and his ability as an engineer on this work
was needed. My recollection is that in New York he had already put
in his citizenship papers, his first, second, and so forth, and it was a
matter, under present regulations, that if they had been approved
or would be approved by the Bureau of Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion, he would comply with the requirements we had at that time
for shipment overseas.
11. Major Clausen. Specifically, Colonel, what did you have to
do with the preparation of that letter or the sending of it?
Colonel LoRENCE. I would have to look at the top of it. (After
examining letter referred to:) I don't know, to tell the truth, other
than this, that looking at the initials on the top, I think this is Mi".
Stilphen, who was then my labor relations man.
12. Major Clausen. He was in your department?
Colonel LoRENCE. Yes.
13. Major Clausen. Do you recall now a Mr. John Martin who
appeared before you and requested the action that is set forth in that
letter on behalf of Hans Wilhelm Rohl ?
Colonel LoRENCE. I don't recall. I know somebody appeared be-
fore me on this case, and that I sent either Mr. Stilphen or somebody
to the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization in order to see
whether or not the papers had been cleared or to push the clearance
of them in order that he could be processed for overseas.
14. Major Clausen. AVhen this party appeared before you who
[1681] was present at that time?
Colonel LoRENCE, I have no idea. I had as many as two or three
hundred interviews a day at that time.
15. Major Clausen. Is this the first case of your assistance to a party
desiring naturalization ?
Colonel LoRENCE. The only case that I know of. It was not assist-
ance to naturalization ; it was checking to see whether the papers had
been cleared in the Bureau.
16. Major Clausen. Do you recall that after this party appeared
before you, you sent somebody, you say, to check over and see the
status of the affair?
Colonel LoRENCE. Yes ; to see whether the papers had passed through
the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. As far as I know,
there was no assistance.
17. Major Clausen. Have you seen that letter before ?
Colonel LoRENCE. I have not seen this letter; no, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 881
18. Major Clausen. Yon never saw it before?
Colonel LoRENCE. I do not think so. I may have.
19. Major Clausex, Are your initials on there any place?
Colonel LoRENCE. Not on here; I don't believe so. However, it is
quite possible that this came through me. I don't know whetlier it
did, or not. I can see Colonel Gesler's initials underneath here, and
any matters of personnel under him were my responsibility. Mr.
Stilphen did part-time work for me and part-time w^ork for Colonel
Gesler, because he was a part-time man on labor relations and a part-
time man on contracts. So, whether it went through me at the time
or not, I don't know ; but the instructions to check up with the Bureau
of Immigration and Naturalization as a persomiel matter, to see
[16S2] whether or not his papers were m order so that he could
be processed for overseas, were my instructions on that.
• 20. Major Clausen. Do you recall now having given those instruc-
tions ?
Colonel Lorence. Oh, yes. I always did that.
21. Major Clausen. To whom did you give them. Colonel?
Colonel Lorence. That I don't know. You see, complete process-
ing of the papers would have two courses : One through our Procedure
Section to see that all the papers were in order for appointment ; and
if it was for liaison work with another federal agency it could be one
of many people ; sometimes myself, in order to see whether there was
a clearance on it. At the time we were trying to clear men and women
for another agency for transfer overseas, and many of those things
took place daily.
22. Major Clausen. Are you sure that your only instructions were
that the party should investigate the status of the papers?
Colonel Lorence. I think that is all ; I don't know.
23. ]Major Clausen. With respect to the part of this letter. Exhibit
2, which reads as follows:
It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United
States is beyond question
do you recall what, if any, investigation was made to determine that
as a fact ?
Colonel Lorence. I think it was, based on the evidence which was
submitted. I would not know unless I had all the other papers, if there
are any other papers. But we have regular procedure in the checking
up. The procedure at that time was prior to the Pearl Harbor pro-
cedure, which set up in- [1683] vestigation through the Provost
Marshal General's office. They didn't have that form. The investi-
gation which was made was the character of investigation which was
made partially by us and partially by the Civil Service Commission
at that time.
24. Major Clausen. Specifically in August, 1941, what was your
procedure to check on the loyalty of a prospective contractor wnth the
government?
Colonel Lorence. A contractor or as an individual?
25. Major Clausen. A prospective contractor.
Colonel Lorence. I did not do any checking.
26. General Frank. Let us say, an individual contractor.
Colonel Lorence. An individual person ?
882 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
27. General Frank. A contractor is an individual person, is he
not?
28. Major Clausen. Specifically in August, 1941, what, if anything,
was the procedure of the Engineer Corps to which you have referred
in your previous testimony that you put into effect with regard to an
individual contractor?
Colonel LoRENCE, I didn't handle contractors; I only handled in-
dividuals that moved in on the federal pay roll as Civil Service em-
ployees or as the equivalent of Civil Service Employees, overseas. I
made no investigation of contractors.
29. Major Clausen. When you told the Board about the procedure
for checking
Colonel LoRENCE. That is on the individual.
oO. Major Clausen. What was that procedure?
Colonel LoRENCE. The procedure prior to the security regulations
which came out after Pearl Harbor was the usual character investiga-
tion, to see whether or not a man complied [1684] with the
law and also his statement and affidavit which he came in with, under
the oath of office, that he was not contrary to the Hatch Act — that is,
communistic activities and things like that — whether or not he was a
citizen or that his papers were in sufficient order.
31. Major Clausen. That was conducted with respect to what ques-
tions? When did you put that procedure into operation in your divi-
sion, you, yourself?
Colonel LoRENCE. That has always been in effect.
32. Major Clausen. With respect to what questions? What ques-
tion would come before you, Colonel, which would cause you to put that
procedure into effect ?
Colonel LoRENCE. That procedure is checked on every individual
that comes into the federal service. It is not a question of checking on
his loyalty to the government, unless some adverse letter or other mat-
ter which was presented in his Civil Service form or on his oath of
office, or something of that nature, brought it to our attention. We
never questioned, on a security basis, anybody at that time, which was
prior to Pearl Harbor, if he was a citizen or the equivalent of a citizen,
his last papers having gone in, as to whether or not there was any
disloyalty.
33. Major Clausen. This procedure you say you followed in August,
1941 — did that apply with respect to persons who wished to be em-
ployed by the Engineer Corps ?
Colonel Lorence. Yes.
34. General Frank. Under Civil Service ?
Colonel Lorence. Yes, sir. Here is the point I want to make : Per-
sonnel who were recruited by us for overseas assign- [1685]
ment on the federal payroll, which was the equivalent of Civil Serv-
ice— they are not classified Civil Service people; they are federal em-
ployees, but not Civil Service.
35. Major Clausen. Was that procedure followed with regard to
contractors ?
Colonel Lorence. I don't know, sir ; I didn't handle that.
36. Major Clausen. Were your functions to deal solely with
civilian employees?
Colonel Lorence. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 883
37. Major Clausen. Do you know how it was, then, that this matter
came to you to be directed by you to somebody to perform the function
of trying to get this man's citizenship papers through, when it related
to a contractor ?
Colonel LoRENCE. Yes; because you see we also handled labor rela-
tions, which means — let me put it this way : In recruiting for an over-
seas job you cannot differentiate between contractors, employees, and
federal employees. You have got to set up wage scales for both. Each
one has to assist the other in pushing the papers and the procedure
through, because you must remember that we were processing on an
average of 10,000 people a week for overseas, not only for Hawaii, but
for Panama and for the island bases.
38. Major Clausen. Did you check on their citizenship?
Colonel LoRENCE. We had two methods on that.
39. Major Clausen. What did you do in August, 1941, on that?
Colonel LoRENCE. This is the way that was handled. Our system
was decentralized to the district or division office in the area where the
actual recruitment was taking place. Those that were recruited in
Washington were handled by my group. The [1686] general
procedure was the same. For federal employees a check was always
made on citizenship, because that was a necessary attribute.
40. Major Clausen. Did that include also an F. B. I. investigation —
to see what they had, if anything?
Colonel LoRENCE. No, sir.
41. Major Clausen. Do you recall having had before you about
August, 1941, axLj recommendations from one Theodore Wyman, a
Colonel, or at that time a Lieutenant Colonel ?
Colonel LoRENCE. I think that is how the matter originated; that
he was the one that asked us to get the man or to help clearance on that.
42. Major Clausen. Do you recall whether you had a letter or some
communication orally or in writing from him ?
Colonel LoRENCE. I don't know whether it was oral or in writing.
It may have been in writing, or oral ; it may have been a teletype or a
cable from Hawaii, because we got communications all three ways in
those times.
43. Major Clausen. You have read this Exhibit 2 over, have you
not?
Colonel LoRENCE. Yes.
44. Major Clausen. Just what was the basis for those statements,
if you know ?
Colonel LoRENCE. The basis for the statement, as I remember, was
that the final papers, through some red tape and so forth, were being-
tied up in the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization.
45. Major Clausen. Who told you that? Where did you get that
information ?
[1687] Colonel Lorence. I don't know where the definite infor-
mation came from at that time, whether it was from Colonel Wyman
or some other source, but it all emanated from the Hawaiian Depart-
ment.
46. Major Clausen. Do you know of your own knowledge whether
Colonel Wyman had any relation to that letter whatsoever?
Colonel Lorence. I think he did, but I don't know definitely.
47. Major Clausen. Your thought in that regard is in what respect ?
79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 2 7
884 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel LoRENCE. I think he did, because in every district or divi-
sion we had an unvariable rule. We never sent anybody to anyone
just for dumping them. That was the rule. Only when they wanted
certain people. The same thing applies right now. Most people are
sent this way, by name, because they know their particular qualifica-
tions, either as an engineer or as an administrative man; and it was
our job to try to get those people, whether they worked in another
department or for a contractor, and see whether or not we could get
them. This is another case of the same sort.
48. Major Clausen. After you gave the instructions to whoever
you gave them to, did you check up on the instructions to see if they
were followed out?
Colonel LoRENCE. No, sir; I don't think so, because if I did that,
then I would have to get myself another checker to recheck, with the
number of cases we used to have on that.
49. Major Clausen. Did you ever get any communication from this
John Martin?
Colonel LoRENCE. I don't know, sir. I don't know him at [1688]
all.
50. Major Clausen. Did you ever get a letter thanking you for your
assistance in the matter ?
Colonel LoRENCE. I probably could have. I got thousands of let-
tei'S. I don't want to be hazy on this thing, Major, but we had a
tremendous business in those days. Our average, as you know, at our
]:»eak — we had 279,000 federal employees in our construction program
which I supervised, and 1,300,000 cost-plus-fixed-fee contract employ-
ees, and I would not know individuals in each case.
51. Major Clausen. Did you ever find out that this Hans Wilhelm
Eohl was a German alien?
Colonel Lorence. No, sir ; not that I know of.
52. General Frank. As far as you were concerned, it was just
another case?
Colonel Lorence. Just another case, just like any other case, where
they needed a man and needed him badly. A job had to be done, and
we sent the people that they asked for.
53. General Frank. Notwithstanding the fact that this man was a
German alien, it was just another case?
Colonel Lorence. No; I would not say that, General. I didn't
know about that, General.
54. General FrxVnk. You just got through telling me that.
Colonel Lorence. Not quite, sir. You mean, there is something in
this letter?
55. General Frank. You said that is the only one you remembered.
Colonel Lorence. On a naturalization case, that is the only one I
can remember.
56. General Frank. Yet you just pushed it right out as if
[1689] you were handling a thousand a day; and he was a Ger-
man alien?
Colonel Lorence. General, I can remember, for instance, of thou-
sands where we made special exceptions, where they were not citizens.
I have in mind now an important case. This brings up recollection
of it; a Doctor Casagrande, who is supposed to be one of the greatest
soil experts in the United States, from Massachusetts Institute of
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 885
Technology. We were requested to take special action so that he
could go down to Panama in order to make a report on deep founda-
tion work on the third lock system.
57. Major Clausen. It says in this letter that Hans Wilhelm Rohl
has peculiar qualifications. Did you tell that to the party to whom
you gave instructions?
Colonel LoREXCE. No. sir.
58. Major Clausen. If you gave the instructions to this party,
whom you say you cannot recall, do you know where he got the in-
formation that he would have to have in order to write that letter?
Colonel Lorence. It must have been from the correspondence that
he got from the Hawaiian Department.
59. General Frank. Or could it have been from ]Mr. Martin?
Colonel Lorence. It could have been from Mr. Martin ; yes, sir.
CO. General Frank. But you do not know (
Colonel Lorence. Xo, sir ; I don't know which it is.
61. Major Clausen. You say 3'ou never got the information, so you
are sure you did not give it to this party to whom you gave instruc-
tions ?
Colonel Lorence. I don't know definitely. I don't think [1690']
I gave the instructions second-handed after listening to Mr. Martin.
I think I turned over the matter to Mr. Stilphen in connection witli
the case in order to process it, because Mr. Stilphen used to be in the
Labor Department before I brought him over into the Engineers.
He was one of the Bacon-Davis lawyers whom I used to deal with
over in that section. He was a good man. He is a cracker-jack on
labor work. I handled wage rates and so forth under the Bacon-
Davis Act among other things.
G2. Major Clausen. Do you know what, if anything. Colonel Ges-
ler had to do with the drafting of this letter?
Colonel Lorence. Nothing, other than that he was the boss and it
j^assed through me or Mr. Stilphen as one of the executives along that
line, looking it over to see if it was in proper order, and so forth.
63. Major Clausen. At this point do you recall having had a con-
ference with Mr. John Martin and Colonel Gesler concerning the
subject matter of this letter?
Colonel Lorence. No, sir; I do not.
64. Major Clausen. All right.
65. Colonel Toulmin. Colonel, what caused you to recognize that
letter immediately when you read it, in view of the fact that you
just stated that everything was routine to you and you remembered
nothing?
Colonel Lorence. There were a lot of outstanding things that came
up during the period. The reason for that, more than anything else,
was that after the telephone conversation to me at Columbus stating
that they wanted me here, I didn't know what they wanted me for. I
could think of a dozen things about \1001] Hawaii that they
might want to know. I went there as Budget Officer when I handled
the labor problem over there, when we were trying to get funds and
they would not give them to us; and a do/en other things. When I
talked to our investigator I asked him whether there was any partic-
ular phase that I should bring papers in, or something like that, and
he said he did not know, but he thought it was in connection with some-
body in connection with citizenship papers, or something like thaf. So
886 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1 cudgeled my brain to find out who that person was in connection
with that. It is the same problem, as I say. We have certain things
that stand out. It is very unusual for us to check in on citizenship
papers, and it was even at that time, and it is very unusual for us to
ask for exceptions for people who are not citizens. That is the reason
I call it an unusual case.
66. Colonel Toulmin. In view of the fact that it is so unusual and
so exceptional, how do you account for the fact that you remembered so
immediately about the letter and the circumstances in which it was
written ?
Colonel LoRENOE. Because, only the facts of what the action is and
what the action should be in order to process the man stand out, and
not the detailed facts of the writing of the letter.
67. Colonel Toulmin. Do you want us to understand that you have
no independent recollection of this incident other than the fact that
that letter was written and you remember having seen it ?
Colonel LoRENCE. I do not even remember whether I saw the letter.
68. Colonel Toulmin. You do not even remember that?
[l()9id] Colonel Lorence. No, Sir. I may have, because I sign a
basketful 20 times a day.
69. Colonel Toulman. You have no recollection of it?
Colonel Lorence. Not this particular one.
TO. Major Clausen. Do you know Colonel Wyman?
Colonel Lorence. Yes. He used to be the District Engineer when
I was in the General Staff School. However, I never served with him
or came in contact with him, even out at Fort Leavenworth. Of
course, I knew him by reputation.
71. Major Clausen. Before you came here to testify did you ever
hear of this letter incident in the press or on the radio ?
Colonel Lorence. Yes; I have read of the incident in the papers.
Not that letter incident, but I have read the incidents in connection
with the tie-up.
72. Major Clausen. Between Rohl and Wyman ?
Colonel Lorence. Yes, sir.
73. Major Clausen. Did that refresh your memory?
Colonel Lorence. No, sir.
74. Major Clausen. When you read those incidents did you re-
member then this letter incident?
Colonel Lorence. No.
75. Major Clausen. Who do you think in the Engineering Corps
might be able to give us information on that ?
Colonel Lorence. I don't know, sir, unless it is Wyman himself.
The i-eascjn I say that is that in practically all recruitment, which w^e
did on field recruitment, it was either the District Engineer or the
Division Engineer or the Area Engineer or one of the people who
were doing the actual recruiting at the time, and our office dealt with
that-
[16'93] 76. Major Clausen. What you did in August, 1941, was
that if an opening appeared for an employee in Hawaii you would
check his citizenship?
Colonel Lorence. Yes.
77. Major Clausen, You did that same thing back in December,
1940, did you not?
Colonel Lorence. Yes.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 887
78. Major Clausen. How did you do it?
Colonel LoRENCE. The check on citizenship, of course, for an ordi-
nary person, is on his Civil Service application, that he is a citizen and
so forth. We don't question that. We don't do any checking on that.
That was the investigating authority of the Civil Service Commis-
sion. The only kind of check we make is where a case comes in where
we are told that a man is not a citizen, or that his papers are in and
that he had been trying to check his papers. There may have been
other cases like that, but I have no recollection. That is what I am
getting at. Normally, there is no check on citizenship papers.
79. Major Clausen. Except by the Civil Service Commission hav-
ing done it for you ?
Colonel LoRENCE. That is correct. The Civil Service Commission
was 9 months to a year behind schedule, and they finally had to turn
it over to the War Department.
80. General Grunert. I have a question or two to clear the record.
Did I understand you to say that you passed on about 10,000 cases a
week for overseas service ? That would be over a thousand a day.
Colonel Lorence. That was during our peak.
81. General Grunert. This was in August, 1941. Did they have
[1694] that amount of construction in the overseas bases at that
time ? That is over a thousand a day.
Colonel Lorence. That is correct, sir.
82. General Grunert. And for ten weeks it would be 100,000 ?
Colonel Lorence. General, we had a tremendous attrition rate over-
seas.
83. General Grunert. All I wanted was to make sure that that was
correct — 10,000 cases a week for overseas bases.
Colonel Lorence. During the peak.
84. General Grunert. How long was the peak, approximately? 1
just want to make sure about it.
Colonel Lorence. The peak on that, General, as I remember, lasted
about three months.
85. General Grunert. You made a statement to the effect that you
received about a thousand telegrams or radiograms or telephone mes-
sages from overseas bases a day ?
Colonel Lorence. Not from overseas bases ; from all over the United
States.
86. General Grunert, That is what I wanted to get the record clear
on. because it sounded extravagant to me.
Colonel Lorence. It was a big program, sir.
87. General Grunert. As long as you have cleared the record and
you are sure of your statement, that is all. Thank you very much for
coming.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
\1695] TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL WALTER S. De LANY,
UNITED STATES NAVY
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Admiral, will you please state to the Board
your name, rank, organization, and station ?
888 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral De Lany. Rear Admiral Walter S. De Lany, Assistant
Chief of Staff for Readiness on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief
of the United States Fleet.
2. General Grunert. Admiral, I believe you understand the pur-
poses of this Board and that we are after facts or leads toward facts,
and because of your assignment during 1941 and your having testi-
fied before the Roberts Commission, we asked you to come in in order
that we might delve for facts. Will you tell us of your assignment
and, generally, the duties of that assignment in 1911 ?
Admiral De Lany. At the beginning of the year 1941 I was Chief
of Staff to Commander, Cruisers, Battle Force, and when the Com-
mander, Cruisers, Battle Force became Commander-in-Chief, of the
United States Fleet about 1 February, 1941, I then became assistant
Chief of Staff for Operations on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief,
United States Fleet.
3. General Grunert. Who was that?
Admiral De Lany. Admiral Kimmel.
4. General Grunert. Will you give the Board your idea of the
command setup that existed in Hawaii at that time and explain just
what the chain of command was ?
Admiral De Lany. So far as the Navy was concerned, the Com-
mander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, commanded all United States
Navy forces attached to the fleet, and as I consider the [1606]
setup, generally saw to it that the responsibilities of the Army and
the Commandant of the Naval District were coordinated and matched
the requirements of the fleet in the Pearl Harbor area.
5. General Grunert. Then the Commandant of the Fourteenth
Naval District was a subordinate of the Commander-in-Chief of the
Pacific Fleet? Is that true?
Admiral De Lany. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet,
did issue directives to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval Dis-
trict, but he made him a task force within the fleet organization ; but
that, as I saw it, pertained only to the relationships that had to exist
between the Commandant of the Naval District and the Commander-
in-Chief, United States Fleet.
G. General Grunert. You speak of the Commander-in-Chief,
United States Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.
They are two separate things, but they both were Admiral Kimmel ?
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir.
7. General Grunert. Are you familiar with the Joint Coastal Fron-
tier Defense Plan drawn up between the Hawaiian Department and
the Fourteenth Naval District?
Admiral De Lany. I cannot say that I am now. General. I think
that if the paper is presented to me I can recognize it.
8. General Grunert. Not that it is going to make any particular
difference, but I would like to see whether we know what we are talk-
ing about. (Handing a document to the witness.)
Admiral De Lany. Yes; I have seen this paper.
9. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not Admiral Kimmel
in his position approved of that joint plan or acted upon it in any
way ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 889
[1697] Admiral De Lany. No, sir; I cannot answer that now.
I cannot hook this specific paper up ^yith any approval that I per-
sonall}^ know of, sir.
10. General Grunert. In most of those plans and agreements yon,
as correspondmg to the Operations Officer that we have on our staff,
would normally pass and see such papers ?
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir.
11. General Grunert. Are you familiar with what they call the
Joint Air Operations Plan, generally, as drawn up?
Admiral De Lany. I think that is the one that was signed by Gen-
eral Short and Admiral Bloch, as I remember it, sir.
12. General Grunert. Yes; drawn up by the respective air com-
manders, Bellinger and Martin. You are familiar with that?
Admiral De Lany, Yes, sir. I am generally familiar with it.
[1698] 13. General Grunert. Were you, in your position, kept
informed of the Army's defensive measures, those taken by the Army
generally ?
Admiral De Lany. Generally speaking, yes.
14. General Grunert. Do you recall whether the Commanding-
General, Hawaiian Department, informed Admiral Kimmel of the
special measures, if any, that he proposed to take, after November 27,
as a result of a message he got from the War Department?
Admiral De Lany. I know that Admiral Kinnnel and General Short
discussed the general situation, and I am quite sure that Admiral
Kimmel knew of the plans that General Short had placed in effect
within the Hawaiian area, which, as I understood at the time, were
primarily set up as a precautionary measure against sabotage.
15. General Grunert. Were you at this conference to which you
refer ?
Admiral De Lany. I think I was ; yes, sir.
IG. General Grunert. Do you recall whether that conference was
held in the morning or afternoon of the 27th ?
Admiral De Lany. No, sir ; I do not recall.
17. General Grunert. Do you recall whether it was held before or
after the receipt of the Navv message which began, "Consider this a
war warning"? Was that message discussed in that conference?
Admiral De Lany. No, sir ; I can't say that, definitely. I cannot
answer that question. I know that there were discussions between
Admiral Kimmel and General Short, in wdiich this matter of the
precautionary measures that were to be taken [1699] within
the Island on the part of the x^Lrmy, and the steps that the Navy took in
their own operating areas, were discussed.
18. General Grunert. Presumablj^, then, the conference must have
taken place after the receipt of the message.
Admiral DeLany. I think so; yes, sir.
19. General Grunert. Otherwise, they could not have discussed it.
Now, let us go back a little further. Were you on duty with
Admiral Kimmel in February 1941?
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir.
20. General Grunert. It appears from the Roberts Commission's
report that Admiral Kimmel inspected the Pearl Harbor defenses in
February, and he declared himself astounded at the then existing weak-
nesses; and that lie pointed out the inadequacy of the antiaircraft guns.
890 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the obsolescence of land-based aircraft, and the lack of aircraft detec-
tors. Do you recall that inspection?
Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir; I think I accompanied him on that
inspection.
21. General Grunert. Do you know whether he communicated those
views on that subject to General Short, or did you communicate them
to the Army for him ?
Admiral De Lany. I can't answer that, specifically ; but as I recall
the thing, the letter that the Commander-in-Chief wrote regarding
the defenses of Pearl Harbor was either shown to General Short before
it was sent, or he was furnished a copy of it.
22. General Grunert. Throughout the year, then, up until the latter
part of November, were there any other inspections made ? [1700]
Do you know of any progress made toward curing what they thought
was wrong?
Admiral DeLany. I know that on at least two other occasions I
accompanied Admiral Kimmel, and I believe General Short was in
the party, around the Island in connection with joint headquarters.
The Army were building quarters up in the cave, up there, and we went
there and inspected all the installations. There was also the question
of the joint air center, and as I remember it. General Short, Admiral
Bellinger, and General Davidson or General Martin, I have forgotten
who, were on that party. We drove down towards the area'^here the
location was being proposed at the time.
23. General Grunert. Then, in your mind, you thought that prog-
ress was being made toward bettering the conditions, from what had
been noted earlier in the year ?
Admiral DeLany. So far as material and personnel were being
furnished, I believe that the conditions were better, as the year
progressed ; but it would be my observation that the amount of mate-
rial that had been originally requested was not forthcoming.
24. General Grunert. Then you think that they were making prog-
ress with what they had, but they needed more ; is that correct i
Admiral DeLany. Definitely so: yes.
25. General Grunert. Now, on the subject of intelligence, did you
know of the presence of a Japanese task force in the vicinity of Jaluit,
between November 27 and 30 ?
Admiral De Lany. As I recall the intelligence, now, as I knew it
then, I recall that the information I had was that one [1701]
carrier task force was operating in the South China Sea, and the
remainder of the Japanese main fleet was in home waters.
26. General Grunert. That leads me to believe that you do not
recall that a Japanese task force was in the Marshalls.
Admiral De Lany. That is correct, as I recall it, now. I may have
known about it • but I cannot recall.
27. General Grunert. Mv next question that I wanted to ask was
whether, if you had such information, you knew whether or not it had
been transmitted to General Short. Generally, do you know what
sort of information of that kind was transmitted to the Commanding
General of the Hawaiian Department, or have they any policy on that?
Admiral De Lany. I understood that there was an exchange of
information between the naval intelligence center in Pearl Harbor
and the Army center at Shaffer, or wherever it was located, and that
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 891
in addition I feel sure that the intelligence as it came in to the Com-
mander-in-Chief was information that normalh^ came through the
district intelligence center, and for that reason I felt that what was
available in the naval intelligence center was also available to the Army
intelligence, because I believe they exchanged information.
28. General Frank. Do you know whether or not that included
combat intelligence?
Admiral De Lany. I cannot answer that. I do not know.
29. General Grunert. We understood from previous testimony that
the combat intelligence, at least certain parts of it, was so highly secret
that it was very carefully guarded and disseminated only to a few, and
I wanted to find out whether or not that dissemination included the
Commanding General of the [1702] Hawaiian Department,
and who decided what to turn over to General Short, and what they
thought was too secret even to turn over to General Short. Could you
answer anything in that line?
Admiral De Lany. No, sir. I cannot answer your question defi-
nitely, General, but it seems to me that I recall instances where General
Short was in the office, there, where Admiral Kimmel had his general
Pacific chart, and that I can recall the intelligence officer of the fleet,
who was then Commander (I think) Leighton, being in there and
pointing out on the wall chart the summary of the information that
we had at the time that the General was in there.
30. General Grunert. And that would include combat intelligence?
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir; that was the location of Japanese fleets
and forces.
31. General Grunert. You think Admiral Leighton, I believe it is
now, was present?
Admiral De Lany. No, sir ; he is a captain, right now.
32. General Grunert. Captain Leighton would be our best source
of information on that?
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir ; I think so, sir.
33. General Grunert. Do you know whether efforts were made by
the Navy to secure information of Japanese naval activities in the
mandated islands?
Admiral De Lany. No, sir.
34. General Grunert. Did the fleet have any particular means of
getting information from the mandated islands?
Admiral De Lany. No, sir.
[170S] 35. General Grunert. Upon what source did they de-
pend for that information ?
Admiral De Lany. Our information came primarily from the main
Naval Department from Washington.
36. General Grunert. That was the combat naval intelligence?
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir.
37. General Grunert. From Washington?
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir.
38. General Grunert. Do you know whether Washington sent you
anything on this subject of what was in the Marshall Islands, about
November 25 or 26 ?
Admiral De Lany. There is a naval intelligence bulletin, dated 1
December, which I am of the impression we did not have in our files
892 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
on the 7th of December, which states the fact that there was a carrier
group, I believe, in the Marshalls.
39. General Grunert. Do you recall where that came from,
whether from the District or from Washington ?
Admiral De Lany. That was an ONI bulletin from Washington,
dated 1 December; but the information that we had prior to the
receipt of that bulletin, as I recall it, was based on information that
came out of the Sixteenth Naval Department, and, I believe, sub-
stantiated in dispatches from Washington.
40. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not General Short,
as Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, was kept
informed of the movement of the task forces of the fleet, in so far
as it pertained to whether they were in or out of the harbor, and,
while they were out of the harbor, what areas they covered that might
give him protection?
Admiral De Lany. I am sure that that information was [1704]
available to Army sources in the Hawaiian area, but whether Gen-
eral Short had it, personally, I cannot answer that.
41. General Grunert. By "available," do you mean, "It's here !
Come and get it !" or whatt
Admiral De Lany. No, sir; I mean that when the fleet went into
an operating area we discussed our operating program with the Army
opposites in our staff organization, and so far as I was concerned
we always arranged drills for range-finder check. Coast Artillery
training. We checked our range finders and submitted our plots
against theirs. There was also an arrangement with the Army as
to the fact that they knew where we were operating, so that their air
forces came out and did whatever searching or bombing or anything
else they wanted to do.
42. General Grunert. Did these task forces that were sent out from
time to time, especially in the latter part of November and early
in December, have any definite "distant reconnaissance" missions, as
we call them, in so far as the defense of Hawaii was concerned?
Admiral De Lany. No ; not as I interpret your question.
43. General Grunert. The defense of Hawaii was under whom, in
the Navy?
Admiral De Lany. Well, the defense of Hawaii was under the
Army; and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District co-
ordinated naval activities with them, as I understand it.
44. General Grunert. The Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval
District?
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir.
45. General Grunert. In that joint plan that you recognized,
there, the Fourteenth Naval District contracts to have the Navy
[lyOS] provide, among other things, distant reconnaissance?
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir ; and I believe the agreement provided,
too, that the Army would assist in it, as I recall the agreement.
46. General Grunert. That afterwards came in the joint air agree-
ment. That is right.
Now, what I am trying to get at is the subject of distant recon-
naissance— whether or not it was made; if so, how; and whether it
was just made periodically; whether these task forces were woven into
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 893
a pattern in making it; or wliat. Could you enlighten us on that
general subject?
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. I say this, that the general mission
of the naval forces in the Hawaiian area had been, and, with the ap-
proval of the Navy Department, continued to be, training. So far as
distant reconnaissance is concerned — and presuming that you mean
by that, aircraft
47. General Grunert. Primarily, yes.
Admiral De Laxy. The number of planes, pilots, and spare
jjarts, and so fortli, that were available in the Hawaiian area, and the
fact that the planes in the Hawaiian area required such wartime work
on them as installing bullet-proof cells and other wartime equipment,
there just were not enough planes, pilots, or time available to do the
job of training and preparing the planes for wartime requirements,
and conduct a distant reconnaissance.
I believe I am safe in saying that the same thing that I say about
Navy planes prevailed in the aviation situation so far as the Army
was concerned.
48. General Grunert. Then I gather from your answer to that
[1706] question that there was practically no so-called "distant
reconnaissance," as such.
Admiral De Lany. That is correct, sir.
49. General Grunert. And that was due primarily to the lack of
means ?
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir.
50. General Grunert. When the task forces went out, whatever
patroling or searching they did was primarily for the task of train-
ing while they were out there, to protect themselves, and was not a
part of a so-called "distant reconnaissance" for the protection of
Hawaii against an air attack?
Admiral De Lany. That is correct. The plane coverage that was
given to naval forces, whether they operated in close proximity to
the islands or whether they operated as we did on certain problems
four or five hundred miles to the northward of the island, our cover-
age was always designed with the idea that we were protecting the
service forces against submarine attack.
51. General Grunert. The reason I am asking these particular
questions is to see whether or not the presence of task forces in cer-
tain areas outside the Island of Hawaii gave the Commanding Gen-
eral of the Hawaiian Department a false sense of security, thinking
that he would be secure from anything coming in that direction, be
it surface or air. If he had been kept informed of their presence,
and of what they did out there, and of what they did not do, he might
then have had a different picture.
That is just an explanation of the line of questioning, so that if
there is anything wrong with that sort of reasoning [1707]
you might tell me. If there is not, I will assume that it is fairly
correct.
Admiral De Lany. The task forces that operated out of the Hawai-
ian area as surface task forces always operated in assigned areas,
which, in my opinion, were known to the Army and the Commandant,
of the Fourteenth Naval District. I believe, too, that the Army was
entirely familiar with all the plane flights that were made by both
894 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Army and Navy planes, and tliat with that knowledge the Command-
ing General knew just what the status of surface and air forces in
the Hawaiian area was, at all times.
52. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not the Com-
mandant of the Fourteenth Naval District had any air means for
long-distance reconnaissance, or did that which existed pertain to
the Navy, proper?
Admiral De Lany. They were a part of the U. S. Fleet, but there
is no question but what the Commandant knew exactly what the
planes were doing.
63. General Grunert. In any use of those PBYs that were flying
in and about Honolulu daily, they were probably engaged in opera-
tions pertaining to a task force going out or coming in, or whatnot ?
Admiral De Lany. Plus training ; yes, sir.
54. General Grunert. Were submarines ever used for this distant
surveillance?
Admiral De Lany. There were submarines stationed off Midway
and Wake for observation.
55. General Grunert. We have been told that because of the lack
of means, there could not be a 360° protective distant [1708]
reconnaissance, and I wondered whether or not in naval tactics, or
whatnot, they often or sometimes used submarines to cover part of
a ring around the place.
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir ; I think that is entirely possible.
56. General Grunert. But you do not know whether any of that was
done?
Admiral De Lany. It was not done.
57. General Grunert. Now, I go into the subject of cooperation
and coordination. Will you tell me what you thought of the coop-
eration between the Army and the Navy, as a whole, and particularly
that which existed with the fleet, of which you know directly, and
that which existed between the Army and the District, if you know
about that.
Admiral De Lany. I am more familiar with what existed between
the fleet and the Army that I am, between the district and the Arm3\
In so far as the fleet is concerned, I felt that from the top down
through my echelon there wasn't any question about amicable under-
standings and coordination.
58. General Grunert. Was there any question about knowing suf-
ficiently of each other's business to be able to carry out your own
responsibility, when it came to cooperative action ?
Admiral De Lany. So far as I personally am concerned, no, be-
cause I was generally familiar with the strength of the Army in the
Hawaiian area, what their antiaircraft defense amounted to, the
number of planes, type, and so forth, that were available, I felt that
the Army knew our general operating schedules, and, as I said before,
there wasn't any question about amicable understandings and coordi-
nation.
[1709] 59. General Grunert. Who was your opposite number
in the Army ?
60. General Frank. Hayes?
Admiral De Lany, Yes ; I did business with Hayes,
61, General Grunert, Might it have been Donegan?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 895
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir ; I did business with Donegan, and I also
did business with Fleming, who was closer to General Short, out there,
than anybody else that T knew of in the Army set-up, sir.
62. General Grunert. Did you know the Army system of alerts that
was in effect, say in November and the early part of December — not in
effect, but which could be put into effect?
Admiral De Lany. I cannot describe them ; no, sir.
63. General Grunert. You Iniew that the one they put into effect
was called "No. 1," the so-called sabotage alert?
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir.
64. General Grunert. You would not know what No. 2 and No. 3
were ?
Admiral De Lany. No, sir ; I cannot describe them. I do not know.
I cannot recall.
65. Genera] Grunert. Was there any question in the mind of the
command of the fleet — not the Commander, but the command of the
fleet; by that, I mean the commander and his staff — as to the adequacy
of that alejrt for the protection of the fleet in Pearl Harbor, in view of
the information or "messages" we will call them, that had been received
by the Army and the Navy?
Admiral De Lany. No, sir; not so far as I am concerned, because I
felt that if the island were alerted against sabotage, that was the extent
to which the defense of the island should go.
\1710] 66. General Grunert. Then it did not enter your mind,
did it, that j^our fleet would have been better protected had it gone into
a more protective alert such as Alert No. 2, which carried a spreading
out of their planes and a readiness to get them into the air in a hurr}^?
Admiral De Lany. Not on the information we had ; no, sir.
67. General Grunert. Then the messages received from the Navy
Department, particularly the one on November 27, which started out,
"Consider this a war warning," together with the message from the
Chief of Staff of the same date, did not alarm you or your Commander-
in-Chief to the extent of thinking that war was quite imminent?
Admiral De Lany. Well, we knew that Japan was on the move.
We knew that she was headed south. We had no statement as to what
the policy of Washington was towards the Japanese, and what would
occur in the event that Japan committed an overt act against the
United States; and, with no further information than that, the war
warning meant just that.
68. General Grunert. Then as far as you were concerned, the
Army's going on a sabotage alert was O. K. with you ?
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir.
69. General Frank. There wasn't an understanding of any kind as
to what a warning in that language! meant?
Admiral De Lany. General, we had no M-Day. I do not know what
you call it in your war plans, but there had been no mobilization, there
had been no mention of anything that indicated anything like that.
[17J1] 70. General Grunert. Who had to bring about that
designation ?
Admiral De Lany. Sir ?
71. General Grunert. Who had to bring about the designation of
M-day?
896 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral De Lany. It had to come from Washington, sir.
72. General Grunert. Are you sure ? I will refresh your memory
on the Joint Act of The Army and The Navy, as set forth in Chapter
II, paragraph 9b :
(Except from Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, Chapter II,
is as follows:)
Operations of Army and Navy foi'ces will be coordinated by the exercise of
unity of command in the following cases :
(1) When ordered by the President; or
(2) When provided for in joint agreements between the Secretary of War
and the Secretary of the Navy ; or
(3) When commanders of Army and Navy forces agree that the situation
requires the exercise of unity of command and further agree as to the service
that shall exercise such command.
That was not just exactly what I had, what I meant and wanted to
bring out then, but I am glad I brought it out now, and I will come
back to the other question.
Was the question of the desirability of unity of command ever
taken up in conference or discussed with a view to possibly putting it
in effect under this that I have just read, in case it became necessary,
prior to December 7th?
Admiral De Lany. Not that I recall, no, sir.
[1712] 73. General Grunert. Did you ever turn the matter over
in your mind as to whether you thought unity of command was
desirable prior to December 7th, and whether or not it could have
accomplished more than cooperation was then accomplishing?
Admiral De Lany. There was never any question in my mind that
there should have been unity of command iDefore the 7th of December.
74. General Frank. When did you think that? At that time,
or is this back sight?
Admiral De Lany. No, sir. I make that statement as a thought on
my part within a month after the — well, by the first of March, 1941.
75. General Frank. But it was not in your mind prior to the
attack ?
76. General Russell. He said March 1, 1941.
77. General Frank. Oh, March 1, '41. All right.
Admiral De Lany. As a matter of fact, I don't recall the dates,
but I know that General Short and Admiral Kimmel, as I mentioned
before, had visualized this thing and had actually inspected the
places where the Army was putting up their command stations in
the mountain out there, with the idea that the whole command setup
would move up there and there would be a unity of command.
78. General Grunert. That was provided for when war broke?
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir.
79. General Grunert. But the unity that I was referring to was
unity of command prior to any emergency, so that the preparations
could be unified instead of waiting until sometliing broke.
[1713'] Admiral De Lany. General, I think in answer to your
previous question I had said there that I don't recall Admiral Kimmel
or General Short discussing unity of command either before the 27th
or subsequent to the 27th of November. Whether it was discussed,
or not, I do not know but I know that, as I said, both the Admiral
and the General had visualized this because of their interest in getting
a place, a post where the command could be exercised.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 897
80. General Grunert, Now, goin<^ back to the former question or
discussion of the M-Day, I refer now to a paragraph in this Joint
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, paragraph 15c (2) :
(Excerpt from Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Ee: M-Day,
is as follows:)
(2) M-Day is the first day of mobilizatiou, and is the time origin for the
execution of this plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war. As a pre-
cautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into
effect certain features of their respective plans prior to INl-Day. Such parts of
this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as
ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local
commanders.
Admiral De Lany. That is right.
81. General Grunert. So they could have put any or all of this
thing into effect by mutual agreement?
Admiral De Lany. That is right.
82. General Grunert. Between local commanders?
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir.
83. General Grunert. But as far as you know it never came to such
mutual agreement?
[1714-] Admiral De Lany. It never came to such a mutual agree-
ment because — well, I think I am correct in saying that nobody out
there considered that it was essential to do it.
84. General Grunert. Then, it all boils down to the fact that they
were sort of sabotage minded but not really war minded at that par-
ticular time?
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir.
85. General Grunert. Is that a broad statement of it?
Admiral De Lany. That is a correct statement, and I think it is
based entirely on factual information that we had available to us at
that time.
86. General Grunert. Then really, before you got into a different
state in which you would actually expect an attack, you expected to
have more information of more critical conditions than you actually
did get ; is that the idea ?
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir.
87. General Frank. You well knew, however, that the Japs were
known traditionally to hit and then let that strike be the opening gun
in the declaration of war ?
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir.
88. General Frank. You feel, I take it from your comments, that
in the face of the information that you had, if the situation were known
in Washington to be sufficiently acute to require the announcement of
M-Day, that that announcement should have come from him?
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir, or we should have had more informa-
tion in order to have us make preliminary deployments or anything
else that we would have made prior to receipt of an M-Day dispatch.
[1715] 89. General Grunert. Tell me. Admiral, about what you
knew about the Army's interceptor and air warning service, as to its
completeness, as to your confidence in it or your lack of such confi-
dence. Just what did you know about it ?
Admiral De Lany. I knew that there were, as I recall it, three radar
sets on the island. I knew that the Army was drilling personnel on
those sets. I knew that there was normal communication between radar
898 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and headquarters that was not reliable but could be used. I personally
conducted a conference between the Army and the representative of
the Fourteenth Naval District at which, as I recall it, personnel from
the telephone people in Hawaii were present when Commander Taylor,
who was entirely familiar with the intercepts system as it was installed
in U. K., was out there. I saw the outline of the system as it was to
be put in, I saw the list of equipment that w^as required, the number of
persons that were required to man it ; but beyond the fact that there
were, as I said, I believe, three radars on the island, I don't believe that
the intercept system was in effect beyond any stage except where the
Army was training on the radar and could get telephone communica-
tion back to some place at headquarters.
90. General Frank. And could pick approaching planes up?
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. The operators were being trained on
their radar sets, sir. I believe the scheme out there, as I recall it, was
that the men were sent out on a truck that went out on a morning pa-
trol, and then when the truck came back from that they picked these
operators up some place around 7 : 30 or something like that in the
morning and brought them back for their breakfast, and then they
went out later on in the after- [1716^ noon, as I recall the thing.
91. General Grunert. The evidence that you gave before the Roberts
Commission appears to be somewhat to the effect that you were push-
ing the establishment of this service, that you were straining to get
it into position and action. Do you know, what was that pushing and
what was this straining, and what were the results? Do you recall
that?
Admiral De Lany. X^s, sir. As I say here, before the 7th of De-
cember, as far as I know the system, the only thing that we had was
the radars, and none of the appurtenances and equipment and so forth
that go to make an aircraft warning or a fighter director system.
92. General Grunert. Did you ever visit the Information Center?
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir.
93. General Grunert. Wasn't that complete ?
Admiral De Lany. Partially so, yes, sir.
94. General Grunert. Were not all the connections made, with not
three but five radar stations ?
Admiral De Lany. Not that I know of, sir. I thought there were
three.
95. General Grunert. These that I am speaking of are mobile sta-
tions.
Admiral De Lany. That is right ; yes, sir.
96. General Grunert. I note that you said there was no direct wire
to your headquarters or your office.
Admiral De Lany. That is right, sir.
97. General Grunert. Now, what was there about getting the direct
wire to your office? Did that take materials that they [17J7]
had trouble getting ?
Admiral De Lany. Well, there just wasn't any available, sir, or it
wasn't put in, because after the 7th of December we did rig some port-
able cable down there.
98. General Grunert. That seemed a little bit strange to me, that
after the 7th of December everything started popping and getting
PROCEEDINGS OK AHMY FKAKL HAKBOK BOAHI) 899
done, and prior to that they seemed to have trouble getting started,
getting things in. Tliat is why I wondered wliy you were pusliing
and straining to get action.
Admiral De Lany. Well, General, I do not think there is any differ-
ence between what happened in the Army and what happened in the
Navy. We couldn't get a 20-mm gun out there before the 7th of
December, and after the 7th they poured in. The same way with
other equipment.
99. General Grunert, That is true in a number of weeks afterwards,
but shortly after, practically on the 7th of December and the 8th and
from there on that system started working, without waiting for any-
thing to come from the United States?
Admiral De Lany. Not on the 8th, sir, or any time within a week
afterward, sir. It was possible to get the information through, yes,
sir; and had we known on the first of November that there was going
to be an attack any time subsequent or close to that, we could have
put the string up then, but the plans were in effect and the material
was being shipped to install a permanent installation as it now exists.
It would have been possible to have done anything, sir.
100. General Grunert. The whole thing goes back again as to just
how deeply they were impressed with the imminence of war. I just
have one or two more questions, and then I will turn you [1718\
over to the mercies of somebody else here.
Outside of the conferences held between General Short and Admiral
Kimmel, what was the nature of the conference held between their
respective staffs ? Were there any periodic conferences or special con-
ferences, or just individual talks, or what?
Admiral De Lany. I can only speak for my section of the staff and
say that they were mostly individual conferences between the giui-
nery people, the communicators in the Operations Section, sir, and
that pertained primaril}^ to joint training exercises that were match-
ing our operating schedule, and then also to the joint base defense drills
that were held in the Pearl Harbor area.
101. General Grunert. When did you leave the vicinity of Pearl
Harbor permanently for change of station ?
Admiral De Lany. I left there in May '42 and was down in the South
Pacific and then came back in November '42, and that is the last time
I have been assigned on anything in Pearl Harbor.
102. General Grunert. The last time you saw Pearl Harbor was
November, 1942 ?
Admiral De Lany. No, sir. The last time I saw Pearl Harbor was
the 2nd of July, 1944. I came back through there from Saipan, sir.
103. General Grunert. What I want to get about the Army defenses
for Pearl Harbor. Do you know whether they have improved to the
extent that you Navy people now think that the Army, with the means
it now has available, can give the Navy protection in Pearl Harbor?
[1719] Admiral De Lany. I can't answer that, General. I
talked with some people on the staff out there when I came through,
and I get the general impression from talking to people on CINCPOR's
staff that generally speaking the requirements of the Army that were
asked for starting in April, 1941, have gradually ac-cumulated out there
and they do have enough stuff.
79716—46 — Ex. 145, vol. 2 8
900 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
104. General Grunert, I gather from, I tliink it was, your testimony
I read before the Roberts Commission that at that time you were pretty
well convinced that Pearl Harbor was not a good place for the fleet to
be, to be protected, to be secure. Is that right or not ?
Admiral De Lant. Yes, sir, I make no hesitancy in saying that
on the 7th of December, 1941, Pearl Harbor w^as not a fleet base as I
would visualize a fleet base.
105. General Grunert. I think I shall give General Frank a chance
now to piece in anything that I may have missed that may be in his
Qiind.
106. General Frank. Do you know the different responsibilities that
the Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District had ?
Admiral De Lant. By Commander-in-Chief's directive he was the
base defense officer, sir, and he was also required to maintain liaison
with the Army.
107. General Frank. "What I am getting at is this : In the first place,
he was Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District?
Admiral De Lant. Yes, sir.
108. General Frank. On a basis on which he was the representative
of the Chief of Naval Operations %
Admiral De Lant. Yes, sir.
109. General Frank. That is one hat ?
\_1720'\ Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir.
110. General Frank. He was a commander under the Commander-
in-Chief of the Fleet, was he not '\
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. He was commander of Task Force 4,
sir.
111. General Frank. Commander. What was that ?
Admiral De Lany. That was Base Defense Officer and as such in-
cluded the outlying islands of the Hawaiian Group, but I mean Johns-
ton, Midway, Wake, Palmyra.
112. General Frank. That is two hats he had ?
Admiral De Lany. Well, that as a task force commander he was the
Base Defense commander who was responsible for his sea frontier
which included the outlying islands.
113. General Frank. Yes. But in this other capacity, which I just
mentioned, he reported direct to headquarters in Washington. Now,
in this capacity he reported to the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet.
Admiral De Lany. As a base defense officer, yes, sir.
114. General Frank. Yes. Now, he had another responsibility with
respect to the joint Army-Navy coast defense plan, did he not?
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir, with the Army.
115. General Frank. And who was his immediate superior with
respect to that ? Did he report with respect to that to the Commander-
in-Chief of the fleet or to Washington ?
Admiral De Lany. I believe by his original orders he would report
to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington.
116. General Grunert. That seemed to be a dual one to me.
117. General Frank. Another subject: Generally speaking, there
[i7^i] actually was not an activity known as distant reconnais-
sance carried out for the express purpose of providing security of
Oahu against a surprise attack?
Admiral De Lany. Against a surprise air and surface attack, no,
sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 901
118. General Frank. No. And I gathered that that was because
of the state of mind that generally existed as a result of conclusions
arrived at from information, messages, and the general situation; is
that correct?
Admiral De Lany. Partially, yes, sir.
119. General Frank. Amplify it, will you ?
Admiral De Lany. And also, as I said before, that the mission of
the fleet activities in the Hawaiian area was at that time primarily
training, and in addition to the fact that there were neither planes,
pilots, nor equipment available to conduct a continued distant
reconnaissance.
120. General Frank. Now, do you feel that the authorities in Wash-
ington were conversant with the lack of material and the lack of train-
ing necessary for adequate protection of the place?
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir, I think they were fully cognizant of
it, because not only had the Commanding General and the Com-
mander-in-Chief repeatedly outlined the deficiencies of the fleet and
the defenses of Pearl Harbor, but in addition to that I am quite cer-
tain that all the plans such as you refer to here had copies of them —
I speak for the fleet now — had copies of them sent back to the Chief
of Naval Operations in Washington. They w^ere entirely familiar
with our training and operating schedule, and they knew that we were
not conducting distant reconnaissance.
[1722] 121. General Frank. Have you any reason to believe
that the state of mind in Washington was different than the state of
mind in Honolulu?
Admiral De Lany. No, sir, I have no way of knowing.
122. General Frank. Have you any opinion that you would like
to express on it ?
Admiral De Lany. Well, mj^ own opinion is that people who sit
close to the throne probably hear a whole lot more than those who
don't sit quite so close to the throne, and with that general opinion I
believe that the people here must have heard more than we did out in
Pearl Harbor.
123. General Frank. With the knowledge, had they had knowledge
that led them to believe that you were on a hot seat and needed help
to take care of yourself, should that impetus have come from here,
you think?
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. I believe a commander in the field is
entitled to every bit of information that can be furnished him, sir.
124. General Frank. There was a lot of help arrived right after
the Pearl Harbor attack?
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir ; some supposed to come in that morn-
ing, I believe.
125. General Frank. Even had it been there, the state of mind
which led to the conclusions that they had wouldn't have made any
difference under the circumstances, however, would it?
Admiral De Lany. Well, I do not think that that is an entirely fair
supposition, because I believe that if the Commander-in-Chief had
not had his fleet depleted for months prior to the 7th of December,
and had both the Army and the Navy re- [1723] ceived equip-
ment for which they asked as equipment being required in emergency,
that the opinion of the Commanding General and the Commander-in-
902 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Chief would probably have been quite some diiferent because I believe
they would have felt that since the material that they needed was
forthcoming there would have been some different point of view on
the thing.
126. General Frank. You generally remember the messages that
arrived from the 16th of October, the 24th of November, and the 27th ?
I do not mean the exact wording, but generally ?
Admiral De Lany. I don't know what you refer to on the 16th of
November, sir.
127. General Frank. October.
Admiral De Lany. 16th of
128. General Frank. October.
Admiral De Lany. Oh, yes, sir ; I know.
129. General Frank. Just to refresh your memory a bit, on October
16th:
Take due precautions including preparatory deployments that will not disclose
strategic intention.
Navy message of the 24th :
Caution relative probability of surprise attack on Guam or P. I.
Navy, the 27th :
War warning. Guam Samoa warned Jap action versus P. I., Thai or Kra
Peninsula, Borneo.
Army message of the 27th :
Hostile action possible. Desire Japan commit first overt act. Do not alarm
civil population. In case of trouble carry out Rainbow Five.
Now, what were the reactions from the amount of information that
you did get ? You knew that there was an acute situation ?
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. Well, as I said in answer to a little
differently phrased question, I felt that Japan was on [IT^^]
the move, as I said, and from the information that we had, the infor-
mation that appeared in those dispatches mentioning P. I., Guam, and
so forth, that the movement was toward the south. There was no
question about that. But I certainly never thought that there would
be an air or a surface attack on Pearl Harbor.
130. General Frank. What I am trying to get is the statement as
to how much the contents of these messages influenced your thinking,
you see.
Admiral De Lany. Well, my line of reasoning, my line of thought,
was exactly as I expressed here. I thought that the movement was
down in that direction. The latest information we had on the em-
ployment of the Japanese Fleet, even presuming that I had known
that there was a carrier group in the Marshalls, would not have led
me to believe that the Japanese carrier force was going to make an air
attack on Pearl Harbor. I never would have believed it. I didn't
think that Japan would ever choose that as an initial act of war.
[1725] 131. General Russell. As a matter of fact, Admiral,
nfter these messages that General Frank has talked to you about had
been received and considered by the naval authorities, no change at all
in their plans were made?
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir ; there were.
132. General Russell. In what way ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 903
Admiral De Lany. We did what we thought was against a pos-
sible hostile act on the part of Japan, and that is that we increased
our protection against submarine activities.
133. General Eussell. In what way?
Admiral De Lany. In that the ships in the operating area were
required to take their war-time dispositions, with the anti-submarine
screens, maintain air patrols, and generally take war-time precautions
as they would do in cruising in enemy submarine waters; outside of
the fact that, as you know, carriers were sent to put planes on both
Midway and Wake.
134. General Russell. I have wondered about those two move-
ments. What was the purpose of those two movements?
Admiral De Lany. That was part of the defensive deployment.
135. General Russell. Those would be land-based planes on those
two islands to be used for what purpose?
Admiral De Lany. Probably reconnaissance, but primarily defense.
136. General Russell. It has been mentioned in the testimony here-
tofore that tlie situation was influenced in 1941 by the transfer of
part of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Ocean. Do you recall when
that was done, and about how much of the Navy was affected?
I i7i?(>] Admiral De Lany. No, sir ; I cannot give the exact dates,
but I know there was a carrier and battleship divisions and one or
two squadrons of destroyers, plus some transports, both large and
small, that we had set up in San Diego to commence amphibious
training.
137. General Russell. Do you know about when that occurred?
Admiral De Lany. No ; but I would say, offhand, some time around
July or August.
138. General Russell. Early in your testimony this afternoon you
discussed with General Grunert the inspection that was made by
Admiral Kimmel and you in the early part of 1941, as I recall. As
a result of that inspection a letter was sent to the Navy Department,
and probably a copy furnished to General Short. That is the letter
which prompted the correspondence between the Secretary of the
Navy and the Secretary of War touching the subject of the inadequacy
of the Arni}^ defense on Oahu. Did you know that such a communica-
tion was sent?
Admiral De Lany. I cannot answer that ; I do not know.
139. General Grunert. The Secretary of the Navy's letter to the
Secretary of War was dated January 24. The Secretary of War's
reply to the Secretary of the Navy was dated February 7. The in-
si)ection that was made was not until after the Secretary of War had
replied to the Secretary of the Navy; so I do not think there is any
connection.
140. General Russell. I think that the record will show that the
letter was written from out there on the 25th, and I am trying to
find out about it. Admiral Kimmel's letter is dated the 25th of
January and the Secretary of the Navy's letter is dated the 24th. I
am just wondering how many inspections were [17B7~\ made.
Do you know whether or not an inspection was made before the 25th
of January?
Admiral De Lany. No, sir; I cannot say that, sir; I do not know.
I cannot recall the dates.
904 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
141. General Eussell. So far as you Imow, there was not an in-
spection out there until shortly before Admiral Kimmel wrote the
letter of January 25 ?
Admiral De Lany. I believe that Admiral Richardson, as the
former Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, had presentedjorior letters
about the inadequacy of the defense of Pearl Harbor.
142. General Russell. In the letter of the 24th of January refer-
ence was made to the probability of a combined air and submarine
attack as being the most probable form of attack by the Japanese
Nation. Do you know about that?
Admiral De Laxt. Yes, sir; and I think you will find that the
Commander-in-Chief's security letters provide for furnishing the
facilities of the fleet to the Army and the Base Defense Commander
in the event that an air attack occurred while the ships were in
Pearl Harbor.
143. General Russell. The interest seems to have been rather acute
in the early part of 1941, January and February ; that is, the interest
in a surprise attack by aircraft and submarines. Is that true?
Admiral De Lany. No, sir; that is not true, because, as I recall
it, the last Base Defense air drill was held some time around — well,
after the 20th of November.
144. General Russell. At that time there was not such an intense
interest in the form of attack out there, was there?
Admiral De Lany. I do not know what you mean by interest.
[17^8] 145. General Russell. It was a fact that there was abso-
lutely no protection or screen thrown out on the morning of December
Tth or attempt to obtain information about the launching of an attack
on Oahu?
Admiral De Lany. That is true not only of the Tth of December,
but every other day before that, sir,
146. General Russell. If you people were so intensely interested
in the type of attack, why was it that no diligence was exercised at
all to discover the force which might have launched that sort of an
attack ?
Admiral De Lany. Oahu is an island. There are no probable sec-
tors of approach. Therefore, the only way that the Island can be
completely protected and an enemy approaching the Island can be
discovered is to maiiftain a 3G0-degree circle of coverage around the
Island. There were neither planes, pilots, nor other facilities avail-
able to conduct and maintain such a continuous reconnaissance.
147. General Russell. You realized the danger, but there was simply
nothing that you could do about it ?
Admiral De Lany. Generally speaking; yes, sir.
148. General Russell. What effect on the damage suffered at that
time would the dispersion of the ships have had?
Admiral De Lany. Within the harbor, you mean ?
149. General Russeix. No. If the ships, instead of being berthed
in the harbor, had been at sea.
Admiral De Lany. If the battleships that were eventually salvaged
and which are now fighting in the Pacific Campaign had been at sea
and had received the same number of torpedo hits that they received
in Pearl Harbor I believe they would be sunk.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 905
[1739] 150. General Russell. It would have been necessary for
the task force to have sought these ships out wherever dispersed and
attacked them at sea ?
Admiral De Lany. Yes.
151. General Russell. Would it have been a considerably larger
undertaking than the attack that was made ?
Admiral De Laxy. Yes ; very decidedly so. And T would like to add
to that, that had the fleet not been in Pearl Harbor and had the
attack changed from fleet ships as their objective to shore installa-
tions as their objective, I believe that the ultimate damage and sub-
sequent results would have been very much more far-reaching.
152. General Russell. In answer to one of General Grunert's ques-
tions 3'ou stated that you did not regard Pearl Harbor and Honolulu
as a desirable Navy base. I attempted to follow the reasons assigned,
l)ut. if they were given, I was confused about it. What were your
reasons for saying that?
Admiral De Lany, My concept of a naval base is one to which fleet
forces may go and obtain the necessary recreation for their crews
and overhaul of their materiel during the time that they are in port.
Facilities were not available in Pearl Harbor, because the ships were
required to maintain a condition of readiness that permitted them to
get underway almost immediately, and the crew was required to stand
condition watches and live on boai'd a ship that was almost completely
l)ottled up, so far as light and ventilation was concerned. Under
tliose circumstances I believe that the general morale and health of
a crew would soon deteriorate if they had to keep that up continuously
not only during the time they cruised at sea but [17o0] also
during the time that they were supposed to be in their bases.
153. General Russell. What caused this condition of semi-alert-
ness which prevented the crews from obtaining the necessary
recreation ?
Admiral De Lany. Tlie condition of readiness that was set aftei'
(he Tth of December, as I said, required the ships to be ready to get
underway.
154. General Russell. We were at war then. Prior to Decembei'
Tth did this condition obtain?
Admiral De Lany. I am talking about something different, then,
General. I am talking about Pearl Harbor as a base after war was
declared.
155. General Russell. I meant, prior to the war.
Admiral De Lany. Prior to the war it was a very good operating
base. The weather was good ; there was plenty of deep water as soon
as you left port.
i56. General Grunekt. What good is a base if you are not going to
use it in a war? The whole thing is prepared for the purpose of war.
Therefore, a place that is good for a iieace base and is not good for a
war base is not a good base, is it ?
Admiral De Lany. No, sir. I have said it is not a good base. I
have said it is not a good base for war operations. The General
asked me about peace time. I said, "Yes, it made a very good operat-
ing base during peace time,'' because you luid no festrictions on the
security of the bases.
906 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
157. General Russell. As a matter of fact, what happened was that
the fleet was moved out there before Pearl Harbor had been completed
and was ready to receive and to protect the fleet. [1731'] Is not
that true ?
Admiral De Lany. That is correct ; and if you see the facilities in
Pearl Harbor as pertained to November and that existed to the 7th
of December, and those that existed on the 1st of July, 1944, you
would appreciate exactly how correct your statement is.
158. General Russell. Admiral, what is your view of the desir-
ability of a base for a large part of our Navy where the surrounding
territory is on the Island of Oahu and is inhabited largely or pre-
dominantly by people whose nation is hostile to the United States?
Admiral De Lany. I think it is very undesirable.
159. General Russell. That is all I have.
160. General Frank. General Russell brought up the point of your
dispersing the elements of the fleet that were in Pearl Harbor as a
defense measure against air attack. What is your reaction to the
presence of a large number of submarines with the Japanese task
force? Did you or did you not know that therfe was a large sub-
marine force with this attacking force?
Admiral De Lany. I knew after the attack that they had been there ;
and I can only say that if the air and submarine coordination in the
attack on Pearl Harbor was as efficient as it was down in the Coral Sea
and in the area where I operated six months afterwards, we would have
had a very sad experience had we stood to the northward and run
into those submarines.
161. General Grunert. Admiral, there appear to be no more
questions, except that I would like to give you an opportunity to add
anything to your testimony that you think might be of value to the
Board in sizing up the situation, which is mainly [1733] from
an Army viewpoint, but not ail-inclusively an Army viewpoint. Is
there anything that occurs to you ?
Admiral De Lany. The only thing that I would like to add to my
statement, sir, is that from my personal knowledge and observation
I am certain that there w^ere no disagreements or misunderstandings
between Admiral Kimmel and General Short, and that any statements
that are made to the contrary are not true.
162. General Grunert. We thank you very much for coming here
and giving us of your time and helping us.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon, at 5 : 20 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of
witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 907
[17S3] CONTENTS
FRIDAY, AUGUST 25, 1944
Testimony of —
Pagu '
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, United States Navy, Retired 1734
DOCUMENTS
The Pacific Fleet in the Command Organization of the Navy as of
December 7, 1941 1740
Excerpt from Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan 1754
Excerpt of Fortnight Summary of Current International Situations 1770
Report of United States Ambassador to Japan 1778
' Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original transcript of proceedings.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 909
[rr-m PEOCEEDINGS BEFOEE THE AEMY PEAEL HAEBOE
BOAED
miDAY, AUGUST 25, 1944.
Munitions Building,
Washington^ D. C.
The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted
the hearing of \Yitnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the
Board, presiding.
Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D.
Russell, and Maj. Gen. AValter H. Frank, Members.
Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C.
Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr.,
Executive Officer.
(Leon M. Golding was sworn as a reporter.)
TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED
STATES NAVY, RETIRED. (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL,
EDWARD B. HANIFY, LIEUTENANT, JUNIOR GRADE, UNITED
STATES NAVY.)
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Admiral, will you state to the Board your name,
rank, organization, and station ?
Admiral Kimmel. Husband E. Kimmel, R^ar Admiral, United
States Navy, Retired.
2. General Grunert. Admiral, you probably know what this Board
has been appointed for. It is to find out the facts as to what happened
prior to. leading up to, and during the so-called Pearl Harbor attack.
By reason of your position and {17r35^ assignment out there
we hope that we can get some facts from you or some leads to where
we can get facts. That is the main reason for asking you to come over.
I have prepared a number of questions based on the list of subjects
I sent over to you. Of course, we will try to stick to those subjects
as closely as possible, but when we get to questioning you we will
broaden out a bit.
First, will you please state to the Board your assignment and, gen-
erally, your duties thereunder, during the year 1941, giving us dates
as far as you can recall them?
Admiral Kimmel. I took over the office of Commander-in-Chief,
LT. S. Pacific Fleet, the 1st of February, 1941. I was relieved of that
command on December 17th, 1941. During that time I was responsi-
ble for the Pacific Fleet.
910 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3. General Grunert. Will you tell the Board generally what your
official relationship was to the Commandant of the 14th Naval Dis-
trict and to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?
4. General Frank. Is there any kind of a chart in existence which
shows the relationship of the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet to the
Commandant of the 14th Naval District and to Admiral Bellinger?
Admiral Ktmmel. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District
was a subordinate of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
The reason I hesitate a moment is that I want to get the thing straight.
5. General Grunert. Use your own time, Admiral.
Admiral Kimmel. The Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval
District was the subordinate of the Commander-in-Chief, but the
[17S6] had many duties; he was authorized to perform many
duties by direct correspondence with the Navy Department. He, by
orders of the Navy Department, War Plans, Joint Action of the Army
and the Navy, was charged with and in charge of the Hawaiian Naval
Coastal Frontier Defense, and the Commandant of the district, to-
gether with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department,
made up a Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. The Commandant
of the district was charged most directly with cooperation with the
Commanding General in Hawaii. He was responsible for details
of Army and Navy cooperation. As my subordinate he kept me in-
formed of what was going on, and I naturally was responsible for
what he did.
6. General Grunert. That is what I wanted to get at next. Any
plans that were made, although he made them in his capacity under
the Navy Department as Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval Dis-
trict, he kept you informed of; and did you approve such plans?
Admiral Kimmel. Yes. He kept me informed, and I knew what
he was doing.
7. General Grunert. You did not actually have to sign those plans,
did you?
Admiral Kimmel. No. My recollection is that I did not sign any
plans, but I knew the plans and I approved the plans.
8. General Grunert. You were generally familiar, then, with the
Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan?
Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes, by all means. I initiated the business
of perfecting the cooperation betwixt the Army and Navy air forces
in Hawaii and was very much interested in it and thoroughly ap-
proved what they did and was informed of it.
[17S7] 9. General Grunert. Admiral, see if I am generally
correct in what my understanding is of the chain of command, as
we might call it, and of action thereunder. For instance, the District
Commander was a subordinate of yours?
Admiral Kimmel. I think I have a document here which may tend
to clarify the minds of the Board on that point. It is an attempt
to simplify the various provisions of the Navy Regulations, General
Order No. 142, General Oi-der No. 143, and the orders contained in
directives from the Navy Department as provisions in the war plan.
I submit that for the consideration of the Board and for their future
study. I think it is accurate. It at least will bring you to the place
where you can find what is laid down in the documents. I hesitate
to testify as to just what the document means, I think you are en-
titled to get that meaning yourselves from the document.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 911
10. General Frank. The Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval
District wore one hat — I take that as a phase of responsibility^ — in
which for certain things connected with the Fourteenth Naval District
he was responsible directly to the Chief of Naval Operations here in
Washington, was he not ?
Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes; matters that had to do with the ad-
ministration of the district, the expenditure of funds, the expansion
of the plant out there — all manner of administrative affairs ; and, as a
practical matter, he was under me primarily for military reasons.
11. General Frank, That was one phase of his work. The second
phase of his work was his responsibility for the Joint Coastal Frontier
Defense Plan ?
Admiral Kimmel. Yes. His responsibilities were laid down
[17-38] in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and were the
result of agreement; and, due to the lack of Army equipment in the
Islands, in order to utilize everything that we had to the fullest extent,
be agreed to supply the deficiencies that did exist there to the best of
his ability. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was a realistic
plan based on what was available and an attempt to utilize it in the
best manner possible without regard to the responsibilities — not with-
out regard — but going beyond the responsibilities as laid down in the
Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935. In the Joint Action
of the Army and the Navy, 1935, the responsibility for the defense of
Oahu lay with the Army; even the long-range reconnaissance was a
function of the Army General Headquarters, Air Force. When it
came to making plans in Hawaii there was no General Headquarters,
Air Force, out there, and we had to rig up a plan to utilize what we
had; and at the time that the Commandant agreed to this plan he
had been informed that he would eventually have 108 patrol planes
assigned to him and that the Army would have something on the order
of 200 flying fortresses, and if and when that condition obtained he
would have been in very good case to defend Hawaii with other ele-
ments that would have been present.
Those are the primary things. However, there being no district
patrol planes in existence, there being only
12. General Frank (interposing). That is, Naval District patrol
l^lanes ?
Admiral Kimmel. Yes. — and there being only a handful, I think,
six flying fortresses suitable for distant reconnaissance and bombing,
it was manifestly impossible for the Commanding General and the
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to dis- [1739] charge
their responsibilities with this equipment, and it was planned to utilize
so many of the patrol planes of the fleet as might be available at any
one time, augmented by such planes as the Army could supply to do the
distant reconnaissance. The number of patrol planes in the- fleet was
81, all told. Of those approximatley between 50 and 60 were in the
Island of Oahu and suitable for service on the 7th of December. I
cannot tell you the exact number, because I do not know which ones
were laid up for check and various things like that, but those 81
patrol jjlanes were fleet planes and they had to cover all the Hawaiian
Islands and cover all actions of the Pacific Fleet. They could not,
and the Commandant knew they could not, be made permanently
available for the defense of Oahu. nor was the fleet out there to defend
912 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Oahii; the fleet was there for different purposes. However, we rec-
ognized, thoroughly and fully recognized, the conditions as they ob-
tained and endeavored to make the very best use of the equipment that
we had available. I found General Short most cooperative in his
efforts to get things done and, as you have probably heard already,
our relations from the time we first met up to the present day have
been most cordial. I, in my experience, have never seen any locality
where the Army and Navy had closer cooperation or more whole-
hearted desire to make the best of what we had then we had in Hawaii
tkiring the term of my command as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet.
I thought I would give you that general picture.
13. General Grunei^t. Admiral, this document which you have
handed me, which shows a chart of the organization as of December
7th, 1941, together with a statement — I believe that if [IT'J/.O]
we take time out and read this into your testimony it would be well.
It may obviate the necessity of asking some of the more detailed ques-
tions, and we can get down to the point with a definite understanding.
With your permission, I will read it, or your counsel may read it.
Admii'al Kimmel. I have no objection to its being read, and my
counsel may read it or you may read it, just as you please. I want you
to understand, however, that this paper was prepared and is, to the
best of my knowledge and belief, an accurate, although restricted,
presentation of the orders and instructions that governed the actions
of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and the Commandant of the 14th
Naval District.
14. General Grunert. This document starts out by saying [read-
ing] :
(Document "The Pacific Fleet in the Command Organization of the Navy as
of December 7, 1941", is as follows :)
1. Normal command cliannel.
2. A legal channel rarely used.
3. Navy Regs. 1481 — The Commandant is the direct representative of the
Navy Department, including its Bureaus and Offices, in all matters affecting
district activity.
a. Art. 1484 (7) — In intercourse vpith government, state and foreign officials
and with local authorities in matters of interest to the Navy, the Commandant
shall himself, or through his subordinate, represent the Navy Department.
b. General Order 142 — The Commandant has dual authority as Commandant
of the district operating [17^fl] under orders of the Navy Department.
c. General Order 143 (7) — Commandants of districts * * * have admin-
istrative responsibility direct to the Navy Department for Naval local defense
forces.
4. Navy Regs. 1480 (4) — All matters pertaining to military operations in
Naval districts shall be under the Office of Naval Operations.
a. Navy Regs. 1485 (5) — All correspondence relative to changes in the assign-
ment of district craft to CNO via Bureaus concerned.
5. CinO, U. S. Fleet and CinC, Pacific Fleet are identical. The relation of
Cincus to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Atlantic and Asiatic Fleet is ex-
pressed in General Order No. 143, "Under the CNO the Cincus will, through
type Commanders, prescribe standards and methods of training for all the sea-
going forces and air-craft of the Navy. The U. S. Fleet is an administrative
organization for training purposes only, and is a task organization only when
two or more fleets are concentrated or operating in conjunction."
G. General Order No. 142 — In his dual capacity, the Commandant of the 14th
Naval District as an officer of the fleet operates under the orders of the
Commander-in-Chief thereof.
a. With duties corresponding to those of a senior oflScer present afloat.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 913
b. In command of a task group of the fleet when and as directed by its
Commander-in-Chief.
The following excerpts from official publications are [1742] pertinent
to the investigation :
"Navy Regs. 1482 — ^In the administration of affairs in the districts, the Com-
mandant * * * will transact necessary business with the officer commanding
the group or unit. These groups or units will be coordinated and every effort
will be made to develop complete intercommunication and cooperation among
several groups and units in regard to all matters requiring joint action.
"Navy Regs. 1484 (3) — The Commandant shall cooperate with Army com-
manders and Commanders of Fleet Forces within the district, in the preparation
of defense plans in time of peace, as well as their execution in time of war.
"Navy Regs. 1484 (5) — He shall be charged with the maintenance of an efficient
information and communication service within the district in accordance with
instructions issued by ONI and Offices of Naval Communications.
"Navy Regs. 1486 (1) — The mission of a Commandant of a Naval District in
coast defense is to control the sea communications witliin the district * * * The
limits of the Naval districts extend to seaward so far as to include the coastwise
sea lanes.
"Navy Regs. 1486 (5) — The Commandants of Naval districts will cooperate
with the Army officers commanding corps areas in the preparation of plans in
time of peace, determining the more probable situations likely to arise and enter-
ing into advance agreements upon plans of joint action for each such situation.
"General Order 142 — The duties of the Commandants will include the local
Naval Defense Forces.
[ll'^S] "a. The duties of a Commandant as an officer of the fleet will be
guided by such instructions as the CinC of the Fleet may consider desirable.
"b. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District will report to the Commander-
in-Chief of the Facitic upon assuming command."
JOINT ACTION AEMY AND NAVT
This publication states under paragraph 19 (d) 3, "Army shall provide, operate
and maintain communication and intelligence systems to include air-craft wai"n-
ing service, with provision for prompt exchange with the Navy."
Paragraph 19 (g) — "Navy will provide and operate:
"h. A system of off-shore scouting and patrol to give timely warning of attack."
Paragraph 21 (b)l — "The Army Air Components will operate over the sea in
directing defense of the coast."
Paragraph 31 (d) — "Category 'd' requires long range air reconnaissance plans
made for use of GHQ, Air Force." Category "d" is defined as — "Coastal fi-ontier
that may be subject to major attack."
Paragraph 31 (g) 2 — "In all categories the Army Commander Is responsible
for AA Defense within the corps area and Naval districts, to include air-craft
warning service."
Paragraph 42 (d) — "Strategic freedom of action of the fleet must be assured.
THE FLEET MUST HAVE NO ANXIETY IN REGARD TO THE SECURITY
OF ITS BASE."
Paragraph 31 (f) — "Regardless of the presence or absence of the fleet, the
GHQ. Air Force, retains responsibility for reconnaissance."
[17 H] Page 49 (d) — "The Army is responsible for the defense against
aerial attack on all Naval facilities ashore in a harbor area." The air-craft
warning .service is defined on page 150 of this publication.
THE JOINT COASTAL FKONTIER DEFENSE PLAN FOR THE HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER.
This plan, signed by General Short and Admiral Bloch, is prepared in accordance
with the basic war plan and joint action Army and Navy. The Hawaiian Naval
Coastal Frontier is defined as including Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Canton and
Wake Islands. The defensive sea areas are defined and Hawaii is considered as
in category "d". The tasks are:
a. Joint — Hold Oahu as a main outlying Naval base. Control and protect
shipping in the coastal zone.
b. Army — Hold Oahu against land, sea and air attack and against hostile
sympathizers. Support Naval forces.
c. Navy — Patrol coastal zone and patrol and protect shipping therein, to sup-
port the Army forces. In this joint plan the Commanding General of the Army
is to provide for ;
914 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
a. Beach, land, sea, coast and anti-air craft defenses of Oaliu, with particular
attention to Pearl Harbor, Honolulu, Schofield Barracks, Wheeler Field and
Lualualei.
b. AA and gas defense, intelligence and warning service.
f. Establish an in-shore air patrol in cooper- [i7//5] ation with Naval
in-shore patrol, and an aerial observation system in outlying islands. Establish
an aircraft warning system for the Hawaiian Islands.
i. In conjunction with the Navy establish a system of land communication
(teletype, telegraph loops, radio interceptions, etc.) to insure prompt transmis-
sion and interchange of hostile intelligence.
e. Establish a joint intelligence service.
The Commandant of the 14th Naval District shall provide for :
a. In-shore patrol.
b. Off-shore patrol.
c. Escort force.
e. Maintain harbor Control Post for joint defense of Pearl and Honolulu
Harbors.
f. Install and operate underwater defense for harbors (Hydro-Acoustic Posts).
g. Plant submarine mines if necessary.
h. Sweep channels.
i. Distant reconnaissance.
1. Local communications (in conjunction with the Army).
n. Operate Naval intelligence for the collection, evaluation and dissemination
of hostile information.
[1746] 15. General Frank. I would still like to ask just a couple
of questions.
16. General Grunert. Go ahead with your questions.
17. General Frank. Prior to this I was asking about the jobs of
the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, and we determined that
he had a responsibility where he reported direct to the Navy Depart-
ment. Then it was brought out that he had a responsibility with re-
spect to the joint coastal frontier defense plan. In that capacity was
he responsible directly to you or to the Chief of Naval Operations in
Washington ?
Admiral Kimmel. The Chief of Naval Operations sent out instruc-
tions to each District Commandant as to the form, scope, and the con-
tents of a defense plan, and they laid down and prescribed certain
parts of the plan. The Commandant, I should say, was responsible
directly to the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chief of Naval
Operations approved or disapproved his action on that. Naturally
I had a chance to get my ideas into the defense plan or any other plan
that the Commandant made. However, it was his job to go ahead
and do it, and unless I interfered, why, he did the whole thing.
18. General Frank. All right. Now another thing: I notice in
this paper that General Grunert just read into the record that it states
in there that the Commandant of the Naval District, being responsible
for the local defense forces, was responsible to the Navy Department,
and that coincides with what you just said.
Admiral Kimmel. That is right.
19. General Frank. Now, he had a third responsibility, which was
that he had command of a task force ?
\ 174-7] Admiral Kimmel. That is right.
20. General Frank. And as commander of that task force he was
responsible to you ?
Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. Now, as commander of the task
force that is laid down, if you would like to have that, just what it
was.
21. General Frank. Will you state it?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 915
Admiral Kimmel. Yes, I can give it to you.
He was in command of Task Force 4 of the Pacific Fleet. Task
Force 4 under the command of the Commandant 14th Naval District,
Rear Admiral Claude G. Bloch, U. S. Navy, included that part of
the 14th Naval District activities which involved the island bases,
primary missions to organize, train, and develop island bases in order
to insure their own defense and provide efficient services to fleet units
engaged in advance operations. Now, by the provisions of my letter
2 CL-41 of 14 October 1941 the Commandant was also designated
as Naval Base Defense Officer, and his duties were laid down in con-
siderable detail in that publication. I think it would be well to pre-
sent now to this Board a copy of Pacific Fleet confidential letter No.
2 CI^-41, revised, of October 14, 1941.
22. General Frank. This, then, constitutes a fourth responsibility
for the District Commander?
Admiral Kimmel. That is correct; I should say yes, that is about
right. The number I presume is correct.
23. General Frank. Yes.
Admiral Kimmel. At any rate, immediately after I. took command
of the Fleet I wanted to get an organization for the use of all the
naval forces which happened to be ni Pearl Harbor [^74-8] at
any one time, so that they could be used in the event of any kind of
an attack. In the middle of February we issued the first letter on this
subject. This letter which I have just quoted was a revision of the
original letter.
24. General Gkuxert. That was in October, was it?
Admiral Kimmel. This is October 14th. This letter tied up some
loose ends and tucked them in where they should be, but made no
material change in the letter of the 15th of February, 1941.
25. General Grunert. May I ask at this point whether your instruc-
tions there were in consonance with this joint coastal frontier defense
plan?
Admiral Kimmel. I think there is no question about it. If there
had been any conflict we would have discovered it in the course of the
numerous drills which we had, and this letter was the subject of con-
siderable thought and effort on the part of the Commandant, 14th
Naval District, the forces afloat, and tlie Commanding General, Ha-
waiian Department. He knew all about tliis order; and in this
order — I think I can touch on some of the high spots of the order
profitably — we disposed the ships of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor as they
came in so as to cover all of the various sectors upon which aircraft
could approach. It was the duty of the senior officer present afloat,
exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, to so place those ships. We
had a sector commander appointed for each sector — that is, of the
ships afloat; and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District was
placed in charge, as Naval Base Defense Officer, of coordinating the
efforts of the Navy, of whatever happened to be ashore, with those of
the Army in the defense of the Pearl Harbor base.
[174^] The other big point that we covered in this and in the
joint agreement betwixt the Commanding General and the Comman-
dant of the 14th Naval District was a fjuestion of cooperation of the
aircraft. I tliink you should have that presented to you. In general
it provided that the bombers and long range planes should be under
7971G— 40- -Ex. 145, vol. 2 9
916 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the command of the Navy ; tlie fighters shoiikl be under the command
of the Army, and there were certain otiier provisions. I won't go
into them because I see you have had it here and it is contained in the
papers.
Incidentally, I came to Washington in June of 1941, and I told the
Chief of Naval Operations about this agreement which we had arrived
at in Pearl Harbor, and he was very much pleased with it, and I
undertook to dictate from memory the terms of the agreement, in his
office, and tell him about it.
2G. General Grunert. Were not those agreements forwarded to
Washington ?
Admiral Kimmel, Yes, it was. He hadn't seen it apparently, and
I had tried to bring him up to date on it. At any rate, I think it had
already been forwarded, and later on another copy was forwarded;
I know that.
Well, he was pleased with it and said that we had gone further in
that respect, of getting a coordinated action of the Army and Navy
air forces out there, than anywhere else, and he wanted to use it as
a model to send to other places, and I think he mentioned the Caribbean
as a place where at that time they hadn't been able to arrive at a
definite agreement.
This order, as you will see if you take the trouble to read it, is quite
comprehensive. It covers all forseeable [1750] contingencies
and prescribes in general the action to be taken by each element of the
Army and Navy in the event of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.
Now, this letter is quite long. There are plenty of copies of it.
27. General Grunert. We have a photostat copy of what you are
referring to.
Admiral Kjmmel. I see. Well, then we don't need it.
28. General Grunert. So I do not think there is any need of putting
it in the record. I think that photostatic copy is the one from the
Roberts Commission.
Admiral Kimmel. Oh, there is one there, if you have that.
29. General Frank. Yes.
30. General Grunert. There are copies of both your February one
and the revised one of October.
Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. I think they are both in that
testimony.
31. General Grunert. All right. You may complete your examina-
tion. General Frank.
32. General Frank. I should like to go back to a statement that you
made with respect to airplanes and the responsibilities of the Com-
mandant of the 14th Naval District. I think you stated, no planes
in existence. I do not believe you meant that. There were types of
planes in existence, but they were not in Honolulu. That is what
you meant ; wasn't it ?
Admiral Kimmel. I don't know what I said, now. I don't know
what you are talking about. I can't make it out. It is not clear what
you are asking, the question you are asking me.
33. General Frank. Well, you were discussing the [1751]
responsibilities of the Commandant of the Naval District with respect
to conducting reconnaissance, and you stated there are no planes
in existence. There were planes in existence, but they were not in
Honolulu and available to him ; is that what you mean ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 917
Admiral Kimmel. Well, it is a fact that the Commandant of the
14th Naval District had no planes assigned to him at this time.
34. General Frank. Well, that is what you meant.
Admiral Kimmel. That is a fact. I don't know what I said. I
can't recall.
35. General Frank. All I was trying to do is to straighten out the
record.
Admiral Kjmmel. I see.
36. General Frank. So that we don't come back and find that you
made a misstatement.
Admiral Kimmel. Well, I don't want to make a misstatement if
1 can help it.
37. General Frank. You see what I am trying to do?
Admiral Kimmel. Yes, certainly. Thank you.
38. General Frank. Now, when you read this — how is that identi-
fied [indicating]?
Admiral Kimmel. I might add that, as the Commandant 14th Naval
District had no planes assigned to him, the only place that he could
get planes was from the Fleet.
39. General Frank. Or from
Admiral Kimmel. Or from the Army.
40. General Frank. Or from Washington, having the Chief of
Naval Operations assign him planes?
[1752] Admiral Kimmel, Well, again I am trying to be realistic,
sir.
41. General Frank. Yes.
Admiral Kimmel. He made his best efforts to obtain planes from
Washington. He wrote letter after letter to obtain planes from
Washington.
42. General Frank. But he didn't get them?
Admiral Kimmel. And he didn't get them.
43. General Frank. Now, in this paper that General Grunert just
read is the statement :
Regardless of the presence or absence of the fleet, the GHQ Air Force retains
responsibility for reconnaissance.
Admiral Kimmel. I didn't make any such statement as that. That
statement is made in Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 11)35, as of
December 7, 1941, and if you get a copy of Joint Action of the Army
and Navy you will find it in there.
44. General Frank. It was just read out of this paper right here
[indicating].
Admiral Kimmel. That was taken from this publication here [indi-
cating]. Did he say what page it was? I don't recall myself.
45. General Frank. Page 3, Paragraph 31 (f).
There would seem to be a little confusion between this statement and
the provision in this agreement that was'inade between the Army and
the Navy in which the Navy takes over responsibility for all recon-
naissance.
Admiral Kimmel. The agreements arrived at in Hawaii were an
honest and energetic effort to use the forces available to [1753]
the best advantage, and there weren't any general headquarters Army
aircraft available in Hawaii, and we knew that there weren't going
to be all}'.
918 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
46. General Frank. I am just trying to straighten out the record.
Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir; I understand.
47. General Frank. That is all I am trying to do.
Admiral Kimmel. Well, I am too. That is all I am trying to do.
48. General Frank. And this statement that you presented gave
this impression that the GHQ Air Force was responsible for recon-
naissance irrespective of the presence of the fleet; whereas actually,
as a result of this agreement that was made between the Army and
the Navy in Hawaii, the Commandant 14th Naval District, under
18 (i) was made responsible for distant reconnaissance.
Admiral Kimmel. Yes; he accepted the responsibility for distant
reconnaissance, because he couldn't do anything else and be sensible.
49. General Frank. All right. I see.
50. General Grunert. Now we go back to a few general principles ;
we may call them general principles. I am now referring to the
joint Hawaiian coastal frontier defense plan. It appears that that
plan was made and it became effective when signed, but was not to
become operative until something happened. I want to read to you a
paragraph from that plan and then ask you a question. Paragraph
15 says "Forces." Subparagraph "c" says, "Overseas reinforcements."
Subparagraph [17S4] (2) to paragraph c is as folows :
(Excerpt from Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan is as
follows:)
M-Day is tlie first day of mobilization, and is the time origin for the execution
of this plan.
In other words, the plan was not to be executed until M-Day had
been decided upon.
Then it goes on :
M-Day may precede a declaration of war. As a precautionary measure, the
War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of
their respective plans prior to M-Day. Such parts of this plan as ai"e believed
necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War and
Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders.
That is the end of that paragraph.
Admiral Kimmel. Yes, I know that.
51. General Grunert. Therefore, parts of this plan could have been
put into effect prior to M-Day had the local commanders so agreed.
Now, in that, as to local commanders, what is your interpretation of
what "local commanders" means? Does that mean to you the Com-
manding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant
of the District? Or does that mean you and the Commanding General
of the Hawaiian Department, or does it mean both combinations?
Admiral Kimmel. I feel that it does not make much difference what
it means.
52. General Grunert. This is mv question. My next question
[17S5] was this :
Admiral Kimmel. I will answer. I am perfectly willing to answer
that.
53. General Grunert. All right.
Admiral Kimmel. I think the Commandant of the 14th Naval Dis-
trict and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, if
they felt that they should put into effect the mobilization, they could
have recommended it to me. That is, the Commandant, 14th Naval
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 919
District, would have recommended such to me ; and if he had so rec-
ommended it to me, I would have referred it immediately to Wash-
ington, We were in communication with Washington. Washington
knew much more about this situation than we did. They were the
fountain head of the information, and if any action looking towards
the execution of this plan were necessary, it appears to me that there
is no question but what Washington should have taken the action.
Now, these provisions of what to do on mobilization and what mobi-
lization meant were laid down in the basic plans, and they were laid
down in the subsidiary plans which went to the execution of the basic
plans ; and I venture to say that, had we put into effect mobilization
order in the Pacific at any time during the year that I was in com-
mand, we would have been most severely criticized by Washington for
having done so without prior reference to them, and they would have
quite promptly pointed out that you can get an answer in an hour
and a half or two hours, and why go ahead and put into effect a plan
like this when you are in direct communication?
54. General Frank. Why? What would that have done?
[1756] Admiral Kimmel. What is that?
55. General Frank. Why should you not have done it ? What would
have been the result to which Washington would have objected?
Admiral Kimmel. It would have alarmed the population. It might
have been considered by Japan an overt act. It would have tended to
upset the Japanese-American relations, which we had been enjoined
to maintain in status quo ; and it would have required, so far as the
Navy is concerned, certain movements of the fleet and certain action
which should not have been taken without reference to the Depart-
ment.
56. General Frank. In Washington?
Admiral Kimmel. In Washington, yes.
57. General Grunert. That has answered the next question I had;
but now I have one : Was there ever a discussion as to whether or not
to make parts of this plan operative, and so recommend to Wash-
ington ?
Admiral Kimmel. In this 2 CL-41 letter which deals with the secur-
ity of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor and in the operating areas outside of
Pearl Harbor also, we prescribed certain security measures to be taken,
and they were placed in effect ; and at the time or prior to the Japanese
attack the ships at sea in the operating areas were operating with full
security measures. Those in Pearl Harbor had a considerable number
of them in effect, but not so much as in the operating area, because in
oiir estimate of the situation (which, incidentally, we revised almost
daily ; I meaji, went over almost daily, in accordance with the intelli-
gence information which we received) we felt that if. as intimated in
the dispatches of 27 November, [17571 if the Philippines were
attacked or if Guam were attacked, that the principal assault would
be there. We felt, too, that it was quite possible that we would have
a mass submarine attack on the ships in the operating areas and off the
entrance to Pearl Harbor. Against such a contingency we took com-
plete precautions.
58. General Grunert. Of course. Admiral, this Board is primarily
interested wherever anything touches the Army, and it is not going
into the naval i^hases. So wliatever you have to say we will be glad
920 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to hear, but if it isn't exactly pertinent to what we are after we shall
save a lot of time and tell yon.
Admiral Kimmel. Well. I am sorry. I am very sorry.
59. General Grunert. So these plans as such were really plans to
be prepared to do something, but nothing could really be done except
by agreement prior to the time M-Day was decided upon or the time
something hit. That is why my question here : Was there no time prior
to December 7 where things appeared imminent to the respective
Commanders over there that caused them to want to implement the
plan, even if they had to apply to Washington to do it?
Admiral Ki^imel. Well, t think, if I have given the impression
wliich your question implies, I have created a wrong impression. We
(I, speaking for myself) would have had no hesitancy in placing into
effect any provision of the plan that I thought necessary to put into
effect prior to any word from Washington; and had I considered it
necessary to place into effect these things, I would have done so. As
a matter of fact, [17S8] we did actually place into effect some
of the provisions of the plan, and not all of them, but I think that the
significance of this paragraph and of ordering the full mobilization is
different from that, and the full mobilization was something that I
would not have ordered without reference to the Navy Department,
but any specific provisions which are contained in these plans I would
not have hesitated at all to order, and did not hesitate to order, as I
considered necessary.
60. Genera] Grunert. Then let me ask this question : At no time
up to December 7 did you consider the conditions over there as justi-
fying you in asking the War Department to declare M-Day in exist-
ence ?
[17-59] Admiral Kimmel. No, I did not; and had I considered
that I liad information wliich the Navy Department did not have, or
had I considered that the information which it supplied to me, or that
the information which had been supplied to me from any source de-
manded that M-Day be proclaimed, I would have so recommended to
the Navy Department.
61. General Grunert. Do you recall any particular provisions of
this joint plan, that were made operative by agreement, prior to De-
cember 7, generally speaking?
Admiral Kimmel. Yes, I think I can give you those. Of course, I
am more familiar with what happened in the Fleet, with what I did
with the Fleet. My main preoccupation was with the Pacific Fleet
and not with the defense of Hawaii.
02. General Grunert., Then what you told me relates primarily to
tlie Fleet?
Admiral Kt^imel. Yes.
63. General Grunert. And not between the District and the De-
partment?
Admiral Kimmel. Yes, yes; correct.
64. General Grunert. Then whatever was done under that joint
plan, unless it was brought to your attention, you could not tell us
very well what was done ?
Admiral Kimmel. Well, I think that's true; yes; yes.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 921
65. General Grunert. Let me read to you, or refresh your mind
about a paragraph in the joint action of the Army and Navy, chapter
2, paragraph 9 (b) , wliich reads as follows:
Operatious of Army and Navy forces will be coordinated by exercise of unity of
command in the following cases :
[17G0] 1. When ordered by the President; or,
2. When provided for in joint agreements between the Secretary of War and
the Secretary of the Navy ; or,
3. When commanders of Army and Navy forces agree that the situation re-
quires the exercise of unity of command, and further agree as to the service
which shall exercise such command.
Did that question come up as to the necessity for unity of command
prior to anything that might happen in the future ? If so, was it dis-
cussed and ever contemplated that the commanders over there would
agree on unity of command?
Admiral Kimmel, To the best of my recollection. General Short
and I never discussed the question of unity of command. We had
worked out a formula for cooperation, and we never had any dis-
agreement which we couldn't resolve amicably and to the satisfaction
of both of us. I think neither one of us raised a question of unity of
command, because, as you know, it has been a touchy subject in the
Army and Navy for many years; and I am certain that had either one
of us recommended that unity of command be placed in effect in
Hawaii prior to the Japanese attack it would not have been done. I
think you gentlement are just as well able to judge that as I am. That
is merely my opinion. In any event, we did not discuss it, and made
no recommendations. That, I can state.
66. General Grunekt. The Board has had testimony to the effect
that, had there been unity of command at that time, it would probably
have improved matters, including plans and agreements under plans,
and a possible decision to take action prior to December 7; so I just
wanted to get your reaction as [1761] to that question of unity
of command.
Admiral Kimmel. I would like to add one thing to that. Unity of
command in the field isn't going to be truly effective as long as the com-
manders are receiving their orders from different sources. It will
help.
67. General Frank. Had you and General Short, prior to December
7, come to an agi-eement to have installed a unity-of -command basis
out there, from whom would that single head have received his orders
in Washington ?
Admiral Kimmel. The President, I presume. There is no other
agency that could give the orders to both of them. I think you gentle-
men can answer that just as well as I can.
68. General Geunert. Now, as to deficiency of means to implement
the plans that existed, can you generally give the Board an idea of what
deficiency in such means there was, as far as the Navy was concerned,
that would prevent this plan from having the best results when any-
thing happened? Not in detail, but just generally.
Admiral Kimmel. I think the primary deficiency in Hawaii was in
aircraft; and next to aircraft, both Army and Navy, it was in the
antiaircraft guns, means for repelling air raids. My recollection is
922 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAKL HAKBOR ATTACK
that we had, on December 7, 1941, 12 B-17 bombers in the ishmds, and
we had 81 patrol planes in the islands, altogether. I may be wrong
in detail, but this is a general picture that I think I can give you. Of
the 12 B-l7s, six of them were in operating condition, six had been
stripped and were inoperative.
69. General Frank. Stripped for parts?
Admiral Kimmfx. Stripped of parts — and you know why — to send
the ones to the Philippines by the ferry. Of the 81 [1762] pa-
trol planes, 12 of them were up at Midway, 12 of them had just
leturned from an extensive covering operation, escorting the task
force which went to Wake, We had had a great many difficulties
with new planes — patrol planes, I am talking about — so I think it is
fair to say that we had in the neighborhood of 50 planes, between 50
and 60 planes, over-all. Army and Navy, fit for distant reconnaissance
or for an attack on a task force. That is, based on Hawaii, now.
70. General Grunert. What should you have had, to be reasonably
prepared for stich work ?
Admiral Kimmel. There was an allowance established of 108 patrol
planes for the Navy, for the District, and about 180, as I remember it,
for the Fleet. In other words, about 270 planes. Maybe my arithmetic
is bad, there — 270 or 280 planes, of the 15,000-plane program, and
plans were to assign that many patrol planes.
71. General Frank. As a metter of fact, there was a plan worked
out which stated that number ?
Admiral Kimmel. Yes.
72. General Frank. Or, rather, it stated the number required.
Admiral Kimmel. It stated the number required, and it was in the
neighborhood of 270 planes, all told, including the 108 for the District.
Also, the Army expected to get, I think it was, 200 B-17 bombers out
there. Now, had those planes arrived, they would have been in fairly
good shape not only to provide a searching force but to provide a
striking force; which is just as important as a searching force; and
it is very difficult to accomplish anything from the surface ships
against an airplane attack, and that was very well recognized, and
has been [1763] proved over and over again in this war. We
had three aircraft carriers which could be used for this purpose, sup-
ported by the fleet, of course ; other elements of the fleet. I am speak-
ing now particularly of what did happen in an aircraft raid against
Pearl Harbor. Of these three carriers, one of them was on the coast
getting some repairs, and was going to ferry some planes out from
San Diego; one of them was returning from Wake, having discharged
some Marine fighters at Wake; and one of them was about 400 miles
southeast of Midway, ferrying some planes up to Midway. They were
not badly placed in case of an attack, as it worked out, provided we
had had sufficient planes left on Oahu to do the job of locating the
enemy.
There has been some misconception, I think, about the question of
distant reconnaissance with surface vessels. I think it is generally
accepted that proper reconnaissance against aircraft attack requires
that the patrol planes run out to about 800 miles from Oahu, around
a 360 degree arc, if you want a full coverage, and this will take about
84 planes, assuming a 15-mile visibility, for one day. Now, the pe-
riphery of that 800-mile circle is some 5,000 miles, and to put ships 30
miles apart, you can divide 30 into 5,000 and get the number of ships
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 923
that it would be necessary to place out there on that periphery. We
didn't have enough ships to do any such stuff as that.
Furthermore, had they been placed on the periphery, it would not
have been effective, because all the enemy had to do was to run by
them at night and get inside the line ; and then you would have nothing
to back them up, because we didn't have any more ships. I just wanted
to dispose of that as being too absurd to even think of. So we had
left, as the only means of [-?7'(?4] locating an enemy, planes,
searching planes, and, of course, radar.
And in addition to the shortage in planes — you asked me about
that — while I do not carry the figures in my head, my impression is
that the Army had about one-third of the anti-aircraft guns that the
Commandant of the 14th Naval District, after a study, considered
necessary.
73. General Grttnert. Of course, we like to have 100 per cent of
anything, but we never get to 100 per cent.
Admiral Kimmel. Oh, no; that is true.
74. General Grunert. But that brings up this question: Was that
which you had used to its capacity and to its limits, or was it not pos-
sible to use what you had for certain protection without getting a
360-degree protection ?
Admiral Kimmel. Certainly; it admits of no argument that if
you send out one plane to 800 miles, you have covered something, but
I have given you, up to the present, only a part of the picture. These
were the forces available. That was the question that I was trying
to cover.
Now, there are many other considerations. The principal one that
arises at once is the question of personnel, the necessity for training
personnel, from the fact that certainly the Navy was training per-
sonnel and shipping them back to the States, that we were constantly
getting new personnel. That intensive training program was essential
if we were not to have a fleet that was utterly impotent. I have been
informed, and I believe firmly, that the Army had just as many
troubles as we had, if not more. They brought pilots out there that
needed training, and they were depleting their trained airmen of all
ratings. [J765] and in the weeks immediately preceding the
attack on Pearl Harbor, the primary effort for their Hawaiian Air
Force, I think it is fair to say, was in ferrying planes to the Asiatic
station, and they very greatly depleted their stuff.
75. General Grunert. To what extent, if you know, was General
Short, as Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, familiar
with what j^ou are telling us?
Admiral Kimmel. With what?
76. General Grunert. To what extent was he familiar with condi-
tions that existed in the Navy, which would affect his defense? In
other words, what did he know about what you are telling us?
Admiral Kimmel. I think he knew it all. I think he knew every-
thing about it; and, as a matter of fact, as a part of our daily work
down there, the available aircraft were reported each day to the Army,^
and the Army reported their available aircraft to the Navy. I mean
the ones based on shore at Hawaii. That is, so far as the aircraft was
concerned. I think that in our various conversations — and we had
many and extended conA^ersations on all phasfes of the business — we
covered practically everything that I can think of.
924 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
77. General Grunert. Now, we take the other side of the picture.
Admiral Kimmel. Of course, you know the difficulties, when you
assume somebody knows something, and you don't mention it — and
we all do that — but I don't think there was much of that, if any.
78. General Grunert. Taking the other side of the picture, how
well were you informed as to the Army's deficiencies for [1766^
a proper defense ?
Admiral Kimmel. I think I was very well informed.
79. General Grunert. Was your staff well informed about details?
Admiral Kimmel. Generally speaking, yes; I think they were. It
is fair to say that they were well informed. As a matter of fact, I
reported in a dispatch to the Navy Department, in the week before
Pearl Harbor — I have got it here, somewhere or other — that there
were just 6 B-17 bombers that were capable of flying, in Hawaii. I
know I was familiar with that, because I reported it. I know, too,
that I was quite familiar with the pursuit strength out there; and this
proposal from the War and Navy Departments, supplied to General
Short by the War Department and to me by the Navy Department, to
relieve Marine units with Army units, both aircraft and troops, out
on the islands, brought up in considerable detail what we actually did
have there at the time; and, incidentally, there was a case where Gen-
eral Short got certain instructions, and I got certain instructions, and
we didn't know exactly what they wanted us to do; but we ironed it
out, and there was no disagreement betwixt us when we did iron it
out.
80. General Grunert. I think the Board is pretty well informed on
the actual conditions regarding materiel, personnel, and so forth, that
existed at the time.
Admiral Kimmel. All right, sir.
81. General Grunert. I would like next to develop the phase of
what I call "intelligence", or information; and before we go into
that, I think it would be well to take about a 5-minute recess.
(Brief recess.)
[1767] 82. General Grunert. Do you want to add something,
Aclmiral?
Admiral Kimmel. I wanted to say, in regard to the conditions that
existed in Hawaii with reference to defense, that in January of 1941,
early January, the Commandant of the 14th Naval District submitted
to the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Richardson, a letter pointing
out what he considered deficiencies in Army and Navy means for the
defense of Oahu. The Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Richardson,
sent that in with a forwarding letter. This letter, I believe, was the
basis of the letter which the Navy Department drew up and sent to
the War Department, pointing out the deficiencies in Hawaii, as to
defense, and the Secretary of War wrote an answering letter, to the
Navy Department, in which he recognized these deficiencies and stated
that the remedying of them was given top priority. All those letters
I presume you have.
83. General Grunert. We have them. We have also had testimony
on them. But the only new thing, or which appeared to be new, in
what 3^ou said, is that the letter was based on Richardson's report.
We did not know just what it was based on.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 925
Admiral Kimmel. Yes; it was based on Ricluu'dson's report; and I
believe that Herron knew all about it and approved what Richardson
was doing, and he sent in a parallel recommendation himself.
84. General Grunert. That brings up a point in the Roberts Com-
mission report. You testified as to an inspection you made of the
I'earl Harbor defenses in February of 1941, in which you stated that
you were astounded at the then existing weaknesses, and that you
pointed out the inadequacy of the antiaircraft guns, the obsolescence
of land-based aircraft, and the lack of air- [1768] craft de-
tectors. As far as that is concerned, did you communicate your views
on that subject to General Short ?
Admiral Kimmel. I think there is no question about that. If you
mean in writing and formally, no. If you mean in conversations, yes ;
and he thoroughly agreed with me.
85. General Grunert. During the time from that inspection in
February, 1941, up to, we will say, the latter part of November, 1941,
did 3'ou know what corrective action was taken? Did you notice any
improvement in what you had found before that?
Admiral Ivimmel. Yes. Roughly, at the time I made that statement
which you have referred to, the Army had no modern planes in Hawaii
at all, none.
80. General Grunert. That was in February of 1941 ?
Admiral Kimmel. Yes. The antiaircraft guns were even fewer
than they Were on December 7, 1941. In the spring we made two trips
with airplane carriers to bring pursuit planes for the Army to Hawaii.
I think it was two trips ; it may have been more. I knew by December
7. 1941, that they had approximatel}^ 100 effective pursuit planes in
the islands. So that was an increase from zero to 100. In that same
time they had as high as 27 B-17 bombers out there. I followed this
very closely because I was very much interested in it; and as I have
previously testified, you know we had just six effective ones on Decem-
l;er 7th. They had a number of other planes in the Army at that time,
that is, B-18's and A-20's, as I recall it. At any rate, I was informed
that they were practically useless for offensive work, and they were so
short that they could not get anywhere at sea, anyway.
87. General Grunert. Let us go into that. Did you know of
[17(10] the presence of a Japanese task force in the Marshall
Islands, in the vicinity of Jaluit, between November 27th and 30th?
If so, was this information transmitted to General Short?
Admiral Kimmel. We had radio intelligence, as I recall, of prob-
ably one or two Japanese carriers in the Marshalls. Along within
this period — I do not remember the exact date, but it was only a few
days before the attack — we also had information b}^ which we thought
we could place with reasonable accuracy all the Japanese carriers.
I do not recall all the details, but I went over this daily with my
intelligence ofiicer, with my war plans officer, and with my Chief of
Stuff, and we made a re-estimate based on the new intelligence and
took whatever action we thought was necessary. Practically every
time that General Short came to my headquarters, which was on an
average of two or three times a week throughout the time I was out
there, I called in the intelligence officer. I had a great wall map in
my office, and he gave us a little lecture on what the latest intelli-
926 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
gence was. That was done during the week of the 27th of November
to 7 December, and we had a report from the Navy Department dated
1 December, 1941, wliich phiced the Japanese carriers, the major part
of them, in the home waters. I think I can read you from this report,
if I may.
88. General Grunert. Yes. We would like to hear it.
Admiral Kimmel. This is the Fortnightly Summary of Current
International Situations issued by the Office of the Chief of Naval
Relations, Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, and dated De-
cember 1, 1941. It is signed by T. S. Wilkinson, Director of Naval
Intelligence. The portion which I am about to read is on page 9,
sub-paragraph C, ''The Japanese Naval Situa- [1770] tion."
(Portion of Fortnightly Summary of Current International Sit-
uations is as follows :)
Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that
extensive preparations are underway for hostilities. At the same time troop
transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and north-
ern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and
Formosan ports. Present movements to the south appear to be carried out
by small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force,
not definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next few days.
To date, this task force, under the Command of the Commander in Chief Second
Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually con-
centrating oft the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each
constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the
Combined Air Force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one divi-
sion of battleships may also be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains
in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers.
The equipment being cari-ied south is a vast assortment including landing
boats in considerable numbers. Activity in the Mandates, under naval control,
consists not only of large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions but
also of construction material with yard workmen, engineers, etc.
In addition to that, of course, there was a radio intercept unit to
obtain combat intelligence in the 14th Naval District, [1771]
directly under the command of the Commandant, 14th Naval District,
and they reported to me what they obtained. There was another
unit, the principal one, out in Manila, in the 16th Naval District, and
a unit in the Navy Department.
89. General Frank. In Washington.
Admiral Kimmel. Yes. In Washington. These three units with
their intercepts and summaries of information exchanged informa-
tion, and generally the Navy Department made up a summary and
sent it out. of their estimate, after having received the other two.
During this period the Navy Department directed the Commandant,
16th Naval District, to prepare the summaries, and gave more weight
to the 16th District than to the 14th District. We of course got all
those and, generally speaking, they confirmed what was in this sum-
mary of December 1st. We had no reason to believe, from any intelli-
gence we had, that the Japanese were going to make any air attack
on Pearl Harbor, or even that any attack was going to be made on
Pearl Harbor. Wliile we had received these messages, all of our in-
formation taken together resulted in the action that we took, and
there was no disagreement as to wliat we felt about the situation.
90. General Grunert. Do you believe that General Short was kept
generally informed of all that you have told us^
Admiral Kimmel. Yes.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 927
91. General Grunert. Was this stuff all highly secret ?
Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes. This stuff was highly secret; and these
secret matters about the enemy — we did not have any secrets from
Short himself.
92. General Grunert. Did you judge what to give General Short,
[1772] or did you give him practically everything?
Admiral Kimmel. I gave him everything. I did not tell him any-
thing about our plans for operation overseas. I gave him all the
information which I thought would help him in the defense of Oahu.
93. General Frank. How did you give him that information ?
Admiral Kimmel. Mostly by word of mouth, because that seems to
me to be the safest way.
94. General Frank. You gave it to him yourself?
Admiral Kimmel. I gave it to him and, as I have told you, by the
lectures in my office ; and his staff officers consulted with mine. So
far as the fleet plans of what we proposed to do were concerned, fol-
lowing the principle that the fewer people that know about any oper-
ations, the better off you are, he was not directly concerned and I did
not tell him about those, and he did not inquire.
95. General Grunert. Skipping down to a question that I had in
mind to ask, he probably had no definite interest in your plans as
far as your responsibilities were concerned, except inasmuch as it
might have affected his?
Admiral Kimmel. That is right.
96. General Grunert. When the task forces left Pearl Harbor to go
out into areas to either maneuver or for any special task which would
probably cover some of the area that would worry him for fear of
an attack coming from that particular direction, was he informed
generally about these task forces and where they were?
Admiral Kimmel. Yes.
97. General Grunert. But these task forces did not do what we
[1773] call distant reconnaissance for the defense of the islands,
did they?
Admiral Kimmel. It is a fact that wherever they were and what-
ever they did covered the areas, and to that extent it was reconnais-
sance. The ENTERPRISE, under Admiral Halsey, went to Wake
and was covered by aircraft all the way out, or patrol squadrons, in
addition to scouting of their own, and they cut a swath across there,
which was, in effect, a reconnaissance.
98. General Frank. It was incidental to the operation of the task
force, however ?
Admiral Kimmel. Yes.
99. General Grunert. Primarily reconnaissance for submarines, for
their own protection?
Admiral Kimmel. No. When Admiral Halsey went to Wake we
did not know what was going to happen to him. Wake w'as a consid-
erable distance. Patrol planes were not a great deal of protection
against submarines, and he did not bother about submarines particu-
larly, because he had an escort of 9 destroyers around his three cruisers
and aircraft carrier. He was looking for bigger game than sub-
marines.
928 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
100. General Grunert. You evidently had some suspicion, if you
sent a task force like that, that was well able to take care of itself.
You thought they might run into something?
Admiral Kimmel. Yes ; we thought they might run into something.
We were taking all precautions, always.
101. Genera] Grunert. But you did not think that that something
might come as far as Hawaii, or attempt to ?
Admiral Kimmel.. Based on the messages we had and our inter-
pretation of the messages and the information we had, we felt
[1774^] that they would not come to Hawaii. Otherwise w^e would
have done something somewhat different. Wake, you know, is 2,000
miles to the westward.
102. General Frank. You stated that your combat intelligence
had told you that there was this force in the Marshalls?
Admiral Kimmel. That is my recollection at the present time. I
cannot be sure of that.
103. General Frank. Which would put it in the vicinity of Jaluit.
That force, in your estimate of the situation, was supposed to consist
of some submarines and aircraft carriers. Did not that disturb you ^
Admiral Kimmel. Yes; but we watched that very closely.
104. General Frank. It disappeared, did it not, about Decem-
ber 1st?
Admiral Kim^iel. No : I do not think so ; not as I recall it.
105. General Frank. I think we have some testimony before the
Board that it went on radio silence and disappeared. If you w^ere
conversant with that, did not that cause you some concern?
Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes. But you must realize that in radio in-
telligence you cannot locate every ship every day. Throughout the
year in which I was in command and conversant daily with the situa-
tion units would disappear for four or five or six days, and then they
would come back again. That was something to be expected.
106. General Frank. What is your explanation, to your own mind,
of the reason for the presence of this Jap force at Jaluit?
Admiral Kimmel. I thought they were taking supplies of various
kinds down there, planes, all manner of things, and deploying. I
thought they were going to make an attack in south- [1775']
east Asia and that they were looking to see that they were not going
to be interfered with.
107. General Frank. Will you state how you felt with respect
to the possibility of a Japanese attack on the Hawaiian Islands at
this time?
Admiral Kimmel. Well, after reading all the messages and getting
all the information it boiled down to an estimate by the Navy Depart-
ment that the Japanese were on the move, and they included as possible
points of attack the Philippines and Guam. Of course, Guam would
have fallen at once.
108. General Frank. This estimate was by the Navy Department
in Washington ?
Admiral Kimmel. That is the message wdiich came. It mentioned
several places. Let me read the message to you.
109. General Grunert. The message of November 27th started
out:
Consider this dispatch a war warning.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 929
Admiral Kimmel (reading) :
The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific
have ended. Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next
few days. An ampliibious expedition against eitlier the Pliilippines, Thai or
Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo, is indicated by the number and equipment
(if Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. You will
execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned
in WPL 46 only. Guam, Samoa, and Continental districts have been directed to
take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent
by the War Department. Inform naval district and Army authorities. British
to be informed by Spenavo.
[1776'] The first sentence is :
This dispatch is to be considered a war warning.
Everytliing else in this dispatch is a characterization of that first
sentence, and it laid down in considerable detail where they expected
the attack — that and succeeding- messages which told of scouting
on the Indo-China coast, the proposal to transfer planes and personnel
to relieve troops on the Islands, and numerous other actions by the
War and Na\\y Departments, including the stress on sabotage, guard-
ing against sabotage in Oahu. It all led us to believe that the attack
would probably be down in southeast Asia; that if they did attack
the United States, it would be in the Philippines ; and if such an attack
were made in the Philippines it might be accompanied by some sub-
marines in the area.
I have said that some time ago. I have tried to repeat just what I
said before.
[1777] 110. General Frank. What I was after was an explana-
tion of how you arrived at a state of mind that led you to believe that
you were at that time secure against a Jap attack in Hawaii.
Admiral Kimmel. Well, I have tried to tell you.
111. General Frank. Yes.
Admiral Kimmel. I might add that the decisions I made were my
own. They were made after consultation with my staff and with my
senior assistants, the senior commanders, those that were present;
and that I have no reason to believe that General Short disagreed
with any of these decisions or the conclusions.
112. General Frank. The Army was sending planes, B-lTs, into
Honolulu from time to time ?
Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir.
113. General Frank. What was happening to them?
Admiral Kimmel. I think you ought to get that from the Army, but
I can tell you as well as I know. I am perfectly willing to do so.
114. General Frank. They were being sent —
Admiral Kimmel. You are talking now of the B-l7s ?
115. General Frank. Yes.
Admiral Kimmel. The B-17s were being transported to the Philip-
pines, and they were going to the Philippines by way of Oahu, Mid-
way, Wake, Port Moresby, and Manila.
116. General Frank. Did the fact that those planes were going
elsewhere and were not building up the force in Hawaii lead you to
any frame of mind ?
Admiral Kimmel. Tlie conclusion was inescapable that, if [1778]
the War Department liatl had any real belief that Hawaii was going to
be attacked, they would not have denuded them of B-17.
930 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
117. General Grunert. I want to go back to a little background on
information which might or might not have influenced the state of mind
early in 1941. Were you advised of the report of the United States
Ambassador to Japan by telegram to the Secretary of the Navy on
January 27, '41 (as contained in "Foreign Relations of the United
States; Japan 1931-41," Vol. II, Department of State, Washington)
reading as follows :
(Report of United Stales Ambassador to Japan (Grew) is as
follows :)
"The Ambassador in Japan (Cfrew) to the Secretary of Navy
(Paraphrase)
Tokyo January 27, 'Jfl — 6 p. m.
(Received January 27, '41 — 6:38 p. m.)
A member of the Embassy was told by [name omitted] colleague that from'
many quarters, including a Japanese one, he had heard that a surprise mass
attack on Pearl Harbor was planned by the Japanese military forces, in case of
"trouble" between .Japan and the United States ; that the attack would involve
the use of all the Japanese military facilities. My colleagues said that he was
prompted to pass this on because it had come to him from many sources, although
the plan seemed fantastic.
(Signed) Grew.
Did you in 1941 know anything about that ?
Admiral Kimmel. Yes, I had the substance of that sent to
[1779] me. It arrived out there in, oh, I imagine somewhere in
February of 1941, and it was sent by a subordinate in the Navy De-
partment in a routine manner. There was no stress laid on it, and
certainly if the Navy Department and the War Department took that
seriously they didn't take the action to meet the attack that they could
well have taken.
118. General Grunert. I think you have covered the question of
cooperation quite well, unless some member of the Board wants to
ask questions on the question of cooperation ; but I want to bring it
down to, say, two primary messages. One was this message you have
just referred to which starts out, "Consider this a war warning," and
the other was the Army message which apparently was sent as the same
information passed to the Army as was passed to the Navy, although
the two messages were worded entirely diJfferent.
Do you recall whether or not you had a conference on those messages
with General Short?
Admiral Kimmel. I received the message of 27 November from the
Navy Department in the afternoon in Hawaii, and I immediately sent
that message : gave it to my intelligence officer and departed from the
usual routine in order to get it to General Short.
119. General Grunert. Who was your intelligence officer?
Admiral Kimmel. Commander Layton.
120. General Grunert. Layton ?
Admiral Kimmel. L-a-y-t-o-n.
And departed from the usual routine in delivering it in order to get
it to him promptly. He was in the office, [1780] brought the
message into the office to me. And while he was still in there General
Short sent me the message which he had received from the War De-
partment on the subject. I read it and gave him back the message. I
didn't keep a copy of his message. As I recall it, I got the message
from the Navy Department the next day, which repeated, as you say,
PROCEEDINGS OF AKMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 931
the substance of the message which liad ah-eady been delivered to
General Short. I knew that General Short had been directed to make
his report to the War Department of the dispositions he had taken,
and I knew that he had made sncli a report.
On succeeding daj's, the 28tli — I don't get the dates ; I have them in
here somewhere (indicating papers) — we had a meeting and we dis-
cussed everj^thing that had to do with these messages. We did dis-
cuss all phases of the situation and the steps that we should take. The
discussion of the transfer of Army units to the islands involved in itself
a discussion of the Japanese situation and what measures we should
take, not only in Hawaii but in the islands.
121. General Frank. You mean the Philip])ine Islands?
Admiral Kimmel. No, no. We were talking about the outlying
islands when I spoke of the islands.
122. General Frank. Yes.
Admiral Kimmel. I might clarify it here. The islands that I re-
ferred to were ^Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, Canton, and Christ
mas, and even down in — we were talking about Noumea and New
Caledonia and Fiji and also Samoa; and how you can discuss move-
ments of the troops to these islands witliout discussing the Japanese
situation is beyond me. It couldn't be done, and we did discuss that
and every phase of it and the [1781] warnings that we had
received.
I don't know what else you asked for.
123. General Grunert. That covers it.
xldmiral Kimmel. What else?
124. General Grunert. That covers my question as to what confer-
ence you had and what was discussed.
Admiral Kimmel. Does that cover tlie question?
125. General Grunert.* Yes.
Now, in that discussion you understood, then, that the Army was
going on Alert 1, for sabotage?
Admiral Kimmel. I knew the Army was on a sabotage alert, yes.
126. General Grunert. And under the circumstances did you con-
sider that sufficient so that that would give you the jirotection that you
needed while your shijis were in the harbor?
Admiral Kimmel. Well, in the absence of an air raid, yes.
127. General Grunert. And evidently if you and General Sliort
were satisfied with the Army and tlie measures taken, tlien there must
have been a frame of mind that there would be no air raid ?
Admiral Kimmel. Oh, that is right.
128. General Grunert. So everything seems to be j^redicated on
that frame of mind and the reasoning and the conclusions reached as to
what might happen.
Admiral Kimmel. That is correct.
129. General Grunert. Now, then, of course- we know what did
happen; but, had it been in your mind that an- air raid might be pos-
sible, then that alert would not have been sufficient.
Admiral Kimmel. In addition to what you have just stated. T knew
that General Short had reported to the War Department the [1782]
measures he had taken. I had every reason to believe that the War
Department, who had much more information or was in a position to
have more information than we had, was satisfied with what he had
79716 — 4(3 — Ex. 145, vol. 2 10
932 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
done, and that went to add another reason why we thought that what
we liad done was all right.
130. General Grunert. Now, in ordea' to make sure about this ques-
tion of cooperation between the Commanders oA^er there, 'I want to ask
you an impertinent question.
Admiral Kimmel. Well, I shall try to answer it.
131. General Grunert. Is it a fact that you and General Short
mutually, whilst maintaining the utmost in cordial personal relation-
ship, felt such a delicacy as to interest in one another's affairs that
neither of you really got down to the details of your respective respon-
sibilities and inquired into each other's business, so that there was a
lack of true teamwork and cooperation based upon definite factual
knowledge of exactly what was happening?
Admiral Kimmel. That's a mouthful. 1 will answer that this way.
I served for a great many years in the Navy. One of the things that
I had observed was the lack of cooperation betwixt the Army and the
Navy in the various theaters that I had served. I was Chief of Staff
with Admiral Tom Craven when he was Commander of the battleships
of the battle force, and he made every effort he could at that time to get
some joint exercises on the West Coast, to get some joint exercises in
the Canal Zone, and to get a joint exercise in Hawaii, and he was
unsuccessful at every turn.
We went on a problem into Pearl Harbor, I think it was in '35,
spring of '35, winter and early spring of '35, and we [17S3] ar-
rived off the entrance along in the middle of the night and steamed
up and down in front of that harbor awaiting an entrance plan;
and during the course of the night the Army turned searchlights on
us. They were friendly, you see; we were entering our own port.
They exposed us to the enemy.
So Admiral Craven got ahold of the Commanding General and
twitted him with this business about how he had turned the search-
lights on them. The Commanding General said he didn't know we
were coming in, didn't know anything about it; and then he went
to our Commander-in-Chief and he spoke to him about it. He said,
"It is none of the Army's business when we come in."
I knew all this, and when I took command of the Fleet I decided
I was going to cultivate friendly relations with General Short and
to exchange information fully and freely with him.
He came to Honolulu a few days ahead of time and lived in a
house out in town, and I went out in civilian clothes, and while he
was still in civilian clothes, and called on him, and I told him then
that I wanted to cooperate and do everything we could together. In
that and succeeding conferences I took up the question of cooperation
and coordination of our effort in Hawaii.
General Short responded as a man should, and our relations were
always cordial, and we discussed all matters that had to do with a
defense of Hawaii fully, frankly, and completely. To be sure, he
did not inquire as to the organizations that I had in the ships, and
I did not inquire as to the organization of his troops on shore. That
was his job. He knew more about [iT'^-l] that than I did,
on the one hand, and I thought I knew more about the other than
he did, and it was not where our paths crossed.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 933
I fool that I was very well infoniied as to the rondition of the
defense of Hawaii as far as the Army was concerned, and I think
he was very well informed as to the Navy, It was a question of
details that I knew nothing about, and many details in the naval
service are left to subordinates. I had to trust them, and did.
I think that constitutes an answer to your question.
Is that an answer to your question ?
132. General Grunert. That is an answer.
Did that same cordiality of cooperation extend down tlirough the
staffs, as far as you know ?
Admiral Kimmel. Yes, I think it did. I am sure it did.
133. General Grunert. Was there ever any discussion or question
as to the necessity of getting the staffs physically together with a
view toward furthering each other's interests?
Admiral Kimmel. I think they were physically together, and they
were on the ends of telephone lines which they used freely and
frequently.
134. General Grunert. Then, no such idea existed as, "Well, hell,
that's their business. Although it affects my responsibility, that's
their business. Therefore I won't inquire into it"?
Admiral Kimmel. No; I think less than in any place I have ever
seen. And there was a certain courtesy which goes with all relations
and must be maintained, and I think it was maintained.
[17S5] You ask about that. I think it would be of interest to
you to have an account of cooperation in training radar crews.
135. General Grunert. I was coming to it next.
Admiral Kimmel. We had radar in four of five ships out there. It
was brand-new in the Navy, but we got it a little before the Army got
it on shore ; and immediately we got it we told the Army about it ; and
they, knowing that they were going to get radar, wanted to put some
men on the ships to send them to sea so that they could see radar op-
erated and learn how to operate it, take lessons in it. For weeks there
we had Army personnel on every ship that was equipped with radar,
every time they left the harbor, and most of the time while they were in
port too, and they learned a great deal about the only equipment of that
kind that was available in the Islands.
Subsequently the Army obtained their radar, and along in August of
'41 I had a letter from General Short in which he thanked me for the
cooperation given him by letting his men go on the ships, and saying
that he expected to have his radar in operation very shortly.
About the same time he wrote to me asking that I detail a liaison
officer for radar. I replied to his letter and detailed my communica-
tion officer. Commander Curts, and told him he would be available
for consultation at all times and liaison, and that was the last request
I had for any liaison officer to be detailed to General Short.
Subsequently a Lieutenant Taylor — W. E. C. Taylor I think his name
is — came to the Fleet, and he was a naval reserve officer and he had been
in the Marines, in the British Navy, British Air Force, had quite a
career. At any rate, he knew [1786] something about the
operation of radar, and I think he knew more about the reception in
the plane than he did about anything else. At any rate, the Army
asked us to let him come over there and advise them. General Martin
934 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
requested it, as I remember, and so I sent him over on verbal orders
to do anything he could to help. He worked \\itli the Army in an
advisory capacity in trying to get their information center — I think
that is what they called it — working over thei'e.
Of course I didn't follow his activities in detail, but I have since
been informed that he did do considerable to assist the Army, and on
24 November he submitted a report to the responsible Army people,
the Colonels in the information center, and I believe he stated that
he had given a copy of his report to my operations officer. I had never
seen it until just the other day. It was quite a good report. I do not
know how sound the recommendations were, but he covered the situa-
tion very well, and it was his views on the situation.
I cite those things to show how we tried to work together and how
we did exchange information.
Now, of course, any liaison officer required in the information center
should have been supplied by the Commandant, 14th Naval District,
rather than by the Commander-in-Chief. That was his function, to
see that that was done, and my information, which I have no way of
checking — at least I haven't checked — was that no specific request had
been received for the detail of liaison officers up to December 7.
13G. General Grunert. That was insofar as tlie information center
of the air warning service was concerned?
Admiral Kimmel. That is right.
[1787] 137. General Grunert. But I believe that the Com-
mandant of the 14th Naval District did have a Lieutenant Burr as a
liaison officer with the opei'ations section of the General Staff, did he
not?
Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes. I was talking merely of the aircraft
warning.
138. General Frank. A. W. S.
Admiral Kimmel. Now, all of my i-emarks there should be restricted
to the aircraft warning service.
139. General Grunert. All right.
Admiral Kijimel. And I do not know of my own knowledge A^•hat
the Connnandant, 14th Naval District, did, but tliat is what I have
been informed.
140. General Grunert. As to this liaison officer, Lieutenant Burr,
with what we call the G-3, which corresponds to your Operations:
was he considered both as liaison officer for you and the 14th Naval
District, or just for the 14th Naval District ?
Admiral Kimmel. I would say that he was the liaison officer for the
14th Naval District primarily.
141. General Grunert. Yes.
Admiral Kimmel. And I think that you should understand that
the ordinary and most of the contacts betwixt the Army and Navy in
Hawaii were headed up as between General Short and Admiral Bloch :
that is, the Commandant of the 14th Naval District and the Com-
mander of the Hawaiian Department. The Connnander-in-Chief was,
theoretically at least, a bird of passage, and it was a fortuitous circum-
stance that I went ashore at all. The only reason I went asliore was
that I could [1788] not house an adequate staff on board the
ships, any ship without practically demcjbilizing it. My communica-
tion was much better when I w^ent on shore than it was on a ship, and
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 935
I had much freer coinmuiiication. Every tmie I cut loose on the ship
it would lay it open to location by the radio direction finders.
That and various other considerations led to my going on shore.
It was inevitable that while I was on shore certain of the decisions
that had to be made as betwixt the Army and the Na\'y would neces-
sarily have to be referred to me. At practicall}^ every conference that
I conducted or that I attended with General Short, Admiral Bloch was
))resent, and Admiral Bloch was primarily concerned with carrying
out the decisions made there.
142. (leneral Grunert. What ])rompted that question about Lieu-
tenant Burr as liaison officer was something that came up in some
former testimony to the effect that that liaison officer was suposed to
transmit everything to the Navy that went on about the Army in
which the Navy was interested.
[17<S9] Admiral Kimmel,. Well, of course, in the set-up. Ad-
miral Bloch was responsil)le for keeping me informed of all his deal-
ings with the Connnander of the Hawaiian Department in which he
thought I would have any interest or that it w^ould be necessary for
me to know. There were a great many things that he did witii the
Commander of the Hawaiian Department, that he never told me
anything about, quite properly to.
143. General Grunp:rt. Let us go forward with the intercepting
command; and we included as one of its functions the Air Warning
Service. I want to find out from you just what you know about that
in the latter part of November and early in December, and what you
thought of it as to its status and its ability to operate.
Admiral Kimmel. Well, at the time, I thought the aircraft warn-
ing service of the Army was probably somewhat better than it later
proved to be. I knew that in the drills that we had conducted they had
been quite successful in following the planes, and I recall that General
Short, on one occasion, told me that he thought he could give us a
coverage up to 150 miles and probably to 200 miles. This was just
conversation. I didn't inquire too closely into it, because that was
quite satisfactory to me; and if he could do that, that was, I thought,
doing pretty well.
I knew that they were standing watches in the aircraft warning
center to the limit of their personnel and equipment; and I knew that,
even though I think now I had somewhat overestimated the capacity
of it, I knew it was far from perfect and far from a finished product ;
but it was all we had, and I believed they were doing the very best they
could with it.
[1790] 144. General Grunert. Did you know they were "stand-
ing watch," as you call it, only from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m., ancl that that was
only for practice purposes?
Admiral Kimmee. In detail, I didn't know^ just the hours that they
were standing watch. The aircraft warning service was manned dur-
ing most of the day. I had been informed of that.
145. General Frank. Did you get the impression that it was manned
most of the da}^ just for training purposes, or for actual, effective
operation?
Admiral Kimmel. Well, I thought wdiile it w^as manned it was effec-
tive. Now, so far as effective operation is concerned, the aircraft warn-
936 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ing service, I knew and everybody else knew, was in a state of infancy,
and we couldn't expect too much of it,
146. General Frank. You knew that?
Admiral KiMMEL. Oh, yes. Why, of course !
147. General Frank. You knew that it had not been formally
activated to the point of where they were providing full-hour service ?
Admiral Kimmel. Well, I knew that on the many drills that we
had had, they had manned this center, and sent out a lot of informa-
tion and drill messages of various kinds.
148. General Frank. Did you realize that, for them to have been
operative, it would have been necessary for several different agencies
like the Navy and the Civilian Defense and others to have had people
on duty all the time at the information center ?
Admiral Kimmel. Well, I was talking about radar; and the in-
formation center, while it is a part of the system, it is [179J'\
not radar, but the information center is to use the radar information
that is obtained.
149. General Frank. That is right; but it all has to be integrated
into a system, for any part of it to be successful?
Admiral Kimmel. Well, it can be partially successful, even when it
is only partially integrated. For instance, if a young man on the
radar calls up and says he has got planes at such and such a place,
that in itself is some information to him. Now, I agree thoroughly
that to be fully effective it must be fully and completely manned.
150. General F^ank. Yes. You realize that it was not?
Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes; but the radar was different from the
information center.
151. General Frank. Yes, I know. We are fully conversant with
that.
Admiral Kimmel. Yes, I know. I just want to clarify my position,
that is all.
152. General Frank. When did General Short make the state-
ment that he could give coverage up to 150 miles ?
Admiral Kimmel. Oh, I don't know. I couldn't give you that by
line and date, to save my life.
153. General Grunert. Knowing what you did about radar and the
information center, did you feel that, on December 7, that had let
you down ?
Admiral Kimmel. Of course, I knew nothing about the receipt of
any inform atiton at all in the Army radar, until the Tuesday, I think
it was, following the attack; and when I found out that they had
known where these planes came from and located within rather nar-
row limits the attacking force [1792] yes, I felt let down,
because that was the information we wanted above everything else.
I have been informed that the Navy, Admiral Bellinger, and Captain
Logan Ramsey, called the Army information center several times
each, during this attack of December 7, and asked them if they had
been able to locate the direction from which these planes had come,
and to which they returned ; and each time they were informed they
couldn't get anything.
Then, when this information was reconstructed two days later, we
felt that it was unfortunate that we had not had that information
available.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 937
154. General Gkunkrt. I have one more (luestion, then T w ill turn
you over to one of the other nienibers, to piece out.
It appears that one Raymond Coll, editor of a Hawaiian newspaper,
was quoted by a Washington newspaper shortly after the submission
of the Roberts Commission's report, on January 1^4, 1942, as having
said, in substance :
General Short and Admiral KLmmel had made clear by their utterances before
December 7 the probability and imminence of a Japanese attack at an early
date.
Is there any basis of fact for that statement ?
Admiral Kimmel. No.
155. General Grunekt. As far as you remember?
Admiral Kimmel. As far as I remember, no newspaperman quoted
me to any such effect. In any event, I did not make any such state-
ment. Now, the only possible basis that he could have had for such
a statement was a speech which I made at the Chamber of Connnerce
meeting — that is, as far as I am concerned — at the Royal Hawaiian
Hotel, and I indicated certain measures [179^] that they
could take in the islands which would improve things considerably,
from our standpoint ; and I forget the exact term. I think it was
along the lines of ''You might even have an attack, here." That was
the sentiment. Other than that, I don't know of anything. And
that was made in September, not in November.
156. General Grunert. General Russell, or General Frank?
157. General Russell. I think you have explored most of it, Ad-
miral. There are tMO or three details. In discussing the aircraft
available to the Army and Navy, early in your testimony, I do not
recall any mention which you made of the aircraft that were on the
carriers. We have had testimony to the effect that the ENTER-
PRISE and the LEXINGTON had a complement of aircraft con-
sisting of some 83 planes.
Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. They were shy. They were
short of torpedo planes, and they were short of fighter planes — every
one of our carriers.
158. General Russell. Let us count what we had.
Admiral Kimmel. All right.
159. General Russeli.. I believe we had 83 planes on each of those
carriers?
Admiral Kimmel. Something of that kind.
160. General Russell. What type of planes were they?
Admiral Kimmel. They were fighters and torpedo bombers. I
think that is all — and scouts, yes — dive bombers, fighters, and torpedo
bombers; that is right, isn't it?
161. General Russell. To what extent were they effective as recon-
naissance planes?
Admiral Kimmel. To a very limited extent, probably a \^179Jf\
maximum of 300 miles, Halsey told me that he could send his planes
out to 300 miles.
162. General Grunert. And have them come back?
Admiral Kimmel. And have them come back. I said, "How far
have you sent them?"' He said, "I have never sent them ofut more
than 200." That was long prior to Pearl Harbor. As to distant
938 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
reconnaissance, there was nothing in those carriers which was capable
of distant reconnaissance.
163. General Russell. They could have a maxinnnn total flight,'
then, of from 400 to 600 miles'?
Admiral Kimmel. When they were armed and ready for action.
164. General Russell. Well, were they armed and ready for action
on these carriers, prior to December 7?
Admiral Kimmel. Oh, 3'es; Halsey had them all armed and ready
for action.
165. General Russell. So this was a reconnaissance force which
we did not mention earlier? This was a reconnaissance means that
you did not mention earlier in the testimony?
Admiral Kimmel. No, it wasn't a reconnaissance means. That is
just what I have said.
166. General Russell. They could go out 200 miles, and look, and
come back?
Admiral Kimmel. Oh, well, yes, sir; that is true; but I mean as
bearing on the subject of distant reconnaissance in the Hawaiian
Islands. They were practically useless for that.
167. General Russell. What aircraft was being used by these task
forces for reconnaissance, for their protection?
Admiral Kimmel. Those. Those were the aircraft that were used
for reconnaissance for their protection.
I / 7,9 J] 168. General Russell. Then that left some 50 aircraft
based on Oahu available for reconnaissance from those bases?
Admiral Kimmell. Yes — loi>g-range aircraft; that is right. Now,
I think I should make it clear that the aircraft based on the car-
riers were not in fact available for reconnaissance, and to stick an
aircraft carrier out into an area where you were expecting an attack
of this kind as a reconnaissance force was just suicidal.
169. General Russell. Let us go back to the question, then that
was answered a while ago, and that seems to be departed from, now.
What aircraft was used by these task forces that went on to INIidway
and Wake and those other islands, for the reconnaissance which was
conducted by the task forces ?
Admiral Kimmel. The aircraft, as you framed the question, were
those that were on the carriers ; but in addition to the reconnaissance
conducted by the aircraft on the cai-riers, we had the long-range
patrol planes operating and covering the areas that they were travers-
ing on the way out and back, and basing on Pearl Harbor, Johnston,
Midway, and Wake.
170. General Russell. That clears it up, for the first time.
Now, we had testimony here about some marine planes.
Admiral Kimmel. Yes.
171. General Russell. That is, as distinguished from the categories
that you have already described.
Admiral Kimmel." They w^ere the Marine Expeditionary planes.
172. General Russell. What was their reconnaissance capacity?
Admiral Kimmel. They were about equal to the planes that go
onto ships — the same thing, the same kind of planes that go onto
the ship, the scout dive-bombers.
[J796'] 173. General Russell. In answer to a question by Gen-
eral Grunert, or General Frank, you stated that, once having located
PROCEEDINGS OF AHAIY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 939
the task force in the mandated islands — and I am not sure that you
confined that answer to the Marshall Islands — you watched it rather
closely. What means did you employ to watch it?
Admiral Kimmel. Well, the radio interception; that is all we had.
Well, I said, "radio interception, that is all we had" — I am not now
and never have been familiar with all the means available to the
Navy Department in Washington.
174. General Russell. As a matter of fact, Admiral, if that Jap-
anese task force was in the Marshalls, it was some 400 or 500 miles
south of one of our positions — I believe. Wake Island — was it not?
Admiral Koiimel. About GOO miles, something like that.
175. General Russell. About 600 miles from Wake?
Admiral Kimmel. Well, if you locate the task force at Jaluit, it is
considerably more than GOO miles.
176. General Russell. It would be 100 or 200 miles farther?
Admiral Kimmel. Yes: that is right.
177. General Russell. In other w^ords, the situation was that we
actually discovered carriers at Jaluit, and we had an operating base
600 or 700 miles away from there? ' .
Admiral Kimmel. That is right; that is right.
178. General Russell. And it came to pass that, if this Japanese
task force left Jaluit, it traveled, by this route, or by Wake, for some
2,000 miles, and launched their air attack on Hawaii?
Admiral Kimmel. Yes.
179. General Grunert. I think the upper one of those maps will
YOU show you the location of Jaluit.
\1797] x\.dmiral Kimmel. Here is Wake, here is Jaluit, and there
is Hawaii. This is not a scale map, but it gives you the general idea.
ISO. General Russell. Now, while we are looking at the map, we
had forces on Wake, and we had forces at Midwaj^, and we had forces
at Johnston ? , . ; : ,
Admiral Kimmel. That is right.
181. General Russell. Let us assume, now, that the Japanese task
force from which the carrier aircraft w^ere launched reached a point
1?)5 miles north of Oahu, and launclied their attack on Pearl Harbor.
Then they had to make their way through the open sea, through these
outposts of ours, for a distance of approximately 2200 miles, to reach
that point from which to launch their aircraft?
Admiral Kimmel. More than that, if they were going to the north-
ward— and that's where the Army says they found them — consider-
ably more than that. I have no idea that they came inside of the 800-
mile circle, when they were going up there, until they got ready to
come in.
In other words. General, I cannot prove it, but I believe now that
the carriers that took part in that attack came from Japan, they didn't
come from the Marshalls, at all ; and I have felt that the most probable
direction of the attack, after it had taken place, was from the north-
ward ; and there are many reasons for that — many reasons for that.
You have given a good many of them, already, yourself — that is, the
outlying islands, and the fear of discovery if they came in from the
south.
182. General Rltssell. They had to pass through whatever screen
of reconnaissance was set up by our installations ?
940 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[1798'] Admiral Kimmel. That is right.
183. General Russell. That is, on the islands we have named ; and
by the barriers of tlie task forces that moved back and forth to these
outlying islands ?
Admiral Kimmel. That is right. That is correct.
184. General Russell. And you regard that as one of the prin-
cipal reasons why they came from some other place?
Admiral Kimmel. That is right. Now, my estimate at the time
was, it was northward. I got information that they were to the south,
which later I think proved to be wrong. "Bill" Halsey was in the
operating area at the time — and he is good; always has been — he
thought they would come from the south ; but, there you are ! I think,
though, now, they didn't.
185. General Russell. Let me ask you this : Is it true or not that
there was considerable activity of hostile submarines in and around
the Hawaiian Islands on tlie 7th of December, and two or three days
thereafter ?
Admiral Kimmel. Yes, yes.
186. General Russell. If it were brought to your attention and you
were convinced that the commander of that submarine force which
operated in that area was located down in the Marshalls, would that
influence your thinking as to where the carriers came from?
Admiral Kimmel. No.
187. General Russell. Not at all ?
Admiral Kim3iel. No, no. Those two forces could assemble in
that area, coming from different directions, and could have arrived
at specified points, or to be at the specified points at the time of the
attack, and then operate from that on ; and [1799] there is no
particular evidence to show as to where the submarines came from.
They could have come from any direction. When I say "any direc-
tion," they could have come either from Japan or from the Mandates.
188. General Russell. About what was the speed of these carriers
of the Japanese Navy at that time?
Admiral Kimmel. Oh, I think the best of them, about 27 knots.
189. General Russell. That is approximately 30 miles ?
Admiral Kimmel. A little over; adding %, 31 or 32 miles, or 14.
190. General Russell. Could they average that over a considerable
period of time ?
Admiral Kimmel. Oh, I think so, long enough to make a 24-hour
dash, or something of that kind.
191. General Russell. If they came from Japan, they would have
been on the open sea for about a week, would they not?
Admiral Kimmel. Oh, I estimated — and this was all part of it —
if they came from Japan, they had to start at least two weeks, maybe
longer, because when they made the attack, they had to be full of
fuel, and they had to fuel at sea before they made the attack; and
fueling at sea at that time of year and in those latitudes was a pretty
difficult proposition ; and I don't think that they came there and made
an attack when they were empty of fuel, as they would have been after
coming all the way from Japan; and therefore these fellows must
have started, oh, I would say at least two weeks beforehand, consider-
ing all the things that I think they had to do.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 941
192. General Russell. If they had come out of the Marshalls,
[JSOO] How lono; before that would they have had to start, to
have made that attack on December 7 ?
Admiral Kimmel. Well, it is about 3500 miles from Japan to Oahu.
From the Marshalls to Oahu approaching Oahu from the north and
skirtino- the 800-mile circle, it would be about 3,000 miles. Those are
offhand estimates. You see what I mean by skirting, do you not?
They would have to keep out of the Oahu 800-mile circle.
193. General Russell. Admiral, this testimony has been given on
this question — and it is a matter of opinion
Admiral Koimel. A good many of these things are.
194. General Russell. Yes, sir; we have gotten opinions both from
Army and Navy personnel.
If four Japanese carriers, each with a complement of 50 or 60 planes,
or a total of from 200 to 250 planes, reached a point from which an
attack on Honolulu could have been launched, say 125 to 150 miles out ;
having 150 to 200 aircraft available for that attack; do you believe
that, with the defensive means available to the Army and Navy at
Pearl Harbor on that day defense could have been set up which would
have been completely successful ?
Admiral Kimmel. No, I think that every bit of evidence in the
war indicates that, once an aircraft attack is launched, it is never
stopped. I mean an attack in force, like that.
195. General Frank. A determined attack?
Admiral Kimmel. A determined attack; yes; and the only excep-
tions to that, that I know of, are the reports that came back from
Saipan, where they practically annihilated the Jap force, with no
damage to ourselves; but those were against moving targets; and
certainly, with the defenses that we had in [1S01~\ Hawaii at
that time, we were going to be hurt somewhat if they drove in.
[1S03] 196. General Russell. Before w^e go aw^ay from the
probabilities of Japanese action in early December : You did con-
clude that there were probabilities of attack against your forces by
submarines ?
Admiral Kimmel. Yes; if they attacked the Philippines, if they
attacked- United States possessions, yes.
197. General Russell. If war came you expected submarine at-
tacks?
Admiral Kimmel. Yes. I expected submarines in that area,
198. General Russell. Around Oahu ?
Admiral Kimmel. Yes.
199. General Russell. But you did not expect an air force attack?
Admiral Kimmel. No; not at that time.
200. General Russell. I want to ask }^ou one or two questions about
your letter. You did not write the letter of January 25, did you?
You had not been on duty there?
Admiral Kimmel. I think it was a letter of January 11, was it not?
There were two letters.
(Informal discussion off the record.)
201. General Russell. I think your counsel has suggested what I
wanted to know. He stated that you collaborated with Admiral Rich-
ardson in the letter which motivated the Secretary of the Navy in
942 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Avriting to the Secretary of War and calling attention to the weak-
nesses of the defenses at the Pearl Harbor base.
Admiial Kimmel. I did not collaborate in the writing of this letter.
Early in January a letter was written by Admiral Richardson, and
that letter I knew about, although I did not collaborate in writing it.
In the latter part of January an- [1S03] other letter on the
same subject was written, and at the end of the letter it said, "Rear
Admiral Kimmel, who is to be my relief, concurs in what I have said."
I think that was on the 25th of January.
202. General Russell. As a part of the estimate of the situation,
as stated in that letter, that the most probable form of attack on Oahu
or the harbor would be a surprise air attack in conjunction with a
submarine attack, the reference to the outstanding weaknesses of the
defenses on Oahu related to this surprise air attack. Do you recall
that?
Admiral Kimmel. Which letter is that? 25 January?
203. General Russell. I did not see your letters, and have not until
now.
Admiral Kimmel. You are talking now about the letter from the
Secretary of the Navy?
204. General Russell. Yes.
Admiral Kimmel. No ; I did not agree to that. I have stated that
I felt that the most probable form of attack out there was a submarine
attack. I thought they might drop some mines. The mining was
easily taken care of, because there was only a limited area in which
they could plant mines effectively.
205. General Russell. Do you have a copy of the Richardson letter
here?
Admiral Kimmel. No.
206. General Russell. Do you have a copy of any letter that came
to the Secretary of the Navy in which the probabilities of Japanese
action out there were described? What I am attempting to say,
Admiral, is this : Do you know whether or not the letter of the Secretary
of the Navy to the Secretary of War set up a [iS'04] different
probability from that contained in other letters?
Admiral Kimmel. I could not state that from memory. . At any
rate, the probabilities set up in the Secretary of War's letter to the
Secretary of the Navy, and of the Secretary of the Navy to the Secre-
tary of War, and of the Commander-in-Chief, are somewhat influenced
by the needs of the situation, by what was needed to be remedied at
the time, and trying to emphasize for all time the things that need to
be done now.
207. General Frank. A conclusion reached at any time depends
upon the series of circumstances surrounding the situation at that time ;
is not that true ?
Admiral Kimmel. Exactly. The conclusion arrived at, in which I
might concur in January, 1941, I would not w'ant to be held to in
November of 1941, under different circumstances.
208. General Russell. Were not the probabilities that the Japanese
would strike from the air the same in November as they were in
January ?
Admiral Kimmel. No.
209. General Russell. What was different ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 943
Admiral Kimmei.. Not necessarily. It all d('[)ends upon Avhat the
Japanese intentions were and M'hat other eniploj^ment they had for
their aircraft at that time.
210. General Russell. What evidence did yon have of changes in
their intentions between January 1st and November which might have
made the probabilities of air attack less?
Admiral Kimmel. AVe are considering now — at least I am — the prob-
abilities of a specific time under specific circumstances. I have given
you my estimate of that. To ask me what the changes were from the
previous January — I do not remember exactly [1(S'0S'] what the
conditions were the previous January. If you mean the physical con-
ditions of Pearl Harbor and such things as that, that is one thing.
211. General Russell. Admiral, what occurs to me — and I am at-
tempting to get at a rather big conclusion — is this : You have testified,
and it has been supported by a line of evidence here, that there was not
available to the Army and Navy any means for distant reconnaissance
to ascertain the location af a Japanese task force.
Admiral Kimmel. That is correct.
212. General Russell. Prior to the time that it might reach a point,
from which it could launch aircraft from carriers. That seems to me
a conclusion that the witnesses agree upon. It has also been testified
rather consistently that such a task force having reached the point
from which aircraft could be launched, the attack could not be stopped.
Hence the conclusion seems inevitable that there was not any way for
the American force at Hawaii to prevent a very great danger to our
installations there by aircraft attack from carriers on the 7th of De-
cember, 1941. Is that true ?
Admiral Kimmel. In general, I think it is.
213. General Russell. If the success of such an attack was assured
and the Japanese seemed to have known everything about the situation
out there, why would they not have made an attack which had to be
successful ?
Admiral Kimmel. Well, of course, there are two or three answers
to that. One is that the Japanese Air Force, I think, without question,
was much more efficient than we had believed it to be. The attack
was a Avell-planned and well executed at- [1806] tack. An-
other phase is that the greatest damage done there was done by air-
craft torpedoes. We believed prior to the Tth of December that they
could not launch an aerial torpedo in Pearl Harbor. We thought
that the water was not deep enough. Our air service had not been
able to do it; and we had received official information fi'om the Navy
Department which convinced us that it could not be done. We were
wrong. The major part of the damage was done by such torpedoes.
So far as reconnaissance is concerned, we had plans for reconnais-
sance and could run reconnaissance of a sort, but in our estimate
which had been submitted to Washington, and wdiich was on file in
both the War and Navy Departments, it was clearly stated that w-e
had to know the time of the attack, within rather narrow limits, in
order to have anything like an effective search, because we could not
maintain a search exce])t for a very few days. Then of course we were
hoping to get more jilanes all the time, and M^e had been promised
additional planes, patrol planes, and additional Army bombers, all of
which were necessary for the defense of Oahu.
944 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
214. General Ritssell. It occurs to me, Admiral, that we have gone
over rather carefully all of those elements.
Admiral Kimmel. I am talking about what we were basing our
estimates on. The question of torpedoes is a very vital one, because
that is where the major portion of the damage was done. If it had
been a pure bombing attack I do not think it would have been anything
like the same amount of damage.
215. General Russell. Let me ask you this question : It occurs to
me that your answer now as to the incorrectness of your esti;nate is
based on your under-estimate of the capacity of the [1807] Jap-
anese Air Force.
Admiral Kimmel. Yes ; a considerable part of it.
216. General Russell. Where did you receive the information from
which you made your estimate as to the capabilities of the Japanese
Air Force.
Admiral Kimmel. From all sources : The Navy Department, people
who had been in Japan. It was all taken together, you might say,
a resultant of many opinions.
217. General Russell. Was the estimate made up by you and your
staff in your official capacity, or was it sent out to you from the Navy
Department ?
Admiral Kimmel. We got information from the Navy Department
about it ; but so far as the efficiency of the Japanese Air Force is con-
cerned I do not think I can at present put my finger on it. I am
merely speaking now of a general feeling, and I think that a good
many people have testified to that feeling, that they had underesti-
mated the ability of the Japanese Air Force, and that tliat was not
confined to the fleet, by any means.
218. General Russell. I think we are all agreed that w^e had a bad
estimate, and we are trying to find out where it came from. That is
largely the purpose of this. Before I go from that : I have asked some
questions heretofore about our failure to know anything about what
was going on in the Mandated Islands except by the radio intercept,
which of course presupposes, to be at all effective, the existence of
some elements of the Japanese forces there using radio on their part.
What efforts were made, after you came into the command of the
fleet out there, up to December 7th, to send people to the Mandated
Islands to discover [180S] what the Japanese were doing.
xVdmiral Kimmel. My recollection is that our orders were not to
go anywhere near them.
219. Genera] Russell. From whom did those orders come?
Admiral Kimmel. We wanted to go into the Gilberts to make some
surveys down there and find out something about the Gilberts, and
the answer was that we should not evince any interest in the Gilberts,
because the Japs might find out that Ave were interested.
220. General Russell. Do you know specifically where the orders
came from to stay out the Mandated Islands?
Admiral Kimmel. As far as I am concerned, they came from the
Navy Department.
221. General Russell. Do you have any recollection of any such
orders ?
Admiral Kimmel. Any specific orders, you mean?
222. General Russell. Yes.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 945
Adininil Kimmel. AVell, the Navy Department restricted the Com-
mander-in-Chief to a considerable extent. A movement such as that
would have had to be approved by the Navy Department. While I
cannot put my finoer on it, I am convinced that no reconnaissance of
the Mandates would have been permitted by the Navy Department
at that time. The only time while I was out there that a reconnais-
sance of the Mandates was authorized was a proposal to send a
B-24 over and do some photographing.
223. General Russell. Could you look into that and present the
information to the Board?
Admiral Kimmel. I have nothing on it.
224. General Russell. One more question, and then we will go
[1809] away from the reconnaissance feature. Did you know as
a result of your contacts with General Short that the maximum limit
of reconnaissance of which any means available to him was capable
ended at the extreme range of the radar? Do I make myself clear?
Admiral Kimmel. Yes. I think you mean that having turned over
all planes capable of reconnaissance to the Navy, the only thing left
to him was the radar. Is that right?
225. General Russell. Yes.
Admiral Kimmel. Yes ; I think that is correct.
226. General Russell. So you knew, then, that when the Army's
radar range of 130 miles was reached, beyond that the Army could
discover nothing about Japanese movements and convey information
to you, whatever the range was?
Admiral Kimmel. Yes.
227. General Russell. So that the responsibility for watching the
departure of Japanese convoys beyond that limit was the responsi-
bility of the Navy?
Admiral Kimmel. I knew also that even if he had available all of
his own planes he could not have gotten the necessary information
from reconnaissance.
228. General Russell. Admiral, I have had some curiosity about
what was done with your radar as far as the ships in the harbor
were concerned.
Admiral Kimmel. I have been informed by experts, and knew
at the time, that the radar on ships in port was virtually useless on
account of the surrounding hills, and the towers and buildings in the
Navy Yard, and we never made any attempt to use it, but depended
entirely on the shore for radar informa- [ISIO] tion. Further-
more, radar pro])erly mounted on shore, and high up, has nmch longer
range than anything we could get, because one of the elements in the
range of the radar is the height above the sea at which it is mounted.
229. General Russell. Did the military people who came down
to the ships while they were in the harbor to receive instructions in
the operation of the radar receive instructions in the operation while
the ships were there in the harbor ^
Admiral Kimmel. They went to sea. That is where they got their
real instruction, but they played with it in port. While you can play
with it in port and learn how to work it, the indications are erratic
and unreliable, if you get any. I am not a radar expert, and you can
run me up a tree very quickly on that.
946 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
2o0. General Russell. Someone else will have to do that. I am not
a radar expert, either.
I believe you stated that General Short on one occasion said that
he could cover 150 to 200 miles?
Admiral I^mmel. Yes.
231. General Russell. Did you interpret that as meaning that he
was then giving you a coverage of that distance ?
Admiral Kimmel. Not at that time; no,
232. General Frank. As a result of the success of the Jap attack you
were prevented from employing your planes, were you not?
Admiral Kimmel. To a considerable extent; yes.
233. (jieneral Frank. You had some PBYs numbering about 50 that
may have been used for reconnaissance had you not felt secure without
using them, did you not?
Adnural Kimmel. Something of that kind, but we had a very
[JSir\ difficult decision to make. We wanted to maintain our
training status. Up to the last minute we had received no orders to
mobilize. We had received these which were quite similar to the
ones we had received previously, and we felt that we w^ere entitled
to further information, and even orders, before we changed our status.
^Ve felt that we must conserve what planes we had.
234. General Frank. I have notliing more.
235. General Grunert. Has anyone any other questions? (No
i-esponse). If not, I have only the following question:
Admiral, is there anything that you want to tell the Board now
which may not have been said by you or not brought out by other wit-
nesses in the hearing before the Roberts Commission, as to the Army,
your relationship with the Army, or what may have influenced the
.Vrmy decision?
Admiral Kimmel. You mean, any further statement that I have
to make ?
23G. General Grunert. Any further statement or anything that
you want to bring to the Board's attention that may assist it in getting
facts or leads.
Admiral Kimmel. I have a statement that I would like to make
to the Board with regard to the information wdiich was supplied to
the two responsible commanders in Hawaii. We thoroughly consid-
ered all such information and took the action which we deemed ap-
propriate. There was no disagreement between the Army and Navy,
and none between me and my personal advisers.
Since Pearl Harbor information has come to my knowledge that
vital information in the hands of the War and Navy Departments
was not supplied to responsible officers in Haiwaii; in [1812]
particular, that the War and Navy Departments knew that Japan
had set a deadline of 25 November, later extended to 29 November
for the signing of an agreement, after which they would take hostile
steps against the United States; that on 2G November an ultimatum
was delivered to Japan by the United States. This was done not-
withstanding a joint recommendation to the President by General
Marshall and Admiral Stark that no ultimatum of any kind should
be made to Japan, I had been advised of this recommendation and
had received no qualification of that information. I had no knowl-
edge of the delivery of the ultimatum to Japan on 2G November, 1941.
procf:edings of army pearl harbor board 947
I am further certain that several (hiys prior to 7 December, 1941, there
was information in the War Department and the Navy Department
that Japan wonld attack the United States and, very probably, that
the attack would be directed against the fleet at Pearl Harbor, among
other places; that there was information in the War and Navy De-
partments on 6 December, 1941, tliat the hour of attack was momen-
tarily imminent, and that early on 7 December, 1941, the precise time
of the attack was known. It was known at least three or probably
four hours before the attack. All this information was denied to
General Short and to me. I feel that we were entitled to it. I felt then
that if such information was available to the War and Navy Depart-
ment it Avoukl be sent to ns. Had we not l)een denied this, many
things would have been different. Had we been furnished this in-
formation as little as two or three hours before the attack, which
was easily feasible and possible, mnch could have been done.
237. General (iRunert. Are tliere any questions now that yon have
heard this additional statement? (No response.)
\1SI3] How about our counsel and recorders? Have you any-
thing to suggest ?
238. Major Clausen. I have nothing, sir.
Admiral Kimmel. May I ])lease have a transcri]^t of my testimony
when it is made up ? I should like to request that.
239. General Grunert. I will take it up with the Department.
I do not see any objection to it.
Admiral Kimmel. Of course you will give me an opportunity to
verify my testimony ?
240. General Grunert. If you so desire. Tomorrow morning we
are starting west.
Admiral Kimmel. That is up to you, if you don't want me to
verify it.
241. General Grunert. We are starting west tomorrow, and I do
not know how soon the notes will be written up. I will talk to the
Board and see wlietlier oi- not there is a copy that can be sent to you
to be verified.
Admiral Kimmel. Thank you.
242. General Russell. I would like to make this request. Admiral.
With reference to the last statement Avhich you made relative to infor-
mation in the War and Navy Departments which was not sent out to
you and General Short, under the division of the work of this Board
which was made by General Grunert I have had considerable to do
with investigating in the field which you have last discussed. Some
of the things to whicli you liave referred may become the subject of
further investigation before the Board is through. I was wonder-
ing if we could get in touch with you after I have sufficient time to
look at your statement as transcribed. It might come to paas that
we would [1814'] want the source of certain information re-
ferred to by you in your statement. Would you be willing to cooperate
with us to the extent that we might be furnished the source of the in-
formation contained in your st atement ?
Admiral Kimmel. I will coojjerate to the best of my ability, in con-
formity with the restrictions which have been imposed upon me.
243. General Russell. I will say, further, that my failure to de-
velop a line of questions or to intei-rogate you was largely the result
7!t"l(l — 4r.--E\. H.-, vol. 2 11
948 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of a feeliiio- that there might be some parts of that about which you
would not want to testify freely if I questioned you at this time. I
hope you will consider the matter and that we may get in touch with
you again.
Admiral KiMMEL. All right. Thank you, sir.
244. General Grunekt. We thank you for giving us of your time,
Admiral.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of
witnesses for the day, and proceeded to other business).
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 949
asm CONTENTS
TUESDAY, AUGUST 29, 1944
Testimony of— Pas®'
Maj. Gen. F. L. Martin, United States Army, Retired 1816
Colonel Jack W. Howard, Quartermaster Corps, Presidio of San
Francisco 1914
Colonel William J. McCarthy, 260th Coast Artillery Group, Fort Bliss,
Texas 1918
Colonel William Donegan, G-3, Fourth Army, Sam Houston, Texas 1928
DOCUMENTS
Navy Message of November 27, 1941 1989
Message to General Short, November 27, 1941 1839, 1942
^ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original transcript of proceedings.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 951
UsiG] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD
TUESDAY, AUGUST 29, 1944,
Presidio of San Francisco, Cal.
Tlie Board, at 0 a. ni., pursuant to recess on Friday, August 25, 1944,
conducted the liearino- of witnesses, Lt. Gen. Geoi'ge Grunert, Presi-
dent of tlie Board, presiding.
Pi-esent : Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President, Maj. Gen. Henry D.
Russell, and ]\Iaj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.
Present also: Colonel Charles AV. West, Recorder, Major Henry C.
Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry T. Toulmin, Jr.,
Executive Officer.
TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL F. L. MARTIN, UNITED STATES
ARMY, RETIRED.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. General, will you ]dease state to the Board your
name, rank, organization, and station?
General Martin. Major General F. L. Martin, Retired. My pres-
ent address is 401 North Boiling Green Way, West Los Angeles,
California.
2. General Grunert. Now, General, you probably know what the
Board has been ai){)ointed for. We are after facts and background
and viewpoints and leads that will give us facts about the attack on
Hawaii. So we hope that in view of your former assignment in Hawaii
you will be able to help us.
Now, I am going to skip around and ask a number of questions
{1817] about a number of things in oixler to piece out here and
there other testimony we have had; and after the Board gets through
asking questions, then if you have anything else that you wish to offer
we shall be glad to hear it.
Are you familiar with the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Fi-ontier Defense
Plan?'
General Martin. Well, of course, you understand, GeiuM-al, it has
been nearly three years ago since I have seen that.
?). Genei'al Grunert. Yes.
General Martin. I know all about it, because it was formulated
at the time that I was in connnand of the Hawaiian Air Foi'ce, now the
7th Air Force.
4. General Grunert. Do you recall your Joint Air Operations
Agreement?
General Martin. I can state as to my memory as to its provisions,
that the searching was to be done by the Navy, calling upon the Army
952 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
at such time as they needed additional assistance. The coast line,
that is, contingent to the Island of Oahu — reconnaissance over that
area was to be conducted by the Army.
5. General Grunert. Now let me ask you a few questions, and then
if I do not bring anything out you may add anything you want.
First, was the Army charged witli the tactical command of defensive
air operations over and in the vicinity of Oahu ^
General Martin. For the defense of Oahu, yes, but if the targets
were located at sea the Navy had control of the mission, would assign
the mission and call on the Army for such bombardment as they felt
was necessary.
[1818] 6, General Grunert. Now, under the Joint Air Opera-
tions Agreement, were all concerned well aware of this agreement and
their respective functions under that?
General Martin. Yes, sir.
7. General Grunert. Was the agreement lived up to ?
General Martin. Well, it was not on the morning of this attack on
Pearl Harbor, because there was no call made upon us for any assist-
ance whatever.
8. General Grunert. What tests and exercises did you have that
were held under this agreement?
General Martin. Will you please repeat that?
9. General Grunert. What tests and exercises did you have under
that agreement in practising for it?
General Martin. We had a number of exercises where targets would
be sent out by a small task force, and they would tow what they call a
slick sled. The slick sled would be bombed by components of the
Hawaiian Air Force under the direction of the Navy. These exercises
were never a great distance from our base, not to exceed probably 100
miles.
10. General Grunert. From the time the agreement was reached
up to the time of the attack, about how many exercises had been held
under that agreement?
General Martin. You have reference to the full compliance with
the joint agreement between the Army and Navy?
11. General Grunert. Yes; whenever the Army and the Navy got
together in any test or exercise. About how many such exercises had
been held?
General Martin. I would not say that we ever had had a full com-
pliance with the agreement. The only opportunity the [181911
Army Air Forces had of entering into a joint exercise with the Navy
was these exercises that I have described where they would tow these
slick sleds in rear of a cruiser or battleship. They would have out a
task force that would have in it destroyers and the cruisers and battle-
ships. We would make an attack upon the slick sled. They would
train their gunners on board, but as to actual firing at any targets that
we had, we did not, have them, but we would drop practice bombs on
the slick sleds.
12. General Grunert. Now, I understand that for tactical air fight-
ing over the land all fighting aircraft came to the Hawaiian Air Force,
whether it was Army, Navy, or Marine • and for work at sea the bomb-
ers and long-distance reconnaissance craft went to the Navy.
General Martin. That is correct; yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 953
13. General Grunert. Now, was that practiced ? Did they ever call
out all you had for practice, so as to get in the habit of doing what
the Navy told them, or did any of the Navy and Marine ever come to
you for practice?
General Martin. Yes, sir. We had one particular maneuver in
which the Navy and Marine fighters joined with the Hawaiian Air
Force for the purpose of such an exercise.
14. General Frank. When was that ?
General Martin. Oh, that was about May, I think, in '41. I cannot
remember the exact dates. Unfoi'tunately, General, I have no record
of the files that are in the 7th Air Force, which was formerly the
Hawaiian Air Force, or the Hawaiian Department.
15. General Grunert. Are those files on record in Hawaii?
General Martin. They should be, yes, sir, and I just have to trust
to memory here as to the statements I am making, which you may find
not to be exactly correct, but they are correct so \1820] far as
my knowledge is concerned.
16. General Grunert. All right. Now, did the Nav}' conduct dis-
tant reconnaissance regularly?
General Martin. Yes, sir, they did. They had task forces out, of
which we had no knowledge. They were secret task forces. They
were out of communication even Avith their home station so far as we
knew.
17. General Grunert. You say that was distant reconnaissance?
General Martin. Well, by task force, the Navy
18. General Grunert. You mean just because the task force covered
an area you thought they were having distant reconnaissance in the
defense of Hawaii?
General Martin. Well, they had some patrol boats that went out
on what was called the early morning mission. They left at approxi-
mately 5 o'clock in the morning. But there were only two or three
of those that went out on i)atrol duty.
19. General Grunert. What were they supposed to do? Do you
know?
General Martin. They made a reconnaissance in that particular
area. Of course, you know how much of a reconnaissance two or three
ships can make, nothing to amount to much.
20. General Grunert. How about air reconnaissance?
General Martin. That is air reconnaissance I am talking about now.
21. General Grunert. You are talking about that.
General Martin. Now, they had task forces out at various and
sundry times, no regular intervals, that went out. As to what they
did, I cannot say, because I didn't know anything about it excepting
they did have them go.
[1821] 22. General Grunert. Now, are you sure that these pa-
trol boats that went out were not to just cover the task forces that
were going out about that time?
General Martin. I cannot give you any accurate information as to
what the Navy did when they had their task forces out.
23. General Grunert. Now, did we have an inshore i)atrol?
General Martin. Nothing more than the airplanes that were flying
in the vicinity of Oahu that were always on the alert for enemy sub-
marine.
954 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
24. General Grunert. Were they armed ?
General Martin. No, sir, no more than they would be for the normal
performance of a mission. That is, they usually went up, ]:)erformed
<iunnery missions at the same time. So they were armed with that:
they had their guns and ammunition, but not for a regular combat
mission.
25. General Grunert, Then, any reconnoitering they did was inci-
dental to their training; is that right?
General Martin. It was incident to the training of a day, and not
as a well-organized reconnaissance for the area.
26. General Grunert. They just happened to observe what they
could see in their training; is that right?
General Martin. Well, a little more than that. General : They were
instructed to observe that area at all times.
27. General Grunert. They were just looking for subs; is that tlie
idea ?
General Martin, Looking for submarines, yes, sir. There was no
other danger from any other source than submarines in the immediate
vicinity of the island. That only extended just four [1822] or
five miles offshore.
28. General Grunert. So that, as I understand, your understand-
ing is that the task forces went out, and apparently they covered cer-
tain areas of the sea ; and outside of that, as far as you know, there was
no distant reconnaissance by the Navy?
General Martin. Excepting for the two or three patrol boats that
went out each morning.
29. General Grunert. Did you know where they went?
General Martin. No, sir, I do not.
30. General Grunert. Did you think that in any way covered a
defense against an air raid?
General Martin. No, sir. I complained to Admiral Bellinger about
the lack of patrolling that was being done.
31. General Grunert. What did he say?
General Martin, Well, he said, "This is all that I have. This is
all I can put up."
32. General Grunert. But you actuallv complained about the lack
of it?
General Martin. Yes, sir. I told him that I was not at all satisfied
with the amount of patrolling that the Navy was doing in so far as
covering the area was concerned.
33. General Grunert. Now, do you recall your air agreement with
Admiral Bellinger, that is, of the 31st of March, '41, the Joint Air
Operations Agreement ?
General Martin. Very well ; yes, sir.
34. General Grunert. Was General Short well aware of that agree-
ment?
General Martin. Yes, sir.
35. General (trunert. Did he a])prove it?
[1823] General Martin. Yes, sir.
36. General Grunert. Now, in there there was an estimated possible
enemy action, and you stated the "high probability of a surprise dawn
attack." Now, that was in the mind of you airmen at the time you
drew up the agreement?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 955
Geiiei-Jil Martin. Yes, sir.
37. General Gri^nert. Now, what was dour to avoid such a surprise
attack that you people thought was highly probable ^
General Martin. Well, nothing more than what I stated. The
search of the area was in the hands of the Navy.
38. General Grunert. Now, there were Addenda i and 2 to that
plan. Addendum 2 to the Agreement described the various states of
readiness by the Interceptor commander using recently-installed
equipment and controlling operations from his central board.
General Martin. Yes, sir.
39. General Grunert. That was just a theory at that time, then, was
it?
General Martin. Well, it was more than that, because it actually
had been used and practiced.
40. General Grunert. Well, that seems to indicate the existence of
the Interceptor Command with an installed air warning service and
a control board as of September 20th or prior to November 17th. But
did you actually try that out during that test?
GtMieral Martin. Well, here is what happened with reference to
the establisliing of this control. Tlie location for the station was
tein])orary. The ])ennanent location was to be under ground, and this
Avas being constructed, and there Avere perma- [18:24] nent
locations for these five instrument stations, and there were permanent
installations to be made, but the engineers had not completed those
sites. So the five reporting stations were in temporary locations, and
the Department Commander would not turn those over to the Com-
manding General of the Hawaiian Air Forces until he had completed
the training under his Department Signal Officer. He refused to turn
them over until he considered they were properly trained. So they
were still training under those conditions and not been turned over to
the Air Force the mornino; of the attack on December 7tli.
41. General Grunert. But you had an exercise somewhere around
November ?
General Martin. Yes, sir. ■
42. General Grunert. 17th to 22nd ?
General Martin. Yes, sir, about that time; I don't know\
43. General Grunert. Now, at that time the air w^arning service,
such as it w^as, and the control board operated, did they ?
General Martin. Yes, sir.
44. General Grunert. Then they were capable of operating?
General Martin. They were capable of operating. The personnel
was being trained for the operation of tlie equipment. The temporary
statious were located, the temporary control station had been located,
and the equipment used primarily in the training of personnel to take
over the operation of the control area.
45. General Grunert. Now, when was the Interceptor Command
actually activated as a part of the Department setup in full control
uf the Interceptor Command ; do you know ?
[18!BS] General Martin. I couldn't give you that date, General;
I don't remember.
46. General Grunert. It was not ]irior to December 7tli? It must
have been afterwaril : is that riji'ht ?
956 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General jNIaktin. It \\a.s set up and (he men were beiiiji' trained foi",
I would say, possibly a month prior to the attack on December 7th.
Now, that is just an estimate. The actual time should be a matter of
record in the Hawaiian Department.
47. General Grunert. Now, let us consider just prior to the attack,
from late in November. Were you in on a conference between General
Short and Admiral Kimmel after General Short received the Chief of
Staff's message of November 27th ?
General Martin. Well, as to the exact date, I do not know, but I
was at a conference with Admiral Kimmel and General Short at
about that time. This was after General Short and Admiral Kimmel
had had a conference with reference to information that they had.
48. General Grunert. What did they discuss at that conference?
General Martin. I do not know as I could tell you definitely, Gen-
eral, just exact! V what was discussed.
49. General (jrunert, Mollison was with you, wasn't he?
General Martin. Yes, sir, he wa.s.
50. General Grunert. Well, do you know whether they discussed
what interpi-etation to })lace on these messages received from Wash-
ington and what action they should take? Do you know whether that
was discussed or not ?
General Martin. Well, no doubt it was, but as to the subject matter
under discussion at that particular time, it is very hazy in my mind.
We were discussing the different possi- [ISM] bilities under
the instructions that had been received from the War Department
by General Short and from the Navy Department by Admiral
Kimmel.
51. General Grunert. Do you recall that the message to the Navy
started out by saying, "Consider this a war warning" ?
General Martin. No, I do not remember that statement being made.
52. General Frank. Did you see the message ?
General Martin. The only messages I saw^ were, as I remember it,
two that came to General Short which he showed to me. One was
something to the effect that no overt act would be committed by the
Army ; that is, the first overt act would not be committed by the Army.
And the next, the other one, as I remember it, was something in con-
nection with preventing undue publicity with reference to his prepa-
rations for the defense of the island becoming known to the public.
53. General Grunert. Were you present at the discussion or was
there discussion that you know of concerning what form of alert
General Short should take under these warnings?
General Martin. Well, as to whether this occurred at a conference
or whether it was just General Short and myself talking, he did discuss
with me the type of alert that he felt was appropriate.
54. General Grunert. You say he did or did not?
General Martin. He did, under the circumstances, and his estimate
of the situation was that under the conditions and the information
that he had his danger lay within the population of the island and
that he was going to order Alert No. 1, which is concentration for
protection against sabotage and internal up- [1S27] rising.
That seemed to be correct and in keeping with the information we had
at the time.
55. General Grunert. Did he ask your advice on what alert to
take, or did he tell you what he had taken or what he decided to take?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 957
General Martin. 1 cannot sa}^ as to whether he asked my advice.
General Short and I usually just discussed these things as man to
man. He made the decision. I had an opportunity to present my
viewpoint. •
56. General Grunert. Then, you concurred in his decision?
General Martin, I didn't see any more danger from attack than
General Short did, that is, from a surprise attack with the informa-
tion we had.
57. General Grunert. Did you concur with him that it would be
all right to have your planes concentrated and not dispersed?
General Martin. Of course, I never wanted to concentrate my
planes, but we had practiced these different alerts, Alerts No. 1 and
Alert No. 2, and they were concentrated under Alert No. 1 for protec-
tion against sabotage. We did not have the manpower to effectively
protect them in dispersed position. That was the purpose of concen-
tration. Under Alert No. 2 we had them dispersed in dispersal areas
at the different airdromes. As to whether it was Alert No. 1 or Alert
No. 2 was just a question out of the estimate of the situation. Now, as
to how seriously General Short and I discussed the necessity of using
Alert No. 1 or Alert No 2, 1 am not capable of saying at this time, but I
will say that I always had the liberty of discussing these matters with
General Short.
58. General Grunert. You tell me you did not lilve to have
\1S:^S] your planes concentrated. Did you object to having them
concentrated?
General Martin. I don't tliink I made any serious objection to him
about it. because at the time that the alerts were decided on, as to
wdiat they constituted, I explained to him the danger of always pulling
your ships in if there was any opportunity of attack from the air, and
we weighed all of those things against the possibility of their being
defended in a dispersed area, and on account of the large number of
men that would be requii-ed they were brought into concentrated areas
w'hen alert No. 1 was in vogue.
59. General Grunert. You then put it on the question of shortage
of personnel. Was there such a shortage of personnel ?
General Martin. There was so far as I am concerned. General. I
Avas charged with the defense of the airdromes with the air persomiel,
and I could not give it.
60. General Grunert. How much more personnel would it liave
taken if you had dispersed them instead of having them concentrated,
approximately, in percentage ?
General Martin. As a rough estimate, it would take about four
times the men than we had. You see, these were around the perimeter
of the field, and both Wheeler and Hickam Fields, which were two
large stations, covered considerable area. We discussed the matter
of having high fences around the areas. There was a high fence around
part of the area at Hickam Field, but not the entire area. This was
considered to be too expensive, as we were still having trouble getting
funds for some of the things that w^e considered very essential, and
to properly protect the planes in a dispersed area would take a large
number [1820] of men.
61. General Grunert. Had there been any evidences of sabotage?
General Martin. No.
958 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
62. General Gru:nert. But 3^011 were all sabotage-minded; you were
all afraid of it?
General Martin. Absolutely.
63. General Grunert. If tliey had taken Alert No. 2, wouldn't that
have covered sabotage also?
General Martin. No. The greater danger was from the air and
not from internal sabotage. The opportunity for sabotage would
probably have been prevalent under either type of alert.
G4. General Grunert. I want to find out what went on in your
minds to convince you that defense against sabotage was sufficient
to protect you after you had had these warnings?
General Martin. A large per cent of the population there was Jap-
anese. As to how loyal those who had been there for the second gen-
eration would be, no one knew.
65. General Grunert. Suppose you had been on Alert No. 2, couldn't
3'ou have l)een just as w^ell protected as far as they were concerned?
General Martin. General, there is no question if you are going to
be attacked from the air that you must not have your planes concen-
trated. Kegardless of what other threats might have been, the con-
trolling factor is the fact that you could not have your planes con-
centrated at the time they were going to be attacked from the air.
66. General Grunert. That is what I want to get at. Here you
make an estimate and you almost dope out just exactly what the Ja]:)s
did, but wdien the time comes, and you get warning, you [ISSO]
apparently' forget your estimate and go to sabotage. I cannot under-
stand what went on in the topside here.
General Martin. All I can do is to say this: All tliese things had
been considered. They had not been overlooked. You come back to
making a final decision. Which is it going to be? They are almost
diametrically opposed to each other. And the decision was made by
the top conmiander that his greatest danger lay in the sabotage and the
uprising that might take place on the islands themselves. They didn't
have guns. We didn't know what they had in the way of dynamite
and other exj^losives. It was hoped they had little or none. But in
making the decision he was governed largely by the information he
had from the War Department as to what he might expect. There
was no indication whatever on the |)art of anyone that he could exj^ect
an attack from the surface of the sea or the air on the Hawaiian
Islands.
67. General Gri^nert. That is wdiat he was out there for, was it not?
General Martin. That controlled his decision to the point where he
decided there was no danger from the air, that his only danger was
from the ground.
68. General Grunert. When Alert No. 1, the sabotage alert, was
called, did you then telegraph to the various airports to tell them to
carry out sabotage Alert No. 1 and concentrate their planes?
General Martin. We had communication with all of our air sta-
tions. We had both teletype and telephone and telegrai)h.
69. General Grunert. Now, in discussing the matter with General
Short, after which he made his decision to go on Alert No. 1, and you
as his air force commander well knowing there was [18SJ] no
competent distant reconnaisance that would cover the areas, how do
you then justif}^ your agreeing with him that Alert No. 1, sabotage,
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 959
would })robably be the best thin<^ to do? You kuew there was no ail'
reconnaissance to cover you from the outside. Therei'oie, you had no
knowledge of what might come in from the sea, and if you had taken
Alert No. 2 you would have covered both your air defense and your
saDotage; but still you concurred on the sabotage alert only. It does
not seem to make sense, unless you have some arguments back of it. I
am just trying to get facts. I am not bhiming you or anyone else.
General Martin. Let us cover the reasons. Let us say we had not
been attacked from the air and we were under Alert No. 2 and the
attack had come from within. We would have had all our shi]is dis-
persed in the dispersal areas. Then the embarrassment would have
been almost as great as it was before, because you are not prejiared to
defend them in the dispersal areas. They could have been destroyed
by little hand grenades or any soi't of a crudely-constructed bomb or
fire, or anything of that nature by a few indivicluals. A few individ-
uals could destroy each one of the areas if properly dispersed, and the
vv'hole thing would go up in smoke. We could be just as severely criti-
cized for having them in that position as we were when the attack took
])lace from the air instead of from the ground. So the choice is, wliich
is the greater threat, and as the Department Conunander made his
decision, which I think was correct, on the infornuition he had, and I
subscribed to it, that the defense should be made from sal)otage and
internal uprising.
70. General Grunert. You subscribed to it because you thought
there was more danger from sabotage if they were dispersed than
\1S32] if they were concentrated?
General Martiist. Yes, sir.
71. General Grtinert. And in concentrating them, you put them
[)ractically wing-to-wing, or overlapped them, where, if a fire started,
you could not get them out to save your neck.
General Martin. Well, they are not serviced or are not armed when
in that condition. That was one of the conditions of the alert.
72. General Grunert. Did you have any evidence as to any actual
danger from sabotage, outside of your knowing that a great number
of Ja]:)anese nationals was part of your population?
General Martin. No, sir; and as far as I know thei-e has been none
since the islands were attacked.
7?>. General Gruxert. It was just that bugaboo of a possible
chance ?
General ^Martin. That was in the minds of all of us, tliat we could
expect trouble from that source.
74. General Grunert. Did you know whether or not these sources
of explosives had been checked and guarded and one thing and an-
other? What gave you the impression that there might be individ-
uals who would have explosives to make individual bombs for sabo-
tage }>iu-poses? Do you know anything about that part of it?
General Martin. No, sir, I do not, because our G-2 activities were
imder the Department itself.
75. General Grunert. When I mentioned the message of Novem-
ber 27th from the Chief of Staff you seemed to recall just the things
about "Let Japan commit the first overt act; don't alarm the public;
don't show your intentions." You recalled those [1833]
960 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(hiiios, })u( do you recall this part of the niessap;e : "If hostilities can-
not be avoided, the United States desires Japan to commit the first
overt act. This policy should not be construed as restricting you to
a course of action that might jeopardize your defense!"' ^
General Martix. Yes, I knew that that was in there.
76. General Grunert, Evidently at the time that course of action
taken to guard against sabotage was not considered as jeopardizing
the defense of the island ?
General Martix. It was not so considered. General Short informed
me that the War Department was thoroughly advised of the action
he had taken. He had no criticism from the War Department as
to the action he had taken in reference to putting the troops under
Alert No. 1. We had had a maneuver just before this and, as I recall,
we went directly from the maneuver into the alert and remained on
there, but for wdiat period of time I do not recall now. However, we
liad been on Alert No. 1 for some period of time before the attack
took place.
77. General Grunert. After the attack, then they took the extreme
alert, No. ?>, didn't they?
General IMartin. We started to make that disposition without any
orders whatever, as soon as the attack took place.
78. General Grunert. How long was that kept up, that No. 3?
General Martin. I cannot tell you.
70. General Grunert. When did you leave?
General Martin. I ffol my orders on the 8th of January. As I
recall, I left the 13th or l-tth"of January.
80. General Grunert. 1942?
General Martin. 1942 ; yes, sir.
[18341 ^'^- General Grunert. Then it was kept up at least from
December 8th until January, when you left?
General Martin. I was relieved of duty part of that time; about
December IHth, I think.
82. General Grunert. What I am getting at is this : If you could
do it afterward and you took the chance against sabotage, you could
have done it before. You had personnel enough to do it afterward,
didn't you ?
General Martin. There is a difference there. It had been actually
demonstrated that we could be attacked from the air. Therefore,
your greatest menace then was from such an attack.
83. General Grunert. Still you demonstrated to yourself when you
made your estimate that yon conld be attacked from the air.
General Martin. General, when you make an estimate of a situa-
tion 3^011 consider all things that may happen. Then you come down
to your decision and weigh one against the other, and finally your
decision is predicated on what is more probable to happen. Your
decision is going to be contradictory to some of the other points in
the estimate you make.
84. General Grunert. Now, when you make an estimate and say
this is the most probable thing that is going to happen, then why not
be pre})ared to meet the most i)robable tiling that is going to happen,
instead of taking something way down the scale? It does not look
consistent. Here you make an estimate and you seem to hit it right
on the nose as to what actually did happen, and then when the time
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 961
comes you pay no tittention to that. You .say, "1 am afraid of
;>abotage."
General Martix. You will have to consider. General, what infor-
mation was being received. I do not know actually what [1835}
the Xavy received, I do know a part of what the Army received,
because those things that it was essential I know were told to me by
General Short, or he let me read the messages. From the informa-
tion he had. he was not of the impression they were alarmed about
an attack on the Hawaiian Islands.
85. General Grukert. Suppose yon had no information at all, then
what?
General Martix. That is a little bit different.
86. General Gruxert. Then what are you out there for? Y'ou are
there as an outpost, aren't you?
General Martix. Absolutely.
87. General Gruxert. Then you ought to be prepared to meet any-
thing that may happen, isn't that right ^
General Martix. Y^ou can put it that way.
88. General Gruxert. And you made an estimate as to what w^as
going to happen and then along came additional information. This
message did not say anything about sabotage, the message on which
the decision was made, did it?
General Martix. You mean the estimate of the situation sa^-s noth-
ing about sabotage?
89. General Gi;ijxert. No ; this decision that was made on the Chief
of Staff's message said nothing about sabotage.
General INIartix. No. it did not.
00. General Gruxert. And the decision was made, on this Chief
of Staff message, to go into a sabotage alert?
General Martix. I cannot recall the chronological order of dates
and circumstances in their exactness. All I can say to you is that that
decision was based upon what was considered to be the logical thing
to do at the time. Now, it happened [1S36] that the estimate
(if the situation as to what was the most probable thing to guard
against was exactly correct. It could have been the exact opposite of
that and the thing the Department Commander prepared for was
exactly what would have l)een correct. It so happened it was not.
91. General Gruxert. If you had had no information from the War
Department or from the Navy Department, what would have been the
thing to do to protect yourselves?
General Martix. I think that requires a lot of thought before you
make that decision.
92. General Gruxert. All this requires a lot of thought. That is
what we are here for.
Genei-al Martix. Why should I have to make that decision now?
93. General Gruxert. Y"ou don't have to. I am not attacking you.
I am trying to develop something so as to get ideas and thoughts as to
what was back in your minds while you were in Hawaii in making
your decision. Anything I say here, do not take as personal, because I
do not mean it that way. I just want to develop the subject to see if
we can find out what happened in the minds of the command out there.
So we beat all around the bush and occasionally go right through it to
try to get some reaction.
962 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Martin. Let us go back please. Assume that this attack had
not taken place and we are making this decision without the informa-
tion that they could do it. All the best minds out there, including
Commander i^rowning. whom (xeneral Frank knows quite well
94. General Grunert. Of the Navy ?
\1SS/] (ieneral Martix. OftlieNavy. Had pondered this ques-
tion; General Street, then a Lieutenant Colonel, and various other
individuals, from every conceivable viewpoint before that was written.
The probability of that taking place was considered the best oppor-
tunity the Japanese had. As to its possibility, it was very, very doubt-
ful that anything so hazardous would occvir, because if it failed, it
meant such a reduction in their striking power that they would be con-
fined to their own home waters from then on. We felt as though it
was just too much of a risk for them to take. These task forces were
out. Very little information was coming in from tlie War and Navy
Departments. I am sure, having no knowledge of a possibility of an
attack taking place, other than it was probable that it could take place,
those things affect you in making a decision. Why should I disperse
my aircraft and get prepared for an air attack, when in all probabili-
ties, under existing and present circumstances, my threat is going to
come from within the population, the Japanese population of the
islands? No, it is very hard for you under those circumstances, this
attack having not been demonstrated that it could be accomplished,
to say that it will be accomplished and my all-out effort must be to
ward that off, when something is right there under your nose that is
full of dynamite. I am afraid that is going to have a very marked
influence on your decision. It did for us.
95. General Grunert. You did get some information through the
Navy and from the Chief of Staff that war was impending. The mes-
sage that went to the Navy started out with the word, "Consider this
a war warning." Then in this message from the Chief of Staff, of the
27th, it also gave intimations of a hostile at- [1838] tack ; and
you peo])le still thought that sabotage was your biggest immediate
danger, is that right?
General Martin. General, I do not believe that you can read into
those messages any specific warning that you can expect attack from
the surface or the air. The possibilities for those tilings, of course,
are always in our minds, but the avertige opinion was very vague as
to there being an actual attack, as I recall it.
96. General Grunert. Did you expect the War Department to tell
you what to do all the time, or just give you certain information on
which to use your judirment as to what to do ?
General Martin. We wanted information on which to exercise our
judgment. The decision had to be made by the Department Com-
mander there as to the defense of the islands.
97. General Grunert. Let me read you the dispatch received by the
Navy, which they were insti'ucted to transmit to the Army. This was
the dispatch of November 'J7th from the Navy to the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet, or a ])araphrase of it: "Consider this dispatch a
war warning." If you are given a war warning, what do you expect
to do?
General Martin. Aren't you reading a Navy dispatch. General?
98. General Grunert. Yes.
J
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 963
General Maktin. I have no knowledge of that. As to whether Gen-
eral Short had it, or not, I could not say.
90. General Grunert. That was the next thing I was going to bring
up. Outside of the November 27th dispatch from the Chief of Staff,
did General Short keep you informed of other messages received
t hrough the Navy or otherwise, or is that dispatch of [18S9] the
27th from the Chief of Staff the only one you knew of?
General Martin. As to the things received through the Navy, I
could not answer it, but as to anything else, he considered I should have
knowledge of, he very probably gave me the information, so far as
I know.
100. General Grunert. Then you do not know about this dispatch?
I will read it to you to make sure of it.
Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an
pffort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make
an aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against
either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo, is indicated
by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their
naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for
carrying out the task assigned in WPL 46 only. Guam, Samoa, and Continental
districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A
similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform naval district
and Army authorities. British to be informed by Spenavo.
You do not recall ever having been made acquainted with that?
General Martin. General Short got something similar to that. I
have some of that information, but not all.
101. General Grunert. General Short got tlie message of the 27th
we have just been talking about and which reads as follows :
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with
only the barest possibilities [iS//0] that the Japanese Government might
come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hos-
tile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be
avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the tirst overt act. This
policy should not, repeat, not, he construed as restricting you to a course of
action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you
are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem
necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as to not, repeat not,
alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hos-
tilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as
they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information
to minimum essential officers.
That appears to be the counterpart of the other message.
General Martin. I do not recall the text of the message you read
that the Navy received, but from some source I received the informa-
tion, I believe from General Short himself, that anticipated a move
might be made down through the East Indies and French Indo-China
or in that direction.
102. General Grunert. In other words, you thought that they would
hit far out first and not hit you ?
General Martin. We had no idea they were going to make this bold
attack from the sea. It was possible. And that possibility had been
weighed, but v/e thought it was too much of a risk for them to take.
103. General Grunert. When you weighed that ])ossibility in your
estimate, you concluded it was highly probable, but when it came to
actual conditions you concluded it was highly improbable; is
imi] that right?
78716 -46— Ex. 145. vol. 2 12
964 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Maetin. Circumstances cause you to change your mind.
104. General Grunert. Now, what was it that Washington said or
did that caused you people to elect sabotage instead of an air attack as
your biggest danger? It was not any particular thing that Washing-
ton did, was it?
General Martin. No, I would not say it was anything that Wash-
ington did that decided us on Alert No. 1. With the number of car-
riers we thought the Japanese had, we felt they would not risk that
number of carriers that we felt they had to bring up.
105. General Grunert. You did not think they had the nerve to
attempt such an almost suicidal attack?
General Martin. That is right.
106. General Grunert. And if you had been on Alert No. 2, would
it have been successful, in your opinion, or do you think you could
have caught them?
Genral Martin. No, General ; we never had enough equipment to
stop them. We could have prevented them from being so successful,
but not to have stopped them.
107. General Grunert. Could you have knocked out those slow-
moving torpedo-bombers ?
General Martin. You might knock out some of them, but you are
not going to get all of them, because they had too many for the forces
we had.
108. General Grunert. Of course, it is like every other situation,
you cannot tell what you would have done, but at least you would have
been in the air and you could have prevented a lot of what was done?
General Martin. It would not have been so severe; no [184-2]
question about that.
109. General Grunert. About this reconnaissance referred to in
that directive of the 27th, it said "take such reconnaissance and other
measures as you deem necessary", or words to that effect. What did
that mean to you ?
General Martin. The observation and patrolling around the coastal
areas, so far as the Army was concerned, were very alert. They were
looking for submarines that might be in the shallower waters or tak-
ing shelter from the conformation of the islands in different parts of
the areas in the islands. That did not extend out to sea to any large
extent, although we were sending training missions right along to the
small islands south of Oahu and others to the northwest, that is out
about five or six hundred miles, for the training of navigators and of
the crews for these long missions over water. All of those M-ere always
on the alert for anything that might be suspicious.
[1843] 110. General Grunert. What could this inshore aerial
patrol do in the line of or for the defense of Hawaii ?
General Martin. It did nothing more than to give information as
to any suspicious looking objects under the water m that area or that
might be on the surface.
111. General Frank. To whom?
General Martin. For submarine.
112. General Grunert. That was patrolling for submarines, to the
Navy?
General Martin. In that area for submarine.
118. General Grunert. But that was for the Navy purposes, wasn't
it?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 965
General Martin. That was for the Army too.
114. General Grunert. What were subs going to do to the Army
defenses?
General Martin. Well, we were charged with the defense of Pearl
Harbor.
115. General Frank. To whom did you give the information if
you got it ?
General Martin. Oh, that would come directly to the Air Force
headquarters and then on to the Department: go to the Department,
the Department would give it to the Navy. They would conmiunicate
in that respect.
UG. General Gbunkrt. Did you ever find any subs?
General Martin. No, never found any.
117. General Grunert. But what could subs near to the Island do
to the Army defenses of Oahu?
General Martin. Well, the joint agreement was that they were to
have charge of the reconnaissance of that particular [1S44]
area within the immediate shore line of Oahu for
118. General Frank. Who was?
General Martin. The Army.
119. General Frank. Yes.
General Martin. Yes, and of course that comes on down to the air
forces.
120. General Grunert. You did it under that agreement?
General Martin, Yes, sir.
121. General Grunert. But as far as the actual Army defense of
Oahu was concerned, what danger were subs to you ?
General Martin, Well, there would be no gain excepting our mis-
sion was to defend the Navy Yard ; that's all.
122. General Grunert. And they could get within distance to
shell the Navy Yard, could they ?
General Martin. No, no ; it wasn't considered that they might shell
the Navy Yard, but they would have been in position to lurk in there
to attack ships of the Navy, carrier or capital ship, anything that they
wished to consider targets.
123. General Grunert. Then, it was really defense for the Navy?
General Martin. And for such observation as they might make in
putting up their periscope ; that was all.
124. General Grunert. This message says, "Prior to hostile Japa-
nese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and
other measures as you deem necessary." Now, was any additional re-
connaissance ordered, or did the Commanding General not consider
any additional reconnaissance necessary?
General Martin. Well, the reconnaissance around the shore line was
increased when they went into alert.
125. General Grunert. Increased?
[1845] General Martin. That was very definitely increased in
the vicinity of the Island,
126. General Grunert. Sabotage alert? Increase it?
General Martin. We did have a very direct concern about the activi-
ties of submarines, but we didn't have any feeling that they were going
to take the gamble of attacking from the surface.
9G6 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
127. General Grunert. As a matter of fact, the Army was sabotage-
minded, and the Navy might be classed as submarine-minded ; does that
about cover it ?
General Martin. Well, I think you are apt to give a wrong impres-
sion to others if you use that statement. You might say, from the
testimony we have given here, that that is true. I would not say that
we were absolutely sabotage-minded and submarine-minded.
128. General Grunert. But at least it was uppermost in your mind ?
General Martin. I think it would be dangerous to convey that
thought because that isn't quite true. We had considered all these
other things. Now, what we actually did would indicate that what
you said is true, but it also indicates that we cast aside serious con-
sideration for these other things that actually did take place, which is
not true.
129. General Grunert. You were not satisfied with the distant re-
connaissance being made by the Navy ?
General Martin* Oh, no; I knew it was not sujfficiently complete.
130. General Grunert. And you complained to Admiral Bellinger,
did you?
General Martin. Yes, sir.
[1846] 131. General Grunert. About when was that? Late in
the game or early in '41 or late in '41, or several times?
General Martin. No. I did it on two different occasions. I did
it shortly after I went over there and then specifically along in August
after we had submitted a scheme for the reconnaissance and pro-
tection of the Hawaiian Islands from the air that had been worked
out by my staff and had resulted from a CPX we had had in the
spring of 1941 after I arrived there in November in 1940.
132. General Grunert. Was that orally or in writing?
General Martin. Sir?
133. General Grunert. Were those complaints oral or in writing,
or what?
General Martin. Yes, sir. You will find a copy of it in the Army
Air Force headquarters and in the War Department.
134. General Grunert. Then, we ought to find in Hawaii, when
we go there, at least two letters from you complaining against the
inadequacy of the distant reconnaissance?
General Martin. In writing? I thought you were talking about
this plan for the defense.
135. General Grunert. No, no. Your complaints to Admiral
Bellinger.
General Martin. I don't know whether you will find them in writ-
ing or not. You should, but whether you do or not, I won't be able
to say.
136. General Grunert. Rather you think probably, it was oral, do
you?
General Martin. Sir?
137. General Grunert. You think probably you just talked to him
about it in complaining?
[184.7] General Martin. Well, I know I did that.
i38. General Grunert. Which might be nothing
General Martin. It is possible it was in writing too, because it was
a subject of considerable moment.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 967
139. General Gkunert. But if there are copies of those things they
would be in the Hawaiian Air Force record?
General Martin. Yes; if it is in writing it should be either in the
— it should be in the Air Force files or
140. General Grunep.t. Well, now, you say there was a lack of these
patrols. You knew they were not covering you outside. Was that
discussed when you decided to take the sabotage alert and not go to
the air alert ?
General Martin. Why, of course.
141. General Grunert. But you discounted that because you didn't
think the Japs had the nerve or the equipment to pull anything like
that ; is that generally the idea ?
General Martin. We just felt that it was too much of a gamble in
the beginning for him to take.
142. General Grunert. Now, how about your air fields? They do
not appear to have been properly protected by taking necessary meas-
ures to protect themselves.
143. General Frank. From what point of view?
144. General Grunert. From the idea of protection of personnel,
from having air raid shelters designated, from having places where
persons could jump into a slit trentch, and having machine guns set
uj) against possible air attack. Now, those things, most of them,
iippear to have been done after December 7, but how much was done
])rior to December 7 ?
General Martin. Well, there was quite a bit had been done prior
to December 7. The plans were made as to the distribution [IS^S]
of the airplanes at the airports. The dispersal positions had been
revetted and slit trenches put in at Wheeler Field. The dispersal
positions had been selected at Hickain Field. The revetments had
not been constructed because it was considered — now, whether I am
quoting correctly or not, but it was my understanding that the De-
partment had requested this and the War Department turned it down
as being too expensive. Now, it may be
145. General Grunert. What was that?
General Martin. The revetments for the bombers at Hickam Field.
It may be that those revetments were turned down in the Department
as being too expensive for the amount of funds that he had. It was
one place or the other, but they had been refused after having been re-
quested. The fields that were being constructed on the other islands
had provisions for shelter for at least one guard company at each
one of these stations.
146. General Frank. What kind of shelter ?
General Martin. They were the theater-of -operation type, except-
ing down at Morse Field ; they were a little more permanent there, a
part of that construction.
147. General Grunert. None of tliat is protection from an air
attack ?
General Martin. No, no, excepting as to concealment. The effort
was made to put them in among the algarroba. Any other protection
that might be available on the edge of the airport, and also they were
staggered in and placed in lines and streets : more to represent a little
native town than anything else.
[184^] 148. General Grunert. Most of them in the line of
camouflage ?
968 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Martin. Oh, they weren't strictly camouflage, but an ef-
fort was made to make them as inconspicuous as possible without
149. General Grunert. Which, in a form, is camouflage so as t(j
make it fit in with the scenery : that is camouflage.
General Martin. Yes, sir. That is, at Barking Sands the roofs
were green very much like these buildings here, and they were among
the algarroba, which were green all the year round.
150. General Grunert. How about setting up machine guns to be
prepared in case an air attack came?
General Martin. The machine-gun pits were at various points
around Hickam Field and also at Wheeler Field. Remember, Gen-
eral, your Alert No. 1 pulled the antiaircraft in from these positions.
The antiaircraft had dispersal points throughout the island. And
Alert No. 1 pulled them in from those positions into their home posts,
so they were not in those positions the morning the attack took place.
151. General Grunert. That seems to be the trouble: Alert No. 1
did everything that should not have been done.
General Martin. Absolutely.
152. General Grunert. That is, in the light of what we know now.
General Martin. Yes, sir ; that is correct. It did exactly the oppo-
site of what the dispersal should have been to meet the attack that took
place.
153. General Grunert. But I still do not understand how after
December Tth we appear to have had plenty of personnel to do
[ISSO] all this dispersion and take care of that in addition to
sabotage, but they seemed to blame the sabotage on the drain on per-
sonnel— why you came to that conclusion.
General Martin. General, we had already been stung. We knew
it could be done. The improbability of it was a thing of the past.
The probability of its happening again was quite dangerous.
154. General Grunert. Now, you made several remarks here to the
Roberts Commission that I just want to call your attention to.
General Martin. I want to make one comment with reference to
something I said before the Roberts Commission which I mentioned to
General McNarney afterward, and he said, Well, he didn't think it was
of sufficient importance to come back before the Commission and prove
it. Admiral Standley showed me a copy of the Navy order which
embodied parts of the estimate of the situation here that I didn't rec-
ognize, and I told him that while these things had been discussed, so
far as I knew, that I had not seen that paper. Well, I had not seen
the paper, but it was an extract from the estimate of the situation
which we have been discussing right here, and that is the only thing I
know of that is in error with reference to the testimony I gave.
155. General Grunert. General Russell.
156. General Russell. I have only two or three things.
General, as I understand your testimony there was no complaint
of an inadequacy of ships available to theArmy to conduct this close-in
reconnaissance : aircraft.
General Martin. Now, wait a minute. I am not following
[1861] what you are saying.
157. General Russell. The mission of the Army in connection with
the defense of Oahu was to conduct the close-in reconnaissance ?
General Martin. There was no objection to our doing it?
158. General Russell. No. Was that your mission?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 969
General Martin. It was assigned according to the joint agreement.
159. General Russf.ll. All right. Now, did you have sufficient air-
craft to conduct that?
General INIartin. Oh, yes, for close reconnaissance. Goodness, you
go around the island in just a few minutes.
160. General Grunert. Was there any definite plan for conducting
this close-in reconnaissance?
General Martin. As to whether you will find an operation order in
<lie operation files at the 7th Air Force that says how this will be
done, I cannot say. It was being done by everyone that went out on
a mission. That was a general understanding, that they were always
alert for these specific things that might be an indication of the pres-
ence of the enemy, particularly under water. We thought he would
be spying upon us, because they would send submarines into that area
to detect the movements of the Navy, of the Fleet.
161. General Russell. Then this reconnaissance was conducted as
a part of some other mission?
General Martin. Normally, yes.
162. General Eussell. Do you recall ever having sent out any Army
aircraft for the specific and sole purpose of conducting this close-in
reconnaissance ?
[1852^ General Martin. I can't recall specifically that that was
done. We had an observation squadron there, you see, that you will
find in their files, I am sure, specifically assigned to some missions for
them. Now, as to the making of that, I wouldn't know.
163. General Russell. Yes.
General Martin. They were given general instructions that this
was a part of their duty. It was a part of the duty of the bombers
and fighters as well. They all had the same responsibility for observ-
ing the area in which they were flying.
164. General Russell. General, your testimony or your evidence
as given in reply to General Grunert's questions indicated a rather
close relationship between you and the Department Commander, Gen-
eral Short.
General Martin. Yes, sir.
165. General Russell. Were your transactions with him quite fre-
quent or infrequent?
General Martin. No ; I would say they were quite frequent. If I
had any business to transact on which it was necessary to get his de-
cision, I would ask permission of his Chief of Staff to have an audi-
ence with him, which was always granted at as near the time I had re-
quested as was possible for him, and he would call on me quite often
to come into headquarters to discuss different matters.
166. General Russell. Wlien did you go out there ?
General Martin. I reported for duty there the 2nd of November,
1940.
167. General Russell. Was the Department in a condition of alert
when you arrived ?
[1853] General Martin. No, sir.
168. General Russell. Were you informed when you arrived that
the Department had been on an alert?
General Martin. No, sir.
169. General Russell. That year?
970 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Martin. Oh, I think there had been some sort of a maneu-
ver or something of that kind. As to being alerted, I didn't have any
knowledge of that, don't remember of anything of that kind. I won't
say that they were not.
170. General Russell. Were you, or not, conscious of the fact that
the relation between the American Government and the Japanese Gov-
ernment grew more tense from the time you arrived until the attack
on December 7, '41 ?
General Martin. Yes, sir; that is right. That is correct. Had
full knowledge of that.
171. General Russell. You had full knowledge of that?
General Martin. Yes.
172. General Russell. How did you acquire that knowledge?
General Martin. Well, I acquired it through the press relations
and through information that the Department Commander gave me.
173. General Russell. Then, the Department Commander and you
were agreed that the relationship between the Japanese and American
Governments was growing more tense through the year 1941 ?
General Martin. Yes, sir.
174. General Russell. Was there anything occurring on the Island
itself which would lend color to this growing tenseness between the
1 wo Governments ?
[18S4-] General Martin. No, there was none, no indication of
anything on the Island that would cause unnecessary suspicion, al-
lliough the G-2 section of the Department was unusually alert and
they were searching for information as such a large percentage of the
population were of Japanese descent or native Japanese, natural Jap-
anese, that they felt that it would be almost impossible for them to
ferret out all the things that might be taking place. So there was
naturally cause for great concern as to what this great mass or large
percentage of population could do that would be harmful to us.
175. General Russell. In the fall of 1941 or in November, to limit
the period a little more, in middle and late November of 1941, what
were the conclusions reached by you and the Department Commander
as to the probable imminence of war with Japan ?
General Martin. We thought it quite probable.
176. General Russell. When you went on Alert No. 1 as of late
November, were you and the Department Commander, insofar as you
knew his thoughts, impressed that war might begin at any day or at
any hour with Japan ?
General Martin. I think that is a little bit further than we consid-
ered. The probability of war, yes. And when you say "the probabil-
ity of war," it is apt to break out at any particular time. The fact that
it was going to break out within the next month or two, as far as I
am concerned, I will say I did not think that it would. I felt that the
Japanese were anxious to accomplish or to gain and hold what they
had, rather than to bring additional trouble on their shoulders.
177. General Russell. Yes, sir. Well, do you know. General,
whether or not the opinion which you have just expressed as to
\J8S5] the imminence of war at that time was entertained also by
the Commanding General of the Department, General Short ?
General Martin. All I can say is, he discussed it with me, and the
information he had, which indicated that the negotiations were not
progressing as they had expected.
r'HOCKKDI i\(iS OK AI»'MV I'KAK'I; IIAHlU)i; HOARD 971
178. Geiie'/al Kussell. Yes, hut you ;iiv uol able
General Mahtin. And thev were <iel! ing at the critical stap'.
17U. General Kusskll. 1 under^^land, then, that you are in.-l in a
l)osition to irive any too clear a ))ictni'e ol' General Slujrt's thouLiJn
about war at that time.
I will ask you this, General : Do you think that in the estimate of the
situation, upon wliich the order for Alert No. 1 was issued, the ])r()b-
ability or i!n[)rol)a])ili{y of immedia.te war with Ja})an playi'd any
]wrt^
General Makmn. You mean to say as to probability of immediate
war takinji; place with Japan being given considcu-ation at the tiiut^
Alert No. 1 was decided'^
180. General Russell. xVnd affecting the order.
General Martin. I don't think there is any doubt but what it was
consitlered.
ISl. Genei'al Russell. General, suppose that a conclusion had be(Mi
i-eached by you that war with Jaj)an was likely at any hour: would
you have thought tlien that Alert No. 1 was sufticient?
General Martin. Yes, under the circumstances that I stated to Gen-
eral Grunert. You weigh all the information you have available to
you. One counters another, and it is up to tlie Department Com-
juander and his assistants to make a decision as to what he thinks is
the greatest set to him. Under the circumst ances and the infoi-mal ion
that was available to him at [JSoG] tha.t time T felt that his
decision was correct.
182. Genei'al Russell. Whether war v.wnv ov not '^
General JMautin. Yes.
IS-'"). General Rltssell. Gener;d, in the discussion by General
(irunert of the
(ieneral ISIartin. 1 Mould like to add something right there, sir, in
addition to the question.
184. Genera] Russell. Veiy well.
General Martin. I feel that our decision was influenced to a certain
extent by the fact that the Navy was patrolling v^-ith task forces in
\^aters of which we had no knowledge. Now, as to what areas they
were covering, v.e did not know, but it did ailect a decision as to the
liaramount danger coming from within rather than from without.
185. General Russell. You didn't know where they wer(>'? You
didn't know where they went to, did you?
General Martin. No.
186. General Russi;ll. Whethei' north, south, east, oi' west i
General Martin. No, sir ; they didn't tell us.
187. General Frank. Did you have confidence in the efi'ectiveness
of these task forces?
General Martin. Well, not complete, no, but
188. Genera] Frank. But? But what?
General Martin. Well, but wliat, I don't know v.liat T was intend-
ing to say. 1 was going to say: the task force, not knowing as to
where it had gone av not knowing wliat iirfoiination it had tliaT would
indicate (luit it should go ceilain j)]aces. I couhhrt nnswer tlie rpiesi ion.
iSi). (leneral Frwk. But you just said th.nt iIh> fact that tli(>
I lSf//'\ Navy had task foives out influenced muw (j('ci:^ion.
Genei-a] Martin. AVell, I am sure that it did.
ino. (h^neral Frank. Well, wliy did it ?
972 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Martin. Well, if there was anything so large as a task force
of proper size to make a successful attack against the Island on the
ocean, I just had a feeling that the Navy, in the spreading of their
task force to pick up information, would contact it in some way.
191. General Frank. Therefore, you had confidence that the Navy
was conducting task force operations that would furnish you a certain
protection ?
General Martin. That is right.
192. General Frank. And because of that feeling of confidence in
the Navy to do it, you felt a certain security ?
General Martin. That is perfectly true. Now, as I stated a moment
ago, we were not completely satisfied with the way this reconnaissance
was being done, because there wasn't enough in the air, and your
reconnaissance from the air would extend over a larger territory in the
limited amount of time, and that was the thing 1 was complaining to
Admiral Bellinger about. There wasn't sufficient air reconnaissance,
but we did have a feeling that the task forces going out were going
out with the specific purpose in mind of conducting reconnaissance
of the waters in that vicinity. As to where they went, I didn't know.
I am sorry to interrupt, but I just wanted to bring out that point.
193. General EtrssEU.. Well, you were not the one that interrupted,
General.
I want to talk to you about what General Frank has injected here,
this question of confidence in the Navy, not [18S8'] from a
reconnaissance standpoint but from a defensive standpoint. You
seem to have some idea, for an air force commander, General, about
naval operations, of the task forces necessary to support this air
attack, and so forth.
What was your feeling about the ability of the Navy based on
Pearl Harbor to destroy such a task force before it could launch the
planes from the carriers, assuming that the Japanese task force was
discovered in time?
General Martin. I felt the Navy was strong enough and the task
forces were strong enough to be such a threat against any concentra-
tion excepting the entire Japanese fleet, which I didn't think they
would ever contemplate sending, that it would be a very decided
deterrent to the Japanese ever sending a task force into that area.
They were strong enough to have defeated any except a very unusually
strong and well constituted task force with plenty of capital ships
in it, because they had capital ships and they had cruisers, a goodly
luunber of destroyers, submarines, and the other lighter ships essential
to the protection of the capital ships and carriers. There were four
carriers that were in and out at various and sundry times which could
have been a part of any task force.
194. General Russell. There were four carriers? Now, I didn't
get the full import of that.
General Martin. Yes, sir. I say "in and out." Now, there were
the Hornet and the Enterprise and the Yorktown and the
195. General Russell. Oh, that is out.
196. General Frank. Lexington.
General Martin. Yes, Lexington.
\1S'^8A^ 197. General Grttnert. Four of our own carriers?
General Martin. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 973
Now, as far as we knew, the Japanese — all the information we had
was that the Japanese had about eight fairly good-sized carriers and
probably about the same number of converted carriers, and the naval
forces that were then in the Hawaiian Islands were perfectly com-
petent of taking care of any normal task force that might be sent
against them. It was a question of their finding them.
198. General Russell. Now, General, this final question: Earlier
in your examination you referred to the fact, when asked about means
available to you to have intercepted and destroyed this air attack
General Martin. Yes, sir.
199. General Russell. You made reference to that and stated that
before you left you wanted to discuss that.
General Martin. Yes, sir.
200. General Russell. And I would like to ask you to discuss it
noAV.
General Martin. Well, I would like to do two things: I would
like to make just a general statement as to conditions, and then I
would like, if I may, to read extracts from personal letters I have
written to General Arnold on the subject, so you can see the thing was
being discussed at the time. And I'll admit I didn't get any very
definite answers with reference to how it Avas going to be corrected,
but it had been under discussion for some time.
"Wlien I took over from General Frank in the Hawaiian Islands
we had, you might say, no combat equipment. We had some P-26s,
an old obsolete type of fighter which we then [1859] called a
liursuit airplane. We had some old observation planes, some B-18
bombers which could never protect themselves in any combat at all.
They could be used for reconnaissance, but you would lose them as
fast as you sent them out, if they went into combat. They were always
recognized as not being a combat ship.
In the spring of 1941 we received possibly 50 P-36s. They were
obsolescent at the time they came over. A little later — as I remember
it, about May — we received some P-40 fighters. These ships were
brought in on carriers and flown off to the station after they arrived
in Hawaii. About May we received 21 B-17s that were ferried over
by air. 9 of these, about the 5th or 6th of September, were trans-
ferred to the Philippines by air.
The 12 remaining were ordered to proceed to the Philippines; and
upon our request that they be delayed that we could continue the
training of combat crews for that type of ship, as the two bombard-
ment groups at Hickam Field woulcl be equipped with that type of
airplane, they would go on the tail of some 60-odd airplanes that
were being transferred from the mainland to the Philippines. At
the time this attack took place the preparation of these 12 B-17s for
transfer to the Philippines had progressed to the point where 6 of
them were on the ground with fuel tanks being replaced, in which we
found some deterioration ; engines being replaced so that they would
have the requisite amount of lack of time on the engines that they
would be sure to be in a position to function properly in transit.
The types of ships which could have been used in combat, which is
the P-40, B-17, and 10 A-20s, were always possibly 50 percent out
of commission due to spare parts. In the beginning of our production
program [1860] all monies, as possible, were placed into the
974 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
producing of additional engines, and the spare parts requirements
were neglected at the time. Therefore, the new airplanes coming
out were deficient to meet the requirements of spare parts.
We had sent cablegrams and letters on the subject of spare parts
through proper channels to our supply agencies, and they were not
in a position to help us. I knew that, but I did want them to be sure
to realize how important it was to improve the spare-part situation
as rapidly as possible. If we had an accident in one of our ships,
we used what they call cannibalism to rob it of certain spare parts
to repair other ships.
Now, that was directly forbidden by regulations, but the situation
was such that I knew that I would be always justified in taking such
action. They were never destroyed in any way but what the parts
if received could be put back in and the ship put back into commis-
sion again. But even the taking of a part from any part of the air-
plane or engine was forbidden as far as our regulations at the time
were concerned,
Now, as to information we may have that you may find in the files,
1 am sure you will find plenty of it explaining this situation, the
exact time when these airplanes were received, and the efforts we
were making to train combat crews. The type of airplane we had was
entirely different from the type we were receiving. Therefore the
training program had to be rather extensive for the fighters. We
were receiving men just out of the schools, who had not had advanced
training at the time : that is, a limited advance training but not on any
of the modern equipment. So they were put through a [1861]
demonstration of their ability to handle the old, obsolescent P-26,
then through the P-36 and on to the P-40, and considerable progress
was being made in training these men to take over the P^O equip-
ment.
201. General Frank. How about the bombers?
General Martin. The bombers, as soon as we got B-l7s, in I think
it was some time in May, we had a few of our pilots that had flown
the B-l7s. They started training others, and as I remember there
were one or two officers remained with the first flight of bombers that
came over, and helped train other additional crews. So they had to
train the pilots to operate the ship, the co-pilots and all other members
of the crew. We had no knowledge of repairing its engines or any
of its equipment. We had schools because the schools on the main-
land— the technical I am talking about, now — had not progressed to
the point where they could meet the requirements. In other words,
they had consumed some of their own fat, so to speak, to meet the
enlargement of the technical school facility. We were getting but
a few technically trained men.
I inherited from my predecessor certain schools which were in be-
ing, and others were established afterwards to give radio, engine me-
chanics, airplane mechanics ; and different types of training and repair
by the artisans in the handling of this new equipment was given at
Wheeler and Hickam Fields. There were possibly 400 men in these
schools, as I remember.
My contention, the only dissension of note that I ever had with
General Short, was with respect to the Air Corps performing its spe-
cific fimctions and taking care of its own, and the ground forces fur-
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 975
nishing protection for the airdrome. The regulations at the time
specified that the air force are [1862] responsible for the de-
fense of the airdrome, but on account of my intensive training program
and the fact that I expected this new equipment to come, the Hawaiian
Air Force having just been set up in November of 1940, there was a
tremendous amount of loose ends to be picked up, and I complained
very bitterly to General Short to have the men relieved that he insisted
be trained as infantry for the defenses of the airdromes and for other
duty ; and his idea was that, when this attack was pressed home to a
point that the air forces had been liquidated, then the ground troops
would be used as infantry. That part of it was perfectly sound and
all right, but my contention was that until I was prepared to meet my
primary mission I could not spare the men to be trained for this sec-
ondary mission.
Now, I would like to read you some extracts from letters.
202. General Russell. Before you get away from training. General,
in order to make the record more or less logical: What effect on this
training program would your having gone into Alert 2 or 3 have had ?
General Martin. So far as training for the defense of the airdromes
is concerned?
203. General Russell. This general training that you are talking
about.
General Martin. As soon as you went into one of those alerts then
it was assumed by the Department that these men had taken their posi-
tions for the final protection of the Island, and parts of them were to
report to the military police, and parts of them, a certain number of
troops were in defense of the airdromes on the Island. Therefore
they would be taken completely away from their essential positions —
those that had [186S] been trained for other positions — with
the air force units. After they had been trained as infantry for this
defense and the alert had been called, they had by that time qualified
for a classification in the air corps or the ground forces, ground crews
for these ships.
[1864-] 204. General Frank. It is not quite clear to me. Let
me ask a question.
General Martin. Perhaps it was not made clear.
205. General Frank. On Alert No. 1 j^ou could continue your Air
Corps training, is that right ?
General Martin. Now so far as these troops that were performing
the duty of infantry was concerned
206. General Frank. Did you perform infantry duty on all three
alerts?
General Martin. Yes, for those troops that had been trained as
infantry.
207. General Frank. lii all three alerts ?
Ge]ieral Martin. Yes.
208. General Frank. Was there any advantage to conducting Air
Corps training in any one of the three alerts ?
General Martin. Well, as to the training in the alert
209. General Frank. No, Air Corps training.
General Martin. Yes.
976 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
210. General Frank. Technical training. Was there any advan-
tage to conducting Air Corps training in any one of the three alerts ^
General Martin. By Air Corps training you mean technical train-
ing?
211. General Frank. Yes.
General Martin. Pertaining to the Air Forces ?
212. General Frank. Yes.
General Martin. There most certainly was, because we were hard
pressed to get the men properly trained to meet our requirements in
the new organization.
213. General Frank. Could you do more technical training for the
[1865'] Air Force in No. 3 Alert, No. 2 Alert, or No. 1 Alert, or
was there no difference ?
General Martin. Of course there was a difference. There wouUl
be more under Alert No. 1.
214. General Frank. More technical training?
General Martin. Yes. Under Alert No. 2 your ships are dispersed
and your crews are with the ships.
215. General Grunert. Under Alert No. 1 your ships were concen-
trated. Did you take them out of parking then, to train, or what?
General Martin. The point you have in mind and what I am an-
swering may be different. There is one thing, as to technical training
in the schools we had on the ground. If you are talking about the
opportunity for training in the crews assigned to the ships, then it is
different.
216. General Frank. No. I am talking about the schools.
General Martin. Your Alert No. 1 gave them great opportunity
for technical training on the ground.
217. General Eussell. What happened with respect to training
crews under Alert No. 1 ?
General Martin. You have no planes at all.
218. General Russell. They are all placed together?
General Martin. Yes. You could not ti-ain crews under those con-
ditions.
219. General Russell. After December 7th what happened to your
training eft'ort?
General Martin, I should say it started about 8 o'clock on December
7tli. The men were moving the ships out of the dispersed areas so far
as they could. In fact, considerable of [1866] them were
caught in getting them to dispersed areas.
220. General Russell. Let us go to December 8th. What sort of
training did you carry on on December 8th and thereafter?
General Martin. There was very little training there, or you could
not call it training. We went to our established stations.
221. General Russell. That was Alert N'o. 3?
General Martin. Combat stations.
222. General Russell. That was Alert No. 3?
General Martin. Yes. While it was training, I would not call it
training.
223. General Russell. General, I want you to be sure or be accurate
on the answ^er that you made a moment ago about under Alert No. 1.
Under Alert No. 1 you assembled all your planes on the aprons and
runways close in ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 977
General Martin. That was to protect them against trouble.
224. General Russell. All day long they were kept there ?
General Martin. They were kept there, excepting those required
for missions and other assignments, which were withdrawn and put
back into this concentration upon returning.
225. General Russell. Were any of those missions training missions
for which you took those planes out?
GenerarMARTiN. In a sense, yes. It was flexible to a certain extent
when permitted by the Department command. A strict interpretation
of the alert would mean you put them there and have them there, but
for training they were withdrawn and taken out and continued to be
used and put back in their concentrated positions at night, or when-
ever they came back. They were training at night as well as day time.
[1867] 226. General Russell. I am going to leave the develop-
ment of your fighting strength, if there is any development, to General
Frank; he knows more about it than I do; but I do want to ask you
one other question. What help could the Hawaiian Department con-
sidered as a whole, Army, Navy and all, have expected in the way of
fighters from the Navy ?
General Martin. It would have helped to take from the Navy,
under our control, such fighters as were flown off the carriers that were
within the harbor. That is all.
227. General Russell. Do you know that strength as of December
Tth?
General Martin. Let me add : And such Marine Corps fighters as
were based on Hawaii.
228. General Russell. Do you know what that effective strength
was as of December Tth, 1941 ?
General Martin. There were no carriers in the harbor, for one
thing. I think there were about 25 ships belonging to the Marines out
at Ewa Air Base. As to what the Navy may have had on Ford Island,
I cannot say. I think you will find those figures of the ships that were
actually on the Island at that time in the Operations file of the 7th
Air Force, because there was a record being made of the fighting
effectiveness of the Hawaiian Air Force from the standpoint of its
real defense.
229. General Russell. When these carriers were in the harbor, the
aircraft which normally accompanied them to sea were taken off the
carriers, were they not?
General Martin. "When they came in ?
230. General Russell. Yes.
General Martin. They always wanted them to go ashore to
\J868] some air field for training. As to whether they were
always flown from the carriers to a shore-based station, I cannot say,
but it was my understanding they were, because there w^as great dis-
cussion between the Army and the Navy as to the number of air
fields that should be made available to the Navy.
231. General Russell. We had some testimony during this hearing
about the probable Jap strength in carriers and aircraft. Do you
liave any independent opinion as to their strength, both in carriers
and aircraft, involved in the attack on December 7th ?
General Martin. I think I said at the time that we felt we could
expect them to have approximately 8 specially designed carriers, and
possibly the same number of converted carriers.
978 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
232. General Russell. I am talking about those in the task force
which made the attack on Pearl Harbor. How many do you think
were there ?
General Martin. I did not think any such number would ever be
in any such task force to leave the Japanese Islands. I would not
expect them to have all of their carriers in the task force.
233. General Geunert. How many Japanese planes attacked
Hawaii, do you know ?
General Martin. No one knows.
234. General Grunert. Your estimate?
General Martin. I would estimate from a hundred to two hundred.
It is my opinion they were in the neighborhood of 150. It is further
my opinion that a great number of those that made the attack never
did return to their carriers. I may be wrong about it, but I believe
that is true.
[1S69] 235. General Russell. General, you stated that you had
some letters that you wanted to discuss. Would you discuss those
now ?
General Martin. I wish to read extracts of personal letters that I
have written to General Arnold. I wrote letters to General Arnold
from time to time to keep him apprised of what was going on in the
Hawaiian Air Force. I will take them up chronologically.
He had written me a letter on October 16th, 1940, which I received
after I reported for duty in the Hawaiian Department. The extract
from that letter that I wish to read is as follows :
From the most accurate information available to date, provided further re-
leases of equipment are not made unexpectedly, it is quite probable that new
equipment will be available for assignment to Hawaii not later than the first
of July, 1941.
From a letter that I had written to him shortly after my arrival in
the Hawaiian Department on the 17th of December, 1940, I wish to
read the following extract :
In my opinion we have in the past and are still practicing a very faulty policy
with reference to providing our foreign possessions with modern equipment. The
importance of these stations from the standpoint of national defense dictate
that they receive first consideration in the assignment of modern equipment and
the full quota of personnel for its operation. We have been satisfied in the
past to supply our units in foreign possessions with obsolescent equipment until
organizations in the States had been equipped with modern types. This to me
is very faulty [1870] and could, in these times of uncertainty, be very
detrimental to our scheme of national defense. Our foreign possessions are
outposts of great importance and should by all means receive first consideration
as to quantity and quality of equipment.
In reference to that, from his reply of the 3rd of February, 1941, I
quote the following :
You are correct in that it is of great importance to provide our foreign depart-
ments with modern equipment. I am sure that you can appreciate the many con-
flicts which arise witli respest to the assignment of aircraft, based upon tactical
needs as determined by the War Plans Division. At this writing, your heavy bom-
bardment groups setup for B-17 airplanes; the 18th Pursuit Group for P-40's,
and the 15tli Fighter Group for P-38s. It appears that we may be able to send
to Hawaii a few of these B-17s around August of this year. Likewise, we expect
to send a small number of P-40s late this spring. Indications are that the
P-38s are not going to be available until the spring of 1942. We are right in the
midst of completing the plans on the assignment of aircraft, pursuant to the 54
group program. As soon as more definite data has been worked out, I will
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 979
advise you as to when your unit should be equipped, in accoi'dance with the plans
now in progress.
In a letter which I Avrote to him on the 25th of July, 1941 I liave the
following extract that I wish to read :
As a result of an Air Force CPX which I held last winter, a study has been
prepared, under tlie direction of Colonel Farthing assisted by Major Morgan and
Captain [1871] Coddington of the Oth Bombardment Group, which gives
a clear presentation as to how these islands can be given a positive defense by the
operation of long-range bombardment. It also dictates the number of this type
of airplane required. This study is going forward witliin the next few days and
I am sending a copy of tliis study, which is siibmitted through the Department
Commander, directly to you. To me it is tlie most important study which lias ever
been prepared for the solution of the problem of the defense of the Hawaiian
Islands and should receive most serious consideration. This is particularly im-
portant in view of the fact that by a memorandum addressed to the Commanding
General, U. S. Air Forces, dated July 17th, 1941, a study was requested to be made
of the air situation in Hawaii to include but one heavy bombardment group for
this Department. Any other increases to be limited to pursuit and light and me-
dium bombardment and observation types, holding any additional heavy bombard-
ment in readiness on the mainland. Due to the unusual circumstances associated
with the proper solution of air defense of these islands, it would be impossible
to attain efficient operation from organization reinforcing the Hawaiian Air
Force after hostilities begin. The solution of our problem requires special train-
ing in the search of water areas and the bombing of precision targets represented
by aircraft carriers and other surface vessels. Fortunately the preparation of
landing fields on the other islands of this group are underway as a result of the
approval of projects which have been submitted some time ago.
[1S72] I would like to enlarge on that particular statement
that has just been made in that paragraph.
A CPX was conducted, I think it w^as in January 1941 or early
February, with three officers of the Hawaiian Air Force who were
capable of operating our estimate of the Japanese air strength in an
attack upon the Islands. I myself conducted the defense with the
obsolete and obsolescent equipment that was then available to us,
using B-18s for bombardment missions because that was all we had.
The radius of action of these B-]l8s with any appreciable bomb load
was approximately 300 miles.
This CPX brought out that the enemy could bring his carriers
within easy range of the islands before darkness fell, running in at
night, and could launch an attack with comparative ease against the
islands and get back to safety beyond the range of the existing bom-
bardment type of airplane before we could make an attack against
them.
236. General Frank. That is the B-18?
General Martin. The B-18. As a result of this information and
knowing that we had been allocated the B-17 type, a study was made
as to the total number required for proper reconnaissance and to
provide a striking force of that type of airplane. This stud}'' was
started by Colonel Farthing, as he had full knowledge of the informa-
tion we had gained from our CPX. His study was in a compara-
tively crude state and the details of his final form were worked out by
my G-3 Section on consultation with myself.
This resolved into an estimate of a requirement for 72 long-range
bombardment airplanes on reconnaissance each day flying at an inter-
val of five degrees. In going out, after [J87S] passing ap-
proximately 600 miles distance from their base, they would not be
able to see between the two courses of adjacent ships. Therefore,
79716— 46--EX. 145, vol. 2 13
980 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
when they went to the limit of their radius, which was estimated to
be a thousand miles, they would turn to the left, and in doing so, in
coming back, they would cover the area in between that was beyond
their field of vision on the outward journey.
An additional 72 ships were required for the next day's reconnais-
sance mission, with 36 remaining on the ground as the striking force.
Those 36 would be augmented, if pilots were found, from the recon-
naissance planes which had been on mission the previous day. This
brought the total of heavy bombardment to 180.
This plan was completed and forwarded to the Department Com-
mander in Hawaii about the middle of August, sometime before the
end of August.
237. General Frank. That made a total equipment of how many
B-I7s?
General Martin. 180. There were 72 for each day's reconnaissance,
72 resting on the ground after having completed one day's recon-
naissance— all the daylight hours that were available to us they would
be out, so they needed rest — and 36 that were a permanent striking
force.
238. General Grunert. And that presumed that the Army Air
Force would do all of its distance reconnaissance?
General Martin. I might explain that this was submitted, due to
the fact that I had a feeling that the Navy was not properly equipped
to conduct a reconnaissance that would be completely satisfactory to
me; and on the assumption that if [1874] trouble arose the
Navy might be quite distant from Oahu, and we were charged with
the responsibility of defending that base so they could always return
to it. It was on the assumption that the Navy would be absent from
Pearl Harbor while we were charged with its defense.
239. General Grunert. And that the District would not have enough
to do that distant reconnaissance?
General Martin. That is right.
240. General Grunert. Outside of the fleet ?
General Martin. That is correct.
Another quotation from my letter to General Arnold dated the 25th
of July, 1941, reads as follows:
Another problem which is causing very grave concern is the fact that there is
in existence such a limited quantity of spare parts for the modern combat air-
plane, which grounds for long periods of time ships which are sorely needed for
combat training. I know how this came about and I know you are aware of this
condition and I am sure you are as fully aware as I am of the effects of this
condition upon our efforts to make all possible progress in providing combat
teams as rapidly as possible.
We are making progress in achieving our goal but it is very irritating that it
cannot be more rapid.
Here is a little more accurate information on the date of forwarding
that secret plan for the reconnaissance and protection of the Hawaiian
defense by air. This is a letter from me to General Arnold on the 15th
of August, 1941 :
There has been mailed under separate cover a secret study which was being
made at the time the memorandum from the [^875] Secretary of the
General Staff was received requesting that "a study be made of the air situation
in Hawaii."
This study was originally made by Colonel Farthing as commanding officer
of the 5th Bombardment Group (Heavy) assisted by Major Rose and Captain
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 981
Cuddington. It has been prepared as a staff study and carefully checked as to
its contents with certain additions being made by the G-3 Section of the Ha-
waiian Air Force. It represents to me the complete possibility of the Ha-
waiian Islands being defended from attack by carrier-based aircraft. It is not
making a statement which cannot be fully realized upon to say that "The defense
of the Hawaiian Islands can be accomplished with the 180 heavy bombardment
airplanes which are set up for the mission by this study." That being true, then,
by occupying outlying fields on this island group and with the requisite number of
airplanes and of the combat crews as called for by this study, the defense of the
Hawaiian Islands has been accomplished and need cause the War Department
nor the Army Air Force further concern.
On the 25th of September, 1941, 1 wrote General Arnold as follows :
Your letter of August 12th, giving information on the augmentation of the
Army Air Force and the sis charts showing the successive build-up to the 84
Group Program was most valuable information for us. It is strange how quickly
you become adjusted to figures in large denominations as to the numbers of
aircraft and personnel which but two years ago would have had a staggering
effect as to the possibility of accomplishment. We now accept the plans [1816]
for the future with the confidence of achievement without a thought of failure.
Since the departure of our nine B-17s we have but 12 of this type left in the
Hawaiian Air Force. We have competent crews which can be sent to the main-
land at any time to ferry additional B-17s as soon as they can be made available
to us. For our preparations for the future and for the carrying out of our defense
mission in the Hawaiian Islands, it is extremely important that we get as many
of these ships as can be allocated to us as soon as possible.
Further along in this same letter I wrote as follows :
The following progress is being made on the establishment of outlying fields on
the other islands. At Barking Sands, on Kauai, one runway is inider construc-
tion ; mobilization housing for two squadrons and one National Guard company
for the defense of the airdrome has been completed ; one bombing target for day
and night bombing has been completed. One bombing target for day and night
bombing is partially completed ; protected gasoline storage is under construction.
At Morse Field, on Hawaii, two squadron barracks and mobilization housing for
one National Guard company, with utility buildings, have been completed;
protected storage for gasoline and runway are under construction. At Hilo
mobilization housing has been provided for one National Guard company for
the defense of the airdrome and work is progressing nicely on one rimway con-
struction and mobilization housing for one squadron will be started in the near
future. At Homestead Field, on [1877] Molokai, the CAA has presented
money which has been placed at the disposal of the District Engineer who has
started work on the extension of runways, and mobilization housing for one com-
pany of National Guard for the defense of the airdrome has been completed.
On Lanai work has started on the construction of the runways, and mobilization
housing is yet to be completed for one squadron. Bellows Field has been desig-
nated a permanent station at which barracks, mess hall and utility buildings,
for the strength of 1200 men are nearing completion — the construction of runways
is underway.
At the end of that same letter I again call attention to the fact that
"Our great need for progress at the present time is for our allotment
of new equipment.
The underground excavation for the Interceptor Command is nearing comple-
tion and we expect to have this in operation within 30 days.
General Frank. What is the date of that letter?
General Martin. The 25th of September, 1941.
Five mobile RDF stations have been established on Oahu but the permanent
stations on this and the other islands will not be available to us until March 1942.
From a letter from General Arnold dated the 7th of October, 1941,
I wish to read the following extract. In preparation for this, I will
say that I had given him a report on the nine B-l7s transferred by air
982 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to the Philippines, in which I had called his attention to the limited
experience of the great mass of personnel and particularly the excellent
work which had been done by Sergeant Griflin as the principal navi-
gator. I stated [1878] that his work was of an outstanding
nature and should be so recognized. In his reply he said :
The status of Sergeant Griffin's application for commission is being determined.
As you have been informed, your need for equipment has been taken up. So far
as the shortage of B-17s is concerned, I know how you must feel when you have
set up an efficient lieavy bombardment organization only to lose part of it because
of the greater need elsewhere. I hope that conditions soon will permit the
allocation of new ships to the Hawaiian Air Force.
[1879] I wish to read the following letter from General Arnold
dated the 25th of September, 1941 :
There has just been brought to my attention the Hawaiian Department Tenta-
tive Standing Operating Procedure publication July 14, 1941. I note under Sec-
tion 2 that the Hawaiian Air Force is charged with being prepared to release
a provisional battalion totaling 500 men to assist the auxiliary police force. It
is further observed that the Hawaiian Air Force is charged with defending
Schofield Barracks against ground and sabotage attacks.
The combat units, together with the auxiliary and service units set up for
the Hawaiian Department, have been designed primarily to insure the full effec-
tiveness of air force operations during that critical time indicated under the
Hawaiian Department Alert No. 1. It would appear, however, that we have
overestimated the requirements for the Hawaiian Air Force. Obviously, it
would be impo.ssibIe for the Hawaiian Air Force to carry out the mission above
noted, in addition to its Air Force combat mission, unless there were a surplus
of Air Corps and related troops.
As we are so short of trained officers and personnel in the Air Force, it is
most undesirable to employ such personnel for other than Air Corps duties, ex-
cept under most unusual circumstances.
It would seem that the proper step to be taken [1880] would be a
request made on the War Department to increase the Hawaiian Department by
the number of personnel required to assist the auxiliary police force and to
defend Schofield Barracks. Our action would then be to reduce the numbers
of Air Corps and auxiliary personnel by that number.
However, before any official steps are taken, I would appreciate your unofficial
and informal comment.
Sincerely.
H. H. Arnold,
Major Oeneral, V. 8. A.,
Chief of the Army Air Forces.
This letter is from me to General Arnold dated 3 November 1941 :
In reply to your request for unofficial and informal comment upon the use of
Air Corps troops as ordered by "Hawaiian Department Tentative Standing Op-
erating Procedure," dated July 14, 1941, the following information is submitted.
During the department maneuvers, which lasted from the 12th to the 24th of
May of this year, the Department Commander, General Short, became very
much interested in the proper employment of all military personnel in a last
stand defense of Oahu. At that time he mentioned the fact that the Air Force
had approximately 4,000 enlisted men at Hickam Field and nearly 3,000 at
Wheeler Field ; he saw no reason why these men should not receive some training
as Infantry so that after the Air Force was destroyed [1881] they could
assist the ground forces in the defense of the island. I told him it was not
possible to give such training at this time as the Air Force's fiist mission, that
of training combat crews, was in a most unsatisfactory state. In lortler to obtain
these combat crews the men must be processed through our technical school^ and
in addition thereto gain experience in the actual performance of these duties
under proper supervision.
As no further comment was made at the time, I thought the matter was a
closed issue. Without further warning a letter was received from the Hawaiian
Department, dated 5 June 1941 on the subject of training Air Corps personnel
for ground defense missions. This letter directed that —
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 983
"a. At Hickam Field : The training of two battalions of 500 men eacli to per-
form the following missions :
"1. One battalion to provide ground close-in defense for Hickam Field.
"2. One battalion to be prepared to take over initially under the direction of
the Provost Marshal, Hawaiian Department, the anti-sabotage mission within
Police District No. 1, City and County of Honolulu, now assigned to the 1st
Battalion, 27th Infantry, under tlie provisions of Field Order No. 1, OHD 38.
"b. At Wheeler Field: The training of one [1S82] battalion of 500 men
to perform the following missions :
"1. Provide ground close-in defense of Wheeler Field.
"2. Be prepared to take over initially under the direction of the Headquarters
Commandant, Hawaiian Division, the protection of the Schofleld Area, now
a.ssigned to the 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, under the provisions of Field Order
No. 1, OD 40.
The training of these 1500 men was conducted under the supervision of Infantry
instructors, after three o'clock in the afternoon, four afternoons per Aveek. The
men who were placed in these battalions were the most recent arrivals in the
islands, plus a cetrain number of noncommissioned officers required in the organ-
ization. The officers for these battalions were reserve officers regularly assigned
to these two stations but from other arms of the service. As the Air Corps
training for the enlisted men in these battalions progressed they received assign-
ments with the Air Corps commensurate with their ability and training. The
Infantry drill in the afternoon, which usually lasted from 3 : 00 p. m. to 4 : 30 p. m.
interfered a great deal with the performance of their normal duties and when an
alert was called these men were required to take their defense positions which
took them away from their Air Corps assignments. This left the organizations
to which these men belonged extremely short of the necessary personnel for
carrying [1S8.3] on the functions required of the Air Corps organizations.
In other words, there was imposed upon these men the performance of a duty
assigned to them for the last defense of this island when the Air Force was still
carrying on this primary mission in the defense of the island. As soon as suffi-
cient reliable data could be collected as to the inroad this was making on Air
Force activities, a letter dated August 25, 1941 was prepared on this subject and
taken to the Department Commander, General Short, in person showing that it
was inconsistent with the Air Force mission to require its men to train as Infan-
try and take their Infantry positions when an alert was called, leaving vacant
their proper assignment with the Air Force. The only relief from the perform-
ance of these duties General Short would give at the time was that those a.ssigned
to such duties and properly trained for the performance of these duties need not
receive more training than was necessary to insure that they would be properly
prepared to assume these duties when called upon.
A new "Standing Operating Procedure" is being prepared but has not yet been
published. A copy of this procedure which was submitted to this headquarters
for comment made no mention of the assignment of Air Corps troops for Infantry
missions, other than Air Corps troops will be trained for the close-in defense
of Army airdromes on the Island of Oahu. I have delayed answering your letter
awaiting the publication of this "Standing Operating Procedure". \1S84]
that I might be sure that the provisions of the existing "Standing Operating Pro-
cedure" had been changed as indicated above.
It is my belief that the letter which I mentioned above, pointing out the un-
necessary handicaps placed upon the Air Force in training as Infantry at a
time when they were unable to conduct sufficient training to meet their primary
mission as Air Force troops, has received consideration. In this letter I asked
the Department Commander to rescind his instructions requiring Air Corps
troops to train as Infanti*y at least until such time as we had developed suf-
ficient combat and maintenance crews to meet the Manning Tables for the num-
ber of airplanes allotted to the Hawaiian Air Force. I am attaching hereto a
copy of the letter on the subject of diversion from Air Force training dated
August 25, 1941.
It is my firm belief that no attempt would be made by an enemy force to make
a hostile landing on these islands until the Hawaiian Air Force has been de-
stroyed or reduced in effectiveness to the point where they could offer little if
any resistance. When the present allotment of airplanes has been received and
these airplanes are properly manned by competent combat crews, there is no
enemy In these waters strong enough to destroy the Hawaiian Air Force or effect
a landing on these ehorea.
984 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I can well understand how one charged with the defense of these islands, as-
suming that the Hawaiian [1S85] Air Force had been destroyed, would
wish to utilize to the fullest extent the military manpower available to him in
carrying out his mission of the defense of Oahu. For Air Corps troops to be ef
fective under such circumstances they should be properly trained for the parts
they are required to play in such defensive action but I just do not wish my Air
Force troops to receive training for this "last ditch fight" until they have been
properly trained for their primary mission with the Air Force.
General Short is a very reasonable man of keen perception. It is now my
belief that he sees more clearly the training problems confronting the Air Force
and realizes its enormous proportions. I do expect that the training of Air Force
trooi)s as Infantry will not be permitted to seriously interfere with their proper
training for their normal mission.
I feel very strongly that a War Department policy should be established or
orders issued which will prescribe that troops from the ground forces have the
responsibility of the defense of airdromes and performance of interior guard duty.
If the interior guard duty is to be performed by Air Force troops, then a special
table of organization should be issued for a Military Police Company to be estab-
lished at each post for the performance of interior guard duty. Due to the im-
portance and value of property on Air Corps stations, troops performing interior
guard duty should be esnecially well trained for this service. These [iSSfi]
services can never be efBciently performed except by those who are regularly
and permanently assigned to such duty. The duties to be performed by troops
for the close-in defense of an airdrome are quite similar and require the same
training as that given to all ground troops for a similar mission. As to the num-
ber of men required, it makes no difference whatever whether the defense of
airdromes and interior guard duty are performed by Air Force troops or troops
from other arms. In either case troops performing these duties must have this
as their sole responsibility and assignment.
I am happy to say that this problem of training Air Force troops with Infantry,
which has caused me such deep concern, seems now on its way to a satisfactory
solution. Having given me this opportunity to unoflBcially and informally bring
this matter to your attention I shall, if in the future this burden becomes unbear-
able, bring it to your personal attention.
I am forwarding under seperate cover a study which has been made of our
personnel requirements to meet the allocation of airplanes for the Hawaiian
Air Force. As you will observe tables of organization for the respective units
liave been adhered to as far as possible. Our experience indicates the number
of men in these organizations barely meet the demands on this personnel for our
operations.
Expressing to you my high esteem, I beg to remain.
Most sincerely,
F. M. Mabtin,
Major Oeneral, U. S. Artny.
[7557] I would like to read an extract from a letter to General
Arnold on the I7th of November, 1941 :
With the transfer of the nine B-17s and accompanying spare parts we have
practically exhausted all spares for B-17s at Hickam therefore it is important
that future flights have distributed among the planes in each flight such spare
parts as exnerience has dictated may be required for these ships while in
transit. Tail wheels and inverters are two items for which tliere has been the
greatest demand.
That had reference to the 19th bombardment group, heavy, which
passed through Honolulu en route to the Philippine Islands.
241. General Grunert. Are there any other questions as far as
those letters read ? I have a few if no one else has.
When you in one of your earlier letters referred to units in the
United States being equipped prior to those in overseas departments,
was there any reply to that as to whether or not that was true that
they were equipping units in the United States before they were giving
overseas departments their proper equipment?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 985
General Martin. I know that was true before I left the mainland.
242. General Grunert. But there was no reply to that effect veri-
fying it?
General Martin. Nothing more than General Arnold acknowledged
the importance of the outpost position of Hawaii.
243. General Grunert. Did he in any reply to you on that subject
make any reference to the requirements for aircraft that was going
across seas to other nations?
[JSSS] General Martin. "Would you please state the first part
of that question ? I didn't get it.
244. General Grunert. In his reply to you did he at any time
explain to you that possibly there were demands on him for aircraft
to be sent to other united nations or allied nations?
General Martin. Oh, he just inferred that.
245. General Grunert. Just inferred it?
General Martin. If you remember, in one of his statements he
inferred that; he didn't say that.
246. General Grunert. Now, you referred to the search of water
areas by that force of 180 bombers, I believe you asked for. Then,
that was really under the joint Army-Navy action arrived at in Wash-
ington in which the Air Force was to do such searching; is that right?
General Martin. Now, I don't get all what you have said. I will
answer it in this way: this plan was conceived by the Air Force,
prepared
247. General Frank. Where?
General Martin. — immediately, shortly after the CPX in the
winter of '41.
248. General Frank. Conceived by the Air Force in Hawaii?
General Martin. Yes, Air Force — oh, I see. By the Hawaiian
Air Force?
249. General Frank. Yes.
General Martin. The study was made. It was followed by a staff
study. The study was originally made by Colonel Farthing and his
assistants, and it was followed by a staff-study of my own G-3 section
of the Haw^aiian Air Force. The plan was drawn up and submitted
to General Short and approved [1S89] by him. Then it was
submitted through General Short to the War Department, excepting
this one copy that had been sent directly to General Arnold.
250. General Grunert. Then, as far as you were concerned, it was
based on your own studies and own plan ?
General Martin. Yes, sir; no, not — our own study and the expe-
rience we had, dictating what was necessary to accomplish the mission.
251. General Frank. As a result of these exercises?
General Martin. As a result of command post exercises, yes.
252. General Grunert. Now, you referred to the construction of air
fields. In that construction work were there any appreciable delays
and, if so, to what did you attribute the delays?
General Martin. Well, it was a perfectly natural delay that you
had t« experience from bringing materials ; first, getting it approved ;
sometimes that was difficult. I didn't have so much trouble with
General Short, but I had a terrible time with General Herron to
convince him of the necessity for outlying airdromes. General Short
came there lecpptive as to the need for outlying airdromes. Then
986 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the estimate had to be made as to the cost, approved, and sent to the
War Department, approved by them, and the monies made available.
Then and only till then could materials start to move from the main-
land to Hawaii for the purpose of construction, such as were needed
from the mainland.
253. General Frank. With respect to the construction of these air-
dromes, when did you begin to get money for Air Force construction
for airdromes and other projects?
[1890] General Martin. I cannot say specifically.
254. General Frank. Well, money was scarce up to a certain point?
General Martin. Yes, up to a certain time.
255. General Frank. And then?
General Martin. Well, it wasn't free until after the attack, or ap-
proximately the time of the attack, was it ever free to the Department.
The things that General Short had been requiring for further de-
fense of the Islands had been given to him very niggardly until the
attack took place, and then he had more.
256. General Frank. Well, did you actually have any money for
the construction of airdromes prior to December 7th ?
General Martin. Yes, on the outlying stations, the runways, and
the temporary housing. Now, as to how much of that was taken
from the Department Commander's funds, I could not say. As to
whether he gave the funds prior to the funds being received for the
project that was submittted to the War Department, I do not know.
257. General Frank. Did you feel that there was any delay in any
of your construction, including the aircraft warning service, that was
attributable to the contractors?
General Martin. No, I did not. I had no contact with the contrac-
tors, but I did have contact with Colonel Wyman, who was the Divi-
sion Engineer of that Engineering — District Engineer. He was not
a District Engineer.
258. General Frank. Yes, he was.
General Martin, The district was here. Division Engineer. He
is most cooperative and operated very rapidly within his [1891]
limitations. Now, he was limited in getting equipment and getting
materials.
259. General Frank. How?
General Martin. Due to the fact that it had to come from the main-
land.
260. General Frank. W^ell. how did that hold it up?
General Martin. First he had to convince them as to its need.
261. General Frank. Had to convince whom?
General JMartin. The War Department.
262. General Frank. Well, if you had the appropriation, the need
was
General Martin. Oh, after the appropriation had been granted, then
as to how he dealt with the contractors, I do not laiow. Whether
the Government purchased the supplies and shipped them or Avhether
the contractors purchased them and shipped them, I do not know, but
I surmise that the contractors made the purchase of the supplies and
shipped them as a part of the contract.
268. Genernl Frank. But so far as you were concerned, did you have
any complaint to make as to the manner in which Wyman functioned?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 987
General Martin. No, I did not.
264. General Frank. Or the manner in whicli the contractors func-
tioned?
General Martin. No, I did not. I complained with reference to
the time that was required to get these permanent stations for the
RDF installation ; but as T remember, those stations were being con-
structed under the supervision of [J892] Colonel Wyman
rather than Colonel Lyman, who was the Division Engineer. Now,
as to who actually had charge of the construction, I will not be posi-
tive, but it is my impression at the present time that Colonel Lyman —
at least, he was pushing it at the time, trying to unravel the knots
that were preventing progress.
265. General Frank. Did joii ever have any difficulty with Colonel
Wyman?
General jMartin. I thought that he was the most aggressive and
active engineering officer I ever came in contact with.
266. General Frank. Did you ever come in contact with a man by
the name of Rohl, R-o-h-1, the civilian contractor?
General Martin. No, I did not; not to my knowledge. If I met
him it was just casually.
267. General Frank. I see. That is all I have along that line.
268. General Grunert. This S. O. P. of November 5th, did that cure
the thing of which you complained, requiring Air Corps personnel to
do guarding duty for sabotage purposes, or were the provisions of
that still in there that required you to turn out Air Corps troops for
such purposes ?
General Martin. Yes, sir. T was just disappointed. I thought
that the thing had been so definitely presented to General Short that
there wasn't any question about his making provision for it in his
orders; but after the attack took place and these men were still on
guard at these stations I asked that they be relieved, tliat they could
take charge of the salvaging of equipment and getting as much of our
equipment back into the air as possible : and he said definitely no, and
\i89S] they were still on that duty until General Emmons ar-
rived about the middle of December. They were relieved before sun-
dovni that night, though.
269. General Grunert. Did the Commanding General of the De-
partment approve your plan for air defense, your 20th of August,
1941, air defense plan that you sent in to your chief?
General Martin. Yes, sir.
270. General Grunert. He. approved that ?
General Martin. Yes, sir. You have reference to the use of the
180 heavy bombardment planes?
271. General Grunert. Yes, that is right.
General Martin. Yes, sir.
272. General Grunnert. Now except having plans for the use of
what you thought was the ultimate in protection, did you have plans
for the use of what you had ?
General Martin. 'Oh, the plans for the use of what we had ? Well,
we could not do much planning with what we had. General. You
just do the best you can, depending upon the situation that confronted
you at the time, knowing full well that you could never fully meet it
988 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
until additional equipment and trained personnel were available to
you.
273. General Grunert. Well, we all like to have everything we
think is necessary, but our job requires us to make the best use of what
we have. Did you have plans to make the best use of what you had ?
General Martin. Well, they were not in concrete form, because I
cannot see any reason for writing up a plan to guide everyone as
to the use of the equipment today when it is going to be different to-
morrow. We do have a plan for the equipment [1894.] that
is promised and which we expect will be available to us in the future :
but the thing that I think is important is this, General: that that
equipment was never stable; it was always in a state of flux, and
you can never lay down that you are going to use so many planes
and so many tomorrow because in all probability that particular
number is not going to be available to you. So it is from a day-to-day
proj^osition of utilizing, in keeping with the situation, to the best
of your judgment, that equipment which is available to you. So
you can have no fixed plan for any such operation,
274. General Grunert. Not to the detail that you describe; I
agree with you there; but you must have plans for the use of what
you do have. They must be flexible, and when you get more you
can do more ; but up to the time you get more you have to use what
you have.
General Martin. Absolutely.
Now, as to plans, I think you have to use that word advisedly.
It is just to make the maximum use of what is available to you on
this particular day when it is needed. Now, that is in the minds of
everyone there that has anything to do with the operation.
275. General Grunert. But if they have no plan by which to
use it, how can they use it intelligently or effectively? There is a
difference between a complete detailed plan and a plan to operate.
General Martin. You have a plan, the master plan that you are
going to operate on, but as far as I know there are no troops that
go into battle that lay down a hard and fast ]Dlan and say, "This is
the one we are going to follow," and, if they {18951 only
happen to have a small percentage of what they expected to have,
still follow this strict plan, because your plans have to conform to
what you have available to you.
276. General Grunert. But they are plans, aren't they?
General Martin. But not from the standpoint of writing them
down and putting them away in the secret archives to be referred
to when they are needed. They are plans to meet the situation of
the moment.
277. General Grunert. Well, with what you had available, did
all that stuff that you had available know what to do on December 7th ?
General Martin. They not only did that, but they did it to the
maximum of their ability. I was extremely proud of the behavior
of all those men because practically without orders they immediately
rushed to the positions, grabbed the ships, got them out of the con-
centration, got them into the dispersion area, and took such steps
as were indicated by the conditions existing at the time. Both officers
and enlisted men. I am extremely proud of their conduct under those
circumstances, which were most unusual and trying. They left noth-
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 989
ing to be desired so far as being competent to carry out that which
was their assigned or intended mission under the circumstances.
278. General Grunert. That finishes my questions so far as that
letter was concerned. He was yours before we left and got on this.
Go ahead.
279. General Russell. After December 7th did men and materiel
for employment by your forces begin to arrive much more rapidly
than before December 7th?
General Martin. Nothing arrived prior to that excepting [1896]
(he 21 that I spoke about that were being sent on to the Philippines.
280. General Russell. Well, did any arrive ?
General Martin. On the morning of December 7th we had nothing
but our 12 B-17s coming from the mainland. Those ships arrived
during the time the attack was taking place. We warned them in
the open, because that is the only way we could warn them, to remain
in the air as long as possible ; that we had no airdromes at other islands
that would accommodate them as yet. They were only partially com-
pleted. Four of the eight were lost from the attack of the Japanese.
Eight were made available to the Air Force afterwards. Some were
damaged in landing. One landed at a golf course. One landed at
Bellows Field with the prevailing wind, on a very short runway.
The new runway was not yet completed there and it was badly crashed.
281. General Russell. What happened beginning December 8th and
thereafter up until you left out there? Did you get a lot of ships or
none, or what?
General Martin. Oh, I wouldn't say a lot, but they were beginning
to come in. As to the exact dates of the arrival of airplanes to supple-
ment the meager force we had there, you can get that from the record.
282. General Russell. Yes.
General Martin. I cannot give you the exact dates.
283. General Russell. Well, I will quit there on that, then.
What about troops? Did they send you more troops out there after
December 7th ?
General Martin. They didn't while I was there.
284. General Russell. All right. Was this statement which
[1897] you have read from the letters a while ago. General, given
to the Roberts Commission?
General Martin. No, sir.
285. Generad Russell. It was not. That is all I have.
General Martin. I don't remember that I read any of these to the
Roberts Commission.
286. General Frank. How many B-17s did you have available?
General Martin. On the morning of this attack ?
287. General Frank. Yes.
General Martin. Six.
288. General Frank. You had six.
General Martin. And three of those were damage in the attack,
so it left just three.
289. General Frank. All right. If you had to have a plan to
operate six B-l7s when you needed 180, where would you have sent
those six ?
General Martin. Well, that is rather — not a difficult question to
answer. You send them where you think they will do the most good,
but you don't expect to get them back.
990 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
290. General Frank. Well, where would you have sent six airplanes ?
General Maktin. I would have tried to get the carrier if I could ;
but inasmuch as I couldn't find the locaton of the carrier and I would
have estimated they would have been lost anyway in the attempt to
get the carrier, I don't think they could have done a particle of good
without protection or without great numbers.
291. General Frank. If six airplanes had barged into this Jap force
that was making the attack, what would have happened ?
[1898] General Martin. They would all have been lost, in my
estimation, I don't see how any of them could have come back. And
it is probable that they would have been lost before they did very
much damage. At least, they would have not stopped the attack.
292. General Frank. Will you give me a little analysis by compar-
ing the probability of a Japanese air attack against the probability
of a sabotage attack?
In the first place, I would like to ask you this question: In race
track parlance what in your opinion were the odds for and against
a Japanese air raid succeeding?
[1899] General Martin. Succeeding?
293. General Frank. Yes.
General Martin. Well, they were very, very large. I do not think
it is possible to be very accurate about it, but if I were betting I
would have said that it was at least 50 to 1, probably greater.
294. General Frank. What?
General Martin. Of their not succeeding; not being made.
295. General Frank. In other words, you considered it what kind
of a venture ?
General Martin. Considered that with the improbable attack from
carrier-based aviation that far from Japan, would be at an odd of
about 50 to 1. Therefore the greater menace to the defenses of the
islands was right in our own midst among the Japanese people which,
as I remember, in about 400,000 are approximately 165,000 of Japanese
descent. Of that number there are possibly 25,000 that are foreigners.
296. General Frank. In other words, you thought that a Japanese
raid such as happened was a very daring, unusual risk ?
General Martin. It was a terrific gamble. Everything was based
on its success ; everything to be lost with its failure.
297. General Frank. All right. Now will you give me an analysis
by comparing the probability of the air attack versus the probability
of the sabotage attack ?
General Martin. Well, I think, from the information we had and
the terrific gamble that would be entailed in risking a sujficiently
large task force of the Japanese Navy with its carriers into those
waters which they knew were frequented by our own Navy, that
would indicate that it would be practically a suicide mission to attempt
anything of the kind. But within our own population we had a very
explosive mixture that could [1900] come to the surface, have
a complete understanding and organization as to what they would do,
without our being able to know anything about it. There are great
areas in the islands that are mountainous and rugged and practically
inaccessible, in which the average person never goes. Those are won-
derful opportunities for caches of explosives, incendiary equipment,
everything of that nature, and it seemed impossible for anyone to be
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 991
completely informed, to be assured that there would be no attack from
within. That seemed to be the most dangerous source of damage in
the defenses of the Hawaiian Department.
298. General Frank. In other words, the sabotage effort was there
present, and the Jap air attack you considered a 50-to-l gamble ?
General Martin. I wouldn't say that the sabotage effort was present.
I would say the probability of sabotage was extremely great. It could
be on you at a moment's notice. The attack from the air, on account of
the extreme gamble that was involved, could be highly successful or
be a complete failure, and we did not believe that they were going to
gamble to that extent in the beginning.
299. General Frank. I see. Now, do you know any place where the
Japanese have been as considerate of Americans as the United States
was considerate of Japanese in Hawaii ?
General Martin. Never.
300. General Frank. What do you think would have been the plight
of 160,000 Americans in Japan under similar circumstances?
General Martin. Oh, it is quite definite they would be in concentra-
tion, they would be carefully investigated and certain ones would be
destroyed. Others would eke out an existence as [1901^ cap-
tives in a foreign country. On the other hand, there were only about
800 of the Japanese that were immediately taken into control by the
military authorities after the attack took place, and this was increased
somewhat, later. As to how many, I do not know.
301. General Frank. Now, had you been alerted so that your fighters
could have taken the air, to what extent do you estimate 80 fighters
could have interfered with the attack?
General Martin. Well, they could have done considerable damage.
They could not have prevented it. It would have been impossible to
have prevented it, but they could have reduced its effectiveness quite
materially.
302. General Frank. How many Jap planes actually were shot
down over Oahu ?
General Martin. I do not know. The Air Forces shot down about
10. The antiaircraft shot down others. As I remember, it was pos-
sibly 29 or 30. There is a record of that.
303. General Frank. Yes, I know.
General Martin. I do not remember exactly. I think it was about
29 or 30. But in my opinion, seeing a large number of those ships
leaving the area with gasoline streaming out behind tliem, they never
made the carriers, and that was true in many cases that I saw where
there would be a white plume of gas — why it didn't catch fire I never
knew — leaving the tanks of the airplanes that were making for the
sea.
304. General Frank. Well, had tlie No. 2 or 3 Alert been active and
if they got, we will say, 25 Jap planes on the sabotage alert, with the
antiaircraft and 80 fighters operating, the chances are that a No. 2 or
3 Alert would have made it most expensive for the Japs.
General Martin. There isn't any question about that. You see, we
lost about approximately 50 per cent of our total {^1902']
strength in this attack. 50 per cent was already on the ground out
992 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of commission. After we dispersed them we lost very few ships
in the dispersed areas.
305. General Frank. You entered into this agreement with Admiral
Bellinger, and wlien yon entered into this agreement you knew that
you didn't have any airplanes to give him to make it effective?
General JMartin. That is true.
306. General Frank. And you also knew that he didn't have very
many air planes to make it effective?
General Martin. That is true. Simply gazing into the future.
307. General Frank. Therefore it was pretty much of a paper de-
fense that you had ?
General Martin. At that time it was, and known to us to be in that
status.
308. General Frank. Now, did you ever have any knowledge of a
Japanese task force with carriers in it in the vicinity of the Marshalls
on the 1st of December ?
General Martin. Oh, no. No, sir.
309. General Frank. Wliat would have been your reaction to that
information?
General Martin. Well, I think I would have been a little more
concerned about the possibilites of their getting nearer, if that had
been true, if I had known that had been true.
310. General Frank. You doubted the audacity of the Japs to risk
carriers, when they had only eight large carriers, in an attack on
Hawaii ?
General Martin. In the beginning. In the beginning of the
[1903] fight I thought that would be too much of a gamble for
them to take on the assumption that they would meet with success.
311. General Frank. With that as a background, what would have
been your reaction had you been told that there was a division of car-
riers in the Marshalls on December 1st?
General Martin. Oh, you would have to assume then that they may
be going to take that one big chance ; at least it is a threat that you
hadn't considered, that they would concentrate a large force so far
from their home base. Then you would have to consider it as a threat
and give it consideration in your estimate of the situation.
312. General Frank. Did you have any information along that
line?
General Martin. No, sir, I did not. This is the first I have ever
heard of it.
313. General Grunert. What was your opinion of the Japanese
air force as such, compared to your own?
General Martin. I thought the}^ were very good, the older members,
and their equipment was not the most modern but would be very effec-
tive. The number of airplanes that could be carried on their carriers
was very much less than that which we could carry on our own large
carriers. Therefore it would require more carriers. The number of
carriers would indicate a smaller force than would be carried by the
same number of our own aircraft carriers.
314. General Grunert. Did you ever have any discussion as to the
necessity for unity of command in place of action by cooperation ?
General Martin. Well, General, as to that being discussed
[1904] between the different oflScers in Hawaii, I do not remember
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 993
having such a discussion ; but to my way of thinking that is one of the
prime essentials for the success of the military force of any country,
particularly this one, to have a central control. It was discussed at
the War College, and we were allowed to discuss it very freely there,
and did, and we believed that that is one of the prime essentials.
315. General Grunert. But inasmuch as you were only on Alert 1,
sabotage, the question of unity of command didn't show up, whether
cooperation proved a handicap or unity of command would have
helped things, because they never came to conclusions ?
General Martin. I think unity of command would have been a direct
help in the solution of the problems in the Hawaiian Islands, and I
believe
316. General Grunert. You didn't make use of what you had, no
where would unity of command have come in to help out^
General Martin. What was that last question ?
317. General Grunert. I say, they didn't use what they had, the
Army or the Navy, in the attack, because the attack surprised them,
or they were not ready for it or they didn't anticipate it ; hence you
don't know whether unity of command would have helped the situa-
tion then or not, do you '?
General Martin. I can't tell you too much about that because it
would be between Admiral Kimmel and General Short, quite fre-
quently. I seldom attended those; and the cooperation between the
two, as to whether it was a 100 percent or not, I am not in a position to
say, but I have always felt that cooperation was one of the weakest
possible props for successful operation requiring united effort.
[1905] 318. General Grunert. Now, if you had had unity of
command, wherein would your Joint Air Agreement have been
changed ?
General Martin. It would have been changed in that all the infor-
mation available to the Army and Navy would come to the central
headquarters.
319. General Grunert. Then you realized the lack if information
or the dissemination of that information, or wdiat?
General Martin. You mean, would it be received, not only received
but disseminated from the central headquarters, which would have
made for strength and unity of effort.
320. General Grunert. What I am getting at is, your reply led me
to believe you felt there was weakness in getting information and
disseminating it. Is that right?
General Martin. Well, it probably is no weaker there. General, than
it would be elsewhere where cooperation is depended upon for unity of
action.
321. General Grunert. You don't know of any information that
you ought to have that you didn't have ?
General Martin. I don't know of any specific instance where there
was lack of cooperation.
322. General Grunert. Then, you don't know whether the Navy
failed to transmit something to you that you should liave used ? You
don't know that as a fact, do you ?
General Martin. Well, tliis thing General Frank has just men-
tioned, that either the Navy or the Department Commander has that,
994 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I think it would have been of value to me in helping me form an
opinion as to the advice I should give my Commanding General.
328. General Grunert. Well, now, General Short kept you pretty
[1906] well informed generally, did he ?
General Martin. Yes, sir ; I thought he did.
324. General Grunert. How did it work on the other end of tlie
game? Did you keep your commanders well informed?
General Martin. I tried to.
325 General Grunert. Rudolph doesn't seem to have known any-
thing about any of these warning messages.
General Martin. Rudolph?
326. General Grunert. Yes.
General Martin. Well, he only knew certain phases of it because
they were absolutely secret, and the more people that know a secret the
less opportunity there is to keep it from being spread about. Now, he
knew that certain conditions were imposed upon operators of an air
force. He may, and I am sure he did — I don't know that he had
knowledge of the wording of the message, any of those messages.
327. General Grunert. Did Davidson know?
General Martin. My Chief of Staff had knowledge of it.
328. General Grunert. Did Davidson know ?
General Martin. That I could not say, General. I wouldn't say.
I couldn't say, to give you factual information.
329. General Grunert. But then you didn't know about the Navy
message that started out, "This is a war warning" ?
General Martin. Not the naval message, but a similar message.
330. General Grunert. And you didn't laiow about the task force
that may or may not have been out in the Mandates? So you appar-
ently were not fully informed, anyway ?
General Martin. Well, I will say this : In any organization if you
want unity of effort and the proper evaluation and [1907] dis-
semination of information, you must have central control of that unit.
331. General Grunert. Did we have unity within the Army as to
spreading of information ?
General Martin. Well, I can't answer to what others do. I don't
know whether they do or not. I think I have suffered from lack of
information on many instances.
332. General Frank. You are highly in favor of unity of com-
mand. Let's
General Martin. Oh, nov*- I am speaking of task forces or — well,
it is a unit sent out to do a certain thing.
333. General Frank. Well, I am talking about the situation in
Honolulu on December 7th.
General Martin. Well, I am answering General Grunert here as to
dissemination, receipt and dissemination of information. Had one
person been responsible for the defense of Oahu, the information
should have come to him and should have been evaluated and dis-
tributed by him. Now, you had a dual situation there. There was
a commander of the Pacific Fleet present. The local defense com-
mander had nothing to do with the operation of that fleet.
334. General Frank. What defense commander. Army or Navy ?
Genera] Martin. The Army defense connnander.
335. General Frank. That is right.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 995
General Martin. He had nothing to do with the orders received
or issued to that fleet. Information coming to that CINCUS might
not have been properly distributed as to its value to the defense
commander of the Hawaiian Department.
336. General Frank. Did you then believe that there should have
[ld08] been unity of command between the Army and the Navy
in Honolulu?
General Martin. You are going to cover too much territory there.
You can't possibly have unity of command when there is one organi-
zation headquarters operating a fleet that is 3,000 miles from that base,
and another charged with the defense of particular islands them-
selves.
337. General Frank. They have it now.
General Martin. Well, I don't agree to it.
338. General Grunert. They have it now.
339. General Frank. They have it now.
General Martin. We had to put something above those fellows.
340. General Grunert. And, as a matter of fact, as soon as war
broke they had it right on that day, didn't they, December 7th and
8th?
General Martin. As soon as General Emmons arrived they had it.
General Emmons and Admiral Nimitz were given those instructions.
341. General Grunert. Yes.
342. General Frank. Now, the question for which I have been try-
ing to prepare you is this: Assuming that there had been unity of
command prior to December 7th, what organization in the War De-
partment or the Navy Department, or both, would have handled it ?
General Martin. There is no head to it at all. There is no what
you may call national defense headquarters which should control,
in my opinion — this is simply my opinion — the military operations of
the Army, Navy, and Air, which I feel should be separate and distinct
from each other, but controlled by this [1909] central plan-
nmg body : a national defense organization, call it.
343. General Frank. At that time the President of the United
States was the only one.
General Martin. That is right. He was the only could be acting.
344. General Frank. And we now have the joint Chiefs of Staff.
General Martin. Yes, which is a
345. General Frank. All right.
346. General Grunert. You don't blame the attack on Pearl Har-
bor on the lack of such an organization, do you ?
General Martin. Oh, no. No, not at all. I did not think that the
organization was weak to that extent.
347. General Russell. General Frank asked you some questions a
moment ago. General, about what could have been accomplished by
80 fighters on December 7th. I want to ask you: Did you have 80
fighters available on December 7th before the Japanese came in and
destroyed a great part of your force ?
[1910] General Martin. Now, let me see. We had approxi-
mately 100 P-40s.
348. General Russell. And they are fighters ?
General Martin. Yes, they are fighters. We had approximately 50
P-36s.
79716—46 — Ex. 145, vol. 2 14
996 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
349. General Russell. And they are fighters ?
General Martin. They are fighters. At least half of those were
always on the ground, on account of lacking spare parts, so I reduced
it to 75. Out of the 75 there is always probably ten or fifteen per cent
that would be out of commission from day to day. They would be
in today and out tomorrow. So it is something less than 75 that
would be the maximum that could have been put in the air on that
day.
350. General Russell. Do you mean to say when you have 150
planes you liave less than 75 you can fight with?
General Mabtin. That is what I am telling you was true of the
Hawaiian Air Force.
351. General Grunert. Due to tlie peculiar circumstances at that
time ?
General Martin. I don't want to be misunderstood. If I had 150
planes I would try to keep 150 planes in the air, but you can't do it,
nor can anyone else. But I was subjected to an additional castigation
with that force by having approximately 50 per cent at all times on tlie
ground, simply because I could not get the requisite spare parts from
the mainland.
352. General Frank. That was a special situation that existed at
that time, which at this time does not exist ?
General Martin. You can expect to have 10 to 15 per cent of your
ships on tlie ground.
[1911] 353. General Grunert. That is normal ?
General Martin. That is normal.
354. General Grunert. Then you could have turned out approxi-
mately between 50 and 55 fighters to meet the attack?
General Martin. Yes.
355. General Frank. And did the mobile AWS trail back the re-
turning attackers to their carriers ? I am speaking of your radar.
General Martin. Oh, no. You could not do that. There was so
much confusion in the air. You look at those plots afterwards, and
there was just a mass of lines. Of course, the people that saw those
could get an indication of a trend, but the operators at the time, re-
gardless of how skilled they might have been, could not have gotten
any particular trend from the tracks on the bands. There were too
many of them.
356. General Frank. Did you feel there was Japanese radio ac-
tivity interfering with your radar?
General Martin. We knew it. They started in as soon as the
attack began. And these stations which had not been in operation
at all were extremely active as soon as the attack began. You were
getting spurious messages that parachutes were dropping on certain
parts of the island, that there were carriers off shore in every direc-
tion except those where we feel now they were. Messages of that
nature were coming in over our frequencies at all times. If you asked
for landing instructions or anything of that kind, it would be garbled
for days afterwards. It was in the neighborhood of ten days or two
weeks before those instruments were located and confiscated.
357. General Frank. You did have sabotage then, didn't you ?
[19121 General Martin. Sabotage?
358. General Frank. That kind of sabotage.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 997
General Martin. By jamming the air frequencies; yes. It was very
much in evidence and there was no indication of it prior to that.
We had two monitorino- stations in existence there, under whose con-
trol I do not kiuny; I think they were F. B. I. They had no indica-
tion of these stations being in existence, because they had not been
operated. But as soon as this attack took place and got under way,
the air was full of Japanese conversation and our own language to
the point where it was very difficult to carry on operations using the
radio for that purpose.
359. General Grunert. When they located these stations, did they
get the personnel that operated them?
General MARnx. They had the personnel that had operated them.
360. General Grunert. I mean, did they capture the personnel with
the stations when they located these interfering stations?
_ General Martin. Oh, yes. But they were not always fixed sta-
tions. They were mobile stations. In fact, the last one we had had
been located out in the direction of Ewa, which had been a Marine
Base, but when we got there there was nothing but a thicket, nothing
out there at all, no possibility of a station.
361. General Grunert. But they captured the personnel with them ?
General Martin. Yes.
362. General Grunert. General, have you anything else j^ou would
like to present to the Board which may give us leads or be of evidence
as to facts about the Pearl Harbor attack that you can think of now?
11913] General Martin. As far as I can think of the different
factors at the present time, I know of nothing but what has been
touched upon or covered in the testimony that has been given.
363. General Grunert. Are there any other questions? There
being no more, thank you very much.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon, at 12 : 30 p. m. a recess was taken until 2 p. m.)
[1914] AFTERNOON' SESSION
(The Board at 1 : 55 p. m. continued the hearing of witnesses.)
TESTIMONY OF COLONEL JACK W. HOWARD, aUARTERMASTER
CORPS.
(The witness was sworn bj^ the Eecorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your
name, rank, organization, and station?
Colonel Howard. Jack W. Howard, Colonel, Quartermaster Corps,
07991, Permanent Boards, 9th Service Command, S. C. U. 1939, Pre-
sidio of San Francisco.
2. General Grunert. Colonel, this Board is after facts about what
happened prior to and leading up to and during the attack on Pearl
Harbor, and because of your assignment there during that time we
thought we could probablj^ get some facts from you.
What was your assignment in Hawaii during the latter part of 1941,
and give us the dates.
998 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Howard. I was the Supply Officer of the Hawaiian Quar-
termasters Depot, stationed at Fort Armstrong in 1941 up until after
Pearl Harbor.
3. General Grunert. The Adjutant General just had you listed
there as commanding officer of that supply depot?
Colonel Howard. I took over the command of the depot in June of
1942.
4. General Grunert. And who then was in command of the Supply
Depot during the attack and just prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?
Colonel Howard. Roland Walsh. I think he is now a Brigadier
General of the Quartermaster Corps in command of the [1915]
Philadelphia Depot. I took over the duties at the time of Pearl
Harbor, on the day of Pearl Harbor, the duties of the executive of-
ficer. I was the next senior second in command.
5. General Grunert. You testified before the Roberts Commis-
sion, did you?
Colonel Howard. I did, sir.
6. General Grunert. What in gist was your testimony there?
Why did they call you?
Colonel Howard. Well, I think that General Walsh could prob-
ably give you more information as to why I went before the Com-
mission than I could. In fact, he called me in and told me this Roberts
Commission was sitting at Sh after and that he wanted me to go up as
a rej^resentative of the Depot to see and meet the Commission.
7. General Grunert. What did the Board ask you when you were
before it?
Colonel Howard. They asked me in effect what I was doing and
what I did do on the day of Pearl Harbor.
8. General Grunert. And I will ask you the same question : What
did you do?
Colonel Howard. I got to the Depot as soon as — or I would judge
around 8 : 30. I was living at that time out of Fort Armstrong, out
in Kahala, and I got to the Depot I would judge about 8 : 30, and
from that time on I was very busy, not only supplying troops but
answering and giving all the information I could over the phone.
9. General Grunert. Wliat protection was there for the Depot
or the surrounding grounds there as far as you were concerned in
that post, the defense measures taken ?
[1916] Colonel Howard. Well, of course, there was a small coast
artillery setup there on Fort Armstrong. I think they were 3-inch
guns.
10. General Grunert. Antiaircraft?
Colonel Howard. No, sir. The antiaircraft guns were right across
the entrance to Pearl Harbor.
11. General Grunert. Yes.
Colonel Howard. I mean the entrance to Honolulu Harbor, on
Sand Island.
12. General Grunert. What protective measures were taken to pro-
tect the personnel against air raids and bombing ?
13. General Frank. Any slit trenches?
Colonel Howard. Sir?
14. General Frank. Did you have any slit trenches?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 999
Colonel Howard. I was trying to think, General, whether we built
those before or after Pearl Harbor. I am of the opinion that they
were not built until the day of Pearl Harbor.
15. General Grunert. Did you have any air raid shelters where
all women and children and the persorinel could run to to get out
of bombing range?
Colonel Howard. No, sir, not at the day of Pearl Harbor, time of
Pearl Harbor; no sir.
16. General Grunert. Were there any standing orders as to pro-
cedure in case of an air attack? In other words, did you know what
to do, and the men and officers under you, in case of an air attack?
Colonel Howard. Well, I don't know how to answer that question.
No. I would say no ; my duty was as a supply officer, and my men of
course were — my employees were mostly civilians, and I would have
been operating on the supjDly standpoint of view entirely. Now, the
post of Fort Armstrong was under the command of Roland Walsh,
and he in turn had an adjutant operat- [1917] ing up there
who had command of the troop, and they did have some kind of a
standard, an S. O. P. in which they were to operate under an at-
tack, but I had nothing to do with that.
17. General Grunert. Your men were in warehouses and one thing
another ?
Colonel Howard. Yes, sir ; warehouses and clerks.
18. General Grunert. Did they have any instructions what to do?
Colonel Howard. Nothing except for fire.
19. General Grunert. Evidently you didn't have much to offer to
the Roberts Commission, and have you anything now that you would
like to offer that you think would be of assistance to the Board in
getting at the facts?
Colonel Howard. I have nothing, sir. As a matter of fact, I have
less information of that than several officers that were around the
Depot at that time.
20. General Grunert. Any questions?
21. General Frank. Wasn't there a casemate or something that was
a bomb-proof in which they could take shelter ?
Colonel Howard. Yes, but that at the time, General, was operated
by some coast artillery men from Fort De Russy, and they were quar-
tered in there.
22. General Frank. Did the women and children actually take ref-
uge in there?
Colonel Howard. No, sir. All the women and children that day
were moved right off of the post and moved on up into the Nuuanu and
Moana canyons.
23. General Frank. All right.
24. General Grunert. That will be all, Colonel. Thank you.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
[WIS] TESTIMONY OF COLONEL WILLIAM J. McCARTHY, 260TH
COAST ARTILLERY GROUP, FORT BLISS, TEXAS
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your
name, rank, organization, and station?
1000 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel McCarthy. William J. McCarthy, Colonel, 260th Coast
Artillery Group, Fort Bliss, Texas.
2. General Grunert. Colonel, the Board is after facts and leads
toward facts ; and because of your assignment in Hawaii in the latter
part of 1941 and also because you testified before the Eoberts Commi?
sion we asked that you be sent here to this Board to testify to give us
such facts as you may know of your own information, and then I have
one particular fact that I wanted to inquire into that I didn't under-
stand in your testimony before the Roberts Commission.
Now, tell me first : What was your assignment in Hawaii, and give
me the dates.
Colonel McCarthy. I arrived in Hawaii on October 6th, 1939, and
was assigned to Fort Kamehameha.
Does that call for my complete assignments all the time while I
was there?
3. General Grunert. Carry it right on through.
Colonel McCarthy. At that time I was a Captain. I was assigned
to the 41st Coast Artillery, railway. I remained with the railway
artillery until July 1, 1940, when I was assigned as battalion com-
mander of the railway battalion. I remained there in various capaci-
ties as battalion commander and artillery engineer of the harbor de-
fense up until July 1, 1941, when I was assigned as battalion com-
mander of the 55th Coast Artillery, which is a 155 tractor-drawn
battalion, and I remained in command of that battalion until I left
Hawaii. Among [1919] other assignments I was the Group
Commander of the so-called Ewa Group, which was a sector of the
defense on the west shore of Hawaii that the 155 regiment covered.
4. General Grunert. Where were you during the attack?
Colonel McCarthy. In Fort Kamehameha, sir, right in the fort.
5. General Grunert. And you had a coast artillery assignment
with the heavy weapons?
Colonel McCarthy. Yes, sir, with tractor.
6. General Grunert. Didn't you have any antiaircraft?
Colonel McCarthy. No, sir. The only antiaircraft that we had
with us were .30-caliber machine guns which were assigned for our
own immediate defense, but that was not anti-aircraft.
7. General Grunert. In the report of the Roberts Commission it
says that you testified that from November 22, '41, until December
2nd or 3rd, Alert 2 had been in effect. You stated the post c(3m-
mander did this. Now, the post was Kamehameha, was it?
Colonel McCarthy. Yes, sir.
8. General Grunert. And what Alert 2 was in effect up to De-
cember 2nd or 3rd, and why was it then called off?
Colonel McCarthy. If I am not — that may be a mistake. I think
I said the 27th.
9. General Frank. 27th of what?
Colonel McCarthy. Of November, and not
10. General Frank. Well, that is immaterial.
Colonel McCarthy. It is immaterial. The 27th. Colonel Walker,
who commanded Fort Kamehameha, had instituted a series [1920]
of practice alerts. We would blackrout the post at certain times, and
we would go in the field ; sometimes we would never leave the post ;
to determine how proficient the units were in getting ready to go
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1001
into the field. You see, besides the 55th Coast Artillery there was
a battalion of railway coast artillery and the loth, which was the
harbor defense regiment, they having command of the fixed guns:
The 16s and l'2s, that were about Fort Kamehameha. There is Fort
Weaver and Fort Barrett.
It so happened that during one of these practice alerts that Colonel
Walker had called the thing suddenly went ofi^ about 2 o'clock in the
afternoon, and battalion commanders were ordered to report to
Colonel Walker's office at once. In fact •
[1021] 11. General Grunert. What date was this?
Colonel McCarthy. I f am not mistaken, it was about the 27th of
November.
12. General Frank, v^ne of these guns went off?
Colonel McCarthy. No. I say this practice alert went on in the
post. The thing suddenly stopped in the middle of it and the bat-
talion officer suddenly ordered us to report to Colonel Walker's head-
quarters. When we got there we were told to forget it, everything is
over. "I just received a call from the Commanding General of the
Hawaiian Department that we are now going on an antisabotage alert,
and we will guard our own installations in Fort Kamehameha and
we will send a sufficient guard to protect the various stations from
being damaged by people wandering around."
13. General Grunert. Then from that time on, which you estimate
to be November 27th, you were on a Department Alert No. 1 or
sabotage ?
Colonel McCarthy. Or sabotage; yes, sir.
14. General Grunert. What was this No. 2 alert that you were
practicing?
Colonel McCarthy. The No. 2 Alert, as we understood it, was one
where we were ready to go into the field, but not actually gohig out
into the field. No. 3 would take us right out into the field. Under
No. 2 we were all supposed to go, and that was what we were working
on.
15. General Grunert. That was just a post practice alert?
Colonel McCarthy. Yes.
10. General Grunert. It was not a Department No. 2 Alert?
Colonel McCarthy. It was not called by the Department,
[1922'] not that one that we were working on.
17. General Grunert. Did your command have anything to do
against an alert called against an air attack?
Colonel McCarthy. No, sir.
18. General Grunert. You would have no function during an air
attack alert?
Colonel McCarthy. No, sir; I would have none.
19. General Grunert. Then that explains why you were on Alert
No. 2 and it was called off about November 27th, and you went on a
Department alert?
Colonel McCarthy. Yes.
20. General Grunert. But the No. 2 Alert that you were on was a
post practice alert which got you ready to take the field, but you did
not go into the field?
Colonel McCarthy. Yes, sir.
1002 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
21. General Grunert. Do you know anything about the protective
and defensive measures for the post that were in effect prior to the
attack ? For instance, what were the measures for the defense of the
post itself, what were the protective measures for the care of person-
nel, the protection of personnel and so forth ?
Colonel McCarthy. Under the SOP that we operated under from
headquarters of the 7th Coast Artillery Brigade.
22. General Grunert. Who had that brigade?
Colonel McCarthy. At that particular moment General Burgin
was in command, but he had relieved General Gardiner. In the event
of a No. 3 Alert all organizations had sepi ^te sectors, I myself hav-
ing the so-called inner sector. That cons - d of all of the defenses
of 155s and some searchlights from a poiii just north of Barbers
Point.
[1933] 23. General Grunert. We will stop right there. I think
you mistake what I am after. I want to find out what measures there
were to protect the post proper in the line of machine guns to fire upon
airplanes, slit trenches to jump into, air raid shelters, and so forth.
Colonel McCarthy. There were no air raid shelters as such. The
only air raid shelter that was figured on being used was at Battery
Hasbrouck, which was a 12-inch battery, and that was a regroup CP,
all underground. Perhaps I better go back a little further. Let me
interpolate here that on the 17th of June, 1940, we were suddenly
alerted very quickly, and everybody moved out into the field. That
is the only time that I know of where we actually took the live ammu-
nition for the gims. I at the moment had the railway battalions on
the north shore. I had one railway battalion and one 155 battalion,
which was manned by the 11th Field Artillery, and we took live H. E.
ammunition and powder out into the field with us.
At that time the Commanding Officer, Colonel Walker, advised that
all officers and enlisted men who had families to make some provision
to evacuate the post to Fort Kamehameha in the event of an attack.
24. General Grunert. Advised the individuals to make arrange-
ments ?
Colonel McCarthy. Yes. The advice took this form : To collect
a certain amount of food that you could carry, a certain amount of
clothes that the family could carry, and the idea at that moment was
to move back into the hills behind the Pali in the event of a landing.
I personally had not figured on an air raid attack. I was thinking of
a landing by troops.
[19^4] 25. General Grunert. Was there ever an S. O. P. issued
that told everybody what to do in the case of an air attack or a landing ?
Colonel McCarthy. No, sir.
26. General Grunert. Were there measures taken after the attack,
protective measures ?
Colonel McCarthy. Yes.
27. General Grunert. What happened then ?
Colonel McCarthy. After the attack all the women and children on
the post were put into Battery Hasbrouck, and they remained there
for three days and nights. Some of the women and children were
evacuated into civilian homes in Honolulu, but they came back after
a couple of days and returned to their quarters on the post.
28. General Kussell. Aftei- this alert of June 17, 1940, what was
the subsequent history ? How long did you stay out ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1003
Colonel McCarthy, We stayed out, if my memory does not fail
me, until almost the 4th of August.
29. General Grunert. And then did the entire unit move back to
the post?
Colonel McCarthy. Yes, sir, when the alert was declared off
everybody came back to the post.
30. General Grunert. You were out on it for about six weeks?
Colonel McCarthy. Yes, sir.
31. General Grunert. What effect on your training and morale did
this six-week period of training have ?
Colonel McCarthy. It did not hurt ; it helped, as a matter of fact.
32. General Grunert. You liked it ?
[1925] Colonel McCarthy. Yes, sir.
33. General Grunert. Then there was no interference with your
training or your morale ?
Colonel McCarthy. No. We carried out gunnery instructions un-
der drill just the same as we would have had we been back at the post.
In addition, we had to stand two alerts, day and night.
34. General Russell. What excitement among the populace pre-
vailed or obtained as a result of this June I7th alert?
Colonel McCarthy. Well, General, I could not answer that. I do
not know. You see, I was at Fort Kam and we went right out to the
north shore, where I was stationed at the time, and came back to Kam.
35. General Russell. And your testimony is to the effect that in
moving in and out you did not come in contact with any of the
civilian population?
Colonel McCarthy. No, sir. Of course, we saw a certain amount on
the road, but the only contact I had with any civilians whatsoever, in
view of this procedure, was with the plantation people, securing rights
of way or permission to go on their ground.
36. General Russell. If there had been a great deal of excitement
among the civilian population on the island, including those of Japa-
nese descent and Japanese who had not been naturalized, such a state
would naturally have reached your ears, wouldn't it ?
Colonel McCarthy. Yes, it would. On the Waialua Plantation a
great portion of their employees were Japanese. They didn't bother
us any, so far as I know. We were right there encamped on their
property.
[1936] 37. General Frank. What did you have command of on
the north shore ?
Colonel McCarthy. A railway battalion. They called it the North
Group, General, but it consisted of one railway battery.
38. General Frank. You said the 11th Field Artillery manned it.
Colonel McCarthy. Yes.
39. General Frank. The 11th Field Artillery belonged to Burgin at
Schofield, didn't it?
Colonel McCarthy. Yes. Two batteries of the 11th Field Artillery
manned 155s which belonged to the Coast Artillery and they were
under my control as group commander.
40. General Frank. The Coast Artillery down at Kamahameha
commanded some of the 11th Field Artillery that belonged under
Burgin at Schofield ?
1004 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel McCarthy. Yes, that is right. Those batteries were as-
signed to man the 155s, which were presumably harbor defense guns
on the north shore. I don't know why, except that they were.
41. General Grunert. Colonel, have you anything that you know
of that you might offer to the Board in the line of testimony that would
throw light on any facts that pertain to the attack ?
Colonel McCarthy. General, the only thing I could tell you is what
happened where I was.
42. General Grunert. What was that, briefly ?
Colonel McCarthy. At about a quarter of 8 in the morning of
December 7th, I heard airplanes passing over Kamehameha and I
heard this firing, machine gun firing. At the moment I thought
[1927] it was the Navy practicing. I had seen them flying around
a good deal.
43. General Frank. On Sunday ?
Colonel McCarthy. This was on Sunday morning, sir.
44. General Frank. Had the Navy been flying on Sunday and
shooting?
Colonel McCarthy. No, but we had this alert and I didn't know
what was happening. I thought they were practicing. We had
blank ammunition for machine guns for ground shooting, but I had
never heard of them being in an airplane. I was curious and ran
out to see, and just at that time I heard the swish of an explosion.
I didn't know what that was. I ran out of my quarters and a Japa-
nese plane was flying overhead with machine guns going. I immedi-
ately tried to raise headquarters. The phones were all dead. I got
my car and chased the battery out, told them to go out and man their
war positions, take over their battle stations.
It so happened that A Battery was in position right at Fort
Kamehameha. C Battery guns were in position at Fort Weaver, but
the personnel was at camp. B Battery's guns and personnel were
at camp. B Battery's position was at Barbers Point.
When I got to the battery area I found B Battery in the middle
of a dog fight with some planes right over their heads. They were
firing .30 caliber machine guns at them. So far as I know, they
shot down two planes. When I got to headquarters Battery they
had knocked down one plane, and a plane had caromed off a tree
and the pilot was lying on the ground. It was one of those single-
seater affairs and was a total wreck. The pilot was dead.
[W^S] About the second wave was just starting to come over
at that time. I started to move out into Hickam Field. I saw
Hickam Field was burning. I didn't know what was causing it, but
I could see it burning. But after the battalion was on the road getting
ready to move, I reported into headquarters for instructions. Colonel
Ryan, who was in the group at headquarters, advised me he had
received a report that there were 25 transports 4,000 yards off
Kaena Point and for me to get into position as quickly as I could,
because I was the biggest thing north of Pearl Harbor at the moment,
with 155s, to be ready to repel what he naturally assumed would be a
landing in force. Those transports never materialized. Where he
got his information, I do not know, except that he gave me that.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1005
I went out in the field and remained in tlie field until I was relieved
on April 12tli or 13th and came back to the United States.
45. General Grunert. Tliank you very much.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
TESTIMONY OF COLONEL WILLIAM DONEGAN, G-3, FOURTH ARMY,
FORT SAM HOUSTON, TEXAS.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your
name, rank, organization, and station?
Colonel DoNEGAN. William N. Donegan, Colonel, General Staff
Corps, 01174, G-3, Fourth Army.
2. Colonel West. Wliere are your headquarters ?
Colonel Donegan. Fort Sam Houston, Texas.
3. General Grunert. Colonel, this Board is attempting to get facts
or leads to facts pertaining to tlie background of the period leading
up to and also concerning the attack on Pearl Harbor. [1929]
Because of your assignment in the Hawaiian Department in the latter
part of 1941 we hope that we can get some such facts from you. I have
prepared a number of questions based primarily upon your position
at that time, which was what?
Colonel Donegan. G-3.
4. General Grunert. G-3 of what?
Colonel Donegan. G-3 of the Hawaiian Department.
5. General Grunert. I will ask you these questions and if you can-
not give us the answers, just say so. If you can, naturally we expect
the answers, but I understood from an interview with you that I
would probably be expecting too much from you. Are you familiar
with the provisions of the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan?
Colonel Donegan. Could I take about 1 minute. General, just to
give my background, and then I think I can be in step ?
6. General Grunert. Go right ahead.
Colonel Donegan. I was in the G-3 Section. Hawaiian Department
from September, 1940, until Pearl Harbor. From September 1940
until November 1941 I was Assistant G-3, with a typical G-3 Section
on a desk. I was appointed G-3 in November. During most of my
time in the G-3 Section, now Brigadier General, then Major Hobart
Hewitt was the so-called specialist on the G-3 Section, on Army and
Navy agreements and also working with the Air Force. Colonel
William Lawton, then Major Lawton, came in and understudied
Hewitt for a period of six months, and then he took over Hewitt's
task and was the specialist on the Hawaiian Defense Plan, Joint Army
and Navy Agreement, and aircraft warning. On these questions he
was my adviser at G-3, and I sat in at all principal meetings with the
[WSO} Navy and Air Force.
7. General Grunert. The Board expects to hear Major, now I
believe Colonel, Lawton later on. In the meantime I will see what
information you can give me on these questions.
1006 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
8. General Frank. From what branch does Colonel Lawton come ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. Both Hewitt and Lawton are Coast Artillery.
9. General Grunert. And you are what?
Colonel DoNEGAN, Infantry.
10. General Grunert. Under that plan was not the Army charged
with the tactical command of the defensive air operation over and
in the immediate vicinity of Oahu?
Colonel DoNEGAN. That was my understanding.
11. General Grunert. They were providing the antiaircraft de-
fense of Oahu, with particular attention to the Pearl Harbor Naval
Base and the naval forces therein ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. Honolulu and Pearl Harbor; yes, sir.
12. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not the Command-
ing General kept himself informed as to the naval forces present in
Pearl Harbor?
Colonel Donegan. I cannot answer that. General. There is another
point I would like to bring out, based on the Roberts Commission
report. We also had in the G-3 Section, now Colonel, then Major,
Dingeman, who was the liaison officer between the G-3 Section,
Hawaiian Department, and the 14th Naval District. I don't believe
he appeared before the Roberts Commission and he is still on duty in
Hawaii.
13. General Grunert. What is his name?
[iPJi] Colonel Donegan. Dingeman, Ray E. Dingeman. He
was in the G-3 Section.
14. General Grunert. And he is still in the Hawaiian Islands ?
Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir. They also have an Air Corps officer in
the G-3 Section who has not been injected into the picture. That is
Wilfred Paul. He was there I believe three months before December
7th and at least three months after December 7th. He was one of the
advisers on the Air equipment. I don't believe he appeared before the
Roberts Commission.
15. General Grunert. What do you suppose he would know that we
cannot find out otherwise ?
Colonel Donegan. He worked up several of the joint Army and Navy
exercises in which the Air participated.
16. General Grunert. He was particularly concerned in M^orking up
exercises that General Martin wanted and that were to receive the
approval of the Department?
Colonel Donegan. I would say the other way. He was working for
General Short and he coordinated our Air Corps and Interceptor Com-
mand and Navy in these joint exercises. He was working more or less
as general air adviser in the General Staff Section.
17. General Grunert. He would not know anything that General
Martin would not know ?
Colonel Donegan. He should not, no.
18. General Grunert. General Martin would probably know all
that Paul knows ?
Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir.
19. General Grunert. Our time is limited and we cannot branch
out too much, unless they are leads for facts that we cannot [1932]
get otherwise.
Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1007
20. General Grunert. Do you know whether the Commanding Gen-
eral of the Hawaiian Department knew what elements of the fleet were
in or out of the harbor ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. I do not know.
21. General Gruneut. Do you know whether such information was
ever requested from the Navy through G-3 ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. Not throuoh G-3. I do not recall, no, sir.
22. General Grunert. Would the knowledge whether the fleet was
in or out of the harbor make any difference in taking defense measures
or applying them or implementing them?
Colonel Donegan. I don't believe it would have at that time. The
Navy was constantly in and out. I can recall that distinctly, because
at one time they alternated a program so the Navy could be out over
the week-end and come back during the week.
23. General Grunert. Did you consider that you had a greater re-
sponsibility when the fleet was in than when it was out ?
Colonel Donegan. Frankly, I did not think so, as G-3.
21. General Grunert. I understand 3'ou had in your office a naval
Lieutenant by the name of Burr.
Colonel Donegan. Yes.
25. General Grunert. Who was the naval liaison officer for the 14th
Naval District.
Colonel Donegan. Yes.
26. General Grunert. Was he capable?
Colonel Donegan: Well, he was selected by the Navy. He
[193S] was there. He was not of much value to us.
27. General Grunert. Did he keep j^ou informed of what the Navy
was doing?
Colonel Donegan. My recollection of Burr is that when we wanted
information we told him what we wanted aiid he went out and got
it for us. But he gave us very little, as I recall, on his own initiative.
28. General Grunert. Did you give him whatever the Navy wanted ?
Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir. There was no question al3out that.
Anything we had in our Section was available to him.
29. General Grunert. Did he often ask for it or did he have to
ask for it or did you, whenever you had anything new, tell him about
it or ask him whether the Navy was interested? I am trying to get
at what actual liaison there was there in getting information from
one to the other.
Colonel Donegan. It was there for him. I don't believe he asked
for much. I think at that time Major Lawton was in daily contact
with his corresponding number in the 14th Naval District.
30. General Grunert. His corresponding number would be what?
Colonel Donegan. There was a series. One time Hewitt and I
would frequently be contacting a Captain Goode, who was the 14th
Naval District, like the Chief of Staff. Then a Captain Munson.
Our liaison was back and forth. I had many trips over there and
would go with either Lawton or Hewitt. I have also gone to now
Admiral, then Captain, McMorris, on board the cruiser Indianapolis.
I had been over there frequently to arrange these missions. He had
a Scouting Force at that time! [1934] Then I know several
times a G-3 representative went out to Admiral Halsey's carrier, to
1008 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Commander Miles Browning, when the carrier would come in from
a "raid", testing out.
31. General Gkunert. Then you did not depend on this naval Lieu-
tenant, Burr, for your contacts?
Colonel DoNEGAN, No, sir.
32. General Grunert. In G-3?
Colonel DoNEGAN. He was an Intelligence man.
33. General Grunert. Intelligence or intelligent?
Colonel DoNEGAN. No, Intelligence, Naval Intelligence. He was
not like a line, tactical or combat officer. He was a Navy Intelligence
reserve officer. We used him very little.
34. General Grtfnert. Would he know anything about the Inter-
ceptor Command ?
Colonel Donegan. Very little.
35. General Grunert. And the war warning service?
Colonel Donegan. We did not deal with him for anything like that.
We discussed the aircraft warning service and dealt with a man in
the 14th Naval District who was an expert.
36. General Frank. He was a sort of a technical liaison man?
Colonel Donegan. That is right.
37. General Frank. Rather than an efficient operating liaison man?
Colonel Donegan. He did not have the background, Dingeman,
our man, did have the background, particularly on this harbor control
post. He spent full time over at the Navy. He came in our office at
8 o'clock in the morning to rheck up on what we had and then went
immediately over to Pearl Harbor, and came back at about 11 : 30 to
have luncheon with us, and would go liack to Pearl Harbor at 1 o'clock
and spend the rest of the day there. He spent full time at Pearl
Harbor.
38. General Grunert. That was Dingeman ?
[19S5] Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir.
39. General Grunert. Now I am going to read you some extracts
here from the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and
ask you a few questions about it.
Paragraph 4 of Section 1 of that plan designates G-3 as the plan-
ning representative for the Army, in paragraph 15c (2) ; Section 3
states in part:
Snch parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior
to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed
upon by local commanders.
Paragraph 21, Section 6, states in part :
This agreement to take effect at once and to remain effective until notice
in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or disap-
proval in part or in whole by either the War or Navy Departments.
Now, do you know whether or not the War and Navy Departments
approved that plan ?
Colonel Donegan. I do not know. Was that not dated some time
in April ?
40. General Grunert. Right.
Colonel Donegan. 1941.
41. General Grunert. Do you know whether they disapproved all
or part of the plan ?
Colonel Donegan. I do not.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1009
42. General Grunert. Did the War and Navy Departments ever
order any part of the plan put into effect prior to M-Day?
Colonel DoNEGAN. Not to my knowledge.
43. General Grunert. Did the local commanders ever mutually
agree to put into effect any part of the plan ?
Colonel Donegan. I do not recall. If I could talk to General Frank
off the record? That comes under something about [1936]
plans being put into effect. As to G-3, 1 do not know.
44. General Grunert. My next question is, if so, would that sort
of thing be put on record and be of record in the Hawaiian Depart-
ment, do you know ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. I would not say so ; to my knowledge, no.
45. General Grunert. What is M-Day?
Colonel DoNEGAN. Mobilization Day.
4G. General Grunert. What does that mean ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. That is the day that the Department command-
ers would be notified by Washington.
47. General Grunert. Could the Department commanders initiate
M-Day?
Colonel Donegan. My understanding was that Washington was
going to do it.
48. General Grunert. I think the plan provided that M-Day could
be put into effect for reasons of the imminence of war of anything
like that, by local agreement between the two commanders. Of
course, it would have been reported to Washington or probably a
request made on Washington to put M-Day into effect.
49. General Frank. What is M-Day?
Colonel DoNEGAN. According to that plan, the War Department
was going to stage an M-Day in preparation for war, prior to which
we would get a maximum war strength garrison. I may add here
that just a week before Pearl Harbor, after a very comprehensive and
complete study, we submitted a report which was mailed not later
or not earlier than the 1st of December to Washington, stating our
requirements for an initial war garrison. It was in the mail on
December 7th, I am sure. In that our G-3 Section worked out what
we considered the essentials of what the War Department called
an initial war garrison, and I believe they gave us the figures.
[19S7] 50. General Frank. What is the necessity for declaring
an M-Day?
Colonel DoNEGAN. In this way, I would say, they would build up
the garrison to war strength. That is the only reason I know of.
They certainly did not have a sufficient garrison there.
51. General Frank. Suppose the Commander of the Hawaiian De-
partment had declared an M-Day ; what would have happened ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. I believe my reaction to that would be, if it was
necessary for the local commanders to declare an M-Day and they
believed the situation was serious enough for that, we would have gone
on to a so-called Alert No. 3, instead of the sabotage alert, or No. 1,
which we were on at that time. I do not believe that they thought
the conditions warranted calling an M-Day. I never thought of
M-Day that way before, but the emergency did not exist at that time.
52. General Frank. What I am trying to find out is what happens
in a place like Honolulu, when M-Day is declared by anybody ? What
is the sequence of events ?
1010 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel DoNEGAN. I don't know. It should be in that plan. They
refer to M-Day in that.
53. General Grunert. I will read it for the benefit of the record.
It is paragraph 15 C (2) of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan,
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.
M-Day is the first day of mobilization and is the time origin for the execution
of this plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war. As a precautionary
measure the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain
features of their respective plan prior to M-Day. Such parts of this plan as are
believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day, as ordered by the
War and Navy Departments, or as mutually agreed upon by [1938] local
commanders.
M-Day therefore appears to be when you take steps just as if i^ou
expect war in the near future, and in taking those steps mobilization
consists of the various steps to be taken, as to the civil population,
as to recruitment for the Army, reception of Army personnel, opera-
tion of martial law and various other steps that you would take only
in case you think war is in the immediate oflBng. Is that your
understanding?
Colonel DoNEGAN. Yes. As G-3 I didn't think war was in the
immediate offing, from my knowledge of the situation at that time.
54. General Grunert, Wliat was your position in January, 1941?
Assistant G-3?
Colonel DoNEGAN. Assistant G-3 and the section I had, I believe,
was that I was in charge of ground troops. I remember particularly
tables of organization and so forth.
55. General Grunert. While in G-3 there did you know of a letter
written by the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War and
the Secretary of War's reply to the Navy, a copy of which was sent
to the Hawaiian Department, that pertained to the defenses, called
attention to certain weaknesses, and especially called attention to the
need for preparation to meet air attacks? Do you remember that
letter at that time?
Colonel DoNEGAN. No, sir, I don't believe I do.
56. General Grunert. General Short acknowledged receipt of a
copy of that letter of February 19, 1941. Do you know what was done
between February and December in the line of increasing the defense
against air attack, generally speaking?
Colonel DoNEGAN. Well, from a training viewpoint I know
[19S9] we had considerable training. We had exercises with the
Navy at least once a month, sometimes twice a month. I think we
had it with the Hawaiian Air Force. We had CPX. I recall an
Air Force communications officer running CPXs.
57. General Grunert. Do you know that they were building an air
warning service?
Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir.
58. General Grunert. Was that considered progress toward air
defense ?
Colonel Donegan. I would consider it such.
59. General Grunert. What other things were done ?
Colonel Donegan. I believe during the year 1941 they built that
Information Center at Fort Shafter.
60. General Grunert. Who in G-3 would know more about this line
of questions?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1011
Colonel DoNEGAN. Lawton.
61. General Grunert. Lawton?
Colonel DoxEGAN. He was a specialist in G-3.
62. General Grunert. Then our best source, outside of General
Short, would be whom ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. The Chief of Staff, General Davidson, who had
the Interceptor Command ; Colonel Paul, Department Signal Officer,
and Lawton, who was the General Staff man.
63. General Grunert. Can you, of your own knowledge, give us
any information that they cannot ?
Colonel Donegan. No, sir, and it would not be as accurate.
64. General Grunert. Then I will see if I can find something else
that you may be able to give us better information about than they
may. What was your conception or understanding of the [IHO]
generally increasing tautness of the international situation as between
the United States and Japan during the latter part of the year 1941?
What did you know about it and where did you get your impressions,
and what were your impressions?
Colonel Donegan. Is this personal, official or a combination?
65. General Grunert. Combination. Tell me what you know.
Colonel Donegan. I think we all felt that there was a tenseness
there. We were working every night during the month of November.
I think Lawton, Dingeman and I worked every night till 10 or 11
o'clock.
66. General Grunert. What did you work at?
Colonel Donegan. At that time we were planning to take over from
the Navy the occupation and defenses — well, we were going to send
task forces to Canton, maybe Christmas. We were going to take over
Palmyra.
67. General Grunert. Let us stick to Hawaii.
Colonel Donegan. This was all under the Joint Hawaiian Depart-
ment. The tempo had increased, because, as I say, we figured out an
initial war garrison if the War Department knew our requirements.
It stepped up the garrison to around 60,000. I knew we were flying
some ships out to the Far East. We were building an air field down
in the South Pacific under the Department's control. We had a time
date. I think the time date the War Department sent was March,
1942, for Christmas and Canton. I don't know whether it is both, but
it sticks in my mind as March. General Short fixed it by a directive
for January. He stepped it up about two months.
68. General Grunert. Let us get back to your state of mind of
IJ941] the relationship between Japan and the United States.
You say you realized, on account of all this, that the situation was
growing more and more tense. Wliat did that indicate to you ? Did
it alarm you in any way as to the defenses of Hawaii or the possibility
of an attack on Hawaii ?
Colonel Donegan. That, sir, would come from G-2. I have no
such information.
69. General Grunert. But there was a General Staff. You were all
one family and one set of brains. G-2 is not supposed to know every-
1 hing. What did G-3 know ? What did you know ?
Colonel Donegan. I didn't know a thing as to an attack coming
when it came.
79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 2 15
1012 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
70. General Grunert. Did you know what information was being
received, wliat alarm or what warning as to the danger of that attack?
Did it come home to yo'ii that it might come or was in the offing or away
in the distance, or what?
Colonel DoNEGAN. Frankly, I did not visualize an attack was com^
ing. I did not expect it.
71. General Grunert. Were you acquainted with or did you have,
knowledge of the Navy message that was received and transmitted
to the Army which started out "Consider this a war warning."?
Colonel DoNEGAN. No, sir, I never saw it.
72. General Grunert. You never saw it, but did you ever hear of it?
Colonel Donegal. I was called up to the Department Command-
er's office, I believe, when that message of November 27th was received,
when we had a staff conference, or the Chief of Staff had it, and I later
Avent into General Short's office
73. General Grunert. That message is the one known as the Chief
of Staff message of November 27th?
Colonel DoNEGAN. It might be. Tliat is the last one I [IQ^^]
recall before Pearl Harbor.
74. General Grunert. That was an Army message, was it?
Colonel DoNEGAN. That was an Army message.
75. General Grunert. That is the Chief of Staff message of Novem-
ber 27th?
Colonel Donegan. That is the one where they mentioned the Rain-
bow plan ?
76. General Grunert. Yes. Tell us what happened then?
Colonel Donegan. We stepped up the tempo of this antisabotage.
77. General Grunert. What do you know about that message ?
Colonel Donegan. That is a long time ago, General.
78. General Grunert. Were you called into conference as to its
meanings?
Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir. We discussed it, and later I went into
General Short, with one or more others of the G-3 Section, and we dis-
cussed it.
79. General Grunert. I think it would be well if I read that mes-
sage and refreshed your memory here, because I want to ask you a few
more questions about it. This is th& message of November 27th, 1941,
from the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General, Hawaiian De-
partment :
(War Department message of November 27, 1941, was read as fol-
lows:)
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with
only the barest possibilities that the .Japanese Government might come back and
offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action iwssi-
ble at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United
States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not,
repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeo-
pardize your defense. Prior to hostile [19Ji3] Japanese action you are
directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem neces-
sary but these measures should be carried out so as to not, repeat not, alarm
civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities
occur you will carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they per-
tain to .Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to mini-
mum essential officers.
That refreshes your mind ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1013
[^944-] Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir.
General Grunert. Now, where did yon get in on that discussion of
that message ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. The Chief of Staff called a conference, up in his
office. I will go back. I was out in the field, and I returned from the
field. The conference had started, and the Chief of Staff was reading
that message. Prior to that time, I believe that Major Horner, in
the G-3 section — he is now Colonel Horner, G-2, of the Ninth Corps —
had gone over the Rainbow plan with General Short, and I further
believe that after the Chief of Staff's conference we restudied that
telegram in the G-3 section. That is the best I can recall it.
80. General Grunert. Now, where did you come in on it? What
advice did you give about it ?
Colonel Donegan. As far as the Chief of Staff, the decision had
been made, as I say, when I returned from the field, and I believe this
directive had been issued about this sabotage or Alert 1.
81. General Grunert. Then the decision had been made?
Colonel Donegan. It had been made.
82. General Grunert. You were not called upon to recommend
what was to be done under that, before the decision was made ?
Colonel Donegan. No, sir. I was not present at the headquarters.
I was, I say, in the field, and wdien I returned, the conference was in
session, and I think the Staff study had been made on it.
83. General Grunert. Do you know who represented G-3 in the
discussion before the decision was made?
Colonel Donegan. I am sure that then Major Horner did.
84. General Grunert. Would it have been natural for them to call
on G-3 Operations for recommendations as to action to be taken under
such a warning, or did the Commanding General make the [194S ]
decision with his Chief of Staff, or what ?
Colonel Donegan. Of course, that was the first time we had ever
received such a warning, and there was no precedent for the staff pro-
cedure in the headquarters.
85. General Grunert. But there had been other decisions made that
pertained to operations before that, undoubtedly ?
Colonel Donegan. In other decisions pertaining to G-3, invariably
I was called up.
86. General Grunert. But in this, you had no say, personally ?
Colonel Donegan. I w^as not available, at the time.
87. General Grunert. Or, the discussion afterwards, after the
decision was made ? Then you reread this thing?
Colonel Donegan. I think that G-3 went into a conference among
ourselves, and we put in effect the directive of the Chief of Staff, and
we made no other recommendation.
88. General Grunert. In your discussion was any question raised
as to whether or not an antisabotage alert was sufficient to cover what
was required and what was intimated in that radiogram ?
Colonel Donegan. I do not believe there was, in the G-3 section.
89. General Grunert. In your own mind, did you ever give it a
thought as to whether or not the "Old Man" was going far enough ?
Colonel Donegan. I will be frank, with you, General, I didn't. I
was fooled as much as anybody else — if we were fooled. That is my
honest opinion.
1014 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
90. General Grunert. Do you think that the antisabotage alert
covered the requirements of the situation ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. I would rather not state, in that there was a de-
cision of the Department Commander. That was his decision, and
I would rather not comment on it.
91. General Gruxert. Were you free to state your opinion and to
hammer it home as long as no decision had been made?
Colonel DoNEGAN. I feel that at headquarters 1 was always
[1946] free to say anything I wanted to say.
92. General Grunert. Then you feel that, the decision having been
made, from that time on your thoughts were not to be expressed, but
the decision was to be carried out ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. No, sir; I did not feel that way. The decision
was made, and if I had taken exception to it, which I had done several
times in the past, I would have gone up and recommended a modifica-
tion. In this case I didn't. I don't believe anybody in the G-3
section recommended I do it.
93. General Grunert. Since the Chief of Staff had been G-3, was
there any inclination on his part to make decisions for G-3 without
consulting G-3 ?
Colonel DoNEOAN. I don't think you can say that he was G-3. If
he had been G-3, it was only for aboiit a month. ' Colonel "Phil" Hayes
was the G-3. He was relieved by Colonel Throckmorton ; and Colonel
Phillips was not G-3, to my knowledge, over six weeks. He was just
waiting to step in to take over the Chief of Staff's job. He never was
a G-3.
94. General Grunert. How was that staff team, over there? Was
it a cohesive team, or were there some disagreements among them,
any jealousies, or backbiting, or disappointments, or what?
Colonel DoNEGAN. I don't think there were any disappointments,
if you are referring to the appointment of the Chief of Staff — not to
my knowledge.
95. General Grunert. Did the staff, or did you, consider Phillips
competent to be a Chief of Staff of the Department?
Colonel DoNEGAN. I would rather not answer. We have been
warned on this thing. I would rather not discuss this thing. I think
that is perfectly all right, isn't it ?
96. General Grunert. We will not require you to discuss it. You
spoke of Captain McMorris, of the Navy ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. Yes, sir.
97. General Grunert. What was his position in the fleet, do
[1947] you know?
Colonel DoNEGAN. He was the Chief of Staff of the Scouting Force,
and I remember I went over there with Hobart Hewitt, and visited
him aboard the flagship, and also I think, with Lawton, and we did a
lot of our training with him.
98. General Grunert. Did he ever express himself to you as to
what he thought about this Japanese situation and the dangers of it,
or anything of that kind ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. No, sir. I think we worked quite closely with
him, because I saw considerable of him when he was Admiral Nimitz'
Operations Officer for Pearl Harbor ; and he never expressed himself
to me.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1015
99. Genercal Geunert. Wliat did you have to do with getting up the
SOP of November 5 ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. I had a chance to go over it and delete anything
I didn't like, I think, and that SOP, I signed it. I read it before I
came to this Board. It is dated November 5, and I think I was
appointed Chief of Staff about November 7, and I couldn't have been
Chief of Staff 24 hours when I signed that thing ; but I helped work
on it in the section, as an Assistant G-3.
100. General Gruneet. And you became Chief of Staff of the
Department ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. Not more than a month before Pearl Harbor. I
mean, the G-3.
101. General Grunert. Oh; I did not understand that you had been
Chief of Staff.
Colonel DoNEGAN. Oh, no. I was G-3, appointed G-3 of the
Hawaiian Department in November 1941.
102. General Grunert. But then, you had been in the G-3 section ?
Colonel Donegan. The G-3 section. I worked on that SOP.
103. General Grunert. Then you were the next senior in the G-3
section, were you ?
[1948] Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir; I was.
104. General Grunert. By the way, how did the staff section work
together? Did they work in isolated groups, or in "compartments,"
you might call them ?
Colonel Donegan. No. It was customary in that headquarters to
have a staff conference every Saturday morning at 8 o'clock. The
Chief of every General and Special Staff section, or the senior or
president of the section was present, and it was conducted by the
Chief of Staff, and at that conference it was supposed that each
General Staff would bring out the principal activity of the week;
and G-2 was called in for an orientation, to bring out numbers of
things going on. That was customary.
105. General Grunert. Let us ask you a little bit about those orien-
tations. "When was the last staff meeting held before December 7?
Colonel Donegan. I would say, on the morning before. It must
have been.
106. General Grunert. That was on a Saturday, and your meetings
usually took place on Saturday?
Colonel Donegan. Every Saturday morning at 8 o'clock. I don't
know whether it was held on Saturday, December 6, or not; if not,
it was an exception, because they were held every Saturday morning
at 8 o'clock.
107. General Grunert. All right. If it was held December 6, and
the Saturday before that, did G-2 come up with anything alarming
about the situation?
Colonel Donegan. It did not.
108. General Grunert. Did not? Then you concluded there was
nothing, inasmuch as you heard nothing said, and G-2 told you noth-
ing at these conferences? Or do you suppose G-2 did not put out,
there, but kept a lot to himself, or between hita and his Commanding
General, which?
Colonel Donegan. I don't think the G-2 visualized what was
\i943] impending.
1016 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
109. General Frank. Did G-2 ever have any information that was
very "hot?"
Colonel DoNEGAN. I never o;ot any of it, as G-3. I don't think
there was much "hot." I know he didn't pass it out.
110. General Grunert. ITow, were these conferences "hot," or were
they just — "Oh, well ! we have to get together once a week and tell
them something!"
Colonel DoNEGAN. Well, you say about being "compartments."
That certainly took us out of the "compartment," and let us know
what the other fellow was doing, if we had anything. It was kind
of instructive to all the staff. I would tell them, from G-3, what the
problems were, what we were doing, and each section would do the
same thing.
111. General Grunert. But, in the last two conferences, on the
last two Saturdays before Pearl Harbor, there was no particular
discussion about what might come ; or was there any particular dis-
cussion about sabotage?
Colonel DoNEGAN. I cannot recall.
112. General Grunert. That was a "hot" subject then, was it not?
Colonel Donegan. A "hot" subject in G-3. In our section, every
officer went out to make visits, for sabotage, went around to see that
the guards were on these water plants and power plants, and down
by the docks, and the oil fuels, down there ; and we thought sabotage
was the real thing, and practically every officer in the section was
out daily checking on activities.
113. General Grunert. In your section, or in the General Staff
meeting, either one, did the question ever come up as to, "Well, the
Navy is doing its job of distant reconnaissance, to ward off an attack,
or to let us know if there is anything coming"? Did that subject ever
come up?
Colonel DoNEGAN. I can't say whether it did or not.
114. General Grunert. It apparently did not impress itself on
[1950] ^ you, if it did come up, because, otherwise, you might re-
member it.
Colonel Donegan. To my knowledge, I think reconnaissance was
effective. I personally thought so.
115. General Grunert. You thought distant reconnaissance was
effective ?
Colonel Donegan. I thought so.
116. General Grunert. Wliat made you think that distant recon-
naissance was effective — your confidence in the Navy ; or did you know
anything in particular about it?
Colonel Donegan. Well, I thought I knew something about it. I
tried to keep abreast of it, and my reaction is, I thought it was effec-
tive, that they were doing as much as could be expected.
117. General Grunert. Would the Navy liaison officer attend these
General Staff meetings ?
Colonel Donegan. Only the Chiefs of sections attended.
118. General Grunert. The naval liaison officer was not in on it?
Colonel Donegan. No, sir.
119. General Grunert. So, even if he had had any information on
it, he was not there to give it to you ?
Colonel Donegan. Well, he would have told me. It was my liaison
officer, and I could have told them at the staff section.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1017
120. General Grunert. What did Dingeman ever tell you about the
Navy reconnaissance ; anything ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. Not to my knowledge.
121. General Grunert. Did you ever make any definite inquiries
as to what the Navy was doing in the line of distant reconnaissance?
Colonel DoNEGAN. I think we would go direct. I would go over
with Lawton, direct, over to the Navy, and ask those questions.
122. General Grunert. All right. Did you go directly ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. We visited frequently.
[WSl] 123. General Grunert. Did you ask about the distant
reconnaissance ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. I don't recall whether we did or not.
124. General Grunert. But you were interested in it, weren't you ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. Yes, sir. That was going on three years, which
is a long time. I don't know whether we discussed that, or not.
125. General Grunert. Then you thouglit they had distant recon-
naissance, but you rcall}' didn't know. You don't remember anytliing
about it?
Colonel DoNEGAN. I believe at this time that they were having
effective distant reconnaissance. If they didn't, I didn't know it.
126. General Grunert. Was that in the line of 360° patroling?
Colonel DoNEGAN. Well, I would say west of Hawaii.
127. General Grunert. West of Hawaii?
Colonel DoNEGAN. Yes ; west.
128. General Grunert. Were you depending on the task forces that
went out, or on the planes that were sent out or ordered, or did you
just have general confidence that they were doing what you thought
they ought to do ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. Frankly, I feel that is more G-2 than G-3. You
are asking me this, G-3, and I should think that would be a G-2 thing
for the Hawaiian Department.
129. General Grunert. Well, the G-3 is operations, and in case
anything happens, you have to control the fighting of the defense,
do you not?
Colonel DoNEGAN. I understand that, but I get my information
from G-2. He goes out and gets it ?
130. General Grunert. Well, did you ask G-2 about it?
Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir. He had no information, other than I
think he gave me everything he had ; so far as I know he [1952'\
did.
131. General Grunert. How was Fielder considered, as to G-2?
Colonel Donegan. I would rather not discuss personalities.
132. General Grunert. Well, discuss officialities, then. Officially,
was he considered O. K. ?
Colonel Donegan. As far as I know, he was O. K. I would say he
was as good a G-2 as I was a G-3. I would just as soon let that go in
the record.
133. General Frank. That's fair enough.
134. General Grunert. Yes; that's fair enough.
What brought about this system of Alerts 1, 2, and 3? When you
first went over there, they only had one kind of alert, didn't they,
and that was an all-out alert ?
Colonel Donegan. That is right.
1018 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
135. General Grunert. Then why 1, 2, or 3? That must have been
in your minds, or somebody started it.
Colonel DoNEGAN. That was discussed a great deal, and I think the
idea was that in the past when they had an alert they moved every-
thing out, and this way they could continue their training and develop
as necessary.
130. General Grunert. You mean, then, it was a step from the
less serious to the more serious, to the all-out ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. To the all-out.
137. General Grunert. All right.
Now, let us get down to this training. Just what training would
be handicapped in Alert No. 2, which was a combination of defense
against aircraft and antisabotage ? Just how did that interfere seri-
ously with training, and whose training ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. Well, I think it spread a considerable number
of men all over the island, every vital installation, the [1953^
ground forces, and it was principally ground forces. You asked me
about the antiaircraft. I will say it did not affect antiaircraft.
138. General Grunert. That was part of the air defense, was it not?
not?
Colonel DoNEGAN. Yes.
139. General Grunert. How did it affect the air training?
Colonel DoNEGAN. I don't believe it did affect the air.
140. General Grunert. It did affect the ground troops, but they
had the least to do, and would not have been put out in No. 2, would
they ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. Fifty percent, in No. 2; and I think SOP, as I
recall it — you have it, I think — 50% went out on Alert No. 2; as I
recall, one battalion, or one something, motorized.
141. General Grunert. But that was primarily for antisabotage?
142. General Frank. No. 2.
143. General Grunert. No. 2 includes, against air and anti-
sabotage ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. And sabotage.
144. General Grunert. But what brought the infantry out, the
"ground troops," as we call them ? The bringing out of the infantry
in full force was No. 3 ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. 100% in the field.
146. General Grunert. Yes.
Colonel DoNEGAN. Everything.
146. General Grunert. JEverything for the fact that they had cer-
tain guarding duties against sabotage under No. 2, and so forth, they
were not much concerned with No. 2 ?
Colonel Donegan. Well, you take 50%. All right, now, they
\j954] are considerably concerned. Fifty percent were altered
under No. 2.
147. General Grunert. Do you know the reason back of calling
Alert No. 1 "antisabotage" instead of Alert No. 2, which would have
been against air, and antisabotage?
Colonel Donegan. No, sir.
148. General Grunert. You do not know the reason, whether the
reason was all training, part training, or what?
Colonel Donegan. I don't; no, sir. I think they thought No. 1
would do the job, otherwise they would have called No. 2.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1019
149. General Grunert, Would do what job?
Colonel DoNEGAN. Whatever job it was, from the information re-
ceived from Washington.
150. General Grunert. The job that was intimated, appeared to be
in the Navy message, which was transmitted to the Army — "this is a
war warning"?
Colonel DoNEGAN. Yes.
151. General Grunert. Now, would antisabotage take care of a war
in the offing?
Colonel DoNEGAN. I don't recall seeing it, as I stated.
152. General Grunert. Then you referred to the job that the Chief
of Staff's message which I read to you called for?
Colonel DoNEGAN. November 27.
153. General Grunert. We will go back to that message. In that
message the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department was
directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as he
might deem necessary. Was any additional reconnaissance made, do
you know, or did he not consider any additional reconnaissance neces-
sary ?
Colonel Donegan. I don't remember. If it was ordered, it
[1955] is certainly a matter of record somewhere. I don't recall.
154. General Grunert. Would such matters have been sent out
through you in directives to do such, or not? I am not heckling you;
I am just after information.
Colonel Donegan. I think this has been handled direct by the Chief
of Staff. It all came so fast, and I say, there was no precedent, this
was the first time it was done; so you see normally you can't say
whether it would be handled through G-3 or not, because there was
no staff precedent or procedure for it.
155. General Grunert. Is there anything now in the line of alerts
or the influences or conclusions respecting this information that you ,
had, that you could tell the Board, that might give us further light
on this thing, as to the state of mind or the reasons or causes, or any-
thing in that line?
Colonel Donegan. No, sir. I tell you, it all happened so fast, No-
vember 27 to December 7, that we were, I will say, on Alert 1. Then,
I couldn't get the reactions of other officers, after December 7. It was
just a question of our being in the tunnel, we dug in, and it wasn't
discussed, even, in fact, in my own section; we didn't have the time.
156. General Grunert. The Hawaiian command was created and
put out there as an outpost, and it was their business to be prepared
for anything; and, if they were properly warned, if you had notice,
why then of course it was the business of the command, your business
as G-3, to make whatever plans the "Old Man" called for?
Colonel Donegan. It was.
157. General Grunert. And up to that time you considered the
plans had been made and pretty well implemented, is that right?
[1956] Colonel Donegan. From the information that I knew,
I think the Department Commander took the steps that were adequate.
158. General Grunert. From what you know of the training and
stated training and efficiency of the conunand, had it been Alert 2,
what would have been the results of this attack that did come ? Have
you ever tried to visualize it that way? Could you have stopped it?
1020 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel DoNEGAN. I have tried to visualize it from all angles. I
don't know whether it could be stopped or not.
159. General Grunert. Could you minimize the danger, or the
amount of damage that was done?
Colonel DoNEGAN. Well, I don't have to answer it, but I will say I
don't believe — it would have been negligible, is my opinion.
160. General Grunert. If you do not answer some of these things,
it leads me to believe that you have something for which you are afraid
you might be hauled up.
Colonel DoNEGAN. Oh, no, sir! Not a thing to worry me, about
that !
161. General Grunert. I think I will turn you over to one of the
other Members of the Board, here, until I think of something else.
General Russell ?
162. General Russell. You were out there when General Short
came out, were you. Colonel ?
Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir.
163. General Russell. You had been out there some time before
that?
Colonel Donegan. I arrived in the Department in August 1940.
164. General Russell. How many new officers did General Short
bring out there with him ?
Colonel Donegan. Very few. From the top down, he brought
[1957] Phillips, he brought Truman. I don't know of anybody
else I can recall right now.
165. General Russell. Phillips became Chief of Staff, and Truman
was an aide?
Colonel Donegan. That is right.
166. General Russell. All the other people who were functioning
out there on General Short's staff as of December 7 he fomid when
he got out there, if that be true ?
Colonel Donegan. I would say, as my memory recalls it, I know of
no one else that he brought out.
167. General Russell. It was not a cleaning out of the staff when
Short came out there and a moving in of a new staff?
Colonel Donegan. No, sir.
168. General Russell. How did you happen to be sent out there?
Was it because it was your turn to go out there ?
Colonel Donegan. I went out in the foreign service. I was as-
signed to the Twenty-first Infantry at Schofield, and I was a Major
of Infantry, in the G-3 section, on DS. I had a nervous breakdown
and I was placed in the hospital. They let me out, and I asked to go
out on DS. I went out there as assistant.
169. General Russell. What I am trying to get at. Colonel, is this :
Who sent people out to the Hawaiian Department ? Was it the War
Department, or the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Depart-
ment ?
Colonel Donegan. The War Department, always.
170. General Russell. Did they require the Commanding General
of the Hawaiian Department to take such people as he had and as
tlie War Department sent him, and do what he could with them?
Colonel Donegan. That is right. He selected his staff [1958]
usually from the personnel available in the Hawaiian Department.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1021
171. Genei'cal Eussell. These people who were on the stajff, there,
Fielder, and you, and Throckmorton — and who was this man who
was G-4 ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. Marsden.
172. General Russell. All those people were already on the staff
wlien Short got there, were they not ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. Let me get this, now. When Short arrived,
"Empy" Potts w^as G-1. That is Adam E. Potts. Marsden was G-2,
Throckmorton was G-3, and Carl Bankfield, I told you, was G-4.
Carl Bankfield went back to the mainland, expiration of service, and
Marsden was put into G-4. "Empy" Potts dropped out of or was
called off of G-1 and went off with a Coast Artillery outfit.
173. General Russell. As a matter of fact, this staff out there was
just a sort of normal staff in the Army as it had operated at that
time ; they were gradually leaving, and gradually coming in ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. That is right.
174. General Russell. General Short had the same problem that
anybody else would have had, to make the best he could out of what
he had, is that right?
Colonel DoNEGAN. Oh, yes; it is the Commander's prerogative to
select his staff.
175. General Russell. He had to select them from within the
Department ?
Colonel DoNEGAX. I believe he inherited some that were sent out
by War Department selection. I think Hobart Hewitt, in the G-3
section, assistant G-3, was sent out by the War Department, the
selection of the War Department General Staff. Then there was a
transition, when the War Department no longer selected them, and
the local commander selected detail on General Staff.
176. General Russell. From where ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. From personnel available within the [1959]
Department.
177. General Russell. From within the Hawaiian Department?
Do you think these people who were selected to l^e on General
Short's staff were selected and sent to him, because they were specially
fitted as General Staff officers?
Colonel DoNEGAN. Which people are you talking about, General ?
178. General Russell. You and Marsden and Phillips — all of you
people. How did you happen to get an assignment on this staff?
Colonel DoNEGAN. It was selected as an assistant G-3 by Throck-
morton, on his recommendation, and was then G-3, and I was placed
on General Staff on the recommendation of Colonel Hayes, when
Hayes was Chief of Staff.
179. General Russell. Some questions were asked you about your
not being called upon to express an opinion on tliis November 27
message. I did not get your testimony any too clearly, but as I recall,
you said that if you had disagreed with the Commander's decision,
and had you thought that antisabotage was not sufficient, you would
have felt perfectly free to go in and discuss it ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. Yes, sir.
180. General Russell. With the Chief of Staff, or the Command-
ing General, or with whom ?
1022 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel DoNEGAN. My channel would have been to go to the Chief
of Staff.
181. General Russell. Were they arbitrary, up there?
Colonel DoNEGAN. No, sir.
182. General Eussell. They permitted you to discuss matters with
them ?
[1960~\ Colonel Donegan, I always felt free to go in.
183. General Russell. I got the impression from your testimony,
Colonel, that in these night jobs that were being carried on, and the
work being done in G-3, your thinking was in the terms of Japan
and Wake ? It was directed toward Japan and Wake ?
Colonel Donegan. No, that was based on War Department direc-
tives. The War Department told us to make studies of task forces
necessary to take over certain islands, and I think Palmyra was one
which was then occupied by the Navy, and we figured out a "TO,"
a table of organization, naturally involving Coast Artillery, Infantry,
and Antiaircraft, and we worked those out with the Navy representa-
tive, who was Colonel of Marines, and submitted those to Washing-
ton.
184. General Russell, But this work that you G-3 people were un-
der pressure to do did not relate to Oahu and the defenses there, but
related to islands which lay between you and, generally, the Philip-
pines ; is that right?
Colonel Donegan. That was just an additional job. Our defense
of Oahu was the primary mission we had, there was no question about
it, you can't get away from it. This was just additional work, prior
to December 7. I was trying to give you a background of what we
M^ere doing, and that was one of the major works going on in the sec-
tion during the month of November, the latter part of November.
185. General Russell. Did General Short step up the defensive
preparations after he got there ?
Colonel Donegan. Considerably.
186. General Russell. Pardon?
Colonel Donegan. A great deal.
[1961] 187. General Russell. He was defense-conscious, you
feel?
Colonel Donegan. Very much so. In fact, I think a great deal was
done, there, on the defense, on bunkers, pill bunkers for the Air Corps,
):)ill boxes, beach defense, being constantly carried on.
188. General Russell. Reference was made to Hawaii as an out-
post, it being the area nearest the mainland, which had been fortified
and occupied by us; but were there not many other installations be-
tween us and Japan and Wake and Midway and the Philippine
Islands and Guam, whatever was done on Guam?
Colonel Donegan. That is correct.
189. General Russell. That is all.
Colonel Donegan. Wliat has that got to do with it?
190. General Russell. How?
Colonel Donegan. May I ask a question ? What has that got to do
with it?
191. General Russell, I don't know what anything has to do with
it!
192. General Gruneet, Have you any questions, General Frank?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1023
193. General Frank. Had you ever discussed the possibility of au
air attack or an air raid on Oaliu?
Colonel DoNEGAN, Discussed it many, many times, every time we
had a joint Army and JN avy exercise, when they came in on Navy car-
riers, and so forth.
194. General Fil\nk. What was your thought about the possibility
of a raid on Oahu by a Jap carrier force?
Colonel DoNEGAN. Well, I believed it was possible; I didn't think
it was probable. I discussed that with staff officers Street and Hagen-
bero-, and they discussed it many times.
[1962] 195. General Frank. Had you ever gone into it in a very
detailed manner?
Colonel DoNEGAN. I had gone into it with your man Farthing, in
connection with patroling. He had a patrolling plan, there, and I
had gone into it and studied it with him — the number of planes nec-
essary to patrol, and the 360° patrol. All those things were discussed.
196. General Frank. Speaking in race-track parlance, what did
you consider the possibility of a Jap air raid?
Colonel Donegan. Frankly, I didn't expect one or anticipate one.
I didn't think they would attempt it; but I had not made up my mind
that way.
197. General Frank. What were the chances, did you think?
Colonel Donegan. I hadn't even thought it out in chances.
198. General Frank. If you did not think they would do it, why
wouldn't they do it ? Let us approach it from the other side. Let us
approach it from the Japanese side. That is what I am trying to
get at.
Colonel Donegan. Well, you could ask every officer in the Hawaiian
Department, over there, the same question, and it's "second guessing"
now, three years later. I think, to ask them, "Why don't you think
they attempted it?" I don't believe anybody over there, whether it was
the Department Staff or the Air Force Staff or Antiaircraft, thought
it. That is what we were there, for, but nobody expected it.
199. General Frank. If you thought the Japs would not attempt it,
why. from the Jap point of view, wouldn't they attempt it?
Colonel Donegan. I don't know why — I will say the same thing —
I don't know why I should answer these questions.
[J96S] 200. General Frank. I am trying to get it as a point of
view, and we are building up a point of view and a background on
this thing. That is the reason I would like to get it. You are a pro-
fessional soldier, you have been in the Army over a period of time.
Colonel Donegan. That is correct.
201. General Frank. And yon must have some sort of professional
opinion. From that point of view, then, I would like to have a pro-
fessional opinion from you on that subject, if you have one.
Colonel Donegan. Well, I can say that with contemporaries there.
I discussed it many, many times, and we had our defenses set for it.
and we studied and supervised the training in connection with the
anti-air defense, antiaircraft, and I personally did not anticipate a
raid on Hawaii.
202. General Frank. Well, I have asked you two or three times,
why. Was it because it was hazardous, it was a risky thing to do, they
1024 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
were hazarding too much to attempt it, or what was behind your rea-
son for thinking they would not attempt it ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. My reason would be that I thought that their
interest lay more in Asia than that they would care to jeopardize the
chances, or their limited fleet, in coming to Hawaii. That would be
my reaction.
203. General Frank. How much of a risk were the Japs taking in
pulling a raid on Honolulu?
Colonel DoNEGAN. The answer is, "Zero," right now, based on De-
cember 7 ; but I should think it would be a great risk.
204. General Frank. All right. Well, that was the reason ? That
is one of the reasons that you thought they would not attempt it,
was because you thought it was too great a risk?
[1964.] 205. General Frank. Had everything not clicked for
them, it might have resulted in a disaster ? Had both the Navy and
the Army been sufficiently alerted to have gone after them, it might
have resulted in a disaster?
Colonel DoNEGAN. Well, it could have been a 100% failure, there is
no question about it^ — just as bad a failure as it was a success, if things
were 100% the other way.
206. General Frank. Now, did you read the Martin-Bellinger esti-
mate of the situation ?
Colonel DoNEGAN. When was it published ?
207. General Frank. I refer to the air estimate of the situation that
they got out in the spring of 1941.
Colonel DoNEGAN. The spring of 1941 ?
208. General Frank. Yes.
Colonel DoNEGAN. I don't recall it.
209. General Frank. They made an air estimate on the situation.
Colonel DoNEGAN. Who is Bellinger — the Admiral?
210. General Frank. The Admiral in command of Patrol Wing 2.
Colonel DoNEGAN. PAT-2? I have sat in conference with him in
connection with the use of air.
211. General Frank. Do you remember this air estimate of the situ-
ation that was submitted?
Colonel DoNEGAN. No doubt I have read it, if he wrote it.
212. General Frank. To get back to this air attack again, did you
ever make any comparison between the probaility of damage from an
air raid and the probability of damage from sabotage?
Colonel DoNEGAN. No, I didn't.
213. General Frank. Or as to which was more probable?
Colonel DoNEGAN. Let me say this. General. I think, now,
[196S] that, after three years, to come here and ask a lot of ques-
tions about what we did or what we didn't do three years ago, I think
it's rather unfair, whether I am a professional soldier of 27 years' serv-
ice, or not. Since Pearl Harbor, like many others, we have been trying
to win this war, working about 12 to 14 hours a day, and to come in
here "cold" and ask me what I thought in December 1941, 1 think it is
unfair for the Board to do it.
214. General Frank. I asked you if you had ever made that com-
parison.
Colonel DoNEGAN. I never compared the damage that an air-raid
would do, and the damage by sabotage. I feel certain I don't recall
going through any such mental operations.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1025
215. General Grunert. The witness may think that he is under some
compulsion to answer these questions. If you don't know the answer,
say so.
Colonel DoNEGAN. I would like to give you the answer, if I can.
216. General Grunert. If you haven't thought it over, say, "I don't
remember" ; but to the questions asked, give him an answer, or say, "I
don't want to answer anything." You are not under compulsion to
try to think back three years ago and actually remember details.
Colonel Donegan. I would like to make my stand clear. I would
like to assist the Board as much as possible.
217. General Grunert. That is all we want.
Colonel Donegan. But I would like to have the questions within
bounds.
218. General Grunert. If they are out of bounds, you need not
answer them, if you cannot answer them, as far as you know.
Colonel Donegan. All right.
[1966] 219. General Grunert. But we have to get facts, and
we have to dig. We have to do a lot of digging, and this is one of the
methods of digging, to see, to get the state of mind, and everything;
and so we are going to continue to dig.
Go ahead.
220. General Frank. No, I have no more.
221. General Grunert. Are there any suggestions by the Recorder,
the Assistant Recorder, or the Executive Officer?
222. Major Clausen. No, sir.
223. General Grunert. That appears to be all. Thank you for
coming up.
(The witness was excused with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon, the Board, having concluded the hearing of witnesses
for the day, took up the consideration of other business.)
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1027
[my] CONTENTS
WE1DNESDAY, AUGUST 30, 1944
Testimony of — Page ^
Colonel John S. Pratt, Retired 1968
Brig. Gen. William R. White, U. S. Army; Mira Loma Quartermaster
Depot, Mira Loma, Calif 1989
Major George S*. Welch, Air Corps, Orlando, Florida 2008
Colonel W. A. Capron ; Ordnance Department ; Ogden Arsenal, Ogden,
Utah 2015
Brig. Gen. Warren T. Hannum, Retired; San Francisco, California 2030
DOCUMENTS
War Department Message of November 27, 1941 2020
Letter, November 6, 1940, Colonel Hannum to Lt. Col. Wyman 2033
Letter. February 14, 1942, Colonel Lyman to Maj. Gen. Reybold 2038
Letter, February 27, 1942, Colonel Lyman to Maj. Gen. Reybold 2042
Letter, January 22, 1941, Colonel Wyman to Rohl 1 2056
' Pases referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original transcript of proceedings.
79716— 46— Ex. 145, vol. 2-
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1029
[1968-] PEOCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 30, 1944
Presidio or San Francisco, Cal.
The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the
hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board,
presiding.
Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D
Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.
Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C.
Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Houlmin, Jr.,
Executive Officer.
General Grunert. The Board will come to order.
TESTIMONY OF COLONEL JOHN S. PRATT ( RETIRED )
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
imdei- Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your
name, rank, organization, and station.
Colonel Pratt. Colonel John S. Pratt. I am retired. I live in San
Francisco, 2230 Washington Street.
2. General Grunert. Colonel, the Board is after facts. It wants
facts and background and viewpoints in order to get leads as to where
it can develop facts ; that is, both prior to and during the Pearl Harbor
attack. Because of your assignment during 1941, particularly, we
thought you might give us some facts or lead us to where we might get
facts.
[1069] Will you tell the Board what your experience has been
in the line of assignments in Hawaii, and give approximate dates.
Colonel Pratt. I arrived in Hawaii the latter part of June 1937, and
left Hawaii April 22, 1942. I was on the Department Staff as Officer
in Charge of Civilian Component Affairs, which included the National
Guard, me organized Reserve, and the R. O. T. C. My office was in the
business section of the city, and not at Fort Shafter.
3. General Grunert. Then you had experience in and about Hono-
lulu for nearly five years ?
Colonel Pratt. That is true.
4. General Grunert. That included the time leading up to the
attack of December 7, and during the attack, and after the attack, for
several months ?
Colonel Pratt. Yes, sir.
5. General Grunert. Now, in your position as Officer in Charge of
Civilian Affairs, you evidently had an opportunity to know consider-
able about the civil population, is that right?
1030 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Pratt. I think I probably did have an opportunity to know
more than the average civilian out there.
6. General Frank. You had an opportunity to know more than
the average officer, too, did you not ?
Colonel Pratt. Probably; yes.
7. General Grunert. I will skip around considerably here, but the
background of what I am getting after is that your position probably
gave you an opportunity to observe, and from that, you may throw
some light on the situation ; and the Board is after such light.
Now, suppose you go back into 1940. I understand that at
[Id'W] that time there was an alert pulled, in 1940. Will you tell
us about that alert, just in general terms.
Colonel Pratt. I believe I understand the particular alert you mean.
It happened as I recall approximately four or five months before the
arrival of General Short. We were in a conference at Fort Shafter,
at which General Herron was presiding, and an orderly came in and
handed a message to the Chief of Staff, Colonel Hayes. He in turn
handed it to General Herron, but excused himself and said that he
would be back after awhile. Later, he returned. The meeting was
finished, and I had occasion to go to the Chief of Staff's office upon
a matter.
While there, I couldn't help but hear him dictating an order, which
in effect was to place the entire command on the alert and at battle
stations, with full supply of ammunition; and I asked Hayes what
it was all about. I said, "I couldn't help but hear what you were
saying." He said that the Navy had lost contact with the high-seas
Japanese fleet, and that General Herron was turning the command
out.
8. General Grunert. At that time was there just one alert, or were
there two or three or four types of alert?
Colonel Pratt. To my knowledge, at least, there was Field Order
No. 1. Now, what other alerts there may have been, I don't know of
them.
9. General Grunert. Wliat, generally, did that Field Order No. 1
prescribe as to being prepared for action ?
[1971] Colonel Pratt. Well, Field Order No. 1 sent all units to
tlieir battle stations and their battle jobs, with the necessary supplies,
ammunition, and so forth.
10. General Grunert. Later, was that field order superseded by
other instructions that required a different gradation of alerts?
Colonel Pratt. I believe it was. I was not acquainted with those
gradations of alerts, though I knew they were in effect. I had never
seen them.
11. General Grunert. But for this 1940 affair, there was just one
getting out and getting ready, is that right?
Colonel Pratt. So far as I know.
12. General Frank. That was a full-out effort ?
Colonel PRiVTT. Yes. Just a moment, please. May I correct that, a
little?
13. General Grunert. Yes.
Colonel Pratt. They would turn us out on alerts, generally at
night, to see how fast the office forces could get to their places of
business and ready for business ; and that was done quite frequently.
14. General Grunert. When you turned out for this alert in 1940,
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1031
and you took your battle position, you were ready for business, you
had all the ammunition and everything you needed, is that right?
Colonel Pratt. Yes, sir.
15, General Grunert. Do you know whether or not that alarmed the
public, at the time ?
Colonel Pratt. I could see no visible effect on the public, because
we had had practice alerts before, and I think they were fairly well
used to them at that time.
16. General Grunert. Did going on such an alert disclose your
intent, except that you were ready to defend yourselves ?
Colonel pRATr. Not to my knowledge.
[1972] 17. General Grunert. At the time of that alert, what
w^as your assignment, and how did you participate in that alert?
Colonel Pratt. I was then Officer in Charge of Civilian Compo-
nent Affairs, and it was my duty to report to my office with my entire
force, and stay there, on a 24-hour basis.
18. General Grunert. What opportunity did you have to size up
whether or not the public was alarmed by the troops going on the
alert?
Colonel Pratt. None other than the newspapers. In other words,
the public did not seem to be unduly interested in the thing, any more
than they had been in the past.
19. General Grunert. Under how many Commanding Generals did
you serve during this period of nearly five years ?
Colonel Pratt. General Drum, General Moses, General Herron,
General Short, and General Emmons.
20. General Grunert. And under how many Chiefs of Staff?
Colonel Pratt. To the best of my recollection, the original Chief
of Staff when I arrived was Colonel Osborne. I am not sure of that.
No, I am wrong about that. There was another man ahead of him,
I think. Osborne was G-3 when I arrived, but I can't remember the
Chief of Staff's name in 1937 ; then Osborne, and then Colonel Hayes,
who was G-3 prior to his assignment as Chief of Staff. Then, when
General Short came out there, Colonel Phillips became the Chief of
Staff; and he was there when I left.
21. General Grunert. In your assigned duties, with whom was
most of your business done, at headquarters ?
Colonel Pratt. With the Commanding General, with the Chief of
Staff, with G-3, G-2, and the Department Surgeon, I would say.
22. General Grunert. Was most of it done with the Chief of Staff?
[W7S] Colonel Pratt. I would say most of it ; yes.
23. General Grunert. What was your connection with G-2?
What line of work did you have to do?
Colonel Pratt. Well, if I had any information that I thought might
be of value to G-2, 1 would tell them about it.
24. General Grunert. Were there many such occasions?
Colonel Pratt. Not many.
25. General Grunert. How did you size up the Japanese element
of the population — as particularly dangerous, or can you give us an
idea on that ?
Colonel Pratt. My attitude towards it, from all I could learn and
hear and see, was that the great majority of the Japanese population
would be loyal, except when the time came when Oahu was just about
1032 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to capitulate ; then I felt that they would turn on us, the great major-
ity would. I had reason to believe that an espionage organization
existed among them, or a military, you might say, espionage organiza-
tion, and that was confirmed later when I was a member of a Military
Commission that tried one Otto Kuhn, a German spy, who had been
operating out there and elsewhere for a number of years ; and he was
found guilty and sentenced to death.
26. General Grunert. During the trial of this German, did it indi-
cate where this espionage system headed up ?
Colonel Pratt. It appeared from the evidence, as I recall it, as
FBI presented it, that he was in close contact with the Japanese con-
sulate there in Honolulu.
27. General Grunert. Then you think there were a number of Jap-
anese agents in and about Honolulu ?
Colonel Pratt. That is my opinion ; yes, sir.
[1974] 28. General Grunert. Was there any evidence of this
training against the United States during or shortly after the attack
on Pearl Harbor, that you intimated, there, that the Japanese ele-
ments might turn against the United States ?
Colonel Pratt. None that I personally know of, except on the
night subsequent to the attack, I listened in on a local police radio
net, and there were certain indications then, and I fully, myself, per-
sonally, expected an attack at dawn in force on the beaches.
29. "General Frank. On the 8th, you mean ?
Colonel Pratt. Yes. I thought an attack might come in on the
8th, the morning of the 8th; and in listening in on this network and
hearing the return messages from the "prowl cars," the police patrol
cars. Different colored lights would blink, and then be turned out,
and rockets would go up; and I believe, if I recall correctly, several
cases, of roman candles ; and that occurred, as I recall, all along the
district from Hawaii to Kahala ; that is, from the northwest coast to
the east coast.
30. General Grunert. That gave the impression it might be the
signal for a general attack the next morning ?
Colonel Pratt. Well, they were signalling something, and I
couldn't imagine what it would be, other than the enemy units at sea,
possibly submarines.
31. General Grunert. Did you anticipate any organized movement
from within, in connection with the possible attack?
Colonel Pratt. I thought it possible that they might engineer such
a thing if and when an attack came in.
32. General Grunert. Did you inform anyone on the staff as to
what your observations were? In other words, was your knowledge
[1075] ^ made the knowledge of the General Staff ?
Colonel Pratt. Well, I think G-2 was tuned in on the same radio
I was. I think he got all of that.
33. General Grunert. What staff conferences were held while you
were there in 1941, or late in 1941? Did you participate in any staff
conferences ?
(yolonel Pratt. I participated in one, which might be of interest
to this Board. I was ordered to attend a conference, at once, at head-
quarters. I was a little late in getting a car, so I was late, and arrived
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1033
late at the conference. In the meantime, the Staff had assembled
and I am told that the order or the radio message received from the
Chief of Stalf in Washington to General Short was read to the
assembled staff, thongh I am not sure of that; and I was handed the
copy, in the clear, of that message, and read it at the time ; and some
instructions were given to certain members of the staff that were more
intimately connected with the alert plan than I was.
34. General Grunert. Let me refresh your memory, or let me ask
you whether this message that I read is the one that you refer to.
This is a message from the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General
of the Hawaiian Department, 27 November 1941:
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with
only the barest possibility the Japanese government might come back and offer
to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at
any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat not, be avoided. United States desires
Japan commit first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed
as restricting you to a course of action that [1976] might jeopardize
your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake
such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these meas-
ures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population
or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will
carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5, as far as they pertain to Japan.
Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to the minimum essential
officers.
Is that the message to which you have reference ?
Colonel Pratt. To the best of my recollection, that is, sir.
35. General Grunert. Now, will you tell us anything more about
that conference — what was discussed, and what impression it created
on those conferring, or what impression it created on you, as one of
the conferees?
Colonel Pratt. Well, it was a very serious message, to me, and I
thought the possibilities of danger quite grave.
36. General Grunert. Had the decision been made as to what ac-
tion to take upon it, at that time, do you know ?
Colonel Pratt. That, I do not know.
37. General Grunert. What action was taken on it, to your
knowledge?
Colonel Pratt. Not to my knowledge. I do not know.
38. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not the Command-
ing General ordered an alert, and what that alert covered ?
Colonel Pratt. This is hearsay information. I was told that Alert
No. 1 was in effect. As I say, I don't know what it was.
39. General Grunert. Then what was the conference about?
[1977] Colonel Pratt. The reception of this message, and doubt-
less the Chief of Staff wanted to give some instructions to certain
members of the Staff. That was what I gathered, at least.
40. General Grunert. Did you know that the command was alerted
against sabotage?
Colonel Pratt. I did not personally notice it, except I believe, as I
recall that, I did see some soldiers posted at certain bridges and
communications systems.
41. General Grunert. As to the purport of this message, did it
occur to you, or did you turn it over in your mind, whether or not the
action taken was sufficient under those instructions and warnings?
1034 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Pratt. Well, it occurred to me, in the light of what General
Herron had previously done, that Field Order No. 1 might have been
put into effect.
42. General Grtctnert. And Field Order No. 1 provided for an all-
out alert?
Colonel Pratt. Yes.
43. General Grunert. Then I gather from the tenor of your testi-
mony that the occasion called for an all-out alert, in your opinion; is
that right?
Colonel Pratt. Well, that was my opinion ; yes, sir.
44. General Grunert. You spoke of General Herron's taking an
all-out alert. Does that lead me to believe that there was a differ-
ence in the way Herron and Short looked at the thing ?
Colonel Pratt. Apparently.
45. General Grunert, How about the two Chiefs of Staff, Hayes
and Phillips; were they different?
[197S] Colonel Pratt. They were different personalities; yes,
sir.
46. General Grunert. Which did you consider the stronger per-
sonality?
Colonel Pratt. Colonel Hayes.
47. General Grunert. Do you know anything about the cooperation
between the Army and Navy, and its effectiveness?
Colonel Pratt. Only by hearsay.
48. General Grunert. From the impression you gathered, were
tliey getting along, were they cooperating, or was there a lack of
such cooperation?
Colonel Pratt. I would say that, from what I heard, the coopera-
tion between the Army and Navy was not what it might have been.
49. General Grunert. Was that more evident early in your service
over there, or late in your service ?
Colonel Pratt. It was evident all the way through, with one excep-
tion. There was an Admiral, and I can't remember his name, who
was in a subordinate position at Pearl Harbor, who went out of his
way to cooperate. His name commenced with an F, as I recall.
50. General Frank. Was it Fitch?
Colonel Pratt. No.
51. General Grunert. Who was the Admiral of the fleet, just prior
to Kimmel, do you remember?
Colonel Pratt. Admiral Richardson, I believe.
52. Major Clausen. There was an Admiral Furlong, may I ask?
Colonel Pratt. No, it was not Furlong. It was as I recall some-
thing like Friedlander or Fridenthal. I don't remember the admiral's
iiame.
\J979] 53. General Grunert. So Admiral Richardson was in
command of the fleet prior to Kimmel ?
Colonel Pratt. Yes, sir.
54. General Grunert. During Richardson's regime and during
Kimmel's regime, do you know anything about their policy of keeping
ships in or out of the Harbor?
Colonel Pratt. Personally, I had never seen what their policy was,
except it was noticeable in passing Pearl Harbor on occasions that you
would see more ships in there, of different types, during Admiral
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1035
Kimmers regime than you would when Admiral Richardson had the
fleet ; and that was particularly true of capital ships.
55. General Gkunert. Have you some questions, General Frank?
56. General Frank. No. Do you have some questions, Major
Clausen ?
57. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. May I put the question?
58. General Grunert. Yes.
59. Major Clausen. Sir, you mentioned some investigation con-
cerning a German citizen. I wondered if you had met or were ac-
quainted with Hans Wilhelm Rohl?
Colonel Pratt. I was not.
60. Major Clausen. Did you hear any derogatory comments con-
cerning this Hans Wilhelm Rohl in connection with espionage ?
Colonel Pratt. Not at that time ; no.
61. Major Clausen. Did you, later?
Colonel Pratt. Only as I learned it from the newspapers and other
reports.
62. Major Clausen. And when was that, sir?
Colonel Pratt. That was after I got back.
63. Major Clausen. And, with respect to Colonel Theodore
Wyman, [19S0] Junior, did you know him ?
Colonel Pratt. Very casually. He was on the staff when I was out
there.
64. Major Clausen. Did you hear rumors as to his inefficiency?
Colonel Pratt. No, I did not. At the time, he was considered to be
quite efficient in getting things done, but he gained the antipathy of
a number of persons, both in the militiiry service and civil life, by what
they termed his "rather high-handed methods," but I never heard any
criticism of his efficiency in getting things done.
65. Major Clausen. Did you hear any remarks concerning the rela-
tionship which existed in Hawaii between Colonel Wyman and Hans
Wilhelm Rohl?
Colonel_ Pratt. Not until after I got back to the mainland.
66. Major Clausen. In connection with this German that was tried
and sentenced to death, did you hear the name of Werner Plack ?
Colonel Pratt. I did not. That is my recollection. I do not
remember hearing such a name.
67. General Grunert. Have you any questions, General Russell ?
68. General Russell. Yes.
Colonel, as Officer in Charge of Civilian Component Affairs, you
were not about Department headquarters a lot, you were in the field
where the various units were, is that true ?
Colonel Pratt. My office was in the business district of Honolulu,
and the only time I visited headquarters was when I had occasion to
do so on official business.
69. General Russell. Of what did these civilian components con-
sist? _ That is to enable me to know the sphere of your [1981]
activities and the people whom you contacted.
Colonel Pratt. They consisted of an Adjutant General and staff' of
the National Guard, two regiments of infantry. We administered at
one time about 1700, as I recall, organized Reserve Officers, some of
them from the mainland, and all the R. O. T. C. units there in Hawaii.
1036 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
70. General Russell. Were there numbers of Japanese people in
these units which you have described, or people of Japanese origin?
Colonel Pratt. In the National Guard there were a few American
citizens of Japanese extraction, in the enlisted branch. To my knowl-
edge there were I think no American citizens of Japanese extraction in
the commissioned ranks. There may have been one or two. But I
think that the Adjutant General of the Territory, Colonel Smoot, made
an honest and a good endeavor to get rid of as many American citi-
zens of Japanese extraction as possible, and I think he did a pretty
good job of it.
71. General Russell. Then it came to pass, Colonel, that the people
who were on the ground, who knew the Jap and the American citizen
of Jap origin, had so little faith in his loyalty that they were almost
entirely excluded from civilian military organizations out there ?
[1982'\ Colonel Pratt. Well, we had some Japanese officers, of
Japanese extraction, in the reserves, Organized Reserves. Some of
them are doing very well in Italy today.
72. General Grunert. How about R. O. T. C. ?
Colonel Pratt. No ; they were Organized Reserves people.
73. General Grunert. But your R. 0. T, C. units; were they prac-
tically all of Japanese extraction ?
Colonel Pratt. The University of Hawaii and the McKinley High
School R. O. T. C, roughly, were about, I would say, 90 percent of
Japanese extraction.
74. General Russell. Well, now let us approach it a little more
directly. Were you in frequent or infrequent contacts with Japanese
and Americans of Japanese origin ?
Colonel Pratt. Well, I knew quite a number of — I knew a few
Japanese, officers of Japanese extraction that I had contact with in
the Organized Reserves, but I had very little contact with people of
Japanese extraction in the R. O. T. C.
y5. General Russell. Colonel, was it a fact, or not, that you were
more intimately associated with civilians and had much more fre-
quent contact with civilians than the average soldier out there, pro-
fessional soldier, because of your assignment ?
Colonel Pratt. I would say so ; yes, sir.
76. General Russell. And by virtue of this contact with civilians
who in turn were in contact with the Japanese elements on the Island,
you seem to have developed a suspicion of the Japanese elements or a
feeling toward them which probably is somewhat different from what
we have found elsewhere. Could that be accounted for by virtue of
your contact with our own people, our civilian people out there, who
in turn were in \^198S'\ touch with these Japs?
Colonel Pratt. As to the question of the loyalty of the Japanese
in Hawaii, it depends utterly on whom you contact. If you contact,
for instance, the managers of sugar plantations or if you contact the
economic leaders of the Territory, you would get one attitude which
is very favorable toward the Japanese; but if you contact the lunas
of tlie plantations and the men who became more intimate in actual
contact with the people, you get an entirely different estimate.
77. General Frank. A luna is a supervisor or overseer?
Colonel Pratt. Overseer of work.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1037
78. General Eussell. Now, you contacted both of these groups, I
assume from your testimony, the huger ups, the upper brackets, and
the overseer brackets ?
Colonel Pratt. In some cases, in some few cases, but I have heard
the opinions of certain people also who have contacted these people.
79. General Russell. Now, either because of unloading coal over
here or because I didn't hear your evidence very clearly, I did not get
the full import of your testimony relating to the radio broadcast
that you listened to that night prior to the attack or
Colonel Pratt. No ; it was after the attack.
80. General Russell. Oh, after the attack ?
Colonel Pratt. Yes.
81. General Russell. As I recall, General Frank asked if it was on
the 8th, and you replied, "Yes," and I became somewhat confused.
Colonel Pratt. Well, it was the night of the 7th-8th.
[1984] 82. General Russell. Yes. It was after the attack on
the morning ?
Colonel Pratt. That is correct.
83. General Russell. Now, on the evening prior to the attack or
any time prior thereto, was there evidence of the possibility of a Jap
attack out there, from the sources that you described which gave you
information on the 8th?
Colonel Pratt. No, sir.
84. General Russell. There was nothing to indicate an attack on
the morning of the 7th ?
Colonel Pratt. Not to my knowledge.
85. General Russell. And there were no signals of any sort that
were sent up on that night that indicated anything out of the ordi-
nary ?
Colonel Pratt. Not to my knowledge.
86. General Russell. Had anything developed on the Islands
proper. Colonel, within the two or three months prior to the Japanese
attack which indicated growing tension or the possibility of trouble
between the Japanese Empire and the American Government?
Colonel Pratt. Nothing to my knowledge, other than what one
read generally on the question of relations between the United States
and Japan, and we all had the feeling that the situation was becom-
ing tenser and tenser due to that influence alone, but as to local indi-
cations I would say no.
87. General Russell. General Grunert in discussing your reac-
tion to the sabotage alert of General Short, on about the 27th of
November, elicited from you an opinion that you thought an all-out
alert should have been ordered.
[1985] Colonel Pratt. In the light of the message that we re-
ceived from the Chief of Statf in Washington and the action that
General Herron took almost a year before, I was led to believe that
it warranted an all-out effort.
88. General Russell. Do you think the fact that General Herron
went on an all-out alert a year before played any considerable part
in the formulation of that idea ?
Colonel Pratt. I think so.
1038 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
89. General Kussell. Do you know upon what order from the
War Department the alert of General Herron was directed?
Colonel Pratt. I do not.
90. General Russell. You do not know, then, that the message to
Herron on June 17, '40, directed him or ordered him onto an alert
to repel an air attack from overseas?
Colonel Pratt. I did not know it.
91. General Russell. Colonel, your impression was that the coop-
eration between the Army and Navy during your entire stay on Oahu
left considerable to be desired ?
Colonel Pratt. That was my impression ; yes, sir.
92. General Russell. Did you obtain that or did you form that
impression from information obtained from official sources or just
discussions among officers in a social or private way?
Colonel Pratt. Discussions among officers.
93. General Russell. At social affairs and other places ?
Colonel Pratt. Well, yes.
91. General Russell. It was based on the talk which went on be-
tween and among Army officers as to these relations?
Colonel Pratt. As far as my knowledge is concerned, yes.
95. General Russell. In your prior testimony. Colonel, you
[1986] stated that you were impressed that more ships were in
Pearl Harbor after Admiral Kimmel took command? In other
words, he had more ships in Pearl Harbor than Richardson ordinarily
had in there ?
Colonel Pratt. It seemed to me so ; yes, sir.
96. General Russell. Could you make any comparison between the
number of ships in the harbor customarily during the week and the
number in there on week ends, Saturdays and Sunday ?
Colonel Pratt. I couldn't, no, sir.
97. General Russell. You noticed no difference?
Colonel Pratt. As far as I am concerned, I didn't.
98. General Russell. I think that is all.
99. General Grunert. Did General Short ever make use of the R. O.
T. C. units in the defense of Hawaii ?
Colonel Pratt. Yes, he did.
100. General Grunert. Prior to December 7th or afterward ?
Colonel Pratt. Subsequent to it.
101. General Grunert. Subsequent to it?
Colonel Pratt. Subsequent to December 7th, I would say a day or
two, the Territorial Adjutant General came into my office and in-
formed me that the Commanding General and the Governor of the
Territory had held a conference in which it was agreed that certain
units of the R. O. T. C. should be turned out for guard duty in the city ;
and if I recall correctly I believe it was either then or later limited to
those of 18 years of age and older, though I am not sure of that.
Well, it seemed to me to be rather important, because of the high
percentage of Americans of Japanese extraction, that I didn't take
the word of the Territorial Adjutant General for this. [1987]
He requested me to order the units out, but I got General Short in
person on the telephone at the command post and told him what the
Adjutant General had told me; and he said Yes, there had been a
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1039
conference in wliich it had been agreed that these units would be
turned out for guard duty. I called his attention to the fact that there
was a high percentage of citizens of Japanese extraction in some of
these units, and he said he thought they might prove to be perfectly
loyal and thought we should go ahead and direct the PMS&Ts to take
ahold and get them out, which I did.
102. General Grunert. In this impression you received through
conversation that the cooperation between the Army and Navy was
not what it might be — was not as it might be desired, we will put it —
was there any lack of that cooperation manifested? In what form
did it show itself ? Can you give us any light on that ?
Colonel Pratt. Well, to the best of my recollection — this is three
years ago now — there was a request made upon the Navy to do certain
things for the Army.
103. General Frank. Such as?
Colonel Pratt. Well, furnishing boats of certain descriptions, and
sometimes participating in certain maneuvers that the Army wanted
to engage in there. As I say, as far as I could see there was one
Admiral there who went out of his way to cooperate, but he was in a
subordinate position and I can't remember his name.
104. General Russell. Any other questions suggested to the Re-
corder?
Colonel West. That German that was tried and sentenced [1988]
to death : Do you recall whether that sentence was ever, executed, or
what was the outcome of that case ?
Colonel Pratt. I didn't know it until I met Mi*., or Major now,
Angus Taylor here in San Francisco quite recently, and he informed
me that the sentence had been commuted to a life term and that it was
being carried out now, if I recall correctly, at Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas.
105. General Grunert. Colonel, can you think of anything now
that may assist the Board in getting at facts or leads that might assist
the Board in getting witnesses who might have knowledge from
which we might adduce some facts ?
Colonel Pratt. No, sir.
106. General Grunert. Do you know of any witnesses now in
Hawaii that can help us get the true story ?
Colonel Pratt. Well, there was a gentleman named Mr. Harold
Kay, K-a-y, who I believe now is military aide to the present Governor
of the Territory, who on the morning of the attack observed the attack
from his home at an altitude of 900 feet, which overlooked the whole
south seaward coast of Oahu, through binoculars and made notes of
what he saw at the time ; and I think he might be of some aid to the
Board in finding out or corroborating testimony as to what actually
did happen so far as he saw it there.
107. General Grunert. And you do not think of anything else, that
you could of your own knowledge assist the Board with any more
evidence ?
Colonel Pratt. No, sir.
108. General Grunert. There appear to be no more questions.
Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
1040 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[19S9] TESTIMONY OF BKIG. GEN. WILLIAM R. WHITE, U. S.
ARMY; MIEA LOMA QUARTERMASTER DEPOT, MIRA LOMA,
CALIFORNIA.
(The witness was sworn by the Kecorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board youi
name, rank, organization, and station?
General White. William R. White, Brigadier General, U. S. Army^
Quartermaster Corps, stationed at Mira Loma Quartermaster Depot,
Mira Loma, California.
2. General Grunert. General, the Board is after facts as to back-
ground as to events leading up to what happened at Pearl Harbor
during the attack of December 7, '41. Because of your long service in
the Hawaiian Department and because you were present prior to and
during the attack, we called you hoping that we can get some facts or
leads toward facts. There is nothing particular except that you were
over there a long time and undoubtedly accumulated a lot of infor-
mation about the situation.
And so, tell us first what your assignment was, how long you were
over there, when you came back, and what your assignments were
while over there.
GeneraLWHiTE. I arrived in Honolulu the end of February 1940.
My first station w^as Schofield Barracks, as Quartermaster at that sta-
tion. In March of 1941 I was ordered to Fort Shafter as the Depart-
ment Quartermaster, which position I held until February 13, 1944,
when I returned to the mainland. Immediately following the attack
on December 7th I was appointed Director of Food Control for the
entire Territory, which duty was in addition to my work as Depart-
ment [1990] Quartermaster.
3. General Grunert. Now, the Board is primarily interested as to
what happened prior to the attack and during the attack. Can you,
first, give us your impression of that cosmopolitan population of
Honolulu, especially regarding the Japanese population, both foreign-
born and American citizens ?
General White. My impression, especially of the Japanese was that
what we term the alien Avas probably a better behaved and more on his
guard as to his behavior than the American-born. It was quite appar-
ent that the American-born soon adopted the Western customs, and in
their recreation and usual habits' they more or less approached the
habits of our own people : I mean by that, in their manner of dress, in
their consumption of food, their love of entertainment, and their et
cetera.
4. General Grunert. Give us some sidelights on the question of
loyalty.
5. General Frank. What was your last word ?
General White. Et cetera. Now, that is not a good word. We
might stop at that last there, but I am just trying to cover it.
May I have that question again ?
6. General Grunert. Give us your impression of the loyalty of the
Japanese American-born American citizens.
General White. I doubt the loyalty of the American-born Jap-
anese citizens just the same as I do the alien-born. In my opinion
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1041
their being American citizens is simply a matter of circumstance, of
having been born under the American flag, and I have never seen why
they should be particularly loyal to this [1991] country, espe-
cially in a place as far off as Honolulu where they are not in contact
with our people as much as the Japanese on the mainland would be.
7. General Grunert. If there was any disloyalty, we will call it,
what form did that take, and what were your chances to observe and
form an opinion on this class of people ?
General White. You couldn't put your fingers on any particular
thing that would stand out as a disloyal act. It was their attitude of
superiority, their pushing a white person around, you might say, in
the stores that are run by the orientals practically entirely over there.
It was quite common for the white person to go in to buy something
and find very little for sale in the front part of the store, and a lack
of interest in making the sale to the white person, while on the other
hand in the rear of the store would probably be a good assortment of
merchandise and probably Japanese back there getting the pick of
whatever was available. It was this type of attitude, you might say,
and the fact that it was difficult to believe that there would be any great
loyalty to this country, that caused me to form the opinion that I
wouldn't trust any of them.
8. General Grunert. To your knowledge were there any acts of
sabotage committed while you were over there ?
General White. To the best of my knowledge and belief there were
no acts of sabotage committed before or during the attack.
9. General Grunert. In your capacity as Department Quarter-
master did you have anything to do with the shipping plying between
the United States and Hawaii?
[1993] General White. Before the attack, of course, we were
interested in getting Quartermaster supplies. We used to requisition
60 days in advance on San Francisco's Depot, and no difficulty was
experienced in getting Quartermaster supplies. As a matter of fact,
on December 7, 1941, I had abundance of food and all other types of
Quartermaster supplies available to the Army.
[1993] 10. General Grunert. Did you have anything to do
with the requisitioning or arranging for shipping of construction
supplies ?
General White. I did not.
11. General Grunert. Do you know approximately what time it
took for ordinary quartermaster supplies, from date of requisition
to date of receipt?
General White. We used to figure 45 days as a turn-around ; that
is, a ship to leave Honolulu, get to the port, San Francisco, pick up
our supplies, and get back to Honolulu. As I stated before, we were
required to submit requisitions 60 days in advance of our actual
needs. There was no difficulty in transportation problems previous
to December 7, 1941.
12. General Grunert. Then you did not experience any particular
delays on account of shipping, as far as anything you were con-
cerned with?
General White. I did not.
13. General Grunert. What knowledge have you of the tenseness
of the Japanese-American situation toward the latter part of 1941 ?
1042 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General White. I saw no evidence of any tenseness on the part of
any Japanese, previous to the attack of December 7, 1941.
14. General Grunert, Were the newspapers full of stories abovit
what was happening?
General White. Just ordinary accounts. I recall distinctly when
Kurusu came through, he was met by our G-2, and the paper car-
ried an account of this interview; and such communications as you
might expect in view of the war situation that was going on at the
time ; but there was nothing that would create [1994-'] a tense-
ness, that I recall, being published.
15. General Grunert. How about the headlines in the morning
paper, say, of November 30, which predicts a war within a week?
Did that make any impression on the people over there?
General White. I must truthfully say I don't recall that headline.
16. General Grunert. Were you kept informed of any so-called
"warning messages" received by the Navy, transmitted to the Army,
or received by the Army directly, from approximately November 24
up to the attack?
General White. Some time just before Thanksgiving, I am not
sure of the exact date, I was ordered to report to headquarters at 3 :45
one afternoon, and upon arrival, I found the chiefs of all the serv-
ices had gathered, and we were taken into General Short's private
oflSce, and the door was closed, and General Short stated that he had
a very serious message to read, from General Marshall. He then
proceeded to read a "radio" that was worded approximately like this :
All negotiations have been broken off. Take all measures for defense. Be
prepared for any emergency, but do nothing to alarm the populace,
Signed "Marshall."
He stated to us that this was secret; that he was ordering Alert
No. 1 into effect immediately ; that this would not be discussed except
insofar as to put Alert No. 1 into effect.
That is the only warning order that was made known to me.
17. General Grunert. Will you listen to this message and see if
tliis is the one to which you refer. This is* a message from the Chief
of Staff to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, 27 No-
vember 1941 :
[19951 Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical
imrposes, with only the barest possibility the Japanese Government might come
t)aclj and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile
action possiblte at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided.
United States desires Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not,
repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might
jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to
undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but
these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil
population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur,
you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 as far as they i)ertain to
•Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to the minimum
essential oflScers.
General White. That is the first time I have ever heard that com-
plete message.
18. General Grunert. But was that the message to which you re-
ferred ?
General White. That was not.
19. General Grunert. That was not?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1043
General White. I might say that the message that I refer to was
much shorter, and that the only thing that I recognize in that mes-
sage that was in the one that I spoke of, was the one statement, "Do
nothing to alarm the populace." My message started off, as I said,
that "All negotiations have broken off." It was very much shorter
than that message.
[1906] 20. General Grunert. Did you actually see the message?
General White. I did not. General Short read the message to us.
21. General Grunert. It could have been paraphrased, and it could
have been just extracts of the message, or was the whole message read,
word for word, do you remember?
General White. It could have been extracted. It was apparent at
the time that General Short was reading word for word, but I did not
see it.
22. General Grunert. But at that time, had he made a decision to
take Alert No. 1 ?
General White. He had.
23. General Grunert. And what did you understand Alert No. 1
to mean ?
General White. Alert No. 1 was to protect all installations against
sabotage.
24. General Grunert. Did you turn over in your mind whether or
not you considered that alert sufficient under the warning then re-
ceived ?
General White. I don't understand.
25. General Grunert. Did you think to yourself, "Well, is that suf-
ficient protection under this warning?" or anything of that kind?
Or didn't you think about it?
General White. I did think about it, and I thought seriously about
it ; and I immediately called my people, the chiefs of my installations,
and gave them this information on the Alert No. 1, and before midnight
that night every installation was guarded, and the Alert No. 1 was
in full effect ; and at that time, I honestly believed that sabotage was
the thing that we [1997] had to look for.
26. General Grunert. All right. Now, as far as your installations
are concerned, if they had taken Alert 2 or 3, what difference would
it have made as to your installations, as to the protective measures
taken ?
General White. Alert 2 provided for an internal uprising, and had
Alert 2 been put in, then it would have been necessary to have placed
more guards around the installations to protect them against an at-
tack from the inside. If Alert 3 had been called, which called for an
all-out attack of the Japanese against the islands, then guarding
my installations would have presented no more problem than Alert 2.
It would have required all troops to have taken the field, in field posi-
tions, for a defense of the island against a Japanese attack from the
outside.
27. General Grujstert. Wliat troops did you have that would have
had to go out?
General White. Well, we had actually no troops of my own, except
that at Fort Armstrong, for instance, we had our own war plan, and
we had a battalion of our own troops that had been drilled. We had
our own machine guns, and we had our positions for them to go, in
case Alert No. 3 or 2 was put into effect.
79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 2 17
1044 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
28. General Grunert. Did you ever hear of a warning that was sent
through the Navy, which started out to this effect —
Consider this a war warning?
General WurrE. I did not.
29. General Grunert. Then, so far as you were concerned, you con-
sidered an alert against sabotage as of sufficient protection under the
instructions received, is that right?
[199S] General White. Under the instructions as I knew them.
30. General Grunert. I gather from your testimony as to what you
understood of the situation prior to the attack, that you were not
alarmed about an attack coming, is that right?
General White. That is correct. I would like to add right here that
the reason I make that statement is that, in my War College class of
'32, we had 10 or 12 very bright naval officers, and I distinctly remem-
ber, and have carried it in my mind ever since, that the theory which
they spoke openly at all times was that in any war between this
country and the Japanese, we would have to take that war to Japan,
that Japan would never risk a naval engagement further than a
thousand miles from her shore ; and throughout the whole year, as I
say, the concensus of those men was to the effect that we would take the
war to Japan in case of a war.
31. General Grunert. Then you never visualized the ability of the
Japanese to bring the war over as far as Hawaii, initially, at least?
General White. I must say I did not.
32. General Grunert. Have you any questions. General Frank?
33. General Frank. Yes.
From your analysis of the feeling that you had against the Japs,
I infer that it was a general state of uncertainty and suspicion.
General White. That is correct.
34. General Frank. But the background for this so far as any fac-
tual proof of it is concerned, is very nebulous, isn't it?
General White. That is correct. I might say that altogether I
have been in the Hawaiian Islands, to my knowledge, six of the ten
past years, and have noticed among the Japanese [19991 this
shrewdness, this grinning of theirs, indications all the way along that,
"Well, if I could knife you in the back, I would be delighted to do it,
if I was sure I wouldn't be punished." It is that attitude.
35. General Frank. That is an impression that you got?
General White. That is correct.
36. General Frank. As a inatter of fact, their characteristics are
very different from the characteristics of an American ?
General White. Yes.
37. General Frank. Their cultural background and practices are
completely different from the American, is that right?
General White. That is right.
38. General Frank. What about their ethics ?
General White. I am not prepared to answer that.
39. General Frank. How do they compare with the ethics of Amer-
icans?
General White. I would say they didn't have any to speak of.
40. General Frank. All right. Now, let us analyze their patriot-
ism a little.
PROCEEDINGS OF AKAIY PEARL PIARBOR BOARD 1045
General White. I think their patriotism is ])nrely a veneer. You
were speakin<j:; of i)atriotisni toward our country?
41. General Frank. I am talking just about patriotism. If you
are going to discuss it, discuss it under (a) and (b) — (a), their pa-
triotism for Japan, and (b) their patriotism for the United States.
General AViirrE. All right. Then we will discuss it under (a),
their patriotism to Japan. That was manifested on all occasions
where any celebration such as the emperor's birthday [2000]
or any holiday that would be in Japan, They would tiy their flags
for all kinds of ceremonies, and it was quite evident that their loyalty
to Japan was just as one might expect.
42. General Frank. Were j'ou conversant with the Japanese law in
their homeland relative to the status of a Jap born of Japanese parents
in the United States or in Hawaii ?
General White. It is my understanding that the Japanese never
gave up that particular person as a citizen of Japan, notwithstanding
the fact that he was an American citizen under our law. In other
words, there was a dual citizenship, so far as the Japanese were con-
cerned.
4o. General Fi;.\n k. Now, for him to become a full-out citizen of the
United States and cease to be claimed as a citizen of Japan, do you
remember what was necessary ?
General White. As I remember, he had to go to court and sign
away his allegiance to the emperor and all connections with his coun-
try. I am not in a ])osition to discuss all the details, but I know that
something like that had to be done.
44. General Frank. And he had to do that even though he were a
native-born Jap ?
General White. Yes.
45. (general Frank. With respect to this impression that you got
from the naval officers at the War College in 1932 about the "1,000
miles,'' did it ever occur to you that there has been technical and in-
dustrial progress in the meantime which greatly increased the range
of aircraft and service craft to an exte;it such that that 1,000 miles
might have been considerably altered?
General White. Yes, sir; and on the other hand, in late years, of
course, we taught that you don't put battleships and [£001]
naval craft up against land-based aircraft, and that in thinking this
thing over, what thought we gave to it over there was that an armada
or a task force suflicient to attack the Hawaiian Islands would be of
such size that it certainly would be reported long before it approached
the islands, especially as the Navy were carrying on their observations
daily, on the lookout for just such an event.
46. General Frank. Did you ever analyze the possibilities of a raid
such as that which occurred ?
General White. No.
47. General Filvnk. Did you ever believe that such a thing would
happen ?
General White. Definitely, I didn't believe it could happen.
48. General Frank. How risky an undertaking do you consider it
was?
General White. I think if that had hai)pencd at any time other
than Sunday morning it might have been quite disastrous for the
1046 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Japanese, and while that doesn't answer your question, I think your
question must be answered that it was quite risky, in my opinion.
[2002] 49. General Frank. Do you think it was a very daring
unusual venture?
General White. Not necessarily so, under the circumstances. War
had not been declared. It was an aerial attack with, as we have been
told, two carriers ; and for a nation
50, General Frank. How many carriers?
General White. I understand there were two, may have been more ;
but for a nation at war to undertake such a mission, it was quite risky.
51 General Frank. I would like to ask one more question: What
do you think would have been the attitude of Japan toward the same
number of Americans in Japan as there were Japanese in Hawaii?
General White. What do you mean by "attitude" ; I mean in that
case?
52. General Frank. Do you think they would have been interned,
or what would have happened to them ?
General White. I am quite suie they would have been interned.
53. General Grunert. Prior to the declaration of war?
General White. Oh, no. No, I didn't understand that was prior
to the declaration of war. I might state that I was in Japan on one
occasion, in uniform, and at every train that I got off there would be
an official at my side asking me my name, my business, where I was
going, how long I expected to remain. Now, whether that happened
to all other officers in uniform, I don't know, but it was quite apparent
from that that they were watching very closely American officers
who were in Japan.
[2003] General Frank. Did you ever see a similar scrutiny of
Japanese in the United States?
General White. I did not. I have not.
55. General Grunert. Did you ever see any Japanese officers in the
United States in uniform ?
General White. No, although I have seen them in the Hawaiian
Department, which is a territory of the United States.
56. General Russell. Was this flag-flying on national holidays
carried on by native-born Japs as well as by those who were born in the
Empire ?
General Whtte. It is my impression that it was.
57. General Russell. Your impression is that there was a sharp line
of demarcation out there between the Japanese and all other groups?
General White. In their patriotism? I mean, their attitude
toward their native country ?
58. General Russell. Well, in their living together, going together,
worshipping the Emperor, and those things, they were a sort of unity
in the Hawaiian Department ?
General White. That is correct.
59. General Russell. They didn't amalgamate with other races
at all?
General White. Let me state it this way: In '35-'37 when I was
over there it was unusual to see a Japanese with anyone else but a
Japanese. When I returned in 1940 it was not unusual to see a Japa-
nese fraternizing with the American soldiers, going to the picture
shows, going to parties and dances with them, and I know of two cases
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1047
where Chinese have married Japanese women. That happened on my
second tour. Durino; my first tour [SOO^] I saw none of that
and I think but very little of that existed at that time.
60. General Russell. So far as you know- those two cases that you
have referred to are the only two cases of intermarriage of Japanese
with other nationalities ?
General White. So far as I know of the Chinese intermarrying with
the Japanese, but I think there have been some American soldiers
that have married some of the Japanese.
61. General Eussell. Did they dominate the commercial life of
Honolulu and other towns out there ?
General White. The Japanese and Chinese practically control all
of the small business.
62. General Russell. The larger businesses were American?
General White. The larger businesses were the Americans.
63. General Russell. Did you buy goods from many Japanese in
connection with your duties as Quartermaster?
General White. Yes.
64. General Russell. You had an opportunity, then, to deal with the
Japanese and get his outlook on life ?
General White. Yes ; and I might say, in business it was no different
from any American concern.
65. General Russell. There was nothing out there just prior to the
attack that convinced you that war was imminent, including this mes-
sage that General Grunert read to you in whole or in part?
General White. No, I would not say that. That message indicated
that the relations were right at the breaking point, and I didn't ques-
tion— I never have questioned — the fact that some day Japan and the
United States would figlit a war, but [£005] there was nothing
in my mind that indicated that such an attack as happened would
happen.
66. General Russell. General, you discussed or you made a state-
ment that other than on Sunday morning you do not think that
attack would have had any chance at all?
General White. No, not exactly in those words. I stated this : that
if the attack had come any other morning but Sunday it would have
found our men more prepared. Sunday morning a great many men
were off duty that normally during a week day would be at their post
and would be on duty, but I think that attack would have had. con-
siderably less chance and might have been quite serious for Japan
had it happened on a morning other than Sunday.
67. General Russell. And your sole reason for that conclusion is
that we would have had more men on duty any other morning?
General White. I think so.
68. General Russell. That is all I have.
69. General Geuneet. From part of your testimony I was led to
believe that j^ou believe that the Navy was conducting long-distance
reconnaissance practically regularly.
General White. That is my understanding.
70. General Gkunert. Now, do you have any definite knowledge as
to whether they did or not?
General White. Other than that I was told and that the Navy sent
their ships out a certain number of miles, and then from there their
1048 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
planes took off and it is my understanding that it was at least 600
miles out : in other words, that the ships went out a certain distance,
and then the planes went out farther than that, and that they cov-
ered approximately 600 miles out.
\2Q06^ 71. General Grunert. You did not know, then, what
these task forces went out for, whether reconnaissance or whether it
was maneuvers of their own, or whether they were covering the per-
imeter around the islands or not, did you?
General White. Now, you must remember that my job was the
Department Quartermaster, the Supply Officer, and I was not in on a
lot of the conferences, and all, where the tactical
72. General Grunert. Then, it appeared to be just your impres-
sion without any definite knowledge on the subject.
General White. Other than having been told in more or less words
to that effect, that there was such a mission.
73. General Frank. By whom?
General White. Well, I can't recall right now any particular per-
son, but it was generally understood.
74. General Frank. It was just general conversation, however?
General White. That is correct.
75. General Frank. And impression?
General White. Yes.
76. General Grunert. What gave you the impression, then, that the
Navy was doing the job of taking care of the outside?
General White. We understood that that was their mission.
77. General Gruneirt. Now, then, from your military education and
from what you know of the past tactics and strategy of the Japanese
and the Germans, is it not true that the Japanese usually attempted to
get in the first blow, which was practically a blow with a declaration
of war at the time the blow was given ?
General White. I know that happened in the Russia War, Russia-
Japanese War; but at the same time there was part of the Russian
Fleet very close to the Japanese Islands at the time of that naval
engagement.
78. General Grunert. And is it not true that the Japanese followed
the German tactics and had been instructed by Germans \_W07'\
in their military education ?
General White. It is my understanding that that is a fact and that
their general staff is taken right from the German General Staub, as
they call it, or more or less copied from them.
79. General Grunert. And also that the Germans usually sought
surprise, and particularly on Sunday morning?
General WnrrE. That is correct. I think we were all influenced by
the great distance between Japan and the Hawaiian Islands as to such
a surprise move on the part of Japan.
80. General Grunert. Just one more question : Have you anything
that you think might be of assistance to the Board in getting at facts,
that you can add to your testimony or give the Board any leads as
to where they might get at such facts, that has not been brought out
during your testimony ?
General White. No. I would simply like to add one statement:
that I knew a great many people in the Hawaiian Islands ; I talked to
a great many oflScers, Army officers, Navy officers; and I have my
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1049
doubts that any officer in the Army or Navy at that time over there
had any idea that such an attack as happened on December 7th, 1941,
was possible. Now, that is my opinion and my impression gamed
from spending quite a time over there and discussing at various times
what might happen.
81. General Grunert. Anything further? (No response.)
Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
[2008] TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GEORGE S. WELCH, AIR CORPS,
ORLANDO, FLORIDA.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Major, will you please state to the Board your
name, rank, organization, and station?
Major Welch. My name is George S. Welch, Major, Air Corps,
0398557. I am stationed with the A. A. F. Board, Orlando, Florida.
I am now on terminal leave from that organization.
2. General Grunert. Major, the Board is after facts as to what
happened before and during ths attack on Pearl Harbor. Because
you were a witness before the Roberts Commission we called on you
to appear before this Board, to see what you could give to us. I have
but one point as far as your testimony is concerned that I want to look
into, but if there is anything else which you can give to the Board
which will assist it we shall be glad to get it.
Now, will you tell us what your assignment was, and when, during
1941 in Hawaii?
Major Welch. You mean, sir, before the war started, up to the
war ?
3. General Grunert. Yes.
Major Welch. I was a Second Lieutenant, sir, assigned to the 47th
Pursuit Squadron, stationed at Wheeler Field in February, 1941, and
I arrived in the Islands and was stationed there still at the time that
the war started. My squadron was on temporary duty at an auxiliary
field, Haleiwa, actually when the war started, the day it started.
4. General Frank. What were you doing down there ?
Major Welch. Our squadron was out there, sir, for gunnery
[£009j camp.
5. General Frank. That is how you happened to have ammunition?
Major Welch. Well, we had some ammunition. We had .30
caliber.
6. General Frank. What kind of planes did you have?
Major Welch. As nearly as I can remember, sir, we had four or
six P-40Bs, about a dozen P-36As, two A-20s, and a B-12 and about
five P-26s.
7. General Grunert. The one particular question I have here:
You testified that the guards at M-a-1-a-i-w-a Field had no instruc-
tions as to what to do if the enemy planes came over. Now, what
field was that ? I haven't heard this name mentioned before.
Major Welch. Haleiwa, sir. H-a-1.
8. General Grunert. That is H-a-1?
Major Welch, Yes, sir.
1050 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
9. General Grunert. Now, what was the guarding system at that
field and what were the instructions in the event of an attack, if
any ? Do you know ?
Major Welch. Sir, as far as I can remember there were no in-
structions to cover any possibility of aerial attack. The only possi-
bility of attack that was covered was either sabotage or an enemy
landing.
10. General Grunert. What was this field ? Just a gunnery range ?
Major Welch. No, sir. Haleiwa Field was a very short, sandy
field originally used as an emergency landing field, and probably
about six months before the war started they had [2010]
chopped down a few trees and were allowing fighter squadrons to
operate out of there as an emergency field to practice shortfield land-
ings; and a month before the war started, the 15th Group, of which
the 47th Squadron is a part, was sending each squadron out there
for two weeks in rotation to operate off of the field in simulated
combat conditions.
11. General Grunert. Who was the commanding officer of that
field at that time ?
Major Welch. Well, the commanding officer, sir, was the com-
manding officer of the squadron that happened to be there.
12. General Grunert. Then the commanding officer was changed?
Major Welch. Yes, sir.
13. General Grunert. Was there no permanent post complement
there?
Major Welch. Yes, sir. There was a Lieutenant Currie who was
Post Quartermaster PX. Really, sir, there was nothing there, no
installations. We brought our own tents and everything with us.
. 14. General Grunert. That is, it was just a question of guarding
your own planes, was it?
Major Welch. Yes, sir; just our own personal equipment.
15. General Grunert. What happened to that field when the at-
tack took place?
Major Welch. The 'Japs passed right over it, apparently didn't
notice its existence or didn't know that we were using it ; and about
the second raid I think one or two planes made a pass at the field,
shot up a couple of P-36s.
16. General Grunert. So there was little damage done there?
Major Welch. There was no damage done, sir, except to a few
X2011] airplanes.
17. General Grunert. And then, as a matter of fact, the lack of
such a guard and instructions what to do in case of an attack didn't
have much effect as far as the actual attack was concerned, did it?
Major Welch. No, sir. By the time the Japs did make one pass
at the field, the men had machine guns out, .30 caliber ground guns,
and they shot back at this man, this Jap.
18. General Grunert. Well, now, about how many planes all told
were on that field at the time of the attack ?
Major Welch. The original attack?
19. General Grunert. Yes.
Major Welch. Everything we had. I imagine it was — I just gave
you an approximate idea of what we had. I suppose it was about
16, 18.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PKARL HARBOR BOARD 1051
20. General (Ji;tiNi:RT. About 1<). Wcih' tlicy bnncluHl. all put to-
gether, or Avere they spread or dis])ers(Ml. or w hat ?
Major Wia-cir. No. sir. They were lined up in a jx-id'cct line right
down one side of the field.
21. General GitUNKUT. Is that \\ha( is always done in ])(>acetinie.
or is that a sjiecial measure against sabotage, or what!'
Major ^A'klcii. At Wheeler Field, sir, we liad revetments, and the
airplanes had been called back from the revetments because of sabo-
tage. At Ilaleiwa we had no revetments, and we just ])arked them
there just to look nice, and also to keep them bunched so we could
guard them easier.
22. General Grunekt. Then, the concentration of jtlanes Avas really
normal ])i'ocedure?
^bijor "Welch. Yes, sir.
I'^OLJ] General Grunert. Routine ])rocedure.
Major Welch. Except, sir, that they had started thiidcing about
dispersal at Wheeler Field and had built revetments which were un-
occupied.
24. General Frank. You took oft' in a ])lane and conducted a little
attack, didn't you?
Majoi- Wei.cli. Yes, sir.
25. General Frank. What did you take off in?
Major Welch. A P-40B.
2C).' General Frank. P-40B.
Major Welch. That is the second or tliird model.
27. General Frank. What hap])ened ? Did you shoot any down?
Majoi* Welch. Yes, sir.
2S. General Frank. How many?
Major Welch. I claimed four definitely, sir.
29. General Frank. All right. Did anybody else take off from
up there?
Major Welch. Yes. sir. Lieutenant Taylor took off witli me as
my wing man, at fii'st.
30. G-eneral Frank. All right.
Major Welch. About half an hour or an hour later three or fowv
othei' pilots took off from Haleiwa.
81. General Frank. How uuiuy did they get?
Major Welch. Between the planes that took off from Si'hofield
and the ones that they finally got off from Wheeler Field. T think we
shot down 12 planes definitely.
32. Genei'al Frank. All right. Taking that as a background and
assuming that you had been on a different kind of an alert at Wheeler,
so that they could have taken off in a matter of a [2013] feAv
minutes with GO or 75 planes, and considering the state of gunnery
training of the fighters at Wheeler, what do you think they could liave
done to that Jap attack?
Major Welch. Providing, sir, that the pilots were ready to go. as
you said, and had ammunition in their planes, we could have shot every
one of them down except the fighters before they got to the Island.
33. General Frank. You think?
Major Welch. I know, sir; I mean from what T have seen Avith the
same type of equipment they used against us there and down in the
Pacific. We have fought the same thing. Their dive bombers wouldn't
1052 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
have gotten through. They might have strafed a bit with their
fighters, but there wouldn't have been any bombs in there or torpedoes.
34. General Frank. This boy has a very outstanding reputation as
an accurate shot.
35. General Grunert. Then naturally that is why he assumes if all
the rest of them were of his caliber they would have gotten quite a
number.
36. General Frank. I simply mention that in passing.
Major Welch. No, sir. I have seen — in New Guinea at one time I
had a squadron of average pilots and trainee pilots that knocked down
the same type of Jap ship, and not a one got through.
37. General Grunert. How about the torpedo bombers ? They are
pretty slow, aren't they ?
Major Welch. Yes, sir.
38. General Grunert. Are they easier to get at than the others
as far as shooting is concerned ?
[2014] Major Welch. Yes, sir; the Japanese dive bomber and
torpedo bomber are sitting ducks.
39. General Frank. That is all I wanted to bring out.
40. General Russell. Sitting ducks for the type of aircraft that you
had out on Oahu on December 7, '41 ?
Major Welch. For our 75 P^Os; not for our other equipment.
41. General Russell. How many of those 75 P-40s did you have out
on Oahu available for action that morning?
Major Welch. Well, sir, they were all available. Of course, they
didn't have guns in them.
42. General Russell. Well, I know. If they had had the guns and
ammunition, how many P-40s were out there ready to go into action ;
do you know ?
43. General Frank. He wouldn't know.
Major Welch. I believe at least 75 or 100, sir. You could find that.
44. General Russell. You are on terminal leave from what?
Major Welch. I am on terminal leave from the air forces boards.
I have been donated to North American by the Air Corps to be an
engineering test pilot.
45. General Grunert. Any other questions? (No response.) There
appear to be none. Thank you very much. Major, for coming.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, a recess was taken until 2 o'clock
p.m.)
[WJ6] afternoon session
(The Board reconvened at 2 p. m., and continued the hearing of
witnesses, as follows:)
TESTIMONY OF COLONEL W. A. CAPRON; OEDNANCE DEPARTMENT
OGDEN ARSENAL, OGDEN, UTAH
(The witness Avas sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24. )
1. Colonel West. Colonel, would you please state to the Board
your name, rank, organization, and station.
Colonel Capron. Capron, W. A. ; Colonel, Ordnance Department.
My station is Ogden Arsenal, Ogden, Utah.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1053
2. General Grunert. Colonel, this Board is after facts, and leads
that may get other facts ; and because of your assignment and position
during 1941 we asked you to come here to testify, with the hope
that we might get something that would help us. What was your
position and assignment in the Hawaiian Department in 1941, and
give us the dates.
Colonel Capron. From August 1938 until December 30, 1941, I had
the dual function of Department Ordnance Officer of the Hawaiian
Department, and as Commanding Officer of the Hawaiian Ordnance
Depot.
3. General Grunert. Then, because of that assignment, you had an
accurate knowledge of ordnance equipment, did you ?
Colonel Capron. Yes, sir.
4. General Grunert. Generally speaking, was the Department well
equipped in ordnance items, or was it deficient in some material items ?
Colonel Capron. When, sir, may I ask?
5. General Grunert. At the time of the attack.
Colonel Capron. It is very difficult to answer that [2016]
question with any degree of accuracy, on account of the time period
that has elapsed.
6. General Grunert. Give us your general impressions as to the
equipment of the department in the ordnance line, as you remember
it.
Colonel Capron. As I remember, sir, the seacoast, in both arma-
ment and ammunition, was in excellent condition. The mobile
ground weapons, I think we lacked 105 howitzers; we had some but
not the full complement; and 90-mm. antiaircraft, of which we had
none. That was a new weapon, sir, at that period.
7. General Grunert. How about ammunition for antiaircraft
weapons ?
Colonel Capron. Our auumnition for the weapons which we had,
the 3-inch M-1, was good ammunition. We had been using the
powder-train fuse. Before the blitz, however, the new fuse centers
which handled the mechanical fuse arrived and we had changed over
a large portion of the ammunition into mechanical-fuse items.
8. General Grunert. Give us a few facts about the storage of am-
munition. What was the status of that at that time ?
Colonel Capron. Ammunition storage for what we had was ex-
cellent— no, I will say superior. The total reserve was underground
in tunnels, the Department reserve.
9. General Grunert. Did you lose any ammunition on account of
the attack?
Colonel Capron. Absolutely none of the reserve. One bomb hit
in the floor of the Aliamanu crater, which is drilled from the inside,
but it had no effect.
10. General Grunert. Now, what can you tell us about the ship-
[W17] ment of supplies from the mainland to the islands, as far
as you recall ? Were there any unusual delays, or was the transporta-
tion about what you expected?
Colonel Capron. There are two answers, there, sir, before and after
the 7tli of December, 1941. Before, it was usual and normal. It was
not so much a question of transportation ; it was, as I remember, the
items were not on hand on the mainland or that the Philippines, hav-
1054 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ing a higher priority than we had, a large number of items "were going
over there which we would have liked to have had, but they just didu't
have them.
11. General Grunert. Do you recall when the Philippines had a
higher priority than you did on ordnance materials ?
Colonel Capron. ISTo, sir.
12. General Grunert. But that was your own understanding and
impression ?
Colonel Capron. That was my impression.
13. General Grunert. You don't know, then, when suddenly toward
the latter part of 1941 they might have had a higher priority, but be-
fore that, they did not have as high a priority ?
Colonel Capron. I believe. General, all of that is a matter of record
on the status report, the ordnance status report for the Hawaiian De-
partment. I wouldn't venture a definite answer; but it was my im-
pression that they were getting things that we would love to have had.
14. General Grunert. That was your impression ?
Colonel Capron. Yes, sir.
15. General Grunert. But you have no evidence to that eifect ?
Colonel Capron. No, sir. It is a matter of record, after the 7th —
if I may finish that first question, sir — transportation [2018]
poured in there. We couldn't have had better service.
16. General Grunert. You mean, then, after the attack on Decem-
ber 7, things started pouring in?
Colonel Capron. Yes, sir.
17. General Grunert. They came at a more rapid rate than they did
prior to that time?
Colonel Capron. They poured in so fast, sir, we could hardly un-
load it.
18. General Grunert. Now, as to any deficiencies in ordnance ma-
terial that may have existed, did that in any way affect the taking of
appropriate defensive measures with what you had?
Colonel Capron. No, sir.
19. General Grunert. You told us that you were the Department
Ordnance Officer. As such, did you attend conferences of the De-
partment staff?
Colonel Capron. All of the conferences.
20. General Grunert. Do you recall attending a conference any
time about November 27 or thereafter, before the attack — any particu-
lar conference?
Colonel Capron. There were so many urgent conferences called
along in that period that I couldn't pin it down, sir.
21. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not General Short
ordered the alert which they call the "sabotage alert," about that time ?
Colonel Capron. We had had alerts, sir, beginning in April, one
after the other. They became more frequent and of longer duration,
with more confinement of troops to their arms, as December ap-
proached.
22. General Grunert. Do you recall whether you were at a
[WIO] conference wherein the Commanding General or the Chief
of Staff referred to a message then received from the Chief of Staff
concerning the Japanese-American situation, in which they were given
directives to do so and so, and cautioned not to do so and so ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1055
Colonel Capron. I remember somethino; about the American-Japa-
nese relations comino; up in an urgent conference that had been called.
The "radio" was read and discussed, but I am hazy on any indicated
action by the War Department.
23. General Grunert. What was your state of mind as to the im-
minence of a war with Japan toward the latter part of 1941?
Colonel Capron. I felt that it was reasonable to suppose that we
would have war; that if we had, it would not come as soon as it
actually did, and that if it should, we would have plenty of advance
notice.
24. General Grunert. From whom did you expect such notice ?
Colonel Capron. From the War Department, sir, who presumably
would get the idea from the State Department. We had always
counted on a period between the announcement of war and the actual
meeting of the enemy. In fact, we had programs which postponed
construction, to hold it for this — I have forgotten what we called the
period.
25. General Frank. Was it a "period of strained relations"?
Colonel Capron. Yes, sir; that was it, a "period of strained rela-
tions."
26. General Grunert. Did this message that was read to you at this
conference indicate to you, as you considered it, a period of strained
relations ?
Colonel Capron. Now, which conference, was that, sir?
[2020'] 27. General Grunert. That is the one you just mentioned.
Colonel Capron. The one in November ?
28. Geiieral Grunert. Approximately November 27. Did you have
other conferences in which messages were read or referred to ?
Colonel Capron. Yes, quite a number of them, sir.
29. General Grunert. Messages from the United States ?
Colonel Capron. Yes, sir.
30. General Grunert. From the Chief of Staff ?
Colonel Capron. In my remembrance ; yes, sir.
31. General Grunert. Does any one of these conferences stand out
in your mind as being of great importance, of more importance than
other conferences you had ?
Colonel Capron. We had one alert in November. The only way I
can fix it. General, is that it was so intense and so sustained that after
things eased up, I assembled my ordnance battalion and gave them a
talk, made a speech to them, in which I had obtained a verbal com-
mendation from General Short to them. If that is the principal one,
I presume it might have indicated strained relations,
32. General Grunert. I will ask the recorder to read to you the
Chief of Staff's message to the Commanding General, Hawaiian De-
partment, 27 November 1941, to see whether or not that will bring back
to your memory whether a particular conference was held on that
message.
Colonel West (reading) :
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes
with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back
and offer to continue. .Tapanesce future action impredictable but hostile
[2021] action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot,
be avoided, U. S. desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy
1056 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that
might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed
to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary,
but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the
civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Sliould hostilities
occur you will carry out the tasks assigned In Rainbow 5 as far as they pertain
to Japan. Limit discussion of this highly secret information to minimum essential
ofBcers.
33. General Grunert. Do you recall whether there was a conference
on that message ?
Colonel Capron. Yes, sir. May I ask what the date of that was?
34. Colonel West. November 27, 1941.
Colonel Capron. I remember the wording, sir, now — "Let Japan
commit the first overt act," and that we couldn't do anything that
would alarm the population on the island.
35. General Grunert. Those two things seem to stand out in your
mind. If they stand out in your mind, why do not these other things
stand out in your mind, such as :
This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of
action that might jeopardibze your defense.
Then, another thing is, in the message, the part which says :
You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you
deeim necessary.
Wliy do certain things stand out in your mind, there, as
compared to other things in that message? Were they emphasized, or
was it because they went on a sabotage alert, or what ? Have you any
recollection of why those two things that you mentioned stood out
more than any others?
Colonel Capron. No, I have not, sir.
36. General Grunert. If any other measures were adopted, how
in your opinion would they alarm the populace, or disclose the intent?
Have you thought on that ?
Colonel Capron. I don't quite understand. General, what you mean.
37. General Grunert. Now, you picked out two parts of the mes-
sage, "don't alarm the public," and the "overt act." Now, if other
measures had been taken, besides antisabotage measures, how in your
opinion would the public have become alarmed ? Have you thought of
it in that line ?
Colonel Capron. I had not ; no, sir.
38. General Grunert. Did anything in particular come up at this
conference as to discussion of the various parts of this message, or
were any reasons expressed why they went into an antisabotage alert
instead of an all-out alert?
Colonel Capron. I can't remember any particular conversation or
any words in connection with that particular message.
39. General Grunert. Now, you stated in your testimony something
to the effect that there was a period which you afterwards identified
as "a period of strained relations," in which certain construction
should go forward.
Colonel Capron. Yes, sir.
40. General Grunert. That intimates that up to that time
[2023] certain construction was not to be prosecuted. What sort
of construction was that? Do you recall what was delayed until
strained relations came into being?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1057
Colonel CArRON. There is a large number of those items, sir. I can't
remember one, any detail on it, but that is a matter of record, and I
am sure it is on file in the records of the Hawaiian Department.
41. General Grunert. There are a lot of things to be done, later,
when you declare M-Day, which is presumably declared when strained
relations reach such a point that war is practically imminent, but you
think there were some actual construction projects that would go for-
ward in that period ?
Colonel Capron". Absolutely, sir; and as I recall, they were engi-
neer's construction. They didn't have any funds to do this, that, or the
other. One of the things I cheated and I used Ordnance money to do,
a job which the engineers didn't have any funds on, rather than put
the thing off until we happened to have a fight.
42. General Grunert. Then it was your understanding that when
this period of strained relations came across, there would be funds
available and additional authorizations and some additional construc-
tion would take place ?
Colonel Capron. I always considered that as being — we all sort of
looked forward to that as "Christmas Day," when all of these things
that we had been after would suddenly come forth.
43. Generall Grunert. They started to come forth after the attack,
didn't they ?
Colonel Capron. Yes, sir ; they did.
44. General Grunert. That was along toward Christmas, wasn't it?
[2024.] Colonel Capron. Yes, sir. I did not mean to be face-
tious.
45. General Grunert. Now, there is one other item I would like to
get some facts or some opinions on. As Department Ordnance Officer,
among other things you were particularly interested in antiaircraft
and antiaircraft ammunition ?
Colonel Capron. Yes, sir.
46. General Grunert. Do you know whether antiaircraft was kept
in position, where its ammunition was, for varicms types of alert?
Colonel Capron. Not off-hand. We had three types of alert. I
think we w^ere in a No. 1 on the 7th. We went in, Saturday, I think.
I do know, before the morning of the attack, that the antiaircraft regi-
ments— there were three regular-service and one very good National
Guard regiment out in the field in position. We had the proper am-
munition at all of the fixed AA positions, right at the guns, and in
most cases it was out in the field with the n:iobile AA's.
47. General Grunert. Of course, it was your business to furnish
ammunition, but it was not yoiir business to put it at the guns, was it?
Colonel Capron. No, sir. However, it was up to me. General, to
have ordnance machinists, ordnance troopers out with these units to
look after them, the mechanisms of the weapons, and so on, and also
to look after the treatment of the ammunition ; and I had those ord-
nance soldiers who were out there at these places.
48. General Grunert. Do you know whether any of the antiair-
craft positions for defense against air attack were in and about the
populated parts of the City of Honolulu ?
Colonel Capron. Well, the only one I know of, sir, was [2025\
the fixed weapons up in Fort Euger. We had, I think, four guns up
there near a hospital. We had never proved or fired them for fear
1058 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of the noise. It miglit frighten people ; but those are the only weap-
ons that I remember of, off-hand as being right in Honolulu.
49. General Grunert. Do you know where the mobile antiaircraft
weapons were to be mobilized in the defense ?
Colonel Capron. No, sir. That was a variable situation. General.
50. General Grunert, Do you know whether or not the actual plac-
ing of what we call "live ammunition" near positions would have
alarmed the population ?
Colonel Capron. Well, I doubt it very much. I don't believe it
made any difference. We were always having maneuvers, sir. There
was ammunition being hauled all over the island. There were truck
trains, and so on. We were shipping it on the ONL Railway, and we
had a long series of maneuvers up, I think, around October, where the
Navy actually flew some planes over to assimulate an attack ; so there
was so much commotion, so much going on from the Army standpoint,
that I doubt if the mere placing of live ammunition, there couldn't
have been any particular reaction.
[2026] 51. General Grunert. Have you any questions. Gen-
eral Russell ?
52. General Russell. What was the state of supply of antiaircraft
ammunition on December 7, Colonel ?
Colonel Capron. I indicated, sir, as I remember, that it was in sat-
isfactory condition ; yes, sir.
53. General Russell. How many calibers did you have? How
many types of ammunition?
Colonel Capron. Three 37s and — I may be wrong on the 37s. I am
not sure of the 37s. We had 3-inch Cal."50, Cal. 30. We had no 40s,
of course, nor 20s nor anything of that sort.
54. General Russell. You had your full equipment of antiaircraft
weapons except those 90 millimeters ?
Colonel Capron. Yes, sir ; we didn't have any 90s. That was a very
new weapon then, sir.
55. General Russell. But everything else, you had a full comple-
ment of weapons ?
Colonel Capron. I am a little hazy on the 37s. We had some of
those, but I doubt if we had many.
56. General Russell. I guess that is all.
57. General Frank. How did you stand on bombs and ammunition*
Colonel Capron. The bombs were fine, as I remember. General, but
as to the aimnunition I am hazy.
58. General Frank. All right.
Colonel Capron. Cal. 50 later became a low point : we gave so much
to the Navy that we starved the Army.
59. General Grunert. Now, Colonel, we have had many witnesses
and we shall have many more, so the Board does not want simply to
pile up evidence just to have a fat record, but we would like to find
out whether there is anything that stands out in [20^7'] your
mind that might assist us, and for us to judge whether or not we
have already covered it.
Now, is there any one thing that stands out in your mind, or two
or three, that you ought to tell the Board about that might have
some bearing on this problem ?
Colonel Capron. I have two things, sir. I have a lasting impres-
sion that when I heard these Jap ships come over I thought, Well,
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1059
the gang arrived from the mainland a little ahead of time. They
had been ferr3dng in, and we were looking for some. The reason
I knew that : when I heard the shooting, our airplanes had been
coming over there, sir, and they had their armament unmounted.
It was boxed up somewhere in the shops, and we had sent — or it
hadn't come (3ver at all. I had wired, or we had all urged that here-
after when ships came over they have the guns not only along with
them but also mounted for doing business. Well, when we heard all
these airplanes and all the shooting, we thought, Well, at last it
percolated and they are arriving here as thej^ should have.
60. General Grunert. Did they arrive shooting?
Colonel Capron. It was the Japs, sir. That w^as the outstanding
impression which I had.
Another one was this ; it may be irrelevant here : Shortly after the
blitz a representative of the White House, a young civilian, came over
to the Islands to discuss presumably the subject of handling scrap
metal. We had a staff meeting in the headquarters office at Shafter.
Well, after this Aieeting was over and, oh, about two weeks later a
nast}^ report came down from the War Department saying that they
had gotten a report from this young civilian, sir, that the ordnance
[B02S] anticraft ammunition had been so foul during the blitz
that they had sprayed Honolulu and killed quite a few people.
I want to bring out the fact that on the afternoon of the 7th,
because there had been people killed in the city and something, pre-
sumably Japanese bombs, had gone through houses — they had func-
tioned ; they had hit out in the street ; they had killed people — I or-
ganized a bomb squad of three, of civilian ammunition technicians.
They went around and checked up every incident. We found what
these things were. They were not Japanese; they were not Army
ammunition. I would like to bring that out too
61. General Grunert. What were they?
Colonel Capron. I made a secret report on that, sir, to General
Short in writing on the 9th or the 10th of December, and am I at
liberty to say ?
62. General Grunert. This is all secret and you are at liberty to
state anything that you think may assist the Board in getting at the
facts, sir.
Colonel Capron. They were antiaircraft ammunition of another
service, sir, whose time fuses had failed to function in the air. This
particular type of ammunition had a base fuse with a tracer which
would function on impact, and it was those items which led to the
belief that the Japanese had bombed the city.
63. General Grunert. Then, if the Board should consider it de-
sirable or necessary to examine this report of yours, do you know where
it is now located ?
Colonel Capron. It should be, sir, in the safe of the Hawaiian De-
partment. In fact, I sent — which was wrong — I sent [2029] the
original up — it was a secret paper. The original went up to the for-
ward echelon. It was locked in the safe and retained in the files of
the Department Ordnance Office. Subsequently some question came
up on that thing, and the original had disappeared, and I made a
copy of my copy and sent it up to the then Chief of Staff, Colonel
64. General Grunert. Of what?
Colonel Capron. Sir?
79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 2 18
1060 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
65. General Grunert. Of what? Chief of Staff of what? The
Hawaiian Department?
Colonel Capron. Yes, sir. Colonel Phillips.
66. General Grunert. Then, the reason or one of the reasons that
you bring out now is to show
Colonel Capron. To show that our ammunition, sir, was good.
67. General Grunert. Your ammunition was good ?
Colonel Capron. Yes, sir.
68. General Grunert. And somebody else's ammunition was not
so good?
Colonel Capron. Yes, sir; the other fellow.
69. General Grunert. And this ammunition was thrown in the air
and didn't explode, and when it came down on the ground some of it
did explode and some didn't?
Colonel Capron. Yes, sir.
70. General Grunert, When you said that the ammunition per-
tained to another service, you meant other than the Army?
Colonel Capron. Yes, sir.
71. General Grunert. All right. Has anyone any other questions ?
[2030] Colonel West. No.
72. General Grunert. Then, that appears to be about all that you
can think of that you think might be of value to the Board ?
Colonel Capron. May I say one more thing, sir? I had heard
there was a rumor the Army-Navy relations before the blitz had been
not healthful. As far as the Ordnance was concerned, sir, I per-
sonally, and my Ordnance agency, had fine relations with the Navy.
We were almost hand in glove, and I have frequently gone over to
the Chief of Staff over there of the District and gotten anything I
wanted; and the Navy Ordnance and the Army Ordnance, who had
a lot in common, were fine.
73. General Grunert. All right. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. WARREN T. HANNUM, RETIRED; SAN
FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.
(The witness was sworn by the Kecorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board your
name, rank, organization, and station ?
General Hannum, Warren T. Hannum, Brigadier General, Re-
tired, I was retired February 1st. On February 4th by appoint-
ment of Governor Warren I was made Director of Natural Resources
of the State of California, and hold that office at the present time.
2. Colonel West. Where is your office, sir? _
General Hannum. My residence address is Apartment 21, 1201
Greenwich Street, San Francisco. Office address is [20S1]
Department of Natural Resources, State Office Building No. 1, Sacra-
mento.
8. (Teneral Grunert. Your retirement date was in 1944, was it, or
104?>?
General Hannum. It became effective February 1, 1944,
4. General Grunert. You mentioned the date but not the year.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1061
General Hanxu^m. Yes.
5. General Gkunert. In our attempts to get at facts and to accom-
plish the mission charged to the Board, the field is so broad that we
divided some of these phases up between the Board members, and
General Frank has this particular line of special investigation, so 1
shall ask him to lead in questioning you, and the other members of
the Board will piece out where they think they ought to get more
information.
General Hannum. Yes, sir.
('). General Gruxert. (xeneral Frank.
7. General Fraxk. Will you state, please, what position you held
in 1941?
General Haxxum. I was Division Engineer of the South Pacific
Division, under the Chief of Engineers, which included all river and
harbor, flood-control, and military construction work in the Pacific
Coast States of California, Nevada, Arizona, part of Utah, and also
the Hawaiian Islands. There was a district under my supervision
in Hawaii, Honolulu, a district in Sacramento, a district in San
Francisco, and one in Los Angeles.
8. General Fraxk. You held the same position in 1942?
General Haxxum. Yes, but in that year the South Pacific and
North Pacific and Mountain Divisions were abolished and [203^']
combined into one division known as the Pacific Division, which in-
cluded practically everything west of the Rocky Mountains except
Hawaii, which had by that time been transferred to the control of
the Conmianding General of the HaAvaiian Department.
9. General Fraxk. Was Colonel Wyman in charge of one of your
districts ?
General Haxxum. He was the District Engineer in Honolulu,
Hawaiian Islands.
10. General Fraxk. Had you been Division Engineer when he was
previously in Los Angeles?
General Hax^xum. Yes.
11. Major Clausex. Sir, are you familiar with the negotiations for
the contract which was W-41-t-Eng-()02, dated 20 De'cember 1940,
with the Hawaiian Constructors, for defense projects in Hawaii?
General Haxxum. Yes. I do not know the contract by the number.
I know it by the name, under Hawaiian Constructors.
12. Major Clausex. You initiated the contract, didn't you, sir, by
a letter to Colonel Wyman when he was stationed in Hawaii ?
General Haxxum. No. As District Engineer he was responsible
for the initiation.
13. Major Clausex. Well, did you write him, sir, this letter, a copy
of which is attached to the I. G.'file, report by Colonel Hunt, letter
dated November 6, 1940, which I show you ?
General Haxxuji. That is not my signature, but it is probable that
I signed it, yes, sir.
[2033'] 14. Major Clausex. But do you recall having sent a sim-
ilar letter to him, if you cannot say that that is it?
General ILvxxum. That is in conformity with my recollection of
the circumstances, yes.
15. Major Clausex. Yes. I would like to introduce this letter in
evidence and read it into evidence, so that the Board may understand
it. We then do not have to make photostats.
1062 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
This is a letter dated November 6, 1940, on the letterhead of the
Office of the Division Engineer, 351 California Street, San Fran-
cisco, California. It is to :
(Letter of November 6, 1940, Colonel Hannum to Lt. Col. Wyman,
is as follows:)
Lt. Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr., C. E.,
U. S. Engineer Office,
Honolulu, T. H.
Dbiae Wyman : I inclose herewith a letter received from Colonel Gesler, Office,
Chief of Engineers, in reference to negotiated contracts on the basis of fixed
price and also cost-plus-fixed-fee. The form for cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts is
inclosed.
If you negotiate on the basis of a fixed price, it appears, since you will not
have the plans and specifications ready until December 20, that you could not
negotiate before that time. After arriving at an agreement, it would take some
time to execute it and then an additional month or two before equipment could
be placed in Honolulu on the job. On the other hand, if you use a cost-plus-
fixed-fee form, negotiations [203Jf] could be conducted without waiting
for the detailed plans. Since the contractors interested are mainly on the main-
land, it seems to me it would be well for you to come to the mainland to conduct
the negotiations with specified parties on specified dates. We will sit in with
you on these negotiations.
Since the Navy contractors over there are on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis, it
occurred to me that a contractor working for you on a fixed price basis would
be at a disadvantage since the Navy work is much larger in amount than you
would have.
However, I prefer that you examine various methods in the light of existing
conditions in Hawaii and come to your own conclusions as to methods and
procedure.
Sincerely yours.
Warren T. Hannum,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Division Engineer.
Now, following that letter, sir, did Colonel Wyman come to the
mainland and confer with you?
General Hannum. Yes; he came to the mainland and conferred
with me.
1. Major Clausen. And would you state fully the particulars con-
cerning what then happened, sir?
General Hannum. He went to Los Angeles to confer with possible
contractors at Los Angeles. Later I advised him, in view of the fact
that neither I nor my office had had any [20J5] experience in
cost-plus-fixed-fee work, and the contract would have to be approved
in Washington, I advised him to proceed to Washington, to the Chief
of Engineers Office, and conduct the negotiations there in order to
expedite the completion of the contract and get the work started.
2. Major Clausen. Well, now, between the dates that Colonel
Wyman arrived and you had this preliminary talk with him, and
your instructions that he proceed to Washington, you are aware, are
you, that he went to Los Angeles and there discussed this contract
with Hans Wilhelm Rohl ?
General Hannum. I do not know that he conducted it with Hans
Wilhelm Rohl. I understood, or my impression is, that he conducted
it with Callahan Construction Company, Mr. Paul Grafe, and my un-
derstanding is that Mr. Paul Grafe went to Washington and was in
consultation in Washington.
3. Major Clausen. Well, do I understand from what you say, sir,
that when Colonel Wyman reported to you as to his trip to Los An-
geles he did not tell you that he had seen Hans Wilh6lm Rohl?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1063
General Hannum. I do not recall that he had said anything to that
effect.
4. Major Clausen. But you do recall that he did say he had seen
Paul Graf e?
General Hannum. Yes. I am sure about that because later on Paul
Grafe went with me to Honolulu in May of '41 to look over the work
over there, and all my contacts regarding that contract were with
Paul Grafe of the Callahan Construction Company.
5. Major Clausen. Do you recall if Colonel Wyman had [2036]
discussed this contract with anyone beside Paul Grafe as a possible
contractor between the
General Hannum. I think he did. I think that Mr. Guy Atkinson
of the Guy Atkinson Construction Company was in contact with him
in Los Angeles, as I recall.
6. Major Clausen. And so far as your memory now serves you, you
do not know whether he discussed it with Hans Wilhelm Rohl ?
General Hannum. No, I don't know.
7. Major Clausen. Well, did you know at that time, sir, Hans Wil-
helm Eohl?
General Hannum. I had heard of him. I did not know him.
8. Major Clausen. Did you know at that time that he was an alien,
a German alien?
General Hannum. No; that didn't come up until later.
9. Major Clausen. Specifically, General Hannum, whose responsi-
bility in the Corps of Engineers would it be to see that the Govern-
ment did not make a contract of a secret nature such as this with a
German alien?
General Hannum. I don't know that — Rohl had made — contracts
had been made by the Engineer Department with Rohl several years
before that in the construction of the breakwater in Los Angeles
harbor.
10. Major Clausen. Mr. Reporter, would you read the question
please ?
General Hannum. And
11. Major CIjAusen. Pardon me. I thought you had finished.
General Hannum. I am bringing out the point that no one knew ;
it wasn't known that he was not a citizen. He had been in this coun-
try for quite a number of years, he was a reputable contractor in Los
Angeles, and if there was any idea that he was an alien, and I don't
know; if he was an alien at that time, the rules and regulations and
laws forbade the employment of aliens.
[2037] 12. Major Clausen. Well, my question was this : Who in
the Corps of Engineers had the responsibility to ascertain ?
General Hannum. Initially the District Engineer. Above that, the
Division Engineer and the Chief of Engineers office.
13. Major Clausen. So in this case the responsibility primarily or
initially would rest upon Colonel Wyman; is that correct, sir^
General Hannum. That would be my correct interpretation of the
rules, yes.
14. Major Clausen. Now, as I understand it. Colonel Wyman came
to the mainland and he conferred with you in San Francisco here?
General Hannum. Yes.
1064 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
15. Major Clausen. And then you gave him certain instructions, he
went to Los Angeles, and. then did he come back here and report to
you?
General Hannum. I don't recall whether he came back to San Fran-
cisco and went from San Francisco or whether he went to Los An-
geles— or went to Washington diiect from Los Angeles. I can't recall
that.
16. Major Clausen. In any event, he then went to Washington?
General Hannum. Yes.
17. Major Clausen. And were any further conferences had with
you, sir, concerning this contract before Colonel Wyman returned to
Hawaii ?
General Hannum. No. No, because that contract was left in Wash-
ington for final execution in Washington, and it was some months
later before it was finally executed, as I recall.
18. Major Clausen. Sir, I show you a letter dated 14 February
[W3S~\ 1942, from Colonel A. K. B. Lyman, Department Engi-
neer in Hawaii, to INIajor General Reybold, and I am going to intro-
duce this in evidence and I would like to read it. Perhaps I should
read it, sir, and then the witness will hear what I am going to say.
It is certified as a true copy by Colonel Brown of the Corps of Engi-
neers.
19. Major Clausen. This letter is dated 14 February 1942, on the
letterhead of the Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Office of the
Department Engineer, Fort Shafter, T. H., too:
(Letter of February 14, 1942, Colonel Lyman to Major General
Reybold, is as follows :)
Major General Eugene Reybold,
Chief of Engineers, Washington, D. G.
Dear General Reybold: We have had an unfortunate and unpleasant situa-
tion develop here in the Hawaiian Department. The District Engineer has
executed some of his work in a most efficient manner, however, due to an un-
fortunate personality he has antagonized a great many of the local people as
well as some of the new employees and officers who have recently been assigned
to his office. Since this atmosphere of antagonism exists whenever any condition
arises such as slowness in making payments to dealers or to employees, even if
this condition is beyond the control of the District Engineer, the people wrath-
fully rise up in arms against him.
Prior to December 7 I did not have very many official dealings with the District
Engineer and I know little about the efficiency of his administrative and
[2039] engineering organization, but since December 7, when it was believed
that it would be more economical and in the interest of efficiency to continue
using his office as the procurement and dispersing agency for the Department
Engineer's office, I have had many dealings with him. Some of the work which
they were called upon to perform for me has been carried on in a highly satis-
factory manner but there are many other items of work, which for some reason
or other there was a slowness in getting results. This, I am told by various
Post and Station Commanders, obtains generally and as a result many of their
assistants carry resentment towards the office of the District Engineer. I shall
have to state that there was rather a very abrupt change made when the ZCQM
was taken over by the District office and some of the difficulties were undoubtedly
created by lack of a suitable transition period.
Even though this area has been ofHcially declared a Theatre of Operations, the
District continues to function independently or under the Division Engineer on
certain work over which I have no control, and as a result there is a lack of
cohesion in our operations, and the whole engineer program is suffering with a
consequent loss of prestige by the Engineers in both civilian and military circles.
However, this could be overcome by certain cori-ective measures in the District
Engineer's organization and methods, and many of these are now being under-
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1065
taken. It is extremely questionable whether a change in sentiment or method
of operation by [2040] the District Engineer at this time could better the
situation in the future due to the intense antagonism that now exists among
civilians and worse among military i)ersonnel towards the District Engineer. It
may be that the present District p]ngineer has outlived his usefulness in this
Departnient.
The Department Commander discussed this situation with me two days ago and
suggested that I warn you that he may conclude that a change is necessary. I
know that General Emmons thinks very highly of the present District Engineer
in some of the work that he has performed ; however, the General feels that pos-
sibly an insurmountable condition has developed which is a handicap to eflScient
operation and he may decide to recommend a change. Before doing this, how-
ever, he has directed me to confer with the District Engineer and suggest changes
in both his organization and his method of operation in an attempt to improve
the existing unsatisfactory service.
Very truly yours,
A. K. B. Lyman,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Department Engineer.
Sir, do you recall having seen that or a copy of it?
General Hannum. No, I don't recall having seen that letter at all.
This is the first I have heard of it.
[2041] But it confirms in a way what Colonel Lyman told me
when I went out there in May 1942. 'l went out there in 1942 on the
request of the Department Commander. That was after Colonel
Lyman had taken over as Department Engineer, taking over the work
of district engineer, and the district was abolished, and was no longer
under the division engineer.
20. Major Clausen. Sir, with respect to this portion of the letter
where it says —
There were many other items of work, on which, for some reason or other,
there was a slowness in getting results.
What did Colonel Lyman tell you about that?
General Hannum. He didn't tell me anything about that, specifi-
cally. What he mentioned was that he said to me when I was over
there that Wyman's administration had not been efficient or effective.
21. Major Clausen. And this was May that you were there, or
October, 1942, did you say?
General Hannum. I know it was in May that I went over there.
No, I guess it was probably in October. I was over there in October
1941 ; it may have been that Lyman mentioned something to me about
that time. There were differences between Wyman and Lyman at
that time when I was over there in October 1941.
22. Major Clausen. This trip that you made in October 1941 was
a sort of inspection trip, was it not, sir?
General Hannum. It was. I made one in May 1941 — I think it was
May 1941 — and also in October 1941.
23. Major Clausen. AVhen you were informed by Ol)lonel Lyman
of this mess that existed with respect to j^our district engineer, what
did you do about it?
General Hannum. I made inspections with Colonel Wyman,
[2042] and also sent over later administrative assistants to assist
him in getting his office reorganized.
24. Major Clausen. When were they sent over, sir? It was after
Pearl Harbor, wasn't it ?
1066 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Hannum. I think it probably was ; yes, sir, I do not want
to say that I agreed with everything that Colonel Lyman said in that
letter. I would like to have that understood, because that's his opinion.
While Colonel Wyman had a personality which was irritating when he
was under pressure in conferences with others, because he was abrupt
at times, he was a very efficient engineer officer and a driver, and got
things accomplished.
25. Major Clausex. I am going to ask you if you ever received
this letter, or a copy of it. It is dated 27 February 1942, from Colonel
Lyman to General Reybold, and I will read it :
Dear General Reybold: I wrote you on 14 February 1942 in regard to the
unsatisfactory situation in the District Engineer office here. Since that time
I have personally investigated conditions and find that they are unsatisfactory,
particularly in the administrative branches. The administration of his office
and his handling of the air field construction program are not altogether pleasing
to the Department Commander and the general unpleasant feeling toward him
makes it desirable to effect his replacement.
With ani organization as large as the present one of the District Engineer,
decentralization of authority is essential. Colonel Wyman appears unwilling to
grant authority to subordinates and attempts to carry too much [204-3] of
the load himself. As a result some phases of the work suffer from lack of
sufficient attention. In addition three of the officers whom he lias selected for
important line island projects have had unfavorable reports submitted against
them evidencing lack of judgment on the part of the District Engineer in the
selection of key personnel.
When I wrote before, the Department Commander had not definitely decided
that a change in District En,^ineers was necessary. He realizes that Colonel
Wyman has done an excellent job in many respects and does not want to take
official action that would tarnish the record of the officer. General Emmons feels
that perhaps Colonel Wyman has lieen in this semitropical climate too long or
that the pace at which the District Engineer has been driving himself lias
clouded his judgment. On several occasions Colonel Wyman has received im-
portant verbal instructions and failed to carry them out, either through forget-
fulness or failure to understand. A reconsideration of the entire situation by
the Department Commander has resulted in asking me to informally request
the replacement of Colonel Wyman as District Engineer.
I sincerely hope that you w^ill see fit to ease Colonel Wyman out of the Ha-
waiian Department in such a manner as to reflect no discredit on him and re-
place him with someone who can visualize the high degree of cooperation which
is necessary between the various commanders, civilians, and the District Engi-
neer's office in order that the Engineer Service may function to the fullest extent.
I, personally, do not believe there is any solution to the [2044] problem
short of the relief of the present District Engineer.
In the event that you see fit to make a change I strongly recommend that two
experienced administrative assistants, thoroughly familiar with Departmental
procedure, be either transferred here or sent on temporary duty to reorganize
the administrative branch of the District office to permit it to carry the tre-
mendous mass of detail expeditiously and effectively. The present administra-
tive heads have not had sufficient experience to manage the large organization
that is now required to perform the administrative detail. Errors in the prep-
aration of pay rolls and vouchers and delay in making payments have resulted
in some hardsli^ and unpleasant feeling among local labor, contractors, except
possibly the one large company handling tlie bulk of his work, and supply firms.
Sincerely,
(s) A. K. B. Lyman,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Department Engineer.
You recall having seen a copy of that, sir ?
General Hannum. No, sir ; I have never seen it.
26. Major Clausen. Do you recall having been informed of that
letter ?
General Hannum. No.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1067
27. Major Clausen. Do you recall having discussed some of the
things mentioned in this letter, with Colonel Lyman?
General Hannum. May I see it?
28. Major Clausen. Yes, sir.
[2045] General Hannum. Kegarding the statement —
that tlie pace. at which the District Engineer has been driving himself has
clouded his judgment.
I do not know that he had clouded his judgment, but I know that he
was driving himself very hard, even before Pearl Harbor.
29. Major Clausen. In Los Angeles ?
General Hannum. And particularly so, after Pearl Harbor, No,
he was district engineer in Honolulu at the time of Pearl Harbor.
30. Major Clausen. I say, sir, was he driving himself hard in
Los Angeles, when he was assigned there ?
General Hannum. He was district engineer. Yes. He was in
charge of the Los Angeles District at a time when they had a great
deal of flood-control work in Los Angeles, and at one time he had over
20,000 men under his employ, and a great many of them, WPA men.
He had them organized and doing the work by force account, and he
did a very splendid job.
31. Major Clausen. Wasn't that Captain, then, now Colonel Flem-
ing, that had that, with General Connolly ?
(jeneral Hannum. No, that was WPA work.
32. Major Clausen. In any event, sir, do you care to comment upon
the statement in there that Colonel Wyman would not carry out in-
structions?
General Hannum. I had not heard of that. I received no infor-
mation at any time that he was not carrying out instructions, unless
it be instructions which Coloney Lyman had given to him as Depart-
ment Engineer.
33. Major Clausen. Sir, do you know Colonel Row, who was De-
partment IG in the Hawaiian Department?
[20Ii.6'\ General Hannum. No, I do not recall him.
34. Major Clausen. Do you recall that he made a derogatory re-
port concerning Colonel Wyman ?
General Hannum. No. no; I do not know that, I don't recall that,
now, if he did,
35. Major Clausen, That is, he made several, but one in particular
was dated the same date as the first letter from Colonel Lyman to
General Reybold, February 14, 1942, which indicated that certain un-
satisfactory conditions existed, and among these there were seven
specific conditions that were unsatisfactory, which existed, and among
them was :
(e) That the district engineer's ofl5ce as a whole has not been organized in
such a manner as to operate with efficiency.
General Hannum. The first time I have heard of that accusation!
The first time I have heard of such report by the Inspector General of
the Hawaiian Department. It did not come, as I recall, to my office.
36. Major Clausen. I am referring to a report of the FBI investi-
gation, and I am reading from that. On page 58, here, it states :
It was discovered during the course of inspections of District Engineer activi-
ties prior to 7 December that his administrative set-up was improperly coordi-
nated and was so mentioned in these reports of inspection. The District Engi-
1068 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
neer in bis replies has stated that steps had been initiated to correct the irregu-
larities and deficiencies reported. It is now evident that many of these irregu-
larities and deficiencies still existed on [20^7] 7 December 1941, and have
been aggravated by tlie increased volume of his activities incident to the outbreak
of war and the taking over of the functions of the Zone Construction Quarter-
master on 16 December 1941.
Colonel Wyman's methods of administration have been such as to antagonize
many persons, military and civil, both within and without his organizations. His
actions have also been ridiculed and criticized in the community. I believe that
this condition is to the great detriment of the Army as a whole and the Engineer
Corps in particular.
Did you ever discuss those allegations with any member of the IG in
Hawaii ?
General Hannum. No.
37. Major Clausen. When you made your inspections, prior to
7 December 1941, did you discuss the District Engineer's functions
and office with any member of the IG in Hawaii ?
General Hannum. No.
38. Major Clausen. Do you recall, sir, an investigation by another
IG, Colonel Hunt?
General Hannum. Yes, because Colonel Hunt stopped by my office
to consult with me on his return from that inspection. That was in
1943, 1 believe it was.
39. Major Clausen. As a matter of fact, you testified at that time
before Colonel Hunt?
General Hannum. Yes, sir.
40. Major Clausen. You had been informed by Colonel Lyman of
these conditions. I believe you recommended Colonel Wyman for the
DSM, is that correct?
[£048] General Hannum. I recommended Colonel Wyman for
a DSM, yes.
41. Major Clausen. Was that your own idea, sir?
General Hannum. It wasn't only by own idea. I discussed it with
others. In fact, I discussed it with General Emmons when I was out
there in May 1942, and General Emmons admitted that he had done a
magnificent jobj but the said that no one, up to that time, had been
recommended, or had been given a DSM, except General Somervell,
and he didn't want to, he didn't feel that it would be a propitious time
to submit a recommendation for a DSM ; and I think Wyman deserved
a DSM at that time for what he had done; and I can say something
about that, if you would like to know.
42. Major Clausen. Yes, sir.
General Hannum. In October 1941, 1 was in Hawaii on one of my
inspection trips out there. Wyman and I had gone out to all the
other islands on a trip, and when we arrived back, on Sunday morning,
we received word that General Short desired to see us that afternoon,
Sunday afternoon ; and when we reported to General Short, we were
informed that he had received a very secret order from Washington
to construct an air ferry route from Honolulu to the Philippines
by way of Australia, and that all the facilities of the district and
division engineer were placed at his disposal. We discussed the
matter with General Short that afternoon, the possible locations for
the air fields en route to Australia, and the next day I believe it was,
there was a conference which I attended with General Short, and
Wyman was present at the same time, and the Commandant of Pearl
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1069
Harbor, at which arrangements were made for assistance by the
[204:9] Navy, particularly with the reconnaissance planes, to start
parties out. Within 48 hours thereafter, as I recall. Colonel Wyman
had reconnaissance parties out, starting out to various places, such as
Canton and Christmas, those two islands particularly, and plans were
being made for him to start the work at once, using, as I recall, the
Hawaiian Constructors' forces.
I remained with him about two days and came back to San Francisco
by plane, commercial liner, and after getting things started in San
Francisco, a place to procure supplies, and get them over to him, and
other things which he needed, I went to Washington; and while in
Washington I reported to General Arnold, to describe to him what
we were doing, and General Arnold was much interested in it because
he had apparently initiated the order to construct the air ferry route.
He asked me. He stated that, naturally, to get to the Philippines
by way of Guam and Wake, he would pass through these Japanese
possessions, and would have difficulty conducting any air ferry route
along that line, and therefore he waiited one by way of Australia, to
avoid the Japanese possessions. He asked me when we would have
it completed, and I said it would not be completed for some months,
but that we would have it available for use with one strip available at
each of the four places in three months — by the 15th of January,
1942— and he said to me, "Well, you don't think they can do that, do
you T I said, "Do you know Wyman ?" He said he knew him fairly
well. "Well," I said, "he hasn't failed me yet, when he was given a
mission like that to do." It was completed, ready for use, on Decem-
ber 28, nearly three weeks ahead of time. And [2050] when
it was reported to Colonel Fleming, he told me that in a conference
with Admiral Nimitz, after Pearl Harbor, at Pearl Harbor, he was
present at a conference at which this air ferry route came up, and
when Admiral Nimitz learned that it had been constructed, or had
been ready for use in less than three months, he said it was one of the
miracles of the war.
43. Major Clausen. By the way, sir, was one of the reasons why
you recommended a cost-plus contract, such as was afterwards signed,
the secret nature of the work?
General Hannum. No, no; it was mainly after discussing it. I
was opposed to cost-plus contracts. In the South Pacific Division I
didn't make any, I didn't allow any cost-plus contracts to be made,
and at the time this came up over there, I didn't want to make theni ;
but after discussing it with Wyman and knowing the situation with
regard to the Navy, how the Navy were making nothing but cost-plus
contracts over there, I couldn't see any method of accomplishing the
work other than by a cost-plus contract.
Since we didn't make any cost-plus contracts in the South Pacific
Division, and even at the time that this problem came up, the features
of the cost-plus contract were not familiarly known outside of Wash-
ington, and they were not particularly well known even in Washington
at that time, in the Army.
44. Major Clausex. You recall having written a letter dated 5 June
1944, to the Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs?
General Hannuih. Yes, I did.
45. Major Clausen. Do you have a copy of that, sir?
1070 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Hannum. I think I retained a copy ; yes.
[2051'] 46. Major Clausen. Would you make that available to
the Board, please, or a copy of your copy ?
General Hannum. I would be very glad to, if I can find it. Have you
a copy, there ?
47. Major Clausen. No, sir ; that is the reason I am asking you for
the copy, sir. I have not seen the original, and my notes state that you
informed the Chairman that you authorized Colonel Wyman to nego-
tiate the basic contract as a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, because of the
urgency of initiating the work, the secret nature of the work, and the
indefiniteness. Does that refresh your memory as to whether one of
the reasons was the secret nature of the work ?
General Hannum. Well, there were some features of the work that
were secret, yes.
48. Major Clausen. Why, General, Avould a cost-plus contract be
more desirable from the secret nature aspects of the work?
General Hannum. If j^ou made a fixed contract, you would have to
write out your plans and specifications, and, normally, advertise; if
3'ou didn't advertise, you would have to call in a number of contractors
and negotiate with them, showing them the plans and specifications.
49. Major Clausen. And was that discussed, then, with Colonel
Wyman, when he had to come over to the mainland from Hawaii?
General Hannum. Well, he knew in a general way what he was nego-
tiating for, the work at that time, but he also realized, we all realized
that the amount of work would undoubtedly be increased over what was
contemplated initially, and it was increased. There was CAA work
involved I think at Canton Island — yes.
[£0S£] 50, Major Clausen. I refer specifically, General, to one
of the reasons assigned, the "secret nature of the work," as to whether
the secret nature of the work and the desirability therefore of having
a cost-plus contract for that reason in part, were discussed with Colonel
Wyman ?
General Hannum. It was possible to keep any nature of work secret.
It was more possible to keep it secret under a cost-plus-fixed- fee con-
tract than it would be under a firm contract, due to procedure.
51. Major Clausen. Did you discuss that with Colonel Wyman, is
my question.
General Hannum. No, I don't know that I did discuss that with
Colonel Wyman. Colonel Wyman, of course, knew what he had to do ;
he knew that certain features were secret, and particularly as I recall,
the AWS work was involved at that time, the aircraft warning service
work.
52. Major Clausen. By the way, had you met Hans Wilhelm Rohl
on any occasion up to December 1940?
General Hannum. No; I did not meet him until just before he went
over to Hawaii.
53. Major Clausen. Did you ever receive any information. General
Hannum, as to the relations which existed in Los Angeles between your
district engineer, there, Colonel Wyman, and Hans Wilhelm Rohl,
which were apart from business?
General Hannum. No. I have heard some rumors. I heard some
rumors.
54. Major Clausen. What were they, sir ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1071
General Hannum. What was published in the newspapers — that
he had some drinks with Rohl. Rohl, I think, was a heavy [2053]
drinker, Wyman was not a heavy drinker, and he took a social drink
with many people, on occasion. I never knew Wyman, if you are
leading up to that point of Wyman's sobriety, I would say that I have
never known Wyman in mv experience to be drunk.
55. Major Clausen. With regard to the other relations that are
alleged to have existed between Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl during
the Los Angeles tour of duty by Colonel 'Wyman, such as accepting
expensive entertainment from Rohl, and then giving Rohl's company
important contracts. Did you ever hear of that during the time that
Wyman was stationed at Los Angeles ?
General Hannum. No, no ; I don't think Rohl ever had a contract
under Wyman, after — ^Wyman was district engineer at Los Angeles
when I came out here as division engineer, and it was a contract for
the breakwater which Rohl had, which had been made before I ar-
rived, and I think the contract was completed before I arrived out
here.
56. Major Clausen. When did you arrive out here. General?
General Hannum. In January 1938.
[£054] 57. Major Clausen. In any event, I understand, then,
that you know nothing of these alleged conditions that existed at
Los Angeles?
General Hannum. I have no first-hand information of any dis-
creditable or dishonorable action of Wyman with Mr. Rohl.
58. Major Clausen. And when was it. General, that you heard
these rumors that you stated you heard concerning the drinking ?
General Hannum. It was only after it came out in the newspapers,
the relation between Rohl and Wyman, when it was publicized.
59. Major Clausen. Did you ever hear of this party, Werner Plack?
General Hannum. Beg pardon?
60. Major Clausen. AVerner Plack, P-1-a-c-k.
General Hannum. No.
61. Major Clausen. Have you read this House Committee on Mili-
tary Affairs report (indicating) ?
General Hannum. No.
62. Major Clausen. Are you acquainted with the fact that shortly
after this December 20, 1940, contract was executed it developed that
the contract had been made with the Rohl-Connolly Company, of
which Mr. Hans Wilhelm Rohl was a German alien?
General Hannum. The contract was made with The Hawaiian Con-
structors, and The Hawaiian Constructors was a partnership as —
well, of course the records will show" what it was. As I recall, it was
the Callahan Construction Company represented by Mr. Paul Grafe,
Rohl, and Shirley, are the names, as I recall. The contract was dated
December 20, 1940. It was later than that before Rohl took out his
final papers, citizenship papers.
[£055] 63. Major Clausen. Well, my question is this: When
did you know that Rohl would have to take out his papers?
Gerieral Hannum. Not until Wyman requested — we got a telegram
I think in the Division office from Wyman to the Chief of Engineers,
asking that the matter of Rohl's citizenship papers be expedited.
1072 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
64. Major Clausen. And with reference to December 20, 1940, the
date of the contract, when did you receive that wire?
General Han num. That was Later, some months later, several
months ; in the next year, I would say, 1942, because it was 1942 when
I was over there in May of 1942. Mr. Paul Grafe went over by plane
with me. We went together with Wyman to look over the work on
Oahu that was under construction, and that evening Wyman told Mr.
Paul Grafe very forcibly that he would have to remain in Hawaii to
supervise that work; that his superintendent of construction wasn't
accomplishing what should be accomplished, and he insisted that Mr.
Grafe or some member of the firm remain in Hawaii to supervise the
work; that his superintendent of construction was not satisfactory.
65. Major Clausen. When was it that Colonel Wyman sent the wire
requesting that Rohl's application be expedited?
General Hannum. It was after that date, I think, because it was
after that that Mr. Paul Grafe probably suggested Rohl's coming over
because Paul Grafe didn't want to remain over there.
66. Major Clausen. Now, sir, you mentioned that that occurred
in 1942. Aren't you mistaken as to the time when that occurred?
General Hannum. Yes, I am mistaken. I should have said May '41.
67. Major Clausen. Well, now, do you recall. General, that
[£0S6] prior to that, in specifically January of 1941, Colonel
Wyman wrote to Mr. Kohl to come to Hawaii ?
General Hannum. January '41 ?
68. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. I will show 3'ou a copy of the letter.
General Hannum. I don't know about that. When did Rohl go?
69. Major Clausen. He went later.
I show you a letter, sir, which is an exhibit in this I. G. report of
Colonel Hunt, dated January 22, 1941, which reads as follows; this is
to Mr. Rohl from Colonel Wyman :
(Letter of January 22, 1941, Colonel Wyman to Mr. Rohl is as
follows:)
Mr. H. W. Rohl, Rohl-Connoixy Company,
4351 Alhambra Avenue, Los Angeles, California.
Dear Sir : Reference is made to Secret Contract No. W-414-eng-602 with The
Hawaiian Constructors for work in the Hawaiian Islands.
As you are actively interested in this venture, I desire you to proceed to Honolulu
at your earliest convenience to consult with the District Engineer relative to ways
and means to accomplish the purpose of the contract. You will be allowed trans-
portation either by clipper or steamboat, both ways, and travel allowance not to
exceed $6.00 per day while enroute in accordance with existing laws and
regulations.
You will make application to either the District [2051] Engineer at
Los Angeles or the Division Engineer, South Pacific Division, San Francisco,
for transportation.
Do you recall having a copy of that about that time ?
General Hannum. No. Now, I don't know whether that is on file
in the Division office, or not. I don't believe it is.
(There was a brief, informal recess.)
70. Major Clausen. I was asking you. General, concerning the
letter that Colonel Wyman sent to Mr. Rohl in January, 1941. I
believe you testified that you did not recall having seen a copy of that.
General Hannum. No; that my present recollection is that this is
the first time I have seen that or known about it.
71. Major Clausen. I see. All right.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1073
With regard to the request from Colonel Wyman for expediting
the application for citizenship, do you know whether the wire was
supplemented by letters or phon"^ calls from Colonel Wyman directed
to that same point ?
General Hannum. I don't recall at the present time whether there
are any wires or not. That would be a matter of record, I think, in
the Division Engineer's office.
72. Major Clausen. Did yon take any action in that respect?
General Hannum. No.
73. Major Clausen. Do you recall, sir, having seen a letter from
General Kingman to Mr. Schofield at the Bureau of Immigration
and Naturalization, dated August 28th, 1941, a copy of which is set
forth on page 5 of this House Committee Eeport [indicating] ?
General Hankum. I don't recall having seen that letter, but I do
recall now that General Kingman did — I did hear that he [2058]
had taken steps to assist in expediting the matter.
74. Major Clausen. When did you first hear that. General?
General Hannum. It was during the time that, I would say, just
before Rohl — it must have been probably early in '42, just before —
or '41, just before Rohl went over there.
75. Major Clausen. When was the first time that you learned that
Rohl was a German alien ?
General Hannum. Not until the whole matter came up, as is in-
dicated in those papers which you have presented.
76. General Frank. Which was about when?
General Hannum. I would say in the spring of '41. I don't know
that it came up before that. I could tell better if I could fix definitely
when Rohl went to Honolulu.
77. Major Clausen. We are informed that he went there around
about September 15th of 1941.
General Hannum. Yes. Well, it was in the spring or summer, in
'41, spring or summer, then, before — and I didn't know that he was
an alien until the question came up of his going to Honolulu and we
finding out that he had not taken out citizenship papers, final citizen-
ship papers, although he had been in this country for quite a number
of years and had been in the contracting business for quite a number
of years.
78. Major Clausen. Now, with regard to the delays in the construc-
tion program, some of these delays mentioned by Colonel Lyman,
what knowledge did you have, sir, that the contracts and job orders
were not being completed on time with respect to the air raid warn-
ing system?
General Hannum. The air raid warning system was delayed not
only in Havraii but in this country due to the lack of receipt [2059]
of instructions from Washington.
79. Major Clausen. Instructions as to what, sir?
General Hannum. As to just where they were to be placed and
the type of installation. We received word about aircraft warning
service, I guess it was in '40. We got instructions suspending action
later, and it was nearly a year from the time we received the first
word about it before we got final word to go ahead ancl we got final
definite instructions. All that, I think, can be verified, if you wish,
by getting copies of records from the Division office,
1074 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
80. Major Clausen. You mean in Hawaii?
General Hannum. No. Tlie Division office in San Francisco.
81. Major Clausen. Have you seen those records yourself?
General Hannum. Well, the instructions came through the office
at various times about the aircraft warning service, and they all were
filed in the office there, in the Division office undoubtedly as well as
in the District office.
82. Major Clausen. Well, they would be forwarded to Honolulu.
83. General Frank. Do you remember what office in Washington
was responsible for the delay ?
General Hannum. I don't know. I think perhaps the delay was
justified because at that time they didn't know just what form the
installation should take nor the locations where they should be
placed. For example, they thought initially that a station high up
would be the best place for a station, that was unobstructed, and later
they found that a plane running, skimming alon^ low, would not be
contacted. So in many places where we put stations, where stations
were i^lanned high up, they were either moved down or alternate
stations placed lower down.
[meO] 84. General Frank. Well, was it the Signal Corps that
was
General Hannum. The Signal Corps were responsible for the de-
sign and the installation, and the Engineers were the construction
agency. The Engineers were not responsible for the initiation of it.
85. General Frank. The Signal Corps were responsible for the
design and for the selection of the sites?
General Hannum. Yes. We did not select the sites.
80. General Frank. All right.
87. Major Clausen. Now, isn't it correct, though. General, that as
early as 1939 studies had been made by a board of officers of which
then Captain Fleming was a member, and sites determined for fixed
A. W. S. stations?
General Hannum. That is probably true.
88. Major Clausen. And isn't it also true •
General Hannum. I don't know. I say it is probably true. I
don't recall.
89. Major Clausen. Yes.
90. General Frank. In Honolulu, you mean ?
General Hannum. Yes.
91. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon, sir.
General Hannum. In Honolulu?
92. Major Clausen. Yes, sir.
General Hannum. Yes. Captain Fleming was at that time, I be-
lieve. Assistant to the Department Engineer.
93. Major Clausen. And in this study by the Board at that time
there were certain fixed stations which were later carried over to this
contract ?
General Hannum. With perhaps modifications, I would say.
[2061] 94. Major Clausen. Yes. Well,inany event,no A. W. S.
stations of a permanent type were constructed prior to December 7,
were they, sir, 1941?
General Hannum. I don't know, but I recall very definitely that
that work in Hawaii was suspended by instructions from Washington.
95. General Frank. All of it?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1075
General Hannum. Yes, on account of the lack of indefiniteness of
just what features were to be carried out.
96. General Frank. Lack of definiteness or indefiniteness?
General Hannfm. Lack of definiteness, or it was not definitely
settled at tliat time. There were some changes, modifications, wdiich
apparently in Washington they discovered would have to be made,
from the experience which had been gained presumably abroad. I
don't know. I never understood why the work was delayed or
suspended.
97. General Frank. In any event, you think it was technical ?
General Hannum. Technical, yes.
98. Major Clausen. And you attribute the delays to the suspension
of the work ?
General Hannum. Yes.
99. Major Clausen. All right. Well, now, you say these instruc-
tions came from Washington to the Division Engineer at San
Francisco ?
General Hannum. Yes.
100. Major Clausen. And you were the Division Engineer?
General Hannum. I was the Division Engineer. They were trans-
mitted through me to Honolulu, in so far as Honolulu was affected.
[2062] 101. Major Clausen. I see. And when were those in-
structions received here, sir?
General Hannum. Well, I don't know. I would have to look up
the records to find out.
102. Major Clausen. Will you do that, sir?
General Hannum. Well, of course, my station at Sacramento, I think
you could get that by telephoning to the Division office. Colonel
Corey is the executive office in the Division office down town.
103. Major Clausen. I perhaps could not describe it, sir, with the
particularity that you could, if you jogged your memory on that.
General Hannum. Yes.
104. Major Clausen. I think the Board would appreciate it, since
we are working against time, if you could do that.
General Hannum. Very good. I will try to have that assembled.
I will have to come down next week some time, then. How long will
the Board be in town here?
105. Major Clausen. We shall be in town for a week. And in the
event the records could be searched by somebody down there at your
request, if the Board has already left we could perhaps review them
in Hawaii.
General Hannum. Very good.
106. Major Clausen. Or on our return.
General Hannum. Yes.
107. General Grunert. May I ask a question there : You have refer-
ence now to fixed stations as such, as distinguished from mobile sta-
tions?
General Hannum. Oh, yes.
108. General Grunert. For air warning?
[206o] General Hannum. Yes. We completed the filter here.
We were able to complete the filter stations and the control stations
in San Francisco and Los Angeles about a week before Pearl Harbor
happened. A week or two weeks, something like that.
79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 2 19
1076 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
109. Major Clausen. Sir, what knowledge do you have concerning
delays in the construction of underground gasoline storage tanks?
General Hannum. That was delayed due to lack or difficulty of
getting the Navy — I think that was the combined storage you are
speaking of, for the Army and Navy ; is that right ?
110. Major Clausen. All we know is that there were contracts for
underground gasoline storage.
General Hannum. Yes.
111. Major Clausen. Including facilities at Bellows Field.
General Hannum. Yes. That was at Bellows Field?
112. Mayor Clausen. Yes, sir.
General Hannum. Or was it up near Wheeler Field?
113. Major Clausen. Bellows Field is one in particular.
General Hannum. I do not recall that one. I recall the one up
near Wheeler Field.
114. Major Clausen. Well, in any event
General Hannum. That was up near Wheeler Field. As I recall,
that was the combined underground gasoline storage, combined for
Army and Navy, and there were technical difficulties involved in the
plans for that, and also difficulties involved in getting coordination
between the Army and Navy requirements, particularly as to the un-
loading point in JPearl Harbor for pumping the gas up to the storage
tanks.
115. Major Clausen. Now, with regard to these delays, did you
[2064] inform high^^r authority of the fact that there were these
delays occurring?
General Hannum. The delays were due to action coming from
Washington.
116. Major Clausen. Well, I state: Did you inform the Chief of
Engineers of those delays?
General Hannum. The Chief Engineers knew of them because he
was the one, or they were issued from his office. The instructions were
issued from his office.
117. Major Clausen. I understood you to say that they were issued
from the Signal Corps, concerning the A. W. S.
General PI annum. Whatever came from the Signal Corps came
through the Chief of Engineers Office to us out here. The Chief
Engineers was in contact with the Signal Corps in Washington and
received the plans and other details from the Signal Office presumably
in Washington, and then transmitted them to the field.
118. Major Clausen. I see.
Now, General, what did you do about speeding up the work over
there on these things? Did you complain to people of these delays
that were occurring in the A. W. S. ?
General Hannum. What delays are you speaking about?
119. Major Clausen. Well, I am just referring to the A. W. S.,
the air raid warning system.
General Hannum. There was nothing to be done. We got in-
structions to suspend and await further instructions.
120. Major Clausen. Did you have any instructions to Colonel
Wyman at any time that this w^as a matter of prime importance, that
these defense installations be constructed as speedily as [206S]
possible ?
General Hannum. Certainly.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1077
121. Major Clausen. Did you tell liim that?
General Hannum. Certainly, and he realized that, too. Everybody
realized it.
122. Major Clausen. I mean did you specifically tell him that?
General Hannum. "Well, I don't know that I did specifically tell
him that. There was plenty of correspondence which might, relating
to the matter, probably still in the files.
123. Major Clausen. Now, during 1941 when the construction was
going on up to December Tth, did you — or rather, let me ask the ques-
tion this way: What were y^ur functions with regard to the carrying
out of the contract that we have referred to ?
General Hannum. Supervision only. - -
124. Major Clausen. Of whom and of what?
General Hannum. Supervision of the work that was being carried
on in the district.
125. Major Clausen. How did the Hawaiian Department Com-
mander, Commanding General, get into that picture?
General Hannum. Pie didn't fit into it until after the work was
turned over to him in the spring of 1942. Wait a minute. Well, he
did fit into it in this way : For instance, when that air ferry route to
Australia was constructed we were directed to have the Division Engi-
neer and the District Engineer to report to General Short, the Depart-
ment Commander, and we did so. In addition to that, when I was out
there, I think it was in May of '41, I directed Colonel Wyman to put
the installations in in accordance with General Short's wishes.
For example, we had money for Wheeler Field and for certain
[2066] installations at Hickam Field, and General Short did not
wish to put those installations in there and crowd and congest those
places, and he wanted to open up Bellows Field, and authority was
given to open up Bellows Field; and construction that was intended —
barracks and things like that which were intended for Hickam Field,
Wheeler Field, were put in at Bellows Field and the work was pushed
hard, including the preparation of a flight strip, although the flight
strip had not been approved as a project in Washington, and that flight
strip was not completed on December Tth because it couldn't be com-
pleted with the mone}' and time available, mainl}^ the money available.
126. Major Clausen. Well, did you ever get any request from the
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to speed up this
work ?
General Hannum. No. When I saw General Short he seemed to be
very well satisfied. I went around with him in May of 1941 and also in
October of 1941 when I was out there.
127. General Frank. Did you have any functions at this end of
procuring, getting priorities on, or expediting delivery of supplies or
equipment ?
General Hannum. Yes; we were the procurement agency here in
the division office for all the supplies and personnel for the district
engineer, and particularly after Pearl Harbor and even before Pearl
Harbor we had great difficulty in getting transportation to get them
out there.
128. General Frank. Did you have any difficulty in getting equip-
ment because of the scarcity ?
General Hannum. It took time, but we were able to get them.
129. General Frank. Priorities?
1078 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[£067] General Hannum. The critical items under the priority
system didn't go into effect, I believe, until some time after Pearl
Harbor, but we got numerous pieces of equipment.
130. General Frank. Scarcity of material and lack of shipping;
was that it ?
General Hannum. No; it was lack of shipping space. Both the
Army Transport Service, and particularly the Army Transport Serv-
ice at that time, and the Navy, how^ever, helped us out on getting over
a good deal of supplies and personnel.
131. General 1^'rank. There was no scarcity of shipping?
General Hannum. Scarcity of shipping? There was scarcity of
shipping, yes. There was no scarcity of materials. I thought you
referred to materials.
132. General Frank. I know, but I am trying to find out what could
have delayed construction, if there was a scarcity of shipping.
General Hannum. What delayed construction was mainly a scarcity
of qualified labor. If there is any delay in construction, construction
could have gone ahead a good deal faster if we could have gotten
qualified labor over there promptly, and qualified supervision. That
office, the work in the District office increased perhaps ten-fold in
December of 1942, and they didn't have the personnel there to handle
it, the qualified personnel either in the field or in the office, and it was
very ditlicult to secure qualified personnel at that time.
133. General Grunert, Wliose business was it to get that qualified
personnel ? The contractor ?
General Hannum. No. The contractor, yes, for his oAvn work, and
the Division office helped him on that. For the office work [2068]
in the District office, initially the District office itself, which in so far
as local sources were concerned, in so far as sources here were con-
cerned, we did endeavor to secure the personnel which was requested,
and even after Colonel Lyman took over that office, even for some
months after that it still was not operating efficiently administra-
tively.
134. Major Clausen. Sir, with reference to the letters that I read
to you from Colonel Lyman to General Reybold, do you recall that
Colonel Wyman was relieved shortly after that second letter was
written ?
General Hannum. He was relieved, as I recall, by an order w^hich
placed the work directly under the Commanding General of the
Hawaiian Department, the same as it had been placed under the Com-
manding General in Alaska.
135. Major Clausen. Did you get a copy of a letter from General
Reybold answering the letter of 27 February, 1942, this letter from
General Reybold to Colonel Lyman dated March 16th, 1942, stating
that the re-assignment of Colonel Wyman was going to be effected?
General Hannum. No.
136. Major Clausen. Well, in any event, did you have anything to
do with his relief yourself?
General Hannum. No.
137. Major Clausen. Did you have anything to do with his assign-
ment to the Canol Project?
General Hannum. No, sir.
138. Major Clausen. Or up there to Alaska?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1079
General Hannum. No.
139. Major Clausen. Do yon know whether on this Canol Project
[2069] he was reprimanded under the 104th Article of War for
failing to observe safety precautions, resulting in part in the Dawson
Creek explosion ?
General Hannum. No. That Canol Project was not under my
direction.
140. Major Clausen. I see.
Sir, with regard to this letter from General Kingman to Mr. Scho-
field dated August 28th, 1941, what did you have to do with that letter
yourself ?
General Hannum. With this letter?
141. Major Clausen. Yes, sir.
General Hannum. By General Kingman to Schofield?
142. Major Clausen. Yes, sir.
General Hannum. I don't know that I had anything to do with it
unless I sent a letter to Kingman about the case. I don't recall that,
though.
143. Major Clausen. Well, would you make inquiry in that respect
also at the Division Engineer's office here?
I have no further questions.
\2070'] 144. General Frank. Did you state that you knew noth-
ing about the association of Wyman and Rohl in Los Angeles?
General Hannum. No ; I did not know of any relationship between
Wyman and Rohl. I Imew that Rohl was a contractor, but I had no
knowledge of any particular social relations or other relations, other
than official, that Wyman may have had with Rohl.
145. General Frank. When Wyman had the supervision of this
contract in which Rohl was involved, in Los Angeles, was he then
under your jurisdiction ?
General Hannum. No, General Kingman was then Division Engi-
neer, here. I relieved General Kingman, here, in January 1938, and
that contract, as I recall, for the breakwater had been made the year
or two before that.
146. General Frank. The contract had been made, but Wyman was
operating down there, in 1938 and 1939, while you were the division
engineer here?
General Hannuini. Wyman went out there in 1935, I believe.
147. General Frank. Out where.
General Hannum. To Los Angeles. He was assigned as district
engineer in 1935 or 1936, along about that time.
148. General Frank. And when did he go to Honolulu?
General Hannum. He went out there in 1939 or 1940, as I recall.
149. General Frank. Therefore, he was in Los Angeles for over a
year under your jurisdiction while you were division engineer here?
General Hannum. Yes, yes; that is correct.
150. General Frank. And you knew nothing of his associations?
[2071] General Hannum. No, no. I don't know that he had
any association with Rohl during the period that he was district engi-
neer, after my arrival. It never came to my attention. We had no
contracts with Rohl in the Los Angeles district, at that time.
151. General Frank. When did they have the breakwater contract
down there ?
1080 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Hannum. That breakwater v;as finished, as I recall, in
December 19o8.
152. General Frank. What kind of system or arrangement did you
have as division engineer to check on your district engineers?
General Hannum. Well, when the engineering papers came in,
these plans and specifications were reviewed in the engineering divi-
sion in my office, and comments submitted to me, and I passed on them,
and the contracts at tliat time had to be approved in Washington.
Copies of the contract came to my office. We had copies of the con-
tract, plans and specifications, and I went out and inspected the work
with the district engineer, to inspect the progress, and also see whether
the work was being carried out, and discussed with him as to whether
it was being carried out in accordance with the plans and specifications.
153. General Frank. Did he know when you were coming, gener-
ally?
General Hannum. Generally speaking, I think he did ; yes. I cus-
tomarily let him know when I was coming, to make sure that they
would be there when I arrived.
154. General Frank. Did you have any organization under which
[£072] you had an administrative inspector go into a district t(?
find out how the work was being done ?
General Hannum. Yes; that is required by the Engineer Depart-
ment regulations. Administrative auditors and inspectors go out, as
1 recall now it was at least tw^ice a year — at least once a year, and
perhaps twice a year.
155. General Frank. But they are more in the nature of auditors,
and their work is not in the nature of making inspections along the
line that the War Department inspectors generally make, is that
correct ?
General Hannum. It is an audit of the accounts, and the records of
the district office, yes — an administrative inspection of all the admin-
istrative records of the office.
156. General Frank. You did not have any arrangement in your
system of finding out what the personal operations of your district
engineers were, did you?
General HANNu:\r. I don't know what you mean by "personal opera-
tions."
157. General Frank. I mean socially.
General PIannum. Personal contacts?
158. General Frank. Yes.
General Hannum. No, no ; only what would be observed by the di-
vision engineer going out and contacting the district engineer and
knowing the persons with whom he happened to be associating.
159. General Frank. If he knew you were coming, and he had good
sense, he would not disclose anything that was not proper, do you
think ?
General Hannum. So far as I observed at any time there was no
suspicion of any guilt on the part of Wyman in his social [£07S]
contacts.
160. General Frank. That is, so far as you know; but I am still
talking about some sort of set-up in your machinery to find that out.
Did you have any sort of arrangement to find that out ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1081
General Haxnum. You would set np such an arrangement as that
only if you were suspicious of somebody, wouldn't you? A brother
officer, you wouldn't suspect that he was carrying on some improper
relations with someone.
161. General Frank. The War Department has a whole Inspector
GenoraFs system set up that makes just that kind of inspection ar-
rangement; and the engineers had none of it in their districts and
divisions, evidently.
General Hannun. Nothing — no, no regular set program of any-
thing like that ; no.
162. General Frank. A condition of injudicious, improper asso-
ciation between a disti'ict engineer and a contractor could have existed
then without your knowing anything about it ?
General Hannun. Oh, you mean in a monetary or a pecuniary
way?
163. General Frank. I mean this : Do you think that it is proper
for a district engineer to accept entertainment continuously, to be on
parties continuously, to be over a period of time intoxicated with a
contractor with whom the district engineer is doing business?
General Hannum. No, no.
164. General Frank. That is what I am talking about.
General Hannum. Yes, yes; but I don't know that that has been
established, in the case between Wyman and Rohl, [3074]
though.
165. General Frank. You have heard no reports to that effect?
General Hannum. I have heard in recent months some allegations
to that effect.
166. General Frank. This happened when he was operating under
your jurisdiction.
General Hannum. Where and when, if I may ask? Well, I don't
know that that is important, sir.
167. General Frank. I am trying to find out if the organization in
the Engineer Corps was based on an absolute trust of the next sub-
ordinate, with almost no check on him.
General Hannum. There are numerous checks, to see that the work
is being carried out as planned and as specified, in accordance with
the regulations.
168. General Frank. What was your measure of efficiency and
achievement ?
General Hannum. The character of the work, and the progress of
the work.
169. General Frank. Specifically, who finds that out, or who did
find that out when you were division engineer {'
General Hannum. Well, I found it out, myself, by the reports that
came in. The reports of operations that came in, under the various
contracts, and also by personal inspections, and when the work be-
came so lieavy that there were so many projects, one man couldn't
cover it, I had additional assistants to go out and check the progress
of the work.
170. General Frank. Did you ever check on Wyman's sobriety?
General Hannum. I have been with him on a number of occasions,
and have taken a social drink with him. My custom [3075] is
1082 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to take one or two, and stop, because I never like to lose control of
myself mentally. Wyman would take more than that; but I have
never seen him, as I say, lose control of himself, or be drunk.
171. General Frank. Are you conversant with the congressional
investigation of the Rohl- Wyman association?
General Hannum. No.
172. General Frank. Are you conversant with the California State
investigation that involved Rohl and Wyman?
General Hannum. No, only what I saw by way of extracts of what
was published in the newspapers.
173. General Frank. I suggest you read them.
Now, in answer to the question that I asked about a type of asso-
ciation between district engineer and contractor, you did not answer
that question, if it were proper for a district engineer to continuously
do those things.
General Hannum. I think I answered no to your question. General.
I think I answered no to that general question that you gave.
174. General Frank. That it was not ?
General Hannum. It was not a proper thing, as you say, to accept
entertainment from him, and gratuitous gifts.
175. General Frank. No, I didn't say anything about gratuitous
gifts, but continuous entertainment, and to establish an intimate per-
sonal association.
General Hannum. Well, I don't think that an engineer officer or
any contract officer should be denied the privilege of social contact
with a contractor just because he happens to be a contractor. That's
a personal, social relationship outside [2076] of business;
provided he doesn't let that interfere with his business, official status.
176. Major Clausen. When you discussed with Colonel Hunt, his
report, if you did, do you know that that report of Colonel Hunt
shows, wholly aside from the other aspect, that the intimate social
relationship which existed between Rohl and Wyman impaired
Wyman's efficiency as an officer?
General Hannum. I don't. I haven't seen Colonel Hunt's report.
He did not show that to me.
177. Major Clausen. You wouldn't condone, for example, would
you, sir, the entertainment of an Army officer by a contractor, with
booze and liquor and women and wild soirees in a hotel?
General Hannum. Well, I wouldn't condone that on the part of
an officer with a contractor, nor anyone else that he might associate
with.
178. Major Clausen. When you made your answer to General
Frank, you did not mean that that is the type of entertainment he
should accept?
General Hannum. No.
179. Major Clausen. As a matter of fact, that is wrong, isn't it,
sir?
General Hannum. That is not proper conduct ; no.
180. General Frank. And when that continues over a period of
several months or years, as in Los Angeles, it seems peculiar that it
should continue without the next higher authority in some measure
knowing something about it, over that length of time, through some
kind of reporting or inspection system.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1083
General Haxxum. Well, all I can say is that in all my visits, there,
neither he nor anyone in the office, nor anyone [2077] else
with Avhom I met down there ever mentioned it to me; and I met quite
a few people in Los Angeles, at vai-ious times.
181. General Frank. Did you ever get any report on him through
General Connoll}^, who was operating down there in that vicinity?
General Hannum. As to his conduct ? No.
182. General Frank. Do you ever inquire as to the standing of
your district engineers in the community ?
General Hannum. Yes, yes; tliat is quite evident, in many places
and cases.
183. General Frank. Did you ever inquire as to his standing in
Los Angeles, through other than the contractors, of course?
General Hannum. Well, I don't know that I specifically made a
point of inquiring as to his conduct, but by talking to contractors and
others who were associated with the district engineers, personalities
or rumors would naturally come up, if there were any. I saw Con-
nolly down there several times, and Connolly's remark about Wyman's
work was that he found difficulty in coordinating his work with
Wyman, on account of W3"man's insistence on getting specific qualified
personnel instead of taking run-of-the-mine, that is to say, the WPA
personnel.
184. General Frank. The congressional investigation and the Cali-
fornia State investigation have indicated a continuous situation of
close personal association, with constantly recurring, rather wild
parties, over a period of time.
General Hannum. Well, I don't see how that could have been true,
while Wyman was in Los Angeles and I was division engineer, because
he showed no sign of the effects of it, whatever, on my visits.
185. General Frank. Nevertheless, we have tliese investigations
[2078] and reports by governmental agencies; and you cannot
ignore a congressional investigation, nor a State investigation.
Now, what I am coming to is, this situation existed, and the next
higher commander, who was responsible for keeping W}inan in line,
was yourself.
General Hannum. Well, as I say, I don't know who gave the testi-
mony, nor the character of the testimony that was given; and was
there anything to indicate that there was any connivance with the
contractor in a pecuniary way?
186. General Frank. I suggest you read the official reports that
exist. What I was after was trying to determine what kind of system
existed in your office, to check on the behavior of your subordinates,
and evidently other than your own visits?
General Hannum. Yes, other than my own visit, or reports; per-
sons who might be sent fi'om my office down there to visit, and what
they might have observed ; and there were others who went down
there, under my orders, administrative officers and engineer personnel ;
and no such reports of conduct like that ever came to me.
187. General Frank. In other words, the man was out there on
his own, and if the reports of such operations came to you, they were
incidental rather than tlirough predetermined methods?
General Hannum. Yes; they were incidental to a visit for other
purposes, and not the check on a man's personal conduct.
1084 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
188. Major Clausen. Sir, do you know Mr. Martin, the attorney
for INIr. Kohl, of the Rohl-Connolly Company ?
General Hannum. No ; I do not know him.
189. Major Clausen. Yon said that von discussed Wyman's eon-
duct with Mr. Connolly?
[2079] Genera] Hannum. No.
190. Major Claifsen. You meant General Connolly?
General Hannum. General Connolly. I did not discuss his conduct,
I discussed the relationship between General Connolly, when he was
in charge of WPA in Los Angeles, and Wyman, who was district
engineer. Wyman was securing WPA personnel from General Con-
nolly, to carry on his work.
191. Major Clausen. I understand.
General Hannum. His work, which was flood-control work, was
being carried on to relieve unemployment.
192. Major Clausen. Did you ever discuss Colonel Wyman with
Mr. Kohl at this time, when Colonel Wyman was stationed down at
Los Angeles?
General Hannum. No.
193. Major Clausen. Or with any member of Rohl-Connolly Com-
pany ?
General Hannum. No; and as I say, I don't think I saw Mr. Rohl
but once, in my office.
194. General Frank. After this kind of association that we have
just mentioned, do j^ou think it was good judgment on the part of
Wyman to ask for Rohl to be sent over, to become intimately associated
with him again in Honolulu ?
General Hannum. No; if he had that relationship, and he knew of
it, I think he was foolish to ask for him to come over there to continue
it ; but the reason that Rohl was taken into the partnership was because
he had floating plant, and he was the only one that had floating plant
available, which was needed over there in carrying on the work over
there in Hawaii. Floating plant was very difficult to get at that time,
195. JNIajor Clausen. Aren't you mistaken as to that, sir ? [2080]
Wasn't the floating plant desirable with respect to the Canol project?
General Hannum. No. We needed floating plant over there. We
had very great difficulty in getting suitable floating plant to do the
work on those outlying islands where there was no water, no fresh
water, no food, everything had to be imported, had difficulty in getting
ships to take it out to the islands.
196. Major Clausen. When was it, sir, that Mr. Rohl was in your
office?
General Hannum, As I recall, just before he finally went over to
Honolulu. He came in to see if we could assist him in getting trans-
portation over, and he saw me at that time, and I didn't likehis ap-
pearance at the time.
197. Major Clausen. What was wrong with it?
General HANNuar. Well, he didn't appear to be absolutely sober.
198. Major Clausen. And what did you do about it?
General Hannum. I fissumed that he had been out to the Club, or
somewhere, and had just come in to see me, and that it was just a
temporary matter.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1085
199. Major Clausen. What did you do about it, sir?
General Hannuivi. 1 did nothino- further about it.
200. Major Clausen. That is all.
201. General Frank. Were you at all conversant with the deal
under which the yacht VEGA, belonging to Mr. Rohl, was taken to
Honolulu ?
General Hannum. The yacht VEGA was taken to Honolulu on
request of Colonel Wyman that it be sent over. He had great diffi-
culty in getting any kind of transportation to carry things [20811
between the islands out thei'e, and it was doubtful, in our opinion,
whether the VEGA would be suitable; but some work was done on
it to try to make it suitable, and it was sent over.
202. General Frank. Do you know anything about the cargo, be-
tween California and Honolulu?
General Hannum. No, I do not know about the cargo.
203. General Frank. Do you know whether the VEGA ever was
used or not ?
General Hannum. No, I don't know whether it was used after it
got over there, or not, or to Avhat extent it was used. I think perhaps
the records in the office might show that.
204. General Frank. While Colonel Wyman was under your juris-
diction, you know of no incident in which his conduct w^as not above
I'eproach ?
General Hannum. His wife divorced him, and after being divorced
he was remarried — if that is to his discredit, why that's about the
only thing that I can think of, at the present time.
205. General Frank. You knew nothing whatever about his general
conduct ?
General Hannum. You are going back to his relations now with
Rohl. again?
206. General Frank. Yes.
General Hannum. No, no; I think I have said.
207. General Frank. And you knew^ nothing about his capacity for
consuming liquor?
General Hannum. No.
208. General Frank. Do you know whether he was put on a pledge
by Colonel Lyman?
['308'2] General Hannum. I did not know that. I do not know
wliat authority Colonel Lyman would have to put him on a pledge.
209. General Frank. When Cololnel Ljanan first went to Honolulu,
Colonel Wyman was then up in the engineer regiment at Schofield;
he had not yet been designated as district engineer.
General Hannum. I think that, as I recall it. General, Wyman was
ordered from Los Angeles to Honolulu as district engineer.
210. General Frank. I think if you will look up the records, for
your own information, now, down in the division engineer's office, you
will find that Wyman was sent from the Engineer Regiment to Hono-
lulu as district engineer.
General Hannum. Oh, I recall, now ; I believe you are right. Gen-
eral. I think he was temporarily on. Yes. that is right; he was sent
over to deal with troops originally. Major Burnell was the district
engineer at that time, and then Burnell was relieved and Wyman was
put in his place. You are right. I recall that, now.
1086 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
211. Major Clausen. Do you recall, when you testified before Colo-
nel Hunt, with regard to Colonel Wyman, you said :
On one occasion, not necessarily in serious conversation, I know that he indi-
cated that he could hold his liquor, indicating that lie had a capacity to consume
a considerable amount, without it very seriously affecting him.
General Hannum. I recall it.
212. Major Clausen. When did you have that discussion with
Colonel Wyman ?
General Hannum. With Colonel Wyman ? I don't recall the exact
incident, whether it was on this side, or over in Honolulu.
[WSS] 213. General Grunert. Will you give me a little line-up
on just the relationship between the division engineer and his district
engineers ? Are your district engineers inider you for administration,
for disciplinary action, for control and supervision? Does all that
apply as with troops? They were actually under your command, but
are there certain limits, or what ?
General Hannum. No, the division engineer has supervisory con-
trol over the operations personnel in the district.
214. General Grunert. Suppose the district engineer does commit
himself as to conduct, is it j-our business to take action against him?
General Hannum. I would take action against him, yes, or warn
him, and consult with him, and advise him.
[2084-] 216. General Grunert. In other words, he is under your
command for his conduct ?
General Hannum. Yes, I think I could say so.
216. General Grunert. For instance, did W3'man have to get your
O. K. to give Rohl a contract ?
General Hannum. No. That was an arrangement that w^as made
between — Wyman was carrying out the contract. He had, of course,
authority to contact the contractors as contractors directly and direct
them. He did not have to come to me for authority to secure Rohl's
services over there.
217. General Grunert. Because they were the contracting firm with
which the District Engineer was doing business; therefore he could
get them over there on his own without your O. K. ?
General Hannum. Yes. He would issue the necessary instructions
to his contractors initially without consulting me.
218. General Grunert. Did you ever get any report about Wyman's
conduct from any source, as to his lack of sobriety or his conduct
otherwise ?
General Hannum. You mean, in Los Angeles or Honolulu ?
219. General Grunert. Anywhere while he was under your com-
mand.
General Hannum. No, I don't believe so. General. I do not
recall hearing any adverse criticism of his conduct except his person-
ality and ability to irritate people. There was brought up one morn-
ing the question of his administration and the differences between
Wyman and Lyman. When December 7th came the troops on Hawaii
needed a lot of supplies and other things, which they did not have, and
in taking their positions, their combat positions, they secured mate-
rials from the various merchants around the island, and in many cases
they did not give [208S] receipts for the materials which they
obtained. Then later Wyman, according to his report to me, tried to
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1087
have the Department Engineer issue instructions or have them issued
by Department Headquarters tliat in securing these materials the com-
manding officer, or even a non-commissioned officer, whoever got the
materials, should give a receipt to the merchant from whom he received
them, merchant or other person. That apparently was not done,
according to what I understood.
After things quieted down, the bills were receiA'ed and tui-ned over
to the District Engineer for payment. Wyman had very great diffi-
culty in getting anyone to certify that the materials had been received.
He had no authority to make payments of equipment money imless
he could get a proper certificate of the receipt of those things. That
led to a confusion and a difference between Wyman and Lyman at
the time. It also irritated a great many merchants and others who
were delayed in receiving payment until there was an- opportunity
to find out whether the materials had actually been delivered by
that merchant to someone in the military service.
220. General Grunert. Then in answer to my question do I under-
stand that you never received any complaint about Wyman that would
cause you to take disciplinary action ?
General Hannuji. No, sir, I did not receive any such complaint.
221. General Grunert. And during the time he was under your
jurisdiction, you know nothing about his conduct that would require
any such action ?
General Hannum. No.
222. General Grunert. Do you know of any delays in construction
[^086] that are properly chargeable to the District Engineer
through inefficiency or neglect?
General Hannum. No, sir. My experience with Wyman was that
he was a driver and he pushed things and pushed them hard, and
in doing so he did irritate some of his subordinates and other persons.
223. General Grunert. You know that of your own personal knowl-
edge?
General Hannum. Yes, sir. he was a hard taskmaster.
224. General Grunert. Do you know of your own knowledge
whether or not any action of the contractors in Hawaii resulted in
delay of construction there ?
General Hannum. No, except unless it be inefficient labor. Of
course, they had very great difficulty in getting efficient labor and
they did not accomplish what might have been accomplished in normal
times in this country, on account of the lack of qualified labor.
225. General Grunert. Then I might ask you this question : Do
you know whether any such delays were intentional on the part of
any contractor ?
General Hannum. I would say that they would not have been in-
tentional. I think that they were trying to execute the contract as
rapidly as possible and to the best of their ability.
226. General Grunert. With your knowledge of construction, as
an engineer officer experienced in construction, had someone else been
in Wyman's place under the conditions that existed, do you think
they could have done a better job, as good a job, or a job with less
success or progress ?
1088 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Hannum. I do not believe they could have accom- [£087]
plished more in the way of construction work. I do believe that they
could have established better relationships with the public and within
their own organization.
227. General Grunert. Any more questions ?
228. General Kussell. There has been considerable testimony about
a man named Lyman. Lyman died out there, didn't he ?
General Hannum. Yes, sir. He went out there. He was on dutj)
as district engineer in Boston along about 1936 or 1937. He was
advised by the doctors to retire. He did not want to retire. He
thought that by going and taking duty with a regiment out at Hono-
lulu he would not work under such heavy pressure and he would get
along all right and when he completed his assigmnent to the engineer
regiment out there, after two years he would retire and live out in
Honolulu or in the Hawaiian Islands.
229. General Etjssell. He was a native Hawaiian ?
General Hannum. Yes. The family was from the Island of
Hawaii.
230. General Russell. You state this man Wyman was rather diffi-
cult to get along with and irritated people considerably. What about
Lyman ?
General Hannum. Lyman had a different personality, a pleasing
personality. He made friends easily.
231. General Russell. And he did not irritate people?
General Hannum. No, I don't think he did.
232. General Russell. If any friction existed between Wyman and
Lyman, it would be your judgment that Wyman would be responsible
for the friction?
General Hannum. Not necessarily so. There were differ- [£088]
ences of opinion. Lyman was a positive character, too, and when he
made up his mind he was just as positive as Wyman was, and because
they were not, either one. under the otlier, there would naturally be
friction there on that particular matter.
233. General Russell. That is all.
234. General Grunert. Knowing what you did, if you had to do
it over again would you choose Wyman to get that sort of a job done,
or would you trust it to somebody else ?
General Hannum. Under the present conditions and what has de-
veloped, I would not want to use Wyman again in the same place, under
the same conditions.
235. General Grunert. General, It may happen that as our investi-
gation proceeds we may want to ask you a few jnore questions when we
come back through here. Do you expect to be here off and on for the
next month or so ?
General Hannum. I will be in the States somewhere.
236. General Grunert. But not necessarily here in San Francisco?
General Hannum. No, but I can be obtained through San Francisco,
here.
237. General Grunert. There may be a few points which the Board
wants to clear up, of which they may think you have knowledge, and,
therefore, although we are through with you now we may want ask
you a few more questions if points come up to be cleared up.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1089
General Hannum. Yes, sir. I can leave my office and phone number
in Sacramento.
238. General Grunert. From what questions that have been asked
and the testimony that has been given, do you know of anything that
has not been brought out wliich might be of assistance to the Board,
that you would like to introduce as evidence ?
[2089] General Hannum. This relates particularly to Wyman's
relations with Rohl and Wyman's performance of duty as District
Engineer in Honolulu preceding and following Pearl Harbor?
239. General Grunert. Yes, as limited to anything that had to do
with the attack on Pearl Harbor, either background or leading up to
it, or personalities concerned with, not any ancient history or things
that happened afterwards, unless they have some bearing upon what
happened then.
General Hannum. And Wyman's conduct included?
240. General Grunert. And Wyman's conckict included.
General Hannum. AVell, I can tell you something which I heard
circumstantially that took place on December Tth in Honolulu, regard-
ing Wyman's conduct there, but I think that you can get that first-
hand possibly better from the personnel in the Honolulu office who
w^ere there with regard to that matter.
On December 7th, which was a Sunday, I was coming back from
Washington and was on the train this side of Chicago, when the radio
recorded Pearl Harbor was being bombed. When I arrived here in
San Francisco Colonel Matheson, w^ho was my assistant, reported to
me that Wyman had called up by radio phone from Honolulu on earl}'^
Sunday afternoon, tried to get me, could not get me and finally got
Colonel Matheson at his house in Burlingame. Colonel Wyman re-
ported to Colonel Matheson "We are being bombed." Colonel Mathe-
son asked him whether he could do anything. He said nope, he
couldn't do anything ; he just wanted to report they were being bombed.
That was all the conversation.
When I went to Honolulu later, which I think was in May
of 1942, I learned or it was reported to me that Wyman on
the [2090] evening of December Tth, Sunday evening, when
the troops were being disposed for defense of the island, happened
to be along the waterfront at Honolulu and saw that the little ship
harbor there to the east of the main harbor, where a lot of little boats
were collected and into which theie was an opening from the sea,
with a shallow depth of water of 6 or 8 feet over the reef, that that
area was not covered, not protected. He proceeded to take measures
to get civilians and secured arms from the Ordnance Depot nearby,
and had them armed, and within a few hours had taken defense
measures and had the place covered, with rifle fire, of course ; he had
no other means.
I will be very glad, if there is anything more that occurs to me,
to report it to you, any circumstances which I think might be of use
to you in your investigation in connection with, as I understand,
Wyman's conduct as District Engineer in Honolulu, and the conduct
of his work.
241. General Grunert. Yes, as to his conduct, his work, delay in
construction, generally about the construction work in Hawaii prior
to December Tth.
1090 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Hannum. Very good, sir.
242. General Grunert. That may have a bearing upon delays that
may have influenced the defenses against the attack of December 7th.
General Hannum. Yes, sir.
243. General Grunert. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon at 5 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of wit-
nesses and proceeded to other business. )
I
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1091
[_mn CONTENTS
THURSDAY, AUGUST 31, 1944
Testimony of : Paga '
Colonel Lathe B. Row, Temporarily Assistant Inspector General,
Western Defense Command, Presidio of San Francisco, California^- 2092
Major Howard F. Cooper, Air Corps, Army Air Force Base, Unit
ATC 2130
Thomas E. Tillman, 1230 Shafter Street, San Mateo, California 2134
Thomas Ernest Connolly, 2400 Fulton Street, San Francisco, Cali-
fornia 2158
Walter Wilton Home, 9425 Wilshire Boulevard, Beverly Hills, Cali-
fornia 2200
DOCUMENTS
Memorandum, 14 February, 1942, Department Inspector General to Chief
of Staff 2094
Confidential Report to Colonel Row 2107
Excerpts from page 10 of Colonel Hunt's Report 2113
Excerpts from page 11 of Colonel Hunt's Report 2114
Excerpts from page 31 of Colonel Hunt's Report 2115
Excerpts from F. B. L Report, October 29, 1942 2122
I Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original transcript of proceedings.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 2-
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1093
{2092-] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOAR])
THUBSDAY, AUGUST 31, 1944.
Presidio of San Francisco, Cal.
The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted
the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the
Board, presiding.
Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D.
Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.
Present also: Colonel Charles AV. West, Recorder, Major Henry C.
Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr.,
Executive Officer.
General Grunert. The Board will come to order.
TESTIMONY OF COLONEL LATHE B. ROW, 03601: TEMPORARILY
ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL, WESTERN DEFENSE COM-
MAND : PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. General Grunert. Colonel, the Board is after facts concerning
the attack on Pearl Harbor, incident to that attack, or connectecl
therewith. It is charged with investigation of certain things that
happepned in and about Honolulu, connected with Colonel Wyman,
and for that purpose you have been called to give the Board some
information. General Frank has charge of this particular part of
the investigation, and he will lead [£093] in questioning, and
the Board will fill out where it sees fit. General Frank.
2. General Frank. Will you state any assignment which you had
with respect to an investigation that you made concerning the ac-
tivities of Colonel Wyman.
Colonel Row. I was assigned as Inspector General, Hawaiian De-
partment, some time in May 1941, and continued on that assignment
until March 1943. One of the assignments given to the Commanding
General of the Hawaiian Department which I found when taking
over the office was inspections of cost-plus-fixed-fee contract opera-
tions within the Department. At that time nothing had been done
relative to the inspections, and during the summer and fall of 1941
this work was started.
The inspections were turned over to the Inspector General, Hawai-
ian Department.
3. General Frank. That was yourself?
Colonel Row. That was myself. These inspections and investiga-
tions were in the main made by subordinates in a section which was
1094 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
organized as a Cost-Pliis-Fixed-Fee section. A very small part of
the work of inspections and investigations were made by me person-
all}^, although under my supervision.
4. General Frank. Were you thoroughly familiar with the re-
sults and the details?
Colonel Eow. I supervised the reports, and interested myself in
the progress of them.
5. General Frank. All right.
6. Major Clausen. Sir, did you have occasion to make a report con-
cerning Hawaiian Constructors, Colonel Wyman, et al.. about Feb-
ruarv 1942?
im94.] Colonel Row. I did.
7. Major Clausen. And would you let me have that, please? The
record shows the witness handed me a document consisting of three
pages, with a fourth page containing a little note, on the top. By
the way, in whose handwriting is this, Colonel, "recommending relief
of," on this little note?
Colonel Row. That was mine, personally.
8. Major Clausen. I am going to read this report into the record,
if I may, so that the Board may hear. It is dated 14 February 1942,
on the stationery of the Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, Office
of the Department Inspector General.
Memorandum: To the Chief of Staff.
1. The preliminary portion of the investigation now being made by Lieutenant
Colonel Emil W. Leard, I. G. D., of this office regarding the operations of the
U. S. District Engineer indicates that the following conditions exist :
a. That the District Engineer has antagonized the business firms of Honolulu
and private individuals of the community by his failure to properly meet
obligations, peremptory actions, and lack of tact on the part of himself and certain
members of his staff.
h. That due to the District Engineer's failure to coordinate the procuring,
auditing, and disbursing sections of his organization payments to dealers for
merchandise delivered and services rendered are in some cases long overdue.
Some firms are threatening to refuse further sales unless outstanding obliga-
tions are paid in full and kept current. Many smaller businesses now are
faced with financial difficulties due to their inability [2095] to collect
amounts due them from the District Engineer. It has been ascertained that
of the larger firms approximately $.500,000.00 is due Lewers & Cooke and ap-
proximately $60,000.00 is due Mr. Murphy, the owner of Murphy Motors and
Aloha Motors. There are indications that similar large amounts are due other
firms.
c. That the District Engineer's delay in paying wages, sometimes for periods
of several weeks, is adversely affecting the prosecution of defense projects and
the morale of employees engaged on these projects.
d. That the failure on the part of the District Engineer to properly and syste-
matically take over the activities of the Zone Constructing Quartermaster on
16 December has resulted in disruption of administrative functions to a marked
degree.
e. That the District Engineer's office as a whole has not been organized in
.such a manner as to operate with efficiency.
f. That there is evidence that the District Engineer has harassed the former
employees of the Zone Constructing Quartermaster and has subjected them to
mental persecution to such an extent that many of the key men have refused
to work in his office.
(J. There is evidence to indicate that the employees of the former Zone Con-
structincT Quartermaster who have been transferred to the office of the District
Engineei' are discontented and dissatisfied over conditions existing therein.
2. Mr. Murphy, the owner of the Murphy Motors and [2096] Aloha
Motors, stated to Lieutenant Colonel Leard yesterday (13 February 1942) that
he has been unable to collect past due obligations for trucks and automobiles
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1095
purchased by the District Engineer. He further stated that he is going to the
mainland by clipper within three days and that he contemplates bringing these
matters to the attention of Delegate King and such other authorities in Wash-
ington as may be necessary to secure rem.edial action unless he can be assured
his vmpaid bills will be settled promptly. He also stated that he contemplates
refusing to make delivery on orders now on hand for more motor transporta-
tion. Mr. Murphy is extremely bitter over the manner in which he and other
automobile dealers have been treated by the District Engineer.
3. In addition to the matters mentioned above, past inspections and recent
numerous incidents requiring investigation have disclosed that the administration
and oi)eration of the District Engineer activites since 7 December 1941 have been
exemplified by extravagance and waste and general maladministration. It was
discovered during the course of inspections of District Engineer activities prior
to 7 December that his administrative set-up was improperly coordinated and
was so mentioned in these reports of inspection. The District Engineer, in his
replies, has stated that steps had been initiated to correct the irregularities and
deficiencies reported. It is now evident that many of these irregularities and
deficiencies still existed on 7 December 1941 and have been aggravated by the
increased volume of his activities [2097] incident to the outbreak of war
and the taking over of the functions of the Zone Construction Quartermaster on
16 December 1941. Colonel Wyman's methods of administration have been such
as to antagonize many persons, military and civil, both within and without his
organization. His actions have also been ridiculed and criticized in the com-
munity. I believe that this condition is to the great detriment of the Army
as a whole and the Engineer Corps in particular.
4. In my opinion Colonel Wyman does not possess the necessary executive and
administrative ability or the leadership to cope with the present situation exist-
ing in this Department. In addition to the matters set forth in paragraph 1
above, inefficiency of his office has further been demonstrated by :
a. His methods of purchase, assignment and use of motor vehicles.
6. His wa.ste of luoney in the renting, remodeling and furnishing of offices
for himself and his stafC.
c. The building of elaborate and expensive ($21,652.46) air-raid shelters at
the Punahou School for the use of himself and the executives of the contractor.
These shelters have sufficient capacity to protect only a small percentage of the
number of employees on the Punahou Campus.
d. Directing his contractor to take over and operate the Pleasanton Hotel at
an estimated loss of $2,500.00 per month when a mess is operated and at the
rates and room assignments fixed by the District Engineer. [209S] The
principal beneficiaries of the use of this hotel to date have been Colonel Wyman
and wife, and his staff and their dependents. This hotel was taken over on
16 January 1942 and a mess was established on 26 January 1942.
e. Failing to utilize to best advantage the services of Lit^utenant Colonel Har-
rold, former Zone Constructing Quartermaster, and his highly trained assistants.
f. His failure to stabilize assignments of personnel to positions of responsi-
bility, and his failure to delegate authority to his administrative assistants to
act for him.
g. His failure to establish a system of accountability to insure the proper
accounting for the receipt and issuance of construction material.
h. His failure to issue directives in necessary detail and to organize his staff
to insure compliance with directives issued by him.
i. His disregard for and violation of orders of the Military Governor concern-
ing the curfew law.
5. Although several of the investigations relative to matters mentioned in
paragraph 4 have not been completed, the evidence already olttained substantiates
the statements made above and indicate that Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., C. E.,
does not possess the necessary executive and administrative ability to properly
conduct the affairs of his office. The fact that Mr. Murphy contemplates such
drastic action and the fact that business firms threaten to refuse delivery on
future orders submitted by the District Engineer indicate the seriousness of the
situation [2099] and the need for immediate remedial action.
6. I strongly believe that vmless a change in the administration of the office
of the District Engineer is accomplished within a short time, most serious reper-
cussions will result.
7. CONCLUSION:
That it is to the best interests of the United States and of the Hawaiian De-
partment that Colonel Wyman be relieved at once as District Engineer.
1096 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
8. RECOMMENDATION:
That Colonel Wyman be relieved as District Engineer at once.
(s) Lathe B. Row,
Colonel, I. G. D.,
Department Inspector General.
I will read the note which is attached to the face of the document :
Informal Memorandum by Dept Inspector General to Dept Commander recom-
mending relief of Col. Wyman as District Engineer.
The words, "recommending relief of" are inserted over the words,
which formerly took their place, as follows :
which resulted in relief of
in other words, the pencil notation.
In view of the seriousness of these allegations and the conduct
which had gone on for some time, will you tell the Board how it was
necessary for you to expose these conditions, rather than the immediate
Commander of Colonel Wyman, the Division Engineer ?
[2100] Colonel Row, The operations of the District Engineer
had increased so rapidly, and in our opinion the organization set-up
was so deficient to take care of it, that it seemed to be impossible to
get any corrective action taken. These matters were brought to the
attention of Colonel Wyman at various times in the form of reports
both written and verbal.
9. General Geuneet. What did the Department have to do with
Wyman ? He was a district engineer under a division engineer — how
did the Department inject itself into it?
Colonel Eow. These inspections were directed by the Secretary of
War in a letter of February 1941.
10. Major Clausen. Now, sir, you have stated to me, and I will ask
the question of you now, about prior inspections ; that is, prior to the
one of February 14, 1942. You have stated to me the fact that copies
are not available in your office, here.
Colonel Row. That is right.
11. Major Clausen. But that they are available in Honolulu ?
Colonel Row. They should be available.
12. Major Clausen. And I have informed you, have I not, that
I was not able to locate the copies in Washington, at that time?
Colonel RoAV. Yes, that is so ; a great many. You may have found
some, there, but not all of them.
13. Major Clausen. I am sure that, although I requested, I was
unable to find any that preceded 7 December 1941, concerning the con-
duct that is referred to in your report of February 14, 1942; and I was
informed that they would be available either through you, or in Hono-
lulu ; so I have asked you for them, and 3'^ou now tell me that they are
not available to you here, but that we will get them in Honolulu ?
\[2J01] Colonel Row. I might explain these inspections, the
form of the inspections. They were considered of the continuing
type, which allows inspections to be made over several months or an
entire year, and then a final report made at the end of the year, and
for that reason these reports did not in all cases reach Washington.
14. General Grunert. Then as I understand it, the War Depart-
ment, as a routine matter, charged the local commander with having
his Inspector General investigate or keep track of certain things in
the District Engineer's administration.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1097
Colonel Row. That is correct,
15. General Grunert. And this was just one of the inspections car-
ried on for that purpose ?
Colonel Row. Yes, sir.
16. General Grunert. And did that, in a way, take some of the re-
sponsibility off the division engineer's shoulders as to administration
of the districts?
Colonel Row. In no manner did it relieve the district commander
of his responsibilities.
17. General Grunert. The division engineer's responsibility?
Colonel Row. Yes, sir; the division engineer's responsibility.
18. General Frank. Were copies of these inspections sent to the di-
vision ens'ineer
Colonel Row. Oh, yes, sir; in all cases, the reports were sent — not
to the division, to the district engineer; but not to the division engi-
neer.
19. General Frank. Do you know the organizational set-up in the
Corps of Engineers?
[2102] Colonel Row. In general ; yes, sir.
20. General Frank. You know that the district in Honolulu was
under the division engineer here in San Francisco ?
Colonel Row. That is correct; yes.
21. General Frank. He, in turn, was responsible back to the Chief
of Engineers, in Washington?
Colonel Row, Yes,
22. General Frank. Now, do you know what machinery the di-
vision engineer here in San Francisco had for checking up on the
district engineer in Honolulu ?
Colonel Row. I don't, at the moment ; no.
23. General Frank. While making those inspections, did you run
onto any activity en the part of the division engineer to check or in-
spect his district engineer in Honolulu?
Colonel Row. I don't recall at this time.
24. General Frank. Do you know of any systematic arrangement
that he had for inspecting his district engineer ?
Colonel Row. I do not; no.
25. General Frank. Do you know the circumstances which prompt-
ed the War Department to have that district engineer's office inspected
by the inspector of the HaAvaiian Department?
Colonel Row. All of those activities were to be inspected by an In-
siiector General ; that was the general plan. In the continental United
States, all of these inspections were conducted from the office of the
Inspector General in Washington, but clue to the remoteness of the
activities in the Pacific, these duties were charged to the Commanding
General of the Hawaiian Department.
26. General Frank. You say that the copies of the inspections
[f!103] were not furnished to the division engineer?
Colonel Row. No, sir; it is to the district engineer.
27. General Frank. Yet the district engineer was operating under
the supervision of the division engineer, and if there were some dis-
crepancies that you had determined in your inspection report, the man
to require the correction was the next higher commander to the district
engineer, who was the division engineer ; that is correct ?
Colonel Row. That is correct, yes.
1098 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
28. General Frank. And yet you didn't give it to the division engi-
neer, you gave it to the district engineer?
Colonel Row. That is true. Of course, these inspections were of a
local nature.
29. General Frank. Well, but you found things wrong; you re-
ported them to the district engineer, and then you found they were
not corrected, and there was no superior of his to whom they were
referred ?
Colonel Row. These reports went through the office of the Depart-
ment Commander.
30. General Grunert. In other words, you were responsible to your
Department Commander for them, and any distribution he made was
up to him ; is that the idea ?
Colonel Row. Well, I think it would be the duty of the Inspector
General to properly advise the Department Commander on those
matters.
31. General Grunert. But you did not think it necessary to send it
to the division engineer?
Colonel Row. It had not been done before.
32. General Grunert. I think it should have been done, but
[2104] it wasn't done, that is all.
33. General Frank. I was following through with a line of ques-
tions which ultimately would indicate that the organization and ad-
ministration both were rather loose.
Colonel Row. In practically every case, Colonel Wyman replied
that corrective action would be taken.
34. General Frank. But there was nobody in Honolulu who could
require him to take that corrective action. The man who would re-
quire him to take the corrective action was the division engineer here
in San Francisco ; that is correct, is it not?
Colonel Row. That is true.
35. General Frank. I am not getting after you, at all; I am just
trying to uncover the strength or the weaknesses of the system.
36. Major Clausen, Sir, along that line, do you know why it was
that, coincident with your report of February 14, 1942, which is ad-
dressed to the Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Department, a letter
from Colonel Lyman, dated that same day, was sent to the Chief of
Engineers, requesting the reassignment of Colonel Wyman?
Colonel Row. I think that letter was the result of the memorandum
which you have read.
37. Major Clausen. The point that I inquired about is, why did
not that letter go to the division engineer, who was the immediate
superior of Colonel Wyman, if you know? Is there any reason that
you know of ?
Colonel Row. I know of no reason.
38. Major Clausen. You are familiar, sir, with the investigation
by Colonel Hunt ?
[2105] Colonel Row. All I know is that he made an investiga-
tion.
39. Major Clausen. Sir, I assume that your report of February 14,
1942, speaks for itself. I am going to read, some very brief extracts
from the report of Colonel Hunt. On page 9 of his report, he states :
The charge relating to Colonel Wyman's questionable association with Mr. Rohl
while in Hawaii, his alleged drunkenness, and occupation of rooms adjoining
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1099
those of Mr. Rohl, is not wholly sustained by the known facts and the testimony
adduced, although elements of that associatiou strongly suggest a relationship
entirely inconsistent with the relative positions of the two men. If, as implied
by news articles on the Tenney Committee hearings, and by various individuals.
Colonel Wynian was aware that Mr. Rohl was not a United States citizen when
he signed contract W-414-eng-602, these allegations take on a more sinister
aspect.
Do you recall, of your own knowledge, having investigated any of
those allegations, sir?
Colonel Row. As I recall, the fact that Mr. Rohl was not a citizen
or had not been a citizen until a short time before December 7, 1941,
came to light in an investigation that was conducted as to misuse of
gasoline by the engineers, and during the course of that investigation
it was discovered that he had not been an American citizen until a
short time previously.
40. Major Clausen. Now, in connection with that investigation of
Mr. Rohl, did you hand me three pages, which I now show you, repre-
senting some notes on that investigation ?
Colonel Row. I did.
41. Major Clausen. And what are those notes, sir ?
\2106~\ Colonel Row. An extract from these notes, is :
During the course of the above referred to investigation
42. General Frank. Just what is that ?
43. Major Clausen. I just asked you what those pages were. You
describe them to me.
Colonel Row. I don't recall what these notes are, but apparently
they are notes made by one of my assistants for my information.
44. Major CLausen. I think it is advisable, sir, to read these notes,
marked "Confidential."
In other words, your statement is that these apparently are notes
made by one of your subordinates, of the investigation that you have
already testified to ?
Colonel Row. For information of the Department Inspector
General.
[2107] 45. General Fkank. For information of the Department
Inspector General, who was yourself?
Colonel Row. Yes.
46. Major Clausen. Paragraph 1 says:
(Conficlential report to Colonel Row is as follows:)
In connection with an investigation directed by the Department Commander
regarding alleged illegal issues of gasoline to military personnel and employees of
the District Engineer and Hawaiian Constructors, the testimony of several
witnesses indicated that Mr. H. W. Rohl, present head of the Hawaiian Con-
structors, had authorized the issuance of USED plates
That is United States Engineering Department?
Colonel Row. That is right.
Major Cr.AusEN (reading) :
plates to privately owned vehicles of several of his employees for the purpose of
official identification and to enable them to obtain gasoline from the government
operated gasoline station on Beretania Street. The testimony further indicated
that Mr. Rohl authorized his transportation superintendent, Mr. Box, to issue
gasoline without charge to other employees of the Hawaiian Constructors who
were operating privately owned vehicles for business use.
2. During the course of the above referred to investigation, correspondence
came to the attention of the investigating officer which indicated that [2108]
1100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Rohl was born in Germany and was, on 15 August 1941, still not a citizen
of the United States.
(Exhibit "A")
May I interpose here this question : Do you know where that Ex-
hibit A wall be found ?
Colonel Row. It should be in the Inspector General's Office in Ha-
waiian Department.
47. Major Clausen. Do you know what significance the date of 15
August 1941 has?
Colonel Row. I have no knowledge of that.
48. Major Clausen. I shall continue reading. Paragraph 3 :
The testimony of Mr. Kohl was deemed essential in the investigation regard-
ing the gasoline, and it appeared desirable to obtain from Mr. Rohl information
as to his status in regard to his citizenship.
4. Repeated attempts were made by the investigating ofBcer to obtain an inter-
view with Mr. Rohl. On the first occasion an appointment was made with Mr.
Rohl by telephone to meet him in his office at 10 : 00 AM the following morning,
April 4th. At the appointed time the investigating officer was told that Mr. Rohl
was not in. Mr. Cades, the attorney for the Hawaiian Constructors appeared and
stated that Mr. Rohl desired him to be present when testimony was taken. Mr.
Cades was advised that this would not be permitted. After waiting approximately
one-half hour for Mr. Rohl, the investigating officer was told by Mr. Middleton,
administrator for the Hawaiian Constructors, that Mr. Rohl would not be
[2109] able to appear as he had an appointment with General Tinker and
Colonel Lyman. Two days later, April 6th, the investigating officer contacted
Mr. Rohl personally and informed him that the testimony would have to be taken
sometime during that day. Mr. Rohl stated that he was just leaving for an
appointment with General Tinker and General Emmons, but that he would come
to the Office of the Department Inspector General later in the day, or possibly that
evening. At 9 : 30 PM, April 7th, Mr. Middleton called this office and put Mr.
Rohl on the phone. Mr. Rohl then agreed to meet the investigating officer at 9 : 00
AM the following day, April 8th. The inspector visited Mr. Rohl's office promptly
on time and waited until 10:15 AM for Mr. Rohl to appear. He then asked
Mr. Rohl's secretary if she could locate him. She telephoned the Pleasanton Hotel
and^then stated that Mr. Rohl was not there and was probably out with General
Lyman. In passing the Pleasanton Hotel after leaving Mr. Rohl's office the
investigating officer observed Mr. Rohl's car parked in the hotel grounds, where-
upon he stopped and asked the hotel clerk the whereabouts of Mr. Rohl. He
was informd that Mr. Rohl was asleep in his room and was not to be disturbed,
and further, that he had informed Mr. Rohl's secretary of that fact when she
had called a few minutes earlier. The clerk was asked to call Mr. Rohl's room
by telephone. Mr. Rohl did not answer. Mr. Kina, the manager of the hotel, was
then asked to awaken him and advise him that a representative of the [2110]
Department Inspector General was there to see him. Mr. Kina went to Mr.
Rohl's room and then reported that Mr. Rohl would not be in his office until after
1 : 00 PM, and that he thoroughly disliked being disturbed. No further direct
attempt was made to contact Mr. Rohl, as it was believed useless to waste further
time in view of his evasive actions. The following morning the Office of the
Military Governor was contacted and requested to take necessary action to
compel Mr. Rohl to report to the Department Inspector General at a designated
time for the purpose of taking his testimony. The following morning the Office
of the Military Governor informed this office that Mr. Rohl had left for the
mainland several days before, apparently on the afternoon of the day that he
was found asleep in the hotel.
5. Neither Mr. Rohl nor anv of his representatives informed the Inspector
at any time that he intended to leave the Territory, but on the contrary apparently
tried to conceal the fact. j x v
6. The matter of irregularities in gasoline distribution is not believed to be
sufficiently serious to warrant Mr. Rohl's evasiveness. I am of the opinion that
something else, perhaps his citizenship status or other matters, may account for
his actions in persistently avoiding being questioned. , x^ <-
7. This matter has been held in abeyance, as this office was informed that
Mr. Rohl would return in about two weeks. As he has not yet returned and
[2111] no definite information can be obtained as to whether he will return,
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1101
it is recommended that the Federal Bureau of Investigation be requested to
malce a thorought inquiry into his citizenship status from the time he first
became connected with tlie organization l^nown as the Hawaiian Constructors
(Cost-Plus-A-Fixed-Fee Contractors) up to the present date, with a view of
criminal prosecution against all responsible persons if the facts so warrant
That is the end of that.
Do you recall whether Mr. Rohl was finally interviewed?
Colonel Row. Mr. Condon of the F. B. I., who is now on duty in
San Francisco, was on duty in Honolulu at that time. Yesterday, in
order to refresh ni}^ memory as to what was done, jNIr. Condon stated
that authority was obtained from the Department Commander to ask
for the assistance of the F. B. I. in this matter and that the F. B. I.
conducted investigations relative to this matter.
49. General Grunp:rt. What were the dates of those notes?
Colonel Row. I don't recall it.
50. General Grunert. They refer to April. April what year?
I am in the air as to the date that these notes were made and handed
in. Was it April '41, April '42, or what ?
51. Major Clausen. Do you remember, sir ?
Colonel Row. It would have to be in April '42.
52. General Grunert. And at that time there w^as question about
Mr. Rohl's citizenship ?
Colonel Row. It would be from — that would be so.
\2112] 53. General Grunert. And wasn't it well known that
he became a citizen in '41 ?
54. General Frank. September.
55. General Grunert. September of '41.
Colonel Row. I believe that is correct, according to the reports.
56. General Grunert. Then, I wonder why he evades being inter-
rogated on accotint of citizenship when he Ijecame a citizen, as the
Board understands, in September of '41. That is Mvhj I wondered
what that "April" there referred to, whether April of '42 or April of
'41. I just wanted to bring that out in the record because it leaves
an impression that that was prior to the time that he actually became
a citizen.
Colonel Row. No ; he became a citizen
57. General Frank. I gather from this that he was over there in
August of '41 before he got his citizenship papers; is that correct?
Colonel 'Row. I can't recall when he went over there. I am not
familiar with that.
58. General Grunert. Wlien was this investigation about gasoline?
When was that conducted ? In '42 or '41? Do you recall that?
Colonel Row. Do you have that ?
59. Major Clausen. No, sir.
Colonel Row. That would be sometime in 1942.
60. General Grunert. Well, then evidently the April date, the
month of April referred to therein, must be '42 ?
Colonel Row. Yes, sir. I am sure.
61. General Grunert. Therefore, that still confuses me more,
[211S1^ why they should be thinking that he was evading being
investigated because of citizenship.
But carry on. I just wanted to put that in the record.
62. Major Clausen. Yes, sir.
1102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Sir, I am going to read from page 10 of Colonel Hunt's report,
as follows:
(Excerpt from page 10 of Colonel Hunt's report is as follows :)
It is difficult, therefore, to escape the conclusion that Colonel Wyman knew
of Mr. Rohl's noncitizenship when the contract was entered into, or at latest
shortly after writing the unanswered letter summoning him to Hawaii. In such
circumstances any close relationship between Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl
thereafter would have involved the former in dealings with a man of doubtful
loyalty to the United States.
Well, my question was much similar to the one put by General
Grunert: whether you of your own knowledge know the basis for this
conclusion by Colonel Hunt.
Colonel Row. No, I am not familiar with that.
63. Major Clausen. In other words, did you follow up on that
asj)ect, or was that later on followed up by the F. B. I. ?
Colonel Row. It was followed up by the F. B. I. It was handled
as a civilian matter.
64. Major Clausen. Until Colonel Hunt came out to Hawaii; is
that so?
Colonel Row. I think that is right.
65. Major Clausen. Now, from page 11 of Colonel Hunt's report :
[21 H'] (Excerpt from page 11 of Colonel Hunt's report is as
follows:)
"Various witnesses testified to having seen Colonel Wyman with Mr. Rohl at
various semi-public functions, —
This is referring to Hawaii.
— when both men indulged freely in intoxicating beverages. So far as could
be ascertained, most of these instances were prior to the attack of 7 December.
No witness was found who could testify to drunkenness on Colonel Wyman's
part. His own testimony and that of other witnesses in this respect indicates
that Colonel Wyman maintained a totally unnecessary, and in the circumstances,
an undesirable social familiarity with the active head of an organization whose
prime business it was to profit from work under his supervision. If there is
reasonable doubt that this .relationship was with a man whose non-citizenship
at the commencement of the contract was known to him, there is no doubt
whatever that it was with a man who at the time of this relationship in Hawaii,
had been proven to Colonel Wyman to have concealed the fact of his alien
status. The least that can be said of that relationship is that it displayed a
callousness on Colonel Wyman's part, not only toward the character of his
associate, but toward the possible consequences of its public display.
Do you recall any facts being brought to your knowledge con-
cerning these incidents that are referred to on this page 11?
[2115'] Colonel Row. I don't ; don't recall.
66. Major Clausen. Do you recall whether any reports in the
Hawaiian Department were given to the Department Commander on
those aspects ?
Colonel Row. No; so far as I know, no reports were rendered nor
any investigations made in connection with that phase of the matter.
67. Major Clausen. Now, on page 31 Colonel Hunt says:
(Excerpts from Colonel Hunt's report are as follows:)
The flattery of Colonel Wyman personally and professionally, which was be-
stowed upon him by his wealthy associate, Mr. Rohl, evoked in Colonel Wyman
so complete a confidence in the former as to lead him to an unwise acceptance
of Mr. Rohl's judgment and advice during their subsequent association in Hawaii.
He thereby relinquished to some extent that independence of judgment required
of an officer in charge of the Government's interests, ^s, indicated in his too
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1103
ready acceptance of Mr. Rohl's recommendations relating to equipment pur-
chases and appraisals.
Then on this page there is this statement concerning one item :
Colonel Wyman did not act in the Government's best interest when in pur-
chasing Rohl-Connolly equipment at a cost of $166,423.17 against the appraised
value of $131,411.03—
And also this statement:
Colonel Wyman did not act in the Government's best interests in the pur-
chase of equipment from the 121161 Hawaiian Contracting Company
at a cost of $156,000, in that he based that payment upon a prejudiced appraisal —
Sir, do yon recall having received information concerning the
matters which Colonel Hnnt has disclosed on this page 31 in these
prior investigations ?
Colonel Row. I recall that we did make investigations relative to
the pnrchase of equipment, but the details I don't recall.
68. Major Clausen. Now, Colonel Hunt infers, by reason of the
discovery of these particular instances of acts of Colonel Wyman not
in the best interests of the Government, that there were others. Do
you recall other instances ?
Colonel Row^ I don't at this time, but the records in the office of
the Department of Inspector General should show them.
69. General Frank. Who is the Inspector General there now; do
you know ?
Colonel Row. Colonel Milard Pierson is the Inspector under Gen-
eral Richardson. I don't recall the Inspector of the Service Com-
mand, the Base Command.
70. Major Clausen. Colonel Hunt on page 391 states as follows, in
questioning a certain witness :
Now, I want to talk about the Hawaiian Constructors. Most observers seem
to agree that their work was not efficiently performed.
Did you get reports to that effect, sir ?
Colonel Row. We did receive reports to that effect, and we reported
on them.
[2117 j 71. Major Clausen. And what did you do with reports
as to the inefficiencies of the Hawaiian Constructors?
Colonel Row. These reports were rendered to the District Engineer,
and efforts were made to correct the deficiencies when found.
72. Major Clausen. Did he say so, you mean ?
Colonel Row. He reported that he was taking steps to correct de-
ficiencies.
73. Major Clausen. And these reports to that effect were rendered
over what period of time, sir ?
Colonel Row. It is my estimation that these reports started in the
early fall of 1941.
74. General Frank. What really happened here was that the chain
of command and control did not uncover this unsatisfactory opera-
tion, but that an agency outside the chain of command of the Engi-
neer Corps, namely the Department Commander, uncovered it and
asked for the relief of this man who was not doing satisfactory work ;
and that, therefore, the system of the Engineer Corps in administering
Wyman's work was not sufficient to uncover this condition and this
situation ?
1104 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Row. That is correct.
75. Major Clausen. Now, sir, do you recall a Robert Hoffman who
was an area superintendent of the Hawaiian Constructors?
(^olonel Row. I met him one morning.
76. Major Clausen. Do you recall an incident which occurred in the
office of General Farthing when Mr. Hoffman had complaints as to
delays and inefficiencies of the Hawaiian Constructors?
Colonel Row. I do.
[2118] 77. Major Clausen. Will you state to the Board what
3^ou recall concerning that incident ?
Colonel Row. As I recall, at some date about April or May 1942,
Brigadier General — Is it Farthing?
78. Major Clausen. Farthing.
Colonel Row. Brigadier General Farthing, Air Corps, telephoned
to me and stated that there was a party in his office who desired to make
a complaint. General Farthing asked me if I would come to his
office and receive this complaint. I did go to Hickam Field and there
met a Mr. Hoffman. I have forgotten his name.
79. Major Clausen. Robert Hoffman.
Colonel Row. Robert Hoffman. Mr. Hoffman gave me a sworn
statement of a number of pages in length. As I recall, his complaints
referred to operations at Bellows Field and included inefficiency of the
engineer operations and of the USED: United States Engineer De-
partment. As I recall, the complaints included conflicts of authority,
dual control, waste, and so forth. These complaints criticized Colonel
Wyman and other personnel.
Do you want me to go right ahead with the story?
80. Major Clausen. Yes, I think so.
Colonel Row. Before leaving Mr. Hoffman, General Farthing told
me that he had just given Mr. Hoffman a letter of commendation due
to the fact that Mr. Hoffman had been closely associated with Colonel
Farthing at Bellows Field.
81. General Frank. And had done good work ?
Colonel Row. And apparently had done good work, in the estima-
tion of General Farthing.
[2119] 82. General Grunert. Wliat work?
Colonel Row. Engineering work.
83. General Grunert. What kind of work?
84. Major Clausen. Area superintendent.
Colonel Row. As area superintendent at Bellows Field.
85. General Grunert. Was he working for Farthing or for Wyman ?
Hoffman.
Colonel Row. For Wyman. But General Farthing was in com-
mand of Bellows Field, as I recall.
86. General Russell. Was Hoffman a soldier?
87. Major Clausen. No, sir. He was employed by Hawaiian Con-
structors.
88. General Russell. Well, that is different.
89. Major Clausen. Yes.
90. General Frank. Nobody said he was a soldier.
91. General Russell. He could not work for the Engineers if he
was working for the contractor.
92. Major Clausen. Well, the Engineers on many occasions issued
orders directing the employees.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1105
By the way, the statement to which I invited your attention yester-
day, which is already an exhibit before this Board as being a state-
ment given in writing, with exhibits, by Mr, Hoffman to General
Farthing : do you recall whether you saw that statement on the occa-
sion when you went to the office of General Farthing?
Colonel Row. No, sir, I did not, as I recall.
93. Major Clausen. All right.
Colonel Row. I don't recall of ever seeing that statement.
94. General Grunert. Before we leave this subject of Hoffman,
[2120'] where is that sworn statement he made that you saw?
Is it available to the Board ?
Colonel Row. This report was typed. .
95. General Frank. What report?
Colonel Row. That Mr. Hoffman gave to me in the form of a sworn
statement. I transmitted it to the Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department, by memorandum recommending
96. General Grunert. Then you think it should be on file in the
records of the Hawaiian Department?
Colonel Row. It should be, sir.
97. Major Clausen. At this point I would like to show the witness
again the sworn statement or the statement that was furnished by
Mr. Hoffman.
98. General Grunert. You have it, then, have you?
99. Major Clausen. I have one, sir, and I would rather assume
that this that I have is the statement, although he informed me yes-
terday that he didn't think it was. I would like to get it. It will
just take me a moment.
(There was colloquj^ off the record.)
100. Major Clausen. I show you, Colonel, Exhibit No. 8-B in
evidence before this Board. I will ask you to take a look again and
see if that is the statement with the supporting documents that you
received — rather, a copy of the statement you received from Mr.
Robert Hoffman.
101. Colonel Toulmin. Give the date now.
102. Major Clausen. That was in '42,
Colonel Row. I examined this document day before yesterdaj^, and
I wouldn't say definitely that this document was never in the office
of the Department Inspector General, but I don't believe it was.
I don't recognize any feature of it except [2121] as to some
of the content, which was similar in nature to the sworn statement
that was given to me by JMr. Hoffman sometime in the spring of 1942.
103. Major Clausen. On page 16 of this Exhibit 8-B there is a
signature of Robert Hoffman and the date April 29, 1942. There
are attached to this statement of Robert Hoffman various documents
which are dated in 1941.
104. General Frank. What months?
[2122] 105. Major Clausen. There are July, September, Novem-
ber, December, August and so forth, and they refer to delays anc?-
inefficiencies.
I first want to ask the question as to whether you had any conver-
sations with General Farthing after this occasion that Mr. 'Hoffman
was in the office ?
Colonel Row. I may have, but I do not recall them.
1106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
106. Major Clausen. And with regard to the months of 1942, do
you know when that was that you had this conversation with Mr.
Hoffman and General Farthing ?
Colonel Row. It seems to me it was either in March or April of
1942.
107. Major Clausen. And did the statement that Mr. Hoffman
make to you refer to items of delays and inefficiencies that occurred
in 1941 ?
Colonel Row. That is my impression at this time.
108. Major Clausen. And did they refer to items of delays and
inefficiencies prior to 7 December, 1941 ?
Colonel Row. It is my impression that that is so.
109. General Russell. What is the date of that statement?
110. Major Clausen. This is dated April, 1942.
Now, for the record and in order that one thing may tie to another,
I am going to read from an F. B. I. report that was furnished to this
Board by G-2, which is dated October 29, 1942, on page 49, as follows :
(Excerpt from F. B. I. report, October 29, 1942, page 49, was read
as follows:)
Confidential informant T-1 related that his division conducted the investiga-
tion which precipitated the transfer [2123] of Colonel Theodore Wyman,
Jr. as District Engineer of the Hawaiian Islands. In connection with that
investig'ation, one Robert Hoffman, Area Superintendent, Hawaiian Construc-
tors, voluntarily furnished information to Confidential Informant T-1 which
indicated many inefiiciencies in connection with construction work performed
by the Hawaiian Constructors and described in detail instances where major
work performed by them had cost the government at least 50 per cent more than
it should have cost under the circumstances. According to Informant T-1,
Hoffman is considered a capable engineer of wide experience and training whose
opinions would undoubtedly carry a considerable amount of v/eight.
This report is by the party you mentioned from the F. B. I., John
Condon. Do you recall having a conversation with Mr. Condon con-
cerning this incident ?
Colonel Row. I do not recall any such conversation with him.
111. Major Clausen. Do you recall if some other member of your
division did ?
Colonel Row. It might have been some other member of my divi-
sion.
112. Major Clausen. I have no further questions.
113. General Frank. Will you state if, as a. result of your investi-
gations of this situation, whether or not in your own mind you con-
cluded, as to the efficiency or inefficiency of the contractors' work, as
to whether or not there was waste and so forth ? •
Colonel Row. I was definitely of the opinion that there \2WJi\
was a great deal of waste and unnecessary expenditure of time and
funds.
114. General Frank. That was based on what?
Colonel Row\ Our inspections and investigations made by our office.
115. General Frank. A series of them ?
Colonel Row. A series.
116. General Frank. But those reports were submitted to the Dis-
trict Engineer and not to the Division Engineer?
Colonel Row. That is correct, as I recall it.
117. General Frank. Do you know whether or not copies were sent
to Washington?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1107
Colonel Row. I believe that some of them, in certain instances, were
sent on. I believe the records in the office of the Inspector General
will show that.
118. General Frank. Otherwise the report just passed back and
forth between the Department Commander and Wyman, and the De-
partment Connnander had no authority in 1941 to put the screws on
Wyman direct?
Colonel Row, No, sir. No cooperation between the Commander and
the District Engineer.
119. General Russell. Colonel, I want to see if I can tie the evidence,
or some of it, up with a few questions. You became the Department
Inspector about when?
Colonel Row. May of 1941.
120. General Russell. How soon after you became the Department
Inspector was it before you were directed to investigate any phase or
phases of the construction which was being done in the Hawaiian
Islands ?
[2125] Colonel Row. The order for inspections had been re-
ceived in the Department some time in February or March, as I recall,
of 1941, but no inspections had been made until after my arrival.
121. General Russell. Do you recall when this Colonel Emil W.
Leard made the inspection, the report of which has been read into the
record by Major Clausen ?
Colonel Row. I should think some time between January and March,
the early part of March, 1942. As I recall, the report was a memoran-
dum to the Chief of Staff, which was made about the 14th of February.
122. General Russell. Is your testimony now that from the time
that you took over as Department Inspector, no investigation into that
construction work was made until the year 1942 ?
Colonel Row. Inspections were made more or less continuously from
early fall, at least, in 1941, somewhere in the early fall of 1941.
123. General Russell. Then this division in your office that was set
up to investigate the type of contract under which the work was done
was actually set up in the fall of 1941 ?
Colonel Row. Yes, sir.
124. General Russell. We have to this time no records of any in-
spections up until the Leard inspections, is that true ?
125. Major Clausen. I have none, sir, except from the witness. The
witness says they were made, but I have not seen the inspections.
126. General Russell. Colonel, did you believe, based upon the
inspections made after you became the Department Inspector and
[2126] down to the completion of the work, that you are in any
position to give an opinion as to the efficiency of the work that was
being done by the contractors prior to December 7th, 1941 ?
Colonel Row. Our opinion was that due to the great expansion of
work, engineer work, in Hawaii, the organization of the office of the
District Engineer was not properly reorganized to handle the great
amount of work that came there. While the engineers were having all
of these difficulties, the Zone Construction Quartermaster operating in
Hawaii on construction work was properly organized and was having
little or very little difficulty. Our inspections included inspections of
the Construction Quartermaster, and I would say the results of those
inspections were excellent.
79716— i6— Ex. 145, vol. 3 31
1108 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
127. General Frank. Who was the Zone Construction Quarter-
master?
Colonel Row. Lieutenant Colonel Clinton Harrold, Quartermaster
Corps.
128. General Russell. How did the work being done under the
supervision of the Zone Construction Quartermaster and that being
done under the supervision of the District Engineer compare as to
extensiveness ? Or in size or complexity ?
Colonel Row. I believe that the work of the District Engineer was
greater in volume and more extensive.
129. General Russell. And more complex?
Colonel Row. And possibly more complex. *
130. General Russell. Colonel, in your opinion were the waste,
inefficiency and other inadequacies inherent in the construction in 1941
attributable solely to the expansion of the work and the failure of the
District Engineer's office to keep his administrative work apace with
this expansion ?
[2127] Colonel Row. Yes, sir.
131. General Russell. Then you do not believe that his personal
conduct, including drinking, if any, his association with and contacts
with Hans Wilhelm Rohl, had anything to do with this ineffective-
ness of the work, the inefficiency or the waste?
Colonel Row. I am unable to answer you on that, because I was not
familiar with the personal conduct of Colonel Wyman.
132. General Russell. Laying aside familiarity with the personal
conduct of Wyman and the conduct of Rohl which might have to come
to your attention by virtue of facts, did rumors of such conduct reach
your ears, either as Inspector or as an officer resident in Hawaii ?
Colonel Row. As I recall this familiarity between Mr. Rohl and
other officials with Colonel Wyman came about largely as a result of
our inspection of the Pleasanton Hotel matter. That, as I recall, was
the first time that it came to my attention that they were very closely
associated.
133. General Russell. Can you tell the approximate date of the
inspection of the Hotel matter?
Colonel Row. It would be some time in 1942.
134. General Russell. Did that inspection then discover facts re-
lating to improper relations between Rohl and Wyman in the year
1941 ?
Colonel Row. No, sir, I do not think so.
135. General Grunert. I have some questions.
I am not quite clear as to the character of inspections that were
required from your office as to construction matters. Did those in-
spections actually include any inspection of engineer work in the field,
or was it limited to paper work and [3128] administration
and management within the office ?
Colonel Row. It was largely administrative inspections. We did
not at any time go into the technical engineer matters.
136. General Grunert. Would such inspections as were made dis-
close the causes for any delays in the matter of completion of engineer
projects ?
Colonel Row. Yes, I believe it would be within the province of the
inspection.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1109
137. Geiioral (thunert. Did any siicli iiisi)ecli()ii sll()^v the reason
for an}' particular clela3's in the eoni})letion of such i)rojects?
Colonel Row. No, sir.
138. General Gkunekt. Then you will not l)e able to tell nie whether
or not such delays as were discovered were intent ional on the part of
the military or the contractors?
Colonel "Row. No, sir.
13D. General Gkunekt. The waste and extravagance and suc.'h de-
lays as were incident to the faulty adnnnistration, as you mifrht call
it, do you know whether or not they were limited to what happened
prior to Deceml)er 7th, or contimied after Decern Iter 7th, or increased
after December 7tli, compared with prior thereto?
Colonel Row. I think the waste naturally increased after Pearl
Harbor, when the urgency for rai)id construction was more apparent.
140. General Gruxert. Then is there anything through those in-
spections to indicate to you that there were intentional delays caused
prior to the Pearl Harbor attack which might have been of advan-
tage to the attackers?
Colonel Row. No, sir, that was never brought into it. [2129]
Intentional delays were never brought to our attention at any time.
141. General Frank. Do you think the delay and waste was greater
than what might be expected in such a large expansion and under the
stress of accomplishing work for war purposes?
Colonel Row. Yes, sir. We felt that correct organization of the
District Engineer's setup would have eliminated a great deal of this
waste, which was largely a dehciency in organization, as we saw it.
142. Major Clausen. Do you have a copy of the letter from the
Secretary of War asking the Hawaiian Department or the Inspector
General to conduct these investigations?
Colonel Ro\v. I do not have, but it should be on WW in the office
of the Department or the Inspector General.
143. Major Clausen. And you say the date is February, 1941?
Colonel Row. About that time, Feln'uary or March, probably
March.
144. Major Clausen. And you were Department Insjjector when?
Colonel Row\ From May ll)41.
145. Major Clausen. A\'lien you assumed that position did you see
and read that letter?
Colonel Row. Oh, yes.
14G. General Grunert. Colonel, is there anything else that you
can think of to add which might throw light on the entire held of
our investigation, anything that has not been liroiight up, tluit you
think you might add ?
Colonel Row. No, sir.
147. General (trunert. All light. Thank \-ou, \erv nuich.
(The witness was excused, with thi- usual admonition.)
[2130] TESTIMONY OF MAJOR HOWARD F. COOPER, AIR CORPS :
1466 ARMY AIR FORCES BASE UNIT, ATC.
(The witness was sworn bv the Recorder and advi-cd of his riuhts
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Will you please state to the Board yoiu- name,
rank, organization, and station.
1110 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Major Cooper. Howard F. Cooper; Major, Air Corps; 1466 Army
Air Forces Base Unit, ATC; APO 938, care of Postmaster, Minne-
apolis, Minn.
2. General Grunert. Major, the Board is after facts, and is trying
to get a lead to facts, to find out what happened prior to and during
the attack on Pearl Harbor. Your name having appeared as a wit-
ness before the Roberts Commission, we asked that you be sent to us
so that we could find out what facts you know, and how you can help
us out.
Now, tell us, first, what was your assignment, at the time the attack
took place, December 7, 1941 ?
Major Cooper. At the time of the attack, I was a First Lieutenant,
Command Headquarters, and Headquarters Squadron, Seventeenth
Service Group,
3. General Grunert. And where was that organization stationed at
that time ?
Major Cooper. It was stationed at Hickam Field.
4. General Grunert. What can you tell us, briefly, about the attack,
itself, from what you personally know about it ?
Major Cooper. On the morning of December 7, 1941, at about 5 to 7,
I heard loud explosions, which got me out of bed, immediately, and I
raised the shade and looked over Pearl Harbor and saw huge billows
of smoke arising. In a few minutes [2131'] after that, loud
explosions came from the hangar line, ancl I immediately ran to the
bathroom and looked out over the hangar line and saw planes bombing
the hangars.
I got into my clothes with my pistol and gas-mask and helmet and
ran down to the squadron ; got the First Sergeant to disperse all of the
members of the organization, armed with rifles, and walked out onto
the parade grounds, where there were two 50-calibers set up. They
were not in operating condition. I stayed with one gun until it was
in operation, and I walked down to the other gun and ordered the
fellows to fire, and they said that one part was missing, for which they
were waiting, and they assured me that the part was on its way, any
efforts to get it faster would be to no avail since there were two fellows
dispatched to get this particular part; and at this time, a third forma-
tion of bombers came over and dropped bombs on the barracks. The
fellows at the gun were all killed.
5. General Grunert. Was it part of your duties to man those guns
during a defense against an air attack ?
Major Cooper. No, sir.
6. General Grunert. You just took charge of them, did you ?
Major Cooper. Yes, sir.
7. General Grunert. How did you know they were down there ?
Major Cooper. I walked out onto the parade ground and saw them.
8. General Grunert. And you say there were some machine guns in
position, but they were not ready to fire because of missing parts?
Major Cooper. Yes, sir.
9. General Grunert. And were these machine guns part of the
\2132] defensive set-up of Hickam Field ?
Major Cooper. No. sir.
10. General Grunert. What were they doing out there, do you
know?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1111
Major Cooper. As a result of the attack, attack methods were de-
vised to protect the field, on the spot.
11. General Grunert. You mean they were suddenly pulled out
there ?
Major Cooper. Yes, sir ; from the ordnance.
12. General Grunert. It had not been arranged beforehand?
Major Cooper. The}^ were pulled out from the ordnance.
13. General Frank. After the first attack ?
Major Cooper. Yes, sir; after the first attack.
14. General Frank. They had not been out there all night ?
Major Cooper. No, sir.
15. General Grunert. I understood you to say it was about 5 to 7.
Was it 5 to 7, or was it 5 to 8 ?
Major Cooper, Oh, that was 5 to 7. No, that was 5 to 8.
16. General Grunert, You are sure it was 5 to 8, not 5 minutes to
7? because I thought you said 5 to 7.
Major Cooper. Yes, sir ; I am positive it was 5 to 8 because when I
did finally return to my quarters, my electric clock had stopped at 8
o'clock, and it was about five minutes before that, that the attack
started.
17. General Grunert. In your testimony before the Roberts Com-
mission you stated, at the time of the attack, you were on Alert No. 3
for about two weeks. What were the forms of alert, and what was
No. 3?
\2133'\ Major Cooper. I am not positive as to the number of the
alert. We had three forms of the alert, there. One was, alert against
external invasion; and the other was, alert against internal sabotage;
and the third was a combination of the two, which was the very serious
alert.
18. General Grunert. Wliich one were you on ?
Major Cooper. We were on the second, the alert against sbotage.
19. General Grunert. Then, though you named it "No. 3," it might
have been some other number, but it was the alert against sabotage 1
Major Cooper. Yes, sir ; it was the alert against sabotage.
20. General Grunert. Because No. 3 happens to be the all-out alert.
Major Cooper. We were not on that ; no, sir.
21. General Grunert. I wanted to clear up that point in the testi-
mony before the Roberts Commission, because it says "Alert No. 3,"
and Alert No. 3 is an all-out alert ; and you were alerted for sabotage ?
Major Cooper. Yes, sir.
22. General Grunert. That happens to be No. 1.
Major Cooper. No. 2, sir, I believe.
23. General Grunert. In your remembrance, it was No. 2, but it
was the sabotage alert?
Major Cooper. Yes, sir.
24. General Grunert. That was the only thing I had to bring out.
Have you any questions ?
Thank you very much for coming in.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon, at 10 : 40 a. m., the Board, having concluded the hearing
of witnesses for the morning, took up the consideration of other
business.)
1112 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[2IS4.] AFTERNOON SESSION
The Board reconvened at 2 p. m., and continued with the hearing
of witnesses, as follows :
TESTIMONY OF THOMAS E. TILLMAN, 1230 SHAFTER STREET,
SAN MATEO, CALIFORNIA.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Mr. Tillman, will you please state to the Board
your name and address.
Mr. Tillman. Thomas E. Tillman, 1230 Shafter street, San Mateo.
2. Colonel West. San Mateo, California?
Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir.
3. General Grunert. Mr. Tillman, the Board is after facts con-
cerning certain things that happened in Hawaii prior to the Pearl
Harbor attack and during the attack. We have also been charged
with making an investigation of certain things that happened in
Hawaii, in which Colonel Wyman was concerned. I believe you have
information on that phase, and I will ask General Frank and the
Assistant Recorder, Major Clausen, to develop whatever you may
know.
4. General Frank. Where were you employed, in 1941?
Mr. Tillman. U. S. Engineers, at Honolulu.
5. General Frank. What was your position?
Mr. Tillman. I was in the estimating section.
6. General Frank. In what office?
Mr. Tillman. In the Operations Office, U. S. Engineers.
7. General Frank. Is that the district engineer ?
Mr. Tillman. That's right.
8. General Frank. Who was your immediate superior?
[2135] Mr. Tillman. It was first a civilian, that I can't remem-
ber his name. It was later Colonel B. L. Robinson.
9. General Frank, Colonel Robinson was Colonel Wyman's assist-
ant, is that right ?
Mr. Tillman. Colonel Robinson was Operations Officer for the
district engineer.
10. General Frank. What were your duties?
Mr. Tillman. Estimating the cost of various phases of work that
the contractor was going to do for the U. S. Engineers.
11. Major Clausen. You recall that, after Colonel Wyman was
relieved from the position as district engineer in Hawaii, you did
some work on the air-raid warning system stations ?
Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir.
12. Major Clausen. And you explained to me, today, the reason for
that. What was the reason? Why were you called in to do that,
sir?
Mr. Tillman. I think the principal reason was that they didn't
seem to get them completed, and the progress wasn't satisfactory,
and they called me in as more of a trouble-shooter, to see if something
couldn't be done to speed up the completion of it.
13. Major Clausen. And who gave you directions to do that?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1113
Mr. Tillman. Lieutenant Colonel Weimer.
14. Major Clausen. When were those instructions given you?
Mr. Tillman. I would say either the very latter part of April, or
the first of June — right in that.
15. General Frank. What year?
Mr. Tillman. 1942.
16. Major Clausen. Now, you also stated to me, when I asked you,
today, as to the reasons why the work had been lagging, [2136]
several reasons. Would you tell the Board what you told me.
Mr. Tillman. You want me to explain it in about the same words
that I exjjlained it to you ?
17. Major Clausen. Yes. This is informal. You told me some-
thing about the work lagging, and you said the reasons were such and
such and such. Just start in as you did with me and explain to the
Board.
Mr. Tillman. Well, the stations were located in various areas
around the island of Oahu. That is the one I am speaking of; and
the Island of Oahu was divided up into areas. Each area had an
area engineer and a superintendent for the contractors. It so hap-
pened that I believe every AWS station was situated at a consider-
able distance from the otHce or headquarters of the superintendent
and area engineer. It was my observation, while I was area engineer,
and other times, too, that the superintendent was not paying a great
deal of attention to the construction of the AWS stations. By the
way, you understand that the AWS stations were a tunnel drilled in
the various places, and usually it was on a hill or a "mountain" as you
might call it, there. After the tunnel was completed, certain other
phases ©4 work had to be done, there, and when those were completed,
then the signal corps made their installations. They would not
move any equipment there until they were completed, painted, and
the civilian crew ready to move out.
18. General Frank. You are talking about the permanent installa-
tions ?
Mr. Tillman. That is correct.
19. General Frank. Do you remember where they were?
Mr. Tillman. Yes, I do.
20. General Fr.\nk. Will you state where they were?
Mr. Tillman. Koko Head, Opana, Uliipau, Kaena Point, Pumana-
hu, Mt. Kaala, and Fort Shafter.
[£137] 21. General Frank. Was there a tunnel to be con-
structed at each one of these places ?
Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, the installations were
in a tunnel, and the specifications called for a 48-foot minimum cover-
age over it.
22. General Frank. You are giving the name "tunnel" to what
they called a "bomb-proof," aren't you ?
Mr. Tillman. Well, yes.
23. General Frank. All right.
Mr. Tillman. It was a tunnel, by the way.
24. Major Clausen. Now, Mr. Tillman, you said that the superin-
tendent didn't pay much attention to these AWS constructions. The
superintendents to which you refer were superintendents of whom?
Mr. Tillman. For the contractor.
1114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
25. Major Clausen. In other words, the Hawaiian Constructors'
superintendent ?
Mr. Tillman. That is right.
26. Major Clausen. And what is the basis for your statement in
that respect?
Mr. Tillman. The areas in which the superintendent had control
of the work were all large areas. He not only had the AWS stations,
but in most instances he had a multitude of other work in progress.
And I just think that he had too much work to do.
27. Major Clausen. How long had this lagging of this work con-
tinued, to your knowledge?
Mr. Tillman. At the time of the attack
28. Major Clausen. You mean December 7, 1941 ?
Mr. Tillman. December 7 — ^the runways were given, if I \2138']
remember right, a No. 1 priority. I believe the AWS stations were
given No. 2 priority.
29. Major Clausen. Given by whom?
Mr. Tillman. The district engineer. The work involved in build-
ing the AWS stations at the beginning of course was all tunnel work
or excavation. This excavation or tunnel, whichever one you want
to call it, was as I say in every instance at the top or near the top of a
mountain. Some of those — in fact every one of them with one excep-
tion, was inaccessible to anything but foot traffic and mules. Couldn't
get a truck or any kind of equipment near them. It was a tremendous
job of digging this so-called "tunnel," it was slow work, very slow.
Does that answer it?
30. Major Clausen. Well, I just would like to have 3^ou tell the
Board and tell me what was the basis for your conclusioii that the
work was lagging ; and I suppose you have told, as much as you can.
Mr. Tillman. At the time I took over the so-called "trouble-shoot-
ing" of the stations, there was quite a complaint from the signal corps
that we were not making any progress. Colonel Weimer sent me out.
. 31. Major Clausen, that is not "Wyman"?
Mr. Tillman. No, that is not "Wyman."
32. Major Clausen. All right. Proceed, please.
Mr. Tillman. He sent me out to Fort Shafter to interview a Major
and a Colonel in charge of the Signal Corps, I can't recall their names,
to find out just what the.v wanted and required. I went out there and
interviewed them, and they just put me right on the spot to get them
completed to where they could make their [3139] installations.
33. Major Clausen. NoWj Mr. Tillman, in connection with your
activities, did you as an estimator have some dealings with the Ha-
waiian Contracting Company, one of the joint adventurers in the
Hawaiian Constructors?
Mr. Tillman. Not while I was in the estimating section ; no.
34. Major Clausen. Did you receive instructions from Colonel
Robinson to appraise certain equipment belonging to the Hawaiian
Contracting Company?
Mr. Tillman. I did, Major, but that was after I was placed in charge
of the Plant Control section.
35. Major Clausen. All right. Let me have the date, please, on
chat.
Mr. Tillman. That date was December 9, 1941.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1115
36. Major Clausen. And your position at that time was what,
Mr. TiUman?
Mr. Tillman. Head of the PLant Control section.
37. Major Clausen. Tell the Board exactly what you did.
Mr. Tillman. I rounded up equipment, rented it, bought it.
38. Major Clausen. No, I mean you received some instructions from
Colonel Robinson ?
Mr. Tillman. Yes.
39. Major Clausen. Concerning equipment of the Hawaiian Con-
tracting Company ? What instructions were they ?
Mr. Tillman. "I received a typewritten list of equipment owned by
the Hawaiian Contracting Company.
40. Major Clausen. From whom?
Mr. Tillman. From Colonel B. L. Robinson, priced out, [21^]
itemized and priced, with a request that I go out and make an appraisal
of it with a view to buying it. I went out to the Hawaiian Contract-
ing Company's yard, took an equipment expert with me, started to
make the appraisal, and was called to the telephone by the superin-
tendent of the yard, and Mr. H. P. Benson, former president of the
Hawaiian Contracting Company, and on the board of directors for the
Hawaiian Constructors, was on the phone, and asked me what I was
doing out there. I told him I was making an appraisal of the equip-
ment. He said, "That equipment has already been appraised, and
I am very much concerned with what you are doing, ancl I wish you
v.'ould get out of there." I did. I went back and picked up my man
and went back to the office, reported to Colonel Wyman that so far as
I could see the equipment was nothing but junk and we wouldn't be
interested in any of it.
41. Major Clausen. You say you reported to whom?
]Mr. Tillman. I mean to Colonel Robinson.
42. Major Clausen. Did you later receive additional instructions
from Colonel Robinson concerning the same equipment ?
Mr. Tillman. I did. I was ordered to go back there and make an
appraisal, and not let anybody stop me.
43. Major Clausen. That was how soon after the first time?
Mr. Tillman. I would say that was approximately two weeks later.
44. Major Ct^ausen. All right. Then what did you do?
Mr. Tillman. I then took this one appraiser, and also another one,
with me, and went out and made an appraisal of it, turned in a report,
it was practically junk and we had no use for it, and would be unable
to use it. The equipment was out- [2141] dated and not equip-
ment suitable for our needs at all.
45. Major Clausen. You sav you turned in a written report to that
effect?
Mr. TiLLJiAN. Yes, sir.
46. Major Clausen. To whom did you give your report?
Mr. Tillman. Colonel Robinson.
47. Major Clausen. Have you a copy?
Mr. Tillman. No, I haven't.
48. Major Clausen. Do you know where we can obtain a copy, other
than in Hawaii?
Mr. Tillman. No, I don't.
1116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
49. Major Clausen. Do you know, then, what happened, after you
had turned in this adverse report, with respect to Colonel Wyman?
Mr. Tillman. I was told, and I don't remember who told me, and
I think it's a fact that Colonel Wyman, the week prior to his being
relieved over there, ordered that that same equipment be purchased
and the deal completed before he left office.
50. Major Clausen. All right.
At this point, I invite the attention of the Board to page 31 of the
written report. It is a confidential report.
What is your present position ?
Mr. Tillman. Engineer.
51. Major Clausen. By whom are you employed?
Mr. Tillman. Donald R. Warren Company.
52. General Frank. Wlio was Mr. Benson?
Mr. Tillman. Mr. Benson was on the executive board of the
Hawaiian Constructors, and formerly was president of the Hawaiian
Contracting Company.
53. General Frank. Well, who was he to give you instructions,
[214^] when you were working for the district engineer?
Mr. Tillman. Except that I was on his property, he had no
authority.
54. General Frank. Was this equipment later purchased by the
Government ?
Mr. Tillman. It was my understanding that it was.
55. General Frank. Wlio was the co-adventurer? Who was the
contractor who had charge of building the aircraft warning service
stations ?
Mr. Tillman. The contractor was the Hawaiian Constructors.
56. General Frank. I know, but when those projects came up,
were they handled by the Hawaiian Constructors, as a whole, or were
they assigned to different contractors?
Mr. Tillman. No, sir; they were handled by the Hawaiian Con-
structors.
57. General Frank. As a whole?
Mr. Tillman, As a whole.
58. General Frank. In other words, the Rohl-ConnoUy Company
did not handle one series of projects, and the Woolley Company
another ?
Mr. Tillman. No, sir.
59. General Frank. And the Callalian Company, another group?
They all handled them as a single, definite group ?
Mr. Tillman. That is right, in so far as I knew. I didn't know
anything about the Rohl-Connolly Company, Mr. Woolley, a Ralph
Woolley, was also in the same capacity with Mr. Benson, in the
Hawaiian Constructors.
60. General Frank. Do you remember how much was paid for this
Hawaiign Contractors' equipment?
[214^3] Mr. Tillman. The price as it was listed to me was
$170,000.
61. General Frank. How much was it worth, as a result of your
evaluation?
Mr. Tillman. You mean in so far as the engineers were concerned ?
62. General Frank. Yes.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1117
Mr. TiLLMAx. Worth nothing,
63. General Fkank. Had it been used by the Hawaiian Contracting
Company on government projects?
Mr. Tillman. No, sir. You understand this equij^ment was some
of it 30, 35, and even 40 years old. It had laid in their yard until it
was overgrown with weeds, rusty, and — well, in other words, equip-
ment that had been discarded many years before.
64. General Frank. Do you know why the engineers wanted to
buy it?
Mr. Tillman. No, sir.
65. General Frank. Do you know whether or not it was ever used ?
• INIr. Tillman. By the engineers?
66. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. Tillmamn. No; I don't.
67. General Frank. Or by the contractors?
Mr. Tillman. No; I don't. I know some of it could not be used.
68. General Frank. Who comprised the rest of the firm with Ben-
son, in the Hawaiian Contracting Company ?
Mr. Tillman. Mr. Kalph Woolley, Paul Graef— G-r-a-e-f—
69. General Frank. No, I am talking about the Hawaiian
[2144] Contracting Company.
Mr. Tillman. Oh, I don't know. I do know wdio was supposedly
the money in back of it, and that was — I can't recall it right now. It
is a very well known one.
70. Major Clausen. Dillingham?
Mr. Tillman. Dillingham — right. He was supposed to own the
company, and Benson was the front for it.
71. General Frank. The Hawaiian Contracting Company was a
Haw^aiian firm, it was not a California firm?
Mr. Tillman. That is right.
72. General Russell. The Hawaiian Constructors were referred
to as a "joint group" or "joint adventurers," who took on all of this
work out there; is that true?
Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir.
73. General Russell. Then Hawaiian Contractors was a local cor-
poration?
Mr. Tillman. That is right.
74. General Russell. Ancl was Hawaiian Contractors a member of
this group which was going to do all that work?
Mr. Tillman. No. Shortly after the raid, the conditions there
were such that no local contractor — or, I won't say "no", but hardly
any of the local contractors could get any equipment or material to
work with. They were left you might say stranded, and it w^as my
understanding that they took in Ralph "Woolley and Mr. Benson
just as sort of co-partners in the Hawaiian Constructors.
75. General Russell. As additional parties?
Mr. Tillman. I don't mean that they took in the firnL I mean
that they just took in these two men.
[214-5] 76. General Russell. Let us go back to the Hawaiian
Contractors ; the people with the money in that outfit were the Dil-
linghams?
Mr. Tillman. That was my understanding.
1118 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
77. General Russell. The Dillinghams are quite big operators out
there ?
Mr. Tillman. They are.
78. General Russell. They own a great deal of real-estate?
Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir.
79. General Russell. They are charged with being rather powerful
in that area ?
Mr. Tillman. They are.
80. General Russell. They are powerful ? They could go directly
to Washington and have some influence?
Mr. Tillman. I don't know about that.
81. General Russell. Have you ever heard of a Colonel Hunt ?
Mr. Tillman. No, sir.
82. General Russell. Did he approach you at any time and secure
from you a statement as to your relation with the worl^ that was car-
ried on out there in the Hawaiian Department?
Mr. Tillman. I don't recall, if he ever did.
83. General Russell. Have you been called as a witness before
anyone, or any body of people, prior to today, for the purpose of
giving the testimony which you are giving to this Board ?
Mr. Tillman. The day before I left Hawaii, I was called in by the
FBI in Honolulu and asked almost these same questions.
84. General Russell. And what date was that, Mr. Tillman?
Mr. Tillman. That would be August 5, 1942.
85. General Russell. With the exception of the statement that
you made to the FBI, are there any others ?
\^2H6'] Mr. Tillman. Well, they also called, when I was on a
secret station for the engineers up at Petaluma, and interviewed me
again.
86. General Frank. The FBI?
Mr. Tillman. The FBI.
87. General Russell. Other than to the FBI, you have testified to
nobody, or to any Board ?
Mr. Tillman. No.
88. General Russell. Benson represented Hawaiian Contractors,
and he told you, when he ordered you off the property, that this
equipment had been previously appraised ?
Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir.
89. General Russell. Do you know now what the basis of that
statement by Benson was?
Mr. Tillman. I think so.
[2147] 90. General Russell. Would you tell us, please.
Mr. Tillman. I found out later that one of Mr. Benson's employees
and a machinery equipment representative and one other man — I
can't recall who he was — had made an appraisal of the equipment.
91. General Russell. Do you know of your own knowledge what
the appraisal value on this machinery was, as fixed by those three
people ?
Mr. Tillman. That was where the $170,000 came from. That was
their appraisal.
92. General Russell. Do you know of any appraisal of this ma-
chinery which may have been in the neighborhood of $130,000 ?
Mr. Tillman. No, sir, I don't.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1119
93. General Russell. You state that you submitted with your
appraisal report a list of this equipment?
Mr, Tillman. No. I was given a list by Colonel Robinson.
94. General Russell. Did you turn that list back in to Colonel
Robinson ?
Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir.
95. General Russell. Did you make any effort upon your second
visit to the place where this equipment was located to fix a value on
the items of the equipment?
Mr. Tillman. Yes.
96. General Russell. I believe your testimony was to the effect
that the Engineers didn't want it at any price, that it would be of
no value to them.
Mr. Tillman. I don't believe I made the statement that the Engi-
neers didn't want it. It was my recommendation that we do not pur-
chase it, that we would have no — could not use it.
\_21Jf8'\ 97. General Russell. Do you recall what the aggregate
appraisal value that you placed upon it was ?
Mr. Tillman. No, I don't.
98. General Russell. But you did place a value of some sort?
Mr. Tillman. Yes.
99. General Russell. Now, one more question about the air warning
service : As a result of 5^our efforts was the work on these air warning
service stations accelerated ?
Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir.
100. General Russell. Would you please tell the Board what steps
you took to accelerate that work ?
101. General Frank. May I ask one question : What date was this
that you were put on the acceleration of this work ?
Mr. Tillman. Probably the last of April or right around the first
of June.
102. General Frank. Of what year?
Mr. Tillman. 1942.
103. General Frank. Yes.
104. General Russell. That answer was made a little while ag(
and seems a bit queer to me : last of April or the first of June. Why
was May left out ? Do you remember those two
Mr. Tillman. Wait a minute. I should have said May. Pardon
me.
105. General Russell. Now, to go back to my question: the steps
that you took to accelerate the work on these air warning stations.
Mr. Tillman. Well, I don't know whether I could just tell you
exactly the steps I took.
106. General Grunert. What did you do that wasn't done before ?
[214^] Mr. Tillman. As a matter of fact, the station that I was
ordered to complete first, when I arrived there there was nobody work-
ing on it, and I went right down to the area engineer who was in
charge of that area and wanted to know why there were no men work-
ing there, and he said. Well, they had no equipment, nothing to work
with. I went back up there then and made a survey to see just what
they had to have, and got in touch with the foreman who had been in
1120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
charge of it, and got a list of equipment from him, or material that
he had to have, and I went out and rounded up this equipment.
107. General Russell. Well, that is exactly what we are thinking
about. On that station nothing was being done, and you got equip-
ment and people and started to work?
Mr. Tillman. That is right.
108. General Russell. Now, do you have any recollection as to what
happened at other stations?
Mr. Tillman. The other stations, they were working, but they were
not making suitable progress. The tunnels were all completed; that
is, the tunnel crew were finished with their work and out of there.
It was more or less concrete and carpenter work and electrical work,
plenty of electrical work, after the tunnel crew got out of there. They
were very short of electrical supplies to complete these stations. In
other words, I think I told the Major some of the items that they didn't
have and that were practically nonobtainable : for instance, 5000-watt
KVA — 5000-volt hotheads, varnish cambric tape, 6-inch pipe cover,
60-amp. double-throw switches, in which I went into a shop where I
linew the man in charge, and had him make these switches. We had
certain stations completed \2150\ up to the point where noth-
ing was left to do but a 60-amp. double-throw switch ; that was all we
had to do to complete them. Well, I went into the shop and had them
made and took them out there and handed them to the electrician. I
did the same thing with pipe cover. I did the same thing with various
other items. I just scouted around until I found them, and took them
out there and handed them right to the men. Each station had a hun-
dred-foot steel tower to be erected. They sent inexiDeriencecl steel men
up there, or men, to erect these towers. They couldn't make any
progress with them at all. At one station I had three different crews
before I got a tower erected.
109. General Russell. What did you say was wrong? Why couldn't
they complete them ?
Mr. Tillman. The towers ?
110. General Russell. Yes.
Mr. Tillman. They didn't know anything about steel erection.
111. General Russell. Lack of skill in that work?
Mr. Tillman. That is right.
112. General Russell. Well, there were various things that you did?
Mr. Tillman. Oh, yes.
113. General Russell. Procurement of the necessary personnel and
procurement of materiel, things of that kind ?
Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir.
114. General Russell. I think that is all I have to ask.
115. General Grunert. Along this same line : Do you know any-
thing about the status of completion of those air warning service in-
stallations as of December 7, '41?
\2151\ Mr. Tillman. I really don't.
116'. General Grunert. Do you know what caused any delays prior
to December 7, '41, on them?
Mr. Tillman. I would say the same reasons that I cited before.
117. General Grunert. I believe 3^011 told us that there was a ques-
tion of an area engineer or supervisor, whatever he is, having a number
of engineering projects to process at the same time, and that the air
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1121
warning service stuflf was, say, Priority 2. Do you know of any
reason why they shouldn't work on both projects simultaneously?
Was it a question of lack of material, lack of personnel, or what?
Mr. Tillman. They were working oh both projects simultaneously.
They were working on all projects simultaneously but preference was
given to runways immediately following the raid. They were given
hrst preference.
118. General Grunert. Immediately following December 7?
Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir.
119. General Grunert. But prior thereto do you know whether they
w^ere given preference ?
Mr. Tillman. I don't believe we had a priority system set up prior
to that.
120. General Frank. As a matter of fact, prior to that they didn't
have any money to build the runways, did they ?
Mr. Tillman. Yes, I think so.
121. General Grunert. Do you know of your own knowledge
whether or not any of these delays were intentional on the part of
anyone ?
Mr. Tillman. I have no way of knowing, no, sir. I don't —
[2162'] I can't believe that they were.
122. General Grunert. Would there be anyone then in the Hawai-
ian Constructors that would have the power to delay if he had such an
intent ?
Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir.
123. General Grunert. Who ?
Mr. Tillman. I would say that Paul Graf e and Mr, Rohl, either one,
could have delayed the progress or completion of work of any kind.
124. General Grunert. In that case would that delay have been with
or without the knowledge of the District Engineer ?
Mr. Tillman. I think it could have been without his knowledge.
125. General Frank. Do you know or believe that either one of them
did delay any work?
Mr. Tillman. No, I don't know. If you want an opinion I would
be glad to express an opinion.
126. General Frank. Let us have the opinion.
Mr. Tillman. It is my opinion that both Mr. Grafe and Mr. Rohl
did everything they could to complete any work that they were inter-
ested in there. Now, the reason that I say that is that while I was
head of the plant control section I sat in with Mr. Rohl at his meetings
with his field superintendents at night, and I heard him express his
attitude in no uncertain terms too many times to think that, unless he
was a lot smoother than I give him credit for, that there was any intent
other than to push that work.
127. General Russell. Wlio were these people to whom Rohl was
talking on these occasions?
[2153] Mr. Tillman. Those were the superintendents of the
various areas that I have mentioned before.
128. General Russell. All native Americans? Who were they?
Mr. Tillman. I think so. I think so.
129. General Russell. How many would be in those meetings?
Mr. Tillman. Oh, anywhere from eight to twelve or fourteen.
1122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
130. General Grunekt. Now let me see if I have this straight. The
Hawaiian Contractors
General Frank. No.
131. General Grunert. Was it a local firm ?
Mr. Tillman. The Hawaiian Contracting Company.
132. General Grunert. The Hawaiian Contracting Company.
And the Hawaiian Constructors was the over-all firm that had the
contract to start with, consisting of various other firms ?
Mr, Tillman. Yes, sir.
133. General Grunert. Now, as to this equipment that you spoke
about that you were sent out to appraise, to whom did that equipment
belong?
Mr. Tillman. The Hawaiian Contracting Company.
134. General Grunert. And not to the Hawaiian Constructors?
Mr. Tillman. No, sir.
135. General Grunert. Yes.
Mr. Tillman. It was the Hawaiian Constructors who were sup-
posedly to make the purchase.
136. General Grunert. From the Hawaiian Contracting Company ?
Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir.
137. General Frank. But the Government was going to pay for it ?
[215^'] Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir. You understand the purchase
arrangement between the contractors and the Government?
138. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. Tillman. They made the purchase. We paid them a monthly
rental of one-twelfth of the cost of the equipment for a year's time
in which it became the property of the Government.
139. General Grunert. Then, whose primary interest, whose finan-
cial interest was it, to get the Hawaiian Constructors to buy this
equipment which the Government would eventually pay for?
Mr. Tillman. You mean who would benefit by it ?
■ 140. General Grunert. Yes.
Mr. Till.man. The Hawaiian Contracting Company.
141. General Grunert. Would the Hawaiian Constructors benefit
by it?
Mr. Tillman. I do not think so.
142. General Grunert. I do not think of anything else. Does
anyone think of any other questions?
143. General Russell. I think we have developed a point there that
may best be clarified a little.
144. General Grunert. Go ahead.
145. General Russell. Now, at the time that you were making this
appraisal of this equipment of the Hawaiian Contracting Company,
they had become one of the associates in the Hawaiian Constructors?
Mr. Tillman. I do not think so.
146. General Russell. Wasn't it after Pearl Harbor that you were
making this appraisal?
Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir.
[fids'] 147. General Russell. Well, didn't you testify a little
while ago that they came in and they began, or they allowed them to
work on the common project after December 7th ?
Mr. Tillman. No. No, I didn't say that.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1123
148. General Russell. Well, I was just mistaken about it, then.
Mr. Tillman. No. They had no more work shortly after the
raid.
149. General Russell. Yes.
Mr. Tillman. They did have an organization and they had this
equipment. Mr. Benson, who was president of the Hawaiian Con-
tracting Company, joined the Hawaiian Constructors as one of the
members of the executive board; that is, in an individual capacity.
The company did not join the Hawaiian Constructors.
150. General Russell. They did not take their organization and
their modern equipment and go in and start to work, then, on this ?
Mr. Tillman. No, sir.
151. General Russell. All right. But Benson as an individual
went over and gave his services ?
Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir.
152. General Russell. Well, that clears that up. I am through.
153. Major Clausen. Sir, you have mentioned several things that
called into play your judgment on engineering matters. Would you,
for the record, tell the Board your engineering schooling background ?
Mr. Tillman. Well, I have been in the construction end of the
engineering for 31 years. Prior, at that time, it had been about 28
years. I took a constructional engineering [2156^ course from
the I. C. S. School.
154. Major Clausen. Worked on major projects?
Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir.
155. Major Clausen. That is aU.
156. General Grunert. Then, you were certain that you knew equip-
ment and what its value was, as to its present shape, and what it could
be used for in the future ? You were a good judge of that, were you ?
Mr. Tillman. I think so.
157. General Grunert. Whom did you have to assist you in this?
You spoke of the equipment man, did you ?
Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir.
158. General Grunert. What was he ?
Mr. Tillman. We were buying considerable equipment from the
Allis-Chalmers people. They sent two equipment experts over to the
Islands to assist us in any way possible that they could be of assistance
to us. The Allis-Chalmers were paying all of the expenses; it cost
us nothing. When they reported over there they were ordered to
report and make my office their headquarters. I took them along —
they weren't working under my direction, you understand. I took
them along as so-called experts.
159. General Grunert. And did you testify that that identical
equipment that you went to appraise and did appraise was actually
sold to the Hawaiian Constructors afterward ?
Mr. Tillman. No, I can't state that it was definitely sold. I think
I stated that it was reported to me that it was sold.
160. General Grunert. That could not have been confused, then,
[3157] with any other batch of equipment that was afterward
purchased ?
Mr. Tillman. I do not think so.
161. General Grunert. Anything else?
79716—46 — Ex. 145, vol. 2 22
1 1 24 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
162. Major Clausen. I would like to know if these two men who
went with you, Mr. Tillman, to appraise this equipment concurred
in your judgment.
Mr. Tillman. Yes, they did.
1(33. Major Clausen. That is all.
164. General EussELL. What were their names ?
Mr, Tillman. I don't remember their names any more. 1 think
I could get their names. I think I have some papers at home that
might give me their names, but right now I don't remember.
165. Major Clausen. Will you ascertain and let me know ?
Mr. Tillman. I could, yes.
166. General Grunert. Are there any other questions?
(No response.) If not, I thank you very much for coming.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
[mS8] TESTIMONY OF THOMAS EENEST CONNOLLY, 2400 FUL-
TON STREET, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Mr. Connolly, will you please state to the Board
your name and address ? Full name and address.
Mr. Connolly. Thomas Ernest Connolly. I live at 2400 Fulton
Street, San Francisco.
2. General Grunert. Mr. Connolly, the Board has a broad field to
cover. In addition to looking into the attack on Pearl Harbor it has
been assigned the task to look into certain phases of that attack in
which one Colonel Wyman, a District Engineer at Honolulu, was
concerned. It is that phase particularly, I believe, in which the testi-
mony from you may help us, and in this broad field that particular
special part of it was assigned to General Frank, and to be assisted by
Major Clausen, so I shall ask them to start the questioning.
3. General Frank. Mr. Connolly, will you state your position as a
contractor during 1940 and '41 ? Do you remember?
Mr. Connolly. I had work of my own; I had work of or I was
associated in work with other contractors. I was the president of the
Rohl-Connolly Company, president of T. E. Connolly, Incorporated,
and I was sponsoring a joint venture by the W. E. Callahan Con-
struction Company.
4. General Frank. Wliere?
Mr. Connolly. The Rohl-Connolly Company and the Gunther-
Shirley Company at Caddoa, Colorado.
5. General Frank. For whom was this work being done at Caddoa,
Colorado ?
Mr. Connolly. The Army Engineers.
[21S9] 6. General Frank, You stated you were president of the
Rohl-Connolly Company?
Mr. Connolly. Yes, I think that is right. I was not president.
I was vice president and I was president.
7. General Frank. When?
Mr. Connolly. The latter half of 1940, from '40 on through to the
present time.
8. General Frank. What is Mr. Rohl's position?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1125
Mr. Connolly. Now he is in the position of sitting on the board
while we distribute the assets of the Rohl-Connolly Company.
1). General Frank. Well, what was his position in 1941 ?
Mr. Connolly. He was a member of the board and vice president of
the company.
10. General Frank. Was he ever president of the company?
Mr. Connolly. Yes.
11. General Frank. When?
Mr. Connolly. Well, we took turns about on that. He was presi-
dent of that company in early '40, '39 probably. I was probably
president in '38.
12. General Frank. What determined who was president and who
was vice president?
Mr. Connolly. Just a matter of turnabout, nothing of any conse-
quence. It was really a partnership. It was incorporated.
13. General Frank. I see.
14. Major Clausen. When did you first meet Mr. Rohl, Mr.
Connolly ?
Mr. Connolly. Oh, some twenty-odd years ago, I presume.
[2160] 15. Major Clausen. When did you first meet Colonel
Wyman?
Mr. Connolly. I first met Colonel Wyman when he was District
Engineer in the Los Angeles area, I would say about '34. 1934.
16. Major Clausen. In any event, Mr. Connolly, in the early part
of 1940 the Rohl-Connolly Company was a corporation doing business,
of which Mr. Hans Wilhelm Rohl was the president; is that correct?
Mr. Connolly. That is right.
17. Major Clausen. All right. Now let's go down to December
1940. Isn't it true that you didn't just take turnabout for no particular
reason, but that in December 1940 you specifically telephoned from
Washington to Mr. Rohl and advised him that he be not president?
Mr. Connolly. That is correct.
18. Major Clausen. Yes. And because he was a German alien?
Mr. Connolly. That's right.
19. Major Clausen. All right. Now, in connection with the Rohl-
ConnoUy Company, before this change in status occurred of your
assuming the presidency in December 1940, what was the stock own-
ership ?
Mr. Connolly. I owned 50 percent of it, 25 percent of it was
owned by Mrs. Rohl, 25 percent by Mr. Rohl.
20. Major Clausen. And the same stock ownership continued, did
it, Mr. Connolly, throughout 1940 and throughout 1941 ?
Mr. Connolly. Yes.
21. Major Clausen. So that when you had this turnabout because
Mr. Rohl was a German alien, there was no turnabout or cancellation
of any stock ownership, was there?
[2161] Mr. Connolly. No, sir.
22. Major Clausen. And he continued as a director, did he?
Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir.
23. Major Clausen. When did you first know about a contract, Mr.
Connolly, which later became Contract W-41^Eng-602, which is the
one that was later in effect with respect to the Hawaiian defense
projects? .*.. . . *
1126 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Connolly. When did I first learn about that contract ?
24. Major Clausen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Connolly. I was advised from here by telephone to Denver
that the contract was to be let in the Hawaiian Islands, but I didn't
know whether it was that or not. That was the specific contract I
learned about the week prior to Christmas, in Washingon, D. C.
25. Major Clausen. Yes. But now when you say you were advised
concerning defense projects, as a matter of fact it was Mr. Rohl who
telephoned you ; isn't that so ?
Mr. Connolly. That is right.
26. Major Connolly. And he telephoned you from Los Angeles?
Mr. Connolly. No.
27. Major Clausen. From San Francisco?
Mr. Connolly. Yes.
28. Major Clausen. And he was then here in the office of the Engi-
neers, wasn't he?
Mr. Connolly. Well, I don't know. He was in San Francisco.
29. Major Clausen. Yes. He had talked with Colonel Wyman ?
Mr. Connolly. Yes.
30. Major Clausen. With whom else in the Army had he talked?
\216^^ Mr. Connolly. Well, that I don't know. I was in
Colorado.
31. Major Clausen. And this was December 16, a Monday, was it?
32. General Frank. What year?
33. Major Clausen. 1940.
Mr. Connolly. Yes, that is about right. Presumably that is cor-
rect.
34. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon, sir.
Mr. Connolly. That is probably correct.
35. Major Clausen. Now, at that time you were in Denver, Col-
orado ; is that right ?
Mr. Connolly. That is ri^ht.
36. Major Clausen. Specifically, what did Mr. Rohl say to you?
Just try and tell the Board exactly what he said at that time in this
telephone conversation, or the substance.
Mr. Connolly. Well, he said, "Colonel Wyman is here and has some
work to offer in the Islands, and he is looking over some contractors
to go out to do it." And I asked Rohl what the nature of the work
was, and he said that Wyman would tell me, for me to meet Wyman at
Cheyenne on his plane and go on to Washington with him; and I
couldn't meet him at Cheyenne because I couldn't get on the plane,
but I could take a plane from Denver to Chicago and there connect
with Wyman's plane, and which I did, and we flew down to Washing-
ton together, and I asked Wyman what was the nature of this thing
and what was the amount of it, and he told me.
37. Major Clausen. As I understand, then, you met Colonel Wy-
man in Chicago ; is that correct ?
Mr. Connolly. At the airport in Chicago.
[2163'] 38. Major Clausen. And you then continued in com-
pany with him from Chicago down to Washington, D. C. ?
Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir.
39. Major Clausen. And didn't you all go to the Carlton Hotel ?
Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1127
40. Major Clausen. And stay there?
Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir.
41. Major Clausen. And you were in his company then for how
many days?
Mr. Connolly. Well, three or four days; maybe a day or two one
way or the other ; four days, five days.
42. Major Clausen. And this contract the number of which I have
previously given you, was that signed, sir, on December 20, 1940 ?
Mr. Connolly. I left at that time. Grafe signed it on the 20th.
43. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. When had you left? What was the
date?
Mr. Connolly. I left the day before that.
44. Major Clausen. So that you left on the 19th?
Mr. Connolly. I think so.
45. Major Clausen. Now, did you have discussions with Colonel
Wyman there concerning the nature of the work and the kind of work
that you would do and the kind of work that these other co-adventurers
would do ?
Mr. Connolly. No. He had one man to do the work. Grafe was
to do the work.
46. Major Clausen. I mean the kind of work that your firm,
[2164] the Rohl-Connolly Company, was to do in connection with
the contract.
Mr. Connolly. No. The work was to be handled by Mr. Grafe.
47. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon.
Mr. Connolly. The work was to be handled by one man for the
joint — for the co-adventurers.
48. Major Clausen. I don't mean the representation, Mr. Connolly,
of the joint venturers by Mr. Grafe. I mean you sat down with some-
body there, surely, and discussed the nature of the work that was to be
done by these joint ventures, your firm and the Gunther-Shirley Com-
pany?
Mr. Connolly. The over-all job, yes.
49. Major Clausen. Callahan Construction Company?
Mr, Connolly. That is right.
50. Major Clausen, And you went into that deeply and fully, did
you not, to find out what you would do ?
Mr. Connolly. No, not so deeply and not so fully, because, for the
very simple reason that it wasn't formulated deeply nor fully. It was
very, very sketchy.
61. Major Clausen. Well, the contract itself sets forth that there
were to be hangars and runways and defense projects?
Mr. Connolly. No, sir.
52. Major Clausen. Air raid warning systems ?
Mr. Connolly. No, sir.
53. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon, sir.
Mr. Connolly. The contract doesn't state that.
54. Major Clausen. Will the Board permit me to go and get the
contract, sir ? I will be right back.
[2166'] It is one of the exhibits out there. I couldn't find it.
55. Colonel West. I will find it.
56. Major Clausen. I see. It is one of the exhibits to the
57. Colonel West. Which one is it?
1128 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
58. Major Clausex. The contract of December 20, 1940.
59. General Grunert. Suppose you let somebody else do the looking
up, and we can go on.
60. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. I will proceed along.
61. Colonel West. I will go out and see if we can find it.
Mr. Connolly. You are speaking now of the contract that I saw in
Washington ?
62. Major Clausen. I am speaking of the contract that is dated De-
cember 20, sir, 1940. It sets forth the general
Mr. Connolly. Not all those multitudinous supplements?
6.']. Major Clausen. No, sir. I am speaking of the basic contract.
Mr. Connolly. That is right.
64. Major Clausen. The one that was signed and executed in Wash-
ington.
Mr. Connolly. That is right.
65. Major Clausen. And it states general terms, various subdivi-
sions and types of work to be done.
Mr. Connolly. That is right.
66. Major Clausen. And the air raid warning system.
Mr. Connolly. There are five subdivisions stated in that contract.
67. Major Clausen. Well, I mean it did, then, set forth the general
character of the work?
Mr. Connolly. That is right. There was no runway in it
[2166] and there are no hangars in it.
68. Major Clausen. Well, whatever is set forth in the contract — let
me put the question this way — you discussed in Washington, did you
not, sir ?
Mr. Connolly. Yes.
69. Major Clausen. All right. You also had telephone conversa-
tions between yourself in Washington and Mr. Rohl in Los Angeles;
isn't that true ?
Mr. Connolly. Yes.
TO. Major Clausen. Concerning the work of the contract?
Mr. Connolly. Not the work. Concerning the financing of the
contract.
71. Major Clausen. The only financing that was to be done con-
cerning the contract was concerning the work to be done under the
contract; isn't that so?
Mr. Connolly. Well, that is correct, if that is what it means.
72. Major Clausen. Well, I mean you talked over with Mr. Rohl,
your theoretic partner in this corporation, the financing of this par-
ticular work; isn't that right?
Mr. Connolly. Sure.
78. Major Clausen. All right. And isn't it true that in addition
to being in the company of Colonel Wyman there, you also met John
Martin ?
Mr. Connolly. Accidentally, yes.
74. Major Clausen. Well, you met him, sir, did you not?
Mr. Connolly. In the lobby of the hotel.
75. Major Clausen. Now, in point of time from when you arrived
in Wasliington, when did you meet John Martin ?
[3167] Mr. Connolly. Well, I met John Martin — when I got
to the Carlton Hotel there was a note there from John Martin saying
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1129
he wanted to see me, but whether I met him that day or the next day
I don't know, but I met him just immediately thereafter.
76. General Frank. Just a minute. This is on the trip to Wash-
ington around the 20th of December in 1940 that all this occurred?
Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir.
77. General Frank. This was at that same time that John Martin
was there present when you met him ?
Mr. Connolly. Well, I met him in the hotel, yes, sir, in the lobby
of the hotel.
78. General Frank. Wlio is Mr. Martin?
Mr. Connolly. He is a Los Angeles attorney.
79. General Frank. For whom ?
Mr. Connolly. Oh, for various people. For Kohl-Connolly.
80. Major Clausen. Now, when you met Mr. Martin he told you
that he was there for the purpose of assisting in acquiring citizenship
for Mr. Rohl, didn't he?
Mr. Connolly. Well, I don't think he did.
81. Major Clausen. Let me refer to your statement given to the
House Military Affairs Committee, as follows :
I met John Martin, Mr. Rohl's attorney, who told me he was in Washington in
the interests of acquiring citizenship or furthering citizenship applications for
Mr. H. W. Rohl. When I thought that there was a likelihood that we would
acquire the contract I further thought that I should have Mr. Rohl resign as
an officer of the Rohl- [2168] Connolly Co. and substitute myself and I so
phoned him and it was so done, and he was neither officer nor a director of the
Rohl-Connolly Co. until after he obtained his naturalization papers.
Did you make that statement?
Mr. Connolly. Yes.
82. Major Clausen. To Mr. Weiner?
Mr. Connolly. Yes.
83. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon?
Mr. Connolly. I think I did, yes.
84. Major Clausen. All right. Well, now, as a matter of fact,
then, Mr. Connolly, Mr. Martin did tell you just exactly what you said
here ; isn't that correct?
Mr. Connolly. Yes, but not in the way that you put it.
85. Major Clausen. Well, you put it to me, then, in the correct way.
Mr. Connolly. I asked John Martin what he was doing there — out
in the lobby in front of a lot of people, — what he was doing there. He
said he was there on business. The next time I see John Martin he
advises me that Eohl is not a citizen and I had not ought to sign a
contract, that is, I had not ought to sign any contract to take Rohl out
of the country. So I knew then that Rohl was not a citizen for the
first time, but I didn't think it made any difference, so I signed the
contract.
86. General Frank. How long had you been associated with Mr.
Rohl up to this time ?
Mr. Connolly. Since 1932.
87. General Frank. Eight years, about ?
Mr. Connolly. Yes.
[2169] 88. General Frank. And this was the first time that you
knew that he wasn't a citizen ?
Mr. Connolly. Yes.
1130 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
89. Major Clausen. And so you then phoned Mr. Rohl and told him
that he should resign ?
Mr. Connolly. Probably I did.
90. Major Clausen. Well, is there any doubt about it, Mr. Con-
nolly? You said in this statement here to the House Military Affairs
Committee
Mr. Connolly. He resigned. He resigned; I became president.
That's ri^ht.
91. Major Clausen. Yes, but I say it says here that when you
thought "that there was a likelihood that we would acquire the con-
tract I further thought that I should have Mr. Eohl resign as an officer
of the Rohl-ConnoUy Co. and substitute myself and I so phoned him
and it was so done."
Mr. Connolly. That is right.
92. Major Clausen. That is correct, is it?
Mr. Connolly. Yes.
93. Major Clausen. You telephoned him for that purpose?
Mr. Connolly. Yes.
94. Major Clausen. All right. Well, now, when did you learn this
in point of time of being in Washington ? On this first day that you
met Mr. Martin ?
Mr. Connolly. No, I don't think it was the first day. I think it was
later on. I think it was a good — after we had been there for two or
three days. We were up to the point of signing the contract. I didn't
learn that the minute I got in Washington, the minute I saw John
Martin.
[2170] 95. Major Clausen. All right. Now, whom did yon
tell that to ? You told Mr. Rohl the situation about his not being in
the corporation because of the fact that he was an alien. Now, then,
what did you say about that to Colonel Wyman ?
Mr. Connolly. Nothing.
96. Major Clausen. What did you say about that to Paul Grafe?
Mr. Connolly. I told Grafe that Rohl was not a citizen.
97. Major Clausen. Why did you tell it to Grafe and not to
Wyman ?
Mr. Connolly. Because I don't know whether — whether Rohl —
whether Grafe and I would agree to sign the contract knowing that
Rohl is not a citizen, or not.
98. Major Clausen. Whom else did you tell in Washington at that
time?
Mr. Connolly. No one that I recall.
99. Major Clausen. Now, here is a photostatic copy, Mr. Connolly,
of articles of agreement dated December 20, 1940. I wish you would
look that over and tell me if that is the basic contract to which you
have reference?
Mr. Connolly. Yes, I think it is, with the exception of these first
four leaves which are seemingly an indication of supplements, job
orders, dates of transmittal. Of course those were not in existence
at that time. And it further states in this contract we were to do five
things, First, ammunition storage magazines; second, warning sta-
tions; third, railway trackage; fourth, fixed fortification structures;
and fifth, in addition to the then existing radio station that was sup-
plemented by an estimate of yardage to be excavated, which amounted
fKOCEEDINiiS OK AKAIY PEAKL HAK150K liOAKU 1131
I'JJ?!} to o80,U00 yards, backiill oT 150,000 cubic yards, concrete
of o(;,000 yards, reiiii'orcino^ steel of 0,000,000, some few culverts and
some pavement.
100. Major Clauskx. Now, in your telephone talks with j\lr. Rohl
from ^Vashin<i•ton — I am referrino- to December 19-10 — what did you
say in talking to Mr. Rohl concerning the air raid warning stations?
Mr. CoNxoLLY. Not a word,
101. Major Clausex'. A\'hat did you say after that time to ]\Ir. Rohl
regarding those air raid warning stations?
Mr. CoxNOLLY. Nothing.
102. Major Clausex. Now let me refer to your testimony or state-
ment given to the House Military Atfairs Committee, as follows :
Questioii : >Subsec]uent to receiving the eoiitract for the Hawaiian Ishiu(l.s, did
Mr. Kohl discuss with you the nature of the contract, and so forth?
Answer: No. There was no detailed discussion of this conlraet at all. Per-
sonally, I iiever saw a written description of it or a blueprint on any part of it.
Kohl and I discussed the necessary linancial arran.uements, advancement of
moneys, because after all we were linancing this, ^ye were building certain air-
fields. We knew what that meant, just simply movefaient of materials and stabili-
zation of a base without a bhieiirint at all. When you are told to run a 7,500
runway we knew what it takes.
Questiiai : But it would be most usual t\ir him to discuss with you the nature and
type uf contract that you received for the Hawaiian Islands?
An.swer : Yes. I don't doubt but what we mentioned [217.^1 building an
airiiort there. I don't thiidc that we ever got into some of these installations
out there. I don't think Kohl and I ever discussed anything of that nature. We
talked of those warning stations because I was curious as to what they were
Tiiafs all that I know that we ever got into any detail about.
Mr. CoxxoLLY. That's not our telephone conversation.
103. Major Clausex. I beg your pardon, sir?
Mr. CoxxoLLY. That is long after Rohl was out of the islands.
104. Major Clausex. That was after he was out of the islands?
Mr. CoxxoLLY. Sure.
105. Major CLAUSEX^ Well, with regard to the contract, do you
mean ? You mean
Mr. CoxxoLLY. I would like to know what an air warning station
was. I didn't know what it was. He was out there, and they built
them.
10(5. Major Clausex. Ail right. You mean you t:ilkcd with Mr.
Rohl concerning these items only after you were out to the islands?
Mr. CoxxoLLY. Why, yes. We were not building any airfields liere
[indicatin*.^ papers].
107. Major Clausex. Well, how many telephone ctdls, Mr. Con-
nolly, did you put in to Mr. Rohl from Washington or did he put in to
you and have with you ?
Mr. CuxxoLLY. I don't know.
108. Major Clausex. Well, give tis an a[)[)roximation.
Mr. CoxxoLLY. Two or three.
109. Major Clausex^ And wluit did you say in these two or three
[2173] conversations?
Mr. CoxxoLLY. I stiitl we htive to fiiKincc this job. It would be
about so much. You have got so nnich of a fee.
110. Major Clausex. And wdiat else?
Mr. CoxxoLLY. Thtit I ought to ttdvc over tliis cdiiipany or else stay
out of it.
111. Major Clausex. What else did you .say, Mr. Connolly?
1132 CONGRESSIONAL IN \ KSTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Ml". Connolly. I don't know what I said, but what I am saying now
is what I think I said. There was no occasion for us to discuss this,
the matter of movement of yards. That doesn't mean anything to a
conti'actor. He knows how to move dirt.
112. Major Clausp:n. Well, does the fact that you didn't know what
an air raid warning station was and the fact that you were curious as
to what they were — -I mean does the contractor know what an air raid
warning station is?
Mr. Connolly. Well, I didn't.
113. Major Clausen. Well, then are you sure, now, Mr. Connolly
that you didn't discuss it with your partner?
Mr. Connolly, Of course not.
114. Major Clausen. As to building something that you didn't
know what it was ?
Mr. Connolly. Yes.
115. Major Clausen. I see.
116. General Frank. You mean to say you were taking on a con-
tract for building sometiiing when you didn't know what it consisted
of?
Mr. Connolly. No, General. In this contract it sets out you are
putting in, doing so many cubic yards of excavation, placing so many
cubic yards of concrete and so many thousands [217J^\ of
pounds of steel and so much bituminous pavement. Well, that's all
right, but putting an air warning station on, I wanted to know what an
air warning station was, after this attack, what were the things, and
how did they work, and why.
117. Major Clausen. After the attack?
Mr. Connolly. Sure.
118. General Frank. This contract was let long before the attack.
Mr. Connolly. I know it, but there was never a print or a descrip-
tion or anything. There's the whole business : There is nothing in this
contract to tell you what it is.
119. Major Clausen. You mean you were to get a fee of fifty thou-
sand for doing something and you didn't know Avhat you were going
to do?
Mr. Connolly. No. I mean we were going to get it for moving this
much dirt and placing this much concrete, and part of it I presume
was going to be an air warning station. It said so much roads and
this, that, and the other. The contractor never installed the equip-
ment, you know, In these things; it was never his job to do it.
120. Major Clausen. Now, isn't it true, Mr. Connolly, that even
in 1940 Paul Grafe had gone to the Hawaiian Islands with some men
and had surveyed the situation and come back and reported to you
that the work was to be thus and thus and thus ?
Mr. Connolly. No, that's not correct. Mr. Grafe sent two men to
the islands way early in the summer.
121. Major Clausen. Of 1940?
Mr. Connolly. Of 1940. And they come back and reported
[2J75] to him, but they did not report to me.
122. Major Clausen. Well, you were there with Mr. Grafe in Wash-
ington. Didn't he discuss that with you ?
Mr. Connolly. No.
123. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1133
Mr. Connolly. I never saw a report that those men ever made.
That was never discussed.
124. Major Clausen. Didn't Mr. Grafe talk to you about the fact
tliat he had gone to the islands or had sent two men to the islands
in 1940 and surveyed the situation from the standpoint of this defense
project ?
Mr. Connolly. Well, he sent two men to the islands, but whether
it was that same party or not, I had no means of knowing.
125. Major Clausen. Is your testimony that Mr. Grafe did not dis-
cuss it with you in Washington, the fact that he had sent two men to
the islands to survey the field for these defense projects?
Mr. Connolly. Well, Grafe never gave me any report on what these
men did for him in the islands.
126. Major Clausen. Did you discuss this with him in Washington?
is my question.
Mr. Connolly. I don't think I did.
127. General Frank. You are financially interested in this firm,
aren't you ?
Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir.
128. Major Clausen. Well, now, when you found out in Washington
from Mr. Martin that your partner was a — by the way, you knew that
was a secret contract, didn't you, Mr. Connolly?
[J17'6'] Mr. Connolly. When we were talking about it, I didn't.
129. Major Clausen. I beg your pai-don?
INIr. Connolly. When it was first shown me it was, yes. I didn't
know it when I went to Washington, though.
130. Major Clausen. AYell, when you saAv the contract you knew
it was a secret contract, didn't you?
Mr. Connolly. That is right
131. Major Clausen. Now, before you were shown the contract or
after, when was it that you knew that Mr. Rohl was an alien ?
Mr. Connolly. Before. Before I saw the contract.
132. Major Clausen. All right. And when you saw the contract
was it in the form that you see it there (indicating) with the exception
of those pages that you say refer to supplements?
Mr. Connolly. Well, it was on white paper, stamped with the
SECRET stamp upside down and downside up, as I recall, along all
four margins of the front page, as I recall.
133. Major Clausen. Well, you were taken considerable aback,
weren't you, by the information that Mr. Rohl was an alien, German
alien ?
Mr. Connolly. Yes.
134. Major Clausen. I mean that was a big shock to you, wasn't it ?
Mr. Connolly. Yes, I was a little surprised.
135. Major Clausen. All right. You had gone on the plane with
Colonel Wyman from Denver, or rather, from Chicago to Washington,
you had been there with Colonel Wyman. and what did you say about
this big shock, if anything, to Colonel Wyman ?
Mr. Connolly. Nothing.
[2177] 136. Major Clausen. What did you say about it to— by
the way, did you go over to the office of the Chief of Engineers ?
Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir.
137. Major Clausen. And whom did you meet over there?
1134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Connolly. Well, the man that did most of this work there I
think was then Major Newman.
138. Major Clausen. What did you say about this alien status of
Mr. Rohl to Major Newman, if anything?
Mr. Connolly. Nothing.
139. Major Clausen. What is that?
Mr. Connolly. Nothing.
[£178] 140. Major Clausen. Whom else did you see in the
office of the Chief of Engineers ?
Mr. Connolly. Well, I remember meeting General Robins.
141. Major Clausen. What did you say to him about it?
Mr. Connolly. Nothing. Two or three other gentlemen, I think.
I don't recall who they were.
142. Major Clausen. When you came back to California, you say
you think you left on the 19th of December, is that correct ?
Mr. Connolly. I do not know. I have got a diary that will give
you the dates, if they are important, but I left and got home prior
to Christmas. I left before that was signed.
143. Major Clausen. Do you have a diary that indicates the num-
ber of telephone calls you had with Mr. Rohl when you were in
Washington ?
Mr. Connolly. No, but I will have a diary that indicates when I
talked to him.
144. Major Clausen. When you came back, thoiigh, from Washing-
ton, this deal had been made, had it not?
Mr. Connolly. Yes.
145. Major Clausen. And in order to make that deal you certainly
talked over the contract with Mr. Martin, did you not ?
Mr. Connolly. Never.
146. Major Clausen. What is that?
Mr. Connolly. No.
147. Major Clausen. You did not talk it over with Mr. Martin,
who was the attorney for your firm ?
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Martin wasn't there as an attorney for Rohl-
Connolly.
148. Major Clausen. In what capacity was Mr. Martin there?
[B179] ^ Mr. Connolly. That, I can't tell you that.
149. Major Clausen. Is it your sworn testimony now to this Board
that Mr. Martin had nothing to do with the drafting of that contract ?
Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir.
150. Major Clausen. And is it your sworn testimony that he had
nothing to do with any of the papers — just for example, the joint-
venture agreement that would naturally precede the contract?
Mr. Connolly, I don't think any joint-venture papers did precede
this contract.
151. Major Clausen. Well, what is the fact as you state it to the
Board, now? What is tlie fact as to whether Mr. Martin drew any
legal papers, or dictated any legal papers, or did anything at all,
whatsoever, legally, with regard to that contract?
Mr. Connolly. Nothing.
152. Major Clausen. In point of truth, now, when you came back
from Washington to California you sat down and talked to Mr. Rohl,
did you not, concerning the contract?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1135
Mr. Connolly. I told Rohl that that contract wasn't to come into
our office down there, nor any papers concerning that contract to come
in there; and there was no further discussion on that contract; nor
was there, ever ; nor was there any plans, papers, nor the contract to
be in that Kohl-Connolly office while he was still an alien.
153. Major Clausen. Mr. Connolly, let me show you this contract,
signed, in which Rohl-Connolly Company joins with the Hawaiian
Constructors, of Honolulu, and I see it is described as consisting of
the W. E. Callahan Company, Gunther & Shirley Co., and Rohl-
[2180] Connolly Company. Now, the Callahan Company,^ the
Gunther & Shirley Co., and the Rohl-Connolly Company were joint
adventurers, were they not? , , . . , ; ,• ■
Mr. Connolly. Yes.
154. Major Clausen. Well, who drew up the papers for that, for
the Rohl-Connolly part ?
Mr. Connolly. There were no papers drawn prior to the signing
and execution of this contract. The Rohl-Connolly Company, the
Callahan Company, and the Gunther & Shirley Company were build-
ing a joint venture in Colorado, and we were going in on the same per-
centages as existed on that job, and we had no legal papers drawn
up prior to this contract, for this contract, at all.
155. Major Clausen. You are speaking of the Cadoa project?
Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir.
156. Major Clausen. So far as this contract is concerned, is it your
statement that you were just to continue on in the same relative per-
centages?
Mr. Connolly. That is correct. . '
157. Major Clausen. When you say that no papers came into the
Rohl-Connolly Company, isn't it true now that papers had to be
signed and given to the engineers, which showed that Mr. Paul Graf e,
here, had authority to sign on behalf of the Rohl-Connolly Company ?
Mr. Connolly. Certainly not ! Unlimited power of attorney to go
to the islands and execute it and carry on this job.
158. Major Clausen. Yes, and who drew that up for the Rohl-
Connolly Company ?
Mr. Connolly. That, I don't know; but the Rohl-Connolly
[:2181] Company did not have it drawn up. I probably executed
it to Grafe, had it drawn up, here, probably John Martin — might be
some othei" attorney ; I don't know.
159. Major Clausen. And that was done before this contract was
signed?
Mr. Connolly. It was not.
160. Major Clausen. So far as this contract is concerned, Mr.
Connolly, is it your testimony, here, to the Board, that you did not
discuss it, or anything connected with the deal, with Mr. Rohl, at all,
until he became a citizen ?
Mr. Connolly. No ; I talked to Rohl, as I stated here a while back,
about this contract, any arrangement necessary to carry it on.
161. Major Clausen. All right. When did you talk to him?
Mr. Connolly. I talked to him from Washington before we ob-
tained the contract.
162. Major Clausen. And on how many occasions?
1136 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Connolly. Oh, I don't know — two or three. I was only there
three or four days.
163. Major Clausen. And then, when you came back to California?
Mr. Connolly. I told him he w^as to have nothing to do with that
contract, until his status changed.
164. Major Clausen. By the way, when was it that you told him
that, Mr. Connolly?
Mr. Connolly. Well, when I next saw him.
165. Major Clausen. When was it after you got back?
Mr. Connolly. That, I can't tell you. I don't know. It was
shortly after I got back, certainly.
166. Major Clausen. It would be in the neighborhood of Decem-
ber?
[2182] Mr. Connolly. In January, I would say, off-hand.
167. Major Clausen. It would be December or January '-11, is that
correct ?
Mr. Connolly. I think so.
168. Major Clausen. All right. From that time down to the time
that Mr. Rohl became a citizen, do you want to say to the Board, or,
rather, do you testify that vou did not discuss the work or the contract
with Mr. Rohl?
Mr. Connolly. Rohl and I never discussed that work, I never saw
a plan myself, and I never had a copy of the contract, and there was
no scrap of paper with anything pertaining to that contract ever in
the Rohl-Connolly Company office in Los Angeles, that I ever knew
about ; and I think I would have known ; and that contract I discussed
with Grafe and told him to set it operating. He had an unlimited
power of attorney, to go ahead and do it.
169. Major Clausen. Concerning Colonel Wyman, do you recall
when he came to Los Angeles as district engineer ?
Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir.
170. Major Clausen. You called on him, did you not, Mr. Con-
nolly, very soon after he arrived, in the company of Mr. Rohl ?
JNIr. Connolly. I don't think so. The first time I saw Colonel
W3anan, as I recall it, was when we were putting in bids on the section
of breakwater along the Los Angeles-Long Beach breakw^ater. That
wasn't a call on Colonel Wyman, that was a call on the division engi-
neer. It had been changed within the week.
171. Major Clausen. Did you ever call on Colonel Wyman when
he was Captain Wvman or Major Wyman, and accompany him to any
[2J83] parties?
Mr. Connolly. I don't think I was ever in a party with Wyman.
172. Major Clausen. Were you ever on a yacht trip with Colonel,
then Captain or INIajor, Wyman?
Mr. Connolly. No, sir.
173. Major Clausen. Did you ever give him a drink?
Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir.
174. Major Clausen. How many times ?
Mr. Connolly. I have had him in my home in this town, and gave
him some drinks. How many times ? I don't know.
175. Major Clausen. When did you have him in your own home in
San Francisco?
Mr. Connolly. I had him in my own home in San Francisco after
he returned here from Washington.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1137
176. Major Clausex. You mean, as he got back from Washington,
from this December 1940 trip, is that right?
Mr. Connolly. That is right.
177. Major Clausen. How did he come to go to your home?
Mr. Connolly. I invited him. He came out to my home for din-
ner, the only guest, my wife and me; ate dinner with me and the
members of my family. We had dinner, and he left at 10 o'clock.
178. Major ClaI'Sen. On this occasion did you tell him this infor-
mation that had taken you aback in Washington?
Mr. Connolly. No.
179. Major Clausen. Concerning Rohl's alien status?
Mr. Connolly. I have never told that to Wyman, yet.
180. Major Clausen. Did you ever have Colonel Wyman, or
[2184] Captain or Major Wyman to your home on other occasions ?
Mr. Connolly. That is tlie only time.
181. Major Clausen. I think I have nothing further.
182. General Russell. What percentage did Rohl-Connolly operate
on in this joint-adventure agreement?
Mr. Connolly. To start out, 80%.
188. General Russell. Was that the percentage that you went into
the 1910 contract on, Mr. Connolly?
Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir.
184. General Russell. Now, you state that you talked to Mr. Rohl,
back in San Francisco, about financing that work. Was all that be-
cause it was necessary to put new moneys into the project, other than
that that was available to the Colorado operation?
Mr. Connolly. No. I got this impression : It was my impression
that that contract offshore in that amount was not wholly desirable,
and Wyman wanted new equipment on that job. Well, new equip-
ment takes new money. The group of us probably had $5,000,000
worth of equivalent equipment with some age on it. Wyman, to do
this job, had to put new plant on it. That takes money, and we put
in a lot of money and bought the equipment to put on this job.
185. General Russell. Where did this new money come from, Mr.
Connolly ?
Mr. Connolly. We put it in, in our proportions,' from our relative
companies, from our companies.
186. General Russell. Do you know how much money Mr. Rohl
as an individual had to put in, in order to enable the group to buy new
equipment incident to starting the work?
Mr. Connolly. Rohl-Connolly's 407o of the necessary capital
[3185] was furnished by Rohl-CohnoUy Company.
187. General Russell. The Corporation, Rohl-Connolly Company,
had the necessary money ?
Mr. Connolly. Yes.
188. General Russell. Then why did you have to talk to him about
the financing, if you were representing the corporation, and the cor-
poration had the money?
Mr. Connolly. Well, if two contractors associated together for
years, and you are going to do something, you just as a matter of
course discuss those things.
189. General Rttssell. In the course of arriving at a joint judg-
ment by you and Rohl ?
1138 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Connolly. Well, taking a new step, you tell your partner what
you are going to do.
190. General KussELL. But the Rohl-Connally Company had money,
already, plenty of money ?
Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir.
191. General Eussell. That is all.
192. General Grunert. Who was the "spark plug" in getting the
work done in Hawaii for the Hawaiian Constructors ? Was there any
one man ?
Mr. Connolly. Graf e was supposed to be.
193. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not that work in
Hawaii started to lag, and that that was the reason they got Rohl to
go out there, to put more punch into it, or what?
Mr. Connolly. Well, Rohl was more aggressive than Grafe, and
Wyman want/ed Rohl to go out there.
194. General Grunert. In your past contacts, working together and
in combinations, who was the more aggressive man, Rohl [2186]
or Grafe ?
Mr. Connolly. Well, Rohl would be the most aggressive, but Rohl
had never had overseas or offshore experience, and Grafe had built the
Madden Dam in Panama, and he had those four or five men with him
who had been key men down there, and we figured we had a "natural."
195. General Grunert. Is that why you co-adventurers chose Grafe
to represent you and get this contract started ?
Mr. Connolly. That is right. I thought it was a good nucleus.
196. General Grunert. But if Rohl had been a citizen, would Rohl
have been the man to go out there and put things through, or not ?
Mr. CoNNLOLY. Well, General, I am not sure on that, because the
key men that Rohl-Connolly had were with me at Cadoa, and they
would have to rob that job, to go offshore. That would be a mattei
of discussion, but I thought Grafe with his group was good.
197. General Grunert. Were Rohl and Wyman pretty thick so-
cially ?
Mr. Connolly. They were always good friends ; yes.
198. General Grunert. Good drinking companions ?
Mr. Connolly. Good !
199. General Grunert. Both about the same type, hard-fisted, go-
getters, punchers? Did they naturally click, that way?
Mr. Connolly. General, they are both that way. They are both
tough, and they get it done, and they drive everybody that is about
them.
200. General Grunert. And ^ou think that was a sort of natural
[2187] affinity?
Mr. Connolly. Well, they could fight about the way to do a thing,
and get it done. One was somewhat like the other. As long as it got
done, that's all that counted. To somebody else, less tender-skinned,
that wouldn't suit so well.
201. General Grunert. In the contracting business and other busi-
nesses, is it natural to do a certain amount of entertaining in connec-
tion with obtaining contracts? Do the parties often fraternize and
drink together, or are they afraid that one will influence the other?
Mr, Connolly, Well, they always do that. General,
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1139
202. General Grunert. They always do that ? So you didn't think
it unnatural that Rohl should entertain Wyman, and that. Wyman
should accept that entertainment from Rohl ?
Mr. Connolly. I thought it was a natural thing to do.
203. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not there is any
gain on one side or the other through that association?
Mr. Connolly. I don't think there is any.
204. General Grunert. Financial gain, or otherwise?
Mr. Connolly. I am certain there is no financial gain.
205. General Grunert. Did you establish a residence in, or go to
Honolulu, while the work was being done over there ?
Mr, Connolly. I did not.
206. General Grunert. You never went over ?
Mr, Connolly. No, sir.
207. General Grunert. Then you know nothing about the process
or the progress of the work over there ?
Mr. Connolly. Oh, yes; I know a lot about the progress of the
work.
[2188] 208. General Grunert. Personally, as a matter of per-
sonal knowledge ?
Mr. Connolly, From personal inspection, I know nothing,
209, General Grunert, You didn't go over there ?
Mr, Connolly, No, sir,
210.' General Grunert. Then I think the information I am after
I cannot get.
211. Major Clausen. That is right, sir. I thought as much.
212. General Grunert. All right.
213. Major Clausen. I had a few more questions. Sir, when you
discovered that Mr, Rohl was a German alien, you were so taken aback
that at first you didn't wish to sign the contract, isn't that correct?
Mr. Connolly. No; that wasn't it. I was so taken aback that I
kept my mouth shut.
214. Major Clausen, And you thought it over and decided that you
might not be a proper party to sign, isn't that true?
Mr. Connolly, I thought it over, and then I asked Grafe what he
thought of it. He didn't see that it made any difference, and neither
did I ; so we signed it.
215. Major Clausen. And you debated the advisability of signing
the contract ?
Mr. Connolly. With Graef , yes.
216. Major Clausen. All right.
Mr. Connolly. "What would be the influence of Rohl, an alien, on
this contract?" Well, we decided that if Paul runs it, if Grafe runs
it and handles it all, it don't mean anything.
217. Major Clausen. Then you say it did not mean a thing ?
Mr, Connolly, I wouldn't think so,
[21 89] Major Clausen, All right, Wlien did you then phone
Mr. Rohl and tell him to resign? Was it after this decision that you
made following your talk with Mr, Grafe ?
Mr. Connolly. I don't know. I did make a phone call; whether it
was before or after, I don't know.
219. Major Clausen. And specifically, what did you tell Mr. Rohl ?
79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 2 23
1140 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Connolly. Four years ago, I can't tell you, but I told him to
keep out of it, that I would handle it — about that many words, elab-
orated.
220. Major Clausen. What did you say about being president ?
Mr. Connolly. "I will be president" — just like that, I would say.
221. Major Clausen. And was the change then from Mr. Rohl, as
president, to you, as president, effected after that?
Mr. Connolly. After that?
222. Major Clausen. Yes, after your talk from Washington to Mr.
Eohl in Los Angeles, in which you told him that you would be president
instead of his being president. Was that then accomplished, that
change in officers ?
Mr. Connolly. Well, we were changed. The minute book will tell
you better than I could tell you ; but we changed the officers, there, in
December.
223. ]\Iajor Clausen. And w^as it after this telephone call that you
had with Mr. Rohl concerning the change, and concerning his alien
status ?
Mr. Connolly. Well, I presume it was.
224. Major Clausen. Is there any doubt in your mind?
Mr. Connolly. No, except you must know something I don't,
[21,90] the way you are questioning me.
225. Major Clausen. Is there any doubt in your mind?
Mr. Connolly, Well, you have created one.
226. Major Clausen. Let me ask you, then, have I created a doubt
in your mind as to whether you told anything to Colonel Wyman
about this undecisiveness on your part as to whether you should sign
the contract?
Mr. Connolly. Not a bit.
227. Major Clausen. You are sure of that ?
Mr. Connolly. You bet I am !
228. Major Clausen. Now, what did Mr. Rohl say to you when you
told him this, about the fact that since he was an alien, he should not
be president? What did he say?
Mr. Connolly. Practically nothing.
229. Major Clausen. That is all.
230. General Grunert. I just want to develop this a little bit more.
What does the president of the company do?
Mr. Connolly. He obligates the company.
231. General Grunert. Were you president in name only, and did
Rohl continue to run the company as usual?
Mr. Connolly. Not as usual. When that company was formed, 1
ran it and financed it, not Rohl.
232. General Grunert. This was not just a subterfuge in order to
get the contract that you couldn't have gotten or shouldn't have
gotten because Rohl was an alien?
Mr. Connolly. No, no; there was no subterfuge.
233. General Frank. Who was in this group in Washington dis-
cussing this contract?
Mr. Connolly. Just Wyman, Graf e, and myself.
[2191] 234. General Frank. Where did you stop?
Mr. Connolly. We stayed at the Carlton Hotel.
235. General Frank. All three of you?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1141
Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir.
236. General Frank. And did you get rooms together ?
Mr. Connolly. No. I had wired on to the Cai'lton for rooms, and
when I got there with Wyman there were no rooms. "We didn't have
any place to go, and Grafe had a reservation, and we took Grafe's
room. He had a bedroom and a sitting room, and Wyman and I tooli
that, until Grafe showed up, and then Wyman got another room. I
stayed with Grafe until I left.
237. General Frank. Who was responsible for getting this group of
contractors interested in this Hawaiian venture?
Mr. Connolly. Why, Wyman.
238. General Frank. Wyman was the man who proposed that these
three contracting firms take on this job in Honolulu?
Mr. Connolly. Well, my understanding is that Wyman came to the
continent to interest contractors, and he interviewed several, that Grafe
wanted this thiling himself, but Wyman wouldn't give it to him alone,
but he would give it to the group that was functioning in Colorado.
239. General Frank. And with that in mind, you and Graff and
Wyman went on to Washington to consummate this contra.-t?
Mr. Connolly. We went on to Washington to negotiate it and de-
termine whether or not we would get it. We didn't have it when we
went to Washington.
240. General Frank. Now, how soon after getting to Washington
did you find out that Rohl was a German alien ?
Mr. Connolly. Why, I think within the next couple or three
[2192] days.
241. General Frank. That had a very direct bearing on the par-
ticipation of the Eohl-Connolly Company in the contract, did it not?
Mr. Connolly. What do you mean, ''it had a very direct bearing"?
242. General Frank. Well, if Mr. Rohl stayed in there as a Ger-
man alien, he legally had no right to accept a defense contract?
Mr. Connolly. Well, I don't know.
243. General Frank. That was just plain law, was it not, at that
time? So it was not a question of judgment, it was a question of
legal responsibility ?
Mr. Connolly. You mean Rohl legally could not participate in
the contract?
244. General Frank. Not unless he was a citizen; and that, in
accordance with the law. That is exactly what I mean. Therefore,
the status of the Rohl-ConnoUy Company in this venture depended
upon Rohl's status, did it not?
Mr. Connolly. Well, I don't know. I am a layman, not an
attorney.
245. General Frank. You were doing business as the president of
the company?
Mr. Connolly. That's right.
246. General Frank. And you certainly had l)etter know some-
thing about the law that restricted your operations.
Mr. Connolly. Well, I didn't know there wms any law that re-
stricted that. General.
247. General Frank. Didn't this man Martin tell you that?
Mr. Connolly. Well, if I discussed it with him, he probably would
have.
1142 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
248. General Frank. What I am getting around to is this : When
\2193'] you learned that Rohl was a German citizen, you started
to "scratch gravel" to eliminate his being an officer in the company,
did you not i
Mr. Connolly. Well, that wasn't what prompted me to do that.
249. General Frank. What was it?
Mr. Connolly. What prompted me was the fact that that thing was
secret.
250. General Frank. Did you get any advice whatever from a
hiwyer on this question?
Mr. Connolly. No, I never developed it with them.
251. General Frank. With Rohl's status in the company as a Ger-
man alien being as disturbing as it was, and with Wyman asking
that group to come into Honolulu, you want me to believe that you
never mentioned it to Wyman ?
Mr. Connolly. General, that is the truth; I never mentioned it
to Wyman.
252. General Frank. That is what you want? That is what you
want?
Mr. Connolly. No, it isn't a matter of wanting. That is a fact.
I never mentioned Rohl's status to Wyman.
253. General Frank. Why shouldn't you have mentioned it to him?
Mr. Connolly. Well, I didn't.
254. General Frank. Why shouldn't you ?
Mr. Connolly. No reason at all, except I am the son of an immi-
grant, myself, who had his papers, of course. I guess, so were most
of us; but Rohl seemed to think that not being a citizen was a terrible
thing. I guess it is, after that many years; and I seemed to feel
that I was rather a chump, not \219Ji.'\ knowing more about my
immediate associate than I did, after all those years, and I probably
thought I didn't like to express it around, about what a damned
fool I was. I had more or less pride, I guess, on my part; but
that's it.
255. General Frank. All right.
256. Major Clausen. So, when you learned of this alien status in
Washington, you not only learned that he was a German alien, but
that he had been an alien since 1913, didn't you ?
Mr. Connolly. No. Well, he had always been an alien.
257. Major Clausen. Yes. Well, you knew though that he had
come to the country in 1913?
Mr. Connolly. All his life.
258. Major Clausen. You knew that he had come to this country
in 1913, didn't you, Mr. Connolly?
Mr. Connolly. Well, now, I don't think I knew when he came to
this country.
259. Major Clausen. Maybe you don't recall your answer. What
the General asked you was, "why didn't you tell Wyman?" And you
said, "Well, it was such a terrible thing to have been an alien all those
years."
Mr. Connolly. I had known him 20 years.
260. Major Clausen. Yes.
Mr. Connolly. That was 20 years he was an alien.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1143
261. Major Clausen. Well, you knew then that he had not only
been an alien, but you he had been an alien for at least 20 years, because
you had known him for 20 years, didn't you ?
Mr. Connolly. Yes — plus the rest of his life.
2H2. Major Clausen. And you did not discuss that with him ?
Mr. Connolly. No.
[219S] 263. Major Clausen. Did Rohl tell you it was a terrible
thing to be an alien for those 20 years ?
]\Ir. Connolly. No.
204. Major Clausen. Do you make the assertion to the Board here,
as a statement of fact, that you did not discuss the law as to Rohl's
participation in this contract with Mr. Martin, in Washington, in
December 1940?
Mr. Connolly. Of course, I didn't. If I did and he had expressed
to me what you gentlemen as attorneys now express to me, I would
have never executed it.
265. ]\Ia jor Clausen. And that is as true as everything else that you
have said, isn't it?
Mr. Connolly. And it's all the truth.
2()(;. Major Clausen. Now, as a matter of fact, you shared a room
with Colonel Wyman, did you, in this Carlton Hotel ?
Mr. Connolly. Yes.
267. Major Clausen. You not only went to Washington, but, in
response to a question by General Frank, you said you slept in the
same room with Colonel Wyman?
Mr. Connolly. That's right.
268. Major Clausen. While you were there?
Mr. Connolly. No — till Wyman got a room, when Grafe came in.
269. Major Clausen. And where was Mr. Martin at this time?
He was in the same hotel, wasn't he?
Mr. Connolly. I do not think so. I never saw him in any room in
that hotel.
270. Major Clausen. Where was he when you saw him in
Washington ?
Mr. Connolly. I saw him in the lobby, but I never Imew [£196]
that he had a room in that hotel. I don't think he did.
271. Major Clausen. Did you just have a casual conversation with
Mr. Martin in the lobby ? Is that all that you saw of Mr. Martin on
that occasion?
Mr. Connolly. No ; I saw Martin in the lobby, and of course, I saw
liim upstairs, too, but I never went into any "legal discussions with
Martin about this contract.
272. Major Clausen. Did you see Mr. Martin there on more than
one day, or was it just the one day ?
Mr. Connolly. I say I saw him more than once.
273. INIajor Clausen. Several days, on several occasions ?
Mr. Connolly. I saw him two or three times, there. That's
reasonable.
274. Major Clausen. DidMr. Martin go to dinner with you?
Mr. Connolly. I don't think so, ever ; no.
275. Major Clausen. Did you see Mr. Martin when you were with
Colonel Wyman ?
Mr. Connolly. Yes, I think I did.
1144 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
276. Major Clausen. Did you have any discussion concerning Mr.
Martin with Colonel AVyman ?
Mr. Connolly. I don't think so.
277. Major Clausen. Well, as a matter of fact, didn't Colonel
Wyman say to you, "Why do you have your lawyer here?" and get
"peeved" at the fact that you did have him there ?
Mr. Connolly. I didn't have him there. He was there. I didn't
have him there.
278. Major Clausen. Well, didn't he say that to you ? That is my
question. Didn't lie remonstrate at the fact that there was a lawyer
on the scene representing Rohl-Connolly Company, he thought?
[2197] Mr. Connolly. There was no lawyer on the scene repre-
senting the Rohl-Connolly Company.
279. Major Clausen. My question, sir, is this: Did not Colonel
Wyman say to you, "Why do you have Mr. Martin here, your lawyer?"
or words to that effect?
Mr. Connolly. I don't think so.
280. Major Clausen. Well, are you sure?
Mr. Connolly. Reasonably sure.
281. Major Clausen. All right.
Mr. Connolly. I don't think I discussed Martin with Wyman.
282. Major Clausen. Did Mr. Martin sit around with you when
you were discussing the contract ?
Mr. Connolly. Certainly not I
283. Major Clausen. Did he go to dinner with the group of you ?
Mr. Connolly. Not that I recall.
284. Major Clausen. In these discussions that you had with Mr.
Paul Graf e. Colonel Wyman sat in on those, did he ?
Mr. Connolly. No.
285. Major Clausen. Just you and Mr. Grafe?
Mr. Connolly. When I remarked about Rohl, yes.
286. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon, sir ?
Mr. Connolly. If you mean it was the contract business that Wyman
was discussing Avitli me, why, of course, he was there ; but if you mean
my discussion with Grafe, as far a Rohl was concerned, Wyman wasn't
there.
287. Major Clausen. You are sure of that, now ?
Mr. Connolly. I know it.
288. Major Clausen. In these discussions that you had with Mr.
Grafe concerning the contract — that is, the details of this [£198]
contract — was Wyman present?
Mr .Connolly. Why, they were read to us, in the Chief's office.
289. Major Clausen. By whom?
Mr. Connolly. By Wyman and Newman, whoever was around
there. There was no contract in anyone's possession around the Carl-
ton Hotel. These papers were in the Chief's office, to stay there.
There was no contract in our hands to discuss, ever.
290. Major Clausen. Mr. Grafe was present with you and Colonel
Wyman, then, in the Chief's office, is that correct?
Mr. Connolly. Sure.
291. Major Clausen. In other words, Colonel Wyman was there,
also?
Mr. Connolly Sure.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1145
292. Major Clausen. Now, who paid for Colonel Wyman's room
at this hotel ?
Mr. Connolly. I don't know, but I suppose he paid for his own. I
know Grafe paid for his room, when I took it over. He had the
reservations. Wyman and I slept there one night before Grafe showed
up. When I left, I left Grafe with the bill ; so he paid the bill, for the
first night, for the night I stayed there.
293. Major Clausen. I have no further questions.
294. General Gruneet. Is there anything else, Mr. Connolly, that
you might tell the Board, that might assist us in getting at facts, that
you have in mind ?
Mr. Connolly. General, anything that I could tell you, that would
help you, I would be glad to, if you would just indicate what else you
think I might do.
295. General Grunert. I just wondered, possibly there had been
sometliing we haven't brought up, that you might have in mind,
[2199] and could tell us.
296. General Frank. Have you anything. Colonel Toulmin?
297. Colonel Toulmin. Nothing, now.
298. General Grunert. Apparently there is nothing else.
Thank you very much for coming.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
[2£00] TESTIMONY OF WALTER WILTON HORNE, 9425 WIL-
SHIRE BOULEVARD, BEVERLY HILLS, CALIFORNIA
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Mr. Home, will you please state to the Board
your full name and address ?
Mr. Horne. Walter Wilton Home, 9425 Wilshire Boulevard,
Beverly Hills.
2. General Grunert. Mr. Home, what the Board needs is help to
get at facts that will lead to other facts.
Mr. HoRNE. Yes, sir.
3. General Grunert. So I am going to ask General Frank and his
adviser there to get at some facts that they think you may be able to
help us on.
4. General Frank. Go ahead.
5. Major Clausen. Mr. Horne, what is your present business?
Mr. HoRNE. I am a realty operator, an insurance broker, have had a
great deal of yachting experience in days gone by.
6. Major Clausen. And in your experience previously did you meet
aHansWilhelmRohl?
Mr. HoRNE. I did, sir.
7. Major Clausen. And did you ever have occasion to discuss with
him his preference for things Germanic ?
Mr. HoRNE. I did, sir.
8. Major Clausen. Well, just briefly narrate to the Board some of
those discussions that you had with him, and when they took place.
Mr. HuRNE. I had the good fortune to own a German-built yacht,
the AliMGAARD, built in Germany for the German Prince
[2^01] Lippe, a 65-ton vessel, racing yacht 106 feet long, one of
the outstanding racing yachts of Germany, brought to America, and
1146 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
we raced it in two races to Honolulu. It was an outstanding^ very
fast ship, built of German manganese-nickel steel ; and Hans Wilhelm
Rohl, known to us in the yachting circle as Bill Kohl, was always very
interested in that boat, several times tried to buy it, even helped in
connection with Honolulu races by supplying masts and gear that came
off of his smaller Swedish boat, the PANDORA.
The PANDORA and the ARMGAARD, then renamed yacht CON-
TENDER, were anchored next door to each other, as neighbors in the
Long Beach harbor ; and I, as Commodore of the Long Beach Pacific
Coast Yacht Club, went down to Spain in 1928 to bring back the
trophies from King Alfonso and to take over to Spain the American
trophies for the trans- Atlantic Ocean race. I did not consult Rohl
as to my going, and when I returned he asked particularly why I went
on a British ship, the Cunard Line, why I hadn't consulted him ; that
I had made a mistake, that he could have helped me, and go on the
Hamburg- American Line. He made the direct, postive statement that
his uncle, whom he was very close to and who was his financial backer,
was the managing director of the Hamburg- American Line and the
North German Lloyd Steamship Company, a most influential, high
German financially and politically, and that he could have gotten me
the very finest of accommodations aboard this trans-Atlantic passage,
and he criticized me for going twelfth hour with any accommodations
I could get.
9. Major Clausen. Now, with regard to Germany and things Ger-
man, did you have talks with him in which he boasted of [2202']
things German ?
Mr. HoRNE. Yes.
10. Major Clausen. By the way, before you answer that question,
when was it that you had this talk with him about his uncle being
Mr. HoRNE. On my return in the fall of 1928.
11. Major Clausen. All right.
Mr. HoRNE. I went down to Spain on July 4, 1928.
12. Major Clausen. All right. Did you have other talks with him
about the subject of preferences for Germany?
Mr. Horne. I kept my yacht in commission through the winter and
took numbers of yachtmen who owned other yachts that were out of
commission, and he went on some of these trips, local trips, where we
were practicing navigation, racing crews, and he was always bragging
about the yacht CONTENDER being the finest and fastest yacht
because she was German-built, and there was no one could build as fine
a manganese steel yacht as the Germans could, and his whole boastful
braggadocio attitude was entirely German, and things German were
by far the best and by far the finest built ; and he was very free in those
days, in 1926 to 1938, in claiming his relationship with the managing
director of the North German Lloyd Line.
13. Major Clausen. Did he ever say anything about the fact that
he was a German citizen himself, not a United States citizen ?
Mr. HoRNE. I think he kept that pretty well covered up. "We didn't
really know at that time that he was a German citizen, until he bought
the large American yacht VEGA, and that was in [2203'] _ his
wife's name, and it was registered in New York, and he bought it for
$48,000. That is the ship that he chartered to the Army Engineers
for $75,000, reported in the newspapers at one-dollar charter, how-
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1147
ever; and we knew, checldng into the thing afterwards, that it was
because of his alien birth, and he had the yacht registered in his wife's
name, his wife Floy Rohl. She received the charter money.
The PANDORA, the first yacht he owned, which was moored next
to me, was under 75 feet in length and therefore could be registered
in the name of an alien German, and the PANDORA was really his
yacht, registered as his yacht.
14. Major Clausex, Now, did you ever have a talk with Mr. Rohl
concerning an acquaintance by him with visiting Germans of high
rank, in business and diplomatic service of the German Republic ?
Mr. HoRNE. On my return from this yacht race to Spain bringing
back the King Alfonso trophy I had occasion or was called upon as
commodore of the yacht club to entertain and did see considerable of
Count Von Luckner, who was an outstanding German, known as the
sea raider, the skipper of the SEA ADDER that came out of the
North Sea at Christmas night and escaped the blockade, in the first
war.
He wanted to see this fine German racing yacht because he had
sailed on the yacht in Travaminda. He had sailed the same yacht in
Kiel and Travaminda, and he wanted to go with me to Honolulu as a
navigator on this very fine German yacht.
I did not invite Hans Wilhelm Rohl to these receptions and enter-
tainments of both Count Von Luckner and his Norwegian princess
wife, and Rohl became incensed over the fact that I [2204] did
not do so, and his friendship or acquaintanceship as a next door neigh-
bor was chilled because of the fact that I had ignored him and had not
invited him to these receptions to Count Von Luckner.
I understood that he had made Von Luckner's acquaintance and had
entertained him when he came here, but the outstanding Von Luckner
reception, a dinner party aboard his own ship, which was his own
birthday party, which was very much of a German — the whole char-
acteristic of the whole thing from beer drinking up and down — Hans
Wilhelm Rohl was not invited to that party. Rather strange that he
wasn't, but he was not invited.
There is no question but that Rohl was a true Nazi German: his
braggadocio, his drinking, his excessive excesses in every way, bull-
headedness and domination, overrunning everybody's rights in con-
nection with yachting entertainments. On the return from the Hono-
lulu race he made himself very, vei'y obnoxious because of his foreign,
German attitude and excessive drinking.
In 1926 when I first met him I was associated politically with three
gentlemen who were my partners in the insurance business, and had
been the campaign manager that had succeeded in arranging the large
bond issues for the Long Beach breakwater, and Rohl came to us
wanting to become a preferred, intimate, friendly contractor, to buy a
lot of insurance from us and bid and secure the breakwater contracts
that he later did actually build in Long Beach, and he offered us all of
his insurance, and it was a left-handed way of bribery, and we were
very suspicious of his methods and his foreign influencing of contracts,
and we withdrew from the thing and have had nothing whatsoever
to do with him.
He did not buy or have anything to do with our office [2205]
because three of my partners were councilmen and were really sitting
1148 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL, HARBOR ATTACK
as a board letting the breakwater contracts ; and I went to the officft
of the Pacific Indemnity Company to try to get the back records of
Ted Woods, the executive vice president, in reference to liis investi-
gation of Kohl's financial position ; and the whole status of his pres-
entation of his qualification for bonds financial, heavy — heavy finan-
cial bonds — was not only his own personal resources, which he ad-
mitted he brought from Germany some years previous, but that he
had a strong financial backing and could command any amount of
money or resources if his contracts got involved in trouble, because
of the financial backing of his uncle, the managing director of the
Hamburg-American Line, who was supposed to be a very wealthy
German.
15. Major Clausen. I have no further questions.
Mr. HoRNE. He tried to buy a German yacht and was unable to do
so, finally bought a large American yacht. We as yachtsmen were
rather impressed with the publicity, that he had taken that large
ocean-going yacht and chartered it to the Government at the be-
ginning of the war for a dollar. It was publicized in the Los Ange-
les Times, and we found out later that he had actually chartered it
to the Engineering Department of the Army Engineers for $75,000
and that the only work and service that that yacht ever performed in
the war effort was the hauling of a cargo of liquor from San Pedro
harbor to Major Wyman in Honolulu and that the boat never had
been put into any useful service in the war effort as a patrol ship,
but delivered its cargo of liquor to Honolulu and just was left there.
16. General Frank. How did you find that out ?
[2306] Mr. HoRNE. Well, ' Commodore Byron McCandless of
the United States Navy, San Diego, the pioneer Navy man in charge
of San Diego for the last twenty years, of the Destroyer Fleet, was
encouraging me and I was offering my services gratis to try to build
up a fleet of American-owned yachts for the offshore patrol, because
the Navy were all lax
17. General Frank. Just to get back, there is just a single point
I am after.
Mr. HoRNE. Yes.
18. General Frank. And that is about this,
Mr. HoRNE. Well, we were trying to charter all these boats to the
Government for a dollar a year, and we were using that as a criterion,
and we found out much to our embarrassment that it wasn't true,
that it wasn't chartered for a dollar a year; it was $75,000.
19. General Frank. Where did you get the information on the
$75,000 that you are stating positively here under oath that he got
for it?
Mr. HoRNE. Well, that, where I got it? We checked the charter
parties. Donald Douglas, a personal friend of mine, a yachtsman,
and vice president of the Douglas Aircraft Company, was interested
in putting his yacht in ; Keith Spaulding, the owner of the schooner
yacht GOOD WILL, a five or six hundred thousand dollar yacht;
we made an investigation at the custom house in San Pedro about that
charter party. We wanted to make the same charter party, and we
found out it was chartered in New York and not here, and out of the
checking up of the thing we found out it was leally chartered for
$150,000, but the Government had finally come down and paid $75,000
as a [££07] modification.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1149
20. General Frank. Where did you get your figures?
Mr. HoRNE. Well, it was in connection with this custom-house
investigation, that we wanted to make the same charters to the Gov-
ernment for a dollar a year, and Keith Spaulding and a number of
other large yacht owners had agreed that they would turn their yachts
over.
'21. General Frank. Did you ever see a document that showed that
he got $75,000?
Mr. HoRNE. No. It was in New York. It was not in this custom
house here. And I think as a result of our trying to find what the
charter party was, to make duplicates of it, we learned — but I don't
know whether we learned from the custom house or where we learned —
that it developed that it wasn't a dollar-a-year charter. The Amer-
ican boys went on and chartered their boats to the Navy for a dollar
a year, turned them over.
22. General Frank. I have nothing further.
Mr. HoRNE. But I don't know where we got that information. It
was someone of the group that owned these yachts, that turned them
over to the Government and
23. General Frank. As a matter of fact, you are not so sure that
that $75,000 is a true statement of the fact, are you?
Mr. HoRNE. Well, to my best knowledge and belief, that tlie yacht-
men made this investigation and they chartered their boats for a
dollar a year and later found out that Rohl had chartered his for a
dollar a year plus $75,000. Now, just where that information came
from, I am sorry, sir, I can't tell you, but it came out in our efforts to
supply this offshore patrol of these large ocean-going yachts.
[!;220S] 2J:. General Frank. So far as you are concerned, then,
it is hearsay?
Mr. HoRNE. I think so, because we didn't have the records in San
Piedro harbor. They were in New York, not here.
25. General Grunert. It may not be true, but you believe it to be
true; is that the idea?
Mr. HoRNE. I really honestly believe it to be true. The yachtsmen
were very much incensed about it, that they had turned over more
jjowerful Diesel schooners for this offshore patrol on a dollar-a-year
basis really inspired by the fact that Bill Rohl had done the thing, and
we found out afterward that he had sandbagged the Department for
$75,000.
26. General Frank. When your group gave their yachts to the
(jovernment for a dollar a year, the Government, however, recon-
ditioned them when they were returned, so that they were as good as
when they were originally loaned to the Government, did they not?
Mr. HoRNE. Well, Walter P. Murphy turned over a 260-foot 3-mast
schooner, and he turned it over to the (joventment just as is : Do with
it as you please ; and the Government I believe are still using it. Now,
they will have to have it reconditioned, I believe.
27. General Frank. That is one conditioned. What about the
rest of them ? Did the Government recondition them ?
Mr. HoRNE. They have altered them. They took out all of the fine
cabins and put for or five times as many — two or three times as many
men aboard. I think that the yachtsmen understood that the equip-
ment would be put back the way it was.
1150 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
28. General Grunert. Could you have been mistaken as to the
l^^09] question of its being chartered for $75,000; or putting it
back in the condition that they received it cost $75,000?
Mr, HoRNE. I understood it was charter hire, $75,000 against my
friends' putting in their yachts at one dollar,
29. General Grunert. All right.
Mr, HoRNE, The matter of conditioning I don't think was a part of
the charter at all.
30. General Grunert. Have you succeeded in what you are after in
getting or giving a document ?
Mr, Horne. I believe that we could get from the New York Custom
House a copy of that charter if you would like to have it.
31. General Frank. It is immaterial to us.
32. General Grunert. Yes, I think we ought to have evidence on
that, and as far as this Board is concerned in its investigation, we
limit ourselves to phases which pertain to the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Mr. Horne. I see.
33. General Grunert. So whatever evidence there is, if our adviser
on tliis advises us to get that evidence we can do so. '
Mr. Horne. Well, I think Mr. Earl Thatcher in Honolulu, who was
a yachtsman and who had lots to do with our yacht racing down there,
when you arrive in Honolulu, can verify and witness as a qualified
witness. He is a member of or in charge of the War Information
Bureau in Honolulu, and I believe that that information can be veri-
fied, that that yacht made a cargo haul of liquor to Honolulu and was
never used otherwise.
34. General Grunert. Yes. We have evidence on that also.
Is there anything else you wish to bring out by this witness ?
[£210] 35. Major Clausen. No, sir.
36. General Grunert. Have you any questions?
37. General Russell. Yes.
This man Rohl about whom you have testified: prior to the time
that he went into work on that breakwater project down there was he
a man of considerable resources ?
Mr. Horne. Well, I would say that he was a relatively small con-
tractor. His financial resources can be determined accurately by
financial statements in the files of the Pacific Indemnity Company,
but the source of that money came from Germany, from his uncle, the
managing director of the Hamburg-American Line.
38. General Russell. Did he make a lot of money out of his oper-
ations with the breakwater contract? Did he become rich in that
operation ?
Mr. Horne. Well, that would be hearsay. I understood that that
was where he became a big, strong financial contractor, from the be-
ginning of the harbor breakwater. I was the chairman of the cam-
paign committee that raised that money, and I believe definitely that
it can be shown in the records that that was his financial start as a big
major contractor.
39. General Russell. Now, it is true that you went over to this
other indemnity company when he was seeking a bond for his break-
water work, and there made an investigation as to his financial con-
dition ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1151
Mr. HoRNE. Yes, I did, jointly with Mr. Ted Woods, the executive
vice president of that insurance company, and the more we got into
it and the more there seemed to be a whole [2211] influence of
his buying — buying influence to get that contract, the further we
pulled away from it. But the Pacific Indemnity Company, of course,
is entirely neutral; they could supply a bond if they wanted to.
40. General Russell. Well, what did you learn about him? That
he was not so strong financially when he went into the breakwater
contract ?
Mr. HoRisTE. That is it. It was ver}?^ questionable as to whether
the Pacific Indemnity Company would write his bond.
41. General Russell. All right ; so much for that.
Now, then, I believe in your earlier evidence you stated that when
this ship of his went out to Honolulu, the one that we have had some
evidence about
Mr. HoRNE. Yes, the VEGA.
42. General Russell. That it took a cargo of liquor for Colonel
Wyman; was that your statement?
Mr. Horne. Yes, the statement that we understood that was what
was — that was the only work that that boat ever did.
43. General Russell. Now, who made that statement that this
was Wyman 's liquor?
Mr. Horne. Well, there is a witness coming tomorrow named Bruce
Pine, Los Angeles, Beverly Hills, and I believe that I learned that
information from him ; and I was in on the Congressional investiga-
tion of an attorney from the House Naval Affairs Committee, or I
believe it was Naval Affairs Committee, previously, and prepared
these affidavits which I will be glad to leave with you, which are signed
affidavits; and thev questioned me very carefully as to these two
yachts, the PANDORA that was registered in Rohl's name and the
Vega that [2212] was not registered in Rohl's name. I was
bej^ond the age limit, fifty, to get into the Navy, and I volunteered my
services to help build up this offshore patrol of these large ocean-
going yachts, and that is how I got into this thing and got into the
custom house to try to get a copy of the charter party, because these
people in a patriotic way had said, "Well, we will do the same thing
and get us a copy of the charter party." And I went down to San
Piedro, found that Rohl's boat was not registered in his name at all.
It was registered in his wife's name, and the custom house said that
she was the American and he was not; he was a foreign, an alien
citizen, and the boat couldn't be registered in his name, but he was the
one that used the boat exclusively. He was the skipper and owner
of the boat as far as the world knew, and he went in and out of port
with it.
44. General Grukert. We have that evidence of the House Military'
Affairs Committee. We have that available to us.
Mr. Horne. Yes, sir. Well, that is how it came out.
45. General Grunert. Yes.
Mr. Horne. Our efforts were very sincere, in a patriotic effort to
supply all these yachts to the Navy for a dollar a year, and my friends
like Donald Douglas and Keith Spaulding rather laughed at me be-
cause I had urged them to put their boats in there at a dollar a year,
1152 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and they found out that Rohl had been paid $75,000 a year; not that
they wanted $75,000: were perfectly contented to offer their ships.
Walter P. Murphy's finest yacht on the Pacific Coast was given for a
dollar a year, and it is in service today and has done wonderful yeo-
man work.
46. Major Clausen. We must get the affidavit, sir, and that is all.
[2213'] Mr. HoRNE. I would appreciate this one privilege. May
I ask the privilege of reading this last page of this affidavit?
47. General Grunert. Go ahead.
Mr. HoRNE. I am so delighted that you gentlemen are taking the
bull by the horns, and a long time ago when this thing [indicating]
was written up it was in hopes that just what you gentlemen are doing
would come about :
That affiant is informed and believes that said vessel sailing with the said
cargo of intoxicating liquor from the harbor of San Pedro was never used for
any purpose of national defense or as set forth in the charter thereof.
That aftiant believes that the method of registration of said vessel VEGA and
the chartering thereof, and the wrongful use of said charter, was and is a fraud
upon the United States Government.
That affiant is informed and believes that the said Rohl was at Pearl Harbor,
Honolulu, prior to December 7, 1941, and had complete detailed information of
all of the offensive and defensive installations of the War Department, and that
he knew on said date of the location of American Naval vessels, American planes,
fortifications and other vital installations, and that the aforesaid knowledge
of the said Rohl at that particular place at that particular time, was too serious
to be a mere coincidence, which in affiant's opinion should be thoroughly in-
vestigated by officials of the Government high enough not to be biased, prej-
udiced, or influenced in any manner whatsoever.
[2214] Namely, RohTs manner of influencing with money and
bribery.
Affiant further states that in his opinion, the Government investigators should
go deeper than the records disclose upon the surface, so that there may be ap-
prehended all alien spies working under cover against the best American inter-
ests, and in league with agents of Germany or Japan, and that all persons so
apprehended should lose their citizenship, and all of their wordly goods and
ill-gotten gains available should be confiscated, and that they should be de-
ported to the countries from which they originally came.
And that it should not be forgotten that the fathers and mothers who mourn
their dead soldiers and sailors who lost their lives in this war, and who have
received Awards of Merit and Distinguished Service Medals, would want to
return these Awards to the United States Government so long as the said Major
Wyman is allowed to ret.ain any merits or the Distinguished Service Medal
granted him, and that he should be subjected to an impartial Court Martial,
and treated as found guilty, according to his just deserts and the best American
tradition.
48. General Grunert. Now, is that evidence sworn to, and so forth ?
49. Major Clausen. Yes, sir.
50. General Grunert. All right ; take it.
We thank you very much for coming up, Mr. Home.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon, at 4: 45 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of wit-
neqs;es for the day and proceeded to other business.)
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1153
\2U5-\ CONTENTS
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1944.
Testimony of— Page •
Mrs. Gertrude Campbell Brunner, 1210 South Euclid, San Gabriel,
California 2216
Hans William Rohl, Rancho Dos Vintos, Camarillo, California 2222
Paul Grafe, 21 Chester Place, Los Angeles, California 2288
John M. Martin, Attorney-At-Law. Los Angeles, (California 2321
J. P. Shirley, 501 Belair Road, Los Angeles, California 2354
'^ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
nages of original transcript of proceedings.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1155
[2216^ PEOCEEDINGS BEFOEE THE ARMY
PEAKL HAKBOE BOAED
FBIDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1944.
Presidio of San Francisco, California.
The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted
the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the
Board, presiding.
Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D.
Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.
Present also : Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C.
Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr.,
Executive Officer.
General Grunert. The Board will come to order.
TESTIMONY OF MES. GERTRUDE CAMPBELL BRUNNER, 1210 SOUTH
EUCLID, SAN GABRIEL, CALIFORNIA
(The witness was sworn by the Assistant Recorder.)
1. Major Clausen. Would you state to the Board your name and
address ?
Mrs. Brunner. Gertrude Campbell Brunner, 1210 South Euclid,
San Gabriel, California.
2. Major Clausen. Mrs. Brunner, there is a procedure that we have
followed with all witnesses, which consists of warning them of their
rights.
Mrs. Brunner. Yes.
[2217] Major Clausen. In this respect: that you don't have to
say anything or testify to anything which might implicate you in any
crime ; that if you do say anything here it may later be used against
you. You understand that, do you ?
Mrs. Brunner. Yes.
4. Major Clausen. You formerly were an employee of the United
States Engineer Department?
Mrs. Brunner. Yes, sir.
5. Major Clausen. And that employment commenced in the year
1935, did it?
Mrs. Brunner. Yes, it did.
6. Major Clausen. And you were then assigned to Los Angeles?
Mrs. Brunner. That is right.
7. Major Clausen. And at that time your duties consisted of run-
ning an addressograph machine ?
Mrs. Brunner. I started as secretary to Major Zajieck, Z-a-j-i-e-c-k.
He was a Naval — an Army reserve officer. And then I later went into
the addressograph department.
79716—46 — Ex. 145, vol. 2 24
1156 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
8. Major Clausen. This was in Los Angeles ?
Mrs. Brunner. In Los Angeles.
9. Major Clausen. While you were stationed there were you ever
the personal representative of Colonel Wyman ?
Mrs. Brunner. Never.
10. Major Clausen. Were you ever his secretary?
Mrs. Brunner. No, sir.
11. Major Clausen. Were you ever the stenographer assigned to
him?
Mrs. Brunner. No, sir.
12. Major Clausen. And Colonel Wyman later went to Hawaii,
did he not?
[^21S] Mrs. Brunner. That is right.
13. Major Clausen. About five years later ?
Mrs. Brunner. That is right.
14. Major Clausen. And that was about 1940, '39 ?
Mrs. Brunner. Somewhere around there, yes.
15. Major Clausen. And did you then go to Hawaii at about that
time?
Mrs. Brunner. No. I think he was over there quite a while before
I went over.
16. Major Clausen. Well, you finally did, though, go to Hawaii ; is
that correct ?
Mrs. Brunner. That is right.
17. Major Clausen. Still as an employee of the United States Engi-
neer Department ?
Mrs. Brunner. Yes.
18. Major Clausen. Colonel Wyman was relieved from Hawaii
about March 1942, returned to the mainland, and was later assigned
to the Canol project. Did you return to the mainland in the early
part of 1942?
Mrs. Brunner. Yes, I did. I resigned. I came back under doctor's
orders.
19. Major Clausen. And did you then go to the Alaskan territory,
Canadian territory, on this Canol project?
Mrs. Brunner. Well, it was three months after I returned to the
States.
20. Major Clausen. And in going to Alaska or Canada did you fly
there with a Ferman K. Pickering, P-i-c-k-e-r-i-n-g?
Mrs. Brunner. He and his wife were on the plane, yes.
21. Major Clausen. Mrs. Brunner, this morning I showed you
[2219'] what purports to be a statement of fact contained on pages
19 and 20 of this report of the House Military Affairs Committee dated
June 14, 1940. I am going to read this portion to you :
Gertrude Campbell, who called herself the colonel's personal representative,
told me that she had been with the Engineers in Los Angeles ; from Los Angeles
she had gone to Hawaii, where she worked directly under Colonel Wyman and
had gone to Canada from Hawaii. I flew from Edmonton to White Horse in
the same plane with Miss Campbell. After staying in White Horse for 2 days,
we proceeded to Skagway, Alaska, by train, also accompanied by Miss Campbell,
who was the colonel's personal representative on the Canol project No. 2, at
Skagway, Alaska. Miss Campbell told me, in the presence of my wife and others,
that on the morning of December 7, 1941, in the Hawaiian Islands, Colonel
Wyman, who was then district engineer, came to the office after the Japanese
attack, in a drunken condition and in civilian clothes, and changed to his
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1157
uniform in full view of the girls in the office. Colonel Wyman meantime shouted
directions to those in the office and passed out guns to anyone who seemed to be
able to operate firearms.
Let me ask 3^011 first, Miss Campbell, if you made that statement to
which reference is made on this page 20, at that time and place.
Mrs. Brunxer. I don't remember anything about that at all.
[^^^O] 22. Major Clausen. Do you recall, though, Miss Camp-
bell, rumors to the eli'ect that on the morning of December 7 Colonel
Wyman came to the office in a drunken condition ?
Mrs. Brunner. I have heard that in Honolulu and I have heard it
since 1 have come back to the States, but I couldn't testify to that
because I didn't see Colonel Wyman on the day of the 7th until in
the afternoon.
23. Major Clausen. I have no other questions.
24. General Russell. You had better identify her, as she is testify-
ing as Mrs. Brunner.
Mrs. Brunner. I was Mrs. Campbell. Mrs. Campbell, not Miss.
25. Major Clausen. You were Mrs. Gertrude Campbell?
Mrs. Brunner. That is right.
26. General Russell. And what did you say of the time, now?
Major Clausen. That is on this occasion that is referred to by
Ferman K. Pickering. You were Mrs. Campbell at that tune?
Mrs. Brunner. That is right.
27. General Grunert. When you saw Colonel Wyman that after-
noon what was his condition as to sobriety?
Mrs. Brunner. Well, I was not close enough to him to tell one way
or another.
28. General Grunert. That is all.
29. Major Clausen. That is all.
Mrs. Brunner. He asked us all to report out there, and we were all
assigned jobs to do. I was making sandwiches and was running small
errands at Kewalo Basin, and I didn't get close enough to any of the
officers except Captain McCrone, [22.2 1] who was my superior.
But I would like to say that I have never worked directly under
Colonel Wyman. I have always worked under an officer. Colonel
W3^man has never been my superior officer except over the officer that
I was reporting to.
30. General Grunert. Is there anything that you would like to tell
the Board that occurs to you that might be of assistance to the Board?
Mrs. Brunner. Well, I don't know whether it would have any bear-
ing on this case or not, but the party that made this statement here had
caused us quite a bit of trouble in Alaska. He and his wife — he was
married on his way to Edmonton, and they sent them up to Alaska on
the job that I was on. We finally had to send them out. He and his
wife got in a fight and they broke her jaw, and they couldn't fix it in
Skagway. They sent them out, and they were going to sue the Gov-
ernment and they were going to do a lot of things. I don't believe
they have done anything since they went back, but Bechtel, Price &
Callahan had a terrible time with them. I think that maybe his back-
ground, if somebody would look into it, might shed a little light on the
subject.
31. General Grunert. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
1158 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TESTIMONY OF HANS WILLIAM ROHL
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Mr. Rohl, will you please state to the Board your
name and address?
Mr. RoHL. Hans William — not Wilhelm — Rohl ; Rancho Dos Vin-
tos, Camarillo, California.
2. Colonel West. And your occupation?
Mr. Rohl. Farmer.
3. General Grunert. Mr. Rohl, this Board is after facts about what
happened prior to and during the Pearl Harbor attack, and in the
course of this investigation there are phases there that pertain to
Colonel Wyman and his connection with construction in Hawaii.
Now, this field is so broad that we have divided the field up amongst
the Board in making this special investigation, although the Board
will act on all phases. So General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen
here, will develop this particular field for us. General Frank.
4. General Frank. Go ahead.
5. Major Clausen. Mr. Rohl, the first question I will ask you : On
(he night of December 7, 1941, did Colonel Wyman stay at your home?
Mr. Rohl. On the night of December 7th ?
6. Major Clausen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rohl. No, sir.
. 7. General Frank. December 6 ?
8. Major Clausen. Or December 6?
Mr. Rohl. Ko, sir. Colonel Wyman never stayed at my home over-
night.
[2223^ 9. Major Clausen. You mean at no time ever?
Mr. Rohl. At no time ever.
10. Major Clausen. By the way, you came to this country from
Germany on October 23, 1913 ; is that correct ?
Mr. Rohl. Correct.
11. Major Clausen. And you were born in Germany ?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.
12. Major Clausen. Lubeck?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.
13. Major Clausen. And you were an alien until September 1941,
sir?
Mr. Rohl. Correct.
14. Major Clausen. You filed a preliminary application for citi-
zenship papers on March 10, 1941 ; is that correct?
Mr. Rohl. I believe it is.
15. Major Clausen. Now, in that application you stated that you
were married on August 26, 1925 ; is that correct ?
Mr. Rohl. That is right.
16. Major Clausen. That you had four children born in 1916,
1918, '21, '23; is that correct?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.
17. Major Clausen. Now, after you filed this application do you
recall that you had a request to appear and give some preliminary
testimony or preliminary examination, sir ?
Mr. Rohl. Here in — I mean in Los Angeles ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1159
18. Major Clausen, Yes, sir.
Mr. RoHL. Yes.
19. Major Clausen. And do you recall at that time that j'ou testified
that your marriage to your present wife was your [£224] sec-
ond marriage?
Mr. RoHL. Yes.
20. Major Clausen. That was not true, was it ?
Mr. Rohl. No. I corrected it.
21. Major Clausen. I say
Mr. Rohl. At the time.
22. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon.
Mr. Rohl. I corrected it at the time.
23. Major Clausen. Well, you corrected it not at that time but at
a later time; isn't that true?
Mr. Rohl. Probably it would have been a couple of days.
24. Major Clausen. In other words, after you testified to that,
you left the place and then went back later on and made your correc-
tion?
Just answer yes or no. Is that correct, sir?
Mr. Rohl. Now, I want to get your question straight.
25. Major Clausen. My question is this, Mr. Rohl: On this pre-
liminary application after you filed your papers for citizenship you
appeared and testified that your present marriage was your second
marriage; you recall that?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.
26. Major Clausen. And I say that was not true, was it?
Mr. Rohl. No. I was under the
27. ^Major Clausen. All right.
Mr. Rohl. I was under the belief that I had a common-law mar-
riage.
28. Major Clausen. Well, later on, then, you called at the office
and you admitted that your testimony in that respect was not true;
isn't that correct?
[2£25] Mr. Rohl. Yes. I found out that there was no common-
law marriage in the State of California.
29. Major Clausen. Yes. But at this preliminary examination you
not only said that your present marriage was your second marriage,
but you also testified that your first wife had obtained a decree of
divorce from you in Sacramento in 1924; isn't that true? That is
what you told them ?
Mr. Rohl. No. I am not sure about that, because I did sign a
settlement agreement with her and filed it with the Petitioner of Immi-
gration or whatever it was.
30. Major Clausen. Now, between the years 1931-1932 you made
about ten trips to Mexico, didn't you, Mr. Rohl ?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.
31. Major Clausen. In connection with construction work down
in Mexico?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.
32. Major Clausen. And on any of these trips did you ever state
that you were a German alien, to any immigration officers?
Mr. Rohl. No. I was not asked.
1160 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
83. Major Clausen. On a certain trip of the VEGA from Jack-
sonville, Florida, to Honoluln, back to Los Angeles, at which time
there was also a stop at Balboa in the Canal Zone, do you remember
anything about the ship's manifest?
jkr. RoHL. No.
34. Major Clausen. Listing you as H. Wilhelm — rather, H. Wil-
liam Rohi, born September 29, 1886, at Tola. Kansas?
Mr. RoHL. No.
35. Major Clausen. Did you have anything to do with the fact
that the manifest indicated that you were born in this [2226]
country ?
Mr. RoHL. No.
36. Major Clausen. Do you recall that your income tax returns
for 1938 and 1939 declared that you were a United States citizen?
Mr. RoHL, I know it now. I didn't know it at the time I signed it,
for the simple reason that I don't make out my own income tax.
I have a competent auditor who does it.
37. Major Clausen. Do you recall, Mr. Rohl. that in an investiga-
tion in 1934 you were asked the question by the Internal Revenue,
"Are you a citizen of the United States?" and that you answered,
"Yes, I am. I was naturalized in 1921" ?
Mr. RoHL. No.
38. General Frank. You didn't say it, or don't you remember ?
Mr. RoHL. I don't remember it.
39. Major Clausen. Do you deny that you made that statement
to the Internal Revenue agent ?
Mr. RoHL. I don't know. I don't see how I could.
40. Major Clausen. Mr. Rohl, do you recall that in connection
with your naturalization application that was acted upon in 1941, a
letter written by Brigadier General John J. Kingman which stated,
among other things, that your services were of vital importance in
Hawaii ? Do you recall such a letter ?
Mr. RoHL. 1 have never seen the letter. I have heard there was
a letter.
41. Major Clausen. You sent your lawyer to Washington, did you
not, sir, for the purpose of getting your naturalization application
treated differently than anybody else's?
Mr. RoHL. I don't believe that.
[2227] 42. Major Clausen. Well, did you send a lawyer to
Washington ?
Mr. RoHL. Yes.
43. Major Clausen. In connection with it?
Mr. RoHL. Yes.
44. Major Clausen. Who, Mr. Rohl?
Mr. Rohl. John M. Martin.
45. Major Clausen. In addition to Mr, Martin you also employed
other lawyers in connection with that application, didn't 3^ou ?
Mr. RoiiL. No.
46. Major Clausen. Well, do you recall a Mr. Cannon?
Mr. Rohl. I believe Mr. Martin employed Mr. Cannon. I did not.
47. Major Clausen. Well, Mr. Martin was your lawyer who em-
ployed Mr. Cannon to act in your behalf ?
Mr. Rohl. Mr. Martin
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1161
48. Major Clausen. Is that correct?
Mr. EoHL. Mr. Martin is my lawyer. He at times employs associ-
ate counsel.
49. Major Clausen. But the fact is, Mr. Rohl, that in addition to
Mr. Martin there was a lawyer by the name of Cannon who also
assisted you in getting your application acted upon ; isn't that correct ?
Mr. RoiiL. I don't believe that anybody assisted me to have the
application acted upon except perhaps the War Department.
50. Major Clausen. Well, do you remember that you went to Court,
Mr. Rohl, to get your citizen application heard ?
Mr. RoHL. Yes.
51. Major Clausen. By Judge O'Connor?
Mr. RoHL. Yes.
[££2S] 52. Major Clausen. And they were present in Court at
that time as lawyers for you ?
Mr. RoHL. Yes.
53. IVlajor Clausen. And who were those lawyers for you present
at that time?
Mr. Rohl. There was Mr. Cannon and Frank Martin.
54. Major Clausen. In other words, you had two on that occasion
in Court for you ; isn't that correct ?
Mr. Roiil. Yes.
55. Major Clausen. And it was September 15, 1941; is that right?
Mr. Roiil. That is right.
56. Major Clausen. Now, do you remember that before that you
had not only had John Martin go to Washington, but you had had
other lawyers go to Washington in connection with your naturaliza-
tion application?
Mr. Roiil. I had other lawyers go to Washington?
57. Major Clausen. Yes, sir.
Mr. RoHL. No.
58. Major Clausen. Did Mr. Cannon go to Washington for you?
Mr. RoiiL. I don't think he did.
59. Major Clausen. This Mr. Cannon was David Cannon, wasn't
he, Mr. Rohl?
Mr. RoiiL. I believe so.
60. Major Clausen. The firm of lawyers in Los Angeles ; isn't that
correct ?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.
61. Major Clausen. Acquainted with Mr. Francis Biddle; isn't
that right?
[2229] Mr. Roiil. I don't know.
62. Major Clausen. Acquainted with Mr. J. Edgar Hoover?
Mr. Rohl. I don't know.
63. Major Clausen. In any event, do you know anything about -i
letter by this INIr. Cannon, David H. Cannon, 650 South Spring Street,
Los Angeles, California, to the Secretary of Commerce, dated August
29, 1941, which states in part as follows: (Paragraph 5)
Theodore Wyman, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, Corps of Engineers, War Depart-
ment, in charge of all the above-mentioned defense work in Hawaii, has re-
quested Mr. Rohl and the War Department to have Mr. Ilohl give his personal
service in connection with the emergency defense work in Hawnii. and as eai'ly
as .Tanuary 1041 and at numerons times since that date Colonel Wynnin has
tendered Mr. Rohl transportation via clipper oi- boat to the Islands and has
1162 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
stated to Mr. Rohl over interocean telephone that he will personally obtain si)ecial
permission, because of Mr. Rohl's alien status, to allow Mr. Rohl to work on this
secret contract.
Do you recall having seen that letter ?
Mr. EoHL. No.
64. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon.
Mr. Rohl. No.
65. Major Clausen. Well, now, isn't this true, Mr. Rohl : that this
lawyer that you had, Martin, was not the one who effected a settlement
between you and the Government for falsely documenting your ves-
sels, but that Mr. Cannon, this [2230'\ David Cannon, was the
man who did that ?
Mr. Rohl. I don't know. You will have to ask Mr. Martin that
question.
66. Major Clausen. I see. You don't know anything about that?
Mr. Rohl. No.
,[2231^ 67. Major Clausen. Did you pay the $25,000, or did
Mr. Martin pay it ?
Mr. Rohl. Well, Rohl-Connolly Company paid it.
68. Major Clausen. The Rohl-ConnoUy Company paid the
$25,000?
Mr. RoHL. Yes, sir; that's right.
69. Major Clausen. You knew about it?
Mr. RoHL. Yes, sir.
70. Major Clausen. And you knew about that at the time?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.
71. Major Clausen. Did you O. K. it at the time ?
Mr. Rohl. I. O. K.'d it.
72. Major Clausen. And you know nothing about Mr. Cannon's
having anything to do with it?
Mr. Rohl. I O. K.'d it on the advice of Mr. Martin.
73. Major Clausen. I say, you know nothing about Mr. Cannon's
having anything to do with it ?
Mr. Rohl. No. I don't even know that Mr. Cannon was in Wash-
ington.
74. Major Clausen. You don't know anything about this letter?
Mr. Rohl. No.
75. Major Clausen. Let me refer again to this letter, the statement
whic];i was made to the Secretary of Commerce by Mr. Cannon, on
your behalf. This was for the attempt to avoid forfeiture of the
vessels that had been falsely documented, where he says, here :
As early as January 1941 and at numerous times since that date. Colonel
Wyman has tendered Mr. Rohl transportation by clipper or boat to the Islands.
Was that a fact?
[2232'] Mr. Rohl. You want me to confirm the letter, or do you
want me to
76. Major Clausen. I am asking whether it is a fact that as early
as January 1941, and at numerous times
Mr. Rohl. Major, may I be excused for a minute? I am asking
you, you are quoting out of a letter?
77. Major Clausen. That's right.
Mr. Rohl. Now, what am I to answer ? The letter ?
78. Major Clausen. The truth.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1163
Mr. RoHL. The truth. I had a letter from Colonel Wyman to
proceed to the Hawaiian Islands.
79. Major Clausen. This was January 1941 ?
Mr. RoHL. That, I don't know, You probably have the letter.
80. Major Clausen. If I show it to you, here, will your memory be
refreshed? I am showing the witness exhibit I to the Colonel Hunt
report, which is a letter from Colonel Wyman to Mr. Rohl, dated Jan-
uary 22, 1941.
Mr. Rohl. Yes, I received that letter.
81. Major Clausen. What did you tell Colonel Wyman about your
going over there ? This letter asks that you go over right away, that
you have got a secret contract. It has been read to the Board. What
did you tell Colonel Wyman ? He wrote you the letter. You are the
man with the secret contract.
Mr. Rohl. I didn't tell him anything. I didn't go.
82. Major Clausen. You just did nothing? I say, did you just do
nothing ?
Mr. RoiiL. No, I applied for my citizenship.
83. Major Clausen. Well, what did you tell Colonel Wyman, is
\2233'\ the question. I say, sir, what did you do with regard to
an answer and a resj)onse to that letter ?
Mr. Rohl. I don't believe I told him anything. I don't believe I
answered the letter. I know I didn't answer the letter.
84. Major Clausen. You know you did not answer it?
Mr. Rohl. That's right.
^ 85. Major Clausen. Let me ask this question : When was the first
time after January 22, 1941, that you said anything to Colonel Wyman
about the subject of his request contained in this letter? Did you
understand the question ?
Mr. Rohl. I understand the question. I don't know.
86. Major Clausen. What would be your most
Mr. Rohl. You want the truth, don't you ? I am telling you the
truth.
87. Major Clausen. Well, was it within a year, or ten years, or two
months, or two days, or a week ? Could you block it in, at some ap-
proximate period ?
Mr. Rohl. As a matter of fact, I don't believe I told Colonel
Wyman. I believe I told Paul Grafe.
88. Major Clausen. When did you tell anything to Paul Grafe
about this letter after January 22, 1941?
Mr. Rohl. Probably on his first trip to the mainland after that.
89. Major Clausen. Which was when?
Mr. Rohl. I don't know.
90. Major Clausen. By the way, you had telephone calls with
Colonel Wyman?
Mr. Rohl. That's right.
[223I^\ 91. Major Clausen. In January 1941?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.
92. Major Clausen. At which time. Colonel Wyman Avas in Hawaii,
and you were in Los Angeles ?
Mr. Rohl. Los Angeles.
93. Major Clausen. Isn't that correct ?
Mr. Rohl. That's correct.
1164 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
94. Major Clausen. How many?
Mr. RoHL. That, I don't know,
95. Major Clausen. You had telephone calls in February 1941,
didn't you, similar calls, between yourself and Colonel Wyman?
Mr. RoHL. Yes.
96. Major Clausen. And in March 1941 ?
Mr. RoHL. Yes. I am just talking, because I read the same book
that you have, where the telephone calls are listed.
97. Major Clausen. What books did I read, Mr. Rohl ?
Mr. Rohl. All the House Military Affairs Committee, 60-page book.
98. Major Clausen. In other words, you know that the House
Military Affairs Committee actually collected positive proof of the
stubs of telephone calls exchanged between yourself and Colonel
Wyman ?
Mr. Rohl, Yes, I admit.
99. Major Clausen. Yes. In other words, those statements in that
I'eport are correct, aren't they ?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.
100. Major Clausen. All right. Now, referring again to this let-
ter, January 22, 1941, it says here — Colonel Wyman is saying to you :
I desire you to proceed to Honolulu at your earliest couveuience to consult
with the District Engineer x-elative to ways and means to accomplish the purpose
of the contract.
Do you want the Board to understand that you just did not
[2^05] answer this letter?
Mr. Rohl. No, I didn't answer the letter.
lOli. Major Ci-^vusen. Let me refer again to the letter of Mr.
Cannon :
As early as January 1941, and at numerous times since that date, Colonel
Wyman has tendered Mr. Rohl transportation by clipper or boat to the Island,
and has stated to Mr. Rohl over Interocean Telephone that he will personally
obtain special permission because of Mr. Rohl's alien status to allow Mr. Rohl
to work on this secret contract.
Is or is not that a true statement of your lawyer, Mr. Cannon ?
Mr. Rohl. I know I never talked to Colonel Wyman over the tele-
phone about my alien status.
102. General Frank. He has not answei-ed this question. Answer
the question.
Mr. Rohl. General, may I have that question, again ?
Colonel West. Read the previous question from the record.
(Question read.)
103. Major Clausen. The General would like you to answer the
question.
Mr. Rohl. Yes, sir. Well, it is a long time, but I have never dis-
cussed, to the best of my memory, my alien status with Colonel Wyman
over the telephone.
104. General Frank. That was not the question.
Mr. Rohl. Oh, I beg your pardon.
105. General Frank. Let us get this question answered.
106. Major Clausen. Yes, sir.
Now, you understand that what I have read is an affirmative rep-
resentation by a lawyer to the Secretary of Commerce for the ^ [^336]
settling of falsely documented vessels which would be forfeited un-
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1165
der the law, which representations are made on your behalf. I would
just like to read to you from the third to the end paragraph of the
letter :
For the reasons above stated, the petitioner, Mr. Rohl, and I have thought
it advisable for me to come to Washington in an endeavor to expedite the
closing of this matter. I have already been here 8 days and am quite willing
to remain as much longer as may be necessary to obtain official action from
your Department and as good business judgment would dictate. In the con-
ference held yesterday it was suggested to me that a decision by your Depart-
ment might not be forthcoming for several weeks, and for that reason it might
not be advisable for me to continue my stay here.
Now, with that in mind, could you answer the General's question?
What about this representation here that Colonel Wyman stated to
you over Interocean Telephone that he would personally obtain spec-
ial permission because of your alien status?
JSow, just let me put the question. Did you ever discuss that sub-
ject on the Interocean Telephone with Colonel Wyman?
Mr. RoHL. I don't believe I have.
107. Major Clausen. What about the statement beginning with —
As early as January 1941 and at numerous times since that date, Colonel
Wayman has tendered Mr. Rohl Transportation by clipper or boat.
Did you ever get a similar letter to this one of January 22, 1941,
tendering vou such transportation?
Mr. Rohl. No.
108. Major Clausen. Is it your statement then that you never
[JJo7\ discussed that with Colonel Wyman on the Interocean Tele-
phone, or in any other way ?
Mr. Rohl. In my talk to Colonel Wyman, he probably — I am sure
he asked me when I was coming over.
109. Major Clausen. I see. And what did you tell him, Mr. Rohl,
honestly ?
Mr. Rohl. Well, I told him honestly. I told him the truth, that
I was still
110. Major Clausen. Getting your papers?
Mr. Rohl. No.
111. Major Clausen. That you couldn't come?
Mr. Rohl. That I was still trying to get Caddoa dam.
112. Major Clausen. Get what, sir?
Mr. Rohl. Caddoa dam.
113. Major Clausen. Yes.
Mr. Rohl. United States Army project, in such shape that I could
leave. We were building a dam in Colorado at the same time.
114. Major Clausen. Do you recall having a conversation in De-
cember 1940 with Mr. Connolly on the telephone when he was in Wash-
ington and you were in Los Angeles?
Mr. Rohl. I had a conversation with Mr. Connolly when he was
in Washington. I don't know what date that was. I mean, in that,
I will take your date for granted, because you probably know that
that is the date.
115. Major Clausen. He told you at that time, didn't he, Mr. Rohl,
that he had ascertained from Mr. Martin that you were a German
alien?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.
1166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[^^^5] 116. Major Clausen. And that by reason of that fact,
you should resign as president, and that he should be appointed presi-
dent. Do you recall that ?
Mr. RoHL. No, because I resigned previous to that.
117. Major Clausen. Is it your testimony, then, that you had no
such conversation with Mr. Connolly?
Mr. RoHL. Oh, Mr. Connolly probably brought it up.
118. Major Clausen. Yes; and do you recall then that you actually
were told by Mr. Connolly from Washington that you should have
nothing to do with this secret contract because it was a restricted
matter ?
Mr. RoHL. Yes.
119. Major Clausen. All right. Well, when you talked with Colonel
Wyman, and he wanted you to come to Hawaii, didn't you tell him
that you shouldn't have anything to do with this contract, for the
reason that you were a German alien ?
Mr. RoHL. I don't believe I did. I know I told Paul Grafe, be-
cause Paul Grafe was told by John Martin, in Washington, the same
time when John Martin told Mr. Connolly.
120. Major Clausen. W-ell, is it this, then — is this the reason — that
Paul Grafe or Mr. Connolly told you that the whole thing had been
explained to Colonel Wyman in Washington, and therefore you didn't
have to tell him, later on, that the only reason that was holding you
up was the Cadcloa, is that the fact?
Mr. RoHL. Yes.
121. Major Clausen. That is the fact? Who told you that? Who
told you that — Mr. Grafe, or Mr. Connolly?
Mr. RoHL. That
122. Major Clausen. The whole thing had been explained to
[^^S9] Colonel Wyman in Washington.
Mr. RoiiL. Nobody told me that. I took it for granted.
123. Major Clausen. You took that for granted?
Mr. RoHL. Yes.
124. Major Clausen. Why? Upon what did you base that as-
sumption ?
Mr. RoHL. May I tell in a few words, of my own words, about that
time ?
125. Major Clausen. Yes, I have no objection.
126. General Feank. Just while we are on this subject, I would like
to ask some questions about these telephone conversations that you had
with Colonel Wyman, he in Honolulu, and you in Los Angeles. Do
you mean to say that never, in any of those telephone conversations,
did you ever bring up the question with him about your alien status ?
Mr. RoHL. I don't believe I did. General. I took it for granted that
he was told that, in Washington.
127. Major Clausen. What did you base that on?
Mr. RoHL. Well, that's what I would like to explain.
John Martin was back in Washington on other matters, not on my
business, or Rohl-Connolly business, Hawaiian Constructors' business.
He was back on some other business.
128. General Frank. Having to do with your firm?
Mr. RoHL. No, sir — with other contractors; no one involved in
Hawaiian Constructors, and by accident he met Paul Grafe and Tom
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1167
Connolly and told them not to sign the contract, until he talked to
them further; so John Martin called me, in Los Angeles, from Wash-
ington, and told me the nature of the contract, and I gave him per-
mission— not permission, but told him to tell [2240] Mr. Grafe
and Mr. Connolly my alien status ; which he did.
129. General Frank. Who was responsible, in trying to get the
group of contractors interested in this Hawaiian project? Was it,
or was it not. Colonel Wyman ?
Mr. RoHL. Yes.
130. General Frank. It was Colonel Wyman ?
Mr. RoHL. He was interested in getting a group of contractors.
181. General Frank. Including the Rolil-Connolly Company, the
Callahan Company, and the Gunther & Shirley Company?
Mr. RoHL. Yes, sir.
132. General Frank. Now, Colonel Wyman, Mr. Connolly, and
Mr. Grafe were in Washington together, in a group, discussing this
contract, were they not?
Mr. RoHL. Yes, sir.
133. General Frank. And a hitch that came up in consummating
the contract was your alien status, is that correct?
Mr. RoHL. General, by that do you mean — now, I have no knowledge
of my own whether Mr.
134. General Frank. Well, I will put it in different words. Maybe
the word "consummating" bothers you. You and they felt that you
could not participate in the contract because it was a defense project
and you were an alien ?
Mr. RoHL. That's right.
135. General Frank. That is correct, isn't it ?
Mr. RoHL. That's correct.
136. General Frank. Therefore, there was some question, consid-
erable question, as to whether or not the Rohl-Connolly Company
could participate in this project?
Mr. RoHL. No, General.
137. General Frank. There was, until you got out of it ?
Mr. RoHL. There was no question about Rohl-Connolly Co.
[224.1] 138. General Frank. To whom were these lettters being
written, and with whom was this conversation by Wyman, in the
United States ? It was with you, wasn't it ?
Mr. RoHL. General, you mean the letter from the Hawaiian Islands ?
139. General Frank. Yes. The letter was to you ?
Mr. RoHL. Direct.
140. General Frank. Rohl, byname?
Mr. RoHL. Yes, sir.
141. General Frank. And the telejjlione conversations by Wyman
were with you, Rohl, by name ?
Mr. Rohl. That's right.
142. General Frank. You were the person that he was interested
in getting over there ; is that not correct ?
Mr. Rohl. That is correct.
143. General Frank. Yes. You were the person that he wanted
on the job, as stated in the letter that was written to expedite your
naturalization, that is correct, isn't it ?
1168 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. RoHL. That is correct,
144. General Frank. Therefore, you were the man who was con-
cerned, and whose alien status threw a monkey-wrench into the smooth
operation of getting this contract through, in Washington, because,
unless you pulled out, the Rohl-Connolly Company could not partici-
pate in the project; that is correct, isn't it?
Mr. RoHL. General, by that do you mean, unless I pulled out
145. General Frank. As an official.
Mr. RoHL. As an active manager?
1^3^42] 146. General Frank. Yes. That was correct, wasn't it*
Mr. RoHL. That is correct.
147. General Frank. Therefore, there was some complication be-
cause of your personal status as an alien, wasn't there?
Mr. RoHL. No, General.
14cS. General Frank. Well, you just said so.
Mr. RoHL. Well, I never had any intention of going to the Hawaiian
Islands and managing that contract.
149. General Frank. Nevertheless, Colonel Wyman in his conver-
sation and in his letters was rather insistent on having you there, wa<s
he not?
Mr. RoHL. That's right.
150. General Frank. Now, since your alien status was the one thing
that interfered with this thing, since your alien status was the one
point that had to be cleared up in Washington, since your alien status
was the one thing that blocked your going to Honolulu, and since
Wyman, on the other side, was so insistent on having you come there,
do you mean to say that Wyman was never told about it?
Mr. RoHL. Oh, Wyman was told about it.
151. General Frank. About your alien status?
Mr. RoHL. Alien status ; because, how could Colonel Wyman write
that letter ? I believe he originated the letter to General Hannum, and
I believe the letter went from
152. General Frank. I am talking now about a time back in Decem-
ber, 1940.
Mr. RoHL. General, you are talking about December? I don't know.
153. (jeneral Frank. All right.
154. Major Clausen. I would like to refresh your memory, Mr.
! 3;^4'^] Rohl, by reading some testimony which you gave before the
Tenney Committee in hearings held in February 1943, particularly an
answer at page 3807 :
Q. When you fii-st obtained the contracts for the construction of military in-
stallation (construction) ; did you tell Major Wyman that you were an alien?
A. I did, on the Hawaiian Constructors.
Q. But you didn't, on any other projects?
A. We don't have it. There are no restrictions. I mean, on a government con-
tract you are not questioned as to whether you are a citizen or not, but on this
particular contract, contract 602, being a secret contract, of course. I told him.
I had to tell him.
You remember giving that testimony?
Mr. RoHL. No.
155. Major Clausen. What is that, sir?
Mr. RoHr.. No.
156. Major Clausen. Well, what is the fact?
Mr. RoHL. I don't know whether that transcript is right.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1169
157. Major Clausen. You do not know whether it is rights
Mr. RoHL. No ; and I will never — I w^on't take anything for granted
in that transcript, because it was a frame-up.
158. Major Clausen. All right, now.
Mr. RoHL. And I will have to stand on that.
159. Major Cl.\usen. Regardless of that?
160. General Frank. Watch your step,
Mr. RoHL, No, no.
161. Major Clausen. What is that?
Mr. RoHL. I am talking about the Tenney Committee.
162. Major Clausen. All right. Now, just tell this Board
[2244] here — just this Board, the fact as to whether it is not
correct that you did tell Colonel Wyman that you were an alien?
Mr. RoHL. Major, I have testified several times that I did not.
163. Major Clausen. Yes. Well, now, just tell me, what is the
fact as you now say it to be.
Mr. RoHL. May the reporter read back ?
164. Major Clausen. No, you may answer the question if you wish.
Mr. RoHL. No, it is in there.
165. Mayor Clausen. It is in there.
166. General Frank. Answer the question. It is a question of the
truth. It is either so, or it isn't.
167. Major Clausen. Let me refresh your memory further. I will
come back to the question. You recall, in December 1940, that there
were discussions between yourself and Colonel Wyman, regarding
this contract, before Colonel Wyman went to Washington?
Mr. RoHL. Yes.
168. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon?
Mr. RoHL. Yes.
169. Major Clausen. There is no question about that in your mind,
is there?
Mr. RoHL. No, but
170. Major Clausen. When did you first know that you were going
to have these discussions with him?
Mr. RoHL. I was requested by, I believe. Colonel Kelton, or Colonel
Kelton's office, to meet Colonel Wyman in Colonel Kelton's office,
who at that time was the district engineer in Los Angeles.
171. Major Clausen. You mean Colonel Kelton was in the District
{^^If-SI Engineer's office, in Los Angeles ?
Mr. RoiiL. Yes, sir.
172. Major Clausen. When did you get that instruction or request?
Mr. RoHL. I would say two or three days before Colonel Wyman
arrived here.
173. Major Clausen. When was that?
Mr. RoHL. That has to be in December 1940.
174. Major Clausen. All right. Now, isn't it true, also, that in
December 1940, you registered under the Alien Registration Act?
Mr. RoiiL. Yes.
175. Major Clausen. You know why you had to do it, don't you?
Mr. RoHL. Because I was an alien.
176. Major Clausen. Yes. Who told you to register under the act,
or did you just read it in the paper and go down and do it, yourself?
Mr, RoHL. I read it in a paper.
1170 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
177. Major Clausen. Then did you go down and do it?
Mr. Kohl. Yes.
178. Major Clausen. What is that, sir?
Mr. Kohl. Yes, sir.
179. Major Clausen. In point of time, before or after, was it, that
you had these talks with Colonel Wyman?
Mr. Kohl. That, I don't know. Major. You probably have the
dates, there, in your own possession.
180. Major Clausen. Well, you knew, when you had the talk with
Colonel Wyman, in December, 1940
Mr. Kohl. That I was an alien.
181. Major Clausen. that you were an alien?
Mr. Kohl. Yes, sir.
182. Major Clausen. And that you couldn't do any work on this
[£^^6~\ contract, yourself ?
Mr. Kohl. No ; I didn't know that.
183. Major Clausen. Well, let me read you some more from this
Tenney manuscript. I beg your pardon ?
Mr. Kohl. Go ahead.
184. Major Clausen. I read from this Tenney transcript, page
3808 :
Q. Are you familiar with the provisions of the law regarding such contracts?
A. Secret contracts?
Q. Well, secret, confidential, or restricted contracts.
A. Yes.
Q. I will read the law to you and see whether or not this is your understanding
of it.
"No aliens employed by a contractor in the performance of secret, confidential,
or restricted Government contracts shall be permitted to have access to the
plans or specifications, or the work under such contracts, or to participate in the
contract trials, unless the written consent of the head of the Government Depart-
ment concerned has first been obtained.
"Any alien who obtains employment on secret, confidential, or restricted Gov-
ernment contracts by wilful misrepresentation of his alien status, or who makes
such wilful misrepresentation while seeking such employment, shall be penalized
by a fine of $10,000 or five years in the Federal Penitentiary.
"For the purpose of this section the term 'person' shall be construed to include
an individual, part- [2247] nership, association, corporation, or other
business enterprise."
Q. Is that your understanding of the law?
A. Absolutely. Now, as a matter of fact, before we took this contract, the War
Department was told.
Did you give that testimony ?
Mr. Kohl. At — I was under that impression-
185. Major Clausen. I say, did you give that testimony, sir?
Mr. Kohl. Yes, sir.
186. Major Clausen. What is that, sir?
Mr. Kohl. Yes.
187. Major Clausen. All right. Now, how was the War Depart-
ment told, before you took the contract?
Mr. Kohl. That, I don't know. As I have said before, that was my
impression. Now, whether Mr. Grafe or Mr. Connolly or Mr. Martin
told Colonel Wyman, or anyone in the Engineer Department, that, I
don't know. I simply took that for granted.
188. Major Clausen. In these talks that you had with Colonel
Wyman, at Los An,geles, what did you say to him about this situation?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1171
Mr. RoHL. In my talks with Colonel Wyman? First, they were
only generalities. I didn't know what the contract was about.
189. Major Clausen. All right. Will you continue, now, and tell
the Board what you told Colonel Wyman, in December 1940, before
this contract was signed ?
Mr. RoHL. Colonel Wyman arrived in Los Angeles, and interviewed
several contractors.
190. General Frank. When ?
[22 j8'] Mr. RoHL. In December, 1940. He was talking in gen-
eralities. He wasn't even saying it was a secret or a restricted or a
confidential contract. He did mention that there was a third con-
tract over there for a little over a million dollars. That was all the
money that had been appropriated, at that time, and he believed the
contract would probably run four or five millions of dollars; and he
asked us if we would be interested ; and that's about all.
191. Major Clausen. Before you had that talk with him, you had
already changed your position as president, with Mr. Connolly — that
occurred on December 16, 1940 — for the reason that you were an alien,
isn't that true?
Mr. RoHL. I beg your pardon. Major, when did I register? I mean,
you can help me, here. You can tell me, probably.
192. Major Clausen. I do not have the date. I have the date when,
as I understand it, you changed your positions with Mr. Connolly, for
the reason you were an alien, which was December 16, 1940.
Mr. RoiiL. I mean, I haven't got that at the end of my — the records
are there. I can furnish you the records.
193. Major Clausen. Do you know that at the time that you went
out as president, and Mr. Connolly went in, the reason for it was be-
cause you were an alien? You knew that then, did you not?
Mr. RoHL. Yes.
194. Major Clausen. All right. That having occurred before you
saw Colonel Wyman, for that reason, I say, what did you say to Colonel
Wyman about that, having in mind the testimony that you gave to the
Tenney Committee?
[22I9'] Mr. RoHL. I didn't say anything to Colonel Wyman
about that.
195. Major Clausen. Colonel Wyman expected you to come to
Hawaii, as is indicated by his letter of January 22, 1941. Did you
represent to him that you would or would not go to Hawaii, when you
saw him, in December 1940 ?
Mr. RoHL. In December, I told him that I would not come to Hawaii.
196. Major Clausen. Where did you say that to him ?
Mr. RoiiL. Either in Los Angeles or in San Francisco.
197. Major Clausen. All right. Now, what were all the reasons —
name them all — that you gave Colonel Wyman, as to why you would
not go to Hawaii?
Mr. RoiiL. Major, or General, the reason, there was a small con-
tract. The Callahan Construction Company had recently completed
the Crado dam, Los Angeles County Flood Control; had an organiza-
tion, and Paul Grafe was going over, and did go over with the Calla-
han organization to perform that contract.
198. Major Clausen. Did go over where?
Mr. RoHL, To the Hawaiian Islands.
79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 2 25
1172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
199. Major Clausen. Yes.
Mr. RoHL. I had no intention of ever going over there.
200. Major Clausen. I say, what did you say to Colonel Wyman,
in December 1940, as your reasons for stating to him that you would
not go to Hawaii ?
Mr. RoHL. The job didn't warrant it.
201. Major Clausen. You told him that, did you?
Mr. RoHL. Yes.
1^250] 202. Major Clausen. And what did he say?
Mr. RoHL. "All right."
203. Major Clausen. And this was Decem'ber 1940 ?
Mr. RoHL. Yes, sir.
204. Major Clausen. And what else did you say on that subject
to him?
Mr. RoHL. That's all.
205. Major Clausen. Now, how many talks did you have with
Colonel Wyman in December 1940? You remembered very specifi-
cally having gone to a conference.
Mr. RoHL. At Colonel Kelton's office.
206. Major Clausen. At Colonel Kelton's office. All right. Now
did you have talks with him elsewhere?
Mr. RoHL. I did see Colonel Wyman here in San Francisco, but
prior to his departure for Washington.
207. Major Clausen. Yes, that is exactly what I had in mind. Now,
between what dates did you have these talks with Colonel Wyman?
Mr. RoHL. I wish I could tell you the exact dates, but here. Major,
haven't you, between the time — let's put it this way : you can supply
the dates. Between the time that Colonel Wyman arrived in Los
Angeles, I believe he came from Honolulu to San Francisco, division
office, and from the division office to Los Angeles, to interview con-
tractors. Now, between the date that he arrived in Los Angeles and
the date that he left for Washington — you are talking about the talks
that I migh have had.
208. Major Clausen. Those are the dates?
Mr. RoHL. Well, yes.
[3351] 209. Major Clausen. In other words, before he went
to Washington?
Mr. RoHL. Yes, sir.
210. Major Clausen. You are sure of that, as the time that you
had these talks in Los Angeles and in San Francisco ?
Mr. RoHL. Yes, sir.
211. Major Clausen. All right. Now, what was said in San Fran-
cisco concerning this subject?
Mr. RoHL. The same thing. As a matter of fact, Colonel Wyman
wasn't sure; I didn't know who was going to be the contractor when
Colonel Wyman left here, because I believed that was out of Colonel
Wyman's hands, anyway. Colonel Wyman, after all, doesn't award
contracts without being specifically authorized.
212. Major Clausen. Do you recall how it came that you were in
San Francisco with Colonel Wyman, before he went to Washington ?
Mr. RoHL. No. "
213. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon?
Mr. RoHL. No, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1173
214. Major Clausen. Well, did you come up here together, do you
remember ?
Mr. RoHL. I don't think so.
215. Major Clausen. Did you have talks at any other place than
San Francisco or Washington, on this subject, before Colonel Wyman
went to Washington ?
Mr. RoHL. No, because I stayed in San Francisco, and Colonel
Wyman went to Washington.
216. Major Clausen. Well, I mean, was it just yourself and
1 3i352] Colonel Wyman that had the talks ?
Mr. RoHL. It probably was.
217. Major Clausen. And was that in the division engineer's office?
Mr. RoHL. No.
218. Major Clausen. What is that?
Mr. RoHL. No.
219. Major Clausen. Well, where did you have these talks?
Mr. RoHL. I probably talked to him at the hotel.
220. Major Clausen. That was at what hotel?
Mr. RoHL. Palace Hotel.
. 221. Major Clausen. What is that, sir?
Mr. RoHL. Palace.
222. Major Clausen. Did you see Colonel Wyman after he got back
from Washington, before he went to the Hawaiian Islands ?
Mr. EoHL. I don't believe I did. I am pretty sure I didn't. I
know Colonel Wyman was waiting for transportation in San Fran-
cisco.
223. Major Clausen. Were you here at that time?
Mr. RoHL. No.
224. General Frank. How did you know that?
Mr. RoHL. Because Mr. Connolly, my partner, if I remember right,
took him out to Christmas dinner, or right around Christmas time,
to his home.
225. Major Clausen. Do you know Werner Plack?
Mr. RoHL. No.
226. Major Clausen. Did you ever meet him?
Mr. RoHL. No.
227. Major Clausen. Did you ever see him, in your life?
[235S] ^ Mr. RoHL. No.
228. Major Clausen. Did you ever hear of him, in Los Angeles?
Mr. RoHL. No, only from Bruce Pine's testimony. I read that.
229. Major Clausen. By the way, you read this testimony, then, of
the Tenney Committee, over, before you came here today?
Mr. RoHL. No.
230. Major Clausen. Well, where did you see the testimony of Mr.
Pine?
Mr. RoHL. After I had them, printed.
231. Major Clausen. You mean to say after the Tenney Com-
mittee transcript was printed ?
Mr. RoHL. That's right.
232. Major Clausen. You saw^ the Tenney Committee transcript,
then ?
Mr. RoiiL. Oh, yes.
233. Major Clausen. It included your testimony?
1174 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. RoHL. And everybody else's.
234. Major Clausen. Yes.
Mr. RoHL. I haven't see it since. I mean, I haven't had time for it.
235. Major Clausen. Now, when did you fir^ meet Colonel
Wyman ?
Mr. Rohl. May I refer to your actual record ?
236. Major Clausen. It was about 1935, wasn't it?
Mr. RoHL. Yes, but I can tell you the exact circumstance.
237. Major Clausen. The exact circumstances?
Mr. RoHL. Yes.
238. Major Clausen. Well, it was in 1935, when he first became
[225J^~] the district engineer at Los Angeles, wasn't it ?
Mr. RoHL, All right, he became district engineer at Los Angeles.
239. Major Clausen. When he was a Captain, isn't that so?
Mr. RoHL, I don't know whether he was captain or major.
240. Major Clausen. You called on him, did you not, with Mr.
Connolly ?
Mr. RoHL. We put in a bid.
241. Major Clausen. What's that?
Mr. RoiiL. Colonel Wyman's, or Captain Wyman, whatever it was
at that time, his predecessor, Major Stickney, advertised for bids on
an extension of the Los Angeles-Long Beach breakwater.
242. Major Clausen. I say, you called on Colonel Wyman after
he arrived there ?
Mr. RoHL. May I continue ? I will stop.
243. Major Clausen. Well, if you have got a statement to make,
yes: make your statement. I am waiting.
Mr. RoHL. The bids were postponed. Opening of the bids was
postponed for two or three days, or for several days, so Mr. Connolly
and I called on the District Engineer, and were told that Major Stick-
ney was not there, that Captain Wyman was in.
244. Major Clausen. Have you completed your statement?
Mr. RoHL. Yes, sir.
245. Major Clausen. All right.
Since the time that you first saw Colonel Wyman, and since the
time that he was relieved as district engineer in Los Angeles, you had
Colonel Wyman on your yachts, did you not, as a guest of yours ?
[2255] _ Mr. R6hl. Yes.
246. Major Clausen. You entertained him on those yachts?
Mr. RoHL. I wouldn't say that.
247. Major Clausen. Well, he was on the yachts, and you gave him
liquor and food?
Mr. RoHL. Yes.
248. Major Clausen. By the way, you are rather familiar with
this House committee report — perhaps we can shorten this. You
have seen that statement of the various kinds of entertainment. Are
they correct ?
Mr. RoHL. No.
249. Major Clausen. All right, now. Why?
Mr. RoHL. Major, if you would only let me explain in my own
words, and put that in the record, that will be the true story, and
all of the true story.
250. Major Clausen. Proceed.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1175
Mr. RoHL. So we are not wastintr so much time, that way.
251. Major Clausen. Proceed.
Mr. RoHL. I have had Colonel Wyman and his officers, meaning the
officers of the district, and their wives, on a trip to Catalina and back,
lasting one — or, say, leaving Saturday afternoon and returning Sun-
day— trip No. 1. I had Colonel Wyman on the yacht RAMONA,
on a trip over to inspect the Catalina Rock Quarries which Rohl-
Connolly were operating — that's No. 2.
252. (jeneral Frank. How long was that trip? Overnight?
Mr. RoHL. Overnight. On the first trip, the officers and their
wives stayed ashore. They were in the Catalina Islands. In other
words, Colonel Wyman did not stay on the [2256'] yacht.
253. Major Clausen. Have you completed your statement?
Mr. RoHL. No ; I had one more trip. I took Colonel Wyman and
Mrs. Wyman on the VEGA, on a trip to Catalina and back. Excuse
me. General, these are two different boats. I was talking about one.
Now, I am talking about the other. I had Colonel Wyman on the
VEGA, one trip ,leaving again on the Saturday, and returning on
Sunday, to Catalina. That is all.
254. Major Clausen. Well, now in addition to that, you had him
out to your home, and you had him up to the Biltmore Hotel, didn't
you, and entertained him ?
Mr. RoHL. I have had him out to my home for dinner.
255. Major Clausen. You have also had him to the Biltmore Hotel,
haven't you, sir?
Mr. RoHL. I have also had him at the Biltmore Hotel; not, how-
ever— not, in both — in all cases, that Colonel Wyman has never been
my guest, except the three yacht trips, overnight, either in my home,
or in the Biltmore.
256. Major Clausen. During the time you had him to the Bilt-
more Hotel, you had an apartment there, didn't you, sir?
Mr. RoHL. I had an apartment there, at times.
257. Major Clausen. And you also had a home right there in
Los Angeles, too, at the same time, didn't you, sir?
Mr. RoHL. Yes.
258. Major Clausen. What is that, sir?
Mr. RoHL. Yes.
259. Major Clausen. Now, I will just summarize this, to shorten
the thing. In August 1935, Colonel Wyman awarded the first con-
tract to Rohl-Connolly Company, in the amount of \2257^
$850,000, and the contract was completed, July 1936.
August 6, 1936, he awarded the second contract to the Rohl-Con-
nolly Company the Long Beach-Los Angeles breakwater job, amount-
ing to $2,145,000, which contract was approved by Colonel John C.
Kingman, district engineer, on August 31, 1936.
Mr. RoHL. District engineer ? Not district engineer.
260. General Frank. "Division engineer," isn't it?
261. Major Clausen. It says "district." "Division," it should be.
All right.
Another contract was awarded to the Rohl-Connolly Company or
Rohl for the furnishing of derrick stone, at $15,770, for emergency
relief.
1176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Those contracts actually were awarded your firm, were thev, Mr.
Kohl?
Mr. RoiiL. Oh, yes! May I explain that, just to get it in the rec-
ord if We built the first, or did Mr. Connolly explain that to j^ou,
yesterday? If he did, it isn't necessary.
i2()2. General Frank. Built what?
Mr. RoiiL. The first section of the breakwater, under Colonel or
General Peterson. I w^ould like to get this in the record. It will
clear up a lot of things.
263. General Frank. Go ahead.
Mr. RoiiL. At that time we were on competitive bids. We werfe
$600,000 below the next bidder, and our bid was $1,520,000, and the
engineer's estimate was $1,500,000, but we were still $600,000 below
the next bidder, in competitive bids. Mr. Connolly and I, or Rohl-
Connolly, built barges, tugs, derrick barges, opened rock quarries to
do that one contract.
[2268] Thereafter, we had every extension off the Los Angeles-
Long Beach breakwater — Newport, Winnemac, Redondo Beach, Seal
Beach — as a matter of fact, all water-borne rock in that area, clue to
the fact that Rohl-Connolly Company was the only firm properly
equipped to do that type of work and could do it cheaper and better
for the government than anyone else.
264. Major Clausen. Have you finished ?
Mr. RoHL. That's the truth. I mean, I thought I would explain
that. There can't be any favors in awarding a low-bidder contract.
265. General Frank. There has been a good deal of conversation
about whether or not you told Colonel Wyman about your alien status,
and finally, in answer to a question from me, you admitted that you
told him about your alien status.
Mr. Ron L. In — today?
266. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. RopiL. General, I migkt have been confused.
267. General Frank. Now, the question I want to ask is, what is the
reason for dodging the point that he was told ?
Mr. RoiiL. There isn't any. General, that I can see.
268. General Frank. Well, that is what I do not understand.
Mr. RoiiL. There was no reason at all for dodging that point. I
mean, it was a fact. I didn't keep it a secret.
269. Major Clausen. In line with wdiat the General said, you said
that you got this Tenney transcript after the hearings, and that you
read it, and you read this portion of it?
Ml'. RoiiL. Major, may I please say, again
270. General Frank. Just a minute, now.
Mr. RoiiL. That the Tenny transcript, I don't know [2259]
whether everything in there is the truth, or not.
271. General Frank. But you ought to remember that, it is sworn
testimony, and since it is sworn testimony
Mr. RoHL. General
272. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. RoiiL. General, I didn't mean to interrupt you. I don't know
wdiether that sworn testimony has been transcribed right. Those
things can happen.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1177
2T3. Major Clausen. Well, when you got the transcript and read it
over, did you ever write to the Tenney Committee and say it was
wrono;
Mr. RoHL. I put it in the waste basket, because that's all it was
worth.
274. General Fraxk. Then it must stand, however, because it is
sworn testimony.
Mr. RoHL. But please — please. General.
275. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. RoHL. Let me see that.
276. General Frank. Now^, just a minute. I am not talking about
this.
Mr. RoiiL. No, no. May I turn you to a front page, there, please ?
I mean, after all, we are talking about something serious, here.
277. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. RoHL (reading) :
Gentlemen (of the press) the committee has ruled for this hearing the public
will be excluded but the press may remain. We are asking the press to be very
careful in reporting anything of a military nature or that might have any bear-
ing on military objectives or installations or anything of that nature which
might be developed in the course of the examination of witnesses. We believe
[2260] we must be exceedingly careful in reference to that. I believe with
that admonition you gentlemen of the press will act accordingly. In other
words, we do not want to reveal any military secrets, if any should be developed
in the examination.
Then a Mr. Combs comes along and tells the press, because they are
excused. 1 was asked to step outside the room, when Mr. Combs tells
the press what to print. That would be in your record. Mr. Combs
is the chief investigator for Tenney.
278. General Frank. That is very true, but I am not talking about
that testimony.
Mr. RoHL. I know you are not. General, but at the same time
279. General P^rank. I still w^ould like to ask you, what is the point
in trying to dodge the admission that Wyman was told about your
alien status?
Mr. RoHL. There isn't any point. General.
280. General Frank. That is what I cannot understand.
Mr. RoHL. Neither can I ; but, General
281. General Frank. Because you already have told me, in prior
testimony, this morning, that Wyman was told, and in this testimony
you testified that Wyman was told. What point was there in not
telling him?
Mr. RoiiL. There wasn't any point in not telling him. There
wasn't. I took it for granted. I made it a point to have Martin
explain it to Mr. Grafe and Mr. Connolly, and I took it for granted
that they immediately explained it to Colonel Wyman.
282. General Frank. Yes ; and then, in this testimony this morning,
you stated that you told it to Wyman.
[££61] Mr. RoHL. No. If I made that statement, I want to
retract it.
283. General Frank. Now, I come right back to my point — what
was the idea of not telling him ?
Mr. RoHL. There wasn't any.
1178 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
284. General Frank. Then why didn't you tell him ?
Mr. EoHL. I will have to come right back again, I was under the
impression that he was told in Washington.
285. General Frank. No, that was the main point and diflficulty of
your getting into this contract, when Wyman was trying to induce
you to come into it. Now, at some time, either now or then, this testi-
mony is in error that you have been giving.
Mr. Kohl. Let's try and get it right.
286. General Frank. Either now or then, the testimony is in error
that you were giving. Then you testified that you told him; that
is, in the Tenney Committee. Here, a little while ago, you told me
that you told him. Now you come back and tell me that you didn't
tell him. At the moment, we have two to one against you.
Mr. EoHL. No, no. General. What dates are we talking about?
287. General Frank. We are talking about some time right after
December 1940.
Mr. RoHL. Some time right after December 1940 ?
288. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. EoiiL. Well, I believe I said that — now, wait a minute. I will
have to tell it in my own words.
289. General Frank. Now, just a minute. Never mind the words —
never mind the records.
l^^e^] Mr. RoHL. All right.
290. General Frank. Let's have the truth.
Mr. RoHL. That's right.
291. General Frank. Yes. That is what I am after; and there is
just one truth about this thing.
Mr. RoHL. That's correct.
292. General Frank. Yes. Now, let's have it.
Mr. RoHL. I don't believe I told Colonel Wyman, personally.
293. General Frank. This testimony is under oath, just as that was
under oath, and just as the prior testimony this morning was under
oath.
Mr. RoHL. I know. General. If I said that, I am going to retract it
right now. Can I do that ?
294. General Frank. It is too late to retract the Tenney testimony.
Mr. RoHL. That is right.
295. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. RoHL. If that is — if the transcript is right.
296. General Frank. Yes. And judicial notice is taken of that,
now. I still do not understand why Wyman should not have been
told.
Mr. RoHL. Neither do I.
297. General Frank. And do you mean to tell me you had all these
conversations with Wyman over the telephone between Los Angeles
and Hawaii, when he was so insistent about your coming out there, all
the way from January 1, 1941, and you never told him about your alien
status ?
Mr. RoHL. Now, wait a minute, General. I told Mr. Grafe.
[2263] 298. General Frank. I am talking about Wyman. Let's
stick to that.
Mr. RoHL. Yes.
299. General Frank. And you never told Colonel Wyman?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1179
Mr. RoHL. In December 1940? I don't-
300. General Frank. I didn't say December.
Mr. RoHL. Oil, I beg your pardon.
301. General Frank. I said shortly after December, in January or
February 1941.
Mr. RoHL. I don't believe I did.
302. General Frank. When did you go to Honolulu?
Mr. RoHL. In September. I left, September 25, 1941.
303. General Frank. Why did you put it off so long?
Mr. RoHL. To get my citizen papers.
304. General Frank. When did you get them?
Mr. RoHL. September 15.
305. General Frank. Wliy did you go to Honolulu?
Mr. RoHL. Because I was requested to go.
306. General Frank. By whom?
Mr. RoHL. By Colonel Wyman.
307. General Frank. Since you were not interested in the contract,
why did you go ?
Mr. RoHL. Colonel Wyman wanted more speed.
308. General Frank. iBut you stated at a prior stage in your testi-
mony that Rohl-Comiolly Company was not interested in it.
Mr. RoHL. Right, General. I am talking now about December
1940.
[£264] 309. General Frank. I am talking about September.
Mr. RoHL. '41.
310. General Frank. 1941. Since you were not interested in the
contract prior to this time, why were you interested in it in September
1941?
Mr. RoHL. I was ordered to go over there.
311. General Frank. You were what?
Mr. RoHL. I was ordered to go over there.
312. General Frank. Who can order you as a civilian? Tell me
that.
Mr. RoHL. The contracting officer. He can't order you ; he can re-
quest you.
313. General Frank. That is just what he did ever since December
1940.
Mr. RoHL. I wouldn't say that.
314. General Frank. And you didn't want to go.
Mr. RoHL. No, General ; not since December, I mean.
315. General Frank. Let me see the letter.
Major Clausen. January 1941.
316. General Frank. All right. Ever since January 1941, then.
Mr. RoHL. All right. Now let us take it for granted, whether it's
right or wrong or
317. General Frank. Let's make it right.
Mr. RoHL. Let's make it right, is right. Colonel Wyman was dis-
satisfied with the progress.
318. General Frank. Under whose supervision ?
Mr. RoHL. Under Paul Grafe's supervision.
319. General Frank. Yes?
Mr. RoHL. He was dissatisfied. ' ' "
[£265] 320. General Frank. Yes?
1180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. RoHL. He wanted me over there. I refused to go.
321. General Frank. When?
Mr. RoHL. I didn't — in this letter. I went
322. General Frank. Wlien ? In what month did you refuse to go ?
Mr. RoHL. I refused to go until I had my citizenship papers.
323. General Frank. I know, but you said, "this letter."
Mr. RoHL. Well, the letter of January.
324. General F'rank. Yes ; you refused to go ?
Mr, RoHL. I didn't refuse to go. I mean I didn't — I didn't tell
them in so many words.
325. General Frank. Well, go ahead.
Mr. RoHL. But I did go to the Immigration Department and told
them that I had — that I was requested to go over there and I didn't
want to go, and they told me it was the right thing to do.
326. General Frank. Who told you that?
Mr. RoHL. Immigration Department in Los Angeles.
327. General Frank. What did you do when you got there?
Mr. RoHL. What did I do? I made a trip aroimd the Island of
Oahu Avith Colonel Wyman and with Grafe and I of course stayed
there for about fourteen days and came back, got personnel and equip-
ment to expedite the work, and this time I was ordered to — by General
Hannum. I intended to fly back. I was waiting for a plane. I was
ordered by General Hanum to get aboard the Lurline on November
the 28th.
328. General Filvnk. You chartered the VEGA or the Government
chartered the VEGA from you, didn't they?
[2366] Mr. RoHL. Yes.
329. General Frank. What was the cargo of the VEGA between
Los Angeles and Honolulu ?
Mr. RoHL. She had no cargo.
330. General Frank. She had no liquor aboard ?
Mr. RoHL. Oh, yes.
331. General Frank. Well, that's cargo.
Mr. RoHL. No, sir.
332. General Frank. What is it, if it is not cargo ?
Mr. RoHL. Supplies.
333. General Frank. For whom?
Mr. RoHL. For the owner.
334. General Frank. Wlio was the owner?
Mr. RonL. Mrs. Rohl was.
335. General Frank. Did she go to Honolulu ?
Mr. RoHL. No.
336. General Frank. What good did liquor in Honolulu do Mrs.
Rohl in Los Angeles?
Mr. RoHL. General, when I told them to outfit the VEGA for six
months' trip, at that time there wasn't much you could talk over the
radiophone, and they outfitted the VEGA for six months' trip.
337. General Frank. With liquor?
Mr. RoiiL. No. With everything. They didn't even know what
kind of a trip — the crew didn't know what kind of a trip it was.
338. General Frank. Who paid for the liquor that went on the
VEGA?
Mr. Rohl. I did.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1181
[^£67] 339. General Frank. How much was on there?
Mr. RoHL. I don't know. I suppose — I think somebody testified
tliat there was 16 or 17 cases or something on there.
340. General Frank. Who used the liquor when it got to Honolulu ?
Mr. RoHL. I took it off.
341. General Frank. And you used it?
Mr. RoHL. Yes.
34-2. General Frank. Did the Government ever pay for it?
Mr. RoHL. No.
343. (jeneral Frank. What reimbursement from the (xovei-imient
(lid you get for the use of the VEGA?
Mr. RonL. One dollar, less — less about five or six thousand dollars
tliat they didn't pay.
344. General Frank. When you took the liquor off the VEGA in
Honohilu where did you put it?
Mr. RoHL. I locked it up in the Pleasanton Hotel, in the locker.
345. General Frank. You and Colonel Wyman had rooms at the
Pleasanton Hotel, didn't you ?
Mr. RoHL. Yes.
346. General Frank. Did Colonel Wyman participate in the con-
sumption of the liquor?
Mr. RoHL. Not much, if any.
If I say anything — General, will it help, I mean, to get at the facts
if I make a statement about the VEGA?
347. General Frank. No. Just a minute now.
Mr. RoHL. Yes.
348. General Frank. Were you conversant with the installation
[3268] of the aircraft warning service bases?
Mr. RoHL. In?
349. General Frank. In Honolulu. In Oahu.
Mr. RoHL. At what time ?
350. General Frank. When you went over there.
Mr. RoHL. In September ?
351. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. RoHL. No.
352. General Frank. You didn't know about them ?
Mr. RoHL. Never seen one.
353. General Frank. Have you anything to ask him ?
354. Major Clausen. Oh, yes, sir.'
Sir, when you got to Honolulu you inspected various defense installa-
tions that you had previously discussed with Colonetl Wyman ; is that
correct?
Mr. RoHL. No, I had not previously — I want to correct that. No, I
had not previously discussed them with Colonel Wyman.
355. Major Clausen. Well, Mr. Rohl, here on page 34 are just, it
looks like, about fifteen or twenty telephone calls between yourself
and Colonel Wyman.
Mr. Rohl. May I, please — may I have them and the dates, and then
I can probably answer you better.
356. Major Clausen. Yes, surely.
Mr. Rohl. I mean let's make it as short and correct as we can.
(A document was handed to the witness.)
Mr. Rohl. Of course, the calls before October the 1st
1182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
357. Major Clausen. What year?
[2269] _ Mr. Kohl. —1941, were social calls.
358. Major Clausen. Well, those before October 1st were socials ?
Mr. RoHL. Yes.
359. Major Clausen. There is one, two, three, four, five, six. Seven,
eight: eight calls, interocean telephone calls, between Los Angeles
and Hawaii, you say were social calls ?
Mr. RoHL. In a year?
360. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon.
Mr. RoHL. In one year ?
361. Major Clausen. Social? What kind of social ? About defense
installations?
Mr. RoHL. No.
362. Major Clausen. Wliat kind of social calls were they? What
did you say to him in these calls ?
Mr. RoHL. Asked him how he was fee'ling ; how he was getting along.
363. General Frank. Who paid for those calls ?
Mr. RoHL. I did.
364. Major Clausen. Did you charge those to the Hawaiian Con-
structors ?
Mr. RoHL. No ; I was not charging anything to the Hawaiian Con-
structors.
365. Major Clausen. Well, did the Hawaiian Constructors charge
the Government for them?
Mr. RoHL. Of course not. How could they ? I didn't even charge
the Hawaiian Constructors ?
366. Major Clausen. Well, now you want this Board to understand
your testimony to be that in these telephone calls the only things you
discussed were those matters you just now mentioned, and that is your
positive testimony?
Mr. RoHL. Yes, sir.
[£270] 367. Major Clausen. All right.
Mr. RoHL. How could I, because I didn't know anything else?
368. Major Clausen. Do you want to take a recess?
General Grunert. Yes ; if you are not near to the point of comple-
tion, we shall take a recess for about ten minutes.
(There was a brief informal recess.)
370. Major Clausen. Mr. Rohl, in view of the fact that you got
this letter from Colonel Wyman in January 1941 and didn't answer
it — didn't answer it by phone or letter — what did Colonel Wyman do
about not getting an answer ? Just nothing ?
Mr. RoHL. I believe I told you that I told Paul Grafe shortly after
that.
371. Major Clausen. I see.
372. General Frank. That is not answering the question.
Mr. RoHL. Wliat did Colonel Wyman do ?
373. Major Clausen. Yes. Was Colonel Wyman the kind of a man
that would issue an order to you, "Proceed to Honolulu at your earliest
convenience," and was' he the kind of a man that, if you didn't go, he
would just wait until you came, sometime maybe in October?
Mr. RoHL. No, he was not that kind of a man at all.
374. Major Clausen. What is that?
Mr. RoHL. He was not that kind of a man at all.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1183
375. Major Clausen. Well, that is why I ask, what did he do when
you didn't go, Mr. Kohl ?
Mr. RoHL. I told him it took me some time to clean up my business.
376. Major Clausen. You told him that?
[^^7i] Mr. RoHL. Yes. ;
377. Major Clausen. On the phone?
Mr, RoHL. I believe I did.
378. Major Clausen. How soon after you get the letter did you tell
him that?
Mr. Rohl. That I don't know.
379. Major Clausen. Wliat is that ?
Mr. RoHL. I don't know.
380. Major Clausen. Well, and then what did you tell Paul Graf e ?
Mr. Rohl. I told Paul Grafe that, to explain my status to Colonel
Wyman, that I couldn't go.
381. Major Clausen. Because you were an alien?
Mr. Rohl. That is right.
882. Major Clausen. And when did you tell him that, bearing in
mind that here you had an orde^, as you now concede, from a man who
demanded action?
I say, when?
Mr. Rohl. You mean when and to whom ?
383. Major Clausen. I say, bearing in mind this order that you got
from Colonel Wyman to go over there, his desire expressed that you
go there at once, and he being the type of man that you say he was, and
you having not the ability to comply with the order because of your
alien status, does that refresh your memory as to how soon after you
got the letter that you told Grafe to give him the information ?
Mr. Rohl. No, but you — I believe you have Grafe here today.
384. Major Clausen. You know that, do you ? '■'-
[227:3] Mr. Rohl. No ; I don't know that. I mean he is waiting
for your call, and he should have his travel dates between Honolulu
and the mainland.
385. Major Clausen. By the way, you showed familiarity with this
House Committee
386. General Frank. He still does not answer your question.
387. Major Clausen. I know that, sir.
Have you anything further to say on that subject?
Mr. Rohl. General, I can't give you specific date because I haven't
got it. I could get it for you.
388. General Frank. He didn't ask you for a date.
When you ask a question, get an answer to the question you ask;
don't let him dodge it.
389. Major Clausen. All right. Answer the question.
390. General Frank. Well, repeat the question.
391. Major Clausen. Bearing in mind the kind of a man that
Colonel Wyman was, the fact that he had expressed a desire that you
go to Honolulu at your earliest convenience to consult with him to ac-
complish the purpose of the contract, and you say that you told Grafe
the status of your alienage which prohibited you
Mr. Rohl. Well, Grafe already knew it.
392. Major Clausen. What is that, sir?
1184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. RoHL. Grafe knew it.
-393. General Frank. What did Wyman do?
Mr. RoHL. What did Wyman do?
394. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. RoHL. Wyman didn't do anything.
[2273^ 395. General Frank. He was the kind
Mr. RoHL. I mentioned to you — what did I tell Wyman ?
396. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. RoHL. It's there a few minutes ago (indicating). I told
Wyman that it took me — it took me several months to clean up my
business on the mainland so I could devote all of my time to the work
on the Islands, which is the truth. In other words, you can't — I made
no preparations. I was — never intended — I never intended — it was
never contemplated that I would take charge of the work in the Islands,
and you can't
397. General Frank. Wyman never came back at you and asked you
anything more about it?
Mr, RoHL. Well, he wrote another letter, not to me. He wrote a
letter to General Hannum, I have heaiifl since.
398. General Frank. Go ahead.
399. Major Clausen. In which he said what?
Mr. RoHL. To expedite my citizenship.
400. Major Clausen. Precisely. And so when he wrote the letter
to expedite your citizenship,
Mr. RoHL. Yes, sir.
401. Major Clausen. — to get you to go to Honolulu, do you w^ant
the Board to believe that you said nothing to him about the citizen-
ship?
Mr. RoHL. Major, I told you now that Paul Grafe told Wyman —
if he hadn't told him before, which I don't know — but by this letter
and the second letter that Colonel Wyman wrote to General Hannum,
we know that Colonel Wyman at that time knew from Paul Grafe that
I was an alien.
402. Major Clausen. All right.
[2271^] 403. General Frank. Wliy didn't you come right out
and tell Wyman before this that you were an alien? Were you
ashamed of it?
Mr. RoHL. Somewhat.
404. General Frank. You were ashamed of being a German?
Mr. RoHL. No.
405. General Frank. Well, what were you ashamed of?
Mr. RoHL. I was ashamed of my negligence, living here that long
without becoming a citizen.
406. General Frank. How much communication did you have with
people in (Germany in the meantime?
Mr. RoHL. None.
407. Major Clausen. Haven't you a relative that is in the Ham-
burg-American Line ?
Mr. RoHL. No.
408. General Frank. You mean to say that you had no communica-
tion between Germany in 1916?
Mr. RoHL. Oh, yes. I had three sisters in Germany, or have; I
don't know which.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1185
409. General Frank. Go ahead.
410. Major Clausen. Sir, let us get down to the contract and the
work that was to be performed under it.
411. General Frank. Let me ask him one question on this contract :
What were the delays and the things delayed that you were to remedy
by going over there ?
Mr. RoHL. I don't know.
412. Major Clausen. Something had happened, hadn't it? Paul
Grafe you said was fighting with somebody else, and things were in a
turmoil?
[2375] 413. General Frank. Let me finish this.
414. Major Clausen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rohl. No, I didn't say that Paul Grafe was fighting with some-
one.
415. General Frank. Well, now, just a minute. Just answer my
questions now.
Mr. RoHL. Yes.
416. General Frank. You stated that you went over there to speed
up tlie work?
Mr. RoHL. Right.
417. General Frank. That Wyman was not satisfied with the
tempo at which it was being conducted ?
Mr. RoHL. That is right.
418. General Frank. All right. Now, what were the delays and
the things delayed that you were supposed to remedy ?
Mr. RoHL. Change organization. Wyman was not satisfied with
our project manager.
4f9. General Frank. Wlio was he?
Mr. RoHL. Ashlock, A-s-h-1-o-c-k, I believe.
420. General Frank. And what else did you do then?
Mr. RoHL. What did I do?
421. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. Rohl. When I arrived over there?
422. General Frank. I would like to know
Mr. Rohl. Yes, sir.
423. General Frank. what were the delays and the things de-
layed.
Mr. Rohl. There weren't any delays or things delayed.
424. General Frank. Well, then why was it necessary for you
\2276'] to go over there to speed up the work?
Mr. Rohl. General, Wyman wanted it done faster than we were
doing it.
425. General Frank. Well, then there was something delayed that
was not satisfactory to Wyman?
Mr. Rohl. Well, there wasn't anything satisfactory to Colonel
Wyman at that time. He just wanted it done fast.
426. General Frank. Well, what did he want done faster?
Mr. Rohl. Runways.
427. General Frank. What date was this that he wanted the run-
ways done faster?
Mr. Rohl. I arrived on September the 25th, I believe, or the 26th,
01 1941.
1186 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
428. General Frank. Yes. What runways were they building at
that time?
Mr. RoHL. They were building Bellows.
429. General Frank. September 20, 1941 ?
Mr. EoHL. Yes, sir, because Bellows was ready for landing on
December the 7th, and a B-17 did land.
430. General Frank. They didn't have much money for fixing up
Bellows on September 20th?
Mr. RoHL. No, but Hawaiian Constructors furnished the money.
431. General Frank. Out of their own pocket?
Mr. EoHL. That is right.
432. General Frank. What else was done? What else that was
delayed did you take steps to expedite ?
Mr. EoiiL. Wliat I did, I came back here and shipped over a lot of
equipment, including equipment for the alternate ferry [2277']
command.
433. General Frank. Alternate what?
Mr. RoHL. Alternate ferry command.
434. General Frank. Alternate ferry connnand.
Mr. RoHL. Now, some of that equipment for Christmas and Canton
Island left here in November, I believe November 18th, on the Luding-
ton, was in preparation or process of unloading at Christmas on the
morning of December the 7th and returned to Los Angeles. The only
way to speed up work at that time was to ship in more equipment,
General, and that is what I did.
435. Major Clausen. In other words, Mr. Rohl, before you went
to Hawaii you shipped over this equipment for this alternate ferry
route ?
Mr. RoHL. No, sir.
436. General Frank. Before he went to Hawaii the second time,
he did this.
Mr, RoHL. After I returned
437. Major Clausen. Well, bef ore-
Mr. RoHL. No. This we must get straight : after I returned from
Hawaii I purchased and took some of Rohl-ConnoUy Company equip-
ment and shipped over to Hawaii, and personnel.
438. Major Clausen. Well, you remember that after the basic con-
tract was signed in December 1940, that there had been supplements
to that from time to time, don't you ?
Mr, RoHL. I knew that when I arrived in Honolulu.
439. Major Clausen. You mean that none of those supplements
came into your office?
Mr. RoHL. Nothing ever came into my office,
440. Major Clausen. Until you got to Honolulu ?
[2278'] Mr. Rohl. I haven't seen the contract yet.
441. Major Clausen. Well, did you know that the contract had
been changed in various ways between December to the time that you
got in Honolulu ?
Mr, RoHL. The contract had been changed ?
442. Major Clausen, Yes, increased in scope, work.
Mr, RoHL. Oh, supplements ?
443. Major Clausen. Yes.
Mr. RoHL, You mean supplements were issued to the contract?
PROCEEDINGS OB' ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1187
444. Major Clausen, Yes.
Mr. Kohl. Yes, I found that out after I got over there.
445. Major Clausen. Well, you mean that you didn't know about
that before you got over there ^
Mr. RoiiL. No.
44G. Major Clausen. You didn't know that the fee had been in-
creased many times, and the amount of the cost of the work had been
increased ?
Mr. RoHL. No.
447. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon'^
Mr. RoHL. No.
448. Major Clausen. Well, about this alternate air route, when
you got over there you w^ere tlien informed and for the first time you
had unfolded to yourself the scope of the work that 3'our firm was
doing there ?
Mr. RoHL. Yes.
449. Major Clausen. What is that ?
Mr. RoHL. Yes.
450. Major Clausen. It could have been $500,000,000 or $500; you
didn't know that? What is that?
[££79] Mr. Roiil. No.
451. Major Clausen. What about the statement in this House Mili-
tary Affairs Committee report about delays in the construction of
these defense projects, as to the accuracy? Page 39, there are various
itemizations of dates when the work was to be started and dates when
they were to be completed. Do you know?
Mr. RoiiL. Major, I have no information on that, but Mr. Grafe
was over there at that time.
452. Major Clausen. Yes.
Mr. Roiil. And I am sure that he can give you the proper ansAvers.
453. Major Clausen. Yes, but you told General Frank about going
over there to speed up things.
Mr. RoHL. That is right.
454. Major Clausen. AVell, when you got over there in September
1941 did you inquire into why these job orders had not proceeded with
the speed that they were supposed to, to be completed in time?
Mr. RoHL. It was lack of material, lack of men. Equipment was
arriving slow, beyond our control.
455. Major Clausen. Well, you found out that there w^ere delays,
didn't you, Mr. Rohl, when you arrived ?
Mr. RoHL. Oh, yes.
456. Major Clausen. By the way, a statement has been made here
about your background. Where were you during the First World
War?
Mr. RoHL. I was in California.
457. Major Clausen. What is that?
[i^£80\ Mr. Rohl. In California.
458. Major Clausen. Remember, you Avere working up in the Bear
River, south bank of the Bear River, at the time?
Mr. RoHL. That's a long time ago.
459. Major Clausen. Wliat is that?
Mr. RoHL. South bank of the Bear River?
460. Major Clausen. Near Sacramento.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 2 26
1188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. RoHL. I was workino- near Sacraniento on flood-control work.
461. Major Clausen. 1917, thereabonts !'
Mr. RoHL. Yes.
4()2. Major Clausen. Is it trne about that time that you went to
Mexico'^
Mr. RoHL. No.
463. Major Clausen. I beo" your pardon.
Mr. RoHL. No.
464. Major Clausen. AVell, did you in U)1T, 1918, or 1919 o(, to
Mexico '(
Mr. Rohl. No.
465. Major Clausen. Now% when you got to Honohdu you made a
survey of these various defense projects, didn't you, with Colonel
Wyman?
Mr. Rohl. And Mr. Grafe.
466. Major Clausen. And then, as I understand it, you returned
to the mainland?
Mr. Rohl. That is right.
467. Major Clausen. And then you went back again?
Mr. Rohl. That is right.
468. Major Clausen. And this time you stayed how long?
[2281] Mr. Rohl. I stayed until — I stayed from the forepart
of December when I arrived until the latter part of April.
469. Major Clausen. 1942?
Mr. Ri.HL. 1942, when Colonel Lyman — not Wyman — Colonel Ly-
man, at that time Colonel Lyman, allowed me ten days on the main-
land.
470. Major Clausen. Can you give us specific dates, Mr. Rohl ?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.
471. Major Clausen. Let me see. You can refer to a paper. Just
go ahead.
Mr. Rohl. I haven't it with me.
472. Major Clausen. What is that?
]SIr. Rohl. I haven't got it with me.
473. Major Clausen. Well, tell the General dates that you were
in Honolulu.
474. General Frank. About?
Mr. Rohl. I have it down in the office — I have it down in the
hotel. I can send it up here this afternoon when I get through, if
you wish.
475. Major Clausen. Can you give approximate dates now?
Mr. Rohl. I can give you approximate dates. These are to the
best of my knowledge, but I have them in writing: I left Los Angeles
on a clipper on or about September the 25th. Septem])er the 25th. I
returned to Los Angeles about October the 10th to employ personnel
and purchase equipment and
476. General Russell. That is all right. When did you go back?
Mr. Rohl. I went back — tliis time I was ordered by General Han-
num to take the steamer Lurline on November the 28th. Then 1
staved until
477. General Russell. April?
Mr. Rohl. April.
478. General Russell. That is all right. That is what I want. Mr,
Rohl. I came back for ten days.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1189
479. General Frank. In April ?
Mr. RoiiL. In — promising Colonel Lyman that I would not stay over
ten days. I couldn't get priorities to fly back. In the meantime Colonel
Mollison was in the South Pacific, so I took a convoy, and about an hour
after I was aboard the convoy my piority came in to fly back.
480. Major Clausen. Now, after you — what is that'? Did you
finish?
481. General Russell. That is all I want to know.
Mr. RoHL. Well, you want subsequent ?
482. General Russell. I don't. The others might.
483. Major Clausen. Yes. So far as I am concerned, I just want to
ask him one question here, or two.
Let me ask you this, Mr. Rohl : When you finally came back from
Hawaii the last time permanently, so far as the Hawaiian Constructors
were concerned, you continued then your relations with Colonel
Wyman by a meeting with him, and then you went up to Edmonton,
Canada, on the Canol project, didn't you?
Mr. Rohl. No.
484. Major Clausen. You mean you never went to Canada on that
project ?
Mr. Rohl. On the Canol project, no, sir.
485. Major Clausen. Well, you sent your equipment up there, didn't
you?
Mr. Rohl. No, sir.
\2^83'] 486 Major Clausen. You mean no equipment of the
Rohl-Connolly Company went up there ?
Mr. Rohl. On the Canol project, no, sir, never.
487. Major Clausen. Did you have any interest at all in any con-
tracts being performed in Canada?
Mr. Rohl. Foley Brothers and Rohl-Connolly had the military
road called the Haynes Cutoff, from Haynes to Champaigne.
488. Major Clausen. Well, in connection with that you had talks
with Colonel Wyman, did you not, about your participation in that?
Mr. Rohl. No. Colonel Wyman called Mr. Connolly from Edmon-
ton on the telephone and asked him or both of us to come up to Edmon-
ton along with numerous other contractors.
489. Major Clausen. Well, did you go to Edmonton?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.
490. Major Clausen. All right. That is all I have.
491. General Frank. I haven't anything.
492. General Russell. How long have you known Bruce Pine?
Mr. Rohl. Not at all.
493. General Russell. Have you ever had any relations with him of
any sort?
Mr. Rohl. No, sir.
494. General Russell. Either directly or indirectly?
Mr. Rohl. Since his story in there I checked up, and as near as I
can find out I was — attended one party with about 75 or between 75 and
100 people, where I might have met Bruce Pine.
495. General Russell. But there have never been any relations
\^228Jf] Between you and Bruce Pine which would lead to any
feeling on your part toward him or any feeling on his part toward
you?
1190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. RoHL. General, I didn't know the man when he was sitting at
the table in that Tenney hearing.
40(). General Russell. That is all that I have.
497. (General Frank. I haven't anything.
498. (xeneral Ritssell. Did you know Mr. Walter Home of Los
Angeles, an insurance and real estate man of that city?
Mr. RoHL. Of Long Beach, yes.
490. General Russell. How long have you known Mr. Home? A
number of j^ears?
Mr. RoHL. Now wait a minute. May I explain? Mr. Home had
a boat and used to sail, and I met him on sailing trips or races, but
I haven't seen — in about 19!28, '^29, or thereabouts; I don't believe I
have seen Mr. Home for ten or twelve years.
500. General Russell. Did you ever have any business dealings
with him, Mr. Rohl?
Mr. RoiiL. No.
501. General Ritssell. You have had no social contacts with liim
since 1928-19:>9?
Mr. RoiiL. No, sir.
502. General Russell. At any time during your acquaintanceship
with Mr. Home, and whatever relationship may have existed, did
anything develop which might cause Mr. Home to have any enmity
toward you or any feeling against you that you know of?
Mr. RoHL. No ; I don't see why.
503. General Russell. Do you have any feeling toward liim in any
way
Mr. RoiiL. No.
['2^86] 504. (Tcneral Russkt>l. Your feeling toward liim is per-
fectly cordial, so far as any exists?
Mr. RoiiL. Oh, yes.
505. General Russell. I think that is all.
506. (xeneral Grunert. Any more questions?
507. Major Clausen. Just a general question here: Did your firm
or yourself ever do any work in Japan or any Ja2:)anese-cont rolled
territory ?
Mr. RoiiL. No, sir.
508. Major (^lat^sen. Where were you at the time of the Pearl
Harbor attack?
Mr. RoiiL. At the Pearl Harbor attack I was at home.
509. Major Clausen. Li?
Mr. RoHL. On Diamond Head Road. We had a— Mi's. Rohl and I
were at home.
510. General Frank. I didn't get that.
Mr. RoHL. Mrs. Rohl and I were at home.
Now, General, I believe I said so; I might say a question was asked
here, Where was Colonel Wyman the night of December the 6th,
whether he was at my house. I read in there [indicating] that he was
at my house drunk. It's false. Colonel Wyman, Colonel Claterbos,
and Colonel Robinson and their wives came over Friday aftei* dinner
to our house, Friday, December the 5th, stayed for about two hours.
The reason was that Colonel Claterbos had arrived in Honolulu on
a mission to the Red Sea, I believe, and I didn't see Colonel AVyman
from Friday evening on till Sunday morning when the alarm went out
for Hawaiian Constructors to report at Kewalo Basin.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1191
Now, Colonel Claterbos was procurement officer in Honolulu after
that tini^.
[^286] oil. Major Clausen. Ilia ve no further questions.
512. General Grunert. Colonel Toulmin?
513. Colonel Toulmin. No, sir ; none.
514. General Gkunert. Mr. Rohl, have you anything more to tell
the Board, anything that you think of that might be of assistance
to the Board in getting at facts, that you want to tell the Board of
your own volition!' Because this is the opportunity to do it.
Mr. Rohl. General, I would say this : the facts are not very hard
to get. Facts are facts. I mean you can't ever clumge the facts.
Stories are stories, and I believe that you will get more facts from j^our
own officers than you will from a lot of gossipers.
515. General Grunert. That is not nuich assistance to the Board
because I think the Board understands that of their own accord. Now,
have you anything that you can add in the line of testimony, as facts
that you think would be of value to the Board ^
Mr. Rohl. I can say this: that during Colonel Wyman's regime
the work was done.
516. General Grunert. The work was Avhat i
Mr. Rohl. Was done, performetl. And it slowed down after that
due to the fact that as soon as Colonel Wyman was transferred Colonel
Lyman, who unfortunately died, called me in and outlined his program
to me and asked me if I would cooperate with him and slowly by
stages transfer the Hawaiian Constructors personnel; and his inten-
tion was, as nuich as jiossible, to form a construction regiment, and the
Army absorbing the Hawaiian Consti'uctors persoimel in easy stages,
which we did during \;3287'\ Colonel Lyman's lifetime.
517. General Grunert. There appears to be nothing else. We ap-
preciate your coming in.
Mr. Rohl. Thank you, General.
518. General Grunert. We shall go to other business until 2 o'clock
this afternoon.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon, at 11 : 30 n. m.. the Board recessed until 2 o'clock p. m.
of the same day.)
\2288] AFTERNOON SESSION
(The Boai-d at 2 p. m. contimied the hearing of witnesses.)
TESTIMONY OF PAUL GRAFE, 21 CHESTER PLACE, LOS ANGELES,
CALIFORNIA
(The witness was s\voi-n by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Mr. Grafe. will you please state to the Board
your name and address ?
Mr. Grafe. Paul Grafe. 21 Chester Place, Los Angeles.
2. Colonel West. And what is your occupation, Mr. Grafe ?
Mr. Grafe. Contractor.
3. General Grunert. Mr. Grafe, General Frank assisted by Major
Clausen will develop this particular phase for which we asked you
to come as a witness.
1192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
4. General Frank. Mr. Grafe, you are a contractor in your own
name or associated with someone ?
Mr. Grafe. No. I am president of the W. E. CaHahan Construction
Company.
5. General Frank. How long have you held that position?
Mr. Grafe. Two yeai-s.
6. General Frank. Two years?
Mr. Grafe. Yes.
7. General Frank. What position did you have in December of
1940?
Mr. Grafe. I was vice president of the W. E. Callahan Construction
Company.
8. General Frank. Who was president?
Mr. Grafe. W. E. Callahan.
9. General Frank. Do you remember a project in which the
[2£89] Callahan Company. Gunther & Shirley, and Rohl & Con-
nolly were engaged, in Colorado, about that time?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.
10. General Frank. What was that ?
Mr. Grafe. John Martin dam.
11. General Frank. John Martin dam. The three firms were as-
sociated as co-adventurers in that project, were they?
Mr. Grafe. That is correct.
1'2. General Frank. Do you remember the contract for defense
work in the Hawaiian Islands that was considered in December of
1940?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.
I'K General Frank. You remember that?
Mr. Grafe. I do.
14. General Frank. What was your first contact wdth that?
Mr. Grafe. In November 1940 Colonel AVyman called me or I called
him about that work that I understood was coming up in Hawaii : and
if he called me I said I was interested, and if I called him I told him
I was interested in the work, and he said that there was some work
coming up, and I sent two i-epresentatives over there to look at — to
look over the work.
15. General Frank. Who were they?
Mr. Grafe. DeWitt Clinton Wolfe and S. E. McCullough.
16. General Frank. In what capacity did you do that?
Mr. Grafe. As vice president of the W. E. Callahan Construction
Company.
17. General Frank. You were interested in it from the point of view
of the Callahan Construction Company alone?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.
[2290] 18. General Frank. Or
Mr. Grafe. Alone.
19. General Frank. You were not concerned Avith these other two
firms with which you were associated in Colorado at that time ?
Mr. Grafe. No."
20. General Frank. You were interested in it solely as a Callahan
project ?
Mr. Grafe. That is correct.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1193
21. General Frank. "Wlien the tliiiio- beo;an to crystallize, when did
you hear from Cohinel Wyman to the effect that he was interested in
havino; you participate in it?
Mr. G'kafe. Well, as a guess, I think in November 1940.
22. General Frank. Do you remember when he came from Honolulu
to San Francisco 'i
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.
23. General Fraxk. On the journey in which he was trying to get
that contract approved in Washington ?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.
24. General Fraxk. How were you notified at that time?
Mr. Grait.. By wire or telephone ; I am not sure which.
25. General Frax^k. Where were you?
Mr. Grafe. In Los Angeles.
26. General Fraxk. Did they request you to do something?
Mr. Grafe. To meet Colonel Wyman in San Francisco.
27. General Frax-^k. In what capacity?
Mr. Grafe. As vice president of the W. E. Callahan Construction
Company.
28. General Fraxk. At that time were the other two firms [2291]
concerned in this?
Mr. Grafe. No, sir.
29. General Frax'k. They were not?
Mr. Grafe. No, sir.
30. General Fraxk. What happened when you met Colonel Wyman
in San Francisco ?
Mr. Grafe. We went to — I think we met in Colonel Hannum's
office, the Division Engineer's office.
31. General Frank. And then what developed?
Mr. Grafe. Colonel Wyman stated that I had had some representa-
tives over on the job, they hadn't yet returned, and that he had
this work to do and he wanted us to do it, the W. E. Callahan Com-
pany, and he said that we were willing to do it.
32. General Fraxk. He told that to?
Mr. Grafe. To Colonel Hannum.
33. General Frax^k. Yes?
Mr. Grafe. Colonel Hannum asked me if that was true, and I
said it was. Then Colonel Hannum asked him if he had talked
to any other contractors. Colonel Wyman said he had not. Colonel
Hannum told him that in accordance with the regulations for and
incident to the wording of a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract he must
talk to at least three other contractors. He quoted the regulations,
and he said it would be necessary
34. General Frax^k. Who quoted those?
Mr. Grafe. Colonel Hannum.
35. General Frax^k. Yes ?
Mr. Grafe. He said it would be necessary for him to talk to other
contractors ; and then they, the two of them, discussed [2292]
other contractors that might possibly be interested, and I was excused.
I don't know what else was said.
36. General Frank. Were you advised of any conclusions that they
reached ?
1194 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Grafe. Yes.
37. General Fraxk. What?
Mr. Grafe. They wei'e goino; to— Colonel Wyman was to go to Los
Angeles to meet some contractors down there and discuss this project
with them.
38. General Frank. Do yon remember what contractors?
Mr. Grafe. No, I don't. I was told today what they were, but
that's all I heard.
39. General Frank. You didn't know then ?
Mr. Grafe. I didn't know then, no.
40. General Frank. When did you leave San Francisco to go to
Washington ?
Mr. Grafe. Well, in a short — in a few days. I first went to Los
Angeles and stayed there, as I remember it, a day or two, maybe three
or four, and then I was to go to Washington to meet Colonel Wyman.
41. General Frank. You didn't go to Washington with Colonel
Wyman ?
Mr. Grafe. No.
42. General Frank. You met him where?
Mr. Grafe. In Washington, at the Carlton Hotel.
43. General Frank. When did the other two firms thsit originally
constituted the Hawaiian Constructors come into the i:)icture?
Mr. Grafe. In the conference at Washington.
44. General Frank. In the conference at Washington. You
[2293] didn't know who those other two firms were until you
arrived in AVashington?
Mr. Grafe. Well, I knew they were being considered.
45. General Frank. Who was being considered?
Mr. Grafe. I thought that the W. E. Callahan— that the Atkinson
was being considered, Gunther & Shirley was being considered, and
Rohl-Connolly was being considered. Of course, Gunther & Shirley
are people that we worked with all the time; I more or less took that
for granted.
4(). General Frank. What about Eohl and Connolly?
Mr. Grafe. Well, I knew that they were being considered, but we
hadn't — I hadn't agreed to take them* in. Or Atkinson ; I thought he
was being considered too. I talked to Mr. Callahan about the matter
as to M^hether or not we should take in any more associates or not,
It was his opinion, and in which I concurred, that it might be a good
idea. Although the contract was not so very much at tlie time, it
looked like it might grow larger, and then in discussing tlie contnict
with me Colonel Wyman had insisted thai we purchase new e<iuipment.
which meant — on rough estimate — it meant between five iind six hun-
dred thousand dollars worth of equipment, so he thc;ught we were
sticking our neck out a little in buying that much equijiment for such
a small amount of work.
47. General Frank. Did you have ecjuipment belonging to the Cal-
lahan firm to start work on the contract originally ?
Mr. Grafe. Oh, yes.
48. General Frank. Now,
Mr. Grafe. We didn't — I want to be sui-e that I understand your
question. You mean did we own equipment that could have [2294.]
been used on that?
49. General Frank. Yes.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1195
Mr. Grafe. Yes.
50. (Jeiieral Frank. That is what I meant. Xow, did you have ar-
rungeiiients for a meeting in Wasliington before you left Los Angeles i
Mr. Grafe. Yes.
51. General Frank. With whom? ■ ;
Mr. Graff. With Colonel Wyman. ' .i ; ; i
52. (General Frank. And who else? ■)■
Mr. Grafe, I didn't know of anybody else.
53. General Frank. Did you communicate with anybody else prior
to leaving Los Angeles that you would meet in Washington?
Mr. Grafe. I don't think so.
54. General Frank. Where uul you stay in Washington? • .
Mr. Grafe. At the Carlton Hotel.
55. General Frank. You made reservations, or did you get a room
after you got there?
Mr. Grafe. No; I made reservations.
56. General Frank. Did you occupy the room for the full time of
the reservation?
Mr. Grafe. I think so. ,
57. General Frank. Did you stay there alone? :
Mr. Grafe. No.
5(S. General Frank. With whom did you stay?
Mr. Grafe. When I arrived Colonel Wyman and Tom Connolly
were in the room, and then when I arrived Colonel Wyman got anotlier
I'oom and Tom Connollv stayed with me.
59. General Frank. Now, when did you learn about the details
[22.9o\ of the contract?
Mr. Grafi^:. You mean as to what the work consisted of? . .
GO. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. Grafe. At this conference, in part, and some about it in San
Francisco.
61. General Frank. And the two men that you sent to Honolulu,
they learned something about it, didn't they?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, but their information was rather sketchy.
62. General Frank. All right. After you got to Washington where
was the conference held at which you learned about the details of the
contract ?
Mr. Grafe. By that you mean the terms of the — I saw the contract
the first time in the Chief's office. . ■ . : • . .
63. General Frank. I beg pardon.
Mr, Grafe. In the Chief's office.
64. General Frank, What Chief ? ,?
Mr, Grafe. Chief of Engineers.
65. General P'rank. The contract already had been drawn up?
Mr. Grafe. Yes.
66. General Frank. The first time you sawMt?
Mr. Grafe. Yes.
67. General Frank. Were the names of the firms on it that were
going to be the co-adventurers?
Mr. Grafe. No.
68. General Frank, Well, how did the co-adventurers get asso-
ciated ?
Mr, Grafe. Well, Colonel Wyman stated that he wanted Kohl and
Connolly in it, and Gunther & Shirley, together with us.
1196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[2296] 69. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. Grafe. And I agreed.
70. General Frank. Where was this stated?
Mr. Grafe. I don't reriiember. You mean at what exact place?
71. General Frank. Well, was it in this conference in the office of
the Chief of Enoineers ?
Mr. Grafe. I am not sure about that.
72. General Frank. Well, you must have some memory of where
you first learned about your associates.
Mr. Grafe. Well, of course. General Frank, I knew that there was
somethino; about associates when I saw Tom Connolly in that room.
7o. General Frank. Yes?
Mr. Grafe. Now, just when it was first broached, I don't know.
74. General Frank. Well, just give me from your memory how this
thing developed. That is what 1 am trying to work out of you.
Mr. Grafe. Well, as I said before when I saw Tom Connolly in that
room why I knew that he must have been up there interested in that
contract.
75. General Frank. Who represented Gunther & Shirley?
Mr. Grafe. I did.
76. General Frank. Well, how did you come to represent them if
you didn't know they were going to be in it ?
Mr. Grafe. Well, I tried to explain that in doing this, after going
to San Francisco, after meeting in San Francisco, Mr. Shirley and
I had agreed that it would be all right for him [2297] to par-
ticipate with us, and I talked to Mr. Callahan on the phone about it
too.
77. General Frank. Well, I asked you a minute ago when you
first knew about who your associates were going to be, and you told
me that the first that you knew^ anything about it was in the Chief's
office in Washington, and now you tell me you went into Washington
as a representative of the Gunther-Shirley Company.
Mr. Grafe. Well, of course we — I look upon the Gunther-Shirley
Company as our partners and part of our outfit at times, and that
picture just gradually grew.
78. General Frank. Well, then, when I asked you about this, why
didn't you tell me that you assumed that the Gunther-Shirley Com-
pany were going to be associated with you ?
Mr. Grafe. I intended to do that earlier in this questioning. I
thought I did that when I told you that we were very closely asso-
ciated.
79. General Grunert. May I ask a question there ?
80. General Frank. Yes.
81. General Grunert. If you had talked to Callahan prior to
going to Washington on this, then why the surprise seeing him in
the hotel?
Mr. Grafe. Well, I wasn't surprised.
8"2. General Grunert. Well, J thought you told us you were sur-
prised.
Mr. Grafe. No. I knew that he was interested. It was my thought
that we would either — that we would be asked to take in Atkinson or
Rohl and Connolly.
83. General Grunert. I mean Connolly, not Callahan. Who was
[229S] associated with Rohl here?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1197
84. IVIajor Clausex. Connolly, sir.
85. General Grunert. Didn't you tell me you were surprised to
see Connolly in tlie hotel in AVashinf;ton i
Mr. Grafe. No, I didn't mean to say that I was exactly surprised.
T knew that he was interested in that cont -act vyhen I did see hir i
there. I don't believe that I knew he was-
86. General RussEi.L. He didn't express surprise. He expressed
information when he saw Connolly present, that he knew he was there
about the contract. .
Mr. Grafe. Sir?
87. General Eussell. You said when you saw Connolly you knew
he was thej-e about tlie contract.
88. General Frank. Now, how was the decision made as to who
were going to be the co-adventurers?
Mr. Grafe. Colonel Wyman told me who they were going to be
and asked me if that was O. K., and I said yes.
89. General Frank. How many days were you in Washington be-
fore this contract was signed ?
]Mr. Grafe. I can't answer that exactly.
90. General Frank. About how many days?
Mr. Grafe. I would say
91. General Frank. Two days, a week, or what?
Mr. Grafe. Oh, no. A week.
92. General Frank. About a week?
Mr. Grafe. Yes.
93. General Frank. You went there; did you have a power of
attorney from the Gunther-Shirley Company?
Mr. Grafe. No.
{^2299'] 94. General Frank. Who signed the contract as binding
the Gunther & Shirley Company?
Mr. Grafe. I did.
95. General Frank. What authority did you have to sign it?
Mr. Grafe. Authority from a telephone conversation.
96. General Frank. Is that legally binding, telephone conversa-
tion ?
Mr. Grafe. No, sir.
^ 97. General Frank. Well, what legal authority did you have to
sign it?
Mr. Grafe. I didn't have any except that ISIajor Newman — I told
Major Newman that I would have these powers of attorneys in before
this contract was approved or signed by the Government. He said
that would be satisfactory.
98. General Frank. Now, Mr. Connolly was there, and Mr. Connolly
signed it for the Connolly-Eohl Company; is that correct?
Mr. Grate. No.
99. General Frank. It is not correct ?
Mr. Grafe. No.
100. General Frank. Well, who signed it for the ConnoUy-Rohl
Company ?
Mr. Grape. I did.
101. General Frank. Well, how did you get authority to do that?
Mr. Grafe. Verbal.
102. General Frank. On the same basis as that on which you signed
it for the Gunther-Shirley Company; is that correct?
1198 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Grafe. Yes, verbal authority.
103. General Frank. Now, this was on or about the 20th of
[£300] December, 1940, wasn't it?
Mr. Grape. Yes, sir.
104. General Frank. And you were the representative for this
group of co-adventurers including Rohl and Connolly, Gunther &
Shirely, and the Callahan Company?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.
105. General Frank. Was there any question, about the participa-
tion of any one of those firms ?
Mr. Grafe. In what way exactly ?
106. General Frank. In any way.
Mr. Grafe. I don't think so.
107. General Frank. It was perfectly clear and in the open,
straightforward, that all three of them could participate just as
they were in the organization that existed at that time?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.
108. General Frank. No change was made ?
Mr. Grafe. I don't know of any. I don't know what changes were
made.
109. General Frank. Who was president of the Callahan Com-
pany ? Mr. Callahan at that time ?
Mr. Grafe. That is right.
110. General Frank. Who was president of the Gunther-Shirley
Company ?
Mr. Grafe. Mr. Shirley.
111. General Frank. Who was president of the Rohl-Connolly
Company ?
Mr. Grafe. I don't know.
112. General Frank. Well, who gave you authority to act?
Mr. Grafe. Tom Connolly.
[2301] 113. General Frank. How^ did you know he had
authority?
Mr. Grafe. Well, I assumed that he had it. I didn't have any
written evidence that he had it.
114. General Frank. This was a million-dollar contract?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.
115. General Frank. And had promise of running into several
million ?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.
116. General Frank. And those firms handled authority and re-
sponsibility on that nebulous an authority?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir. That's our habit.
117. General Frank. What's that?
Mr. Grafe. That's our habit.
118. General Frank. Did any question ever come up about the par-
ticipation of the Rohl-Connolly Company?
Mr. Grafe. No, sir.
119. General Frank. No question ever came up about it?
Mr. Grafe. From whom ? No, sir.
120. General Frank. No. That was a defense contract?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1199
121. General Frank. Were you conversant with the existence of a
law at that time that any firm participating in a defense contract had
to have citizens as its officials? .:
Mr. Gkafe. No, sir.
122. General Fkank. Yon didn't know that? . ' \
Mr. Grafe. No, sir.
123. General Fraxk. Yon liad better take him.
124. Major Clausen. Sir, when yon were in Washington on this
occasion you talked with Major Newman?
[MB] _ Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.
125. Major Clausen. And did vou also discuss the contract with
Colonel Gesler? ' •
Mr. Grafe. Very little with Colonel Gesler.
12G. Major Clausen. You talked alx)ut the contract with General
Robins ?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.
127. Major Clausen. You talked about the contract with General
Schley?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir. Very little with those three gentlemen.
128. Major Clausen. You talked about the contract with Jolni
Martin?
Mr. Grafe. No.
129. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon, sir. >
Mr. Grafe. No.
130. Major Claitsen. AVell, you met John ]\Iartin there, didn't
vou
Mr. Grafe. Yes. In Washington? •
131. Major Clausen. Yes.
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.
132. Major Clausen. Well, all my questions were directed to
Washington.
When you saw John Martin %Yhere was he?
Mr. Grafe. He came up to my room.
133. Major Clausen. In the Carlton Hotel? ,
Mr. Grafe. Right.
134. Major Clausen. And you had a discussion with him at that
time?
[B30S] Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.
135. Major Clausen. And what did you talk about?
Mr. Grafe. About a bid that we had placed for the set of locks at
Gatun.
136. Major Clausex. As a mater of fact, sometime on this occasion
of your visit to Washington you talked with John Martin concerning
the alien status of Hans Wilbelm Rohl ; correct?
Mr. Grafe. That is possible.
137. Major Clausen. I didn't ask you whether it was possible. I
said, is that correct, sir?
Mr. Grafe. That is possible.
138. Major Clausen. You mean it is possible it is correct ?
Mr. Grafe. Answering your cjuestion, I said it was possible.
139. Major Clausen. You don't wish to go further than that?
Mr. Grafe. Further about what? I don't understand. You get
me confused.
1200 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
140. Major Clausen. Would you read the question to the witness
to which he said "possible" ?
The Reporter [reading] :
Question. As a matter of fact, sometime on this occasion of your visit to
Washington you talked with John Martin concerning the alien status of Hans
Wilhelni Rohl ; correct?
Mr. Grafe. I don't know. I am not sure.
141. Major Clausen. You knew who Mr. John Martin was at the
time, didn't you ?
Mr. Grafe. Sure. He was our attorney.
[2304] 142. Major Clausen. Yes. He at that time in Washing-
ton on this occasion^ — whether it was on the day that you first met him
or later on — he was informed about the contract and as a matter of
fact suggested the terms of the syndicate agreement or the agreement
which would represent an understanding of your various interests;
isn't that true ?
Mr. Grafe. Yes.
143. Major Clausen. Well, now, by the way, you made an affidavit,
Mr. Grafe, to a representative of the House Military Affairs Commit-
tee ; do 3^ou recall that '^
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir. To which representative?
144. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon, sir.
Mr. Grafe. What representative?
145. Major Clausen. Well, I have one here. Did you make more
than one ?
Mr. Grafe. I don't think so.
146. Major Clausen. Well, then it is whatever representative you
made it to.
Mr. Grafe. Made it to —
147. Major Clausen. I show you a document consisting of seven
pages, and I will ask you to read that an.d see if that is it.
Mr. Grafe. You want me to read it all ?
148. Major Clausen. No, sir. I just want you to look it over from
one page to the other page, to see if that is the affidavit that you made
on that occasion,
Mr. GrafI:. I don't believe it is.
149. Major Clausen. Do you have a copy of the one that you made?
Mr. Grafe. Yes. I do.
[230o] 150. Major Clausen. Where is that copy?
Mr. Grafe. Down at the hotel. I say that because I thought I
signed this affidavit.
151. Major Ciausen. All right. Will you do this for the Board?
Will you send the Board out a copy of the copy that you have in
your hotel ?
Mr. (trafe. I surely will.
152. Major Clausen. All right, sir.
153. Colonel Toulmin. Major, mav I suggest that this gentleman
doesn't have anything except his orfginal copy. He would have to
go home in order to send you a copy. Why can't he bring it out here
and let the reporter copy it, and then we will be sure to have it right
away before you get away ?
154. Major Clausen. Yes, he may do that when we finish a few
more questions.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1201
111 any event, on occasion John Martin discussed \vith you the citi-
zenshipstatus of Hans Wilhehn Rohl ; isn't that true?
Mr. (jtrafe. My mind is confused as to just when Bill Rohl's citi-
zenship status was discussed. Now, John Martin tells me that it was
when we were in Washinoton, and possibly that is true. I didn't
attach very much importance to that matter, or I wasn't startled until
I learned of this law that you are talking about, which was sometime
in April, and then I became keenly alive as to the situation then.
155. General Frank. You didn't know about the law until April?
Mr. Grafe. No.
156. Major Cl.^jsen. Now, Mr. Grafe, you just swore that when
you learned that Hans Wilhehn Rohl was an alien you did not attach
[2'Wll] much importance to it. I ask if you gave this testimony
to Colonel Hunt of the Inspector General's Department, page 560:
Question. I take it that you were somewhat surprised yourself to learn that
Mr. Rohl was not a citizen.
Answer. I was very much surprised. Boy, that was a bombshell.
Did you give that testimony?
Mr. Grafe. I don't remember whether that is the exact wording
or not.
157. General Frank. Well, that is official, so tb.ere is no question
about that.
158. Major Clausen. You testified before Colonel Hunt: you re-
member that, Mr. Grafe?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.
159. Major Clausen. All right. What did you say to Colonel
Wyman in Washington on the subject of the citizenship of Mr. Rohl?
Mr. Grafe. Nothing.
160. Major Clausen. Whenever you learned, whenever it was, that
Mr. Rold was an alien, it was a bombshell, wasn't it?
jNIr. Grap^e. Well, I am not sure, Major Clausen, whether the fact
that I learned that he was not a citizen was a bombshell or whether
I learned of that law, that it was a bombshell. You must remember
that is several years ago.
161. Major Clausen. When you saw John Martin in Washington
you discussed with him various things, and you would go to dinner
with him?
Mr. Grafe. No.
["23(7/'] 162. Major Clausen. Were you in his company for sev-
eral days there?
Mr. Grafe. No.
163. Major Clausen. How long had you known Colonel Wyman?
Mr. Grafe. Since '86 or '37.
164. Major Clausen. By the way, you paid for the hotel bill of
Colonel Wvman, didn't vou, when he occupied rooms at the Carlton
Hotel in December 1940?
IVIr. Grafe. No. No ; the company paid for the bill. He gave me
the money. He left in a big rush and gave me money for the hotel
bill, and I had all the bills sent to the company for the company to pay.
165. Major Clausen. To whom did you talk about this case before
you came here today?
Mr. Grafe. I talked to Mr. Shirley.
166. Major Cl.vusen. Whom else?
Mr. Grafe. Mr. Connolly.
1202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
167. Major Clauskx. Mr. Connoll_y. Whom else?
Mr. (iiiAFE. Mr. Rohl.
168. Major CLAirsEx. Whom else?
Mr. Grafe. Mr. Middleton.
169. Major Clausen. Yes. Mr. Martin?
Mr. Grafe. Mr. Martin.
170. Major Clausen. That is all?
Mr. Grafe. Yes.
171. Major Clausen. The time to which you j'list referred as having
talked to these people — that was on the occasion of your responding
to the order to appear before this I>oard, wasn't it?
[2308] Mr. Grafe. Sir?
172. Major Clausen. I say, the talks that you had with these various
people were since you got the order to appear before this Board?
Mr. Grafe. That is a difficult question to ask — or to answer. I
don't understand it.
173. Major Clausen. All right. Put it this way: When did you
talk to these peo])le about the case the most recent times?
Mr. Grafe. Today at lunch.
174. Major Clausen. Today at lunch. In otlier words, you talked
to Mr. Connolly after he had testified here; is that correct?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.
175. Major Clausen. He told ycu he had been here and testified, did
he?
JNIr. Grafe. Yes, sir.
176. Major Clausen. Did he tell you what he had said?
Mr. (trafe. Yes, sir.
177. Major Clausen. He told you that ?
Mr. Grafe. Yes.
178. Major Claltsen. And what did he s:iy that he had said ?
Mr. Grafe. I don't remember all he s,",id.
170. Major Clausen. You can't recall that?
Mr. Grafe. No.
180. General Frank. And you learned this at lunchtime?
181. Major Clausen. Today, sir.
By the way, you talked with Mr. Rohl at lunch too? Was he there
at lunch with vou?
Mr. Grafe. Yes.
[^SOB] 182. Major Clausen. He told you he had been here and
testified?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.
183. Major Clausen. And he talked over with you what he had
testified here this morning?
Mr. Grafe. Some of the things.
181. Major Clausen. Some of the things ?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.
185. Major Clausen. Do you recall, Mr. Grafe, that Colonel Wyman
at Washington in December 1940, when he learned that Mr. Martin
was there, became, to use your words, "sore"?
Mr. Grafe. That is true.
186. General Frank. You seem to remember two and a half years
better than you do two hours, Mr. Grafe.
Mr. Grafe. No, if I had been asked to answer something that hap-
pened two and a half hours ago that I couldn't answer.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1203
187. Major Clausen. When, as I understood your testimony, you
learned that a contract for some defense projects was to be let in
Hawaii — and this was sometime around September 1940; is that
correct ?
Mr. Gkafe. It is just — Major, let me explain that I explained to
Colonel Wyman that Mr, Martin was not there in any capacity in
connection with this contract.
188. Major Clausen. That is your conclusion ?
Mr. Grafe. Well, as far as I knew he was there to — representing —
asking me whether or not we wanted to protest the award of a contract.
189. Major Clausen. Well, he was also there helping Kohl get
citizenship papers, wasn't he? . .
Mr. Graee. That I don't know.
[2310^ 190. General Frank. You don't know that?
Mr. Grafe. I don't know whether — that he was doing that.
191. General Frank. Mr. Grafe, about what was the profit you and
your associates made on this Hawaiian contract?
Mr. Grafe. About eight hundred — between eight and nine hundred
thousand dollars.
192. General Frank. Now, when you made this contract Mr. Rohl
was a German alien and an official of the Rohl-Connolly Company;
that is correct, isn't it ?
Mr. Grafe. It is correct that he was an alien. I don't know that
he was an official of the Rohl-Connolly Company. I have been told
that there were some changes made then, and just when they were
made I don't know.
193. General Fra'nk. Well, did you take into consideration that
this contract might be illegal?
Mr. Grafe. No, sir.
194. General Frank. Have you thought about it since?
Mr. Grafe. No, sir.
195. General Frank. And have you thought that in such an event
the Government, even now, could recover from you and your
associates?
Mr. Grafe. No, sir. You say have I thought of that?
196. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. Grafe. No, sir.
197. Major Clausen. I would like to invite the attention of the
Board to the fact that this witness indicated by his testimony that
Mr. Connolly and Mr. Rohl have violated the injunction of secrecy
with respect to their testimony before the Board. The Recorder
Avarned the two witnesses that they [2311] were not to disclose
what went on here, and by this witness it appears that these two men
have done so.
Mr. Grafe, you first learned of the contract September 1940, and
then, as I understand, you sent two men to Hawaii to review the pro-
spective work ?
Mr. Grafe. That is true.
198. Major Clausen. Now, Avhen they were over there Colonel
Wyman showed them around, did he not?
Mr. Grafe. I don't know about thnt. He probably took them to
some places, and his representatives took them oth<>rs. I am not sure
about that.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 2 27
1204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
199. Major Clausen. And then when he came to the mainland,
when Colonel Wyman came to the mainland in December 1940, you
met Colonel Wvman in General Hannuni's office here in San Fran-
cisco; is that correct?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.
200. Major Clausen. And then did yon go to Los Angeles with
Colonel Wyman, or was he from Los Angeles?
Mr. Grafe. No, sir.
201. Major Clausen. Yon said something abont Colonel Kelton.
Did yon meet with Colonel Wyman in Colonel Kelton's office ?
Mr. Grafe. I didn't say anything about Colonel Kelton.
202. Major Clausen. When was the next time yon saw Colonel
Wyman after the San Francisco visit ?
Mr. Graft. In Washington.
203. Major Clausen. All right. Now, between that time did you
see Mr. Rohl and discuss with him the prospective participation of his
firm in this contract?
Mr. Grafe. No, sir,
204. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon.
Mr. Grafe. No, sir.
[2^13] 205. Major Clausen. Mr. Grafe, you did discuss with
Colonel Wyman from time to time the citizenship status of Mr. Rohl,
did you not ?
Mr. Grafe. I discussed it with him the first time in April 1941.
206. Major Clausen. As a matter of fact, you were so interested in
the citizenship status that 3'ou made a trip to the mainland from
Hawaii for the purpose of accelerating the granting of citizenship to
Mr. Rohl, isn't that true ?
Mr. Grafe. No, sir.
207. Major Clausen. I am .going to read you from a letter which
was written to the Secretary of Commerce by an attorney, David A.
Cannon. First, let me ask you, do you know Mr. Cannon ?
Mr. Grafe. No, sir.
208. Major Clausen. This is a representation that he made :
Mr. Paul Gnife, Managing Director for tlie Hawaiian Constructors, recently
flew to and is now in the United States, with the knowledge and consent of
Colonel Wyman, in an endeavor to clear the way for Rohl's going to the Hawaiian
Islands on this work.
Is that a correct statement ?
Mr. Grafe. No.
209. Major Claltsen. Did you ever, in the Hawaiian Islands, discuss
this subject, at all, about accelerating the citizenship of Mr. Rohl, with
Colonel Wyman?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.
210. Major Clausen. As a matter of fact, you signed a letter, your-
self, did you not, to Mr. Rohl, on August 15, 1941 ?
Dear Bill: After considerable discussion with Ted, it was agreed [2313]
that this matter would be handled as follows : I would write the attached letter,
and Wyman would write one of a similar nature, which he read to me, to the
Chief of Engineers, through the regular channels, attaching a copy of my letter.
His letter is going out on the clipper today.
Kind personal regai'ds,
Sincerely,
Paul Grafe.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1205
Do you remember writing that?
Mr. Grafe. I don't remember writing it, but it is possible that I did.
211. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon, sir?
Mr. Grafe. It is possible that I did.
212. Major Clausen. Would you care to look at it again, to see it
with your eyes? [Major Clausen hands the letter to the witness.]
Mr. Grafe. I don't remember writing it, but it is possible that I did
write it. There is nothing there to
213. Major Clausen. You mean that is not the original letter?
Mr. Grafe. That's right.
214. Major Clausen. Well, that is a Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion report.
Mr. Grafe. Well, I am not denying that I wrote the letter.
215. Major Clausen. Well, all right. Now, concerning the subject
matter of the letter, just tell the Board what discussion you had had
with "Ted," because you say here —
After considerable discussion with Ted.
I assume you referred, there, to Colonel Wyman, isn't that [2314]
true ?
Mr. Grafe. That is true.
216. Major Clausen. All right. Tell the Board what "considerable
discussion" it was you had with "Ted."
Mr. Grafe. Colonel Wyman wanted Mr. Rohl to come over to
Hawaii and help with this work; so did I; and we knew that he
couldn't come over, as he was an alien. We understood that he was
applying for citizenship papers and that there was no action being
taken on it; so we wanted to request the office of the Chief of Engi-
neers to see that prompt action would be taken on his application for
citizenship.
217. Major Clausen. When did you have tlie first of those discus-
sions with Colonel Wyman in Hawaii, Mr. Grafe?
Mr. Grafe. I would say, in August.
218. Major Clausen. Didn't you say here today that you had the
first discussion with him somewhere around April?
Mr. Grafe. That was about his citizenship status, but there was no
discussion about helping him get his application acted upon.
219. Major Clausen. All right. Tell the Board what discussion
you had with Colonel Wyman, in April, concerning Mr. Rohl's citizen-
ship status.
Mr. Grafe. I told Colonel Wyman that he was an alien, and he
seemed surprised to know about it. And then he said, as I remember
it, he said, "I think there is an order out, or a circular letter out, about
that, from the Chief of Engineers' office, as to the status of an alien
on work of this character.'' It was a form letter ; and in a day or two
he sent me a copy of that letter, and I sent it on to Frank Martin and
asked him [2olo] what that law meant as to our status on the
contract.
220. Major Clausen. The circular letter to which you refer was
one which stated that the employment of aliens on defense projects
was forbidden by law, isn't that correct?
Mr. (trafe. I don't remember what the law said. I can get that,
copy of that, if you want me to put it in my testimony.
1206 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
221. Major Clausen. I wish you would send that to the Board,
also. Now, Mr. Grafe, 1 refer again to this letter from Mr. Cannon
to the Secretary of Commerce, dated ^LUgust 29, 1941, and to the por-
tion which I read a few moments ago. Did you ever iiy to the United
States and do anything in connection with getting the citizenship of
Mr. Rohl accelerated or ex])edited or granted, or in any way acted
upon ?
Mr. Grafe. No, sir.
222. Major Clausen. So. so far as your testimony is concerned, this
representation that was made by Mr. Cannon is false, is that correct?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.
223. General Frank. It is? It is false?
224. Major Clausen. Yes, sir; he said, "Yes, sir."'
225. General Frank. This official testimony is false?
220. Major Clausen. That is what he says, sir. He says the i-epre-
sentation in the letter, of Mr. Cannon, to the Secretary of Commerce,
is a false representation.
Mr. Grafe. It — well, now, I don't — Let me answer your question in
a different way. I do not care to answer that, whether that is true
or false. I do not understand your question, exactly. What I say
is that I never did anything [2ol6] except talk to Colonel
Wyman and write him a letter about Bill's alien status. That is the
only thing I ever did in connection therewith.
227. General Frank. Mr. Grafe, where were ^^ou born ?
Mr. Grafe. In Indiana, Clay City.
228. Major Clausen. Mr. Grafe, you finally ascertained, did you
not, in connection wnth all the citizenship business, in Hawaii — I
mean, you learned in Hawaii that the reason that this citizenship was
being held up was for certain acts of Mr. Rohl, and included among
them was the fact that he had falsely documented certain vessels,
which would result in a forfeiture of these vessels to the Government?
Mr. Grafe. No, I didn't know about that.
229. Major Clausen. Well, this letter from Mr. Cannon is a letter
which is in effect a petition of the Rohl -Connolly Company for re-
mission or ndtigation with respect to asking to pay a fine for these
violations of the law; and following the letter, the petition was
granted. I tell you that, to show you the seriousness of the falseness
of the statement of Mr. Cannon, if it is false.
I will read you again what he says concerning you. By the way, I
will say this, that this remission and the payment of the fine preceded
the actual citizenship granting; as a condition, in my opinion. Now,
pai-agraph G :
Mr. Paul Gi-afe, Managing Director for the Hawaiian Constructors, recently
Hew to and is now in the United States with the knowledge and consent of Colonel
Wyman, in an endeavor to clear the way for Rohl's going to the Hawaiian Islands
on this work, and is now at the Caddoa Dam, in Colorado, to assist in making
arrangements for \2.U7] someone to take over the Caddoa project, if
llohl's naturalization affairs are so adjusted to permit Mr. Rohl to proceed with
(he work in Hawaii. Mr. Grafe must return to the Islands at the very earliest
possible date.
Now, taking it piece bv piece, did you "recently flv to the United
States," with respect to tlie date of this August 29, 1941 letter?
Mr. Grafe. Did I fly ? That is possible.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1207
230. Major Clausen. AVere you in the United States in August,
1941 ? On August 29, 1941, were you in tlie United States ^
Mr. Grafe. I would have to consult my records. I spent most of the
time that year in Honolulu.
231. Major Clausen. It says :
with the knowledge and consent of Colonel AVyman, in an endwivor to clear the
way for Rohl's going to the Hawaiian Islands on this work.
Did you fly here for that i)urpose?
Mr. Grafe. No, sir.
232. Major Clausen. Were you at the Caddoa Dam, in Colorado,
in August— August 29, 1941 ?
Mr. Grap^e. 1 was there in July and August. It seems to me that it
was in July — July or August.
233. Major Clausen. By the way, do you know anything about a
letter written by General Kingman to the Department of Innnigration
and Naturalization, requesting the granting of Mr. RohFs application
for citizenship?
Mr. Grafe. No, sir.
234. Major Clausen. Now, I show you, Mr. Grafe, what appears to
be a copy of a letter dated August 15, 1941, from you to [2318]
Colonel Wyman, District Engineer, which accompanies this letter that
I have already referred to, that you wrote to Mr. Rohl. This is page
15 of the FBI report. I will ask you to look that over and see if you
wrote that letter. I say, do you recall having written that letter, sir?
Mr. GraI'^e. I assume that I — I know I wrote a letter like that, and
I would assiune that that is an exact copy of it.
235. Major Clausen. All right.
I have no further questions.
236. General Frank. I have no further questions.
237. General Grunert. Have you any questions. General Russell?
238. General Ritssell. Yes ; two or thi-ee.
Mr. Grafe, how long have you been connected with the Callahan
Company ?
Mr. Grafe. 22 years.
239. General Russell. You are a member of the Callahan family,
are you not, by marriage?
Mr. Grafe. No, sir.
240. General Russell. You are now the President of the company?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.
241. General Russell. Now, Mr. Grafe, I want to know something
about that operation out there. Who hired all those people that did
the work on Oahti ? Where did you get your laborers ?
Mr. Grafe. We had an employment office in Los Angeles and San
Francisco.
242. General Russell. Were any Rohl-Connolly supervisors out
there with you, in the beginning?
Mr. Grafe. None.
243. General Russell. What organization did you ttdce out there
[2319] with you, as your supervisory organization?
Mr. Grafe. Well, we took the general superintendent, the adminis-
trator, several key foremen, warehousemen.
244. General Russell. From what company oi- companies?
1208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr, Grafe. From ours, and Gunther & Shirley's.
245. General Russell. Did yon have any of the Rohl-ConnoUy
organization out tliere, until August 1941?
Mr. Grafe. No, sir.
246. General Russell. When did any of the Rohl-Connolly or
ganization appear out there, to do some of the work, first?
ISIr. Grafe. Key employees, you are talking about? I think the
first man — the first men were the ones who went over, that started
over on the Ludington.
247. General Russell. About when was that?
Mr. Grafe. That must have been about in November 1941, because
it was turned back, after the attack.
248. General Russell. Is it your testimony that only Callahan's
and Gunther & Shirley's supervisory personnel were in the islands
prior to November 1941 ?
IVIr. Grafe. Yes, sir.
249. General Russell. Did Rohl-Connolly Company come into this
picture, as one of the adventurers, at your instance, or at the instance
of Colonel Wyman ?
Mr, Grafe. Colonel Wyman's instance.
250. General Russell, How many times had Callahan Co. been
associated with Rohl-Connolly, before this work out in Oahu?
Mr. Grafe. Once.
251. General Russell. Where was that?
Mr. Grafe. John Martin Dam,
[2320'] 252. General Russell, Was it essential to have Rohl-
Connolly Company in the operation, so that it might be financed?
Mr. Grafe. No, sir; it wasn't essential or necessary. We thought
that we should have someone, another partner, in there, to help carry
the risk that might be incurred in the purchase of this equipment
on such a small contract.
253. General Russell. Did Tom Connolly go to Washington at
your instance, or at Wyman's instance?
Mr. Grafe. Well, not at my instance, I assume, at Wyman's in-
stance.
254. General Russell. You have been questioned about a letter
written by a man named Cannon. You testified you did not know
that man?
Mr. Grafe. Did not know him; that is correct.
255. General Russell. Did you ever see that letter?
Mr. Grafe. No, sir.
256. General Russell. Had you ever heard of that letter prior to
your being questioned about it by Major Clausen ?
Mr. Grafe. No, sir.
257. General Russell. That is all I want to ask.
258. General Frank. Who sent John Martin to Washington to ex-
pedite Rohl's citizenship papers?
]Mr. Grafe. I don't know.
259. General Frank. Anything else?
260. ]\Iajor Cl.\usen. No, sir.
261. General Grunert. That appears to be all.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
PROCEEDINCiS OF AKMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1209
[2321] TESTIMONY OF JOHN M. MARTIN, ATTORNEY-AT-LAW;
LOS ANGELES, CAL.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Will you state to the Board ,your name and ad-
dress, please, Mr. Martin.
Mr, Martin. John M. Martin ; 714 West Olympic Boulevard, Los
Angeles, is my office. My residence is Pasadena.
2. Colonel West. And what is your occupation?
Mr. Martin. Attorney- at-law.
3. General Grunert. Mr. Martin, this field we are covering is so
broad that we are dividing it up for special investigation, and in
this particular part of it. General Frank will lead, assisted by Major
Clausen ; so I will ask General Frank to go ahead.
4. General Frank. Mr. Martin, were you ever employed by Mr.
Rohl to represent him as his attorney ?
Mr. Martin. Yes; I have represented Mr. Rohl, oh, off and on, I
would say for approximately seventeen years.
5. General Frank. Do you represent him, or have you represented
him, individually, or as tlie counselor for the firm of Rohl-Connolly
Company ?
Mr. Martin. Both, whenever called upon to do so; also represent
Mrs. Rohl, and the H. W. Rohl Company, and Mr. Connolly, and the
Rohl-Connolly Company; and the Rohl-Connolly Partnership, before
the Rohl-Connolly Company was incorporated, some twelve years ago.
6. General Frank. Is the Rohl-Connolly Company still a going
concern, or is it being liquidated ?
[2M2] Mr. Martin. Well, my brother, Frank Martin, has han-
dled that matter directly for the Rohl-Connolly Company, and it is
my recollection that T. E. Connolly Company, Inc., which is a corpora-
tion owned by Fr. T. E. Connolly, ac(iuired the stock in the Rohl-
Connolly Company, and that was owned by Mr. and Mrs. Rohl. That
was some — oh, eight, ten months ago — maybe a year ago.
7. General Frank. In December 1940, you were in Washington?
Mr. Martin. Yes.
8. General Frank. At about the time that the Hawaiian contract
was being negotiated ?
Mr. Martin. Is there any objection to my referring to a memo
randum ?
9. General Frank. No.
Mr. Martin. I was in Washington, it was, I believe the greatei
l)art of the time from October 18, 1940, until Christmas 1940. I was
^specifically there on December 17 and December 18, which I believe
;ire two (hiys when the negotiations were going on.
10. General Frank. Have you talked to anybody who has appeared
before this Board as a witness?
Mr. Martin. Yes.
11. General Frank. Have you discussed the testimony that they
gave, with them?
Mr. Martin. Only in substance, principally with ]\Ir. Connolly,
who last night asked me three questions. He said, "When did you
1210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
go to Washington, D. C, in 1940? How long were yon there? and
what did you do while there?" And in response to that, I called
my office to get from my work sheets or time [£M3] sheets some
identification as to where I was, during the periods mentioned; and
I have such a memo, made by me in conference over the telephone;
which is complete from October 18, 1940, until Christmas 1940; so
that as to that period I can say definitely where I was on any dates.
12. General Frank. We are interested in your being in Washington,
right around the 15th to the 20th of December.
Mr. Martin. Yes.
13. General Frank. On that trip, what were you there for?
Mr. Martin. I was called, from Washington, D. C, by the McNeil-
Zoss Company, in connection with the negotiations for the San Diego
Housing project contract with the Department of Public Works. I
had just returned to my residence, to attend my wife's father's funeral,
and received that call, on November 28, 1940, asking that I meet with
Mr. McNeil and Mr. Zoss, on December 2 ; so I left
14. General Frank.' Let us confine the activities that you had there
to those associated with the Rohl-Connolly Company, or with Mr. Rohl.
Mr. Martin. Well, I really had none during that period, with one
exception. I had conferences along in December with Mr. Grafe and
Mr. JSeabury, of the Callahan Corporation, in connection with the
Callahan Construction Company's bid on the Canal locks; and I had
a conference on December 17 with Mr. Grafe, in Washington, in con-
nection with the brief I was writing for the comptroller general on
that protest; and at that time
15. General Frank. Now, just a minute. We have some testimony
from commissioned officers of the United States Army [2321^]
about a conference you had with them in Washington, relative to
obtaining citizenship for Mr. Rohl ; and that is the activity about which
we would like to learn from you.
Mr. Martin. I don't have those dates here, but they were along
the latter part of Aug-ust 1941. The conferences were with General
Robins, primarily, the Chief of Engineers, or, by the way. General
King was then Chief; but conferences primarily with General Robins
and with Colonel Lorence.
16. General Frank. L-o-r-e-n-c-e?
Mr. Martin. I believe so, in General Robins' office, and with
Mr. Stilphen, who, as I recall, was a civilian attorney in General
Robins' office.
17. General Frank. Will you tell us just what happened on that
occasion.
Mr. Martin. Yes. I had with me a photostatic copy of an order
or directive or letter from Colonel Wyman, requesting that Mr. Rohl
come to the islands.
18. General Frank. Who gave you that? Did Colonel Wyman
send that to you?
Ml". Martin. I don't know, but I believe that during the summer
of 1941, Mr. Rohl asked me if, when I returned to Washington, D. C,
in connection with other pending cases, if I would explain to Colonel
Wyman wdiy he, Mr. Rohl, had not reported at the islands in obedi-
ence to that instruction; and it is my recollection that at that time,
Miss Dickey, of his office, had made and gave me a photostatic copy.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1211
10. General Frank. Miss Dickey, in whose office'!'
Mr. Martix. In tlie Rohl-Connolly Company office. She is secre-
tary of the company. She gave me a photostatic copy of \JJ2o]
this letter from Colonel Wyman, dated along in January 11)41. and I
j)resented that letter, or the photostat, to General Robins, in his office,
the latter part of August 1941.
20. (leneral Frank. That is right.
Mr. INIartin. And I explained to him that Mr. Rohl couldn't go,
because he was not a citizen. General Robins suggested to me that
he. as head of the department, could waive that requirement. I told
hnii that I had discussed with Mr. Rohl that possibility and that Mr.
Rohl felt that he would be subject to criticism if he went there on a
waiver. I told General Robins that Mr. Rohl's petition for citizenship
was pending in the federal court for Los Angeles, had been for some
six months, and that I felt that the only way that Mr. Rohl could
propei'ly go was after that petition for citizenshi]) had been heard by
tlie federal court on its merits.
I believe at that time General Robins called in Colonel Loi'ence and
Mr. Stil))hen. I am not sure as to (leneral Kingman being called at
that conference, but the upshot of the conference was that General
Kingman addressed a letter to Mr. Schofield, the head of the Depart-
ment of Immigration and Naturalization. I believe Mr. Stilphen
delivered that letter to Mr. Schofield by hand.
21. General Frank. Who prepared this letter?
Mr. Martin. I do not know. It wasn't prej^ared in my presence.
22. General Frank. Did you assist in the preparation of it?
Mr. Martin. No, sir; I did not.
2."). General Frank. Did you offer any suggestion with respect to
;iny phraseology in it?
Mr. Martin. No, I did not. I never saw it. My only \2326]
knowledge of the letter was, I believe, General Robins i-eading me
from a copy of the letter. I never saw the original nor had any
part in it.
24. (jeneral Frank. And at whose direction did vou take steps to
ex])edite this citizenship petition? Did Mr. Rohl send you there for
that {)urpose?
Mr. Martin. No. Mr. Rohl had asked that while T was in Wash-
ington I explaiii it to (jeneral Robins, why he was not reporting to the
islands in obedience to that order. I had conferences pending with
the Acting Secretary of Commerce, in Washington, and with the
Solicitor, General Trimble, and with Commander Fields, in connection
with proceedings that were being contemplated with reference to the
registration of the Rohl-Connolly Corporation's marine equipment,
and at that time the Seci'etary of Commerce in his report was perfectly
villing to mitigate the penalty, to a monetary consideration, under
the statute, but insisted upon the vessels being registered; and as I
recall, the regulations at that time required that 85% of the stock be
owned by American citizens.
Mr. Rohl, who was then an alien, owned 257^ of the stock, so that
the vessels either had to be reregistered or sold or transferred, or the
entire stock ownership be held to the extent of 8.5 c; by American citi-
zens. Therefore, looking to a settlement of those j)roceedings, the
War Department and the Department of Commerce both cooperated
1212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to tlie extent of uskino; or rather advising the head of the Immigration
Department tliat it would expedite a clearance of the matter, if the
Rohl petition for citizenship could be put on the calendar and heard
on its merits; and pursuant to those conferences, which [i2327]
were held direct between General Robins' office and either the Acting
Secretary of Commerce or somebody in his office, Mr. Schofield wired
Los Angeles to ascertain the status of the Rohl case, and I in turn
received word back from General Robins' office that Mr. Schofield had
arranged for the case to be set for trial on September 15, 1941 ; and I
so advised my office and Mr. Rohl.
25. General Frank. Did you get a letter? You are conversant with
this letter that General Kingman signed?
Mr. Martix. That is the letter, a carbon copy of which, as I recall.
General Robins read me, I would say early in September.
26. General Fraxk. The date of the letter is August 28?
Mr. Martin. That is right.
27. General Frax'k. Now, did you get a similar letter from the
Department of Commerce?
Mr. Martix^. No. I talked with the Department of Commerce, and
was told by Solicitor General Trimble and the Acting Secretary of
Commerce, and by Commander Field, that the matter having been
adjusted to their entire satisfaction and the mitigated penalty having
been paid, that they would so advise Mr. Schofield, that so far as they
were concerned there was no reason why the hearing of the Rohl case
should be delayed.
28. General Frank. Do you know whether or not Mr. Schofield was
so advised by them ?
Mr. Martin. Commander Field personally stated to me in his office
at Washington that he had so advised Mr. Schofield.
29. General Frank. How?
]Mr. Martix\ I don't I'ecall for the moment ; but I wrote a letter to
my office at Los Angeles, and a copy of it to Mr. [i2338~\ Rohl,
at Caddoa, in which I outlined those conversations, and that letter
would give accurate information, as I dictated it at that time.
30. General Frank. You do not remember whether they did it by
letter, verbally, by telegram, or how they did it?
Mr. Martin. It was done verbally, I believe.
31. General Frank. Now, when you went to Washington, did you
receive any instructions from Mr. Rohl to start activity on expediting
his citizenship ?
Mr. Martin. No. When I went to Washington — now we are talk-
ing about 1041, Avhen I was there in August ?
32. General Frank. I am talking about events during this very
time. \
Mr. Martin. No.
33. General Frank. Did you ever get a communication or any advice
in any form from Mr. Rohl to expedite his citizenship papers, about
this time?
Mr. Martin. No.
34. General Frank. Namely, in August 1941.
Mr. INIartin. Not to my recollection. I was told by Mr. Rohl when
he gave me the copy of Colonel Wyman's request, that he wanted me
to explain to General Robins that until that was heard on its merits,
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1213
that lie couldn't report. Mr. Rohl was anxious of course to have his
petition heard, and it was beino- delayed by the federal court, by nu-
merous departments in Los Angeles who were investigating the regis-
tration of these vessels.
85. Major Clausen. Mr. Martin, you are a California lawyer, ad-
mitted to ]iractice, for how long?
{2S29'] Mr. Martin. Well. I have been admitted to practice here
since 1924.
36. Major Clausen. With your offices in Los Angeles?
Mr. Maktin. Yes.
37. Major Clausen. Do you recall a conversation that you had with
Mr. Grafe, in Washington, regarding the citizenship status of Mr.
Bohl?
Mr. Maktin. Yes.
38. Major Clausen. Whei-e did that conversation take place?
Mr. Martin. In the Carlton Hotel.
39. Major Clausen. Who was })resent ?
Mr. Martin. Mr. T. E. Connolly. - ^
40. Major Clausen. And when did that occur?
Mr. Martin. On December 18, 1940.
41. Major Clausen. What was said by yourself and these parties?
Mr. Martin. To make the conversation complete, I would have to
go back one day, if you permit me to go to December 17.
42. Major Clai^sen. Surely.
Mr. Martin. I met Mr. Grafe in connection with this Canal Zone
job, and learned from him at that time that he w\as negotiating for
a U. S. E. D. contract in the islands, where he expected to carry on
with the same group that w^ere then constructing Caddoa dam. I had
been attorney for Callahan Com]:)any, I would say, for eight or nine
years, and for the Gunther & Shirley Corporation, about the same
length of time, both of whom were proposed to be parties to this Pacific
island contract; and I knew that INIr. Rohl was not a eitizen. I felt
that while I was not called u}3on to give advice, that I should advise
Mr. Grafe and Mr. Connolly that Mr. Rohl was not a citizen. It
I'JoSO] seemed to me that for him to go outside the continental
United States might cause trouble, and I asked Mr. Connolly and
Mr. Grafe if they would refrain from concluding any negotiations or
signing any contract till I obtained permission to give them certain
factual information.
The following day. I called from W^ashington, D. C and talked to
Mr. Rohl, and asked his permission to tell Mr. Connolly and Mr. Grafe
that he was not a citizen. He gave me that permission; and it is my
I'ccollection that after he had given me that permission, I put Mr.
Connolly on the extension, so that Rohl could tell him direct that he
wanted the two of us to go tell Mr. Grafe that fact. It is my recollec-
tion that call was from my associate's office, Mr. Hermann J. Galloway,
of the firm of King & King, Washington, D. C, and that Mr. Galloway
w-as present at that conference. Mr. Connolly and I then left Mr.
Galloway's office and went over to the Carlton Hotel, which is two or
three blocks from the office of King & King, and I told Mr. Grafe, in
Mv. Connolly's presence, that I had just talked with Mr. Rohl, and
that I then had the ])ermission which I was seeking to tell him that
Rohl was not a citizen. That was in the Carlton Hotel. I can't tell
you, other than it was in Mr, Grafe's room.
1214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
43. Major Clausen. You were aware, were you, Mr. Martin, of the
espionage act at tliat time, w^iich forbade employment of aliens on
defense projects ?
Mr. Martin. In a oeneral way; yes,
44. Major Clausen. And you explained that to these men as being
one of the reasons why you felt that the work should not be under-
taken with Mr. Rohl in the position of an alien and us [£SS1]
president, unless some revelation of that were made?
Mr. Martin. Well, I only discussed this feature with tliem. I said,
''Are you planning to use Mr. Kohl in any connection, for any purpose
in connection with this contract?*' and they stated, "None, whatever,"
that Mr. Grafe would take charge of the work, and that Mr. liohl
would have nothing to do with the work. However, T was not there
to advise with them, nor did I advise with them, in connection with
their negotiations for this contract, nor did I have any information as
to what the contract was, other than that it was for work in the islands
of the Pacific.
45. Major Clausen. I asked you. Mr. Martin, whether, on the oc-
casion of these talks which you had with Mr. Grafe on that subject,
vou explained to him the reason why it was necessary that no alien be
employed on a defense project in the islands.
Mr. Martin. No, I didn't, because I had no information it was a
defense project.
46. Major Clausen. Well, isn't it a fact, though, Mr. Martin, now,
right here in the Board, you telephoned Los Angeles and dictated the
joint- venture agreement ?
Mr. Martin. I telephoned from Mr. Grafe's room and talked to my
brother, and dictated to him, or rather, gave him the instructions over
the phone for the preparation of the power of attorney and a joint-
venture agreement. I did not dictate it in the sense that I formulated
the terms. I simi)ly told him to prepare a joint-venture agreement,
the same as the one then in existence between the same parties on Cad-
doa dam, Avith the same participation.
47. Major Clausen. In simple English, you told your Los
[23Si2] Angeles office to prepare a joint-venture jigreement re-
specting the contract that was being negotiated in Washington at that
time?
]\Ir. ]\Iartin. I don't know whether I talked to my brother, or
whether Mr. Grafe talked to him on the phone; but in any event,
such instructions were given to my brother, Mr. Frank Martin, to
prepare a joint-venture agreement. As to whether I personally covered
it in full, I don't know.
48. Major Clausen. Do you recall having been interviewed by the
House Military Affairs Committee, on February 19, 1944?
Mr. Matrin. Yes.
49. Major Clausen. Present at that time were ^Ir. Heiniaiui J.
Galloway, yourself. H. Kalph Burton, ami Joseph G. Colgan?
Mr. Martin. Yes.
50. Major Clausen. Do you recall having made this statement to the
question :
Mr. Burton. You state that there were a number of supplements dated De-
cember 20, 1940?
Mr. Martin. Yes. I served as attorney for Hawaiian Constructors trom the
very inception of the contract until the completion of the work about a year ago.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1215
By that I mean I personally dictated from Washington to my Los Angeles ofl5ce
the joint-venture agreement.
Did you make that statement ?
Mr. INIartin. Well, in substance that. I gave the instructions for
its preparation. That statement you are reading- from of course is
not a complete statement, that is the stenographer's high lights of a
conference that I had with Mr. Burton.
[JrlSo] 51. Major Clausen. Now, from whom did you receive
the information necessary for the instruction that you conveyed to Los
Angeles with respect to the preparation of this joint-venture agree-
ment ?
Mr. Martin. Mr. Grafe, at that time, and in his room; it was very
brief, to give to me that he wanted a similar agreement to the Caddoa
agreement. I didn't have time to prepare it, and instructed my
brother to prepare it.
52. Major Clausen. You were not the attorney for Mr. Grafe,
were you ?
Mr. Martin. Well, I was, from time to time, when employed; that
is all ; and I am, for any of these clients.
58. Major Clausen. No, I mean on this occasion.
Mr. Martin. I wasn't there representing the Callahan Corpora-
tion in this HaAvaiian contract, but I was there in conference with
Mr. Grafe as attorney for the Callahan Corporation and the Gunther
& Shirley Corporation, on the Canal Zone bid.
54. Major Clausen. I am referring specifically. IMr. Martin, to the
Hawaiian project.
]VIj-. Martin. No, I never became attorney for that, until after
the contract was executed. I never saw the contract nor read it for
many months after it was executed.
55. Major Clausen. Well, isn't it a fact. Mr. Martin, that you got
information concerning this project from Mr. Grafe, Mr. Connolly,
and Colonel Wyman ?
Mr. Martin. No; that is not a fact. I never discussed it with
Colonel Wyman. I never discussed it with Mr. Connolly. The only
information I had was the information that ISIr. Grafe gave me,
that they wanted to form a joint-venture agreement, [2331^]
because they were then negotiating for work on the islands in the
l^acific Ocean.
56. Major Clausen. By the way, at the time you put in this phone
call to Mr. Rohl concerning this matter that you have just testified
about, who was president at that time, of Rohl-Connolly Company?
Mr. Martin. I believe T. E. Connolly was.
57. Major Clausen. A change had been effected prior to this con-
versation: it had been effected on December 16, had it not, at which
time Mr. Rohl stepped down as president, and Mr. Connolly stepped
in?
Mr. Martin. Well. I have no personal, direct information on that
subject, but it is my recollection that I saw at one time a resignation
which Mr. Rohl signed as director, dated December 12, 1940. As to
when it was accepted or acted upon, I don't know.
58. Major Clausen. Well, isn't it true that you prepared the nec-
essary papers to accomplish that change?
1216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Martin. No.
59. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon?
Mr. Martin. No.
HO. Major Clausen. Wlio did that'^
Mr. Martin. I assume it was done by my brother, lint I am not
so positive.
()1. Major Clausen. Who was your brother, Mr. Martin?
Mr. Martin. Mr. Frank L. Martin, Junior, who is associated with
me in the practice of law at Los Angeles. That is merely an as-
sumption.
()-2. Major Clausen. Is he a Los Angeles lawyer, too?
[£S3o] Mr. Martin. Yes.
68. Major Clausen. Now, you also telephoned this brother of yours
on this day that yon telephoned Mr. Rohl, and you told your brother
what you had told Mr. Grafe concerning the fact that Mr. Rohl w^as
an alien, and for him to make a note of it, didn't you ?
Mr. Martin. Well, in sequence, I talked with Mr. Rohl, first. I
then talked w^tli Mr. Connolly and Mr. Grafe at the hotel. I then
called, from Mr. Grafe's room at the hotel, to tell my brother that 1
had informed Mr. Grafe and Mr. Connolly that Mr. Rohl was not a
citizen, and that they desired him to prepare a joint-venture agree-
ment on this work.
64. Major Clausen. Now, you answered some questions to General
Frank, here, concerning the letter from General Kingman to Mr.
Schofield.
I was inviting your attention, Mr. Mai-tin, to this letter from Gen-
eral Kingman to Mr. Schofield, August 2.S, 194:1, a copy of wdiich is
set forth on page 5 of this House Military Affairs Committee report.
You had been trying to get Mr. Rohl naturalized for quite some time,
hadn't you?
Mr. Martin. No.
65. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon?
Mr. Martin. No.
66. Major Clausen. Isn't it true that as early as 1929 you wrote a
letter to Mr. Edward F. Colladay, a lawyer in Washington, and asked
that he help get Mr. Rohl naturalized ?
Mr. Martin. Well, not exactly that. I wrote a letter asking if he
knew of any program by which the fact of Mr. Rohl being married to
an American citizen w^ould obviate the \2336] necessity of him
starting all over again. In substance, he wrote me back that he would
have to start all over again. I so advised Mr. Rohl. and he did not
care to do it, and nothing was done from 1929 until his petition was
later filed, I believe, in March 1941.
67. Major Claisen. Now, in addition to Mr. Colladay, and in addi-
tion to your brother, you had another lawyer in this attempt to get
Mr. Roiil naturalized, or to pave the way — Mr. Cannon ; isn't that
true?
Mr. Martin. No, not in the exact w^ords you stated.
68. General Frank. Let him state it.
Mr. Martin. Mr. Cannon was an attorney friend of my brother in
the same building. I was absent from my office. My brother was ill,
and Mr. Cannon did aid in the preparation of those papers, and, I
believe, appeared as the attorney for Mr. Rohl, on his petition for
citizenship.
PROCEEDIN(JS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1217
69. Major Clausen, Do you recall liavino- seen a letter that Mr.
Cannon Avrote to the Secretary of Commerce concernino; the remission
of the penalties for the false documenting of vessels?
Mr. Martin. I don't recall it at this moment. I do know that those
negotiations were personally handled by me direct wnth the Depart-
ment, in Washington, D. C., in the absence of *Mr. Cannon. Mr.
Cannon had gone there for the purpose of submitting certain data,
prior "to the time that I was in Washingt(m, and took the matter up
direct Avith the Department of Connnerce, but he was not in Washing-
ton at the time that I had the negotiations and settled tliis matter with
the Department of Commerce.
[23J7] 70. Majoi- Clausen. Well, you mean he was not in
Washington, in August 1941, is that youi- statement f
Mr. Martin. No; I think he was there in August 1941. I can't be
positive as to dates, but he was there shortly before the time when I
went to Washington and negotiated a settlement with the Department
of Commei'ce.
71. Major Clausen. And that had to be gotten out of the way be-
fore Mr. Eohl could be naturalized, isn't that true i
Mr. Martin. Only in this way: The De})artment at Los Angeles
had declined to ])lace Mr. Rohl's petition on the calendar for hearing
in federal court until they could make a report one way or the other
on the documentation of these vessels. As it then stood it w^ould be
an adverse report, and after the hearing and determination by the
Department of Commerce, it became a favorable report. In other
words, they directly notified the De|)artment that they did not longer
tlesire the jjetition to be delayed on account of any contemplated steps
by the Dei)aitment of Commerce.
72. Major Clausen. Well, in point of truth, the Los Angeles office
had reconnnended on July 10 — rather, had recommended, that the
AttoT'uey (leneral "issue a warrant for the arrest of this alien, Hans
AVilhelm Rohl, male, native and citizen of Germany, who last entered
the United States at Honolulu, T. H., ex-vacht VEGA on January 21,
1938," stating:
He is unlawfully in the United States, in that —
He is in the United States in violation of tlie Immigration Act * * *.
This is by the inspector in charge of the Los Angeles local office,
Judson F. Shaw. You knew that, didn't you. Mr. [2S38]
Martin?
Mr. Martin. I had no personal knowledge on that. I was advised
by one of my associates in Washington, D. C, Mr. Hermann J. Gallo-
way, that he learned from conference with the deportation officer in
Washington, or the head of the Department, that such a recommenda-
tion had been made by the Los Angeles office, and that a decision had
been rendered by the head of the Department overruling the recom-
mendation, holding it was not a proper case. I only know that from
infoi-mation given me by Mr. Galloway.
73. Major Clausen. Well, that reconnnendation that he not be de-
})orted and not be arrested was based upon the fact that the statute
of limitations had run, now^, wasn't it?
Mr. Martin. I have no information.
74. Major Clausen. So that was, sir, a gratuitous ruling?
Mr. Martin. I had no first-hand information on that, at all.
1218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
75. Major Clausen. Now, I was going to invite your attention,
Ml'. Martin, to a letter that Mr. Cannon addressed to the Secretary of
Commerce and that it contained on pages 8-11 of this FBI report.
1 am going to ask you to read that, if you will, and tell me if you
have seen that before. It is a copy of a letter.
Mr. Martin. Well, I have at this time no recollection of having
seen this letter, or of conveying — I am sure I had no part in its pi'ep-
aration. but I probably have seen a copy of it in the files of my office.
70. Major Clausen. Now, who is this Cannon, this lawyer^
Mr.* Martin. At that time he was an attorney having his [2^39]
(»ffice i nthe same building, the Bank of America building, at 7th
and Spring, Los Angeles, an acquaintance of my brother's, rather
than mine. My brother was ill and so arranged with Mr. Cannon
to help out on a number of different matters.
77. Major Clausen. Now, these questions I am going to ask you
are in the line of certain evidence that has been shown to the Board.
Is Ml-. Cannon a reputable lawyer?
Mr. Martin. Very, to my knowledge.
78. Major Clausen. And do you think that he would put statements
in the letter to which your attention was invited, which were in-
accurate ?
Mr. Martin. Not knowingly; positively !
7*.). Major Clausen. Well, from where did he get the information
for the ])reparation of that letter?
Mr. Martin. Well, I wasn't in Los Angeles. I would assume that
he got this information by direct interview with
80. Major Clausen. Mr. Rohl, eh?
Mr. Martin. With people who had first-hand knowledge of the
facts.
[i2340] 81. Major Clausen. Well, for example, the statements
in there concerning Mr. Eohl ; do you suppose you could get the in-
formation concerning them from Mr. Rohl? Do you know anything
about that, Mr. Martin?
Mr. IMartin. I don't know personally. I had no part in the prep-
aration of this letter, as I recall.
82. Major Clausen. Well, let me ask you this question : I invite your
attention to a portion of this letter :
As early as January 1941 and at numerous times since that date Colonel
Wyman has tendered Mr. Rohl transportation via clipper or boat to the Islands
and has stated to Mr. Rohl over interocean telephone that he will personally
obtain special permission, because of Mr. Rohl's alien status, to allow Mr. Rohl
to work on this secret contract.
Did 3^ou ever have a discussion concering that matter with Mr.
Rohl ?
Mr. Martin. I had a discussion with Mr. Rohl as to whether Colonel
Wyman, as the authorized representative of the head of the depart-
ment, could probably waive that citizenship requirement. I told him
that I thought that probably he could, but that he might be criticized
for going onto a job, by men who were working there who w^ere
citizens.
88. Major Clausen. Well, in other words, Mr. Rohl told you that
Colonel Wyman had stated to him these things over the interocean
telephone?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1219
Mr. Martin. No, he never made any statement of that kind to me.
[234-1] 84. Major Clausen. Now, this letter referring to these
things — just let me ask the question this way: Did you ever have any
discussions concerning this subject matter with Colonel Wyman?
Mr. Martin. No.
85. General Frank. Did you know Colonel AVyman^
Mr. Martin. I had met him on the occasion of the general oi)ening
of bids, as District Engineer in Los Angeles.
86. Major Cl^^^usen. You met him also in Washington in December
1940, didn't you?
Mr. Martin. Well, 1 — yes. A\'ell, he asked me if 1 knew him. I
knew him from that fact. 1 me't him and passed the time of day .with
him for perhaps two minutes in Washington, D. C.
87. Major Clx\usen. Yes.
Mr. Mariin. At no time did I have any conference with him or dis-
cuss business in AVashington, D. C.
88. Major Clausen. Two minutes in W^ashington !'
Mr. Martin. Not to exceed that; just greeting in the hotel.
89. Major Clausen. By the way, Mr. Martin, were you registered at
the Carlton Hotel during that time?
Mr. ]\Iartin. a number of these entries show when I was registered
[indicating]. I don't believe that I was, but I cannot state positively
from the memorandimi before me. It is my recollection that I had a
room engaged at the Roger Smith Hotel in Washington, D. C, by the
month at that time. Usually I do note where I stay, at what hotel, and
in a number of instances I did, and I think I quit making that nota-
tion on [2S43] my worksheet because I engaged a room at the
Roger Smith by the month.
90. Major Clausen. WeJl, all right. Now, it says here in this letter
of Mr. Cannon that Mr. Paul Grafe flew to the United States, was
now in the United States with the knowledge and consent of Colonel
Wyman and in an endeavor to clear the way for Mr. Rohl's going to
the Hawaiian Islands. Do you know anything about that?
Mr. Martin. No. That's the tirst I ever heard that statement, and
for that reason I would now say that I never saw the letter to which
you are referring, if it contains such a statement.
91. Major Clausen. At the time, Mr. Martin, that you had this
conversation in Washington concerning the letter from General King-
man, did you tell anybody in the War Department, any military men,
the information you had received concerning this attempted recom-
mendation toward a deportation of your client?
Mr. Martin. I don't believe that I ever had au}^ first-hand informa-
tion or ever discussed that matter with anyone outside of Mr.
Galloway.
92. Major Clausen. In other words, you were in possession of in-
formation that a reconnnendation had been made by the Los Angeles
inspector in charge that your client be deported, arrested for illegal
entry. You didn't tell that to anybody there when you went and
spoke to them about having this letter sent, referring to the letter on
page 5?
Mr. Martin. I don't believe I spoke to them about having that
letter sent. I don't helieve that letter was [2343] written at
my suggestion or instance at all. I don't believe I had any knowledge
79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 2 28
1220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of that letter being sent until after it had been delivered by Mr. Stil-
phen and I was read a copy by General Robins. Now, I never dis-
cussed with anyone the deportation of Mr. Rohl, nor did I discuss
the fact that the head of the department had overruled that and
rendered a contrary decision.
93. Major Clausen. Well, you say you didn't discuss it. That is
the testimony. You were shown a copy of it, were you not, by Mr.
Stilphen ?
Mr. Maktin. I believe by General Robins.
94. Major Clausen. That was when '^
Mr. Martin. Let's see. The date of that letter is?
95. Major Clausen. August 28, 1941.
Mr. Martin. I would say about six days later, about September 4,
1941.
96. Major Clausen. All right.
Mr. Martin. I could give you that exact date if you
97. Major Clausen. Yes. Have you it there?
Mr. Martin. I don't have it here because I don't have that period
here, but I am quite positive that it was in the month of September
and not in the month of August 1941.
98. Colonel Toulmin. Do you want to make a note to get it?
Mr. Martin. You want to know what date I first learned of the
letter of August 28th?
99. Major Clausen. I want to know the date that you say you saw
a copy of this letter. Who showed it to you? You say General
Robins did?
Mr. Martin. What date did I see letter of August 28th? {23U]
Well, that can stand as September 4, 1941, unless I find differently.
100. General Frank. However, you know that arrangements were
being made by the Corps of Engineers to take steps to expedite action
on his citizenship ?
Mr. Martin. Oh, yes, and by the Department of Commerce also.
101. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. Martin. That is to expedite the setting of the case on the
calendar at Los Angeles.
102. General Frank. Yes. And you knew all this, at the same
time having this other information in the back of your head?
Mr. Martin. What other information do you refer to now?
103. General Frank. State it.
Mr. Martin. You mean as to the recommendation ?
104. Major Clausen. The recommendation of the Los Angeles in-
spector in charge that your client, Hans Wilhelm Rohl, German alien,
was unlawfully in the' United States, not in the possession of an un-
expired immigration visa.
Mr. Martin. Well, the source of information, as I understand it,
was Mr. Schofield's office, the man with whom General Kingman was
conferring, and the man with whom Commander Fields and the Sec-
retary of Commerce were conferring. While it is only second-hand
information with me from Mr. Galloway, it is my understanding
that Mr. Galloway obtained information from the head of the depart-
ment with whom Commander Fields and General Robins were con-
ferring.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1221
105. Major Clausen. Yes. but the General asked you the question
that you had this information in back of your head. [2S4^~\
You knew it when you went there to Washington and had these talks
in August 1941; isn't that correct?
Mr. Martin. I knew from Mr. Galloway's leport to me that he
had learned that the department had received such a reconnnenda-
tion and that the department had overruled it, holding that it was
not a proper case.
106. Major Clausen. Now, did you know that on March 1, 1941,
the district director of. the Los Angeles district, William A. Car-
michael, made a recommendation that information had been received
"which indicates that Mr. Rohl has been falsely representing him-
self as an American citizen for a number of years, and a thorough
investigation will be necessary prior to the final hearing in order
that ap])ropriate i-ecommendation may be made to the Court" i
Mr. Martin. No, I had no such knowledge as that.
107. Major Clausen. Well, now, you were an attorney, as you
stated, for all these different companies; Mr. Rohl. He, Mr. Rohl,
became the directing head of the Hawaiian Constructors on the Ha-
waiian contracts on or about the 26th or 2Tth of September, 1941,
at which time he arrived in Hawaii ; is that correct ?
Mr. Martin. AA'ell, by second-hand information I would say as to
at least a substantial portion of the work that would be true. Mr.
Grafe was the directing head, as I understand it. until January 1942.
I undei'stand that ISIr. Rohl, through some arrangement with Mr.
(xrafe in the Islands, divided the responsibilities from the time that
Mr. Rohl arrived there in the fall of '41.
108. Major Clausen. I believe that is all I have riglit now.
[2346~\ 109. General Grunert. Any questions ^
110. General Russell. Mr. Martin, there isn't anv confusion or
doubt in your mind that after you talked with Rold in Los Angeles in
December of "40 you then went to wdiere this man Paul Grafe was
and told him that Rohl was an alien and that you had Rohl's con-
sent to convey that information to Grafe?
Mr. Martin. None whatever. I made that statement to him in the
])resence of Mr. T. E. Connolly.
111. General Russell. And it is your recollection that Connolly
was on the telephone, on an extension of the same telephone, when
you were talking with Rohl ?
Mr. Martin. That is correct: at District 6196, Washington, D. C.
112. General Russell. When you obtained this information from
Rohl and when you conveyed that information to Grafe, did you think
or would you consider that you were acting as attorney for those two
parties, Rohl and Grafe, during that time ?
Mr. Martin. No, not in connection with that matter. I was at-
torney for the Callahan group on the Canal Zone bid.
113. General Russell. But you were acting more in the capacity
of a friend, and the relation of attorney and client did not exist
either when you were talkin?! to Rohl or when you were conveying
the information to Paul Grafe?
Mr. Martin. Not the relationship of attorney and client, but these —
Mr. Rohl and Mr. — or Mr. Grafe and Mr. Connolly were my personal
1222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
friends, and I felt that I was in possession of certain factual informa-
tion which they were entitled to have but which I was not privileged
to give without Mr. Rohl's consent.
[2347] 114. General Kussell. Yes, I understood that, but I
wanted to clear up this point.
Mr. Martin. No. It was just giving them factual information, not
advising them either legally or as to the matter of policy as to what
they should do.
115. General Russell. Now, Mr. Martin, were you present in the
District Court on the lotli of September, 1941, or on such date in
September '41 as Rohl's application for naturalization was heard hj
the Judge of the District Court ?
Mr. Martin. I was not. It is my recollection I was in the East
trying a lawsuit. I was never present tat the preparation of any
of the Rohl citizenship papers or on any of the hearings or examina-
tions or the Federal Court hearing in Los Angeles.
116. General Russell. Do you know, either by original or primary
or hearsay testimony, whether or not this Kingman letter about which
testimony has been given was presented to and considered by the
District Judge at Los Angeles when he was passing upon this appli-
cation of Rohl in September of '41 to become an American citizen?
Mr. Martin. By second-hand information, it was not. By that I
mean that on the occasion of a trip by Mr. Joseph G. Colgan as an
investigator for the House Military Affairs Committee, a trip to
Los Angeles where he came and stayed approximately five weeks mak-
ing investigations, T was present when he interviewed a number of
superintendents for the job. and other people, and I recall of asking
Mr. Colgan if he had examined the Federal Court files in that citizen-
ship matter. He told me tliat he had, that he had interviewed Judge
J. F. T. [2S48] O'Connor who heard the case, that he had
obtained photostatic copies of tlie calendar and of the reports of the
various departments in that matter, and that he had forwarded them
to Mr. Burton at Washington ; and I discussed with liim a summary
of the evidence that was received at that bearing, from apparently
the — the evidence by the department to be considered by the Court
was reduced to a written summary, and the Government counsel showed
that summary to Mr. Cannon, and with joint consent the summary
was presented to Federal Court wliile Mr. Rohl was on the stand.
I discussed with Mr. Colgan the contents of that summary, and from
that confernece I would say that the General Kingman letter was not
there. Now, that confernece is a comparatively recent conference
with Mr. Colgan, so that my recollection is fresh on that.
117. General Russell. That is all I have.
118. Major Clausen. I have one more : While you say the Kingman
letter may not have been there, the fact is, is it not, that the Court was
informed that the participation of Mr. Rohl in this defense project
was necessary and was being held up until he had been naturalized?
Mr. Martin. I don't believe that is correct, but I have no first-hand
information. If that is a fact, it is my first knowledge on the subject.
119. Major Clausen. I refer to page 5 of the report of the House
Committee on Military Affairs.
120. General Russell. But you haven't straightened out the part
that I thought I made absolutel}^ clear. The point I have attempted to
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1223
develop is whether or not when this man's application for citizenship
was being heard by the District [2J49] Court there was brought
to the attention of the District Court the desire of the Engineering
Department or the Chief of Engineers that the application be granted,
and I do no know of any way it could have been gotten to the attention
of the Court except by this letter or some other tesitmony.
121. Major Clausen. That is on page 5.
122. General Russell. But that does not show that this letter was
before the Court, as I understand it. Our record on that is blank at
this time.
123. Major Clausen. At this moment.
Mr. Martin. I am sorry, I have no infonnation on that.
124. General Guunert. -Is there anything further that you would
like to tell the Board that you think would be not only of interest but
of value to the Board in its attempt to get facts about this case?
Mr. Martin. If I could revert from the status of witness to the status
of former counsel for Hawaiian Constructors and informally state to
you certain things that I tliink might be of interest to this Board, I
would be glad to do so; and if after such a conference you desire to ask
me additional (luestions on the record I will be glad to answer them.
I do have certain understandmgs as to facts which may or may not be
within the knowledge of this Board. It is my desire to be helpful. I
feel that I have been placed in a very embarrassing situation by some
false statements that were made in this report.
For instance, it ])laces me in conference at these negotiations live
specific days in Washington. D. C. I was never present at any negotia-
tions, never advised concerning \2S50^ any. On one of those
days I Avas in continuous conference with — for B. Perini & Sons, Bos-
ton, and their engineers. On another clay I was in continuous confer-
ence as attorney for the Arundel Corporation at Baltimore, with JNlr.
Froelinger, the president of that company, Mr. Warren Black, the vice
president of the company, and Mr. James Sanborn, consulting engineer.
On another of tlie days mentioned I left at 5 : 15 p. m. from Washing-
ton, D. C. on a P. C. A. for Chicago. On one of the days mentioned
I was at the Palmer House in Chicago and worked on the Bates and
Ilogers Blue and Kittatiny tunnel contracts where I i-epresented them.
I left Chicago on one of the days mentioned, by Braniff Lines at
4 : 30 p. m. and flew to Wichita, Kansas. On' one of the days mentioned
I arrived at my mother's home in Hutchinson, Kansas, and had turkey
dinner there.
So that I simply wasn't doing what that report says. If this Board
is interested at all in some way of corroborating my statements, I have
with me cards here that will show for every date between October 18,
1940, and Christmas 1940 the name of the client with whom I was in
conference, and the name of a disinterested witness who was present at
that conference, who can corroborate those duties.
125. General Grunert. Mr. Martin, the ground to be covered by this
Board is limited to the phases that pertain to the attack on Pearl Harbor
and what leads w\) to that. Outside of that the Board is not interested.
Mr. Martin. Of course, I have no personal knowledge on that. The
only suggestion I could make on that was that there \2351'\ was
a written report made by Mr. Joseph G. Colgan, as I understand it,
to the Department of Justice, of some forty typewritten pages cover-
1224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ing his five weeks' investigation of the Hawaiian Constructors while
he was in Los Angeles. It is my understanding that that report —
while I have never seen it, it is my understanding that it w^oukl com-
pletely discredit the so-called House Military Affairs report which
was written, and was written at the instance of the Department of
Justice, by Mr. Colgan after he had ceased to serve as an investigator
for the House Military Affairs Committee. I have no personal knowl-
edge of the contents of that report, but it seems to me it might be help-
ful to this Board to have such a report before it if such a report exists.
126. General Grunert. Have you any questions?
127. JSIajor Clausex. I have a question here, sir. Page 13 of this
report of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is an extract from a
memorandum from your office. Would you read that and see if that
is an extract [handing document to the witness] 'i
Mr. Martiist. I remember of discussing, though I believe it was by
telephone, not with Mr, Kohl personally, the advisability of Mr. Rohl
ceasing to act as an ofticer or director of a corporation who was seeking
to negotiate for Government work.
128. Major Clausex. I just wanted to know if that was an extract
from a memorandum in your files. Do you recognize it as such ?
Mr. Martix. No, I don't recognize it as such, but the facts there
stated I believe to be correct.
[2SSB] 129. Major Clausen. O. K. Now, a member of the
Board has asked that you leave your memorandum from which you
have testified, those notes.
Mr. Martix. No objection to doing that. I am not sure that they
are legible to the average person, but I have no objection to leaving
them, and if the reporter has any difficulty in reading them I will be
glad to help him. I would like for the record to show that they consist
of ten cards in pen and ink memorandum in my own writing. May
they be returned to me, or would you rather
180. Major Clausex. I have no objection at all myself.
131. General Fraxk. Yes, return them to him.
132. Colonel West. Mr. Martin, one final thing: As these proceed-
ings are confidential, it is required that the testimony given and other
proceedings that took place be not revealed outside. Do you fully
understand that ?
Mr. Martix. I didn't understand that, but I do now.
133. Colonel West. We usually caution witnesses just before they
are excused rather than at the beginning, about that point.
Mr. Martix. You mean that I am not to discuss with even people
who are my clients what has occurred at this proceeding?
134. Colonel West. That is correct.
135. General Fraxk. It has already been violated.
Mr. Martix. Well, I knew of no such instruction until
136. Colonel West. No, you didn't. It is only the witnesses who
have appeared. If some witness who had already appeared previously
discussed it with you, you of course didn't know about it.
Mr.^ Mariin. Well, 'the discussion that I had was with [2353]
Mr. Connolly asking me three specific questions, and that is the only
reason I am able to hand you this memo, is that I called my office and
got the data in substance as it appears on these cards.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1225
137. Generiil Gruni:rt. But you understand, what has taken place
here has taken place between yon and the Board and is not to be dis-
cussed with anyone else.
Mr. Martix. Yes, sir.
138. General Grunert. All right. Thank you for coming.
Mr. Martix. Pardon me. ]May I ask, are you still endeavoring
to ascertain from me tlie date when I first saw this letter of August
28th ?
139. Major Clausen. Correct.
JNIr. Martix. If I find it to be a different date from the September
■1, 1941, 1 have given you, I will so advise you.
140. ]\rajor Clausex. "Very well.
Mr. JSIartin. If I find it to be the same, I will not advise you.
141. ]Ma] or Clausen. All right.
142. General Grunert. We shall take a recess for ten minutes.
(The witness was excused.)
(There was a brief informal recess.)
[235Ji-'] TESTIMONY OF J. P. SHIRLEY, 501 BELAIE ROAD, LOS
ANGELES. CALIFORNIA.
(The witness was sworn by the Becorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24. )
1. Colonel West. Will you state to the Board your name and ad-
dress, please. Mr. Shirley?
Mr. Shirley. J. P. Shirley, at 501 Belair Boad in Los Angeles.
2. Colonel West. What is your occupation?
Mr. Shirley. Contractor.
3. General Gruxert. INIr. Shirley, I am going to ask General Frank,
to be assisted by Major Clausen, to lead off in opening up this subject,
and the other members of the Board will ask such questions as they
see fit, as it develops.
INIr. Shirley. Yes, sir.
4. General Fraxk. Mi'. Shii-ley, in 1940 well, wait a minute.
To go back: You are associated witli the (ninther-Shirley Company?
Mr. Shirley. Yes, sir.
5. General Fraxk. As contractors?
Mr. Shirley. That is right.
6. General Frank. In Los Angeles?
Mr. Shirley. That is right.
7. (xeneral Frank. There is a Mr. Gunther in this firm?
Mr. Shirley. Xo. Mr. (huitlier j)assed away in about eight years
ago.
8. General Frank. Who are the officials of the firm ?
Mr. Shirley. I am the president, and our secretary is a young
woman in the office. My son was a vice president, but he went to
work up in Canada, so he resigned when he went \23S5\ to
work on a Government job up there, so I am the only official of the
company now\
9. General Frank. In 1940 you were associated with the Callahan
Company and the Bohl-Connolly Company in a venture in Colorado?
Mr. Shirley. Yes, sir; joint venture at Caddoa.
1226 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
10. General Frank. Then in December 1940 that same group be-
came associated in a Hawaiian contract?
Mr. Shirley. That is right.
11. General Frank. That contract was consummated in Washing-
ton on the 20th of December, 1940?
Mr. Shirley. Yes, sir.
12. General Frank. Who repi-esented you in that?
Mr. Shirley. Mr. Grafe.
13. General Frank. What were the circumstances under which he
represented you?
Mr. Shirley. Well, I think the start of that was that I think that
I remember meeting Colonel Wyman and some contractors in Los
Angeles, I believe Kelton's office, talking about the work in Hawaii,
and he was looking for some contractors to do some work in Hawaii,
about a million dollar contract, and I remember — I don't remember
really the other contractors were there. There were two or three
others. I think Mr. (niy Atkinson was one, and Mr. Rohl, and Mr.
Grafe had previously sent over two men to Hawaii to look at this work
that was contemplated, and they came back, and with not much of a
report, as I recollect it. It is a long time ago.
14. General Frank. Yes?
Mr. Shirley. And I don't remember everything that [2SS6]
happened, but as I remember it their report was very indefinite about
what there was to be done. So then in about, it seems to me, a couple
of weeks after this meeting with Colonel Wyman in Los Angeles Mr.
Grafe was going to Washington about this work, and he was acting
for me too on that.
15. General Frank. Did he have a power of attorney?
Mr. Shirley. I don't remembei- whether he had with him, but he
did have a power of attorney on several other jobs, and I don't know
whether I gave him one then or whether I gave it to him later.
16. General Frank. I see. In any event
Mr. Shirley. But he was acting for our company.
17. General Frank. He did represent the Gunther-Shirley Com-
pany in signing the contract in Washington on the 20th of December?
Mr. Shirley. That's right.
18. General Frank. And the co-adventurers' agreement — that is,
the details of participation was the matter of an agreement drawn up
among yourselves, I take it?
Mr. Shirley. That is right ; yes, sir.
19. General Frank. Wlio drew that up?
Mr. Shirley. I think it was Frank Martin.
20. General Frank. Frank Martin?
Mr.ISii;RLEY. Yes.
21. General Frank. And that was generally along the lines of the
agreement that you had in Colorado?
Mr. Shirley. Just the same, I think.
22. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. Shirley. Same percentage of interest, anv wav.
[£357] 23. General Frank. Were you ever in Honolulu?
!^Ir. Shirley. No,
24. (Teneral Frank. You didn't go to Honolulu?
Mr. Shirley. I did not.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1227
25. General Frank. Who represented you in Honolulu? Mr.
Grafe?
Mr. Shirley. Mr. Grafe ; yes.
26. General Frank. Go ahead.
27. Major Clausen. You had talks in Los Angeles with Colonel
Wyman, did you, in December 1940?
Mr. Shirley. Very shortly, yes.
28. Major Clausen. Where did that take place, Mr. Shirley?
Mr. Shirley. I think it was in the Engineers office in Los Angeles,
Colonel Kelton's office.
29. Major Clausen. Do you remember that there present was Mr.
Rohl?
Mr. Shirley. I think Kohl was there and I think Mr. Atkinson was
there.
30. Major Clausen. And this was a sort of a gathering together of
contractors for the purpose of trying to get
Mr. Shirley. Somebody to do this work.
31. Major Clausen. Yes. What did Colonel Wyman state to you
gentlemen assembled at that time as to the nature and extent and
scope of this work ?
Mr. Shirley. Well, not much about the nature of it, but possibly
it cost around a million dollars, and it might increase. As I remem-
ber, it was liable to increase to more money.
32. Major Clalvsen, Specifically what did he say the work was?
[2368] What kind of work was it to be?
Mr. Shirley. I don't remember whether he described the work or
not. I don't know. I don't think he did, because we were prepared
to do most any kind of work, and really what kind didn't make much
difference, but I don't believe he described the work, and from their —
from my recollection of the report of these two men that Mr. Grafe
sent over, they didn't know much about it when they came back,
either.
33. Major Clausen. Well, did Mr. Grafe have the report down
there? Did you have that report?
Mr. Shirley. No.
34. Major Clausen. When did you get the report?
Mr. Shirley. Well, I just don't remember when they come back,
but I think before this meeting, and I don't think Mr. Grafe was at:
this meeting, as I recollect it.
35. Major Clausen. In other words, you had a report which had
been obtained by these two men that Mr. Grafe sent over?
Mr. Shirley. Yes.
36. Major Clausen. And which report you had received before the
meeting in Los Angeles with Colonel Wyman?
Mr. Shirley. That is right.
37. ]\Iajor Clausen. Well, when you sat around and talked down
there about the possibilities of going into this work, did you mention
this report and have it with you there?
Mr. Shirley. No.
38. ]Maj or Clausen. Did you have the report?
Mr. Shirley. I don't know. I never saw the written report, but
I talked to these men. I knew them. They had worked for us be-
fore, and I knew them both, and I think that [2oo9] their
report is so indefinite, I didn't pay much attention to it.
1228 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBjR ATTACK
39. Major Clattsex. You talked with Mr. Rolil about the work to
be done ?
Mr. Shirley. No. We intended to if we — in my talk to Mr. Grafe
we intended to do this work ourselves if we could get it alone. I didn't
talk to Mr. Grafe— to Mr. Rohl about it.
40. Major Clausex. Well, the Gunther-Shirley Company and the
Callahan Construction Company are in the same building, aren't
they ?
Mr. Shirley. Yes, sir.
41. Major Clausen. And the Rohl-Connolly Companv, where are
they?
Mr. Shirley. Well, they had their office down on a boulevard out
of Los Angeles about four or five miles at that time.
42. Major Clausen. Well, 3'ou knew about the 20th of December,
1940, that the contract had been awarded i'
Mr. Shirley. Yes, I did.
43. Major Clausen. To these three firms?
Mr. Shirley. Yes, I did.
44. Major Clausen. So from that — by the way, you were in Los
Angeles cluring the period, then, sav, from December 1940 to Decem-
ber 1941 ?
Mr. Shirley. Well, was I in Los Angeles all that time, you mean?
45. Major Clausen. Yes. I mean off and on you were there?
Mr. Shirley. Yes, sure.
[2o60] 46. jNIajor Clausen. Did you meet Mr. Rohl at different
times ?
Mr. Shirley. Very seldom.
47. Major Clausen. Well, you were really partners, in a sense, on
this job. What did you discuss with Mr. Rohl in that interim con-
cerning the work?
Mr. Shirley. Well, j^ou mean before we had the contract?
48. Major Clausen. Xo. I mean
Mr. Shirley. After?
49. Major Clal^sen. After the contract and for a period of about
a year thereafter.
Mr. Shirley. Well, ]\Ir. Grafe was more or less in charge of this
work, and really I didn't discuss this — I don't believe I ever dis-
cussed it with Mr. Rohl, this project.
50. Major Clal'Sen. I have no further questions.
51. General Grunert. Is that all vou wanted out of this witness?
52. General Fraxk. That is all.
53. General Grux^ert. Have you any questions? (No response.)
None occurs to me, if that is what you wanted. Thank you very
much.
Mr. Shirley. Any other information I can give you, I would be
very glad to help in any way I can.
54. General Grunert. Thank you very much. I think they have
a program in which to develop their evidence, and whatever they
want from you they apparently got. Thank you very much.
]Mr. Shirley. All right.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon, at 4:40 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of
witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1229
[_^36i] CONTENTS
SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 1944
Testimony of— Page '
Paul J Lynch. 919 Sutter Street, San Francisco. California 2362
Willard Brnce Pine. 320 Carolwood Drive, Los Angeles 24. California— 2375
Rcbei't Eugene McKee, General Contractor, El Paso, and Los Angeles,
California 2398
DOCUMENTS
Letter, March 1, 1943, Robert E. McKee to Hon. R. E. Thomason 2413
' Pages referred to are reiiresented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original transcript of proceedings.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1231
[2362] PEOCEEDINGS BEFOKE THE AEMY PEAEL
HAEBOE BOAED
saturday, september 2, 1944
Presidio of San Francisco, California.
The Board, at 9 : 35 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted
the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen, George Grunert, President of the
Board, presiding.
Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D.
Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.
Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C.
Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr.,
Executive Officer.
TESTIMONY OP PAUL J. LYNCH, 919 SUTTEE STREET, SAN
PEANCISCO, CALIP.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Please state to the Board your name and address.
Mr. Lynch. Paul J. Lynch, 919 Sutter Street, San Francisco.
2. Colonel West. What is your occupation ?
Mr. Lynch. I am an engnieer, civil engineer, consulting engineer.
3. General Grunert. Mr. Lynch, General Frank, assisted by Major
Clausen, will cover this particular part of the investigation. I will
let them go ahead and then the rest of the Board will ask any questions
they see ht.
4. General Frank. Mr. Lynch, on what duty were you in 1941 in
[2363'] Honolulu ?
Mr. Lynch. I was the Area Engineer for the 5th Field Area, under
Colonel Wyman of the United States Engineers.
5. General Frank. What was the area covered by the 5th Field
A.rea i
Mr. Lynch. The 5th Field Area covered approximately the terri-
tory between Kaleiwa and Diamond Head.
6. General Frank. That is right straight across the island ?
Mr. Lynch. Right straight across the island.
7. General Frank. That takes in the whole island ?
Mr. Lynch. That takes in that whole shore from Kaleiwa to Dia-
mond Head.
8. General Frank. From the south to the north, around by way of
Barbers Point to Makapuu Point ?
Mr. Lynch. Diamond Head, Makapuu Point and Bellows Field.
] 232 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
9. General Frank. Kahuku?
Mr. Lynch. Kahuku.
10. General Frank. Down to Kaleiwa ?
Mr. Lynch. That is right. Kaneohe.
11. General Frank. How many Areas do they have there?
Mr. Lynch. That w^as the 5th Field Area. They had — I have for-
gotten— 11 or 15.
12. General Frank. That takes in half of the island ?
_Mr. Lynch. Well, I had that half in 1941. Then she was split up
after the blitz. Kahuku was assigned to another Area.
13. General Frank. What were your duties 'i
Mr. Lynch. Ai-ea Engineer.
14. General Frank. Specifically, what were your duties ?
Mr. Lynch. I was responsible and accountable for all of [2r364\
the construction and material, supplies and ecjuipment, and the pay-
roll in the 5th Field Area, construction of the underground storage,
runwa3^s, ramps, and so forth.
15. General Frank. When did you get there ?
Mr. Lynch. March, 1941. The date I have forgotten.
16. General Frank. There was no permanent aircraft warning site
in your area, was there?
Mr. Lynch. There was no aircraft warning operating prior to De-
cember 7th, to my knowledge.
17. General Frank. That is, permanent ?
Mr. Lynch. Permanent. There may have been one on Diamond
Head, but I did not know of it.
18. General Frank, At least, you did not have the construction of
any such ?
Mr. Lynch. No ; not prior to the 7th.
19. General Frank. At any time?
Mr. Lynch. That is right."
20. General Frank. There was none under construction prior to
the 7th?
Mr. Lynch. No ; that is right.
21. General Frank. Now, let's go over to Bellows Field. There
was a runway being constructed over there?
Mr. Lynch. There was an existing runway there, when I got there,
General, of 2,700 feet.
22. General Frank. That was the one going straight in from the
shore line ?
Mr. Lynch. That is right.
23. General Frank. Was there another one, too, going out to the
northwest?
[£J6S] Mr. Lynch. Not when I got there.
24. General Frank. Towards the bathing beach?
Mr, Lynch. T made a survey there.
25. General Frank. In what state of construction was that on De-
cember 7th?
Mr. Lynch, I had about 2,000 feet completed; that is, with coral
top, ready for the asphalt. I had a plant there. I didn't have it
erected, and there was no asphalt on the field. That is, on the new
runways, Runways A and B.
26. General Frank. What was the total length of that ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1233
Mr. Lynch. Of the existino;, before I got there ?
27. General Frank. No, of the new one, when it was finished.
Mr. Lynch. 0,000 feet.
28. General Frank. Do yon know the state of funds for construc-
tion of that runway when you started?
Mr. Lynch. Only through hearsay. You mean the finances for
Bellows Field?
29. General Frank. Yes. You were starting there on a shoestring,
weren't you ?
Mr. Lynch. Yes, we were. I heard — I don't know this directly —
that we borrowed funds.
30. General Frank, Were you concerned with the construction of
any of the sites for the mobile aircraft warning seryice stations?
Mr. Lynch. No, sir, at no time.
3L General Frank. You know Colonel Wyman?
Mr. Lynch. I knew him, yes.
32. General Frank. What was the nature of your associations with
him?
[£oOG] Mr. Lynch. Personally, do you mean ?
33. General Frank. And oflicially; both.
Mr. Lynch. Personally, Ave had nothing in common. I worked
directly for him in the islands for approximately a year, directly un-
der him. Do you want to know what I think of him as an adminis-
trator and executiye ?
34. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. Lynch. Well, I think he is one of the best.
35. General Frank. As an administrator?
Mr. Lynch. As an executive and as an engineer and getting work
done, I think he is one of the best Army men I ever came across.
30. General Frank. Do you know anything about the organization
of his office?
Mr. Lynch. Nothing. I did not know Colonel Wyman until I
reached Honolulu. I had never met him.
37. General Frank. All you know then is through your contact
with the field organization, outside of his office?
Mr. Lynch. Well, the Colonel and I — I worked directly under him,
and any orders giyen he gave to me.
38. General Frank. Your knowledge of tlie organization was pure-
ly witli the field organization?
Mr. Lynch. That is right, my own setup of the 5th Field Area which
I had and was responsible to him for.
39. General Frank. From your point of view were there any delays
in construction?
Mr. Lynch. Oh, General, on every job I have ever been on there
have always been delays. That is a yery general question I am going
to answer generally. It is on every job. On any military job where
you don't have a chance to make the surveys that [2367] you
should, there is bound to be delay. There were delays in equipment,
delays in getting men, delay in getting organized.
40. General Frank. How long did it take you to get organized?
Mr. Lynch. I would say about three or four months. The cause
of that I would not know.
1234 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
41. General Frank. From your point of view what were the causes
of the outstanding delays?
Mr. Lynch. Lack of money, I would say, to go ahead. Colonel
Wyman always cautioned me to be very careful about every expendi-
ture that I made. He was very conscientious.
42. General Frank. From your point of view, was there any w^aste,
unnecessary waste, manifested anywhere?
Mr. Lynch. Not on my end of it. Unnecessary waste ?
43. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. Lynch. There is waste on every job, and I have been in con-
struction for nearly 40 years.
44. General Frank. In that area can you name me the projects
with which you were charged from Makapuu Point around to
Haleiwa ?
Mr. Lynch. Haleiwa was my field of survey, prior to the blitz.
Then I had Kahuku, Kaneohe Airfield, Bellows Field, Ulupau, and
warning stations on Makapuu, close to Diamond Head, embracing
the airfield principally at Bellows Field, wliich was the one which
was under pressure.
45. General Frank. Did you have a project for constructing any
underground tanks at Bellows?
Mr. Lynch. Yes. I started them and laid them out.
46. General Frank. When ?
Mr. Lynch. I think it was August or September, 1941.
We [2368] had no equipment. I had one compressor and two
jackhammers and I mucked the stuff by hand and hauled it out by
mules.
47. General Frank. Principally because of what ?
Mr. Lynch. Lack of money.
48. General Frank. Lack of money ?
Mr. Lynch. That is my opinion.
49. Major Cla.usen. Mr. Lynch, were these underground gasoline
storage tunnels at Bellows Field ?
Mr. Lynch. One tunnel.
50. Major Clausen. At Bellows Field; was that constructed by
December 7, 1941 ?
Mr. Lynch. No. I had 500 feet on December 7th, approximately,
completed.
51. Major Clausen. Can you give an estimate in percentage as to
the amount that was completed on that date ?
Mr. Lynch. I would say about 40 per cent. I think the tunnel
was 1200 feet.
52. General Frank. What is the diameter of that?
Mr. Lynch. Sixteen feet by sixteen, I would say, approximately.
53. Major Clausen. Do you recall a party named Robert Hoff-
man?
Mr. Lynch. Yes, I do.
54. Major Clausen. What connection did you have with him?
Mr. Lynch. He was the Area Superintendent for the contractor
on Bellow\s Field, Honolulu and Kaneohe, directly under my super-
vision.
55. Major Clausen. Would you give the Board your opinion as to
his business ability and experience?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1235
Mr. Lynch. He was a very good man.
[2369 \ 50. Major Clausen. Did you have occasion to make com-
plaints to Colonel Wyman concerning delays, oral complaints?
Mr. Lynch. Yes, I did, and I got results.
57. Major Clausen. Did you have a controversy with Colonel
Wyman concerning layouts, designs, construction methods?
Mr. Lynch. Yes, I had a controversy w^ith him and we got together
and settled the thing, and that is the last time we had any discussion
on such a matter. We diifered on the method of design and construc-
tion, and we took our hair down, and after that we got along beauti-
fully.
58. Major Clausen. After that was it done in accordance with your
ideas?
Mr. Lynch. Not altogether. I was not altogether right in the
picture. As I say, we got together. There were a number of differ-
ences and Ave did get together,
59. Major Clausen. You left the islands about March, 1942?
Mr. Lynch. The latter part of March.
60. Major Clausen. Then you were employed on the Canol Project
under Colonel Wyman?
Mr. Lynch. Yes.
61. Major Clausen. Do you know of the personal relations which
existed on the Hawaiian Islands between Mr. Hans Wilhelm Rohl and
Colonel Wyman ?
Mr. Lynch. No.
62. Major Ci-ausen. I have no further questions.
63. General Russell. You stated there was nothing in common be-
tween you and Wyman, outside of your official relations. Exactly
what did you mean by that ?
Mr. Lynch. Apparently we did not have the same line of thought.
By personal relations, I mean I would not go out with \2370']
him. I would not want him to sleep with me. He would not want
me to sleep with him.
6-1. General Russell. How do you define those differences?
Mr. Lynch. Well, from a personal view, his background and mine
were altogether different. His methods, say, of pleasure are altogether
different from mine. But I will say this for him, though; he was on
tlie job ; and he knew his stuff.
65. General Russell. Did you think that these personal habits of
his away from his work interfered with his efficiency on his work?
Mr. Lynch. Not with me, absolutely not.
66. General Russell. With anyone?
Mr. Lynch. That I would not know.
67. General Russell. Did you think that his personal habits away
from the job rendered him at any time incapable?
Mr. Lynch. Oh, no.
68. General Russell. In carrying out his work ?
Mr. Lynch. As to my personal feeling that I may have for him,
just my personal slant oil any man, I may like or dislike. There is no
twilight zone with me. But as far as working for him is concerned,
I don't know of a better man I ever worked under.
69. General Russell. His personal habits did not interfere with
his efficiency?
79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 2 29
1236 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR AITACK
Mv. Lynch. Not in my judgment, as far as I was concerned, on
either the Canol or the Hawaiian.
TO. General Grunert. Do you of your personal knowledge know
whether or not any of the delays that occurred were due to the con-
tractors on the job?
[2-37 J] Mr. Lynch. Well, of course, there were delays; no ques-
tion about that. I cannot recall offhand what those delays were, but
there were bound to be delays by the contractors, bound to be delays
by the Engineers. I made mistakes.
71. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not any delays that
did occur were intentional on the part of the contractors or any other
person ?
Mr. Lynch. No, sir.
72. General Grunert. Any other questions?
73. General Frank. What is your opinion?
Mr. Lynch. Oh, yes, there were delays.
74. General Frank. I am talking about the intentional part of it?
Mr. Lynch. No, I don't think there Avas anything intentional. You
mean sabotage or anything of that sort?
75. General Frank. Any kind of a delay that was intentional on the
part of a contractor?
Mr. Lynch. No, I don't think so. I know in my 5th Field Area that
was absolutely none. There could not be. I was responsible. The
contractors could not get away with it.
76. General Frank. Was there any tendency on the part of the
contractor to try to get away with it?
Mr. Lynch. No, sir, absolutely not.
77. General Frank. They gave complete, 100-percent, whole-
hearted cooperation, effort and endeavor?
Mr. Lynch. Well, yes, I would say they did. Hoffman worked
directly for me as a representative of the contractors.
78. General Frank. What made you hesitate?
Mr. Lynch. Your question is pretty technical. You say 100
[2372] percent. There is no cooperation 100 percent. There is
nobody going to work for me and get anything 100 percent. I have
got my ideas and the contractor had his.
79. Genera] Frank. Do you suppose the contractors had a good
spirit of endeavor?
Mr. Lynch. Yes, very much.
80. General Frank. All of them?
Mr. Lynch. All of the contractors, you mean ?
81. General Frank. Yes.
Mr, Lynch. I would have to speak of my own 5th Field Area.
82. General Frank. That is Avhat I mean.
Mr, Lynch. Yes. They would have to. General, or they wouldn't
be on the job.
83. General Frank. You say Hoffman was the contractors'
supervisor?
Mr. Lynch. Superintendent.
84. General Frank, With whom did you work? The Hawaiian
Constructors?
Mr, Lynch, The Hawaiian Constructors, Pie was on the job, I
think, when I made a suggestion to Colonel Wyman, which he ap-
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1237
proved, that instead of havino; a superintendent for the dirt move-
ment and a superintendent for the tunnel, they would throw every-
thing under a general superintendent, so I could hold him responsible.
Wyman thought that was an excellent idea and he put it through.
Hoffman was made the Area Superintendent, and then we branched
out. I will say this : He worked.
85. General Fijank. What was the Army building at Kaneohe?
[237S\ Mr. Lynch. That was the hospital, the insane hospital.
Do you know where that is ?
86. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. Lynch. We took half of that over for the Army and then put
some additions on it.
87. Major Claitsen. You mentioned, in connection with some of
the questions of General Frank, Mr. Hoffman being the contractors'
representative and your having worked with him. Do you have the
approximate dates when Mr, Hoffman was the contractor's Super-
intendent ?
Mr. Lynch. In the 5th Field Area he was the superintendent ap-
proximately from the middle of April until I left in the latter part
of March, the middle of April, 1941, until the latter part of March,
1942,
88. Major Clausen. Prior to the time that Mr. Hoffman assumed
the functions of Superintendent for the contractors had there been
other superintendents whom you had caused to be relieved because of
their inefficiency?
Mr. Lynch. Yes. The Hawaiian Constructors sent out one man
for superintendent and he lasted two days, and they sent out another
man, and I think he stayed one day, Hoffman came out and he stayed
right on,
89. Major Clausen, Now, concerning the delays concerning which
considerable complaints were made, did you have any discussions
as to those delays with Mr. Hoffman?
Mr, Lynch, Oh, yes,
90. Major Clausen. And did he agree with you as to the delays
or did you have differences with him ?
Mr, Lynch, Well, we had differences, no question about it,
[2374] as any one will on a job of that kind, but, generally, I
will say we agreed,
91. Major Clausen, Did Mr. Hoffman complain himself as to these
delays?
Mr. Lynch, Yes, Bob did,
92. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon?
Mr. Lynch. Bob did complain.
93. Major Clausen. Do you know anything of a statement he made
concerning these delays in writing to General Farthing?
Mr, Lynch, No, I do not,
94. Major Clausen, Or to the Inspector General of the Hawaiian
Islands?
Mr. Lynch. No, I do not.
95. Major Clausen, That is all.
96. General Grunert. There appear to be no more questions, Mr.
Lynch. Thank you for coming in.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
1238 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[2S75] TESTIMONY OF WILLARD BRUCE PINE, 320 CAROLWOOD
DRIVE, LOS ANGELES 24, CALIFORNIA.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Will you state to the Board your name and
address?
Mr. Pine. Willard Bruce Pine. My address is 320 Carol wood
Drive, Los Angeles 24.
2. Colonel West. What is your occupation ?
Mr. Pine. Well, at the present time I am in the shirt business, but
for the last four years I have been working for the Tenney Commit-
tee of the State Legislature.
3. General Geunert. Mr. Pine, General Frank, assisted by Major
Clausen, will develop this particular phase of our investigation. So
I shall turn you over to the mercies of General Frank.
Mr. Pine. 'AU right.
4. General Frank. You may proceed, Major Clausen.
5. Major Clausen. Yes.
Mr. Pine, your connection was with the Tenney Committee, the
California State Legislature's joint fact-finding committee on un-
American activities ^
Mr. Pine. That is correct.
6. Major Clausen. And in connection with that would you give the
Board a brief background as to how you became interested in these
activities and just what you have done since you first became inter-
ested ?
Mr. Pine. Well, prior to Pearl Harbor I wanted to get in the Army,
and I found I had a heart condition which prevented [2376]
me, so I knew a great many of the boj^s — not a great mau}^ but a few
agents of the Federal Bureau, and I was anxious to make some con-
nection to do something. So I presume tliat was about the fall of
1941. Then came Pearl Harbor, and right after that in February I
met Jack Tenney, and the budget of the State Committee was rather
limited, and as a consequence I offered my services, and from then un-
til practically the present time I have participated in the investiga-
tions of Mankind United, most of whose leaders, you know, were aft-
erwards arrested and convicted of sedition ; and in the various com-
munist investigations : for instance, now we are actively engaged in
ihe Political Action Committee, that is, their ramifications within the
State. And the Rohl case — I mean, when I say "Rohl case" I mean
the investigation of Rohl — I was very much interested in because I
knew the man and knew something of his background. Then, there
were lots of local investigations besides Mankind LTnited, various re-
ligious organizations who prey upon people in the State.
7. Major Clausen. Mr. Pine, you Avere present, were you, at the
hearing of the California Tenney Committee, which I will refer to as
''the Tenney Committee," on February 27, 1943 i
Mr. Pine. Yes, I was.
8. Major Clausen. And you recall at that time that certain ques-
tions were asked you as to your investigation particularly of the back-
ground of Hans Wilhelm Rohl as disclosed by the files and records of
the office of the Immigration and Naturalization Commissioner in the
Federal Building in Los Angeles, California?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1239
Mr. Pine. Yes.
[2377] 9. Major Clausex. And you were asked at that time, and
it is a fact, isn't it, that you examined those files and those records for
the purpose of ascertaining tlie background of Mr. Rohl ?
Mr. Pine. That is correct.
10. ]\l/ijor Clausen. And on one occasion you also were accom-
panied by the attorney for the Tenney Committee, Mr. R. E. Combs,
chief counsel and investigator?
Mr. Pine. Yes, sir.
11. Major Clausen. Now, in that investigation did you see the ap-
plication of Mr. Rohl for naturalization?
Mr. Pine. Yes, I did.
12. Major Clausen. And did you read the documents in support of
that application, consisting of the interrogation of Mr. Rohl by the
immigration inspector ?
Mr. Pine. Yes.
13. Major Clausen. As a result of that investigation are you able to
say of your own knowledge, from having read those papers, what
those papers disclosed as to the recommendation with respect to
whether citizenship should or should not be granted this party Rohl ?
Mr. Pine. I know that there was an application for a warrant, an
application for the issuance of a warrant of arrest made by Judson
Shore, who was the agent in charge, on the grounds that he was
illegally in this country, and the one premise was the fact of the in-
correct entry in Honolulu on the yacht VEGA in 1938.
14. Major Clausen. And do you remember when it was that you
examined these files and records, over what period of time?
[2S78] Mr. Pine. Well, I probably — that's very hard to say. I
was probably there six or seven times, one e with Combs, twice I think
with an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and probably
two or three times besides that.
15. Major Clausen. Have you read the report of the House Com-
mittee on Military Affairs?
Mr. Pine. Yes. I worked with them, with their investigator con-
stantly while he was out here.
16. Major Clausen. I refer to the committee report dated June 14,
1944.
Mr. Pine. Yes, I have a copy of it.
17. Major Clausen. And do you recall a letter set forth I believe on
page 5 of that report, purportedly sent by General Kingman to
Mr. Schofield of the Immigration and Naturalization Bureau at
Washington?
Mr. Pine. Yes, sir.
18. Major Clausen. Do you remember if the files in Los Angeles had
that letter or a copy of that letter in the files ?
Mr. Pine. I am very positive — very, very positive, having gone
through that file several times, that there was no copy of that letter,
because the first I ever knew of General Kingman's letter wag when I
read the House Military Affairs Committee report.
19. Major Clausen. Now, do you recall in the investigation of these
records at Los Angeles a letter from F. H. Crockett of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service at Laredo, Texas, dated March 7, 1941, to
the effect that he had no record there of Mr. Kohl having gone in or
put of the United States at that point?
1240 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[2379^, Mr. Pine. Yes.
20. Major Clausen. Do you remember a statement by Mr. Wilcox
Cole or some other official of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service to the effect that in 1932 it was absolutely impossible for an
alien to go in or out of the United States at Laredo without being
questioned as to his citizenship status?
IVIr. Pine. Yes, I recall that.
21. Major Clausen. Do you recall a statement in the record at Los
Angeles that when the yacht RAINIONA stopped at Acapulco, Mexico,
where it took on gasoline and supplies, that there was no record of
Rohl being present on the boat either as a passenger or a member of
the crew ?
Mr. Pine. Yes, sir.
22. Major Clausen. Do you remember that?
Mr. Pine. Yes, I remember that very well.
23. Major Clausen. The substance of that being in the file.
Do you remember whether in looking over these records at Los
Angeles there was any letter from Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., in
general urging that Rohl be made a citizen, that the case be expedited '(
Mr. Pine. There was a letter dated, I think it was, January 22nd in
1941, which was an order for Rohl to proceed to the Islands to take
his part in — well, I think I can't quote the letter ; it's right in there —
in the work in which you are interested.
24. Major Clausen. Do you remember the letter in the files there
from T. B. Schumacher of the Immigration and Naturalization Serv-
ice, dated February -1, 1941, asking that the case be [^2380"[
made a special case and that the case be expedited?
Mr. Pine. Yes, I do.
25. Major Clausen. And, by the way, when you examined this file
you took notes, did you, Mr. Pine ?
]Mr. Pine. Yes, we did.
26. Major Clausen. Do you remember a letter dated J^arch 13, 1941,
from some official of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
stating in effect that when the VEGA sailed from the West Coast to
Honolulu, Rohl was not revealed on the passenger manifest as a
member of the crew or a passenger ?
Mr. Pine. No. As I understood it, it sailed from the East Coast
but touched at Nassau in the Bahamas on that trip and in Panama
and then proceeded to Honolulu.
27. Major Clausen. Do you remember that there were statements
to the effect that that manifest showed Mr. Rohl as being born at Tola,
Kansas ?
Mr. Pine. Yes, which is the birth place of his wife.
28. Major Clausen. And do you remember in the income tax re-
turns, mention of which was made in these files at Los Angeles, that
Mr. Rohl had stated under oath that he was a citizen of the United
States?
Mr. Pine. Yes, I do.
29. Major Clausen. And do you remember that some document there
stated that he had set forth in a return that he had been naturalized
in 1921?
Mr. Pine. That is correct.
30. Major Clausen. Mr. Pine, I show you the transcript of the
hearing before the Tenney Committee, and certain purported
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1241
[2381] testimony given by Mr. Rolil, set forth on pages 807, 808,
and 809. as bracketed off by me, and I ask you to read that and then
tell me if you recall that testimony having been given by Mr. Rohl on
that occasion.
Mr. Pine. Did I read particularly this you have marked here?
31. Major Clausen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Pine. Yes, I was there. That is, as I remember it, exactly
what he testified to.
32. Major Clausen. And is that your recollection of the testimony
that he gave on that occasion?
Mr. Pine. Yes, sir.
33. General Frank. There is no error in transcription ? Generally
there is no error in the transcription of the testimony by the
reporters ?
Mr. Pine. No. Can I make a remark off the record ? As a matter
of fact, the explanation he gave his friends outside of that hearing
was exactly the same thing, that he was too busy traveling, never gave
it a thought.
34. Major Claltsen. The particular point of the part I have brack-
eted off was that he, Hans Wilhelm Rohl, had told Colonel Wyman
that he, Hans Rohl, was an alien, and that he had told Colonel Wyman
this before the contract of December 1940 had been signed.
Mr. Pine. Well, as I remember his testimony, when he was ques-
tioned as to whether he had ever told Wyman — that is Colonel
Wyma]i — that he was a German alien, he replied to that by saying
that he hadn't before, but in this contract he had to.
[23S2] 35. Major Clausen. Yes.
Mr. Pine. Because it was a secret contract.
36. General Grunert. He had to, or had told him ?
Mr. Pine. No. He said he had to. I think you will find his answer
was that, "On this contract I had to tell them."
37. General Grunert. He had to tell him, but did he tell him?
38. Major Clausen. It says here — do you want to read that and
see?
39. General Grunert. What does it say there that he did do? A
man may have to do things, but he sometimes won't do them anyway.
Mi\ Pine. "I did on the Hawaiian Constructors." That was
exactly what he testified to, and I know he gave that statement to the
Military Affairs Conunittee, I believe.
40. Major Clausen. Now, concerning that subject, Mr. Pine, is
there any information of your own knowledge that you can give the
Board as to a verification of the fact that he, Rohl, had told Colonel
Wyman that he was an alien before that contract was signed?
Mr. Pine. No. No, not of my own knowledge.
41. Major Clausen. Is there any information that you can give
the Board as to any inethciency of the work of Colonel Wyman in the
Hawaiian Islands?
Mr. Pine. Well, it would all be verbal. Now, I believe you have got
Mr. Combs coming up here.
42. Major Clausen. Mr. who ?
Mr. Pine. Combs, who was the chief investigator for the com-
mittee.
[2383] 43. Major Clausen. Yes, sir.'
1242 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Pine. And he will have all those affidavits. They took a great
many which were not even available at the time of the Military Affairs
Committee hearing, but the only other people who now have them
are the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
44. Major Clausen. I see.
Mr. Pine. And he has them. They are all in affidavit form and
sworn to.
45. General Frank. I would like to ask some questions here.
Mr. Pine. Yes, sir.
46. General Frank. How did the California Committee happen
to be investigating an Army officer's activity in Honolulu?
Mr. Pine. Well, they didji't start to investigate an Army officer's
activity in Honolulu, but they were investigating Hans Wilhelm Rohl
in this State, and through the investigation of Hans Wilhelm Rohl,
whose life was so bound up with Colonel Wyman's since his arrival
here in 1935, why, naturally that came into it, but Wyman came in
incidentally ; I mean the committee had no jurisdiction over him.
47. General Frank. You have been intimately associated with this
committee ?
Mr. Pine. Yes, I have, sir,
48. General Frank. The Tenney Committee?
Mr. Pine. Yes, sir.
49. General Frank. Based on the background of testimony that
has been received by the Tenney Connnittee that you feel to be authen-
tic, will you make a general statement to the Board as to the relations
between "Rohl and Wyman over a i)eriod of years?
[£384] Mr. Pine. Yes, I will be perfectly willing to make a
statement.
50. General Frank. Go ahead.
Mr. Pine. From numerous witnesses whom I have interviewed and
others when I have been present when they were being inter-
viewed
51. General Frank. Was this testimony under oath?
Mr. Pine. Yes. When they were being interviewed by investi-
gators for the Military Affairs Committee of the House of Repre-
sentatives and in some instances by agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and by the statements, some of which were not taken
under oath because at that time they seemed to be superfluous, that ■
52. General Frank. Let's confine this to conclusions reached
through authentic information that is taken under oath.
Mr. Pine. That from the day — or correct that, please. Within a
month or several months after Colonel Wyman's arrival as District
Engineer in Los Angeles, that his association with Hans W. Rohl
socially was certainly an inappropriate one for a District Engineer to
maintain with a contractor, in that their lives, relationships, and
pleasures were so closely welded together
Now, do you want me to — excuse me. Do you want me to go ahead
and explain that, or
53. General Frank. I should like to liave it explained briefly. And
have you knowledge as to who paid for all this entertainment?
Mr. Pine. No, I have not.
54. General Frank. Well, explain it briefly so as to show [2386]
the nature of this entertainment.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1243
Mr. PixE. Well, it goes back Imo; before there was any thought of
Pearl Harbor or anything of that nature. Rolil owned the VEGA,
after of course the RAM( )NA, and we had very many mutual friends
who, every time they were invited aboard the VEGA, would say they
would never go again if Bill was going to have the drunken major on
board. I never knew Wyman's name, never knew who he was at that
time, but I knew him by that name, and Mrs. Rohl had told her friends
that she had to put up with him because of business reasons, and
through the testimony of his servants, members of his crew — and I say
"testimony,'' I mean by that aflidavits taken by the Military Affairs
Committee and statements taken by the Tenney Committee, that they
were very often in residence together at the Biltmore Hotel, that
Wyman was a frequent guest at the Rohl home and a partner in
Bill's night life. .
55. General Frank. Do you think that any reasonable share of the
expenses of this entertainment and pleasure could have l>een paid for
out of the salary of an Army officer of "Wyman's grade?
Mr. Pine. As I understand it, all the suites in the Biltmore Hotel
and everywhere else were taken in the name of Rohl, and I don't see
how it would be humanly possible for an Army officer to have main-
tained the pace that the Colonel seemed to.
Can I speak off the record ? Of course. I have seen all his club bills,
and so forth. I know about what he was spending on alimony and
things of that kind.
56. General Frank. All right. Go ahead.
[2386] 57. Major Clausen. I wonder if you could say, from
your examination of these club bills and other evidences of indebted-
ness, anything further in answer to the question of General Frank as
to whether the Colonel would be living beyond his means as a Major
and have to have independent resources to maintain this pace.
Mr. Pine. That, sir, is very hard to tell. Those club bills are very
deceiving. In some months the Colonel would spend $75, and other
months it would be less than $2, and very often — his first wife ex-
plained it that, well, when they would have these large bills it would
be a group of friends who would go out, and because the Colonel be-
longed to the club, why, their check would possibly be only $10, but it
would reflect a very large amount on the bill. You see what I mean?
In other words, the others would pay him their share in cash. You
see, he belonged to a great number of clubs, but that was deceptive
again because as an Army officer his dues were very small, and many
of them he didn't use very frequently.
58. Major Clausen. Now, what you are referring to, Mr. Pine, are
club bills of clubs to which Colonel Wyman belonged and which bills
were in his name?
Mr. Pine. That is correct, sir.
59. Major Clausen. But what I have in mind are bills that would
be normal bills for expensive parties at the Biltmore Hotel, for
example.
Mr. Pine. Well, they would be all so far as I know — now, I didn't
go through the Biltmore records personally; just one day. But you
would really have to be a millionaire to support the expenditures made
in that hotel— by Mr. Rohl, [£S87] however.
1244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
60. Major Clausen. And specifically also, with respect to the yacht
trips that were taken by Colonel Wyman and the other forms of enter-
tainment to which you have testified, the question is then posed as to
whether, if Colonel Wyman paid his share of all that entertainment,
it could have been done out of a Major's salary.
Mr. Pine. I don't think it could be done out of the President'te
salary, as a matter of fact.
61. Major Clausen. Now, did you in Los Angeles yourself know a
Werner Plack, Mr. Pine ?
Mr. Pine. Yes, I did, quite well.
62. Major Clausen. Did you have occasion to see Hans Wilhelm
Rohl in company with this Werner Plack?
Mr. Pine. Yes, very possibly I saw them together three or four
times, but there was only one incident which stands out in my mind
when I know definitely they were together.
63. Major Clausen. Would you tell that to the Board, please?
Mr. Pine. Well, it was in the summer of 1938. The reason I place
it as 1938 was, a friend of mine who is now dead was out here visiting
me, and we had been to the baseball game. We went over to this place
called the Swing Club in Hollywood, which was at 1710 North Los
Palmas, and I imagine we arrived there — I hesitate to say — probably
around midnight. After we had been there a short time there was a
floor show, small floor show going on, with a chorus, and the orchestra
was playing, and suddenly the master of ceremonies stopped the music
and they swung into a new tune, and all the girls and the two men, as
I remember it, in the floor show all started [2SS8] to sing,
"Here comes Bill, here comes Bill, here comes Bill, here comes Bill
Rohl now."
Well, naturally, knowing — having known Bill, I turned to see who
was coming in, and it was Bill, Werner Plack, and some white-haired
gentleman ; I don't know who he was, have never seen him since.
64. Major Clausen. What was your acquaintance with this Werner
Plack?
Mr. Pine. Werner Plack I met in 19 — this has got to be an approxi-
mate date — about 1935. Werner came over here as a guest of Baron
Von Gunhardt, who then lived on the corner of Roxbury and Lex-
ington in Beverly Hills.
65. General Frank. Just a minute. Spell that for the reporter.
Mr. Pine. V-o-n G-n-n-d or G-u-n-h-a-r-d-t, I guess it was. And
I met Werner many times during that summer. He seemed to he coin-
|)letely anti-Nazi and against Hitler. Shortl}^ after that he returned
to Germany where, from my memory, I believe he remained about one
year. On his return to this country he was a thoroughly indoctrin-
ated admirer of the Nazi government. I saw Werner off and on in
friends' homes and in my own, at various public places around Beverly
Hills, frequently, until his return to Germany — I hesitate — it was be-
fore the Russian invasion. It was previous to June 22, 1940.
66. Major Claisex. Do you know whether that return was
voluntary ?
Mr. Pine. Not of my own knowledge. I know that Harry Flan-
nery of the C. B. S. told me, when he saw Werner in Berlin [2389]
when he got back — you see, Werner during this last two years in this
country spent most of liis time drunk, and for anyone to believe that
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1245
he could possibly be an agent of the German Government seemed
ridiculous. However, Harry W. Flannery, who was then represent-
ing Columbia Broadcasting in Berlin, told me. that from the time
Werner Plack arrived in Berlin a very few days only transpired before
he became an executive of the German Foreign Ollice.
67. Major Claisex. This Baron Von Gunhardt, who was he?
Mr. PixE. Well, there were four — I never knew them very well.
There was Girt Von Gunhardt. They were married to the Anheuser-
Busch family, I believe, or the Anheuser-Busch girl married Von Gun-
hardt, and they lived in Germany, and they moved to this country.
There was one' brother who was in a great deal of trouble with the
Nazi Government over there. The other brothers, as I understand,
were intensely loyal.
68. Major Clausen. I was going to ask you, tirst, if you knew any-
thing about the subsidizing of Werner Plack while in this country by
the German Consul in San Francisco, Fritz Weideman, or the German
Consul in Los Angeles, that doctor, what was his name ?
Mr. Pix^e. Geisman.
69. Major Clausen. Geisman.
Mr. Pix'E. I personally know notliing of that except again by hear-
say, that Dr. Geisling was the one who was instrumental in sending
Werner back to Germany, and from what I understand Werner sold
Dr. Geisling a bill of goods, that is, by that, that he understood the
American temperament and the American psychology, and if he had
a job in the German Foreign Office, [2390] why, he could do
a good job. You see, Werner was the one who was instrumental in
putting P. G. Wodehouse and the Crown Prince on the air.
70. Major Clausex^ In Germany?
Mr. Pix'E. Yes, in Germany when he returned.
71. Major CLAUSEX^ Well, can you tell the Board anything as to
the connection of Wyman with this Hans Wilhelm Rohl relationship
as it is affected by this Werner Plack, in a general way, with leads?
Mr. Pine. I don't think there was any connection whatever between
Colonel Wyman and W^erner Plack. So far as I know, they may
have never met.
72. General Fraxk. You know that Rohl knew Plack?
Mr. Pine. Yes, I know that he was with him that night, and they
were very friendly. That I unhesitatingly can testify t(^, that in
various parties where they w^ere around in the same group I am sure
they nuist have been together, but I wouldn't testify to the fact thev
were, but that night there is no question about it.
73. Major Clausen. I have no further questions.
[2301] 74. General Grunekt. Have j^ou anv questions. General
Russell ?
75. General Russeel. Yes. I would like to see what this is all about.
This Tenney investigation started in 1943, did it not ?
Mr. Pine. No, no; not the investigation. The investigation leally
started wlien we received the amazing neAvs in Beverly Hills that
Rohl had been executed in Hawaii — which turned out of course to be
incoi-rect ; and I'll tell you Avhen that was. That was right after
December 17, 1941, right after Pearl Harbor.
76. General Russell. This Tenney Committee that was set up by
the California legislature exists for the pui"pose of investigating
un-American activities ?
1246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Pine. That is correct.
77. General Russell. That is its function ? Did you begin working
with that committee about the time it came into being?
Mr. Pine. No, I didn't start working w4th that committee until, I
believe it was, January 1942.
78. General Russell. Now, ^^•hen did this man Rohl become the
subject of investigation by that committee ?
Mr. Pine. Well, it was when all the rumors began to circulate very
freely, we began to check into his background.
79. General Russell. Briefly stated, what was the sum and sub-
stance of these rumors wliich prompted this committee to investigate
Rohl?
Mr. Pine. The sum and substance of the first thing that ever came
to my attention was when a gentleman by the name of J. Raymond
Owens gave the Navy his yacht for the duration. That was about a
150-foot yacht. So Ray Owens and L. B. Askins [2S92] went
down to turn the boat over to the Navy. Ray was taking his personal
things off — his liquor off, and taking his crew off. After they returned
from Newport Harbor they called me, as well as almost everybody
else they knew, that night, to tell that Rohl had been executed; Lieu-
tenant Nivers had told them it had been discovered that Rohl had
been receiving money from the German government for years, and
that he had never been an American, and was an alien — the story of
course was incorrect, as it turned out — was an alien at the time of
Pearl Harbor, that he had had access to all the plans, information,
and military installations there; and as a result of this, that he had
been tried and executed for treason. Of course, that news spread
like wild-fire. That was the I7th of December, if my memory serves
me rightly, 1941 ; and so far as we knew for another month — it was at
least six weeks after that — we thoroughly believed that Rohl had been
executed, until several month, until Floy Rolil came back on a clipper,
and she was asked by a mutual friend, and she said no, that Bill had
not only not been executed, but was in full charge of construction work
in the islands.
80. General Russell. I have not found anything yet that set the
Tenney conmiittee on Rohl, or anything that thej^ found out about him ;
and that is what I was trying to find out.
Mr. Pine. Mr. Combs is probably much better qualified than I auL
He is the counsel and the cliief attorne}^ of the coni.mittee, and he has
the entire files. It is pretty hard for me, out of my head.
81. General Russell. Well, is there anything in the investigation
which relates to improper conduct of Rohl in connection [!2J9rJ]
with the construction work out in the Hawaiian Department?
Mr. Pine. Yes; there are in the records now, which is not in tiiat
transcript.
82. General Russell. Evidence to show improper conduct of Rohl,
out in the Hawaiian Department?
Mr. Pine. Oh ! I wish you would qualify that.
83. General Russell. Well, you qualify it in your answer,
Mr. Pine. Why, yes, to this extent : There are affidavits from the
general superintendent of the Hawaiian Constructors that Avhen he
was asked if he had ever seen Mr. Rohl drunk over there, in his
affidavit he replied that he had seen him almost every day and he
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1247
never had seen him when he woukl have called him completely sober.
84. General Russell. That is whose affidavit?
Mr. Pine. The name is King — John King', who for four or five
months was general superintendent of Constructors.
85. General Russell. That was prior to December 7, 1041, or was
it thereafter?
Mr. Pine. Thereafter, because
86. General Frank. We are going to have Mr. King as a witness.
87. General Russell. All right.
Mr. Pine. A man by the name of Wuckheiser, too.
88. General Russell. Mr. Pine, how long had you known this
man Rohl?
Mr. Pine. I would set that about 1932, because I remember asking,
at the time of the change in administration, when Hoover went out
and President Roosevelt came in, whether it would affect his business,
and that is the only reason I say it must have been 1932 or '33.
[2394] 89. General Russell. Had you had social contacts with
him, and had you spoken to him over this period of time? Did he
know who you were?
Mr. Pine. Yes, although I understood that Floy Rohl told a mutual
friend that Bill had said that every time I had ever met him he had
been so drunk he only remembered me once, when I sat on the arms
of his chairs sometimes for two hours at a time. This was long before
the time I had any idea lie was a German alien, for that matter.
90. General Russell. Did vou ever liave any business dealings
with Rohl?
Mr. Pine. None whatever.
91. General Russell. You only came into the investigation by
virtue of your association with this Tenney Committee?
Mr. Pine. That is correct.
92. General Russell. And do you think that they took after him
M'ith this Tenney Committee because they got the report that he had
been executed in Hawaii ?
Mr. Pine. Yes. I know that was the first thing that interested
me, and then when he showed up back here — that is, everything was
all right; and then I believe is the time that Mr. Combs started into
work to find out how he became a citizen at a time like that.
93. General Rltssell. That is all.
94. General Frank. I liave nothing.
95. General Grunert. I have one or two questions. From your
association with the Tenney Committee, and what you know of your
own accord, do you know of anything un-American that Wyman has
ever done?
[2S95] Mr. Pine. That Wyman has ever done ? Well, of course,
that depends upon your interpretation of "un-American." If you
mean in regard to anything subversive — no.
96. General Grunert. Is it un-American to get drunk, if he got
drunk ?
Mr. Pine. No.
97. General Grunert. Is it un-American to carouse, if he did
carouse ?
Mr. Pine. No.
1248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
98. General Grunert. Mr. Pine, this Board is limited in the scope of
its investigation, to such phases as may bear directly or indirectly on
tl)e attack on Pearl Harbor.
Mr. PixE. I understand.
99. General Grunert. We are not investigating everything or
carrying everything througli to conclusions because of leads received
in attempting to accomplish our objective. I explain that to most all
of the witnesses that have been connected with former investigations,
because I do not want anybody to understand that tliis Board will
exhaustively go into phases that are not connected with what we have
been charged with doing; and that, of course, is what led up to Pearl
Harbor, and what happened at Pearl Harbor.
Mr. Pine. May I ask if you have Rohl's nurse under subpoena,
Madeline Ferguson ?
100. Major Clausen. No.
101. General Grunert. I think we have testimony, haven't we, such
as she gave?
102. Major Clausen. No, sir ; we do not have, here.
Mr. Pine. Madeline Ferguson was a trained nurse who [2396]
endeavored to enter the Army, and she had sinus trouble, I believe, so
she was rejected. However, the American Red Cross accepted her
services and sent hei- to the islands, and shortly after her arrival there,
I have forgotten the date on that, she had Rohl as a case, and her
affidavit of course Mr. Combs has ; but if she speaks the truth, it reveals
beyond question that Rohl feared something of which I know nothing
about; that is, that when he returned here to the coast she still
attended him, at the Palace Hotel. The first thing that "Jim" Gwynn
and — well, it was Tom Connolly's brother — I don't know — were in the
insurance business; that when he moved into the suite, he used to go
behind every picture, beds, and so forth; and when they had to move
to another suite, they were positive that the place had been wired and
that's why they had moved them; but they accused her, in front of
Rohl, of being actively Avorking for the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, planted next to him by them, and that that was the first time, that
she had attended him at Honolulu for months, and she continued to
attend him at various times, in the Biltmore Hotel and the Palace
Hotel ; that she knew there wasn't anything wrong outside of his
drinking. She didn't go to the Fedei-al Bureau of Investigation at
that time, because she thought it was such a silly story ; but that he
lived in constant dread, and particularly, that "Jim" Gwynn and "Pat"
Connolly were more worried than Rohl.
103. General Grunert. Had any of these j^ersons that you have
mentioned ever been in politics here in California ?
Mr. Pine. Who do you mean ?
104. General Grunert. There was nothing political about this
[2.397] Tenney Committee, was there?
Mr. Pine. None whatever. "Jack" Tenney had never heard of
"Bill" Rohl or known him, so far as I know.
105. General Grunert. Do you know whether Colonel Wyman, or
Major Wyman at that time, dabbled in politics at all?
Mr. Pine. I have never heard such a thing.
106. General Grunert. Now, knowing what I might call our limita-
tion on our field of investigation, can you think of anything else that
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1249
you might add that might help the Board or assist the Board in its
mission to get at the facts on those phases that pertain directly to
the Pearl Harbor attack?
Mr. Pine. Well, you probably have access to wherever she is, Ger-
trude Campbell, who is now Mrs. Brunner.
107. General Grunert. She has already been a witness.
Mr. Pine. She has? Well, then, there is a Mrs. Cooper, I believe.
108. Major Clausen. We did not call Mrs. Cooper.
Mr. Pine. That's entirely hearsay on my part, from men who were
there.
109. Major Clausen. If you think Mrs. Cooper should be called,
could you give us
Mr. Pine. I don't think so. I am just trying. Was she the lady
who was with him in Honolulu, and then with him up in Edmonton?
110. Major Clausen. I think so. There is some statement to that
effect in the affidavit of a Ferman K. Pickering.
Mr. Pine. Pickering?
111. Major Clausen. Some things have been beyond the scope of
the Board's activities.
[2398] Mr. Pine. You see, a lot of this is confused in my mind
from what I knew of the Alcan Highway investigation. I think I was
thinking of her in that connection.
112. Major Clausen. Do you think Mr. Combs will have an affi-
davit from this Madeline Ferguson which would bear on this point
that you mentioned this morning?
Mr. Pine. Yes ; he will have, as I recall it, two long affidavits from
her, sworn to.
113. General Grunert. Then you can cover that.
114. Major Clausen. All right. And would he also have any
pertinent leads, which would limit it to our mission ?
Mr. Pine. You will have the complete file.
115. Major Clausen. Or do you have anything in addition to what
he might have?
Mr. Pine. No. I have nothing. He has everything — the entire file.
116. General Grunert. That appears to cover about all we can get
from this witness. We thank you for coming over here today.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Brief recess.)
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT EUGENE McKEE, GENERAL CONTRACTOR,
EL PASO, TEXAS, AND LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Will you state to the Board your full name and
address.
Mr. IMcKee. Robert Eugene McKee, and my address is El Paso,
Texas, and also, Los Angeles.
2. Colonel West. And what is your occupation, Mr. McKee?
\2399] Mr. McKee. I am a general contractor.
3. (jeneral Grunert. Mr. McKee, this Board is particularly inter-
ested in facts bearing on what happened prior to Pearl Harbor and
during the attack, and any phases that bear on that story. That in-
1250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
eludes an investigation of what happened in the construction line prior
to Pearl Harbor. Now, the field that we cover is so broad that we have
parceled out some of these special subjects to members of the Board,
and your friend, General Frank, has that particular specialty, and he
will be assisted by Major Clausen; so I will ask General Frank to lead
in asking the questions.
4. General Frank. Mr. McKee, will you state generally the scope
of your operations, to show the size of your hrm.
Mr. McKee. Well, we are working, we have offices today in Pan-
ama; Dallas, Texas; Santa Fe, New Mexico; Odgen, Utah- and
Los Angeles, California, and we have considerable work for the Navy,
the Army, the Veterans' Administration, and the Ordnance Depart-
ment, I think the Santa Fe job is used ; as well as for the various rail-
roads. We do a good deal of work for them. We had an office out
in Honolulu, as you know, up to the time — well, till about six months
after Pearl Harbor. We were there about five or six years.
5. General Frank. In 1941, on what work in Honolulu was your
tirm engaged ?
Mr. McKee. We were working at Hickam Field, Schofield Bar-
racks, and Fort Shaffer; and I am not sure whether we were still
working at Pearl Harbor. I don't think we were at Pearl Harbor.
It might have been, the early part of 1941.
6. General Frank. In the early part of 1941, what as you [!2400~\
remember was about the estimated amount of your contracts?
Mr. McKee. Everywhere ?
7. General Frank. In Hawaii.
Mr. McKee. Well, I would say we must have had several millions
of dollars worth of work.
8. General Frank. Several? Five? Ten?
Mr. McKee. Well, I would say somewhere around from three to
four million. That is in Pearl Harbor alone. I mean, in Honolulu,
alone.
9. General Frank. In Honolulu alone ?
Mr. McKee. Yes. That is just from recollection.
10. General Frank. Now, did you know Colonel Wyman ?
Mr. McKee. I never met him. I had had correspondence and con-
versation with him over the long-distance phone.
11. General Frank. What was the nature of that?
Mr. McKee. Well, the first — when he first came over to Honolulu,
as district engineer, the first contacts I had with him was in connection
with a building at Wheeler Field. We built a- large barracks at
Wheeler Field, a^-d on the roof, without going into too much details,
constructions and materials, user for insulating material, Vermiculite,
and on top of that, put a rooting paper. The Vermiculite unfortunately
holds moisture, and it formed bubbles of air or moisture underneath
the roofing, and it raised up into blisters; and this occurred after we
were through with the building. We hadn't yet received our final
payment ; and about that time I think Colonel Wyman came over, and
we were trying to get him to accept the building ; our contention being,
and which I believe we were afterwards verified as being correct in,
that we had put on the [i3401] materials, as specified, and it
wasn't our difficulties, to get our final payment. Well, Colonel Wyman
brought up this question of these blisters on the roof, and he wanted
PKOCEEDINGS OF AKMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1251
US to put up a cash bond — the money. I offered to put up — we already
had a bond on the job, and the roofer, the Peerless Roofincr Company,
who did the work for us in Honolulu. We wore willing to make good
(he guarautce, in case the roof went bad. That occurs frequently in
Honolulu on account of the moistur(>; not enough interval between
rainfalls to let a roof out there dry up thoroughly; and he wouldn't
accept anything, he said, except cash. AVell, we offered to give him
Government bonds, and first one thing and another — anything else,
but we didn't want to give him the money, because I thought it was
difficult to impound cash ; so we had quite a little correspondence about
that matter, and finally, through efforts of — in Washington, we had
tliem agree to accept some form of Government bonds, and the matter
was closed, and we put up the bonds. I don't know where they were
deposited ; but as soon as Colonel Wyman left, why, they returned the
bonds to us ; and that was our first instance of having, you know, really
from myself coming in contact, although our office had other contacts
v\ith him.
12. General Frank. Who was supervising your work in Honolulu?
Mr. McKee. Well, there was originally Mr. Jones, and we liad a
Mr. Hardie, and Mr. Stoker, and Mr. Wylie.
13. General Frank. Who was heading up the organization for you?
Mr. INIcKee. Well, originally, Mr. Jones, and then he left to come
back, and then Mr. Wylie, and Mr. Stoker looked after the office, and
Mr. Hardie, on the outside ; and of course we had a lot of other men,
there, you know — Mr. Clark, and Mr. [2^03] Hatchel was over
there, and quite a few others.
14. General Frank. Now, do you remember when the Hawaiian
Constructors came into being?
Mr. McKee. Well, yes; to some extent. We had been doing con-
siderable work there, and I think the Hawaiian Constructors first
started to build some temporary quarters near Hickam Field, as well
as I recollect it. We had been in association with another — on other
work, under, I think it was Major Harold, for some various work. I
think it was a hospital, Tripler hospital, with about six or seven other
Honolulu contractors; and, as I say, al3out this time, I think, when
Colonel Wyman came over, why, with Rohl-Connolly and the Callahan
concerns, came over. We had figured some air fields on the various
islands; sometimes, some of the other local contractors, there; and
although we thought that we, and some others, were entitled to the
business, why, we dicbi't get it, they gave it to, I think, Callahan, or
Rohl-Connolly, I don't know which ; and then as I say, about that time
they formed this, what I understood was Hawaiian Constructors —
wasn't that the name?
15. General F'rank. Yes ; that is right.
Mr. McKee. I don't know just exactly who were the parties to it.
I think Mr. Woolley w^as in on it, as well as Rohl-Connolly.
16. General Frank. Gunther & Shirley ?
Mr. McKee. Yes ; some other concern. .
17. General Frank. And the Callahan Company?
Mr. McKee. Callahan.
18. General Frank. Were you approached to come in on this or-
ganization?
79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 2—30
1252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. McKee. Not originally, not when they first came over,
[^^6>J] not until after Pearl Harbor.
19. (leneral Frx\nk. Did you have a plinit and a constructing or-
ganization in Honohdu at the time^
Mr. McKee. Yes, we had probably the largest organization over
there, I guess, at the time.
20. General Frank. Do you know why you were not approached to
become a part of this organization, with the largest construction or-
ganization in the islands at the time?
Mr. McKee. Well, only from what w^as hearsay, and that is that
these men w^ere friends of Colonel Wyman, and followed him around
from various jobs that he had had in the past, that's all. I understood
they were more or less favorites of his, Connolly and ourselves, but
I don't think very few other contractors really had very much
opportunity.
21. General Frank. Who were the others who had no opportunity?
Mr. McKee. Well, I think, as I say — Mr. Black was one, and there
were quite a feAv others, I don't remember all the names of the fellows
over there, now; and although I think the Hawaiian contractors —
do you remember the Hawaiian contractors? They went in on it,
didn't they, finally?
22. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. McKee. They were not very happy about it, so they told us,
and as I say, we were never approached, and I understood the same
thing applied to most all of the other contractors. I don't remember
all the names right now, and we discussed it more or less informally.
23. General Frank. Do you know why you were not approached?
Mr. McKee. No, I don't know the reason, I suppose, except that per-
haps they wanted someone else.
1^404] 24, General Frank. Were you ever approached?
Mr. McKee. After Pearl Harbor, after the bombing of Pearl Har-
bor, why, we were approached by Colonel Wyman, and he insisted
that we go in with the Hawaiian Constructors. Of course, I don't
know whether you know it or not, but they kinda call me "the lone
wolf," I don't usually go in on any combination of any kind, and I
have always been opposed more or less to these joint ventures. I feel
that greater efficiency and success can be gained and more respon-
sibility by sending, in one place, and I was somewhat afraid that these
joint ventures were leading to too much profit on some of the jobs.
Frankly, I didn't think it would stand up, and the original — after
the bombing, as I remember it now, after Pearl Harbor, he notified
our organization that we would have to go in with the Hawaiian Con-
structors, as a subcontractor, or go out of business; and they wired
me and phoned me, and I believe I wrote them and wired them back,
whichever was available at that time, that I was opposed to going in
with the Hawaiian Constructors on these general principles, that I
was willing to do any work that the Army wanted me to do and I
would be glad to do it without any fee whatever, and they could have
our entire organization; and as I said, then, the amount of money
involved, so far as I was concerned, it didn't make any difference. I
didn't care whether we made anything at all or not. That didn't
seem to satisfy him, and I think he called me over the long-distance
telephone when I was in Los Angeles, and he talked to me and told
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1253
me that if I didn't — so that was my impression, anyhow, in words;
I don't know the exact words he used — that if I didn't go in with Rohl-
Connolly, that he would drive us out of [£405] business as
far as the Hawaiian Islands were concerned. "Well," I told him,
"Colonel, I guess if that is the way you feel about it, I guess you will
have to do it." And I also impressed on him, and I also notified
Wyman, that as far as I was concerned, they could have our entire
organization, and we would do any repair work or any work that
they wanted, and without any fee whatever, if they so desired, and
we did finally, after quite an excange of telegrams and letters and
protests to Washington, why, we finally did take over the repairs on
some buildings, and I think we were there about six months at Pearl
Harbor, and we finally sold out to the engineers our equipment.
We had quite a few unfinished jobs, and of course what I was more
concerned about was the fact that we wanted to get finished our own
jobs, and he wanted us to throw those into Hawaiian Constructors
and finish them as subcontractors o(f Ha,waiian Constructors. I
thought that we were more familiar with it, and I believe that the
facts are that we were, and probably had a little more efficient
organization especially for finishing those contracts than they could
possibly have had with the Hawaiian Constructors; so I refused to
go in as a subcontractor, and finally we did finish all the contracts
we had, except two, which were stopped, and as far as we were con-
cerned, were not completed. That was true I think of Fort Shafter
Barracks, I am not sure — two contracts — and we settled up those
contracts satisfactorily, apparently, to them and ourselves.
After a period of time, that part was settled. Then we went
ahead and did considerable repair work. They used our [2406]
equipment and our materials, and various other things, and after
a long period of time, why, they finally, when it was finished, they
paid us for it, and paid us a small fee, although we didn't request it.
[i^407] 25. General Frank. Were you ever given an opportu-
nity to come into the Hawaiian Constructors on the same level as
Gunther-Shirley and Rohl-Connolly?
Mr. McKee. Not as I recollect, no. They wanted us to work as
sub-contractors, the way I understood it.
26. General Frank. Did you have any opportunity to know any-
thing about the type of organization under which the Hawaiian Con-
structors operated ?
Mr. McKee. Well, very little. We had contact with some of the
men. Then I had contact indirectly through my own men with some
of their organization.
27. General Frank. What was the general reputation of that organ-
ization ?
Mr. McKee. I would be probably vain if I told you what the gen-
eral impression was. Their engineers told us we were the only ones
for a while that did any work over there after Pearl Harbor, but
apparently the organization wasn't very efficient. I am not — that's
about tlie general understanding, that they were not operating a very
efficient organization, which is usually the case with too many cooks
in the broth.
28. General Frank. Mr. McKee, do you know of any instances of
unnecessary delay that occurred. in construction of any projects over
there?
1254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. McKee, Well, I don't know of any specific instances without
going into it pretty thoroughly. Some of our men — because I
wasn't there, but it was the general understanding that the jobs that
they had were not going ahead ; now, for what reason, I don't know.
A lot of jobs that we figured on, I know, that were supposed to be
completed in a certain length of time, [2408'\ many times
weren't even started for months and months after the contracts were
let. Why that was, I don't know. But, as I say, the general im-
pression in the islands was that they were delayed; I don't know why.
29. General Frank. Dou you know^ of any instances — did you hear
of any instances — where there was any deliberate delay ?
Mr. McKee. No, I couldn't say that I know of any deliberate delays.
30. General Frank. Have yo'u any information or any knowledge
of anything that happened among the contractors or between the con-
tractors and Colonel Wyman that may have contributed to delays?
Mr. McKee. What do you exactly mean by that, General?
31. General Frank. Well, what I am trying to do is to give you an
opportunity to state to the Board anything that you may have in the
back of your head on the conditions tliat existed over there.
Mr. McKee. Well, the only thing I would say in some of our in-
stances, without going into other peo])les' field which I am not familiar
with — shouldn't be — ^but from the reports of Mr. Wylie and Mr. Stoker
and others
32. General F'rank. Who were your representatives?
Mr. McKee. Yes. That many times Colonel Wyman was not in a
fit conditions to attend to business. We had lots of times where we
couldn't get decisions for reasons which we thought were: w^asn't in a
condition to attend to business. That was the whole thing.
32. Genera] Frank. That was because of his lack of sobriety ?
Mr. McKee. Well, apparently, yes. I have had one report
[£409] where we had some papers to be signed where he told me
that he wasn't — couldn't sign his name at that time. I don't know
how far that went.
34. General Frank. Who gave you that information? Your own
representatives ?
Mr. McKee. One of our own men, yes. We had a conference up
there and supposed to have it agreed, and at that time he was unable
to continue for some reason or another. I wouldn't say that he was —
how intoxicated, or anything, he was, because I don't know.
35. General Frank. Was this before Pearl Harbor?
Mr. McKee. That was before Pearl Harbor.
36. General Frank. Who was your representative at that time?
Mr. McKee. Well, I say, we had my son over there, John McKee, and
Mr. Wylie and Mr. Stoker. We had quite an organization. John
Clark, Mr. Hardie, Mr. Jones, and
37. General Frank. Who would know directly about this ?
Mr. McKee. Well, I think probably Mr. Hardie and Mr. Wylie.
Mr. Hardy is down at San Bernardino now.
38. General Grunert. Did the lack of that signature at that par-
ticular time actually result in delaying any phase of work then going
on, or just was it an administrative delay?
Mr. McKjee. Well, I really couldn't say, but we had had — 1 was just
using that as an instance, but we had had difficulty in getting decisions
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1255
in order that our work jM-ocoed. That was one of the things that we
were, of course, interested in. I wasn't so much interested in his habits
as I was in getting my job done, because we had times when there was
great difficulty in getting decisions for a while there. That was the
only thing [24-10] that apparently, as far as I am concerned —
understand, I have never met Colonel Wyman personally. I wouldn't
know him if I saw him.
39. General Frank. Do von know anything about the association of
Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl ?
Mr. McKee. Only what 1 had heard from previous talks with other
members of the Engineering Department of the government, and just
general, you might say — 1 wouldn't say whether it was rumors or gen-
eral understanding of all the contractors and the professional people
regarding his past associatioils.
40. General Frank. What was that?
Mr. McKee. That he was very close to Mr. Eohl, especially, and
\ ery intimate with him in many ways, and apparently it was hard for
anybody else to get along with him, even officers antl the people who
worked with him, and such, and also any contractors or anyone.
41. General Frank. Do you feel that that rebounded to the disad-
vantage of the government?
Mr. McKee. Well, I should say so, yes. I think an officer in charge
of work should not be bound too closely with anyone with whom he
does business ; I would say not only an officer but even my ow^n men.
I won't permit them, for instance, to be with them or get too intimate
material men or sub-contractors. I want them to pay their oAvn way.
I don't want them to be obligated. I think the same thing applies to
a good officer. I think he should be free to make a decision without
any bias to it, feeling. Of course, he can't be if — of course, under-
stand, I read this report which was sent to me of some congressional
board, I guess. A copy was sent to me here about two L^-^-?-^]
months ago. I didn't know about all of those things that were men-
tioned in there, but I have heard generally that he was a man of ex-
cessive habits and hard to get along with and was very friendly to
especially Rohl-Connolly and Callahan.
42. General Frank. Can the statements that you just made cover
his reputation among the contracting fraternity ?
Mr. McKee. Fraternity, yes.
43. General Frank. But so far as you know there was no detriment
rebounded to the govermnent because of that association?
Mr. McKee. Well, I would say I don't — it's awfully hard to say
anything, specific thing, but I don't think there is any question about
its rebounding to the detriment of the government. I don't think there
is any question about that. How detrimental, well, that's a matter of
comparison.
44. General Frank. Just because that kind of an association is not
healthy ?
Mr. McKee. Yes, and then, it costs the government money. I don't
think there is any question about that. I know it cost the government
money.
45. General Frank. Will you expand on that a little bit?
Mr. McKee. Well, for instance, as I say, we figured some of the air-
fields on the various islands just about the time before Pearl Harbor.
1256 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
They could have taken in several reputable contractors and given the
work to and had — and actually saved money under the bid that they
gave it to Callahan, for instance, and who are very good men. They
were
46. General Frank. Who were they?
Mr. McKee. I am just trying to think. We were low on one
[24^^] or two projects, and several other contractors involved I
don't remember now. It is a matter of record. I could find out. I
haven't it with me. But they were all good men. They were all men,
I mean, that you would know in Honolulu.
47. General Frank. And do you feel that the work would have been
finished as rapidly as it was finished under the contract on which it
was done?
Mr. McKee. You mean that specific contract ?
48. General Frank. Yes, those fields.
Mr. McKee. Well, it probably has developed. I don't think — I
don't know that they have ever finished the jobs yet, unless the Army
finished them. In fact, they didn't even get started on them. I think
they would have been farther along. I don't know whether they would
have been finished, or not, but I think they would have been farther
along, from what reports I had. I don't know whether they would
have finished them, because I think Pearl Harbor came in the interval
there, and I am not sure whether the government finished them, or
not, exactly. Fortunately it was a good thing for us. It could have
been very expensive, and with the conditions like they were, but we
would have done our best to get it done anyhow.
49. General Frank. These firms that bid on them and didn't get
them had the organization and the plant and equipment with which
to do the job?
Mr. McKee. Yes, I am quite sure they did.
60. General Frank. Including your own organization?
Mr. McKee. We had arranged for ours or we wouldn't have figured
the job, of course, because it was
51. General Frank. Have you anything?
[i^pS] 52. Major Clausen. Yes. I would like to ask Mr. McKee,
for the record, concerning a letter that he wrote which I think should
go in this record, to the Honorable R. E. Thomason, on March 1, 1943.
Do you recall writing a letter to Congressman Thomason?
Mr. McKee. I don't remember, unless — I wrote a lot of letters.
53. Major Clausen. I will read it:
(Letter of March 1, 1943, Robert E. McKee to Honorable R. E.
Thomason, is as follows:)
Dear Congressman Thomason : You no doubt will recollect ( if not you can look
up your files) that the writer had quite a controversy with the District Engineer's
Office in Hawaii, right after "Pearl Harbor" in connection with the desire of
Colonel Wyman to have the writer become a part of the Hawaiian Constructors,
which was headed by Hans Wilhelm Rohl, of Rohl-ConnoUy Company of Los
Angeles.
I am enclosing herein a newspaper clipping from the El Paso Times, regarding
an investigation of Hans Wilhelm Rohl and his connection with Colonel Theodore
Wyman. I am sending this to you as I believe this now, without doubt, justifies
the position that I took at the time of the controversy, and no doubt they would
have been far better off to have had us, or someone else, do the work, but we are
probably better off to have had it end as it did. Nevertheless, from what I have
heard, a further investigation of Colonel Wyman would not be amiss, and it seems
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1257
to rae that the Army should follow this matter up. Such men [2//J4] as
Chester Clark In Honolulu and others seem to be well posted regarding certain
matters connected with Rohl and Colonel Wyman. How in the world anyone
like Colonel Wyman could ever receive the Distinguished Service Cross I can't
understand. Please note that portion of Mrs. Rohl's testimony wherein she said
that they "tolei-ated Wyman only because of business." The general rumors are
that he was inebriated most of the time.
All of this is for your infm-mation and for the good of the government. As far
as the writer is concerned, it is a dead issue, but I do question the advisability
of having a man like Colonel Wyman the head of anything.
Very truly yours,
Robert E. McKee,
General Contraetor.
Do you recall that letter ?
]Mr/]\IcKEE. Yes, I do.
54. Maor Clausen. That is all I have.
55. General Ivussele. You testified that you didn't think that this
plan of havino- a number of contractors associated together, as the
Hawaiian Constructors were, was a good plan : and as I remen:iber your
evidence, you said something in immediate connection therewith about
profits, and I did not get tlie import of that.
Mr. McKee. Well, the general trend of the so-called joint ven-
tures— that is a new word that they have more or less concocted in the
last two or three years. There is no question about it leads to higher
prices, costs the government money, because of the fact that you
eliminate competition.
56. General Kussell. Assuming that the contract entered into
ISIff)] between the government and the joint adventurers is what
they call a cost-phis-fixed-fee contract, would the number of contrac-
tors engaged in the completion of work under such a contract result
in higher cost to the government?
Mr. McKee. Yes, I think it does, because it is the old adage, you
know : Everybody's business is nobody's business ; and the general
tendency has been — I have had several fixed-fee jobs. Personally, I
am not in favor of fixed-fee jobs excejit under dire necessity. I don't
think they are economical.
57. Genei-al Kussell. Assuming that this group of contractors des-
ignates one of its members to carry out the work under that type of
contract, wouldn't it be possible to operate with the same efficiency and
get the same result as if one individual, one partnership or one corpo-
ration was doing the work?
Mr. INIcKee. It should, but the history of the many such projects
is that it has not been.
58. General Russell. Your experience, then, Mr. McKee, in the
contracting field, and your obser\ations of that type of operation
.simply shows that exi)erience indicates that it is more costly to the
government?
Mr. McKee. I think so.
59. General Russell. Now, you were otit in the Territory of Hawaii
doing some work prior to the time that Wyman interested this other
group to come out there, as I understood your testimony?
Mr. McKee. Yes, several years.
GO. Geneial Russell. That work wliich you liad been doing for the
goveiniiHMit oil Ihe installations, bad it been done on a flat contract
basis or oji a cost-plus-fixed Tec basis?
1258 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. McKee. Flat contract basis.
[24J6] 61. General Etissell. Were you familiar with the type
of work which was proposed to have been clone under this December
'40 contract that went to Rohl and his crew ?
Mr. MgKee. I don't, of course, know all the work that was embodied
in his contract because I have had no opportunity to examine it, but
in so far as the original work that he had, I should say we, not only
ourselves but many others, were in far better position. He had had
no experience in the line of work at all,
62. General Russell. I didn't ask that question. My question was,
Were you more or less familiar with the type of work which the gov-
ernment desired to have done when these negotiations with Rohl and
his associates were made for the purpose of doing that work?
Mr. McKee. I think so.
63. General Russell. Did you know what they wanted done out
there?
Mr. McKee. Well, I couldn't say what they wanted done. I don't
know just exactly what someone else would want. If you tell me what
kind of work it was
64. General Russell. Let's see if we can understand each other.
Wyman had some work out there for the government that he wanted
done?
Mr. McKee. Yes.
65. General Russell. And he went to Rohl and his group to get
them to do it ; is that right?
Mr. McKee. That is the best of my understanding of it.
66. General Russei.l. Yes. Now, what was tliat work tliai lie
wanted done?
\24j7] Mr. McKee. Well, I couldn't say because I have never
had an opportunity of examining the contract or to know what the
])rojects were. I know there was some repair work. He built some
temporary buildings and quite a variety of jobs.
67. General Russell. Assuming that that work was the installa-
tions of underground petroleum tanks, radar stations, landing fields
for aircraft, probably some building, was there any reason why, with
conditions as they existed in the Territory of Hawaii at that time, that
bids for this work could not have been obtained as the other work had
been done out there ?
Mr. McKee. When they originally started, the bids could have been
obtained, but not after Pearl Harbor.
68. General Russell. In December 1940 was there any good reason
that you know as to why the work that was to be done out there for
the Army could not have been accomplished on bids?
Mr. McKee. I don't know of any reason. We were doing it all the
time.
69. General Russell. Up to that time?
Mr. McKee. Had the work under contract, and more permanent
character : We were building engine test buildings and other buildings
of a permanent character.
70. General Russell. Do 3'ou know of any cost-plus-fixed-fee basis
coutracts that had been done in the Territory of Hawaii prior to
December, 1940?
71. General Frank. Were the Navy doing any; do you know?
PKOCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1259
Mr. McKee. The Navy was doing some work at Pearl Harbor, I
think; had just started, but it was the Pacific Constructors, I think;
some such name of an association of private firms.
72. General Russell. Was it a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract; [24IS]
do you know ?
Mr. McKee. Well, (he first contract — I am sure, (ieneial, the first
contract was, at the dock, you know ; dry-dock, I think they let that
by contract. That was the first job that came over. I don't think
they let — I am not sure now, but I don't think they let any fixed-fee
until later, because we bid on that. I am not sure whether we bid, or
not, but the first big job, you know, that amounted to anything was
that dry clock that they asked for bids on.
73. General Frank. Was there any work done by any contractoi-
in Hawaii that your organization was not equipped to do^
Mr. McKee. Yes, there might have been some.
74. General Frank. What was it?
Mr. McKee. Well, I would say tunnel work and probably dredging
or something of that character, but there were other concerns there who
were equipped who made a specialty of that business.
75. General Russell. You were not approached at all by Colonel
Wyman in connection with this other work to be done out there?
Mr. McKee. Never, as far as I know.
76. General Russell. That is all I have.
77. General Grunert. Did you have any what they call floating-
equipment for construction work available to your firm for such work,
for instance, as was afterwards done on the string of islands down
toward Australia?
Mr. McKee. Well, we used a lot of floating equipment up here
at Benecia. We built those, you know, at the Ordnance, and this big
pier. We built all that work. We used floating [2419] equip-
ment for that, this pier and dry-dock.
78. General Grunert. I think it appeared in testimony that there
was no such equipment available in or about Hawaii or readily pro-
curable for that class of work.
Mr. McKee. There was some available in Hawaii. Whether it was
enough or not, I don't know. The Hawaiian Contracting & Dredging
Company had considerable work — had considerable equipment and
had been doing considerable work for years there, for Howard Dil-
lingham, isn't it?
79. General Frank. And you had floating equipment here on the
coast?
Mr. McKee. We had them under lease. We had it rented by —
but it was available. I don't know how much was available. In fact,
most of the equipment they did use I think they either rented or
bought for that purpose. It \yas available if you wanted to — you
know, if you had the work to go out and get it at that time.
80. General Grunert. Now will you just give me a few illustrations
of how local contractors could have done a better job than the
Hawaiian Constructors did? Was it because of equipment available
to them at hand that the Constructors had to get from the mainland?
Was it because they had materials or could have access to materials
to get them there quicker. Was it because they could have priority on
shipment, or what was it that would have improved the situation
1260 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
had these contracts been made with local contractors as compared
to having been made with the Hawaiian Constructors? You see what
I am getting at?
Mr. McKee. Better supervision. Just a good General in the Army,
the same ; they have a good man at the head of it.
[242O] 81. General Grunert. Better management?
Mr. McKee. Better management; that's all.
82. General Grunert. Better
Mr. McKee. Equipment. As far as equipment, I would say, and
the materials, they were practically equally available to anyone with
the Army's help. You understand at that time, why, in fact it was
congested, traffic congestion to Honolulu, has been congested for many
years, even before the war. There always was a shortage of trans-
portation to everybody.
83. General Grunert. How about labor?
Ml'. McKee. We never had any trouble ourselves getting labor at
the time. Of course, you know the labor situation is like the mate-
rials situation : it changes almost from day to day.
84. General Grunert. Now, you yourself were out there a con-
siderable time, were you?
Mr. McKee. I was there three or four times, spent some time.
85. General Grunert. And you and your main superintendents
or assistants had a contract under the Quartermaster Corps?
Mr. McKee. A Colonel Harold did. I think it was Harold,
H-a-r-o-l-d. But also we had work over there for Colonel Nurse
and Colonel Hunt and quite a few other men beside him.
86. General Grunert. What I am getting at, during the time you
had that contract did you entertain any of them by social
entertainments ?
Mr. McKee. General, I have an ulcerated stomach, and even if
my inclinations were, Lord preserve me from such embroilments,
so I never was able to go very far.
[^4£1] 87. General Grunert. Well, was it considered a heinous
crime to have social relations in the line of entertainment, with
somebody you are doing business with, if you don't go to extremes?
Mr. McKee. General, it depends on the extent of it, you know. I
have had dinner lots of times with many people that I did busi-
ness with, and I might have at times — when the Lord permitted,
I might have had a cocktail, but I found the men
88. General Grunert. Well, it is a question of the degree, is it?
Mr. McKee. The degree. I found the men I dealt with were very
reluctant to — and I didn't discourage it — to enter into any, you
might say, continuous entertainment.
89. General Grunert. Now, as to your ideas on the subject of
cost-plus-fixed-fee, if you have something sort of nebulous to do,
and you make a large contract on which you may have to have
quite a number of changes, or under that let a number of sub-
contracts or have what they call work orders or what not, doesn't
a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee give you much more leeway without the red
tape and delays that encumber the other type of contract?
Mr. McKee.' General, I don't want to be on a pinnacle differing with
everyone else, but for one, we built Brownwood, which cost about
$20,000,000, at Brownwood, Texas. That's Camp Bowie. We did
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1261
that on a fixed-fee basis, and we had more trouble getting decisions
there. And I turned around and built I think it's Camp Shepherd
at Wichita Falls on a straight contract basis, which was larger in
extent and cost less money. The one we did by fixed-fee — just as
an example I can use that [24-^£] best, that I think at Brown-
wood where we had a fixed-fee it looked more difficult apparently to
get things settled than it was where w^e had a straight contract, and
the reason of that was that when we were at Wichita Falls, or any-
where else — we built quite a few large contonments — we would
insist that these things must be decided, and we wanted to get
through and we wanted to get done; while we had nothing to say
about it at Brownwood. For instance, we only could do what
we were told to do, and that's all. We had no prerogative, prac-
tically, of our own. But when we got to our contract, why, we in-
sisted that they make these decisions. See?
90. General Grunert. That is what the Board wanted — at least,
that is what I wanted to get information on. You being an expe-
rienced contractor and I being very much of a dub layman on that
subject, I just wanted to see how the thing looked from both sides.
There is only one other question I have, and then if the others
have no more questions, why, we shall go to lunch.
Do you know of your own accord or have you reason to believe
that either Colonel Wyman or the contractors in Hawaii intention-
ally delayed work in order to give the Japanese a better oppor-
tunity of succeeding in their attack?
Mr. McKee. You ask me my opinion?
91. General Grunert. Yes.
Mr. McKee. I would say no. But that isn't the — there are all kinds
of rumors that you hear to the contrary. I think it was just a case of
Colonel Wyman's bad habits, frankly. I don't think he intentionally,
as far as I know, did anything, no. Now, as far as Mr. Rohl, I can't
say that, but I say as far [24^3] as Colonel Wyman that I don't
know whether he did anything maliciously to help either the Germans
or Japanese. I just think he didn't know any better; that's all. I
think, frankly, he was ignorant.
General, I want to say one thing. You said you knew of these years
of experience I had. I w^as going to say, in all the years of experience
I had, I find each day I know less, so I wouldn't say that — either that,
or I am becoming mellowed with age ; I don't know which. I used to
be a lot more positive about things than I am now.
92. General Grunert. Now, Mr. McKee can you think of any-
thing else that you might tell the Board that may help it in its mission ?
Mr. McKee. Well, I really don't know what the —
93. General Grunert. Anything occur to you?
Mr. McKee. Particularly as far as Colonel Wyman is concerned,
you mean, are you talking about?
94. General Grunert. Well, concerning the attack on Pearl Harbor,
concerning what went on before and what happened during that time,
and as far as construction is concerned ; as far as AVyman and Rohl
are concerned, only such phases as may have had a bearing on the
attack on Pearl Harbor.
Mr. McKee. Well, I was just discussing the other day — of course I
have talked to a great many people that came back from Honolulu :
1262 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Clark and — you know Chester Clark. Of course, he talks a whole lot,
and you have to discount a little of that, of course, General, as you
know, and he apparently talks very freely and very fluently, so you
should get him down when you get over to Honolulu over there, and
see if he will tell you as [^WJ much as he told everybody else.
But apparently up to about two weeks before Pearl Harbor, from all
I can gather from my own men and others, the Army and the Navy
were on quite an alert all the time. They were really rigidly looking
after apparently the defenses of the islands. And then for some un-
known reason all this stopped. Planes were parked out on the field,
and the alert ceased. That happened, I understand, beginning about
two or three weeks, I think, prior to that time, apparently ; so I say,
from all the reports I have, there was a very rigid condition of alert,
and then for some unknown reason — of course, you hear lots of things ;
you read the newspapers, I suppose — this condition ceased and they
became lax. That's all. I have heard that.
And you hear all kinds of rumors about Rohl's connection with the
Germans, and things of that kind, which of course are purely, I imag-
ine, imagination in a great many cases, which become rumors after
passing from one man's mind to another. Of course, a lot of people
think there was a definite connection between Pearl Harbor and Mr.
Kohl and his activities, but T don't know that. I am just telling you.
You know, everybody hears so many things, it is questionable whether
they are worthwhile.
05. Major Clausen. I have one more thing, sir. Just for the record
I would like to show that the letter which I read and which Mr. McKee
sent to Congressman Thomason was, through the good offices of Mr.
McKee, sent through the Congressman to the War Department and
thereafter was the basis of the investigation, in part, of Colonel Hunt,
and is annexed to the report of Colonel Hunt, and verified in many
respects by the statements of \£4^6] Mr. McKee.
Mr. McKee. T just want you gentlemen to understand I have no
animosity as far as Colonel Wyman is concerned. I am just merely
a poor country contractor trying to do a job and trying to do it to the
best of my ability, and we have a good organization. There are men
with us for 25 years, lots of them. We have raised them in the busi-
ness. Outside of that I have no particular axe to grind.
96. General Grunert. We thank you for coming and assisting us.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon, at 11:50 a. m., the Board concluded the hearing of
witneSvSes for the day and proceeded to other business.)
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1263
?-^^] C O N 1^ E N T S
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1944
Testimony of — Page '
R. E. Combs, Attoniey-At-Law, Visalia, California 2427
Rea B. Wlcklser, 1522 Rodney Drive, Los Angeles, California 245(5
Ray Anderson. 1030 Euclid Street, Santa Monica, California 2479
George Francis Bartlett, Smartville, California 2492
Harry W. Flannery, 537 North Wilcox, Los Angeles, California 251()
'■ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original transcript of proceedings.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1265
\.U27^ PEOCEEDINGS BEFOEE THE AMY PEARL
HARBOE BOAED
monday," september 4, 1944.
Presidio of San Francisco, Cal.
The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on Saturday, September 2,
1944, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert,
President of the Board, presiding.
Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry
D. Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.
Present also : Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C.
Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr.,
Executive Officer.
General Grunert. The Board will come to order.
TESTIMONY OF R. E. COMBS, ATTORNEY-AT-LAW, VISALIA,
CALIFORNIA.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Mr. Combs, will you please state to the Board your
full name and address.
Mr. Combs. My name is R. E. Combs, and my address is 415 West
Race Street, Visalia, California.
2. Colonel West. And what is your occupation ?
Mr. Combs. I am an attorney-at-law.
3. General Grunert. Mr. Combs, General Frank, assisted by Major
Clausen, will lead in this particular part of the investigation.
Mr. Combs. Very well. General.
[242S] 4. Major Clausen. Mr. Combs, did you conduct an inves-
tigation concerning the activities of one Colonel Wyman and Hans
Wilhelm Rohl, in connection with the activities of the California State
Legislature's Joint Fact-Finding Committee on un-American Activ-
ities?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir ; I did.
5. Major Clausen. And would you state in a general way how you
happened to conduct the investigation, so far as it related to Colonel
Wyman.
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir. Mr. W. Bruce Pine, who I understand testi-
fied before this Board recently, became a volunteer special investigator
for this committee, early in February 1942, following a hearing which
the committee held in San Diego. Pine, who had resided in Beverly
Hills for a number of years, had a casual social acquaintance with
Rohl — that is Hans Wilhelm Rohl — and he related to me early in
1266 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1942 — I don't remember the exact date — that he had occasion to go to
Newport Harbor Yacht Club, where he overheard a conversation by
someone, during Avhich the statement was made in substance that Rohl
had become involved in some difficulty concerning some subversive
activities in connection with the installation of certain projects for
the Army in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor.
Pine conducted a sort of desultory investigation on his own for two
or three days, and then he informed me of the results of that investiga-
tion; and one of the things that he ascertained was that Rohl did not
become a citizen until about two and a half months prior to the attack
on Pearl Harbor. Rohl was a resident of southern California, and
had been, ever since 1925; and this committee being charged by the
Legislature [^4^9] with the investigation of any subversive
activity concluded it would investigate Rohl; particularly so, when
Pine recalled that he had seen Rohl in company with a man by the
name of Werner Plack, who had been an employee of the German vice
consulate in Los Angeles under Doctor Gyssling, who went from Los
Angeles to Japan and thence to Germany, and was given a rather
responsible position in the German foreign office, censoring short-
wave radio broadcasts that emanated from Berlin; so I authorized
Pine to make a preliminary investigation, which he did.
In the course of the investigation, he inspected the records of the
Immigration and Naturalization service in Los Angeles, and I also
did, later, several times, made copies of the documents that were con-
tained in the files, some of which later were missing, and as far as I
know still are; Ment to San Pedro and checked the manifests on two
of Rohl's boats, the RAMONA and the VEGA ; and our interest in
the matter of course was primarily centered on the alleged subversive
activities of Hans Wilhelm Rohl, a resident of southern California,
rather than on the activities of Colonel Wyman, which we considered,
as far as we were concerned, of corollary and secondary interest to us,
but which of course were involved.
We worked on the case from some time early in February 1942 until
the date of our hearing on February 23, 1943. After that, there was
some publicity given to the case, in the press. The hearing was closed
to the public, but it was not a privileged hearing, as we were informed
by the Legislative Counsel Bureau of the State Legislature, because
the hearing was opened to the press, and through the medium of the
press, the information {S4S0] concerning the proceedings was
available to the public. We anticipated that some appropriate federal
action would be forthcoming, by reason of the revelations made in
the hearing, because we were convinced that each and every misrepre-
sentation as to citizenship was a separate federal offence, each falsifica-
tion as to citizenship, on the income-tax returns of Rohl, was a federal
offence; his ownership of a boat in excess of 75 feet in length was a
federal offence; his illegal entries into the United States were federal
offences; and we felt that he had possibly had access to certain secret
Army installations, and naval installations, too, for that matter, prior
to his becoming a citizen, which was a violation of the statute of the
United States Code, annotated, which was quoted during the course
of the hearing of February 23, 1943; but nothing was forthcoming,
until late in 1943, when Mr. Fulton Lewis arrived in Los Angeles, for
the purpose of going into the case and making some broadcasts on the
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1267
case, based on the transcript of our hearing, if he found it expedient;
which he did ; and which whipped the case into considerable promi-
nence. Mr. Weiner, as a result of Mr. Lewis's activity, directly came
to Los Angeles. Mr. Pine and I worked with Mr. Weiner for several
weeks.
6. Major Clausen. You mean Mr. Weiner, of the House Military
Affairs Committee?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir. And it was then that we began to concentrate
a little more on Colonel Wyman's relations with Eohl with reference
to their installations, than we had, theretofore. When Weiner returned
to Washington, we continued our activities in the case. We inter-
viewed I should say roughly about a hundred additional witnesses,
took affidavits from those [£4^1] who seemed most credible and
whose information seemed most applicable. We checked the records
of various hotels that Wyman had occupied wnth Rohl, with the idea
m mind of placing them together if possible during the preliminary
negotiations for the basic contract of December 20, 1940 ; and shortly
prior to its consummation on that date, in Washington. We checked
additional telephone records. We interviewed a great many people
who had worked in Pearl Harbor, in addition to those whose names
were given to Mr. Weiner when he was out there, and we discon-
tinued our active work on the case on or about the lith day of June
of this year, when the House Military Affairs Committee made public
their findings and recommendation.
7. Major Clausen. Mr. Combs, since the House Military Affairs
Committee made its report, dated June 14, 1944, has your committee,
or have you, yourself, continued the investigation so as to uncover
additional evidence?
Mr. Combs. To some extent, Major; yes.
8. Major Clausen. Ajid does that additional evidence to some
extent relate to Colonel Wyman?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
9. Major Claussen. Then, specifically, may I ask this: whether you
have any additional evidence, other than what might be available to
this Board, as furnished by the House Military Affairs Committee,
concerning the relationship between Wyman and Kohl, in Los Angeles,
before Colonel Wyman was assigned to the Hawaiian Department?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir; we do have quite a good deal of additional
evidence. You see, sir, when Weiner returned to Washington, which
was in December of last year, we continued our [£f55] investi-
gation up to the 14th of June of this year, and it was during that
interval that we developed some additional information concerning
the relationship between Rohl and Wyman, that, so far as we know,
the House Military Affairs Committee does not have.
10. Major Clausen. Specifically, could you give the Board a very
brief statement as to what the findings would be of yourself in that
regard, and what leads or affidavits yon might have, which could be
furnished to the Board ?
Mr. Combs. I jotted down some notes, if I may refer to them, from
my files, before I came up.
11. Major Clausen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Combs. It was after Weiner returned to Washington that we
obtained two, and I think, three, but I am sure of two affidavits, from
79716— 46— Ex. 145, vol. 2 31
1268 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Madeline Ferguson, who was the nurse for Kohl in the Hawaiian
Islands and after he came to California, and in her presence, Rohl and
his associates expressed apprehension of an FBI investigation of the
relationship between Rohl and Wyman, and the manner in which the
contract was being handled. This was prior to our hearing on
February 23, 1943, and Miss Ferguson was not interviewed by Weiner,
and we didn't know about her until after he had left ; and as a matter
of fact, she was accused point-blank of being an FBI agent ; that she
had insinuated herself into the confidences of Rohl and his associates,
and had attended various of their parties, and so on, and had gotten a
good deal of information that they became apprehensive about; so,
after she had heard them express apprehension about some sort of
federal investigation — and they mentioned the FBI — a few days after
that, according to her affidavit, she {2Jf33'\ was called into
Rohl's presence and accused of being an FBI agent.
12. Major Clausen. Would you make those affidavits available to
the Board by sending them to me ?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir; I will be glad to. I would like to send you
the original and a copy, and have the original returned, if that would
meet your purposes.
13. Major Clausen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Combs. We have to attach the original to the report as an
exhibit, that is the reason.
14. Major Clausen. Yes, sir.
Now, do you have any additional evidence on that same point, as
to the relationship which existed between Rohl and Wyman, before
Wyman was assigned to the Hawaiian Department, other than the
affidavits of Madeline Ferguson?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir; we do.
There is a witness, whose name I can't recall, oif-hand, that we in-
terviewed after Weiner had returned to Washington. He lives in
Long Beach. He was a publicity man for William Wrigley in con-
nection with Wrigley's enterprise at Catalina Island, and it was on
Catalina Island that Rohl-Connolly Company had some rock quarries.
Rock from those quarries was used to cap the breakwater at San Pedro,
and according to testimony of engineers who should know, the thing
isn't very satisfactory.
15. General Frank. The breakwater is not very satisfactory?
Mr. CoaiBs. The rock that caps it, General. It melts away and
has to be constantly replaced, and there was a bid submitted, for
another type of rock which had been very highly \2Ji3Ji] rec-
ommended, and that bid was rejected by Wyman in favor of the Rohl
rock, and the first trip that Wyman made with Rohl, when Wyman was
a Captain, and came, I think it was either late in July or early in
August, 1935, was over to the islands to inspect that rock with Rohl.
The affidavit of Nils Olson, who was the steward aboard the RAMONA
at that time, will show that Rohl told his steward, in effect, that he
had an extremely important and influential business associate who
was to come on board the yacht on that occasion, and who should be
treated with every deference and courtesy; and Olson, of course,
acceded, and they did go over and inspect the rock, and later went
over, a subsequent time, and inspected the rock, and on the second
occasion they stayed over the week end, and it was then, I believe, if
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1269
my memory is correct on it, or shortly thereafter, that they met this
witness that we interviewed. The witness went on several parties
with Rohl and Wyman, and related to us in suhstance some of their
conversation, and we considered it as bein^' somewhat significant as a
Jink in the background of what we considered the process by which
Wyman was softened up by Kohl.
16. Major Clausen. Do you have any evidence. Mr. Combs, con-
cerning tiie question as to whether Colonel Wyman exceeded his salary
or earnings as an Army officer, in the time that he was at liOs Angeles,
prior to the time he went to Hawaii?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir ; we do.
17. Major Clausen. And could you give the Board some idea of
what that evidence consists ?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
18. Major Clausen. And whether or not that can be made [,^SS]
available to the Board ?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir. I checked Wyman's bank account, both while
Weiner was here and afterwards, because he didn't have time to check
it in very much detail. I also went out to the Jantz Realty Company
at Westwood and checked their record. Pardon me. First, I went
to the recorders' and assessors' and tax collectors' offices in Los Angeles,
to check all of the property owned either by Wyman, his present
wife, or his ex-wife, ancl then I went to the Jantz Investment Com-
pany and checked the escrow transaction wdiich involved the purchase
of the $16,000 home at 221 Woodruff Street in Westwood. I then
made a complete check, which information Weiner does not have,
of the clubs and fraternal and social organizations that Colonel
Wyman affiliated with shortly after he met Rohl, and I checked each
and every expenditure at each of those clul)s, which of course showed
the days that he was there. I do not know whether you have this or
not. They included the Los Angeles Athletic Club, the Los Angeles
Country Club, the California Club, the University Club, the Bel-Air
Bay Club, the Hollywood Athletic Club, the Hollywood Country Club,
and the Jonathan Club, in Los Angeles — his expenditures at those
clubs. I bore in mind, of course, that being an Army Officer, the initia-
tion fee or dues would be negligible, and we were interested primarily
in the actual expenditures that were made, and they were considerable.
The home in Westwood was purchased with funds that were ex-
plained by Mrs. Wyman, but the upkeep of the home and the elevated
social position that the possession and the operation of such a home
entailed, involved a considerable expenditure.
[34S6] 19. Major Clausen. With respect to some of the enter-
tainment of Colonel Wyman by Mr. Eohl, did you check as to the
approximate cost of such entertainment in the Biltmore Hotel?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir. And after Weiner left we also checked some
of the affairs in both the St. Francis and Palace Hotels in this city.
20. Major Clausen. You mean affairs similar to the entertain-
ment of Colonel Wyman by Rohl in the Biltmore Hotel at Los Angeles?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
21. Major Clausen. Occurred here in San Francisco?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
22. Major Clausen. That evidence is available in what form, Mr,
Combs?
1270 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Combs. Statements and affidavits by employees of the hotel.
23. Major Clausen. Can yon give me also some brief idea as to
the nature of tliat evidence and as to the times when that entertainment
occurred ?
Mr. Combs. I wouldn't — I would hesitate to do that, Major, from my
memory, because I don't remember the dates. There were a great
many dates. On some occasions Wyman was present and on many
others he was not, but tlie parties continued whether he was there oi-
whether he wasn't. They were just stepped up a bit, apparently,
wlien he was there. But we do know that Rohls' expenditures at the
Palace Hotel where he stayed with the greatest regularity were con-
siderable. For example, he registered at the Palace Hotel on Decem-
ber 14, 1940, in suite 8064-6, which was a very luxurious suite, at
[2Jf37'\ $35 a day. He got a rate, by the way. And he was
also registered there on January 14, 1941, in the same suite, 8064-6,
at $41 a day, which indicates that he had guests.
24. Major Clausen. Now, during that particular period, that is,
December 1940, have you ascertained whether Colonel Wyman was in
the company of Mr. Kohl in Los Angeles 'I
Mr. Combs. In San Francisco, you mean. Major?
25. Major Clausen. Yes, in Los Angeles, and in San Francisco also.
Mr. Combs. I don't know as to Los Angeles, Major, but we have
information tliat he was present in San Francisco.
26. Major Clausen. With Mr. Rohl ?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir,
27. Major Clausen. And in what form is that evidence ?
Mr. Combs. Statement by Mrs. Eohl.
28. Major Clausen. A statement by Mrs. Rohl. Can you give
some brief idea as to the nature of that testimony ?
Mr. Combs. No, sir. I am sorry I can't. In substance she stated
that she knew that her husband left for San Francisco to meet Wyman
and with Connolly — that is Thomas E. Connolly — to discuss the pre-
liminary negotiations for the contract of December 20, 1940; that
Rohl did leave for San Francisco, and when he came back he told her
that he had discussed the contract with Wyman and with Connolly.
And if I may interject a thought of my own there, I prepared a
series of questions to be propounded to Thomas Connolly by Weiner,
and Weiner took the list of questions and went to San Francisco —
came to San Francisco, and was unsuccessful, in his opinion and in
mine, in really getting \^2JfS8'] into the meat of the thing to
find out the occasions when Connolly and Wyman and Rohl were to-
gether discussing the essential matters that were called for by the
contract of December 20th, and in my opinion that has never been
done. We worked for months and months with the F. B. I. in this
case, as we do in all cases, and in my own opinion I don't think that
the case has been exhausted by any means, with regard particularly
to the question of whether Rohl did or did not have access to the basic
information set forth in that — or called for by that contract ; and I
think the chief telephone operator of the Palace Hotel, who was so
intimately acquainted with Rohl that she would on her own initiative
call up nurses to come and nurse him through his somewhat frequent
hangovers, and who is now residing in San Francisco but no longer
in the employ of the hotel, would be a very, very valuable witness,
and so far as I know she has never been contacted by anyone.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1271
29. Major Clausen. Would you furnish the Board her name, please ?
Mr. Combs. Gladly, and her address.
30. Major Clausen. And also the statement by Mrs. Rohl?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
31. Major Clausen. And also the additional affidavits concerning
the San Francisco relationship?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir. I have the man's name in Long Beach that I
didn't recall a while ago. His name is Norman Kint, K-i-n-t.
32. Major Clausen. And he was a man who had some evidence con-
cerning the rock ?
Mr. Combs. Concerning the rock and the conversations of [2439]
Rohl and Wyman and their relationship during the summer of 1935.
33. Major Clausen. Now, in addition to the testimony of Mr. Rohl
given before your committee on February 27, 1943, do 3'ou have any
evidence as to whether Colonel Wyman was informed prior to the
signing of the basic contract that Mr. Rohl was an alien?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
34. Major Clausen. In what form is that evidence?
Mr. Combs. I believe it's in the form of a letter. I am quite sure
it's either a letter or two letters or a wire, but we have it available.
The file, the material we collected, is quite voluminous over a period
of over two years, and I don't i-ecall really just what form it is, but I
am positive we have such information.
35. Major Clausen. AVill you make that available also to the
Board, Mr. Combs?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
36. Major Clausen. Now, would you inform the Board as to the
37. General Frank. Just a minute. A little while ago you gave
us a list of tlie clubs that you investigated in Los Angeles.
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
38. Genera] Frank. You didn't make the direct statement, and
therefore I would like to ask the direct question : Did you find that
Colonel Wyman was a member of each one of those clubs that you
enumeratecl ?
Mr. Combs. He was a member of each of those clubs with the excep-
tion of two. One of them was the Jonathan Club, and [^440]
the other was the University Club, and at those two clubs he lived for
periods of time and made considerable expenditures. He was a
member of each of the other clubs that I mentioned.
39. General Frank. In this investigation did you get any record of
his expenditures there ?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir ; we got a record of his expenditures at each of
those clubs.
40. General Frank. Do you have those available ?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
41. General Frank. Will you make those available to the Board?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
42. General Frank. Such information along that line that you
have ?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
43. Major Clausen. Sir, I am going to ask you this question:
whether you determined in your own mind, from your investigation,
as to whether there was a contrast between the activities of Colonel
WymsLH after he became associated with Mr, Rohl, as compared to his
1272 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
previous services in the Army; whether you are able to say anything
as to that.
Mr, Combs. Yes, sir; I was very forcibly impressed by it. I men-
tioned it to both Weiner and Pine about the middle of our investiga-
tion when Weiner was out here. It seemed to me that an interesting
highlight of the entire investigation, at least as far as I was concerned,
was the striking contrast in the tastes and personal characteristics be-
tween Wyman and Rohl up to their meeting in the summer of 1935 and
immediately afterwards.
[244^] Rohl, on the one hand — of course this is just my own
impression of the thing — came into this country in 1913, and he started
his career by siring four illegitimate children in Sacramento. He
adopted a consistent and very often a stubborn pattern of concealing
his alien status ; whether deliberately or not, of course, I don't know ;
1 am not able to prove. In my opinion he did it deliberately.
When the Ramon a came from Acapulco to Los Angeles in '33, his
name was missing from the manifest, although the other members of
the crew and the passengers' names appeared. When the Vega sailed
through the Panama Canal and docked at Honolulu late in 1937, he
was faced with a situation wherein for the first time he was compelled
to make a categorical statement whether he was or was not a citizen,
so he made a statement that he was born in lola, Knasas, which was
the birthplace of his wife, and although the date of his birth appeared
correctly in the manifest, September 29, 1886.
There were many other occasions, of course, with which no doubt
you are familiar. The next time he was faced with the necessity of
making a categorical statement was in making his federal income tax
returns during the period when they required a statement as to citizen-
ship, and year after year he swore, and I have seen these income tax
statements myself, that he was an American citizen, and on one occa-
sion he said that he was naturalized on — well, I wouldn't want to give
the exact date, but the precise date of his naturalization is set forth.
In a preliminary statement to the Immigration and Naturalization
officials he stated that he had been naturalized. He later repudiated
that statement. So all through his career he [_2^2'] apparently
adopted a pattern of concealing that alien status, and one of the
intriguing questions corollary to the investigation was why he did
that. We have some ideas. Whether or not they are correct, of course,
I don't know.
44. Major Clausen. What are your ideas, Mr. Combs?
Mr. Combs. My idea is that Rohl was essentially a stiff-necked, very
proud, and somew!iat overbearing Prussian, extremely proud of his
father, who, as I uitderstand it, was an instructor in a technical school
in Hamburg; of hi- family.
He stated one time when he was drunk that he was a German agent,
to a fellow employee up in the vicinity of Bear River in Northern
California. He boasted of his acquaintance with officials of the Ger-
man Government. He associated with Werner Plack, as we know.
And there were a lot of other things that he did that I didn't consider
important enough to mention to anybody, but they are little things
that, when they are all added up, are a pretty good indication, in my
opinion, of the man's over-all characteristics, of his basic inclinations;
and I think Rohl thought too little of this country and too much of
his own to bother to apply for citizenship; and when he was faced
PROCEEDIN(JS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1273
with the necessity of eitlier becoming a citizen or foregoing a lush
contract that was danolod before him, it then occurred to him to be-
come a citizen.
There were other things that I thought might possibly be of some
significance. There is a footnote on page 31 of a book by Michael
Sayre called Sabotage, which relates how a German agent by the
name of Von der Osten came to this country from Japan in March
1941; March 1(5, 1941. Two days later he [^4^] was hit and
killed in Times Square, New York, by a taxicab. The F. B. I. traced
his residence to the Taft Hotel in New York, and there they found a
sketch of the installations the were called for by the contract of Decem-
ber 20, 1940, with a written notation on the bottom of it, "This will
be of interest to our yellow friends." Von der Osten was a known
German agent, a very important one. He worked under a man by the
name of Ludwig.
In my opinion, Rohl was the type of a person who, if the monetary
return would be great enough, wouldn't hesitate for a minute to make
the information available. Of course, that again is my own idea,
but I can't help but draw that conclusion from some of the other
things that existed in the case. Of course, this is only a possibility,
and in my opinion it is a rather remote one, but it still is a possibility.
We have a great many witnesses — we have statements from a gr^at
many witnesses whom I consider of terrific importance in connection
with the manner in which the work was accomplished in the Hawaiian
Islands, not King and Wickiser, the man whom Weiner interviewed,
but we interviewed I guess about fifty men who worked in the aircraft
warning tunnels, men who moved a concrete building six inches after
the floor and the walls and ceiling had been poured and had set; B-17
hangars that were all ballixecl u}), according to the testimony of men
who should be in a position to know. AVe have affidavits from civilian
employees of the Engineering Corps who worked not only in Hono-
lulu under Wyman and Rohl but also in Edmonton and some other
cantons in Christmas Islands and some of them in Alaska. We have
a great number. Some of these [^-^44] men kept guest books
and diaries, and so forth, that they made available to us. All of that
information has come to us since Weiner left, and I don't believe —
I am not so sure that he does not have any of that information.
45. Major Clausen. You have made that distinction several times
as to something that you now have which you did not have when
Weiner left.
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
46. Major Clausen. You say that, do you, because the report of
the House -Military Affairs Committee dated June 14, 1944, from
a reading of it by you, is essentially based on the evidence that was
uncovered by Mr. Weiner when he worked in conjunction with you
here in California?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
47. Major Clausen. Is that correct?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
48. Major Clausex. And therefore, for example, these affidavits
as to delays in the defense projects in Hawaii would be in the nature
of additional and new evidence?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
1274 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
49. Major Clausen. I was going to explore that field a little later.
I didn't interrupt yon. Would you now go back to my previous ques-
tion as to whether you have, from the evidence, seen indications that
Colonel ^^>nl:lll, then Captain or Major Wyman, when he reported
to Los Angeles, was tlieretofore not the same character of individual
that he was when he hxter came under the influence of Mr. Rohl?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir ; I am sorry I got off the point.
50. Major Clausen. Yes.
[^44^] Mr. Combs. From our information, prior to the time he
met Rohl, Wyman was a very capable and hard-working engineei-,
devoted to his family. He had been married nearly thirty years in
193;-). His family consisted of his wife and his daughter Jane, and
he was i-ather conservative and steady in his tastes.
Rohl, on the other hand, was almost diametrically opposed in his
personal tastes. He was a sort of middle-aged man-about-town in
Southern California, a lavish entertainer, a lavish spender. He would
charter an entire commercial airliner, a 21-passenger plane, to fly
from one place to another because he didn't want to be bothered with
anyone else aboard. When he entered the Biltmore Hotel, according
to the information that we have from the employees, all the other
guests' luggage would thump to the floor while the bellboys made a
dash for Rohl to escort him to the elevator and get one of those fifty-
dollar tips. Special songs were composed in his honor when he went
to some night clubs that he frequented, and one that we know of, and
others that we have heard of, and the entertainment would stop while
they would sing this song. He was simply that kind of a man, a lavish
spender, drank to excess.
But after Wyman met Rohl, Wyman's tastes ran peculiarly parallel
to Rohl's, and he drifted away from the wife that he had been married
to for thirty years, and she obtained a divorce on the ground of incom-
patibility, in Nevada. He commenced an affair with the sister of his
deceased office secretary. He went on these parties with Rohl, some of
which ran into the thousands of dollars. They were constantly getting
in fights and brawls at night clubs, led the band, and [^44^] tip-
ped the waiters hundred-dollar bills at the time; and among many
affidavits of guests who were aboard both the Ramona and the Yega
they tell of the almost constant run of parties that the two men went
on. An affidavit from Wyman's driver, which I think Weiner had,
would bear that out, as would the testimony of this man Kint in Long
Beach that I mentioned.
51. Major Clausen. I just wanted to ask you one question concern-
ing this boast of Rohl that he was a German agent. Do you know to
whom that was made ?
Mr. Combs. I have the name, yes, sir. I don't recall it offhand.
52. Major Clausen. Would you furnish that to the Board ?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
53. Major Clausen. Now, specifically regarding these delays in the
construction work in Hawaii, would you furnish the Board the affi-
davits or statements that you mentioned in your testimony ?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
54. Major Clausen. Does your committee have evidence as to
whether after Rohl was awarded this contract he was in communication
with his associates concerning the plans before he was naturalized ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1275
Mr. Combs. I don't think so. We have evidence, considerable evi-
dence, that he was in communication with his associates both within
two days prior to the sio;ning of the contract and very frequently
thereafter, between December 20th and September 15th, 1941 ; but as
to what the substance of the conversations was we have no evidence
except, of course, inferential evidence.
[2447] 55. General Frank. Did you ever see this basic contract?
Mr. Combs. Xo, sir.
56. General Frank. You are not familiar with the fact that the basic
contract itself does not contain details ?
Mr. Combs. Yes, I am. I understand they are set forth in the
supplements.
57. General Frank. They are set forth in the job orders?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
58. General Frank. Therefore, he might have complete knowledge
of the basic contract and still not have very information ?
Mr. Combs. Yes, I understand. We do have some evidence, I might
say. that prior to December 20th, 1941, he did have conversations in
which some details of the installations were discussed. AVhat those
details were T do not recall, but I would be glad to make that informa-
tion available to you. We do have the substance of one specific con-
versation between Wyman and Rohl ])rior to December 20th, 1940, in
Avhich some of the details that were called for in the contract and its
supplements were discussed.
50. Major Clausen. You will make that available to the Boju'd ?
, Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
(^0. General Grttnert. Wait a minute. ^ ou said ]n"ior to December
20th. 1941.
Mr. Combs. 1940.
61. General Gruxert. How could any settlements prior to that be
discussed, when the basic contract had not yet been signed ?
Mr. Combs. What I meant to say. General, was this: that the sub-
stance of the conversation that occurred prior to [^44^] De-
cember 20th, 1940 between Wyman in Honolulu and Rohl in Los
Angeles concerned some of the installations that were thereafter
called iov by the contract of December 20th, 1940 and its supplements.
62. General Grunert. Then I understand that possibly Wyman gave
to Rohl some information about what was to take place later under
the contract ?
Mr. CoiNrBs. Yes, sir.
63. Major Clausen. Now, specifically with regard to these delays
again, is there anything additional that you can tell the Board?
Mr. Combs. No, sir; I think not, with the exception of the state-
ment, which I think I already made, that there are some 50 witnesses,
I would say, on hand, all of whose statements I consider are of con-
siderable value in connection with delays, men who were employed in
building the project.
64. Major Clausen. Do you have any additional comments on your
Avritten statement which bear upon the mission of this Board?
Mr. Combs. I don't think so, sir.
65. Major Clausen. That is all that I have.
66. General Russell: In connection with this investigation, of
course, you seem to have developed rather fully Rohl's history and
1276 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
operations, socially and otherwise, in Los Angeles. Was he regarded
in that area as an outstanding contractor?
Mr. Combs. It is a rather difficult question to answer, General. He
was regarded as a man who was capable of good engineering work.
67. General Russell. He seemed to have spent a lot of money.
[^44^] Did that create in your mind an impression that he had
been a successful man, making all of this money during this war?
Mr. Combs. No, sir.
68. General Russell. What was the thought about where that money
came from ?
Mr. Combs. I concluded that he got it when he went to Germany
in 1924, or arranged to get it.
69. General Russell. There have been some suggestions or evidence
from which the impression could be drawn that he made a lot of money
out of that breakwater contract at Los Angeles. Did your investiga-
tion develop anything about that?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir; it did. He made a categorical statement to a
man by the name of Staub that he did not make any money out of the
Los Angeles breakwater.
70. General Russell. In this investigation where you developed
these affidavits did you or your associates attempt to determine the state
of feeling of these people who gave the affidavits as to whether or not
they were disgruntled or had any personal views which might have
influenced their statements ?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
71. General Russell. You regard those people as being reliable
people, without bias ?
Mr. Combs. Those from whom we took affidavits I am satisfied are
completely unbiased. There were some of them who were obviously
disgruntled for personal reasons and from whom we took no affidavits
for that reason.
72. General Russell. I think that is all.
73. Colonel Toulmin. Mr. Combs, as I understand it, you are a
member of the bar?
[24S0] Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
74. Colonel Toulmin. As a lawyer, we would like to have you pre-
pare a lawyer's statement, in the form of possibly a brief, outlining
exactly the information that has now^ come to you which has not been
used heretofore before other investigating committees or boards, as to
two things :
First, the relationship of Rohl to the contract for construction in
Hawaii, both prior to December 1940 and subsequent to that date, with
particular reference to his knowledge of the details of that construc-
tion- and with particular reference to the changes, alterations, delays
and other difficulties with the construction, with which Rohl had some
connection or part.
Second, a statement of the relationship between Colonel Wyman and
Rohl both before and after that contract, with respect to his operations
under the contract or proposed operations under the contract.
Can you do that?
Mr. ('ombs. Yes, sir; F can do it, but it will take come time, for this
reason : We intejid to have a hearina" or a sei'ies of hearings commenc-
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1277
ing this month, both here and elsewliere in the State, involving mat-
ters on which we have been working for some time and on which I
came to San Francisco on this trip, incidentally to this hearing, of
course, to prepare. I will be in San Francisco probably ten days or so
working on those things and then I am due in Los Angeles to set up a
series of hearings down there. My files relating to the Rohl Case and
all of the photostats and documents, and so on in connection with it
that have been accumulated since about March, 1942, are at my home
inVisalia. If they were here I could do the things that you [^4-51]
ask me to do in a comparatively short time, in connection with other
work.
75. Colonel Toulmin. We want just a summary letter.
Mr. Combs. Yes; I understand. I would not feel that the letter
would be very helpful to you unless I could refer to the sources of proof
on which the statements in the letter would be based and, unfortu-
nately, those sources are not here. They are at my home and locked
up, scattered through a dozen different files pertaining to the Rohl
Case. So in order to prepare such a statement I would have to have
access to that material so that the thing would be factual and helpful.
76. General Frank. Could you prepare that statement and have it
available to use by September 22nd ?
Mr. Combs. No, sir ; I think not ; not unless I had the files. I prob-
ably will be in the middle of hearings by that time. We have one on
the Political Action Committee; we have one on the Hindu Gadar
party, and others. I have to write the trial brief and have the wit-
nesses subpoened and the hearings prepared.
77. General Frank. It is highly desirable that this Board have
that information.
Mr. Combs. Yes ; I understand.
78. General Frank. Because we considered that rather vital testi-
mony.
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
79. General Frank. If you could throw some extra effort into mak-
ing that available it would be appreciated.
Mr. Combs. If I could get that file up here, General, I could prepare
such a statement.
[24^2] 80. General Frank. Is not the means available to you to
get the file?
Mr. Combs. Yes, but it would take me about two or three days to
get a reservation back and then I have to get another one back here.
81. General Frank. Where is Visaliaf
Mr. Combs. It is about 190 miles from here.
82. General Grunert, Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
83. General Russell. You are continuing your association with the
committee that you testified about here this morning?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
84. General Russell. Does that committee plan any further investi-
gation of this man Rohl?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
85. General Russell. Do you expect, if the evidence warrants it, to
take any action, criminal or otherwise, with respect to him?
1278 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr, Combs. We are unable legally to do so, General, for this reason :
Our committee is a fact-finding committee and, as such, we have a great
deal of latitude in the ascertainment of facts. W^ are not bound by
the rules of evidence. We can ask leading questions. Witnesses are
not permitted the advice of counsel during hearings. We enjoy im-
munity from either prosecution or suit for slander or libel. But
we have no power to do anything except ascertain facts and to make
our records available to the appropriate federal or State agencies for
such action as may be appropriate. That, we have done.
86. General Russell. Do you mean in the Rohl Case yini liave
[24S3] done that already?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir. We have made our information available,
first, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to the War Frauds Divi-
sion of the Department of Justice, through Mr. Harrington's office in
Los Angeles; we have made it available to the House Military Affairs
Committee, which is also a fact-finding body; but we have made it
available to every agency that we thought could do anything about it,
and we have also made it available to the United States Attorney's
office.
87. General Russell. And nothing has been done yet?
Mr. Combs. Nothing except lapsing of the statutes of limitations
which would bar prosecution. They are being chopped off day by
day.
88. Colonel Toulmin. What is your explanation of why the Depart-
ment of Justice does not take action ?
Mr. Combs. I don't know, sir. I can only give you my own idea.
89. Major Clausen. I have one more question for the record which
is merely a high light. In the investigation which you have made of
files of immigration and Naturalization did you discover that certain
letters were missing?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
90. Major Clausen. And what were those letters that you could
not find ?
Mr. Combs. One of them, I am positive, was a letter or a wire from
Wyman to some official in the Immigration and Naturalization stating
that Rohl was an alien and asking that his application for citizenship
be expedited.
91. Major Clausen. How did you know it was missing?
[^4^4] Mr. Combs. I read it and copied part of it before it was
missing.
92. Major Clausen. That is all.
93. General Grunert. That was missing from the files of the Bu-
reau of Immigration and Naturalization ?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir; together with several other documents.
94. Colonel Toulmin. State, first, when you examined the file and
found the Wyman communication in it.
Mr. Combs. I can only approximate the date from memory, but it
was some time during the summer of 1942.
95. Colonel Toulmin. Now state when you looked at the file again
and found it gone.
Mr. Combs. Shortly before the hearing in February of 1943.
96. General Grunert. Are there any further questions?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1279
97. Major Clausen. No, I have none, sir. Mr. Combs, would you
be available perhaps for rebuttal testimony in the event it becomes
necessary in about two weeks or so ?
Mr. Combs. If our hearings have been conchided, Major, I will be.
98. Major Clausen. All right, sir.
99. General Grunert. Mr. Combs, do you thmk of anything else
that might be of assistance to the Board that has not come up, that
will not be covered in your statement, plus the evidence that you are
going to submit, that you think you should bring to the attention of
the Board?
Mr. Combs. No, sir. I would like to make one statement \2JiS5\
off the record, if I may, General.
100. General Grunert. All right. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
101. General Grunert. Thank you very much, Mr. Combs.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
[2JfS6^ TESTIMONY OF REA B. WICKISER, LOS
ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Mr. Wickiser, will you state to the Board your
full name and address, please.
Mr. Wickiser. Rea B. Wickiser. I live at 152t^ Rodney Drive, in
Los Angeles.
2. Colonel West. What is your occupation ?
Mr. Wickiser. My occupation is construction. I am principally
a tunnel man.
3. General Grunert. Mr. Wickiser, General Frank assisted by
Major Clausen will open up this special investigation that we want
as far as you are concerned, and the rest of us will ask questions to
fill out if needed, so I will turn you over to General Frank, here.
4. Major Clausen. Mr. Wickiser, would you give the Board some
details on your background in construction work, please.
Mr. Wickiser. Well, I came out of school in 1931, and I went to
Boulder Dam, worked on the tunnels at Boulder Dam, worked as
laborer, and a miner, worked on the concrete work there, and under-
ground, and high-scaling ; and I went from there down on the south-
ern California aqueduct and the tunnels there. I worked on several
different jobs on the aqueduct, and went down as a shift boss, general
foreman at Parker, on the diversion tunnels there, and about that time
the Aliamanu Crater job in Honolulu came up, and I went to Hono-
lulu under — at that time, it was Captain Hill, the Army Engineers,
and drove the storage tunnels there, and I was general tunnel foreman
on that job, and I came back from there, and worked at PG&E for a
very [24^7] short time, and I worked on the Pennsylvania turn-
pike, where I was superintendent of West Portal for Guthrie, Marsh-
Peterson, and from there I came back, went down to Parker Dam again
and drove the four penstock tunnels for the State of California. The
contractor was C. W. Wood ; and from there I went to Camp San Luis
Obispo, where I was in charge of excavation, quarries. Then I went
1280 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to Honolulu for the Territory Airport Constructors ; and I think that
was in June or in July of 1941.
5. General Frank. Is this a chronological statement?
Mr. WiGKiSER. Well, approximately so. I don't remember dates.
6. General Frank. When did you get out of college?
Mr. WiCKiSER. 1931.
7. General Frank. What college?
Mr. AVicKisER. Heidelberg College, at Tiffin, Ohio.
8. Major Clausen. In connection with your work in the Hawaiian
Islands, did you meet a Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. ?
Mr. WiCKTSER. Not personally, no.
9. Major Clausen. Was the work that you were doing at that time
work in connection with the contract of the Hawaiian Constructors?
Mr. WiCKiSER. When I first went there you mean, sir?
10. Major Clausen. When you first went there, you were working
for the Territory Airport Constructors, is that correct?
Mr. WiCKiSER.' That's right.
11. Major Clausen. You signed that contract for your participa-
tion in that, on July 18, 1941 ?
Mr. WiCKisER. That is right, sir.
[24^8] 12. Major Clausen. And you then, later, went to work
in connection with the Hawaiian Constructors' contract?
Mr. WicKiSER. At the time war broke out, I was taken over by
Hawaiian Constructors, because Territory Airport Constructors had
their contract cancelled, and Hawaiian Constructors took over all the
personnel of the Territory Airport Constructors.
13. Major Clausen. Now, you are familiar with some of these
defense projects in the Hawaiian Islands that were constructed by the
Hawaiian Constructors?
Mr. WicKisER. Yes ; I am, sir.
14. Major Clausen. And in particular, do you know of the runway
on wdiich the grades were changed nine times by the Army engineers?
Mr. WiCKisER. Allow me to make myself very clear. Now, I see that
you are reciting or reading here from testimony that was taken by Mr.
Weimer or Weiner, I believe it was. That is pertaining to the runways
at Hilo, the Hilo airport. Now, there were no changes, up until after
the war had come upon us down there, because the company that I was
with down there, prior to December 7, had a unit-price contract for
that job, and they had plans that they had bid on ; and you just don't
move in and change work on that type of a contract; but as soon as
the contract was taken over by Hawaiian Constructors, which was a
cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, then we were operating directly under
the engineers ; and they were changed nine times, at that time.
I might draw a picture of that, so that you are familiar with it.
They had an idea that they might have to move out of that country
in a hurry, and they wanted to wreck the ^ [^4^5] airport, so
there were boxes that were placed. Theoretically, the tops of these
boxes were even with or at the top of the surface of the runways, and
then in these boxes there were supposed to be bombs placed, that they
could demolish their runways. Well, these boxes were wooden, and
as the runway elevation was changed, your boxes had to be sawed off
or raised with the elevations of your runways, and they were changed
nine times, because I changed those boxes on those runways nnie
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1281
different times. As a matter of fact, they got so that I just threw up
my hands. I couldn't keep up with them from day to day. I would
get half of them changed, then there would be a new program tomorrow
morning; and I just got '*fed up" on it, and I got on a plane and
went to Honolulu ; yes, that's true. I think that elaborates a little bit
on that, and explains.
15. General Frank. What was the occasion of all these changes,
once they had determined the grade?
Mr. WicKisER. Well, sir, you would have to get someone in the
engineering department, the U. S. E. D,, to find that, because we
simply operated upon directives from the engineering department,
from the engineers, the Army engineers.
16. General Frank. I am trying to get an opinion from you, as an
engineer. After the grade had been once established, was there any
necessity for changing it to put these boxes in?
Mr. WiCKiSER. I am not an airport engineer, to begin with. I am a
construction man. I don't know what the "powers to be" down there
had in mind.
17. General Frank. Was there anything about the subsoil [2400^
that required a changing of the grade, to put the boxes in there?
Mr. WiCKisER. No. There is a cut-and-fill problem on most of those
boxes, but in the area where the boxes were changed, was through the
intersection of these runways. Now, had there been a change in plans
to balance the cut-and-fill on out at the end of runw^ays, it would have
certainly affected the intersection of the runways; if there was a
maximum grade or minimum grade that they had to hold to for those
runways, it would have ; but once it was determined, sir, there would
be no reason for it. If they had a plan, a master plan that they were
going by, what they wanted, there was no reason in the world for it.
18. General Grunert. But this was all after December 7, 1941 ?
Mr. WiCKisER. Immediately after.
19. General Grunert. Immediately after?
Mr. Wickiser. And not before.
20. General Grunert. No, sir.
21. Major Clausen. Now, during the the time that this changing of
the runways was taking place, was that under Colonel Wyman?
Mr. Wickiser. Yes. I believe Colonel Wyman left there in March,
didn't he?
22. Major Clausen. Yes, sir.
Mr. WiciSER. Yes.
23. Major Clausen. March 1942.
Were you ever instructed by Colonel Wyman with respect to a tun-
nel, not to leave the dirt in the tunnel, and not to take it outside?
[i2461] Mr. Wickiser. I again want to make myself clear. I
am not trying to crucify anyone. No, that statement is not true; and
if it is that way, it is an error. We were only instructed by Colonel
Wyman's men, the man that was in charge of the Hilo airport for
Colonel Wyman.
24. General Frank. Who was that?
Mr. Wickiser. That man was named Fred Henderson. He was a
civilian at that time. No, at that ti'ine'' he was a lieutenant. He was
connnissioned, I believe.
1282 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIOATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
25. Major Clausen. You had one experience, did you not, where
you made a 62° turn to the right off an exit, and you found out after-
wards that the plan they had given you was incorrect?
Mr. WiOKiSER. That is correct. I can't remember the exact dates,
but it was shortly after war broke out, that they were in a very big
hurry for some radar tunnels, or — not radar; they were AWS stations
they called them ; was out at Pahoa, in an old cinder cone. It is called
East Point. They had plans for one tunnel that was up inside the
crater, and there had to be a road lea(^ling up to it. You had to get the
material up to the top, and we built a road and camouflaged it up
part wa}', and then over the cone, down inside, we just worked off of a
foot-path, and inasmuch as the ground was cinders, we could handle it
by just hand-mucking it, or hand excavation with wheel-barrows,
instead of breaking a big trail and moving a lot of equipment in there,
because it would have disturbed the surrounding country, and they
wanted to have a perfect camouflage job where no one could find it
from the air.
26. General Frank. By "cinders," you mean volcanic cinders?
Mr. WiCKisER. Volcanic cinders — what they call, out in the
'\2Jf62'] islands, Aa. There's two types of lava out there. One
is Lapahoehoe, and the other is Aa. Well, we cut out this job
by hand. Now, when I moved in there, the instructions were not
to make a dump outside the portal of this AWS tunnel, because
it would show from the air. Well, i didn't know what in the world
I was going to do with it, I had to dump it some placey and I
couldn't eat it; so I didn't know what to do with it, outside of just
bringing it out and dumping it. I had no way of carting it off, so
we brought it out and dumped it, and camouflaged it. Then, that
tunnel was completed, and I had a plan for it; but down below, in
back of the Camp at Pahoa, there had to be another tunnel driven,
and they were in a very big hurry for that, and I asked for the
engineers to come out and stake the job; and no one would show
up; so they had an inspector on the job, there, at that time, by
the name of Walker, who was not an engineer, but he and I located
the tunnel, and we wanted it, to get busy and drive in. We were
working on the schedule, but I still had no plans on the second
tunnel, so they sent me out a sketch from the engineering office that
showed the tunnel going in and making a turn to the left. Well,
we drove this tunnel, completed it. After we had completed it, and
I had moved off of the job, I got a set of plans on it that showed
the tunnel going in and making a dog-leg to the right; so I didn't
know what to do, unless they wanted to drive a new tunnel, I said
they could make a turn to the left as well as to the right ; so I didn't
do anything more about it, because I went to Honolulu right at that
time, and was wanting to go home; but instead of getting away
from there, why they prevailed upon me to stay and do some of the
work that they had, to be done right away.
[^^<5] 27. General Grunert. Wliat you have related is all
after December 7, 1941, is it?
Mr. WiCKiSER. I beg your pardon.
28. General Grunert. This driving of the tunnel you are speak-
ing about is all after December 7, 1941?
Mr. Combs. Oh, yes.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1283
29. Major Clausen. Mr. Wickiser, did you have any experience
with the engineers under Colonel Wyman before December 7, 1941?
Mr. Wickiser. Only the eno;ineers that were handling the Ter-
ritory Airport Constructors' work, representing the Engineers in
Hilo."
30. Major Clausen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Wickiser. And I will say that the Engineers that we worked
with there — the boy that we worked with was named Haynes
(H-a-y-n-e-s I believe is the way spell that) and he was a very fine
boy, and he was a competent engineer.
31. Major Clausen. Mr. Wickiser, in view of your testimony I
am going to read a portion from this affidavit contained on page 37
of the House Military Affairs Committee report :
From the experience I had with Wyman's engineers, when I found he re-
ceived the Distinguished Service Medal, I thought somebody had slipped up
somewhere along the line, and that Washington just didn't know what had
been going on.
Would you comment on that, please, to the Board?
Mr. Wickiser. Yes. Now, again I want to distinguish between the
two types of contract that I w^orked under over there. One with the
Territory Airport Constructors was the unit-price contract, and we
had bid on that job, or the [24<64-] contractors that I was work-
ing for had bid on the job, and they were going to be paid so much
for doing a job, a specific job that they had the plans on. We had no
interference whatsoever.
But I went to work for Hawaiian Constructors, and immediately
the picture changed. There was just such a vast amount of confusion
and so many changes from day to day in the orders that we received
on how we w^ere to do the work that it was pust impossible to get any-
thing done. On top of that, the men were not being paid. They were
from two to three months behind in their pay, they were wanting to
go home, and it Mas just tough as hell trying to get any work out of
them. And, oh, I could go on and on. But principally there was just
a damn bad relationship there right at that time. Now, when I got
over to Honolulu I was wanting to go home, and quite a few men that
had just arrived from the States
32. Major Clausen. You found out, Mr. Wickiser, did you, that the
conditions which you observed yourself after 7 December 1941 were
similar to conditions that had obtained before that time ?
Mr. Wickiser. No ; they were entirely different, sir.
33. Major Clausen. So far as the Hawaiian Constructors were con-
cerned, were you familiar with those conditions before 7 December
1941 yourself?
Mr. Wickiser. Oh, yes. Hawaiian Constructors also had a job
going at South Point down on the Island of Hawaii where Hilo is
located, and I came in contact with those men. I might say that prior
to December the 7th there seemed to be a minimum of confusion down
there, but it wasn't that way after December [24^5] the 7th.
The reason for it I don't know. That is, getting orders on what
you were going to do, they seemed to be pretty stable, but, you see,
this whole— as soon as Avar hit us down there we were all turned over
to the management of Hawaiian Constructors. Now, the airport that
we were doing there under the Territory Airport Constructors was
immediately taken over by Hawaiian Constructors.
79716—46 — Ex. 145, vol. 2—32
1284 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
34. Major Clausen. And that is when these conditions commenced?
Mr. WiCKiSER. That is when these conditions came in.
35. Major Clausen. All right.
36. General Frank. Prior to this time you were working on a fixed
contractual basis?
Mr. WiCKiSER. That is right, sir.
37. General Frank. Now, will yon make a statement, please, as to
the difference in conditions between the time that the cost-plus-fixed-
fee condition came into being and the condition under which you
operated under the fixed-price contract basis ?
Mr. WicKisER. Would you — you want me to make a comparison
between the two of them ?
38. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. WiCKiSER. Well, the first is the pay situation. The men were
paid on two days' notice ; in other words, your pay period stopped on
Saturday; Tuesday you were paid, with the Territory Airport Con-
structors.
35^. Major Clausen. That was the fixed-price contract?
Mr. WiCKiSER. That is right. The contractors handled their own
pay. But when the men were transferred to Hawaiian Constructors,
the Army was doing the paying, and we had men — [£4-^6]
well, I know myself I waited — the first pay check was two months :
when I went off the pay roll of Territory Airport Constructors until
I got a pay check from the Engineers down there it was two months.
40. General Frank. What about changes? What about changes
in work ?
Mr. WiCKiSER. You mean the orders coming down there, changes?
41. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. WicKiSER. Well, you would have never known the old plans
that we had to do the job. They were completely changed.
42. Genera] Russell. Were these changes constant nnd recurring?
Mr. WiCKisER. Fi^om day to day, sir. I might tell you now, that
not only existed right at that time but existed right up until the
time Hawaiian Constructors' contract was terminated over there;
not only under Colonel Wyman ; it existed under General Kramer.
The only man that we didn't have those conditions under was General
Lyman. General Lyman did not operate that way, sir.
43. General Russell. How many did you have? Wyman, Kramer,
and Lyman ? Were those the three ?
Mr. Wicktser. Wyman, Lyman, and Kramer, in that order.
44. General Russell. How long did you have Kramer?
Mr. Wickiser. Well, Kramer relieved General — took over the duties
of General Lyman when he died. Now, it seems that General Lyman
died in October, I believe it was, of 1942.
45. General Russell. Then how long did you operate until Kramer?
[B467] Mr. Wickiser. From October 1942 until the time the
contract was terminated.
46. General Russell. That was when ?
Mr. Wickiser. I believe it was terminated the first day of February,
47. General Frank. 1942?
Mr. Wickiser. Of 1943.
48. General Frank. 1943.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1285
I would like to ask one more question here, about the eflf'ectiveness
of the two methods of aceomplishinjr work: first, through the fixed-
price contract, and, next, through the cost-plus-fixed-fee.
Mr. WicKisER. Well, that would, of course, depend whether or not
a man could safely bid a job. I don't think a contractor could have
opei'ated out there under a unit-price contract after war came on,
sir, because you didn't know whether you could get equipment, re-
[)lacement for your equipment ; you didn't know whether you could
get personnel: you didn't know whether you could get material to
do the job. I think that the Territory Airport Constructors were
just tickled to pieces to get their contract taken away from them,
because I don't think they could have operated.
49. General Frank. Then, you think there w^as no other way to
do it than under a cost-plus-fixed-fee?
Mr. WicKisER. Xo, sir. I do not.
50. General Frank. Have you anything else ?
51. Major Ci.ausen. Your basic objection was not the cost-plus-
fixed-fee contract but the supervision of the cost-plus-fixed-fee con-
tract ; is that correct ?
[24^8] Mr. WicKisER. Yes. I think you gentlemen are aware
of a letter that was written outlining the procedure of the duties of
the engineers and the contractors under a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis. If
those instructions or those procedures were lived up to by both ])arties,
I don't think there would ever be any trouble, but when one side starts
to move over into the other man's territory he gets in ti'ouble.
52. Major Clausen. And did that happen (
Mr. AViCKisER. Oh, that did happen. For instance, the duty of the
Engineers under the cost-plus-fixed-fee is to use the contractors' per-
sonnel, to use their experience: and when you have experienced men
that are sent out to do a job on that basis, it is to use that experience.
But that was not the case there. I took over the tunnel work at Oahu
as general tunnel superintendent in June of 1942. At that time Gen-
eral Lyman — or he was Colonel Lyman at that time — Colonel Lyman
wanted this tunnel program expanded, and he wanted it done in a hell
of a hurry. At that time there was also one job that w^as going on that
they were doing for the Air Corps that was bad. They had had one
cave-in at one of the portals getting underground, and, well, they were
a little afraid of it.
AVell, I went up there and I got ahold of some good men that were
available right in Hawaii, and we went to work on that job, and we
had just completed it at the time I left. There was practically a mile
of 24-foot tunnel in bad ground, mud, and it had to be timbered, every
foot of it, and spiled.
At the time I took that job over there was an inspector on the job.
I'll get it [examining papers]. It was an inspector on the job: that
the fellow who was superintendent of that [2469] particular
job for me had no control whatsoever on his job. For instance, this
inspector was doing the hiring. He was also making rate changes on
men without ever notifying the superintendent of the job. The boy
didn't know whether he was running the job or whether this inspector
was. And I might tell you that the inspector on that job had never
been on a tunnel job in his life up to that time.
1286 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
53. General Grunert. What was he ? The contractor's inspector or
an Engineer inspector, or what ?
Mr, WiCKiSER. Just an inspector. I think I have a note on that.
54. Major Clausen. Inspector employed by whom?
Mr. WiCKiSER. Here [indicating] ; I think this answers your ques-
tion here.
55. General Frank. Just a minute. The inspector represented
the
Mr. WiCKisER. Engineers.
56. General Frank. Corps of Engineers?
Mr. WiCKiSER. That is right, sir.
Now, here was a job over at Fort Shafter, a job called 208. When
I took over I found this job was virtually at a standstill because of
overinspection. The inspectors in charge would refuse to allow a con-
crete pour to begin unless the pour could be completed within the
regular working hours of that day. This resulted in hours of wasted
labor on the concrete crew because the pour would have to wait until
the following day, even though the overtime in question was only
one hour. The inspectors in charge would arbitrarily change the
water content of the concrete without notifying the foreman. They
were using pump Crete, and if you do that — [^470] you gentle-
men are familiar with pump crete operations — you know that the man
that is operating the nozzle and the pump must know how much water
is going in there so that he can keep that concrete moving through the
pump without a plug.
The inspectors would also give orders to the men and in general
assume the position of superintendents rather than inspectors. I
might tell you that that was one of the first problems that I had
confronting me there, and we rectified it by going to General Lyman
or Colonel Lyman as he was at that time. I went directly to him and
let my hair down, and it was straightened out.
Now, here was a job called 403-W. It was a bomb storage job,
consisted of going up a valley that had high walls on either side,
called Kipapa Gulch, and driving these short tunnels every 200 feet.
Well, at Job 403-W I went out — this job was in the preliminary
stages of building roads. The tunnel equipment was bought and
was in Oahu. The battery locomotives had to operate over this road
with the main railway laid out in front of these tunnels, see, so that
you could get from one to the other with your tunnel equipment. The
engineer tliat was out there, the chief of party surveying that job,
had grades laid out as high as 14 percent. 14 percent, and there was
a crew that was — jackhammer crew and shovel crew — working behind
him taking up these grades of 14 percent that" you were going to run
light railway equipment over.
Well, you don't have to go into that. You gentlemen know that
can't be done. So arbitrarily I moved back and started the crew at
3 percent maximum, which was entirely too much for [21^71^
railway equipment, but we moved back, and I went right in and got
it straightened out with Colonel Lj^man at that time; and he said,
"Well, if the engineering can't keep up with you," he said, "let's get
the job done, and we'll come out afterwards and we'll survey what
you have got done. But for Christ's sake," he said, "let's get the work
done."
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1287
57. Major Clausen. That was Colonel
Mr. WiCKiSER. General Lyman.
58. Major Clausen. General Lyman, L-y-m-a-n.
Mr. WiCKiSER. L-y-m-a-n.
59. General Grunert. This all was after December 7 of '41?
Mr. WiCKisER, That is right, sir. And I might tell you, with the
exception of a survey party man, the chief of party that was there
staking the job, he also had three other jobs that he was covering.
Tliere Avas no one representing the Corps of Engineers on that job,
no one there at all, until I insisted on a man being there; and when
they finally did place an inspector there, he was a man that had had
i>o previous tunnel experience at all.
Now, if you gentlemen will care to investigate this next statement
that I am going to make, I would certainly welcome it. There was
a tunnel between 17-B and 17-A at Kipapa Gulch, Job 403-W, that is
60 feet long. Of course, we worked on center line and grade given
us by engineers. This tunnel was staked wrong and, if driven to its
entire full length, would have intersected the next tunnel to it. I had
a hell of a lot of work, and I tell you 60 feet of tunnel could be punched
down there in a mighty short time the way that we were stretched out
on the tunnel, you know, because we were driving 200 feet of tunnel a
[2472 \ day on that one job; and before they had had an under-
ground on the lines that the engineers had given them, the back sights,
and when I went up and took a look at this particular hole, and I says,
"Fellows, you're wrong. Let's get another engineer out here with a
transit and let's have him ])lot this work again and see if w^e're headed
right."
They brought out another man, and he said, "Well, you're not right."
That tunnel was out there that they had — we gunited it and poured
a portal on it, and they could use it for an office or something else that
they wanted to have underground. But again, as I say, had they driven
this tunnel as they were intending us to do, it would have intersected
the other tunnel, but according to the specs on the job they had to be
200 feet apart at all points of parallel tunnels.
I can go on if you care to have me to.
60. Major Clausen, I have no further questions.
61. General Grunert, You see, Mr, Wickiser, we are primarily
interested in what happened prior to December 7th; and what infor-
mation there is after December 7th, we are interested in only so much
of it as has a bearing on the phases that pertain to the attack on
December 7th.
Mr. Wickiser. I see, sir.
62. General Grunert. So, although we are interested in what you
are putting out there, to give us a general line on the efficiency of the
management, I think there has been enough evidence of that sort to
cover what we need,
I have one question here: Do you know why Colonel Wyman was
awarded a decoration?
[247s] Mr, Wickiser, No, sir, I do not. But I can tell you again
that as far as the men that were working out there, working on the
construction work, they thought it was a joke,
63. General Grunert, Do you know anything about his work on the
string of air bases down toward Australia ? Did you have anything to
do with that?
1288 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. W1CKI8EK. No, sir.
(U. General (irunert. Then, those who may have known about it
and appeared to be surprised that he received a decoration didn't
know but what he may have done extraordinary work on something
else of whieli they were not aware?
Mr. WiCKisER." That might have been. But I might also say that
most of these men also knew of Colonel Wyman in Los Angeles, sir,
which goes back a little further than that time.
65. General Grunert. Then, many of these men had been working
foi- Colonel Wyman, then Major or Captain Wyman, in Los Angeles?
Mr. WiCKisEK. AVell, either for him or they were associated with
contractors.
(■)0. General Grunert. Then it was a sort of common knowledge or
i-iimored knowledge, at least, of certain existing conditions?
Mr. Wr'Kise:r. Common knowletlge.
67. General Grunert. Are there any other questions?
68. General Russell. Do you know a man named Rohl ?
Mr. WiCKiSER. Well, I know Bill. I know him not intimately. I
might say that the only time that Bill Rohl was ever on any of my work
out there in the Islands was along in the fall, latter part of October
of 1942, and I was having a little trouble, and my wife w^as evacuated
from Hawaii, and we [^-i-'H] ^^acl lost a youngster, and — well,
she was here and I was wanting to come home, and I had fulfilled my
contract and was staying over at the insistence of Mr. King, who was
the general suj)erintendent for Hawaiian Constructors at that time,
and T was wanting to come home. Percy Benson and Mr. King and
Mr. Rohl met me on tlie road as I was coming from Job 403-W, and
I talked to them on the higliAvay. and they said they wanted to go back
and see the job. So I rode back, and we went up onto the job, and
I told them at that time — I was talking to Bill and I told him I wanted
to go home, and Bill told me this. He said, "Wickie, you can't go
home," he said, "because if you go home who in the hell's going to do
the work ? We haven't got a man that we can turn the work over to,
and the Engineers can't do it themselves. If you walk out," he said,
"you are just leaving everybody down." And he says, "You can't go
home. You got to stay and finish your job."
69. General Russell. Was that the first time you saw Mr. Rohl out
t here ?
Mr. WiCKiSER. That's the first time I ever saw him out there, sir.
That is the truth.
70. General Russell. And that was late in '42?
Mr. WiCKiSER. '42.
71. General Russell. You did not see him nor did he visit any job
that you were doing for the Hawaiian Airport Contractors prior to
December 7, '41 ?
Mr. WicKiSER. No, he had no reason to, because he had no connec-
tion with that.
72. General Russell. Now, you expressed some familiarity
[247-')^ in your earlier testimony with the work which was being
done by the Hawaiian Constructors prior to December 7, '41, stating
that you were impressed that it was running along normally and
without confusion.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1289
Mr. WiCKiSER. Yes. I might state, though, that there were prob-
ably four or five million dollars' worth of work involved at that time,
and the organization that was there to handle it probable was adequate,
but after the attack of December the 7th the work jumped to— well,
at the end of the contract, I think 150 million or something like that.
There is a hell of a big difference, gentlemen, between an organiza-
tion that it takes to handle from two to five million dollars' worth of
work than one that it takes to handle over a hundred million dollars'
worth of work.
73. General Eussell. Do you know, by reputation or by common
knowledge out there, what if any effect the appearance of Kohl on
the Islands had so far as confusion in work or expediting work is
concerned ?
Mr. WiCKisER. No, I don't. No, it wouldn't be fair for me to say
one way or the other, I'll be honest with you, because it would be just
hearsay.
74. General Russell. Well, what the Board is interested in is
whether or not, when Mr. Rohl came out there late in the fall, if he
did, of 1941, that he immediately began to expedite the work.
Mr. WiCKisER. Well, I will put it this way :
75. General Russell. Or did he produce confusion ?
Mr. Wickiser. Allow me to put it this way : From the time I went
over to Honolulu and from the time I went to work [^^7^] for
Hawaiian Constructors there — now, I had worked for them, see, over
on Hawaii, down at Hilo, but when I got there I was ready to go home,
and in the meantime H. J. King was made superintendent, and when
he took over I knew then things would hum, and he asked me to stay
there and help him do the job.
76. General RusseCl. You don't have any knowledge on the question
I am asking you?
Mr. Wickiser. Yest, I do. I want to get to that.
77. General Russell. All right.
Mr. Wickiser. Now, at the time King took over I knew that this
man King was strong enough that Bill Rohl wouldn't ride him a bit :
that is, if he was superintendent, that he would be doing the job, and
not Bill Rohl. So that is exactly what happened too, because I think
when you fellows get there — when you finally get Mr. King here tomor-
row, you will find out that he insisted that Bill Rohl leave the job alone.
78. General Russell. Well, do you think it was better for the job
for King to run it?
Mr. Wickiser. I think so.
79. General Russell. Without Rohl's, in other words,
Mr. Wickiser. That's right, sir.
80. General Russell. — interference?
Mr. Wickiser. That is right, putting it that way.
81. General Russell. So that seems to be a sort of answer to my
question.
Mr. AVickiser. That's right, sir.
82. General Russell. All right. Now, you talked a little while ago
about the people who were out on this job in Hawaii [24-77] hav-
ing had associations with Wyman back in Los Angeles, and you stated
that as a result of those associations they were considerably surprised
when he was decorated or received some official recognition?
1290 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. WiCKiSER. Yes, sir.
83. General Russell. Isitageneralization, then, that we may draw,
that those people didn't think very much of Wyman as a contractor
back in Los Angeles ?
Mr. WiCKiSER. No.
48. General Russell. As an engineer back in Los Angeles?
Mr. WiCKisER. No, not as a contractor.
85. General Russell. I mean as an engineer back in Los Angeles?
Mr. WiCKiSER. That is right.
86. General Russell. Would you mind telling the Board the basis
upon which these people predicated their thought that Wyman was not
a good engineer officer ?
Mr. WiCKiSER. I won't say that Wyman probably wasn't an able
engineer, but the thought was, or the feeling, around Los Angeles
among different contractors that Wyman was quite a drinking man
and he was domineering. I have heard several legitimate contrac-
tors— good, honest men — that have told me of their experience of going
in, talking to Wyman, and where they just walked out, walked out of
his office, because they felt that they could be treated as men, didn't
have to be treated in the domineering, insulting way that he treated
them.
87. General Grunert. Do you think of anything else that you might
add that might be of interest to the Board, in view of this limited
mission that I have stated ?
[247s] Mr. WiCKiSER. There is just one thing that I would like
to say, and that is from the standpoint of confusion ; I would like to
say that there was just as much confusion over tliere when the contract
was terminated as there was right after Pearl Harbor. The only re-
lief that we got there at all, from an operational standpoint, was the
time or during the time that Colonel Lyman, who was later General
Lyman, was in charge of the Engineering office, and we did have it
while he was there. We did have relief, and there was a good, whole-
some, friendly relationship that he insisted upon, from both parties ;
and as soon as General Kramer took over it slipped right back to where
it was before.
88. General Grunert. All right, sir. Thank you very much for
coming.
Mr. WiCKiSER. All right, sir.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon at 11 : 20 a. m. the Board recessed until 2 p. m. of the
same day.)
[£4791 AFTERNOON SESSION
(The Board at 2 p. m. continued the hearing of witnesses.)
TESTIMONY OF RAY ANDERSON, 1930 EUCLID STREET, SANTA
MONICA, CALIFORNIA
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Will you please state to the Board your full name
and address?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1291
Mr. Anderson. My name is Kobert Arthur Kay Anderson, but I use
Ray Anderson as my name.
2. Colonel West. And your address?
Mr. Anderson. 1980 Euclid Street, Santa Monica, California.
3. Colonel West. What is your occupation ?
Mr. Anderson. Electrician.
4. General Grunert. Mr. Anderson, on this particular phase of the
investigation I am asking General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen,
to take the lead.
5. Major Clausen. Mr. Anderson, by whom are you employed at
the present time ?
Mr. Anderson. In the L. A. shipyards, Todd Shipyards.
6. Major Clausen. You have been a resident of the State of Califor-
nia for how long?
Mr. Anderson. Since 1930.
7. General Frank. By L. A. you mean the Los Angeles shipyards ?
Mr. Anderson. Yes, the Los Angeles shipyards.
8. Major Clausen. How long have you been in the electrical busi-
ness, Mr. Anderson?
Mr. Anderson. All my life.
\2JfS0\ 9. Major Clausen. Did you have occasion to be em-
ployed on the Hawaiian Islands?
Mr. Anderson. Yes, sir.
10. Major Clausen. In connection with the construction of defense
projects for the Hawaiian Constructors, Mr. Anderson?
Mr. Anderson. Yes, sir. I was hired here in San Francisco.
11. General Frank. How old are you, Mr. Anderson ?
Mr. Anderson. I will be 63 in December.
12. Major Clausen. During what period of time were you employed
by the Hawaiian Constructors ?
Mr. Anderson. I was hired by them in January.
13. Major Clausen. What year?
Mr. Anderson. 1942, and I stayed out there until August.
14. Major Clausen. Of 1942?
Mr. Anderson. Yes, sir.
15. Major Clausen. Can you give me some very brief idea as to the
projects on which you worked during that period ?
Mr. Anderson. I worked in General Emmons headquarters from
the time I went there until I left.
16. Major Clausen. To your knowledge was electrical work done
by others on these defense projects before you arrived in the Hawaiian
Islands ?
Mr. Anderson. There had been some pipe put in on the job we were
on, but nothing further. Pipe had been put down in the tunnel.
17. Major Clausen. What was that pipe?
Mr. Anderson. Electrical pipe, conduit for the wiring of the tunnel.
\M81] 18. General Frank. Wliat tunnel?
Mr. Anderson. At Aliamanu crater. It was the headquarters of
General Emmons. They had moved in there. General Emmons. The
Navy had down below there the Navy magazines about three or four
miles west of Fort Shafter.
19. Major Clausen. Did you during the period you were in Hawaii
meet Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. ?
1292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Anderson. Yes, sir, I talked to him and saw him frequently.
20. Major Clausen. Do you recall whether Colonel Wyman during
that time was ever intoxicated ?
Mr. Anderson. Yes, sir.
21. Major Clausen. To what extent ?
Mr. Anderson. Well, he could navigate.
22. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon?
Mr. Anderson. He could navigate, but he was intoxicated. I will
tell you something about this whole thing \Yhile we are on this evi-
dence. I was made a kind of a political football over this deal to
start out with.
23. Major Clausen. Over what deal?
Mr. Anderson. This Tenney Committee.
24. Major Clausen. Yes?
Mr. Anderson. And my personal opinion about that whole deal is
that it is all over. Rohl has left those construction companies.
Wyman has been put out of his job, and I believe General Emmons
was possibly relieved over it. I can't be sure about that. And the
whole thing, as far as those Islands are concerned, should be a dead
issue. Today it is a political football. I told Jack Tenney last year
about it. Fulton Lewis [2^82] had broadcast my testimony
luitionally and it was not the right thing to do. I was going into Doug-
las on the morning when I was subpoenaed and I told them exactly
how I felt about that, and at that time I felt very sore because I actually
was afraid that the Japs might come back there. We had fight after
fight over the installation of that electrical equipment back there, be-
cause I wanted to make the communications separate from the power,
because the power might be knocked out. We had quite a fight over it.
And the story about the beds and the food is past and gone.
Whether Colonel Wyman through his negligence permitted that condi-
tion, I don't know, but he told me that the food was good enough for
us, and he had shut down on it because we were wasting it. We
couldn't get a cup of coffee without paying 35 cents for it, or you could
get the whole meal for 35 cents. They had issued Army rations to
those men from the day we arrived there until we left. I went to the
barracks, the Ordnance barracks at the headquarters around the 1st
of April and lived there with the soldiers in the barracks, six of us, —
two electricians, two carpenters and two plumbers — lived in the bar-
racks with the soldiers. I was there the morning Colonel Wyman got
relieved.
25. Major Clausen. When you testified to the Tenney Committee
you told them facts, didn't you?
Mr. Anderson. Yes, sir.
26. Major Clausen. Regardless of your personal preferences, this
Board wants the facts.
Mr. Anderson. I can realize that, too.
27. Major Clausen. Well, tell me this: You said you knew
[24SS] Colonel Wyman was intoxicated. Just tell me whether
you ever had occasion to see Colonel Wyman in an intoxicated
condition.
Mr. Anderson. Well, he was what I would call in an intoxicated
condition. His breath smelled a little bit and he didn't seem to be
level-headed as a man in that position should be.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1293
28. Major Clausen. And that was during what period of time?
Mr. Anderson. I don't think he went back to his office after the 9th
of March. I think the relief was ordered on the 0th of March, and
he never went back there. He stayed at that hotel. The guards had
to go in one night and jump him about keeping the light on in the-
room.
29. General Frank, You stated that Colonel Wyman was intoxi-
cated, but we have no dates on that. Can you give us the date?
Mr. Anderson. I do not recall the exact date. The first time I met
Colonel Wyman, I want up to his office in the Young Building.
30. General Frank. When?
Mr. Anderson. That was some time in the latter part of February,
the last couple of days.
31. General Frank. Of what year?
Mr. Anderson. 1942. We argued all the way down into Bishop
Street.
32. General Frank. Was he sober then ?
Mr. Anderson. No, he was not. He had been drinking but I never
saw Colonel Wyman take a drink. I can tell you that.
33. General Frank. Now, from then on ?
Mr. Anderson. Then I saw him the next week.
34. General Frank. Which was still in February?
Mr. Anderson. He had been drinking at that time.
[24^4] 35. General Frank. Still in February of 1942?
Mr. Anderson. That would possibly be around the 1st of March,
36. General Frank, Yes,
Mr. Anderson. And then I talked to him the day before he was
relieved, when the order came to him.
37. General Frank. Was he still intoxicated ?
Mr. Anderson. He still had whiskey on his breath.
38. General Frank. But as to whether or not his faculties were
impaired ?
Mr, Anderson, That I could not say, General, That is the hardest
thing in the world to say, A man can be drunk and maneuver around
and do certain jobs fairly well,
39. General Frank. In your own mind, when do you consider a
man drunk?
Mr. Anderson. Well, it is a hard thing to say. Some people think
if he is in the gutter he is drunk, but a man who has had more than
enough for him, I consider him drunk.
40. General Frank. In other words, you thought on these occa-
sions
Mr. Anderson. I actually thought he was drunk.
41. General Frank (continuing). That Colonel Wyman was carry-
ing more than he could hold ?
Mr. Anderson. Yes.
42. General Frank. That was your interpretation ?
Mr. Anderson. That was my interpretation, yes.
43. Major Clausen. Mr. Anderson, you testified to the Tenney
Committee that Colonel Wyman was in an intoxicated condition or
lay in the hotel drunk all the time for some five days before he
[2485] left his job.
Mr. Anderson. He stayed up in that hotel five days before he came
out, to the best of my memory.
1294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
44. Major Clausen. What is the basis of your statement that he lay
in the hotel drunk for those five days ?
Mr. Anderson. Well, he was gone and we saw him down in the
lobby once or twice during that time and he wasn't dressed for the
street.
45. Major Clausen. When you say "we saw him" you mean that
you saw him ?
Mr. Anderson. I saw him, yes, sir.
46. Major Clausen. And could it have been that he was working
in the hotel during those five days merely getting his papers ready
to get out ?
Mr. Anderson. That could be possible, sir.
47. Major Clausen. I was wondering where you got the basis for
your statement, that five days before Colonel Wyman left his job he
lay in the hotel drunk all the time. Specifically what is your basis for
that, Mr. Anderson ?
Mr. Anderson. Based on that, I don't know.
48. Major Clausen. In other words, the Board wants facts.
Mr. Anderson. That is true.
49. General Frank. Do you know anything about the situation in
Honolulu prior to December 7th ?
Mr. Anderson. No, sir, nothing whatever prior to the time I went
there.
50. General Frank. And you arrived there when ?
Mr. Anderson. I arrived there at the beginning of [24^6]
February.
51. Major Clausen. Do you know anything, Mr. Anderson, about
the work that was done on the Islands as an alternate air route down
to Australia ?
Mr. Anderson. Only that the men came back from Christmas Island
and told us that General Tinker had ordered them out.
52. Major Clausen, In other words, the Hawaiian Constructors
had been given certain work to do for an air route down to Australia,
is that correct ?
Mr. Anderson. Yes.
53. Major Clausen. And some of the returning men stated some-
thing with respect to the Hawaiian Constructors. What did they say,
sir?
Mr. Anderson. They said that General Tinker came to Christmas
Island — Canton Island was still going on — they said that General
Tinker came to Christmas Island and ordered all of the construction
men to leave there.
54. Major Clausen. Do you have the names of some of those men
who told you that? Can you give those names to the Board?
Mr. Anderson. I doubt whether I can or not. Major.
55. Major Clausen. You stated also to the Tenney Committee that
you believed that sabotage, in the sense that there was deliberate hold-
mg up of the work, had been going on for some time.
Mr. Anderson. Well, that is what it appeared to be.
56. Major Clausen. And what was the basis for that.
Mr. Anderson. On account of not being able to get certain things
done, could not get plans and other things of that kind. They were
always blaming the men. Middleton and Bazants in [2^87]
PROCEEDINGS OP ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1295
particular blamed the men that the work was not being gotten out
and the men would not work.
57. General Frank. Have you talked to anybody about this testi-
mony that you are giving here, in the last few days ?
Mr. Anderson. No, sir, 1 haven't seen anyone, except one boy that
came back from Honolulu two or three months ago, and we never
discussed anything about the island other than different people we
knew.
58. Major Clausen. Over what period time, Mr. Anderson, did
this sabotage go on ?
Mr. Anderson. We had a great deal of difficulty about getting the
job done all the way through.
59. Major Clausen. Do you know if that existed prior to the 7th
of December, 1941 ?
Mr. Anderson. That I could not say. That I would not know.
60. Major Clausen. By whom was this holding up of the work done ?
Mr. Anderson. Presumably the superintendents or whoever had
charge of the various areas.
61. Major Clausen. When this information came to you, Mr. An-
derson, as to these things, did you make reports to anyone?
Mr. Anderson. Not about that, because there was no one but — well,
I got a man to speak to Colonel Bathurst.
62. Major Clausen. Wlio was Colonel Bathurst?
Mr. Anderson. A deputy chief of staff.
63. Major Clausen. Wlio is this man that you got to speak to him ?
Mr. Anderson. A fellow by the name of Glasgow.
[^4^8] 64. Major Clausen. You say you got him to speak to
the Colonel ?
Mr. Anderson. Yes, about straightening this out, and he told
Glasglow that the thing would be straightened out shortly and
Colonel Wyman was relieved a week later.
65. Major Clausen. Did you ever make reports to G-2 concerning
these conditions.
Mr. Anderson. Not about the work. About going into Hickam
Field I did. I had a telephone call in the generator room one night
from a Japanese woman for an electrician, and I reported that
to G-2.
66. General Grunert. Mr. Anderson, I understand from your
testimony that you know practically nothing about what happened
prior to December 7th, 1941, in Hawaii?
Mr. Anderson. No.
67. General Grunert. And you do not know whether what you
considered might be sabotage occurred prior thereto?
Mr. Anderson. That I think. General, would be an expression
rather than a direct statement.
68. General Grunert. That was an opinion of your own?
Mr. Anderson. Yes. I see there they have Fort Kam. I never
to my knowledge ever heard of it.
69. General Grunert. All these things you know about happened
after December 7th, 1941?
Mr. Anderson. Yes, sir. I was here in California when the Japs
hit Pearl Harbor.
1296 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
70. General Grunert. Is there anything that you could tell us
about what happened prior to December 7th, 1941, or things that
might have led u]) to the conditions which you found when you got
over there?
[£489] Mr. Anderson. Well, General, I will tell you, this
whole construction setup, I worked on construction all my life, and
in the course of competitive construction we have to work when we
have material. We were at one time working there without any
wire and there were millions of feet lying there that we knew of,
and things of that kind were carried on. It appeared that those
people had the intention of always keeping the men disturbed.
Now, I cannot say that any Army officer had anything to do with
that, because Middleton, as far as the ordinary things went, was
the big! man there. Mr. Rohl and Mr. Woolley and Mr. Benson
had a committee, of which Mr. Woolley was the head. Charlie
Winsted told me they had started out there first and put Woolley
on that executive committee, supposed to operate it. Then they
decided that they should have another contractor from Honolulu
and they brought Mr. Benson in. Mr. Benson and Mr. Rohl had
nothing to say to any of the men of the Constructors when there
were any complaints. They were ahvays handed over to Mr.
Woolley. We had no hot water to bathe in. The construction men
needed it. They had a little 20-gallon tank and we could not get it.
Different things of that kind had gone on. The food was bad. The
Army cooks were good. When I lived with the soldiers there I
had no complaint to make about the food. The Army ration wias
sufficient and well cooked.
71. General Grunert. But these were all conditions existing
afterwards ?
Mr. Anderson. Existing afterwards, yes, sir.
72. General Grunert. You see, this Board is concerned only with
phases that had any bearing on the attack on Pearl Harbor and it is
limited in its investigation to such phases, so this [24^0] infor-
mation which you may have about conditions afterwards, unless it has
a bearing on what occurred or what the conditions were prior to the
attack, the Board cannot see any great connection with what it has
been charged with doing.
Mr. Anderson. I can understand that, General, and I would like
to say this much about that whole deal. The best thing that ever
happened to us was the Japs hitting us at Pearl Harbor and not at
sea. The Japanese have had the full run of those islands for years.
The people there are actually friendlier to the Japs than they are
to us, from my experience on the island. To my mind, this whole
business, the Truman Committee and all included, it is a political
football today, for which the Army and Navy will have to suffer.
It is something past to us. We have gotten over most of our soreness
about the whole thing. We were sore, because men 40 and 50 years
old to go into those things don't go in there for the fun of it. I can
earn that money here without going out there for the amount of
money we were paid. We went there because we thought we could
help, and we could not. We just could not help. That is the thing
that burned us up. We had this thing of working under Japanese.
It is a crime that a man should have to work under a Japanese at a
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1297
certain time. They actually had a strike at Bellows Field for a day
on that account. George Shaefer — he is in the Army now — he refused
to work for 13 days, and they stopped his pay and wouldn't pay him
afterwards, because he wouldn't w^ork under a Japanese. A Japanese
ma}' be a good American citizen, born here, no doubt, but they haven't
shown it. Of course, this whole thing, as I say, now, the politicians
are kicking it around. There will never be [2^91} anything
come of it or done. Rohl got out of his job and the rest of them like-
wise.
73. General Grunert. That will be all, I believe. Thank you.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
[£492] TESTIMONY OF GEORGE FRANCIS BARTLETT, EMART-
VILLE, CALIFORNIA
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. ]\Ir. Bartlett, will you please state to the Board
your full name and address?
Mr. Bartlett. George Francis Bartlett; postoffice address, Smart-
ville. California.
2. Colonel West. What is your occupation, Mr. Bartlett?
Mr. Bartlett. Engineer.
3. General Grunert. Mr. Bartlett, General Frank here, assisted by
Major Clausen, will lead in asking the questions, and the rest of the
Board will develo]) any subject that they think needs development.
Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir.
4. General Fraxk. Mr. Bartlett, what is your present occupation ?
Mr. Bartlett. I am a principal engineer with the USED on fur-
lough.
5. General Frank. How long is your furlough?
Mr. Bartlett. I am not doing anything at the present time. I am
convalescing from an eye ailment.
6. General Frank. Were you employed by the Engineers in Hono-
lulu along about 1940 and '41?
Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir.
7. General Frank. What was your job over there?
Mr. Bartlett. In Honolulu I was stationed at Fort Shaffer as
resident engineer or principal inspector at the underground command
post in the radio transmitter tunnels that were being built there by
the Hawaiian Constructor [2493] Company.
8. General Frank. At Aliamanu Crater?
Mr. Bartlett. No. At Fort Shafter.
9. General Frank. At Fort Shafter itself ?
Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir. Not in the crater. We put in two tunnels
there.
10. General Frank. How long have you been with the Corps of
Engineers ? ^ ^
Mr. Bartlett. Off and on since 1937. I was with them in 1937
and '38, and then I quit and was up on the Shasta Dam for a while.
Then I accepted a j^osition that they offered me to go to Honolulu,
and this is the time that I went and the time that I went to Foi't
Shafter.
1298 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
11. General Frank. What kind of work have you had most of your
experience in?
Mr. Bartlett. Mostly underground excavation and general con-
tracting, railroad building, and so forth, roads and highways.
12. General Frank. Will you state again what job you had in 1941?
Mr. Bartlett. I w^as the associate engineer acting as resident engi-
neer and principal inspector at the Fort Shafter underground radio
transmitter tunnel and the command post tunnel.
13. General Frank. From what date until what date, about?
Mr. Bartlett. Some time in late April until December.
14. General Frank. '41 ?
Mr. Bartlett. '41. At Fort Shafter.
15. General Frank. I see. Who were the contractors on that
\_H9J,-\ job?
Mr. Bartlett. Hawaiian Constructors.
16. General Frank. How did the work go ?
Mr. Bartlett. At times there was no cause for complaint, but most
of the time, why, we were stepping on them pretty hard.
17. General Frank. Why ?
Mr. Bartlett. Well, the general lack of procurement and passing
the buck, if you know what I mean, back to us. There was a con-
fusion of authority. In other words, we were supposed, as we under-
stood the Engineers, to furnish certain things, and the Constructors
would claim that they would furnish those things, and then it was
reverse position, and it led to confusion. That was one item in which
we had considerable difficulty: procurement, in other words.
18. General Frank. Do you remember any of those items?
Mr. Bartlett. They were all minor items.
19. General Frank. Such as?
Mr. Bartlett. Well, I can give you an example. We were start-
ing a large excavation, a tunnel, there. We had finished one smaller
tunnel, and we were putting in this command-post tunnel, which was
quite an excavation, and it ran into a long haul, the material of the
spoil. So I made a report of the general situation there and what
should be done, and the report went through Major Kobinson to
Colonel Wyman, and Colonel Wyman, as I understand, took it up with
the contractors, that they would have to get some other means besides
wheelbarrows to move this muck out of there, and they expressed their
inability to do it.
\2Ii95\ I found where there was some old equipment lying idle
in Honolulu in a junk yard and called Colonel Robinson's attention
to it, and immediately Colonel Wyman had me go clown and get that
material and equipment and have it set aside for the contractors to
purchase it. They had to do the purchasing in that particular in-
stance, for some mysterious reason. So they were several weeks in
getting around to purchasing it, and day by day went by and we were
mtensely busy, so we— I finally went down to headquarters again, in
the Young Building, and asked to see Colonel Wyman, and the Colonel
was not in, but I stated my case, and that night-
20. (ieneral Frank. To whom?
Mr. Bartlett. To Major Robinson, then. He was then Major.
And that night, why, the contractor went out there and got this
equipment, in trucks.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1299
21. General Frank. Who was the contractor?
Mr. Bartlett. Hawaiian Constructors.
22. General Frank. Do you remember who the particular-
Mr. Bartlett. Their representative at that time was a fellow we
named — we called Curly Ellison.
23. General Frank. Were there other instances of delay similar
to that?
Mr. Bartlett. Oh, yes. There were delays in procurement, in get-
ting different items, and there w^as considerable routine involved in
getting those items, but that Avas gradually
24. General Frank. Were the items available in the Islands?
Mr. Bartlett. They would be, yes, sir.
25. General Frank. Name some of them.
Mr. Bartlett. We had to get some what wo called inserts to
\3496] put into this radio transmitter tunnel, from the Honolulu
Iron Works, and they were available. I called up on the telephone
and they were available. So I had a procedure of finding out wdiero
these tilings were and then notifying the procurement department of
Ihe USED, who would get busy and get the stuff for us. But if we
could give them the leads, why, we found that, their time being taken
up with other things, why, — and not knowing exactly what we wanted,
and the nomenclature sometimes was indefinite, why, Ave generally
told them Avhere they could get this stuff, and they would go and
get it.
So in this particular instance these inserts Avere needed, and it Avas
holding up the work, and the Honolulu Iron Works had them and
would deliver them immediately. So the contractor Avas supposed to
call for them, and a day Avent by and two days and quite a few days,
and they finally stated that they Avere not doAvn there. I took a rep-
resentative of the
26. General Frank. Who told you? The contractor ?
Mr. Bartlett. The contractor stated that they Avere not there. And
I took a representative of the contracting company doAvn there, and
we found them and got them. Noav, that was indicative of the trifling
delays AA'hich do occur on all construction jobs, but I think it was more
pronounced down there than anywhere I have ever been.
27. General Frank. Can you give us another tAvo or three instances?
Mr. Bartlett. They were all just about as trivial as that. General,
and I am trying to think of something that was of more magnitude,
but I can't recall anything at present.
28. General Frank. Each one of these things, hoAvever, was
[!24'97] essential to the complete operation of the project Avhen it
Avas finished?
Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir.
29. General Frank. Is that right?
Mr. Bartlett. Yes, that is correct.
30. General Frank. Could it have operated without these things?
Mr. Bartlett. Yes, it could have. We could have got along, but the
Avork Avould haA'e been much sloAver. It Avouldn't have been the gen-
eral line of construction work as proper procedure.
31. General Frank. Would it haA^e been satisfactory?
Mr. Bartlett. It Avould have been very unsatisfactory to any con-
struction man, for instance, to see the laborer Avheeling out over a
79716— 46— Ex. 145, voL 2 33
1300 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
distance of twelve or fourteen hundred feet excavation material from
a face of a tunnel that was 12 by 16.
32. General Frank. In your observation of the operation of the
contractors did you observe anything; that indicated that there was any
intent on the part of the contractors to delay the work? Was there
anything that showed intent to delay the work?
Mr. Bartlett. Well, that would be an opinion. My opinion is yes,
tliere was an intent, but I couldn't definitely put my finger on anything
right now.
3?>. General Frank. What led you to your opinion that there was
intent?
Mr. Bartlett. Well, we would want certain things done at a cer-
tain time, and it would be resented on the part of the contractor. If I
gave them a definite order that such and [^498] such a thing
would have to be done at a certain time to make the work proceed in
an orderly way, why, they would quite often find some subterfuge
for not doing it, apparently, and we did not get along very well. There
was considerable bickering on the job, but we made them to a certain
extent expedite the work.
34. General Frank. Would anybody take care of them ? Was there
anybody topside taking care of them? Could they appeal to some-
body who would support them ?
Mr. Bartlett. The contractors ?
35. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. Bartlett. Yes.
36. General Frank. Who would support them ?
Mr. Bartlett. Well, as a rule it would go up to Ellison, and he
was the general superintendent.
37. General Frank. A civilian ?
Mr. Bartlett. A civilian, yes, sir.
38. General Frank. Yes?
Mr. Bartlett. And from Ellison it would go to a chap, a local con-
tractor that entered into that.
39. General Frank. Woolley?
Mr. Bartlett. Woolley. Woolley seemed to carry the load. We
saw very little of Paul Grafe of the Callahan Company, although he
was out there a few times, and old man Rohl was out there once, and
it would be appealed to them- and then apparently the thing would
be adjusted at headquarters and we would have our way about it, but
it would entail delays, and my impression ahvays was that the delays
were caused by the contractors and not by the USED, because every
man that I [2499] knew in the USED was trying very hard
to expedite the work.
40. General Frank. Once the information of any of this delay hav-
ing reached military headquarters, Colonel Wyman's headquarters,
wdiat was done about it ?
Mr. Bartlett. You would get action right away. If you could reach
Colonel Wyman or Colonel Robinson you would get action immedi-
ately. If it had to go through a routine and some of their subordinates,
it was a little slower. You would get a decision one way or the other
from Colonel Wyman or Major Robinson.
41. General Frai^^k. Did you ever run across Mr. Rohl?
Mr. Bartlett. Once.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1301
42. General Frank. What was the circumstance?
Mr. Bartlett. He came out there to the command-post tunnel, and
I saw a civilian walking over there, so I went over. It was during
the noon hour. The men were not working. And he walked in. I
think that either Colonel Robinson or Colonel Wyman was with
him, and one or two others, but he was over there by himself, and the
Army group was standing off to one side talking with some of the
personnel at Fort Shafter. So we all went in the tunnel together, and
Rohl made himself known to me and asked me who I was, and I told
him, and we walked through tlie tunnel and he told me who he was,
and it was his job.
43. General Frank. Nothing unusual about his being there?
Mr. Bartlett. No. It was the first and last time I ever saw him
there.
44. General Frank. I see. There was no incident that caused you
to remember it ?
[2S00] Mr. Bartlett. Yes.
45. General Frank. What was it ?
Mr. Bartlett. We had put in a little Denvfer-Gardner mucking ma-
chine, a little sort of a toy arrangement for loading cars, and the con-
tractors had brought that to facilitate loading and it wasn't our idea
of just what we should have, but it apparently was all that was avail-
able, and Rohl asked me what I thought of that, and I says, "Well,
what do you think of it ?" I says, "It's yours."
And he laughed and he says, "I don't have to tell you." And that
impressed itself on my mind at that time, and that is the way I happen
to recall Rohl was in there, because Woolley came out quite often, and
I had met Paul Grafe quite a few times. He had been out there several
times when we first started the job.
46. General Frank. Colonel Wyman ever come out there?
Mr. Bartlett. Oh, yes, very often.
47. General Frank. What was your impression of him ?
Mr. Bartlett. My impression of Coloned Wyman ?
48. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. Bartlett. Well, my impression at that time was that he was a
good engineer, carrying a very heavy load, difficult to approach, but
once you could get his ear long enough to tell him something, why- you
would get a decent decision. That seemed to be the impression that
we all had of Colonel Wyman at that time.
49. General Frank. Did, at any time while you were there, you ever
see him intoxicated?
Mr. Bartlett. No, I haven't.
[2501] 50. General Frank. What was his reputation among the
group that were working for him ?
Mr. Bartlett. Why, he was not particularly popular with any of
us. He was aloof, but we expected that, and he would come out there
and have very, very little to say, but the next day, why, we would get
a letter or something of that sort pointing out certain things and
ordering certain things done. That was his general procedure. In
other words, I would say that the Colonel didn't get close to his em-
ployees at all, like other officers that I worked under down there,
51. General Frank. Do you think that the circumstances surround-
ing these delays could have been helped ?
1302 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Bartlett. Yes, I think they could have been helped.
52. General Frank. How?
Mr. Bartlett. I believe that a change in personnel in quite a few
respects
53. General Frank. Of personnel. Personnel representing the
Engineer Corps or the contractors?
Mr. Bartlett. Well, both. Both, possibly including myself- because
I was more or less cranky down there when things didn't go to suit
me, and 1 presume I was temperamental, and I know some of the others
were that took the job more or less seriously, and there were others that
didn't take the job quite so seriously. You lind that in every outfit,
I guess.
54. General F'rank. Do you think that these delays prevented the
completion of some of that work before December 7th ?
Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir. Tliat work should have been done — going
on ordinary construction standards, we should have had our work done
in 60 percent of the time that it took for [£50^] accomplish-
ment. That's offhand 60 percent.
55. General Frank, ^hicli of those projects, in your opinion,
should have been finished prior to Pearl Harbor?
Mr. Bartlett. The radio transmitter station on Kokee should have
been finished.
56. General Frank. That is up on Kauai ?
Mr. Bartlett. Kauai, yes, sir. And the radio transmitter tunnel
should have been finished.
57. General Frank. On Kauai ?
Mr. Bartlett. No.
58. General Frank. At Shaffer?
Mr. Bartlett. At Shaffer. Now, the Engineers had that ready
for installation of equipment, but the Signal Corps had difficulty in
getting the equipment; and when the equipment came, some of it had
been ordered by the Signal Corps, some by the contractor. It was not
the proper equipment. It was fouled up some way, and we couldn't
set up things as we should, so we improvised and got it going anyway.
But it was very unsatisfactory and disconcerting.
59. GeneralFRANK. What other projects should have been finished
before Pearl Harbor and were not finished because of these delays?
Mr. Bartlett. Well, I can't recall any now.
60. General Frank. Was there any dissention or squabbling among
the contractors?
Mr. Bartlett. Among themselves ?
61. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. Bartlett. Yes, their personnel used to squabble considerably.
They were fiighting among themselves. The [2S03] weather
was hot, and there were the petty jealousies that you find on construc-
tion jobs sometimes where there is not a well ordered head to it.
62. General Frank. What about the control of that construction
group? Was it well controlled or poorly controlled, the Hawaiian
Constructors?
Mr. Bartlett. Well, my impression — my definite impression is, it
was very poorly controlled.
63. General Frank. Well, it was under two heads there at different
times: it was under Mr. Grafe for a while, and then it was under
Mr. Kohl. Was there any difference that you could feel ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1303
Mr. Bartlett. I didn't notice Rohl entering into the picture much.
It seemed to be Grafe, and then after he left, why, Rohl was there for
a short time, but Woolley seemed to take over.
64. General Frank. You never thought that thei'e was good posi-
tive control?
Mr. Bartlett. No, sir, I didn't. And there wasn't good positive co-
operation. We didn't feel that we were all shoving along together at
any time. We just couldn't make them see our point.
65. General Frank. All right.
66. Major Clausen. When was it, Mr. Bartlett, that you saw Mr.
Rohl?
Mr. Bartlett. I think it must have been along in the summer
months. We were from June until December on the command post,
and it was along in probably August.
67. Major Clausen. Of what year, sir?
[250 J^\ Mr. Bartlett. '41.
68. Major Clausen. Do you know^ anything concerning the rela-
tions between Mr. Rohl and Colonel Wyman?
Mr. Bartlett, No, I do not.
69. Major Clausen. I have no further questions.
70. General Russell. You state that when you saw Rohl on one
occasion he said, "I don't have to tell you,'' referring to some little
appliances for loading cars?
Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir.
71. General Russell. And you said that impressed you, Mr. Bart-
lett?
Mr. Bartlett. Yes.
72. General Russell. Now, why did that ?
Mr. Bartlett. Well, I thought that the other — his men had tried
to sell me the idea that this little mucking machine was quite all right
and it was doing effective work, and my impression Avas that it wasn't
the indicated equipment for a job of that sort. So when Rohl made
that remark that he didn't have to tell me and laughed, why, I just
made a mental reservation, "Well, that old fellow is a little more —
knows a little more about it than some of the men working for him,"
or something of that sort. That is the impression I got, but it was
his
[2505] 73. General Russell. Your impression was that Rohl
probably had the same idea about it that you did ?
Mr. Bartlett. No, sir; I don't think that. I think that he just
figured that they put a mucking machine in there, and it was on the
cost-plus basis, and it was in there messing along and jumping off the
track and disconcerting the labor, and it didn't appeal to me, and he
know that it wasn't adequate, but he just said, "I don't have to tell
you," and laughed about it ; and I guess he was correct about it.
74. General Russell. You got the impression he wanted to tell you
that was the contractors' job, not the engineers' job, and he did not
have to ?
Mr. Bartlett. Well, General, no, I did not get that impression. I
got the impression that he was sort of evading the issue, and it was a
rather delicate flattery to me, because he was talking, one construction
man to another, and he wasn't going to tell me anything, but he was
just going to laugh it off.
1304 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
75. General Etjssell. I do not remember when you stated you left
out there, Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Fort Shafter ?
76. General Russell. When you left the islands to come back.
Mr. Bartlett. Oil. I went to Kauai on the 2nd of December to ex-
pedite the work.
77. General Russell. 1941, or 1942?
Mr. Bartlett. 1941 ; to e'xpedite the radar station over there. I
was there until August 1942, and the work was pretty well finished up,
and then I went over to Honolulu, and I was there until nearly De-
cember, and I think I arrived here, the 10th of December.
[2S06] 78. General Russell. Wyman was out there in 1942,
when you left, was he ?
Mr. Bartlett. Xo, I think he had left. No, Colonel Wyman was
district engineer in May, I think.
79. General Russell. But you were serving with the Department
Engineers for the United States Army all that time ?
Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir.
80. General Russell. Well, when you left the islands and came back
to this country, did you then close your relations with the engineers?
Have you been with them since, or not ?
Mr. Bartlett. Yes ; I went to Canada, up to Edmonton. Colonel
Wyman requested five or six of us up there, and I was dissatisfied with
conditions up there, so I resigned, and they wouldn't accept my resig-
nation, but gave me a furlough.
81. General Russell. Now, if I have gotten your testimony cor-
rectly estimated, you were of the very definite opinion that the oper-
ation by the Hawaiian Constructors during your association with
them in Oahu and in the Hawaiian Department was unsatisfactory.
Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir.
82. General Russell, Distinctly unsatisfactory?
Mr. Bartlett. Distinctly unsatisfactory.
83. General Russell. And you would attribute that condition to a
lack of positive supervision?
Mr. Bartlett. A lack of experienced personnel.
84. General Russell. In what grades? In the supervisory grades ?
Mr. Bartlett. In all grades, right down through, skilled labor,
and everything but the common labor. The common labor, the Fili-
pino labor, and the Hawaiian labor, when it was good, it was excellent ;
and what we had was mostly excellent.
[2S07] 85. General Russell. And the inefficiency extended on
up to the top?
Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir ; it did.
86. General Russell. And you do not think that Rohl's appearance
on the island influenced the situation which you are now describing?
Mr. Bartlett. No; I am not familiar with anything that he did
down there. The only time I ever saw the man was when he came
out there, that particular time.
87. General Russell. Did you tell General Frank when that visit
was, by Rohl ?
Mr. Bartlett. I think it was in August, but I am not sure.
88. General Russell. 1941?
Mr. Bartlett. In 1941 ; yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1305
89. General Russell. It could have been in September or October?
Mr. Bartlett. It might have been.
90. Geneial Rlssell. Had you known Rohl before i'
Mr. B ARTivETT. No, sir.
91. General Russell. Had you been in the construction work on
the west coast for any time before this '.
Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir.
92. General Russelt>. You knew nothing of the Rohl-Connolly Com-
pany?
Mr. Bartlett. Oh, yes ; I knew "Tom'' Connolly.
93. General Russell. You knew "Tom" Connolly %
Mr. Bartlett. Oh, yes.
94. General Russell. How do you regard Connolly, as a contractor
and operator ?
\%508'\ Mr. Bartlett. Well, "Tom" and I were pretty friendly
at one time. We were both on the Hetch-Hetchy job, years ago, and
he branched out and went into contracting, and our paths crossed a
few times, and he seemed to be getting along pretty good, and I figured
he was rather a bright, aggressive young man, as a contractor, and
was doing all right, and I wished him well; but 1 have not seen "Tom"
Connolly since I was over in Goat Island one time, there, and they
were putting in a tunnel, and that is the last time I saw him, the last
time I ever had any conversation.
95. General Russell. How about this Callahan Company? How
were they regarded in the construction world?
Mr. Bartlett. Well, that calls for my opinion again, and I will
say — I am trying to be as cooperative as I can on this, without stick-
ing my neck out too far — but I will say that the Callahan outfit had
the best personnel; their lead men were better, than men that they
brought over to the islands were better than any of the others.
96. General Russell. Including the Rohl-Connolly Company?
Mr. Bartlett. I didn't see any Rohl-Connolly men that were worth
a darn. In fact. I din't remember any of them, now.
97. General Rl^ssell. You do not know when their first supervisory
personnel reached the island ?
Mr. Bartlett. I think it arrived in February or March 1941, and I
arrived there in April 1941. There were some of them there when I
got there.
98. General Russell. You are certain of that? There were some
Rohl-Connolly?
Mr. Bartlett. Yes ; "Shorty" McCoy and "Curly" Ellison \_2509'\
were there.
99. General Russell. Were they Rohl-Connolly people ?
Mr. Bartlett. They were Callahan people.
100. General Russell. I am talking about Rohl-Connolly super-
visors.
Mr. Bartlett. I don't know any of their men that were there.
101. General Russell. And you do not know when they first came,
or if they came while you were there ?
Mr. Bartlett. I don't know of any that came.
102. General Russell. Did you know any of the Rohl-Connolly
Company's supervisors that were out there at any time while you were
on the island ?
1306 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Bartlett. No, sir ; I can't recall any.
103. General Kussell. Sor far as you know, then, there were none,
or do you mean that you cannot recall them ?
Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir. There was supposed to be a tunnel outfit,
and all the tunnel men that we got were from Callahan.
104. General Russell. That is all.
Mr. Bartlett. And Callahan picked some of them up from the Red
Hill in the Navy. They were stealing each other's key men all the
while down there, and we were trying to stop it.
105. General Grunert. Mr. Bartlett, do you know of your own
knowledge, or have you any reason to suspect, that the contractors
purposely and intentionally delayed any part of these projects with a
view toward sabotaging them, or with a view toward making the situ-
ation more favorable to a Japanese [2510] attack?
Mr. Bartlett. No. Of course, we all have our opinions, but I have
no substantial basis for my opinion.
106. General Grunert. These minor things that you mentioned —
and you called them minor — were they of such nature that they de-
layed projects that would have been of great value in the defense?
Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir.
107. General Grunert. For instance, how would your CP have
been able, if it had been completed, to have had any effect on what
actually happened ?
Mr. Bartlett. The CP wouldn't. The CP would— that went the
best of any job that we had, and in spite of the fact that the expense
was great, and the manner of operation was not good construction
methods, still we felt that we were doing the best that we could by mov-
ing that spoil out in small quantities. Instead of having a big Conway
mucking machine and large cars and so forth and going right through
it, why, we had to whittle away with small stuff; but the command
post would have been finished by the first of the year if we hadn't had
the "blitz," it was that far along; but that didn't affect the general
situation down there. It is my personal impression that, had the
Kokee radar station been finished, it might have made a big difference.
108. General Grunert. What do you know about that particular
situation ?
Mr. Bartlett. Well, I finished the job over there. That is where
they sent me on the second of December. I went over there as area
engineer to speed up the Barking Sand airport, and the Kokee radar
station.
109. General Grunert. You went over there on the 2nd of Decem-
ber?
[2511] Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir.
110. General Grunert. What did you find when you got over there ?
Mr. Bartlett. Well, I found the Hawaiian Constructors there with
three supervisory personnel. They hadn't the tower up. The mate-
rial had been there for some time.
111. General Frank. How long, about?
Mr. Bartlett. Oh, it had been there for — it was a matter of weeks.
I couldn't recall now just how long; but we had it up ; in five days, that
tower was up.
112. General Grunert. AVithout getting anything additional?
Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1307
113. General Grunert. All the materials were there ?
Mr. Bartlett. It seems they had difficulty getting the iron workers
or something of that sort, and they went over there at the same time
I did, and we got that tower up, and then the signal corps moved in,
and we had the station going in a few weeks. Then we afterwards
did a great deal more work, there, but we had the station operating;
but, had that station been operating before December 7, it might have
been a different story, probably. Again, it might not.
114. General Grunert. Whether other stations were operating, or
not?
Mr. Bartlett. Well, I think that that station, from what I have
heard, it might have just emphasized to others that there was a serious-
ness of an attack.
115. General Grunert. Do you know anything about the informa-
tion center, or the "control center," as they call it, of the Air Warning
Service, whether that had been completed, so that [2S12] the
outlying stations could use the center, through which to transmit infor-
mation ?
Mr. Bartlett. If you mean the filter center, why, that was — I am
afraid I have confused you a little. We call that "command post,"
which it was to be — it is a filter center, now, as well as a command
post, at Shafter.
116. General Grunert. It was built as a command post?
Mr. Bartlett. It was built as a command post to start with, and
we always called it that, and then we enlarged it, and so forth, and
went along, and we put in the filter center.
117. General Grunert. What I am getting at is whether you know
enough of the whole picture to be able to tell us what parts were com-
plete, what not complete, and how it affected the picture of what hap-
pened on December 7. As far as I could gather, you were primarily
concerned, up to December 2, with vour command post, that tunnel
at Shafter?
Mr. Bartlett. That is right.
118. General Grunert. You did not get in this other game until
December 2?
Mr. Bartlett. That is right.
119. General Grunert. And then you saw this one station, the con-
dition of that?
Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir.
120. General Grunert. Now. Avhat do you know about the filter
center, and what do you know about the other AWS stations, if any-
thing?
Mr. Bartlett. On Oahu?
121. General Grunert. Yes.
Mr. Bartlett. Well, only what I have heard, that there [^SW]
was, over on the other side of the island, a mobile station that was in
operation at that time.
122. General Grunert. Are there any other questions?
123. General Frank. Hawaiian Constructors consisted of several
firms working together?
Mr. Barti.ett. Yes, sir.
124. General Frank. WTiere did the supervisors and overseers come
from, representing the contractors?
1308 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Bartlett. I have been told, I think by some of the men them-
selves, and by others, that Ellison came from Los Angeles
125. General Frank. No, what I mean is, how did they determine
who supervised the jobs? Were there so many men from Callahan
Co., so many men from Gunther & Shirley Company, and so many men
from Rohl-ConnoUy, or how did that work out, do yon know?
Mr. Bartlett. Well, I talked with the boys about that, some of
them, and it seems that they sent over whatever men they didn't need,
Gunther & Shirley sent over some men, and they were mostly clerical
men. There were very few construction men in their outfit. And
the Callahan people sent over five or six construction men ; some of
them were all right ; some were not.
126. General Frank. In other words, the supervisors and overseers
that the contractors sent over there were those that they could spare,
and they were not outstanding construction men. is that tlie idea i
Mr. Bartlett. There were some of them that were good construc-
tion men for the jobs they were doing. There were some of them
really tried, and some didn't.
127. General Frank. Have you any information, to be more
[2S14] specific along that line ?
Mr. Bartlett. Yes. We had a fellow there, on Oahu. this Ellison,
that was messing the things up pretty bad, and I didn't consider him
efficient.
128. General Frank. For whom was he working?
Mr. Bartlett. He was working for Hawaiian Constructors, and he
was a Callahan man; and they picked up a fellow from Red Hill,
that had been a Callahan man, a fellow named Cherry ; he was a good
tunnel man. He made that command post go along pretty good. Then
he moved, and we had a fellow named "Shorty" McCoy, from Texas,
a Callahan man; and a fellow named Cummings, a Callahan man.
They were good average construction men, dirt movers; and then one
of them, his year was up. McCoy, he went away, and they sent a man
over there that I could never find, he was intoxicated most of the time,
and so I had him relieved, finally, but I had a lot of difficulty of getting
rid of him. That took me months to get rid of him.
129. General Frank. Who was it?
Mr. Bartlett. I am trying to think of his name. The records will
show it. And we finally got rid of him, and the engineers took over
the work over there, completely.
130. Major Clausen. Mr. Bartlett, you mentioned previously in
your testimony having gone to a certain island and there doing work
on a radio transmitter, at which island you arrived on 2 December
1941. Do you recall that, and was that the Island of Kauai?
Mr. Bartlett. Kauai ; yes, sir.
131. Major Clausen. You said the work that you did there was
on that radio transmitter. Then, later on, you explained that it was
a radar station ; that is correct, isn't it ?
[2S1S] Mr. Bartlett. It was radar. It was an Air Warning
Service station.
132. Major Clausen. So, when you called it a "radio transmitter,"
you meant it was one of these?
Mr. Bartlett. We put in a radio transmitter station there also,
afterwards. The radar was the first one that we put up, the Air Warn-
ing Service station.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1309
133. Major Clausen, That was one of the permanent air-raid warn-
ing service stations ?
Mr. Bartlett, Yes, that was a permanent installation. We stuck it
up in the house to start with, and then w^e went underground after-
wards and connected it up.
134. Major Clausen. All right. That is all.
135. General Grunert. Do you think of anything else that might
throw light on this subject?
Mr. Bartlett. I would like to be as helpful as I can. I feel that
we were taken for a ride over there in lots of ways, and this thing
has come up to me so suddenly, and I had a great deal of difficulty in
getting down here, and not much sleep, and I haven't been a very
good witness, I am afraid; but I have tried to be as cooperative as 1
could. I can't think of anything else at this time.
136. General Grunert. Thank you very much for coming.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Brief recess.)
[riSlO] HARRY W. FLANNERY, 537 NORTH WILCOX,
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA.
(The witness was sworn by the Kecorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Mr. Flannery, will you please state to this Board
your name and address ?
Mr. Flannery. My name is Harry W. Flannery, address 537 North
Wilcox, Los Angeles, 4.
2. Colonel West. What is your occupation?
Mr. Flannery. Occupation, radio news analyst. Columbia Broad-
casting System.
3. General Grunert. Mr. Flannery, I am asking General Frank,
assisted by Major Clausen, to develop this particular lead that we are
after.
Mr. Flannery. All right.
4. Major Clausen. Mr. Flannery, you are a radio news analyst for
what station?
Mr. Flannery. Columbia Broadcasting System, operating out of
KNX, Los Angeles.
5. Major Clausen. And you have been so for what period of time?
Mr. Flannery. Since March 15, 1942 on KNX. I have been with
the Columbia Broadcasting System since January 1st, 1935.
6. Major Clausen. You were formerly on duty in Berlin?
Mr. Flannery. Right. I followed William L. Shirer as Columbia
correspondent.
7. Major Clausen. And you wrote "Assignment to Berlin" on your
return ?
Mr. Flannery. Yes.
8. Major Clausen. Do you know a party by the name of Werner
Plack?
Mr. Flannery. Yes, sir.
9. Major Clausen. Do you have occasion to know whether he was
[2517] in Berlin working for the German Foreign Office?
Mr. Flannery. That is right.
10. Major Clausen. That was during what period of time?
1310 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Flannery. That was during the period from some time in the
early part of 1941, I think January, up until the time I left, and
presumably he is still in Germany.
11. Major Clausen. What date was it that you were sent to Berlin
as correspondent for the Columbia Broadcasting System?
Mr. Flannery. I arrived there on November 4th, 1940.
12. Major Clausen. And you were relieved on what date?
Mr. Flannery. And I was relieved on September 29th, that is, I
left Berlin September 29, 1941, and arrived back here October 15th,
1941.
13. Major Clausen. When did your acquaintance with Werner
Plack originate?
Mr. Flannery. When he arrived in Berlin from the United States.
The time was early in 1941, I believe January. My records do not
show whether it was January or not, except that I know I met him
with Charles Lanius, who was NBC representative, and Lanius, I
know, did not arrive in Berlin until January, 1941.
14. Major Clausen. Do you know whether Werner Plack had any
connection with Fritz Wiedemann, at one time the German Consul
General at San Francisco?
Mr. Flannery. Of my direct knowledge, I do not know, but I
understand he was in the Consulate with Fritz Weidemann in San
Francisco.
15. Major Clausen. Do you know whether he had any connection
with Doctor Gyssling, the German Consul in Los Angeles?
[2518] Mr. Flannery. No.
16. Major Clausen. By the way, you mention this Werner Plack
in your book, do you not, "Assignment to Berlin" ?
Mr. Flannery. Yes, sir, that is right.
17. Major Clausen. Could you tell the Board in detail just what
duties Mr. Plack performed ?
Mr. Flannery. He was in the Radio Department for the German
Foreign Office. There were two men principally in the office. The
head of the office was George von Lilienfeldt, who was also in the
United States previous to assuming his duties there. Plack was his
assistant, and during a period of 1941, a period of several months,
when Lilienfeldt was in the Baltic States in the Foreign Office, after
the Russian War had started, Plack was in charge of the radio de-
partment of the Foreign Office. His duties consisted of arranging
broadcasts to the United States on the Nazi radio, and being a censor
for the American broadcasts or broadcasts by Americans to the United
States, and also arranging a sort of an entertainment committee of the
Nazis. They had a number of men whose duty it was to try to make
the press and radio feel better, that is, arrange dinners and parties
and things like that.
18. Major Clausen. Did he indicate to you at any time his propa-
ganda activities in the United States on behalf of the German Reich?
Mr. Flannery. You mean during the time he was here or during
the time he was in Berlin?
19. Major Clausen. Well, did he ever boast to you in Berlin that
he had been active in the United States as a propaganda agent?
[£519] Mr. Flannery. He did not boast to me about it, but he
seemed not disturbed and rather, instead, pleased at some notoriety
he had achieved here, in which he was accused of having taken part
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1311
in propaganda activities here. There was an article we had — I be-
lieve it was in magazine Vogue — we had copies of a number of Ameri-
can magazines and newspapers over there — in which he happened to
be mentioned as one of those w^ho were working on Nazi propaganda
in the United States, and he showed it to us with great pride. His
name was merely mentioned in the article.
20. Major Clausen. Do you remember the issue of Vogue in which
that appeared?
Mr. Flannert. I do not, but it usually took us two months or more
to get a copy, so I presume it was issued some time in 1941.
21. Major Clausen. Was he accused of espionage in this article
written in Vogue ?
Mr. Flannery. As I recall it, yes.
22. Major Clausen. Do you know the circumstances under which
this party, Werner Plack, left the United States and went to Berlin?
Mr. Flannery. As he told it to me, he left in the last part of 1940,
going to Berlin by way of Japan, presumably, therefore, leaving
from San Francisco. As he left he told me that he had a lot of trouble
with the F. B. I. He claimed that this was due to his having made a
number of telephone calls to girls all over the country. He claimed
they were innocent calls. The F. B. I. apparently did not think so.
The F. B. I. went all through his baggage. According to Plack, he
was up all [2520] night before getting on the boat. They went
all through his baggage his cigarettes and packages and everything
else, after he had had them packed. He also had a little fight in Holly-
wood just previous to that with a man who is now in the United
States Army. The man came up to Plack, according to newspaper
accounts and told Plack, "You are a dirty Nazi," and Plack apparently
did not reply.
23. Major Clausen. Do you know the route taken by Plack back
to Germany?
Mr. Flannery. By way of Japan, so I was told.
24. Major Clausen. In other words, he went via Japan?
Mr. Flannery. That is right.
25. Major Clausen. Could you approximate the approximate time
he arrived in Germany on this return route from the United States?
Mr. Flannery. No, because I don't know exactly when he left
the United States. The records will show.
26. Major Clausen. You did not known this Werner Plack in
the United States, did you?
Mr. Flannery. No.
27. Major Clausen. Do you know whether he was the Werner
Plack who formerly had lived in Los Angeles? Did he tell you he
had lived in Los Angeles?
Mr. Flannery. Yes, he said he had lived in Los Angeles. He told
me that, and I have heard since from other people about a Werner
Plack who lived there. In every respect in checking on his habits
and occupation and so forth, it is the same man. He was a wine
salesman in Hollywood.
28. Major Clausen. Do you know what if any connection with
Werner [3S21] Plack this party Hans Wilhelm had?
Mr. Flannery. I do not know, no.
29. General Frank. Did he have anything on the ball?
1312 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Flannert. Plack?
30. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. Flannery. Yes, Plack was pretty clever as a propagandist.
He arranged the Wodehouse broadcasts, and he also planned — I don't
know whether he planned — those of Count von Luckner. Von Luckner
was very well liked here after the other war, and putting him on the
air, and Wodehouse, in the American magazines and so forth, and
his also planning on putting on von Eckener and the Crown Prince,
his idea of putting those on the radio was with the idea that more
listeners would listen to it and the propaganda would get over. So
he was an able man in that respect. At the same time he was handi-
capped considerably by his habits of drinking, as a result of which
he sometimes could not read my copy, which was supposed to be
censored.
31. General Frank. That was going to be the next question; how
about the use of alcohol ?
Mr. Flannery. He was very fond of liquor.
32. General Frank. To what extent did it incapacitate him?
Mr. Flannery. Well, he couldn't can-y out his duties as censor
in that particular respect, because he could not see the copy. One
night he asked me to read mine to him. Of course, I could read any-
thing, but he couldn't even concentrate upon what I was reading. I
remember on this night he felt that as the censor he should put some-
thing on the script, so he took out his pencil and started at the front.
I had to stop him on \2522'] that and erase it, because it
would not be decipherable by the time it left the place. I don't
know whether this habit incapacitated him in his other duties or not,
but T presume it would.
33. General Frank. How effective in the United States do you think
he would have been as an agent ?
Mr. Flannery. He might have been — this is just my opinion —
fairly successful, because he was that type of person whom the Ger-
mans, I understand, had a number of over here, who would give parties
and would supply a lot of liquor and otherwise spend money for food
and so forth, and after these parties a lot of things could be said in
favor of the Nazis. As I came back to Hollywood afterwards the last
time here, I understand that largely Plack did that sort of thing. It
can be a very insidious sort of thing, because you will not be seeming
to have that as your main purpose, but as you do have these parties
you can talk about Germany being right in this respect and Germany
being right in the otlier respect, and that was the way he could oper-
ate, and I think that was one of the reasons why he had that particular
job over there.
34. General Grunert. Do you know Colonel Wyman ?
Mr. Flannery. I do not know Colonel Wyman.
35. General Grunert. Do you know of any connection that Plack
may have had with Hawaii ?
Mr. Flannery. Hawaii, no. All of the other material in regard
to Plack with Rolil and Wyman would not be of my knowledge, so I
do not know about that.
36. General Grunert. Thank you very much for coming.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition).
Thereupon, at 3 : 50 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of wit-
nesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1313
imsi CONTENTS
Tuesday, September 5, 1944
Testimony of — Page '
H. J. King, 904 South Oakland Street, Pasadena, California 2524
Emma Jane Ballard, Colton, California 2567
Emil Lawrence Zucca, Senior Aircraft Service Mechanic, San Ber-
nardino, California 2580-A
1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original transcript of proceedings.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1315
V^mi PKOCEEDINGS BEFORE THE AEMY PEAEL
HAEBOR BOAED
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1944.
Presidio of San Francisco, California.
The Board, at 9 : 30 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, con-
ducted tlie hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President
of the Board, presiding.
Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry
D. Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.
Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C.
Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr.,
Executive Officer.
General Grunert. The Board will come to order.
TESTIMONY OF H. J. KING, 904 SOUTH OAKLAND STEEET,
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Mr. King, "will you please state to the Board
your name and address ?
Mr. King. My name is H. J. King. My address is 904 South Oak-
land, in Pasadena.
2. Colonel West. And what is your occupation, Mr. King?
Mr. King. I am a construction engineer.
3. Major Clausen. Mr. King, vou are an engineer?
Mr. King. Yes.
\2525'\ 4. Major Clausen. You are a graduate of Northwestern
University ?
Mr. King. Not a graduate of Northwestern, no. I attended North-
western.
5. Major Clausen. You studied engineering at that university?
Mr. King. Yes, sir.
6. Major Clausen. You have a son who is now a professor there?
Mr. King. He is not — he is now at the University of California.
7. Major Clausen. I see.
Mr. King. He was at that time.
^ 8. Major Clausen, But you have had engineering experience, both
civil and military ; is that correct ?
Mr, King. Yes, sir.
9. Major Clausen, You were in the United States Army the period
of 1917 to 1919 with the rank of Major ?
Mr. King. I was, not during that time ; 1 didn't hold the rank of
Major. I resigned from the reserves in '29 as a Major.
79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 2 34
1316 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
10. Major Clausen. But you have had-
Mr. King. Yes, I was in the 4th Division during the last war.
11. Major Clausen. Do you recall having met Hans Wilhelm Rohl
in the Hawaiian Islands in the capacity where you were working
for the Hawaiian Constructors ?
Mr. King. Yes.
12. Major Clausen. In what condition did you find Mr. Rohl?
Mr. King. Well, he was playing pretty hard.
13. Major Clausen. He was what, sir ?
[£5£6] _ Mr. King. Playing pretty hard.
14. Major Clausen. Playing at what?
Mr. King. Well, that I couldn't say. He just wasn't paying very
much attention to business ; I know that.
15. Major Clausen. You mean he was playboying ?
Mr. King. Yes.
16. Major Clausen. He was a playboy?
Mr. King. Yes, that's it.
17. Major Clausen. Did you find him drunk?
Mr. King. I never saw him when he wasn't, more or less.
18. Major Clausen. And that observation of Mr. Rohl in that
condition commenced when, Mr. King?
Mr. King. On the 16th of February in '42.
19. Major Clausen. And continued for what period of time?
Mr. King. Until about the middle of June of the same year.
20. Major Clausen. Now, when you reported there
21. General Frank. Did you know him prior to Pearl Harbor ?
Mr. King. I knew him to speak to, and that's all. I knew him by
reputation.
22. General Frank. Did this same condition exist prior to Pearl
Harbor, that you know?
Mr. King. I only know that. General, by inference and by hearsay.
23. Major Clausen. The General has brought out that point. Did
you know prior to Pearl Harbor, from hearsay and general knowledge,
anything concerning Colonel Wyman?
Mr. KcNG. Yes, I did.
24. Major Clausen. And what was that concerning his proclivities
for playboying or drinking ?
[2527] Mr. King. Well, the general impression around Los
Angeles where Colonel Wyman was stationed was that he was pretty
much of a playboy too.
25. Major Clausen. And what about his drinking?
Mr. King. Well, that was generally understood, that he was a pretty
hard drinker.
26. Major Clausen. Well, later on did you meet Colonel Wyman in
the Hawaiian Islands ?
Mr. Kjng. Yes, I saw him.
27. Major Clausen. And what was his condition?
Mr. Kjng. I never did see him drunk.
28. Major Clausen. Did that surprise you?
Mr. King. It did, yes, because I had previously heard of his being
a hard drinker.
29. Major Clausen. As a matter of fact, when you reported, there
was a considerable time in the Hawaiian Islands before you were
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1317
actually able to commence work because of the condition of Mr. Rohl 5
isn't that correct ?
Mr. King. Well, I presume that it had a great deal to do with it.
He was chairman of the executive board at Hawaiian Constructors,
and they just couldn't get him on the spot or get him to work.
30. Major Clausen. In other words, you waited around there
some
Mr. King. Thirty days.
31. Major Clausen. Thirty days before he was sufficiently sober to
put you to work?
Mr. King. Well, at any rate he didn't put me to work, [£528]
and I i^resume that was the reason.
32. General Frank. When did you go there ?
Mr. King. I left San Francisco on the 15th and arrived in Honolulu
on the 16th.
33. General Frank. Of what?
Mr. King. February '42.
34. Major Clausen. You commenced work as area superintendent
for Area 14, which included the Ewa area, on March 15, 1942 ; is that
correct, Mr. King?
Mr. King. Approximately, that is the date.
35. Major Clausen. And you were area superintendent for the
Hawaiian Constructors ?
Mr. King. Yes.
36. Major Clausen. And about two weeks later you were appointed
general superintendent for the Hawaiian Constructors ; is that right ?
Mr. King. That is correct.
37. Major Clausen. And you occupied that position until you left
the Islands ?
Mr. King. Yes.
38. General Frank. On what projects were you engaged over in
the Ewa area?
Mr. King. Well, in the Ewa area there was the A. W. S. station.
39. General Frank. A^Hiere ?
Mr. King. Well, I can't remember the name of the mountain, but
it was off to the right of Ewa, back up in the mountains there. There
was a number of 5-inch battery positions that were under way at that
time. There wasn't much going on in [2529'] Area 14 at that
particular time, and shortly afterwards Area 14 was consolidated with
Area 3.
40. Major Clausen. Mr. King, did you have occasion to observe
the work that had been done by the Hawaiian Constructors before
you arrived?
Mr. King. Well, I saw what had been done prior to the time I
arrived, of course, after I arrived there.
41. Major Clausen. Yes. And as an engineer and skilled in build-
ing, you were able to form some conclusions as to the character of this
work that had been done?
Mr. King. Yes.
42. General Frank. More particularly the conditions under which
it had been done, the state or morale of the people that were engaged
in the work.
43. Major Clausen. Yes, sir.
1318 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
44. General Frank. What was that?
Mr. King. Very poor,
45. Major Clausen. Now, I invite your attention, Mr. King, to an
affidavit dated December 18, 1943, and especially this part : "Generally
speaking, the work that had been accomplished under the supervision
of Colonel Wyman prior to December 7, 1941, was pretty lousy."
Tell the Board first, Mr. King, what work —
This affidavit, you recall having made that statement?
Mr. King. Yes.
46. Major Clausen. This affidavit that I have in mind is an affi-
davit that you furnished the House Committee on Military Affairs;
is that correct ?
Mr. King. That is correct, yes.
[2530'] 47. Major Clausen. And the date on which that was
done is this date that I have indicated, December 18, 1943?
Mr. King. It was some time around December 18, during December.
48. Major Clausen. And at that time you gave this affidavit to Mr.
John H. Weiner, representative of the House Military Affairs
Committee?
Mr. King. That is correct.
49. Major Clausen. Yes. Now, tell the Board just what work it was
that you had in mind at the time that you stated in this affidavit that
the work accomplished under the supervision of Colonel Wyman prior
to Pearl Harbor was pretty lousy. Wliat work was that, Mr. King ?
Mr. King. Well, first I want to make it plain that I am not abso-
lutely certain that all this work was under his jurisdiction. I presume
it was.
50. Major Ci^usen. Yes, sir.
Mr. King. He being the Department Engineer, it must have been.
51. General Frank. District Engineer.
Mr. King. Well, District Engineer, if it is; this is different, yes.
But generally speaking they are synonymous.
52. Major Clausen. What work was it, Mr. King?
Mr. King. Well, there was an airfield at Bellows Field which was
in pretty bad shape.
53. Major Clausen. Yes, sir?
Mr. King. Due largely to lack of equipment, but more specifically
to the state of mind, the morale of the people that were working there.
There was also another airfield under [S531] way at
54. Major Clausen. Well, let us stay with Bellows, first, and tell
the Board what there was about the work that you observed which
indicated to you it was pretty lousy.
55. General Frank. May I ask a question first ?
56. Major Clausen. Yes.
57. General Frank. How did you, being in charge of Ewa on the
west side of the Island, happen to know so much about the work at
Bellows, which is on the east side of the Island ?
Mr. King. Well, General, I must invite your attention to the fact
that I was only in Area 14 for two weeks, and then I became general
superintendent and my jurisdiction covered the entire Hawaiian
group.
58. General Frank. All right.
59. Major Clausen. Would you read the question ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1319
The Reporter (reading) :
Question. Well, let us stay with Bellows, first, and tell the Board what there
was about the work that you observed which indicated to you it was pretty
lousy.
Mr. King. Well, it was dragging. There wasn't sufficient equipment.
The quarry operations in the pit from which the base material for
the airfield was procured was only — it was operating at, I would say,
30 percent efficiency.
60. Major Clausen. All right, sir. Now, what other work did you
observe in the same condition?
Mr. King. Well, there was another airfield at — at that time, that
was referred to as Dillingham. I forget the name that they finally
assigned to it. It was a Kanaka name, so I \2o32'\ don't
remember it.
61. Major Clausen. And what was there about that work which
indicated to you it was pretty lousy?
Mr. King. It was dragging for the same reason.
62. Major Clausen. Now, did you observe any other work?
Mr. Kjng. Yes, the airfield at Kahuku w^as in the same condition,
63. Major Clausen, Yes, sir. All right.
Mr. King. In fact, all work at tliat time.
64. Major Clausen. Well, let's see about the air raid warning sys-
tem. Was that work in that condition?
Mr. King. Generally speaking, yes.
65. Major Clausen. And what work was there of the air raid warn-
ing system that was in that condition ?
Mr. King. Well, there was one station in Area 14. It is difficult for
me to locate this station exactly because the locations were more or less
secret. I know where it was ; I could go and put my hand on it, but
I can't tell you now just exactly where it was.
66. Major Clausen. Is that the one that was on a mountain ?
Mr. King. Yes. If I heard the name I would remember it.
67. Major Clausen, All right.
68. General Frank. Was it Kaala?
Mr. King. No. Kaala was another one.
69. General Frank. Where is it? In the vicinity of Kahuku ?
Mr. King. Oh, no ; it is around on the Ewa side, back up behind the
Ewa plantation, in the mountains there.
70. General Frank. Up on the Waianae Range ?
Mr. King. Yes, on the Waianae Range.
\2533~\ 71, General Frank. Well, that identifies it close enough.
72. Major Clausen. All right. And what was there about that
v>'ork that was pretty lousy, Mr. King?
Mr, Kjng. Well, it was short of equipment, short of men.
73. General Frank. What kind of equipment?
]\Ir. King, Tunnel equipment.
74. Major Clausen. Short of men?
Mr, King. Short of men. The same status of morale was quite
evident.
75. Major Clausen, And did that same condition exist with respect
to tunnel work on the Islands ?
Mr, King. Yes.
76. Major Clausen. And tunnels for what, Mr. King ?
1320 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. King. For ordnance stores.
77. Major Clausen. You mean ammunition?
Mr. King. Explosive stores, ammunition, bombs, and that of course
was more or less in — the only underground work that was goinor on at
the time that I took over was the A. W. S. stations. The other, the
ordnance stores and underground storage for various things like ex-
plosives, ordnance stores, and so forth, was more or less in abeyance
awaiting equipment from the States, which shortly arrived.
78. Major Clausen. Now, did you know a Colonel Lyman,
L-y-m-a-n?
Mr. King. Yes, I knew Colonel Lyman, afterwards General Lyman.
79. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. How did you rate Colonel Lyman,
afterwards General Lyman?
Mr. King. In my opinion General Lyman was probably the
\263Ji,~] ablest man in the Islands.
80. Major Clausen. Now, what value to the work was Mr. Kohl,
if any ?
Mr. King. I would say that insofar as the work was concerned,
rather than his being of value, he was more a detriment.
81. Major Clausen. As a matter of fact, he was so great a detriment
that it was through a conference of Colonel, later General, Lyman,
with you, that it was finally arranged that he be sent away from the
Islancls ; isn't that right, Mr. King ?
Mr. King. That is true.
82. Major Clausen. Tell the Board about that.
Mr. King. Well, I think it was about the first of June — the date is
somewhat — I am not quite certain about, but within a week; it was
about the first of June or perhaps the last week in May of 1942, Colonel
Lyman called me at the hotel and asked me if I would come to his office
in the Young
83. General Frank. What hotel?
Mr. King. The Pleasanton.
84. General Frank. Yes. Colonel Wyman or Lyman ?
Mr. King. Lyman. .
85. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. King. Asked me if I would come to his office. He by that time
had taken over and had succeeded Colonel Wyman, and asked me if I
would come to his office, and he told me to come down after dark,
which I did. So I drove down through the blackout and met the
Colonel at his office. [2635^ And, after some dilatory conversa-
tion, he came right out with what he had in mind, what was "on his
chest," as he said: "What are we going to do with Eohl?" And he
asked me then if I thought that the other members of the Constructors
would have any objection to his putting Mr. Rohl on a plane and
sending him back to the States. I told him that, so far as I was con-
cerned, it would be a very happy move and I was quite certain that the
other members of the firm would see it the same way ; that I was quite
happy that he had approached me on the subject rather than them,
because of the fact that they probably would not be in a position to
talk as frankly to him as I was, because they might feel that they were
squeezing Kohl out, whereas I had no interest in the matter; so within
a few days after that, Kohl left the islands.
86. Major Clausen. I have no further questions.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1321
87. General Frank. You stated that all the work was dragging.
How was that evidenced?
Mr. King, Well, General, it was evidenced by the sad state of the
men engaged in the work. Evidently they didn't think it was necessary
to pay these men or feed these men or look after these men.
88. General Frank. Who was responsible for that ?
Mr. King. Well, it was certainly the Engineer Corps, no one else.
They were doing it. They were keeping the time. They were signing
the pay checks.
89. General Frank. The man at the top cannot be responsible for
all the details.
Mr. King. No, that's certainly true.
90. General Frank. Now, there were some intermediaries between
[2636 \ Colonel Wyman and the bottom, where this lack of morale
existed, who shared that responsibility?
Mr. King. Who were responsible for that ; surely.
91. General Frank. And who were they?
Mr. King. Generally speaking, they were a flock of Reserve Officers
he had on duty there.
92. General Frank. Also, the contractors shared that responsi-
bility, because the men were working for the contractors?
Mr. King. That was a rather anomalous condition, there. They
were the contractors' men, that's true; but the contractor was not
functioning as a fixed-fee contractor, and never did function as a
fixed-fee contractor.
93. General Frank. It was functioning as a cost-plus-fixed-fee con-
tractor ?
Mr. King. But with the work almost completely out of control of
the contractor. For instance, the functions of keeping time, of pre-
paring the pay rolls, and seeing that the men were paid promptly
and on time, were not exercised by the contractor but by the Corps
of Engineers.
94. General Frank. Was that so, from the beginning, or was it
taken over by the engineers because the contractor's organization did
not handle it efficiently?
Mr. King. No; I don't believe so. I think it was taken over im-
mediately after Pearl Harbor, for the convenience of the Govern-
ment, not because the contractor's organization was handling it
inefficiently. I have no personal knowledge of that, General, because
it was before my time, but I inquired into it, in a large number of
cases, and have asked a good many people who had been working
for Hawaiian Constructors, [2537'] prior to Pearl Harbor,
whether or not, prior to Pearl Harbor, they had been j)aid promptly
and on time; and the answer invariably was Yes. I wish the Board
could have seen what I saw.
95. General Frank. Explain it.
Mr. King. I was there, myself, for, I would say about some six or
eight weeks before, and I begun to get to the point where I wanted
some money, so I started looking around for my check, and I finally
went down in the addressograph room of the Young Hotel, where
these checks were written. There were checks on the floor, there were
checks in the air, they were on tables, there were pay rolls mixed up.
How they ever paid anybody, I can't tell you. It was the most
startling thing I ever saw.
1322 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
96. General Frank. It struck you that there was considerable con-
fusion ?
Mr. King. There certainly was.
97. General Frank. That was caused by what — lack of organiza-
tion ?
Mr. King. Lack of organization, lack of knowledge, lack of ex-
perience on the part of people that were doing it.
98. General Frank. Lack of supervision ?
Mr. King. Yes.
99. General Frank, From the top?
Mr. King. All the way down.
100. General Frank. On the other hand, when a question was put
to the top for a decision, evidently it got action, are you conversant
with that?
Mr. King. I think a decision was made at the top, but whether or
not that decision was transmitted all down through [2538] the
various grades and translated into action, I don't believe it was. I
know we tried and tried and tried, we worked continuously for a year,
to pick this morale up, to make these people that were working for
us believe that we hacl some interest in what they were doing, and
were trying to build their morale up; and we didn't succeed very
greatly, I can tell you. That condition obtained right through until
I left.
101. General Frank. Do you think the situation could have been
solved by a unit-price contract?
Mr. Kjng. No, it could not, for the simple reason that in order to
award a unit-price job you have to have some idea of your quantities
and the character of the work. Now, those were indefinite.
102. General Frank. Wliy were they so indefinite as to preclude
a fixed-fee contract?
Mr. King. Well, for instance, if you were going to take a job on
the grading for instance and were to be paid a unit price per cubic
yard for material moved, you would have to know how many yards
of material there were in your job, would you not?
103. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. King. Well, that information wasn't — we built those things
without plans.
104. General Frank. It was possible to make plans, was it not?
Mr. King. Well, yes; it was possible, but they were not made.
105. General Frank. Then thei-e evidently existed not only a lack
of organization but a lack of planning.
[25'S9] Mr. King. Absolutely, absolutely.
106. General Frank. And it was possible to provide plans, was it
not ?
Mr. King. Yes, it was — it should have been; but they were not
provided.
Perhaps the General will permit me to read an extract from a
report that I made to the Hawaiian Constructors on that very sub-
ject, just before I left.
107. General Frank. The thing that I would like to emphasize in
the record, Mr. King, is the position you held in that organization
in Honolulu during this time; and that position was what?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1323
Mr. King. General superintendent in charge of their field opera-
tions.
108. General Frank. In that position, you certainly should have
been conversant, in a detailed manner, with the general conditions.
Mr. King. Absolutely, sir.
109. General Frank. All right. Eead it.
Did you, in j^our position, deal personally with Colonel Wyman?
Mr. King. With Colonel Wyman ?
110. General Frank. Wyman; yes.
Mr. King. No.
111. General Frank. With whom did you deal.
Mr. King. With Lyman. You see, at the time Colonel Wyman was
there, I was standing by. If you remember, I stated that I was there
30 days before they could make up their mind what they wanted to
do with me. Well, at about the [£S40] end of that 30 days.
Colonel Wyman was relieved, and Colonel Lyman succeeded him.
This is rather a long thing, so I am going to confine it to an extract
of that part of it that deals with inadequate planning.
112. Major Clausen. It may be you would let us have that when
you are free. We will give it back to you.
Mr. KJNG. I would be glad to do that.
113. Major Clausen. Thank you.
Mr. Kjng. (reading) :
Much time and money have been lost and many delays have occurred through
failure to receive plans. Job Orders of high priority have been issued accompa-
nied by no plans or by partial plans. Work has been started on the basis of
partial plans and then held up or temporarily suspended awaiting receipt of
further plans. A typical example may be cited : Job Order C-^.O calls for the
construction of an extensive underground Command Post for the Forward
Echelon.
That was a combined Navy and Army Command Post.
114. General Frank. Where — in Aliamanu Crater?
Mr. King. That is right. It replaced the old one.
Because of insistence on the part of the Commanding General that work on
this project be started, a premature Job Order was received on November 13th
calling for the "construction of an underground Command Post in accordance with
plans to be furnished."
115. General Frank. Who was responsible for furnishing the plans,
at that time ?
\25^1'\ Mr. King. General Lyman's office.
116. General Frank. Lyman, or Wyman ?
Mr. EaNG. No, I will take that back. It was General Kramer's,
then. General Lyman had died before this.
Obviously no work could be started until some sort of plans were received.
However, on December 7th, we received a memorandum from the District Engi-
neer to proceed with the construction of the project, but to confine work to
the access road and to the central underground corridor. Verbal instructions
were received from the District Engineer to have men and equipment on the
ground the following day. These men and the necessary equipment, consisting
of wagon drills, compressors, a power shovel and trucks were hastily assembled,
and were in fact, on the job and ready for work the following day. However,
during the following three days, the access road and portal cut were staked in
three different locations, and it was not until the fourth day that we were able
to even start work, beyond the cutting of grass and the clearing of a few small
trees. At this date (January 14, 1943), the access road has been completed,
1324 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK.
the portal cut excavated, tracks have been laid, and we are now ready to "go
under" with the main corridor tunnel. However, no plans for this tunnel have
been received and work will necessarily be halted, in fact, has already been
curtailed because of the lack of plans.
117. General Frank. I think that is sufficient, along that line, be-
cause you are getting into a regime which is not under investigation
by this group. You are now getting into the [^5^] Kramer
organization, which comes not only after the Wyman regime but after
the Lyman regime.
Mr. King. That's right.
I have another one, here, concerning job 104r-W, which was started,
I am quite certain, under Wyman.
118. General Fbank. All right.
Mr. King (reading) :
Job 104-W may also be cited as a typical example of inadequate planning.
This job consists of a three story concrete shop structure, originally planned to
be 263 X 291 feet in size, the entire structure to be below ground level and pro-
tected by a heavy concrete burster course.
I do not know whether you gentlemen are familiar with that par-
ticular shop. It is out near Wheeler Field.
Excavation to a depth of approximately 60 feet was made to the dimensions
shown on the original plans, and the pouring of concrete footings for walls and
columns was under way when revised plans increasing the size of the structure
by 57 feet on one end and adding several projecting additions to two of the other
sides, as well as lowering the grade of the entire structure 16 feet, were received.
These revisions necessitated the shutting down of concrete operations, and the
resumption of excavation work, the equipment for which had been largely re-
moved from the work. The unit cost of the additional excavation necessarily
was several times what it would have been had it been included in the original
excavation. Detailed plans for this structure have not been received and delay
after delay has occurred through lack of plans. [254S] For instance, work
on the second story was delayed some thirty days awaiting plans for an elevator
shaft. Plans for imbedded metal work have been lacking, thus holding up the
placing of concrete in the structure. This project has, from its inception, been
short of materials, particularly concrete aggregates. In my opinion, this project
could and would have been long ago completed had it been adequately planned
and had materials been made available.
119. General Frank. All right.
Where were you, before you went to the islands ?
Mr. King. Wliere was I working ?
120. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. King. I was at Camp San Luis Obispo.
121. General Frank. What were you doing there ?
Mr. I&NG. I was general superintendent of the L. A. Dixon Com-
pany, the contractors on that job.
122. General P'rank. How did you happen to go to the islands ?
Mr. King. I went to the islands because I understood they wanted
a tunnel man.
123. General Frank. Who was responsible for getting you to go to
the islands ?
Mr. Kjng. Paul Grafe* who was vice president of the Callahan Com-
pany, one of the members of the Hawaiian Constructors.
124. General Frank. When you went to the islands as general su-
perintendent, were you working for the Corps of Engineers, or for
Hawaiian Constructors ?
Mr. King, Hawaiian Constructors ; and I worked for no [2544]
one but the Hawaiian Constructors, while I was there.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1325
125. General Frank. Who was your immediate boss, or superior?
Mr. King. The executive committee of the Hawaiian Constructors.
126. General Frank. There must have been some one man to whom
you looked.
Mr. King. Well, Mr. Rohl originally was the chairman of that com-
mittee. Afterwards, Mr. Woolley was.
127. General Frank. You have already testified as to the general
effectiveness of Rohl's supervision.
Mr, King. Surely.
128. General Frank. Because of his use of liquor, it was generally
ineffective; is that correct?
Mr. King. Surely. That's entirely correct.
129. General Frank. Wliy was this report written?
Mr. King. This report that I have just read from ?
130. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. King. That was written at Mr. Woolley's request, shortly before
I left. Mr. Wooley was chairman of the executive committee.
131. General Frank. He was impressed with the fact that the work
was lagging, from the point of view of the contractors, because of lack
of planning on the part of the engineers, I take it?
Mr. King. Yes. That was one of the reasons he wanted this report.
132. General Frank. And what was another reason ?
Mr. King. Well, the lack of control that the contractors had over
their work. The whole trouble in the islands, General, came about
due to a conflict of opinion as to what the functions of a fixed-fee
contractor were. We had one set of [254S'] ideas — I say "we,"
meaning the Hawiian Constructors — the Corps Engineers had another.
Now, under date of> I think it was November 24, 1941, there was a
directive from the Office of Chief Engineers, outlining the duties and
functions of a fixed-fee contractor, and that was the basis of our con-
tention, that we as contractors were being emasculated due to this
duality of control. We had absolutely no control over our work; and
that was the reason I resigned and came home. I have here a copy of
my letter of resignation, which very definitely states it. It is dated
January 7, 1943, and was addressed to Mr, Woolley, executive man-
ager of the Hawaiian Constructors :
Deab Me. Wooley : Owing to the apparent unwillingness of the District Engi-
neer to permit the Hawaiian Constructors any semblance of control over the work
entrusted to them, I am impelled to advise you that I elect to terminate my con-
nection with your company and to return to the mainland upon completion of my
employment contract * * •
Now, that was the reason I left, there, because I was absolutely out
on a limb. Now, let me explain the reason for that. So long as Gen-
eral Lvman lived, I felt, having Imown him a long time, having served
with him during the last war, I felt that he trusted me. Wlien he left
and he was succeeded, T didn't feel that his successor did.
There was some possibility of making a defective system work as
long as General Lyman was there, due to his personal characteristics ;
but the minute General Kramer got there- why, there was absolutely
no chance of our doing anything.
_ [2546] 133. General F'rank. Therefore, from your point of
view, it generallv was unsatisfactoiy, under Wyman, satisfactory
under Lyman, anS unsatisfactory again under Kramer ?
Mr, King. That is true, from my personal point of view.
1326 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
134. General Grunert. What did you have to do with Wyman ?
Mr. King. I had nothing to do with Wyman.
135. General Grunert. Then how can you say it was unsatisfactory?
Mr. King. On the basis of our preliminary talk, what we said here,
to start with, my observation of what had been done under Wyman.
136. General Grunert. But no actual personal experiences ?
Mr. King. No ; no absolute, personal experience.
137. General Grunert. I just wanted to get that.
138. General Frank. But it was from observing the conditions of
his operations, when you arrived there ?
Mr. King. That is right ; what had been done under him.
139. General Frank. What was the reaction of the executive com-
mittee to sending Rohl back to the United States?
Mr. King. The two members of the executive committee who were
present in Hawaii at that time — that is, Mr. Benson and Mr. Woolley —
were quite pleased, because it relieved them of a very embarrassing
situation.
140. General Frank. That is all.
141. Colonel Toulmin. Mr. King, you referred to an order of the
Corps of Engineers, defining the relationship between the contractor
and the Corps of Engineers, as about November 1941 ; was I correct in
understanding that fact ?
Mr. King. November 24, 1941, if I am not mistaken.
142. Colonel Toulmin. Have you a copy of that document ?
[2547] Mr. King. No, I have not.
143. Colonel Toulmin. Will you state again what was the purport
of that document?
Mr. King. The purport of that document was to establish policy, to
make sure that the various department division engineers made use
of the contractor's facilities. In other words, it invited attention, that
the Government was paying a fee for the services of these contractors,
and warned against setting up duplicate organizations; which was
exactly what they did in the islands.
144. Colonel Toulmin. Who issued that directive ?
Mr. King. I think it was Brigadier General Robins, who at that
time was acting Chief Engineer.
145. Colonel Toulmin. Was this Chief of Engineers' directive of
November 24, 1941, complied with, so far as you know, or was it not
complied with?
Mr. King. It was not complied with.
146. Colonel Toulmin. Who was in charge in the islands for the
Corps of Engineers, at the time, November 24, 1941, when this order of
General Robins, Chief of Engineers, was issued ?
Mr. King. That, I don't know, not being there.
147. Colonel Toulmin. That is all.
148. General Russell. Mr. King, when this work was being done,
as you have described, under the system of a duality of control, do
you mean to testif}^, then, that the supervision of the work from a
contractual standpoint was done by the engineer officers ?
Mr. King. That was their idea of what their function was. Now,
perhaps I might explain it further, by [264S] reading another
extract from this same report. I will be glad to turn this report over
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1327
to the Board, if it wishes it. This extract, I think, will show the point
I am making. That is :
About March 15tb, I was appointed Area Superintendent for Field Area No. 14,
relieving Mr. W. J. Nichols, who had suffered a nervous breakdown because of
his inability to accomplish the results that he demanded of himself. Immediately
upon my taking over the area, Major Shields, the Area Engineer, called me to
his oflJce for a conference. Instead of reviewing the scope of the work before
us and outlining the priority of the several jobs, he began issuing orders dealing
with the disposition of men and equipment, stating that this foreman was to be
assigned to that job, etc. I courteously, but firmly, told him that in my opinion
he had a serious misconception of his functions as Area Engineer and that the
prerogatives he was attempting to assume were those of the Contractor's Area
Superintendent. I told him that his true functions as Engineer were:
1. To transmit to me as the representative of the contractor information as
to the relative priority of various jobs.
2. To transmit to me job orders, plans and specifications for such work as was
from time to time authorized by higher authority.
3. To furnish field engineering data and to stake out the work.
4. To perform such necessary inspection as would insure completion of the
work in strict compliance with [2549] plans and specifications.
5. To see that an accurate record of time worked by our employees was kept
and that the same was properly transmitted to the U. S. E. D. Payroll Section so
that our men could be promptly and accurately paid.
Then there is another recommendation.
149. General Russell. I think we have developed this position
rather fully, Mr. King. The point I am directing your attention to
now is whether or not these engineer officers took over the contractual
work and attempted to carry it on as contractors rather than as super-
visory engineers.
Mr. King. Yes, that was their attitude.
150. General Russell. And it was your opinion that they were not
capable of doing that job?
Mr. King. Surely.
151. General Russell. And as a result of their invading the field
of the contractors, coupled with the fact that tliey did not have the
experience and the ability to do the work, the confusion arose, and
delay occurred ?
Mr. King. Surely.
152. General Russell. That is the story, as you see it?
Mr. King. Yes.
153. General Russell. You stated there were constant changes in
plans, and one of those that you described indicated rather substantial
changes ?
Mr. King. Yes.
154. General Russell. Now, do you know where all these plans
came from?
Mr. King. Where they originated?
155. General Russell. Yes.
Mr. King. Yes. They originated in the design division of the
district engineer's office.
[2S50] 156. General Russell. Well, now, those people on the
Islands, though, didn't have the authority to plan the developments ?
Didn't they come in there from Washington with those plans for the
development of the Islands ?
Mr. King. No. I think the development largely was
1328 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
157. General Russell. Have you got that somewhere ?
158. Major Clausen. I said, they had the authority over that, to
do that, sir ?
Mr. King. I think that these plans were developed as time went on.
I must say this in extenuation, perhaps, of that planning division.
They had a tough job, for the simple reason that it was mighty difficult
to get any two or three people to agree on what they wanted.
159. General Grunert. Meaning what? I don't get it.
Mr. King. Well, for instance, one, we will say, speaking of this
Job 104 of this shop, for instance, I know from actual experience that
one Air Corps colonel would have this idea, another one would have
that idea. They would have to get together, and perhaps the man
who originally thought the thing out was relieved, and his successor
decided they wanted something else, and that all gradually got back
to the design division, and that is where these changes apparently
originated.
160. General Russell. Then, there was no coordination on top by
the Department Commander ?
Mr. King. Well, I am not qualified to answer that question.
161. General Russell. All right.
Mr. King. I have a personal opinion, but I don't know whether
you want that.
[^SBl] 162. General Russell. Now let us go back and talk about
those checks that you saw all over the place. Who was the engineer
out there then ?
Mr. King. Well, General Lyman had taken over about a week before
that.
163. General Russell. If I get the picture, you contractors had got-
ten these laborers together and carried them out there ?
Mr. King. Yes.
164. General Russell. You employed them?
Mr. King. We did.
165. General Russell. Procurement of personnel for construction
was your job?
Mr. KJENG. That is right.
166. General Russell. How did it come to pass, then, that their
quartering and feeding became a function of the Engineers?
Mr. Kjng. Well, their quartering and feeding was not an tliat time
a function of the Engineers, but by order of the Commanding General
we had to feed our men Army rations, and naturally it was a function
of the Engineers to provide those rations. We did not operate our
camps with locally purchased stuff.
167. General Russell. Who operated the messes ? The contractors
or the military personnel ?
Mr. King. We operated some and they operated some.
168. General Russell. Well, then, the contractors were partly re-
sponsible for the poor feeding of the men ?
Mr. King. To a certain extent, yes. They perhaps were respon-
sible for the preparation of the food, and the Army was responsible
for the furnishing of the food. And I might say, [2S52] too,
that Army rations are not a very — while they are adapted to the
feeding of military units, they are certainly not adapted to feeding
construction people, for the simple reason that Army rations are
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1329
predicated on feeding three meals a day, at a given time. The com-
ponents are set up on that basis. But where you have to feed men
around the clock, three shifts, they don't fit in very well.
169. General Grunert. Isn't that just a question of management?
Mr. King. I don't think so. General. For instance
170. General Gruneet. Could you not have had the rationing in-
creased ?
JNIr. King. Well, the rations were pretty skimpy all the way through.
For instance, the substitution of canned meats for fresh meats: it
would be weeks that we would get only a small amount of fresh meat,
and would use the
171. General Frank. The troops were operating on the same basis,
however, weren't they ?
Mr. King. Yes, surely. I'll agree to that. That was the argument.
The argument was, "If it is good enough for the troops, it is good
enough for your men."
172. General Frank. Well, isn't that a pretty solid argument?
Mr. King. Except that it does not fit, trying to — for instance, I may
explain it this way: for instance, if you feed a man three times a
day, suppose you have to get out lunches to feed your men under-
ground : your bread component isn't anywhere near enough to do that.
In other words, they eat more bread than the ration would furnish, due
to the fact that one of the meals is a cold meal that has to be prepared
and shipped out to the
[2S63] 173. General Frank. That is a question of arrangement,
planning and management.
]Mr. King. Also of procurement.
174. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. King. If you haven't got the bread, you can't
175. General Frank. It can be made, though.
Mr. King. It can be furnished.
176. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. King. Yes ; if you had sufficient bread, it would work.
177. General Frank. That is just a question
178. General Grunert. That is the question I am getting at. If
you have sufficient quantity, whatever the quality is, it is what you can
procure. Now, if you have quantity through proper arrangement,
whether you feed three times a day or six times or send a meal out, or
whatnot, it is a question of management.
Mr. King. Yes. Well, there wasn't sufficient quantity.
179. General Grunert. There could have been, because
Mr. King. Although I will say that that varies entirely with the
people who are handling individual camps.
180. General Grunert. Management.
Mr. King. Some of the camps worked it out better than others ; but
there was, even in the best of the camps, considerable complaint of the
lack of fresh meat.
181. General Frank. If the boats do not bring it over, there is not
fresh meat.
Mr. King. Yes.
182. General Frank. And if the soldiers don't get it and the
[2554] workmen don't get it, and the soldiers don't yell, the work-
men should keep quiet.
1330 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. King. Yes, that is true ; I'll agree with that, although at that
same time I went over to the Navy Yard on several occasions and
found lots of meat over there.
183. General Frank. That is all right. They had different facili-
ties for bringing it over.
Mr. King. Yes.
184. General Frank. I would like to ask some further questions.
Are you through ?
185. General Russell. No.
186. General Frank. Go ahead.
187. General Russell. As I get it, the Engineers were trying to
run the contracting business and didn't know how, and you people
were trying to feed your men with Army rations and didn't know
how.
Mr. King. Well, I wouldn't say that, General. I think we knew
a little about feeding men. I've fed a lot of men in my day.
188. General Russell. Yes, sir. But you couldn't satisfy, or you
didn't satisfy, your people out there?
Mr. King. No.
189. General Russell, By giving them the Army rations?
Mr. King. No, I couldn't.
190. General Russell. Irrespective of the logic behind the situation,
it didn't take with your employees ?
Mr. King. That is right.
191. General Russell. That is the situation, isn't it?
Mr. King. Yes.
[SooS] 192. General Russell. All right.
Now, I do not think that we developed very fully this conference
that you had with Lyman when it was agreed that Rohl would have
to go. What charges were made by Lyman against Rohl upon which
he based his conclusion that Rohl had to leave the Islands.
Mr. King. Well, he stated, in the first place, that he couldn't get
ahold of him when he wanted him. That was one of his complaints,
that he would run around — he particularly complained of his running
around with certain Air Force officers and committed the General —
that is. Colonel Lyman — to things that he couldn't — in other words,
went out of channels, if you understand what I mean; and he also
said that the fact that the old boy was drinking so hard was very
embarrassing, and he felt that his presence there was just generally
undesirable.
193. General Russeix. This final question, now, Mr. King: On De-
cember 7 the war came along, and the plans which had been made
for the development of the Islands were all abandoned, and the
scheme of operation was changed ? |
Mr. King. Changed many times, absolutely.
194. General Russell. And we stepped all of those operations up
out there to a war tempo ?
Mr. King. Yes, sir.
195. General Russell. Now, in your opinion, did these things that
I have just narrated contribute to the confusion which followed ?
Mr. King. Yes.
196. General Russell. Which existed ?
[2S56'] Mr. King. Unquestionably, General.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1331
197. General Russell. You were just working under conditions
that were new to everybody ?
Mr. King. Quite so. iBut they didn't improve as time went on,
some of these fundamental thinks that were wrong.
198. General Russell. They didn't improve under Lyman, even?
Mr. King. No. As a matter of fact, we never did get to the point —
we never did get to the point, during my entire stay in the Islands,
where our men were paid promptly and on time and accurately.
199. General Frank. How long were you there?
Mr. King. I was there from — just about a year, just within a day
or two of a year.
200. General Russell. I think that is all.
201. General Frank. How long did Lyman have control of this
before
Mr. Kjng. I think the General died in the first days of September
1942. My recollection is that that's
202. General Frank, And he had had it how long?
Mr. King. He had had it since
203. General Frank. March.
Mr. King. It was the first part of March, about the first part of
March.
204. General Frank. Now, I would like to ask you, what were the
relations among the contractors? There were Rohl-Connolly,
Gunther- Shirley ?
Mr. I&ng. Yes.
205. General Frank. W. E. Callahan, and Ralph Woolley?
Mr. King. Yes, and the Hawaiian Contracting
[2557] 206. General Frank. Constructing?
Mr. King. Contracting Company.
207. General Frank. Hawaiian Contracting Company?
Mr. King. Yes, the Dillingham people.
2'08. General Frank. What were the relations among the con-
tractors themselves with respect to the supervision they were getting
under Rohl ? Rohl held what position.
Mr. King. Rohl held the position of chairman of the executive com-
mittee. In other words, he was the top hand while he was there, or was
supposed to be.
209. General Frank. Was Rohl satisfactory to the contractors?
Mr. King. No. To the other members?
210. General Frank. That is what I am talking about.
Mr. King. No, no, certainly not.
211. General Frank. Well, then why was he kept?
Mr. IOng. Well, largely because of the fact that — I think that these
island members of the firm felt that there was a natural cleavage
between the mainland members and the island members. The island
members were the only people there outside of Rohl.
212. General Frank. Who? What?
Mr. King. How?
213. General Frank. The island members?
Mr. King. Yes. That is, Benson and Wooley and Rohl were the
only representatives of the outfit there. See, Callahan and Shirley-
Gunther, they didn't have any representative there at all during my
tenure.
79716— 46— Ex. 145, vol. 2 35
1332 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
214. General Frank. Mr. Graf e was not there ?
Mr. King. No. Grafe left, as I understand, about [2568]
Christmas, right immediately after Pearl Harbor, and, as far as I
know, had practically no communication with the job from that
time on.
215. General Frank. Well, was there anything done among the
contractors themselves to get rid of Eohl, who the contractors them-
selves felt was unsatisfactory ?
Mr. King. I don't know. I can't answer that question, whether
there was anything done by them as individual members. I don't think
there was, for the simple reason that they felt that if they did initiate
any move to get rid of him they would be accused of trying to take
the thing over.
216. General Frank. Well, was there any preference shown for
Rohl in the Engineer Corps that you know of ?
Mr. King. Certainly not — I am not qualified to say about Wyman's
relations with him. I assume there was as far as Wyman was con-
cerned, although I do not know this of personal knowledge.
217. General Frank. All right.
218. Major Clausen. Sir, you are fairly well satisfied that, while
this system of the contract and the supervision by the Engineers was
bad, the connection of Rohl with that system aggravated an already
bad situation ?
Mr. King. Well, it certainly didn't help it any.
219. Major Clausen. Well, your answer would be yes, wouldn't it?
Mr. King. Yes.
220. Major Clausen. All right, sir. Now, the situation really was
inherited by you ?
Mr. King. Yes.
[£S69] 221. Major Clausen. You came there when this system
was in operation ?
Mr. King. Yes.
222. Major Clausen. And do you know anything of the fact, even
before Pearl Harbor when the Hawaiian Constructors had a much
smaller job to do, as to the bad situation which resulted in the relief
of Colonel Wyman ?
Mr. King. I had no personal knowledge of it, not being there.
223. Major Clausen. Do you have any files there which you have
been reading, any papers or documents, that might be pertinent to
what you might assume the Board is interested in ?
Mr, Kjng. Well, I have ; I think probably some of these papers are
of interest.
224. Major Clausen. May I have it myself afterwards to read over,
to return to you, sir ?
Mr. King. Surely. I will be glad to have you make copies of any-
thing here, and return the original file to me.
225. Major Clausen. All right, sir.
By the way, who preceded you as general superintendent for the
field work of the Hawaiian Constructors?
Mr. King. Well, there was a man by the name of C. G. Clapp who
was over there, and he left about three days after I got there.
226. Major Clausen. What is your present position, Mr. King?
Mr. King. I am director of yard operations at Port Hoeneme for
the Pacific Naval Airport Contractors.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1333
227. Major Clausen. That is about fifty miles from Los Angeles?
l^oGO] Mr. KixG. That is this Seabee base down the coast.
228. Colonel Toulmin. May I ask you a question, Mr. King?
Mr. King. Yes.
229. Colonel Totjlmin. It is not clear in my mind as to exactly the
sequence of events that took place as far as you are concerned. Now,
first, what was the date of your arrival in the Islands ?
Mr. King. February IG, '42.
230. Colonel Toulmin. Do I understand that about a week preced-
ing your arrival in the Islands General Lyman, L-y-m-a-n, had taken
command ?
Mr. King. No. It w^as
231. Colonel Toulmin. What is the fact about that?
Mr. King. General Lyman succeeded Colonel Wyman about the first
week in March of '42.
232. Colonel Toulmin. And you came when ?
Mr. King. I came the 16th of February, some three weeks before the
change was made.
233. Colonel Toulmin. So you were there during the period of
Colonel Wyman's incumbency in this office of District Engineer ?
Mr. King. Yes, the last month, I should say, of his incumbency.
234. Colonel Toulmin. And three weeks after you arrived General
Lyman took command in succession to Colonel Wyman ?
Mr. King. That is correct.
23.5. Colonel Toulmin. Now let us go back to this order of the Chief
of Engineers of November 24, 1941, which defined the relationship
between the Corps of Engineers and the contractors.
Mr. King. That is right.
\2S61i\ 23G. Colonel Toulmin. You would regard that as a
fundamental order establishing that relationship ; is that correct?
Mr. King. Absolutely, sir.
237. Colonel Toulmin. That would be your basic working docu-
ment between the Corps of Engineers and the contractors ?
Mr. King. Yes, and the prime contract itself.
238. Colonel Toulmin. That is right. So you would have two
things to look at : first, the order of November 24, 1941, from the Corps
of Engineers, defining the relationship between the contractor and
the Corps of Engineers, and the contract with the contractor : is that
right?
Mr. King. That is right. Those two documents would be your basic
documents.
239. Colonel Toulmin. They would be your "bible," wouldn't they ?
Mr. King. That is right.
240. Colonel Toulmin. Now, when you got there and had this
chance for about thirty days of observing what was going on while
you were awaiting assignment and the pleasure of the executive com-
mittee to give you the final assignment, to what extent did you observe
that this order of November 24, 1941, was being violated?
Mr. King. I had no opportunity to observe. Colonel, for the simple
reason that I didn't get out of Honolulu. I was just sitting there
waiting assignment.
241. Colonel Toulmin. Well, when you did get out of it, which was
about a month after you arrived
1334 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. King. Yes.
242. Colonel Toulmin. Wliat did you observe as to the [2562]
violation of this order of November 24, 1941 ?
Mr. King. Well, I immediately — at that time I was not aware of
this order. I became aware of it later. But I certainly saw the duality
of control which I knew was not contemplated by any fixed-fee
contract.
243. Colonel Touliviin. Well, from your observations when you
did observe this condition, would you be able to state that these
conditions in violation of this order had been in existence for some
appreciable period ?
Mr. King. Oh, yes.
244. Colonel Toulmin. How long would you say they had been in
existence ?
Mr. King. Oh, I think they had always been more or less in existence
in the Islands, certainly back as far as the Tth of December.
245. Colonel Toulmin. Well, to violate the order of November 24,
1941, would have required a relationship between the District Engineer
and the head of the contracting organization that was very acquiescent
in making some new arrangement other than that specified by the
order ; isir t that right ?
Mr. King. Yes.
246. Colonel Toulmin. So that, in order to violate this order it
would be necessary for Colonel Wyrnan and Mr. Rohl, if he was the
head of the organization, as I understand he was — the contractors —
for them to cooperate in violating the order, in order to work out some
new arrangement other than that specified by the order; is that
right ?
Mr. King. I don't think the violation of the — this wasn't an order;
it was a directive ; a policy directive, as I remember it. I do not be-
lieve it was violated in letter by [2563'] either Colonel Wyman
or General Lyman, but it was violated in spirit by their subordinates,
and those were the people that we had to clo business with, and those
were the people that controlled things,
247. Colonel Toulman. So the net effect, then, Mr. King, was that,
whoever did, it took the cooperative arrangement between Colonel
Wyman and Mr. Rohl, of the subordinates in the Hawaiian Contrac-
tors, to change the spirit of this order and do something else other
than that directed by the Chief of Engineers ?
Mr. King. I don't see that Mr. Rohl would have anything to do
with it,
248. Colonel Toulman, Well, the subordinates under Mr, Rohl
would have something t o do with it, wouldn't they ?
Mr, King. No. The attitude of assuming control was arbitrarily
assumed by the Corps of Engineers.
249. Colonel Toulmin. All right. Then, the responsibility for
changing this order, either in letter or in spirit, was upon the Corps
of Engineers ?
Mr. King. That is right. That is true.
250. Colonel Toulmin, That is all I have to ask,
251. General Frank, But the contractors were the ones who were
suffering as a result of this interpretation?
Mr. King, Absolutely.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1335
252. General Frank. Or violation of it?
Mr. King. Absolutely. That is right. In other words, they could
not function.
253. General Frank. And the one man who represented the con-
tractors was Mr. Rohl ?
[2o64-] Mr. King. True enough.
254. General Frank. Therefore it was up to Mr. Kohl to try to alle-
viate the situation under Colonel Wyman, was it not?
Mr. &NG. Yes.
255. General Frank. And that was not done by Mr. Rohl?
Mr. King. That I can't say. I do know that there was a continuous
record of protest made by the Hawaiian Constructors to the Corps of
Engineers, a copy of which I have here : a continuous record of pro-
test starting as early as May 1942 and continuing throughout until
the termination of the contract.
256. General Grunert. It appears that from your personal obser-
vation and your own knowledge practically all your testimony relates
to after Pearl Harbor ; is that right ?
Mr. King. That is true, General.
257. General Grunert. And that from your observations you
found that the morale and certain conditions were inherited probably
from before Pearl Harbor?
Mr. King. I would say, rather, as a result of Pearl Harbor.
258. General Grunert. As a result.
Mr. King. As a result of the tremendous confusion engendered by
the attack, as part of the reason.
259. General Grunert. Now, you appear to have made quite an
indictment of the Corps of Engineers or that part of it that func-
tioned in Hawaii. In that indictment do you know whether or not
it concerned their ability as engineers or as administrators?
Mr, King. You have hit the nub of the situation there, l^565~\
General, exactly. Engineers, generally speaking, are not adminis-
trators, they are not managers, and there is where the mistake was
made. These reserve officers are picked up. They are engineers,
technical engineers. They have little experience in management, and
they were attempting to do something that they knew very little about.
260. General Grunert. Now, that report you have there, the papers
from which you read extracts, the Board would like to have you leave
that with the Board so that we can see what is in it and see whether
or not we want to put some of it in the record as an exhibit.
Mr. King. Yes. I will be very glad to turn this over to you with the
understanding that it is my personal opinion ; it is not necessarily the
reflection of the attitude or the opinion of the Hawaiian Constructors.
It is my own personal opinion as the result of my observations there.
261. General Grunert. We accept it as such.
Any other questions ?
Mr. King. And I feel, in justice to the Hawaiian Constructors, that
it should not be used to their prejudice. I will be glad to leave the
entire file here, including —
262. General Grunert. Mr. King, do you know of anything else
that you might think of that might be of assistance to the Board?
You understand that the Board is limited in its investigation to such
phases as pertain to the conditions prior to and during the Pearl Har-
1336 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
bor attack, and that any evidence that we accumulate otherwise should
have a bearing on that phase.
Mr. King. Yes.
[2566] 263. General Grtjnert. So that what we have been going
after is to see what bearing it has on that phase.
Mr. King. Yes. In other words, then. General, the period of my
tenure there is not under investigation ?
264. General Grunert. Only insofar as
Mr. King. As it bears on
265. General Grunert. So far as we are concerned, insofar as it
bears on what might have happened before or during Pearl Harbor or
had connection therewith ; am I right with the Board ?
266. Major Clausen. Inferences which may be drawn.
267. General Gunert. And the inferences drawn ; true enough.
Mr. King. Well, I can't think of any information that I can give
the Board that would bear on conditions prior to Pearl Harbor or at
the time of Pearl Harbor or immediately thereafter.
268. General Grunert. I didn't want you to get the impression that
this is a thorough investigation of everything in '42 or '43 or whatnot,
except as it might have a bearing on what happened at Pearl Harbor
or leading thereto.
Mr. King. Well, I have nothing along that line.
269. General Grunert. We thank you very much for coming and
assisting us.
Mr. King. I am very glad to appear, gentlemen.
270. General Grunert. We shall have a recess.
(There was a brief informal recess.)
[25671 TESTIMONY OF EMMA JANE BAILAED,
COLTON, CALIFORNIA.
(The witness was sworn by the Assistant Recorder and advised of
her rights under Article of War 24.)
1. Major Clausen. Mrs. Ballard, would you state your name, resi-
dence, and present place of employment.
Mrs. Ballard. Well, my name is Emma Jane Ballard. I live in
Colton, California, near San Bernardino. I work at the Army Depot,
in parachute repair maintenance.
The way I feel about anything that I know is, that I am not divulg-
ing any information that I heard over my switchboard in Honolulu,
it is information that I saw and heard outside of my switchboard.
I never listened to any information over the switchboard. I was
always very much too busy, if I had had the inclination.
2. Major Clausen. You were formerly employed by the United
States Engineering Department, in the Hawaiian Islands, is that
right?
Mrs. Ballard. That is right.
3. Major Clausen. And that extended over what period of time?
Mrs. Ballard. Well, I am not sure just what date I went to work,
but I went to work in November preceding Pearl Harbor for the
Procurement Department, the civil section of the Engineers, and until
the 8th of December, when I was on duty for 24 hours a day for weeks,
I had no contact other than just over the phone with any of the official
staff. I was in connection with the civil section of the Engineers.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1337
4. Major Clausen. When did you leave the islands?
Mrs. Ballard. I left there, the 20th of February, and [2568]
arrived back in San Francisco the 1st day of March, 1942.
5. Major Clausen. Do you recall, during the time that you were
on duty, before Pearl Harbor, having observed Colonel Wyman ?
Mrs. Ballard. I don't suppose I saw Colonel Wyman more than
three or four times at the most, in the time that I worked, before Pearl
Harbor.
6. Major Clausen. And did you observe him after Pearl Harbor,
and up to the time that you left ?
Mrs. Ballard. Well, he wasn't there when I left. I don't know
where he was, but I had observed him very closely when I was there
on duty.
7. Major Clausen. And can you give the Board some idea as to the
number of times that you saw him, from Pearl Harbor up to the time
that you left the islands, how frequently you saw him, if you saw him
at all?
Mrs. Ballard. Well, several times a day.
8. Major Clausen. Do you know whether, during that time, Colonel
Wyman was drunk? If so, just answer, and then explain to the
Board how you came to reach that conclusion.
Mrs. Ballard. Well, I had orders to check and verify time and
charges, and verify any long-distance calls which were made, and the
calls that were made to this Hawaiian Construction Company, and the
head, there, Wilhelm Rohl, and Ralph WooUey, and Chadwick,
Every call that ever was made, Colonel Wyman went into a rage
when I had to verify those calls, and many times came directly to the
switchboard and raged and roared around, and everyone was in ap-
parent mortal fear of him — he didn't awe me a bit! — and he continu-
ally [3569] smelled of liquor. He made the remark to my
face one day, or rather to his man secretary, a Mr. Eads, that he
didn't know whether he could trust me or not with those calls, and
he resented it that I had to check on all of tliem. And I told him to his
face that if he could trust himself as well as he could trust me, he
would be doing all right.
9. Major Clausen. When he objected to your checking on calls,
were they calls that you were putting in, from himself to this Wilhelm
Rohl?
Mrs. Ballard. Yes.
10. Major Clausen. And could you give me some estimate as to
the number of those calls that he put in, and the number of times that
he made this objection ?
Mrs. Ballard. No ; I don't believe I could give them, but a great
number, though.
11. Major Clausen. Did that extend over the period from the time
that you were first on duty there as a telephone operator down to the
time that you left ?
Mrs. Ballard. Well, after the 7th of December, and up until,
well, a short while before I left there, he was removed from duty,
and a Captain Trik, Carl H., later Major, was placed in command
there over that section.
12. General Grunert. Do I understand these calls you referred to
were made from approximately the 7th of December up until some
time in March ?
1338 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mrs. Ballakd. I left there in March, but I don't know just how
long he had been gone when I left there ; but over a period of several
weeks, that he made those calls.
13. General Grunert. And they were made to the mainland?
Mrs. Ballard. Some of them. Some of them, this Wilhelm
[2570] Kohl seemed to be in Maui and different sections of the
island.
14. Major Clausen. Was there a requirement that you check these
calls?
Mrs. Ballard. Yes, sir; I had direct orders that I had to check
time and verify costs and keep a record of that.
15. Major Clausen. You had that order from whom, Mrs. Ballard?
Mrs. Ballard. Well, I couldn't say. When I first went in on that
board at Punahou, the chief operator from down town, at the engi-
neers' office down town, was in charge, and that was her order to me.
16. Major Cl/\usen. On some of these occasions when you saw
Colonel Wyman, Mrs. Ballard, was he in your opinion drunk?
Mrs. Ballard. He was very drunk, many times.
17. Major Clausen. Were some of those times before Pearl Harbor ?
Mrs. Ballard. No, I don't recall that I was ever close enough to
him to notice that, before.
18. Major Clausen. Before Pearl Harbor?
Mrs. Ballard. Before Pearl Harbor.
19. Major Clausen. What was the basis for your assuming that
he was drunk?
Mrs. Ballard. Well, I wouldn't consider that a man in his right
mind would storm and rage around and have everyone in mortal
terror of him, like the man did ; and then I knew one of the civilians
there that was always bringing liquor in, and very often offered us
a drink as he went through.
20. Major Clausen. The civilian would bring liquor to whom?
[2571] Mrs. Ballard. To Colonel Wyman's office. He was his
civilian assistant.
21. Major Clausen. What was his name?
Mrs. Ballard, His name was Robert Dikes.
22. Major Clausen. Did you get close enough to Colonel Wyman
to smell his breath ?
Mrs. Ballard. Oh, many times. He was right at my switchboard.
23. Major Clausen. And did his breath smell of liquor?
Mrs. Ballard. Very badly.
24. Major Clausen. Did you have occasion to observe his walk?
Mrs, Ballard. He staggered when he would walk, many times,
and bump the sill.
25. Major Clausen. As a drunken man would?
Mrs. Ballard. Well, as I would imagine he would.
26. General Grunert. Why do you suppose Colonel Wyman was
concerned about your keeping proper records of these calls?
Mrs, Ballard, I never could understand that, at the time, until
this newspaper article came out about him and Wilhelm Rohl, here
several months ago.
27. General Grunert. But, at the time, you could not understand
why he should interfere with your records ?
Mrs. Ballard. No, sir ; I couldn't.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1339
28. General Grunert. Did you imagine it was just because of his
condition ?
Mrs. Ballard. Yes; I used to think that that was because he
was-
29. General Grunert. What did he actually say to you ?
Mrs. Ballard. Well, he couldn't see any sense in me [2672]
sticking my nose in, and butting in on his business, why I had to
check on his calls when they were personal calls, and remarks of
that sort.
30. General Frank. What do you mean, "personal calls"? Were
they not on official business ?
Mrs. Ballard. Well, they were on the Army switchboard, but they
were calls
31. General Frank. Wlio paid for the calls — the Government?
Mrs. Ballard. I presume that the Government did.
32. General Frank. Were they not carried as official calls?
Mrs. Ballard. Yes, sir.
33. General Frank. When did you start in this position where you
had supervision and checking of these calls ?
Mrs. Ballard. Right immediately after Pearl Harbor. I lived in
the Naval Hospital Reservation, at Aiea, and the Marine guards —
I had not worked very long for the engineers, and I had no pass or
badge or anything to get in, to show that I was officially employed
by the engineers, and to go to Honolulu from where I lived, I had to
go right directly throug-h Pearl Harbor, through the bombed area,
and the Marine guards refused to even let me out of the Hospital
Reservation, the 7th of December, and I finally worked my way out,
the morning of the 8th. I got into Honolulu about 20 minutes after 7.
I was sent right immediately. I think about 11 o'clock I went to work
on the switchboard down in the Alexander Young building, and
worked until about 11 o'clock, and relieved the girls there, and then
I was sent to Punahou to take over for a day or two — well, maybe a
week, there were two other girls that helped me, and then I was left in
entire charge of [2573] that board.
34. General Frank. What did you do, prior to Pearl Harbor?
Mrs. Ballard. I had worked for the Procurement Department on
Aleakea street for the engineers. I hadn't work very long. I
hadn't been over there but about a year, and my husband had a very
good job, and I didn't consider it necessary to work, but I got very
bored doing nothing, so I finally went to work.
35. General Frank. Do you remember any calls back to the main-
land between Wyman and Rohl?
Mrs. Ballard. Well, I remember about half a dozen to San Fran-
cisco, that I put through.
36. General Frank. Did he ever talk to Los Angeles ?
Mrs. Ballard. No, I don't know that I ever did.
37. General Frank. These were all government calls?
Mrs. Ballard. They were all put through as official calls.
38. General Frank. And they were paid for by the Government?
Mrs. Ballard. Yes, sir.
39. Major Clausen. Do you recall, Mrs. Ballard, ever seeing this
German alien, Hans Wilhelm Rohl ?
Mrs. Ballard. Yes ; I have seen him many times.
1340 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
40. Major Clausen. Where?
Mrs. Ballard. The engineers had one section, one building of the
Punahou School, which was a very large area, and the Hawaiian Con-
struction Company were directly across a narrow street, in another
building.
41. Major Clausen. During what period was it that you saw this
Rohl?
[^574-] Mrs. Ballard. Well, evidently he flew in and out from
the mainland to the islands at will, and at the times that he was there,
in and out of the engineer's office, there, in Colonel Wyman's office.
42. General Grunert. Was this prior to September 15 1941?
Mrs. Ballard. No, it was after Pearl Harbor that they took over
Punahou.
43. General Grunert. Then you did not know whether he was an
alien at the time that you knew him.
Mrs. Ballard. No, sir ; I didn't know very much about him, at all.
44. General Grunert. The question was asked, as if he were an
alien at the time you knew him.
Mrs. Ballard. No ; I didn't know that.
45. Major Clausen. I had reference, sir, to the fact that she had
read in the newspapers concerning the German alien. I wanted to
make my question specific, that that was the man that I was referring
to.
40. General Grunert. All right.
47. Major Clausen. It had no relation to the time of his alienage.
This man that you saw, named Eohl, did you ever see him in com-
pany with Colonel Wyman?
Mrs. Ballard. Yes, many times.
48. Major Clausen. When you saw him in company with Colonel
Wyman, was Colonel Wyman ever in the condition that you stated, as
to drunkenness?
Mrs. ^Ballard. They were both pretty well drunken, at that time.
["^-^7.5] 49. Major Clausen. You say they were both pretty well
drunk ? I beg your pardon ?
Mrs. Ballard. Yes, sir.
50. Major Clausen. Where did this occur that you saw them in that
condition ?
Mrs. Ballard. Well, I was on specific duty in the library building
at that school, and that was wliere my switchboard was, and the official
staff were in through a corridor, and right directly behind our switch-
board; and to get into their offices, they went through the entrance
right by my switchboard.
51. Major Clausen. Did you get close enough to this party, Rohl, to
smell his breath?
Mrs. Ballard. No, I don't know that I ever was as close to him as I
had been to Colonel Wyman.
52. Major Clausen. * Wliat was there about his actions that indicated
to you he was drunk ?
Mrs. Ballard. Well, loud talking, and staggering.
53. Major Clausen. Mrs. Ballard, can you tell us anything about
the prosecution of the work ? I mean the actual work of the engineer-
ing department, so far as it relates to the things that they were sup-
posed to be doing, in your opinion?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1341
Mrs. Ballard. No ; I don't believe I could tell you much about that.
I can tell you about the way the engineers tied up the work for the
other agencies.
My husband worked for the Pacific Naval Air Bases, there, for the
Navy, and for several weeks. Colonel Wyman had — I don't know just
how he worked it with the Navy, but I do know that he had materials
tied up in and around Pearrl Harbor they \2576'\ were using
for the emergency defense work, until they were stymied, they were
helpless to go ahead with their work.
b-i. General Frank. Who was that ?
Mrs. Ballard. Well, the Pacific Naval Air Bases, there. My hus-
band worked for the Turner Construction Company, which built the
Navy housing there around Pearl Harbor.
55. General Grunert. Then what you know is hearsay from your
husband ?
Mrs. Ballard. No; many calls that I had in on the switchboard
about that, the different heads of that, from out around Pearl Harbor,
"rowing" and "raising cain" about the materials being tied up.
56. Major Clausen. Mrs. Ballard, was the engineering office in
which you were employed one big happy family, or did you have quite
a bit of strife and commotion?
Mrs, Ballard. The civil section, there, except for this one Robert
Dikes, was a very congenial group.
57. Major Clausen. Did Colonel Wyman ever act towards others,
in your presence, as he acted towards you?
Mrs. Ballard. Oh, yes ; many times. The different ones that were
in contact with him, he would yell at them and bark at them, and they
were very much in awe of him. One particular time, he came out of
his office, I was off the switchboard right at the minute, and was talk-
ing to this Captain, McCrone, whose desk was right directly outside
Colonel Wyman's office; and if they didn't all jump just at attention,
just the minute that he appeared, why he would yell at them; and
this particular time there were about six of those captains and lieu-
tenants after him; just fell in. He yelled at them, and they just
[2S77] fell in behind him and goose-stepped out of there; and I
said, "I thought this was a democracy, and we have the 'little king'
with us !" And he turned around and glared at me, but he didn't
say anything.
68. Major Clausen. Mrs. Ballard, did any of these exhibitions of
that character occur when this Colonel Wyman was acting in this
drunken fashion ?
Mrs. Ballard. As a rule, I think those occurrences happened when
he was drunk.
59. Major Clausen. And you told me something this morning about
the townspeople of Honolulu's general impression of the engineering
corps, as shown by statements to you, when you would say by whom
you were employed. Would you want to elaborate upon that, or tell
the Board what you told me ?
Mrs. Ballard. Well, in cashing checks or anything, we used to be
required by the merchants there to show our badge and pass, and they
many times have made the remark to me, "Oh, you work for the
engineers!" and then give me the regular horse laugh.
60. Major Clausen. I have no further questions.
1342 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
61. General Frank. What did that indicate?
Mrs. Ballard. Well, I would say that the engineers were rather
the laughing-stock of the island, the way they destroyed property
there and all, after Pearl Harbor. They cut trees, and this school
that they took over, they were paying an exhorbitant sum for it,
and they had many valuable art objects, and the library, there, that
was of untold value and wealth, and Colonel Wyman, at his order —
I have heard him, one morning, [^S78] order a ditch digger
in there, and the library, the books in that library, and the paintings,
and everything in that library were thrown into a ditch eight feet
deep and covered up.
62. General Frank. Did you see this ?
Mrs. Ballard. Yes, sir; and the morning of the 8th of December,
this Mr. Nelson, who was president of the faculty of that school,
had tried to retain some of the buildings to store their things in, and
Colonel Wyman ordered me — came out to the switchboard and ordered
me to find the man, and, at a very difficult task, I located hiin, and he
came up there, and he ordered him to open these other building which
he had locked up with valuable things of the school in, and he said
that in their agreement they had agreed to allow them to retain certain
buildings for storage of their articles, and Colonel Wyman said, "Are
you going to open those buildings, or am I going to get a battering
ram and knock the doors and the walls down?" He said, "You can
take your choice, Nelson !" Nelson opened the buildings for him.
63. General Frank. When was this that you saw these books buried ?
Mrs. Ballard. Well, it was in the week following Pearl Harbor;
and going across to the canteen for breakfast one morning, I saw
this ditch digger.
64. General Frank. Where was this ditch ?
Mrs. Ballard. . It was in the grounds, on the lawn of the school.
65. General Frank. But where ? Between what buildings ?
Mrs. Ballard. Well, between the library building and [2579]
Bingham Hall.
66. General Frank. Were they ever taken up ?
Mrs. Ballard, Not as far as I know, those ditches were never
opened.
67. General Frank. Was there any commotion or remonstrance
about it ?
Mrs. Ballard. Oh, there was an awful row about it. They rode
rough-shod over everyone, the people in their beautiful residences
there in Honolulu, the beautiful trees ; Colonel Wyman ordered those
trees chopped to the grotmd, on private grounds; those lawns and
homes were denuded of their trees that were a thousand years old.
They were supposedly used for camouflage. I wouldn't say as to
where that shrubbery and all that was cut there was ttsed.
General Russell, This drunken condition which you have described,
by Wyman, was any of that during the daytime, when he was sup-
posed to have been on duty ?
Mrs. Ballard. They were on duty 24 hours a day, there. They had
mattresses there and slept there in that library building.
68. General Russell, Did you see him in that condition during the
daytime ?
Mrs, Ballard. Yes, I have ; many times.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1343
69. General Eussell. That is all.
70. General Grunert. Is there anything else that occurs to you,
that you think might be of value to the Board, or that you have,
of your own knowledge ?
Mrs. Ballard. No, I don't think so: just the general everyday
things that occurred were along that trend.
[2580] 71. General Grunert. Under whose jurisdiction were
you employed as the telephone operator, there ^
Mrs. Ballard. I was employed by the Civil Service Board, which
was in the Engineers Building, the Alexander Young building.
72. General Grunert. Then Colonel Wyman had no authority, and
could not have discharged you if he wanted to, could he?
Mrs. Ballard. Well, I suppose if I had given him cause for dis-
charge he could have.
73. General Grunert. Did he ever attempt to get rid of you?
Mrs. Ballard. Not that I know of.
74. General Frank. You were a civil-service employee ?
Mrs. Ballard. Yes, sir. The one thing that I have always puzzled
about, I didn't register for evacuation until the 13th of February, and
I was out of there in a week, if that was engineered by some one,
there, because other people that had registered immediately after the
7th of December were still there in August and September.
75. Major Clausen. August and September of the following j'^ear?
Mrs. Ballard. Of 1942.
76. General Grunert. I think that is all, then. Thank you very
much.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
[2580- A'\ TESTIMONY OF EMIL LAWRENCE ZTJCCA, SENIOR
AIllCRAET SERVICE MECHANIC; SAN BERNARDINO, CALI-
FORNIA
(The witness was sworn by the Kecorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Mr. Zucca, will you please state to the Board
your full name and address.
Mr, Zucca. Emil Lawrence Zucca, 1141 Magnolia, San Bernardino,
California.
2. Colonel West. What is your occupation, Mr. Zucca?
Mr. Zucca. Senior aircraft service mechanic.
3. Major Clausen. Mr. Zucca, you are employed now by whom?
Mr. Zucca. By the Air Service (Command.
4. Major Clausen. And you have been, for what period of time?
Mr. Zucca. Since February 10, 1942.
5. Major Clausen. You formerly were employed by the United
States Engineering Department ?
Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir.
6. Major Clausen. And in that capacity, did you meet a then Major
or Captain Wyman ?
Mr. Zucca. I met him as Major Wyman, sir.
7. Major Clausen. Did you meet him in that capacity, in Los
Angeles?
1344 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. ZuccA. Yes, sir.
8. Major Clausen. And that was when, Mr. Zucca?
Mr. ZuccA. In 1936. Let's see ; I started there, I believe it was March
10, 1936.
[£580-B] 9. Major Clausen. And what were your relations
with Major Wyman at that time ?
Mr. Zucca. I was assigned to the district engineer as chauffeur,
sir.
10. Major Clausen. As whose chauffeur?
Mr. Zucca. I was assigned to drive the district engineer, as the
district engineer's chauffeur, and that was Major Wyman, at the time,
sir.
11. Major Clausen. And when you drove him, did you use an offi-
cial car ?
Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir ; we did.
12. Major Clausen. And do you know Hans Wilhelm Kohl?
Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir; I do.
[2581] 13. Major Clausen. When did you first meet Mr. Eohl?
Mr. Zucca. I don't recall when I first met him. I really don't
remember, you know, exactly when T first met him. It was some time
during the period of time while I was driving the District Engineer.
14. Major Clausen. How long did you drive for Major Wyman?
Mr. Zucca. Well, it was approximately four years, around that.
I started there in March, just, you know, driving there, and then I was
assigned to the District Engineer about four months after I was
employed, and I drove him until he was assigned to the Honolulu
District.
15. Major Clausen. Now, it was during that time that you met
Mr. Kohl also?
Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir.
16. Major Clausen. Did you ever drive Major Wyman to the
Biltmore Hotel in Los Angeles ?
Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir; I did.
17. Major Clausen. Did you ever have occasion on any of these
trips to go up with Major Wyman or anyone else to the apartment,
in there, of Mr. Kohl ?
Mr. Zucca. I did on a few occasions, I had been up to the rooms
there in the hotel, sir.
18. Major Clausen. You saw Mr. Kohl there at that time, did you ?
Mr. Zucca. Well, yes ; I had seen him there on, you know — at differ-
ent times he would be there.
19. Major Clausen. Yes.
Mr. Zucca. Sometimes.
[2682] 20. Major Clausen. And on some of these occasions you
would see Colonel Wyman and Mr. Kohl drink ?
Mr. Zucca. Well, I never — I wouldn't want to say that I actually
saw them drink, sir.
21. Major Clausen. Well, you saw liquor there, though, didn't you ?
Mr. Zucca. Well, yes, sir. I mean that wouldn't indicate, I mean,
anyone was
22. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon.
Mr. Zucca. That wouldn't indicate I saw them drink, though.
23. Major Clausen. How many times did you drive Major Wyman
to the Biltmore Hotel ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1345
Mr. ZuccA. I don't know, sir.
24. Major Clausen". Can you give some estimate as to the number
of times ?
Mr. ZuccA. That is rather a difficult question to answer.
25. General Frank. How often did you drive him there, about?
Twice a week ? Once a week ? Three times a week ?
Mr. ZuccA. Well, sometimes I might say once a month.
26. General Frank. Well, some other times how often was it?
Mr. ZuccA. Well, then again it might be twice a week. It depends —
I mean that wouldn't indicate that Major Wyman was going to see
just Mr. Rohl. I mean, after all, there were a lot of people that were
connected with the Engineer district who stayed at the Biltmore Hotel
when they arrived in the district, and he would go there to meet them,
Army officers and other civilian personnel who were there for the
district.
27. Major Clausen. You saw, some of these times when you went
[2S83] up to Mr. Eohl's apartment in Los Angeles, Paul Grafe,
didn't you, Mr. Zucca ?
Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir, I met a Mr. Paul Grafe.
28. Major Clausen. And on some of these occasions when you would
drive Major Wyman to the apartment of jSIr. Eohl you would wait for
him, and wait sometimes from nine o'clock at night to two 'oclock the
next morning ; isn't that right ?
Mr. Zucca. I have, yes, sir ; I have waited for him.
29. Major Clausen. And you, also during the same period that you
drove Major Wyman to the Biltmore, have on occasions driven Major
Wyman to the home of Mr. Rohl, which was elsewhere than the Bilt-
more ; isn't that right ?
Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir ; I drove Major Wyman to Mr. Rohl's home on a
few different occasions.
30. Major Clausen. In other words, the home of Mr. Rohl, or it
might be another home of Mr. Rohl, was different than the Biltmore
Hotel?
Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir; I believe he had a private residence.
31. Major Clausen. In Los Angeles?
Mr. Zucca. In the Hollywood district, sir.
32. Major Clausen. Yes. At Los Angeles ?
Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir.
33. Major Clausen. Now, you also had driven Major Wyman at
times around to various night club ; isn't that correct ?
Mr. Zucca. I have on occasions, yes, sir.
34. Major Clausen. All these trips were in the official car ; is that
correct ?
Mr. Zucca. Well, not all of them, sir. I believe that I said that all
those trips at one time were in the official [^-55-^] car, but that
is an incorrect statement. They were not all. I mean there was oc-
casions when they weren't in the official car.
35. Major Clausen. What car would you then use ?
Mr. Zucca. Well, Major Wyman had a car of his own, sir.
36. Major Clausen. And you would drive that for him ?
^ Mr. Zucca. Well, I had on very rare occasions driven his own car.
sir.
1346 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
37. Major Clausen. Well, you have driven Major Wyman around
to a lot oi night clubs ? Earl Carroll's ? Or let me have the names.
You give them to me.
Mr. ZuccA. Well, Earl Carroll's is one. I don't recall. The Jane
Jones Club.
38. Major Clausen. Little Jane Jones Club.
Mr. ZuccA. Yes, sir. And the Cafe La Maze.
39. Major Clausen. Trocadero?
Mr. Zucca. Trocadero, sir.
40. Major Clausen. Ambassador?
Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir.
41. Major Clausen. What other ones, Mr. Zucca ?
Mr. Zucca. That is all I recall, sir.
42. Major Clausen. Now, when you would drive him around to
these places, who would be in the party with Colonel Wyman ? Would
Mr. Rohl be there?
Mr. Zucca. Well, occasionally, yes, sir.
43. Major Clausen. And this Paul Graf e sometimes ?
Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir.
44. Major Clausen. How about a man by the name of Plack?
Werner Plack. Was he ever along ?
[2S8S] Mr. Zucca. Don't know him, sir.
45. Major Clausen. When you were driving there, you would wait
until the party was over and then take them home ; is that right ?
Mr. Zucca. Sometimes, sir.
46. Major Clausen. That would be around midnight, one o'clock,
later on ?
Mr. Zucca. Well, yes. You know, the time varied. Sometimes it
would be earlier ; sometimes it would be a little later.
47. Major Clausen. Now, on some occasions did you just take
Major Wyman and Mr. Rohl to these places ?
Mr. Zucca. I had, I believe, on a couple of occasions taken them,
just the two of them, sir.
48. Major Clausen. And in addition to those night clubs did you
sometimes take Major and Mrs. Wyman and Mr. and Mrs. Rohl out to
night clubs or country clubs ?
Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir, I have.
49. Major Clausen. And what were some of those places?
Mr. Zucca. Well, I think they were the country clubs. The Bel-Air
Country Club I believe was one; that was the beach club. I don't
recall the names of the others, sir, at the present time.
50. Major Clausen. Well, different hotels?
Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir ; I would say, like the Ambassador.
51. General Grunert. Didn't Mr. Rohl have a car of his own?
Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir ; he did.
52. General Grunert. Did he use it much, or did he ride a great
deal with Major Wyman?
[2586] Mr. Zucca. Well, he usually had his car with him, sir.
53. General Grunert. Go ahead.
54. General Frank. What do you mean by that?
Mr. Zucca. I mean that sometimes that Mr. Rohl might ride in the
car with us, but he would have his own car, you know, in the party, sir.
55. General Frank. Trailing along behind?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1347
Mr. ZuccA. Yes, sir.
56. General Frank. What for?
Mr. ZuccA. Why, I really don't know, sir.
57. General Frank. Did you know his chaiiffe'ur?
Mr. ZuccA. I did, sir.
58. General Frank. Would his chauffeur be waiting at these places
outside while you were waiting for Major Wyman ?
Mr. ZuccA. Occasionally, sir; yes, sir.
59. General Frank. Go ahead.
60. Major Clausen. I believe you ah-eady said that you have driven
Major Wyman out to Mr. Rohl's own home, and I wonder while you
were out there if you ever met this party named Plack.
Mr. ZuccA. I don't recall him, sir.
61. Major Clausen. What is Mr. Rohl's chauffeur s name ? I mean
the man who was the chauffeur at the time that you were the chauffeur
for Major Wyman.
Mr. ZuccA. A Mr. Brown.
62. Major Clausen. What is his first name?
Mr. ZuccA. I don't know.
63. Major Clausen. Do you know where he lives, his address?
Mr. ZuccA. No, I don't.
[2587] 64. Major Clausen. Do you know where he is working?
Mr. ZuccA. No, I don't.
65. General Frank. How often would Major Wyman stay all night
at Mr. Rohl's?
Mr. ZuccA. I have never known him to stay all night at Mr. Rohl's,
sir.
66. Major Clausen. I have no further questions.
67. General Russell. When did you first begin working for Cap-
tain or Colonel Wyman ?
68. General Frank. Major Wyman.
69. General Russell. Major Wyman.
Mr. ZuccA. I was assigned to Major Wyman when I was assigned
as the District Engineer's driver about four months after I was em-
ployed with the Army Engineers.
70. General Russell. And that was when?
Mr. ZuccA. Well, I started, I believe the date was — it was either
February or March the 10th, 1936 : March, April, May, June, or July,
some time around there.
71. General Russell. And how long did you drive for Major
Wyman ?
Mr. ZuccA. I drove until he was transferred from the district at Los
Angeles to Honolulu, sir.
72. General Russell. And then it covered a span of three or four
years ?
Mr. ZuccA. Yes, sir ; about three and a half years, roughly.
73. General Russell. Now, were you an enlisted man in the Army
and just detailed as Major Wyman's driver?
Mr. ZuccA. No, sir ; I was a civilian.
[2588] 74. General Russell. You were a civilian employee?
Mr. ZuccA. Yes, sir.
75. General Russell. What kind of car did the Major have?
Mr. ZuccA. You mean his own personal car, sir?
79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 2 36
1348 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
76. General Russell. No. The official car. Did he have one as-
signed to him as his permanent official car?
Mr. ZuccA. Yes, sir; there was a car assigned to the District En-
gineer.
77. General Russell. And you were given the job of driving that
particular car?
Mr. ZuccA. Yes, sir.
78. General Russell. And did you drive the Major around very
much in the daytime ?
Mr. ZuccA. Yes, sir.
79. General Russell. And then you would drive him some at night ?
Mr. ZuccA. Yes, sir, occassionally.
80. General Russell. Did he live in more than one place during
this period of approximately three and a half years when you acted
as his chauffeur ?
Mr. ZuccA. No, sir, not that I recall, sir. He was
81. General Russell. Where did he live during that period of time?
Mr. ZuccA. In West Los Angeles, sir.
82. General Russell. Do you recall the number and street?
Mr. ZuccA. Yes, sir; 221 Woodruff, West Los Angeles.
83. General Russell. A very nice home he had there ?
Mr. ZuccA. Yes, sir, a very nice home.
84. General Russell. You would pick him up there and take
[2S89] him downtown to the hotel or out to a club after he had
finished his work at night; is that so ?
Mr. ZuccA. Yes, sir, sometimes.
85. General Russell. Did he and his wife separate during this
period of time that you acted as his chauffeur ?
Mr. ZuccA. Yes, sir.
86. General Russell. Did he continue to live in the home, or did
Mrs. Wyman live in the home thereafter ?
Mr. ZuccA. He continued to live in the home, sir.
87. General Russell. Did she move?
Mr. ZuccA. Mrs. Wyman — I believe she was in the East, sir.
88. General Russell. She moved away?
Mr. ZuccA. Well, she was in the East. I don't know whether she
moved or not.
89. General Russell. Did Major Wyman marry again before he
went out to the Islands.
Mr. ZuccA. Yes, sir, he did.
90. General Russell. How long was it between the date of the
first Mrs. Wy man's going to the East until the Major married again ?
Mr. ZuccA. I don't know, sir.
91. General Russell. You don't recall when he married again?
Mr. ZuccA. No, sir. I was on thirty days' leave at the time, and
I don't recall how long it was.
92. General Russell. Do you remember when you went on that
leave ?
Mr. ZuccA. It was in — let's see. It was August. I think it was
in August 1938, 1 believe.
93. General Russell. Now, do you remember when Mrs, Wyman,
[£590] the first Mrs. Wyman, left to go to the East?
Mr. ZuccA. No, sir. I had no idea that they were having any
difficulty or anything at all. I don't recall when she left to go
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1349
east, and I was rather amazed when I came back, to hear that they
had separated, and later on I heard that he was married again.
94. General Kussell. Now, aren't we getting a little bit con-
fused? Did he separate and marry again, all during this one
period of thirty days' leave that you had f
Mr. ZuccA. No, sir.
95. General Russell. Where were you when the first Mrs. Wyman
went out east?
Mr. ZuccA. I was in the Los Angeles district, sir.
96. General Russell. Weren't you his driver then ?
Mr. ZuccA. Yes, sir, I was.
97. General Russell. You were taking him home and carrying
him back to his office and going out to parties with him all tliat
time ?
Mr. ZuccA. Well, I was taking him home, yes, sir; but I mean
I had no knowledge of Mrs. Wyman's whereabouts, whether she was
home or in the East.
98. General Russell. Well, all of the time before she went east,
would you go get him and take him down to the hotel and leave
the first Mrs. Wyman at home?
Mr. ZucCA. I would like to clarify one thing: that when I'd go
get Major Wyman, sir, I would usually take him to the district
office.
99. General Russell. Well, now, you told Major Clausen a little
while ago, you took him down to the Biltmore Hotel.
Mr. ZuccA. I did. I have, yes, sir.
[£591] 100. General Russell. You told General Frank you
would take him sometimes once a month and sometimes twice a week.
Mr. ZuccA. I have, yes, sir. That's right.
101. General Russell. But you left Mrs. Wyman when you would
take him down to the hotel?
Mr. ZuccA. Well, let's put a time element in here. Wliat time do
you mean?
102. General Russell. I don't know. You fix the time.
Mr. ZuccA. Well, maybe in the mornings when I'd pick him up I
would take him to the district office in Los Angeles.
103. General Russell. We are not troubled about that. We want
to know when the period was you were taking him to the hotel. Was
that before Mrs. AVyman left and went to the East?
Mr. ZuccA. No, sir.
104. General Russell. You never did take him to the Biltmore
Hotel while he was living with the first Mrs. Wyman ?
Mr. ZuccA. Yes, sir, I have.
105. General Russell. Yes. You did and you didn't.
Mr. ZuccA. I have taken him to the hotel and I have taken him to
the district office, sir, when Mrs. Wyman was — when he was living
with Mrs. Wyman, and I presume that during the time that Mrs.
Wyman was away.
106. General Russell. Now, have you ever taken Mr. Rohl aud
"Colonel Wyman out to a night club, just the two of them?
Mr. ZuccA. Yes, sir, I have.
107. General Russell. Anybody else in that automobile?
Mr. ZuccA. Well, sometimes there would be, yes, sir.
108. General Russell. Who would that be ?
1350 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr, ZuccA. Well, sometimes it might be Mrs. Wyman ; it [2592'\
might be Mr. Graf e, Mr. Sverdrup.
109. General Russell. Did you have anybody else in there, in those
cars ?
Mr. ZuccA. Well, oh, there was — I — you know, I mean, after all,
there was a lot of people connected there with the district office.
110. General Hussell. Ever have any otlier ladies in those cars?
Mr. ZuccA. No, sir.
111. General Russell. Mrs. Wyman and Mrs. Rohl are the only
two ladies that you ever had in that automobile?
Mr. ZucCA. iTes, sir. That's the only ones that I recall, sir.
112. General Russell. Could there have been some others and
you have forgotten them before now?
Mr. ZuccA. Well, it was a long — long time. Four years is a long
time. After all, this is 1944. That was in 1936, '37, '38, and '39.
113. General Russell. But you remember Paul Graf e ?
Mr. ZuccA. Wei, yes, sir, I remember Paul Grafe.
114. General Russell. His riding in the automobile?
Mr. ZuccA. Yes, sir.
115. General Russell. You remember Mrs. Wyman riding in the
automobile ?
Mr. ZuccA. Yes, sir.
116. General Russell. And Mrs. Rohl riding in it?
Mr. ZuccA. Yes, sir.
117. General Russell. And these other two gentlemen you have
mentioned, and those are the only ones you can remember ?
[2693'] Mr. Zucca. Those are the only ones. I mean I have seen
them quite often, naturally, and remember them.
118. General Russell. There might have been other people riding in
there?
Mr. ZuccA. There was undoubtedly other people, you know, that we
had driven at different times, but I don't recall who they were.
119. General Russell. Now, when Brown would come along be-
hind you in Rohl's automobile, who was in there with him ?
Mr. ZuccA. "No one, sir.
120. General Russell. He would be just alone?
Mr, Zucca. Yes, sir.
121. General Russell. Major Clausen asked you about going up
to the hotel room where Mr. Rohl and Major Wyman were. Have
you ever seen any girls up in those rooms ?
Mr. Zucca. No, sir.
122. General Russell. Never saw a one in your life ?
Mr. Zucca. No, sir.
123. General Russell. You saw some liquor but didn't see anybody
drink any?
Mr. Zucca. I saw some liquor, but I didn't see anybody drinking it.
124. General Russell. In all the times you had ever been in there
you never saw one soul take a drink of liquor ?
Mr. Zucca. No, sir.
125. General Frank. What did you go up there for?
Mr. Zucca. Well, I took some cigarettes up to Major Wyman a
couple of different occasions. One afternoon I took a briefcase up to
him, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1351
\^69Jf] 126. General Russell. What time of day was it that you
were going up to this room where Rohl was, where the Major was?
Mr. ZuccA. In the afternoon, sir.
127. General Russell. Always in the afternoon ?
Mr. ZuccA. About four o'clock in the afternoon, yes, sir.
128. General Russell. You never went up there at night at all ?
Mr. ZuccA. No, sir, I have never been up there at night.
129. General Russell. When have you seen Mr. Rohl ?
Mr. ZuccA. Wlien?
130. General Russell. Yes, lately.
Mr. ZuccA. I haven't see Mr. Rohl since I left the Engineers, sir,
19 — let's see. That was 1941 when I left there, and I hadn't seen him
quite some time previous to that.
131. General Russell. Wlien did you see Paul Grafe last?
Mr. ZuccA. About the same time, sir.
132. General Russell. '41 ?
Mr. ZuccA. Yes, sir.
133. General Russell. Do you know how you came to give this
statement that Major Clausen has read sections from to you?
Mr. ZuccA. Do I know how I came to give it?
134. General Russell. Yes.
Mr. ZuccA. Yes, sir ; I was — let's see. Some Weiner — ^Werner.
135. General Russell. Weiner?
Mr. ZuccA. Weiner, I believe — I believe that was his name — con-
tacted to me at the San Bernardino air depot at San Bernardino and
questioned me along these same lines, sir.
136. General Russell. Do you know who pointed you out to him or
suggested that he 2:0 to see you?
[P.SSS'] Mr. ZuccA. No, sir, I don't.
137. General Russell. I think that is all.
138. Major Clausen. I have one more question, sir : Some of these
times when you went up to the Biltmore Hotel Mr. Rohl would have
different apartments, wouldn't he? I mean, change around from time
to time ?
Mr. ZuccA. Well, yes, sir.
139. Major Clausen. Yes. That is all.
140. General Grunert. Any other questions ?
141. Major Clausen. No, sir.
142. General Grunert. Can you think of anything else that you
may want to tell the Board that hasn't been brought up?
Mr. ZuccA. No, sir.
143. General Frank. When yon would call for Colonel Wyman and
Mr. Rohl at tliese night clubs and hotels, and so forth, were they al-
ways both of tliem perfectly sober?
Mr. ZuccA. To my knowledge, yes, sir.
144. General Frank. Do you know?
Mr. ZuccA. Well, I would say that, as far as I knew, they were
sober, yes, sir.
145. General Frank. But do you really know ?
Mr. ZuccA. Pretty near. Well, I think I could tell a sober man.
1 mean, pretty hard to say that a person is drunk.
146. General Frank. If he is not in the gutter ?
Mr. ZirccA. No, sir, I wouldn't say that.
1352 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
147. General Grunert. How did Major Wyman treat you? Was
he rough with you abrupt or dictatorial, or was he nice to work for,
or what ?
148. General Frank. Was he considerate of you ?
[£596] Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir, I would say that he was.
149. General Frank. That he was what?
Mr. ZuccA. Considerate of me, sir.
150. Major Clausen. Well, he gave you extra money, didn't he,
Mr. Zucca ?
Mr. Zucca. No, sir.
151. Major Clausen. Well, who was it gave you the tips? Mr.
Kohl?
Mr. Zucca. I received a tip, I believe, on two different occasions
from Mr. Sverdrup.
152. General Grunert. You mean four years and you just received
two tips ?
Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir.
153. Major Clausen. Mr. Rohl told the Tenney Committee his idea
of a man being drunk was one who couldn't stand up any more. Is
that your idea of the definition of drunk?
Mr. Zucca. No, sir.
154. Major Clausen. Did he ever tell you that?
Mr. Zucca. No, sir.
155. Major Clausen. That is all.
156. General Grunert. There appear to be no more questions.
Thank you for coming.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon, at 11:50 a. m., the Board concluded the hearing of
witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1353
V2597^ CONTENTS
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1944
Testimony of : Page '
Maj. Gen. Henry T. Burgin, Army of the United States, Fort Sliafter,
T. H 2598
Colonel William S. Lawton, General Staff Corps, Headquarters, Pacific
Ocean Area, Fort Shatter, T. H 2665
Brig. Gen. Edgar King, Medical Department, Fort Shafter, T. H 2696
Hon. Lester Petrie, Mayor of the City of Honolulu, T. H 2708
Maj. Gen. B. H. Wells, United States Army, Retired, 4551 Kahala
Avenue, Honolulu, T. H 2722
Walter Francis Dillingham, Carnation Avenue, Honolulu, T. H 2745
DOCUMENTS
Radiogram to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department November 27,
1941 2680
Message of December 7, 1941 to Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart-
ment 2692
1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original transcript of proceedings.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1355
[25981, PKOCEEDINGS BEFORE THE AEMY PEAEL
HARBOE BOAED
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1944.
Fort Sh after, Territory of Hawaii.
The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on Tuesday, September 5,
1944, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert,
President of the Board, presiding.
Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D.
Kussell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.
Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C.
Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr.,
Executive Officer.
General Grunert. The Board will come to order.
TESTIMONY OP MAJOR GENERAL HENRY T. BURGIN, ARMY OF
THE UNITED STATES
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board your
name, rank, organization, and station.
General Burgin. Henry T. Burgin; Major General, Army of the
United States. My station is Fort Shafter, T. H., I presume.
2. General Grunert. General Burgin, the Board is after facts as to
what happened prior to and during the attack on December 7.
[£699] Because of your assigned duties at that time, we hop© we
can get some facts from you, and also probably get leads to others
who have such facts. Now, the Board, with the hearings held in the
last month or more, has pretty thoroughly developed the subject, so,
instead of piling up evidence on facts already substantiated, I will
attempt to bolster up some of them by skipping from question to ques-
tion, much of which is as a background of the Roberts Commission's
report. Then, after I get through with that, we can open up any
subject that the Board Members desire to have opened up, and also
give you an opportunity to introduce anything that may occur to you,
as it might have value to the Board.
Now, according to the Roberts Commission testimony, you evidently
believed that Short counted on the Navy for warning of a sea approach,
through the sources of Navy scouting, and you stated that Short ex-
pressed himself forcibly that no enemy ships could get close enough to
land a plane. Why this belief, do you know?
General Burgin. It should be "launch a plane." I did not say "land
a plane."
3. General Grunert. To "launch a plane"?
1356 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Burgin. Launch a plane from a carrier.
4. General Grunert. Did you concur with Short in that belief, or
had you given the matter thought ?
General Burgin. I concurred in General Short's belief, and I got it
from conversations with General Short and others. We had no means
whatsoever, so far as the Army was concerned, of getting information.
We had no surface ships. We did have some planes. It was my un-
derstanding that those planes of the [2600] Army operated
under the Navy so far as scouting purposes went, patrol purposes.
Those patrols were seen to go out every morning, come back late after-
noon. I was never shown or didn't attempt to see what routes they
took, where they went, or what sectors they covered, but in my mind,
and I am sure, in that of General Short's, was the idea that the Navy
was doing the scouting, and that from the Navy we would get our
information, should the enemy approach.
5. General Grunert. But you never knew just what scouting the
Navy was doing, if any?
General Burgin. I never know positively, no, only I saw these scout-
ing planes go out and some back. It was not my business and I didn't
bother to look into it.
6. General Grunert. What were they — the Navy PB Ys ?
General Burgin. A great many w^ere Navy PB Ys, some of them were
Army bombers.
7. General Grunert. Tell me, first, just what did you command at
that time?
General Burgin. I commanded w^iat was known at that time as the
Coast Artillery Command, consisting of a seacoast artillery plus all
the antiaircraft artillery in the Hawaiian Department.
8. General Grunert. What was the Fifty-Third Coast Artillery
Brigade ? What was that ?
General Burgin. That was antiaircraft artillery, composed of the
Sixty-Fourth Regiment, the Two Hundred Fifty-First Regiment, and
the Ninety-Eighth, which came in just before the attack, two or three
months before.
9. General Frank. A National Guard regiment?
[2601 \ General Burgin. The Two Hundred Fifty-First was
the only National Guard regiment.
10. General Grunert. Now, it appears that you had in that brigade
a brigade SOP of November 26, 1941, which charged each unit with
responsibility for its own security against air and ground forces, and
with the maintenance of air guards and dispersion of personnel and
materiel, and which provided for alarms for air attack. Now, was
this in conformity with the Department SOP of November 5, or was
that your own idea, or what?
General Burgin. At this time, I don't recollect whether it exactly
conformed to the Department SOP. I believe it did. In addition
to that, the idea behind that particular paragraph is the same old
idea that you have with an infantry company marching along the
highways. They are cautioned to be ready to shoot, to disperse, and
every man shoot at the plane, should they be attacked. The same
idea was behind this — each individual unit to look after itself, in so
far as strafing planes were concerned, and keep dispersed.
11. General Grunert. Was this both in post and while out?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1357
General Burgtn. Everywhere, the idea behind it. That is followed
even today in all these units. They are scattered as much as you can,
dug into the ground, hidden.
12. General Grunert. How did that work out during the attack?
General Bfrgin. I did not have a chance to check it, because we
were not particularly attacked. They had one target to go after,
which was Pearl Harbor, and they went after it. They did it, and
did the strafing of airfields, serious strafing, but so far as my AA
units, they were not attacked [2602'] seriously. There were
probably half a dozen men injured from attack during the whole
day.
13. General Grunert. Under that SOP, which required each unit
to take care of itself, did that include preparing the necessary air-raid
shelters and the preparation of slit trenches, and all other require-
ments to ward off an air attack?
General Burgin. I do not think that would be in that particular
paragraph, but that is SOP to do that when you go out into a field
position for battle, and the men actually did it without having to
be told, when they went out.
14. General Grunert. In the various garrisons in which your
troops were stationed, were such precautionary measures taken prior
to December 7?
General Burgin. You mean, were slit trenches made, and so forth?
No, they were not.
15. General Grunert. Was that done, shortly after December 7?
General Burgin. Immediately after, and during.
16. General Grunert. Now, there is a statement in your testimony,
I believe, to the effect that you turned your anti-aircraft over to the
Interceptor Command for drills, prior to December 7, and on that
date, for action. Was the Interceptor Command then in being?
General Burgin. The Interceptor Command was being organized.
It was never in being and functioning, as it should have been. It
was only a temporary measure ; but that particular feature of Inter-
ceptor Command controlling AA fire was jealously guarded by the
air people, and we had constant training and maneuvers, practice,
where that particular thing [260S] was stressed, and the anti-
aircraft was turned over to interceptor command.
17. General Frank. On what date?
^ General Burgin. A peculiar thing attaches to that. For at least
six weeks or two months prior to December 7, we had, every Sunday
morning, one of these exercises with the Navy. Our AA would go
out in the field and take their field positions. They would know
that the Navy was coming in, with carrier-based planes, and they
would simulate an attack on the island, and we put our guns out
mainly along the roadways, sometimes in position, and practiced
simulating fire against this simulated attack made by the Navy.
And we were out just one week prior to December 7.
18. General Frank. On Sunday?
General Burgin. On Sunday; but, by some stroke, we did not go
out on December 7. The fleet was in the harbor.
The interceptor command never got into being actually as a bona
fide interceptor command, for weeks after December 7 ; but we were
practicing as an interceptor command, through General Davidson, all
the time.
1358 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
19. General Grunert. During these practices and exercises, did the
thing work?
[2604] General Burgin. It Avorked, yes, because we would get
the information of the planes coming in, and immediately the inter-
ceptor command would take over. All that is, so far as turning it
over to the interceptor command, is that the interceptor command
tells you when to hold fire and when to resume fire. If he doesn't
want you firing, he tells antiaircraft to hold fire, and under the orders
we have to hold fire.
20. General Gruxert. Now, suppose that the interceptor command
as had been working during these clrills and exercises, was in being on
December 7, and had been working as it had been working during
the drills and exercises : what difference would it have made in ward-
ing off the attack or in minimizing the effect of the attack, in your
opinion?
General Burgin. In my opinion, none.
21. General Grunert. Why not?
General Burgin. Because we didn't have ammunition with our
mobile antiaircraft. If they had been out in the field without any
ammunition, they would have been worse off than they actually
were.
22. General Grunert. That brings me to my next line of ques-
tioning.
What did you have out with your antiaircraft batteries such as
existed on December 7th? Where were they? In what condition
were they to go into action?
General Burgin. They were all ready to go into action immediately,
with the exception that the mobile batteries did not have the ammu-
nition. The fixed batteries along the seacoast, tliose batteries bolted
down to concrete, had the ammunition [3605] nearby. I had
insisted on that with General Short in person and had gotten his
permission to take this antiaircraft ammunition, move it into the sea-
coast gun battery positions, and have it nearby the antiaircraft guns.
It was, however, boxed up in wooden boxes and had to be taken out.
The ammunition for the mobile guns and batteries was in Aliamanu
Crater, which, you may know or may not, is about a mile from Fort
Shafter, up in the old volcano. The mobile batteries had to send
there to get ammunition. In addition to that, the mobile batteries
had to move out from the various posts to their field positions. They
were not in field positions.
23. General Grunert. What proportion of mobile to fixed, approx-
imately? Two to one? Three to one?
General Burgin. I can give you that exact figure from some notes
here.
24. General Grunert. I can probably refresh your memory by your
saying
General Burgin. 26.
2.5. General Grunert. Location of 60 mobile and 26 fixed antiair-
craft guns?
General Burgin. Yes, 26 fixed guns and 60 mobile at the time of the
attack.
26. General Grunert. And then there were 26 fixed antiaircraft
guns which had the ammunition alongside and ready for action?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1359
27. General Frank. In boxes.
28. General Grunert. Was that ammunition for the fixed guns
boxed or uncased?
General Burgin. It was boxed.
[3606] 29. General Grunert. But how long approximately
would it take to unbox it and get it into action?
General Burgin. It depends on the batteries. Some of them had
ammunition immediately available; that could be done in a very few
minutes, four or five : they get enough ammunition out to begin firing,
and continue to unbox. The batteries at Fort Weaver that is across
the other side of Pearl Harbor, a little longer, because this ammuni-
tion was at Fort Kamehameha, had to be carried across the channel.
But for the other fixed batteries I would say they could have been fir-
ing within five minutes, as far as the ammunition was concerned.
They did begin firing; they went into action, three of those batteries.
Three of those batteries got into action promptly.
30. General Grunert. They didn't get into action for the first
wave of the attack, did thej^?
General Burgin. That I don't know. These waves, I have never
found anyone yet who could distinguish the difference in waves
and how many waves actually came in here, as a matter of fact.
31. General Grunert. Did you have any information that was got-
ten out to the batteries in time for them to get into action before the
attack actually struck ?
General Burgin. Oh, no; we knew nothing about the attack until
the torpedoes dropped.
32. General Grunert. Then, you succeeded, through your own re
quest, in getting boxed ammunition with your fixed antiaircraft bat-
teries, which consisted of a])proximately 26 guns?
General Burgin. Right.
33. General Grunert. But you were not successful or did you
{2607] attempt to get ammunition to keep with your mobile bat-
teries that could have gone into position with their ammunition with-
out having to wait to draw it?
^ General Burgin. Yes, sir. we did. I would like to answer that a
little more elaborately. You may recollect yourself the great diffi-
culty in prying loose ammunition from our storehouses and from the
ordnance during peacetime. It was almost a matter of impossibility
to get your ammunition out because in the minds of everyone who has
preservation of ammunition at heart it goes out, gets damaged, comes
back in, and has to be renovated. The same was especially true here.
It was extremely difficult to get your ammunition out of the maga-
zines. We tried the ordnance peoi)le without results. General Max
Murray and myself went personally to General Short. General Mur-
ray pled for his ammunition for the field artillery. I asked for
ammunition for the antiaircraft. We were put off, the idea behind
it being that we would get our ammunition in plenty of time, that we
would have warning before any attack ever struck. ,
34. General Frank. Was that putting off made directly by the
Commanding General or by a staff department?
General Burgin. Both; staff departments first, then the Command-
ing General in person.
1360 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
35. General Frank. Supported them ?
General Buegin. In his own office, to General Murray and to me.
36. General Frank. Well, what were the staff departments who
opposed it?
General Buegin. The Gs; G-4s, the Ordnance.
[2608^ 37. General Frank. And their reasons were?
General Burgin. Same old reason, that they didn't want to issue
any of the clean ammunition, let it get out and get dirty, have to take
it back in later on and renovate it ; and, besides, we would get our
ammunition in plenty of time should any occasion arise.
38. General Grunert. Then it was just a question of maintenance
and preservation. Did the question of possible sabotage come into
it ; do you know ?
General Burgin. That is quite true ; the sabotage was foremost in
everybody's mind. As long as the ammunition could be left locked up
in the magazines, it was pretty safely guarded and could not be tam-
pered with to any great extent.
39. General Grunert. Still, you being on an outpost here, with
some intimation, at least, of the imminence of an attack, the guns were
no good without ammunition ?
General Burgin. Quite true, sir.
40. General Grunert. And, therefore, what warning in the matter
of time did you figure you should have in order to get your guns in
position and your ammunition there with the guns to fire ? Had that
been practiced?
General Burgin. We had many, many practices and tested that out,
and it varied from the battery's position, where it started to where it
wound up, and other things, but six hours was considered to be the
maximum.
41. General Grunert. Six hours.
General Burgin. Day and night. We went out daytime and we
went out nighttime.
42. General Gkunert. You actually took the live ammunition
[2609] out there to practice handling it ?
General Burgin. No.
43. General Grunert. And to practice taking it out there?
General Burgin. No, I never took live ammunition on any prac-
tices. That was done once. I can't say this for a fact, though, be-
cause I don't know. I was only told it was done before I came here,
at one time. The ammunition was taken out. There was a flurry and
a scare, and the then there was all hell to pay when the ammunition
came back in and had to be cleaned up, put back in the ordnance maga-
zine. That, however, is not my personal knowledge,
44. General Grunert. Was there any question in your mind as to
the ammunition not being put out there because it might alarm the
public or indicate the intent of what was about to happen?
General Burgin. The idea never occurred to me at the time. Look-
ing back at the message General Short had, not to alarm the public
there is a possibility that was in his mind. I couldn't alarm the public
in this way : to move one of these batteries out to take the position
in a private field was practically impossible prior to December 7th.
As soon as you got off the highway, the owner, the manager, the top-
side man, all ran onto General Short's neck : The Army is trespassing
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1361
on their land. Get to hell out of there. You had to do all these
maneuvers on Army land or on the hisfhways.
45. General Grunert. All right. Now, how many of the mobile
positions for the 60 mobile guns were on such private land that you
had to trespass to put them in position? Do you recall that?
[£610] General Burgin. I can look here and refer to this bulle-
tin.
46. General Grunert. Go ahead.
The actual number doesn't make so much difference. I would like
to have an idea of what the percentage is, if possible.
General BurcxTn. About 40 percent were on private land.
47. General Grunert. And the other 60 percent, then, could have
been put in position without going on private land ?
General Burgin. Wait a minute. I have included those fixed bat-
teries. Make that higher. That percentage, at least 50 percent of
the mobile batteries were on private land.
[2611] 48. General Grunert. I believe General Short stated
something to the effect that under Alert No. 1 each battery had a
skeleton crew with it. Would that refer to the fixed batteries or to
the mobile or to both?
General Burgin. It referred to both as far as sabotage meant only.
49. General Grunert. But your mobile batteries had to move out
from their location to go into a position, and then none of these mo-
biles went out in their position, and they had skeleton crews ?
General Burgin. I don't quite understand your question. I am
sorry.
50. General Grunert. Here, your fixed batteries are fixed and they
undoubtedly had a skeleton crew there to prevent sabotage.
General Burgin. Eight.
51. General Grunert. In other words, your skeleton crews to pre-
vent sabotage came in, as far as your mobile batteries are concerned,
as if they were at the post and had not moved out into position?
General Burgin. They were taken more or less as a regiment or a
battalion on the post and the sabotage guards did not necessarily go
down to the battery itself.
52. General Grunert. There was not, then, much of a sabotage
problem as far as guards were concerned, within the post itself?
General Burgin. No, sir.
53. General Grunert. You may have answered this, but I will ask
it again : What instructions, if any, prevented the antiaircraft com-
mand from having ammunition at the guns? Were [2612]
there any instructions or could you not get the ammunition?
General Bukgin. There were no instructions forbidding the anti-
aircraft or any other outfit from having the ammunition, but it was
just impossible to pry the ammunition loose from the Ordnance,
the G-4's, or from General Short himself.
54. General Grunert. Now, in February of 1941, Admiral Kimmel
pointed out the critical inadequacy of antiaircraft guns. Were you
here at that time, in February of 1941 ?
General Burgin. No, sir. I came in August of 1941.
55. General Grunert. Since August, 1941, what improvement in
the line of antiaircraft gun equipment took place, up to December,
1941?
1362 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Burgin. Up to December 1941?
56. General Gruistert. Yes.
General Burgin. No improvement in actual equipment, with the
bare exception of about 20 37-mm. guns that arrived. However, there
were more in training than were actually in use, because of no ammu-
nition for them up to just a day or two of December 7th.
57. General Grunert. And they were 37s ?
General Burgin. 37 mm.
58. General Grunert. How did you consider your command pre-
pared for action with what you had ? Was it adequate, satisfactory,
or unsatisfactory, and what explanation is there for your answer ?
General Burgin. With what we had we were prepared for action,
with the one exception that our mobile antiaircraft did not have its
ammunition. I have already explained the reason for that. So far
as the equipment was concerned, it was [2513^ as modern
as the U. S. had at the time, with the bare exception, perhaps, that we
had 37-mm. automatic weapons, yes, whereas they were using the
40-mm. Bofors and other aerials.
59. General Grunert. Did you have any 90s?
General Burgin. We had no 90s whatever at the time.
60. General Grunert. What was the status of their being supplied
to the Army at that time, do you know ?
General Burgin. It was reported that there was an automatic supply
and we would get them when they had them.
61. General Grunert. Do you know what priority you were on as
compared with other commands at that time ?
General Burgin. No, I do not. The 90s came along fairly well after
December 7th. We are equipped now with 90s and 120s ; no 3s what-
soever. In fact, all the equipment we had on December 7th has been
discarded, with the exception of the .50 caliber machine guns.
62. General Grunert. On December 7th, then, did you have prac-
tically your full allowance, as per tables, of the weapons that were
prescribed for you at that time ?
General Burgin. No. We had the full allowance of guns, but did
not have the allowance of automatic weapons.
63. General Grunert. Mainly what?
General Burgin. Mainly the 37 mm. or the 40. You might say
we had none of them because we had just received a shipment of 20,
I think, but no ammunition. We were way short on .50 caliber machine
guns. We had only about 40 per cent of our allowance. We had sup-
plemented them with .30 caliber, however.
64. General Grunert. Have you anything else to add to the anti-
aircraft situation picture that you think would help the [261Ji^
Board?
General Burgin. I think not, sir. The whole thing sums up in
about this: We practiced making a quick get-away from central lo-
cations to field positions. We felt that we could get into field positions
after the warning which we expected to receive.
65. General Grunert. Had you been alerted in what the SOP of
November 5th describes as Alert No. 2, which is an alert to ward off
an air attack, plus an alert against sabotage, then what condition would
you have been in ?
General Burgin. The batteries would all have been in their field
positions with the ammunition open ready at the guns.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1363
66. General Grunert. Then it all boils down to your not being; in
the alert which required you to be ready for any eventuality, is that
right?
General Btjrgin. That is correct.
67. General Grunert. Now, a question as to your distribution of
batteries. Was there an antiaircraft battery assigned to Ford Island
or to cover Ford Island in its fire ?
General Burgin. Yes. Practically all the batteries surrounding
Pearl Harbor were a protection to Ford Island. There was, in addi-
tion, a battery listed for actual position on Ford Island. It was
later put in there.
68. General Grunert. How much of this fixed stuff was in the
scheme of covering Ford Island, how much of a fixed antiaircraft
battery ?
General Burgin. There were only three which you might consider
in that category, unless your attacking planes came [^OlS]
along the shoreline, from Diamond Head ; then they could all be in
that category, because they can shoot at the planes before they reach
Ford Island.
69. General Grunert. Then, what you might call the main antiair-
craft protection of Ford Island consisted of your mobile batteries,
which had to take position before they could afford that protection?
General Burgin. That is correct.
70. General Grunert. Was there ever a scheme made up of having
these people dispersing your mobile batteries so as to get them into
assigned positions more quickly than they could get into them from
their concentrated locations ?
General Burgin. No. They were dispersed pretty well as it was,
with one outfit at Shafter, one at Schofield Barracks, one at Camp
Malekoli ; tliree regiments, three areas. The regiments were assigned
to field positions nearest to their locations.
71. General Grunert. I have one question here that refers to your
testimony before the Roberts Commission, to the effect that you never
knew when the fleet was coming in- except when practicing, and you
stated that such knowledge would have helped the defense. Was that
information ever requested, if it was going to be of help to you in
the defense? Was an attempt ever made to find out when the fleet
was coming in ?
General Burgin. I would like you to read that answer to me again,
that I am supposed to have given before the Roberts Commission.
72. General Grunert. This is what this says: "General Burgin
never knew when tlie fleet was coming in, except when practicing.
[3616] He stated such knowledge would have helped defense."
Just what was the exact wording is I do not know. This is a summari-
zation of such evidence.
General Burgin. The last line there is what I take exception to,
that it would help defense. I call your attention to the fact that we
were not defending Pearl Harbor prior to Pearl Harbor. We were in
a state of peace, not in a state of war. The practices prior to December
7th were the only instances in which I was personally told that the
fleet was coming in between certain hours and carrier-based planes
would make a simulated attack on us and we would oppose them with
simulated opposition. We had at Pearl Harbor a harbor entrance
79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 2 37
1364 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
control post, where one of my officers sat with the Navy, but this officer
was given very little information, except when we were maneuvering
or practicing tactical situations. In the ordinary course of events,
the fleet went in and out without any indication whatsoever to me, at
least, and it is my opinion that no information was given to General
Short. That I do not know.
73. General Grunert. I understood from former testimony that
your control officer or the officer at the harbor entrance control post
was only there periodically and not on a 24-hour basis, is that right.
General Burgin. That is true, up to December 7th ; he was there on
a daylight basis, you might say.
74. General Frank. Wliat good did it do you to have him there
at all?
General Burgin. Practically none, except practice, tactical situa-
tions, so if such things developed we could quickly take care of the
harbor entrance control.
[£617] 75. General Frank. It did not give you any intelligent
information as to the location of our own fleet units ?
General Burgin. Absolutely not.
76. General Grunert. The testimony before the Roberts Commis-
sion also appears to show you stated that you expected Alert No. 2 to
follow almost immediately after Alert No. 1. What was the basis
of that? What was back in your mind there?
General Burgin. An actual statement by the Chief of Staff to that
effect. When I got the orders to go into Alert No. 1, 1 put it into effect,
checked here and there to see that it had gone into effect, that the
guards were out. Then I made a trip to the Commanding General's
office. General Short's office. I asked the Chief of Staff if he would
mind telling me the reason for Alert No. 1. He showed me the radio
that had come from General Marshall and stated "We will go into
Alert No. 1 ; then we will slide immediately to Alert No. 2, and then
to No. 8."
77. General Grunert. That was on November 27th, then?
General Burgin. As I recall, it was, it was November 27th.
78. General Grunert. But up to December 7th you had not slid into
Alert No. 2, had you ?
General Burgin. No, sir, there was no change in the alert. We had
done many, many other things guarding against sabotage, sending
guns and troops to Canton and Christmas, as I recollect, but we had
not changed our alert status.
79. General Grunert. Then you actually saw and read the Chief
of Staff's message on November 27th, 1941 ?
General Burgin. I did.
80. General Grunert. Did that give you any idea to suspect
1^618] that Alert No. 2 would be called soon, or the necessity for
any other alert outside of Alert No. 1 ? In other words, how did you
size up that message ?
General Burgin. It is easy enough from hindsight to say you would
have gone into another alert, but it did strike me we were a little
backwards; that we should have gone into Alert No. 3, gone all-out,
in spite of the fact it would turn the whole town upside down if we
had.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1365
81. General Grunert. That is one of the questions I want to ask.
In what way was that turning upside down going to affect things,
outside of what you have testified to, going on private property ?
General Buegin. That is true.
82. General Grunert. In what way would you have turned things
upside down, if you had gone into Alert No. 3 ?
General Burgin. That would have been the main thing, getting
your batteries into position, combating the opposition that would have
taken place and the excitement we expected to cause among the local
Japanese.
83. General Grunert. Before we get off into another trend of
thought, there must have been in your mind some question about the
adequacy of Alert No. 1, since you went to the Commanding General
and questioned him about it; and from your testimony it appears
that he had some idea of following it up with Alert No. 2, But what
gave you the idea that Alert No. 2 might follow Alert No. 1, unless
you considered No. 1 inadequate?
General Burgin. I did consider No. 1 as being inadequate, but I
did not voice that idea to General Short or his Chief of Staff. On the
other hand, I considered seriously that radio [2619] that had
come in to General Short, and wondered what I would do in his
position, that he would not unduly excite, or words to that effect, the
public.
84. General Frank. Do you remember the wording of that radio-
gram ?
85. General Grunert. General Frank will read you the radiogram,
in order that you may refresh your memory on it, and I thin^ the
Board would then like to ask you a few questions about it. •
General Burgin. All right.
86. General Frank (reading) :
Negotiations witli Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with
only tlie barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and
offer to continue.
General Burgin. Now, wait a minute. That is not the radio I
saw.
87. General Grunert. Go ahead and finish it and then we will
ask you about it.
88. General Frank (continuing) :
Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment.
If hostilities cannot, repeat not, be avoided the United State desires that Japan
commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as
restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to
hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and
other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out
so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Re^port
measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned
in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this
highly secret information to minimum essential officers.
[2620] That is signed "Marshall."
89. General Grunert. That was the Chief of Staff's message of
November 27th. That apparently does not ring the bell on you ?
General Burgin. That does not ring the bell to me. That was not
the message I read. It had a great many similar phrases in it.
1366 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
90. General Frank. Are you sure that you saw the original message,
that you did not see a digest of it ?
General Burgin. I could not answer that. I am not sure. It was
signed "Marshall" and it was to General Short. It had nothing about
the Rainbow plan in it, for example, and while it said "The United
States" this message said "The President".
91. General Frank. This is the only message that was so signed
"Marshall" on that date.
92. General Grunert. And that is the only message that the Board
has been able to find of that date. Do you think there is a similar
message ?
General Burgin. I certainly do.
93. General Grunert. Could it have been paraphrased and you be
given the wrong conception of it?
General Burgin. It is possible, but I don't think so.
94. General Grunert. Do you think possibly the last three years
may have done something to your memory ? You seem to be pretty
certain. What cements that idea in your mind ?
General Burgin. I don't think so.
95. General Frank. Wliat was the substance of the message you
saw?
General Burgin. All right, I will give it to you just as [2621]
my mind recalls it. "Diplomatic relations with Japan have broken
down completely. Hostilities may be expected at any time. You wiU
take the necessary action. The President desires that Japan shall com-
mit the first overt act. The President desires that nothing be done to
unduly excite the public." Then I think the rest of it was "Report
action taken", or words to that effect. That is what sticks in my mind
as the message that I read.
96. General Grunert. Then you do not recall this particular part
of any message that you then read, "This policy should not, repeat not,
be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopar-
dize your defense" ?
General Burgin. I do not. I have no recollection of any such para-
graph in it.
97. General Grunert. Had you received a message with that word-
ing in it would you have considered action just for a sabotage alert
as restricting your defense ?
General Burgin. I would, yes, sir.
98. General Grunert. We will go back to that subject again, later,
when w^e get some copies of other messages.
General Frank. You stated a little while ago that as a result of the
message you had received there was some question as to action, in
answering the question as to what kind of an alert you in person would
have directed. From what you said it leads me to ask you this ques-
tion : In your mind did the wording of this message put you in a
quandary as to just what was expected of you ?
General Burgin. No, I cannot say that.
99. General Frank. Do you think it put General Short in a
[2622] quandary?
General Burgin. That is hard to say.
100. General Frank. If you had received this message what do you
think you would have done?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1367
General Burgin. I think I would have gone out into Alert No. 3,
101. General Frank. Why?
General Burgin. Because I believe in doing the maximum rather
than doing it by dribbles.-
102. General Frank. Would going into Alert No. 3 have handi-
capped your training, as far as your training is concerned ?
General Burgin. No, sir. It would help my training, train right
into position.
103. General Grunert. Of course, your viewpoint at the time was
that of the Coast Artillery Command, plus the Antiaircraft Com-
mand, and not the viewpoint of the top commander ?
General Burgin. Absolutely.
104. General Grunert. Let us get down to this series of questions :
Were conferences held by the Commanding General or his Chief of
Staff with the principal commanders, wherein they were kept informed
of the situation, and in turn they would inform the Commanding
General of the measures taken by them to meet such situation ?
General Burgin. No, sir, there were no conferences, at least while
I was there.
105. General Grunert. Did you ever hear of a message received by
the Navy on November 27th which started out "Consider this a war
warning" ?
General Burgin. No, I never did.
[2623'\ 106. General Grunert. Just what did you know about
the tenseness of the existing situation from late in November until
the attack took place?
General Burgin. Nothing officially, only what was in the papers
and what you would glean at dinner parties and other places.
107. General Grunert. Then there was never a discussion, as far
as you know, between the top commander and his principal com-
manders— and you were one of them — as to the tenseness of the situa-
tion, as to the information received from the Navy concerning that
tenseness?
General Burgin. No, sir, there never was.
108. General Grunert. Were you called into discussion on this
message received from the Chief of Staff as to what measures should
be taken thereunder?
General Burgin. I was not.
109. General Grunert. Then the decision to go into Alert No. 1
was made without your advice or consultation?
General Burgin. Correct, yes, sir.
110. General Grunert. If you did not consider Alert No. 1 as
adequate, did you feel that you could go to the Commanding General
and say "See here, I don't think this is adequate to give me a chance
to do my particular job in defense"? Did that occur to you?
General Burgin. That did occur and that could have been done
at any time and might have been done had the attack not come quite
so soon. All I was after was to get my ammunition; that was the
main point, and 1 had already been there once on that. [£624]
However, if we had had our ammunition and been in field position
it would not have stopped that attack. It might have deranged it
a bit, but the results would have been serious just the same.
1368 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
111. General Grdnert. The Board has had previous testimony as
to Saturday conferences held. Were they conferences between com-
manders or staff commanders, or do you know anything about such
conferences ?
General Burgin. I do not, no, sir. In my whole four months,
August 7th to December 7th, I was called once to a Commanding
General's conference, one time. At that conference there were minor
subjects discussed ; never anything along this line whatsoever.
112. General Frank. Were you here when General Herron was
here ?
General Burgin. No.
113. General Frank. Were you familiar with the weekly confer-
ences that he held with his people? Did you ever hear about them?
General Burgin. Never did. General Herron had gone some time
before I arrived.
114. General Grunert. Who was Chief of Staff while you were
here?
General Burgin. Colonel Phillips.
115. General Grunert. Colonel Phillips?
General Burgin. His initials I do not know.
116. General Grunert. Did you have a chance to size him up as
to his capability or efficiency ?
General Burgin. Yes, only casually.
[2623] 117. General Grunert. What did you think of him as
Chief of Staff?
General Burgin. That is a pretty tough question, but I will answer
it. Normally he was looked upon as one of General Short's fair-
haired boys, and he carried things with a pretty high hand.
118. General Grunert. But he never called, so far as you know,
the commanders of the lower echelon in conference to discuss what was
in General Short's mind, or to seek advice from them as to decisions
to be made ?
General Burgin. No, sir, he did not. At least, I was never called,
and I was next in command or next in rank to General Short.
119. General Grunert. Do you know anything about conferences
held between the Army and the Navy and the cooperation between the
Army and the Navy ?
General Burgin. No, sir, I do not.
120. General Grunert. Did you ever have occasion for such cooper-
ative action or any reason for cooperation with the Navy ?
General Burgin, I went down and made my acquaintance with Ad-
miral Bloch, who at that time was Naval District Commander.
Through him we worked up this harbor control idea, where I put an
Army officer in there with the Navy to work up the organization and
functioning of a bona fide harbor entrance control plan.
[2626] 121. General Frank. You gave one answer to General
Grunert's question on Phillips. What was the concensus on Phillips'
efficiency and effectiveness ?
General Burgin. It never occurred to me that he was extremely
efficient, or otherwise — the average, run-of-the-mine.
122. General Frank. How did he get along with his subordinate
commands ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1369
General Burgin. I don't know ; got along all right with mine, be-
cause I was fairly senior and ran my own command. I didn't know
Phillips well and personally. I met him at various dimier parties
and other things.
123. General Frank. Would you have selected him as chief of staff ?
General Burgin. No, because I didn't know him.
124. General Grunert. Did you make up the plan for antiaircraft
defense of Oahu^
General Burgin. Yes ; I sat in with my staff and helped work it up.
125. General Grunert. Did that defense include the equipment of
the District and of the fleet when in harbor in a concerted whole for
antiaircraft defense ?
General Burgin. Not prior to December 7.
126. General Grunert. Was it veering toward that, or did you
expect to see it remain separate, if an attack had not occurred^
General Burgin. There had been very little planning done along
that line prior to December 7, but we soon saw that with various ele-
ments of the fleet always in the harbor they should be tied into our
antiaircraft command, and the [^6"27] problem was attacked
and worked out, whereas fleet units in the harbor had come under
what was then the interceptor commander, now the air defense com-
mand. Still, the Navy reserves for each ship the right to decide for
themselves whether they shall fire or not, so it is really not worth
very much even under its present condition. The captain of the
ship is still given the last say, which I think he rightly should have,
whether he should shoot or not. It is the preservation of his ship.
127. General Grunert. General Russell.
128. General Russell. In discussing the factors which should have
been considered in going into Alert 2 or Alert 3, you used language,
General, about the ''opposition which you would have had to combat."
I was wondering just what you meant by that language.
General Burgin. I wonder if you can find that in your notes. Re-
peat your question to me, will you ?
129. General Russell. You were replying to a question from Gen-
eral Grunert, and in that reply you used language about "combat-
ting opposition," and then I paraplu^ased the other — opposition which
would have been provoked by Alert 2 or Alert 3. All of that language
about combatting opposition was quite new.
General Burgin. What I meant by that was the opposition, the
annoyance we would have received from owners of land, and other
facilities, when we took them over. We would have had to have gone
with these batteries and other units, mobile outfits, trucks, tractors,
out into the canefields and other fields, and all the lawyers in town
would have been on our [2628] necks in a very short time. We
had all that to consider, if we were to comply with the directive as I
read it, to not unduly excite the public.
130. General Russell. Is it true, therefore. General, that prior to
December 7, 1941, so far as you recall, you had never had all of your
mobile batteries in the positions which they were to occupy in the
event of hostilities?
General Burgin. That is correct ; they had not all been in the actual
position they were to go in.
1370 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
131. General Frank. Was that because of this opposition of the
people who owned the land ?
General Burgin. Yes, and the fact that we had not yet gotten the
leases all fixed up, so that we could move into those positions for
practice.
132. General Kussell. As a matter of fact, therefore, the action
which would have been required under Alert 3 had never been taken
on this island?
General Burgin. In so far as the guns going actually in positions,
digging their revetments, putting in their bunkers, that had never
been done, so far as the mobile, in all their positions ; in some, it had.
133. General Russell. Elsewhere in your testimony you referred
to "turning the town up-side-down," or language similar its meaning
to that.
General Burgin. I see I will have to curb my language.
134. General Russell. No, we are just attempting to get at the
thought behind the language. We are not interested in the language.
Do you think that going all-out on Alert No. 3 would have resulted in
disturbing the people of the City [^€£9] of Honolulu?
General Burgin. I do.
135. General Russell. Is there in your mind some thought that
there would have been developed a considerable opposition among
the influential civilian population here on the island toward the results
of Alert No. 3?
General Burgin. I think there is no doubt about it, in the world.
136. General Russell. In other words, if General Short had or-
dered Alert No. 3 — and I am asking this question in the interest of
clarity — if General Short had ordered Alert No. 3 and thrown all of
his people into readiness for immediate combat, including the issuing
of ammunition, it might, or, in your opinion, it would have provoked
opposition on the part of some of the responsible and influential
civilian population here on the island?
General Burgin. I feel positive it would.
137. General Grunert. Even though he might have explained that
to the influential citizens, there would still have been opposition?
General Burgin. I don't believe you could have explained it, at that
time.
138. General Grunert. Who are some of those influential citizens
that you think might have voiced their objection?
General Burgin. Oh, my !
139. General Grunert. Is Dillingham one of them?
General Burgin. Mr. Dillingham, Mr. Walker.
140. General Frank. Which Walker?
General Burgin. I don't know. He is a sugar man. General
Wells.
[2630] 141. General Grunert. General Wells is what?
General Burgin. General Wells is with the sugar people, a manager
of some kind.
142. General Frank. The Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association.
General Burgin. He was instrumental in fighting the sugar people's
battles quite strongly prior to the war, and even yet, so far as I know.
143. General Grunert. How about Petrie? Is he one of them?
General Burgin. No, I don't think so. What was the governor's
name, at that time ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1371
144. General Grunert. Poindexter ?
General Burgin. Poindexter — right. Mr. Spauldinff.
145. General Grunert. Who are known here as the "Big Five"? I
believe I have heard that term.
General Burgin. I don't know.
146. General Grunert. These so-called "big, influential people"
have mostly land and crop interests, have they, where Alert No. 3 might
interfere with or disrupt them ?
General Burgin. That was my idea. That's my idea; yes, sir.
147. General Russell. I want to ask another question in line with
this, General. I have gotten the impression from your testimony that
the possibility of this opposition might have had a little bit deeper
basis than indicated by your answer to General Grunert's last question,
which rather limited this opposition to the land owners because of
disturbing their profits, and whatnot. I had gotten the impression
that we would have opposition from influential people on the island,
because they did not want the community upset, and the [2631]
relation between the races disturbed and their commercial trends
broken into. Was that behind this opposition, too ?
General Burgin. It might have been ; I don't know much about that
feature of it. I don't see how it would have any bearing on the races,
except perhaps the Japanese, they could see we were doing something,
and those who wanted to try to get information back to their own
country would have that opportunity. That had nothing to do with
it in this case, so far as I can see.
148. General Russell. Going away from that for the minute, you
have given considerable testimony about the weapons available to you
as antiaircraft commander. We have had testimony to the effect that,
first, the weapons available for the protection of Pearl Harbor, of
the smaller caliber, were not numerous enough, and were ineffective.
What is your opinion on that ?
General Burgin. They were certainly not numerous enough. They
were, however, about as effective as any weapons we had at that time,
except for a few experimental models. For example, we had the 3-inch
gun, a pretty good old gun in its day. The 90-mm. had hardly come
into play up to that time to any great extent ; there were some manu-
factured, some in use, on the mainland. There had been built 12
experimental model 105-mm. They were all sent to Panama, and were
on duty down there. They never panned out well, and were discarded ;
but so far as our heavy equipment, it was pretty good for its day.
149. General Russell. Did you observe the firing of the batteries
in and near Pearl Harl^or against the high-altitude Japanese bombers ?
General Burgin. Yes.
[2632] 150. General Russell. What was your impression of
that fire?
General Burgin. Those bombers never reached any great altitude.
As far as I could tell they were never over 11,000 feet, any of them.
Any gun we had would reach that, even the old Navy 5-inch, which
isn't a very good gun, either ; at the time ; very low muzzle velocity, very
slow fire; also defective ammunition. That is the Navy 5-inch, their
main weapon.
151. General Russell. The fire against these bombers flying at ap-
proximately 10,000 feet has been described in testimony elsewhere as
1372 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ineffective, because the bursts were below, and frequently to the rear
of the targets. Were you impressed that that was true ?
General BurCxIN. It didn't occur to me at the time, except that in
any antiaircraft fire, you may have observed, yourself, the great per-
centage of bursts is behind the target, even in practice, even in battle.
There are two reasons for that ; the first is your deceptive appearance.
The burst occurs there, the plane goes ahead, but before that burst is
big enough for your eye to see it, the plane has traveled considerably,
so your burst is not so far behind as it would appear to be. The other
reason is our training; we are always trained on a comparatively slow-
moving target. We get out on an actual plane, it is going at least
twice as fast as any target you ever shot at, and it takes a few rounds at
least to get your bursts up in the lead ; but so far as your bursts being
late, that wasn't observable to me to any great extent. It was cer-
tainly not due to the fact that the guns would not reach 10,000 feet.
Every gun we had would reach that — 17,000 feet. The same, with the
Navy 5-inch. Just what their maximum height is, I don't know, but
it is certainly beyond 17,000 feet.
[£633] 152. General Frank. The question of shooting ahead or
behind is a question of training and practice, is that right?
General Burgin. That's my idea of it, yes.
153. General Grunert. I would like, before you leave that subject,
to ask you about the Navy 5-inch ammunition. You say some of it
was defective ?
General Burgin. A great deal of it was defective, and "duds." Un-
fortunately, the "duds" detonated on contact with the ground. They
were not really "duds," so far as contact with any material object was
concerned. However, they did not burst in the air. They burst all
over town. They burst all over De Russy, where I was. I saw them
burst two of them up in the crater on Diamond Head, knocking out one
of my mortars. That 5-inch ammunition was falling all over the
island. A great many people thought they were Japanese bombs, but
only one bomb hit the town of Honolulu, and I think that was an ac-
cident. All the rest of them were Navy 5-inch shells.
154. General Grunert. How do you know that to be a fact?
General Burgin. I went out and dug up the fragments and looked
at the markings on them. I know they were Navy shells ; and so does
the Navy.
155. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not the Army was
blamed for that damage ? Do you know whether or not the Army was
accused of having poor ammunition, and that they thought it was the
Army ammunition that did that?
General Burgin. I never heard of that.
15G. General Grunert. All right. Go ahead. I just wanted to
get that clear.
157. General Russell. General, I am jumping about, because I
\263Jf\ just made a note here and there.
General Burgin. Go ahead.
158. General Russell. A great deal has been said about the inter-
ceptor command, whether or not it was in operation, and so forth.
General Burgin. Yes, sir.
159. General Russell. As I recall your testimony, it was to the
effect that when the interceptor command was organized and operat-
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1373
ing, its only effect on you would be to tell you when to shoot and when
not to shoot?
General Burgin. That is practically correct.
160. General Russell. There is nothing so very difficult and intri-
cate about the interceptor command ?
General Burgin. Not a thing.
161. General Russell. And this man, Davidson, had been desig-
nated a considerable time before December 7 as the interceptor com-
mander, or had been named as the man who was going to organize that
and exercise the command over it ?
General Burgin. Right.
162. General Russell. In the exercises which had been held prior
to December 7, 1941, the interceptor command had been in action i
General Burgin. In a minor way.
163. General Russell. As a matter of fact, its operation was essen-
tially minor, any way ?
General Burgin. Absolutely, up till well after December 7. I
might elaborate on that, to give you my ideas. The whole scheme of
things there was in embryo, you might say. These warning radars,
you heard a lot about, were just being installed. [^(JS5] They
go in as part of the interceptor command. They were not complete in
any manner of means. The Signal Corps was putting them in. They
had no permanent home for interceptor command, and when I re-
marked a moment ago it was simple, it is simple enough in operation,
but it is complicated as everything, for installation, equipment, and
funds. They operated under General Davidson in a temi^orary shack
on the Fort Shafter Reservation down here in the hollow. At the
same time, the real interceptor command, which is now the Air De-
fense Command, was being dug in a hillside up above Fort Shafter,
where it is now located — a million dollars' worth of stuff in there ; so
when I said it is simple, I don't mean simple in equipment and opera-
tion, but in control of the antiaircraft — extremely simple; nothing to
do except to tell you when you can shoot and when you can't ; but the
interceptor command in itself is an enormous, complicated machine.
You ought to look at it while you are here.
164. General Russell. I hope to. It was new throughout the
Army, in 1941?
General Burgin. Incidentally, we do not call it the "interceptor
command" any more. It went through several stages, called a "fighter
command," and now it is called the Air Defense Command.
165. General Russell. All right. Another disassociated subject:
What percentage of your troops were with the fixed batteries on the
morning of December 7 ?
General Burgin. I would say about a third of them. We had a very
small number of troops, however, in the fixed defenses, a total of 101
officers and 2,712 men.
166. General Russell. How many were actually out with the
[2636] batteries on duty, on that morning of December 7 ? What
percentage ?
General Burgin. None of them, except the guard skeleton.
However, they were right at the batteries. They were manned in
a very few minutes.
1374 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
167. General Russell. Some confusion seems to have grown up in
my mind about your ammunition, about the status of your ammuni-
tion. You had your ammunition, on December 7, you did not have to
go to ordnance to get it ?
General Burgin. No, you are wrong. I had the ammunition for
seacoast artillery at the guns, in the magazine. I had the ammunition
for the six fixed antiaircraft. We had that ammunition in the sea-
coast magazine. I didn't have the ammunition for the mobile anti-
aircraft's 3-inch guns.
168. General Kussell. A moment ago, you referred to the table
when you were discussing the personnel available to you on December
7. What percentage of your table strength had been given you on
December 7 ?
General Burgin. We were pretty well below strength. The per-
centage, I can't give you, but, all in all, we were short 900 or 1,000 men.
169. General Russell. And you had how many — 2,700, on this day 't
General Burgin. Well, that is seacoast, alone. You have got to
remember, I have got two commands — antiaircraft and the seacoast,
170. General Russell. You were short 900 on both commands ?
General Burgin. In the two commands combined; yes.
171. General Russell. And in the two commands combined, could
[2637] you give us quickly, there, what the table strength was?
General Burgin. No, I haven't got it, I am sorry. I can get it for
you very easily.
172. General Grunert. Approximately 20,000?
General Burgin. No, no, no; I didn't have that many — probably
about 13,000 or 14,000, total.
173. General Grunert. And that is just about 10 percent short?
General Burgin. Yes.
174. General Russell. General, is it true, or not, that in 1941 the
plans for defense against attack by aircraft were in a state of flux or
changing constantly ?
General Burgin. Quite true ; and they are changing, yet.
175. General Russell. As a result of the experiences on December
7, and other experiences, has the Army in its operations h<-^-c in the
island increased to any considerable extent the number of antiaircraft
weapons ?
General Burgin. That fluctuates extremely, but at one time th( y
increased enormously, they were a way up. Those have gone out in
the middle and west Pacific, however. We are back now in the number
of guns to about where we were on December 7. However, we have
got a much better gun.
176. General Russell. Do you think that the reduction in the num-
ber of guns, which has been accomplished in the recent past, results
from the fact that there is no great })i'obability of any further Japanese
attacks, here ?
General Burgin. No, you are wrong. That has been discussed with
General Richardson, time and time again. Pie and I both feel that we
are yet subject to attack, that as long as the Japanese have a carrier
afloat she can risk one or two or [SSSS] more, she can get in
here; and all the navies in the world won't keep her out, if she wants
to get here. That has nothing to do with the number of guns.
177. General Russell. It has been reduced, then, simply because the
people who are charged with responsibility for making the decision
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1375
believe that the number of guns which you have here now are adequate
for the protection of the island ?
[2639'] General Burgin. That is correct. I have so stated to
General Richardson, and he agreed with me. He had established as a
minimum the number that we have now.
178. General Russell. Are you on any form of alert now ? If so,
what is the type ?
General Burgin. We are on a five-minute alert. We can get to the
battery in five minutes.
179. General Russell. That is neither 1, 2, or 3, the old type of alert,
is it?
General Burgin. That has gone out.
180. General Russell. What is it? A cross between 2 and 3, or
more nearly 2, or what?
General Burgin. Well, more nearly 3 all the time. We have had
since December 7th the men in the camps right at the guns, and they
can get there as quick as you can sound an alarm, almost.
181. General Russell. General, I am not sure that the record is
clear between you and me on our recent questions you were asked.
General Burgin. I am not either.
182. General Russell. You don't seem to answer my questions.
General Burgin. I try to.
183. General Russell. And I don't seem to understand your answers.
General Burgin. I try to.
184. General Russell. Something is wrong.
I am attempting to develop whether or not it is the sense of the com-
manders here on the Island now that they have adequate weapons for
the protection or for the accomplishment [£640] of their mis-
sion against aircraft raids.
General Burgin. All right. I will answer you yes. Now, you have
got to qualify that when you say "adequate protection." If you were
left here with everything you could get, with all the influences of the
world to help, you would probably take more: but when General Mar-
shall tells you that with the manpower shortage and everything else
you have got to scrape the bottom from here and there to provide your
fighting force out in the Pacific, you have got to balance one against
the other and come to a decision. General Richardson has said the
minimum antiaircraft which below we shall not go, and he feels and I
feel that under the circumstances that is adequate.
185. General Russell. And you have gotten to that number ?
General Burgin. And we have not yet quite reached that minimum.
We are above it.
186. General Russell. How does that compare now with the number
of weapons that you had available on December 7, 1941 ?
General Burgin. The big guns, as I stated, are approximately the
same. The gun is nuich better and ])robably ten times as effective as
the equipment we had December 7, 1941. The defense around Pearl
Harbor is stronger than anything that has ever been put up in Europe
anywhere.
187. General Russell. The smaller caliber guns, how does that com-
pare now with December 7, 1941 ?
General Burgin. Much more. We have got our full complement,
20 batteries.
1376 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
188. General Russell. In answer to one of General Grunert's
questions you said, had you been in position with your ammunition
ready to fire on December 7, that you might have [2641] af-
fected the Japanese flights in some way. I believe you used the term,
you might have broken it up to an extent, or words to that effect,
but you would not have been able to have prevented the damage
which they did here.
Assuming that the antiaircraft fire had been reinforced by the
aircraft, are you in position to know what effect the two operating
in conjunction would have had on the Japanese attack?
General Buegin. I think your answer is as good as mine on that.
We did have some aircraft that was operative; how many, I don't
know. Personally I didn't see any, but there were a few fighters
got into the air. The full force of fighters would have no doubt —
well, we could have done much more effective operation than they
did. The same as our antiaircraft; we probably could have broken
up some of their formations, prevented some of the damage; but
you never have enough antiaircraft to prevent an air attack. Just
can't be done.
189. General Russell. A little while ago you also stated that
it was impossible to prevent the Japanese fleet from moving car-
riers into a point from which aircraft could be launched for an
attack on the installation here on Oahu.
General Burgin. I am going to have to ask you to repeat that,
what you said.
190. General Russell. Did you or did you not make the state-
ment that it was impossible?
General Burgin. I did not.
191. General Russell. Will you read the General's answer about
three questions up?
General Burgin. I said General Short got that fi^om the \^6J0\
Navy, that it was the impression of everybody that they could not
come here. I have never stated that they could not. I stated a
moment ago that even now they could.
192. General Russell. Well, that was what I asked you, if it wasn't
true that you stated that it was impossible to prevent Japanese car-
riers from reaching a point from which they could launch an air
attack against the installations here on Oahu.
General Burgin. I think it is impossible right now.
193. General Russell. Yes. Well, that is what I asked you.
General Buegin. Correct.
194. General Russell. Now, General, you were quite positive in
your earlier statements that the message which you saw on the 27th
of November used the term, "the President," at least twice.
General Burgin. That is certainly my impression, sir.
195. General Russell. That is your impression?
General Burgin. I looked at that message handed out of the safe
by Colonel Phillips, who held it m his hand while I read it, and it is
certainly imprinted on my mind that it said "the President" twice.
196. General Russell. And you recall, as you know, wherein the
President's name was mentioned in connection with the commission
of the first overt act?
General Burgin. Not the President's name, but the word, "the
President."
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1377
197. General Eussell. "The President"?
General Burgin. Correct.
198. General Eussell. And you also have a distinct recollection
that the term, "the President," was used in \2GJt3'\ connection
with injunction against alarming the public?
General Burgin. That is my impression.
199. General Eussell. Yes. And you are yet definite in your im-
pression that the message read to you by General Frank is not the
message which Phillips took from the safe and showed you?
General Burgin. I feel positive that is not the message, although
it has many of the same terms in it.
(There was colloquy off the record.)
200. General Frank, To clear this up a little: My questions will
dodge around here and not follow sequence.
General Burgin. Yes.
201. General Frank. You stated in response to a question by Gen
eral Grunert, I think, that, "The interceptor command was being
organized. It was never in being and functioning as it should have
been. It was only a temporary measure ; but that particular feature
of interceptor command controlling antiaircraft hre was jealously
guarded by the air people, and we had constant training and maneu-
vers, practice, where that particular thing was stressed, and the anti-
aircraft was turned over to the interceptor command."
I asked you, "On what date?"
I think perhaps I was under the wrong conception there. You
didn't mean that the antiaircraft on the afternoon of December 7th
was turned over to the interceptor command, but that it was turned
over to the interceptor command during these exercises and maneu-
vers ; is that correct ?
General Burgin. That is correct, during the exercises and maneu-
vers, and then it was there for them on December 7. Now, I didn't
actually turn it over to them.
[^W] 202. General Frank. Yes.
General Burgin. But under our practices the control should have
been there by the interceptor command. Whether it was or not, I
can't answer.
203. General Frank. Well, as a matter of fact, do you know when
the interceptor command was organized, formally organized?
General Burgin. There was never any formal opening. I don't
know the date.
204. General Frank. Wlien it was announced as the
General Burgin. Well, it was a long time, anyhow, before they
got actually going.
205. General Frank. December 7th ?
General Burgin. In fact, it was more than a month before they got
in their permanent home up here and got going properly.
206. General Frank. As a matter of fact, the radar and the inter-
ceptor command installation actually was under control of the Signal
Corps ?
General Burgin. Eight.
207. General Fil:\nk. And had not yet been turned over to the in-
terceptor command on December 7th ; isn't that correct?
General Burgin. That is quite true.
1378 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
208. General Frank. All right. Now, here is a statement here,
"The interceptor command controlling antiaircraft fire was jealously
guarded by the air people." Well, was there an;7thing about their
jealously guarding that that interfered with its effectiveness?
General Burgin. Oh, no, not a thing in the world. That is an un-
fortunate remark there, and meant only this: that we [264^]
had all these practices and there were many, many times when I, as
antiaircraft fire man, thought they ought to be shooting, and as inter-
ceptor command he said no, because he had his interceptors coming in
from a distance. An example of that we had in target practice down
on the beach, and we got an order to hold fire, interceptor command.
"Why?" I said. "Why to hold fire?"
"Well, the clipper is coming in."
The clipper wasn't even in sight, way over the horizon then. I said,
"For God's sake, I am not going to shoot the clipper down. Go on,
let me have my target practice."
It was just those little misunderstandings which made that state-
ment crop out there a moment ago.
209. General Frank. As long as I clear up the point.
General Burgin. It had nothing to do with the December 7th flight.
210. General Frank. Now, you stated that you thought the Navy
was conducting reconnaissance.
General Burgin. Yes.
211. General Frank. "They were sending, out planes every
morning."
General Burgin. Weren't they ?
212. General Frank. Did you know what those planes were going
out for ?
General Burgin. No, I don't know positively. Practice, perhaps.
We were told they were patrolling.
213. General Frank. That is a fact. They were patrolling, but they
were patrolling not for reconnaissance for defense of Oahu, but
patrolling the areas in the vicinity of their task [264S'\ forces
in guarding against submarine attack.
General Burgin. Well, that's news to me.
214. General Frank. Now I would like to get your reaction to this.
We have had testified before the Board by a naval officer that it was
necessary for the Navy to have intelligence information so that they
would know within rather narrow limits of an impending attack, for
them, the Navy, to meet it.
General Burgin. I should think that would be a true statement.
It certainly needs intelligence just as much as we do.
215. General Frank. Did jou have any information along that
line ? You evidently didn't.
General Burgin. I had no way to get any information as to the
enemy's arrival. I am tied down to the Island with nothing to go
any farther.
216. General Frank, Evidently there was not a free exchange of
information that reached the level that you held.
General Burgin. It didn't reach my level, no.
217. General Frank. All right.
General Burgin. I expected to get my information through Gen-
eral Short.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1379
218. General Frank. All riglit. Now, was the command generally
api^rehensive with respect to offending the local Japanese?
General Burgin. I don't think the command as a whole was appre-
hensive at all. I don't think the}^ cared whether they offended them
A' ery much or not.
219. General Frakk. Do you remember the wording in this mes-
sage ? Here it is :
You are directed to undertake sucb i-econuaissance [26-^7] and other
measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should not be carried out
to alarm the civil population or disclose intent.
General Burgin. That rings a fairly familiar bell.
220. General Frank. Well, the civil population was largely Jap-
anese.
General Burgin. Oh, well. That's quite true; a large percentage of
the Island population is Japanese.
221. General Frank. And here was a message not to alarm them.
As a matter of fact, there were a series of messages that came in be-
tween October 16th and November 28th, seven of them, four of which
contained the admonition not to alarm the population.
General Burgin. That's news to me. I only knew of one.
222. General Frank. Well, the question I wanted to ask, following:
Was there a leaning over backward in the attitude to keep from offend-
ing the Japanese ?
General Burgin. I don't know. Looking back in retrospect I
would answer yes, it looks that way from this distance.
223. General Frank. What kind of a spirit among the officers and
men resulted from this attiude?
General Burgin. There wasn't any noticeable result, in my mind.
I knew nothing about the admonition being repeated not to excite the
public. It was not noised around as far as I know. It should have
reached me if it had been. The only time I saw it was in that one
message.
22J:. General Frank. Did you believe that there would be a Jap-
anese air attack on the Islands ?
General Burgjn. I did not.
225. General Frank. Why?
[264.8] General Burgin. Because I thought they were so far
away that we would get some intelligence through our Intelligence
Department first, and then I was positive that our Navy was scouting
around out there and they would give further information of approach
at all in this direction, and our own Navy was out here shooting target
practice, maneuvers all the time. It looked like we were perfectly
able to take care of ourselves against anything the Japanese should
send this way.
226. General Frank. Then, there was generally a state of mind of
security ?
Geiieral Burgin. Yes, with a degree of nervousness underneath it.
227. General Frank. I asked these last two or three questions to
give you a little guide as to tlie trend I am following in the questions
that I am asking, you see.
General Burgin. Yes.
228. General Frank. Was there any kind of a war attitude present
in the command ? Were the officers war-minded ?
79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 2 38
1380 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Burgin. No, not noticeably so. I was impressed when I
first arrived here in August that the war spirit was a good deal less
than on the mainland.
229. General Frank. Now, you stated in your testimony that people
were apprehensive about sabotage from the Japanese. From your
observation was there any aggressive attitude tow^ard preventing this
much dreaded sabotage, or Avas it mostly passive ?
General Burgin, More or less passive, and they selected the points
that should need guarding, like the power plants and the bridges, and
they actually went on Alert No. 1, put the guards on the power plants
and the bridges, and my searchlights and my [2649\ big-gun
batteries that may have been knocked out with a dynamite charge or
something. It was passive, I would say.
2'30. General Frank. You are an officer of considerable military
experience. I would like to get an opinion from you. What do you
think would have been the predicament of a similar number of Ameri-
cans in Japan under similar circumstances ?
General Burgin. You mean if the population had been reversed
and we had been Americans in Japan ?
231. General Frank. Yes.
General Burgin. I think we could have turned the place upside
down by sabotage ; probably would.
£'32. General Frank. What do you think the Japanese would have
done, however? Do you think they would have allowed Americans
to have been at large in Japan ?
General Burgin. They certainly would not. We would have been
locked up long before war started.
233. General Frank. That is what I am after.
234. General Grunert. All right; go ahead.
235. General Frank. Do you think the nation at large, from the
press and your memory of it, was war-minded ?
General Burgin. Certainly the opposite, in my opinion.
236. General Frank. You stated that you thought, that you be-
lieved, that you were going to get a warning from a system of recon-
naissance that you thought existed.
General Burgin. Right.
237. General Frank. But which didn't. How were you going to
get that warning?
General Burgin. My idea was, the Navy had its scouts out there,
had its carrier-based planes out farther to the west, [2650']
still, scouting, that they were going out at least 800 miles from Oahu
every day. The carrier during the daytime would have to be farther
than 800 miles, and we would get as much warning as it would take
the carrier to run in from beyond 800 miles and launch the planes.
The next thing was, we figured we would have at least 12 hours'
warning.
238. General Frank. Did you ever figure that that protection would
have to cover 360 degrees ?
General Burgin. Quite right.
239. General Frank. Before you had that sense of security, did you
ever think of that ?
General Burgin. Yes, we thought of it.
240. General Frank. In fact, in a statement in a reply to General
Grunert you stated that in your p)rotection of Pearl Harbor against
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1381
attack you were confronted with a state of peace instead of a state of
war. However, the dispositions that you made were practice for ac-
tual war. Therefore, to all intents and purposes the dispositions were
the same, weren't they ?
General Burgin. No; the dispositions for peace were far different
from those of war.
241. General Frank. Why?
General Burgin. Because the dispositions of peace, the whole 64th
Kegiment, for an example, were in the barracks here at Fort Shafter,
with its field positions out well beyond here but nobody occupying
them. The 98th were at Schofield Barracks, 251st at Malekoli. They
were not in their field positions for war.
242. General Frank. And you never moved out into all of your
field positions?
General Burgin. Never all at one time, no; but every [2651]
battery went out didn't have to go into actual position in the cane
field and knock down a man's cane. Go in alongside the road. Some
more of these simulations that w^e did in peacetime.
243. General Frank. What facilities, to your knowledge, did our
Intelligence Department have to get information?
General Burgin. I don't know.
244. General Frank. You just know that it didn't reach you.
To get back to this question of disturbing the local Japanese, did you
ever see any excitement among the local Japanese over any military
divisions or operations?
General Burgin. Never have, either before or after December 7.
245. You now know that there was not effective reconnaissance out,
in compliance with the defense plan for the protection of the Island
of Oahu?
General Burgin. Yes, I know that.
246. General Frank. Did you ever hear of the presence between
November 25th and 30th of a Japanese carrier task force with sub-
marines in the Marshalls?
General Burgin. Never.
247. General Frank. What would have been your reaction?
General Burgin. I don't think it would have been any different.
We were working under S. O. P. from topside. We would have
waited on orders from him.
248. General Frank. You still would have believed in the Navy?
General Burgin. Yes, I certainly would.
249. General Frank. Well, now that you are conversant with the
fact that the Navy was not providing this protection in which you
believed, had that circumstance been chased in the [£652]
open where commanders of your level and above had known it, what
do you think would have been your action ?
General Burgin. I think I would have gone to General Short and
asked him. Let's go all-out and do everything we could here.
250. General Frank. Now, you stated that you had some difficulty
in getting into war positions with your equipment. And did you
ever want to emjilace any of your equipment on Hawaiian Pineapple
Company land ?
General Burgin. I don't think we did prior to the war. Now, I am
not positive. The pineapple go up to the northward and the sugar
cane down around Pearl Harbor; there are no pineapples in there.
1382 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
So I have no recollection of any difficulty with the pineapple people.
251. General Frank. All right. What was the attitude of the
Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association?
General Buegin. Like everybody else, they didn't want the Army
to go on their stuff, on their property. The same attitude is growing
up right now. We are having terrible difficulty every time we want
a piece of property or to use a piece of property. It is the same thing
over again: time for the Army to get out. They don't want the
Army around. The same attitude is growing up right now ; not bad,
because we can do most as we please now, acting carefully.
' 252. General Frank. Where does that attitude head up ?
General Burgin. I don't know. Just human nature, I think.
253. General Frank. In the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association ?
General Burgin. I don't know that it is confined to the sugar plant-
ers. I have nothing against the Big Five. I know [26SS]
nothing about them, or any other thing. I can't place any particular
person. It's everybody. Anybody who owns land or property
doesn't want us around.
254. General Frank. Well, do you think that that is because of
commercial interests ?
General Burgin. Why, of course.
255. General Frank. Or because of Japanese interests?
General Burgin. Commercial interests, selfish interests, of course.
256. General Frank. In this endeavor to prevent alarming the
population, do you think that that had reference to alarming the
commercial interests or the Japanese?
General Burgin. I thought, everybody.
257. General Frank. Will you analyze a little bit the difference?
What effect would it have had to have alarmed the Japanese, since
war was coming anyhow ?
General Burgin. You can analyze it as well as I can. I don't see
that it had any effect at all.
258. General Frank. I would like an answer for the record, please.
General Burgin. It is rather a difficult thing to answer. It's all a
man's opinion anyhow. I don't think it would disturb the Japanese
any more than it would anybody else.
259. General Frank. All right. Now let's walk over on the side
of the commercial interests.
260. Colonel Toulmin. The question is not answered.
261. General Frank. I know. Would you repeat it, please?
The Reporter (reading) :
All right. Now let's walk over on the side of the commercial interests.
[2654^] General Burgin. I have no feeling one way or the other.
I don't think there is any distinction between the commercial interest
or the Japanese interest or anybody else's interests. A great deal of
the commercial interests were Japanese, incidentally.
262. General Frank. Well, it would have affected the normal con-
duct of business; it would have affected normal intercourse with the
mainland; it would have affected industry?
General Burgin. Yes.
[265S] 263. General Grunert. When you are speaking of that
are you speaking of Alert No. 2 or the all-out alert?
General Burgin. I mean the all-out alert.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1383
264. General Grunert. How about Alert No. 2?
General Bukgin. Alert No. 2 is almost as bad, to go out and take
your field positions.
265. General Grunert. Under No. 2 you get ready to meet an air
attack and also guard against sabotage i
General Burgin. That is right. No. 2 would probably have been
almost as bad as No. 3.
266. General Grunert. And under No. 2 the infantry and artillery
do not go out ?
General Burgin. I have forgotten what the infantry did under No.
3, but I think they did not go out under No. 2, or No. 3, those two
divisions. As far as the antiairciaft is concerned, there is very little
difference between 2 and 3.
267. General Frank. You stated that had you received this mes-
sage of November 27th you w^ould have to go Alert No. 3. You also
stated that you thought that it would have disturbed the population.
Notwithstanding the cautions in that message not to alarm the popu-
lation, would you nevertheless have .gone to Alert No. 3 and have
violated that part of it?
268. General Burgin. I think so.
General Frank. Had the Army and Navy known that the Japs
were coming, do you think that a determined Japanese air attack in
force could have been stopped ?
General BtJRGiN. Yes, I do. I think the Navy could have stopped
it themselves.
269. General Frank. How?
[26-56] General Burgin. Met them carrier for carrier. They
had at least two carriers here, as I recollect, the ENTERPRISE and
the SARATOGA, and a whole battleship fleet.
270. General Frank. I know, but they were out on task maneuvers.
General Burgin. They were out, yes, but they got radio and they
got information, however. They are supposed to be out if they meet
the enemy. They are not going to meet him in Pearl Harbor, that is
sure.
271. General Frank. Considering that they require a 360-degree
defense, and the only notice that you have of their approach is the
fact that the Air Force has been launched from the carriers and is
on its way, 130 miles out, do you think that it can be stopped ?
General Burgin. No. You are limiting it now. Why don't you
put them 20 miles instead of knowing they were coming? Of course,
you would have to do something if you knew they were coming, and
if they had known they were coming down the fleet would have been
there.
272. General Frank. But the radar
General Burgin. The radar would not have helped any, because the
fleet would have been too close. It would have helped some, but the
antiaircraft and the fixed defenses could have been further along
and ready to meet the initial attack, which they were not. The
initial attack is probably the one that did the most damage, the
torpedo planes.
273. General Frank. Do jon think a sneak attack would succeed
now?
General Burgin. Yes.
1384 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[26S7] 274. General Frank. Do you consider it reasonable for
the American people to believe that the Jap attack on December 7th
could have been absolutely prevented?
General Bukgin. I think it most unreasonable to even think so,
under the conditions we were in, with that fleet. I still go back
to that. If you are going to prevent carriers coming here, and bat-
tlewagons, you have got to meet them with the same stuff. They are
not in Pearl Harbor but out in the Pacific. We had a 360-degrees
at Midway, too, but we met them there and licked them.
275. General Frank. But they had intelligence.
General Bltrgin. Right.
276. General Grunert. What is the use of having a fighter com-
mand here if they are not going to be able to lick what comes in the
air?
General Burgin. None at all.
277. General Grunert. It is a waste of a fighter command if they
are not going to be able to defend themselves here, to a great extent,
anyway.
General Burgin. They can defend themselves here. You get that
20-mile warning and you get fighters in the air, because now they
are on the alert so they can get in the air.
278. General Grunert. Then why should a sneak attack be success-
ful now, or what extent would you say that it would be successful ?
General Burgin. Well, it would not be successful to the extent that
tlie disaster of December 7tli was, but it would cause damage. There
is no question in my mind if they want to get in here they can get in
here, even now, with carrier-based planes.
279. General Grunert. We had a youngster w^ho shot down four,
I believe, even without that warning and so forth, and he testified
that if they were ready they could have practically [2658]
eliminated them, especially the torpedo bombers and so forth. So it
is just your opinion that there would be a certain amount of success;
it could not be absolutely stopped ?
General Burgin. Absolutely. They cannot stop them, if they de-
termined to come in.
280. General Grunert. But it would not be another Pearl Harbor,
anyway ?
General Burgin. It would not be another disaster like December
7th, 1941.
281. General Frank. Could the defense forces be surprised now?
General Burgin. Yes.
282. General Frank. To what extent?
General Burgin. I should say they could be surprised beyond radar
surveillance by carrier-based planes.
283. General Frank. Are you familiar with the technical details
of radar?
General Burgin. Not too deeply technical, no. I know that the
long-range one will reach out to about 120 miles. It is not positive
to go off and pick up planes that are down on the surface. We never
had a hundred ])er cent success with it; so they can come in.
284. General Frank. That is all I wanted right there. An attack
could come in at about 20 feet ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1385
General Burgin. They have come in undetected, many times, with
our practice attacks, undetected until they reach about 20 miles on
our 268, when the searchli<ihts pick them up.
285. General Frank. As a matter of fact, even if they come in
about 20 feet off the water at 130 miles, the radar does not pick them
up until they get in within about 20 miles. Therefore [26S9]
if they come in low enough it is possible even now for a surprise
attack; is that correct?
General Bukgin. That is correct. We have had it many times in
practice. They are still working on radar to get one that will pick
up low-flying planes out on the water.
286. General Frank. Do you know anything concerning any de-
lays or tendencies in the construction of the aircraft warning service
facilities by the Hawaiian Constructors?
General Burgin. I do not. I know nothing about that.
287. General Frank. Did j'ou ever hear any complaint with re-
spect to this?
General Burgin. Not until it came out in the papers some two
or three months ago.
288. General Frank. Did you ever come in contact with or know
anything about the relations between a Colonel Wyman, the District
Engineer, and a Mr. Rohl, in Hawaii?
General Burgin. No, I know nothing whatever about that, and
never did.
289. General Grunert. Did the antiaircraft setup have a triple-
A. L S.?
General Burgin. Oh, yes.
290. General Grunert. How far out is that or to what extent can
that give warning of the approach of hostile planes?
General Burgin. As far as you can see.
291. General Grunert. And how much warning in time does that
give your information system to get your information disseminated
so that you can get ready to fire?
General Burgin. Well, it is an awful short warning. It is only
as far as you can put your own men out where they can see and get
the message back. Probably two minutes, or something like that.
[2660] 292. General Grunert. That does give you some warn-
ing?
General Burgin. It gives you a little warning.
293. General Grunert. And it supplements the air warning
system ?
General Burgin. That is right.
294. General Grunert. But only for your own Command?
General Burgin. That is all.
295. General Frank. But you have some radar of your own, do
you not?
General Burgin. Oh, yes, now. We had not then. We have got
many classes of radar, both for fighter control and picking up planes.
The 268 is the main one.
296. General Frank. And this radar you now have is effective
how far?
General Burgin. About 20 miles as a maximum.
1386 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
297. General Gkunert. But they can pick up better than the warn-
ing system?
General Buegin, No.
298. General Grunert. I understood it could get the beam lower
so it can get them coming closer in ?
General Burgin. No. We have a separate radar for the sea-coast,
for the water.
299. General Grunert. I understand they are working on a com-
bination of 268 and your 574?
General Burgin. I forget the number of it, but we have the latest
one at the fort command now, but it is in an experimental stage.
300. General Grunert. This command of Oahu and the Hawaiian
Command is an outpost of the United States?
[B061] General Burgin. No doubt about that.
301. General Grunert. And an outpost is intended to be awake
and on the alert so the mainland can go to sleep ; that is the general
idea of an outpost?
General Burgin. That is right, yes.
302. General Grunert. I asked you something about the Big Five,
and you gave me a few names, but there is an article in the paper today
under Kennedy saying "Big Five Does Not Control Hawaiian Air-
lines". And it gives their names. Mr. Kennedy named the Big Five
as Alexander & Baldwin, Castle & Cooke, C. Brewer & Company,
American Factors, and Theodore H. Davies, Limited. Is that just
the big five airlines or is that the Big Five in business out there ?
General Burgin. I cannot give you any information on the Big
Five. It is my impression it is the Big Five in business, not on the
airlines. In fact, I am positive of that feature of it.
303. General Grunert. Which one of those is Dillingham con-
nected with, do you know ?
General Burgin, I do not know. They are all interlocked one with
the other. I don't know a darned thing about the Big Five, to be
frank with you, and care less.
304. General Grunert. All right. Any other questions?
305. General Frank. In military procedure, when a tactical and
strategic commander is confronted with a situation he makes an esti-
mate of the situation. That is normal, is it not?
General Burgin. Correct.
306. General Frank. And in determining what the enemy will do
he tries to find out the action of the enemy along what line, in the
extreme ?
[2662'] General Burgin. Along the line of what he can do to
hurt you.
307. General Frank. To what extent?
General Burgin. That is, you try to estimate what the enemy can
do to hurt you. I suppose that is what you are getting at.
308. General Frank. Yes.
General Burgin. That is right.
309. General Frank. But to hurt you, he will hurt you in varying
degrees in what he does.
General Burgin. You try to find out what he can do to hurt you
most.
310. General Frank. And in making your decision on your line
of action, what do you do ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1387
General Burgin. Try to protect against that, the most serious
threat.
311. General Frank. T]iat is all.
312. General Grunert. Is there anything else that you can think
of to inform the Board that has not been brought out, that refers to
the subject?
General Burgin. Yes, there is one little thing on my mind.
313. General Grunert. All right.
General Burgin. I think I stated that I attended only one con-
ference where General Short called his senior officers together, and at
that conference minor things were discussed, which is quite true, in
the way of work projects, unloading lumber, and so forth. At that
same conference there was a discussion of the war that arose, to a
minor extent, but it was not [266^3] the purpose of the meet-
ing, however, but General Short did refer to the seriousness of the
situation and turned to General Martin, who was his air commander,
and said, "Martin, you keep one-third of your fighters on alert at all
times."
314. General Grunert. Do you recall when that conference took
place ?
General Burgin. That was a few days prior to the 27th. It was
not that morning. I did not see General Short himself that morning.
I saw Colonel Phillips. It was only a day or two prior to that.
315. General Kussell. Did you have contacts with General Short,
other than at the conference that you are talking about, from August
up to December ?
General Burgin. Yes, I had contacts in various ways. I will give
you one example. I was hunting for a right good command post for
my headquarters and decided on the magazine up in Diamond Head
crater. General Short went with me to inspect this and to make the
decision on the ground. On various things like that I came in contact
with General Short.
316. General Kussell. Was he accessible and approachable in his
headquarters ?
General Burgin. Oh, yes.
317. General Russell. Did he come out to see j^ou and have in-
formal talks with you ?
General Burgin. No, sir; never. He never called any conferences
except that one that I mentioned.
318. General Russell. You say he never did come out to your com-
mand post and see you out there and see you in the field and talk with
you?
[£664-] General Burgin. I have no recollection of his ever
coming out at any time.
319. General Russell. And such talks as you had with him were
those where you went to his headquarters ?
General Burgin. Yes, sir.
320. General Frank. How long were you under his command, the
number of months ?
General Burgin. Four months, August 7th, until he was relieved
about December l7th, or something like that.
321. General Grunert. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
1388 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[2665'] TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM S. LAWTON; COLONEL, GEN-
ERAL STAFF CORPS; HEADQUARTERS, PACIFIC OCEAN AREA;
FT. SHAFTER, T. H.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you state to the Board your name,
rank, organization, and station.
Colonel Lawton. William S. Lawton; Colonel, General Staff
Corps ; headquarters. Pacific Ocean Area ; Ft. Shafter, T. H.
2. General Grunert. Colonel, this Board is after facts, and leads
to facts ; and because of your assignment in 1941 and during the at-
tack, we hope that we can get some of those facts from you, or leads
to others.
Just what was your assignment ?
Colonel Lawton. I was an assistant to the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-3, sir.
3. General Grunert. Would you give the approximate dates?
Colonel Lawton. I was in headquarters on March 7, 1941, in that
position, and stayed in G-3 until August 1942, sir.
4. General Grunert. Who was G-3, at the time?
Colonel Lawton. Colonel William E. Donegan, sir.
5. General Grunert. Colonel Donegan testified before the Board,
and in effect stated that he did not know very much about certain
G-3 matters, and that you knew it all, or words to that effect, on
those certain things. One of them was the Joint Coastal Frontier
Defense Plan. Another one was the liaison, I believe, and copera-
tion with the Navy. Is that approximately correct? Were those
your specialties in the G-3?
Colonel Lawton. Yes, I handled those matters in G-3, sir.
6. General Grunert. What other matters in G-3 did you handle,
particularly or especially?
Colonel Lawton. For a while I handled Air Force matters,
[2666] but I was not handling those on the 7th, sir, of December
1941 ; certain aspects of field fortifications, seacoast and antiaircraft
artillery matters, generally.
7. General Grunert. All right. First, let us take up this Joint
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. What do you recall, gen-
erally speaking, of the responsibilities of the Army, under that plan?
Colonel Lawton. Could I refer to the plan, sir?
8. General Grunert. Yes, go ahead.
Colonel Lawton. In any particular aspects ?
9. General Grunert. What was their mission? What was the
Army's mission, with what was it charged?
Colonel Lawton. To hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and
air forces, and against hostile sympathizers, and support the naval
forces. That is stated so in the plans, sir.
10. General Grunert. Under that mission, they were responsible
for the land defense?
Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir.
11. General Grunert. And in implementing that plan, what did it
include? They had the inshore aerial patrol, did they?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1389
Colonel Lawton. Tliere was none established. That is prescribed
as a mission for Army forces. There was none established on the
7th of December, or prior to that time, sir.
12. General Geunert. Did it make any difference as far as the
plan was concerned, whether the fleet was in or out of the harbor?
Colonel Lawton. To my recollection, no sir. There was nothing
prescribed in the plan, I am quite sure; nothing stated in the plan
to that effect.
[2667] 13. General Grunert. Who was charged with distant
reconnaisance in that plan ?
Colonel Lawton. The Navy, sir.
14. General Grunert. When you say "the Navy," what do you
mean — the fleet, or the district, or both ?
Colonel Lawton. No, sir ; for the Fourteenth Naval District. The
Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District was charged with
that, sir.
15. General Geunert. Do you know whether or not they lived up
to that with which they were charged, in the line of distant recon-
naissance?
Colonel Lawton. I can't recall factually at this time, sir. My
best recollection is that there was certain distant reconnaissance. It
was sketchy, to my belief, if any. I am not sure on that.
16. General Grunert. Whose business was it, in the staff, to follow
up whether or not the Navy was following its part of the plan, for
the Commanding General ? In other words, to whom did he look to
see whether or not that plan was implemented?
Colonel Lawton. It would be the General Staff Chiefs. There
were certain aspects of the plan that were G-1 functions ; others, G-2,
-3, and -4, sir.
17. General Grunert. Well, whose function was it to see whether
or not the Navy was carrying out its part of the plan of distant
reconnaissance?
Colonel Lawton. I think that would be primarily a G-2 function.
18. General Grunert. Just because of the question of intelligence,
was that the idea?
[2668] Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir.
19. General Grunert. Just what cooperation was there between
G-3 of the Department and operations of the Navy, or what corre-
sponded to a similar position in the district or the fleet, or both ?
Colonel Lawton. You are speaking now of liaison, sir, of contact
back and forth between the Army and the Navy, sir?
20. General Grunert. Yes, sir.
Colonel Lawton. There was an officer in G-3 always who w^as
primarily charged with naval liaison. I took over from Major
Hobart Hewitt, in about August.
21. General Grunert. Then you actually performed the duties of
liaison officer between the Department and the Navy, in so far as
operational matters were concerned?
Colonel Lawton. From the Army, as an Army officer; yes, sir.
We also had a naval officer in the G-3 section.
22. General Grunert. And his name was Burr?
Colonel Lawton. Burr; yes, sir; Lieutenant Harold Burr.
1390 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
23. General Grujstert. While we are on that subject, what was
he worth to G-B ?
Colonel Lawton. His duties were not important, sir.
24. General Grunert. All right. Then you did not get much in-
formation from him, did you?
Colonel Lawton. Just as a messenger going back and forth, sir,
to get certain specific information, or to bring certain specific infor-
mation to the Navy.
25. General Grunert. Of course, you do not know, but I wondered
what the Navy thought of your being the liaison officer for the Army.
Were you any better than he was for the Navy ?
Colonel Lawton. I think I was in a position to give them better
information.
[2669] 26. General Grunert. All right. Now, what sort of in-
formation passed back and forth? What did you do over that pe-
riod, say, the latter part, from October 1 to December 7 ? What hap-
pened between the two of them ? What information was passed back
and forth, and what did they jointly get, together ? In other words,
give us a story of that, of your activities during that time, in so far
as the Navy or the fleet and the Naval District were concerned.
Colonel Lawton. Why, I find it a little difficult to remember exact
occurrences of matters that came up at that time, sir.
27. General Grunert. Give your memory, as it goes. Just tell us
the story, and then we will piece it out by questions.
Colonel Lawton. I would quite frequently go over to see Com-
mander Knowles, who was the operational officer and War Plans officer
in the Fourteenth Naval District; occasionally would see Captain
Earl, who was the Chief of Staff for Admiral Bloch. Most of my
business was done with Commander Knowles. I believe, during that
period that you mention, there were one or two joint agreements that
were gotten up between the Fourteenth Naval District and the Ha-
waiian Department, as to which I conferred with Commander Knowles
quite frequently. We had a number of meetings, along with other
officers. In training matters, coordination of use to training areas, I
used to see him quite frequently.
28. General Grunert. Then your conferences were primarily on
training matters and joint exercises, were they?
Colonel Lawton. Training matters, joint exercises, and then there
were, I think, in connection with the Hawaiian [2670'] Coastal
Frontier Defense Plan of 1941, several joint agreements made, as
annexes.
29. General Grunert. The Board has knowledge of a Joint Air
Operations Agreement, and it has knowledge of two addenda to that
agreement. That is the only thing that I recall right now that the
Board has knowledge of. Do you recall anything else ?
Colonel Lawton. Tliere was one agreement, I think, at that time,
with relation to harbor entrance control posts, sir.
30. General Grunert. That was a local affair. Was that put in
writing ?
Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir.
31. General Grunert. And was it made a part of a plan ?
Colonel Lawton. It was made part of this plan.
32. General Grunert. Is it in the plan that you have, there ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1391
Colonel Lawton. I believe it is, sir. Yes, sir; it is Inclosure B,
Annex No. VII, to IICF-41, joint harbor entrance control post.
33. General Grunert. What annexes have you, there, and what are
their topics ?
Colonel Lawton. Annex No. 1, Section VI, Allocation of Military
and Civil Manpower; Annex No. II, Section VI, Allocation of Util-
ities and Installations; Annex III, Section VI, Allocation of Local
Transportation Facilities : Land, Water, and Air ; Annex IV, Section
VI, Allocation of Signal Communications ; Annex V, Section VI, Al-
location of Supplies (Other Than Food), Construction Materials and
Mechanical Equipment; Annex VII, Section VI, Joint Security
Measures, Protection of Fleet and Pearl Harbor Base.
34. General Grunert. Wait. That sounds interesting. Generally,
what is that about ? What is the date of that ?
[267 ^ Colonel Lawton. That is the 28th of March, 1941, sir.
35. General Grunert. Generally, what is that about?
Colonel Lawton. Conduct of joint air operations in defense of
Oahu.
36. General Grunert. That is the Joint Air Operations Agree-
ment, then?
Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir.
37. General Grunert. Well, go ahead. We know about that.
Give the dates of those annexa as they go on from this.
Colonel Lawton. The one I just mentioned was Inclosure B to
Annex VII, which is a joint harbor entrance control post, approved
August 12, 1941, signed by General Short and Admiral Bloch. That
is the last one, sir.
38. General Grunert. Now, were you liaison officer for G-3 with
both the fleet and the district, or only the district?
Colonel Lawton. I was not designated in writing as either one,
to my knowledge, sir. In general, when we had matters to take up
with regard to the fleet, the chief of section accompanied the naval
liaison, or the officer in G-3 charged with naval duties, when he
went there.
39. General Grunert. Were these meetings that you had with the
Navy periodic or just when one or the other wanted to have some-
thing to talk about ?
Colonel Lawton. Wlien matters came up to be discussed.
40. General Grunert. And would you always go over to the Navy,
or would the Navy sometimes come to the G-3?
Colonel Lawton. It would come to us as often as we went over
there, sir.
41. General Grunert. And when you had something like this to
propose as an annex, or something to implement that plan, were those
about the only times you got together, or what other [2672]
subjects brought you together?
Colonel Lawton. There were frequent discussions with regard to
training, sir, and allocation of training areas.
42. General Grunert. And that is all local training areas?
Colonel Lawton. Antiaircraft and seacoast artillery, firing areas,
and training areas for naval vessels.
43. General Grunert. During any of those discussions, did the
question of a long-distance reconnaissance ever come up?
1392 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Lawton. I don't recall any that I was present at, sir.
44. General Grunert. Did they ever inform you what their task
forces were doing, while they were out, or where they went, or when
they would come back ?
Colonel Lawton. They would let us know — that is, we would get
a memorandum from the fleet when their forces were going out for
exercises, target practice.
45. General Grunert. What did that information usually contain?
Colonel Lawton. It gave the composition of the forces, and I.
believe the general area in which they were going to conduct their
training.
46. General Grunert. And did that information then disclose
what amount of reconnaissance they were going to make in that area,
and what actions were liable to or could be considered as working in
the protective scheme for the islands?
Colonel Lawton. I don't recall anything of that nature in those.
47. General Grunert. You knew they were going out; according
to that, you knew the approximate area they were going to work,
but then you did not know just what they were going to do when
\_2673'] they got out there, whether they would send planes out
to cover a certain wide area, or in, around where they were; whether
they were going to look for planes or submarines, or anything of the
kind, did you ?
48. General Frank. Did you know anything about the details of
their operating after they got out?
Colonel Lawton. The only information that I can recall we had
in that regard, they would go out and operate with one ; they would
break it up many times into two task forces out there and operate,
one against the other. I went out some time, T would say, in the fall
of 1941, on the SAN FEANCISCO, which we broke up into two
groups, and we endeavored to locate this group that had gone out
the day ahead of us by air search and by other means.
49. General Grunert. Then anything that was done by those task
forces while they were out there, in so far as the defense of Hawaii
is concerned, was incidental to their own business of going out there
and playing with each other in their training ?
Colonel Law^ton. To the best of my knowledge, sir. As far as I
know, every document we got in our section, with regard to these
naval exercises, they were purely training exercises.
50. General Frank. And they were not conducted for the defense
ofOahu?
Colonel Lawton. To the best of my laiowledge they were not, sir.
51. General Frank. Except as their presence there might be inci-
dental to such defense ?
[267 .'4'] Colonel Lawton. That is right.
52. General Grunert. Now, was G-3, as the operations division for
the Department, concerned about having protection all around, about
the island, as a defensive measure? Were they concerned to the
extent that they wondered whether the sea, north or south, was being
covered in the line of reconnaissance?
Colonel Lawton. There was very little attention paid to that matter
at that time, sir?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1393
53. General Grunert. Still, the plan and the agreement reached
was that the Navy would perform the duty of distant reconnaissance,
and that was a protective measure for the Army to do its work ; but
they never went after the Navy to ask them why they didn't give
distant reconnaissance, as far as you know, did they ^
Colonel Lawton. I don't recall any specific instance, before the
7th, sir. It is hard to divide, before the 7th and after the 7th.
54. General Grunert. Yes, I know ; but you and I make an agree-
ment ; I agree to do so and so, which helps you in what you are charged
with doing ; you agi'ee to do so and so, which helps me : Now, I cannot
understand why you do not insist that I live up to my agreement, and
know that I am doing it, because it affects your business. Do you see
what I am getting at?
Colonel Laavton. Yes, sir. I understand, sir.
55. General Grunert. So far as you know, that was not done prior
to December 7?
Colonel Lawton. I believe it was not done at the time, because in
the opinion of the commanders there was no need for such recon-
naissance.
[2675] 56. General Grunert. Then why put it in the plan?
Colonel Law^ton. That was a plan to be implemented at some future
time.
57. General Grunert. After they hit you — yes. Implement that
protection, after they hit you. That is a poor time to implement any-
thing, after you have been hit !
58. General Frank. Were you waiting for D-day?
Colonel Lawton. No, sir ; but this plan was agreed upon, as I recall,
back in March or April.
59. General Frank. When the plan was drawn up, was there any
arrangement made to itemize the equipment that was available to
implement the plan ?
Colonel Lawton. I do not know, sir, at the time. I had nothing
to do with it, at that particular time, sir.
60. General Grunert. There was in the plan a provision that locally
they could implement any part of that plan that they so desired, isn't
that true?
Colonel Lawton. I think that is correct, sir.
61. General Grunert. And as far as you know, they did not locally
agree to implement any part of that plan except for their training
and exercises, is that right?
Colonel Lawton. Well, I couldn't say without going through it,
how much of this was implemented. I mean there was nothing that
came out to my knowledge that says "This plan, here, will be put in
effect in all phases."
62. General Grunert. But in part of the phases, it apparently was
put into effect for the time being, for practice and training?
Colonel Lawton. In what regard, sir?
[2676] 63. General Grunert. Whenever you had a jomt exer-
cise outside, whenever the Air Corps had a joint exercise w^ith the
Navy.
Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir ; that is true.
64. General Grunert. That was implementing part of the plan for
that particular exercise?
1394 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Lawton. That, as a training element.
65. General Gkunert. But, so far as you know, the plan was never
implemented for distant reconnaissance?
Colonel Lawton. I believe there was some distant reconnaissance
before the 7th of December, sir. The number of planes that the Navy
had available were few, and I am not sure right now, but it should
be a matter of record.
66. General Gkunert. Was the inshore aerial patrol implemented?
Colonel Lawton. The surface patrol I believe was, sir. The air
patrol was not.
67. General Frank. Do you know whether or not the commander
of the Fourteenth Naval District had in his own command any air-
craft with which to conduct this distant reconnaissance that he fought
so hard to get ?
Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir ; he had PB Ys and Patrol Wing 2.
68. General Frank. And do you know whether they belonged to
the Fourteenth Naval District, or to the fleet?
Colonel Lawton. My recollection, they were under the Fourteenth
District, sir.
69. General Frank. It has been stated in naval testimony before
the Board that they belonged to the fleet.
Colonel Lawton. If that is the case, then I don't [£677] be-
lieve Admiral Bloch had any airplanes under him, sir.
70. General Frank. And you did not know that he did not have
any planes with which to conduct the reconnaissance that he agreed to
conduct, in this joint plan, or did you?
Colonel Lawton. I believe the airplanes, certain planes of Patrol
Wing 2, were available to Admiral Bloch for that purpose. I think
some of them — I am quite sure that some operated. I know they
operated under him in our training exercises, sir.
71. General Frank. But if the fleet commander wanted to pull
them away for fleet operations
Colonel Lawton. I think he could, sir.
72. General Frank. — that left the Fourteenth District commander
high and dry?
Colonel Lawton. I believe that is correct, sir.
73. General Frank. Did you know that, at that time?
Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir; I knew that Admiral Kimmel could
take those planes away, sir.
74. General Frank. You did know that?
Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir.
75. (xeneral Frank. Did you believe that the Navy was furnishing
you reconnaissance that provided security? Did you believe that,
prior to December 7?
Colonel Lawton. Oh, I was sure they were not furnishing sufficient
reconnaissance to provide security. That is, sufficient reconnaissance
would have required a 360° search, which they did not have the
airplanes to use, and the airplanes were not available for that purpose.
76. (xeneral Frank. Did you expect an attack by air?
Colonel Lawton. No, sir.
[£678] 77. General Frank. Why not, if the Navy were not
furnishing complete 360° reconnaissance protection?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1395
Colonel Lawtox. I think the general understanding was that no
considerable portion of the Japanese fleet could be absent from sur-
veillance by American observers
78. General Frank, Naval?
Colonel Lawton. — and intelligence personnel, in the Far East, for
a long enough period to enable them to come this distance, without
our knowing it and being informed of that fact.
79. General Frank. And you trusted to that?
Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir ; I think that might be so stated. I have
heard numerous naval officers make that statement, as personal friends,
from time to time.
80. General Grunert. Prior to Pearl Harbor, or afterward?
Colonel Lawton. Prior to Pearl Harbor, sir.
81. General Grunert. Tell me whether or not you knew anything
about a naval message, or a message received by the Navy from the
Chief of Naval Operations, on November 27, which began with the
words, "Consider this a war warning," and which wound up by saying,
"Transmit this to the Army," or words to that effect. Did you know
of that message?
Colonel Lawtton. I have seen it since the 7th. Whether I saw that
message before the 7th or not, I am not sure, sir. I saw an Army
message of similar character.
82. General Grunert. In view of the liaison between G-3 and the
Navy, would it not have been natural for the Navy to have furnished
G-3 with a copy of the message, or was that the channel through which
the information would be given to the Army?
\£679] Colonel Lawton. That went on a higher level, sir.
83. General Grunert. When it got to its destination, then did it
not drop in the slot and come down to G-3 operations ?
Colonel Lawton. I don't believe that particular message did, sir,
from the Navy.
84. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not the Command-
ing General received that message?
Colonel Lawton. No, sir : I don't, as a fact.
85. General Grunert. What do you know about the message re-
ceived by the Commanding General from the Chief of Staff of the
Army, November 27 ? Do you recall that message ?
Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir ; I know they did receive a message, sir,
and I saw it, I believe, that day, sir.
86. General Grunert. Tell me generally what you remember about
the contents of that message.
Colonel Lawton. The general import was that negotiations were
continuing with Japan, and that we should take precautions against
sabotage; we were not to commit any acts to arouse the local public.
I don't remember more of the message than that. That was the
general trend.
[M80] 87. General Grunert. Those things stuck out in your
mind? You were to take measures against sabotage; you were not to
alarm the public : those two things ?
Colonel Lawton. That is right, sir. And I recall another one, to
the best of my recollection within five, six days or a week later, that
said — I've always thought, from remembrance afterwards, that the
wording was used, "Intensify antisabotage protection."
79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 2 39
1396 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
88. General Grunert. I shall ask the Recorder to read that message
to you and see if that is the message of November 27 to which you
refer. Listen to it carefully, because I want to ask you a few ques-
tions about it.
89. Colonel West. This is the radiogram dated November 27, 1941,
addressed to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, signed
"Marshall," the body of which reads as follows :
(Radiogram to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort
Shafter, T. H., signed "Marshall", is as follows:)
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes
with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back
and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action
possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the
United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should
not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might
jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to
undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary
[2681] but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to
alarm civilian population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should
hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as
they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information
to minimum essential officers.
90. General Grunert. Do you recall that as being the message to
which you refer ?
Colonel Lawton. That is the message to which I refer, yes, sir;
91. General Grunert. Yes. Now, it seems to stand out in your
mind — the reason I didn't have that message read to you first, I wanted
to see what your recollections were of the things that stood out in the
message. Now, yon said (1) sabotage. Sabotage is not mentioned
in that message. (2) Don't alarm the public. Yes, that is mentioned.
Now, what I can't quite get is why, "Don't alarm the public," stands
out in your mind, where certain things like, for instance, "this policy
should not restrict you to use any action which may jeopardize your
defense" — why that didn't stand out if the alarming the public does
stand out. Is it, do you suppose, because of the action taken, that
that fixed that in your mind and the other one didn't, or what ?
Colonel Lawton. I believe it was, sir, because in the discussions
at the time — I believe I saw that whole message before the — on the 27th
of November or possibly the 28th, but I recall the action that was
directed in G-3 by the Chief of Section was to the effect that we would
go into the anti-sabotage alert. The members of the section, the
officers in [2682] the section, were detailed, I don't recall ex-
actly the date of the week; I would say that was about a Thursday.
We went out Thursday or Friday, and we went out on Saturday after-
noon and Sunday and checked the sabotage guards at various public
utility installations.
92.' General Grunert. Now, that was action taken as a result of a
decision made on this message ?
Colonel Lawton. That is correct, sir.
93. General Grunert. Were you in on the discussion that the Com-
manding General held with the staff as to advising him on what action
should be taken ?
Colonel Lawton. No, sir, I was not.
94. General Grunert. When that action was taken on Alert No. 1,
alert against sabotage, and that was transmitted to the G-3 Section,
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1397
was there any discussion in the G-3 Section about that alert or about
the message itself?
Colonel Lawton. I do not believe there was, sir, and that is what
makes me wonder now as to whether I saw that complete message at
that time or not.
95. General Gkunert. Because it is quite natural, when you get
something from the "Old Man," to sort of discuss it and wonder why
he did this and just what he wants us to do.
Colonel Laavton. Yes.
96. General Grunert. And his decision and things of that sort.
Don't those things occur in this new Army as they used to in the old
Army ?
Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir.
97. General Grunert. I thought so. But you don't recall any such
discussion ?
[2683] Colonel Lawton. I am sure there wasn't.
98. General Grunert. All we want you to do is to remember.
Colonel Law^ton. I am sure there wasn't at that time, sir. There
was no detailed discussion.
99. General Grunert. But when you heard of it the action had
been taken to take No. 1 Alert ?
Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir. Any discussion was with respect to
what acts of sabotage might be expected.
100. General Grunert. All right. We will drop that and go to the
S. O. P. of November 5, '-11, and its provisions. Do you recall that
S. O. P., and what did you have to do with getting it up?
Colonel Lawton. I had very little to do with getting it up, sir.
Major Horner got that S. O. P. up, sir.
101. General Grunert. What was Major Horner? Another as-
sistant ?
Colonel Lawton. Yes.
102. General Grunert. What did Donegan do? His assistants
seemed to be doing everything. What did Donegan do?
Colonel Lawton. He supervised the work of the other members of
the section.
103. General Grunert. Do 3'ou know what brought about the
change from the old system of the department to have one alert which
meant all-out alert, to three alerts, three spasms: sabotage, air and
sabotage, and all-out ? Do you know what brought that about ? Were
you in there at the time the change was made ?
Colonel Lawton. No, sir. I believe that was prior to the early
part of '41.
[£684] 104. General Kussell. Did you see any messages from
the Chief of Staff or from the War Department in late November, early
December, other than the one that has been read to you by Colonel
West?
Colonel Lawton. I believe I did, sir. I thought there was one
around the 3rd of December.
105. General Russell. What do you remember about that message?
Colonel Lawton. That was the one that, to my recollection, said,
"Intensify antisabotage precautions."
106. General Russell. Do you recall any message out here in which
the Commanding General of the Dej^artment was told that the Presi-
1398 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
dent had certain views about alarming the public and about the first
overt act being committed by the Japanese ?
Colonel Lawton. In which the President was mentioned, sir ?
107. General Russell. Yes.
Colonel Lawton. No, sir, I don't recall any such message.
108. General Russell. You have no recollection of that. That
is all.
109. General Frank. We hear a great deal about the Big Five out
here. Do you know what they are?
Colonel Lawton. The heads of some of the big businesses here, sir.
110. General Frank. You heard about it?
Colonel Lawton. I couldn't name the members of the Big Five.
111. General Frank. You have heard about them?
Colonel Lawton. That is right.
112. General Frank. Do they wield some influence in the Hawaiian
Islands ?
1^685} Colonel Law^ton. I think, a very great deal economi-
cally, sir.
113. General Frank. How long have you been here ?
Colonel Lawton. Five years next week, sir.
114. General Frank. Has there ever been any feeling or appre-
hension in the Army about influential civilians remonstrating to
Washington relative to military measures they didn't like?
Colonel Lawton. Well, you asked that whether there has ever been
any discussion on that ?
115. General Frank. Has there ever been any feeling, any appre-
hension ?
Colonel Lawton. I don't believe I w-ould call it apprehension, sir.
I know it has been discussed among Army personnel that, for in-
stance, the matter of taking cane land, that is, for defense purposes,
profitable cane and pineapple lands, that there have been protests
made by — whether going to Washington, I have no factual knowledge,
but I certain am of the opinion that they did.
116. General Frank. When those questions come up, has the
knowledge that those j^eople will be vigorous in their protests ever
affected your decisions ?
Colonel Lawton. Never affected mine, sir.
117. General Frank. Well, do you think they ever have affected
military decisions to prosecute military plans vigorously?
Colonel Lawton. Only to a minor extent, anything that has ever
come to my attention, sir.
118. General Frank. They have had some effect on projects, how-
ever?
[£686] Colonel Lawton. My belief would be, of a very limited
character, sir; I don't think anything major.
119. General Grunert. Were you ever told to "Lay off so and so.
That will excite the Big Five, or one of them, and we'd better not try
to put that across, even though it is good for the military end of it"?
Anything like that ever come to you ? Did you know of it ?
Colonel Lawton. I don't recall of any such incident.
120. General Grunert. As far as you know, then, as far as G-3
were concerned, they were free to advise the Commanding General as
to the best military measures to be taken despite any influence that
might be used to delay or offset those measures?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1399
Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir; that is particularly true in the period
before the war ; I never ran up against that at any time, sir.
121. General Frank. Eight after December 7th the whole Terri-
tory was very cooperative, were they not ?
Colonel Lawton. Very much so, sir.
122. General Frank. What is the situation right this minute?
Colonel Lawton. I think the feeling now is, my personal opinion,
many of the business interests feel the war is passing far enough to
the west that they can resume some of their
123. General Frank. Restrictions on the Army?
Colonel Lawton. No. Operations.
124. General Frank. And restrictions on the Army?
Colonel Lawton. As far as property is concernecl, sir, because of
certain agitation to release the curfew and certain elements releasing
the internees.
125. General Grtjnert. Has complacency again set in?
[£687] Colonel Lawton. I don't believe I would call it com-
placency, sir. I think it is a question of business and profits that
are entering the minds of some of the larger business firms, who
have been greatly curtailed.
126. General Grunert. Are attempts under way to put conditions
back to what they were before December 7th, in the line of business?
Colonel Lawton. I think that is the general trend, yes, sir.
127. General Frank. Is there any plan in the Department to
recommend a different attitude toward alien Japanese in the
Territory ?
Colonel Lawton. Not to my knowledge, sir.
128. General Frank. So, from a military point of view would you
consider them a menace, the same as they considered them before
the war?
Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir.
129. General Frank. And there is no recommendation, from a
military point of view, to clamp down on them?
Colonel Lawton. I thing the situation with respect to the Japa-
nese population, both alien and citizen, from the military point of
view, is about the same today as it was a year ago, two years ago, sir.
130. General Frank. There are about how many Japanese on
Oahu? About how many?
Colonel Lawton. I think it runs around 40,000, sir.
131. General Frank. If there were 40,000 Americans under similar
conditions in Japan, how do you think they would be faring right
now?
Colonel Lawton. Not very well, sir.
[2688] 132. General Frank. What do you mean by that?
Colonel Lawton. I think they would be very much restricted,
probably not eating very well.
133. General Frank. And interned?
Colonel Lawton. Interned, and working at forced labor.
134. General Frank. Yes. What do you think the Japs would do
to them when peace came, a group of Americans under the same
conditions that the Japs are in Hawaii?
Colonel Lawton. You mean in case of a Jap victory, sir? They
wouldn't have much to say.
1400 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
135. General Frank. I am just talking of when peace is over,
victory or no victory. What I am trying to do is to get a com-
parison out of you as to whether or not we would proceed reason-
ably to protect ourselves against that menace or whether we would
still allow the menace to remain, and you have stated that the
Department
Colonel Lawton. I don't believe I understand that question, sir.
136. General Frank. You have stated that the Department has
no plan drawn up to recommend to the civil authorities to make any
change in the status of the Japs other than to continue to allow
them to remain a menace after peace is declared; is that correct?
Colonel Lawton. I don't — I didn't intend to make that statement,
sir.
137. General Frank. Well, have you any such plan ?
Colonel Lawton. I understood your question, General, was to the
effect as to whether we had — the military had changed its viewpoint
towards the Japanese at the present time.
[2689] 138. General Frank. Yes. Well, has it? Let us pro-
ceed along that line. Let us get something that you really under-
stand now.
Colonel Lawton. No, sir ; I do not believe the military has changed
its attitude toward handling of the Japanese in the Territory today
compared to six months, a year, or two years ago, sir.
139. General Frank. And what is that attitude?
Colonel Lawton. I think, a vigilant alera by the part of the Litelli-
gence personnel which is reflected in the fact that hardly a week goes
by that certain Japanese are not picked up and interned, having in
their possession flags, Japanese flags or objects which should have
been turned, in, or making anti-American remarks or refusing to be
drafted.
140. General Frank. Do you think that that is a reasonable, healthy
way to handle them, from a military point of view?
Colonel Lawton. I think, under the circumstances, considering all
aspects of the problem, yes.
141. General Frank. Do you think any other nation in the world
would do that toward a potential enemy ?
Colonel Lawton. No, sir.
142. General Frank. Why do you
Colonel Lawton. I'll take that back, sir. I don't know, sir. I
woudn't say. No, sir. I think one thing that is involved here is a
matter of economics and labor. If that number of Japanese were
removed from these islands, were stirred up to the extent that they
were improperly taken care of, didn't receive proper food and cloth-
ing, where many of these Japanese are citizens, that we would have
aroused a resentment which would cause us more trouble, I believe.
[£690] 143. General Frank. Do you believe that their pres-
ence here is a jeopardy to our national defense?
Colonel Lawton. Not at the present time, sir.
144. General Frank. What?
Colonel Lawton. There are certain individuals that are, but the
population as a whole, at this stage of the war, I do not believe is a
menace.
145. General Grunert. Are there any other questions? General
Russell?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1401
14C). General Eussell. No, sir.
147. General Grunekt. Do you think of any, Colonel Toulmin?
148. Colonel Toulmin. Yes, sir. I would like to ask him one ques-
tion.
Colonel, was the real reason for not wishing to disturb the state of
mind of the civil population prior to December 7, 1941, — was it that
if that was done it would upset the labor conditions for the commercial
interests here in the Island who did not want their Japanese labor in
any way stirred up to interfere with their commercial operations?
Colonel Lawton. I don't believe that had anything to do with it,
sir.
149. Colonel Toulmin. That is all.
150. General Grunert. Major Clausen?
151. Major Clausen. No, sir.
152. General Grunert. Colonel West?
153. Colonel West. No, sir.
154. General Grunert. Do you think of anything else that you can
tell the Board that may be of assistance to it in getting at facts as to
what caused Pearl Harbor or what took place cluring Pearl Harbor,
that you want to tell the Board ?
[2691] Colonel Lawton. The only thing that stuck in my mind
since that time, sir: the radio that came in late on the 7th, and the
information that was in back of that,
155. General Grunert. Meaning what?
Colonel Lawton. As to why that information was not positively
and rapidly furnished the Commanding General, under the circum-
stances.
156. General Grunert. What information do you refer to?
Colonel Lawton. The radio that came in, actually delivered, I be-
lieve, to General Short in the afternoon of the 7th.
157. General Grunert. You mean the radio from the Chief of
Staff of December 7th giving additional information on the situation,
which did not reach the Commanding General until early in the after-
noon ?
Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir; said the Japanese were delivering an
ultimatum, I think, at 7 : 30 local time.
158. General Grunert. Let me have that message. Colonel. Would
you read it ? December 7th. Will you read it to the witness ?
159. Colonel West. Yes. This is the message dated December 7,
1941, which was dispatched to the Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department, signed "Marshall." The body reads as follows :
[2692] (Message of December 7, 1941, to commanding general,
Hawaiian Department, signed "'Marshall," is as follows :)
Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what
amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code
machine immediately stop. Just what significance the hour set may have we
do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this
communication.
160. General Grunert. Now, what was it about that message you
wanted to put across to the Board ?
Colonel Lawton. Well, my thought has been that if the negotiation
had reached that stage where an ultimatum was being delivered, code
machines being destroyed, that steps would be taken to get that in-
1402 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
formation rapidly to the Army and Navy Chiefs concerned in the
Hawaiian area.
161. General Grunert. And, as I understand, you want the Board
to consider whether or not the way that message was sent was what
it should have been, how it should have been sent ?
Colonel Lawton. That is right, sir.
162. General Grunert. Do you know how it was sent ?
Colonel Lawton. Went through RCA, sir.
163. General Grunert. RCA. And how could it have been sent,
in your opinion ?
Colonel Lawton. Through Signal channels, sir.
164. General Grunert. Through Signal channels?
Colonel Lawton. Yes, Army Signal channels.
165. General Grunert. You don't know whether it was sent
[2693] through Army Signal channels, and the only way to get
it here by the Army Signal was to send it through RCA to get it
here as quickly as possible ?
Colonel Lawton. No, sir, I do not.
166. General Grunert. You don't know that?
Colonel Lawton. I don't know that, sir. That might be true.
167. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not there was
oceanic telephone available?
Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir.
168. General Grunert. Do you know whether it was working that
day?
Colonel Lawton. It worked later that day, sir.
169. General Grunert. What happened later that day, that you
know that?
Colonel Lawton. I know that Colonel Phillips, Chief of Staff, talked
to Washington, sir.
170. General Grunert. Talked to Washington ?
Colonel Lawton. I believe General Short did too, but I am not
positive of that. I know that Colonel Phillips did, sir.
171. General Grunert. Are there any other questions?
Colonel Lawton. Another thought that I know has been in the
minds of the people here : when the message of the 27tli of November
came in, the action taken here was reported to the War Department,
that we had gone on a sabotage alert, and when no further direction
was received from the War Department in that regard, I think the
Chiefs here considered the precautions taken were what was desired
by the War Department.
172. General Grunert. Then, as far as you personally are
[£694-] concerned, and what you understand to have been the talk
among your fellow officers, it was, "If they didn'l like what we did,
why didn't they tell us what to do?" Is that the gist of it?
Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir. I have often wondered why they didn't
sir.
173. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not, when the
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department did not receive
any further news after he put in his report, there was ever any attempt
made on this end to find out whether what he had put in was O. K. ?
Colonel Lawton. I don't know of any message that went forward
in that regard, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1403
174. General Grunert. You don't know whether any inquiry was
made, "Well, now, I have just taken the sabotage alert. Does that
suit you people?" Or did they just sit back and say, "Well, I put
in the report, and if there's nothing about it," — was there any acknowl-
edgement of that report? Do you know?
Colonel Lawton. I don't recall any, sir.
175. General Grunert. Just took it for granted, then, that the re-
port was received and that the report was satisfactory, and nothing
else desired?
Colonel Lawton, That's to my knowledge, sir. I assume many
things went on between General Short and General Marshall that
I know nothing about, sir.
176. General Grunert. You just want to bring it to our attention.
Colonel Law^ton. I know there were matters between General Short
and Admiral Kimmel that — conversations that were not transmitted
at least to me in G-3. Whether Colonel Donegan knew [26951
it or not, I don't know. But they had, I know, numerous conferences
during the period from the 27th on.
177. General Grunert. Is there a file in G-3, or was there a file
kept in G-3 of .the interchange of information and correspondence
between the Navy and the Army that is available to the Board, or is
most of this by voice?
Colonel Lawton. All the preliminary discussions were voice.
There were letters that went back and forth signed by the Adjutant
General or by General Short that would be prepared in G-3.
178. General Grunert. But you don't know of any such particular
file that records all, whatever was done and whatever was said?
Colonel Lawton. No, sir.
179. General Grunert. If 5'ou had to do it over again, would you
record these things?
Colonel La"U"1'on. Yes, sir.
180. General Grunert. Are you doing it now?
Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir.
181. General Grunert. Any questions ? (No response.) All right.
Thank you very much. Colonel.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
[2696] TESTIMONY OF BRIGADIER GENERAL EDGAR KING,
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT, FORT SHAFTER, T. H.
(The witness was sworn by the recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board your
name, rank, organization, and present station ?
General King. Edgar King, Brigadier General, Medical Depart-
ment, stationed at Fort Shafter, Headquarters of the United States
Army forces in the Pacific Ocean.
2. General Grunert. General, the Board is after facts as to what
happened prior to and during the Pearl Harbor attack, any leads
that we can get from those who know such facts. The reason we asked
you to appear as a witness is because General Short in hiB testimony
before this Board referred to you as having knowledge of conditions
in Honolulu and also of the measures taken, as I recall it, to prepare
1404 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
themselves to meet such an attack. I think where yon come in are
the medical and sanitary preparations.
General King. Yes, sir.
3. General Gkunekt. So we have called yon to tell us generally
what was done, what the conditions Avere, so we can ask any questions
about those when they occur to us. There is nothing special, so far
as I am concerned, except that general start. So you will please give
us what you remember and the points you think you ought to cover.
General King. I reported for duty in the Hawaiian Department in
August of 1939.
4. General Grunert. By the way, what was your assignment?
General King. Surgeon, Hawaiian Department.
5. General Grunert. You were the Department Surgeon?
[2697] General King. Department Surgeon.
0. General Grunert. And you were that from when to when?
General King. I reported on the 15th of August, 1939, and except
for the change in terminology I am occupying the position now that I
filled at that time.
7. General Grunert. All right, go ahead.
General King. It was not long after I reported that it became
necessary to consider the possibility of war and the preparations
which were necessary to meet it in my department. We took the
question of supply, personnel and so forth under consideration and
did what we could to get certain increases in the next 12 months, the
next 18 months. The principal thing to be mentioned as having been
done was the rearrangement of the medical supplies to be readily
usable in the expansion of medical facilities.
I think it was February of 1941 when it appeared to be probable
that this area might be involved in war, and I made a recommendation
to the commanding general covering what I considered certain mini-
mum preparations which should be made to meet a possible attack
upon these islands.
The recommendations could be considered in two parts, I am not
attempting now to quote literally. I am stating things in general
terms. One concerned the question of the organization to meet what
had become known as civilian defense — I believe there had been that
term used already at that time — and the other was to meet the require-
ments of the military forces themselves.
The first part, or the part which I mentioned first, the matter of
civilian defense, consisted primarily in a recommenda- [3698]
tion that I be authorized to consult with the local civilian medical pro-
fession and others who were concerned, with a view to organizing the
existing facilities and to securing supplies and creating, if we could,
a workable organization which could take care of casualties in case
the City of Honolulu should be subjected to a bombing attack. That
was the thing we primarily had in mind, to make use of what there
was available.
The second concerned certain increases in supplies, certain increases
in bed capacity of hospitals, and increases in medical department per-
sonnel above what was then available.
A third thing was a revision, a careful revision of the plans for the
expansion of hospitals in case war action occurred. This expansion
program — I think it was called at that time a mobilization plan — is in
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1405
existence in all commands, but we found it necessary to give some
particular consideration to that phase of preparation.
There were some considerations given to the medical service of the
other Hawaiian Islands, but that covered more or less a normal medical
service, depending upon the timount of troops placed on those islands,
with particular reference to them.
8. General Grunert. How did those plans blossom as the time went
on? Were you pretty well satisfied that you had a good setup on
December 7th, 1941?
General King. From my memory that I am using now I won't
guarantee that every word is accurate for the record. But the organ-
ization of the civilian phase of this proceeded rather satisfactorily.
In November of 1911 — I think it was the latter half of November —
all of this was with the approval of the commanding general, I might
say ; he was kept fully informed of [£699] this and where his
approval was necessary it was given. I went to each of 21 aid sta-
tions, as we called them, in the City of Honolulu, strategically located
as to possible points where casualties might occur, and we had what
I thought was a very satisfactory situation, well trained, with the
help of medical officers and physicians who volunteered. And the
civilian hospitals had some modifications in routine which could be
put into effect when necessary.
So far as the military preparations are concerned, we had gotten
some increases in our bed capacity; we had gotten some progress
toward leasing a building, now the 147th General Hospital; we had
completed our plans for an air attack. We had not gotten all the
personnel we had hoped for, for which presumably the War Depart-
ment had their own reasons ; and which I do not question. We had
organized our existing medical personnel into teams and so on, such
as would be required in an emergency; and considering all things we
were not badly off for an immediate emergency. We were in a very
dangerous position if we had anything like a sustained attack. We
did all we could to meet that.
9. General Grunert. It functioned pretty well during the attack
and immediately after the attack?
General King. Yes, sir. We had to do a great many things that
were of an emergency nature, but I felt, all things considered, that
it was a very fine job, and I so stated in an official report concerning
those officers and men and the civilian people who assisted us.
10. General Grunert. You stated that, in February of 1941, you
considered this might be a possible theater of war. Why did that
come to you that particular time? Wliy not in [2700]
November of 1940 or July of 1941? What particularly brought that
to your mind at that time?
General King. My recollection of my mental processes. General, is
this : From the time that I arrived I had in mind getting the medical
department in shape for war. Certain things were present which
particularly made that necessary for me to get bus}^ on. I studied,
as near as I could, the trend of things and I felt at the time that I
wrote this particular recommendation that that was as long as I could
wait, if I was going to accomplish anything in the way of training
these people. That was my design. I kept thinking of it off and on
in connection with other things up to that. Those were the processes,
as I recall.
1406 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
11. General Grunert. Now, what were your mental processes
toward late in November of 1941, according to the information you
then had?
General King. Well, I felt absolutely certain that it would only
be a little while till we were occupied with Japan. I had a little
knowledge of the Oriental, had served them in the Orient, and I
reasoned that we would not be given any warning whatever. Those
were my actual mental processes.
12. General Grunert. Were you concerned when they just took
Alert No. 1 instead of taking a more protective alert?
General King. I was extraordinarily disappointed, sir.
13. General Grunert. You also referred, I believe, in your testi-
mony here that you started to organizing with a view meeting the
medical demands for an air attack. Did you consider an air attack
as probable or more probable than a surface attack? Do you recall
what your mental processes were on that line ?
1^701] General Ejng. Rather clearly, I think, in preparing
particularly the civilian population in this area against an air attack,
based upon what we had heard of the use of air in Europe it seemed
to me that the greatest amount of damage could come from an air
attack, and that is why I stressed, in an effort to get the work done,
the danger of air attack over surface, because I though it was the
keenest, most dangerous element, as we then saw it. So I talked more
about that, and it was more in my mind than a surface or any other
attack.
14. General Grunert. In your disappointment as to the alert taken,
for security purposes, did you figure it was within your province to
attempt to point out to the Commanding General or any superior that
you did not think that that was sufficient to cover the subject?
General King. I could not see that it was any of my affair, sir. I
knew that they had more information than I did. That was my
personal observation.
15. General Grunert. Tell me, from your long exjoerience out here,
can you give us any highlights as to the population, their degree of
loyalty, their possible reactions under situations such as were experi-
enced before and during the so-called blitz, and after it? Can you
give the Board the experience of your long service here, so we can get
a better insight as to what this population looks like and acts like ? I
can put some specific questions, if you wish, or you can make a general
statement as to that.
General King. It is very difficult to say anything about that which
can be proven. That is about the best way to start my remarks. With
the population approximately a third Japanese [2702~\ or of
Japanese origin, personally I regard it as potentially very dangefous.
and I believe — this is based upon a concept formed from many little
things — that the population as a whole would have become very dan-
gerous if the war had gone against us at Midway, for example, instead
of going against the Japanese. That is the reaction that I had formed
from rny knowlege of the place.
16. General Grunert. Has your opinion changed any, or do you
think that status still remains?
General King. I would have no reason to change my opinion what-
ever about the great majority of these people, that is, the Japanese
people. I cannot prove that statement, you understand.
, PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1407
17. General Grunert. Now that it appears that tlie United Nations
are winning this world war, do you think there will be any trouble
with the Japanese here in the future, unless Japan appears to be
winning ?
General King. I could offer no predictions to that, General. The
Japanese are a problem here. It is bej^ond my ability to say what they
will be if we win the war. I don't Imow what it will be. I feel certain
that if we were not winning the war there would be quite a different
situation than it is now.
18. General Grunert. Were you consulted as to what form of alert
the Department should take, or to give advice as to Avhether or not
they should do this or that?
General King. I tliink I was not at any time at that particular
moment. I recall a dispatch which came in which I thought meant
the thing would not be but a few days away, and I think that is the
same you refer to when Alert No. 1 was [2703'] adopted. I
was simply told the decision of the Commanding General.
19. General Grunert. You were told of the decision and not asked
whether or not you had any opinion about what should be done?
General King. I cannot recall that I was asked, no. I am sure, in
fact, that I was not.
20. General Grunert. Was that the message from the Chief of
Staff of the Army or the message from the Navy which was trans-
mitted to the Army ?
General King. I cannot say, sir. I was called to the office of the
Chief of Staff, He handed me a message which I read, which had in
it words like this : "It is expected that all necessary precautions will
be necessary, but we want to hit the enemy first, if we can, but be
ready to hit them." Something like that.
21. General Grunert. Was the President's name or his position
used in that message, do you recall ?
General King. I do not recall.
22. General Grunert. But that was the only message that started
out about the same as that ?
General King. That is the only one I recall specifically, and I recall
tliat very specifically.
23. General Frank. You said a little while ago that there was a
Japanese problem here.
General King. Yes, sir.
24. General Frank. What is it?
General King. Well, I can best describe it, I think, by the fact that
it represents an oriental viewpoint which it will take several genera-
tions, at least, to change. If you look along some of the streets here
where there are more Japanese than [2704-] some of the other
races, predominantly Japanese, it looks very like the streets in
Tientsin or some of the other north China places. It resembles that
more than an American street. It gives one that idea.
25. General Frank. But is it a problem? Is it inimical to our
national defense?
General King. In my judgment, the presence of that amount of the
population at an outpost like this, unless it is definitely controlled,
is inimical to our national defense.
1408 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK »
26. General Frank. Is it controlled here?
General King. It has been during the war, to the best of my knowl-
edge.
27. General Frank. If it is a problem, how would you solve it?
General King. I doubt that I am capable of giving a solution to
that. It is a highly-complicated problem, one which depends on the
viewpoint of the nations of the world as to the disposition of the
Japanese people after this war. I don't think I can offer a definite
solution at this time.
28. General Frank. Does the value of the Jap as a laborer in the
Hawaiian Islands have a deterring effect on taking positive action to
solve the problem?
General King. May I qualify that by saying that I understand — it
is assumed you could not get other labor — I hear, without being able
to definitely state my source of information, that the Japanese people,
that is, speaking of them now as Japanese people, are very valuable in
many respects as laborers and particularly as artisans and men of that
sort, which I think is an economic phase of the political problem and
will have to be taken into consideration along with the other things.
29. General Frank. Do the commercial interests control this
[2705] solution?
General King. I have no knowledge on which to base an answer to
that question.
30. General Frank. What do you think?
General King. I don't think any commercial interest can control
it, if the government wants to take positive action. If you are speak-
ing of the local political situation, I have not enough knowledge to
answer that.
31. General Frank. Were you conversant with the official message
that General Short had received from Washington relative to the
situation existing between the period of November 27th and December
7th, other than this message you saw?
General King. I recall this : that I was kept informed of everything
which affected the medical department, to the best of my knowledge,
as to whether I saw all these messages I cannot say, because I do
not have any way of knowing.
32. General Frank. Getting back to this commercial situation
again, have you any feeling that commercial interests control the
government's action as to the solution of this Japanese problem.
General King. May I ask which government you refer to, sir?
33. General Frank. The local.
General King. The Territorial Government?
34. General Frank. Yes,
General King. I do not know, General, whether tliey do or not.
I do not have any knowledge of it. I hear things; I read it in the
papers, but I don't know anything about it, to be honest with you;
I really don't know anything about it.
[2706'] 35. General Russell. General, I do not know that it is
germane to anything we are out here upon, but the subject has been
touched upon in the last question or two about this Japanese problem.
General King. Yes, sir.
36. General Russell. About a third of the population are Japs?
General King, That is approximately correct.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1409
37. General Russell. The problem, therefore, was created by bas-
ing a substantial part of our Navy on a territory where a third of
the inhabitants were hostile in a lot of ways toward our government.
General King. I don't quite follow you. General.
38. General Russell. The problem was created by bringing the
Navy in and putting it at Pearl Harbor when all around it a third
of the population was Japanese ; isn't that true?
General King. I believe the problem would have existed regardless
of who were here, if we had Pearl Harbor Navy Yard and base here,
if they had any people, Hawaii ans or anything. The problem as
far as the Japanese were concerned, the Japanese Navy in its attempt
to start this war, would have been the same. The presence of this
large number of Japanese sympathizers, in my judgment, made it
very easy for them or much easier for them to get all the information
they needed with reference to what went on here. But the problem,
I think, would have existed regardless of the population if we had
this area under our control and had our base here. It would have
been more difficult for them.
39. General Russell. It will continue to exist as long as these
Japanese are on the islands, isn't that true ?
General King. Well, so long as we have any Japanese any-
[2707] where, as we have Japanese here, it will not be as easy as
if we did not have them. Perhaps that is the only way I can answer
your question.
40. General Russell, That was all I wanted.
41. General Geunert. Are there any other questions? General,
do you think of anything else that you might tell the Board that may
be uppermost in your mind or that muy be craving for an outlet,
that the Board might consider, concerning this matter.
General King. I have tried to state in a brief form the simple fact
that we were not quite ready to meet those fellows at the time. As to
why that was, I do not know.
42. General Gkuneet. If there is not anything else, we will thank
the General and excuse him.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon, at 1 p. m. a recess was taken until 2 p. m.)
[2708^ AFTERNOON SESSION
(The Board, at 2 o'clock p. m,, continued the hearing of witnesses.)
TESTIMONY OF HON. LESTER PETRIE, MAYOR OF THE CITY OF
HONOLULU, T. H., CITY HALL, HONOLULU, T. H.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24, )
1. Colonel AVest. Mr. Petrie, will you please state to the Board your
name and address ?
Mr. Petrie. Lester Petrie. My business address or residence ?
2. Colonel West. Your business address.
Mr. Petrie. City Hall, Honolulu.
3. Colonel West. And you are, I believe, the Mayor of Honolulu?
Mr. Petrie. I am, sir.
1410 CONGFteSSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
4. General Grunert. Now, Mr. Petrie, this Board was appointed to
ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack by the Japanese
armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on the 7th of December,
1941, and, in addition thereto, to consider the phases which related to
the Pearl Harbor disaster of the report of the House Military Affairs
Committee, which is largely concerned with construction matters.
Now, we are after facts or leads to where facts can be found. General
Short has furnished the Board with a list of representative citizens
living in Hawaii who, he says, may have information of value to the
Board. Your name being on that list, we have asked you here with
the hope that you may have facts to present to us. General Short
did not refer to any particular subject on which you might testify,
so it is up to you to open up the subject, which may then give us a
[2709'] line on questions that we would like to ask about the sub-
ject. Have you anything in mind ?
Mr. Petrie. No, I have not anything in particular that might be
pertinent to that. I do not recall. You have not the testimony of
the other commission that was here? I was before that commission.
5. General Grunert. We have that.
Mr. Petrie. I do not recall just what it was, now.
6. General Grunert. But in so far as our mission is concerned, we
did not think it necessary to call you on any particular point in that
testimony.
Mr. Petrie. No.
7. General Grunert. But there may be something that stands out
in your mind which you think the Board ought to consider. It was
on General Short's request we ask you to come. He did not mention
anything in particular.
Mr. Petrie. All I can say, if I can recall now what I testified before,
that I know nothing that is pertinent to the subject matter that I
understand the investigation is for. I really believe the General was
apprehensive of the situation here. As Mayor, I think it was along in
the spring of that year, 1911, that I created a Major Disaster Council —
there was no other organization here — to prepare for any emergency
that might arise. In other words, we felt we were not prepared here
as citizens. We invited the Army and Navy to have representatives
there and they sat in with us, in an advisory capacity only. I am
sure that General Short's representative was there, the Army and
Navy. They may not have been at every meeting, but we created this
council and we proceeded to supplement our \2710'] fire equip-
ment and our medical supplies, principally, and organized for per-
sonnel emei"gency assitance that might be needed on any occasion.
8. General Grunert. Was that similar to what we now know as
Mr. Petrie. O. C. D.
9. General Grunert. As O. CD.?
Mr. Petrie. That is right. They took over. When the blitz came
in, they took over.
10. General Grunert. That is what was known as the Community
Services of the O. C. D. ?
Mr. Petrie. That is right.
11. General Grunert. In that was anything organized in the line
of defense measures that the O. C. D. now has, in the line of black-
outs, in the line of air raid shelters, air raid warning service, and so
forth?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1411
jNIr. Petrie. Not at that time. That all came afterward. I think
that all came after the blitz that these shelters were constructed.
12. General Grunert. Then at that time there was no consideration
given as to the necessity for the protection, immediate protection, of
civilians, from an air attack, outside of taking care of themselves
after the attack happened^
Mr. Petrie. I don't think so. I don't think we had gone that far.
13. General Grunert. This was all in the embryo stage of working
up lo what the O. C. D. has done?
Mr. Petrie. That really took place afterwards, after the blitz came.
14. General Frank. Who was the leading spirit in starting
[r/77] this?
Mr. Petrie. I was in the Disaster Council and a few of the members
around the City Hall and my department heads, we got together.
15. General Grunert. That is, in the line of your duties as mayor,
you thought that is what you ought to be doing?
Mr. Petrie. Yes, sir.
15. General Grunert. And the military worked in with that
scheme whole-heartedly ?
Mr. Petrte. Absolutely, yes.
17. General Grunert. And rendered all assistance that you
thought was necessary?
Mr. Petrie. Yes, and the}- were advising the people continually
at that time, I think, to lay in food supplies.
18. General Frank. Did General Short cooperate very thoroughly
Avith the city government and the commercial interests ?
Mr. Petrie. Yes, he did. I will say that, yes. We got along
very well with General Short, very well.
19. General Frank. Why do you say "we"?
Mr. Petrie. The city; that is as far as I speak. The other
branches of government, the Territory, I do not speak for. I speak
for the city administration.
20. General Grunert. Do you speak for the prominent citizens in
the city or just for the city administration?
Mr. Petrie. I think I could go as far as to speak for the citizens
of the city.
21. General Grunert. Do you think of anything else that you
might add? Do you wish to express j^our opinion of General Sliort
or the Army administration, either in preparation for what might
happen or in action when it did happen?
[2712'] Mr. Petrie. Well, I cannot say anything more than that
I honestly believe they did everything that possibly could be done.
I know they were apprehensive of the situation, of an emergency,
because they were quite active. They had these meetings. We had
a meeting at the Eoyal Hawaiian Hotel and one of the members of
the Chamber of Commerce, I think, could speak for that, but I at-
tended one of the meetings when General Short spoke, the Army
spoke and the Navy spoke, along these lines of preparedness.
22. General Grunert. Did that give you the impression that they
understood or realized the gravity of the immediate future?
Mr. Petrie. I would say so.
23. General Grunert. Did anv of you visualize an air attack, or
not?
7971G — 4G — Ex. 145, vol. 2 40
.1412 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Petrie. No. I know I did not. I did not believe it after I
had seen it and I looked at it for an hour, almost, from my front
porch.
24. General Grunert. Then apparently the city population was
not particularly war-minded, were they?
Mr, Petrie. This was all being worked up. I would not say they
were as war-minded then as they were after the blitz, but I don't
think they anticipated any such happening as occurred on Decem-
ber 7th.
25. General Grunert, Suppose General Short or Admiral Kimmel
or any of their subordinate officers or staff had gotten up at one of
these meetings and said "You people are all asleep here; something
is liable to happen next week," would you think that was jingoism,
would you think he was an alarmJst, or what?
Mr, Petrie, My personal observation of that meeting with the
Navy, I think Admiral Kimmel kind of insinuated that to the prom-
inent citizen here in Hawaii, the Chamber of Commerce.
[^713] 26. General Grunert. Is it not true that one of your
own papers here practically predicted the blitz, within about a week?
Mr. Petrie. I do not recall that,
27, General Grunert. How did you consider the news in the
papers; as a little far-fetched, or what?
Mr, Petrie, I do not know. We were not paying too much atten-
tion to it at the time, I was quite busy at that time when all this was
coming out and I didn't get much chance to read the papers before the
day of the blitz. I came down that Sunday morning and I didn't leave
the city hall until about 10 or 11 days after that. I stayed right there,
28, General Grunert, Then you do not recall this flare headline in
the morning paper of November 30th ?
Mr. Petrie. No ; I do not recall it,
29, General Grunert. It said that war was very liable to happen
within a week or something like that,
Mr, Petrie, I do not definitely recall it.
30, General Grunert, If you had seen it, then what ? Would you
credit it very much? I don't know how you size up your papers or
your editors, or whatnot.
Mr, Petrie. I don't know. Sometimes you think one way and
sometimes you think another. To give you an illustration now, you
read in the press today that our forces are here, and advancing here,
and then tomorrow you pick up the paper and they are still back
here. Now, you can take that for what it is worth and maybe that is
the same all over. That is my impression of the latest news that we
have been getting here. They are a little optimistic,
31, General Grunert, At that time did you think the situation
[27 H'] was sort of tense or imminent or just would not happen
to Hawaii?
Mr. Petrie, I don't think they were imminent or tense at that time.
32, General Frank, Had you been getting frequent alarms?
Mr, Petrie, No, I think we may have had an alarm, but not
other than a practice alarm.
33, General Frank, What I mean is, had the Japanese situation
become tense from time to time? Had you become accustomed to it?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1413
Mr. Petkie. Well, only what we saw in the papers there. That
is all we had, and much of that was coming from Washington, from
the mainland.
34. General Frank. What I am getting at is
Mr. Petrie. The Admiral, I know, when he went through here,
ever3'thing seemed to be all right.
35. General Frank. They called, "Wolf, wolf" so many times
that when they finally called it again you did not pay much attention
to it?
Mr. Petrie. If they did call it, I know there wasn't too much atten-
tion paid to it very seriously. I don't think they were worked up to
any high pitch just immediately before that.
36. General Grunert. How about the population of your city at
that time? Did you consider, on account of the Japanese element,
both American born and alien, that that was a particular menace to
the safety of the island?
Mr. Petrie. No; we did not.
37. General Grunert. You say "we did not."
Mr. Petrie. I did not.
[3715] 38. General Grunert. Was there any evidence that they
engaged or intended to engage in sabotage ?
Mr. Petrie. No, I don't think there was, and even on that day I
don't think there was.
39. General Grunert. Just how do you size them up now ?
Mr, Petrie. I have lived here with them, I have grown up with
them. I have been here practically all my life, except two years of it.
I look at them a little bit differently, perhaps. Of course, I believe
possibly there are some, as has been demonstrated since, that are not
loyal, and there may not be any question in my mind if Japan had
succeeded in getting in here that a good many might have followed
that way, but the opportunity did not arise, so you cannot say it would
happen. I have no reason to say they would or would not.
40. General Frank. How many aliens have you on the island?
Mr. Petrie. I do not recall jiist now. 30,000, is it? Or approxi-
mately?
41. General Frank. 30,000 what?
Mr. Petrie. Aliens, if I am not mistaken. Those figures are off-
hand.
42. General Frank. Of what particular advantage are they ?
Mr. Petrie. Well, they originally came here as cane workers, work-
ers in the cane fields. Then they "gradually graduated into business,
and most of the aliens now, I think, are or were in business.
43. General Frank. Are they an asset in the labor situation here
now ?
Mr. Petrie. Well, to a certain extent those that are in the mechanical
field are all right, on account of the shortage [2716] of man-
power. I think the government has recognized that, because they
do practically nothing else but this construction.
44. General Frank. In normal times, with so much unemployment
in the United States, how do you reconcile giving employment to
30,000 aliens in Hawaii?
1414 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Peteie. They were residents of Hawaii, I guess, and possibly
they were more economical from a wage scale. They were in competi-
tion to the white labor. There is no question about that.
45. General Grunert. Was there any effort ever to get labor from
the United States, to replace the alien labor, or was there any need for
such an attempt?
Mr. Petrie. I don't know. I could not answer that. That could
come from someone else. I do not recall any.
46. General Frank. Are they a problem now ?
Mr. Peteie. No, I would not say they were. I think the F. B. I. did
a pretty job here, and the minute something happened they had them
pretty well lined up. They did a very good job. They had them
pretty well all located.
47. General Gruneet. That was after the attack?
Mr. Peteie. That was after the attack, yes, sir.
48. General Geunert. Do you think of any other subject upon which
we might get information from you, that might be of value to us?
Mr. Peteie. No, not that I think would possibly help you in your
activities.
49. General Grunert. Any questions?
50. General Russell. How many people are there within the cor-
porate limits of Honolulu of Japanese origin ?
[^TIY] Mr. Peteie. Of Japanese origin ?
51. General Russell. Yes.
Mr. Petrie. In the City of Honolulu?
52. General Russell. Yes.
Mr. Petrie. I cannot say offhand. In the Territory there were
about 150,000, if I remember correctly. There may be 60,000 possibl3^
53. General Russell. In the City of Honoluhi ?
Mr. Petrie. Well, the City of Honolulu now is the island.
54. General Frank. City and county ?
Mr. Petrie. Yes.
55. General Russell. You just have one political entity ?
Mr. Petrie. That is all, yes.
56. General Russell. You are the mayor of the island ?
Mr. Peteie. Of the island, that is it.
57. General Russell. Your police jurisdiction extends over the
island ?
Mr. Petrie. Yes.
58. General Russell. And you of course have a police force of some
sort?
Mr. Peteie. Yes,
59. General Russell. And on that police force you have your secret
investigators, a detective force as we know it?
Mr. Peteie. Yes, we have a detective force.
60. General Russell. Just how large is your detective force ?
Mr. Petrie. Oh, it is not very large. I don't recall now. 15 or 16
men, maybe.
61. General Russell. Did they at any time prior to December 7th
direct their attention toward observing these people of 12718]
foreign origin ?
Mr. Petrie. I think they worked with the F. B. I. on that. They
were working together on that. I know they took one of our principal
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1415
officers up there who was within the detective department. He went
in and was assigned to the F. B. I.
62. General Russell. If I interpreted your answer a minute ago
correctly, you left the question of the regulation of the Japanese, in
relation to the American government, to the federal agents, the F. B. I.,
principally, is that correct?
Mr. Petkie, I did not get you, General.
63. General Russell. You left the regulation or the investigation
of these people of foreign origin to the F. B. I. ?
Mr. Petrie. Yes. It was handled all practically by the F. B. I.
64. General Russell. I am interested to know whether or not these
people of Japanese origin who are now American citizens participate
m your elections?
Mr. Petrie. They do, yes. Some of them are running for office.
Some of them are elected. At that time, I think, in 1940, I guess it
was, one was elected to the Senate of the Island of Hawaii.
65. General Russell. Do they vote together? Do you consider
them a Japanese bloc as a political entity ?
Mr. Petrie. That is hard to say. It is hard to prove anything like
that. It has often been suspicioned, but it is awful hard to prove.
When you start to analyze it you just get down
06. General Frank. Are there candidates from the Japanese
[27 W] bloc in both political parties?
Mr. Petrie. Yes.
67. General Russell. In other words, the Japs out here split up,
too?
Mr. Petrie. Oh, yes ; they were not all together, the Japanese. They
divided up. There was a Japanese member of the House of Repre-
sentatives and there were some Japanese county officers on the other
islands. I think the majority of the council on Kauai were Japanese,
3 out of 5, if I remember correctly.
68. General Grunert. I have one or two more questions.
Mr. Petrie. That possibly may be due to complacency, on account
of not getting in politics.
69. General Russell. Have you got Democrats and Republicans
out here ?
Mr. Petrie. That is all, Democrats and Republicans.
70. General Russell. Are there some democratic Japanese and some
republican Japanese?
Mr. Petrie. That is right. Oh, yes, they are like you have them
on the mainland, in California. It is nothing new down here. There
are quite a few of them up north, northwest.
71. General Grunert. Do you know a Mr. Raymond Coll?
Mr. Petrie. I do.
72. General Grunert. Is he still editor of a paper here?
Mr. Petrie. Yes.
73. General Grunert. I have information here that a Hawaiian
newspaper editor is quoted by a Washington newspaper, shortly after
the submission of the Roberts report on January 24th, 1942, in sub-
stance; that General Short and Admiral Kimmel had [2720']
made clear through their utterances before December 7th, 1941, of the
probability and imminence of a Japanese attack at an early date.
Do you recall any utterance of theirs to that effect?
1416 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Petrie. I do not specifically recall it.
74. General Grunert. Suppose there had been an all-out alert in-
stead of a sabotage alert; would that have made a difference as far
as the population of Honolulu was concerned? You understand that
General Short ordered a sabotage alert?
Mr. Petrie. Yes; I understand.
75. General Grunert. You understand that there are various forms
of alert?
Mr. Petrie. A general alert and a sabotage alert. The sabotage
alert was practically an invasion, I would say. Is that what you
mean ?
76. General Grunert. No; a sabotage alert is just against sabotage
or subversive efforts.
Mr. Petrie. I don't think we had any of that here at all, a sabotage
alert.
77. General Grunert. Suppose you had had an all-out alert in
which they had been prepared to meet any attack, would that have
alarmed your populace, if they had taken such measures, do you know ?
Mr. Petrie. If the Japs had gone that far ?
78. General Grunert. No. I mean if the Army had gone all out
to meet an attack, would that of itself have alarmed the population
here ?
Mr. Petrie. I doubt it very much. You mean to any subversive
activities?
[27£1] 79. General Grunert. Yes.
Mr. Petrie. Particularly with reference to the Japanese?
80. General Grunert. To alarm them.
Mr. Petrie. I doubt it.
81. General Grunert. You don't think if the Army had taken
that alert
Mr. Petrie. I don't think they would have blocked together, no.
82. General Grunert. I want to make sure you understa^jid what
I mean. If the Army had prepared itself and had actually gone into
all these position to withstand an attack, would the act of their going
into a position and so preparing themselves prior to the war have
alarmed the population ?
Mr. Petrie. It might possibly to a certain extent have put the
public upon a general alert itself.
83. General Grunert. But what reaction would such an alarm
have had ? What could they do, if anything ?
Mr. Petrie. I don't think they could have done anything, because
the public itself was really in a position — the armed services were
here and they, were leaving anything of that nature to the armed
services.
84. General Grunert. Any other questions? There appear to be
no questions, unless you can think of anything else you would like to
tell the Board. Otherwise, we thank you very much for coming. ^
Mr. Petrie. I don't know. I would like to give you whatever in-
formation I can.
85. General Grunert. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1417
[£72£] TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL B. H. WELLS, UNITED
STATES ARMY, RETIRED, 4551 KAHALA AVENUE, HONOLULU,
T. H.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board j^our
full name, rank and address.
General Wells. My name is Bryant H. Wells. I am Major Gen-
oral, United States Army, Retired. I live at 4551 Kahala Avenue,
Honolulu.
2. General Grunert. General, this Board was appointed to ascer-
tain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese
armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on the Tth of December,
1941, and, in addition thereto, to consider the phases which related
to the Pearl Harbor disaster of the report of the House Military
Affairs Committee which is largely concerned with construction mat-
ters. Now we are after facts or leads to where facts can be found.
General Short furnished the Board a list of representative citizens
living in Hawaii who, he says, may have information of value to the
Board. Your name being on that list, we have asked you here with
the hope that you may have facts to present to us. General Short did
not refer to any particular subject on which you might testify, so it
is up to you to open up the subject, which may then give us a lead to
questions by which to develop it. He selected you as one of the rep-
resentative citizens of Hawaii. What is your business among the
citizens of Hawaii that you should be selected as a representative
citizen? We know 3'ou are a representative of the Army, but we ask
this of you as a representative citizen over here.
[2723] General Wells. From the date that I retired from the
Army, which was in January, 1935, I was employed by the Hawaiian
Sugar Planters Association as secretary and treasurer of that organ-
ization, until, I have forgotten just when, but after a few years I was
made the executive vice president and secretary of the Hawaiian Sugar
Planters Association, which position I held up to June 30th of this
year, when I retired from that. During that time I participated in the
affairs of the community. For 9 ^^ears I was a director of the Cliamber
of Commerce of Honolulu, and I have been identified with the Red
Cross and Boy Scouts and Cliiua Relief and various things of that kind
of a public nature.
3. General Grunert. What do you think that Short thought you
knew that might be of advantage to the Board in the mission, as I
have stated, of the Board ? Does any particular thing occur to you ?
Or just a knowledge of general conditions and so forth?
General Wells. I am kind of sorry I have to answer that question,
for this reason : I think that General Short put my name down because,
after he had left, a certain prominent citizen in the city here brought to
me a letter which he proposed to send, I think, to the Secretary of War,
in which it asked for leniency in dealing with General Short. He
asked me to sign it. I read it over. I told this gentleman that the first
part of the letter I agreed with entirely, and that was that General
1418 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Short from the time he got here until the disaster overwhelmed him had
entered into the spirit of the community, had cooperated wonderfully
with them and shown a broad vision of conditions here and had become
quite popular in the community, and people had a good deal of
confidence in him.
[2724] The last part of the letter, I don't remember just what it
said, but it was rather effusive. It didn't make so very much difference,
but I told this gentleman I didn't want to sign it. It was on the second
page. I said that I liked General Short, that "I think General Short
has got a lot of ability ; I think his relief from here is all that could be
expected ; he could not continue here after what has happened, and I
hope he will be given some job elsewhere where he will have training,
but I think you put down here a lot of things or are giving him credit
for having done a lot of things that he did not do. Not that it makes
so much difference, but I don't want to sign it."
He said, "Oh, do you think so?" And he asked me to explain. And
I did, and he said, "I guess that is right." He said, "I will change it.
It is all right if I change the last sheet, is it?" I said, "Yes, I will sign
the first sheet", which was to the effect of what I said.
I learned afterward that he did not make any change in the letter
at all, so my signature stands on that letter, and a copy of it was sent
to General Short, and General Short wrote me a letter and thanked
me for it.
Now, I like to be perfectly clear with the Board here on that. I meant
what I said, that I was willing to sign it. I don't know why this
gentleman did what he did. The reason I found it out is because later
he brought one for me to sign in the case of Admiral Kimmel, which
1 told him I would not sign, and I upbraided him for having sent the
other one in without having corrected it as he promised to do.
That is all I know.
4. General Grunert. In your position did you keep up your
[2725] connections with Army matters in any way, or are you
in. position to testify as to the measures taken or the improvement in
conditions as far as the military defense is concerned?
General Wells. No ; I would not be an expert witness on that. You
mean, during his incumbency ?
5. General Grunert. Yes.
General Wells. All I can say is that things were rather lively from
the time he got here. There had been a good many changes in the
defense system of the island. For instance, as early as 1939, as I
recall it, in the fall of 1939, Admiral Adolphus Andrews came down
here with a Scouting Fleet; I think they called it the Hawaiian De
tachment of the fleet or some such thing as that; which was a lot
of ships and a lot of officers and men. And shortly after that the
rest of the fleet came down under command of Admiral Richardson,
who was then the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet.
6. General Grunert. Would you know that letter you referred to if
3^ou saw it ?
General Wells. I think I would, yes.
7. General Grunert. Is Frank E. Midkiff the fellow who composed
the letter?
General Wells. That is him. A very nice fellow, by the way, and
very enthusiastic about the Army and Navy, and has been president
of the Chamber of Commerce and always likes to help people.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1419
8. General Grunert. I show you this letter, which is in the record,
in the testimony of General Short at pages 338 and 339, and see if you
recognize that letter.
General Wells. It would take me a little while to read \27^6~\
this. My eyesight is not particularly good.
9. General Grunert. We can read it to you if you wish.
General Wells. If j^ou could have the Recorder read it to me I
would be very happy and it would save your time.
10. Colonel West. The letter is dated in Honolulu, December 22,
1941, and is addressed to The President, The White House, Wash-
ington, D. C.
Sm: We, the undersigned representing substantial business and social organ-
izations in Hawaii, and having had for many years in many ways a vital interest
in the armed forces stationed in Hawaii, do hereby wish to express our sincere
appreciation of the services rendered to this territory and to our Nation by
Lieutenant Genei-al Walter C. Short.
We have found him, at all times to be most cooperative and furthermore he
has exercised a vigorous leadership in causing this community to prepare for
an emergency such as exists at present. Almost a year ago he laid out a plan
for this purpose and has taken all steps practicable toward carrying out such
a plan.
General Short's thorough foresight and his forceful presentation of his ideas
to our Territorial Legislature, to our local oflBcials, and to our community in
general have been very largely responsible for (a) the enactment of a sound
"M-Day" Bill ;—
General Wells. I don't know about that; I doubt if I had very
much to do with the passage of the M-Day Bill, but that is the letter,
if that is the question you ask. You are beginning \2727'] now
to get into the things I would not subscribe to. Up to that point I
was willing to.
11. General Grunert. Let us branch off to a few other subjects on
which you may have some knowledge and may be able to give us some
light. During your service here you have got to know these people
pretty well, haven't you ?
General Wells. Yes, some of them.
12. General Grunert. How about the Japanese element? You em-
ployed a lot of them in the sugar business, didn't you ?
General Wells. Yes.
13. General Grunert. What is your opinion? Are they a dan-
gerous element to the safety of this outpost here, or not?
General Wells. They are not.
14. General Grunert. They are not ?
General Wells. In my opinion.
15. General Grunert. This is your opinion ?
General Wells. That has been demonstrated.
16. General Grunert. Do you know of any evidence of sabotage
that occurred since you have been here to show their inclination ?
General Wells. On the contrary, I have made inquiries into quite
a number of cases where sabotage was alleged to have been committed,
and in every case when followed down it proved to be a false alarm.
17. General Grunert. Do you know that General Short decided
on November 27th to take up an alert called a sabotage alert and de-
cided not at that time to take up any more protective alert, and one
of the reasons given for that is that he did not want to alarm the
public. Now, had they gone to an all-out alert, gone \^728~\ on
1420 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
into position, ready for anything, air attack, surface attack, or what-
not, do you know what reflection it would have had on the public or
how it might have disturbed the public ?
General Wells. I don't think it would have disturbed the public
in any way adversely. I think there might have been some people
in the public that were so much interested in it they would have liked
to have gone out and seen what was happening. But the people of
this island have seen alerts and have seen the command turned out
to their war positions so many times that it is an old story. There
would have been no excitement, in my opinion, had he gone to the
war positions.
18. General Grunert. Would there have been any protest on the
part of business interests or others because of possible disturbance of
crops or their taking places in sugar fields, and so forth, that would
have deterred anyone from taking that alert unless he had to ?
General Wells. I think not.
19. General Grunert. Taking the people in the sugar interests,
would there have been a protest from the sugar people, if he had taken
an all-out alert, because of disturbance to their labor, to their fields,
to their cane and so forth ?
1^729] General Wells. The best answer I can give to that is
to make it a little lenglhy.rather than just yes or no.
At the time I came here in 1930, before I came here, while still in
Washington, I had heard — I was in the War Plans Division there — that
it was difficult to train on this island because of the high development
of agriculture and the few places where troops might maneuver off the
reservations, and of the reluctance of the people who owned property
to let the Army have access to their property for that purpose.
I found it just the reverse. From somewhat close to thirty years of
experience before that in many places on the mainland those conditions
did exist. We had to keep on the road. If we went into fields or any-
thing of the kind or into roads across fields we usually had to get not
only the owner's permission but had to pay for it and frequently it
was denied us. I found it j'ust the reverse here. I never had any
trouble, in the four years that I was in command, of getting permission.
You had, of course, to ask. Only decency would indicate that you
should ask permission and not just move onto people's property.
Of course, that doesn't mean that we could take trucks or wagons or
horses or men through cultivated fields. We didn't need to. We had
property of our own that we could maneuver on in rather a large way,
and over in the Waianae pocket where there is very little cultivation
there is land for that kind of work. But to cross fields, to go through
their roads, to go through their valleys and over their hills, and so
forth, to camp on their ground, to use their water, and all of those
things, we had no difficulty whatsoever in getting permission to do it,
and I never paid a cent for it. That is my [2730] recollection.
If there was any money ever paid for any camp ground or for water
or for firewood or anything like that, why, I never knew about it.
Now, coming to the answer now, in building a plan for the defense
of the Island, where you had to use land of that kind, it was necessary,
of course, to get permission of the owners or managers of various plan-
tations. In my plan of defense of the Island I sent my G-3 all around
the Island. We did a great deal of hiking ourselves, so we knew people
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1421
personally, and we had permission — we would show them what part
of their lands might be used in case of an emergency, and we asked
if we might include it in our defense plan and if, when we wanted to
have practice or maneuvers, would it be all right for us, just by notify-
ing them that we were going to pull off a maneuver, to go into those
places without further ado. We never had any trouble of getting
permission.
Now, during the time that you mentioned I have no doubt that the
plan — whatever it was or whatever changes were made in it, since I had
fooled with it, it had several Department Commanders since that time.
What General Short had done to it I don't know in detail. I have no
doubt that he had procured authority to include certain lands that
might be needed, that they had been surveyed, and that he had received
permission, and that it wouldn't have been anything unusual at all for
the troops of his command to have gone to those places whenever he
wanted to sound an alert for them to go. As a matter of fact, they did
it time and time and time again.
20. General Grunert. Then, I gather from what you have told us
that, as far as you know, there was no influence out here \2731'\
which might have caused the Commanding General to take some action
that he didn't think was adequate for the occasion : in other words, that
he took a sabotage alert and not a more protective alert, that was of his
own volition and not influenced bv the criticism and the influence of
the prominent property owners ? Is that generally the idea ?
General Wells. I feel very sure that it was not through any in-
fluence of a civilian character.
21. General Grunert. That was just one of the things we are
looking into.
General Wells. Well, I want to say this : that, in answer to your
question, I've heard — don't know how true it is, but it was published.
It has been published ; I can't say where now. You probably would
know. I think it is in the Roberts report that was published, or that
part of it, that a message was sent from the War Department to
General Short telling him that he should expect sabotage, asking him
not to commit any overt act, and to report what action he had taken.
Well, I have always thought that naturally, when General Short
got those instructions from the War Department that he should
expect sabotage, maybe not having been here long enough to know
the situation and to cast out of his mind the fear that there would
be any, and fearful that if he didn't take steps against sabotage that
he might bring criticism upon himself, that that was the reason that
he sounded what was afterwards known as Alert No. 1. But that
is only my opinion. That, I thought, was an error on his part because
he was taking steps against his friends, when the danger was outside.
22. General Grunert. Do you know anything about whether there
\2732'] was any friction between the Army and the Navy in the
line of cooperative action ?
General Wells. At that time, you mean ?
23. General Grunert. Just prior to December 7th or at that time.
General Wells. No, I don't know of any. I have heard it stated,
seen it in papers, and so forth, that Admiral Kimmel and General
Short didn't speak to each other. I don't believe a word of it. In
fact, I have seen them together, been with them together. How ex-
1422 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tensively they cooperated by going to see each other when these
messages began to come in, of course, I don't know anything about
it, but I know that they were friendly or, if they were not, they made
a pretty good bluff at it, because I have seen them together many times
and they seemed to be cordial.
24. General Frank. How many alien Japanese in the Territory ?
General Wells. Oh, I don't know. I think about 20,000, but that
is just a guess. You can get those figures accurately. That would
be the best way to get them, instead of taking them from me.
25. General Frank. I am just after a representative bloc. That
is as far as I want.
Is there any question about the loyalty of the alien Japs?
General Wells. Well, General Frank, I want to say, from the time
I came here — and I came here with a view which I got by reading
papers, in the War Department, in talking to people who had served
over here, in which they had conceived at one time that they would
put all of the Japanese here in a stockade or send them to another
island because if they had any trouble [2733] here they were
all treacherous and they would pounce down upon us and sabotage,
and so forth. Naturally, there wasn't any question that was more
important to a commanding officer, so that during my four years I
made a particular study of that for the purpose of deciding what was
the truth of the matter, if I could get at it.
I came to the conclusion that there had been a lot written and a lot
said for which there was no foundation. I concluded that we didn't
know, and we never would know until the emergency came, just what
the situation was. But there was nothing in the conduct of these
people here in their daily lives and their conduct as citizens that justi-
fied me in believing that they were any different from any other hy-
phenated Americans, so far as those that were citizens, or that the
aliens were any different from a lot that we were familiar with in
other parts of the United States. As a matter of fact, they were law-
abiding and quiet and industrious and provident and thrifty and
not quarrelsome.
It is true they are not very pretty to look at. I wasn't struck with
that. They are rather secretive, they are gregarious, and so on. But
I figured that the great majority of them, aliens and citizens, would be
loyal. There would be skunks, the same as there are in many other
sections, that are hyphenated Americans, but there wasn't anything
that the great United States couldn't handle with respect to them, and
it would be a great deal easier to handle them and take care of them
by treating them and giving them the rights that the Bill of Eights
provides for citizens and that the proclamation of the President of
the United States in the last war guaranteed to aliens.
[2734-] As early as 1932 they had an organization here — well,
earlier than that — they had an organization known as the New Amer-
icans, which were gitten together by a very prominent Japanese here
named Okamura, who was a Christian minister. He cannot become
a citizen, for reasons that I don't need to go into, although he would
like very much to, but he has a home down there, and he brings in a
lot of these boys, young fellows from all over the Islands, every year,
or did up to the time of the blitz, to the number of about 75 or 100, in
between there somewhere, representatives from the various Islands,
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1423
that he calls the conference of the New Americans, which lasts for a
week, and he has prominent citizens talk to these boys about Ameri-
canism and things of that kind. He always has a theme in advance.
I think it was in '32 that I — I talked to him several years, but in '32
1 brought up this question, my point of view. Admiral Stirling
brought it up from the Navy point of view, and I told him that they
were suspected, the thing that they already knew, but so far as I was
concerned I believed that they were conducting themselves with pro-
priety, and that I regarded them, in the plan of defense of this Island
that I was building, as an asset.
I am glad you asked the question, because I have banked my repu- .
tation more or less. I have been one of the people who has shown
faith and confidence in them, and I did that because of my regard for
the Constitution of the United States. I didn't bring these people
here, I wasn't responsible for it, but they are here, and they were here
properly under the laws of the United States and under the Constitu-
tion, and they were entitled [27S6] to whatever protection it
fell within my jurisdiction to give them.
I say I am glad I did it because subsequent events that have happened
since that time has convinced me, if it doesn't anybody else, but I can't
see how anyone can — now the time has come, and I said at that time,
"We can't tell now, but when the emergency comes we can tell in a very
few weeks. We will know where you stand." And now it has been
more than a couple of years, and aside from remarkably few who have
been taken under our wing — and they are only suspected ; it isn't be-
cause of anything they did particularly, the great majority of them —
the rest of them have performed as well as or equally as well as a lot of
our own, you might say, our own Caucasian people.
26. General Frank. About how many Japs did the Hawaiian sugar
planters employ totally?
General Wells. The last time I looked at the list I think it was about
12,000.
27. General Frank. I would like to ask you a question about the
status of Japs in Hawaii as considered by the Japanese government.
They consider all persons of Japanese ancestry as citizens of Japan, do
they not ?
General Wells. I think that they did for a while. Most all nations
do that, consider the children of subjects or citizens to be citizens of
their country. I think we fought the War of 1812 on that question
somewhat, as far as Great Britain was concerned, and they claimed the
right to take our citizens off our ships. And that is one of the features.
But Japan, I think, if my recollection is correct, is about the only nation
I know of that has made provision
[3736] 28. General Frank. That is what I am getting to.
General Wells. — have made provision for those who want to give
up or to alienate themselves from that tie ; they have provided a way
for doing it.
29. General Frank. Yes.
General Wells. And I don't know of any other nation that has,
although I am not an expert on that.
30. General Frank. Do you know who is an expert? "WTiat I am
after is to have that explained a little bit. What do they call this legal
process by which these Japanese renounce their allegiance to Japan ?
1424 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Wells. You mean those that they call dual citizens?
31. General Frank. Yes.
General Wells. Now let me see if I get that correctly. Up to a cer-
tain time, which I think was about 1925, a child born here — of course,
any of them born here from any time are regarded by our government
as citizens of the United States. Now, up to this year, which I think
was 1925, the Japanese people regarded them as subjects of Japan ; and
then, on account of various questions concerning Japanese here and in
California, and so on, they issued a decree or passed a law, or whatever
it is they do over there, that any child born here whose parents wanted
him or her to retain Japanese citizenship had to register that child three
weeks after it was born with the Japanese consul here; and if they
didn't so register the child, that Japan would lay no claim to it.
With respect to those that were born before '35 and who were Amer-
ican citizens, and they were then dual citizens and wanted to release
themselves from that dual status, they provided [2737] a man-
ner of doing it, which, as I recall it, was quite complicated, but it
meant you went up to the Japanese consul here and you filed an
application, and he did something with it and sent it on to the prefect
or district or the home of the parents of this party in Japan, and
then there was some rigmarole there, and then he came back, and
usually maybe it will be approved, but oftentimes — and I have talked
to some of these young fellows as to why they didn't do it. Thely
said it took so long to go through it that they didn't want to bother
to do it. They had always regarded themselves as American citizens ;
they had been told that they were, having been born here ; and why
should they go to the trouble and expense? It costs them a little. I
think that $3 was the fee for it, but there was a manner in which they
could divest themselves of the dual citizenship.
32. General Frank. From your point of view, then, you never con-
sidered this dual-citizenship group a liability to the United States?
General Wells. Well, General, I have always considered it just the
same as the millions of citizens that live on the mainland right now
that are in that same status. I have made talks before these people
and told them that, but I have also said that, "You are in a little dif-
ferent status here because you are under suspicion, and I advise you
to do away with your dual citizenship." I have done that time and
time again. I always had an idea that they should do that if they
could. I have sent quite a number of them, individuals that I happen
to know who have asked me what to do and how to do it, up to the
Japanese consul to get it done.
[2738] 33. General Frank. Was there any differential in pay
between Americans and Japanese doing the same work in the cane
industry ?
General Wells. Not doing the same work.
34. General Frank. How did prices paid the Japs in Hawaii com-
pare with prices paid in Louisiana, for instance ?
General Wells. You mean on the sugar plantations?
35. General Frank. Yes.
General Wells. Well, in recent years, since 1934 when they passed
the sugar legislation, things have changed so that I can't tell that
exactly, but our wages here have always been higher and are higher
now, very much higher now, but those wages since
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1425
36. General Fraxk. Higher than what?
General Wells. Higher than they are paid in Louisiana.
37. General Fraxk. Oh.
General Wells. Higher in cash, and no comparison with respect to
the superiority of the perquisites that are furnished the men here
as compared with those they have down there.
38. General Grunert. Have you any questions?
39. General Kussell. General, your discussion of the Japanese on
the islands has suirjiested a question or two to me.
You were more or less familiar with these people as they were em-
ployed on the sugar plantations and, I assume, the other agricultural
pursuits here on the islands?
General Wells. A little louder, please.
40. General Russell. I say, you were familiar with the Japanese
as they were employees on the sugar plantations and the other agri-
cultural pursuits on the islands ? You knew of them, saw them ?
[2739] General Wells. Yes. I knew them fairly well, yes.
You see, I wasn't the manager of any plantation. I was connected
with the association which is an association of plantations. But I
visited the plantations. Reports came to our office. I have talked to
managers, and I am fairly well familiar with the Japanese on the
plantations and how they work.
41. General Russell. And in your experience did you have reports
about the activities of the Japanese consular agents?
General Wells. Well, from the time when I was in command I
always considered that the consul was some fellow whom we had to
keep track of and watch.
42. General Russell. No. The information which we have of
Japanese activities is to the eifect that in the islands just prior to De-
cember 7th, 41, there were 219 agents of the Japanese consul here,
that ihej circulated among the Japanese populations on these farms,
and their mission seemed to be to keep the relationship between the
Japanese on the island and the homeland established, work out this
principal of dual citizenship, and so forth ; and the question I am ask-
ing is as to whether or not you in your connection with the sugar
growers got any reports of these activities.
General Wells. No. I did while I was Commanding General. My
G-2 told me about them. We didn't pay much attention to them. I
always considered that they were, I thought — in fact, I thought I
knew, and I believe now, that one of the duties of the Japanese consul
here, that are laid down to him by his own government, was to keep
track of the Japanese here in the best way he could, and I think that
he — usually a new one would come here most — after being here a little
while and getting himself located in his house and office and joining
the Chamber of Commerce and meeting a few people and trying to
ingratiate himself that way, he would go and make a trip around the
islands, I suppose to make contacts with the prominent Japanese on
the [2740] various islands.
43. General Russell. But in all of your connections here — I am not
talking about the Japanese consul ; I am talking about these 219 people
who were working out from his office.
General Wells. Yes.
1426 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
44. General Kussell. In all of your contacts with your association
you never heard any report at all on their activities among the people
on the plantations, the Japanese people ?
General Wells. I am saying that when I was in command my G-2
told me that there were people on the islands at that time who were
reporting to the consul. Just what the nature of those reports was
we never could find out exactly. I didn't consider it very serious, but
from the time I have been associated with the Hawaiian Sugar
Planters' Association I don't recall a single instance where I ever
heard or the managers ever told me that they were a menace or that
they were doing anything contrary to what they ought to do. In
that connection — and it might be in that connection — when the F. B. I.
came down here, quit a time before the blitz, the officer in charge there,
Mr. Shivers, came over to see me. He said a large part of the Japa-
nese were around on our plantations, and he thought it would be help-
ful to him in getting a line on things if I could give him some informa-
tion about the reliability of those Japanese aliens and citizens who were
on plantations. And I said, "Well, it is a kind of a ticklish thing,
maybe. Only the reason I think about it is that I hate to be suspecting
these people all the time, but," I said, "if you want it I'll do anything
you want me to. I'll send out to the managers and ask them to send
in lists of the names of every Japanese that is [^74-1] working
on the plantation, and also to state what in his opinion the character
of these men would be ; particularly, if he feels that there are some that
should not be trusted, to say so ; and, if he feels absolutely sure that
certain individuals can unquestionabily be trusted, to say that."
I did that. I got in the list. Some of the managers thought,
"Well, I don't know of anybody whom I have any reason to suspect."
I recall one plantation manager who put down three men, — he's on
a plantation that employed, as I recall it, something like 2,000 em-
ployees; they weren't all Japs — who stated that, of all the Japanese
he did have, that there were three men that he thought ought to be
watched, that he wouldn't trust them. On the contrary, he put down,
I don't remember how many, but more than that, of men that he would
trust with his own life. The rest of them he had no reason to suspect.
In general, I think that one plantation out of the 35, as I recall
it now, was the only one where a manager was willing to put his
name down on a list and say that he wouldn't trust anybody, and that
man had three fellows.
45. General Russell. That is all.
General Wells. Does that answer your question ?
46. General Russell. Yes. The only thing I wanted to know was
whether or not these consular agents made trouble for you, the people
out on the plantations.
General Wells. Yes.
47. General Russell. And you say no ?
General Wells. I know they didn't make any trouble on the plan-
tations. The only trouble we had, I think, on the [274^] plan-
tations in handling Japs that amounted to anything was, occasion-
ally,— of course, they had a strike here back a great many years ago.
But they had some questions sometimes over religion, as a rule. There
would be something. One sect like the Okinawas, which they have,
put up the money to build a church, and another group of Japanese
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1427
who didn't like the Okinawas and looked down upon them, and they
wanted a church. The manager said he was not going to have his
plantation all covered with churches ; they would have to get together.
So they got together. One sect put up a monument to one of its
reverend saints in front of it, and the other came and knocked it
down. Things like that you might have in the plantations, but that
is the only case I speak of.
48. General Grunert. General, suppose what would happen to the
sugar interests if the 12,000 Japanese now employed were withdrawn.
It would sort of upset things, wouldn't it ?
General Wells. It surely would put a — give them a headache. The
best answer to that is that we had here before things. started to hum
over here, which was a year and a half or two years before the blitz,
with these big contractors coming down and the Army and Navy
having so much money to spend, what they called the Pacific Naval
Air Base Contractors. There were five of them, with Walter Dilling-
ham here associated with them, and then afterwards what they called
the Hawaiian Constructors, which were some people who came down,
too. We lost between then and now, on the plantations, as far as I
can recall it, something in the neighborhood of 15,000 men, Filipinos
and others, all told. They went because they got better pay, and they
went because there was no one else to go. They were [274^]
practically shanghaied in many places. But anyhow, it was un-
reasonable that either the sugar or pineapple could pay the wages that
the government paid; and particularly, when the government put a
ceiling price on the sugar we couldn't change the price of sugar. We
couldn't increase the amount we got for it. So we had to get along,
at the same time the government sent out requests that sugar was
absolutely essential to the prosecution of the war, in the manufacture
of industrial alcohol, wanted us to — they took off the ban that they
had had on there with respect to the quota that we could have and
asked us to produce our maximum. At the same time we were losing
all these men.
Well, we have done remarkably well by going to mechanism very
largely, in introducing grab harvesting as distinguished from hand
harvesting, and many other of the operations in cultivation, harvest-
ing, and milling the cane are now done in more economical ways.
Those ways, of course, have produced headaches in another way and
require more machinery when again we are handicapped by having
to get priorities for the machinery that we needed, which has not
been easy to do. In fact, new machinery we were prohibited from
having. We have had to buy second-hand at enormous prices, but
we have gotten along.
Now, you ask, if you took 12,000 more away from us. I don't know
what would happen. All I can say is that this industry has survived
in spite of hell and high water, through the industry and activity of
the people who run it, but I think many of the plantations would go
flat if you took those men away.
49. General Grunert. Is there anything else you think of that
[2744] might be of value to the Board in its mission, that has not
been brought up ?
General Wells. No, I don't think so. I doubt if what I have said
will be of much value to you.
79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 2 41
1428 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
50. General Grunert. You would be surprised at the many leads
we get and the many opinions we get which dovetail at times.
General Wells. Yes.
51. General Grunert. All right. Thank you very much for com-
ing up.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
General Grunert. We shall tnke a five-minute recess.
(There was a brief, informal recess.)
[2P5] TESTIMONY OF WALTER FRANCIS DILLINGHAM, CAR-
NATION AVENUE, HONOLULU, T. H.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Mr. Dillingham, will you please state to the Board
your name and address ?
Mr. Dillingham. Walter Francis Dillingham, Carnation Avenue,
Honolulu.
2. Colonel West. Wliat is your occupation?
Mr. Dillingham. I am president of the Oahu Eailway and Land
Company.
3. General Grunert. Mr. Dillingham, this Board was appointed
to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by the
Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on the 7th of
December, 1941, and. in addition thereto, to consider the phases which
related to the Pearl Harbor disaster of the report of the House Mili-
tary Affairs Committee, which are largely concerned with construc-
tion, that took place since 1941. Now, we are after facts or leads to
where such facts can be found. General Short has furnished the
Board a list of representative citizens living in Hawaii who, he says,
may have information of value to the Board. Your name being on
that list, we have asked you here, with the hope that you may have facts
that you can present to us. General Short did not refer to any particu-
lar subject on which you might testify, so it is up to you to open the
subject which may give us leads as to questions we may want to ask
you to develop that subject. That is rather a nebulous beginning, but
that is the situation. Your name was presented in a list of names that
General Short sent to the [27^6] Board, so we hope that you
have something in mind with which to lead us to other things about
which we may question you. Have you any such ?
Mr. Dillingham. I would not know where to start. General,
4. General Grunert. Have you any idea why General Short put
your name down, except as a prominent citizen who may have known
something about what he did over here ? That is the main lead I can
give you. You knew General Short, did you ?
Mr. Dillingham. I knew General Short practically the whole time
of his tour of duty here.
5. General Grunert. Did you know anything about his association
with the citizens or his knowledge of the people or anything along
that line that might give a lead?
Mr. Dillingham. Yes, sir. I became very well acquainted with
General Short through business dealings and also through social con-
tacts. I might say this : that it has been my privilege and somewhat
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1429
my duty, in connection with my business activities, to become ac-
quainted with all of the Commanding Generals who have been here
since the first armed forces came to Hawaii in 1898, 1 think it was, at
the time of the Spanish War. General Short was one of those with
whom I came in contact.
6. General Grunert. Do you know anything about his accomplish-
ments in attempting to better or perfect the defenses of the island?
Mr. Dillingham. From my observation — and I think I was in a
favored position to know what was going on in construction work,
because I have been active in construction work for many years — I
formed the opinion and stated it a good many times, that I considered
him one of the ablest Commanding Generals we have [2747]
had here. He was a driver; he wanted to see things done; he accom-
plished a great deal, a great deal, and was able to do that because he
was a very satisfactory man to do business with. I may say I did
not always agree with him, but that is possible. I have learned, in
business, to disagree with those one deals with.
During the time he was here he acquired or started to acquire lands
on the water front, and very successfully upset plans that I had had
in mind in connection w4th the development of the Honolulu harbor
extension, Kapalama Basin, by condemning some 70 to 75 acres across
the water front property. The matter was so serious that I took it
up with General Somervell in Washington.
7. General Grunert. And General Somervell at that time was
what?
Mr. Dillingham. This was before he was — I don't know just what
his particular activity was, but he had control over situations such
as was presented to me. He was interested in transportation, I think.
In any event, I was told to see him. I did see him. I explained that
in this over-all condemnation suit which was being instituted, they
were taking away all of the water front property that was vitally
necessary to the Hawaiian Dredging Company, of which I was the
organizer and president, that if all this water front property was
taken away from us our shops, repair shops, ways on which we build
scows and dredges, and so forth, would fold up, as this company had
developed all the harbors on the islands of the Territory that started
with opening Pearl Harbor in 1909, with dredging the original chan-
nel there, and a good many million dollars for the Army and for the
Territory. It would put us out of business [2748] unless we
had a home port. It did not seem to me necessary, nor to the interests
of the government as well as to us, if we were denied any place to work.
As a result of that conversation I thought and had reason to believe
that word was sent out here, because upon my return from that trip I
took up the question with General Short of rearranging the plans
which the Army had so as to give us a part of this frontage of several
thousand feet which we had on the water front.
8. General Grunert. What did he want it for, do you know ?
Mr. Dillingham. Yes, sir. It was for the development of ware-
houses in connection with terminal wharves which were to be built
to serve the Army Transport. I made trips over the ground with
him, and as a result of that it was decided that they could leave us
the 12 acres which we were using, but it would be necessary for the
1430 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Government to entirely surround us with lands needed for military
purposes.
That was not a happy situation to me, or to us, because we had no
right of way into our property except through the courtesy of the
Army, and easement to a right of way being a not very permanent
connection. However, that was the arrangement. The lands were
condemned. Steps were taken to condemn the property and we lost
possession of it, and work was started to fill the low areas and make
ready for the construction of warehouses.
In the plan for this development the railroad, which, as I have
stated, I was connected with, was interested, because some years ago
I arranged with the Territory to secure a right of way for a belt line
road right around this probable some-day harbor extension, Kapa-
lama, to have this railroad hook in with the warehouses and serve the
wharves and so forth. Discussions were held [2?49] with the
United States Engineers and others to perfect a working arrange-
ment on paper.
I have taken some time, very little time, to explain what took a
great many meetings and discussions, but a very considerable amount
of money was involved. You will appreciate that when you know
the limited area of water frontage in this harbor, and the taking away
of what we had definite plans for on locations which I bought, I think,
in 1913, took a long shot ahead, looking for a final permanent location
for a home base for our dredging enterprise.
All that came out of those discussions and plans was that a small
area, much smaller than we required and planned for was left to us,
and it is occupied and operated by us today.
9. General Grunert. You might call that a handicap to his desire
for a full plan. Do you know of any other handicaps under which
he may have suffered in attempting to build up a 100 percent defense?
Mr. Dillingham. If I gave you the impression that it was a handi-
cap, I think I have not stated the position correctly. General. It was
a rearrangement which, as it turned out, was directly in the interests
of both the Army and the Navy, for we have built scows, we have
repaired equipment, we have been continuously at work 24 hours a clay
on that piece of property in connection with the war effort.
10. General Grunert. Still you considered him a very satisfactory
man to deal with?
Mr. Dn.LiNGHAM. Yes; I think he is a clean-cut, straight-forward,
hard-hitting man to get what he wants, and I am inclined to believe
that if some word had not come from Washington [2750'] to
emphasize the importance of our place in the picture he would have
grabbed it all off. As it turned out, had that taken place, it would
have been a serious handicap to the defense operations of both the
Army and the Navy, for we have built a very great many barges and
scows and dredges and whatnot that have been actively used in this
effort.
11. General Grunert. As it turned out?
Mr. Dillingham. Yes.
12. General Grunert. Suppose that Washington had not inter-
fered, would you still have considered him a very satisfactory man to
deal with?
Mr. Dillingham. I considered him very satisfactory, if you like,
in driving home what he wants.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1431
13. General Grunert. With what construction company were you
associated ? Any particular firm ?
Mr. Dillingham. With the Hawaiian Dredging Company.
14. General Grunert. Did that company have any construction con-
tracts for the government ?
Mr. Dillingham. We have done construction work, dredging work,
wharf building, dry-dock building, and so on, for the Navy; we have
done dredging work for the U. S. Engineers, so that we have practi-
cally been continuously employed for 35 or 40 years in government
work.
15. General Grunert. As to your dealings with the Army Engi-
neers, who was the District Engineer with whom you did business,
do you recall ?
Mr. Dillingham, Oh, yes ; I have done business with a good many.
The last one I did business with was Colonel Wyman.
16. General Grunert. Wyman or Lyman ?
[2751] Mr. Dillingham. Both. Lyman followed Wyman. I
have done business with Albert Lyman. Albert Lyman was the last
engineer that I had any considerable amount to do with, and he fol-
lowed Colonel Wyman.
17. General Grunert. Since we are on that subject and before I
open any new ones, I think I will ask General Frank and Major Clau-
sen to develop a certain specialty that they have assumed in this in-
vestigation, while we are on this subject. You go ahead with that
line, and develop it. General.
18. General Frank. Did you have any interest in any contracting
company or construction company that was associated with the Ha-
waiian Constructors?
Mr. Dillingham. Yes, sir. I organized in 1919 the Hawaiian Con-
tracting Company. The reason for organizing it was that I wanted
to give — this is important I think — some of my associates who had
gone along witli us in the dredging company an interest in construc-
tion work of a wider field than we had in the dredging business. So
this company was organized and the stock was offered to the young
men who had been associated with me in the dredging business. The
idea was, so there would be no competition between the two companies,
because they were closely affiliated, that the contracting company
would do the land work and the dredging company would do the
water front work. That made a line of cleavage so that if it were
wharves the dredging company handled it; if it were filling, recla-
mation, salvage work, dredging, any work of that character, the
dredging company handled it. If it were bridges, roads, buildings,
sewers, work of that character, the contracting company handled it.
I agreed with my principal associate in the dredging busi-
[27521 ness that we would take whatever stock the boys were not
able to take. So, as it turned out, while not getting the control, I
had a substantial interest, but had no interest, nor was I a director,
nor have I ever been, in the contracting company.
These companies were affiliated, used the same group of engineers,
occupied the same building, under two separate managements. As
to the contracting company, Colonel Wyman asked me, after he had
been here some time, and I met him, if I would be interested in coming
in and taking an interest in the Hawaiian Constructors. Is that the
name of it?
1432 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
19. General Frank. That is right.
Mr. Dillingham. I said no, I would not. He wanted to know why
not. And we had quite a talk. I said that all my time and all my
efforts were dedicated to the work which we had in hand, that I was
not interested in getting into anything more than what I had on hand.
20. General Grunert. About when was this, Mr. Dillingham, when
he approached you as to this?
Mr. Dillingham. I think I can tell you pretty close to it. That was,
I thinlv, perhaps in May or June of 1941, along in there some time.
Colonel Wyman explained to me that the Navy had put one over
on the Army in getting — I am repeating now ; I am not vouching for
facts — the Navy had put one over by giving my organization, my as-
sistants, property work which the Navy was doing, that he came down
here without any idea that there was any outfit, local outfit, that could
handle the work which was in sight for the engineers to do, and because
of my long residence in this place and connections which I had, to use
his exact words, [2753'\ "you can get anything that is necessary
to push your job along, and I have got this outfit I brought with me,
that have got to find their way around," and he said "I would like to
have your outfit come in and take a hand in this, so as to help push our
jobs along."
21. General Gunert. But this was after the contract had been
awarded to the Constructors and they were on the job?
Mr, Dillingham. Oh, yes, they had been here and they were doing
quite a lot of work. I don't know when they came here, but I know
it was about the middle of the year of 1941, because — and this may
interest you, — I turned it down flat, but I said this, "If at any time
there is anything you think I can do to help out in the situation, you
can call on me just as if I had the controlling interest in this contract
of yours. I don't want anything for it, but I do want to help wherever
I can. So if a situation arises where you think, as you seem to think,
that I could be helpful, just let me know what to do."
Well, along in October of that year, one Sunday noon. Colonel "Wy-
man and Colonel Weimer came down to this ranch that I have, where
I spend my week-ends. They arrived about noon and had a bit of
lunch and then he said : "General Short has sent me down here to tell
you we have got to have a 35-ton crane, and the only crane that is not
now being used in war work is the one that you have down in your
shops, the dredging shops."
I said, "Well, Colonel, you can't have it."
He said, "By God, we will buy it."
I said, "You can't have it. We are outfitting right at the moment
a dredge which has come from California and that they want to put to
work as soon as possible. Without that [2754] crane it is
impossible to lift the spuds or move any of the heavy pipe, and it will
tie us up so we will have to shut down. We cannot do it. We have
another one which has already gone and we can't allow this one to go."
^ We was a very persistent man and a very forceful man. He and I
did not always get along. But we locked horns on this one. He said
"Short says you must let us have it." I said "I can't help it ; you can't
have it." He said "Well, you telephone some of your outfit." I said
"I won't telephone. It won't do any good. The answer is no."
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1433
Well, he stuck to it for an hour and a lialf , or more, and then I said,
"I will see you tomorrow, Colonel. In the meantime I will try and
thinli up some way out of your fix here,"
So the next morning I took up the question of whether or not there
was a crane available, and to satisfy Colonel Wyman I took the shop
foreman up to the Colonel's office, and I said "Now, I tried to explain
to you how imi^ortant this crane is to us. Here is the shop foreman,
Manuel Costa. He will tell you what our situation is, and the answer
is no."
Then he said "This is so important that nothing is comparable in
importance to the getting of this crane. By God, you are going to let
me have it." I said, "No, I am not.' '
Suddenly it struck me and I turned to this man, and I said "Listen,
Manuel, what has become of that gantry crane that we had at Hilo
when we finished the Hilo breakwater?" He said 'T think it is up
there." So I took the telephone and called up the superintendent.
Am I making this too long for you gentlemen ?
22. General Grunert. Go ahead; it is very interesting.
\2756'] Mr. Dllingham. I called up the superintendent of the
Hilo Railroad and said "Where is that crane you used on the outer
end of that breakwater r' He said, "It is boxed up behind the round
house." I said, "Tear it down, so it can be inspected. It is a 30 to
35 ton crane, is it not?" He said, "Yes."
So I said, "Colonel, have you got a man that can go up and inspect
this rig?" He said, "Yes, I have, but," he said, "I haven't got any
money to pay for sending him to Hilo." I said, "All right, I will
pay for it, and you can pay me some time. I will send one of our
engineers, mechanical engineers with your man, and they can go up
tomorrow morning."
So I telephoned and arranged the transportation by air, and we then
discussed how we could get it -down, and Wyman said, ' T have got a
load going up on a scow that ought to be in Hilo tomorrow." I said,
"You hold that scow in Hilo until we can find out whether this crane
will answer the purpose or not." That was arranged.
Manuel Costa said everything was set to go. Then Wyman said,
"I am going to tell you what a jam I am in." I may say, until the
calendar ran against me, that I have for over 20 years been a reserve
officer in good standing and have discussed the defense plans for this
island with many commanding officers, and for several reasons, and
one was because of the part which the railroad here would play in
any attack that would be made upon the island.
He pulled down a chart and for the first time I learned where the
Japanese were. I was shown these islands to the south and southwest
of us and how they were placed there and how easily they could cut
our line of communications between [2756'] here and Australia.
He said, "The Ludington is loading in San Diego. I have got orders
to get equipment down to Canton to be used at Canton and/or Christ-
mas, unload the Ludington when she gets there. We have got to get
out of here in so many days with this equipment. I haven't a scow ;
I haven't a crane ; I haven't a towboat ; I haven't got a damned thing,
and I have got to get this equipment together and get it off down
there."
1434 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Well, Golly, I said to myself, if there is anything in God's world
I can do to help this situation, this is a situation that should take
priority over anything else. Word came back from Hilo that the
crane was worth moving, but the boiler was shot. I got it down here
and I put it in the shop. I had a battle royal with my son, the manager
of the dredging company, because he said, "You can't, you just can't
tie us up this way." I couldn't tell them why, but I said, "This has
got to have priority. I don't care if you shut down right now, but
we have got to have this thing ready to go. Take my word for it.
You will have to take my word for it." We got it ready a day ahead
of scheduled time and off, and it was down there to meet the Ludington.
We got the scow, we got the tow boat, strapped this crane in the center
so she could lift the stuff out and put it on one end and on the other
end and then go ashore and lift it off again, guns and very necessary
heavy equipment that had to be put ashore.
Subsequent events satisfied me that that was a contribution that was
of the very greatest value to the war effort, because we hadn't been set
up there. If the island was attacked or defended, we maintained the
line of communications for our planes through to Australia; and I
have said many times, I don't know [2757] of any job that was
more important to the war effort than what was put over by Colonel
Wyman.
I hold no brief for him, but I can tell you gentlemen that in over
50 years of business experience nobody I have ever known would have
put that over unless he had had the drive that Colonel Wyman had,
who wouldn't take no for an answer. He stuck to it until he solved
the problem, and I couldn't discourage him, and until the thing was
really put up in such shape that it had to be done, a way had to be
found to do it. I am glad to bear testimony to this, because I read
the papers.
23. General Frank. Did the Hawaiian Contracting Company
finally become a member of the Hawaiian Constructors?
Mr". Dillingham. Subsequently they were. They were taken in.
They were — I'll tell you. Let me tell you that story.
Colonel Wyman and Kohl called me to a meeting and tried to get
me associated in this group, and I said that I wouldn't be interested,
as I said before, and I wouldn't go along. So that was that.
Some days after that Mr. H. P. Benson, who was president of the
Hawaiian Contracting Company, asked me if I would go with him
to the engineer's office to discuss a proposition which they wanted to
make to get the Contracting Company in to help on this construction
work of the U. S. E. D. I agreed to go, and went. The Contracting
Company had the contract to build the two wharves in Kapalama, and
when the war came on they cancelled the contract ; and under a clause
of the contract, a recapture clause, they took all of the equipment, all
of our men except the office force and the management, and took them
over — Wyman did — into his group. He took the equipment, the men
[2758] served, and I don't know just how they were handled, but
we were left without any men, without any equipment, and we were
just the shell of a company with some money which they eventually
paid for some equipment.
24. General Frank. Are you conversant with the manner in which
that organization functioned over in the Hawaiian Constructors ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1435
Mr. Dillingham. No ; I know very little about the details of what
went on, but my advice to Benson was not to go in on it ; and at that
meeting which I started to tell you about, after ten or fifteen minutes
I got up and said, "Well, I am not running this company, and I
have no managerial interest in it, but any arrangement you make with
Mr. Benson is your affair", and I left. He came to me and said, "We
are flat. We have nothing to do unless we can go in there."
I said, "What I have heard, they need some assistance such as you
can give in straightening out some of the tangles and snarls which
result from driving ahead to grab materials and men and freeze this
and freeze that and freeze the other thing so as to have something to
work with." The result was, it had gotten awfully jammed up, and
there was a lot of howling about it from the business community
because they couldn't get their bills approved, and so forth and so on.
I said, "There is a big job for you, Percy, in there, but I wouldn't
touch it."
25. General Frank. You said that to Benson?
Mr. Dn.LiNGiiAM. Yes, I wouldn't touch it. It's an awful mess, I
think.
26. General Frank. Were you familiar at all with those matters?
Mr. Dillingham. Only by hearsay and the difficulties that
[^TSO] people were having in dealing with them. I wasn't con-
nected with any deal of that sort, and so I wasn't affected.
27. General Frank. Who were the people who were affected ? Can
you tell us that?
Mr. HiLLiNGHAM. Davies & Company. Theo. H. Davies & Com-
pany, I think the American Factors, Honolulu Iron Works, and a
great many smaller concerns.
28. General Frank. What were the reasons they needed help?
Mr. Dillingham. Well, I told Colonel Wyman one day, I said,
"Colonel, the trouble with your outfit is that you haven't set up an
organization big enough to do tlie tremendous job that is on you.
You need a top executive, chief -clerk type of man to run the office.
You need a man that's conversant with the pay and the checking up
of orders and bills and so on. You are trying to do it all yourself,
and there isn't any man living can handle the job the size that this
has suddenly developed into without having properly trained and
able men to handle the different jobs so that when it comes on your
desk you can put your O. K. on and it's on the way. You are trying
to do all that detail yourself, and no man can do that."
29. General Frank. Do you know of any delays in defense con-
struction because of that situation?
Mr. Dillingham. Oh, I couldn't. If I said I did, I would have to
tell you where and when, and I don't know.
30. General Frank. You said a moment ago, in talking to Mr.
Benson, for him to do what he wanted to, but you wouldn't touch it.
Why wouldn't you touch it ?
Mr. Dillingham. Well, I had about all that I could handle, and
]oolicy matters, and details connected with business that I [£760]
was trying to operate; and to take this on in addition was out of
the question, plus the fact that I knew they weren't set up as any
business of that magnitude would have to be set up to function per-
fectly. But it was war, and the jobs had to be done, and the drive
1436 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
was to do them. The hours of work that those men spent were just
beyond anything that I have ever known, because I have been called
9 — one call I got 10 o'clock one night from Colonel Wyman, a rumpus
about unloading some ship in the harbor. He drove these men, ac-
cording to Mr. Benson, up to 12 and 1 o'clock, and he would be down
in the morning at 5 or 6. He was a thief for work if ever a man
was, and he drove everybody with him that way.
31. General Frank. Are you sufficiently familiar with the details
to tell us whether or not when the Hawaiian Contracting organiza-
tion went in there, that they were allowed to use their organizational
and directive ability in the Hawaiian Constructors, or were they di-
rected by the Engineer Corps?
Mr. Dillingham, If T may make the suggestion, the man that can
tell you all of this and give you the detail and the straight of it is
Mr. Benson, and anything that I might say would be what I remember
of discussions or talks that I had with him; but he would have first-
hand information about all of that I am sure.
32. General Frank. That is what I want to get. Now, did you
ever meet this man Rohl?
Mr. Dillingham. Yes.
33. General Frank. Do you know anything about him?
Mr. Dillingham. Well, personally I didn't want him for a partner.
In that perhaps I do him a great injustice when I say [2761]
that, but I didn't like the cut of his jib, to be perfectly frank.
34. General Frank. Would you ever hire him ?
Mr. Dillingham. No, sir.
35. General Frank. Why?
Mr. Dillingham. I don't know why. I didn't like him.
36. General Frank. How many times, ever, did you see him?
Mr. Dillingham. I think only three times.
37. General Frank. Was he always sober?
Mr. Dillingham. I don't know.
38. General Frank. Did you have any suspicion?
Ml'. Dillingham. Yes.
30. General Frank. Now, how long did jou know Wyman ?
Mr. Dillingham. I think I met him fairly shortly after his tour
of duty started. I don't remember just when it was, but I didn't see
much of him until it came pretty close to the attack here, the months
before that, I think, four or five or six months prior to that when I
first had discussions with him. I think that's right.
40. General Frank. If Wyman were available would you hire him ?
Mr. Dillingham. Yes, for certain type of jobs I would consider
him a very valuable man.
41 . General Frank. Are there any qualifications on that ?
Mr. Dillingham. Yes.
42. General Frank. Will you state them ?
Mr. Dillingham. I would want to follow along with him. It's a
very hard question to answer, but he was such a driver that he was
not one that would get along with men in civilian life. In all prob-
ability, in civilian activities he would have [2762] trouble with
his organization because of his domineering, driving character. But
if there was a tough job somewhere to be done, and regardless of
everything else it just had to be done, I would feel that in his hands it
would be accomplished somehow.
I
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1437
43. General Frank. Do you know wliether or not he had an}- habits
that affected his dependability?
Mr, Dillingham. I never saw him, in any meeting I ever had with
him, when I thought he wasn't alert, on the job. I had practically
no social contacts with him. I think he only was in our house once,
and that was for a very short time when he came to inquire- about
something.
44. General Frank. Would you say he was a man who called for
close supervision ?
Mr. Dillingham. Well, in what connection. General? "Close
supervision?" Close supervision implies a check on his integrity or
honesty, or so on.
45. General Frank. Well, I am talking about his work. If you
had been Division Engineer in San Francisco and responsible for
him as District Engineer in Hawaii, what degree of supervision would
you have felt were necessary ? That is in the light of statements you
have just finished.
Mr. Dillingham. Well, if it was a rush job that had to be done I
would turn him loose on it. If it was a job that was a developing
plan, and so on, I would want someone of entirely different nature,
training, and ability to go over his setup and see how in balance he
had his work planned out.
46. General Frank. If his operations extended over a period of
eight months, or any period, how often would you feel it necessary
to check on him ?
[£76r3] Mr. Dillingham. Well, that would depend somewdiat
on the form of reports that came in, the progress reports, the labor
reports, and costs of the operation. If those were full and complete,
if those reports were satisfactory, I wouldn't consider that he needed
very close supervision.
47. General Grunert. May I butt in there ?
48. General Frank. Yes.
49. General Grunert. Suppose you had him in the job which he
did here in Hawaii, in which apparently the office was pretty well
balled up due to a lack either of key personnel to administer the
office: how then would you have known through these reports in
what shape that office was unless you came and looked at it and knew
conditions? Would those reports have reflected the conditions that
actually existed here ?
Mr. Dillingham. I wouldn't think so. I know nothing about it,
but I don't believe that they were taking the time to write out re-
ports and all the rest of it. I don't think the man is a good organizer.
I think he is a driver.
50. General Grunert. Then, if he is not a good organizer, wouldn't
you necessarily have had to provide him with such organizational
brains to help him or at least come to see how his organization was
getting along?
Mr. Dillingham. I would think so.
51. General Grunert. Go ahead.
52. General Frank. In his selection of men he was instrumental
in bringing Rohl over here to lielp him. Do you think Rohl was of
any help to him ?
Mr. Dillingham. Well, I can repeat what he said to me. He said
that, "These people have done good work for me on the mainland,
1438 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and I brought them over here because"— repeating what [2764]
I have ah-eady said— "because I didn't think there was anybody here
that was in a chiss to do the job that I knew they could do."
53. General Grunert. Well, had he investigated to find out whether
there was anybody here to do the job before he went to the mainland
to get them ; do you know ?
Mr. Dillingham. No, I don't know.
54. General Grunert. Did he ever approach you prior to that con-
tract being awarded?
Mr. Dillingham. No, sir.
55. General Grunert. In December?
Mr. Dillingham. No, sir.
56. General Grunert. Were there others beside yourself who had
capable organizations to do a great deal of that work ?
Mr. Dillingham. Why, there are other organizations here that
do construction work of different kinds successfully.
57. General Frank. Do you think Benson would have been big
enough to have created the right type organization to have met that
requirement, or Woolley ?
Mr. Dillingham. Given the opportunity at the start, I think that
Woolley and Benson could have put in an organization in the office,
and that would have been of great value.
58. General Frank. Are you conversant with the McKee Construct-
ing Company?
Mr. Dillingham. No, sir.
59. General Frank. Mr. McKee who built Hickam Field ?
Mr. Dillingham. I knew when they were here working on the field,
but I didn't have any contacts with them.
60. General Frank. Was this tour of Wyman's here his first
[2765] tour in the islands, to your knowledge?
Mr. Dillingham. I think it was. I don't recall of ever knowing of
his being here before.
61. General Frank. You were here during the period prior to Pearl
Harbor and afterwards and knew generally the reputation of this
pair, Rohl and Wyman. Will you tell what it was?
Mr. Dn^LiNGHAM. I don't think they were very well known, frankly,
in the community. It was, it seemed to me, a very involved setup
that they had: I couldn't answer that question. I don't know.
Rohl was, I think, here only a small part of the time, and there was
a fellow named Paul Graf e who I think had the dealings with Wyman
and with Benson and Woolley.
62. General Grunert. What is your opinion of Grafe?
Mr. Dillingham. Well, I wouldn't employ him. It is pretty hard
to answer questions like that, what my opinion is. I had so little
to do with him, practically nothing to do with him. The same with
Rohl. I think we form our likes and dislikes and our impressions —
oftentimes I do — in ten or fifteen minutes' talk ; and what feeling I
had was that this California outfit do business in a different way from
what we do business. But that doesn't condemn them.
63. General Frank. You knew that this Hawaiian Constructors was
operating on a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract?
Mr. Dillingham. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1439
64. General Frank, Will you state your opinion of the relative
advantage and disadvantage of a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract as com-
pared to a fixed-fee contract?
Mr. Dillingham. No interests of mine that I know of have worked
on a cost-plus-fixed-fee except the interest that I [2766] have
through the contracting company on this U. S. E. D. contract. The
Hawaiian Dredging Company was one of the first three companies
to work on a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for the Navy. That was on
the Pacific Naval Air Base contract. That contract grew from an esti-
mated expenditure of money of between 12 and 14 million dollars to
over 500 million. If the old method of advertising for contracts had
been followed, the time it would have taken to get up the drawings, to
write the specifications for the work in these far-flung locations sucli
as Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, Canton, as well as the tre-
mendous amount of construction work that was done on this island,
I don't believe it would have been possible, because of the time element
consumed in getting together these facts, calling for bids, securing
the bonds, having the contract signed, and so on — I don't think it
would have been possible to have accomplished half which was accom-
plished under the cost-plus-fixed-fee, in the work which we were con-
nected with.
65. General Frank. In that work, however, you had an opportunity
to use the organizing and directive ability that already existed in your
dredging company?
Mr. Dillingham. Very definitely.
66. General Frank. And you had control of directing the work of
procurement and in planning operations?
Mr. Dillingham. Yes, subject to review and such control as the
Bureau of Yards and Docks exercised over each job.
67. General Frank. And the government did not take over super-
vision of your work?
Mr. Dillingham. No, sir.
68. General Frank. You supervised that yourself?
[2767] Mr. Dillingham. Yes, sir.
69. General Frank. They gave you the plans on which to proceed ?
Mr. Dillingham. Yes, sir. And when you say "you" you mean the
group where we in turn formed a directive group centralizing the di-
rection and control of ourselves within ourselves ?
70. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. Dillingham. Yes, sir.
71. Major Clausen. Concerning, Mr. Dillingham, some of the other
contractors who have been available here to have done this work that
was later done by the Hawaiian Constructors, can you tell the Board
some of the group that might be here ? You mentioned Mr. Woolley
and Mr. Benson. Now, in addition to those two are there others?
Mr. Dillingham. Mr. E. E. Black.
72. Major Clausen. Does he have an organization here, sir?
Mr. Dillingham. Yes, sir.
73. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. Dillingham. And Glover, Jimmie Glover, both of whom were
constructors, do construction work in wood and concrete and under-
ground and roads and buildings, and so on.
1440 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
74. Major Clausen. Now, is there a Mr. Wiley, W-i-1-e-y, who is
a contractor, local contractor, with whom you are acquainted?
Mr. DiLLixGHAM. I don't believe so. Mr. Wiley ?
75. Major Clausen. Is there a Mr. Clarke of the Clarke-Halawa
Rock Company?
Mr. Dillingham. Yes, I know Mr. Clarke.
76. Major Clausen. And will you state to the Board your opinion
as to his organizing and directing ability, sir?
Mr. Dillingham. I wouldn't employ Mr. Clarke.
[2768] 77. Major Clausen. Just when was it, Mr. Dillingham,
when you became a part of the Hawaiian Constructors ?
Mr. Dillingham. I never became a part of the Constructors.
78. Major Clausen. You never were?
Mr. Dillingham. No, sir.
79. Major Clausen. I understood that you were.
Mr. Dillingham. No, sir.
80. Major Clausen. You have made a statement that this Califor-
nia outlit operated differently than the Hawaiian groups.
Mr. Dillingham. Yes, sir.
81. Major Clausen. You had reference to the Hawaiian Construc-
tors?
Mr. Dillingham. I had reference to Paul Grafe, and under Rohl's
direction or management or whatever the relationship was.
82. Major Clausen. Mr. Paul Grafe represented, did he not, W. E.
Callahan Construction Company and the Gunther-Shirley Company ?
Mr. Dillingham. I think so.
83. Major Clausen. Both those organizations, Mr. Dillingham, are
Nebraska corporations.
Mr. Dillingham. Oh, are they?
84. Major Clausen. And Mr. Rohl represented Rohl-Connolly Cor-
poration, and that also was a Nebraska corporation.
Mr. Dillingham. Well, I didn't mean to say anything about Cali-
fornia corporations. I should have said mainland corporations.
[2769] 85. General Grunert. Have you jQnished your line of
inquiry, General Frank, or have you something else ?
86. General Frank. Are you through, Major?
87. Major Clausen. This Mr. Wylie I refer to is an employee of the
McKee organization. Were you acquainted with the McKee Con-
tractors when they were here and built the Hickam Field and other
permanent installations ?
Mr. Dillingham. Yes, I know of them. I was not connected with
them in any way.
88. Major Clausen. That is all I have.
89. General Grunert. Mr. Dillingham, from your long residence in
the island and your wide acquaintanceship, could you give the Board
just a little talk of what you know of the people, especially the Japa-
nese element of the population, as to tlieir — I won't call it loyalty to
the United States, but as to their danger to this outpost of the United
States?
Mr. Dillingham. Of course, that has been a question. I think three
presidents of the United States asked me over a period of years what
I could tell of what I thought of the lovalty of the Japanese-Americans
here. My answer to that was this: No one really knows. The acid
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1441
test would be where they will stand if we ever mix it with Japan. If
the thing can be staved off for another generation, the wish is father to
the thought, but I believe that the roots of the third generation will be
in the ground sufficiently deep so that it will be fully to their interests
to be loyal and support the government as against any outsider.
90. General Grunert. Was there any indication because of the raid,
the blitz, or whatever they call it, of any particular [2770] ele-
ment showing their desire to turn against the United States or to perpe-
trate deeds or acts of sabotage that confirmed your belief that they
showed an inclination of what the present-day generation out here was
inclined to do?
Mr. Dillingham. I do not know of a single case where a Japanese
agent or a Japanese-American showed anything out of line with sup-
port to this country. In our own experience, we had 45 Japanese-
American brakemen, and on the morning of the 7th we had on our
docks, which are served by rail and truck, a great many thousand tons
of dynamite and high explosives. We used, because we had no other
labor, our regular train crews, worked them around the clock, and
they picked up and moved away from the docks in Honolulu enough
dynamite and high explosives to flatten the whole city of Honolulu.
These boys worked on these trains, carrying train loads of ammuni-
tion, dynamite and high explosives, from the water front in Honolulu
and the Pearl Harbor naval station and other restricted areas, now
restricted areas, towed by locomotives without headlights, without any
lights of any sort, and they had to give up using fog torches, electric
torches, because when they were used it frequently happened that
somebody on guard on the way took a shot at the fellow that was be-
tween the engine and the highball. We have had our men shot at,
machine gunned as the train pulled out at the foot of Waianae Moun-
tain, when we had Marine guards on the train, and guards along the
side, and moving trainloads of ammunition ; they would open fire and
shoot back and forth. Of course, it made a job for me to do.
But never once was there an employee of the road, Jaj^anese or
otherwise, I may say, who failed to carry on or who showed any
inclination to do other than his job and do it well and faith- [2771]
fully and stay on it 17, and 18, and 19 hours out of the 24, as many
of them did. I do not know of a single case in Honolulu where there
was sabotage. All the hooey that went out in the papers, everything
that was published, every report suggesting something of that sort
was run down, and not one particle of evidence was developed to sup-
port any of those yarns.
I think it was a marvelous record. "Wliat they were wishing or
thinking, many of them, no one knows. But so far as any acts are
concerned, I must say that they certainly delivered a square job to
the United States.
91. General Grunert. Did you expect an air raid when it came ?
Mr. Dillingham. No, sir.
92. General Grunert. Had you any reason to believe that the inter-
national condition between the United States and Japan was such as
to result in explosion about that time ?
Mr. Dillingham. No, sir.
93. General Grunert. Did you form an opinion as to the tense-
ness between the two nations about that time ?
1442 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Dillingham. Naturally we were interested in what the press
carried about the negotiations in Washington. I think there was a
feeling — I felt they were not getting anywhere with those negotiations.
94. General Grunert. Your sources of information were the press
and radio only, were they ?
Mr. Dillingham. Yes, sir.
95. General Grunert. Do you know the types of alert that were pre-
scribed by the Army ?
Mr. Dillingham. I am not sure that I know them all. I know
there was a sabotage alert, there was the top alert, and I did [B77'2]
know the week before the 7th that there was a form of alert which
was described and discussed at that time as being the sabotage alert.
96. General Grunert. You had no occasion to ask yourself whether
or not that was sufficient security under the circumstances as you knew
them?
Mr. Dillingham. Well, it was considered a drill from that point
of view, one of many drills that were being held.
97. General Grunert. Did you have any experience under the drill
in an all-out alert, where they took their positions as if to meet an
attack, be it from the air or sea or whatnot ? Have you ever noticed
any of those drills ?
Mr. Dillingham. I do not recall a drill of that sort. There may
have been, however.
98. General Grunert. Do you know whether not any of the pre-
cautions that were taken by the Army at any time alarmed the public ?
Mr. Dillingham. I don't think so.
99. General Grunert. Suppose every defensive move that could
have been taken to meet any possible condition had been taken, of
occupying the positions, of placing live ammunition at guns and the
location in position of antiaircraft guns, together with protection of
various points against sabotage ; would that have caused any particu-
lar alarm amongst the public that you know of ?
Mr. Dillingham. I think it would cause considerable discussion,
if that had been put into effect. The question very naturally would be
why?
100. General Frank, There would have been no upset ?
[2773] Mr. Dillingham. Oh, I don't think so.
101. General Grunert. Have you, outside of your interests in the
railroad and your construction, any other interests that employ con-
siderable labor?
Mr. Dillingham. Well, I have been interested for some 10 years
in this cane fibreboard factory in Hilo. I have been vice-president
of the Oahu Sugar Company employing some 500 men.
102. General Grunert. The Board does not want to know your
interests. It just wants to get an idea of the amount of labor over
which you have some control and of which you may have some
Iniowledge, with a view to finding out what the conditions were as
to their loyalty, as to their possibility of being a danger to the United
States, and as to whether such business interests or commercial in-
terests would lead the commercial people to interfere with anything
the Army wanted to do in the line of taking defensive measures. Do
you know of any such?
Mr. Dillingham. No.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1443
103. General Grunert. You do not know of any protest that busi-
ness or commercial firms or managers of labor would make if the
Army took an all-ont alert at anv time?
Mr. DiLLTNGHAM. No, sir.
104. General Grunert. Have j^ou any questions?
105. General Russell. Were you down in this vicinity of Pearl
Harbor on this day of December 7th, 1941?
Mv. Dillingham. I was at the ranch, which is on the other side of
tlie Waianae Mountains. Two planes engaged in a dog fight and
we thought it was a target practice. I was at breakfast on the
veranda, and after disposing of the family down there I came right
down to Pearl Harbor and spent the day at Pearl Harbor, until about
4 in the afternoon. My son was in charge of dredging operations
there. He came in ahead of me. [2774-] I followed him in
as quickly as I could, in time to see the planes come over that did
the photographing, and I stayed out and watched them.
106. General Russell. What I had in mind particularly was your
testimony of a moment ago, in which you related that the operation
of tlie trains indicated a lot of indiscriminate shooting by the troops,
one shooting at the other. It indicated quite a bit of confusion
among the American troops here; is that true?
Mr. Dillingham. No, sir. I'o everybody that was just as much
of a shock as there would be if this thing happened in Washing-
ton, D. C. The reaction was somewhat in the nature of paralysis,
I would say, rather than excitement. Unbelievable. It was not on
tiiat day that any of this shooting went on, but when night came on,
planes were coming in and being shot at, not far from my home,
and fires in the cane field from a shot-down plane, and fire from the
ships which was still burning, and the uncertainty as to whether that
night the morning attack would be followed by a landing, all caused
a pretty serious state of mind in the people here. It was not then
so much as the following nights, that we were trying to reorganize,
that we were moving, as we did every night, trains in and out.
107. General Russell. But the night that you were describing
about the planes coming in and getting shot at, that was the night
following the attack on the morning of the 7th ?
Mr. Dillingham. Yes, that was the night of the 7th.
108. General Russell. They were friendly planes?
Mr. Dillingham. Yes.
109. General Russell. And our people were shooting at them ?
Mr. Dillingham. Yes.
[2775'] 110. General Grunert. What is the state of mind as
of today ?
Mr. Dillingham. What is the state of mind today?
111. General Grunert. As compared to the state of mind as of
December 7th, before the blitz. Are they growing complacent again?
Don't they expect an attack now, or have you any index to that state
of mind ?
]\Ir. Dillingham. I think there is this difference. General : Before
the 7th there was uncertainty as to what the reaction would be in the
Japanese population here. I think the officials of the Army and
Navy, from statements made by them — and I discussed it with a great
many over a period of several years — the attitude of the public di-
79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 2 42
1444 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
vided somewhat as to how we could depend on the Japanese, or
wdiether we could not, which led to the feeling that the most seri-
ous thing that could happen to us in the event of war would be what
the Japanese would do, whether we would be knifed in bed, and
hysterical people saying they wouldn't have them in the house if they
didn't have to, because if there came along D-Day, or whatever they
call it, they might pin you all in bed. There was a lot of loose talk
of that kind. I don't think anyone today is afraid of any such reac-
tion on the part of the Japanese. That is quite different from what
the feeling was before the 7th.
112. General Russell. That feeling was rather real and would
enter into any decision made by a commander here, wouldn't it ?
]\Ir. Dillingham. I think, in fact I know, that that was borne in
upon them from some distance away, that they have got to be pre-
pared to handle a situation that might develop locally in the event
of trouble. If I had to die for it, I never met an officer of the Army
or Navy with any idea that we w^ould be [2776'] bombed from
the air. No one that I ever talked to ever intimated that such a thing-
was a possibility.
113. General Gruner'J'. Is there any indication at present that busi-
ness or employers of labor would be inclined to not cooperate with
the military in what the military thinks ought to be done, because they
now think tliat there can be no more raids, and, on account of the
present war situation, a great many of these restrictions should be
removed, because they interfere with business or pleasure?
Mr. DiLLiNGHAji, I do not think the business men have raised that
point even in their own minds. I think that this little community
was solidly behind whatever was necessary in the judgment of our
military leaders to be done, just as if they were all in miiform and
drilled to support them. I have never known this community — I
have seen them in trouble before; we had the plague, cholera and other
scares here, yellow fever and one thing another, and they were pretty
badly frightened and got together to do something about it, but I
have never known this community so of one mind to get in and do
W'hatever was necessary or give whatever was wanted as they have
been since the 7th of December.
The exception to the rule was when politics entered into the thing
and there was a feeling amongst some of our legal fraternity and col-
leges that we ought to say, "By God, we ought to maintain the rights
of American citizens," and all that sort of hooey that nobody gave
a damn about.
We were perfectly willing to go to bed at 10 o'clock and 8 o'clock
and go without lights and all the rest of it, and nobody wanted any
change. Irrespective of wdiat was said, that was the truth. They
didn't want to be moved into a different position, [1,^777] for
one very good reason : They felt that if tliere was anything lurking
in the minds of the Japanese or any tendency for any Japs to get
together or any desire to do a thing like that, they were denied that
opportunity under tlie curfew and were a darned sight safer as Ameri-
can citizens under that kind of military control, when the fear of im-
mediate punishment was facing a violator of military law, as against
cases dragged along in the courts, and the minute they lifted the
thing up our troubles began with the police and the police depart-
ment. 'File minute that was done they began having trouble.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1445
114. General Grunert. "Wouldn't that be good govermnent on the
part of the city or the county to have put that in of their own accord,
then?
Mr. DiLLiJ^GHAM. To do what?
115. General Grunert. To have a curfew of their own.
Mr. Dillingham. No, it is the fear of punishment, General. It
was tlie teeth in the military control that made people feel com-
fortable here.
116. General Frank. As you know, Mr. Dillingham, this Alert
No. 1 that was in vogue as a defense against sabotage ?
Mr. Dillingham. Yes, sir.
117. General Frank. And they decided upon that because they
were so ultra-allergic to sabotage and that feeling, that state of mind
had been built up. Now, from what you say I assume that that same
feeling existed among the civilian population.
Mr. Dillingham. The uncertainty as to whether or not
118. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. Dillingham. That is right.
119. General Frank. And there was a feeling among the civilian
[3778] population of the necessity of taking measures against sab-
otage as a protection just in case?
Mr. Dillingham. Right.
120. General Frank. That is right?
Mr. Dillingham. That is correct. .
121. General Frank. I am bringing that up so as to indicate that
notwithstanding there were some messages from outside the Depart-
ment that came in that told them to beware of sabotage, there was a
feeling right here in the community that prompted that same action ?
Mr. Dillingham. Yes. I would not say that it was a unanimous
opinion or anything like that. Except in time of great stress, you
would find a variety of ideas on the thing. Some people felt tliere
was danger from it, and others said "Oh, pshaw," or something, but
as a precautionary measure I think those who believe in a coiiserva-
tive position felt we should not take any chances; would rather be
ready than sorry.
122. Major Clausen. Sir, are you acquainted with the reasons why
Colonel Wyman was relieved as District Engineer for the Hawaiian
Dejiartment ?
Mr. Dillingham. No, I am not. I happen to know that he and
Colonel Albert Lyman did not see eye to eye on many things. I think
there was a good deal of friction between those two officers.
123. Major Clausen. Do you know, sir, why notwithstanding
whatever reasons may have existed for the relief of Colonel Wyman,
he was later awarded a D. S. M. ?
Mr. Dillingham. Wyman or Lyman ?
124. Major Clausen. Wyman, sir.
[3779] Mr. Dillingham. Wyman ?
125. Major Clausen. Yes.
Mr. Dillingham. Do T know why ?
126. Major Clausen. Yes.
Mr. Dillingham. I have always understood that it was in recog-
nition of what he did in opening and keeping the door open between
here and Australia.
1446 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
127. Major Clausen. Did you have anything to do with that
D.S.M.?
Mr. Dillingham, I haven't anything to do with making awards of
that sort, naturally, but I made the statement a great many times, as
I made it here, that I think it was a contribution to the war service.
Everything else aside, he darned near did the impossible to make pos-
sible the keeping open of communications lying between here and
Australia. To my mind that is one of the most important things
that could have been done at that time, but he surmounted the dif-
ficulties and did it.
128. Major Clausen. Did you have anything to do with the recom-
mendation for that? Did you ever so recommend to his superiors?
Mr. Dillingham. No, sir.
129. Major Clausen. Or did anyone else that you know of ?
Mr. Dillingham. I talked at large on the subject, and I think I
wrote Lee Warren, to be sure about that, that this Wyman was de-
serving of recognition for the accomplishment of that job tliat I knew
so much about.
[2780] 130. Major Clausen. Just for the sake of the record,
would you state who Lee Warren is, Mr. Dillingham?
Mr. Dillingham. Yes. Lee Warren is an attorney in Washington
that has represented me by power of attorney for 20 years. He was
in the Navy, retired more than 20 years ago, studied law, and has
represented business interests there.
131. Major Clausen. This D. S. M. passed through a chain of
origination in the office of the Division Engineer at San Francisco,
then through the office of the Chief of Engineers in Washington and
to the Commanding General of the Army Service Forces, General
Somervell, for the usual routine handling.
Mr. Dillingham. Yes.
132. Major Clausen. Did you talk or write to any of those?
Mr. Dillingham. No, sir.
133. General Frank. Just for purposes of the record, I would like
to get in there that the Rohl-Connoll}'- Company and the Shirley-
Gunther Company and the W. E. Callahan Company have offices
in and do business in California, notwithstanding where they are
incorporated.
134. General Grunert. Have you any further questions?
135. General Russell. No.
136. General Grunert. Was there much if any damage to property
and loss of life in Honolulu aside from Army and -Navy installations
and personnel ?
Mr. Dillingham. Tliere was some. There were a number killed.
There were some houses hit by falling shells and shrapnel, but in
proportion it was very light.
137. General Grunert. Is there any feeling existent or extant in
the islands here as to what General Short and Admiral Kimmel
[2781] did or did not do, as to whether or not they did their duty
or did not do their duty ?
Mr. Dillingham. Would you read that question again, please?
(The pending question, as above recorded, was read by the reporter.)
Mr. Dillingham, I judge, from letters received from the mainland
and further away, that feeling was much more keenly critical of
their failure to do their duty than here in the islands.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1447
138. General Frank. Had you been at the other end of this attack,
Mr. Dillingham, would you not have been feeling that you were
participating in a very courageous task of jeopardy?
139. General Grunert. Do you mean on the Japanese end?
140. General P'raxk. Yes.
141. General Grunert. Oh.
Mr. Dillingham. Yes, I would have felt so if I believed all that I
read in the papers about the impregnable Hawaii, tliat I was going
up against a buzz-saw.
142. General Frank. It, therefore, was a courageous undertaking
tliat could have been disastrous, just as disastrous in defeat as it was
successful in victory?
Mr. Dillingham. Well, I wouldn't say that, because the loss of life
and property if we had bagged the whole lot would have been very
little compared to the odds in personnel and materiel; we stood to lose
a great deal more than they could have lost if we had knocked them
all out.
143. General Frank. But, had they lost the carriers that partici-
})ated in this, •
Mr. Dillingham. Ah, yes.
144. General Frank. — it would have had a great effect upon future
Japanese naval operations?
[^3782] Mr. Dillingham. That is very true.
145. General Frank. Therefore, they made a gamble ?
^ Mr. Dillingham. No question about that.
146. General Grunert. Although we have gone quite far afield from
our original start here, and we didn't know wTiy General Short wanted
you to appear before the Board, except that you knew something the
Board might be able to use, I think we have covered considerable
ground, but now is there any ground left that you can think of, any
facts that you can give the Board that have not yet been covered, or
subjects that have not been touched upon, that you would like to tell
the Board?
Mr. Dillingham. I have read so much hooey about the relations
between General Short and Admiral Kimmel that I feel that I would
like to go on record, having known both these gentlemen, having known
them. General Short in a business and social way, and Admiral Kimmel
only in a limited social way. I am perfectly positive that there was
a speaking and pleasant relationship between Admiral Kimmel and
General Short. I never heard that there was any friction or any lack
of get-together between those two men until after the fracas was over.
I would like to say this : that prior to the Tth there was no one ranking
officer here recognized by both branches of the service. The question
of whether the top Admiral or the top General had authority over the
other branch of the service, as far as I know, was never determined.
In other words, there was sort of a dual control. Under those condi-
tions, from my point of view as a citizen, I think that is a very difficult
situation. If after the Tth the thing was set up. Admiral Nimitz was
put in supreme command and the Commanding General here made
military governor, there there [2783] was a sort of a question
as to whether this controlled that or this individual controlled the
other, and it got down to details. But with the individuals who repre-
sented those two tops the relationship was good, as I know of my own
knowledge; and I thought, and still think and believe, that it is abso-
1448 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
lutely necessary that there be one control in a locality when there is
a job for both to do; and I think that that situation not only applies
here but it applies in the islands to the south and elsewhere.
147. General Grunert. At that time had you that same thought
through to conclusion, how would that have been in Washington, one
head here receiving instructions from two heads in Washington?
Wouldn't that unity of command or of control be necessary from top
to bottom ?
Mr. Dillingham. I would think so. I am a believer, in business, of
having a boss that has the final say in the direction of policies, and so
forth and so on.
148. General Grunert. But that has come about now through our
system of joint Chiefs of Statf which made unity of command possible.
Prior to that, had they had unity of commancl without a joint chief
of staff in Washington, they would probably have received conflicting
instiuctions from two heads.
Mr. Dillingham. Yes.
149. General Grunert. So the system as a whole would have to be
adjusted to meet the conditions extant at that time.
Mr. Dillingham. I have just finished reading Ten Years In Japan,
by Ambassador Joseph Grew. When I read of that year leading up
to December 7th, to say nothing of what came before, and read that
on January 27th, because of the amount of conver- [2784^] sation
there was about a sneak attack on Pearl Haabor, that that was sent
to the State Department, and then follow along up to the time of these
conversations, and no progress, and the military and the civilians'
controls in Japan shifting from one foot to the other, and so on, and a
growing antagonism against the United States, ancl on the third of
November Ambassador Grew sent a long cablegram to Mr. Hull out-
lining the situation; and the fact, the deduction, the only deduction
I can make, was that war would inevitably follow if they didn't fix
the situation promptly, and there didn't seem to be any prospect of
that, and so forth and so on; and the next day in his journal he said,
"I think that my telegram of the 3rd will become history." One month
and four days before the attack on Pearl Harbor this information is
sent to the State Department in Washington; and if, as I assume,
a message was sent out to be alerted for any emergency, and Admiral
Kimmel and General Short knew of this background or had those
instructions from the Secretary of War ancl the Secretary of Navy,
and the captains of warships who were in town with their families on
Saturday night, and the Army didn't ha^e ammunition at the guns
and the men placed, I think they were very derelict in tlieir duty.
So if that would be information that they had, that w^ould be the
warning that they had, and nothing more was done about it than to
look out for the possible sabotage here, and so forth and so on, they
certainly didn't do their job.
150. General Frank. Have you read the Roberts report?
Mr. Dillingham. No, I have not read the Roberts report.
151. General Russell. This dereliction of duty that you have pic<
tured just a moment ago — in outlining the factual basis tliere-
[^785] for you spent some considerable time in talking about the
details of what the ambassador who wrote the book knew, and its
transmittal to the State Department.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1449
Mr. Dillingham. Yes, sir.
152. General Russell. I was not clear as to whether you thought
that the dereliction was more apparent and real if the commanders
here knew what the ambassador in Japan knew. Do you think that
that would affect their dereliction whether they knew what was going
on in Japan or not?
Mr. Dillingham. Yes, I'd think so, for the reason that I don't be-
lieve— in fact, I feel positive that there wasn't an Army or a Navy
officer stationed here in Hawaii, and maybe elsewhere, who believed
that it was likely or possible that we would be bombed by Japan. I
don't believe they were. And unfortunately I can't tell you the
opinion of a man high in office in this country who believes just as I
do and included himself in the statement that that couldn't be, that
that situation couldn't arise.
Much of the work that was being done here for the defense of these
islands I think was considered on the part of a great many officers
as being a hell of a good opportunity for some contractors to make
some money, ])ut that it was wholly unnecessary. And certainly I
was on the wrong end of that one.
153. General Grunert. Any further questions?
154. General Frank. No.
155. General Grunert. We seem to have exhausted what has
occurred to us. So we thank you very nuich for your presence and
taking your time and giving us of your testimony.
Mr. 1 )iLLiNGnA.M. Very well, sir.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon, at 5:34 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of
witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1451
yme^ CONTENTS
SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 1944
Testimony of— Page^
Frank H. Locey, Waialae Ranch, Honolulu, T. H 2787
Frank E. Midkiff, 406 Castle & Cooke Bldg., Honolulu, T. H 2803
John H. Midkiff, WaiaUia, Honolulu 2833
1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original transcript of proceedings.
... at the
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1453
1^787] PROCEEDINGS BEFOBE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD
SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 1944.
Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii.
The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted
the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the
Board, presiding.
Present : Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D.
Eussell and Maj. Gen. Waker H. Frank, Members.
Present also: Cohjnel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C.
Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr.,
Executive Officer.
General Gruxert. Tlie Board will come to order.
TESTIMONY OF FRANK H. LOCEY, WAIALAE RANCH,
HONOLULU, TERRITORY OF HAWAII
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Mr. Locey, will you please state to the Board your
name and address?
Mr. LocEY. Frank H. Locey, Waialae Ranch, Honolulu.
2. Colonel West. And what is your occupation, Mr. Locey? You
operate that ranch ?
Mr. Locey. I operate the ranch. Oh, I do several other things. I
am an importer of livestock.
3. General Grunert. Mr. Locey, this Board was appointed to ascer-
tain and report the facts relating to the attack made by the Japanese
armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7th, 1941,
and, in addition thereto, to consider the [2788'] phases .which
related to the Pearl Harbor disaster of the report of the House Military
Affairs Committee, which was largely concerned with construction
activities prior to that attack. Now, we are after facts or leads to
Avhere facts can be found. General Short has furnished the Board a
list of representative citizens living in Hawaii who, he says, may have
information of value to the Board. Your name being on that list,
we have asked you here with the hope that you may have facts to pre-
sent to us. General Short did not refer to any particular subject on
which yon might testify, so it is up to you to open the subject, which
may then give us leads on which we can ask questions.
Do you think of any particular reason why he should have sug-
gested-.your name as possibly having information that may be of
Aalue to the Board?
Mr.". Locey. Well, as far as Pearl Harbor on December 7th is con-
cerned, I was not that close to the military situation, although at the
1454 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
time I was president of the Board of Forestry and Agriculture, for 10
years, and I came in contact over land deals with General Short. I
sat on the Governor's Food Commission, which General Short was
very much interested in. General Short several times sent for me prior
to December 7th to discuss issues that I was familiar wdth.
4. General Grunert. Then you can possibly give us some sidelights
on his attempts to build up his defense of Hawaii and his cooperation
with the civilian governmental officials.
Mr, LocEY. I was president of the Department of Agriculture for
10 years, and I saw in General Short's time a marked stepup in pre-
paring. I could see the hookup in my business with him.
He was continually — I have charge of all the forestry in
the [2789] Territory which was Territory property — he was
continually working on roads, trails, getting permits to get into dif-
ferent water setups and studying the w^ater conditions. He was
greatly interested in the food situation of our people. He quite a
few times — I would not say quite a few times, but he was continually
harping at the civilian population here to right themselves in case of
a war.
Several months prior to December 7th, he had put guards on all
the bridges and installations here. There was not a day or night that
you would go out — I might go a little further than that, which would
be hearsay, and say that his fear and Washington's fear was of sabo-
tage here, not an attack. He did his utmost. He put out guards on
all of our utilities, on all of our bridges, day and night. He put them
all through our forests, all over our water setups. They had a c(^n-
tinuous guard over them. There was hardly a day that there were
not letters coming in on the forestry situation from General Short,
most of them personally signed by General Short.
5. General Grunert. Then the way I size it up, as far as you can
see, he did his utmost to be physically prepared for anything that
might happen ; at the same time he paid a great deal of attention to
antisabotage measures. Does that about size it up ?
Mr. LocET. He did the utmost. I saw him prior to December 7th
several times, on the food situation. On December 7th I was with
him for a while; on December 8th I was at quite a lengthy meeting
with him. I think that General Short was a savior to this country
on December 7th. As I say about 10 or 11 o'clock I was with him,
and saw the way the man held himself.
[2790] On December 8th he called a meeting at headquarters of
about 40 of us, and he outlined what he wanted us civilians to do.
He outlined the food situation. He talked }:)robably for two hours.
Soon after he left I took over the civilian defense, and it was a
big problem for me. We had about 11,000 people on our staff to or-
ganize and put on the staff. We had construction and hospitals and
bomb shelters, which was piled on me in directives that were written
in General Short's time. We revolutionized the whole hospital setup.
We went into all phases of civilian life, that were prepared under
his administration.
He sat and talked on December 8th to us boys for probably two
hours, and for a year after that, when I got out of the civilian de-
fense— I was not a war man and what I was doing I never did before,
and problems and directives were coming at me en masse. There
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1455
wasn't a day or many times a day that questions would come up to
me that were a mystery. I did not know how to decide them. I
could pretty near always go back to General Short's speech that he
made on that day, the 8th, and get an answer.
6. General Grunert. This was all after December 7th ?
Mr. LocEY. That was December the 8th, this meeting.
7. General Grunert. Was any of this preparatory work done prior
to December 7th ?
Mr. LocEY. Well, there was a marked stepup here with the engineers,
through their branch.
8. General Grunert. Did you have any air raid shelters, any black-
out drills, any slit trenches dug, and so forth, prior to December 7th ?
['27.91] Mr. Locey. We did not on the civilian setup. The civil-
ian setup here was like you might say it was in the United States.
It had to be sold to the public.
9. General Grunert. In other words, the public had to be convinced
of the necessity for it ?
Mr. LocEY. There had to something happen. The public was not
sold on the food setup. General Short made a lot of public state-
ments on the food setup. General Short feared a blockade here.
10. General Grunert. The former commanders had also feared
that, hadn't they?
Mr. LocEY. Well, yes, but they were so far ahead of war that we
did not notice it, probably.
11. General Grunert. You did not pay any attention to it?
Mr. LocEY. We didn't pay any attention. General Short was a
very calm and convincing man.
[2792] 1-2. General Grunert. How long have you been in the
Islands ?
Mr. Locey. I have been here thirty years, thirty-four years.
13. General Grunert. Then possibly you can assist the Board in
some general observation. Do you mind if we question you along
general lines?
Mr. LocEY. No, sir.
14. General Grunert. How about the population you have over
here, particularly the Japanese element, both aliens and American
citizens? How do you size them up as to their being a menace or
a danger to the United States and the Islands? Would you like to
express yourself on that ?
Mr. LocEY. I would.
Our community talks of statehood here. I think it is the most
asinine thing I ever heard. I think we have the finest form of govern-
ment here that there is in the United States today. I have been
through the mainland. I have seen more or less things that weren't
right, that couldn't be changed. We have a form of government that
you can put your finger on and clamp down at any time. Our judges
here are appointed by and go up as high as the President. We have
got a better staff of judges in the territory, and have had for thirty
years, than this territory could ever have or any state has ever had,
"because they are appointed, they are fearless, they don't have to look
forward to election when a case is decided. They are clean and above-
board, and there is no election mixed up with it.
You speak of the Japanese here. General Short, General — oh
1456 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[279S'\ 15. General Grunert. Herron?
Mr. LocEY. No. He was a Colonel at the time : Green was General
Short's executive officer that was put in military governor. He was
quite concerned, and I was on his advisory staff on civilian affairs.
He kept asking me about these Japs. I constantly said that these
Japs were — we were amazed at the way they did behave, but there
isn't anything else they could do at the time. But I kept a-telling
the General that when he would bring this subject up, that if this
Island ever had an invasion and it got to a point where we had 60
percent of the advantage and the Japs had 40, look out; Goddamit,
they would all go against us. I don't say all of them. I'll take that
back. There are some good Japanese boys here. But we are just
a-kidding ourselves. Our population : go to our schools here and look
at the masses just filling the high schools, just the statistics of the
graduates of the high schools in two or three years. They are voters.
See what our vote, estimate what our vote will be here in four years.
Why, hell, the population is 40 percent Japs now, and there is always
a sway in vote that you can't depend on.
16. "General Grunert. Are most of tliem Democrats or Republicans,
or both ?
Mr. LocEY. Well, they are mostly youngsters; they don't know
what they are.
17. General Grunert. But there are some on each side?
Mr. LocEY. More on the Democrat side than the Republican side.
More on the Democrat side.
18. General Grunert. Then, you think they would be a definite
menace in case the Japanese attacked and appeared to [£794.]
be winning?
Mr. LocEY. Oh, definitely. I wouldn't say all of them; there's a
lot of the boys that would rally to our side. But there's a lot of
them here.
19. General Grunert. There is no indication of that now in the
present state of the war, is there?
Mr. Locey. Oh, not the slightest. On December the 7th there
wasn't a thing hardly went wrong here.
20. General Grunert. Do these Japanese all cling together, vote
together, and vote as a bloc, or are they separated into parties, or
what?
Mr. Locey. They will bloc some, and then they kind of fear to
bloc, and they waited to gain more strength. You can take in our
House, compare. I will go back a little further on the question you
asked me of the setup here. Go a little further back. I spoke of
the appointments of the people that were appointed here. I didn't
make any mention of the elected setup. If you would take and get
before a bunch of elected officers here and a bunch of appointed offi-
cers, why, there is the difference of day and night. Now the Japs
started to crawl into our House of Representatives. A few of them
got elected. They kept a-crawling until they got one — prior to De-
cember the 7th, a couple of years before that, they got one Japanese
member in the Senate. But there was a marked clnnb-ujj of Ja])anese
getting elected to our House. Then one crawled into the Senate.
But it's nothing now to what it would be, in my mind, in ten years
from now. Why, Goddamit, if we got statehood, some day we would
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1457
liave a Japanese governor and a couple of Japanese delegates in
AVashington. That's my opinion; hope [2795] this is not
for
21. General Grunert. All this is secret, but whoever digs out the
secret record has to have the authority to do so. But it is not for
publication.
Mr. LocEY. I am interested here. It's not becoming of me, really,
to talk this way against the community and this territory.
22. General Grunert. You use your own judgment on that, and if
you think there is anything that you might say that is liable to re-
bound on you that way
Mr. LocEY. I don't ask to have it stricken out. It is my feeling;
Goddamit, I can stand up under it. The bigger percent of the popu-
lation here is for statehood. Everybody laughed at it when they
started it. A couple of politicians began to talk about it to get more
votes amongst that class, until it has grown and grown; Goddamit,
they have all got to believing it. I think it is most ridiculous, and I
am way in the minority on that thought ; there are very few people
that's got to thinking as I do.
2o. General Frank. What advantage would statehood be to indus-
try?
Mr. LocEY. I can't see it. I just — I can't see. They had a congres-
sional meeting over here years ago on statehood, and they harped and
harped on statehood. The only advantage that it would have, we
don't get proper representation in Washington. We have one dele-
gate that sits in the House. He has a voice but no vote, and his voice
is not any good if he has not got a vote to trade, and these representa-
tives kept a-asking what we wanted. The answer was very easily
answered : [3796] We want representation in Washington that
will have a value. But I think that we are asking for a lot of trouble
to get that representation. We sure need representation in Congress
and in the House. We have a House member, but he has no vote,
and they pay no attention to him. He's a — Republicans, now they
don't pay any attention to them, even if they do have a vote, because
they are in the minority; but just think of a man that hasn't got a
vote; they just pay no attention to him.
24. General Grunert. Do you have any questions?
25. General Frank. No.
26. Major Clausen. No.
Mr. LocEY. I might go a little further on December the 7th, and
speaking of pre])aredness, I left out the Navy. You didn't ask me.
I was also Fish Commissioner for ten years, and we have a deep sea
fishing industry here that depends on what they call nehu. It is a
small fish for bait, and about 90 percent of those are in Pearl Harbor,
and quite a while prior to December they just shut us down; we
couldn't get a fisherman in Pearl Harbor to get bait.
That wasn't my business, but I ai)pealed and represented them. We
couldn't get them in, and it got to a point where we couldn't get our
own game wardens to police Pearl Harbor, which is a great fish reser-
voir. It got to a point where we couldn't get a one of our officers in
there to police the shore for fishing violations. Pearl Harbor was
just as tight as could be. That went on for, oh, probably a year prior
to Pearl Harbor,
1458 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
27. General Grunert. Their fear of sabotage or fear of the signal-
ing, or what ?
Mr. LocEY. I think fear of sabotage. My understanding of this
whole situation before December the 7th, it was a great [3797]
fear of sabotage. Plenty^ of Army officers here told me that this place
was impregnable; they just waved aside the thought of attack, but
that was just hearsay, but I know of General Short's feeling, and I
knew that it was the feeling in Washington, through hearsay which
comes so straight to me, that it was sabotage that we had to look after.
28. General Grunert. Well, they are sent out here for defense pur-
poses.
Mr. LocEY. Yes, sir.
29. General Grunert. Sabotage is just one element of defense.
Mr. Locey. That is right.
30. (Tren.eral Grunert. Now, do you people out here feel that the
Army and Navy have let you down through not being able to do more
to resist that attack?
Mr. Locey. No. No, we don't.
31. General Grunert. You didn't have very much damage or loss
of life among your civilians in this thing?
Mr. Locey. No ; we only had— well, there was at Pearl Harbor. I
don't think there was hardly any loss in the military reservations, of
individuals?
32. General Grunert. I mean among your civilian population.
Mr. Locey. Civilian. Well, there was some civilian population at
Pearl Harbor, but in the town
33. General Grunert. Those were employees, were they ?
Mr. Locey. Yes, employees. In town there were only a very feAv,
and those came from shells of our own guns that were popped at the
Japs.
34. General Grunert. And you people, you civilians, you business-
men, and so forth, did you anticipate any such attack?
[2798] Mr. Locey. No.
35. General Grunert. Were you complacent? Were you satisfied
that this place was impregnable, and therefore
Mr. Locey. No. Well, to a civilian, the war — we don't understand
it; and if a man is a businessman he takes the advice of a man that is
in that business.
36. General Grunert. That is, you look to the constituted authori-
ties to take care of you, naturally?
Mr. Locey. Yes, that is right.
37. General Grunert. Well, now, were you conscious or war-
minded, conscious that war was in the immediate offing? Did you
realize the tense situation?
Mr. Locey. Yes, we did.
38. General Grunert. Where did you get that information?
Mr. Locey. Well, you just couldn't help from the attitude of Japan ;
you couldn't help from the attitude of our own nation of beginning to
clamp down on Japan. Something had to happen. It had to break.
39. General Grunert. Then, as I gather it, you thouglit there was
going to be war but it wasn't going to hit here, first, at least ?
Mr. Locey. It wasn't going to hit here. The attitude, it seemed
we got a lot of our attitude from Washington, because we read the
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1459
papers, and it was my experience with papers that they are a menace ;
they don't tell 10 percent of the truth in a lot of cases. They will
switch things around. They always have in my business.
40. General Grunert. But you still think that the Army and Navy
did what they should do here, under the circumstances?
Mr. LocEY. I don't know a great deal about the Navy ; [£799]
I wasn't in touch with them, never have been, but I have been more
or less close to the Army and the Generals that have been here prior
to Short, and I think that the Army was very much on the job. Their
construction efficiency was high. Their officers are a high type of men-
We had criticism here in the press on this Colonel Wyman.
[2800'] 1. General Grunert. What do you know about Wyman ?
Mr. LocEY. Well, Wyman was a very funny man, but everything
these papers said about Wyman was utterly false, in my mind. I have
never seen a man that came into a community, that made more enemies.
He was ruthless and hard and cold and tough, and if he worked an
hour, he worked 20 hours a day; and if there was ever a driver that
ever came to Hawaii it was Wyman, and we would have been so far
back in our work, or the Army would — why, they couldn't have got a
man that would have driven work through as Wyman did. He was
just like a ''bull in a china shop." He didn't make friends. He wasn't
a personal friend of mine, but I believe in justice, and the papers, the
items they printed on Wyman, all letting down, was just all bosh.
42. General Grunert. Did you know this man Rohl?
Mr. LocEY. No.
43. General Frank. Did you know Wyman ?
Mr. LocEY. I knew him personally. I had business contacts with
him. General Short appointed me on December 8 to make an inventory
of farming machinery that was necessary to produce more food here,
and turn it over to Wyman. I contacted Wyman on that, and anything
after December 7 that pertained to food or agriculture, I was Wyman's
contact man. Of course it mostly came through an agent, but hell ! you
could get Wyman at 12 oclock, or 2 oclock, in his office, at night ; and
1 have been out on the jobs. On agricultural problems and vegetables
he had called me in a few times to consult me and take me out and show
me the jobs, get my advice on them ; but I think everything that I have
seen in the paper about Wyman was false, in my mind.
44. General Grunert. Did you see any reports about his [2801]
imbibing of liquor to excess? If so, would you say they were false,
also?
Mr. LocEY. Well, I am not a social man. I knew Short very well. I
was never in his house. I never met him socially. It was always in a
business way. The same applied to Wyman. I guess Wyman took a
drink. A few Army men do take drinks, don't they ?
45. General Grunert. We have you as a witness, and we are not on
the stand.
Some of those "hard-boiled guys" who get things done are some-
times, not always, hard drinkers.
Mr. LocEY. Well, they have got to have "an out." That has always
been my experience and observation ; that if you see a man who is a
"driver," and a man who accomplished something, he had some "out."
Maybe he drank, I don't know ; I guess he did ; but I don't know, why
should I say he drank ? I never saw him drinking.
79716 — 46— Ex. 145. vol. 2 43
1460 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
46. General Grunert. In your associations with or in your knowl-
edge of Wyman, did you ever know whether his taking a drink or his
having liquor interfered with his work?
Mr. LocET. I never have seen anybody that liquor did any good. I
am a teetotaler. I keep liquor in my house. My friends come there,
sometimes, and get too much. I have never seen liquor do anybody any
good. There are lots of them that drink it, but as far as General
Wyman's work, here and "driving," we would have lost, without
General Wyman.
47. General Grunert. You mean Colonel Wyman ?
Mr. Locey. Or Colonel Wyman ; yes.
48. General Grunert. The other one was General Lyman.
Mr. Locey. Yes. I knew General Lyman very well.
40. General Grunert. But you mean Colonel Wyman ?
Mr. Locey. I mean Colonel Wyman. He was a man that probably
couldn't stay too long in one place. He was such a [2802]
"driver" and so ruthless that in time they build up a sort of barrier
around him, that they don't get through things as well as the man that
goes a little calmer ; but if there was ever a "driver" it was Colonel Wy-
man. If there was ever a man worked hard, or worker long hours, it
was Colonel Wyman.
50. General Gri^vert. Do you think of anything else that you would
like to tell tlie Board, that lias not been brought up, that might be of
value to us?
INIr. Locey. Xo.
51. General Gkixeut. Anything leading up to Pearl Harbor, or
d'uriiig Pearl Harljor?
Mr. L()Ci;y. Well, I don't know anytliing. I have ahvaj^s had my
opinions.
52. General Grunert. Sometimes peoj)le have something in the back
of their mind they would like to turn loose. Now, this is the oppor-
tunity.
Mr. Locey. No, I haven't anything. I don't think I have anything
else.
53. General Grunert. Are there any other questions?
Mr. Locey. I have always felt in this case that there were records
here that would show, and clear General Short. I feel that General
Short has been crucified. I think he was our savior on December 7. I
worked so close with him. He was so calm and so broad, and I think it
has been a crime the way he has been treated. I think he has been a
savior to this country, a savior on December 7. That's not as a personal
friend, because, just a business associate of mine. He wasn't a personal
friend, at all.
54. General Gri nei;t. All right, sir ; thank you for coming over and
giving us your time.
(Tlie witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
[280S] TESTIMONY OF FRANK E. MIDKIFF, 406 CASTLE
& COOKE BUILDING, HONOLULU, T. H.
(The witness was sworn by the Ilecoi'der and advised of his rights
under Article of Wai' "24.)
1. Colonel AVest. Mr. Midkiff, will you please state to the Board
your name and address.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1461
Mr. Frank Midriff. Frank E. Midkiff, 40G Castle & Cooke Build-
ing, Honolulu.
2. General Gruxert. Mr. Midkiff, this Board was appointed to as-
certain and report the facts relatino; to the attack made by the Japa-
nese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7. 1041,
and, in addition thereto, to consider the phases which related to the
Pearl Harbor disaster, of the report of the House Military Affairs
Military Committee. Tliis rei)ort largely concerns construction prior
to the attack. Xo^^•. we are after facts, or leads to where facts can be
found. General Short has furnished the Board a list of representative
citizens living in Hawaii, who, he says, may have information of value
to the Board. Your name being on that list, we have asked you here,
with the hope that yo'u may have facts to present to us. General Short
did not refer to any paificular subject on which you might testify, so
it is up to you to open the subject, which may then give us leads to
questions by which to develop it.
I think possibly his suggesting that you be asked to appear was
because, as I understand, you prepared a letter, or at least signed a
letter that went to the President, the date of the letter being Decembei
22, 1941. That is probably the reason; so you may start by telling
us about that letter and its contents, and what you people thought ot
General Short, and \2804] the reasons, and so forth.
Mr. Frank Midkiff. 1 tried to find a copy of that letter. General,
last night, and was unable to put my hand on it.
3. General Grunert. I have it here, if you wish to refresh youi
memory.
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Well, I am only glad that you have it, because
that is my chief concern, that you have it.
4. General Grunert. That was the letter, as it is contained in the
files of the Eoberts Commission's report, and we have the Roberts
Commission's report to consider.
Mr. Frank Midkiff (reading) :
We have fouiitl him at all times to be most cooperative, and, furthermore, [le
has exercised a vigorous leadership in causing this community to prepare f'or
an emergency such as exists at present. Almost a year ago he laid out a plan
for this purpose, and has taken all steps practicable toward carrying out such
plan.
That is our opinion. A number of us were under .the general
impression that General Short was certainly one of the most active
Army officers in making preparations for an attack by Japan.
Along in April, or March possibly, of 1941, he caused one of his
staff officers, then Colonel Albert Lyman, to meet with a group of
men down town — these men represented, I believe, the Mayor's De-
fense Committee — to discuss a plan for jirotective measures for the
civil population of Oahu, in case of bombardment. Colonel Lyman
left with the members, certain of them, copies of that plan, witli the
exception of Part II, which Part II was omitted from the plan, be-
cause it was a description [3S0o] of a possible attack by air-
plane. That was omitted. All the rest was there, containing the
measures to be adopted by the civilians, how to organize tlie city for
the emergency, to provide aii--raid i)r<)tection, take care of evacuation,
and utilize the workers, and so on. It went into great detail.
1462 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Furthermore, at about the same time, there was the annual meeting
of the Chamber of Commerce of Honohil-.i, at which General Short
spoke, very eloquently urging the people to be prepared, to lay in
stocks of supplies, to avoid panic, and giving them instructions in
case of emergency that might arise. At the special session of the
legislature, the General appeared in person, and it was I think due
to his straightforward presentation that the legislature enacted the
M-Day Bill, which they had failed to enact at the regular session of
the legislature, earlier.
5. General Grunert. Then I gather from your testimony that
General Short was an asset in preparing this command for defense;
particularly, within your own knowledge, an asset in preparing the
civilian end to defend themselves ?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir.
6. General Grunert. What do you know about how those measures
that were planned for were actually put into effect when the attack
came ?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. By the civilians ?
7. General Grunert. Yes.
Mr. Frank Midkiff. I was not a member of the Mayor's Defense
Committee until after December 7. On about December 8, I was
asked to come over and assist in the civilian defense set-up, then, and
take charge of the evacuation procedures. To my general observa-
tion, not being a member of the organization, [3806] I note
that the personnel were selected and appropriations were made by
the legislature for the use of civilians, and unusual powers were given
to the Governor, and training that personnel in the civilian defense
corps was being carried out regularly. The Civilian Defense Corps,
to what exact extent I am not certain, did cooperate with the Army
in the Army's maneuvers and problems.
{SSO?] " 8. General Grutvtert. Was this prior to December 7th?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir. A man who is now, I believe,
Major Dopy, was in charge of that civilian defense corps. He is now
in the Army.
9. General Grunert. Then you believe that General Short did
everything, as far as you can see, that should have been done in
prej)aring his command to defend the island?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. I think so. The plan that he laid out. Gen-
eral, was supposed to have cost the civilians about a million dollars,
and Colonel Lyman made that plain, that it would be quite an
expensive thing for them, and I well recall the cold chills that the
business men had at the prospect of having to spend that much
money. Nevertheless, General Short placed it before them, as to
what they should be doing.
10. General Frank. Was anything ever done with it?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Only that the business firms loosened up
with their personnel to assist in the civilian defense corps. I do not
believe that the Territory really began spending money to any con-
siderable extent until after December 7th.
11. General Grunert. Were your people war conscious? Did you
think this thing was coming, or what?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. I think it was our general feeling that Gen-
eral Short was stressing this thing more than necessary ; because
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1463
of the fact we had the fleet here and because we could see these
fortresses going out in all directions and planes going out in all
directions on reconnaissance, and they having submarines and de-
stroyers out, we felt that we were quite well protected. But I
think, even more than that, we were of the impression, the most of
us, that there was no great imminency of war.
\i2S0S] 12. General Grunert. But when they struck is when
the money started pouring out?
Mr. Frank jSIidkiff. That is right.
13. General Grunert. When the necessity showed itself?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir.
14. General Grunert. So, as I gather it, your state of mind was
one in which, yes, war was in the offing, but it Avould not come here
because of the protective measures you thought were in existence?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. That is right, sir, and I believe we also had
the feeling that Japan would be plumb foolish to attack the United
States, absolutely asinine.
15. General Grunert. Maybe she would have been plumb foolish,
but she took that chance.
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir.
16. General Grunert. You thought it was a desperate chance to
take?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir. I think we didn't even think they
would be that rash and that crazy.
17. General Grunert. That brings me to the subject of the Japa-
nese population here. Are they of that same foolish disposition,
thtit they will take chances? In other words, what do you think of
the Japanese part of the population of the island, both alien and
American ?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. There is a wide range, as I see it. I have
often been asked that question, General, because I helped form a com-
pany of American citizens of Japanese ancestry before the first world
war, and took them in, and had their training and so forth, until I
was put in charge of an officers training [2809] school.
18. General Frank. You mean a company of soldiers as a part of
a battalion?
Mr. Frank jMidkiff. Yes, sir. Because I had that contact and
because after the war we formed an American society of Japanese
ancestry, citizens of Japanese ancestry, and tried to teach Ameri-
canization 1 ere, I have often been asked that question by the Com-
manding Generals of this Department, and I have always felt there
^s a wide range in the attitude of the Japanese we have here toward
*^lie United States Government and in the kind of Japanese that we
have here. Some are highly intelligent, well educated. A great
many of tl:em are not very well informed. Most of them are literate.
They read the Japanese papers, but they are not very well informed.
They go to church and are what you might call well disciplined, but
they have been taught to love Japan and adore the Emperor and so
forth, the old-timers. So we have the American citizens that are
educated here, the American citizens that have been sent to Japan
for their education, and then we have the old-time aliens here who
are rajDJdly dying out.
1464 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL«^HARBOR ATTACK
These old-time aliens, for the most part, are simple, harmless peo-
ple, not well enough informed or astute enough to be trusted with any
kind of militarj^ intelligence, but just plodding away. I don't think
they would be capable of being organized into planned resistance.
The Kibei, the ones born here but sent to Japan, I have always felt
were not trustworthy. I have always felt they haA^e really been in-
doctrinated with the love of the Emperor and the feeling of the su-
periority of Japan and so forth, very much like the Germans.
[2810] 19. General Grunert. Are there many such?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. I do not know the number, but there
may be some hundreds. They are not too common, but enough of
those so that we resented their sending their children to Japan, did
not think it was a good thing. I would say it was a small number,
comparatively, but in the hundreds.
20. General Grunert. When they return here do they attempt to
spread propaganda as to what they find out about Japan when over
there?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. I have never heard of their doing that ac-
tively, but they impress on their children or try to impress on their
children, more tl^m the ones born and educated here, the superiority
of Japanese culture, love of the Emperor and so forth. They do
that in their own children, in their houses.
21. General Frank. Does not the Japanese family head have a more
positive control over the family than tlie Americans?
IVIr. Frank Midkiff. Very much more, yes, sir. It is what j^ou
might call a well disciplined family, indeed. The young people are
brought up according to the customs of Japan, rather carefully. They
get that in the Japanese language schools as well as at home. The
old people openly loudly deplored the tendency of the young Ameri-
cans, born here and educated here, to pull away from them. They
were getting too fresh and too uppity. They were not controlled.
They objected to that.
On the whole, the Japanese have been a more or less docile group
here, hard workers, good citizens, law-abiding, as the records will
show, on the whole, no serious crimes, a few serious crimes. The
peo|)le here trusted them.
To my knowledge, having been here for 31 years, there has
[2811] never been a case, for example, of a yard man or a house
man stealing any property, money or anything like that, to which
they had access at all times in the residences; nor have they let the
employers down by neglecting their duties or permitting trespass, if
they can avoid it. They have always been helpful as employees in
that respect, and trustworthy.
22. General Grunert. On and after December 7th, 1941, did you
have occasions to observe the actions of the Japanese as to whether or
not stuck to their jobs or they let their employers down, or attempted
to organize, or anything of that sort?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. I have had occasion to observe the actions of
the Japanese and the people here generall}^ and to my knowledge
there was no evidence of anything like that.
2?>. General Grunert. Do you think that most of them were ignor-
ant of the attack that came?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. I think so, yes. I think the most of them
were sort of stupid, people that were not really astute enough to
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PP^ARL HARBOR BOARD 1465
be trusted with any serious intelligence of that sort, and they were
confused, many of them were crying and running around distractedly
and could not understand what it was all about.
24. General Frank. You believe that had there been a landing or
the Japanese invading force had been partially successful, that there
would have been a large support of that Japanese invading force
by the native Japs?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. I think that is quite probable, that a great
many of the aliens, practically all of the Kibei, and a number even
of the American citizens educated here might have attempted to
cooperate with a landing party, and if the Japanese [2812] had
been successful in an area and not all over the entire island there
might have been many who w^ould have joined them and operated
with them. I think that is quite probable.
25. General Frank. You think, then, that they were a problem,
from a military point of view ?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. I think that under the circumstances you
mention many of them would be a problem, yes, sir.
2G. General Frank. What is the solution of that problem?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. For the future, after the war?
27. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Most of them now, I think, after Japan is
defeated, will not need any further attention. The old timers, their
curve is dropping off very fast here, the old aliens. The Kibei, I
should say it would be a good thing to send them all back to Japan
and to send any alien that did not wish to show loyalty to the United
States or was disturbed over defeat of Japan, send him back. Give a
chance to the American citizens born and educated here to state
whether or not they wish to be thoroughly loyal to the United States,
assuming that as American citizens they will be loyal, but give them
a chance to state, and if they do not wish to declare their loyalty view
there would be no harm in sending them all back.
28. General Grunert. What do you think the reaction to that
would be? How many would you lose, do you think? Have you
ever tried to analyze it that way?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. I think that from a practical standpoint
those few American citizens educated here would want to go back.
I think very few of the old timers, with their children and grand-
children here, would consider going back. Some [2S1S] would
prefer to go back there, join the remainder of their families, and die
there, but on the whole I think it would be possibly 5 per cent of the
population that would be deported under the terms I suggested.
29. General Grunert. Do you think the defeat of Japan would
inHuence those who are on the fence to become citizens ?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Of the United States?
30. General Grunert. Yes.
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Of course, the opportunity is not available
to them, unless they were born liere, but I think the defeat of Japan
in many cases would cause them, those that have been inclined to favor
Japan, to think twice and to show their loyalty toward the victorious
nation.
31. General Grunert. Suppose that 80 per cent of those did not
want to remain or 80 per cent of your Jai)anese would be taken out
from here, how would it affect your economic interests?
1466 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Frank Midkiff. It would be very serious.
32. General Grunert. Which industry would be hit the hardest?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. The two industrialized agricultural indus-
tries, sugar and pineapples.
33. General Grunert. Sugar and pineapples?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Those two. They would be very hard hit.
34. General Frank. From your point of view, then, as pertaining
to the Japanese situation, you would like to put it on a stable, clean-
cut basis, and eliminate the uncertainty with respect to the Japanese?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. I should. I advised, at the beginning of the
war, when time made it impracticable to adopt my recom- [2814^
mendation, that everybody here be processed and to find out the loyalty
of the people here, because had there been an invasion, of course, our
duty was to confine all of the Japanese, and all like the Japanese, all
the Orientials, and our work would have been seriously affected. I
thought it would be advisable for us to go through and process them
all and put a big identification mark on the ones that we decided would
be trustworthy, and, if we had to use the others, in case of an invasion
to lock them up.
35. General Frank. Has anything like that been done ?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. No, sir.
36. General Grunert. I was going to say, it sounds very sensible.
Why don't you people do it?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. It has been done for those people who have
to be used on the water front and in strategic places.
37. General Grunert. Are the business interests against such
action ?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. I don't think they would be. There was a
time when it was thought of, but the time seemed so short, it could not
be passed to get around to it.
38. General Grunert. Is it being thought of now seriously ?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes.
39. General Grunert. Whose business do you think it is to get that
thing started ? The Territorial Legislature or what ?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. An idea like that, I think, probably should
originate in the Territory or with the department entrusted with the
security, the F. B. I. I am sure Mr. Shivers of the F. B. I. thought
the plan was a good one at the time.
40. General Grunert. Certainly, if a thing like that should be
[£815] done in the future, it would look like now is a good time
for the people to strike, when they have definite impressions of their
danger and what happened in the past and what may happen in the
future.
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes. May I, before I leave
41. General Grunert. We don't want you to leave for some time,
unless it is on the same subject; otherwise I will give you an oppor-
tunity later to line up anything you want.
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, thank you.
' 42. Colonel Toulmin. I would like to ask a question there, if I
might.
You mentioned the Japanese language schools. Will you describe
briefly what they are and why you continue to allow them to be taught
Japanese and segregate themselves under their own language?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1467
Mr. Frank Midriff. The language schools were all closed by order
of the military government on December 7th or 8th and they have not
been reopened. No assemblages have been permitted of the Japanese.
43. Colonel Toulmix. What did you have before that time ?
Mr. Fraxk Midriff. We did have the language schools right up
to December 7th.
44. Colonel Toui.min. Who ran them?
Mr. Fraxr Midriff. They were run by groups of Japanese, people
Avho organized and brought teachers over from Japan. Quite often
they were Buddhist priests. They were decidedly sectarian on the
whole. Some of them were Buddhist schools, some Shinto schools. A
few were non-sectarian. But they taught the Japanese language.
They thought it was a necessary thing, [2816] that they needed
it in their business, but they also thought that certain items of ethics
had to be taught in these schools that were neglected in the public
schools, such as filial ])iety and loyalty and disinterestness and things
like that. They justified the need for those language schools in order
to teach the children to speak with their elders and to respect their
elders properly.
45. Colonel TouL3rix. May I interrupt you there? Do you rec-
ommend that those schools should not be reopened ?
Mr. Fraxr Midriff. I do. I think those schools should not be re
opened, any language schools.
46. Colonel Toulmix. What about Japanese newspapers, are they
still being published in Japanese ?
Mr. Fraxr Midriff. There are two papers, the Hawaii Herald and
the Hawaii Times, which formerly were the Hawaii Nippu Jiji and
Hawaii Hochi, that are published in English and Japanese. It was
the feeling of the military government that in order to get announce-
ments and probably propaganda over it was necessary to use those
papers.
47. Colonel Totjlmix. Do you recommend their continuance after
the war is over, in Japanese?
Mr. Fraxr Midriff. If they are duly interpreted, they might be
useful for a while, until these old timers die off. I <:hink they will
die a natural death. I should be very glad when the time arrives
that they are unnecessary. If they are really necessary from the
standpoint of giving some of these old fellows who cannot talk infor-
mation and if they are duly checked and interpreted and the interpre-
tation is filed and so on, I think they would be all right.
[^Sl?] 48. General FRAXR.What kind of a problem do you
run into in putting a restriction like on the freedom of the press?
Mr. Fraxr Midriff. For example, after the First World War, in
this organization that I was the head of, in the American Legion,
we took the initiative in doing away with the language schools. A
case went from Oregon to the Supreme Court of the United States
which knocked that out. We legislated against it in this territory.
We had to restore the language schools then, because of that Supreme
Court decision. We might be up against it on that account, too.
49. Major Clausen. I have one question on the same point. Sir,
what proportion of the Japanese attended these Japanese language
schools ?
Mr. Frank Midriff, I think 90 per cent of them.
1468 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
50. Major Clausen. 90 per cent?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. A very large per cent. They attended an
hour a day after the public schools.
51. General Frank. They attended the regular English public
schools ?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. That is right. That is required.
62. General Frank. And after that was over they then went to
the Japanese lan,guage schools?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir.
53. General Grunert. Is it not a question of reciprocity? What
is done in Japan? They are allowing freedom of worship or reli-
gion ; they allow certain churches. I do not suppose there are enough
Americans grouped over there to have a school of their own. I
think that must be taken into consideration. Were not there agree-
ments made between fellow nations as to what [2818] to
allow their nationals to do. When it comes to your own nationals,
if you can define them as nationals, those that are not held to a dual
citizenship, it is a question of arrangement between the nations.
54. General Frank. It is not a question of reciprocity, unless the
laws and customs of the two countries coincide with the question of
reciprocity.
55. General Grunert. I think this is very interesting, but I want
to get down to our task here.
Summing up your testimony regarding General Short, I gather
that you sized him up as being a great asset to this command over
here in preparing it to carry out its mission of defending these
islands ?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir.
56. General Grunert. That he cooperated well with the civil au-
thorities and made considerable progress in preparing the civil popu-
lation to take care of itself in the case of an emergency ?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir.
57. General Grunert. Now, then, when the time came and the sur-
prise attack struck, do you people over here feel that the military
authorities let you down by not taking the proper alert to use the
means that had been perfected for that defense ?
Mr. Frank MmKiFF. There is, I think, on the part of a great many
people just that feeling. I think that on the part of many more
thoughtful people there is a feeling that the Army was doing every-
thing humanly possible, practically, to maintain the security of the
Territory, to prepare the people and the troops.
[3810] 58. General Grunert. Then you say everything was
being done to prepare the troops, the civilian population. However,
we assume that all proper measures that were necessary were taken, but
when the time came they were not applied. Did the people feel they
were not applied ? You* understand that the alert adopted was the alert
against sabotage?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir.
59. General Grunert. It was not an all-out alert against anything
else but sabotage?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir.
60. General Grunert. In that respect has there been any feeling
here that the Army should have taken the all-out alert in order to fulfill
their mission, for proper protection ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARM f PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1469
[2820] Mr, Frank Midkiff. That has been expressed. I have
heard it expressed. I think, however, that there are a nnmber of people
who are better informed — think they are better informed on this sub-
ject— that feel that if the general public knew the details the general
public would not blame the local commander here.
()1. General Gruxert. And b}- the details that you referred to, just
what have }■ ou in mind ?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. I have a feeling that it has been impossible,
for man}' reasons, for General Short to tell anyone, much, any of the
details as he knows them, and I have a reference to details of what
he was doing in the way of work here to prepare airfields, what he was
requesting in the way of supplies aiid material, troops, and equipment,
and, from the other end, what his instructions had been as to his con-
duct in these tense and touch-and-go times. All of those, it is my
belief, had a very definite bearing on this whole situation, but the
general public knows nothing of that.
()2. General Gruxert. Then, you appear, from what I gather, to
think that, if the public knew what General Short knows, it might put
a different complexion on it.
Mr. Fraxk Midkiff. 1 really believe so, yes, sir.
()3. General Gruxert. Now I am going to ask the members of the
Board whether they have any other questions, and then I will give you
an opportunity to add anything that you can think of that might help
tlie Board.
.General Russell?
()4. General Russell. Did 3011 visit in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor
on the day of the 7th, the night of the 7th or 8th of December, '41?
[2821] Mr. Fraxk Midkiff. I did not visit there, but I was up
on the hills back at the Kamehameha Schools from 8 : 05 a. m. Decem-
ber 7th until about 12 noon December 8th, where I could see a great
deal of what went on.
65. General Russell. Could you give us your impressions briefly
of what you saw and what you thinlv about it?
Mr. Fraxk Midkiff. I heard these tremendous explosions shortly
before 8 o'clock. I was to speak at the Kamehameha Schools that
morning up on the hills there, and I went up just as fast as I could
get up there, and arrived to see great smoke clouds and fire at Pearl
Harbor, hear these tremendous explosions, seeing the Japanese planes
flying around the place, flying back up over the hills and circling
around over town, and so forth.; and my first duty as the trustee of
the Kamehameha Schools was to quiet the students and teachers and
tell them to have no fear, that in a very short time our planes would
be up and the fleet would be out and this would be all settled, and
that comforted them.
And so we waited for that to happen. But to our amazement these
Japanese planes continued to fly around. They didn't seem to be
very fast planes either, flying low around here, cracking away at
everything, and the explosions continued. I was not close enough
to see any plane drop any bombs, but I could see the — like, for
instance, a little later time I saw some destroyers go out of the chan-
nel, and I saw Japanese planes following those and bombs straddling
ships [indicatingj. The ships kept on going. We began then to
get — we had gotten reports over the radio of what was going on.
They tried to explain what we were seeing there. Then the radio
1470 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
was silenced, [^823] and we just had to wait until the refugees
began to flee from Hickam and Pearl Harbor and come up to the
Kamehameha Schools to tell us what they had been through.
66. General Russell. When did you see the tirst evidence of defen-
sive measures or response by American forces ?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. About — well, I could see our Army trucks
moving along the highways at great speed, in diiferent directions,
but chiefly toward Pearl Harbor and Hickam, and I could — about ten
o'clock or ten-thirty, I am not certain of the time now, I saw two
B-17's take off and start out over the town and go out toward Molokai.
I am informed that there were other planes active, able to get off
the ground, but I didn't happen to see any of those out toward Scho-
field or Barbers Point or Kahuku where I am told they were active.
A f ter 8 : 05 the only planes of ours that I noticed were those two
B-17's. I was also told that some of our B-17's came in at about
eight o'clock right in the midst of this thing. I didn't see those.
67. General Russell. But from what you saw there was very little
opposition offered to the Japanese invading force at any time that
day?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. I saw a great deal of antiaircraft, A great
deal of antiaircraft. And there were other small-caliber machine
guns, and so forth ; and the antiaircraft, on the whole, was far higher,
exploded far higher than the planes. I noticed that. Way up high.
68. General Russell. After the Japanese were all gone home that
day, during the afternoon and night did this shooting continue bj^
the American troops ?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. It did. In the evening I saw a B-17
[2823'\ come back almost over the same course, and it came out
and circled and made ready to land at Hickam, apparently, and for
some reason or other then it did not land but leveled off and went
on over across Pearl Harbor, with everything in the book opened
up at it, tracer bullets and everything else going way up into the sky.
And a little later that other, -second B-17, or one — the second B-17
came back and had the same experience, and the next morning
G9. General Russell. Go back to that night. Was there shooting
going on in our troop areas almost constantly through that night of
December 7th? Could you hear firing almost constantly throughout
that night?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. There were probably both civilian and Army
troops scouring the heights and scouring the valleys and active on
the coasts all around, very active; and, for instance, in the valley
alongside the Kamehameha Schools, Kapalama Valley, there was
shooting all night from time to time. I didn't know whether it was
civilians in these parties or whether it was Army troops making this,
searching around to see if there were any Japanese activities up there,
but there were shots being fired all through the night.
70. General Russell. All right. Now, I am sorry to have disturbed
you.
Mr. Frank Midkiff. The next morning about four o'clock or four
twenty-five I heard over the radio, "Unidentified planes coming in
from the northeast, approximately 00 miles from Kauai. That is all."
And I went down to the dining hall of the Kamehameha Schools where
I had a good view. A little later I saw planes coming in, and again
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1471
everything was opened [2S24-] up at them, antiaircraft, and so
forth. Those pLanes then, they were up so high that there was a little
sun on them by that time, and they went out over the sea and later
came back, settled down some place.
71. General Russell, That is all I have.
72. General Frank. You stated that you did not believe that there
would be a Japanese attack on Oahu; you believed this prior to
December 7th ?
Mr, Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir.
73. General Frank. Did that general feeling in the community
result in the conclusion that local sabotage was a much greater menace
than an air attack.
Mr. Frank Midkiff. I think the people here did not fear sabotage.
I think they had no fear of the maids. There were people who imme-
diately circulated stories that the maids had tried to poison the
ranking Army officers, and so forth. There were all kinds of rumors
of that sort. None of us believed that, and so far as I know nothing
of that sort occurred. We had no fear of the local Japanese, nor did
we believe that there was any substantial organization outside of the
consul's clique and his associates.
74. General Frank. Yet you yourself have stated that you didn't
trust the
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Kibeis?
75. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Kibeis.
7(). General Frank. Yes.
Mr. Frank Midkiff. That is right. I think they are Japanese, but
I don't feel that they — unless they were attached [2S25] to the
consul and serving him, I don't believe that they are part of an organi-
zation or ever were a part of an organization that amounted to any-
thing, or were entrusted with plans.
77. General Frank. And also you stated that, had the Japanese
landed, you thought that a large portion of the Japanese would have
gone over to them ?
]\Ir. Frank Midkiff. I think that is probably true,
78. General Frank. Now let us get back to the question I just
asked.
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes. Then do we — did we fear sabotage?
79. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. Frank Midkiff. I think we did not fear sabotage. We thought
these Japanese were more or less docile, with the exception of those
uppity, those Kibeis who we felt were Japanese, but we didn't feel
that there was any likelihood or probability of the Japanese landing
here and of their being a chance for the local Japanese to be able to
do anything. It would be nothing but suicide, and I might have
thought that would have been easy less advisable than for Japan to
attacl^ the Islands. I think that was the feeling locally.
Excuse me. General. Let me say this : that there are people here
who have always distrusted the Japanese and have said for years that
the only good Jap is a dead Jap, and there are many people like that.
They haven't been here very long, I think, on the whole, but I can give
you an outstanding example of one for your consideration, if you will
1472 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
not put it on the record right now as coming from me. Just let me
give it to you informally, if I may.
80. General Grunert. Off the record.
(There was colloquy off the record.)
[2S26] 81. General Frank. There had been built up a very
decided consciousness about the probability of sabotage?
Mr. Frank MroKirr. Yes, that is right.
82. General Frank. And on the part of General Short ?
Mr. Frank Midktff. Yes, sir.
83. General Frank. That was supported to a certain degree by a
certain number of the local populace, was it not?
Mr. Frank MmKirr. I think it was, yes, sir. We were anxious to do
everything that he would recommend. For example, he wanted the
civilians to be well organized and trained so that in the civilian defense
corps there would be men available to guard the waterworks and the
electric ]Dlant, and so forth.
84. General Frank. The point on which I am about to crystallize is
this: Generally in the community was there a greater apprehension
against sabotage than there was against an air attack?
Mr. Frank Mtokiff. I believe that there may have been, as I try to
think of it myself, my own attitude and those with whom I was in
closest touch, the attitude that both were preposterous but that we had,
nevertheless, in these times, to take the advice of those responsible for
our security and get ready, to train our civilian defense corps and train
against sabotage, and so forth, and that the Army and Navy should be
on the alert, as we thought they were.
85. General Frank. As a matter of fact, if sabotage were going to
take place, it right then and there was upon them because the people to
do it were here present.
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir.
86. General Frank. Whereas the raid was yet to come.
[2827] Mr. Frank Midkiff. That is right.
87. General Frank. You think that that was an influencing point
of view ?
Mr. Frank MmKiFF. With the people here ?
88. General Frank. With the people, yes.
]\Ir. Frank IMroKirr. Most people themselves, I think, woidd not
have been afraid of the Japanese. Most people felt that they should
do everything possible to cooperate with the conservative stand of the
Army. I think most people would have felt that the first thing that
would have hit us, if anything would hit us, after the air attack, would
be some sabotage and not a landing party immediately.
89. General Frank. Do you believe a Jap raid now possible?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. I think it might be possible. I don't know
what these fast carriers could do. They might elude our submarines
and our reconnaissance, come in fast enough to take a poke at us, about
as they did on December 7th. I think it might be possible, a raid;
yes, sir.
90. General Frank. As a matter of fact, air bombardment attacks
in force are being pressed through to varying degrees of success on
targets all over the world, and in the face of determined opposition.
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir.
91. General Frank. Right today.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1473
Mr. Frank Midriff. I am quite impressed with that. I have this
feeling, and I don't wisli to be unjust, but I have the feeling that our
Navy, prior to December 7, did not have a due appreciation of the
danger of air ; and 1 think, if our fleet hadn't been sunk, that there was
a good chance that it might [£828] have sailed out into the
deep water against the Japanese out here and been sunk in deep
blue water. That is what I have always felt about it, indicating,
I believe, the reaction I have had at that time that up until tliat time
there was not the appreciation of tlie danger of the air force to ships.
92. General Frank. As a matter of fact, that Japanese air attack
was a very courageous, daring, liazardous, spectacular project?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. I feel that it was one of the most remarkable,
well planned, coordinated, and lucky things that ever happened in
warfare. There was a good deal of luck about it, it seems to me, too.
93. General Grunert. I hear much about this sabotage. Just be-
cause they have personnel here, why should there be so much danger
of sabotage? What have they got to sabotage with? Is it dynamite
or weapons available to them? Are explosives available to them?
Are the authorities here so careless in taking care of the dangerous
things that this publi(/ could get at such weapons with which to sabo-
tage? Have they anything from which they can make bombs and
things of that sort? I don't quite get, just because there is a lot of
personnel available, that tlie danger of sabotage is necessarily there
unless they have something to sabotage with. Do you care to express
yourself along that line ?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. In tlie days before Pearl Harbor a great many
of our expert powder men in the quarries and on the plantations, and
so forth, were Japanese : okl powder men. Many of them were Japa-
nese. They had access to the explosives. We don't know how much
material and supplies the consul may have [2829] had or what
distribution he may have made of the material and supplies that may
have come to him from Japan. There is somewhat of a customs im-
munity. But if he had not had a good organization, well distributed,
even though he had brought in explosives, and so forth, from Japan,
he couldn't have used those things to any great extent. I think that
General Short was more apprehensive of sabotage than the people
here were, I might say. He hadn't been here so long, and at any rate
I don't think he would have taken any chances. He was apprehen-
sive, I am sure, about sabotage, and more than we were.
94. General Grunert. Now, the other point, the other question I
have, is this, more or less bringing up a topic to get a reaction. I
think everybody respects the air forces that can do a lot of damage,
but if you are properly prepared against an air attack you can mini-
mize that damage. Now, since December 8tli or 7th haven't you peo-
ple been preparing yourselves to minimize whatever damage could be
done by a return air raid, in the line of discipline, in tlie line of
O. C. D. organization^ in the line of air raid shelters? And at the
same time the Army and the Navy have undoubtedly taken measures
to have all their weapons of defense in position, which was not done
in December 7tli; so that even though an air attack is possible the
damage it could do is not so great if you are pi-epaivd foi- it. Is that
right ?
Mr. Fraxk Midkiff. That is riofht, yes, sir.
1474 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
95. General Grunert. Of course it is going to do damage, and I do
not think an air raid, as such, a determined raid, can be stopped, but
the effect of it can be greatly minimized. Is that your way of looking
at it?
[2830] Mr. Frank Mtdkiff. Yes, sir.
96. General Grunert. I just didn't want to leave the impression
that an air force could come over and do as it pleases.
Are there any other questions? (No response.)
Is there anything else that you think of that you would like to tell
the Board about, for its consideration, that may be of assistance to
it in accomplishing its mission ?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. After I joined the O. C. D. and had charge
of evacuation, I had a great deal of contact with the Army.
97. General Grunert. This was after December 7th?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. December 7th, yes, sir; after December 8th.
And I am not able to tell whether many of my impressions and many
of the things I have learned came before or after December the 8th,
but I have a decided belief and I have been informed that General
Short was making earnest efforts to increase the protection here, was
asking for supplies, personnel, and equipment from the War Depart-
ment, and that things were not coming as fast as he would have liked,
but were coming much faster than they had been coining in years past.
There had been a change in the tempo. It wasn't nearly what General
Short was expecting and hoping for, and it is that feature that I
think would be productive of investigation also, that one point right
there, whether the War Department really was supporting General
Short.
98. General Frank. But he didn't use what he had.
99. General Grunert. That is the big question : Did he use what
he had?
[2831] Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes. Well, he had— the question
would be, how much did he have in the way of radar, and how much
did he have in the way of personnel to man it, and so forth.
100. General Grunert. We know what he did have. Did he use
what he had ? All those questions must be considered, and the Board
is glad to get all these leads with a view to coming to conclusions.
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir. There was also the feeling among
some of us that the reconnaissance over the sea was entrusted to the
Navy and that there was a definite division of responsibility.
101. General Grunert. Might you rather not say "charged to the
Navy" instead of "entrusted"?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir.
102. General Grunert. Does that about cover everything you can
think of? Because we would like to have everything that is in the
back of your mind.
Mr. Frank Midkiff. The one thing that has been referred to in
the press and that we were concerned with at the time was the fact
that a telephone might have been used instead of a coded message
arriving here so that it became intelligible to General Short at 11 : 30
a. m. instead of at an earlier hour.
103. General Grunert. You are referring to the so-called Decem-
ber 7th message ?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1475
104. General Grunert. Was the oceanic telephone in operation and
had it been used that morning, do you know, by anyone?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. I don't know that, but I have no reason
105. General Grunert. Well, it is a point that you think ought
[2832] to be considered ?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir.
106. General Grunert. I see.
Mr. Frank Midkiff. I have no reason to believe that it was out of
commission. I am most thankful that the investigation has finally
come around, because I am sure justice will be done. I have in my
own mind felt that it was necessary on December the 7th, and after
that incident, for us to have someone to blame, and shortly after-
wards it was advisable to have someone to make a hero of, because I
have felt, from what I have understood to be the situations, that con-
ditions were not so dissimilar out in the Philippines from what they
were here.
That is about all I have to say.
107. General Grunert. All right. Thank you very much for com-
ing. We appreciate it.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
108. General Grunert. We shall have a recess for ten minutes.
We have sat now for two hours.
(There was a brief informal recess.)
[2833] TESTIMONY OF JOHN H. MIDKIFF, WAIALUA, HONOLULU
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Mr. Midkiff, will you please state to the Board
your name and address?
Mr. John Midkiff. John H. Midkiff; address, Waialua, Honolulu.
2. Colonel West. And what is your occupation, Mr. Midkiff?
Mr. John Midkiff. I am the manager of the Waialua Agricultural
Company, Limited.
3. General Grunert. Mr. Midkiff, I always explain to most of the
witnesses what this Board is attempting to do, and it was appointed
to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Jap-
anese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on the 7th of Decem-
ber 1941, and in addition thereto, to consider the phases which related
to the Pearl Harbor disaster, of the report of the House Military
Affairs Committee, largely concerned with construction matters prior
to Pearl Harbor.
Now, we are after facts, or leads to where we can get facts. Gen-
eral Short has furnished the Board a list of representative citizens
living in Hawaii who he says may have information of value to the
Board. Your name being on that list, we have asked you to come
here, with the hope that you may be able to have facts to present to us.
General Short did not give us any particular leads as to what facts
we might find, or what these various witnesses might be able to tell
us, so we depend on you to open up the subject, and then we will ask
some questions. Now, just what your connections w^ith General Short
were, what you know about him, at [2834-] about, prior to, or
during the attack, we leave that to you ; so, if you wish to make a state-
ment, we would be glad to have it as an opener.
79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 2 44
1476 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. John Midriff. Well, that's a little bit difficult, nothing too
definite on that.
4. General Grunert. If you would rather, I will open it up with a
question.
Mr. John Midriff. I will try to cover it a little.
5. General Grunert. All right.
Mr. John Midriff. I have been fairly well acquainted with most
of the Department Commanders, for a good many years, here, and I
was impressed, and our engineering department on the plantation has
mentioned a number of times the very large amount of new things that
were being done on our plantation, and I am referring to the northern
part, Waialua, Haleiwa, and around in that direction, that would make
it a safer place in case of attack — oh, for instance, such things as a
north shore raili'oad, that came through from Wahiawa, that came
down and branched, both ways on the plantation, that could not be
cut off as readily as the Oahu Railway that went around to the beach
line.
There was a great deal, a tremendous amount of rights of entry
asked of the plantation for maneuvers, probably more than there ever
had been ; and a great deal of training going on.
6. General Grunert. This, I assume, was when ?
Mr. John Midriff. Well, a couple of years before the Pearl Harbor
attack; and a very large number of large gun positions that had rights
of entry to put them on various strategic places on the plantation,
especially high up on the hills, overlooking the ocean, to where they
could cross-fire ; and those, in the [283S'\ main way, would be
the things that impressed me.
7. General Grunert. And this was under General Short, fi-om
when to when, do you recall? He came here in February 1941 and
left in December 1941. It was during that period, that you noticed
this progress, also ?
Mr. John Midriff. That is true. Under General Herron, a great
deal of this type of work had been started, and I suppose the fact that
apparently we were coming nearer to war, at least the civilian popu-
lation seemed to think so, it seemed to be speeded up under General
Short.
8. General Grunert. Do you know of any handicaps that he may
have had in preparing for the defense of the Island of Oahu, such as
not being able to get positions that he wanted ? Were there any posi-
tions on your plantation that he wanted, that he could not get?
Mr. John Midriff. I think not. I don't recall any, at this time.
9. General Grunert. Did they have a number of so-called "alerts,"
in which they practiced going into position ?
Mr. John Midriff. Many.
10. General Grunert. They had no trouble in going into such posi-
tions as they selected, because they got your permission to go there?
Mr. John Midriff. That is right.
11. General Grunert. Did that apply generally in other places, do
you know?
Mr. John Midriff. I think that it did. I believe that most people
in my position realized that we needed to cooperate with the Army.
[2836] 12. General Grunert. Now, you spoke of being near
war. Just what did you mean by "being near war," prior to the
attack?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1477
Mr. John Midriff. Well, there was a general feeling that we were
going to have war Avith Japan.
13. General Grunert. What caused that state of mind on your
part? What were the reasons back of it? Where did you get your
information ?
Mr. John Midriff. Some of them, from the preparedness speeches
of the President of the United States. He had very evidently been
attempting to prepare the Nation, at least it seemed so to me, mentally,
for the war, and to get a great deal more war equipment built.
14. General Grunert. That came from newspapers and radio, pri-
marily ?
Mr. John Midriff. That was true.
15. General Grunert. Did you have any private sources of infor-
mation ?
Mr. John Midriff. No.
16. General Grunert. Did you have any conversations with the
Commanding General of the Department as to the possible imminence
of war ?
Mr. John Midriff. I have had conversations with practically all
the preceding commanding officers, but in a general way, I think,
when you talked with the Army or the Navy — and I think even more
so with the Navy — for years before, you had a sort of feeling that
"Well, some day we are gohig to fight Japan"; nothing more with
General Short than with any other Commander.
[i2837] 17. General Grunert. Did you anticipate an air attack
as of December 7, or about that time ?
Mr. John Midriff. I did not ; no. It was a great surprise to me.
18. General Grunert. Did you think we were going to war with
Japan within six months of that time, approximately?
Mr. John Midriff. I did.
19. General Grunert. Then, why did you not think it might hit
here, instead of elsewhere?
Mr. John Midriff. Well, I am not a military man. I couldn't
ansAA^r that, General. I could only say, of my own reactions in
March of 1941, 1 had a meeting of all the Japanese on our plantation.
20. General Grunert. How many such Japanese were there
approximately?
Mr. John Midriff. Well, we have about 500, but we had this meet-
ing of representatives of the various groups, and I told them that I
felt we were going to have war with Japan, and the things that I
felt they should do to put themselves in the right position if we did —
the thiugs that I thought would be expected of them.
21. General Grunert. "Wliat were those things?
Mr. John Midriff. Well, in the first place, I felt that it was a very
good thing, there were bond drives at that time, for them to invest in
our bonds ; never, by word or deed, to say or do anything that anybody
could interpret as being disloyal to the United States; to remember
that their children were here, and that if we did have war, they would
undoubtedly be fighting for the United States ; not to put themselves,
as _ [^SS8] aliens, in a position where they were on one side and
their children on another — just general things of that kind.
22. General Grunert. Were most of these Japanese the older
generation, or youngsters, or was it a combination ?
1478 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. John Midkiff. They were both. They were representatives
of both the older and the younger.
23. General Grunert. Had you occasion between that time and De-
cember to note what they did with your advice ?
Mr. John Midkiff. t felt that our people followed it very closely.
I think probably the best proof of that is that we haven't had a single
one of our men picked up and interned. I think that's very unusual.
24. General Grunert. Did they buy bonds?
Mr. John Midkiff. Oh, yes ! Many of them !
25. General Grunert. Can you give us your general impression of
your employees, as to their feeling toward Japan and toward the
United States?
Mr. John Midkiff. In some months back, the Army gave young
Japanese people a chance to volunteer for active combat, and over
97 percent of our people did volunteer for that active combat ; and I
think that would probably be about as good an answer as I could give
to that.
26. General Grunert. That sounds quite unusual; or was it un-
usual, compared with other plantations, or do you know ?
Mr. John Midkiff. It is considerably higher than the Territory,
as I remember it. I am not quite sure about the Territorial figures.
It was somewhere around 22 percent for the Territory, that volun-
teered ; I am not sure about that. I think that's about that.
[2839'] 27. General Grunert. How did you feel on this sub-
ject of sabotage by Japanese aliens, or Japanese Americans ?
Mr. John Midkiff. I felt that if there were any sabotage it would
not be committed by the mill run of the Japanese people here ; that if
there were going to be sabotage, it would be definitely directed by the
Japanese consul or his staff; that the people who have lived here on
the plantations, and particularly, most of the parents have been here
all the w^ay from, oh, 30 to 50 years ; and their children are born and
brought up here, and are to make their homes here ; they have no inten-
tion of going back. I didn't feel that we had much to worry about
from the ordinary run of the population; that they would not be
entrusted with military information by Japan.
28. General Grunert. Now, suppose Japan had followed its air
raid with a surface attack and been reasonably successful ; what then
do you think the attitude of the Hawaiian Japanese would have been ?
Mr. John JNIidkiff. Well, undoubtedly there would have been some
of them that would have sided in with the invader. I think a large
percentage of the local-born would not have. Of course, my views
undoubtedly are colored by the knowledge of my own people that I
have lived and worked with out there for over 20 years, at Waialua ;
and, as I say, I don't believe that 97 percent of them would volunteer
to fight for the United States if before that they were going to side in
with an invader.
29. General Grunert. What form of agriculture was it that was
followed on this plantation ?
Mr. John Midkiff. Sugar.
30. General Grunert. How about the pineapple people, were
[^840] they in about the same category?
Mr. John Midkiff. I should think mostly ; the production men in
the fields, at least. I couldn't answer for the people in the canneries,
in town ; I don't know enough about that.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1479
31. General Grunert. We are trying to get away from this word
"surprise," but were you surprised by the attack on December 7 ?
Mr. John Midkiff. Yes, I was surprised. We had had a party.
We have an annual sugar planters' meeting here early in December,
each year, and had a number of friends from outside, managers from
the other islands; they spent the night with us, and we had ha,d a
party, that was a little too much of a party, probably. They certainly
surprised me. Got me out of bed. I heard a great deal of com-
motion over at our place, and I had a hard time believing that it was
Japanese.
?>2. General Grunert. Do you know what forms of alert the Army
had to take care of the various contingencies?
Mr. John Midkiff. There were many. I couldn't say exactly what
forms of alert they had; no. I know that prior to that, there had
apparently been a feeling that something unusual was about to happen,
because there had been more alerts by the Army staff.
'do. General Grunert. That is, more turning out of troops, more
occupation of positions, or what?
Mr, John Midkiff. That was my impression, yes. My house is a
house with large grounds, there, and about 9 o'clock in the morning,
I think it was 9 or 9 : 30, on the morning of the 7th, the Twenty-First
Infantry had moved into my back yard and had the battalion head-
quarters set up there. They were certainly prepared to move rather
fast, to have that all down there at [2841] that time.
34. General Grunert. Where did they come from ?
Mr. John Midkiff. Schofield.
35. General Grunert. How far is your place from Schofield?
Mr. John Midkiff. About 10 miles.
36. General Grunert. But they were not out there on the 6th ?
Mr. John Midkiff. They were not h\ position at my place, no.
They had been, formerly, many times, down there, but they were not,
on the 6th.
37. General Grunert. It appears the Army was on what they called
the "Alert No. 1," about November 27, and continued on that alert
until the attack. That alert calls for protection against sabotage only ;
it does not call for protection against air attack, nor against surface
attack. They had two more forms of alert. The second form was
tliat which was protection or readiness to meet an air attack, plus
sabotage; and the third form was an all-out alert to meet everything.
They took this first alert, an alert against sabotage, and that is the
alert they were on when the attack struck. Was that generally known
to the public, or was it known to you?
Mr. John Midkiff. No, it was not known to me. It was simply that
tilings that we saw gave us that impression; but it was not known.
38. General Grunert. Now, my next question : Did the general
]mblic, as you know it, feel let down by what the Army failed to do,
or by the inadequate measures they took to meet this attack?
Mr. John Midkiff. I don't think so.
39. General Grunert. You don't think so?
Mr. John INTidkiff. Not in Hawaii.
[284-3] 40. General Grunert. How do you feel about it?
Mr. John Midkiff. Well, for publication, I i-ather sort of hate to
have this thing down in these notes, if I could, in some of our meet-
ings, discuss it oflf the record.
1480 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
41. Genercil Grunert. It won't do us any good unless we have it
on the record, because we must come to our conchisions from the
record ; so if you have something you do not want to say, why, don't
say it; but if you have something you can tell us, we would be glad
to hear it.
Mr. JoHX MiDKiFF. Well, all right — you asked what I thought of
it. I thought that the Army in Hawaii, compared to the Army leaders
in the Philippines, got a very bad deal, frankly.
42. General Gruisert. You mean they got a bad deal in what way?
Mr. John IMidkiff. Well, in the very fact that, at the time — and
as I say, I am not militarj^ ; I knoAv very little about it — but the im-
pression was that here, practically the same thing happened in Hawaii
that had hajDpened in the Philippine Islands, and the commanders
here were certainly relieved, and, apparently to me, held up to a good
deal of shame, while under rather similar conditions in the Philip-
pines they were quite heroes.
43. General Grunert. You didn't know, of your own accord or
knowledge, whether both of them were, so-called, "guilty," or were
innocent, both of them?
Mr. John Midkiff. No, I didn't. I couldn't say that I did. You
ask my impression. I am giving you my impression.
44. General Grunert. Then your impression was made up from
what you have heard and read about what happened in the Philip-
pines, and what ypoi^know happened here?
[2843] Mr. John Midkiff. That's right.
45. General Grunert. Well, what I was really getting at is, did the
people here think that the Army let them down by not using all that
they had to meet the attack?
Mr. John Midkiff. I think that the people of Hawaii, as a whole,
under the conditions, knowing that the ambassadors were talking
over the situation in Washington, felt that it was a thing that would
have happened under most any circumstances, with any commanding
officers, and that they did not feel "let down."
46. General Grunert. Still, you looked to your Army and your
Navy to protect you, did you not ?
Mr. John Midkiff. Yes, sir ; definitely.
47. General Grunert. And that they must have more knowledge
than is ordinarily available to you, to come to a judgment as to what
to do?
Mr. John MidkiFf. That is true. In that, I might repeat, I am
giving my impressions.
48. General Grunert. Naturally ; that is what we want.
Now, is there any other thing that you think of, any subject you
might want to open up on, that will give us a lead on which to develop
it?
Mr. John Midkiff. I don't think of anything more. As I say, it
was just a feeling that we had that a very great deal had been done
for some months prior to the attack at Pearl Harbor, and that about
everything was being done, from the civilian point of view, that
could be done.
49. General Grunert. Suppose we admit that the 100% prepared-
ness measures had been taken ; they would not have been of avail if
l^S^-i] they had not been used, would they ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1481
Mr. John Midriff. That is true.
50. General Grunert. But, from what I gather through your tes-
timony, you noticed progress was being made, and the Commanding
General 'and his staff, and his troops, were interested and working
toward preparing themselves to defend the island?
Mr. John Midriff. That is right.
51. General Gruxert. Do you know an5^thing about the construc-
tion that took place, here? Did you have any connection with it?
Mr. JoHX Midriff. Which construction ?
52. General Grunert, Mostly in the line of tunneling, building
emplacements, and building air warning stations, and so forth.
Mr. John Midriff. Well, of course, I know of the construction
work that took place out on my own plantations — railroads and gun
emplacements, and things of that kind. The fact of the underground
storage of oil. and things of that kind, for the Navy, it is more or
less public knowledge; but just exactly what it was, I did not know.
53. General Grunert. Were you acquainted with, or did you know
about Colonel Wyman, who was a district engineer in Hawaii^
Mr. John Midriff. I had met him.
54. General Grunert. What do 3'ou know about him ?
Mr. John Midriff. Well, he called the plantation managers, some
time before the war, I believe ; I am not exactly sure about the time,
but anyway, it was felt that they would need the help of our Filipinos
for war work, construction, and also some of our Japanese; and there
was formed in Hawaii what they called, in [284^] this island,
the Oahu Volunteers, and, on the Island of Hawaii, the Hawaiian
Rifles, and so on ; and we were supposed to be able to help in any way
with construction work, if necessary, or fighting, if necessary, what-
ever we were called upon to do ; and Colonel Wyman called us in one
Sunday morning shortly after the war to talk about, oh, the building
of airfields and things of that kind, where we were helping, the use
of our men. We turned practically all of our men and all of our
equipment over to Colonel Wyman and his staff for some time; had
several hundred of our men regularly, and all of our equipment, build-
ing airfields and things of that kind.
55. General Grunert. Do you know anything about Colonel Wy-
man's deficiency or his ability in his job as district engineer?
Mr. John Midriff. Again, impressions. He impressed me as a
rather "hard boiled go-getter*' that I would sort of like to have in
charge of a job, but didn't like personally. I didn't care much about
him personally, but I did think he was moving things along pretty
well.
56. General Grunert. Did you know a man by the name of Rohl?
Mr. John IVIidriff. I did not. I have heard of him.
57. General Gruner'j. Did you know a man by the name of Grafe?
Mr. John Midriff. I did not.
58. General Grunert. Can you think of anything else that you
would like to tell us about? General Short evidently depended on
you to give us some leads. You have been trying to give us some.
Are there any others that are in the back of your mind that may be
of help to us in coming to conclusions or ferreting [28461 ' out
otlier things ?
1482 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. John Midriff. I really don't think of any other leads, Gen-
eral. I feel that most all my testimony has been very intangible,
just simply impressions. I have no very definite knowledge. I knew
General Short and talked to him on a good many occasions, as I had
with General Herron before him, and other commanding officers.
69. General Grunert. You liked him and respected him, did you
not?
Mr. John Midriff. Very much. The community as a whole I am
sure liked and respected him.
60. General Grunert. But you knew nothing definite about his
military ability or capacity or judgment?
Mr. John Midriff. No, except the impression that he was doing
a very good job in preparing the place.
61. General Grunert. Thank you very much for coming. It is a
pleasure to have met you, and thank you for helping us out.
Mr. John Midriff. Thank you. If I do think of anything more,
if I may volunteer, I will do that.
62. General Grunert. All right.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Whereupon, at 11 : 35 a. m., having concluded the hearing of
witnesses for the day, the Board took up the consideration of other
matters.)
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1483
im?] CONTENTS
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1944
Testimony of— Page'
Brig. Gen. William J. Flood, U. S. Army, Chief of Staff, 7th Air Force,
Hickam Field, Oahu 2848
Rear Admiral Charles H. McMorris, United States Navy, Chief of
Joint Staff. Pacific Fleet in Pacific Ocean Area 2866
Brig. Gen. John Stewart Bragdou, Chief of Construction Division,
Office of Chief of Engineers, War Department, Washington, D. C__ 2894
Major Boiling R. Powell, Junior, General Staff Corps, Legislative and
Liaison Division, War Department, General Staff, Washington,
D. C 2923
Senator William Hardy Hill, 77 Keokeo Road, Honolulu, T. H 2934
Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, General Staff Corps, Headquarters, POA,
Fort Shafter, T. H 2943
DOCUMENTS
Priority dated August 2, 1944 2904
Excerpts from folder marked "Confidential, 336.92, Japanese Consulate
and Consular Agents" 2967
Message to War Department, November 14, 1944 2972
Message to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated July
8, 1941 2974
EXHIBITS
No. 22, Photostat of Japanese Map 3009
1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original transcript of proceedings.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1485
[^^645] PEOCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEAEL
HARBOR BOARD
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1944
Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii.
The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on Saturday, September
i), 1944, conducted the hearings of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert,
President of the Board, presiding.
Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D.
Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, members.
Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry
C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr.,
Executive Officer.
f Jpueral Grunert. The Board will come to order.
TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. WILLIAM J. FLOOD, U. S. A., CHIEF
OF STAFF, 7TH AIR FORCE, HICKAM FIELD, OAHU
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights,
under iVrticle of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board your
name, rank, organization, and station ?
General Flood. William J, Flood, Brigadier General, U. S. Army ;
Chief of Staff. 7th Air Force, Hickam Field, Oahu.
2. General Grunert. General, the Board is after facts and after
leads to where we can get facts. The reason we requested you to come
here was that the Board understood that you had command of Wlieeler
Field during the attack, and so we hope we ['284^] can get
some facts from you to fill out the story that is gradually taking shape.
What was your command in 1941 over here, and during the attack?
General Flood. I was in command of Wheeler Field, sir. Wheeler
Field at that time consisted of our fighter airplanes. Practically all
of them were at Wlieeler. I was not in command of any fighter units ;
merely the field.
3. General Frank. Base commander ?
General Flood. Base commander, yes, sir.
4. General Grunert. Suppose you tell us about what defense meas-
ures were taken prior to and after the attack, at Wlieeler Field. In
defense measures I mean what preparatory work was done, what
was the system of defending the field itself against an air attack, and
what was done after the air attack took place that had not been done
ju'ior thereto?
General Flood. Prior to the attack, sometime in November, we were
called — all base juid tactical commanders were called to General Mar-
tin's office, who was then in command of the Hawaiian Air Force ( that
was a forerunner of the 7th Air Force) and we were told that Head-
1486 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
quarters Hawaiian Department was in receipt of a message outlining
the strained relations between the Japanese and the United States,
and that we were to be particularly on alert for sabotage. At that
time I think the sabotage readiness phase was 1. We increased our
guards around the field. We pulled all our airplanes in groupments
on the ramps, and so forth, in order to save manpower, and felt that
we could probably better take care of sabotage that way, and we in-
creased our guards around the [2850] perimeter of the field.
We also put more stress on training of the rifle. We were short of men,
and, of course, as you know, in the Air Force all our men are me-
chanics and we don't have time to train them how to shoot a gun
so much, but we did then. We drew some of them out and tried to
make marksmen out of them, to know how to handle rifles, and so forth.
5. General Grunert. What was the defense of Wheeler Field, the
ground defense, as planned ?
General Flood. Well, sir, at that time we had some machine gun
positions on our big hangar, and we had a perimeter guard, is all,
at that time. That was before we had the fence.
6. General Grunert. Perimeter guard armed with rifles ?
General Flood. Yes, sir.
7. General Grunert. And some machine guns on the hangars?
General Flood. Yes, sir ; and on top of the hangars, on top of the big
barracks.
8. General Grunert. On top of the barracks ?
General Flood. Yes, sir.
9. General Grunert. To protect the hangars?
General Flood. Yes, sir.
10. General Grunert. Had the men been instructed with the ma-
chine gun ?
General Flood. Yes, sir.
11. General Grunert. So you had a perimeter guard of riflemen
partly instructed, and how many machine guns?
General Flood. Well, sir, I don't think we had more than about five.
12. General Grunert. Five machine guns ?
\28S1] General Flood. Yes, sir.
13. General Grunert. Was there an S. O. P. on just what everybody
would do in case of an attack by air ?
General Flood. Yes, sir, there was an S. O. P. I am sure that the
Hawaiian Department had an S. O. P.
14. General Grunert. Were there any women and children on the
post?
General Flood. Yes, sir ; we had all the families here.
15. General Grunert. Wliat were the instructions, what were the
plans as to taking care of them in case of attack?
General Flood. Well, we were to evacuate, if we had anv notice; the
local Red Cross, and so forth, here, under the Office of Civilian De-
fense— I am pretty sure that that was the agency that had made
arrangements to take families into the homes away from the stations
and into, you might say, the suburbs or the hill areas of Honolulu if
such became necessary.
16. General Grunert. Then, I understand your scheme was evacua-
tion rather than protection in or about Wheeler Field ?
General Flood. Yes, sir ; we had no protection right there at Wheeler
Field. We had no trenches or anything.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1487
17. General Grunert. You had no air raid shelters?
General Flood. No, sir.
18. General Grunert. Or any place for immediate protection?
General Flood. No, sir.
19. General Grunert. In case you were caught by surprise?
General Flood. No, sir.
20. General Grunert. Yes. Now, tell me briefly what happened
when the attack came.
General Flood. Well, the attack, as I remember it, hit us [2852]
about 7 : 55 Sunday morning on the 7th. It struck me at first — the
first we knew about it, I just happened to be out in front of the quarters
talking to some people, and there was a bomb hit down near the Wheeler
Depot area, and my first reaction was that it was an accidental bomb
due to someone having been out on maneuvers, or something like that.
Then immediately following that these low-flying airplanes came in, I
would say around 25 of them, about 50 to 75 feet in the air. You
could almost hit them with a rock if you had it. And then, of course,
we saw the insignia of the Japanese rising sun on it, and then right
away we knew what had happened, and we all hurried to ther line.
AVell, we started to the line when the bomb hit, and they dropped I
think not more than five bombs on Wlieeler Field, two of which hit one
of the barracks and, say. maybe three hit the shop area. Then the}^
machine-gunned the whole post. I mean they went up and down the
Jine and in the residential area strafing. They went up and down the
line strafing, I presume incendiaries, at our airplanes, because they
burned most of them. They were all loaded with gas, and so forth,
and of course they went up right away; and unfortunately that morn-
ing there wasn't any wind, and the black smoke and all, we couldn't
see down there. We were trying to get airplanes out, tow those out
tliat were not burning, but you could hardly see anything around the
hangar area, just this black smoke with no wind to amount to any-
tliing. We found afterwards that they had practically got all our
planes. I think we probably had, oh, maybe 45 or 50 left out of an
original about 150.
21. General Grunert. In what shape were those that were left?
General Flood. Well, those that were left were not liad, sir.
[28S3] Fortunately we had gunnery exercise on Saturday, and
we had some few airplanes over at Haleiwa, which is a field a few
miles from Wheeler, that the Japs didn't hit. So we rushed some
boys over there right away, and tliey had some ammunition and every-
thing ready to go, there, because they had been practicing gunnery ;
and we got approximately 14 ships in the air that morning, and I
think we approximately got 14 Japs down. As far as I know, those
Avere the only airplanes in the air.
22. General Grunert. What was the scheme of anticraft protection
for Wheeler Field?
General Flood. Well, there wasn't any scheme. AVe didn't have
any antiaircraft other than machine guns.
23. General Grunert. I know, but it was covered by antiaii-eraft
fire of the Department, wasn't it?
General Flood. I presume it was, sir.
1488 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
24. General Grunert. Do you know of any anticraft that went into
position before the blitz was over, that A^ont into action before the
blitz was over, as far as yon know, as far as you were concerned?
General Flood. Not at Wheeler, but they were firing from Schofield
Barracks. I don't know where, but I could see them, I am pretty sure.
25. General Grunert. Well, after the thing was over, what addi-
tional measures were then taken for anything that might come in the
future?
General Flood. Well, I made a survey right away that morning,
and, figuring that most of our airplanes were destroyed, I got ahold
of four officers who had been in the Infantry, Air Force, and I im-
mediately formed four infantry companies [S8S4] with my
air force people. We put them around the field, particularly over
near Kunia Gulley there, to watch for anybody that might come in;
and then I called on the Department for some troops to guard the
airfield. We thought we might be able to get some planes up. Of
course we didn't know what was coming. They sent me a battalion
of infantry from Schofield. We started the battalion around, and
their guns, and so forth. Major Nave I believe at that time was in
command, and I turned all that ground personnel over to him, includ-
ing the four companies that we formed with air force troops.
2G. General Grunert. This was on your request and not according
to a plan for the protection of the field ?
General Flood. It was on my request I got the battalion; yes, sir.
Colonel Collins, who is now General Collins, was then, as I remember
it, the Chief of Staff, and I got in touch with him.
27. General Frank. Chief of Staff where?
General Flood. Of the Hawaiian Department. I believe he was.
No; it was Phillips, I believe was, according — no; Phillips I believe
was Chief of Staff. Yes, that's right. It was not Collins.
28. General Grunert. Now, you said as soon as they went on the
sabotage alert you had to pull in all the planes from wherever they
were, to concentrate them so it would take less guards. Where were
these planes before you concentrated them?
General Flood. Well, we had them around the field, sir, spotted in
different positions around the field, and we pulled them all into the
apron.
29. General Grunert. Well, weren't they being guarded while
[2?5-5,5] they were all around the field, prior to your pulling them in ?
General Flood. Well, they were guarded, yes, sir, by the guards on
the field, but no particular guard on the individual airplanes as we do
now have.
30. General Grunert. The day before ;^ou got the sabotage alert they
were all si)otted around, and they were being taken care of?
General Flood. Yes, sir.
31. General Grunert. And the day you got the sabotage alert you
pulled them in?
General Flood. We pulled them in.
32. General Gri'nert. Into a group, to take care of them?
General Flood. Yes, sir.
33. General Grunert. Weren't they being taken care of?
General Flood. Well, sir, we thought they were. We asked — as a
matter of fact, I asked General Martin if we could continue to disperse.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1489
and he said, "Well, Flood," he said, "no. The orders are to concentrate
your planes." Well, then I got a wire from the Commanding General
of the Department that we would not disperse the airplanes, or a tele-
type. I haven't got a copy of it, but I am sure there is a record of it
here.
34. General Grunert. Then, it just looked as though they expected
something to happen the day after, that might not have happened the
day before, as far as sabotage is concerned ?
General Flood. Well, it appeared to me, sir, that they might have
thought there might have been some kind of organized sabotage in this
area, which I don't know about.
35. General Grunekt. But you just carried out your orders?
[2856] General Flood. That's all ; yes, sir.
36. General Grunert. If you hadn't received those definite orders,
what would have been your disposition on your own ?
General Flood. Sir, I believe I would have left them dispersed. I
asked for that permission.
37. General Grunert. How would you have taken care of them dis-
persed? How much more personnel would it have taken, in your
opinion, to take care of them dispersed, as compared to concentrated?
General Flood. Well, there were men working on the airplanes all
day, and I don't think it would take any more, except at night you would
probably increase your guard, say, as we do now. We have a guard
per airplane now, or try to. We did up until recently. We don't right
now.
[28S7] 38. General Grunert. Do you know what department
orders required the concentration of airplanes under Alert No. 1 ? Was
that the SOP of November 5, do you know?
General Flood. Yes, sir ; there was a condition of readiness No. 1 ;
yes, sir; that is what we were under, at the time.
39. General Grunert. That was an SOP of November 5 ? General
Russell, have you any questions ?
40. General Russell. I do not think that is particularly clear.
General. Were you acting under an SOP in concentrating your planes,
or did you have an order from the Hawaiian Department explicitly
directing a concentration of the planes ?
General Flood. We had a directive from General Martin, at this
meeting, that we would pull our planes in and group them up for
guarding against sabotage. That is where T got my instructions, from
General Martin.
41. General Russell. Wliat did your testimony mean, a moment
ago, to the effect that you had a teletype or some form of recorded
order ?
General Flood. No, sir ; I did not mean a teletype, that way. I say
that after this meeting, I asked General Martin if we couldn't disperse
the airplanes, and he said, "No, Flood, that is not the orders, but," he
said, "I will investigate it." I then later, I think the next day, got
a teletype saying that I would not disperse the airplanes. That tele-
type as I remember it was not signed "Martin," it was signed "Short."
42. General Russell. Would it be possible for you to get that tele-
type and let us have it, at this date?
General Flood. Well, I presume, sir, that Wheeler Field has that
in the files, I will try to locate it for you.
1490 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[2858] 43. General Russell. We will appreciate that.
44. General Frank. Will you locate it and furnish the Board an
official copy of it ?
General Flood, Yes, sir. If they haven't got it, I am sure the De-
partment here has it.
45. General Frank. You will dig it up ?
General Flood. I will take steps to try to locate it ; yes, sir.
46. General Russell. There has been evidence at one time or an-
other about a third of the airplanes being required to be on the alert
constantly, by a department order ; do you know anything about that ?
General Flood. No, sir; I don't anything about that.
47. General Russell. It is true, however, that none of the planes at
Wheeler Field were on the alert 7 December 1941 ? Wheeler Field w^as
where you were ?
General Flood. Yes, sir; Wheeler Field. On December 7, sir?
48. General Russell. Yes. Do you know whether any airplanes
were on the alert on the morning of December 7, 1941, or not?
General Flood. No, sir; I don't. That would be General Davidson,
the Fighter Command.
49. General Russell. You saw the planes, and where they were
when the attack came?
General Flood. Yes, sir.
50. General Russell. You saw none of them make an effort to get
off the ground and into the air?
General Flood. Oh, yes; yes, sir. In addition to my job as Base
Commander, I was Acting Executive of the Fighter [3859']
Command, and General Davidson had given me permission to aid him
in running the set-up out there; and two or three airplanes did get
off the ground. They were not on the alert, however, as far as I
know; they might have been put on by the Fighter Command; but
they got up, because the pilots went down there and saw what was
going on, and the mechanics and the pilots loaded their ships and
took off from Wheeler. There were not more than two or three that
got in the air from Wheeler. The airplanes I mentioned being in
the air, about 14, were practically all from Haleiwa, which is a station
where we have planes for gunnery. We send them over there for
maneuvers in gunnery. It is right on the water.
61. General Russell. On previous Sunday mornings, say the Sun-
day mornings in November 1941, had your fighter planes participated
in any exercises or maneuvers held here in the Hawaiian Depart-
ment 'i
General Flood. We had maneuvers, sir, periodically. I cannot tell
you whether there was any in November. General Davidson's records
would show that, I think.
52. General Russell. You do not recall any early Sunday morning
maneuvers just prior to the Pearl Harbor attack^ in which j'our fight-
er aircraft participated?
General Flood. No, sir ; I don't know of any, myself.
53. General Russell. That is all I have.
54. General Frank. You just stated that you were Base Com-
mander, but you were also Executive of the Fighter Command?
General Flood. Yes, sir; that was an agreement that General
Davidson and I had, because at that time we were building this Air
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1491
Defense Command Post, which is your present set-up, right [2860]
here at Shafter.
55. General Frank. The information center?
General Flood. Yes, sir; and he was dividing his time between
Wheeler and that point.
56. General Frank. What tactical authority did you have over
the Fighter Command ?
General Flood. I had not tactical authority. I didn't order any
airplanes out, or any maneuvers of any kind.
57. General Frank. What were your duties, then as Executive?
General Flood. Just to take care of the set-up at Wheeler Field,
help the groups along.
58. General Frank. In what way?
General Flood. Well, in an advisory capacity. We had a lot of
young' fellows up there that, when General was away, he felt an
old officer ought to be around to whom they could turn and ask ques-
tions, and that was the type of work I was doing for him. I had no
tactical responsibility.
59. General Frank. When did you become Base Commander at
Wheeler Field ?
General Flood. I became Base Commander, there, in about Novem-
ber, sir.
60. General Frank. 1941?
General Flood. Yes, sir. Prior to that, I was A-4 of the Hawaiian
Air Force — since that the time you put me in that job, in March
1940.
61. General Frank. As A-4 of the Hawaiian Air Force, did you
have contacts with the district engineer?
General Flood. Yes, sir; quite often.
62. General Frank. What was the nature of those contacts?
[£S6'1] General Flood. They were all construction projects, the
development of the Hilo Alport, the Homestead Airport, Bellows
Field, Barking Sands, and Wheeler.
63. General Frank. Was there any money appropriated to develop
those fields prior to December 7?
General Flood. There was money appropriated to him, sir, not to
us, as I remember it. He got ths money. I know that he set up the
estimated costs, and so forth, and I presume he got the money, him-
self. We didn't handle any money ourselves in the Air Force —
that is, the Air-4 office.
64. General Frank. Did the construction proceed satisfactorily?
General Flood. Excellent, under Wyman — faster, under Wyman,
I believe, than it did nnder the Department Engineer, who at one
time was in on a lot of the stuff.
65. General Frank. Who was the Department engineer, do you
remember ?
General Flood. Yes, sir; that was Brigadier General Lyman,
"Queen" Lyman. I do not know whether that is his regular name,
or not. He was of Hawaiian descent, and they called him "Queen."
66. General Frank. How well did you know Wyman?
General Flood. I only know bim, sir, in an official capacity. I
had never been out with him socially. I saw him though at least
two or three times a week during the course of his construction
period.
79716—46 — Ex. 145, vol. 2 45
1492 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
67. General Frank. Were you always able to find him and to do
business with him?
General Flood. Yes, sir; he had an office down-town. Of course,
at some times we would call him up and he would not be there, but
he would always be out to see us on any big [2S6£] project.
68. General Frank. Was he cooperative?
General Flood. Exceedingly so, with the Air Force. I don't know
whether he was an advocate of air or not, but we never had any
trouble with him. We would tell him what we wanted. Well,
naturally, of course, we would have the usual arguments about run-
ways and so forth, and the way he wanted to build them and the
way we wanted, so we took his word, as being an engineer.
69. General Frank. Was the runway at Bellows Field under con-
struction when you were A-4 of the Hawaiian Department?
General Flood. Yes sir; we started on Bellows Field, the whole
Bellows Field project, when I was A-4. Colonel Wyman undertook
that project, himself, and at the time, we were asking for money,
and I remember — I don't know whether this has anything to do
with any interest in this case, but I asked him about starting on it.
I said, "You are starting it pretty fast. Did you get the money for
it?" He said, "Well, we'll get the money. We will go ahead. We
need this"; so he put that project over in no time at all; and it is
a good thing he did, because we needed it.
70. General Frank. The work proceeded satisfactoril}^, then?
General Flood. Yes, sir.
71. General Frank. Were there any construction projects that,
from your point of view as A-4 of the Hawaiian Air Force, lagged,
that w^ere under his jurisdiction?
(jeneral Flood. No, sir ; I would say they went faster under
Wyman's jurisdiction.
72. Major Clausen. Sir, are you familiar with the exact [2863]
times that this work was required to be done by the contract and the
job orders?
General Flood. No; we had nothing to do with that. That was
Wyman's.
73. Major Clausen. So, in answering General Frank's questions as
to whether it was satisfactory, you would not know whether the con-
tract and job orders had been lived up to ?
General Flood. I meant it was satisfactory from an Air Force
standpoint of having the facilities, getting it ready for us. Now,
as to whether or not it came up to specifications that the engineers laid
down or not, I can't answer that, because that wasn't our responsibility.
74. Major Clausen. With respect to Bellows Field, the runwav
there would not take a heavy ship, would it, on 7 December 1941 ?
General Flood. Well, I don't think it was a question of the runway,
there. I can't answer that. I would say it could take a heavy ship,
but in fact, we never put any heavy stuff in there, because of the nature
of the field, because it is a bad field. It was never designed to put
heavy stuff over there.
75. Major Clausen. You said something about concentrating the
airplanes, the airplanes having been pulled in before the 7th of De-
cember. Were they put wing to wing?
General Flood. Yes, they were pulled in on the a]iron in front of
the hangars and practically wing-tip to wing-tip.
PKOCEEDIN(;S OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1493
76. Major Clausen. Did you empty the gasoline tanks on some of
them?
General Flood. No, sir ; we kept them so we could fly. We did not
drain them. It takes quite a while to fill an [2864] airplane,
if you ever need it.
77. Major Clausex. You also said something about the practice
now being to guard each plane with one man, and having in mind
that you have more planes now than you had before the 7th of Decem-
ber lOttl; you had sufficient personnel before 7 December 1941 to do
that same thing, did you not ?
General Flood. Not one man per airplane ; no, sir.
78. Major Clausex. How many planes were there on Wheeler
Field?
General Feood. Right on Wheeler Field? Oh, I would say maybe
110.
79. Major Clausex. Did you have 110 men?
General Fj.ood. We had more than 110 men, but we could not spare
110 men for guards for each individual airplane, because at that time
our service units were short, and these people were all mechanics.
You had no real set-up for guarding, except what we call "basics."'
Of course, now we have; we have MP companies that are sent out,
assigned to the air force for the purpose of guarding. We do not
use trained men in guarding, unless in emergency.
80. Major Clausex. Suppose you had dispersed the planes instead
of concentrating them, before 7 December 1941, would it have been
possible to have assigned one man to each plane ?
General Flood. I think it would, in emergency. It would skin us
down.
81. Major Clausex. But you could have done it?
General Flood. I think we could have done it.
82. Major Clausex. How many men did you have?
General Flood. I do not know the strength off-hand of [2865]
the men at Wheeler Field, but we could skim down and have done
tliat if it had been necessary to put one man per airplane.
83. Major Clausen. I have no further questions.
84. General Frank. Colonel Toulmin, have you anything?
85. Colonel Toulmin. Nothing. ,
86. General Gruxert. Have you anytliing that occurs to you that
you would like to bring to the attention of the Board that has not been
brought up? The Board lias pretty thoroughly covered the ground
with other witnesses, and there is no need of just building up testi-
mony, just to pad the record.
General Flood. No, sir.
87. General Gruxert. But if you knoAv of anything that is in the
back of your mind that may be of assistance to the Board, let us have it.
General Flood. No, sir; I haven't anything, at all.
88. General Fraxk. Did you ever know a Hans Wilhelm Rohl?
General Flood. No, sir ; I never knew him.
89. General Frank. Did you ever liear of liim ?
General Flood. I have read in the papers. Isn't he the man that
Wyman has entered into contracts with, or supposed to have contracts
over here?
90. General Fraxk. Yes.
1494 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Flood. I have read of him. I never knew him, and I never
knew he was here until after the stories broke in the papers.
91. General Frank. Did you ever know a Paul Grafe?
General Flood. No, sir; I never knew him. We had no contacts,
at all, as you remember, General, with any of the contractors. Ours
are with the Department and the district engineer. They were the
ones that let the contracts out, and we didn't even know who had them,
except we heard the names.
92. General Grunert. Thank you very much for coming in.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
[2S66] TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL CHARLES H. McMORRIS,
UNITED STATES NAVY, CHIEF OF JOINT STAFF, PACIFIC FLEET
IN PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Admiral, will you please state to the Board your
name, rank, organization and station?
Admiral MgMorris. Charles H. McMorris, Rear Admiral, United
States Navy, Chief of Joint Statf, Pacific Fleet in Pacific Ocean
Areas.
2. General Grunert. Admiral, this Board is after facts and leads
to where it can get such facts, if it cannot get them from the witnesses
present. The Board asked you to come here because you had testified
before the Roberts Commission, and from that testimony and your
assignment in 1941 we hope we can get some facts from you. The
field which we have to cover is so broad that we have parcelled out
some of the phases of this investigation. General Russell here has
charge of this particular phase of it, so he will lead in questioning you,
and the other members of the Board will fill in. So I turn you over
to the tender mercies of Genei-al Russell.
3. General Russell. Admiral, what was your assignment in No-
vember and December of 1941 ?
Admiral McMorris. Head of the War Plans Division of the staff
of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.
4. General Russell. How long had you been on tliat assignment
prior to December 7th, 1941?
Admiral McMorris. Since 1 February, 1941.
5. General Russell. That was about the time that General Short
came out and became Commanding General of the Hawaiian [2867]
Department ?
Admiral McMorris. Almost exactly the same time.
6. General Russell. During that period, Admiral, from February
1, 1941, to December 7, 1941, were there frequent or infrequent con-
ferences between the Commanding Genei-al of the Hawaiian Depart-
ment and the Admiral of the Pacific Fleet ?
Admiral McMorris. There were a very considerable number of con-
ferences between those two officers. They were generally held in the
office of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and I attended most
if not all of them.
7. General Russell. Briefly stated, what subjects were discussed at
those meetings ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1495
Admiral McMorris. The defenses of the Hawaiian Area and the
operations in case of war of the Pacific Fleet and, among other things,
the possibilities of moving some of the units of the Army under the
command of the Commander, Hawaiian Department, to Midway and
Wake, and the building up of certain defenses at Canton and other
outlying islands.
8. General Russell. Were those conferences more frequent or less
frequent in the latter part of the year 1941, or were there any changes
in the frequency of holding those conferences?
Admiral McMorris. As I recall now, they were more frequent, but
a certain degree of tenseness in the international situation obtained
throughout 1941 and I cannot say with clefiniteness that the frequency
had markedly increased.
9. General Russell. Was this subject of the tenseness in the rela-
tionship between the Japanese Empire and the American Government
discussed at any of these conferences?
Admiral McMorris. Yes. more frequently than not that situa-
[28G8] tion was discussed.
10. General Russell. Is it your opinion or impression that there
was a realization on the part of those participating in those conferences
that the situation between the Japanese Empire and the American
Government was becoming more tense in the year 1941 as the year
progressed ?
Admiral McIMorris. Yes.
11. General Russell. Is it your opinion that there was a realization
on the part of these officers, both naval and Army, that a war with the
Japanese Empire was inevitable?
Admiral McMorris. I would say highly probable.
12. General Russell. Highly probable?
Admiral McMorris. Rather than inevitable.
13. General Russell. Were speculations indulged in at these con-
ferences as to the imminence of war with Japan, its likelihood of
breaking out in the immediate future ?
Admiral McMorris. Yes.
14. General Russell. What, in your opinion, was the concensus of
judgment of those officers attending these meetings as to the imminence
of war with Japan in late November, 1941?
Admiral McMorris. It is my opinion that those officers believed that
war with the Japanese Empire might occur in an extremely short
time, although there may have been expressed some uncertainty as to
whether a war between the Japanese and British Empires might not
precede the involvement of the United States by a short time. I do
not believe, however, that there was serious doubt but that we would
actually be involved on verv short notice.
15. General Russell. You have introduced the subject of war
\2S60] . occurring between the British and Japanese Empires a
short time before we became involved. Was it the opinion of the as-
sembled officers in these conferences that we would go to the rescue
of Britain if she became involved in war with Japan ?
Admiral McMorris. It was felt that if Great Britain became in-
volved that some overt act, real or fancied, would almost surely occur
and that it would not be so much of going to the rescue of the British
Empire as to defend American interests.
1496 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
16. General Russell. Was this opinion or conception based on
facts, or was there some factual information which had been received,
or was it mere speculation on the part of these officers?
Admiral McMorris. Largely speculation, and a general acquaint-
ance with movements of certain Japanese forces in the southeast Asia
area, and the feeling that Japan might be unwilling to expose her line
of communications to a threat from the Philippines.
17. General Frank. You felt that the United States would be forced
in bv an overt act bv Japan rather than by a determined decision by
the United States? '
Admiral McMorris. Yes.
18. General Rltssell. But your reasoning was that our entry into
the war would probably be preceded by an outbreak of hostilities be-
tween the British and Japanese Empires, which would give our forces
some notice of the coming events ?
Admiral McMorris. I would not say that I believed that, but in
discussions it was certainly regarded as a distinct possibility or even
probability.
19. General Russell. Now, Admiral, if high naval officers had
12870] reached the conclusion that war with Japan was highly
probalDle and that its imminence was a very great possibility, what
conclusions, if any. were reached about the probability or the possi-
bilitv of an attack on Pearl Harbor and the Armv installations on the
Island of Oahu ?
Admiral jSIcMorris. Certainly I personally regarded such an at-
tack by saboteurs or by submarines as extremely probable. I did not
at any time envisage such an attack as actually occurred.
20. General Russell. You now refer to a surprise air attack from
carrier-based airplanes ?
Admiral McMorris. Yes, sir, I did regard it as a possibility that a
small raiding force might at some time undertake it and run efforts
along our lines of communication in this vicinity and that such a raid-
ing force might include some carrier strength.
21. General Russell. Admiral, did you know of the presence of a
carrier force or a task force, Japanese task force, in the Marshall
Islands in which carriers had been discovered late in November of
1941?
Admiral McMorris. I believe I recall some intelligence data that
indicated the possible presence of carriers in the Marshalls area.
Parenthetically, I might acid that it has since become well established
that no such force was in the Marshalls, but, of course, this added in-
formation Avas not available to us at that time. The intelligence
that we actually had was of a speculative nature.
22. General Rltssell. What is the information which you have re-
ceived since that time that establishes clearly that no such task force
with carriers was in the Marshalls late in November, 1941?
[3871] Admiral McMohris. Interrogation of prisoners or re-
ports of interrogations of prisoners and captured documents that
seemed to quite clearly indicate the movements of the Japanese car-
rier force in late November and early December.
23. General Russell. Where are the documents that you now refer
to?
Admiral McMorris. I believe that our intelligence organization in
the Pacific Ocean Areas has that information available.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1497
24. General Kussj:ll. A^'oiild that be in files here on the Island of
Oahu?
Admiral McMorris. I should say very probably, but I would have
to consult our Intelligence Officer to give a positive statement in that
connection.
25. General Kussell. Would you be willing to undertake that for
us and let us know whether or not you find those documents and if
they could be made available to us?
Admiral McMorris. Yes, sir.
26. General Eussell. Are there reports. Admiral, of the questioning
of the witnesses upon whom you base your opinion that the carriers
were not in the Marshalls in late November and early December avail-
able in records any place ?
Admiral McMorris, I would expect to find that information at the
same source.
27. General Russell. Will you attempt to ascertain that for us and
let us know, please, sir?
28. General Russell, Prior to the morning of December Tth, 1941,
possibly on the date of November 27th, 1941, do you recall specifically
a conference attended by you, General Short, possibly Admiral Kim-
mel, and others, in which the possibility of [:?872] an attack on
Pearl Harbor was discussed?
Admiral McMorpjs, I recall that about that time, certainly in very
late November, a number of dispatches concerning the existing mili-
tary situation had been received, and that conference did take place in
Admiral Kimmers office at which the Commanding General of the
Hawaiian Department and various other officers were present. I par-
ticularly remember a discussion with regard to the movement or the
possible movement of certain pursuit planes from Oahu to Midway
and Wake and that certainly the possibility of an air attack on Pearl
Harbor was mentioned, and I recall that the merits or demerits of
sending certain particular units to Midway were inquired about. I
had advocated sending the less efficient group to Midway, and Admiral
Kimmel inquired when I felt an air attack on Pearl Harbor might
occur, and I replied that I felt such an attack would never occur.
29. General Russell, Admiral, we have discussed the fringes of it,
possibly, without going to the heart of it. Would you state to the
Board the reasons upon which you based this conclusion, that an air
attack on Pearl Harbor would never occur?
Admiral McMorris, Again, I am expressing my own views, but
they are the views which colored such recommendations as I made from
time to time to the Commander-in-Chief. I felt that the Jaj^anese
interests lay in the Asiatic area and that they could more effectively
utilize their full power in that area. I doubted that an attack on the
Pearl Harbor area w'ould inflict great damage and felt that the
Japanese would have a similar conclusion. I felt that if we were con-
templating a similar attack on the Japanese homeland that the dam-
age we might inflict would not be commensurate with the risk and
probable losses [2873] involved, and that, similarly, the Jap-
anese would reach such a conclusion as regards an attack on Hawaii.
Subsequent events, of course, proved my conclusions very unsound.
30. General Russell, Earlier you stated, Admiral, that you had
come to the conclusion that the event of war against the United States,
1498 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
assuming it was brought on by an offensive action on the part of Japan,
would result from threat to the Japanese line of communication m its
progress to the south. Did it occur to you that possibly the mam in-
strument which the American people had to attack that line of com-
munication was the fleet here at Pearl Harbor ?
Admiral McMorris. I knew that such was not the case, that our
logistic capabilities at that time would not have permitted any con-
siderable portion of the fleet in the Pearl Harbor area operating in
that portion of the Pacific. I did know, however, that there had been
considerable augmentation of the air strength in the Philippine area
as would endanger such lines of communication, and that submarines
based on Manila would be highly effective against such a line.
[2S74.] General Kussell. But you did not regard our surface
fleet at Pearl Harbor as a threat to the Japanese line of communica-
tions to the south, from the Japanese Empire ?
Admiral McMorris. I did not. I did not so regard it until we were
able to establish ourselves much further west and have facilities for
logistic support that could not be developed for a very considerable
period.
32. General Russell. Admiral, to go back to a question which has
been suggested to me in relation to the attack made here on Pearl
Harbor: You state that subsequent investigation has been made, and
3^ou have now come to the conclusion that the task force which made
the attack did not assemble in the Marshall Islands ; is that true ?
Admiral McMorris. That is correct, sir.
33. General Russell. What is your opinion now as to where this
task force came from ?
Admiral McMorris. That they departed from ports in southern
Honshu, made a rendezvous in the southern Kuriles, and steamed al-
most directly eastward on a line that approximates the latitude midway
between Pearl Harbor and the Aleutians, and then almost directly
south.
34. General Russell. For the purposes of the record : the first port
from which this task force sailed, is it, or not, located on the mainland
of the Japanese Empire, the home island ?
Admiral McMorris. The initial port of departure was from the
main base of Japan, but that their assembly point from which they
finally sailed was an isolated harbor to the northward of the main
islands of Japan, that is, to the northward of Hokkaido.
[287S] 35. General Russell. And from that point they traveled
in which direction?
Admiral McMorris. East.
36. General Russell. Almost directly east?
Admiral McMorris. Almost directly east.
37. General Russell. And thence almost directly south ?
Admiral McMorris. Almost directly south.
38. General Russell. Do you know of any refueling point between
the point that you have described as their assembly point after leaving
the homeland and the point from which they launched their attack on
Oahu?
Admiral McMorris. From their point of departure I believe they
proceeded in one force, did fuel enroute, but I do not now recall just
the location of the refueling point or points.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1499
39. General Eussell. How long, in the opinion of the Navy, was it
from the time this task force left the mainland of Japan, or its initial
assembly port and point of departure as you have described it, until it
reached Pearl Harbor?
Admiral McMorris. It has been some time since I have reviewed
that information, but it was in the neighborhood of two weeks from
the time of departure from their mam bases.
40. General Kussell. Have you any factual basis from which de-
ductions have been made by the Navy as to the constitution of this
task force?
Admiral McMorris. There were six cruisers and attendant light
craft in this task force, but the aircraft from only four of the carriers
actually participated in the Pearl Harbor attack.
41. General Russell. Could you tell us roughly how many
[2876} surface ships, including carriers of various categories,
would have been in this task force ?
Admiral McMorris. Without refreshing my memory, I believe an
answer to that might be misleading.
42. General Russell. Admiral, the thing I am attempting to learn,
if possible, is whether or not this was a considerable convoy, this task
force, and if you can estimate roughly the number of surface craft that
might have been in it.
Admiral McMorris. The force in question was a fast striking force
that did not include the heavy battleships but was in general compara-
ble in strength to two of the carrier task forces which the United
States now operates. Let us say there were in the neighborhood of 15
combatant vessels, including the 6 carriers.
43. General Russell. Does the Navy have conclusions as to the dis-
tance that these forces were from Pearl Harbor when they launched
their aircraft which participated in the attack on Pearl Harbor ?
Admiral McMorris. In the neighborhood of 300 miles. I might
add that the distance was considerably greater than we felt that it was
feasible to launch an attack on the part of our own carriers at that time.
The special fittings of belly tanks, and the willingness to sacrifice
planes that might run out of gas, permitted the operation to take place
from that distance.
44. General Russell. At the time of this attack on December 7th, as
we recall, there were two or three task forces from the Pacific Fleet
based on Pearl Harbor operating away from Pearl Harbor, American
vessels : is that true ?
[2877] Admiral McMorris. That is correct. There were at that
time three American carriers in the Pacific. One was completing
or had just completed overhaul at Puget Sound and was enroute to
San Diego to obtain her air group. One carrier with attendant
cruisers and destroyers had just delivered certain marine fighters to
Wake and was expected to arrive at Pearl Harbor on 7 or 8 December.
The remaining carrier, also with attendant cruisers and destroyers,
was returning to the Pearl Harbor area after delivering fighters to
Midway.
45. General Russell. Admiral, to shorten the examination, and
without describing the elements of the Navy present in Pearl Harbor,
was the fighting strength of those elements at Pearl Harbor on the
morning of December 5th, 6th, and 7th, we will say, of sufficient
1500 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
capacity to have destroyed the Jap task force had the Jap task force
from which these aircraft were launched been located and intercepted?
Admiral McMorris. It would have been impossible for that force
to have brought the Japanese task force within gun range of the
heavy ships unless by some fortuitous circumstance which I do not
envisage ; and unless they could have been brought within gun range
they could not have been destroyed.
46. General Russell. Well, let me state that question another way.
Let's assume that on the 4th or 5th of December this approaching
Japanese task force had been discovered, by reconnaissance or acci-
dentally or otherwise. Was there here in Pearl Harbor a force which
could have gone out and prevented this task force from reaching a
point from which the aircraft could have been launched for the attack?
Admiral McMoeris, If the force in question had been [i2878'\
discovered on the 5th of December, there is no question in my mind
that the forces present would have been moved to intercept the Jap-
anese forces, and that it is highly probable that if such interception
had taken place the Japanese force would have been deterred from
making an attack on Pearl Harbor. On the other hand, and we are
now in the field of speculation, I suspect that a fight would have oc-
curred in which our losses might have been even greater than actually
occurred.
I'd like to amplify that a moment, if I may.
47. General Russell. Yes. Would you ?
Admiral McMorris. The antiaircraft defenses of our ships at that
time were by no manner of means as effective as they have since
become. We would have had but two carriers present as against
the Japanese six; and, while I believe that we would have inflicted
damage on the Japanese, I believe that our own losses would have
been extremely heavy and might well have included the loss of both
our carriers.
48. General Russell. Well, to state it a little bit crudely, they were
going to get you whether j'ou stayed at home or whether you went
out and fought them ; is that it ?
Admiral McMorris. I regret to say I think that is probably true.
49. General Russell. Now, Admiral, the documents which this
Board has seen relating to the plans for the joint operations of the
Army and Navy, in estimating the situation, have, as I recall, without
exception, stressed the probability of a submarine-air attack on Pearl
Harbor as being very, very probable. These documents, as I recall,
were prepared in the sping of '41. As a matter of fact, the Secretary
of the Navy [2S79] sent a letter to the Secretary of War in
which the attention of the Secretary of War was called to the possi-
bility or probability of that form of attack, and there was stressed in
this letter the weakness of defenses here against such an attack. Are
you familiar with those documents and those estimates?
Admiral McMorris. Without having any detailed recollection of
the matter, I feel quite sure that at the time I knew of them, and cer-
tainly the matter of AA defenses of this area had been a matter of very
grave concern, and representations were made to the Secretary of the
Navy to increase the AA gun power, radar, and so forth, to insure
more effective protection of ships in Pearl Harbor.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1501
50. General Russell. Do you recall making an inspection of the
antiaircraft defenses here on Pearl Harbor as they were maintained
by the Army ?
" Admiral McMorris. I at one time did make a tour of the defenses
of Oahu with General Gardner, who gave a presentation of his anti-
aircraft setup; and then I rode around the Island, saw a number of
(he installations, and attended several antiaircraft practices. I do
not now^ recall whether that was when General Herron was here or
after General Short had taken over. I did know that Army author-
ities felt that the AA gun power immediately around Pearl Harbor
needed improvement, and they were particularly concerned over the
posibility that aircraft coming in from the south might be able to drop
bombs before they had been under very seriious AA fire. I did not,
however, have detailed familiarity with the AA defenses here, nor
would I be a competent judge to pass on many of the [2S80]
technicalities. What I now have outlined is rather a general im-
pression.
51. General Russell. Do you know of any reports made by the
Xavy here to the Navy Department in Washington or to Army au-
thorities here or elsewhere in which these deficiencies or inadequacies
of the antiaircraft defenses were pointed out? I will confine that
question to the period after February 1, '41, if I did not in the the
original question.
Admiral McMorris. I do not now recall very clearly. Such mat-
ters could have occurred within the staff without my recollecting it,
but I do recall, when on a trip in the summer of '41 to the Navy De-
partment with Admiral Kimmel, representation to naval authorities
that the AA gun power and radar defenses of Pearl Harbor should be
improved ; that I do recall that the matter of acquiring radars was one
very frequently discussed, and that during 1941 very marked improve-
ment was made in that connection.
52. General Russell. Admiral, do you know any reason why the
thinking of the Navy might have changed from iFebruary 1941 to
November 1941 as to the probability of a surprise air raid on Pearl
Harbor ?
Admiral McMorris. Perhaps I had better express my own views in
that connection, that to my mind as the defenses here were strength-
ened I thought that the Japanese would be very promptly aware of it ;
and I thought that as the year wore on the Japanese were becoming
more fully committed to an all-out efi'ort in another direction. I did
not discount the possibility of air raid here, but I did doubt that it
would be highly effective. I did believe that any raiding group would
suffer [^881] disproportionately to damage that they might
inflict upon us.
53. General Russell. This last question so far as I am concerned,
Admiral : Do you know of any directive or order which may have
been restrictions or limitations upon the freedom of the Admiral of
the Pacific Fleet in the disposition of the elements of that fleet; from
higher authority?
Admiral McMorris. I am sure there were none.
54. General Russell. And you base that assurance on the fact
that you knew of none, and would have known of such if they had
existed ?
1502 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral McMokris. That is correct.
[288£] 55. General Frank. Do you know liow Jap intelligence
revealed to the Jap navy the conditions here, so favorable to this
attack ?
Admiral McMorris. I do not.
56. General Frank. Is there any thought about that in the Navy?
There must have been some discussion of it.
Admiral McMorris. I never entertained any doubt, any time during
1941, that the Japanese were fully informed of all military activities
in this area.
57. General Frank. Do you feel that there was sufficient effort
made in the islands, and that could have been made, to protect against
Jap intelligence?
Admiral McMorris. You are getting out of my bailiwick. General.
58. General Frank. You are Chief of Staff; you must have had
some thought on it.
Admiral McMorris. I was War Plans Officer at that time, and my
concern was very largely with the plans for offensive operations in
the Marshall area.
59. General Frank. From a general point of view, is there any feel-
ing about that, in the Navy ?
Admiral McMorris. I would say in general that there was a feeling
that intelligence efforts on the part of the United States in time of
peace, toward restricting information reaching the enemy, are weak,
and that it takes stress of war to obtain popular support for restrictive
measures.
60. General Frank. You have already commented on this. I
would like to approach it from a little different point of view, with
respect to this question : Had the Japanese attack [£8SS~\ been
anticipated and met by the Navy, could aircraft from the carriers
have been successful, do you feel, in an attack on the Jap carriers ?
Admiral McMorris. Will you read that question?
(Question read.)
61. General Frank. I will tell you what I am after, just to clear
this up a little bit. I am going to follow this with a question as to
what would have been the effect on subsequent operations of the Jap
fleet, liad they not lost those carriers. Do you see my approach?
Admiral McMorris. Had the Japanese lost their carriers, undoubt-
edly they would have been handicapped in some of their subsequent
operations, but it is improbable that all of their carriers would have
been lost. In fact, at one time or another, those carriers have been
under attack ; and I believe that one of the six carriers that came to
Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December 1941 is still operative.
62. General Frank. Then would you say that this Japanese attack
was not so hazardous, so courageous, and such a decided gamble?
Admiral McMorris. I would say that I felt that it was a considera-
ble gamble at the time, and that had the Japanese continued in, with
all the defenses fully manned and alerted, there would have been suf-
fered very severe damage, and, in so far as locally is concerned, would
not have'inilicted great damage. I do think however that we would
surely have suffered damage within our fleet.
63. General Frank. Do you feel that there was a certain compla-
cency here which led the command, both Army and Navy, to feel
secure against such an attack?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1503
[2884] Admiral McMorris. No, I would not say that in quite
those words.
64. General Frank. How would you state it?
Admiral McMorris. I would say that they felt an attack of that
particular nature was improbable, but that their capabilities for with-
standing such an attack, with the measures at hand, would be quite
effective.
65. General Frank. That is, the capabilities of the Jap attack
would be effective ?
Admiral McMorris. No, that the capabilities of defense would be
effective.
66. General Frank. But there seems to have been an effective Jap-
anese intelligence system.
Admiral McMorris. I am quite sure of it.
67. General Frank. Therefore, in the face of that intelligence sys-
tem, which kept them advised of the attitude and measures taken here,
do you feel under those circumstances that this Jap attack was hazard-
ous, courageous, and a gamble ?
Admiral McMorris. I so felt at the time. I still feel that there
was great risk involved, even though they escaped undamaged.
68. General Frank . But you have already stated that at that time
there was not a sufficient naval force here to have met them success-
fully.
Admiral McMorris. That's correct.
69. General Frank. Do you consider this was a suicidal attack in
that it was made so as to sacrifice the airplanes and crews but save the
carriers?
Admiral McMorris. I believe that that was in their minds
[~(55-5] to a large extent. I do not believe that they expected to
lose all of their crews, but that they were prepared to lose all or a
great portion of them. I believe for that matter that they were pre-
pared to accept some losses within their carriers, themselves.
70. General Frank. Had all or any part of this analysis through
which we have just gone taken place prior to the attack?
Admiral McMorris. Certainly not, as it has been outlined, here,
subsequently. There had been consideration given to the question,
and to the effectiveness of these carriers.
71. General Frank. What I don't quite understand is how. if you
felt fears that six carriers could come in that could not be handled^ by
the United States fleet, here, how you felt that Oahu was so secure
against attack.
Admiral jNIcIMorris. Let me say, here, that the fleet is not primarily
to defend Oahu, but rather, that Oahu was a place of refuge for the
fleet. It was not expected that in time of war the fleet would be pres-
ent in Oahu, except the units here for rest and replenishment; just as,
today, the fleet is not present in Oahu, but rather is operating for the
most part far afield.
72. General Frank. So far as you know, did this Jap attacking task
force completely evade all United States naval intelligence detection ?
Admiral McMorris. As far as I know, no intelligence, on the part
of any portion of the United States authorities, was developed.
73. General Frank. Intelligence indicated a Jap task force in the
Marshalls, with carriers and submarines. Do you know whether or
1504 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
not the radio intercept was successful in picking [3886] the
force, but wrong in the location ?
Admiral McMorris. I feel quite sure that that did not obtain.
74. General Frank. Is it a difficult task to make a rendezvous with
supply ships at sea without the use of radio ?
Admiral McMorris. No ; it should be very simple.
75. General Grunert. Admiral, do you recall whether or not you
were present or knew anything about a conference that was held
as a result of two messages received, November 27, 1941, one coming
to the Admiral of the fleet, and one, to General Short; the one to the
Admiral of the fleet starting out by saying, "Consider this a war
warning" ?
Admiral McMorris. I remember such a message, and I remember
that, subsequent to that, there was a conference ; but whether or not it
was entirely on the basis of that dispatch or on proposals of other dis-
patches that came in about the same time, I do not recall. Minutes
of those meetings were never made.
76. General Grunert. Is it common practice in the Navy to receive
a message starting out, "Consider this a war warning," or what did
that mean to you navy people, when they said, "Consider this a war
warning" ? Was that discussed ?
Admiral McMorris. It was certainly considered to mean that the
internal situation was continuing to deteriorate, and that we might
find ourselves engaged in war, in very short order. This was not par-
ticularly disturbing or unexpected, but rather confirmatory of the
general thoughts at the time.
77. General Grunert. Then you presume it was sent just as a
routine matter ?
[2887] Admiral McMorris. No, sir; by no manner of means.
78. General Grunert. Then it would seem that if you had that
"thought in mind, there was no use in sending you such a message.
That is just an observation on my part. As to your estimate, wherein,
at one of the conferences, you expressed yourself as estimating or feel-
ing that the Japs would never so attack, and there was no probability
of such an attack, or words to that effect ; now, at such conference, an
expression on your part, in your position, is not an expression of your
own opinion, it is the expression of an official opinion which possibly
a commanding general of the Department could take as reflecting the
Navy estimate of the situation, and possibly, on which he could base
action that he took, because of your understanding; is that a correct
expression? If not, will you correct me in its incorrectness?
Admiral McMorris. I would not pass an opinion or conclusion as
to the merits or demerits of the conclusion which 3^011 have just given.
79. General Grunert. But is true, is it not, that when you express
yourself at any official conference, that is an official opinion, at least ?
Admiral McMorris. That certainly was an expression of the opin-
ion of the War Plans officer of the fleet commander. I shoulcl be
highly surprised, however, if the individual who is charged with
defenses should govern his actions or preparations for defense or
offense entirely on an opinion so expressed.
80. General Grunert. During any conference subsequent to No-
vember 27, do you recall whether or not the Commanding [2888]
General of the Hawaiian Department informed the Navy as to the
PROCEEDINGS OP ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1505
measures he was taking in view of what we w^ill call the "warning
messages*' received ?
Admiral McMorris. I do not recall.
81. General Gruxert. Do you know what measures the Command-
*ing General took about that time?
Admiral McMorris. No.
82. General Grunert. Then you do not know whether or not he
informed tlie Navy of the measures that he did take?
Admiral ^McMorris. I do not know. That, however, does not imply
that such action did not take place.
83. General Gruxert. Were you not interested in the measures he
took, or Avas going to take, in order to protect your fleet?
Admiral INIcMorris. ISIj^ own concern and my duties were with the
implementation of the plans for offensive action. The commander
of the Hawaiian sea frontier, and, to a lesser degree, the operations
section of our staff, would have had those matters of their immediate
concern.
84. General Grunert. Then as I undei'stand it, you were concerned
|)ractically with operation of the fleet after it was out of the harbor,
and not particularly in the harbor?
Admiral McMorris. My concern was with the future rather than
(he immediate present.
85. General Russell. Admiral, the course which you have described
as being the one that the Navy thinks now the Jap task forces took in
order to launch their aircraft, is about how many miles in length ? Do
3'ou recall how far that is?
Admiral McMorris. You mean from the port that they last de-
parted, until they arrived ?
[£889] 86. General Russell. Until they arrived at the point at
which they launched their attack.
87. General Frank. Did they have to refuel before they got back
home?
Admiral McMorris. I don't know that they have got information
on that, that they tried to estimate that distance. I mean, without a
chart at hand, it is certainly several thousand miles ; but with a quick
reference to the chart, which I suppose is not obtainable here, I could
give it with a considerable degree of accuracy.
88. General Russell. I am not sure that we can, from the record,
determine, but we were attempting to relate that back of December 7
to the date of November 26, which would have given them approxi-
mately 11 days' traveling time. We were wondering if they could
have followed the course which you have described and have completed
it within eleven days.
[28&0] 89. General Russell. Have you any information which
you could give us from which we could deduce the distance travelled
by the task force, assuming thjit it followed the course which you now
think it did ?
Admiral McMorris. I believe that we have certain intelligence data
that might furnish very closely the dates and courses.
90. General Russell. Would you make that data available to us ?
Admiral McMorris. Yes, sir.
91. General Grunert. Admiral, on several occasions you referred,
in addressing this body, to it as a court. It is not a court. It is a
Board.
1506 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral McMorris. Very good, sir.
92. General Frank. Admiral, you seem to adhere to the sincere
belief that this Jap attack was possible and at the same time have the
sincere belief that it was not probable.
Admiral McMorris. Those were certainly the views that I enter*-
tained at that time.
93. General Frank. Also the Japs had rather complete intelligence
information of the conditions here. That has been indicated by cap-
tured orders of the attack ?
Admiral McMorris. Yes, sir.
94. General Frank. Also that the Army here took measures against
sabotage only. Was that satisfactory to the Navy ?
Admiral McMorris. I do not know that I can answer that question
in that way. Certainly, the chief concern that we felt at the time
was that saboteurs or a submarine attack constituted the chief hazard.
95. General Frank. What defense measures against air attack did
the Navy have on December 7th ?
[£892] Admiral McMorris. The details I do not know.
96. General Frank. They had certain guns aboard the ships ?
Admiral McMorris. A plan had been drawn up and signed by the
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commander,
Hawaiian Sea Frontier
97. General Frank. Who was Admiral Bloch ?
Admiral McMorris. Yes. — that included provisions for ships
and aircraft in port participating in the local defense, but exactly
what those provisions were or what conditions were prescribed I can-
not say.
98. General Frank. In analyzing the testimony, the Jap attack-
ing force had a relative degree of security against attack by our fleet,
did it not ?
Admiral McMorris. Probably, unless there was chance encounter.
99. General Frank. But you stated that had our fleet known of
its existence, it would probably have suffered defeat had they met.
Admiral McMorris. I think that is quite possible.
100. General Frank. Then about the only threat the Jap air at-
tack had was from local defenses, after the attack had been launched ;
is that correct ?
Admiral McMorris. Not quite, because the things that the Jap
fleet would have to contend with would have included both elements
of the fleet, which even had our fleet been defeated would probably
have inflicted some damage, so that no one element or consideration
can be taken as a thing apart.
101. General Frank. According to your own testimony, it would
not have been a paying venture for the United States Fleet have gone
out after this attacking Jap force; that is correct, [2892] is
it not?
Admiral McMorris. No, sir, I did not say it would not be a paying
venture. I did say and feel that our own losses might well have
been heavier than those actually experienced, but that I would have
expected some damage to have been inflicted on the Japanese Fleet,
Avhereas they actually escaped scot-free.
102. General Frank. Except for the loss of their
Admiral McMorris. Excejjt for the loss of some aircraft.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1507
103. General Frank. What in your opinion would have been the
result of a conflict at sea between the available naval craft here, with
two carriers, and the Jap force that came in?
Admiral McMurris. I believe that our fleet would have suffered
quite severely and that it would largely have been a contest by air
forces, and that it is improbable that we would have succeeded in
bringing the Japanese carriers under gunfire. That, however, is
necessarily highly speculative.
104. General Frank. That is ver}^ true, but in the face of this
analysis it would seem that this attack would show up to have been
much more probable than with the existing conditions at the time
then estimated?
Admiral McMorris. It might be considered very doubtful if the
Japanese Fleet had been discovered, with our forces at sea, as to
whether or not they would have continued the attack.
105. Major Clausen. Admiral, was the reason that no counter-
attack was launched because of the lack of available means, or because
you did not know where the attackers were?
Admiral McMorris. We did not know where the attackers were.
106. Major Clausen. Would the present radar installations on the
higher mountains as presently operated, had they been operated
[2893] before or on 7 December, 1941. have permitted you to have
found the attackers?
Admiral McMorris. It might have materiallv assisted.
107. Major Clausen. That is all I have.
108. General Grunert. Any other questions?
Admiral, is there anything else that you think of that you would
like to advance or tell the Board that may be of assistance to it in
coming to a conclusion about these matters ?
Admiral McMorris. No, sir.
109. General Grunert. Thank you very much for coming u}5. W^e
appreciate your giving us your time.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
[2S94] TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. JOHN STEWART BRAGDON,
CHIEF OF CONSTRUCTION DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF ENGI-
NEERS, WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board your
name, grade, and organization and station?
General Bragdon. John Stewart Bragdon, Brigadier General, Chief
of Construction Division in the Office of Chief of Engineers.
2. Colonel West. In the War Department?
General Bragdon. In the War Department, yes.
3. Colonel West. Washington, D. C?
General Bragdon. Washington, D. C, yes, sir.
4. General Frank. Will you state, General Bragdon, how you hap-
pen to be here ?
General Bragdon. Yes, sir. I am here under orders, of which I have
copies, issued by the Adjutant General, dated the — (the witness ex-
amines paper) I think it's the 2nd of September; and these orders
79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 2 46
1508 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
instruct me to proceed and report to the Commanding General, Pacific
Ocean Area, on temporary duty in connection with the activities of the
Army Pearl Harbor Board, which meets 17 September 1944.
I was called on the telephone by General Styer, I think about two
weeks ago, and told that this investigation was going on and that I
should — they wanted somebody to appear before the Board who was
conversant with the procedures and policies of — construction policies
of the Engineer Department, to appear before the Board, and that I
was the person that [2895] should do it, and
5. General Frank. You were to appear as a witness before the
Board?
General Bragdon. They told me, they stated — stated that Colonel
Wyman was coming back from France, and they wanted somebody as
counsel and adviser to him, but they also indicated that I should also
make sure that any facts concerning construction and the Engineer
Department or the War Department s methods along that line should
be — I should inform the Board of anything which they wanted to know
in that line.
6. General Grtjnert. Was this at the instigation of the Chief of
Engineers or the Commanding General of the Army Service Forces ?
General Bragd.on. No, sir.
7. General Grunert. Or what?
General Bragdon. General Styer told me that General Somervell
wanted me to do that, and I think at the same day or possibly a day
later I got a call from the Under Secretary's office, from General
Reber, and General Reber stated that he had been present when that
discussion had been going on and that the Under Secretary's office felt
that I should have the assistance of a lawyer, and suggested Major
Powell, and of course I said I was very glad to have that assistance
and would be very glad to have Major Powell accompany me, and he is
here, ahd he has orders just similar to mine.
8. General Grunert. The Board has no information about your
coming, as far as I know. Is that true, Mr. Recorder?
9. Colonel West. Yes, sir. The only information that the Board
possibly had regarding General Bragdon was that little [£896]
memorandum that came through the other day, forwarded from our
Washington headquarters, over Colonel Hughes' signature, advising
us that General Bragdon had been designated as Colonel Wyman's
counsel and had made request of our headquarters in Washington for
certain information. That came second-hand from the Washington
headquarters through Colonel Hughes, and we have no copies of orders
such as that which General Bragdon has in his possession, or no other
official information.
10. General Grunert. You go ahead, finish ; then I will begin.
11. General Frank. Why is this lawyer with you?
General Bragdon. I take it, to assist me, sir. I mean that is the
12. General Frank. In what capacity?
General Bragdon. I would say, the same reasons that I am here.
He has his orders to be here with me, sir.
Now, what we had hoped that the Board would do, sir, was allow
us to submit statements concerning each of the phases — all phases of
the matter. We have particularly read the interim report of the
Congressional Committee, and I rather felt that probably that put this
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1509
particular phase of the matter somewhat different from other phases,
because in that were a lot of conclusions affecting primarily Colonel
Wyman's actions in connection with certain of the work under his
charge.
That committee — that report has been published, and of course the
newspapers carried these criticisms all over the United States, and
it was thought desirable that every effort be expended to see that all
data were submitted to the Board. In the Office of the Chief of En-
gineers Major Lozier has been [2897] studying exhaustively
all the files bearing on it, and particularly the A. W. S. files and the
War Gas Reserve files and the circumstances surrounding the award-
ing of the Hawaiian Constructors' contracts. Those three phases were
the three things chiefly touched on by the Congressional Committee,
and so we have been studying the files to see if we can get out all the
data that it was possible to get and pin down the various circumstances,
connecting them up with the dates chronologically so as to show a true
picture, and that turns out to be a prodigious task, because the ram-
ifications of all of these things, if pursued, are almost inexhaustible.
Major Lozier has done a lot of work like that, on that line; and ever
since Major Powell was told that he would come, he similarly has made
exhaustive studies, and we are now working, have been working, started
working on the files yesterday when we came here.
This wire that I have here
13. General Frank. Now, just a minute. Specifically in what ca-
pacity are you here ?
General Bragdon. Well, I take it I am here for two things : in the
first place, to — this order says, "in connection with the activities of
the Army Pearl Harbor Board" : in other words, to get any data that
the Board may want, particularly in connection with the Engineer
Department activities; and the next thing: and then as counsel for
Colonel Wyman, to help him work up data which bear on his connec-
tion with the work, and also in connection with the charges made in
the interim report.
14. General Frank. You are out here, from your point of view, to
act as counsel for Wyman, as a counsel for the Corps of Engineers,
or whom ?
[£898] General Bragdon. Counsel for Colonel Wyman, in help-
ing him produce data for the Board, more or less in defense of his
actions ; but I didn't — don't conceive it. General, to be solely that ; I also
conceive it to be my duty to present everything I can that affects those
particular activities, namely, the — r-
15. General Frank. Do you feel that you were sent out here as a
sort of special investigator for this Board?
General Bragdon. No, sir; not at all, sir.
16. General Frank. Do you feel that you are sent out here as a sort
of counsel for the Engineers ?
General Bragdon. Yes, sir; I would say partially that.
IT. General Frank. From whom did you get your instructions?
General Bragdon, From General Styer.
18. General Frank. What were those instructions?
General Bragdon. Those instructions were about like this, sir
19. General Frank. Have you anything written?
1510 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK '
General Bragdon. No, sir. I had a telephone conversation, but I
don't know whether that's along with me or not. I can tell you just
about the way the conversation went. The Chief of Engineers and the
Deputy Chief happened to be out of the office, and General Styer
stated
20. General Frank. Wlio is the Deputy Chief?
General Bragdon. General Robins.
21. General Frank. Yes?
General Bragdon. — were out of the, office, and General Styles got
me and stated that Colonel Wyman was back from France and going
through Washington, was in fact over there, had just been in General
Somervell's office, and that he was [2S99] coming out to appear
before this Board; and they stated that they wanted somebody to
appear before the Board who understood the Engineer Department's
construction procedures and policies, who was well acquainted with
those and could present those as it might affect this case before the
Board, and he ended up by saying, "You are it."
I said ,"I am it, am I?"
And that was about all there was to it. He said that Colonel Wyman
was proceeding on out to San Francisco to have a few days' rest.
They had pulled Colonel Wyman, who was in command of the base
at Cherbourg, out from there, from his activities. He was all tired
out, and he should get a few days' rest. I should contact him in Sari
Francisco.
22. General Frank. In San Francisco?
General Bragdon. Yes, sir; which is exactly what transpired. 1
contacted him about two days before I came out, and we went through
some of the files there, that we tliought some of the data might be there
that might not be here.
23. General Frank. Did you get any instructions from General
Somervell ?
General Bragdon. Not personally, no, sir; nothing other than just
what I told you, from General Styer.
24. General Frank. Did you get any instruction from Mr. Patter-
son's office?
General Bragdon. No, sir, not directly from him himself. I talked
to General Reber, and General Reber's sole discussions with me were
with reference to having a legal man along with me.
25. General Frank. For what purpose?
General Bragdon. To assist me.
l^OOO] 26. General Frank. Well, why is the Assistant Secre-
tary's office interested in having a special lawyer out here as an assist-
ant to Wyman's counsel ?
General Bragdon. I don't know. sir. I know that except — well, I
would say any office would be interested in having as much data pre-
sented by — well, I guess I might consider myself as a specialist, be-
cause I have specialized in construction so much.
27. General Frank. Well, we have an officer who is an Assistant
Recorder on the Board.
General Bragdon. Yes.
28. General Frank. Major Clausen, who has been put on the Board,
at the instance of the office of the Under Secretary, Mr. Patterson,
to assist the Board in this very matter.
General Bragdon. Yes.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1511
29. General Frank. Now, he, I understand, is here for the purpose
of representing the War Departinent and the Under Secretary's office ;
and noAY, as I understand it, the same Under Secretary's office is phicing
another lawyer here to take care of Colonel Wyman's interests.
General Bragdox. Well. I would say he was here primarily to assist
me, sir, and I have found in — 1 have asked
30, General Frank. And you are here as counsel for Colonel Wy-
man?
General' Bragdon. Yes, sir. 1 have found, though, in looking
through these files that it is a terrific task, and I have been using
Major Powell on that. He has been searching — since he has been on
this work what he has been doing has been searching files, the A . W.
[£901] 31. General Frank. When he came back — Colonel
Wyman — to whom did he report in Washington ? To General Somer-
vell?
General Bragdon. Yes, sir.
32. General Frank. Or to the Chief of Engineers, or to whom?
General Bragdon. To General Somervell, sir. You see, he over
in France — over in — yes, in France, he wasn't under the jurisdiction
of the Chief of Engineers. He reported to General Somervell. I
haven't got a copy of Colonel Wyman's orders, but he has. He is
here, sir. He is now in Hawaii.
33. General Frank. Can you state what you are here to prove?
General Bragdon. No, sir; I am not here to prove any particular
thing. I am simply here to — I take — conceive that I am here to see
that all data that can possibly bear on construction and the activities
here are brought before the Board.
■ I wonder if I can give you an 'example of how I figure I might
be helpful? I think I can, sir. Before Pearl Harbor, when peace-
time regulations were in effect, the procedures were very cumbersome.
We had very small limitations on awards of contracts. For instance,
a District Engineer had a $10,000 limitation, a Division Engineer
a $50,000 limitation. Everything above that had to travel out all
the way back to Washington, and there was all that complicated
procedure, whicJi was proper procedure to protect the United States.
But after Pearl Harbor things changed, and there was a transition,
too, along that line ! and after Pearl Harbor even an Area Engineer,
a subordinate of a District Engineer, had a $3,000,000 limitation.
I think general policies like that do make clear quite a [29021
number of things.
34. General Frank. Are you on full time status as a counsel now
for Colonel Wyman ?
General Bragdon. Well, I am not doing anything else, sir ; I mean —
35. General Frank. It seems sort of peculiar, because General
Short has been given a counsel to act in addition to his other duties.
General Bragdon. Yes, sir. Well, of course,
36. General Frank. And here Colonel Wyman comes along and
has you, a Brigadier General, and a Major out of the Assistant Secre-
tary's office to take care of him.
General Bragdon. I think, sir, the reason I was designated was
simply because I am head of the construction division and supposed
to be well acquainted with our construction procedures.
37. General Frank, Do you know anything about the operations
at Pearl Harbor around December 7, 1941 ?
1512 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Bragdon. Except as revealed from a study — I have been
studying this up, naturally, since I was assigned to the job — no, sir.
I had
38. General Frank. Yes., But you had no experience with the
contractors' nor with the District Engineer's operations in 1941 in
Hawaii ?
General Bragdon. No, sir, I did not.
89. General Frank. All right. Now, who is Major Lozier?
General Bragdon. Major Lozier is an officer who has been on duty
in the Chief of Engineer's legal
40. General Frank. Is he a service officer ?
[B90S] General Bragdon. No, sir. The Judge Advocate Gen-
eral's Office. He has been on duty in the Chief of Engineer's office,
and he has been sent out here on permanent change of station.
41. General Frank. Did he come out here with you?
General Bragdon. No, sir; he preceded me. His permanent change
of station orders I think have been in existence about six weeks. I
don't know why they didn't get clearance. And when the Board in
Washington called Generals Reybold and Robins before it, he was
assigned to work on this case, to get up data for them, so those two
Generals could answer you gentlemen's questions before the Board.
He has worked intensively on that ever since — well, I think for about
five weeks. He worked on the files in Washington, the A. W. S. files
and the War Reserve Gasoline Storage files.
4^. General Grunert. Still working on that, is he?
General Bragdon. Yes, sir.
43. General Grunert. Then was he sent out here also to help some-
body else?
Gfeneral Bragdon. You see, General, he was out here — his orders
out here, I think, about six weeks ago.
44. General Grunert. Then, why is he still on this work? Has he
been instructed to be still on this work out here ?
General Bragdon. I don't know whether such instructions were
given him or not, sir, but we did send a w^ire out here in connection
with my coming, asking them to please arrange these files out here
in the chronological order and to segregate them according to what
we conceive to be the three main branches of investigation, that is, to
segregate the Air Warning Service files from the Reserve Gasoline
Storage files [2904] and the Rohl-Connolly contract so that
they can be examined here. I found, in the little questioning I have
done of various people connected with this, that very few of them can
give answers that are specific. They just give you leads, and you
have to go to the files to find out anything that is really anyways
conclusive.
45. General Frank. To whom were you to report when you got
here ?
General Bragdon. General Richardson, sir. I just got here yester-
day, and I came over, and General Richardson was not here. General
Ruffner was out when I got here, too.
46. General Frank. You have an official copy of the telegram to
General Richardson ?
General Bragdon. Yes, sir, I do.
47. General Frank. Will you read it into the record, please?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1513
General Bragdon. Do you want all these numbers also ?
48. General Frank. Yes.
General Bragdon. Or shall I read the written matter? This says:
(Priority dated August 2, 1944, is as follows:)
Peiokity
- 29 Aug 44
Washington, D. C.
A WAR 300004Z WTJ
W-88692 30th Orders are being requested for Brigadier General J. S. Bragdon
to proceed to Hawaii in connection with the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearings
there. General Bragdon will act as counsel for Colonel Wyman who will appear
before the Board. It Is desired that [2905] these officers reach Hawaii on
or about twelve September. (To Richardson from Somervell signed Marshall)
It is requested that you have the Department Engineer have the records per-
taining to the construction of aircraft warning stations, the war reserve gasoline
project and all work pertaining to both, also the records pertaining to the Rohl
Connolly contract and any other contracts for work or materials relating to the
above projects, reviewed and a chronological analysis made thereof so that it
will be available for the officers above. It is particularly desirable that there
be a chronoligical record of the actual work done and of aU delays in connection
therewith, with reasons therefor. Also that local priorities and changes therein
be listed according to their occurrence. It is further suggested that the analysis
be developed under the three general headings of :
(a) the project for the aircraft warning stations ;
(b) the war reserve gasoline storage project ; and
(c) the Rohl Connolly contract —
That should have been "Hawaiian Constructors."
— in its relation to those projects and any other work or materials for which
that contract was used. Major Lue C. Lozier who is being transferred to the
Office of the District Engineer on permanent change of station —
Apparently the second page of it is not here, sir. I will have to
get that. It was very brief on the second page, [2,906] to the
effect that he also was coming. I will have to get that, sir.
[290S-A'] Addenda
(A corrected and complete copy of the above-mentioned radiogram
which was furnished the Recorder of the Board by Headquarters,
United States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, (Through Lt. Col.
R. W. Hain, G. S. C.) reads as follows :)
This is a re-decipherment of the message dated 30 August and contains
corrections.
12 Sept 44
(Date of re-decipherment)
Priority
a WAR 300004Z WTJ Washington, D. C.
W-88692 30TH Orders are being requested for Brigadier General J Pd S Pd
Bragdon to proceed to Hawaii in connection with tlie Army Pearl Harbor Board
hearings there pd General Bragdon will act as counsel for Colonel Wyman who
will appear before Board Pd It is desired that these officers reach Hawaii on or
about twelve September Pd Paren to Richardson from Somervell signed INIar-
shall paren It is requested that you have the Department Engineer have the
records pertaining to the construction of aircraft warning stations cma the war
reserve gasoline project and all work pertaining to both cma also the records
pertaining to the Rohl Connolly contract and any other contracts for work or
materials relating to the above projects cma reviewed and a chronological
analysis made thereof so that it will be available for the officers above Pd. It is
particularly desirable that there be a chronological record of the actual work
done and of all delays in connection therewith cma with reasons therefor Pd
Also that local priorities and changes therein be listed according to their orcur-
1514 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
rence Pd It is further suggested that the analysis be developed under the three
general headings of colon paren a paren the project for the aircraft warning
stations semi paren b paren the war reserve gasoline storage [2905-B]
project semi and paren c parent the Rohl Connolly Contract in its relation to
those projects and any other work of materials for which that contract was
used Pd Major Lu C Pd Lozier who is being transferred to the Office of the
District Engineer on permanent change of station is being sent out immedi-
ately Pd Major Lozier also has studied this case
[2906 — continued'] 49. General Frank. Have you received any
other instructions — any other instructions from anybody — other than
(hose you have mentioned?
General Bragdon. No, sir. I talked it over with General Kobins.
and General Robins said, "Just give the Board all the facts you can
find." That was almost exactly his words. And General Reybold got
back about an hour before I left — no, a few hours before I left, the
same morning. He had no instructions to give me.
50. General Frank. To whom are you directed to report in Wash-
ington after you complete your duty liere?
General Bragdon. I wasn't directed to report to anybody, sir. I
suppose that I should inform my su])eriors of what happened.
51. General Frank. Who directed you to come here?
General Bragdon. These orders, sir [indicating].
52. General Frank. I know, but I am getting to the authority that
originated these orders.
General Bragdon. I take that to have been General Somervell, be-
cause General Styer so told me.
53. General Frank. Yes.
General Bragdon. General Styer first called my Chief and Deputy,
but they were both absent.
54. General Frank. I think that is all.
General Bragdon. General, could I say — I think I did say it before,
but I did feel, sir, that this particular phase of it was somewhat differ-
ent from other phases because [2907] there had already been
an investigation, and printed report of investigation which actually
states certain things were not efficiently done, and that's been in the
press all over the country. That's known, and I don't thiijk there is
any other phase that has been that way, and I think that undoubtedly
is why our superiors felt that somebody who was supposed to know
our procedure, both then and now, should be here to make sure the
Board could get all those phases and aspects before it. I think that
Avas all there was behind that, sir.
(There was colloquy off the record.)
General Bragdon. Maybe I had better correct that, sir. General
Reber is with the — you mentioned it, Colonel.
55. Colonel West. Well, I understood he was with the Legislative
and Liaison Division of the War Department.
General Bragdon. With Colonel Persons.
56. Colonel West. General Persons.
General Bragdon. General Persons. Yes, I think he is. Maybe
I am mistaken on that. I know he went over to be with the Under
Secretary, and I am not just sure, sir, of the relationship between that
Legislative Liaison Section and the Under Secretary's office. I know
that General Reber — I thought he was right with the Under ^Secretary's
office. I have only been in Washington about two and a half months,
and I am not quite sure of all the relationships between those officers.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1515
57. General Gruxert. What conversation did you have with Reber ?
General Bragdon. It was solely to — as I said before, sir, he thought
I should have a — he stated that he had been in General Somervell's
office when the conversation had taken place there, and he stated
he thought I should have a legal man [3908] to help me,
58. General Grunert. Then, do you. know whether he represented
the Under Secretary of War or whom he represented when he made
that statement?
General Bragdon. No, sir, I don't know exactly that. I can't an-
swer that, sir.
59. General Gruistert. Let me see if I understand the situation cor-
rectly. You came over here under orders to act as a counsel for one
Colonel Wyman. That's one thing.
General Bragdon. Yes, sir.
60. General Grunert. You came over here also to provide the
Board with data from the War Department files and from the Ha-
waiian Department files if the Board wants such data; is that right?
General Bragdon. Yes, sir.
61. General Grunert. Then, you are in a dual capacity of repre-
senting one Colonel Wyman and of being an agent on behalf of the
War Department; is that right?
General Bragdon. I would say, on behalf of the Engineer Depart-
ment of the War Department. Yes, sir, I would say that was correct.
62. General Grunert. Now, as far as the Board knows, Colonel
Wyman has. not yet been accused of anything except by a Congres-
sional Committee report: and tlierefore, as far as the Board is con-
cerned, why, we do not admit that there is a counsel required by any
witnesses who have appeared before this Board, although any wit-
ness may have the advice of counsel in that respect, and not counsel
as distinguished from somebody charged with something as far as the
Board is concerned.
[£90d] General Bragdon. Yes, sir.
63. General Grunert. You understand that?
General Bragdon. Yes, sir.
64. General Grunert. Now, the Board will be very glad to get any
evidence that is available or any explanation of evidence which has
not already been advanced and is not already thoroughly understood
by the Board. Do you understand that the Board is limited in its
investigation to phases that led up to and are directly connected with
the Pearl Harbor disaster, and nothing after that unless it relates to
that attack?
General Bragdon. Yes, sir. I understand that, sir.
65. General Grunert. And these records that you have been in-
vestigating, most of them are after Pearl Harbor or prior thereto, or
what?
General Bragdon. All prior thereto, sir, and the fact is, we have
been concentrating on the records of the time between the Hawaiian
Constructors' contract and December 7th, the date of Pearl Harbor,
and of course we had to go back somewhat prior to that in order to
understand that part of it.
66. General Grunert. Now, from your investigation have you made
up a running story or statement that you would like to submit to the
Board or testify to before the Board ?
1516. CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Bragdon. Not at this time, sir.
67. General Grunert. How long will it take you to do that?
General Bragdon. I would like as much time as I could get.
68. General Grunert. This Board is very limited as to its time, and
it is going to leave here probably on the 19th and go back to Wash-
ington.
[2910] General Bragdon. I had understood from our orders
that you were going to call Colonel Wyman on the I7th, so we had
been aiming our studies that we have been making to have our data
ready on the I7th.
69. General Grunert. Wyman has been scheduled to appear here
on the 14th. It may originally have been intimated the 17th, but it is
actually scheduled now as the 14th.
General Bragdon. The 14th ?
70. General Grunert. We have to move up in order to accommo-
date or take care of everything we are cliarged with doing within the
limited time we have to do it. Now, whether or not we could post-
pone his hearing until a little later, that would be up to General
Frank, who has that particular part of the investigation. But there
is no use in rehashing a lot of this stuff if the Board already has the
evidence that you desire to present on behalf of the Chief of Engineers
and on behalf of Wyman. Therefore, it would be very necessary for
us to hear what you have to make in the line of a statement before we
determine whether or not it is just piling evidence up. In other words,
you don't know what the Board knows.
General Bragdon. No, sir, I don't.
71. General Grunert. And we don't know what you may have
found out that the Board doesn't know.
General Bragdon. Could I present the statement of that on the 15th,
sir?
72. General Grunert. I think you ought to present your statement
as early as possible, to Major Clausen, with a view to seeing whether
or not it is new evidence to the Board ; the earlier the date, the better.
Then we can determine what in [2911] your statement the
Board hasn't had and doesn't understand or hasn't had in the evidence
so far.
General Bragdon. Could I
73. General Grunert. This is as if you were coming new into the
case. You are coming into the case, newly into the case but probably
with old evidence as far as we are concerned, and we have not time to
bother with rehashing all this stuff.
General Bragdon. No. I see that.
Could I have the privilege, sir, of reading any of the evidence that
pertains to those particular phases ?
74. General Grunert. I clo not see the necessity of your reading
the evidence that the. Board has taken.
General Bragdon. My whole point was to see if — in many cases I
have found things
75. General Grunert. YoumayconsultMajor Clausen as to whether
or not such evidence exists on any point you wish.
General Bragdon. Yes.
76. General Grunert. But to turn over the evidence of the Board
to any particular witness or anyone who is interested in another wit-
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1517
ness would be giving one witness the benefit of knowing what all the
other witnesses had said, and in case of any future action therein it
wouldn't be "turkey."
General Bragdon. Of course, my idea would be just to do it in his
presence, in his office.
77. General Grunert. But you, are in the capacity here — that is
why I wanted to bring out that dual capacity. You are in the capacity
here of a counsel, to counsel some particular witness. Therefore I do
not see where it is pertinent that you should read all the evidence, nor
should the witness know [2912] what the others testified to.
General Bragdon. Yes.
78. General Grunert. If, as an aftermath of whatever may happen,
anyone is particularly charged with anything, then the law and the
regulations give him ample cfpportunity to prepare whatever case may
be against him.
■ It seems that most people have an idea that this is a court of inquiry
or something or a court to investigate some particular man or some
particular person. We are here to find facts about those things
charged to us.
General Bragdon. Yes.
79. General Grunert. And as far as you people are concerned, now
that you have shown yourself as counsel for Wyman, as far as you
are concerned, those phases that pertain to the Pearl Harbor disaster,
it may or may not have a bearing on the Pearl Harbor disaster, and
that will include Colonel Wyman.
General Bragdon. Yes.
80. General Grunert. So we want to get all the evidence we can, but
we can't include you as a member of the Board to know everything
that has gone on, and so forth.
General Bragdon. That is right.
81. General Grunert. There is nothing to be hidden except through
our instruction of holding this in closed session.
Do you sort of get an understanding of that, I mean ?
General Bragdon. Yes, sir. Of course, it is a fact that those — we
had then an awful lot of data which bore on those matters which
were in that Congressional report. Of course, we had naturally ad-
dressed ourselves to that, because that was pretty definite — rather, an
awful lot of things were said there, [2913] and that was why
we thought it was important that these things that we had found
which answered a lot of those things should be most certainly placed
before you.
82. General Frank. Well, you understand that the Board has a
regular procedure, and we have developed a requirement for things
that we want, and we have established the routine of getting it.
General Bragdon. Yes, sir. I only want to fit in with that proce-
dure, sir. I say, I only wanted to fit in with that. I wasn't
83. General Grunert. You might ask the Assistant Recorder
whether certain evidence has been brought out, introduced or not,
with a view to finding out what has been done, so that if you have
anything new the Board would be glad to get it.
General Bragdon. Yes.
84. General Grunert. Is that about right?
85. General Frank. Yes.
1518 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Bragdon. I can submit all the statements I want, can't I,
with reference to these
86. General Frank. Yes.
87. General Grunert. Yes, but we don't want to pile up evidence.
If we are satisfied that we have evidence on a point, there is no use
piling up records of it. We would be glad to get anything you want
to submit for consideration.
General Bragdon. General, would there be any objection, with ref-
erence to particular witnesses that have to do with Wyman's case,
to either myself or Major Powell being present, just for those particu-
lar witnesses that had to do with Wyman and the air warning service ?
[2914] 88. General Grunert. You mean, to sit in with those
witnesses when they give their testimony ?
General Bragdon. Just to be present. *
89. General Frank. No.
90. General Grunert. No; we cannot consider that anybody at
present needs a counsel for that, except where it is authorized by the
War Department directly, as was done for General Short, and that
was just to sit in during the time General Short was giving his testi-
mony, and for no other witnesses.
General Bragdon. Not while others affecting him were there? My
whole point would be just to make sure you got everything bearing on
those individual points.
91. General Frank. You seem to have come out here to have joined
the Board.
General Bragdon. No, sir, I don't believe that — I mean, I have no
such intention.
92. General Grunert. Well, the Board is a little bit confused as
to the necessity of the War Department's sending two or three people
out here when the War Department is already represented by an
Assistant Recorder who was specially detailed for that purpose by
the Under Secretary of War.
General Bragdon. Yes, sir,
93. General Grunert. So that this coming of this avalanche of
talent, or rank and talent, is not understood by the Board ; but if this
avalanche has anything to contribute to the Board, we shall be very
glad to get it.
94. General Frank. Have you some questions. Colonel Toulmin?
95. Colonel Tout^min. I would like to ask him one or two [£915]
questions, if it is agreeable. General.
General, I am confused and I think the record is not entirely clear
as to just whom you are representing, or defending, rather, other than
Colonel Wyman. Whom else are you acting either as counsel for or
defending here besides Colonel Wyman ?
General Bragdon. I wouldn't say I was defending any individual.
I do feel that I should bring to the attention of the Board any pro-
cedures which might explain to the Board any charges of wrong poli-
cies or inefficiencies on the part of our methods of doing things.
Do I make myself clear on that ?
In other words, if it is asserted that due to certain methods of the
Engineer Department certain things might have been delayed, and I
can explain them, then I would conceive it to be my duty to do that.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1519
96. Colonel Toulmin. Then you would be acting as a witness; is
that it?
General Bradgon. I would say that that was it, too, yes.
97. Colonel Toulmin. And you would also be acting as counsel ?
General Bragdon. Yes, because, General, of course, you see, the two
things are intermingled. Colonel Wyman was the officer who was in
direct charge. Of course, he was under the Commanding General
here, but he was in direct charge. But there are a lot of things to be
explained by existing procedures at that time, which were peacetime
procedures, and there is a legitimate line of demarcation, although
there was a transition between them, and that transition had to do
with things — for example, CPFF contracts were not in existence in
time of peace, [2916] and they came in before Pearl Harbor,
but just before it.
98. Colonel Toulmin. But it is a little unusual to have a man ap-
pointed both as counsel and as witness. Under any sort of procedure
before a board or a court that is a bit unusual, so I am puzzled in
asking the question.
. Now let me ask one more question : What was the reason for the
conference between such high authority as General Somervell, General
Styer, and General Reber in connection with this matter? That is,
what is the objective sought to be accomplished ?
General Bragdon. I don't know that, sir, because I wasn't present.
The only thing I knew about when I received a telephone call and I
received those instructions which I have already mentioned.
99. Colonel Toulmin. You are not counsel for those people, are you ?
General Bragdon. No, sir.
100. General Gruni:rt. Well, then, have you finished ?
101. Colonel Toulmin. That is all.
102. Colonel West. I have one question, General.
103. General Grunert. Yes.
104. Colonel West. Suppose, General, in the course of your re-
search for certain documents or data which this Board desired, you
should run across some information which might be inimical to the
interests of Colonel Wyman : what would you do in a case of that sort ?
General Bragdon. I would give it to the Board.
105. Colonel West. Even though you have been designated as his
counsel, you feel under a duty to see that a full, free, and frank
disclosure of all the facts is made ?
[2917] General Bragdon. Of course, you ask a very difficult
question, but I asked General Eobins
106. Colonel West. I think you are in a very difficult position,
and I am wondering if 3'ou gave any thought to the matter before you
left Washington.
General Bragdon. Well, I did to this extent: I said to General
Robins-=— I didn't ask him that question, as such, but General Robins
said, "You should give the Board all the facts you can find, but our
point is to give them all the facts." And that is what I conceive it to
be my job to do, to give you all the facts, because I thought there was
a great paucity of facts.
I would like to reiterate, too, with every one of those I questioned —
I believe it was about four or five people who had to do with the
1520 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
air warning service in Washington : a Colonel Smith, a Mr. Kichard-
son, a Colonel Letts, who had been in that job for about 35 years;
Colonel Mayo, now with the Air Force; and when I talked to those
people all I got was generalities; I couldil't get specific things. But
they would give leads, and the only way I could get anything I could
pin down was when I went to these files, and then I would get some-
thing that was specific. That was one thing that worried me. Just
questionings didn't get it, but when you went to the files and com-
menced to pin things down, then the story commenced to be clear.
107. Colonel Toulmin. General, I would like to ask one question:
Is Colonel Wyman aware. General, of the fact that your position will
be such as that indicated in your answer to Colonel West, that as his
counsel you feel that you are also going to produce any^ information
that may lead to his [2918] conviction?
General Bragdon. Well, he isn't on trial, sir. I mean you say
108. Colonel Toulmin. Well, have you told him that you are going
to produce all of this evidence no matter whom it hurts?
General Bragdon. No, we did not discuss that point at all.
109. Colonel Toulmin. I see.
General Bragdon. I mean, I don't think "conviction" is a word
that should be used, because
110. Colonel Toulmin. Well, omit the word "conviction." Have
you told him that you are in this unique capacity of both his counsel
and as an investigator to get all the facts?
General Bragdon. No, sir. I am willing to tell him that I will
conceive it to be my job to produce anything before the Board that
I find the Board could
111. General Frank. Who appointed you as counsel for Wyman?
General Bragdon. Well, I would say that, as far as the appoint-
ment is concerned, there was no written designation.
112. General Frank. Well, who designated you?
General Bragdon. Well, that was the time, of course, when General
Styer talked to me on the phone. General.
113. General Frank. What I am trying to get is who designated
you as that, as counsel.
General Bragdon. Nobody gave me an official designation. Those
were the terms used by General Styer when he called me up.
114. General Frank. It is, then, General Somervell's office that
has designated you as counsel for Wyman ?
General Bragdon. Yes.
115. General Frank. All right. Now, who gave you the [^OW]
instruction to provide all this inforihation to the Board? General
Somervell's office?
General Bragdon. No, sir.
116. General Frank. Or the Office, Corps of Engineers?
General Bragdon. No, sir. General, you are making it more formal
than it was. I simply talked with General Robins about coming out
here. I asked, "Have you anything to tell me to do, General, when I
get there before the Board?"
And he said, "No. Just tell them the whole straightforward facts,
anything you find."
Now, that is the only basis I have for this other reply to Colonel
West. I didn't get a lot of specific instructions.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1521
117. General Grunert. Then, it is the Engineers that want the
Board to hear you as a witness ?
General Bragdon. Well, they had — they never initiated that, sir.
They never initiated that.
118. General Grunert. Well, we didn't initiate it. Did Wyman
ask for you? Why are you out here ? Somebody initiated it.
General Bragdon. Well, all I know is, I was called by one of my
superiors in General Somervell's office.
119. General Grunert. Well, then, it was initiated in General
Somervell's office ?
General Bragdon. It was initiated in General Somervell's office, yes,
sir.
120. General Grunert. That is, as far as your coming out here as
counsel for Wyman is concerned ?
General Bragdon. Yes, sir.
121. General Grunert. Well, now, who initiated your coming out
here to give the Board additional information the Board hasn't
[2920'] already received or called for?
General Bragdon. Well, nobody told me that I would be a witness
before the Board — that is, and defined it as formally as you gentlemen
have formulated it.
122. General Grunert. We only accept evidence here through wit-
nesses.
General Bragdon. Yes, sir.
123. General Grunert. And official documents.
124. General Frank. After all, there has to be some sort of formal-
ity about the operations of this Board.
General Bragdon. Yes. On the other hand, sir, I would say if we
should chase that down technically, it is simply a fact that this ordered
me here to report to General Richardson in connection with the ac-
tivities of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.
125. General Frank. But the Board calls the witnesses it wants,
not those that are imposed upon it.
General Bragdon. Yes, sir. Well, I would like to appear before the
Board if you will all give me the authority to do it, sir. If you simply
say I can't do it
126. General Grunert. That is what I am getting at. The Board
will then consider you as an officer desired by Colonel Wyman to
counsel him. I say "counsel him"; not as his counsel, but to counsel
him, because he hasn't been charged with anything that I know of.
General Bragdon. Yes, sir.
127. General Grunert. And also as a witness.
128. General Frank. For the Board.
129. General Grunert. Yes, as a witness, we will call you; as a
witness for the Board.
[2921] General Bragdon. I appreciate that very much, sir.
130. General Grunert. So that you can find anything you have in
mind, make up. your statement, and I would advise you to consult
with the Assistant Recorder so as to avoid wasting your time and our
time on what is not necessary.
General Bragdon. Yes, sir.
131. Colonel TouLMiN. May I ask one question ?
132. Colonel West. I have one.
1522 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
133. Colonel Toulmin. General Grunert, may I ask just one ques-
tion, please?
134. General Grunert. Yes.
135. Colonel Toulmin. General, may I ask you this ?
General Bragdon. Yes.
136. Colonel Toulmin. Did Colonel Wyman's visit to General Som-
ervell precede the instructions that came to you from General Somer-
vell's office? Did they tell you anything? Or General Styer?
General Bragdon. Yes, sir.
137. Colonel Toulmin. That is all.
138. Colonel West. May I ask another question, General?
139. General Grunert. Yes.
140. Colonel West. Did Colonel Wyman-ask for you by name, as
counsel ?
General BraCxDOn. I don't know, sir. I have wondered that. I
just don't know.
141. Colonel West. Do you know whether or not he asked General
Somervell's office to designate someone as Counsel?
General Bragdon. No, sir ; I do not know that.
142. Colonel West. Did I understand you to say that you had
[2922] talked with Colonel Wyman in San Francisco ?
General Bragdon. Yes.
143. Colonel West. On the way over here ?
General Bragdon. Yes, that is right.
144. Colonel West. Did you inquire of him whether or not your
designation as his counsel was satisfactory to him ?
General Bragdon. No, I didn't ask him that at all.
145. General Grunert. Well, we will ask him that.
146. Colonel West. I have no further questions, sir.
147. General Grunert. Thank you very much. And get busy now,
so that you will be prepared to help the Board when the time comes
for you to be called.
General Bragdon. Thank you, sir.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
[292Sli TESTIMONY OF MA JOE BOILING R. POWELL, JUNIOR;
GENERAL STAFF CORPS, LEGISLATIVE AND LIAISON DIVISION,
WAR DEPARTMENT, GENERAL STAFF, WASHINGTON, D. C.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Major, will you please state to the Board your
name, rank, organization, and station.
Major Powell. Boiling R. Powell, Junior; Major, General Staff
Corps, Legislative and Liaison Division; War Department, General
Staff. Washington, D. C, is my station.
2. General Grunert. Major, we really do not know what you
are a witness for, or to, or against, or whatnot ; but it appears that
you have come out here on something connected with this Board,
so I am going to have General Frank try to find out what you are
here for, and what we are going to do with you.
Major Powell. All right, sir.
3. (jreneral Grunert. (jeneral Frank.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1523
4. General Frank. Will you state how you happen to be here.
Major Powell. I am here pursuant to orders of the Adjutant
General dated 4 September 1944, which direct me to —
Proceed, not later than 13 September 1944, to the Commanding General,
Pacific Ocean area, on further temporary duty for approximately 31 days,
in connection with the activities of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, which
meets September 1944, and upon completion of this temporary duty, will return
to proper station.
That is a quotation from these orders of mine. I was instructed.
[m24]' 5. General Frank. By whom?
Major Powell. By General Miles Reber, of the Legislative and
Liaison Division, War Department, General Staff.
6. General Frank. In whose office does he function?
Major Powell. He functions under the War Department General
Staff. General Persons is the head of that particular division of
the War Department General Staff, and I was directed by General
Eeber to report to General Bragdon for instructions, and to serve
General Bragdon in any capacity I could, in connection with the
consideration of the interim report of the House Military Affairs
Committee, involving the Wyman-Rohl relationships and the charges
contained in that interim report, with which you are familiar; and
that was my instruction.
7. General Frank. In what manner are you serving with respect
to the Assistant Secretary's office?
Major Powell. Well, I' have no directions or instructions from
either the Assistant Secretary or the Under Secretary. My only
instructions came from General Reber,
8. General Frank. You have no instructions from Judge Patter-
son's office.
Major Powell. No, sir; the only instructions I have are from
General Reber, and he, as I said, directed me to report to General
Bragdon.
9. General Frank. Do you know whether or not your coming
out here was coordinated with Judge Patterson's office?
Major Powell. I don't know, of my own personal knowledge;
no, sir.
10. General Frank. When you came out here, did you know that
there already was an officer on the Board who was \2925'\ des-
ignated by tlie War Department?
Major Powell. Yes, sir; I had secured a copy of the order appoint-
ing the Board, and the order referring to the Board this considera-
tion of the interim report; and I knew that Colonel West had been
designated Recorder of the Board, and Major Clausen, Assistant Re-
corder; but I was not directed of course to work with the Board, or
become any part of the personnel attached to the Board. I was told
that I was to work with General Bragdon and assist .him in preparing
evidence to be presented to the Board in connection with the charges
contained in this congressional committee, report — in other words,
in the nature of counsel or advisor.
11. General Frank. Did you receive instructions from anybody
else besides General Reber on this thing ?
Major Powell. No, sir.
12. General Frank. None?
79716— 46— Ex. 145, vol. 2 47
1524 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Major Powell. None whatever — other than General Bragdon,
after I reported to him, of course.
13. General Frank. What instructions did you receive from him?
Major Powell. Well, General Bragdon has used me in assisting
him in preparing the evidence involving the charges contained in this
House report, the interim report, assisting him in getting that to-
gether and trying to develop it in orderly and coherent fashion so that
we could present it to the Board and be of assistance to the Board in
that respect.
14. General Frank. That is, the evidence concerning what?
Major Powell. The charges leveled against Colonel Theodore
Wyman and
[2926] 15. General Frank. That he did what?
Major Powell. Well, the charges in this report of the House com-
mittee. There are a number of charges and accusations and innu-
endoes and everything else contained through there; and we have
been trying to develop evidence and get the facts, all the facts that
have anything to do with that, in the files of the office of the Chief
Engineer, and in tlie files of the office of the division engineer in San
Francisco, and in the files of the engineer office here at Honolulu;
and my only purpose was to get that together and present it in an
orderly and coherent way so the Board will have the whole picture.
We are not attempting in any way to present a biased or just one
side of the picture; we want the Board to have the whole thing, of
course ; but that is the nature of our activities.
16. General Frank. Was there some question about the ability of
the Board to get at the facts?
Major Powell. None whatever, to my knowledge; certainly no one
ever told me of anything, or made any such accusation; but this
Board, I was told, was charged, of course, with the investigation of
the whole Pearl Harbor matter, and the engineer, the Chief of En-
gineers and his officers have been accused of irregularities and inef-
ficiencies, through this House report, and no other branch of the
service has a House report such as this one facing it, and I was ad-
vised that it was because of the charges contained in that House
report that it was desired that we prepare evidence and aid the Board
in answering the charges contained in the House report; not the gen-
eral Pearl Harbor investigation as such, if you get the [2927]
distinction, there.
17. General Grunert. Wliat are your investigations? Had you
any instructions in the nature of preparing a defense against such
charges?
Major Powell. Not a defense, other than presenting the facts, the
whole facts, and presenting them in a coherent manner that would be
easily understood.
18. General Grunert. Wlierein is the Legislative Division, as such,
interested in this matter? Why should they have selected someone
from the Legislative Division — why not some one from the Adjutant
General's Office, or from the Juclge Advocate General's Office, or
what ? Why were you selected to do this, do you know ?
Major Powell. No, sir; I don't know.
19. General Grunert. You do not know why Reber was called upon
to produce somebody, do you?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1525
Major Powell. No, sir; I don't.
20. General Grunert. Are you an ex-engineer, or an engineer?
Major Powell. No, sir; I am a lawyer in civil life.
21. General Grunert. But have you been connected with the engi-
neers ?
Major Powell. No, sir.
22. General Grunert. This just came out of the clear sky to you?
Major Powell. Yes, sir.
23. General Grunert. And apparently they are just using you to
advise with and help General Bragdon, because of your legal expe-.
rience ?
Major PoAVELL. Legal background; I think so; yes, sir.
[29£S] 24. General Grunert. And they thought it was neces-
sary to have someone with legal experience to dig up these facts, is
that it ?
Major Powell. I can't say what they thought, sir, that they thought
it was necessary, or not. I think they thought it would be helpful to
have a man with legal background prepare this evidence.
25. General Grunert. And what progress have you made ?
Major Powell. Well, as I say, we have gone, and gone through the
records in the Chief of Engineers' office, in Washington; we have gone
through the records in the division engineer's, in ISan Francisco, and
are now in process of going through the records here ; and we are pre-
paring exhibits and maps, and we are preparing documents and things
of that nature that we are finding, to present.
26. General Grunert. Are you preparing these things just as if the
ones to whom you were going to submit them do not know anything
about the case ?
Major Powell. No, sir; but we are preparing them from the point
.of view of giving the Board, being absolutely sure that the Board has
everything that has a material bearing on the case, and trying to pre-
sent it to the Board in a manner tliat will save the Board a lot of time
and assist them in understanding the real significance of it.
27. General Grunert. The Board will appreciate anything 5^ou can
do in that line that is not redundant, that is not already contained in
the record ; and then you will be prepared to be called as a witness by
the Board, will you, as soon as you have obtained this evidence and
put it in form ?
[2929'] Major Powell. It had not been anticipated that I would
be called as a witness. As I say, it was anticipated that I would aid
in preparing witnesses to appear before the Board, more than being
called as a witness, because I have no personal knowledge of this
matter, as General Frank brought out.
28. General Grunert. Now, when you prepare a witness, what do
you prei^are that witness for, except to procluce certain evidence or
certain lines of thought or lines of action? Now, why should you
prepare witnesses?
29. General Frank. Evidence is "fact."
Major Powell. Well, when I say "preparing a witness," I mean
seeing that the witness Avill present to this Board, the witnesses that
have been called by this Board will present to it, everything that is of
record, and is pertinent, here.
1526 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
30. General Frank. You tliink that needs a lawyer — an expert
lawyer to do that for the Board ?
Major Powell. Well, I can't say, of course, would not be presump-
tuous enough to say the Board needs me, but I received these orders
to come and help in any way that I could.
31. General Grunert. Then I understand that you simply have
been detailed to assist General Bragdon in whatever he has been
ordered to do?
Major Powell. That is correct; yes, sir.
32. General Gruxert. Well, I think that settles it, right there.
33. Colonel Toulmin. I would like to ask him just one question.
34. General Grunert. Go ahead, ask him a question.
35. Colonel Toulmin. You are from the Legislative Division, as I
understand it. You have read this committee interim report of Con-
gress, is that right ?
[2930] Major Powell. Yes, sir.
36. Colonel Toulmin. Is it your purpose to show that the commit-
tee's stateinents were wrong, in whole or in part ?
Major Powell. Well, it is our purpose to show all facts that have
anything to do with the statements of the committee.
37. Colonel Toulmin. You do not answer me.
Major Powell. And whether its statements are wrong or not, or
whether they are half truths, will just depend on the facts.
38. Colonel Toulmin. Is it your position that Congress did not
either have the ability to get at the facts, or did not put all the facts
in the record ?
Major Powell. It is my own personal opinion from the facts that
I have uncovered in the files of the engineers' offices that there are a
great many inaccuracies in that report of Congress, and I think the
facts that we present to you gentlemen will definitely show that.
39. Colonel Toulmin. What firm were you connected with in civil
life. Major ?
Major Powell. Well, I was first connected with the law firm of
Martin, Turner, & McWhorter, in Birmingham, Alabama. I served
for a year on the law faculty at the University of Virginia, and imme-
diately before coming in the Army, I was associated in legal work
with the American Telephone & Telegraph, as a house counsel.
40. Colonel Toulmin. That is all.
Colonel West. May I ask a question ?
41. General Grunert. Yes.
Colonel West. What was General Reber's assignment prior
[2931] to his going on this Legislative and Liaison Division ?
Major Powell. I don't know, sir. I didn't know him before that.
I don't know just what it was.
42. Colonel West. Has he just recently gone on that assignment?
Major Powell. He has been there for some time, to my knowledge.
Now, he has been acting as head of that division, in General Persons'
absence.
43. Colonel West. Is that division under the Under Secretary of
War's office in any way ?
Major Pow^elIj. Well, I know it is a division of the War Depart-
ment General Stalf, and I cannot say just how the War Department
General Staff fits into the picture, but it was my impression that, in
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1527
effect, that was General MarshalTs staff, and that the line of command
would go right on up through. General Marshall to the Secretary of
War.
44. Colonel West. Just one other question : Is it your understanding
that you are functioning as a sort of assistant counsel for Colonel
Wyman ?
Major Powell. That's my understanding — ^to assist him.
45. Colonel West. In other words, you are General Bragdon's as-
sistant, and he is designated as counsel ?
Major Powell. As counsel.
• 46. Colonel West. So you are really in the nature of assistant coun-
sel for Colonel Wyman ?
Major Powell. That is right, sir; I was assigned to assist Colonel
Wyman in any way possible, and our approach to this thing has been,
as I have said — I would like to emphasize — not from the point of view
of the over-all investigation of [2932'] this Board, into the
Pearl Harbor disaster, but this House interim report. We have studied
that very carefully and analyzed all the charges contained in there,
and have been endeavoring to develop the evidence on those charges.
47. General Frank. I would like to ask a question. You stated that
you considered it one of your duties, to prepare the witnesses. We
simply are after facts, and if the witness has the facts, that is all we
are after — the simple facts.
Major Powell. That is right.
48. General Frank. How do you expect to prepare a witness to give
us simple facts, other than the normal way in which he wotild do it?
Major Powell. Well, we have been endeavoring; when I say "pre-
pare the witness," I mean, to see that the witness knows all of the facts
that he is supposed to know, that are in the files, there, that are con-
tained, there, and have them organized in some orderly way to come
down here and present them to you gentlemen.
49. General Frank, After all, is it not the Board's option to get its
facts and its witnesses, without having the witnesses tampered with?
Major Po"\Mi:LL. Well, I wouldn't want my statement with reference
to the preparation of a witness to be interpreted for one moment as
tampering with the witness, or advising the witness to say anything
less than the whole truth, and everything that is material; but it is of
some assistance, I think, for a witness to go over all the facts and come
prepared, rather than just walk in "green", not knowing what he is
going to be faced with.
[2933] 50. General Frank. Do I understand that you are about
to ask the Board for a list of the witnesses that it is going to call, so
that you can have an opportunity to deal with them?
Major Powell. Well, no, sir; I am not about to ask the Board for
any list of witnesses.
51. General Frank. All right.
52. Colonel Totjlmin. I would like to ask you one question. Major.
Do you regard it as proper for a lawyer to appear as counsel for a
man, and also appear as a witness in disclosing all of the records and
other data and facts, which ma}' be ach^erse to the man whom he
represents ?
Major Powt:ll. I say it would be highly irregular, sir, and as I
have stated before, I have no instructions to appear as a witness, and
1528 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I would be of no aid as a witness, because anything I said would be
second-hand.
53. General Grunert. See if this statement of mine is correct: As
far as you know, then, the War Department and the Chief of En-
gineers' Office have sent you people out here to be sure that the Board
gets a chance to get all the facts ?
Major Powell. Correct.
54. General Grunert. Pro or con ?
Major Powell. Eight, sir.
55. General Grunert. That is all.
Major Pg^vell. And to withhold nothing.
56. General Grunert. Thank you very much for coming in. We
wanted to get your status settled, because we did not know where
you stood.
Major Po"vvELL. All right, sir; fine !
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon, having concluded the hearing of witnesses, the Board
took up the consideration of other business until 2 p. m.)
[2934.^ AFTERNOON SESSION
(The Board, at 2 o'clock p. m., continued the hearing of witnesses.)
General Grunert. The Board will please come to order.
TESTIMONY OF SENATOK WILLIAM HARDY HILL, 72 KEOKEO ROAD,
HONOLULU, T. H.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24^)
1. Colonel West. Senator, will you state to the Board your full
name and address, please?
Senator Hill. William Hardy Hill, 77 Keokeo Eoad, Honolulu.
2. General Grunert. Senator, this Board was appointed to ascer-
tain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese
armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on the 7th of December,
1941, and, in addition thereto, to consider the phases which related
to the Pearl Harbor disaster of the report of the House Military
Affairs Committee. This latter report is largely concerned with con-
struction. We are after facts and leads to where facts can be found.
General Short has furnished the Board a list of representative
citizens living in Hawaii who he says may have information of value
to the Board. Your name being on that list, we have asked you here
with the hope that you may have facts to present to us.
Now, General Short did not refer to any particular subject on which
you might testify, so it is up to you to open the subject, which we may
then develop by our questions. Do you know of any particular thing
that General Short might wish you to [293S] tell the Board ?
Senator Hill. I do not, and as far as facts are concerned regarding
the attack I do not have any. I knew General Short very well, had
many talks with him. We have discussed briefly, as much as a military
man would care to discuss with a civilian, the situation over here, but I
have no definite facts that I can give this Board.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1529
3. General Grunert. Possibly he might have wanted you to tell us
what you thought of him, together with what you may know of your
own accord as to his endeavors here to build up a defense. Is there
anything in that line that you might tell us ?
Senator Hill. AVell, I have never known a man who I thought more
highly of. I think he was a very fine man. He was a serious and con-
scientious man and very high idealed. I felt and he led me to believe,
at least I gathered from what he said at different times, that he was not
being given support in the way of men and ammunition from Wash-
ington that he should. I believe that he felt that he should have had
more men and more ammunition and better equipment.
The General was not afraid of an attack from Japan. In fact,
nobody in Hawaii gave any thought to that. We thought we Were safe
and Japan would attack possibly the Philippines or possibly Panama.
There was no thought in niA^ mind and I am sure there was no thought
in General Short's mind that Hawaii would be attacked.
On one occasion, when General Short returned from Washington, I
said to him "Well, how did you get along?" And his answer was that
he did not feel that he was being given the support that he should.
[2936] 4. General Grunert. You did not know what he ex-
pected, did you ?
Senator Hill. I believe — and all of this is belief — that he wanted
more planes, that he wanted more men, and I am not sure that he told
me, but somebody told me, some military people, that some of the guns
had not been fired for some 15 or 20 years, until he came here, and I
gathered that he was back there to try to get larger appropriations in
order to better fortify the Islands of Hawaii, the Territory.
5. General Grunert. Although these things that you tell us may not
be facts, this Board, although it wants facts, is also obtaining some
impressions. It wants to size up the conditions. Can you give us
something in the line of the condition or the state of mind of the popu-
lation here?
Senator Hill. Yes. The population had a tremendous amount of
confidence in the armed forces. They felt they were absolutely pro-
tected against any attack that could ever be made. As an example,
about two months before the attack I made a little speech up in Spo-
kane, Washington to the Rotary Club, and I told them that I thought
they were in just as much danger of attack as we were; we had high-
powered guns and we had the radars, we had planes, and that we were
absolutely safe, and that was the feeling of all of the civilian popu-
lation.
6. General Grunert. Having thatf impression when the attack came
did you feel let down by the military?
Senator Hill. Frankly, we did. We felt that we were let down to a
certain extent, but the feeling here, and almost all of the people feel,
that the let down was not here but in Washington.
[2937] General Grunert. Have you any basis for that feeling?
'Senator Hill. We feel that in Washington the powers that be were
being hoodwinked by the Japs and that they were afraid to do very
niuch for fear that they would offend the Japanese. I know we read
in the papers where they refused some 30 or 40 thousand dollars to do
some work on Guam, for fear that it would offend the Japanese.
1530 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The general feeling, I think, is that Washington did not give us the
protection and the men and equipment and so forth that we were
entitled to. We feel and have felt since the war that Cordell Hull and
others in Washington knew a great deal more about the situation than
we were told. There was no feeling that I know of that General Short
had let us down or had sort of gone to sleep on the job. He was recog-
nized, I think, throughout the Territory as a very serious-minded and
an efficient and a good man, doing the best that he could. He was not
out on parties at night, not a drinking man, but he was all business.
There is a kindly feeling toward General Short throughout the
Territory,
8. General Grunert. Now, you said that it was general belief that
he did the best he could. The Board has had testimony to the effect
that he took an alert, called No. 1, the sabotage alert, where he could
have taken an all-out alert. What the consequences were or what
happened is well known. What might have happened had he taken
a greater alert that would have provided greater security, one does
not know. But I cannot well ask you what was in General Short's
mind when he took the lowest form of alert, but can you tell us any-
thing about the public mind as to the danger from sabotage of your
population ?
Senator Hill. We were not afraid of sabotage and there was
[24^8] very little of it here. The different races, we feel differently
toward them from what they do on the mainland, and still feel that a
great many or nearly all the Japs were loyal citizens or, at least, loyal
enough not to do any harm.
I think that the armed forces — I think that General Short was not
too much afraid of sabotage and work of that kind. We have heard
that at that time they were on a sabotage alert. We have also been
led to believe that these alert orders came from Washington. They
were on the alert so much for a year or two before the war — I talked
with some of the officers — "My God, we have been on the alert so much
off and on and off and on" that it got to be a sort of a tiresome thing.
I did not know that the General had it within his power to name the
type of alert. We were under the impression — at least I was, and
most of us were — that these orders came from Washington.
We have also heard that orders were cabled from Washington on
December the 7th regarding this attack and the possibility of it, and
the message did not reach General Short until sometime in the after-
noon. General Short did not tell me that. Some of my information,
I am very glad to tell you where I got it so you can follow it up, was
from a man named Dick Hallei*, a newspaper man who was very
friendly with General Short also. I think that he can give you pos-
sibly some information that you want.
9. General Grunert. Is he located here in the city?
Senator Hill. He lives here in the city, I think at the Pacific Club.
10. General Grunert, And at that time he was a newspaper man ?
Senator Hill. He was.
[2939] 11. General Grunert. And he gave you an impression?
Just what impression did he give you?
Senator Hill. He gave me the impression — some of the impressions
I have given you here — that General Short was doing the best that he
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1531
could and that he ^Yas being let dcnvn a little by Washington, they
were not giving him the equipment and men that he should have
and that he had asked for repeatedly.
12. General Grunert. Did he tell you that this sabotage alert was
ordered from Washington?
Senator Hill. I cannot say whether Haller told me that or not.
We heard it at the time. I cannot say, I do not recall whether Haller
was the man who told me that, but it was general information.
13. General Gruxert. What do you suppose his source of informa-
tion was?
Senator Hill. I have an idea it was General Short direct. He was
very close to General Short. »
14. General Grunert. Was there any influence that you know of
by citizens or groups of citizens that would have prevented or would
have influenced General Short in refraining from going on the all-out
alert because of the disruption it might cause in plantations as far
as the sugar-cane crop or the pineapple crop or this and that were
concerned?
Senator Hill. Since the war, since the outbreak, it has been shown
that the actions of the Commanding General here are influenced some-
what by the civilian population. Now, I mean this : General Emmons
had in mind moving a great many of the Japanese from the Territory.
He discussed this with me. I also discussed with his Deputy Chief
of Staff, Phillips. He wanted to move many, many thousands out of
here. It was his idea that the Japanese, the intelligent or semi-intelli-
gent, semi-educated Japanese was the more dangerous; that the old
alien out of the [2940] canefield w-as not so dangerous. But
the sugar planters, the so-called Big Five in the Territory, imme-
diately got busy, contacted Washington, contacted General Emmons,
contacted everybody that they could and put it up to them in this
way : "We put out a million tons of sugar per year. If you take our
Japs out you get no sugar." They were very badly frightened that
something of that kind w^ould happen and they used all the pressure
that they could, and apparently they were successful in getting what
they wanted, because General Emmons definitely did want to ship out
many, many thousands of Japanese.
15. General Grunert. Where was he going to ship them, do you
know?
Senator Hill. Anywhere on the mainland, but get them out of
here.
16. General Grunert. You knowing the Japanese and Filipino
elements of the population, how do 3"0U size them up as regards their
being a menace to the defense of the group of islands?
Senator Hill. At the present time? You mean whether thev ar-e
a menace now?
17. General Grunert. Then or now.
Senator Hill. I cannot see that they are in any way a menace to
the war effort. The Filipino is definitely a good worker and a loyal
man. The Japanese, I believe, are loyal to us, most of them, because
we are in charge. I do believe that as soon as a Japanese soldier
is put on Hawaiian soil, the majority of the people will be loyal
Japanese. I think they are just riding — —
1532 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
18. General Frank. The bandwagon ?
Senator Hill. Riding on the fence. I have many of them [294-11
working for me and with me. I have lived with them here for 33
years. I know that even in the third and fourth generation the Jap is
just as much a Jap as he was a thousand years ago. As you know,
their religion, their State, their politics, are all in one, — the family.
Recently there was a third generation Japanese married. His mother
was born here. He was married in the old Japanese style, just exactly
as they did in Japan 2,000 years ago. They are not becoming Amer-
icanized.
19. General Grunert. But they do have two political parties, don't
they?
Senator Hill. Yes. We have two political parties, the Democrat
and the Republican parties here, and up until a few years ago, when
their numbers were small, they voted en bloc. As they got larger,
as the group became larger, a few others aspired for a little power or
leadership, and with the help of some of the rest of them we got
them sort of divided and fighting among themselves, so they are not
now voting in a solid bloc, although they have been able to elect many
Japanese to public office, in the Legislature and in the different
boards of supervisors.
20. General Grunert. Do any of you think of any other avenue
of approach, anything else to ask the Senator ? If not, I will ask the
Senator to bring up anything that he thinks might be of value to the
Board, realizing that we are looking at the attack on Pearl Harbor,
what led up to it, what happened there, and only those things after-
wards as are related to the attack.
Senator Hill. I am sorry I have not been of more help to you.
I realize I have not been of much help. There are two or three things,
though, that I would like to mention. One is that [294^] the
Roberts report stated that there was no cooperation between the Army
and Navy. Again, I do not know the facts, but we never heard before
the war of any lack of cooperation. We Imew there was a certain
rivalry in the football games, and so forth, but we felt and knew,
or thought we knew, that they were conferring and cooperating. Now,
that is the general impression in the Territory.
21. General Grunert. You do not know how effective that coopera-
tion was, do you ?
Senator Hill. I do not.
22. General Grltnert. You knew they were getting together, but you
do not know what happened when they got together ?
Senator Hill. No. I do know that Admiral Kimmel and General
Short both were holding conferences every day for many, many
months ; not together ; I mean with their various men. I know that
they were getting together; to what extent or how far they went, I
do not know ; but nobody thought of the Army and the Navy working
at odds. They all felt they were cooperating with each other and
doing it properly. I think that is about the only thing that I could
bring up that might be of interest.
23. General Grunert. We thank you very much for coming and
appreciate your coming all the way up here.
Senator Hill. I am very glad to come, but I am sorry I cannot be
of more help.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1533
[29P] TESTIMONY OF COLONEL KENDALL J. EIELDEE, GEN-
ERAL STAFF CORPS, HEADQUARTERS POA, FORT SHAFTER, T. H.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24. )
1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your
name, rank, organization, and station ?
Colonel Fielder. Kenclall J. Fielder, Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Headquarters POA, APO 1)58, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco.
2. General Grunert, Colonel, I am going to turn you over to Gen-
eral Russell as being the Board member who will go into this par-
ticular phase specially. The rest of us will piece out by questions.
Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir.
3. General Russell. When did you become G-2 on the staff of the
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?
Colonel Fielder. In the late summer of 1941. I think I reported
on the 22nd of July.
4. General Russell. From January 1, '41, until you became G-2
of the Hawaiian Department, what was your assignment?
Colonel Fielder. I was with the 22nd Brigade at Schofield Bar-
racks on this Island, as executive officer.
5. General Russell. You came down as a member of the staff and
immediately became the G-2 of the Commanding General of the
Department?
Colonel Fielder. That is correct, yes.
6. General Russell. Colonel, would you tell the Board what per-
sonnel you had in the G-2 organization as of November and December
1941, in the G-2 division?
[2944] Colonel Fielder. The G-2 section at that time was en-
gaged in counter-intelligence as well as so-called combat-intelligence,
of which there was none because there was no combat, but we did have
a small combat section. We had the public relations section and the
ccensorship. It was subdivided into two general subdivisions, one of
which took in combat-intelligence, public relations, and plans for
censorship. That comprised one lieutenant colonel, three captains,
two first lieutenants, and six clerks. Then, we had the counter-
intelligence division which was engaged in planning, preparing for
anything subversive. That was composed of one lieutenant colonel,
one captain, seven first lieutenants, two second lieutenants, and nine-
teen counter-intelligence corps agents, plainclothesmen. That was
the G-2 section at that time.
7. General Russell. Total personnel in the G-2 section, therefore,
was some fifty?
Colonel Fielder. Commissioned, I can tell you exactly: eighteen,
and nineteen agents. They are enlisted men, but they are plain-
clothes.
8. General Russell. Thirty-seven. And then your clerical force?
Colonel Fielder. We had about nine clerks : six with the public
relations section and three with the counter-intelligence.
9. General Russell. Colonel, sometime prior to December 7 a sub-
division of work had been made on the Island between the Office of
Naval Intelligence, the F. B. I., and the G-2 section of the Depart-
ment. You are familiar, of course, with that delineation of duties,
and so forth ?
1534 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Fielder. Yes. T am.
[B94S] 10. General Russell. As a result of the agreements
reached between those three agencies, would you tell the Board
the limitation on the operations of the G-2 section of the Hawaiian
Department, or the fields in which they could operate pursuant to
the terms of that agreement?
Colonel Fielder. We were limited to operating among military
personnel and among civilians employed by the military estab-
lishment.
11. General Russell. Did you, or not, in 1941, irrespective of the
limitations of this agreement, operate among the Japanese people
on the Island? And by "Japanese people" I mean all of those who
were aliens and those of alien origin, Japanese origin.
Colonel Fielder. We did to a limited extent The F. B. I. and
the O. N. I. and the Military Intelligence Division were very closely
associated even then, and we had meetings once each week of the
heads of these three organizations, and we did assist them with
our translators and with our agents, but we had no authority to open
new cases or to prosecute, or anything like that.
12. General Russell. You repeat, therefore, that your jurisdiction
over civilians was limited to those employed by the military estab-
lishment ?
Colonel Fielder. That is correct.
13. General Russell. Colonel, I am going to ask you some ques-
tions in a minute, probably, about the sabotage ancl the threat of
sabotage as existing because of the presence of so many Japanese
people on the Island. It may be necessary, however, to lay a little
broader groundwork than I have done [2946] already.
On and after December 7, 1941, military law was declared on the
Island; is that true?
Colonel Fielder. That is correct. About noon on December 7th
martial law was declared.
14. General Russell. Will you tell the Board what effect on the
jurisdiction of the G-2 section over Japanese people this declaration
of martial law had?
Colonel Fielder. It had the effect of placing all the responsibility
for control of the alien population or the subversively inclined popu-
lation in the hands of the military. That was by joint agreement.
The War Department and the Navy Department and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation in Washington had agreed that in the
event of martial law in Hawaii the senior military commander would
be responsible, and it was what we call the limitation agreement,
and it does delineate the duties of the various investigative
organizations.
Now, when we got a copy of that over here, we had our own
little local agreement signed by General Emmons at that time and
Admiral Bloch, the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, and
Mr. Shivers of the F. B. I.; and that merely elaborated a little bit
on the central agreement, the main agreement.
15. General Russell. Have you been in touch with the Japanese
population since that time, in a more detailed way than prior to
December 7th?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, I have, very much more so.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1535
16. General Russell. You have continued in your assignment as
G-2 until this time ?
Colonel Fielder. I haven't changed assignment ; I am still [3947]
G-2.
17. General Russell. Yes.
Colonel Fielder. Although the commands have changed, I am still
the G-2 for the Senior Commander.
18. General Russell. Now, Colonel Fielder, there has been con-
siderable discussion by various people as to the threat to our national
security and tlie probability of sabotage because of the presence here
of so many Japanese people on the Island, I want to break this down
and go through it hurriedly to get G-2's reactions to that situation,
and possibly it would be better to do that with it under certain heads.
The Japanese as individuals, how many — what is the percentage
of Japanese population in the territory?
Colonel Fielder. It is almost 40 percent, about 100,000.
19. General Frank. On this Island or in all the Islands?
Colonel Fielder. All the Islands. About 90,000 on this Island.
20. General Rltssell. The total population of the Islands, then,
there is approximately -100,000?
Colonel Fielder. That is right ; 450,000, about.
21. General Russell. How does the Japanese population on all
of the Islands compare with what we commonly refer to as the white
population?
Colonel Fielder. Just about the same. Roughly the population is
divided into three thirds : one-third white, one-third Japanese, and
one-third mixtures: Chinese and Hawaiians, and part Hawaiians,
and Filipinos, and so forth.
22. General Russell. What is the predominant pursuit of the Jap-
anese population on the Island ?
[294-8] Colonel Fielder. I suppose you would call the predomi-
nant pursuit agriculture, but they also control many other things.
Practically 80 ])ercent of all the artisans, carpenters, plumbers, elec-
tricians, and so forth, were of Japanese extraction, and then of course
many businessmen, many professional men : lawyers, doctors, even
bankers* They were engaged in almost every pursuit.
23. General Russell. Based on your work among these people, the
data which your section has accumulated, and the data which have
been furnished you by F. B. I. and O. N. L, have you reached any
conclusions as to the percentage of loyalty or disloyalty to the Ameri-
can Government — I will put it another way: have you reached any
conclusion as to the percentage of Japanese who, in a contest between
the American Government and the Japanese Government, would be
loyal to the American Government?
Colonel Fielder. It is almost impossible to arrive At any definite
percentage. There is no question but what a great number of them
would be completely loyal to the United States. There is no question
but what a large number would be pro-Japanese because they are
aliens; you couldn't expect them to be otherwise. The queer thing
about the Japanese is that you cannot differentiate between those who
are potenHallv loyal and those who are pot-entially disloyal. But we
just don't think the way they do; we can't solve their minds; and unless
they commit some overt act or unless we have evidence against them,
1536 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
such as knowing that they have large financial holdings in Japan or
that their nearest relatives are there, or that they have contributed
toward the Japanese war effort in the war [2949] against
China, and things like that, there is no way of telling whether they
are loyal or not.
24. General Russell. I was going to ask you if any conclusions as
to loyalty and disloyalty could be drawn because of the place of
birth or the time spent on the Island.
Colonel Fielder. You can't draw a definite conclusion. But there
is one class of Japanese called Kibeis, those who are born here and
then received much of their education in Japan; they are dual citi-
zens. We consider them the most dangerous group because they are
young, they are active, they are smart, and they have been indoc-
trinated with this fanatical worship of the Emperor and willingness
to die for the Emperor, and all that stuff.
25. General Russell. It is from that group that you might expect
the leaders of the Japanese people to come, if at all ?
Colonel Fielder. Yes ; at the present time. Now, prior to the war,
of course, they had many alien Japanese leaders, people engaged in
shipping, the NYK Line officials in this town, the bankers, the editors
of the local papers, and the Shinto priests, the language school teach-
ers, and several other pategories, they were the potentially dangerous
ones at that time. Many of these, of course, were picked up promptly
on December 7th.
26. General Russell. Now, those people were aliens and had come
to the Island from Japan after having attained their maturity in
Japan?
Colonel Fielder. Not necessarily. They might have been born
there. If they are born in Japan and come right away, they are still
aliens.
[£950] 27. General Russell. Yes.
Colonel Fielder. Many of them are — —or most of them are 40
years old or over, but some of them are not that old.
28. General Russell. Well, now. Colonel, to hurry along: You
have in the Islands a great group of Japanese people who are poorly
educated, work with their hands, the laboring class; that is true,
isn't it?
Colonel Fielder. That is true, definitely.
29. General Russell. And then you have the upper crust, the peo-
ple that you are talking about, the Kibeis and the merchants and the
bankers and the shipping interests and the professional people. They
are the educated Japanese people. Now, from the standpoint of
loyalty to the American Government, where would you expect to find
the greatest degree of loyalty, among the uneducated group or among
that educated group?
Colonel Fielder. You would expect the greatest degree of loyalty
not among any of those that I have mentioned, but among the citizens
who were born here, educated here, and who have never been away
from these Islands, which is still another group. None of the groups
that you mention.
30. General Russell. Well, they are potential leaders, aren't they ?
Colonel Fielder. Many of them are.
31. General Russell. All right.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1537
Colonel Fielder. We have hundreds of them here who have gone
through our colleges and universities on the mainland, have gone
through the college here, who have never been away from the American
soil.
32. General Russell. Now, you think those people, all those
[295 11 that belong to what we will roughly call the intellectual
class, are loyal Americans?
Colonel Fielder, I think 95 percent of them are.
33. General Russell. And they would go down the line in a con-
test with Japan ?
Colonel Fielder. Right. That is borne out by the fact that about
6,000 of them are in our Army and have given a splendid account
of themselves in Italy with the Hundredth Battalion.
34. General Russell. Therefore your conclusions are that among
the intellectual group some part of them would be disloyal, and then
there would be a large element of them that would be loyal?
Colonel Fielder. That is correct, yes, sir.
35. General Russell. And among the uneducated or laboring group
they would probably follow the leaders ?
Colonel Fielder. They would probably follow the leaders. Many
of the old aliens have been here so long, they are more or less harm-
less in a group because most of their interests are here. They have
raised their families here. They have severed many of their ties
with Japan. Consequently, as a group you couldn't consider them
necessarily dangerous, but as individuals any one of them might be
dangerous.
36. General Russell. Now, Colonel, prior to the outbreak of — I will
come back to this sabotage thing in a minute. Prior to the outbreak
of hostilities in December of 1941, December 7, 1941, you had lists
of Japanese people here, "A" and "B" lists?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, we did.
37. General Russell. Now, what did the "A" list mean ?
[2952'] Colonel Fielder. "A" list?
38. General Russell. Yes.
Colonel Fielder. Meant those that would be picked up immedi-
ately in the event of any hostilities, even against the Philippines,
we will say, or against Malaya, anywhere between the United States
and Japan, even though notwithstanding
39. General Russell. How many people did you have on your "A"
list as of December 7, '41 ?
Colonel Fielder. I have forgotten now. I could get those figures,
but I don't recall.
40. General Russell. Did it run into thousands ?
Colonel Fielder. No.
41. General Russell. Or into hundreds ?
Colonel Fielder. I would say three or four hundred. But I can
get those figures if it makes any difference.
42. General Russell. Well, three or four hundred is enough for
us.
"B"list?
Colonel Fielder. The "B" list is those that were also considered
potentially dangerous but who would not be picked up immediately,
in the event they sank one of our transports on the way to the Philip-
1538 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
pines, or diplomatic relations were severed, or something like that.
But they would be picked up in the event of an attack on this place
or war in this part of the Pacific Ocean. Otherwise they would just
be watched.
43. General Russell. Now, on this subject of percentage of loyalty
and disloyalty, do you think they would be affected materially by the
success oi Jap arms in the Territory, assuming that they might have
been successful here ?
. [£dS3] Colonel Fielder. Yes ; many of them would. Many of
them who would be neutral otherwise would turn to the winning side.
44. General Frank. Or the invading side?
Colonel FiELDEK. Or the invading side.
45. General Russell. Now, Colonel, what about the Japanese or-
ganizations on the Island, very briefly ?
Colonel Fielder. They are great on organizations. They organize
for every form of sport, every form of religion, and everything else.
There are literally hundreds of Japanese organizations, but those that
were considered dangerous, most dangerous, were the Shinto religious
sects, and of course the Black Dragon Society, which everybody is
familiar with, was one of their very rabid imperialistic organizations.
46. General Frank. What characterized the two of thenl?
Colonel Fielder. Intense loyalty to Japan, I think, more than any-
thing else, and desire to better Japan's position in the world of nations.
■ 47. General Russell. Now you are discussing with General Frank
this Shinto group ?
Colonel Fielder. That is the Shinto ; yes, they are. When you get
into religion I am just not familiar enough wuth it to go irito much
detail, but in the Shinto religion it is tied in pretty close with the
federal government, the Japanese Empire, the worship of the Empire.
48. General Russell. Go to heaven if you die for them.
Colonel Fielder. Well, that's right.
49. General Russell. Well, do you think that that sort of thing is
taught here in your Shinto temples 'I
Colonel Fielder. It certainly is taught; there is no [£954-]
question about it. It isn't any more because we don't let — we have
closed up all the Shinto temples, but it was taught prior to December 7.
50. General Russell. How many Shinto temples did you have prior
to December 7, 1941? '
Colonel Fielder. I have no idea, but it ran into hundreds.
51. General Russell. Didn't you have some conception of the num-
ber of followers of Shintoism here in the Territory ?
Colonel Fielder. I would say probably the F. B. I. did have. We
didn't have, except what they turned over to us.
52. General Russell. Well, they hadn't been here very long, had
they, Colonel?
Colonel Fielder. The Shintos?
53. General Russell. No. The F. B. I.
Colonel Fielder. I think they came about probably ten years ago.
64. General Russell. Well, don't you think as G-2 it would have
been a part of your function to have learned how many of these Shinto
peo])le there were among the Japanese, if they believed in that sort of
a thins;?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1539
Colonel FiEijjER. Well, I am not sure but what my own counter-
intelligence people did know, but I as head of it didn't know exactly
how many they had. We undoubtedly had access to the records of
how many; otherwise we couldn't have arrested those that were con-
sidered dangerous.
55. General Rfssell. Xo, but how many Shinto temples uere there
that you closed up after December 7, 1941 ?
Colonel Fielder. I will have to get that from the records.
[29SS] 5(). Oeneral Russell. Will you get that and give it to us ?
Colonel Fielder. I will do that. As a matter of fact, the office —
if 3'ou are going to call ]\Iajor Meurlott, who is my assistant,
57. General Russell. He is supposed to come in later.
Colonel Fielder. He can give you all of the details of that.
58. General Russell. What kind of reaction did you get from
closing up these Shinto temples?
Colonel Fielder. Strangely enough, it wasn't bad. They didn't
seem to mind it so much. They seemed to expect it more or less, many
of the Shinto priests, or at least a few, and a few of the other leaders.
When we went around to pick them up on the morning of December 7,
we had a plan. It was just a regular dragnet affair. Some of them
even had their suitcases packed. So they knew what was coming.
59. General Russell. All right. I would like to have the back-
ground on this Shinto organization.
Colonel Fielder. I'll see that Major IMeurlott has this when he
comes up before the Board.
60. General Russell. Now, the consular activities, including the
consular agents. The reports we have indicate that there were 219
of these agents operating in the Islands on the 7th of December or
shortly theretofore. Were you at all familiar with the activity of
these people ?
Colonel Fielder. Yes. We knew that they were in the employ of
the Japanese consulate, but we didn't know in what capacity. Many
of them were very minor clerks and probably informants.
[!20o6] 61. General Rl'Ssell. Were you furnished reports on
these consular agents and Shinto priests by the F. B. I., Colonel?
Colonel Fielder. As individuals, yes, we exchanged files, and we
had at that time — we still have — many filing cabinets full of reports
of investigations of individuals. We had on December 7 access to
practically all the information that the F. B. I. had on individuals.
That is how we got the ''A" and "B" lists. We had a map as big
as the side of that wall (indicating), of the city of Honolulu and
of this entire Island. Kverv house for one of these people that we were
suspicious of, we had a pin there, and it was a comparatively simple
matter to put out our dragnet and pick them up when hostilities
started, but we couldn't touch them prior to that.
62. General Russell. Well, did it come to pass that as of December
7, or November 27, based on the information which you had and
which has been referred to in these previous questions, that you felt
that there might be an element of Japanese on this Island or on these
Islands that would engage in sabotage efforts against the Government
in event of war ?
Colonel Fielder. Very definitely.
63. General Russell. In the event of hostilities or war?
79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, voL 2 48
1540 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Fielder. Very definitely. Everything pointed in that direc-
tion. You couldn't — you can't conceive of that many people of a
different race not engaging in some subversive activity in the event
of hostilities. I can't conceive of 160,000 Americans being in Japan,
when war is declared, without them doing something against Japan.
And the same way here ; we couldn't think otherwise.
64. General Russell. In other words, you had the feeling [2957]
that if relations became more tense and war should intervene, or war
was immediately imminent, that you might expect activity of some
sort in the nature of sabotage by some elements of the Japanese on the
Islands ?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, everything pointed to that. In analyzing
the big picture of the war, we knew that Japan's ambition was to the
south where they could get resources. We knew that they needed
tin, they needed rubber, they needed oil ; and we also knew that this
was their one stumbling block.
65. General Russell. What was their one stumbling block?
Colonel Fielder. Pearl Harbor.
66. General Russell. You mean the Navy?
Colonel Fielder. The Navy. The Navy. Our Navy, Pearl Harbor.
Consequently it looked as if the easiest thing for them to do would
be to inflict great damage on our military and naval installations here
any way they could. Well, with 160,000 potential saboteurs scattered
throughout the Islands it is perfectly reasonable to assume
67. General Russell. How were they going to get tlieir hands on
their equipment, the explosives and whatnot, to commit acts of
sabotage?
Colonel Fielder. About all they would need would be a box of
matches.
68. General Russell. Explain that ; will you please, Colonel ?
Colonel Fielder. AVell, for instance, the oil tanks over here near
Pearl Harbor, dozens of them, right out in the open, not underground
at all ; the docks, the waterfront. Any waterfront can be
[2958] 69. General Russell. You can't set them afire with a
match, can you?
Colonel Fielder. You certainly can if you spread a little gasoline
on it, and right within 500 yards of the docking facilities, all of the
commercial aviation that's stored on the Island was there.
TO. General Frank. You mean aviation gas?
Colonel Fielder. No. Aviation gas, yes. That's it. As a matter of
fact, every other kind of gas, automobile gas ; and under those docks,
for instance, are a very intricate series of pipe lines where they bunker
the ships, and so forth. It would be a very simple matter to open
one of those valves and flood a little oil, a little gasoline on the water,
and set it on fire.
71. General Russell. Well, what about blowing up utilities and
destruction of aircraft that was parked back there? What was your
fear there ?
[2979] Colonel Fielder. The fear, there, was that you could
more easily protect aircraft when they were concentrated than if they
were dispersed.
72. General Russell. How were they going to get the thing to blow
them up with ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1541
Colonel Fielder. Well, dynamite, for instance, was very plentiful
here at that time, because of the nature of this particular island, for
instance. Every time you build a home up there on one of these hills,
you usually have a blast away a lot of rock, consequently all of the
constructions .companies, almost every gang of builders had cases
of dynamite which might have been used. That is one way they
coulcl do it.
73. General Russell. Do you recall a message which came out to
General Short on the 27th of November ?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir; I do.
74. General Russell. Did you see that message?
Colonel Fielder. I saw it.
75. General Russell. Did you know of a message which arrived
for the Navy, on or about that same date, which began with the words,
"This is a war warning" ?
Colonel Fielder. No, sir ; I didn't see that ; never heard of it, until
after this thing was all over.
76. General Russell. A^^ien General Short received that message
on the 27th that we are discussing, and which began with the state-
ment that "negotiations with the Japanese government are practically
over, to all intents and purposes," did he have a staff meeting and
discuss what to do about that?
Colonel Fielder. As I remember it, he called the staff officers in,
the Chief of Staff did, one or two at a time, but [2960'] it was
called to my attention. We read the thing, and we actually discussed
the message, and intensified our inspections of the sabotage plans. I
personally was detailed by General Short to go to Wlieeler Field, go to
Fort De Russy, go to Fort Kamehameha, and check on the interior
guard systems, check on the plans for repelling enemy action, subver-
sive acts.
77. General Russell. Did you agree with the decision made by the
Commanding General, to go on a sabotage alert and not to take a more
effective form of alert?
Colonel Fielder. I don't consider that my prerogative, to agree or
disagree with the Commanding General.
78. General Russell. He did not ask you for your opinion about it ?
Colonel Fielder. He did not ask me for my opinion.
79. General Russell. ColoneL you are about the only man we have
found here who was not willing to express an opinion about whether
he though the sabotage alert was good or bad.
Colonel Fielder. I have indicated that I thought — I very definitely
thought it was sound. I didn't expect anything else, if that is the
answer j'ou want.
80. General Russell. I do not care what the answer is, I just want
the question answered.
Colonel Fielder. I did not mean it just facetiously, or anj'thing like
that, but I want to make it perfectly clear that I did expect sabotage,
^■ery definitely.
81. General Frank. Did you expect an air attack?
Colonel Fielder. No, sir; I did not.
82. General Russell. Colonel, there has been shown us a telephone
call from Doctor Mori on the Island of Oahu to someone [2961]
in Japan. Have you ever heard of that telephone call ?
1542 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir; I am familiar with that.
83. General Russell. When did you first see it, and under what
conditions.?
Colonel Fielder. I first saw it on the late afternoon of December 6,
1941. It was brought to mel)y Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell, who was
my assistant at that time. I read it, and went over to General Short's
quarters and discussed it for about an hour with him, and Bicknell
was there at the same time. We couldn't solve it, we couldn't make
heads nor tails out of it. We considered it very suspicious, very fishy,
but the person doing the talking on this end was a newspaper woman,
and it appeared from the conversation that someone in Tokyo, some
newspaper was trying to get material to advise the Japanese public
of conditions in Hawaii, and there were a lot of things they talked
about — flowers, for instance, poinsettias and hibiscus, which didn't
seem to make sense, and till this day that message has not been solved,
so far as I know.
84. General Russell. Who did you say brought that message to
you ?
Colonel Fielder. Colonel Bicknell — Lt. Col. George Bicknell.
85. General Russell. Did he remain with jou, so long as you and
General Short were considering the message?
Colonel Fielder. He remained at least an hour. General Short
and I considered it for perhaps another hour, because we were going
to Schofield Barracks together. We were an hour late getting there
as a result of that message, and, riding out in the car, we discussed it ;
and then on the way back, about 9 :30, we discussed it still further,
and arrived at no conclusion as to its significance.
[2962] 86. General Russell. To go back to the November pe-
riod, you received a message on November 27 from G-2, the War
Department, is that true ?
Colonel Fielder. That is true.
87. General Russell. Have you got the original of that message,
which was in the file, here ?
Colonel Fielder. I believe that has been turned over to the Board.
I have a copy of it.
88. General Russell. I hand you a message. No. 473, dated 27
November 1941, which reads :
"Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate STOP
Hostilities may ensue STOP Subversive activities may be expected
STOP Information Commanding General and Chief of Staff only."
Do you remember what time of day you got that message?
Colonel Fielder. I do not remember. I could find out from the
original, perhaps.
89. General Russell. Was it before you were in the conference with
the Chief of Staff al)out the sabotage order, or not?
Colonel Fielder. I am not sure of that, but I think it was subse-
quent, I think this came after the other message, but I am not sure.
It has been so long, now, that some of the details have slipped my
mind.
90. General Russell. Colonel, on this subject of sabotage, and of
how broadly prevalent the sentiment about it was, do you recall my
calling your attention on Saturday to a letter of August 3, 1941, which
was signed by a man named George Paisn, written to the President of
PROCEEDINGS OP ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1543
the United States, from Blue Ridge, New York? Do you remember
that?
12963] Colonel Fielder. Yes, I remember that.
91. General Russell. Was that letter, or a copy of that letter, for-
warded from Washington out to the Hawaiian Department, and is it
, now in th>e files of the Hawaiian Department?
Colonel P^iELDER. It is.
D'i. General Russell. Do you recall my asking you to check on this
man. George Paisn, to determine who he was. and why he was writing
the President about the danger of sabotage here on the island?
Colonel Fielder. I checked so far as our files; we had nothing on
him, at all. That letter came out in September 19^1:1, as I remember it.
9;>. General Russell. This is a letter w^ritten by a man named
George Paisn to the President and sent out here to the Hawaiian De-
partment, and I will read one sentence from it :
I possess information tliat cannot be questioned of the existence of some kind
of understanding between tlie large numlxn- of Japanese who live in Hawaii, the
Japanese government and the native Hawaiians. I cannot give the source of this
information in a letter, but shall be happy to do so to anyone who can be trusted
not to reveal it to anyone but yourself. The danger of sabotage of these reserves
of ammunition and of stores cannot therefore be overlooked and demand the
most stringent precautions on the part both of the American naval and of the
military authorities in Hawaii.
Colonel, do you mean to testify that when you got a letter with that
sort of information in it. coming from the President, you did not
check on the man wdio wrote it, to see whether or [296'4] not it
was worthy of serious attention?
Colonel Fielder. That's exactly what I mean to say. A copy of
that letter was sent out here for our information by General Miles,
who was then the G-2 of the War Department. We immediately
checked here as best we could to find out whether any ring of saboteurs
or potential saboteurs existed. We inunecliately discussed it, as I
remember it, but we got nowhere. This w^as probably one of, I would
say, eight or ten letters that I have seen which predicted sabotage
and other subversive acts by local Japanese.
The fact that it is addressed to the President does not make it any
more impressive. I presume that this letter was turned over to the
FBI, and I presume that the FBI on the mainland investigated this
fellow, but our files do not show a result of that investigation. Xow,
I would be very glad to ,go to the FBI files and perhaps w^e could find
out whether this was run down, but we didn't do it in my section.
94. General Russell. Now, so nuich for the sabotage evidence.
Colonel, it it true that you had a great number of these people whom
you detained after December 8, 1941. Did you ever try any of those
people on any criminal charges?
Colonel Fielder. One man was tried, a German named Kuhn, for
espionage, and he was sentenced by a military commission to be shot,
or hanged.
95. General Russell. Those records I have been looking for. and I
ask you now. They told me today they thought they would have them
forme. You did not find them in your records?
Colonel Fielder. Y^'es ; we have them. I thought they had been
delivered to the Board, by Colonel Hayne.
1544 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[£965] 96. General Kussell. Hayne told me today he would
check.
Colonel Fielder. He has them.
97. General Russell. Now, so far as you know, however, of all the
Japanese people that you interned after December 8, not a one of them
has ever been tried ?
Colonel I^ielder. I do not know of any that have been tried.
98. General Russell. Since December 8, 1941, or immediately prior
thereto, has any Japanese from this island been tried for disloyalty to
the American Government, or for acts of sabotage ?
Colonel Fielder. Not to my knowledge.
99. General Frank. Would you know ?
Colonel Fielder. Not necessarily. That would come under the
Military Governor's office, and they could have a military commission
sitting on one of the other islands and I might not ever know.
100. General Frank. Would you know it if it were on this island?
Colonel Fielder. Not necessarily. I could very quickly find out,
though, by a telephone call.
101. General Russell. Do you not believe, being in as close touch
as you are with the Japanese Hawaiians on- this land, that if such
thing had occurred, you would know somthing about it?
Colonel Fielder. I think if it were an outstanding case, there is no
question but I would know something about it. The chances are
I would know, yes; but you can see that some of the consular agents
might have been tried before a military commission on Japanese of
gathering information of our fleet, he might have been acquitted, or
might have been sentenced to a penitentiary sentence; I don't know.
[2966] 102. General Russell. All right.
Turning now from sabotage. Colonel, what are the sources of infor-
mation available to you as G-2 on this island, from which you might
make deductions as to possible Japanese activity by the armed forces,
either naval or military?
Colonel Fielder. You are speaking at the pres'ent, or prior to De-
cember 7?
103. General Russell. Prior to December 7.
Colonel Fielder. The only source of information we had was
through the Navy. That's locally. Now, of course we had access to
War Department information. Navy Department information; that
would come to us; but locally, our only source of information was
through the Navy.
101. General Russell. Do you believe that the information was
being sent from these islands to the homeland of the Japanese gov-
ernment by their Japanese consul or his agents?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, I do.
105. General Russell. Was it possible for you to have intercepted
any of that information and have made deductions therefrom which
might have been of benefit to our armed forces here on the island?
Colonel Fielder. It was not possible under the conditions; no.
106. General Russell. What were those conditions, Colonel?
Colonel Fielder. The first thing I think of is that we were not
authorized to do anything in connection with the local population.
The consular agents had diplomatic immunity ; and even the FBI
I understand were not permitted to intercept the commercial cables.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1545
[2967] 107. General Russell. Wliat were the means of com-
munication available to the Japanese consul, if he desired to communi-
cate with the homeland?
Colonel Fielder. Probably the safest thing would be by courier.
The boats ran regularly, and the diplomatic mail is not subject to
examination. I would say the safest method would be physical trans-
mission of messages, not by radio or telephone. Then of course they
had the commercial cables, they had telephone connections, and they
had the Mackay radio and the RCA, all of which had circuits to and
including Tokyo.
108. General Russell. Were you permitted to intercept messages
from these other means of communications ?
Colonel Feeder. We were not.
109. General Russell. Are you permitted to do that now?
Colonel Fielder. We are not. It is illegal.
110. General Russell. On the 7th of December, did the military
people raid the Japanese consulate here on the island ?
Colonel Fielder. Yes; they did.
111. General Russell. Did they discover any messages which had
not been destroyed, in that consulate?
Colonel Fielder. Yes; they did.
112. General Russell. Is this folder which I have in my hand,
marked "Confidential, 336.92, Japanese Consulate and Consular
Agents," a folder or file containing all of the messages delivered to
you by the FBI as taken from the Japanese consulate on the day of the
raid ?
Colonel Fielder. It contains all that have been pieced together and
decoded and translated. We had probably several waste-paper basket-
fuls of scraps which were never solved. We [396S] worked
on this, oh, some six or eight months, piecing the various little scraps
together, and we finally did solve some of them. This is the complete
file of messages that have been solved.
113. General Russell. Now, Colonel, did I ask you, on Saturday,
last, to go through that file and to select any message or messages
which might have been helpful to you as G-2 in predicting Japanese
future actions, had they been in your hands prior to December 7, 1941 ?
Colonel Fielder. Yes; you did.
114. General Russell. And did you select any such messages?
Colonel Fielder. I selected several messages here which would have
been very much of interest to me. They might not have given us any
definite warning of an attack.
115. General Russell. Would you read into the record two, three,
or four that you would consider more material, so that the Board
might hear them, and so they may become a matter of record. Will
you identify them by date. Colonel, so that we might know.
Colonel Fielder. Yes. Here is a message, No. 115, 14 May, 1941,
from Kita, who was the local consul, to Tokyo. It saj^s :
With respect to message No. 10 of January 8th for the purpose of reenforcing
the local air force 21 B-17 bombers, under command of Lieut. Greneral Emmons,
departed San Francisco at 1559 the 13th flying in formation and arrived Hicliam
Field at 0558 the 14th.
116. General Russell. That went to whom?
Colonel Fielder. To Gaimudaijin, Tokyo.
1546 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
117. (xeneral Russell. Did you know then, Colonel, or do you know
now, who that addressee was?
[2969] Colonel Fielder. I do not.
Here is one that might have been of interest to us. It indicated
that they knew that some of our fliers were joining the Chinese
forces. It is from Kita on 8 July 1941, to the foreign minister, Tokyo :
A report regarding the Washington report of the Latin Pact of May that
American pilots are joining the China air force. Tlie local Chinese consul general
on 10 June enrolled 100 men at his consulate (largely from local air groups)
Newspaper reports indicate that the Chinese military attache in Washington
(makes arrangements?) Furthermore according to English (language) news-
papers or the 5th
that must be a misprint.
200 men have already (Toppa Senn) gone ( ?) . The Chinese consul general
avoids a statement regarding his orders.
End of message.
On September 2, 1941, from Kita to foreign minister, Tokyo, a
similar message, one sentence of which is pertinent :
A ship left port en route for the Orient carrying about 50 American aviators
and mechanics. Although th& group declined to reveal their destination they
are an advance party already assigned to patrol the Burma border and the
Burma Road, and they have obtained permission to resign from their military
duties.
Here is one of December 3, 1941, from Kita to foreign minister,
Tokyo, No. 363 :
Wyoming and two seaplane tenders departed third.
December 4, 1941, RCA message No. 364, from Kita to [2970]
foreign minister, Tokyo :
One British warship arrived Honolulu and departed early morning fourth,
approximately 100 tons, one stack, one four-inch gun forward and aft. Fueled.
Immediately after arrival enlisted ratings, received mail from British consulate.
On December 4, 1941, RCA message 365, from Kita to foreign min-
ister, Tokyo.
USS HONOLULU arrived 1300 4th.
December 6, 1941, from Kita to foreign minister, Tokyo, message
Xo. 368 :
1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp Davis
North Carolina on the American .mainland. They considered (at that time)
the practicability of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and Panama.
Investigation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected for
tlieir use or any preparations for constructing moorings. No evidence of train-
ing or personnel preparations were seen. It is concluded that their installation
would be difficult. FiVen if they were actually provided they would interfere
with operatlonis at nearby Hickam Field. Ewa Field and Ford Island. The
whole matter seems to have been dropped.
2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the non-use of nets for torpedo
defense of battleships and will report further.
That, to me, is a rather significant message. That left here on
December 6, 1941.
118. (General Frank. By cable or radio?
[2971] Colonel Fielder. By cable, RCA.
Here is a message, 3 : 20 a. m., December 7, 1941, from the Japanese
consul, Honolulu. No, it is received by him from Togo :
Relations strained between Japan and the United States and Britain.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1547
That is elated 3 : 20 a. m., on the morning of the 7th.
Outside of those, there are no messages in there, that might have
been particularly helpful.
119. General Russell. Is it your testimony, or not, Colonel, that
with the messages which are contained in the file recently identified,
and the telephone message which we have discussed already, and which
is known as the Mori message, that those include all of the messages
which reached you, as G-2, from FBI, prior to December 8, 1941 ?
Colonel Fielder. Well, these messages did not reach me for weeks
after December.
120. General Russell. But they were seized by the FBI from the
consulate and turned over to you, weeks after December 8?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir; that is correct.
121. General Russell. Therefore, the number of messages which
3'ou havQ produced in response to the Board's notice to produce, as
coining from the FBI, consists of this one telephone transcript about
which you have testified ?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir; that is correct, so far as the armed forces
of Japan are concerned.
[3972] 122. General Russell. Now, Colonel, did you read the
local papers along about the first of December, 1941," to see what the
relationship between the Japanese Empire and our government was?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, I naturally read the papers.
123. General Russell. Wh<it was your conclusion at that time as
to the inevitability of war with Japan?
Colonel Fielder. It appeared inevitable to me.
124. General Russell. You thought it was coming some time ?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir. I had no idea when, but it seemed
inevitable.
125. General Russell. You did not have the impression that it was
imminent?
Colonel Fielder. No, I did not.
126. General Russell. I asked you or the Board asked j^ou to pro-
duce all the messages which you might have received from G-2 or the
War Department indicating to you the imminence or the inevitability
of war. As I recall, you have produced only this one message of
November 27th. We had some other messages which we might want
to identify. Here is a message which might be interesting for the
record. Will you identify and read that message and tell the Board
where it came from and what the basis of information therein con-
tained is?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir. This is a message that we sent to the
War Department on the 14th of November, 1941. I authenticated the
message. It reads :
(Message to War Department authenticated by Colonel Fielder,
dated November 14, 1941, is as follows:)
The Adjutant General,
Washington, D. C.
For G-two interviewed W. G. Keswick, British courier from [2973]
Singapore now enronte San Francisco comma Washington and London in same
plane with Saburo Knrusn comma Keswick states quote mission of ambassador
is primarily to confirm Nomura reports that United States Government is not
bluffing stop If he sees any indication of weakness in attitude of United States
comma then Japan may move toward other hostilities stop Should he observe
only attitude of strength and determination great possibility no such hostile
1548 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARbOH ATTACK
acts would take place unquote stop. Keswick information and opinions hitherto
fairly accurate period
127. General Russell. As I get it, you people here interviewed this
man named Keswick, who was travelling with Kurusu, and Keswick's
opinion was that he was going to the States to see whether or not we
were bluffing in our attitude toward Japanese aggression in the Pacific ?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir, that is true.
128. General Russell. And you made that sort of reply ?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir. We interviewed many people that
passed through here. That was one of our sources of information.
Honolulu has always been somewhat the crossroads and many British-
ers, Dutchmen and Filipinos and whatnot travel through here. We
interviewed a great many of them prior to December 7th, 1941.
129. General Russell. That message went from you to the War
Department?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir, that is right.
130. General Russell. Here is a message of July 8th, 1941, from
the Adjutant General to you, in which he discusses the international
situation. I believe that message is in the record [2974^ from
other sources. But you did receive this message of July 8th, 1941,
which discusses the War Department's idea as to what the Japs were
going to do ?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir, that is correct.
131. General Russell. Will you read into the record that part of
that message which deals with the War Department's prophesy about
the Japanese future action ?
Colonel Fielder. The date of this message is July 8th, 1941; the
number is 94-War-BC-207, to the CG, Hawaiian Department, Fort
Shafter:
(Message to commanding general, Hawaiian Department, from War
Department, dated July 8, 1941, is as follows :)
For your information deduction from information from numerous sources is
that Japanese Government has determined upon its future policy which is sup-
ported by all principal Japanese political and military groups. This policy is at
present one of watchful waiting involving possible agressive action against mari-
time provinces of Russia if and when Siberian gari-ison has been materially
reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will win a decisive
victory in European Russia. Opinion is that Jap activity in the south will be
for the present confined to seizure and development of naval, Army and air bases
in Indo-China, although an advance against the British and Dutch cannot be
entirely ruled out. Neutrality pact with Russia may be abrogated. They have
ordered all Jap vessels in U. S. Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by
first August. Movement of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and
additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned.
That is the end of the message.
(jeneral Russell. Do your files have any other messages [£975]
from the War Department touching the Japanese situation until the
message of November 27, 1941, from this date in July?
Colonel Fielder. No, sir. That is all that appears in the G-2 files.
132. General Russell. There is another source of information we
want to deal with briefly, and that is this newspaper situation. You
say you were reading the newspapers out here in early December and
late November ?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1549
133. General Russell. Do you remember the headline of Sunday,
November 30, 1911, to the eilect that the Japanese might strike over
the week-end ?
Colonel Fielder. I do not remember that in particular. It prob-
ably impressed me at the time.
131. General Russell. I will -ask you this : Did you during that
critical period in November and early December, 1941, prior to the
attack, as a result of seeing any headlines in the local papers go down
to their offices and contact them to determine from where they were
getting the information on which these headlines were based?
Colonel Fielder. No, I did not, because that never would occur to
me. Unless it was something very outstanding and did not represent
opinion, I don't think I would ever query them on it.
135. General Russell. Was not that a source of information which
you people did not have out here, as to the imminence of war?
Colonel Fielder. I do not consider it such. I do not consider a
daily newspaper a source of official information, because [^2976^
I think everything that they would have access to would be available
to tbe War Department.
136. General Russell. Your mental attitude, then, excluded all
sources of information coming to you except official information?
Colonel Fielder. Not at all. I just cited a couple of cases where we
interviewed people passing through. We were seeking information
from all sides. But it never occurred to me to query a daily paper
because it had a headline that war was imminent. We knew war was
imminent.
137. General Russell. Colonel, we have been discussing the things
that we did not know about the Japanese. I now want to ask you a few
questioiis about the maps which you took off the Japanese or which
were taken from the Japanese after or during the attack of December
7th, 1941. You have before you now a map. Will you tell the Board
what that map is ?
Colonel Fielder. It is a chart, an American chart, a very old one.
showing the depth of the water of Oahu. It shows the outline of
Pearl Harbor. It shows Hickam Field. It shows Fort Kameha-
meha. It shows several military installations. At this particular
point in Japanese is written "4 6-inch tractor-drawn guns." It shows
around the perimeter of Pearl Harbor where certain ships are berthed.
It does not mention them by name, but it has a fairly accurate outline
of the installations inside of Pearl Harbor.
138. General Frank. On what date?
Colonel Fielder. The date is not shown. They had this map in
their possession a number of years, because there is one entry on there
dated 1933 in Japanese, but it is a coastal [2977^ ' Geodetic
Survey map which anyone could buy before the war at any map store.
Apparently, they have gathered information from time to time and
overprinted it in Japanese on this particular chart. In addition to
that, there are modern entries apparently made by the aviator himself.
He has got certain magnetic bearings to certain targets in Pearl
Harbor.
To^my mind the significance of it is that they were very meticulous
in briefing their pilots prior to this attack. To me it indicates they
had practiced a great deal. They probably rehearsed this thing many
1550 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
times before it came ojff, because they had very detailed information
"and instructions for the pilots.
139. General Grunert. Tell us some more things about the maps,
Colonel.
Colonel Fielder. It shows the drydocks at Pearl Harbor. It shows
the fuel — the tank farm of oil, Navy oil, which did not exist at the time
this chart was printed originally.
140. General Grunert. What is shown about Hickam Field ?
Colonel Fielder. It shows the number of hangars, a total of 8 hang-
ars, and one headquarters building, all apparently sketched in in ink
over the original chart.
141. General Grunert. How many hangars actually existed tliere
on December 7th ?
Colonel Fielder. Five,
142. General Grunert. How do you account for eight being shown ?
Colonel Fielder. The plans for Hickam Field called for eight hang-
ars, although those plans are more or less standard, and there is in
existence a drawing or a sketch of Hickam Field which dates back to
about 1936, at least, which shows in outline five hangars constructed
and three outlined in broken lines or dotted lines.
[^2978] 143. General Frank. The original plans called for that
number of hangars and they had not gotten the money to date by
way of appropriations to construct them.
144. General Grunert. What impressed me was that it appears on
this old map to have been a lot of modern installations put on there,
but when they get to Hickam Field they ap])arently do not know that
five are constructed and they put eight on there. It just doesn't make
sense. If they had recent information about this and that, why didn't
they have recent information about the large hangars on Hickam
Field? Do you suppose they got ahold of some plans and took that
for the granted as the number there ?
Colonel Fielder. Probably did.
145. General Russell. It is the first time he said anything to me
about the plans being in existence in 1936. The story he told me was
that they had plans that they were working on Hickam Field then at
the time of the attack, calling for eight, and that only five of them
had been put in, which indicated to my mind very clearly that they
had the current plans under which the field was being constructed.
Now he comes up and says it was in 1936. I know nothing about that.
Colonel Fielder. I beg your pardon. I did not mean to mislead.
I. don't understand now what you are after.
146. General Russell. It is perfectly obvious that if they were
working on current plans calling for eight hangars and only five had
been put up and that map showed eight, then that map was made from
the plans and not fi-om an observation of the field.
Colonel Fielder. Oh. yes, that is granted.
147. General Russell. But if the plan was made in 1936, thev may
have had it for three years. That is the first time I knew [2979]
it was a 1936 plan.
Colonel Fielder. That is the first time I knew it, today. You asked
me to look it up Saturday and I went to Hickam Field and got their
files.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1551
148. General Russell. Do you have the map on which you sliowed
me Pearl Harbor with the number of ships there by name, the WYO-
MING and some others, on Saturday ?
Colonel Fielder. I think that is it right there.
149. General Russell. Could you identify what you are referring
to?
Colonel Fielder. This is a translation and photostat of an overlay
made from a chart taken from tlie body of a Japanese submarine op-
erator. A two-man submarine ran on the reef off this island. One
of the operators was captured and the other one drowned, and this was
on the body of the one that was drowned.
150. General Russell. What does it show about Pearl Harbor?
Colonel Fielder. It shows the ARIZONA and the PENNSYL-
VANIA bv name as being — it shows their place of berth. It shows
the TENNESSEE, the CALIFORNIA, the SARATOGA, the WYO-
MING, the SAN FRANCISCO, tlie OMAHA, the TRENTON.
151. General Fraxk. Was the SARATOGA at Ford Island?
Colonel Fielder. It was not. Very few of these cruisers were in
port.
152. General Russell. Are those the places where they were habitu-
ally berthed when they came in there, Colonel ?
Colonel Fielder. I am not sure. I am quite sure that it is correct
for the — the location is correct. Whether or not the ships berthed in
those places, I do not know. I know where [2980^ thev were
on that date. I know where the CALIFORNIA, and the WEST
VIRGINIA and the ARIZONA and tlie UTAH were, and this does
not quite correspond, but it is sufficiently accurate to indicate that they
had pretty good knowledge of where our ships tied up.
153. General Russell. That is all.
154. General Frank. Give us a short statement on the industry of
the Japanese workers as compared to others on the islands.
Colonel Fielder. In my opinion, they are much better. They lose
less time, they work harder, they are more law-abiding.
155. General Fraxk. Do they work much faster?
Colonel Fielder. Much faster.
156. Genei-al Frank. You get a lot more labor out of eight hours
of Japanese labor than you get out of any other labor on the island?
Colonel Fielder. That is correct. This particular building is an
outstanding example. Most of the labor on this building was Japan-
ese, and they put it up in, I think it was, five weeks from the time they
broke ground, these two buildings.
157. General Frank. Did you render G-2 estimates periodically
prior to December 7th?
Colonel Fielder. We did not.
158. General Frank. Why not?
Colonel Fiedler. I better modify that. I was thinking of periodic
reports which are based on combat. We submitted periodically re-
ports of the local situation which covered economy and communism,
racial disorders and things like that.
159. General Frank. How periodically?
Colonel Fielder. I believe it was once each month.
1552 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[2081] 160. General Frank. How often did you submit strate-
gic estimates ?
Colonel Fielder. I did not submit one that I remember, a strategic
estimate, prior to December 7th, from the time I became G-2.
161. General Frank. Do you submit them now?
Colonel Fielder. We submit a weekly rej^ort and a monthly report.
162. General Frank. What is in it?
Colonel Fielder. That is based on operations. We have a periodic
report that goes in every week and then we have one that goes in bi-
weekly now, every other week.
163. General Frank. You stated that there were few, if any, mes-
sages that you received prior to December 7th.
Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir, that is correct.
164. General Frank. As G-2 of the Hawaiian Department?
Colonel ielder. Yes.
165. General Frank. You did not get much information from the
War Department as a G-2, then ?
Colonel Fielder. Very little in the messages. Now, they would send
us out studies, of various islands, for instance, maybe the Philippine
Islands. We had a" lot of terrain studies; we had a lot of economic
studies, strategic studies.
166. General Frank. Did they give you any information on the
political situation ?
Colonel Fielder. The local political situation?
167. General Frank. No, the international political situation.
Colonel Fielder. I do not remember any report on the international
situation at all.
[2982] 168. General Frank. Well, was the Department Com-
mander expected to get it? Is not G-2 the normal source for that?
Colonel J'ielder. That is the normal source for it and we normally
get those things. I just don't happen to remember. I could very
easily look in the files. But we got nothing, to my knowledge, that
had any particular bearing on the imminence of war.
169. General Frank. Did you get any intelligence messages from
the Navy ?
Colonel Fielder. No, we did not.
170. General Frank. The Navy had an intelligence message which
reported a Japanese task force in the Marshall Islands. Did you
know anything about that ?
Colonel Fielder. I did not.
171. General Frank. Do you get any messages now ?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, we do.
172. General Frank. From the Navy?
Colonel Fielder. From many different sources. We get very de-
tailed valuable information.
173. General I'rank. Do 3^011 get any messages on the international
situation ?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, we do.
174. General Frank. Do you feel that you now are kept fully
abreast of the situation ?
Colonel Fielder. I do, refinitely.
175. General Frank. Do you feel that a JajDanese air raid is prob-
able or possible now ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1553
Colonel Fielder. I feel it is definitely possible, but not probable.
[2983] 176. General Frank. Have you any means of watchmg
for it now ?
, Colonel Fielder. Yes, I have.
177. General Frank. Are you taking those steps ?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, I am, very definitely.
178. General Frank. Do you feel that Oahu could be surprised to
any such extent as it was surprised before?
Colonel Fielder. I don't think it could be surprised to that extent,
but I think it is entirely possible to raid this place again from the air
and do a lot of damage.
179. General Frank. Do vou feel that a hostile force could come in
here flying its planes about 20 feet off the water and reach its objective ?
Colonel Fielder. I think undoubtedly they could.
180. General Frank. Without being reported ?
Colonel Fielder. I think it would be reported, but possibly too late
to repel them.
181. General Frank. It would be reported from about only 20
miles ?
Colonel Fielder. Twenty miles, line of sight; further than that
from the higher installations.
182. General Grunert. Only 20 miles out ?
183. General Frank. That is all.
184. General Grunert. They could only get them from the time they
got within 20 miles ?
185. General Frank. Eight today the facilities are such that if
they came in at about 20 feet over the water they can get within about
20 miles before they can be detected, unless they are seen visually.
186. General Grunert. Low flying?
[2984] 187. General Frank, Yes, sir.
Colonel Fielder. That is right. I thought it was a little further
than that. I thought it was at the height of the line of sight.
188. General F'rank. They have to be seen, by vision. Did the
Navy know of that Poinsettia-Hibiscus message?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, they did. I don't know just when they got
it, but a copy of that was sent to the Navy and Army by the F. B. I.
189. General Frank. ^Yas there ever any discussion that Poinsettia
and Hibiscus might apply to types of naval ships like carriers and
battleships ?
Colonel Fielder. Very definitely, except it did not make sense,
because they said they were both in blossom and there were no carriers
in Pearl Harbor. There were battleships and one or two cruisers.
190. General Frank. Might "blossom" have meant that they were
at sea ?
Colonel Fielder. It could have contained a code, there is no question
about that, but we tried to solve it, and so far as I know it has not been
solved.
191. General Frank. I have nothing further.
192. General Grunert. Do you remember one Captain McMorris
of the Navy making statements to the effect that in his opinion the
Japs would never so attack, meaning by air, and also there is no pos-
sibility of such an attack ? Do you remember that being discussed or
that opinion being stated ?
1554 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel FiFXDER. No, sir," I do not,
193. General Grunert. Was the Army informed of the sinking of
[2985] a Jap sub about 6 : 45 a. m. December 7th ? -
Colonel Fielder. It was not.
194. General Grunert. Now, in your testimony before the Roberts
Commission it appears that you reported at a staff meeting that the
Japs were burning papers at the consulate on December Oth, that the
information came from the F. B. I. and that no one paid any attention
to it.
Colonel Fielder. That is incorrect. I did not. I did not report
that to the Roberts Commission.
195. General Grunert. Do you know anything about that ?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, I do.
196. General Grunert. What was that about ?
[2986] Colonel Fielder. The information came to us that the
consulate was burning papers, and if I am not mistaken that came from
sources other than the F. B. I. I think it came from the War Depart-
ment, but it also came from F. B. I. sources. And that was reported at
the staff meeting, and it was discussed, but that in itself, while signifi-
cant, was not in any way conclusive, because there is not a day goes by
that we don't burn secret papers right out here, for instance, and it was
quite possible that the Japs had been directed to burn up certain codes.
In fact, we know now, from the material that was captured at the con-
sulate, that they were destroying their codes and a lot of their files of
messages at that time.
That was not ignored at the staff conference, but no particular action
was indicated, and it merely indicated that war was more nearly upon
us, but not of an impending air attack.
197. General Grunert. You definitely understood that the consulate
was the head of the espionage system in the islands ?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir.
198. General Grunert. Had you any way of getting information as
to what was happening at that consulate?
Colonel Fielder. None whatever.
199. General Grunert. Did you ever make an attempt to get it?
Colonel Fielder. We discussed it at great len2:th with the F. B. I. as
to how — what we should do, and I am of the-
te'
200. General Grunert. You never went beyond the letter of the law
or the letter of the instructions by easing operators in there to find out
what they were doing?
Colonel Fielder. We did not.
201. General Grunert. Now, it is also in the digest of this Roberts
report : it says, "Fielder discussed possibility with Commanding
General in a purely academic way." Why, what is discussing the
possibility of an attack in an academic way? [2987] We have
our academic ways at our schools and colleges. Wlien you discuss
whether or not you are going to have an attack, what can you discuss
in an academic way ?
Colonel Fielder. I don't know whose testimony that refers to.
202. General Grunert. Well, did you discuss the possibility of such
an attack with the Commanding General? And, if so, what was done
about it ?
Colonel Fielder. That was discussed innumerable times, not only
with the Commanding General, but with all the staff officers. We
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1555
didn't necessarily discuss an air attack as such, but we planned how
tlie troops would be disposed; where would the defenses be installed,
what regiments would be dispersed on certain beaches, where the
main line of defense would be in the event of invasion. All those
things were discussed.
20o. General Gri xekt. All those things were discussed, and a lot
of them practiced, were they?
Colonel Fielder. A lot of them practiced.
204. General Gruxeut. But when it came down to the actual time,
they found the command in Alert No. 1, which was sabotage, and
therefore the implements that had been prepared could not possibly
be used ? Is that so ?
Colonel Fielder. That is so.
205. General Gruxert. Then, it appeared that if Alert No. 2 had
been in force there would have been a much better chance, if not of
stopping the attack, of minimizing the loss ; is that right ?
Colonel Fielder. Undoubtedly losses would have . been smaller.
They could not have stopped the attack.
[29<S8] 20f). General Gruxert. If an error was made or a mis-
take in judgment, it was a lack of comprehension of just was about
to come about, or a question of adopting the proper alert ?
Colonel Fielder. That enters into it. There is no assurance at
all that Alert No. 2 or Alert No. 3 would have repelled the air attack.
In my opinion it would not. It might have — it undoubtedly woidd
have reduced the losses.
207. General Grfx-^ert. Now let me ask you a little about these
staff conferences. How many staff conferences did they have? They
had periodic staff conferences between the Chief of Staff and the
heads ?
Colonel Fielder. Every Saturday morning we had a staff
conference.
208. General Grux'ert. Was it a routine matter?
Colonel Fielder. That was a routine matter, but they
209. General Grux'^ert. What did it amount to?
Colonel Fielder. Well, for instance, my part of it consisted of
bringing the staff officers up to date on world conditions.
210. General Grunert. Did you give them a little talk every
Saturday ?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, every Saturday morning.
211. General Gruxert. Then, in a way that was sort of an estimate
of the situation ?
Colonel Fielder. That is exactly what it was.
212. General Grux^^ert. How did you estimate the situation along
about November 27 to December Gth, say ?
Colonel Fielder. I considered it serious, I considered war immi-
ment, but frankly I didn't think it would be precipitated in that
manner. I expected the Japs to expand towards the south. [2989]
About that time we had knowledge of a large number of ships going
down the China coast to the south, which looked as if an invasion
force was taking off for Indo-China or the Malay States, or the
Philippines or some other place. I felt that there was great danger
of war, but I couldn't — I didn't anticipate that it would be inflicted
on us so suddenly. I thought perhaps there might be a sinking
79716^46 — Ex. 145, roL 2 49
1556 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of a transport, one of our transports, maybe on overt act against
the Philippine Islands, maybe a severing of diplomatic relations;
but we had pacified the Japs so many times, had had this critical
situation for weeks and weeks, and then we would give them maybe
a little oil or something, and I didn't — I definitely did not antici-
pate war as being imminent.
213. General Grunert. But you considered the Hawaiian com-
mand as in an outpost, didn't you?
Colonel Fielder. More as an outpost, more as a base from which
the Navy could operate. I had great confidence in the presence of
our Navy here, and we had most of our Navy here at that time, and
I couldn't — I just didn't know enough to visualize the approach of
an enemy task force as long as our Navy was present.
214. General Grunert. Then, you had what we might call a sort
of blind confidence in the Navy ; is that right ?
Colonel Fielder. Well, it must have been.
215. General Grunert. Did you know that the Navy was not
making distant reconnaissance for the protection of the islands?
Colonel Fielder. I knew that under the joint agreement they were
charged with it.
216. General Grunert. Right.
[2990] Colonel Fielder. And I thought they were making
reconnaisance.
217. General Grunert. Do you know whether any steps were ever
taken to ascertain just what they were or weren't doing in the line
of distant reconnaissance?
Colonel Fielder. I made none personally. I don't know whether
the other — whether the Commanding General made any or not.
218. General Grunert. Did you know what the task forces were
going out for or what they were doing out there and in what way
it would have helped to protect the island from an approach?
Colonel Fielder. I merely assumed that they were going out for
battle practice, maneuvers. We could hear firing in the distance
occasionally when they were out.
219. General Grunert. I want to clear up a few points and then
I will go to the gist of what I really want to find out.
Now, did I understand you to tell General Russell that you did
not see an article or a flare headline across your morning paper
of November the 30th predicting war within a week?
Colonel Fielder. I didn't say I didn't see it. I said that I didn't
remember it at this time as having impressed me particularly.
220. General Grunert. Then, you didn't place much credence in
what the papers put out?
Colonel Fielder. I apparently didn't, and I still do not — some of
their headlines.
221. General Grunert. Now, tell us about the statement that ap-
pears in the Roberts report record to the effect that Mr. Shivers stated
that Mr. Angus Taylor, District Attorney, wanted to prosecute some
Japanese agents for failure to register under the alien registration act,
but General Short was opposed to this without giving them notice so
to do, claiming that it Avould [£991] react unfavorably to his
plan of trying to make friends and create good relations amongst them.
Now, what did you have to do with that, and what advice did you
give General Short on the subject ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1557
Colonel Fielder. That happened before I took over as G-2, but I
am familiar with it and I know the background for it. Still in the
backs of everj^one's mind was the old sabotage bugaboo, and with so
many Japanese here the Army authorities felt that any way — any
steps, almost, should be taken to control the local element of — the local
Japanese population; and also they had been told not to disturb the
population, not to bring on racial disorders, not to conmiit any overt
act. And very definitely, if these agents so-called had been prosecuted
it would have thrown the community into a tailspin, and I still think it
was wise not to do it. General Short's policy has proven sound, in
that they have had no trouble from the Japanese population.
222. General Grunert. How do you know it was proven sound if
they never attempted it ?
Colonel Fielder. His policy was to treat them fairly and not an-
tagonize them or stir them up, but to handle them fairly, and I say it
is sound because it has had no overt acts.
223. General Grunert. Isn't it the characteristic of the Japanese to
be told what to do in no uncertain terms ^ Won't they respect you
more ?
Colonel Fielder. They do respect authority. They also respect fair
treatment.
224. General Grunert. Or is it possible that they have a contempt
for those who they appear to think are weaklings — following the Ger-
man and the Japanese custom ?
[2992] Colonel Fielder. If they construe it as weakness, I think
that is correct ; they have a contempt.
225. General Grunert. Well, weren't they laughing up their sleeves
that they could have these agents trotting all around against our laws
and nobody lay a finger on them ?
I don't expect 3^ou to answer all these unless you want to.
Colonel Fielder. I am delighted to answer them, because I think
that the stand that General Short took was absolutely sound.
226. General Grunert. Then, at that time, at least, you thought
appeasement was the best policy ?
Colonel Fielder. I did. I don't call it appeasement, exactl3\ I call
it fair play. These people had not been advised of their rights; they
had not been told that it was illegal to act. Many of them were just
as ignorant of their oli'ense as anything in the world.
Now, here is — he didn't decline to prosecute. He wanted to give
them warning and tell them that if they didn't register before a
certain date they would be prosecuted.
227. General Grunert. Well, why hadn't this warning been given
all this time ?
Colonel Fielder. That I don't now.
228. General Grunert. Since the law was in existence.
Colonel FiELbER. That I don't know. That is not within the
229. General Grunert. Yes. All right; we will drop that subject.
Now, it is recorded here that in your testimony before the Roberts
Commission you denied that Washington had advised you [2993]
of three code words that would signal attack. Was there ever any
understanding with Washington as to signals or messages of this
kind to denote imminence of actuality of attack?
Colonel Fielder. Absolutely none.
1558 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Grunert. That's all out of clear sky ?
Colonel Fielder. That's out of the — that's a figment of someone's
imagination,
230. General Grunert. Now tell me a little more about the time
that Bicknell came up — according to the testimony we have, he got
this message, this message this woman is supposed to have telephoned
to Japan, and he goes, according to his story, takes it up to the Com-
manding General's house where you and the Commanding General
were about to start out for some other place, and he has a short dis-
cussion with you, and that's all that came of that case as far as he
knows; but he expressed himself as feeling that that was a most
important thing and that it meant a great deal.
Will you tell us more about just what happened there? As I re-
member it, he said he had a very short conversation and intimated
that you discussed that thing for about an hour.
Colonel Fielder. Yes, I did ; for longer than that.
231. General Grunert. Was he there all the time?
Colonel Fielder. Bicknell was there the whole time. He had called
me up first, I don't remember the exact hour ; I imagine around 6
o'clock in the afternoon, and he came — I said, "Well, come right on
out".
He came out to my quarters, we read it over, and I said. "This
is — we had better go over and see General Short,*' who lived next
door, and we, the two of us, went over, sat out on [2994-] his
porch for I don't know how long, but I would say 45 minutes to an
hour at least, because we were over an hour late leaving for where
we were going; and we all considered it extremely interesting, possi-
bly important, but we couldn't make heads or tails of it.
232. General Grunert. It didn't induce General Short in any way
to go to his next step in another alert, did it?
Colonel Fielder. No, because, if you will analyze the conversation,
the simplest thing is to read it, and all it is, it is getting information.
It ask about the searchlights and whether there are many sailors on
the streets, whether there is — how the military reacts toward the
233. General Grunert. But didn't all these things add up into some-
thing? All these indications should have added up into — of course
it is hindsight.
Colonel Fielder. It is hindsight.
234. General Grltnert. But it might then at that time have been
foresight to have all these things add up into meaning something more
than mere sabotage.
Colonel Fielder. It didn't. It is easy enough, when an act has
been committed, to look back and see a lot of indications of that act,
but hindsight is so much better than foresight. We studied it at
great length ; we really did.
235. General Grunert. Tell me, in the same conne'ction : I believe
in the hearings before the Congress on whether or not to demand that
so-and-so be done, one congressman testified or at least announced
that when Bicknell got up to the Commanding General's quarters the
Commanding General cussed him out and practically kicked him out.
Will you tell us whether that is [299S] true or not, sir ?
Colonel Fielder. That is untrue.
236. General Grunert. All right ; that is all on that.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1559
Now Jet US go over a few messages here and see what you know
about these things.
Here is a message or a paraphrased dispatch of the 16th of October,
'41, from the C. X. O.. which warned all concerned of the existing
grave situation and which directed the Navy to take due precautions
which would not constitute i)r()vocative action against Japan. Did
you know anything about that October IGth message? That was the
gist of it.
['29^6] Colonel Fielder. I don't remember it in particular.
It might have been discussed at a staff meeting, but I don't remember
it, no, sir.
237. General Gruxert. Here is a message from the same source
to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, November 24, 1941, in which
it is stated as an opinion, "A surprise aggressive movement in any
direction is a possibility," and in which it was directed not to "pre-
cipitate Jap action." Do you know anything about that message?
Colonel Fielder. I do not.
238. General Grunert. You have already told us you know nothing
about this message of November 2Tth to the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, which is paraphrased and includes the following: "Con-
sider this dispatch a war warning."
Colonel Fielder. I was not familiar with that, either.
239. General Grunert. You were familiar with the Chief of Staff's
message to the Commanding General November 27, '41, which brought
on Alert No. 1?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir, I was familiar with that.
240. General Grunert. Were you at the discussion prior to the
decision as to what was to be done then ?
Colonel Fielder. I discussed that with the Chief of Staff and I
think with the Commanding General prior to the decision, but I don't
remember those details. The message was called to my attention,
and we did discuss it,
241. General Grunert. Prior to or after the decision?
Colonel Fielder. I am not sure.
242. General Grunert. Did he ask you for an estimate of the situa-
tion, in view of what was know then?
[2997] Colonel Fielder. No. he did not.
2'43. General Grunert. Was there any discussion, as far as you
remember, as to whether or not you should go to No. 2 or No. 3 alert?
Colonel Fielder. There was no discussion as to whether we should
go to No. 2 or No. 3, that I remember. I do remember discussing with
the Commanding General what might be expected of the local popula-
tion, and that was discussed any number of times. Sabotage was more
or less foremost in our minds ; there is no question about that.
944. General Grunert. Foremost in your minds why ?
Colonel Fielder. Because of the imminent danger from so many
245. General Grunert. Did you have any experience to back that
up with?
Colonel Fielder. Nothing except the experience that the Germans
had given us, and we knew that the Japs were collaborating with the
Germans. We knew that there were Germans in Japan training the
Japs.
246. General Gunert. In that experience you read about the
Germans did you also run across the fact that they usually hit on
1560 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Sunday morning? I think that was part of that same series of stuff
they put out.
Colonel Fielder. Yes, that is true. And it was well loiown. of
course, that the Japs liked to surprise-attack. That's what they did
at Port Arthur.
247. General Grunert. Now, you got this G-2 message from the
War Department November 27, to you, G-2, in which it states that
acts of sabotage and espionage were probable, and also [2998]
possible that hostilities may begin. That was a straight G-2 message
to G-2, and it was just inter-office, really?
Colonel Fielder. It was inter-office.
248. General Grunert. Yes.
Colonel Fielder. I was directed to bring that to the attention of the
Commanding General and the Chief of Staff only, which I did.
249. General Grunert. Now, on November 28th you also got a
message which pertained more to protection against sabotage and
airfields?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir.
250. General GRiJisrERT. That was an Adjutant General's message?
Colonel Fielder. That was an Adjutant General's message.
251. General Grunert. But those of these G-2 messages that
referred to sabotage were received after the decision was made to go
on an Alert No. 1, sabotage?
Colonel Fielder. I am not sure of the time. General. That is prob-
ably correct. We could check the hour of receipt very easily.
252. General Grunert. Now, there is a naval dispatch of Decem-
ber 3rd to the effect that information disclosed that instructions were
sent to various Japanese diplomatic and consular posts to destroy
certain codes and ciphers and to burn secret documents. Was this
information transmitted to you? Do you remember that?
Colonel Fielder, I don't remember it from that source.
253. General Grunert. Now, there is one on December 4th and one
on December 6th somewhat along the same line. Do you recall any
additional information you got from the Navy after [2999]
November 27th ?
Colonel Fielder. I do not.
254. General Grunert. Do you know anything about the actual
time of receipt of the Chief of Staff's message of December 7th ?
Colonel Fielder. Only that it was after the attack. I don't remem-
ber what hour; I think it was around noontime.
255. General Grunert. Had you had occasion to use the oceanic
telephone for anything with Washington ? Was that used as a means
of communication ?
Colonel Fielder. I never used it until after the attack. I used it
twice on the morning of December 7th.
256. General Grunert. And prior to that ?
Colonel Fielder. Prior to that I had never used it.
257. General Grunert. Now, do you know how long it took you to
make connections and get messages through by using that means?
Colonel Fielder. It took approximately an hour to get a message
through.
258. General Grunert. From the time you put in your call until the
connections were made ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1561
Colonel Fielder. From the time I put it in until I talked to General
Miles in Washington. And he called me back later. I talked to him
twice on that day.
259. General Grunert. After December 7th you actually got in
contact with General Miles, and then he called you back?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir.
260. General Grunert. Now give us a little more to wind up with.
Give us a little bit of information about just what [3000] your
contacts with the district and the fleet were, in the line of getting
information and giving information.
Colonel Fielder. It was very, very close insofar as counter-intelli-
gence was concerned. The investigations and the suspect list and those
things were discussed regularly every week. But insofar as combat-
intelligence and my associations and relationships with the fleet-intel-
ligence officer, thej' were not very close because we had practically
nothing in common. There was no combat at that time.
261. General Gruxert. And you say the district never transmitted
to you the fact that they had picked up a task force in the Marshall
Islands?
Colonel Fielder. They did not.
262. General Grunert. Any other questions?
263. General Frank. Do you get that kind of information now?
Colonel Fielder. Oh, yes, very definitely.
264. Major Clausen. Yes, we have some on the Rohl-Wyman
matter.
Colonel Fielder, are you acquainted with a Hans Wilhelm Rohl?
Colonel Fielder. I am not.
265. Major Clausen. You, while in charge of the G-2 of this Head-
quarters, though, have conducted investigations concerning this indi-
vidual, have you ?
Colonel Fielder. I think the F. B. I. did.
266. Major Clausen. Well, you did hand me a G-2 file which indi-
cated an investigation of Hans Wilhelm Rohl by your section here,
sir.
Colonel Fielder. I thought that was a — it's a series — [3001]
we do have a file on him which includes a report of an investigation
by the F. B. I., and we have in that file also a series of newspaper
clippings, and so forth, but we did not make a full investigation of
this man.
267. Major Clausen. AVell, I didn't ask you whether j^ou had made
a full investigation. You have, or had in July 1942, a Captain
Meurlott?
Colonel Fielder. Meurlott.
268. Major Clausen. Who was he?
Colonel Fielder. He was in — what was the date of it ?
269. Major Clausen. July 1942.
Colonel Fielder. He was in the counter-intelligence section of the
G-2 office at that time.
270. Major Clausen. And did he conduct an investigation concern-
ing Hans Wilhelm Rohl. any type of investigation whatsoever?
Colonel Fielder. Well, I don't think he did. He might have pe-
rused the files, and so forth, but I wouldn't call that an investigation.
1562 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
271. Major Clausen. Well, I show you a report titled, ''Memo for
files," dated July 22, 1942, and ask you if you recognize that as being in
the handwriting of Captain Meurlott.
Colonel Fielder. Yes, that is his handwriting all right.
272. Major Clausen. And that is a photostatic copy, is it. Colonel,
from the files to which you just referred ?
Colonel Fielder. That is right.
273. Major Clausen. Was that report made under your supervi-
sion ?
Colonel Fielder, les, it was.
[300^] 274. Major Clausen. You were acquainted with it at
the time?
Colonel Fielder. No, I was not.
275. Major Clausen. I see.
Well, I will offer in evidence this memorandum dated July 22, 1942,
and read it to the Board at this time. This is entitled :
(Memorandum dated 7/22/42, by Captain Meurlott, is as follows:)
Memo for files :
Decision made to bring this case to a close without the formality of a Cl-Rl
report. Subject is claimed by Colonel MoUison to be a confirmed drunkard, and,
inferentially, to be incompetent as a subversive influence for that reason. Irre-
sponsibility' rather than subversion appears to characterize the irregularities in
his activities, as brought to the attention of this office.
Case closed.
Signed "K. M. Meurlott, Capt. M. I."
To whom is that subject applicable? it says, "subject is claimed."
Who was the subject?
Colonel Fielder. Oh, that is Hans Wilhelm Eohl.
276. Major Clausen. I see. Now, are you acquainted with Captain
Ulrich von der Osten, who Was a German spy? Are you acquainted
with that case?
Colonel Fielder. No, I am not.
277. Major Clausen. Let me read you this from the F. B. I. report
dated March 11, 1943:
[3003] (Excerpt from F. B. I. report of March 11, 1943, in re
Captain Ulrich von der Osten, is as follows:)
Captain Ulrich von der Osten was in fact one of the chiefs of the German in-
telligence service among whose duties it was to established contact with indivi-
dual agents operating throughout the world. En route to the United States from
Shanghai he had reported detailed information concerning national defense
preparations of the United States at Pearl Harbor and other vital points in the
Hawaiian Islands. In his report on the Hawaiian Islands he mentioned that this
information would be of particular interest to "our yellow Allies." This report
of von der Osten, fortunately, failed to reach its destination and was ultimately
turned over to the FBI.
Are you acquainted with that case?
Colonel Fielder. I am not.
278. Major Clausen. Did you maintain liaison with the F. B. I.
concerning matters of that kind, sir?
Colonel Fielder. That could very easily be in the hands of mysec-
tion without my knowledge. I say that I personally was not familiar
with it.
279. Major Clausen. This report was made in 1941 and resulted
in conviction and sentences to terms of imprisonment of five to twenty
years, of a ring of spies.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1563
Colonel Fielder. I am not familiar with that.
280. Major Clausen. March 11)42 the court convicted these people.
I wondered, in connection with that report from which [3004]
I have just read, if you ever gave any consideration to the possibility
of a coincidence between the constiiiction of national defense prei)ara-
tions in the Hawaiian Islands and the actual bomb pattern of the
attackers on 7 December 1041.
Colonel Fielder. No, I haven't.
281. Major Clausen. You don't know? Well, if you have never
have given consideration to it, you would not know.
Colonel Fielder. I have considered the pattern, but not in connec-
tion with the construction plans.
282. Major Clausen. Did you know, Colonel, about the alternate
air route to the Philippines that was constructed or under construc-
tion about October?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, I knew about that. In the fall of '41.
283. Major Clausen. And that was commenced ab(jut October
1941?
Colonel Fielder. '41.
284. Major Clausen. Did your office ever receive any information
concerning the fact that the plans for that alternate air route may
have come to the attention of the Japanese Government prior to
7 December 1941 and thus have indicated to Japan the fact that this
nation, that is the United States, was going to wage war with Japan?
Colonel Fielder. No, that never came to my attention.
285. Major Clausen. Did your office ever receive information that
Colonel Wyman, in the spring of 1942, at a drinking party with three
other Army officers, — or I will ask this first : You know Colonel Theo-
dore Wyman, Junior, sir?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, I know him.
[SOOo] 280. Major Claltsen. Did you ever receive information
to the effect that Colonel Wyman, in the spring of 1942, in connection
v\ith several other Army officers, participated in an evening of drink-
ing and made this statement, Colonel :
There are probably a good many things which I have clone during my life that
;ire not exactly right, but there is one thing I have not done and that is to sell
out my country the way that s. o. b. Rohl dirt to his (Jerman friends. I should
never have trusted him and what I should do now is take this service revolver,
go out and shoot him and then blow my own brains out.
Colonel Fielder. That never came to my personal attention.
287. Major Clausen. Well, now, you indicated a few minutes ago
that such an important thing as a case of a spy might well be in your
section here and not come to your personal knowledge. Will you
search your files and see whether there is, any place in this Department
or under your jurisdiction or command, any place, information
concerning this statement that I have just read?
[3006] Colonel Fielder. That could very readily be in the files
of the Inspector General. Unless an Army officer is suspected of
espionage or some disloyal act, he would not come to the attention of
the G-2 section. If he went out on a drinking party, or if he gam-
bled, or if he went in debt, oi- something like that, he would probably
be investigated by an ins])ector; but unless it was subversive, we
probably wouldn't investigate him at all.
1564 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
288. Major Clausen. The incident to which I refer is reported to
us to have been referred to the G-2 office at Honohihi ; so would you
conduct that investigation and advise the Board, sir?
Colonel Fielder. I will have the officer who can answer that, and
wlio has charge of the files, as a subsequent witness. It would be much
more appropriate to have him identify the fides, and search his files.
289. General Grunert. Will you coach him to look that up so he
can testify on it?
Colonel Fielder. I will. I have already done that, and he reported
to me that this was the only thing he had in Ins files.
290. Major Clausen. I am going to read you a paragraph, here,
from a lead, and ask you if joii have ever heard of this :
Check assertion that Rohl was close to the owner of a barn near Schofield
base. This man is said to have been operating an illegal sliort-wave radio on
December 7, 1941, and was shot by military police. There should be some data
in the Honolulu FBI office about this matter, since we are informed that an
inquiry was made by the FBI office in Los Angeles. This man's name was given
to us as Bert Hasby, and his friendship with Rohl was said to have been intimate.
Do you know anything about that, Colonel ?
Colonel Fielder. Yes; I know about that. - ■
[S007] 291. Major Clausen. What are the facts?
Colonel Fielder. The facts are that Hasby was a Japanese alien,
and he ran a beer garden adjacent to Schofield base. He was not
even picked up after December 7. We subsequently investigated him
some year or year and a half after the war started, and he was interned
for a while on the mainland and was subsequently paroled. He is
now out, though ; he was not shot.
292. Major Clausen. Did Colonel Wyman ever talk with you re-
garding the immigration application of Hans Wilhelm Rohl?
Colonel Fielder. Never mentioned it, never talked to me about any-
tliing about Rohl.
293. Major Clausen. Do you know anything of any letters or oral
conversations that Wyman had with respect to that application of
Rohl?
Colonel Fielder. No; no; he never talked to me about it.
291. Major Clausen. I have just one question on this other matter
of Doctor Mori. Was this Doctor Mori a woman dentist?
Colonel Fielder. Doctor Mori was a man, but the woman that did
the talking was a newspaper woman, and I think a daughter-in-law ;
I am not sure; but Mori was a professional man. I don't kiiow
whether he was a surgeon or a physician or a dentist.
295. Major Clausen. Well, this "hibiscus and poinsettias" conver-
sation was by a woman from this end, and not this Doctor Mori, a
dentist?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, except the call was placed for Mori, and she
did the talking after the connection was completed. That is my
recollection of it.
[3008] 29G. General Grunert. Did you ever "G-2" her after-
wards?
Colonel Fielder. Oh, yes ; she was picked up.
297. General Grunert. What was done?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1565
Colonel Fielder. She was interned. She was mterned, and so was
he ; and I have forgotten what became of him, he may still be interned ;
but they did not get enough on any of them to proceed before a military
commission, but they did get enough to intern them.
298. General Grunert. Are there any questions ?
299. General Russell. No.
300. Colonel Toulmin. Is this photostat in evidence?
301. General Grunert. No ; they were not put in evidence, they were
just explained.
302. Colonel Toulmin. Do you not think it ought to be put in evi-
dence. General?
303. General Grunert. It would be very interesting to have it in
there, if the Board wants it in.
304. General Frank. Is this on the record ?
305. Colonel Toulmin. I was talking on the record.
306. General Grunert. Does the Board want this in the record ?
307. General Frank. It may not be of interest, because it is an old
photogi'aph. It is obsolete. It has several hangars on there that never
were built, but it does not have on there either the big engineering docks
nor the supply warehouses at the other end of the line.
Colonel Fielder, Nor the Aqua system.
308. General Frank. Yes — nor the Aqua system.
309. General Russell. It had on there enough for the Japs to blow
hell out of us doM'u there with, and that is what they were [30091
using it for.
310. Colonel Toulmin. My thought is that some question might be
raised at some time why the record was not complete. It is a very
simple thing to put it in and then nobody could be critical of our not
having it in the record.
311. General Grunert. Identify it, and we will put it in.
312. Colonel^ouLMiN. This photostat of the Japanese map found on
a Japanese aviator, December 7, 1941, is offered in evidence with the
next number.
(The photostat referred to was marked as Exhibit No. 22, and was
received in evidence.)
313. General Grunert. Colonel Fielder, do you know of anything
else, on any subject that relates to what we are after, that has not been
brought up here, that you would like to introduce in evidence ?
Colonel Fielder. I have one other very short statement I would like
to make.
314. General Grunert. Go ahead.
Colonel Fielder. That is to the effect that, while everyone in the
Army here was materially concerned about sabotage, certain other steps
were taken to prepare the group of islands for defense ; and I did men-
tion the fact that we held maneuvers, and that we fortified the beaches,
and things like that; but as far as my testimony is concerned, I don't
want it to appear that all we did was prepare for sabotage, because we
went a great deal further than that.
315. General Grunert. You prepared for a number of things, but
what was actually put into effect on December 7 when the attack
struck ? You were actually in alert No. 1 ?
1566 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[3010] Colonel Fielder. We were in Alert No. 1 at that time;
that is correct.
316. General Grunert. Are there any other questions? There
appear to be none. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Whereupon, at 4:55 p. m., having concluded the hearing of wit-
nesses for the day, the Board took up the consideration of other
matters.)
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1567
[3011] CONTENTS
TUESDAY. SEl'TEMBER 12, 1W4
Testimony of — Page'
Colonel Leonard D. Weddington, Air Corps, Sixth Air Service Area
Command 3012
Captain Edwin T. Layton, U. S. Navy. U. S. Pacific Fleet 3028
Commander Harold S. Burr, U. S. N. R., 14th Naval District 3067
Major General IMaxwell Murray. United States Army, Commanding
Guadalcanal 3075
Riley H. Allen. Editor, Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Business Address 125
Merchant St., Honolulu, T. H 3105
Lt. Colonel Melbourne H. West, Headquarters 7th Fighter Wing 3120
DOCUMENTS
Message of November 27, 1941, to Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department 3094
Newspaper Articles 3110
EXHIBITS
No. 23. Photostat of a captured .Tapanese chart taken from the chart-
board of a Japanese dive bomber 3035
24,25. Two captured Japane.se maps 3074
26. Captured map with translation of Japanese endorsements 3074
' Pagos referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original transcript of proceedings.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1569
iwm PROCEEDINGS BEFOEE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1944
Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii.
The Board, at 8:30 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, con-
ducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President
of the Board, presiding.
Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D.
Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.
Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, liecorder; Major Henry
C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr.,
Executive Officer.
General Grunert. The Board will come to order.
TESTIMONY OF COLONEL LEONARD D. WEDDINGTON, AIR CORPS,
SIXTH AIR SERVICE AREA COMMAND
(The witness was sworn b}^ the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your
name, rank, organization, and station.
Colonel Weddington. Leonard D. Weddington, Colonel, Air Corps,
Sixth Air Service Area Command ; APO 959.
2. General Grunert. Colonel, this Board is after facts, and leads
to where we can get facts; that is, concerning what led up to, and
v.hat happened during, the attack at Pearl Harbor. We asked that
vou attend because you are listed here, at the time of the attack, as
commanding Bellows Field ; is that right ?
[3013] Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir.
3. General Grunert. Xow, I wish you would tell the Board the
conditions at Bellows Field at the time of the attack, as to its prepa-
ration for defense and what it did to defend itself that day.
Colonel Weddington. Do you desire, on the preparation, our defense
as to the tvpe of alert, orders that we had received, or something like
that?
4. General Grunert. What were the physical means of defending
the field? What measures were taken to defend the field, to ward
off an air attack?
Colonel Weddington. Prior to December 7, there were practically
no means of warding off an air attack available at Bellows Field.
5. General Grunert. Did you have machine guns in position?
Colonel Weddington. No, sir.
6. General Grunert. Did you not have any-no emplacements of
any kind for weapons, or any protection for the personnel, in the line
of slit trenches or air-raid shelters — anything of that sort?
1570 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Weddington. No, sir; natural ditches and ravines were the
only thing.
7. General Grunert. In the line of protective measures, what took
place after December 7?
Colonel Weddington. Our preparation was hurried, and we accom-
plished some, from the time of the warning; until the attack, because
at Bellows Field we had one i)lane make one ])ass, firino; his forward
guns through a tent area, approximately an hour before w^e at that
field came under any attack other than that.
[SOI4.] 8. General Grunert. What protective measures have
you there, now ? Do you know what there is, now ?
Colonel Weddington. I know approximately. I do not know the
numbers of organizations, because they have changed a number of
times since I have read over the station list at that place; but I do
know that they have numbers of emplacements for automatic weapons
and have sites in the vicinity for antiaircraft gun positions. They
have placed them in there several times. We placed them within a
few days after the attack, and kept them there for many months.
9. General Grunert. What aircraft was at Bellows Field on the
morning of the attack?
Colonel Weddington. The 0-4Ts, I believe there were 7 there at
the time belonging to the Eighty-Sixth Observation Squadron. They
also had on the line two O^Ds. There was one squadron of fighters
at Bellows Field engaged for a month's aerial gunnery ]iractice. I
am not certain of the number of P-40s that they had, but they had
in the vicinity of 12 on the field that morning.
10. General Grunert. Making a total of about how many air-
planes ?
Colonel Weddington. 21, approximately.
11. General Grunert. These were all concentrated practically
wing-to-wing, were they?
Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir; at the time the first airplane came
over the field. Before the next attack, they Avere dispersed as much
as possible on the field at that time, which, with the number that
we had, the maximum distance between airplanes was approximately
50 to 75 feet.
[301.5] 12. General Grunert. Was this of your own volition
that the airplanes were so placed, or were you required to so place
them ? . .
Colonel Weddington. It was the volition of the indoctrination on
the field. I personally arrived, it had been done.
13. General Grunert. In other words, it was done according to
orders from higher up, is that right?
Colonel Weddington. I believe our indoctrination certainly came
from there; yes, sir.
14. General Grunert. Have you any questions. General Russell?
15. General Russell. You state that "when you arrived these planes
were all in. wnng-to-wing. is that what vou testified?
Colonel Weddington. When I arrived ?
16. General Russell. Yes.
Colonel Weddington. No, sir.
17. General Russell. When were thev placed winij-to-wing?
Colonel Weddington. From the time the first airplane came down
and fired into our tent gap and went away, we had about an hour.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1571
18. General Russell. We do not nnderstand each other. When did
yon place your airplanes wing-to-wing, or close together?
Colonel Weddington. The night before, when the flying for the
day was oA-er.
10. General Russell. How long had you been doing that prior to
December 7, 1941?
Colonel Weddington. All the time except when we were placed
under some kind of special order.
20. General Russell. In October 191:1, were you doing that?
Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir.
21. (lenei-al Russell. You had been doing it always?
■ Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir.
[.JOJh'] 22. General Russell. That is all.
28. (xeneral Frank. At that time, were there any pilots on the field ?
Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir,
24. General Frank. How many airplanes were destroyed ?
Colonel Weddington. Actual destruction?
25. General Frank. Well, how many airplanes were made incap-
able of flight ?
Colonel Weddington. I believe, four.
26. General Frank. Did any of them try to take off?
Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir.
27. General Frank. What happened?
Colonel Weddington. They were shot down immediately, with the
Japs right behind them. They couldn't hit the airplane while taxiing
down. I personally watched, wondering what would happen if the
pilot was hit while taxiing, whether the airplane would just go on off,
over the island, or whether he would die there, or whether he would
groundloop, or what would happen; and I w^as watching particularly,
because I saw them make at one of them taxiing down six passes. Six
different airplanes made passes at him and seemingly never hit him,
but when he got on the runway and started to take off, they got right
square behind him, and just as he got off, shot him down in flames;
and he was trurning, trying to give them a bad target, and crashed
into the beach and burned there.
The other one that they shot down taking off, I did not see take off',
because there were some of them making passes at the position I was
in at that time, and I ducked. I had seen him taxiing down, how-
ever. They shot him down in the same [3017] manner, except
that he was not so badly shot up, landed in the water about three quar-
ters of a mile to a mile down the beach, and swam ashore. He was
not killed.
28. General Frank. That morning, did any of the B-l7s that had
been flown over from the mainland land at Bellows?
Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir.
29. General Frank. How many?
Colonel Weddington. One.
30. General Frank. Did you examine it ?
Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir.
31. General Frank. What armament did it have?
Colonel Weddington. Six 50-caliber machine guns, I believe, is the
total.
32. General Frank. Were they mounted?
79716 — 46 — Ey 145, vol. 2 50
1572 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel WEDDiNGTOiSr. Yes, sir; I believe so. I am certain they
were, because we used the two on the top turret that were capable of
being manned. We left them in position, and manned them for a
number of days, because we had no other mounts. We took the others
out and tried to improvise mounts at other parts of the field, and
obtained ammunition for them. That was the next day or two before
we got it. They had no ammunition aboard. They were mounted,
but no ammunition aboard.
33. General Frank. Do you know the direction from which they
came in?
Colonel AVeddington. You mean to that field, or to these islands?
34. General Frank. I mean the B-17s.
Colonel Weddington. Tq that field, or to these islands?
35. General Frank. No, to these islands.
[3018] Colonel Weddington. No, sir.
36. General Grunert. Has anyone else any questions ?
37. Major Clausen. I have some, here.
Sir, what facilities did you have for gasoline for these planes ?
Colonel Weddington. We had a small storage tank. They were in
the process of putting in more, but at that time there was a storage
tank I believe of only 20,000. I am not positive of that number.
38. Major Clausen. And so, on the 7 December 1941, they were then
constructing the underground gasoline storage tanks, is that correct,
sir?
Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir.
39. Major Clausen. Do you know roughly what percentage of com-
pletion that underground work had reached on 7 December 1941?
Colonel Weddington. Approximately 50 percent of the tunneling.
I believe the total figure of the depth was 417 feet into the hill.
40. Major Clausen. And was it usual, Colonel, for the truck with
gasoline to come over the mountains every day about 10 o'clock?
Colonel Weddington. I don't recall any specific time they didn't
come over. They came around.
41. Major Clausen. From what point did the truck with the gaso-
line have to come — how far away ?
Colonel Weddington. The gasoline had to come from Honolulu.
42. Major Clausen. That was about 30 miles?
Colonel Weddington. Approximately; a little more; a [3019]
little more than 30, 1 believe.
43. Major Clausen. Noav, were any of the aircraft on the field
drained of gasoline on this morning, for security reasons, or otherwise ?
Colonel Weddington. Not drained for security reasons. They had
been flown the day before, and it had been the practice when the squad-
ron was on its month of aerial gunnery practice not to refuel the air-
planes M'hen they got through on Saturday afternoon, but to refuel
them during Sunday; and other days, they normally simply cleaned
the guns, and armed the next morning when they were ready to go ;
but on Saturday afternoons it was the ]:)ractice to get a better job of
cleaning, to actually take the barrels or whatever portion of the gun
necessary at that time to take off and to give them a better cleaning.
The guns were actually dismounted from most of the P-40s.
44. Major Clausen. Specifically, with reference to the gasoline,
could you give me some idea as to what percentage of gasoline these
planes that were on the field had in their tanks ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1573
Colonel Weddington, No, sir; I have not heard what percentage. I
know some of them were not fueled, and some of them might have been.
45. JMajor Clausen. So, in addition to being wing-to-wing, they also
needed to be fueled ?
Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir.
46. Major Clausen. Can you tell me something about the runways,
Colonel ? Were the runways being constructed at that time, also ?
[3020] Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir.
47. Major Clausen. Just tell the Board roughly what liad been
done and what needed to be done to these runways as of 7 December
1941.
Colonel AVeddington. The plan was for a 2-runway field, and they
had been working over a month taking out sand hills and coral hills
and working the coral into a depth to give them a good base on one of
the runways. The other runway had very little work done on it, be-
cause it was going to be built directly over the existing runway, so,
to keep the field operative, they were not doing anything on that run-
Avay until the other runway was capable of handling aircraft.
48. Major Clausen. And with reference to what you called "the
other runway," can you-give the Board some idea as to the percentage
of completion on 7 December 1941 ?
Colonel Weddington. No. not definitely a percent, because so much
work had entered into it, and they worked 24 hours a day and in 7
days had it so they could take any sized bomber that we had, by
Thursday.
49. Major Clausen. By Thursday?
Colonel Weddington. They worked night and day.
50. Major Clausen. The following Thursday?
Colonel Weddington. The following Thursday, by working night
and day; and we reported on Wednesday that we could take anj^thing
over there by Thursday. We hesitated to tell anybody we were work-
ing night and day. However, we were afraid that we would get stopped
working at night, so we worked night and day to get that thing ready,
and then told them on Wednesday that we could take any bomber
that they had the next day. We had [S021] been informed
that Hickam Field was out, and for several days we got no other infor-
mation as far as operation.
51. Major Clausen. Colonel, the Wednesday and the Thursday to
which you have just referred were the Wednesday and Thursday fol-
lowing ?
Colonel Weddington. Immediately following December 7.
52. ]\Iajor Clausen. Noav, as of December 7, you had no runway
there which was capable of taking the bombers, is that correct, sir ?
Colonel Weddington. They landed very light on it. It was 75 feet
wide and I believe 3,800 feet long.
53. Major Clausen. And this one B-17 that landed, in fact was
wrecked, isn't that correct ?
Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir. He was wrecked, however, because
he landed down a very strong wind, and not up-wind.
54. INIajor Clausen. Now, getting l)ack to this gasoline storage, do
you know the amount of gasoline that was in the tank that you had
at Bellows just before the attack on 7 December 1941 ?
1574 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Weddington. I don't recall if it was full or not. I believe
it was kept fairly right up to the top of it, I never heard, one way
or the other, so it must have been full.
[302^] 55. Major Clausen. Do you know w^here I could get that
information, sir?
Colonel Weddington. Possibly the records, but I am not sure.
50. Major Clausen. Was there any construction taking place at
Bellows Field in addition to the gasoline storage facilities and the
runways ?
Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir, there were buildings for a complete
permanent camp or permanent post.
57. Major Clausen. Had they been completed ?
Colonel Weddington. No, sir.
58. Major Clausen. Can you give the Board some idea of the per-
centage of completion of these additional facilities?
Colonel Weddington. There were 16 — I have forgotten the exact
number in the oval of the so-called 63-man barracks. The buildings
themselves were supposedly completed. There were no sewage facili-
ties. The sewage had not been started, even, and half of these build-
ings were so low that without the seAvage they could not even put in
temporary latrines or cesspools. On the higher half they dug and
connected up temporary cesspools and were using about six of these,
six or eight. Tlie one office building — we called it No. 1 item, I think
it was — approximately of the standard cantonement type construction,
26 by 108 feet — I believe that is the size of the building, I am not posi-
tive of that size, but it was a standard cantonement type construction.
Two of those had been completed. However, the U. S. E. D., Area
Engineer, was still occupying one of them.
59. Major Clausen. Now, you said you understood that Hickam
Field was out on December 7th ?
[30£3] Colonel Weddington. Yes.
60. Major Clausen. Was Bellows the only field available that could
be used ?
Colonel Weddington. No, sir. Our information was that the run-
ways at Hickam were not usable. We had not heard one way or the
other about Wheeler. However, Wheeler, not being a field with run-
ways at that time, had no runways on it. We felt that it could be
used, but we did not know^ the extent of the damage to Wheeler Field.
We had not been informed of that.
61. Major Clausen. Did you later learn the extent of the damage,
as to whether Bellows was the only available field ?
Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir.
62. Major Clausen. What was that?
Colonel Weddington. That they could be used. They swept the
runways and repaired what little damage had been done. It was
mainly debris and not damage to the runways actually at Hickam,
and since they were expecting more airplanes to arrive, and we were
trying to relieve the congestion, they decided to send all available
B-18's that were left to Bellows, and we informed them that we could
use them on Thursday.
63. General Grunert, At Bellows Field was the lack of gasoline
any handicap to what took place that day ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1575
«
Colonel Weddington. I believe Ave could have gotten, if the air-
planes had been armed and refueled, more of them into the air.
G4. General Gruxeht. Could you have gotten all of them in the
air with the fuel you had?
Colonel Weddinoton. I do not believe that that many pilots were
available,
\o02Jf] 65. General Grunekt. I mean, as to gasoline. Did you
have enough gasoline to put all the planes in the air, if necessary?
Colonel Weddington. Yes, there was, enough gasoline there to
take care of the planes.
66. Major Clausen. In regard to the consti'uction of this gasoline
storage facility, the runways and otlier items you mentioned, do
you know the dates on which they were supposed to have been
completed ?
Colonel Weddington. No, sir. I do not recall if we heard an
estimated date of completion.
67. General Frank. Were you satisfied with the progress of the
construction ?
Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir.
68. General Frank. Was it being prosecuted vigorously?
Colonel Weddington. Ii believe so. There were other projects
going on on the island and they were continually pulling equipment
from the job there and taking it somewhere else, until finally the
Area Engineer was very disturbed about it, because it interfered
wnth his program, and we would find out that equipment would
leave and he did not know about it and I did not know about it.
We had very little to say about it. I instructed the guards at the
gate that no equipment left that field without the personal O. K. of
the Area Engineer,
69. General Frank. Who was the Area Engineer?
Colonel Weddington. Mr. Paul-
70. General Frank, Lynch?
Colonel Weddington, Lynch, Paul Lynch.
71. General Frank. Were there any delays in construction that
were brought to your attention?
[3025] Colonel Weddington. I do not recall any specific de-
hiy, except, as I mentioned, the equipment being pulled off, and
then a little project being held up and the location of a certain
building. We would argue with them. They tried to locate build-
ings once in a Avhile from down town by an incorrect contour map,
and they would hold the Area Engineer to placing it the way it
was shown on their drawing, and we would say ''It can't go there
that way," and so we would have to call up and get them to come
out and show them it would not go that way.
The District Engineer continually did things like that. In one
area, particularly, that was completely smoothed off to be the
shoulder of one of the runways later, they wanted to put buildings
around the contour, on the hill. We said that was entirely out,
that no buildings go in that area. Finally we got a fairly open
authority to place the buildings where we wanted to. If it was too
much out the Area Engineer would — we got along very well with
the Area Engineer.
1576 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
72. General Frank. Did you have any clifRculty with the Dis-
trict Engineer's office, other than this confusion with respect to
location ?
Colonel Weddington. No. Outside of a little confusion like that
we had no real trouble, because when it got to a problem larger
than that, we knew we were without authority and would pass it
on up to the Air Force,
73. General Frank, Did you feel you were getting full support
from the District Engineer's office?
Colonel Weddington, Of course, we didn't know all the problems
that they were up against,
74. General Frank. There was some confusion?
[3026] Colonel Weddington. We felt like we could direct for
our own benefit out there better than they were doing. That is a nat-
ural feelmg on the part of the lower echelons, I believe, I would not
say that we were not getting cooperation.
75. General Grunert. Have you anything else that is on your
mind that you would like to tell the Board that you think would be of
benefit to the Board?
Colonel Weddington. No one has asked about the availability of
ammunition to the personnel we had there.
76. General Grunert. All right, suppose you tell us about that.
Colonel Weddington. We had no ammunition, except the belted
war reserve amnnmition belonging to the 86th Observation Squadron,
32,000 roiyids, I believe.
77. General Grunert. What did you want to have; what did you
think you ought to have?
Colonel Weddington. We should have had some for the rifles we
had there, that had been given to us for training recruits. We thought
we should have had some ammunition for them. The 86th Observa-
tion Squadron also had a few .30 caliber machine guns which we could
not obtain the belts for.
78. General Grunert, Did you ask for what you needed or did you
just wait to be served?
Colonel Weddington. No, sir. We asked for it several times.
79. General Grunert. What was the answer ?
Colonel Weddington. It was not available and it was not authorized
for any purpose that we were over there for.
80. (jreneral Grunert. As to December 7th, were you handicapped
by not having it then? Were you in a position to fire and use
[3027] it, if you had it?
Colonel Weddington. We could have fired the machine guns if we
had had belts. We did have them in the hour over there between the
first airplane and the attack of the 9 fighters that finally attacked the
field; we did unbelt war reserve ammunition belonging to the 86th
and issued it to all the people, all the men there that we had issued
rifles to. Many of them had never fired a rifle, but we at least armed
them.
81. General Ghuneet. Thank you very much for coming.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1577
[3028] TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN EDWIN T. LAYTON, U. S. NAVY
(The ^Yitness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1: Colonel West. Captain, will you please state to the Board your
name, rank, organization, and station!'
Captain Layton. Captain Edwin T. Layton, U. S. Navy, attached
to staff of the Connnantler-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. My present
capacity is combat intelligence ofiicer.
2. General Gruxbrt. Captain, the Board is after facts or leads to
facts. We have developed c^uite a bit of background and also quite
a bit of the story, so we are piecing out as much as possible.
First, will you tell us what was your assignment and position just
prior to the attack and during the attack?
Captain Layton. I was fleet intelligence officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
3. General Gkunert. Did you have anything to do with the Naval
District?
Captain Laytox. No, sir. The Naval District is a separate com-
mand, and the operations of the intelligence organization there are
directly under the Commandant and the Chief of Naval Operations.
However, the district intelligence officer keeps the fleet intelligence
officer apprised of any information ashore that would have any effect
upon the morale of the fleet, or subversive elements, or activities to-
wards sabotage, or anything that might disturb the activities of the
fleet from its base.
4. General Grunert. Now, will you please give the Board a
[3029] brief general summarization of your duties as fleet intelli-
gence officer, and wind up by telling us jusib what connection you had
with the department headquarters ashore, the Army?
Captain Layton. The duties of the fleet intelligence officer were to
assemble, collate, to evaluate and disseminate information to the fleet,
also to the Commander-in-Chief and to sab task force commanders,
of all matters that were concerned with the operations of the fleet,
whether it was a matter of materiel or a matter of tactics, or matters
of cognizance of junior commanders. My collation and evaluation
and dissemination of intelligence to the Commander-in-Chief itself
generally concerned itself with the broader picture of the situation in
the Pacific.
I do not recall the exact date, but somewhere mid- 1941 Colonel
Raley — Colonel Edwin Raley of the Air Corps, wdio was G-2, Hawai-
ian Air Force — called on me and suggested that we establish immedi-
ate and intimate relationship of liaison, telling me that he had been
so directed by the Department G-2. His selection, he explained, was
because the Air Corps and the Navy based here would operate closely
in case any operations of the fleet in these waters would be expected,
and that the function of the ground force here was largely of a defen-
sive garrison category. From that time on Colonel Raley or one of
his assistants and 1 were in almost daily conferences. As the time
grew closer the end of November, and princi})ally the middle of No-
vember on, there was never a day but wdiich I saw Colonel Raley in
person at least once and sometimes two and three times. That was
also particularly [3030] marked toward the end of Novem-
ber when considerable intelligence was received from various sources
1578 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
regarding the Japanese intentions in the Far East. He informed me
that he was keeping his General informed of all these matters.
5. General Grunert. By "his General" he meant whom? Do you
know ?
Captain Layton. I believe it was General Martin. I am not
real
6. General Grunert. Martin.
Captain Layton. It is so long, I have forgotten the name of the
Connnanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force at that time. I
believe.it was General Martin.
7. General Grunert. What connection did Raley have with G-2,
if any?
Captain Layton. As a subordinate under G-2, as I understand the
setup, he was told to contact me as a liaison between the G-2 and the
fleet.
8. General Grunert. And then the information that passed between
the two of you passed for the Department and not just between the
Air Force of the Department and you ?
Captain Layton. I cannot say that at first hand. I do not know
what he did or what action he took with regard to this material. It
was my assumption, however, that, rather than he talking to the G-2,
that the Commanding General of the Air Forces was to confer or have
conversations regarding the situation with the Commanding General
of the Hawaiian Department. That is not first-hand evidence.
9. General Grunert. Just what took place at these conferences?
What type of information did you pass to him ?
[3031] Captain Layton. Starting about the early part of
November, somewhere between the 10th and 12th, we started to receive
a series of reports from naval observers in China, naval attache in
Tokyo, naval attache in Chungking, from the British and other
sources, regarding the movements of Japanese troops, vessels, naval
vessels, transports, and so forth, south along the China coast. There
was also information of the highest secrecy from the British sources
and from other sources which indicated invasion of the Kra Isthmus
was impending. The intelligence from all sources, added up, indi-
cated a southern movement on the part of the Japanese amphibious
forces, and as the days grew on mor« confirmatory intelligence was
received to strengthen this picture.
10. General (irunert. What was the source of your inf ornuition ?
Captain Layton. I would have to ask the Board now as to what
degree of security I am given on my testimony.
11. General Grunert. I don't want you to divulge anything that
may be used by — I will put the question a little differently : Did you
get information from the District radio intercept?
Captain Layton. Yes, we received information from many sources.
The principal source of information, of course, is Office of Naval
Intelligence under Cliief of Naval Operations.
. 12. General Grunert. But the principal source came from Wash-
ington ?
Captain Layton. That would be — all sources from Washington
would be channeled through that source.
13. General Grunert. Yes.
Captain Layton. That is, we will say that I })resume the [30.321
military attache at Chungking, if he received some information, he
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1579
would pass it in turn to G-2, who in turn would pass it to O. N. I., who
in turn would pass it to us. Most of our dispatches coming from
China direct or from Japan direct or from the Philippines or from
French Indo-China or from the Singapore area would be passed
through the naval observers there, but it wasn't necessarily their
original information; it may have come from some other source.
14. General Gruxert. All right. Let us get nearer home. During
the latter partof November do you recall having received information
of the presence of a task force in the Marshall Islands^
Captain Layton. There was a statement to the eifect that it was
believed that some carriers and a majority of the submarines were
estimated to be in the Marshall Islands.
15. General Grunert. That came from what source?
Captain Layton. That came from, what the source is called, combat
intelligence, 14th Naval District.
1(). General Grunert. Who evaluates that sort of information as to
its credibility, or who checks it up? i
Captain Layton. I did.
17. Genei-al Grunert. How did you evaluate it?
Captain Layton. Since that information was not checked from
other combat intelligence sources having available to them the same
material, it was not possible to add it or to evaluate it as "iV-1." It is
after all, an assumption rather than a definite statement of fact.
It was, however, believed that the submarine situation was more clearly
identified than the carrier situation insofar as no carriers themselves
were [oOJ-^] identified. This, I may say now, has been proven
erroneous. Captured documents and interrogation of prisoners have
proven beyond a shadow of a doubt that no carriers were in the Mar-
shalls at that time.
18. General Grunert. Was this information not confirmed, or was
this information confirmed, by the intercept at Cavite?
Captain Layton. It was not confirmed at Cavite.
19. General Grunert. It was not. Are you at liberty to tell us
what is your source of information as to what you actually think hap-
pened now, instead of what was then at that time supposed to be the
origin or the source from which the task group that attacked Hawaii
came?
Captain Layton. I am at liberty, and I would be glad to tell the
Board. Based on the interrogation of several prisoners, both locally
and in the Southwest Pacific area, based upon documents that have
been captured, it is established beyond shadow of doubt, as far as I
am concerned, that the task force allocated toward the attack on Pearl
Harbor departed Empire ports and bases about 22 November and
proceeded direct to Tankan Bay on Etorofu Island where they as-
sembled, fueled, and departed on 27 November, proceeding on easterly
courses until on or about 4 or 5 December (I say that because one
prisoner says 4 and one says 5 ; these dates are all east longitude dates)
at which time they turned south. The course taken was to avoid all
shipping and avoid being sighted.
On the night of the 7th, east longitude date again, they increased
speed to 26 knots and proceeded on to the attack. The fly-off was at
about () : 30 Honolulu time, although one captured document shows at
least an intended fly-oft' slightly later than that.
[30S4] 20. General Grunert. How far out, approximately?
1580 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Layton. The document which showed the intended fly-off
point was about 250 miles. This was based — off the record a minute,
would the Board care for a photostat of that document?
21. General Grunert. Yes.
Captain Layton. I have it here if you would like it.
(There was colloquy off the record.)
[S03'5] Ca]3tain Layton. I would like to introduce a photostat
made in my office of a captured Japanese chart taken from the chart-
board of a dive bomber two days after the attack, when it was 'raised
in Pearl Harbor. I, myself, took this from the plane, and saw that
it was photostated in my office unchano;ed.
(The photostat referred to was marked Exhibit No. 23, and was
received in evidence.)
I have marked on there, in English, our interpretation of these
markings. Tliere is a point with a circle around it, timed 0300. All
these times are Japanese times minus 9, which they maintain at all
times, as well as the Japanese date, without changing it going across
the date-line as we do. There is a line runnino; slightly to the west
of south, headed for the north point Oahu, on which space to part our
positions with times 0320, 0340, and 0400 hours. These correspond,
starting off with the assumed fly-off point of Honolulu times of 0730,
0750, 0810, and 0830. Their spacing is about 156 to 160 nautical miles
per hour, which obviously must be a plane speed, and which is evalu-
ated as being a plane speed, with lean mixture, to make the longest
distance with the most amount of bombs and the most amount of "gas"
thev could carry and take off.
22. General Frank. With the least amount of consumption of
"gas"?
Captain Layton. The least amount of consumption of "gas."
I would like to invite your attention to several points on this, one
of which, translated in English, sa^^s :
No. 1 Assembly Point. 80 depjrees 20 miles from Knlmkn Point.
No. 2 Assembly Point, 30 decrees 20 miles from Kanoehe Bay.
On various points Qahu, such as Barber's Point, points on Hawaii,
points on Maui, are reference points. These are merely like reference
points on a map, A, B, C, D. and E. Those will \3036'] prob-
ably be used in connection with sightings. It is to be noted this chart
is eridded in Japanese fashion. A, B, C, D, and so forth.
There is another line running due north, the southern position of
it being slightly to the soutli of the fly-off point, which would re]:)re-
sent a fly-off on a southerly course, and then tlie carriers being south
of the fly-off point at the end of the fly-off proceeding north. These
positions are marked as follows: 0350. It is to be noted that this is
50 minutes after fly-off time. The next northerly point is 0450, the
next northerly point is 0550, the next northerly point is 0650. the next
northerly point is 0750. These times are again Tokyo time. Placed
in English, they are Honolulu time: 8:20, 9:20, 10:20, 11:20, and
12 : 20.
The spacing of these on the chart indicates a speed of about 26 knots
and indicates the carrier retirement course. There are three positions
in the left-hand corner, rather indistinct, representing three submar-
ines, 1-19, 1-21, and 1-23. One prisoner-of-war interroiration states
that three submarines accompanied this task force from Tankan Bay
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1581
and proceeded witli this force, deploying to protect the force prior
to the run-in at hi^h speed.
Here is one that is not translated, marked up, so that you can see
what it looked like in the original.
23. General Grunert. Make a proper notation, identify it, and put
it in the record, please.
Colonel West. This document will be received in evidence and
marked Exhibit 23.
24. General Grunert. Now, let us go back to the radio intercept,
which indicated some Japanese vessels in the Marshalls. [3037 \
Was this information transmitted to the Army, do you know?
Captain Laytox. I do not recall off-hand. I believe I told Colonel
Raley about it, but I don't remember, now, positively, whether I did
or not.
25. General Grunert. At that time, without the knowledge you
have now, it indicated that there was something in the Marshalls, be-
cause of which it might have been well to suspect something might
come from the Marshalls. Have you ascertained where the two-man
"subs" came from ?
Captain Layton. Yes, sir. With slightly less positive identifica-
tion than the previous testimony I gave regarding the task force, the
2-men "subs" were carried "piggyback" on submarines specially de-
signed to carry them, and were released in the vicinity of Oahu. Their
mission was to proceed inside Pearl Harbor and to destroy American
naval vessels there.
I may offer, if I may, another chart showing the positions of five
submarine numbers inside the Pearl Harbor channel entrance, which
it is assumed are the submarine positions. It also shows the course
and time element of a submarine passing around Ford Island, inside
Pearl Harbor, and is the predicted track of the submarine, from which-
this chart was taken. This chart was taken from the "midget" sub-
marine captured off Bellows Field.
I would like to invite the attention of the Board that three sub-
marines, marked here "1-16," "1-20," and "1-22," are on the left-hand
side of the channel, entering Pearl. The 1-18 and the 1-21 are on
the right-hand side of the cliannel, entering Pearl. The captured
submarine was either the 1-16 or the 1-18, I have forgotten which.
They apparently took their names from their parent submarine', which
was the real 1-18 or 1-16 or 1-20.
26. General Grunert. How many of these submarines were de-
stroyed, do you know?
[3038] Captain Layton. All of them, sir. The reason I say
"all of them" was, the Japanese announced nine ofKcers and petty
officers had all been raised in rank, and had lost their life on their
suicide mission against Pearl Harbor. The Japanese press subse-
quently was forced to announce that one of the members of these
crews had been taken prisoner, because many Japanese knew theee
were 2-man submarines, and nine men could not be divided in two.
I also have photographs of these people, now.
27. General Grunert. At what time were any of these submarines
destroyed in Pearl Harbor ?
Captain Layton. One was destroyed by gun fire and ramming
on the morning of December 7, during the attack.
28. General Grunert. Do you know approximately what time ?
1582 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Layton. I couldn't testify that, first-hand; it would be
hearsay.
20. General Grunert. Was one destroyed before the attack?
Captain Layton. One was destroyed outside of Pearl Harbor by
theUSSWAKD.
30. General Gri^xert. Do you know what time that was?
Captain Layton. I don't know at first-hand evidence; no, sir.
3L General Grunert. But it was well before, about two hours be-
fore the attack?
Captain Layton. It was somewhere around two hours before the
attack. I can ^et the records to find out the exact time.
32. General Grunert. Do you know whether that information was
transmitted to the Army?
Captain Layton. I do not know, sir.
[■Wod] 33. General Grunert. Whose business would it be to
transmit such information to interested agencies?
Captain Layton. At that time it would be the mission of the duty-
officer who had the staff duty.
34. General Grunert. Do you know what time that information
was received, where it could have been transmitted to the Army?
Captain Layton. It was received in the Fourteenth Naval District,
first. What action they took, I do not know,
35. General Gritnert. Then throuf^h ordinary channels it would
have been up to the Fourteenth Naval District to transmit the infor-
mation to the Army, if such transmission were to be made?
Captain Layton. Yes, sir.
36. General Grunert. And it would be in their judgment as to
where to transmit, and whether or not to transmit, and what dis-
semination to give it?
Captain Layton. Yes, sir; being an event within their naval sea
frontier.
37. General Grunert. I have one more question on the pick-up in
the Marshalls. Although you could not verify it at the time, and you
did not give it an "A-l" priority, as I might call it, at the same time
there was evidence of some Japanese naval vessels in the Marshalls?
Captain Layton. Yes, sir.
38. General Grunert. Wouldn't that, in your opinion, have been
sufficient news in order to at least check up on whether or not measures
had been taken, to be sure that your defense was all it should be?
Cai^tain Layton. Checking up the measures of defense was not my
function as a fleet intelligence officer. I would lik^e [301^0'] to
invite the attention of the Board to the fact that there had been naval
officers in the Marshalls since early December 1040.
30. General Grunert. Naval officers?
Captain Layton. Naval vessels, in the Marshalls.
40. General Frank. You mean Jap naval vessels?
Captain Layton. Yes, sir; Jap naval vessels in the Marshalls, since
December 1040. May 1 refresh my memory? As a result of which,
I made a personal study of the Japanese movements into the Marshalls
and Carolines and Mariaiias, as we were in ])ossession of intelligence
that they were then actually fortifying and liuilding air bases on
various strategic atolls. I informed Admiral Richardson of this in
late December 1040, and informed Admiral Kimmel of this activity
when he took command in February 1041.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1583
As of February 1941, I laid out what was my opinion at that time
of the defenses and aviation stationed in the Marshalls, and noted that
as of that time some 30 auxiliaries were engaged in transport of sup-
})lies, material, and personnel, and at least five men-of-war were in the
general Mandates area. Subsequently, this number of ships, naval
and auxiliary naval, in the Mandates, and including the ^larshalls,
rose to the total of sojne eighty per month, en route, at. aiul returning.
The fact that one unit of the conununication intelligence net
assumed that carriers were in the Marshalls was based on their tenta-
tive identification of destroyers, which had previously worked with
carriers, being in the Marshalls. The submarine concentration in
the Marshalls was accepted as almost A-1, and submarine activity
was anticipated. We had had, from [3041] time to time,
innumerable submarine contacts off Oahu. They had been followed
up, and eventually lost. Admiral Kinnnel's decision to treat all sub-
marines in the Hawaiian area as eneniy was based upon the infornui-
tion which we have mentioned, and also the thought that submarine
action was most likely in case of hostilities.
41. General Grunert. Do you recall a message received by Admiral
Kinnnel from the Chief of Naval Operations on the 27th of Novem-
ber, which, as paraphrased, started out by saying, "Ccmsider this dis-
patch a war warning''^
Captain Laytox. I do.
42. General Grunert. Did you have any connection with trans-
mitting that to General Short ?
Captain Layton. I did.
43. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not it was trans-
mitted to General Short?
Captain Layton. I do. It was.
44. General Grunert. By whom ?
Captain Layton. Admiral Kimmel directed me to make a para-
phrase and insure its delivery to General Short. Prior to that, he
told me to show him the parajjhrase, to be sure it met with his appro-
val, and that it paralleled closely the original message. I typed the
paraphrase, after several revisions, and took it into his cabin for his
approval. At that time, the Chief of Staff of the Fourteenth Naval
District, Captain Earl, arrived with a message from General Short,
which the Admiral read, and, said, or words, "This is almost like
ours." He said. "All right. Get this to General Short," and returned
the message to the Chief of Staff of the Fourteenth Naval [o04:2]
District, Captain Earl. We walked out of the cabin together, and
Captain Earl said, "Lieutenant Burr, the Navy liaison officer with the
headquarters, Hawaiian Department, is returning General Short's
message to General Short, and it is appropriate that he also deliver
this message, as he is the official liaison officer." He then asked Burr
to read the message, which I had in my hand, for General Short, to
be sure that he understood it. I handed them to Lieutenant Burr,
and he delivered them, that evening. It was done about 5 : 30, or
maybe a little later.
45. General Grunert. Of the 27th?
Captain Layton. Yes, sir.
40. (leneral Grunert. Then, as far as you know, you understand
that Burr delivered the juessage?
1584 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Layton. Yes, sir.
47. General Gkuxert. Have you any questions ?
48. General Frank. Was that a matter of assumption, or a matter
of fact?
Captain Lavtox. He has told me he delivered the message.
49. General Frank. To whom?
Captain Layton. When he arrived at the headquarters. General
Short and his Chief of Stafi' were absent, inspecting the condition of
alert that had been put in, and he delivered it to the senior stafi"
officer, who was head of G-3, I believe, and I believe his name was
Colonel Donegan, or Donovan— Donegan, I believe, sir; I am not real
sure — for delivery to (Teneral Short
50. General Russell. With the possible exception of some reference
which you made to the evidence or the statement of [r304S] the
captured Japanese, you have given the Board none of the factual
bases for your conclusions as to the course which the carrier task
force followed in reaching the point from which the planes were
launched in the attack of December 7. How extensive is this informa-
tion upon which you have based your conclusions as to that course?
Captain Layton. I did not say from one prisoner; I said, from
several prisoners, from independent sources. We have one other
prisoner who is at present under interrogation, who was secret secre-
tary on the staff of Admiral Yamamoto, then CINC, combined fleet,
who was present when the original operation order was drawn up,
and he also, without knowledge that we knew, wrote a rough draft of
the order, as he remembered it, in which it said :
On X minus^
that was 18 days.
the striking force composed of the first air tleet would sortie home waters and
proceed via Tankan Bay and carry out a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, taking
courees such as to avoid shipping, and to arrive undetected on X-Ray Day.
Of interest is that they prescribed that if any third power's vessels,
including Russia and Japan, were found within COO miles of its desti-
nation; that vessel was to be destroyed; that if any third power's ves-
sels, including Spviet Russia and Japan, were found outside of 600
miles of the force's destination, the vessel was to be seized, and to be
prevented from making any radio transmissions; if suspicion was
existent that it had made transmissions, the vessel was to be destroyed.
[3044] 51. General Russell. That document is in your pos-
session ?
Captain Layton. That document has not yet been fully translated.
This prisoner is still under interrogation. I give you that as a first-
hand evidence of having talked to the prisoner and having read his
initial draft. That dociunent will be translated, with others that
this man is doing, within two or three weeks, and will be published as
an official intelligence bulletin from the Pacific Ocean Areas Command,
52. General Russell. How many witnesses who have given evidence
bearing on the course of that task force have been examined by ONI,
by your agency, and by all naval agencies of which you know ?
Captain Layton. I think three have been examined by Pacific
Ocean Area agencies, and two have been examined by General Mac-
Arthur's agencies.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1585
53. General Russell. And these five were personnel of this task
force ?
Captain Laytox. That is ri<2;ht, sir. Additionally, I might add,
we also have a facsimile of a captnred Japanese map, which shows
the courses of the carriers between November 1941 and June 1942,
when they met their end at ]Midway. That was captured in the South
Pacific area and translated by that combat intelligence center at
Noumea. It also shows a course due east of Tankan Bay, and then a
course southeast to north Oahu.
[SO45] 54. General Russell. What was the strength of this task
force that we are discussing, the Japanese task force?
Captain Layton. 5'rom a captured official Japanese document taken
from the plane from which the charts, the photostats I have produced
before the Board were obtained, a small call sign list was extracted
that showed the following carriers there, and other documents that .
bear this out :
Six aircraft carriers, including the AKAGI, KAGA, HIRYU,
SORYU, SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU ; two battleships, two fast battle-
ships, the HIEI and the KIRISHIMA ; two heaw cruisers, the TONE
and the CHIKUMA; one light cruiser, the ABUKUMA; Desron 1.
55. General Russell. That is what?
Captain Layton. Destroyer Squadron 1. It should be pointed out
that Destroyer Squadron 1 is a command and the ABUKU]\L\. is its
flagship. The number of destroyers present cannot be positively de-
termined, because they were not given by name on the call sign list.
56. General Russell. Estimated, how many surface craft were in
this task force ? ■
Captain Layton. Six aircraft carriers, two fast battleships, two
heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and some destroyers.
57. General Russell. More than 11?
Captain Layton. JNIore than 11.
58. General Russell. You have enumerated 11, and there were a
number of destroyers also?
Captain Layton. There should have been a number of destroyers,
although the prisoners of war said there were destroyers in Tankan
Bay, plus 3 submarines, which were not on the [304G] call sign.
59. General Russell. You gave the maximum speed that this task
force maintained after it turned south, southeast, in the direction of
Oahu. Was that 26 knots ?
Captain Layton. 26 knots is what the prisoners said.
60. General Russell. Approximately 30 miles an hour?
Captain Layton. Very close to it, yes.
61. General Russell. What is your estimate of the relative combat
strength of this task force and the elements of our Navy which was
based at Pearl Harbor ?
Captain Layton. This task force was a very powerful organization
in air and was the same organization that in one raid on Port Darwin
made the force at Darwin, Australia, to be no longer used as an advance
naval and air force. Part of this force hit Ceylon and Trincomalee
in the Indian Ocean, and destroved the aircraft carrier HERMES and
the cruisers DORSET and CORNWALL.
It might be added that part of this force returning to Japan stopped
by Wake and supported the final assaults on Wake. This force was
1586 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the cream of the Japanese Navy. Four of these aircraft carriers came
to Midway antl were sunk there. It is to be recalled that several re-
ports on Japanese naval air activity have stressed the fact that the
character of the pilots and their aggressiveness and their tactics have
never returned to a par since the disruption of the carrier forces at
Midway.
I would like to speculate for a minute on the tactical disposition of
this force. It is to be recalled that on the night of the Tth of December,
1941, our date, Midway wa.s bombarded by two cruisers and four
destroyers, and the shell holes [30J^7] indicated 8-inch shells.
It is my conviction that the two heavy cruisers of this force, the TONE
and the CHIKUMA and sonle destroyers, broke away from this task
force prior to their last run in for Oaliu and made a run to arrive off
Midway in the late evening for a bombardment. I say this because
every other 8-inch cruiser of the Japanese Navy was well accounted
for and has been subsequently checked by captured documents from
prisoners.
62. General Russell. Assuming that the elements of the American
Navy based on Pearl Harbor, with two of its carriers present, had
discovered this task force at a time which would have enabled it, the
American elements, the fleet at Pearl Harbor, to have gone out to sea
and engaged in combat, what is your opinion as to the outcome of such
an engagement?
Captain Layton. This is my personal opinion.
63. General Russell. Yes.
Captain Layton. I think the American forces here would have
taken the licking of their life, first, because the American people were
not psychologically prepared for war.
64. General Russell. How would the psychology of the American
people influence a naval engagement off of Oahu ?
Captain Layton. I am referring to the American Navy as a part of
the American people, and I use this example: During the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor a portion of a squadron of American carrier
planes were then flying in from a carrier to Ford Island. They were
attacked by Japanese fighters, and it is to be observed that these planes
were armed with machine gun ammunition and machine guns ready
to fire, and I can find no record of any of these carrier planes firing
one single [^048] shot at any Japanese plane.
65. General Russell. Well, let us analyze that a little further.
Would this terrific licking which you think we would have taken in
a naval engagement have resulted from the psychology of our fighters
or from the lack of equipment to compete with the Japanese task
force ?
Captain Layton. I do not mean that the psychology would lick
them, at all. Lack of equipment would certainly have been very dis-
astrous; lack of cruisers, because the battleships would never catch
that force of the Japanese. But the Japanese aviators at that time
were all charged up to go fight. Our })eople were not charged up to go
fight, until after Pearl Harbor was hit.
66. General Russell. Would not they have gotten pretty tensely
charged if they had an order to proceed and meet and engage a Jap-
anese task force which was seeking to invade the Island of Oahu?
Captain Layton. I do not belittle their fighting spirit. I do not
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1587
mean it that way at all. I merely, mean the shock of Pearl Harbor,
which I saw at first hand, caused a reaction among certain people that
I think the initiative being in the hands of the other fellow, regard-
less of his great sui^eriority in planes and numbers w^ould have made
him, fresh from an attack, fresh from the exhilaration of having
delivered his attack, a psychological foe worthy of consideration.
67. General Kussell. How many aircraft do you estimate were
present in the Japanese task force?
Captain Lation. 424 aircraft on the carriers.
68. General Russell. Could the naval elements at Pearl Harbor
[3049] have mustered any aircraft fleet in strength to compare
with and engage the Japanese aircraft in battle?
Captain Layton. If both our carriers had been present — and only
one was — their total planes would have been a maximum of somewhere
around ISO.
■ 69. General Russell. Each had a capacity of around 90?
Captain Layton. At a maximum, and, as you know, there were no
combat flyable aircraft after the Japanese hit the Hawaiian Islands.
TO. General Russell. I was attempting to draw a picture of what
would have happened had w^e discovered the approaching Japanese
I ask force in time to have intercepted it and engaged it in the open sea.
Captain Laytox. That then brings this ponit of psychology : If
they were sent out to intercept a Japanese task force, they would un-
doubtedly have done a good job. I believe that they would have been
completely smashed.
71. General Russell. Because of the superiority of equipment of
the Japanese task force ?
Captain Layton. And the Japanese task force had the initiative in
so far as long training of the air units is concerned, preparation for
war, constant training on the dive bombers. We know from a few
documents here and there that this was worked out in advance,
rehearsed.
72. General Grunekt. May I interpose a question there ? Suppose,
now, the Japanese had used the same reasoning that you did, that you
are putting forth now, would it not have been to their advantage to
entice the United States Fleet out of Pearl Harbor, if they were going
to do so much damage to it, than [30o0] take the chance of
coming within reach of land-based aviation ? Why did they do what
they did, if they were reasoning as you are reasoning now ?
Captain Layton. The Japanese mission was to destroy as much as
possible of the Pacific Fleet. The Japanese also realized that were
they to be caught at night or under conditions of bad visibility,
whereby their carriers would be of no value, they would have been
wiped out by gunfire, with no power. They had no power in gunfire.
I would like to repeat that. I said before they w^ere very powerful in
the air. They w^ere very weak in defensive gunpower. A handful of
cruisers under fog, rain or bad visibility opposing them would have
destroyed them completely by destroying their planes on deck with
gunfire, and fire resulting. Cruisers and destroyers would have been
able to put in killing blows. My statement they were powerful, I
want to emphasize, was from the air. Therefore the Japanese decided
to make their fast run in to be able to use their air against the naval
ships in the harbor.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 2 51
1588 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
We know their priority was: 1, aircraft carriers; 2, battleships; 3,
cruisers; 4, naval installations at Pearrl Harbor and, of course, the
overall priority covering the action was to destroy planes on the
ground on the way in. In other words, their fighters would destroy
planes on the ground; their dive bombers and speedy planes would
destroy, in order, aircraft carriers, battleships and cruisers, and, there-
after, shoreside installations,
73. General Russell. What facilities or means were available to you
to detect or discover such a task force you have described, a hostile task
force ?
[3051] _ Captain Layton. We would have to be informed through
our normal channels of information. The Commander-in-Chief of
the Pacific Fleet possessed no independent intelligence organization.
The Connnander-in-Chief was kept apprised through the intelligence
organizations of the formation, composition and almost destination of
the Japanese task force that invaded Malaya or invaded the Philip-
pines. That was all brought out in the message referred to prior to
the 27th of November, where some aircraft carriers were estimated to
be in the Marshalls. Those task forces followed the picture presented,
moved to the areas indicated and carried out the missions presumed.
74. General Pussell. Let us go back to the task force that invaded
us at Pearl Harbor. Your report assumes they were assembled off the
mainland of Japan, where the task force gathered before starting its
eastward journey.
Captain Layion. General, that position is in the north Kuriles.
They moved from the Japan home waters up there where it is an unin-
habited location for their departure east. That force was under the
strictest injunction, according to a prisoner I have referred to previ-
ously, who is now under interrogation, to use their radio under no
circumstances whatever. Also, he has stated that one of the outlines
of this plan was that the communication unit belonging to the com-
bined fleet would initiate deception tactics, to give the impression that
the major force of the combined fleet was remaining in inland sea
waters. They said that the TATSUTA MARU was to sail to the
West Coast as scheduled ; and some days prior to this X-Ray Day of
execution she would be turned around and return to America. They
thought of everything.
75. General Russell. Then there was nothing on this rendezvous
[S052] part of the northern islands
Captain Layton. There was absolutely no evidence from the radio
intercepts.
76. General Russell. I mean, nobody lived there ?
Captain Layi'on. No.
77. General Russell. At this rendezvous?
Captain Layton. This is a very desolate island. It has a few fisher-
men on it, who are, of course, Japanese. Two prisoners of war stated
they were absolutely forbidden to go ashore. The only shore party, of
which he was one member, went in to burn trash. They were forbidden
to throw overboard garbage or trash in any form.
78. General Russell. The only place we could have, had spies to
observe the formation of the task force would have been on the main-
land of Japan ?
Captain Layton. Spies even on the mainland of Japan would have
merely noted their departure. Their departure we know almost cer-
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1589
tainly was through the Bungo Channel between the Islands of Kyushu
and Shikoku. which forms the outer rim of the island there, and that is
the channel they go out of when they go to the Kuriles.
79. General IIu,s'sell. The point is that the elements of the task force
that left the home island went in isolated units, and met at a distance
from there and proceeded en masse on this assignment?
• Captain Layton, That is the best information we have.
80. General Russell. That is all I have.
81. General Gruxert. Are there any other questions?
82. Major Clausen. I wondered, sir, if you wanted the name of
[3053] the duty officer whose responsibility it was to communicate
the information to the Army of the sinking of this Jap sub ?
83. General Gkunerts. Yes, ask that question.
84. Major Clausen. Sir, will you give me the name of the duty
officer whose responsibility it was to have informed the Army of the
sinking of this submarine?
Captain Layton. The name of the duty officer of the llth Naval
District I do not know. First, it is too far past and, secdiid, I would
not make it my business to find out who was the duty officer in the llth
Naval District. The duty officer on the Commander in Chief's staff
was then Commander Murphy. He was informed, as I recall it, about
7 : 30. _
85. Major Clausen. You stated there were 420 aircraft on the car-
riers. Do you have an estimate of the number that was used in the
attack ?
Captain Layton. I have tried to make that estimate but, unfor-
tunately, our observers vary so much ; but at least 300 came to Oahu.
8r). Major Clausen. That is all I have, sir.
87. Colonel Toulmin. May I ask one question ?
How long before the attack on Pearl Harbor did the Japanese
rehearsals probably start?
Captain Layton. The best indication was that the rehearsals were
held somewhere in July or August at Nanseishoto.
88. Colonel Toulmin. You are referring, of course, to 1941 ?
Captain Layton. 194L There were maneuvers held in that area.
May I check my memory '( I better check as to what date that was. I
think that is correct.
[3054] 89. Colonel Toulmin. And when did you acquire the
information about these rehearsals?
Captain Layton. About a year ago.
90. Colonel Toulming. And to what extent, if any, were you able
to get any information out of the Marshall Islands as to the activities
of the Japanese force of two or three years prior to December, 1941 ?
Captain Layton. There was no information from any source out
of the Marshall or Mandated Islands, due to the Japanese regulations,
which would permit no foreigners and very few Japanese to enter
that area, particularly after they commenced the militarization in
late 1940.
91. Colonel Toulmin. Did you have any instructions from the
State Department not to intervene in that situation without its
approval ?
Captain Layton. There had been long existing differences between
the Navy Department and the State Department as to American
1590 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
naval vessels calling in the Marshall Islands, that is, the open ports
of the Marshall Islands.
Having served in Tokyo myself and seen some of this material
handled, it will be interesting, perhaps, to the court to hear.
The Japanese Navy would say, of course, there are open ports and
we would be glad to have you call in at Jalnit or Truk, of course.
And we would approach the State Department, that is, the Ambas-
sador or Secretary w^ould. And they would say "We cannot see any
reason at all wdiy you should not stop in at Yap or Palau or Truk;
they are open ports."
Then when you would press them for a [30-55] date or writ-
ten approval, either they would say "The home office is very bad. They
can't get along with the Ministry of Colonies, and they are not will-
ing at this time," or they would give the excuse that there are no
pilots to take you in, very bad reefs and very treacherous. At other
times they would say they had no one there of suitable rank to greet
this vessel, and therefore it was disapproved. It always ended with
the word "disapproved."
92. General Russell. Let us go back to one thing more on this
task force. The elements of this task force when they left the home-
land proceeded in a northerly direction ?
Captain Layton. Yes, sir.
93. General Russell. The movement of other elements of the
Japanese Navy was in a southerly direction, at that time?
Captain Layton. Yes.
94. General Russell. Therefore, had the movement of these ele-
ments to the north been discovered, it would have indicated missions
other than those of the elements wdiich were moving to the south ?
Captain Layton. That is correct, sir.
95. General Russell. That is all.
96. General Grunert. I wash you woukl give the Board — by the
way, this is a Board and not a court.
Captain Layton. Excuse me, sir. In the Navy it is a court. I
am sorry. Please change that to "Board" when I said "court."
97. General Grunert. Would you inform the Board or give the
Board an idea of how much of what you got in the line of informa-
tion of all of these situations was eventually transmitted to the
[3056] Army, and the system of so doing? For instance, the in-
formation that 370U received, was that transmitted to the District
or did it come from the District, and did you in your position trans-
mit anything to the Army or did you consider that the District's
business to transmit such information to the Army?
Captain Layton. The information received from the Office of Naval
Intelligence, Chief of Naval Operations, was, I presume, passed to
the Army by Washington, where they were the fountain-head of in-
telligence, both military and naval.
Now, I think I should clarify the matter of the combat intelligence,
or communications intelligence, as it is now known. The naval com-
munications intelligence thannel is run by Washington, supervised
by Washington, over which the Commander-in-Chief has no direct
responsibility, nor concern, except he is informed by the adjacent
unit nearest him, and his intelligence officer lias access to their files
and to their intelligence as a matter of speed and ascertaining the
accuracy of certain views or statements.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1591
98. General Frank. Wluit do you mean by adjacent unit?
Captain Laytox. For instance, if the Commander-in-Chief was
here in the Hawaiian Ishmds, he would have liaison or entree to the
communications intelligence unit of the 14th Naval District. If he
were in Guam, then he would have liaison or access to the intercept
unit. It was not a communications or intellifjence unit. It was an
intercept unit at Guam. If he were in Cavite, he would do likewise.
The units at Cavite and in Pearl Harbor, 14th Naval District, and
one in Washington, were on one separate circuit. The Commander-
in-Chief held the crypto by which that circuit was controlled.
[■)0o7] 90. (leneral Frank. Conmiander of which fleet ?
Ca})tain Layton. Pacific Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief of the
Asiatic Fleet. So that they could be informed directly regarding any
matter of high security, but they did not fit on the circuit as an inter-
cept unit, it being an automatic land line or high-speed transmitter
which no receiver wire would take. It was the responsibility of the
Chief of Naval Operations, undei- whom the Director of Naval Com-
munications is subordinate, and to whom this connnunications intel-
ligence organization is responsible and operati'ng. It is the Chief
of Naval Operations or his subordinate whose res})onsibility it is to
pass appropriate matters of that intelligence to appropriate govern-
ment agencies, and not the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.
As a matter of fact, he is not authorized to do it. When I was passing
information that came from those sources to Colonel Raley I was
doing it on my own responsibility and I so explained to Colonel Raley
that I was so doing.
100. General Frank. The amount of material that you could pass
to Colonel Raley, compared to the total that you received, had to be
limited?
Captain Layton. I passed him only the highlights and most im-
portant spots.
101. General Grunert. And those things that you thought the
Army had an interest in, is that it ?
Captain Layton. All of these had to do with the situations in the
Far East, the intrigues, how the British reported to us that spies, for
example, were going to put a false report out that the Japanese had
landetl at Singora on the east coast, and had a false report to go to
the British in Malaya across the [r30'o8] border that they needed
assistance, and to entice them across the border from Padang Bessa,
across the border from AlorStar. The British having been enticed
across the border, they were then to be declared by Thailand as an
aggressor, and Thailand was to call on Ja})an for assistance, and the
Japanese entry into Thailand was then to be as an ally and a joint
attack be made on ^Malaya on the basis of sovereignty. The date was
tentatively scheduled for 1 December.
102. General Frank. 1941 ?
Captain Layton. 1941. The movement of troops south, the move-
ment of amphibious craft, warships, all these things all added into a
picture, which I told Colonel Raley.
General (trunert. You do not ki"iow what conferences or conversa-
tions the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet had with the Com-
manding General of the Hawaiian Dei)artment in wliich he may have
passed information to the C(Mimianding General of the Hawaiian
Department ?
1592 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Layton. I do not know, sir. I do know, however, that I
delivered one message — may I refresh my memory? I delivered one
message on the direction of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,
to General Short in person, on either the 24th or 25th of November,
where it said that the chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations
with Japan was very doubtful and that the situation, coupled with the
statements of the Japanese Government and the movements of their
naval and military forces indicated, in the opinion of naval operations,
a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack
on the Phillippines or Guam as a possbility. It stated that the Chief
of Staff of the Army had seen the dispatch and concurs and
re- [S0o9] quested that the people addressed in the dispatch
inform the senior Army officers in their area. It also had an injunc-
tion that the utmost security was necessary in order not to complicate
an already tense situation or to precipitate Japanese action.
General Short asked me what I thought of it at which time I told
him that Ave had considerable intelligence from various sources of the
movements of Japanese units to the south, that troops, amphibious
craft, warships, movements of planes, had all been detected. He asked
me if the Navy had an airfield in Guam. I told him we did not, that
an airfield on Guam had been allowed to go into disuse, and that Guam
had its guns removed, and that Japan was so informed, in the year
before Pearl Harbor, to make the Japanese realize our very peaceful
intentions.
[3060] 103. General Grunert. Have you anything?
104. General Russell. Yes,
Did you know in November of 1941 of the existence of any agree-
ments between the British, the Dutch, and the Americans as to taking
action in concert in event the Japanese armed forces should do cer-
tain things, such as attack British, Dutch, or American possessions
or go into the Gulf of Siam, for example?
Captain Layton. No, sir.
105. General Russell. Do you know now whether any such agree-
ment as that existed?
Captain Laytox. Not of first-hand knowledge. I have heard that
there was such an existing agreement, but I have never seen it nor
heard of it officially.
106. General Russell. Assuming that such agreements did exist
in the fall of 1041 from October on, and you had known of those
agreements, would they have influenced 3^ou in your estimate of the
situation as to the probability of war with Japan and its inevitability?
Captain Layton. General, it is pretty hard to go back now, with all
the things that have happened, and remember what I would have
thought then, but, doing the best I can, it would depend upon the
type and nature of the agreement, the locality concerned; and, in
other words, all the circumstances would have to be taken into their
proper position and their proper weight.
I would like 'to mention that we had in accordance with this a
message from the Dutch who said that they had these secret sources
which told them the Japanese were going to move in on Dutch Timor
and possibly even Portuguese Timor, and asked us [3061] if
we had any information of that move. We told them we had noth-
ing whatsoever, but there was some indication that some Japanese
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1593
forces would soon proceed to the Palau area, but whether or not they
liad agirressive intentions against Timor we could not confirm.
107. General Frank. As a matter of fact, from the information
that you did have, did you anticipate, did you think war was imminent
with Japan ?
Captain Laytox. We had a war warning. The Department had
ordered a reconnaissance made by flying boats over the French Indo-
China coast, the approach of the Gulf of Siam. Japanese submarines,
vessels, a whole convoy, transports and aircraft, were seen in the area
on the ()th of December. A dispatch from the C-in-C Asiatic Fleet
re):)orted two transport convoys en route into the Gulf of Siain.
The discussion then, as previously, that I heard in the Commander-
in-Chief's office was : Would the Japanese attack, or was this a furtlier
movement into the west coast of French Indo-China to establish an
advance base to use in the future on occasion of other moves'^ Or,
if the Japanese decided to pull this Thailand induced invasion, would
thej' leave the Phili]:)pines on their flank? The possibility of war
vas fully debated. I did not personally think that the Philippines
would be left on the flank in case the Japanese decided to make an
all-out southeA'ly push with military force.
You must remember at this time, although the negotiations had
broken down and there was very little evidence that they might be
renewed, these negotiations had been going on in Washington since
somewliere around April 1941, intermittently, [3062] but they
had broken down once before and suddenly Kurusu was given the
right of way of a clipper being held for him in Hongkong, and there
was nothing that would indicate that perhaps they couldn't find some
other way. After all, the Japanese is essentially an oriental, and bar-
gaining is one of their fortes. If they can't get their way one way,
they will go around another way to bargain, and they never ask first
what they really want : they ask for about twice as much so they can
meet you in the midway of compromise.
So with that in mind there was also the situation of : Was this a mili-
tary move or was this a show of force, or did they think that they
could put a little more pressure on French Indo-China and that we
would not do anything?
Those are questions we all know the answer to now, but at that time,
lacking all the pictures in this jigsaw puzzle which included naval
operations and diplomacy, national policy, we couldn't form a com-
plete picture from which you could guess the entire puzzle, because
you will never have all the jigsaw pieces, but we had insufficient pieces
to see the whole ])icture clearly.
108. General Frank. You still haven't answered my question.
Captain Layton. I beg your pardon, sir.
109. General Frank. As an intelligence officer you make intelligence
estimates for the Commander-in-Chief, don't you?
Captain Layton. Yes, sir.
110. General Frank. Did you consi(ier at that time, in view of the
information that was available, that war was imminent ?
Captain Layton. I did not think that war was imminent, although
war was an entire possibility.
[3063] 111. General Frank. All right.
1594 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
112. General Grunert. Are there any other questions? (No
response.)
Captain, have you anything that you think of that we haven't
touched on that you think might be of vahie to the Board in coming
to conchisions, that you haven't brought up or that we haven't
brought up ?
Captain Laytox. I would like to state that I have good information
that there is, or that there was, intelligence of value in the Office of
Naval Intelligence and also in G-2 in Washington which bears on the
case in question, and, while it was not the decisive pieces of evidence,
they were just some more pieces of jigsaw puzzle that might have
assisted considerably in arriving at a proper estimate of the situation.
113. General Grunert. In other words, what was the gist of such
information? You must have some idea of what it amounted to.
Captain Layton. The gist of the information was the most highly
secret sources and had to do with the presence or absence of naval
vessels from Pearl Harbor, reports concerning them, also concerning
international relations, particularly ourselves versus Japan, Japan
versus and concerning her allies, Germany and Italy.
114. General Grunert. You mean, that you think should have been
transmitted to the Admiral and the General here? Is that the idea?
Captain La^ton. I do. sir
115. General Grunert. And having had those, from what you now
know — or I don't know what you do know on that subject, but
[3064] had you had additional information it would have given you
a different idea, a different outlook, or a different viewpoint, or what?
Captain Layton. I think it would have assisted General Short and
Admiral Kimmel into seeing a broader picture of the situation as it
existed then than without their being able to see the other parts of this
jigsaw puzzle of which many pieces were missing, but these pieces were
ones that we possessed in our Government and we did not have out here.
llC). General GrI'Nert. That, of course, is hindsight, like most
everything else we get before this Board.
Captain Layton. Of course.
117. General Grunert. However, someone nuist judge as to where to
draw the line as to how much they give. Otherwise we would have a
state, or a chief of naval operations or a chief of staff headquarters at
each one of the lower commands, with everything they get.
Is there anything else that you think of?
Captain Layton. Nothing further, sir.
118. General Frank. I would like to ask him a question.
119. General Grunert. All right.
120. General Frank. Does your estimate of the situation indicate
that a surprise air raid is possible right now?
Captain Layton. It is always within the Japanese potentialities to
place aboard their carriers the planes from the shore bases, for instance,
to assign to them by land line telegram from Japan certain escorts, to
give them explicit instructions that they shall not break radio silence,
to sail them and take advantage of weather fronts that form, as they
\S06'5] know they periodically do form, and they can strike Hawaii,
Oahu, tomorrow.
121. General Frank. Do you know how close they can get to Oahu
right now, even in good weather, if they are not under visual observa-
tion, without detection?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1595
Captain Layton. Not first-hand evidence, but I would guess some-
where within radar range, if they are not visually detected by a plane.
122. General Fkaxk. To what distance do you believe radar range to
be a protection, positive?
Captain Layton. Positive protection, sii-?
123. General Frank. Yes.
Captain Layton. Against low-flying planes, about 20 miles.
124. General Frank. That is right.
Captain Layton. Unless you have got a very high mountain where
you. can get your radar way up in the air, and then you can extend it out
to about 28 miles, and from there on you have to have too high a moun-
tain for a horizon.
125. General Gruxert. In order tliat the record shall not be mis-
construed or misread, if it is read by someone, I think a little item of
explanation ought to be entered therein, because the layman has the
idea that they can detect up to about 120 or 130 miles, and many of them
cannot understand that a low-tlying craft cannot be detected until it
gets very close in. That is the idea, is it? ,
Captain Layton. Yes, sir. The radar wave we could call, in other
words, human sight going out from the eye, hitting something, com-
ing back, and reflecting on the ej^eball its [30G6] vision, its im-
pression. Now, if you stand- on a high mountain, you may only see
then to the horizon due to the curvature of the earth. If you stand
on the seashore you may not see out very far due to the fact that j'our
height of eye is the actual height of your eye above the sand you stand
upon ; and based on the triangle, one leg of which is the height of your
eye, and the hypotenuse is to the horizon, and the base is from the
base of your feet to the point where your eye touched the horizon,
the higher you go the longer the leg of the right angle triangle.
126. General Frank. No.
Captain Layton. Excuse me.
127. General Frank. Not always.
Captain Layton. Well, up to a degree.
The higher you go the greater becomes the upright, and therefore
the hypotenuse must be increased also. That is the distance you see
the plane.
128. General Frank. That is all right in theory, but it doesn't al-
ways work in practice. For instance, right here on this island it
didn't work.
Captain Layton. I am only speaking of theory now, to explain
what radar does.
129. General Frant^:. Yes.
Captain Layton. Therefore, a low-flying plane two or three feet
off of the waves
130. General Frank. Or twenty.
Captain Layton. — cannot be detected as soon as one who is flying
way high because he is the same as visual observation then.
131. General Grunert. I think that gives enough explanation
[3067] for the record, anyway.
If there is nothing else, Captain, we thank you very much for com-
ing.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
1596 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TESTIMONY OF COMMANDER HAROLD S. BURR, IJ. S. N. R.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Commander Burr, will you please state to the
Board your name, rank, organization, and present station?
Commander Burr. My name is Harold S. Burr, Commander,
U. S. N. R., and I am at present assistant district intelligence officer,
14th Naval District.
2. General Grunert. Commander, we are after facts and leads to
facts. Now, we have developed a great deal in the testimony we have
heard, so there are just a few things that we would like to check up
with you.
Will you tell the Board just what duty you were on in the latter
part of 1941 and during the attack on Pearl Harbor?
Commander Burr. Immediately preceding the attack and following
it I was naval liaison officer representing the 14th Naval District at
the headquarters.of tlie Commanding General.
3. General Grunert. Then, you represented the 14th Naval Dis-
trict. How about the fleet ? Did you represent the fleet ?
Commander Burr. No, sir.
4. General Grunert. And with whom did you do most of your
business in the department headquarters?
[3068] Commander Burr. My desk was located in G-3, and
most of my work was with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.
5. General Grunert. Who was that at that time?
Commander Burr. Colonel Donegan.
6. General Grunert. Donegan?
Commander Burr. Yes, sir.
7. General Grunert. Will you tell the Board what that liaison con-
sisted of ? What did you do there, and why were you there ?
Commander Burr. While I am an intelligence officer, sir, most of
my work was of a general utility nature, assisting the Army in its con-
tacts with the 14th Naval District.
8. General Grunert. So all the business that the 14th Naval Dis-
trict did, was that transmitted through you ?
Commander Burr. I wouldn't say all of it, sir, but
9. General Grunert. What classes of business that was conducted,
or cooperation between the Department and the District, passed
through you ? What sort of things did you handle ? ,
Commander Burr. Well, it was a wide variety of things', sir. There
were no specific instructions, but I was the only naval officer at the
time in the headquarters of the Commanding General ; and as matters
came up with headquarters within the Army that involved contact
with the 14th Naval District (it might be on matters of finding the
right ordnance man or the right public works man or the right opera-
tions man for the Army to contact) that was my job.
10. General Grunert. Were you a sort of leg man for the District?
[3069] Commander Burr. Yes, sir, I would say that.
11. Genera] Grunert. Then, you did a great deal of contacting of
other staff officers who transacted business between themselves ; is that
right?
Commander Burr. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1597
12. General Grunert. Was it your duty to keep the Army informed
of what the District was doing or what intelligence it received ?
Commander Burr. Not on operational intelligence matters as a
rule, sir.
13. General Grunert. But occasionally they would use you for that
purpose ?
Commander Burr. But occasionally on things, yes, sir. As the
Commandant of the District issued directives which I thought would
be of interest to the Army, I did my best to bring them to the atten-
tion of those Army officers who I thought would be concerned.
14. General Grunert. All right. Let's have the other side of the
j)icture. Did the Army give the District all the information the Dis-
trict wanted? And, if so, was it transmitted through you, or did
the same thing apply, that they used you in finding out with whom
to do business, and then they did business sometimes with your knowl-
edge and sometimes without?
Commander Buim. That is it, sir; sometimes with my knowledge
and sometimes without.
15. General Grunert. Let us think of this special case on which
the Board would like to have information. This was a message
from the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington to the \3070]
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, dated November 27, 1941,
which, paraphrased, started out, "Consider this a war warning."
Do you remember that message?
Commander Burr. I remember a secret message that came in at
that time. I w^ouldn't be able to say definitely that that was the
message, but it sounds very much like it.
16. General Grunert. At that time were you used, in 3^our ca-
pacity as liaison officer, to deliver this message from the fleet or
from Admiral Kimmel to General Short?
Commander Burr. Yes, sir, I was used for that.
17. General Grunert. How did you. receive the message, and what
did you do wit it?
Commander Burr. Well, it was in connection with a similar mes-
sage which General Short had received from the War Department,
in which he showed it to me, asked me to read it ; and, as I remember,
there was an instruction in there for General Short to inform the
Commandant of the District, and I took it over to the District. The
Commandant was not present, and so I showed it to the Chief of
Staff, who promptly took me to Admiral Kimmel's office where the
message was shown to him also, and it was at that time that —
18. General Grunert. This that you are talking about is the Army
message ?
Commander Burr. That is the Army message. But that is how
I happened to be over in Admiral Kimmel's office when he gave me
the message that the Navy had received, to show to General Short.
19. General Grunert. Did you show it to General Short?
Commander Burr. No, sir. When I returned to Fort Shafter
[3071] General Short was not present and could not be located.
And similarly with the Chief of Staff: the senior officer present
was Colonel Donegan, as I remember, in G-3, and he said that he
would assume the responsibility for seeing to it that the message
tvas delivered to General Short as soon as he could be located.
1598 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
20. General Gkunert. Do you know whether ,or not that message
actually reached General Short?
Commander Burr. It is a long time ago, sir, but I am under the
impression that I did ask Colonel Donegan afterwards if that mes-
sage had reached General Short, and he said that it had. That is
my impression.
21. General Grunert. Was that message a secret message, as
far as you know?
Commander Burr. Yes, sir.
22. General Grunert. What is the standing operating procedure
of handling secret documents? Was a receipt demanded or given?
Commander Burr. A receipt was not demanded on that., sir.
23. General Grunert. So as far as you know there is nothing
in writing to show delivery or receipt ?
Commander Burr. No, sir. There is, I believe, an officer present
here in the Islands w^ho w^as present at the time I handed the message
to Colonel Donegan, and he might be able to confirm my statement.
24. General Grunert. Who is that officer?
Commander Burr. Colonel Lawton. Colonel William Lawton.
25. General Grunert. Do you know whether G-2 of the Depart-
ment knew anything about this message? Was he concerned
[307^] in any way as to the transmission ?
Co.mmander Burr. I don't think so.
26. General Grunert. Or was he included in the know?
Commander Burr. I don't think so, sir. It appeared to be a G-3
pigeon as it was handled.
27. General Grunert. All right. That covers the points that I
wanted to use this witness for. If you want to ask any other questions
of him, you may. General Russell?
28. General Kussell. No, not I.
29. General Grunert. Now, before you go, tell us what is in the
back of your mind that you would like to have the Board know. Is
there anything that occurs to you that might be of value to the Board,
any other subject you think of bringing up? Somebody usually has
a little something they want to say.
Commander Burr. Yes, sir.
30. General Grunert. We want to give you the opportunity if there
is anything that occurs to you.
Conmiander Burr. Well, I was a very young reserve officer, only
being on duty a short time, and tremendously impressed with the im-
portance of that message, although it was very confusing to me.
31. General Grunert. You read both the Army message and the
Navy message?
Commander Burr. Yes, sir. I couldn't distinguish one from the
other at present, although they impressed me as being essentially the
same, but the import of it as I read it seemed to focus attention on
the Philippines and the Far East and apply to this area only as a
security precaution, an antisabotage precaution, as I remember.
[3073} 32. General Grunert. Do you remember whether there
was anything in either message that refers to sabotage?
Commander Burr. That word sticks in my head, sir, but I only
had a quick glance at it, and that was some years ago, and I wouldn't —
couldn't swear to it.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1599
33. General Grunert. But it did impress you as one that required
something to be done in order to insure your own security here in
the Ishxnds ?
Commander Burr. Yes, sir.
84. General Grunert. An5^tliing else?
Commander Burr. I was very much upset that I couldn't deliver
the message directly to General Short, but there seemed to be nothing
more I could do about it ; and, knowing its urgency and the fact that
probably prompt action was indicated, and knowing that messages of
that sort usually went pretty directly to G-3, I felt that G-3 was the
appropriate place to deliver it.
35. General Gruxert. Quite natural. Thank you very much for
coming.
Commander BuRR. Yes, sir.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
36. Genera] Russell. Let me put these in evidence, unless somebody
has some objection to it.
37. General Gruxert. I have no objection to putting them in evi-
dence. I said we did not want them, but if you want them, far be it
from me to keep you from putting them in.
38. General Russell. 1 want these to be marked exhibits next in
number : two captured Japanese maps which were identified [3074 \
before the Board by Captain Layton; and also another exhibit which
is a copy of a captured map with translation in English of the Japa-
nese endorsements ; and those three will be marked next in order.
(Captured Japanese maps identified, by Captain Layton were
marked Exhibits Nos. 24 and 25 and received in evidence.)
(Copy of captured map with translation of Japanese endorsements
was marked Exhibit No. 26 and received in evidence.)
39. Colonel Toulmix. Are there any more witnesses?
40. General Gruxert. Xo more witnesses; this morning.
(Whereupon, at 11 a. m.. the Board, having concluded the hearing
of witnesses for the morning, took up the consideration of other
business.)
[S07S] afterxoox" session
(At 2 p. m., the Board met and continued with the hearing of wit-
nesses, as follows:)
General Grunert. The Board will come to order.
TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL MAXWELL MURRAY, UNITED
STATES ARMY
(The witness Avas sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board your
name, rank, organization, and station.
General Murray. General Maxwell Murray, 02216 : jNIajor General,
United States Army; commanding Guadalcanal Base.
2. General Grunert. General, this Board is after facts, and leads
to where we can get facts, as to what led up to Pearl Harbor, and also
1600 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the attack. Because of your assignment durinii; the latter part of 1941,
and because you testified before the Roberts Commission, we put you
on the list, here, as a witness.
Now, the Board has developed a great deal of the story, and there
is no use piling evidence on evidence, so we will skip around here and
try to piece out some of this story, and then open up any subjects that
any Members of the Board want to open up, as well as give you an
opportunity to open up anything we may not touch on.
First, I would like "to talk to you about artillery ammunition, and
ask you this question: Why was not sufficient ammunition at hand
for the artillery, on December 7?
General Murray. There was sufficient artillery ammunition on
hand, but it had not been issued to troops.
3. General Grunert. I mean "at hand," not "on hand."
[3076] General Murray. I was not authorized to draw the artil-
lery ammunition from the magazines. I requested authority from
General Short to draw artillery ammunition and stack it ; I suggested
either in the gun parks or on the division review field, in small stacks.
The division review field, as you know, is a large area immediately
adjacent to the old artillery park, and had been planned as the dis-
persal area for the artillery.
4. General Grunert. Tell us, first, what your assignment was.
General Murray. I was in command of the 25th division, at that
time.
5. General Grunert. And that was stationed where?
General Murray. That was stationed at Schofield Barracks. I was
a senior divisional commander and had been in command at Schofield
Barracks until, I can't be certain of the date, but I believe that the
organization of the post command under Colonel Earl M. Wilson had
been established shortly before Pearl Harbor, before the attack on
December 7.
6. General Grunert. That was a station command?
General Murray. It was a station command; yes. As I recall it,
that had just been organized, and I had moved into a divisional head-
quarters which was separate from the post headquarters.
7. General Grunert. Then you had the tactical division, and had
nothing to do primarily with the post?
General Murray. Nothing with the post.
8. General Grunert. And in your division you had what artillery?
General Murray. I had the Eighth, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Field
Artillery, but it is not generally known that we had [3077]
practically doubled the gun strength of the brigade before the 75-mm.
gun batteries ; the Eighth and the Thirteenth were 75-mm. gun regi-
ments, and each of those batteries had eight guns to the battery instead
of four. The Eleventh was the 155-howitzer regiment, but they were
in addition manning two batteries of 155 guns, and some 240-mm.
howitzers. The 75 regiments both had 240-mm. howitzers assigned to
them, too.
We had a total of six 240-mm. howitzer batteries organized, and two
howitzer batteries — "two-gun batteries" we called them ; and those
had all been equipped and furnished, and we had as I recall it a total
of 1?)C) guns mounted in the single brigade, which made a very heavy
artillery deployment.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1601
9. General Grunert. Under the new plans for defense, what was
the assifrnmeht as to mission, as to your division, and as to the use of
that artillery?
General INIurray. The division was assigned to the south sector.
10. General Grunert. Will you describe that sector.
General Murray. The south sector extended from a point north of
Waianae pocket — I have forgotten the name of the exact point —
stretched around through the southern half of the island, and up to
just beyond the northern edge of the Kanoehe Bay side, the eastern
side of "the island, at a little island off the coast, Lae-Ka-Oio.
11. General Gruxert. Did that sector include the City of Honolulu?
General Murray. It included the City of Honolulu, yes.
You asked for the mission of the artillery?
12. General Grunert. Yes.
[S078] General Murray. The artillery was charged with the
establishment of the immediate support of the beaches by approxi-
mately half of the 75-mm. guns in the brigade. They were emplaced
on the beaches to provide close-in enfilading fire as support of the
machine-gun positions, wliich also covered the beaches. In addition to
the immediate beach defense, the infantry defense of the beach was
supported from fixed artillery positions, dug-in positions, running
from 1500 to 2500 yards in rear of the beaches, the 75 gun batteries, and
in rear of those, or about on the line, were the 155 howitzer batteries;
observation for all batteries being set up on the beach for a close
defense.
In addition to those organic guns, the 75 guns and the 155 howitzers,
the 240 howitzers were in position, so that practically the entire beach
that was assigned to the division was under fire of at least one 240-mm.
howitzer battery, and in many cases, the batteries; the important areas
of the beach were covered by two batteries. I would like to correct one
statement that I made earlier. I said that the brigade manned 155
guns. I recall now that we had turned those over to the Twenty-
Fourth Division just before December 7, because they were in the
northern sector. They had been assigned to the Eleventh Field, but
we had turned them over. I had f orgotton that when I made the state-
ment.
I might add, I have not prepared myself for this discussion, but it
comes from memory.
18. General Grunert. All right.
Genera] Murray. So we had additional 240s.
14. General Grunert. Then your mission was primarily against a
surface attack?
[3079] General IMurray. Entirely, except for individual small
arms and automatic weapons, which were organic in the division.
15. General Grunert. Primarily, for your own protection ?
General Murray. Primarily; yes.
10. General Grunert. Do you recall the types of alert that were pre-
scribed at that time?
General Murray. Yes, We were ordered to go on No. 1 Alert, on
November 27, and on December 7, immediately after the initiation of
the attack, we had a message to go on No. 2 Alert, and that was immedi-
ately followed by a directive to go on No. 3 alert.
17. General Grunert. See if I am correct in this : No. 1 Alert is the
so-called "sabotage alert"?
1602 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Murray. Piimarily.
18. General Grunert. No. 2 is the alert against an air attack, plus
sabotage ; No. 3 is the all-out alert, including everything ; is that right ?
General Murray. I am not certain. I would have to look up the
division order, which is not available to me; at least, the order that we
had. As I recall it, the Department alert probably included the anti-
aircraft, but the division alert, in so far as I can recall it, the No. 2
Alert, involved a movement of certain infantry troops and certain light
weapons to position, but did not call for the installation of the heavy
artillery units, the 240s.
19. General Grunert. I see, then, you had a division alert, under the
prescribed Department alert?
General Murray. Yes.
20. General Grunert. It may have been different in nomenclature?
General Murray. In minor details. The nomenclature was
130S0~\ the same, but the details were not.
21. General Grunert. Then really wdien you turned out it was the
all-out alert, in which you used your infantry and your artillery?
General Murray. Yes, sir; we jumped from the No. 1 Alert to the
No. 3 Alert.
22. General Grunert. Now% we get back to the ammunition. You
say that there was no ammunition immediately available to you for
quick action, is that right?
General Murray. So far as I can recall, we did not have a round
of arnmunition in the gun parks.
23. General Grunert. And, in case you were turned out, to go on
an alert which required ammimition, you would then have to draw it
from somewhere?
General Murray. We had to draw it.
24. General Grunert. Where did it come from ?
General Murray. We drew it directly ; the majority of it w^as drawn
at Schofield Barracks, although the artillery units of the Eighth
Field Artillery, which came directly to the positions in Honolulu and
Hickam Field, immediately adjacent to it, were to draw ammunition
at the Aliamanu Crater, which was down here near Pearl Harbor.
25. General Grunert. What additional time, outside of turning out
from where you were to get to positions, would it take to get ammuni-
tion to your positions, approximately?
General Murray. I would say that there had been set up for the
regiment two separate entrances, made so as to expedite the issuing
of ammunition, so that my estimate would be that it took not over
an hour to issue the unit of fire which we took to the beach with us on
December 7.
[3081] 26. General Grunert. And did I understand you to say
that you had requested that you be given authority to stack some am-
munition here and there so as to expedite it ?
General Murray. Yes.
27. General Grunert. And to whom did you apply, and what was
the result?
General Murray. To General Short. I should go into it a little fur-
ther. I was not satisfied, myself, with the status of our ammunition
for either the infantry or the artillery. We were authorized by the
Department, an old order had limited us to 6,000 rounds of small-
PROCEEDINGS OF ARiMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1603
arms ammunition per company in tlie parks. It was held there pri-
maril}' for antisabotage purposes. That made a limited amount of
machine-gun ammunition and a limited amount of rifle ammunition.
Our infantry companies were all equipped "svith extra machine guns.
We had, I think, at least 15 machine guns in each rifle company ; the
average may have been nearly 20. It was obviously impossible —
most of our ammunition was not belted — it was obviously impossible
to get out the ammunition and belt it without a serious delay. We
were ordered to have 10,000 rounds at each machine-gun position,
which was a very heavy allowance, a little over three units of fire, so
that when I brought that point up to General Short that it had
taken, on experiment, three days, with only two. We had two belt
loading machines for a heavy-weapon company, and it took us three
daj^s to load up our belted ammunition on a previous trial, so that
he had authorized us to draw and belt machine-gun ammunition, draw
the necessary rifle ammunition, and store that in the parks. As I
recall it, the only limitation that he made on infantry ammunition was
[3082] that we could not have mortar ammunition or high-ex-
plosive grenades inside the barracks. That was left us in the ordnance
depot, in the infantry warehouses, as was the artillery ammunition.
However, the fact that we were able to get all of the infantry, rifle,
and machine-gun ammunition at all ordnance magazines cleared the
congestion in the ordnance area to such an extent that we could draw
artillery ammunition very rapidly, and as I said before, the artillery
ammunition was prepared for prompt issue in stacks of a unit, so
that the trucks of the Eighth could go directly to the doors that were
assigned to them with the ammunition crews on board and load very
promptly. That is what made for the expeditious delivery of ammu-
nition.
As a matter of fact, while I said there was an hour possibly delay,
that is merely guesswork because I am certain that the artillery was
loaded and had the ammunition, ready to go, and that the first unit
of fire, which was 300 rounds per gun for 75s, and 150 rounds for the
155 howitzer, that was loaded and ready by the time the artillery was
ready to move from the post. I don't think that the actual movement
of the guns to their jDositions was delayed on December 7.
[3083] 28. General Gkunert. Then on December 7th you got
in position by 4 p. m. Was that normal ?
General Murray. I would say it was a little before that. It was an
exceedingly rapid move, especially when you consider we had that
much ammunition. As a matter of fact. Colonel Kelliher, who checked
the movement of the post for me, came back and reported that the
movement out was the best he had ever seen the division execute.
29. General Grunert. Now, it appears from the Roberts Commis-
sion report, or, at least, I gather the impression that you had drawn
some ammunition in violation of standing orders. What regulation
did you violate in drawing ammunition for emplacement in battery
position ?
General Murray. I do not recall that, sir. The only question that
came up, so far as I can recall, was the drawing of infantry ammuni-
tion, which was authorized. It is possible that certain batteries may
have had some at the gun positions on the beach, but I say that as a
possibility and not of my knowledge. So far as I can recall, all ammu-
79716 — 4G — Ex. 145. vol. 2 52
1604 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
nition was drawn for the field artillery units on tlie day of December
7th; that is all the ammunition that was taken to the positions, that
went to the guns in their initial movement to position.
30. General Grunert. The evidence, as I recall, also states that you
drew this ammunition reall}^ in violation of standing orders, because
you anticipated a surprise raid. Is that true?
General Murray. I do not recall that, sir. I would like to check it
up, but I do not recall it.
31. General Grunert. Let us see that testimony here. Or let us
see what the digest of that is. I then had the question, [3084]
What caused you to anticipate a surprise raid, but if you do not recall
that you did
General Murray. No, sir. As I say, I have not discussed it v.ith
anyone since that date. I may have made that statement. I may
have known of some that was in the hands of the artillery at that time,
but I do not recall it at this time.
32. General Grunert. In the meantime, we can go to another
subject.
General Murray. I would like to suggest that Colonel Kelliher, who
was the executive of the artillery brigade at that time, is in charge of
the Planning Section of the Department Headquarters, and he would
know.
33. General Grunert. We will get him if it is of any material mo-
ment. Were the commanders of major units — and by major units I
mean such a unit as you had, such as Wilson and Burgin had, and
Martin and so forth — kept informed of the War and Navy Depart-
ment warning messages ?
General Murray. So far as I know, we received every message. I
received only one personalh^
34. General Grunert. So far as you know, you received only one?
General Murray. Yes, sir, with reference to the preparation or the
immediate preparation for possible attack. We had a number of in-
formal conferences. We had a number of informal conferences with
General Short as to the status of our troops, and the equipment at
hand.
35. General Grunert. Do you recall ever having seen a message
of November 27th from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, which started out "Consider [3085]
this is a war warning"?
General Murray. It did not arrive in that exact wording. I have a
true copy of the message that was given to me orally, which I would
like to present.
36. General Grunert. All right, read it. Then we won't have to
have so many appendices to our record.
General Murray. May I describe this document?
37. Geaieral Grunert. Yes,
General Murray. At the time the order for the alert was received
on November the 27th, as I recall it, it was approximately 3 o'clock,
possibly 3:30 p.m. I was in the dentist chair. My aide came to me
and said Alert No. 1 had been ordered, and I asked "whether the neces-
sary steps had been taken to put it in operation. He said the initial
units were loading out at that time. I asked as to whether the liaison
officer had gone down to the Department Headquarters, which was
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1605
routine. He advised me that he had gone, and I told him that I would
report to headquarters as soon as the dentist could complete the tem-
porary work he was doing.
Shortly after I arrived at my divisional headquarters, the liaison
officer returned with an oral message which he told me he was to deliver
to me in person and with the utmost secrecy. He repeated his message
to me and I asked for his notes. He said that he had no notes, that he
was not authorized to take notes, that the message had been read to
them twice by the Chief of Staff, but they were not allowed to take
any notes. So I asked him to repeat it, and I was certain that I had
the gist of the message, so I then directed him to w^rite out the message
as he had given it to me and file it as secret in the divisional G-2 safe.
[30S6] The copy that I have at hand now is a copy of the orig-
inal message which I was fortunate enough to find with the 25th Divi-
sion on Noumea the other day and they still had the original one in
headquarters. It reads :
Negotiations have come to a standstill at this time. No diplomatic breaking
of relations and we will let them make the first overt act. You will take such
precautions as you deem necessary to carry out the Rainbow plan. Do not excite
the civilian population. This will be held to minimum people. Note. — I was
told to tell General Murray, General Wilson, and Colonel Wilson only.
That is initialed by Colonel Haynes; message from Colonel Philips,
November 27, 19-il.
That was the only message as a direct message tliat I received prior
to the order to move out on No. 3 Alert on December 7. As I say, there
were a number of conferences and discussions, detailed instructions,
given, of which I have no record, from General Short at that time.
38. General Grunert. Were you ever called into conference on this
message to di&cuss what might be the best thing to do under its terms?
General Murray, I feel certain that we were. I recall one discus-
sion particularly. The question came up as to whether any further
procedure was necessary on the completeness of our sabotage and
patrol cover. The sabotage order required not only standing guards
but heavy patrols and the readiness of one battalion to move at short
notice as a reserve unit. And the discussion included the fact that the
report had been made to the War Department of our antisabotage
status.
[3087] 39. General Grunert. But that was after the decision
had been made to go on Alert No. 1 ?
General Murray. Yes, sir.
40. General Grunert. And you were discussing how best to carry
out that alert (
General Murray, Yes, sir.
41. General Grunert. But you did not discuss prior to going on
Alert No. 1 or your advice was not sought as to whether you should
go on No. 1, No. 2 or No. 3 ?
General Murray. I do not recall any further discussion in that
detail.
42. General Grunert. And you do not recall on that same day
knowing anything about a message received by the Navj- which started
out "Consider this a war warning" ?
General Murray. I have never seen or have never heard directly of
that message.
1606 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
43. General Grunert. Did you hear anything about any othei
messages after or around November 27th which related to the inter-
national situation, the burning of papers at the consulate and- so forth?
General Murray. No. No, sir. I heard nothing.
44. General Grunert. How often or how frequently were your
conferences with the Commanding General? Were they periodic,
were they when something came up, or what ?
General Murray. That is a rather difficult question to answer. I
should say that I saw General Short at his office possibly five times
between November the 2Tth and December the 7th.
45. General Grunert. Do you recall generally what you discussed
[3088] with him at those meetings?
General Murray. We discussed the general situation as we saw it
in Washington, the discussions of the daily reports of* the conference
in Washington, and General Short maintained a very close personal
interest in the activities of the division.
46. General Grunert. In those discussions do you recall the source
of General Short's information about the situation in Washington
and the situation in the diplomatic field and so forth ?
General Murray. No, sir. I cannot be certain as to that. I know
that General Short was in communication with Washington by tele-
phone from time to time.
47. General Grunert. Before December 7th ?
General Murray. That is my impression, sir. I know that he had
one of these scramblers, as we call them, and my impression was that
he talked with Washington, and I considered or I know that part of
the discussions were based on the newspaper reports.
48. General Frank. Is that an inference by you or a fact?
General Murray. That is an inference. I say that we discussed it.
I know there was a discussion of the newspaper reports.
49. General Grunert. In that discussion what was the state of
mind? What did you conclude from your discussions? Were you
in accord with what you concluded or was there difference of opinion?
In other words, what did you discuss ?
General Murray. I recall no difl'erences of opinion. General. My
reaction was that we were on the verge of war, that we were, ready
for it, the ground troops were ready for it, [3089] and it
took merely a move to position to meet them. We all anticipated,
I am certain, something further than the message that was re-
ceived on November 27th.
50. General Grunert. But you were on a sabotage alert and you
took no other alert until the blow struck?
General Murray. No other alert.
51. General Grunert. Then if the concensus of these discussions
was that war w^as imminent, why do you suppose no other form of
alert was taken? Was that discussed?
General Murray. I do not think that any one of us considered it
as imminent as it was.
52. General Grunert. Imminent for somebody else but not imme-
diately imminent for you?
General Murray. I would say not immediately imminent. I
might elaborate. You asked whether we did anything besides the
antisabotage. Of course, there was continuous work by all troops in
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1607
establishing their gim positions and digging machine gun installa-
tions and completing the installations and checking the installations,
improving the telephone lines, improving the trails to the infantry
positions, putting wire in the critical areas. That was being car-
ried by troop details, but the troops were carrying it out not from
positions on the beach but by details from Schofield. Those were
part of the discussions we were carrying on with General Short as
to the jDi'ogress that was being made.
[3090] 53, General Grunert, All excellent preparatory meas-
ures.
General Murray. Preparatory altogether.
54. General Gruxert, But not implemented unless the proper alert
had been adopted?
General Murray. That was correct, sir.
55. General Grunert. Now, so far as you were concerned, as the
attack took place and what happened, even if you had been on Alert
No. 3, would you have had any influence on the attack one way or
another ?
General Murray. So far as the ground troops are concerned, I
do not think it would have made a particle of difference insofar as
the events that occurred on December the 7th were concerned.
56. General Grunert. Your mission was primarily concerned with
sabotage and with all-out position?
General Murray. Our mission was primarily sabotage and defense
against ground or close-in naval attack, and we were not equipped
or prepared to execute an active defense against an air attack.
57. General Grunert. Now come back to testimonj' before the
Eoberts Commission, in order to help your memory as to what
was said then. In a statement to a question from General McCoy
it says here that a part of the statement was as follows :
Several clays before the alert I violated the usual regulation regarding am-
munition by moving all infantry ammunition except high explosives into the
company barracks, the barrack room, and that meant that most of them
had as much as thirty rounds of ammunition in the belts, so they were ready
for immediate action.
[3091] That was an evident violation of something, but-
General Murray. Well, it is a statement of a violation of the old
regulation, but that was — I would like to correct that as to the state-
ment that I made before this Board. That movement' of ammuni-
tion into the barracks was in violation of the standing orders of the
post, but I made that movement of the ammunition on the authoriza-
tion of General Short.
58. General Grunert. Yes.
General Murray. Is that clear, General ?
59. General Grunert. That is clear to me.
General Murray. The standing regulations of the post permitted
us to have only 6,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition in the bar-
racks, and that confirms my recollection to the effect that he did not
permit me to bring the high explosive ammunition into the barracks.
That was the mortar ammunition and grenades.
60. General Grunert. Then, in reply to a question from the chair-
man, you said,
I was just looking after the alert, I thought there might be a surprise raid.
1608 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
That is where that digest got this,
I thought there might be a surprise raid.
Now, do you recall what caused you to think there might be a sur-
prise raid ?
General Murray. That is in line with what I stated or meant to con-
vey in my statement that I considered an attack might be imminent.
We all considered the possibility of a surprise raid, an attempt to raid
either some of our installations by a small landing — I think that the
general impression, certainly among the ground troops, was that the
most possible attack would be what would correspond to a [3092]
commando raid.
61. General Grunert. Yes.
General Murray. That was my own impression.
62. General Grunert. But if a commando raid was in the offing,
do you think you, being on Alert No. 1, would have been prepared for
it?"
General Murray. No, sir. As an afterthought, it looks — I say
there is no question but what as far as protection against commando
raids or any small raid, any sort of a surface raid, we would have been
in a better position had the troops been in the defense position.
63. General Grunert. I wanted to keep away from this after-
thought, this hindsight.
General Murray. Yes, sir.
64. General Grunert. That is why I dug up that remark of yours
that you expected a surprise raid. That was not really afterthought ;
that was practically at the time that you thought that. That is why
I wanted to develop the thing a little more. If you expect a surprise
raid, it isn't afterthought, now, that you think there ought to have
been a better alert than Alert No. 1 ?
General Murray. I think that I expressed myself fully. I would
have made a better statement of my position had I said that I would
have been certain we would be better prepared for a surprise raid had
we the ammunition in the hands of troops. It was a prevention that
I thought should be taken ; prevention [3093] of a disaster in
case of surprise was to have ammunition in the hands of troops ; and,
as I say, it is better — I think I made clear that I would have preferred
to have had the artillery ammunition in the hands of the troojos,
65. General Grunert. Another remark, another part of the testi-
mony, is to the effect that when General Murray got Alert No. 1 he
was not informed as to the seriousness of the existing situation ; no
intimation, nothing, although he talked to the Commanding General
and Headquarters several times between November 27 and December
7. Is that still your impression ?
General Murray. That is approximately the — the only direct in-
ference— the only direct information that I had had with reference
to the war status was in this message which I read of November the
27th.
66. General Grunert. I will ask the Recorder to read you the Chief
of Staff's entire message from which evidently that part was transmit-
ted to you, this with a view so that you will understand what was in
the entire message, and that you only got a part of that message, evi-
dently. Have you seen the entire message since ?
General Murray. No, sir, I have never seen it.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1609
67. General Grunert. You have never seen it.
I will ask the Recorder to read it to you. to see whether or not that
would have made any difference had you heard the entire message.
Colonel West. Shall I read it now, General ?
68. General Grunert. Yes.
[S094-] Colonel West. This is the message dated November 27,
1941, addressed to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H., signed '"Marshall," the body of which reads as
follows :
(Message of November 27, 1941, to commanding general, Hawaiian
Department, signed "Marshall," is as follows:)
Negotiations with Japan appear to be torniinateil to all practical nnrposes
with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back
and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action
possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, i)e avoided the
United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy Bhould
not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action ti:at might
jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you ar<* directed to
undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but
these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil popu-
lation or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you
will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pi^rtain to Japan.
Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential
officers.
69. General Grunert. Evidently, then, they just picked out such
parts of that message as they though you needed?
General Murray. There is another possibility: that it [3095^
was read twice to the staff oflicer whom I sent down there and who told
me definitely that he took no notes, was not permitted to take notes,
probably because of the obvious secrecy of this message, and his notes
omitted two or three important sentences in that message.
70. General Grunert. He may have forgotten them.
General Murray. He may have forgotten them.
71. General Grunert. Or they may not have been impressed upon
his mind.
General Murray. That was it; yes, sir.
72. General Grunert. Now, that sentence in there that in effect saj'S :
No matter what you have to do, don't you jeopardize your own defense.
General Murray. Yes, sir.
73. General Grunert. That is rather serious : No matter what is
required otherwise, he nuist not jeopardize his. own defense. Now,
that in a way might have caused
General Murray. May I — one sentence — ask the second sentence
there, with reference to tlie imminence of hostilities? I think it is
about the second or third sentence.
74. General Grunert. All right. Reread that.
General Murray. This need not be on the record. General. It is
merely for my own information. I would like to hear it read.
7.1. General Grunert. Read it in the record. Put it in the record
again.
Colonel West. I had better read it all again. It begins :
Negotiations witli Japan appear to be terminated to all practical i)ui'poses with
only the barest [3006^ possibilities that the Japanese Government might
come back and offer to continue.
1610 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Now, the second sentence is :
Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment.
If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan
commit the first overt act.
That is the end of the third sentence, and the fourth sentence is :
This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of
action that might jeopardize your defense.
76. General Grunert. I think that covers as much as he wants.
General Murray. That covers it, yes, sir.
77. General Grunert. Now, that sentence in there about alarming
the civil population: Do you know of anything that would have
alarmed the civil population had you gone on an all-out alert, as far as
you were cocerned?
General Murray. No, sir, I don't think it would have alarmed them.
It was the question that the act — the fact that we were taking over all of
the important installations: the water, lights, gas and oil utilities,
patrols all'over, all important bridges guarded.
78. General Grunert. That's Alert No. 1 ?
General Murray. That's Alert No. 1, yes, sir.
79. General Grunert. Do you think that would have been more
of an alarm than if you had gone into position ?
General Murray. I think that is just as much of an alarm
[30&/] to the people that we were anticipating something as if
they had gone to the beaches.
80. General Grunert. How about if you had gone into Alert No. 3 ?
How much would it have interfered with your training? What sort
of training was going on at the time?
General Murray. At that time our training was, I would say, com-
plete and right up to the handles.
81. General Grunert. Then that would have been just a question
of going into the field and continuing such training as you were able
to do?
General Murray. Yes, sir.
82. General Grunert. It would not have made much difference to
your command at that time?
General Murray. I don't think it would have made any difference
as far as training. Possibly the training would have been a little
more active, actual. We were rather limited in our training during
that period due to the fact that we were on defense construction work,
work,
83. General Grunert. General Russell?
84. General Russell. You state that you had numerous talks with
General Short between November 27 and December 7, four or five;
is that true?
General Murray. Four or five, I should say.
85. General Russell. During those conversations the international
situation was discussed ?
General Murray. Yes, sir.
86. General Russell. You were keeping up with developments
by the local press, what you read in the papers ?
General Murray. That is my impression. General.
[3098] 87. General Russell. Do you recall General Short tell-
ing you anything about other information that had been coming in
from Washington ?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1611
General Murray. My impression is that lie mentioned — I have quite
a definite impression that about the first of December, two or three
days after the report of the action that had been taken, and under the
message that has just been read, that he mentioned a reply from the
War Department acknowledging the receipt of the information. That
is memory of nearly two years, and I cannot be certain, but I am
strongly of that impression.
[3099] 88. General Russell. Tlien General Short had reported
the alert status which was in existence here, to Washington ?
General Murray. That is my impression; yes, sir.
89. General Russell. And it was his impression that it had been
approved in Washington — that is, the alert status had been approved
by Washington ?
General Murray. That was the impression that I have carried for
nearly two years.
90. General Russell. General, there has been some testimony about
Sunday morning exercises for several weeks prior to the Sunday
morning of December 7. Did your command participate in any such
exercises as those ?
General Murray. None that I can recall. We had completed a
maneuver. As I recall it, it ended about the end of October. We had
had a 15-day maneuver of both divisions and the artillery, the De-
partment artillery troops; antiaircraft and coast artillery had been
involved to a certain extent, but that was the completion of the train-
ing period, and so far as I can recall those were tlie only exercises that
were held on Sunday morning. Those, of course, included Sunday.
91. General Russell. How long had you been in command of the
unit on the island prior to December 7, 1941 ?
General Murkaa'. I had command of the artillery brigade from
about the 1st of July 1940 until about the middle of June 1941, approx-
imately, and I took command of the Twenty-Fifth Division — of the
Hawaiian Division, first, and I believe the separation of tlie Hawaiian
Division, Avhich was a Sixth Regiment organization at tliat time, into
two triangular divisions, was completed approximately the 1st of
October. I would have to [SlOO] check the records on that,
but my recollection is it was taken the 1st of October.
92. General Russell. And you were on the island only from the
middle of the year, from July until the attack ?
General Murray. Yes, sir.
93. General Russell. There seems to be some confusion in the
record about the number of alerts, practices of going into position, and
so forth, which had taken place during the period that you just
described. What is your recollection of whether or not numerous
alerts were staged and practices of going into defensive positions?
General Murray. During the entire period?
94. General Russell. Yes.
General Murray. I could give no estimate of the number. General,
but it was a routine. A great many occupations of position were
made as part of regimental exercises. A regiment sent a battalion
down.
95. General Russell. Were these occupations of positions confined
to the units of your division, or were they a part of general all-out
alerts by the Hawaiian Department ?
1612 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Murray. There were cases of a general all-out alert, but
m no case that 1 can recalled did we take the complete ammunition
component with us. Just before I joined the division, a complete
move, including the fire allowances, had been made in June 1940, just
before I came to the department, but so far as I can recall, we made —
I will have to change my statement. I believe we made one which
moved the ammunition to the positions. We had after General Short
arrived a loading problem, to check the time involved in distribution
of ammunition, our ability [3101'] to transport it; and my
impression is that the troops went to the positions at the same time.
I cannot give the exact date, but I believe that was shortly before the
Hawaiian Division was broken up.
96. General Frank. Was that under Short or Herron?
General Murray. The last one was under General Short. The first
one was under General Herron, on a War Department order.
97. General Russell. In these conferences with the Commanding
General of the Hawaiian Department, or elsewhere, was consideration
given to the effect on the morale of the troops of constant or continued
alert during peacetime — in other words, the effect on the troops of
being out in peacetime, looking for Japanese who never came?
General Murray. Crying "wolf"? No, sir; because I believe that
in practically all cases we knew that they were training alerts. I do
not recall of any one that we moved in while I was in command of
troops on the island, where the troops felt that it was anything other
than drill, to determine our ability and the time it would take us to
set our positions and be readj^
98. General Russell. That is all.
99. General Frank. Really, how much intelligence information did
you get over a period of time ? Did you get any ?
General Murray. That is a very difficult question. General, because
that would be a G-2 record, which I am not sufficiently familiar with
to know.
100. General Frank, I am not after the fine points of the record,
I am just after your impression as to whether there was an official dis-
tribution of information.
General Murray. I cannot answer that question definitely.
[S102] My impression is that we did. I know that G-2 of the
division was in constant contact with Colonel Fielder of the Depart-
ment, but I cannot recall at this time exactly what the contents of
the G-2 reports were.
101. General Fra>7K. Do you remember of ever getting anything
"hot"?
General Murray. I do not recall definitely of having received any-
thing that I considered what 3^ou call "hot"; that is, active informa-
tion bearing on the possible initiation of hostilities.
102. General Frank. Have you, since that critical period between
the 25th of November and December 7, become conversant with infor-
mation that did exist at that time ?
General Murray. No, I do not recall it.
103. General Frank, Well, what I was about to lead up to was this
question — if in your opinion you though the caution with which vital
information was handled hindered full-out defense measures?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1613
General Murray. I do not feel that it did; because I was so con-
vinced of General Short's immediate interest and his full knowledge
of what steps were being taken; and his directives were so definite
that I did not feel there was anything that he had that was not being
applied to the position in hand, I felt that I was in possession of the
information that he had. Is that a clear answer to your question,
General ? I am not certain whether I have covered exactly what you
want or not, sir.
104. General Frank. It would be necessary that you knew that
something went on of which you were not informed, in order to
[■3103] be able to answer the question ; therefore, the lack of prep-
aration for the question made it impossible for jou to answer it.
General Murray. I might say that this report, here, is much more
definite as to conditions than the abbreviated report that was given
to me directly, which was from my G-2.
105. General Frank. I have nothing further.
IOC). General Grunert. Are there any other questions by any of the
advisors or counsel?
If not, can you think of anything that you feel that you know, that
you could tell the Board, to assist us in arriving at conclusions as to
this matter in hand ? Usually, witnesses have something in the back
of their head which, if it is not brought out by questions, they wish
to bring it out.
General Murray. Well, I have no hesitation. It is merely a ques-
tion as to what I can offer that will clear the picture. The only point
that occurs -to me at this instant is, you asked as to the next informa-
tion that I had had with reference to a dispatch from Wa-hington.
The only positive information that I have as to a dispatch which
succeeded the one received on November 27 was on the afternoon of
December 7. General Brush and I — General Brush was my assistant
division commander — reported to General Short's command post, at,
I would estimate, approximately 3 :oO p. m. on the afternoon of
December 7, to inform him that tJie division was completely in posi-
tion and had the first unit of fire at the guns, for all weapons ; and
while we Avere discussing tlie details, that he wished carried out, the
Chief of Staff brought in a telegram, which he presented to General
Short, a radio message, which I have never seen, but which appar-
ently was a great shock to General Short, and he [3104^] made
some explanation, and as I recall it, said, "Well, this is a lot of news
that would have made a great difference in the situation," or words to
that effect. I have never seen the message.
107. General Frank. Have we located that?
108. General Grunp:rt. That vras the December 7 message; yes.
It arrived early in the afternoon of December 7. That is the one to
which the witness evidently refers.
General Murray. I presume that is the message.
109. General Grunert. You have never heard it, so you would not
know that.
General Murray. I never heard the message, and that is the only
thing; that is the next direct contact that I can be sure of, of having
been received from the War Department.
110. General Grunert. Then you never heard of an}" messages
received through the Navy, concerning this situation?
1614 . CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Murray. No, sir.
111. General Grunert. Are there any questions?
Thank you very much. We appreciate your coming.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
[3105'] TESTIMONY OP EILEY H. ALLEN, EDITOE, HONOLULU
STAR-BULLETIN, BUSINESS ADDEESS 125 MEECHANT STEEET
HONOLULU, T. H.
1. Colonel West. Mr. Allen, will you please state your name and
address ?
Mr. Allen. My name is Kiley H. Allen; business address, 125
Merchant Street; home address, 3275 Pacific Heights, Honolulu,
T. H.
2. Colonel West. And you are, I believe, editor of the Honolulu
Star-Bulletin?
Mr. Allen. I am, sir.
3. General Grunert. Mr. Allen, this Board was appointed to
ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by the
Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December
the 7th, 1941, and, in addition thereto, to consider the phases which
related to the Pearl Harbor disaster of the report of the House
Military Affairs Committee, the latter of which was largely con-
cerned with the construction that took place here prior to
December 7th.
Now, we are after facts or leads to where facts can be found.
I requested that you come before the Board in view of your posi-
tion as an editor of one of the prominent papers here, with the
hope that you might be able to give the Board some facts, or at least
impressions and background, and possibly some opinions, if they are
well based.
I do not know just what line to proceed along, except to ask you
what your impression was, togethe*' with that which you transmitted
to the public during the latter part of November and early in De-
cember, as to the status of the international [3106] situation,
particularly between the United States and Japan, including your
impression of the possible imminence of war and whether or not
the impression was that war would hit here and, if so, how soon.
AVould you give us a little story on that, just a little rambling^
talk to give us an idea of what the editors thought and what im-
pressions they gave the people through their papers ?
Mr. Allen. I will be glad to, General.
I think it is fair to say that an examination of the columns of
our paper throughout a good part of 1941 will show that we were
aware of the increasing tensity of the situation on the Pacific and
the increasing possibility that friendly relations between the United
States and the Empire of Japan would be severed and that this
severance might lead to combat.
As early as the forepart of 1941 we were urging preparation by
the civil community to meet such an eventuality, and we were in-
strumental and I in some of my activities, outside of editing a news-
paper, was in some degree instrumental in endeavoring to build up
agencies of preparedness in the community.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1(315
If I may go back a little further, sir, I was a member of the executive
committee of the Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross, as I am
now, and earl}'- in 1941 we were considering the possibility that this
island might become a scene of defense, or at least that we might be
called upon to defend ourselves, and that such defense might result in
civilian casualties, and we began aiding other agencies, including the
Preparedness Committee of the Medical Association in their first aid
stations. In mid-summer of that year, I recall we appropriated a con-
siderable sum to aid that agency, the Preparedness Committee of the
[3107] Medical Association.
We urged very strongly the increase of island food production. We
urged particularly that steps be taken by the Territorial executive to
cooperate in the bringing in and storing of surplus commodities.
Our editorial columns called attention to the increasing tensity of the
situation, and we interpreted particularly the negotiations, or the dip-
lomatic exchanges in progress at Washington, first with Ambassador
Nonuira and the Secretary of State, and later with Special Emissary
Kurusu and the Secretarj^ of State, we interpreted the lack of success-
ful conclusion of those negotiations as a very ominous sign.
I think that is a fair statement of the text of the tone of our editorials.
We urged the passage of what is called the M-Day Legislation. We
did criticize the Territorial executive for what we felt to be a lack of
realistic action to carry out the provisions of an M-Day Bill as it was
passed by the Territorial Legislature.
I mention that not to bring up an old criticism so much as to answer
your question, sir, as to what we attempted to do.
4. General Grunert. Mr. Allen, can you tell the Board the sources
of your information for your editorials and for your write-ups con-
' cerning the international situation? In other w^ords, did you have
some authentic sources from which to get information to publish to
your people ?
Mr. Allen. Most of our information, General, was derived from a
reading of the dispatches.
5. General Grunert. What dispatches?
[-3108] Mr. Allen. Which came to us by the Associated Press,
United Press and our own Washington bureau, together with what I
felt to be an increasingly grave atmosphere locally. It was impossible
to escape the feeling, I think, that there was an increasing apprehension
here locally that this tense situation on the Pacific might involve the
Territory of Hawaii.
I do not recall any particularly confidential information. General,
that r received. I do recall at various times the officers with whom I
was acquainted here spoke to me about tlie possibility of such eventuali-
ties, and civilians, too.
I spoke about the principal source of information being the dis-
patches and information from Washington. A search of our paper, I
am sure, would show that the headlines and the news stories told of this
situation, I recall we carried headlines on the imminence of trouble at
Singapore, based on dispatches. We carried headlines on preparations
for eventualities at Manila. We carried statements by Secretary of
State Hull in which he indicated that the conversations proceeding
between his office and that of the Ambassador of Japan and the Special
1616 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Emissary from Japan were not resolving themselves into friendly
accommodations or friendly solutions.
We interpreted the varj^ sharp -warning of our administration to
Japan that the Japanese must, in order to retain the confidence of the
United States, treat with China. We interpreted that as a very serious
warning and a very serious note, and also, if I recall correctly, we
stated our own conclusions that Japan was quite unlikely to yield to
that demand or to that insistence.
We interpreted some of the moves which were made, the possibil-
ities, such as were obvious to a layman and a citizen [3100\ such
as myself. We interpreted those moves as signs of increasing tensity ;
the requisitioning of some of our great passenger ships for transport
use, the warnings to our nationals to leave the Far East.
That, General, was our chief source of information on which we
based our conclusions, rather than any confidential or off-the-record
information that we had as to the actual imminence of a break with
Japan.
6. General Grunert. Were you as the editor of a paper free to
interpret these things to your own satisfaction, without coercion from
any source ?
Mr. Allen. Yes, sir.
7. General Grunert. Did you in au}^ way have to cater to your local
population, particularly since a great deal of it may have been Japa-
nese? Do they read your paper?
Mr. Allen. They do, sir.
8. General Grunert. And did you have to tone down anything you
wanted to say because of' their reading the paper, or anything of that
sort?
Mr. Allen. Not in the slightest.
9. General Grunert. You did not think that anything you put in
there, or did you have to consider whether that would alarm them or
possibly make the situation worse locally by predicting a break or
calling attention to the strained relations, or anything of that sort?
Mr. Allen. We had to consider. General, the possibility that we
might misinterpret the news too seriously and needlessly alarm and
disturb not only our readers of the affectecl nation, but the citizenry as
a whole. So far as I can recall, I never [3110'] held back on
calling the facts as I saw them.
10. General Grunert. Were you conservative in such interpreta-
tion ?
Mr. Allen. I felt that I had to be at least conservative to a degree
that I should not be jingoistic.
11. General Grunert. Did you just prior to the — I don't know
vrliat you call it over here, whether disaster or blitz or what-not, but
prior to December 7th did things appear tense to you, so that you had
to put out a big headline on anything? Did any particular point
stand out during that week prior to the attack that j'ou figured some-
thing was quite imminent?
Mr. Allen. That, sir, I do not recall. I do not recall exactly what
it was.
12. General Grunert. Does an editor pass on anything except the
editorials, or does he pass on the scareheads, as I call them?
Mr. Allen. In our organization I am responsible and I do pass,
especially in time of tensity and time of special delicacy or respon-
i
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1617
feibility, upon headlines as well as upon the text of articles, although
1 do not ahvays see all the headlines before they are written or before
they are published. I do keep pretty closely in touch with them.
13. General Grunert. I have before me a few of the headlines of
the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, and I will.just read them in the record
to see what the general trend was.
The 29th of November, 1941 :
U. S. Waits Japan Reply.
First of December :
U. S. Army Alerted in ^I;uiiia, Singapore Mobilizing As V^ar Tension Grows.
Again, December 1 :
Japan Envoys Resume Talks Amid Tension.
{^3111^ Another one on the 1st of December :
War Fears Grow In Philippines.
The 4th of December :
Japan Spurns U. S. Program.
The 6th of December :
Singapore on War Footing.
Again on the 6th :
New Peace Effort Urged In Tokyo.
Another one on the 6th of December :
Civilians Urged To Leave Manila.
Of all those the one of the 4th of December seems to indicate to me
more than any other,
Japan Spiu'ns U. S. Program.
There is an excerpt here :
Domei Japanese News Agency reported toniglit that it is "utterly impossible
ror Japan to accept American proposals" for settlement of tlie Far Eastern
Situation as Premier Hideki Tojo and Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo explained
current diplomatic issues to the privy council.
There is no answer to that ; only I just wanted to read this into the
record.
During all this work here what connection did you have with the
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on the work of
building up the civilian end of the defense?
Mr. Allex. I knew the Commanding General fairly well. I talked
with him occasionally. Our chief contact, General, with both of the
services was through, at that time, the Naval Intelligence or the
Army G-2 Intelligence, now Public Relations or Public Relations
Branch.
14. General Grunert. Do you feel that they played the game
with you?
Mr. Allen. I have no criticism upon that point at all. I should
add that there may have been matters which they knew \^3112'\
about which I knew nothing, but I have no criticism of our contacts
with them.
15. General Gruxert. Did you depend on them as sources of infor-
mation for articles, or did they refuse any such information, if asked
1618 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
for ? Ill other words, did you ask for anything and, if you asked for it,
did you get it.
Mr, Allen. We were under a voluntary censorship, which has been
in effect for a considerable time. I at times have differed with some
of the aspects of that voluntai^y censorship and have expressed myself
in an entirely friendly way. I should say that with the exception of
those matters which were represented to us as being of secret in the
interest of "military secrecy, we received adequate cooperation. I do
not recall any instance in which we were denied access to information,
except on the ground of necessity for military secrecy. May I add
just this: that our relations were never hostile; always, so far as
I know, friendly and cooperative.
16. General Grunert. How were the people over here generally;
war-minded or peace-minded, or complacent, or what?
Mr. Allen. I think that there were large sections or considerable
sections that were acutely apprehensive. That would be elements in
all races, perhaps. I think there were other sections who relied com-
pletely on the believed ability of the defense forces to detect an
attack in case one should be made. I think the atmosphere, rather
than one of complacency — I don't think you can call it complacency —
I think the atmosphere was rather one of reliance upon the military
and naval leadership and military and naval installations and forces
to give warning, first, of a possible attack and to repel that attack if it
was [3113] made.
I think in general the people of the territory were extremely coopera-
tive in providing such support and such aid as was requested by the
military and naval commanders, such as might by done by civilians.
17. General Grunert. You have answered my next question in a
v/ay, but I will put it anyway : Did you have confidence in the mili-
tary ? By military I mean both Army and Navy ?
Mr. Allen. Personally, sir, I had great confidence in them.
18. General Grunert. Do you or does your public, as I will call it,
consider that the Army let you down, because of what happened at
Pearl Harbor?
Mr. Allen. If you will just pardon me, General, I want to phrase
my answer precisely.
19. General Grunert. Take your time.
Mr. Allen. I think we feel that we had a right to expect of the
Army command a greater degree of alertness than was manifested
on December 7th, 1941,
20. General Grunert, By that you mean another degree of alert-
ness which gave more security than that degree of alertness they call
sabotage ?
Mr, Allen. Yes, sir,
21. General Grunert. That is an answer to my question. Anything
else?
22. General Russell. Did you come out here on the day of December
7th, the night of December 7th?
Mr. Allen. I came out along — I did not come to Fort Shafter. I
came along the roadway. I did not come out until late in the after-
noon. I was busily engaged all morning in newspaper duties, as we
were issuing extras. I came out late [311^] in the afternoon.
I drove out along the roadway. I did not go to Pearl Harbor. I drove
part way and then drove back again along the roads.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1619
23. General Kussell. Did you come out that night ?
Mr. Allen. No, sir.
24. General Russell. Was there a lot of confusion that afternoon?
Mr. Allen. Not a great deal. I came out about 4 o'clock. There
was a great deal of traflic. There had been impressed into service a
great variety of misceUaneous vehicles. I did not detect what I would
call more confusion than one would expect after such an attack. It
is rather hard to answer your question exactly.
I have heard — and this is hearsay, because I did not see it — I heard
in the morning there was not so much confusion as a tremendous jam
of vehicles because of the tremendous pressure to get people from Pearl
Harbor and other installations. I thought when I came out that
things were moving pretty well. My observation early in the day
downtown had been that the movement of troops through the city
Avas proceeding expeditiously, so far as I could judge.
25. General Russell. Did you and the people here in general have
the feeling that there was a possibility of sabotage or subversive
activities on the part of the Japanese people on the island in the event
of war with Japan or the imminence of war with Japan ?
Mr. Allex. You are speaking of the people as civilians, sir?
26. General Russell. Civilians, Japanese civilians.
[SJlo] Mr. Allen. For myself I will speak perfectly frankly.
I have had for many years a great deal of faith and confidence in the
Americans of Japanese ancestry, American citizens. I have repeatedly
said and written tliat I thought they would stand the test as American
citizens, realizing that there might be exceptions to that general state-
ment. I know that there were a great many others who were of the
same mind as myself, particularly the peo])le who deal with the young
Japanese, not merely as servants and employees, but deal with them in
a more intimate way, are better acquainted with them.
I think it also fair to say that there are other citizens who had in
their minds a doubt as to the conduct of Americans of Japanese an-
cestry under such a task or in the case of war between the United
States and Japan.
27. General Russell. This latter gi^oup regarded the Japanese
po]:)ulation here as furnishing a potential source of fifth column
activity?
Mr. Allen. I think so.
28. General Frank. Did you ever know the District Engineer who
was out here at that time. Colonel Wyman ?
Mr. Allen. I kncAv him vej-y slightly.
20. (ireneral Frank. Did you ever haA'e any business with him ?
Mr. Allen. No, sir, not directly wnth him. On matters of informa-
tion I have talked briefly with him and on matters of information
have talked briefly with his subordinates, but I had relatively little
contact with him.
30. General Frank. Did anything ever arise in your association
with him or your dealings with him about which you would like to
comment to the Board?
[3116] Mr. Allen. Not with him personally, General. This is
second-liand inf oi-mation. I give it as nothing else. I heard instances
given of his what might be called ruthlessness, about which I am per-
sonally not familiar. Therefore, I hesitate to answ^er your question in
the way it was put.
79716—46 — Ex. 145, voL 2 53
1620 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
31. General Frank. That is the full extent to -which you are con-
versant with his activities?
Mr. Allen. You mean his official activities?
32. General Frank. Yes,
Mr. Allen. Yes, sir.
33. General Frank. Do you know of any personal characteristics,
in 3'our opinion, that adversely affected his efficiency?
Mr. Allen. I do not personally, no.
34. General Frank. By reputation?
Mr. Allen. Do you want nie to give hearsay ? This is only hearsay.
I Avill give it, if you wish.
35. General Frank. I would like to know, to establish that infor-
mation on the basis of reputation in the communit3^
Mr. Allen. I heard that at times he was a heavy drinker.
3(). General Frank. Which affected his official capacity ?
Mr. Allen. No, sir, I did not hear that.
37. General Frank. Did you ever know of Hans Wilhelm Rohl?
Mr. Allen. No, sir.
38. General Frank. Do you know anything about him ?
Mr. Allen. Only what I have read. I am familiar witli the reports
that have come in.
39. Major Clausen. What information, Mr. Allen, did vou receive
as to the characteristics of Hans Wilhelm Rohl, either from original
source or by hearsay?
[3117] Mr. Allen. Frankly, until the case became of public
notoriety some months ago, I cannot recall that I had more than heard
that there was such a man. It was not until the news came out of
the investigating committee in Wasliington that it had made any im-
pression on my mind about him. I just do not recall that I more than
heard of him as one of the interested contractors.
Major Clausen. With respect to the information you received from
Colonel Wyman that you have related to General Frank, was that in-
formation received by you during the time that he was on duty here ?
Mr. Allen. Yes, sir.
40. Major Clausen. I believe that is all the questions I have.
41. General Grunert. Colonel Toulmin?
42. Colonel Toulmin. Nothing, sir.
43. General Grunert. Colonel West ?
44. Colonel West. No, sir.
45. General Grunert. Do you employ Japanese on your paper?
Mr. Allen. Yes, sir.
46. General Grunert. How do they size up? What kind of Jap-
anese are they ? Young men, old men ? How do they size up ?
Mr. Allen. We have, I think, onl}'^ one Japanese alien, part time.
We have a number of Americans of Japanese ancestry. We select
them as carefully as we can, and w^e endeavor to extend to them — if we
feel that they are people who can be trusted — we extend to them our
confidence and support.
I might add that on the morning of December 7th one of our Ameri-
cans of Japanese ancestry employed on our news staff begged to be able
to be allow ed to go out on the street and cover the news. I was ai)pre-
hensive that I might be mistaken, on that [3118~\ tumultous
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1621
iii(irnin<i-. that he might be shot or locked up. I finally decided that
■\ve would send him out to the Japanese consul and bring back what
news he might find there. He came back and related with every evi-
dence of satisfaction that the Japanese consul just had been taken
over and he was glad to see that the Japs were locked up at this time.
I might say that he himself on previous occasions had been sent
by us to cover the news and he felt that he was being, as he expressed,
pushed around by the Japs of the consulate. He himself is of Japa-
nese ancestry, a graduate of St. Louis College, which is a Catholic
institution, and a young man we felt to be of fine character and integ-
lity. We have a number of others. We feel that they are loyal citi-
zens and good workers.
[■3119] 47. General Grunert. This one that went to the Japa-
nese consulate that morning — outside of that general news item he
didn't get anything else, did he?
Mr. Allex. I don't recall, frankly. I can find out, if it is material,
but so far as I know, why, he wasn't on the street very much. We had
to be careful lest if he were too active, as a newsman would be, he
might get himself into difficulties and have difficulty explaining what
he was doing.
48. General Gruxert. Now, Mr. Allen, do you think of anything
else that you want to tell the Board that might be of value to them
in reaching conclusions as to the mission charged to the Board?
Mr. Allen. Just one thing, and perhaps that may have been com-
pletely or sufficiently touched on for your purposes: I have always
felt that the preoccupation or, let me say. the concern of the military
and naval connnands with the fancied or feared situation from within,
the sabotage situation, was such that it took their concern away from
the possibility of attack from without. I felt that they had, or some
of them had. a very strong belief that there would be uprising or wide-
scale, wdiolesale sabotage within, at any slightest opportunity, and
did not sufficiently take into account what has been done in the terri-
tory over a period of a great many years to mold our young citizens
of Ja]Tanese ancestry in the same beliefs and the same devotions that
American citizens of other ancestries have. It seemed to me that that
was a fundamental and a tragic error in their conception of the situa-
tion in the territory.
49. General Grunert. These were your thoughts prior to \31'£0'\
December 7, or have they been formed in your mind since Decem-
ber 7?
Mr. Allen. Prior to December 7. I expressed them to a considera-
ble degree editorially at a time when there was pending in Washing-
ton a so-called martial-law^ bill, which, whatever its merits, did seem
to be based at least partly on an acute distrust of the Americans of
Japanese ancestry in the territory.
50. General Grunert. Anything else? (No response.)
We thank you very much for coming up, and we appreciate it.
Mr. Allen. Yes, sir. Thank you.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
General Grunert. A five-minute recess, and then we have one
witness after that: we shall take but a short time with him.
(There was a brief informal recess.)
1622 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TESTIMONY OF IT. COL. MELBOURNE H. WEST, HEADaUARTERS
7TH AIR FIGHTER WING
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights
under Article of War 24. )
1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your
name, rank, organization, and station?
Lt. Col. West. Melbourne H. West, Lieutenant Colonel, Headquar-
ters 7th Fighter Wing, APO 958.
2. General Grunert. Colonel West, this Board is after facts or
leads to facts pertaining to the Pearl Harbor attack. We called you
because you had testified before the Roberts [31^1] Commis-
sion. Now, this Board has covered a lot of ground and has developed
most of the main subjects, so Ave are just filling out by checking up on
various points.
Will you tell me what your assignment was the latter part of 1941,
including at the time of the attack?
Lt. Col. West. I was battery commander of a searchlight battery.
3. General Grunert. Stationed where?
Lt. Col. West. At Camp Malekoli.
4. General Grunert. Malekoli. That was the home station, or
what you might call the home station. Was that also the position of
the battery when and if you were alerted?
Lt. Col. West. That was the home station of the battery, but it was
not the field position of the battery when we were alerted.
5. General Grunert. I notice in the Roberts Commission testimony
that you are alleged to have said that at Malekoli the antiaircraft had
to be gotten out of storage and set up ; no equipment in place nor any
ready to fire. Is that correct ?
Lt. Col. West. It is correct.
6. General Grunert. Will you explain that to us? We don't know
just how to interpret that: "The antiaircraft had to be gotten out of
storage and set up." What does that mean ? If your position was not
at Malekoli and you had to take it out, does that mean that all this
equipment was placed in dead storage and you had to dig it out, oil
it up, put it together and take it out, or what? Explain it to us.
Lt. Col. West. The equipment was not in dead storage. The guns
were on wheels, ready to be connected with their prime [31^1
movers and moved to their battery positions. They were stored at
Camp Malekoli for the purpose of protection during the alert, the
type of alert that we were in.
7. General Grunert. Then, it simply meant that you took it from
there to your position ?
Lt. Col. West. That is right, sir.
8. General Grunert. And got it in position ready to fire?
Lt. Col. West. That is correct.
9. General Grunert. Well, that is what misled me when I read it.
I just asked you to come down here to clear up that point.
As far as Alert No. 1 was concerned, the sabotage alert, there was no
call for your mobile battery to be in position for action, was there?
Lt. Col. West. That is correct.
10. General Frank. May I ask him a question?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1623
11. General Grunert. Yes.
12. General Frank. Would you mind showing on that map where
your field position was and where Malekoli is ?
Lt. Col. West. Malekoli is about two miles north of Barbers Point,
southwestward tip of the Island, The field position of my battery,
which was a searchlight battery, was in the Ewa plain area adjacent
to Pearl Harbor and including the Wainae pocket.
13. General Gp.unert. How many searchlights in your battery that
you had to put out in position?
Lt. Col. West. 15 searchlights.
14. General Grunert. And they were all concentrated at Malekoli ;
is that right?
[3123'] Lt. Col. West. All the searchlights were, sir. There were
three radars which were in field positions.
15. General Grunert. And you didn't have your searchlights out
in position with small detachments to take care of them and operate
them in those positions?
Lt. Col. West. We did not. That's not customary even now, sir.
The searchlights go out to the position, they operate at night, they
come into the central position in the daytime, up until just recently.
16. General Grunert. Well, you take them out just before dark ?
Lt. Col. West. Yes, sir.
17. General Grunert. And operate in the position ?
Lt. Col. West. That is right, sir.
18. General Grunert. About how far does the farthest searchlight
have to travel?
Lt. Col. West. About five miles.
19. General Grunert. Then there is no need of keeping searchlights
out there in the daytime, is there ?
Lt. Col. West. No, sir.
20. General Grunert. Except to save wear and tear on rubber and
use of gas and oil?
Lt. Col. West. And the guards which may be necessary to guard
the position. The radars were in their field positions.
21. General Grunert. And, as I understand, the searchlight and
the radar act in combination; did they?
Lt. Col. West. That is correct, sir.
22. General Grunert. Is there anything that you have in mind
that you w^ould like to bring to the attention of the Board, to see
whether or not we may or may not have gotten information [31£4-^
on it. that you think is pertinent to the issue, knowing what took
place and probably some of the reasons why the things happened?
Sometimes the witnesses have something in the back of their heads
that they might like to have somebody else know about. Have you
any such information ? If so, this is the time to let us know.
Lt. Col. West. I have none, of my personal experience. I don't
know Avhat has been brought up before the Board. The things I have
in m}^ mind or have expressed have probably already been brought up
before them.
23. General Grunert. Then, there is nothing that is particularly
itching to come out, is there?
Lt. Col, West. No, sir.
1624 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
24. General Gkunekt. Have you any questions?
25. General Russell. No, sir.
26. General Grunert. Any questions by the Board ? (No response.)
Thank you for coming.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon, at 4:45 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of
witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
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