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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."

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Given By 
U, S. SUPT. Ul- DOCUMENTS 



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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

' BEFORE THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEARL HARBOK ATTACK 

CONGEESS OF THE UNITED STATES l2>%7 
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS , 9^- 

FIRST SESSION / ^O 

PURSUANT TO //«// 

S. Con. Res. 27 ^^- 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 28 
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




O 



PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



//■ 



HEARINGS 

C^,'^^ - • . ■ DEFOKE THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

conCtEess of the united states 

SEVENTY-NIXTH CONGRESS 

FIItST SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

S. Con. Res. 27 



''J>761 



A CONCUKFvENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 28 
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 





UNITED STATES 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

WASHINGTON : 1943 



«• «• SUPtRimwoWr Of OOCUMENTS 

AUG 13 1946 



"-2)767 



JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL 
HAIJBOR ATTACK 

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman 
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman 
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from 
SCOTT W. IjUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania 

OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa- 

HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Mielii- tive from California 

gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from 

J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin 
North Carolina 



COUNSEL 



(Through January 14, 194G) 
William D. JMitchell, General Counsel 
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel 
JULE M. Hanxaford, Assistant Counsel 
JOHN E. ;masten, Assistant Counsel 

(After January 14, 1946) 
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel 
Samuel H. Kaufman. Associate General Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel 
LOGAN J. Lane, Assistant Counsel 



HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 


Pages 


Transcript 




Hearings 


No. 




pages 






1 


1- 399 


1- 1058 


Nov. 


. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 


2 


401- 982 


1059- 2586 


Nov, 


. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945, 


3 


983-1583 


2587- 4194 


Dec. 


5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945. 


4 


1585-2063 


4195- 5460 


Dec. 


14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 


5 


2065-2492 


5461- 6646 


Dec. 


31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946. 


6 


2493-2920 


6647- 7888 


Jan. 


15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946. 


7 


2921-3378 


78S9- 9107 


Jan. 


22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946., 


8 


3379-3927 


9108-10517 


Jan. 


30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946. 


9 


3929-4599 


10518-12277 


Feb. 


7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946. 


10 


4601-5151 


12278-13708 


Feb. 


15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946. 


11 


5153-5560 


13709-14765 


Apr. 


9 and 11, and JNIav 23 and 31, 1946. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 
No. 



12 
13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 through 25 

26 

27 through 31 

32 through 33 

34 

35 

36 through 38 

39 



Exhibits Nos. 

1 through 6. 

7 and 8. 

9 through 43. 

44 through 87. 

88 through 110. 

Ill through 128. 

129 through 156. 

157 through 172. 

173 through 179. 

180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations. 

Roberts Commission Proceedings. 

Hart Inquiry Proceedings. 

Army Pearl Harljor Board Proceedings. 

Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings. 

Clarke Investigation Proceedings. 

Clau.sen Investigation Proceedings. 

Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 

Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- 
ments. 



Ill 



IV 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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Joint 

Congressional 
Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


1I1IIIII1III1— (COC5lllll(MI 

iiiiiiiiiiiiiOKM^iiiiilMi 

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i(N 1 CC lO 1 1 1 1 1 — 1 1 

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« 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 III 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

taiiiiiiiiiiiiiOJi-^OiiiiiOSI 

a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 CO 1 .-1 lO 1 1 1 1 1 00 1 

Hi 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 (M 1 00 T 1 1 1 1 1 O 1 

liiiiiiiiiiiiiOiCOCOiiiiiOi 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 J 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


1 I 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lo I 1 1 1 1 1 1 

2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ii-J II 

S, 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ! 

III 1 1 -Tt< II 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

64' 

194 
59-63 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarlte 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aui^. 

4, 1945) 


Vol. 




Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 
"660-688' 


Joint 

Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

3105-3120' 

2479-2491 

4022-4027" 
148-186 

2567-25S0" 

3972-3988 

2492-2515 

1575-1643" 

3720-3749' 
1186-1220 

1413-1442' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
Juno 15, 1944) 


1 1 1 1 CO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -rf 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 iCO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

KllllCOliillliillli-i 1 

^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

.e 1 1 1 1 1-1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 LO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

^1 1 1 1 lOi 1 .-1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

1 1 1 lOO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.-I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberta 

Commission, 

Dec. IS, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 
203-209 

1127-1138 
1033-1038 

1719-1721' 

1219-1224' 

"888-951' 
1382-1399 

"'377-389' 
1224-1229 

"'314-320' 


6 
a 

% 


Allen, Brooke E., Maj 

Allen, Riley H 

Anderson, Edward B., Maj 

Anderson, Ray 

Anderson, Walter S., Rear Adm 

Anstey, Alice 

Arnold, II. H., Gen 

Asher, N. F., Ens 

Ball, N. F., Ens 

Ballard, Emma Jane 

Barber, Bruce G 

Bartlett, George Francis 

Bates, Paul M., Lt. Comdr 

Beardall, John R., Rear Adm 

Beardall, John R., Jr., Ens 

Beatty, Frank E., Rear Adm 

Bellinger, P. N. L., Vice Adm 

Benny, Chris J 

Benson, Henry P 

Berquist, Kenneth P., Col 

Berry, Frank M., S 1/c 

Betts, Thomas J., Brig. Gen 

Bicknell, George W., Col 

Bissell, John T., Col 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



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Vr CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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INDEX OF WITNESSES 



VII 



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VIII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


Pages 

"""4797-4828 

403-457, 

551-560, 

605-615, 

5367-5415 i 

4221-4300 
26-34, 36-38, 
40-49, 55-73, 
75-79, 82-92, 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

428-432 
414-417 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 
2i2-2i3 

ioo-ioi 

182 

""ioo-ioi" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1915) 


Vol. 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

,'Oct. 19, 1944) 


O 1 1 1 1 O 1 1 1 1 1 1 (M 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 _ 1 
t-- 1 1 1 1 CO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lO 1 

2 O 1 1 1 1 TtH 1 1 1 1 1 1 l^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 00 1 

^^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 

-e 1 1 1 1 1 ^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 C.0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 CO 1 
ft<0 1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 1 1 ICO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1^ 1 

l>-iiii^ t^iiiii iiOOi 

O 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 t 1 1 1 II 1 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

2030-2090' 
3957-3971 

""24i-274" 

""267-240" 
2934-2942 

2200-22i4 
1914-1917 

""745-778" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
4 i 7-430 


Joint 

•Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


iiiiii-^iiiioiicoiii iiii 

iiiiiK^iiiit-iit^iii IIII 
« 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 1 1 1 1 CO 1 1 '* 1 1 1 IIII 

g, 1 1 1 1 1 1^ 1 1 1 IrH 1 1 1 1 1 1 IIII 

e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 01 1 1 1 IIII 

f^ ,-tiiii-:t<iiCOiii IIII 

liiiiit^iiiicOii'^iil IIII 
10 1 1 1 ICO 1 1 III IIII 


3 


Hamilton, Maxwell M., State Dept 

Hannum, Warren T., Brig. Gen 

Harrington, Cyril J 

Hart, Tliomas Charles, Senator 

Rayes, Philip, Maj. Gen 

Heard, William A., Capt., USN 

Henderson, H. H., Lt., USA 

Herron, Charles D., Maj. Gen 

Hill, William H., Senator 

Holmes, J. Wilfred., Capt., USN 

Holtwick, J. S., Jr., Comdr 

Hoppough, Clay, Lt. Col 

Hornbeck, Stanley K 

Home, Walter Wilton 

Howard, Jack W., Col 

Hubbell, Monroe H., Lt. Comdr 

Huckins, Thomas A., Capt., USN 

Hull, Cordell 

Humphrey, Richard W. RM 3/c 

Hunt, John A., Col 

IngersoU, Royal E., Adm 

Inglis, R. B., Rear Adm 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



IX 



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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



.Joint 

Congressional 

Comniittec, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


OiiiiiiOGOiii Ill _.- -O 1 1 

CO OCO Sn^oii 

LOiiiiiiOCOiii E2?TiMii 

loiiiiii-^i 11 ^^5"^'' 

|iO 1 1 1 1 1 1 Ci -t< 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1 
ciO 1 1 1 1 1 ilMCO 1 1 1 1 1 1 2^1:- 1 1 

tiiio 00 1 1 1 1 1 2 2-1 1 1 

lO -* 1 °„^'' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

Mav 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

541-553 

182-292 

""140^142" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 
103 
107-112 

186 
219-222 

102 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


^1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 II 


Joint 
Committee 
E.xhibit No 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 

904-918 

628-643 

"734-740" 

"852-885" 


Joint 
Committee 
E.xhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

2665-2695" 
3028-3067 

1161-1185" 

2787-2802" 
1014-1034 
1678-1694 
3226-3250 

2362-2374" 

2-54" 

T. S. 2-52, 

192-226 

3126-3152 

1816-1913 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

214-22.5 
363-367 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 

1146-1156" 

1156-1171" 

4-32" 
1068-1095 

1272-1285" 

""500-504" 

1793-1805" 

"320-352," 
1648- 
1659 


i 


Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN 

Kroner, Hayes A., Brig. Gen 

Landreth, J. L., Ens 

Lane, Louis R., Ch. W/0 

Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col 

Laswell, Alva B., Col. USMC 

Lawton, William S., Col 

Layton, Edwin T., Capt., USN 

Leahy, William D., Adm 

Leary, Herbert F., Vice Adm 

Lewis, Fulton, Jr 

Litell, S. H 

Locey, Frank H 

Lockard, Joseph L., Lt., USA 

Lorence, Walter E., Col 

Lumsdcn, George, Mai 

Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN 

Lynch, Paul J 

Lynn, George W., Lt. Comdr 

Mac Arthur, Douglas, Gen 

Marshall, George C, Gen 

Marston, Morrill W., Col 

Martin, F. L., Maj. Gen 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



XI 



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PiPhPh 



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XII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



.Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


Pages 

5210 
4933-5009 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt . 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 
""387-388" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

14S 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov- 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


COi -H 1 (Nil it^ii 

Tfi 1 1 111 1 1 00 1 CO 1 1 1 1^ 1 1 

£ 1 1 1 1 1 1 11.^ 1 (Nil Mil 

^LO II 111 III 1 II 1 ci> 1 1 

O-* 1 1 ,11 . lO 1 11 It- 1 1 
fil 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1> 1 1 1 1 1 1 

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1—1 1 1 1 1 1 1 


Joint 

Committoc 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarice 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1914; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


,o 1 ' ' III III 1 111 1 1 1 1 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

140 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


1 1 lO 111 111 _r-r-j-(N^~t-'~(N 1 1 CO 1 1 00 00 
1 ici I^r^iPoocoio 1 1^ 1 lOO 

1 1 IT 111 111 Tc^^s;:;: i iT I i? ^ 

«3iil:- III III *-^',rlill|iit^ iiOOl 

I I'* III 111 c^'og^S 1 I'* 1 I^^O 

II III 111 1— li— It— III IIT— 1 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 

(Army Pearl 

Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

1107-1160," 
1240-1252 

3636^3640 
2375-2398, 
3990-3996 
3153-3165 
2923-2933 
3885-3915 

1968-1988' 
1035-1070 

778-789 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
147-169 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to .Ian. 23, 1942) 


1 Ik-'I-'^ I 1 CO 1 -r.-roo 1 1 ieo-rt< 1 1 1 1 

1 itr(»<7J 1 1 lO liS^Sc^ ' ' lOOOO 1 1 1 1 

« 1 i^IlNiQ 1 1 CO iSr^Tj< 1 1 it-OO 1 1 1 1 

^||CN|,_,,,,^|C0^ , 111— Ijllll 

(^ 1 i^^4. 1 1 i :^g ' 1 iciS 1 1 1 1 


a 


Pettigrew, Moses W., Col 

Phelan, John, Ens 

Phillips, Walter C, Col 

Pickett, Harry K., Col 

Pierson, Millard, Col 

Pine, Willard B 

Poindexter, Joseph B., Gov 

Powell, BoUing R., Jr., Maj 

Powell, C. A., Col 

Powers, R. D., Jr., Lt. Comdr 

Prather, Louise 

Pratt, John S., Col 

Pye, William S., Vice Adm 

Rafter, Case B 

Raley, Edward W., Col 

Ramsey, Logan C, Capt., USN 

Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



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XIV CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 









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IxNDEX OF WlTXKbSES 



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•XVI CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



.loint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


M M Mi 1 1 i ; i i M ; i i 11 1 

2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 , i'^ 1 . 

c 'CO 1 AcOl 

C^ Ol ,1 1 1 1 i^O 1 

1 M M i" i i M i i M ! i M"" i 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


iiiiiiOiiiiiiCDC0(NiOiii 1 

1 ^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 00 lC O 1 lO 1 1 1 1 

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.aiiii,idiiiiii.cO-^(^i(Niii 1 

f^iiiiiiOOiiiiiiI^-^OliTfiiii 1 

COi COiOiOirfiiii 1 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

187-189 
105-106 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ^ 1 1 1 1 1 , , 1 , , 1 

1 1 1 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , , , 1 1 II,,, u 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lo i 1 1 1 1 1 1 I I 

1 1 05 , 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 lO 

1 i ; i i i ! : i : ; iS ! 1 i i i I i ; i 

1 1 1 00 i 1 1 1,11, 1 

1 1 , 1 , , 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 1 , , 1 1 1 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 
2722-2744 
3120-3124 

198^2667" 
2456-2478 

134.5-1381" 

910-931 
3663-3665 

3677-3683' 

3750-3773 
3357-3586" 

2580a-2596 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
""279-288" 

379^382 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

toJan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 
1311-1329 
496-499 
1830-1842 

1334^1340" 

""247-259" 

1525^1538' 
1683-1705 


S 


Wells, B. II., Maj. Gen 

West, Melbourne H., Lt. Col 

Whaling, William J., Lt. Col 

White, William R., Brig. Gen _._ 

Wichiser, Rea B 

Wilke, Weslie T 

Wilkinson, T. S., Rear Adm 

Willoughby, C. A., Maj. Gen 

Wilson, Durward S., Maj. Gen 

Wilson, Erie M., Col 

Wimer, Benjamin R., Col 

Withers, Thomas, Rear Adm 

Wong, Ahoon H 

Woodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR 

Woodward, Farnsley C, Lt. (jg), USN_ 

Woolley, Ralph E 

Wright, Wesley A., Comdr 

Wyman, Theodore, Jr., Col 

York, Yee Kam 

Zacharias, EUis M., Capt., USN 

Zucca, Emil Lawrence 



PROCEKDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 803 



[76.m CONTENTS 



WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 23, 1944 
Testimony of — Page' 

Benjamin L. Stilplien, 109 Jaroleuiou Street, Broolclyn, New York 1539 

1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original transcript of proceedings. 



79716 — 4G — Ex. 145, vol. 2 2 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 805 



[1539-] PKOCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL 

HARBOR BOARD 



WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 23, 1944 

Munitions Building, 

Washington, D. G. 

The Board at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted 
the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the 
Board, presiding. 

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. 
Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H, Frank, Members. 

Present also: Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and 
Colonel Harry A. Toulniin, Jr., Executive Officer. 

General Grunert. The Board will come to order. 

TESTIMONY OF BENJAMIN L. STILPHEN, BEOOKLYN, NEW YORK 

Major Clausen. Sir, the Recorder will not be here for a little while, 
so I will act as Recorder. 

(The witness was sworn by the Assistant Recorder and advised of 
his rights under Article of War 2-1.) 

1. Major Clausen. Will you state to the Board your name? 
Mr. Stllphen. Benjamin L, Stilphen. 

2. Major Clausen. And your address? 

Mr. Stilphen. My address is 109 Jarolemon Street, Brooklyn, New 
York. 

[IBl^O] 3. Major Clausen. What is your occupation ? 

Mr. Stilphen. I am handling industrial relations with the Sinclair 
Oil Corporation. 

4. Major Clausen. In 1941, Mr. Stilphen, were you employed by 
the United States Engineering Department? 

Mr. Stilphen. The Office of the Chief of Engineers ; yes, sir. 

5. Major Clausen. What were your duties specifically in August 
1941? 

Mr. Stilphen. My duties were somewhat varied. I was generally 
sort of a "trouble-shooter" and expediter in handling the labor field. 
I was classified as a lawyer, but the law had a small part in what I did. 
1 was a liaison labor man; that is what I was. I also did expediting 
and "trouble-shooting" for them. 

6. Major Clausen. Are you. admitted to the bar? 

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir. I am a member of the District Court here 
in Washington, D. C, and of the Court of Appeals. 

7. Major Clausen. Were you acquainted in August 1941 with one 
HansWilhelmRohl? 

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir. 



806 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

9. Major Clausen. Were you acquainted at that time with Theodore 
Wyman, Jr. ? 

^Ir, Stilphen. No. sir, 

10. Major Clausen. Were you acquainted with a John Martin, 
[15411, attorney for Mr. Rohl? 

Mr. Stilphen. I met Mr. Martin. 

11. Major Clausen. Wlien did you meet him? 

Mr. Stilphen. It was sometime in tlie summer of 1941. 

12. Major Clausen. Do you recall exactly, with regard to August 
28, 1941, when you met Mr. Martin? 

Mr. Stilphen. Well, I was sitting at my desk, and Colonel Lorence 
and Colonel Gesler sent a message out and asked me to come into their 
office ; and Mr. Martin was with them. 

13. Major Clausen. He was in the office with Colonel Gesler? 
Mr. Stilphen. And Colonel Lorence. 

14. Major Clausen. Could you tell me approximately when that was 
in 1941 ? 

Mr. Stilphen. I have not the slightest idea. It was in the summer- 
time sometime; that is all I can remember. 

15. General Frank. Who was Colonel Lorence? . 

Mr. Stilphen. Colonel Lorence was Walter E. Lorence ; he was the 
assistant to Colonel Gesler in the Office of the Chief of Engineers. It 
was the finance section. 

16. Major Clausen. Mr. Stilphen, I show you our Exhibit No. 2, 
which is a photostatic copy of a letter, and ask you whether you have 
seen the original of that before. 

Mr. Stilphen (after examining copy referred to). It sounds sus- 
piciously like something that I might have written. 

17. Major Clausen. Do you recognize that as having been prepared 
by yourself? 

Mr. Stilphen. Frankly, I do not, but I have a general idea that I 
wrote it ; yes, sir. 

[154^] 18. Major Clausen. Can you tell me whether the talk 
you had with John Martin was before the letter was prepared? 

Mr. Stilphen. Oh, j^es. 

19. Major Clausen. About how long before ? You said you met him 
in the summer of 1941. 

Mr. Stilphen. I do not know. Several days elapsed, because I had 
to investigate a case between the time I met Martin and the time this 
letter was written. 

20. General Frank. What was Martin's mission in there? 

21. Major Clausen. I was just going to ask that. General. 
When you met Mr. Martin you say he was in the office of Colonel 

Gesler and Colonel Lorence. Tell us what was said by those officers 
to you and Mr. Martin at that time. 

Mr. Stilphen. I was called in and introduced to Mr. Martin and, in 
substance, they said that a Colonel Wyman, whose name I knew but 
whom I had never met personally, who was in charge of certain con- 
struction for the Corps of Engineers in Hawaii, had written, wired, 
telephoned, or communicated in some way with the Office of the Chief 
of Engineers stating that this man Mr. Martin represented — that his 
services were necessary to completion of these projects out there; that 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 807 

he was one of the foremost construction engineers of tlie worki, and 
they had to have liim out there. 

Mr, Martin was introduced as counsel for this man Rolil, and said he 
was back here on other business but had been asked by Mr. Rohl, after 
a consukation in some way or another — I don't know how — that 
"VVyman had been asked to come down to the War Department to see 
the officers in charge to see if sometliing \J'543] could be done 
about getting Rohl's citizenship papers expedited, because at that time 
there was some sort of a regulation that an alien could not leave the 
country. So he had to have citizenship papers. 

I might add that Mr. Martin, I was told, Avas back here on other 
Imsiness and stopped in to see what could be done about this thing. 

22. Major Clausen. Who told you that, Mr. Stilphen — Colonel 
Gesler or Colonel Lorence ? 

Mr. Stilphen. I think it was Colonel Lorence, if I am not mistaken ; 
I would not be too sure about it. 

23. Major Clausen. What were your instructions with regard to 
this? 

Mr. Stilphen. To take Mr. Martin out and find out from him his 
idea of the case, what it was all about, and then to see if I could not 
do something about it. 

24. Major Clausen. What did you do? 

Mr. Stilphen. I took Mr. Martin out to my desk and sat him down 
and got Rohl's full name, his address, and his background, on paper, 
and then I called the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Immigra- 
tion and Naturalization. I am very hazy about this business. I will 
try to recollect it the best I can. If I remember correctly, I could not 
get hold of anybody at that time. I talked to some girl. So I told 
Martin that I would take care of it, but I could not get hold of anybody 
then. 

25. Major Clausen. Did you ask Martin why he did not go down 
to the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization himself and do this? 

[1S44] Mr. Stilphen. No, sir. My instructions were to do sonip- 
thing about it. 

26. Major Clausen. Was anything said at this meeting as to why 
John Martin should not go down himself and take care of getting hi.=! 
client's citizenship papers expedited if he could? 

27. General Fkank. Who gave you these instructions — Lorence or 
Gesler? 

Mr. Stilphen. It was one of them, or both. I think it was Lorence, 
as a matter of fact. 

28. Major Clausen. Did Mr. Martin tell you why it was that while 
the petition for naturalization was filed on January 15, 1941, here it 
was August 1941, and still it had not been granted? 

Mr. Stilphen. I found that out. I found out that that was the usual 
paper work procedure. 

After I did get hold of the proper party at the Department of 
Justice, I was informed that his papers were in final form, but that the 
usual red tape — he was in a certain line of precedence. At the time he 
filed his application here there might be ten other people filing their 
applications, and fifteen might be before him. His case was completed, 
but it was a question of taking his papers off the top of the stack and 
putting them on the bottom of the stack. 



808 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

29. Major Clausen. But nothing other than that? 

Mr. Stilphen. That is correct ; that they had completed the investi- 
gation and had nothing against him. 

30. Major Clausen. Who told you that? 

Mr. Stilphen. Somebody in the Bureau of Immigration and Nat 
uralization. I have not the slightest recollection of who [^^4^] 
it was. 

31. Major Clausen. Was it the Commissioner? 
Mr. Stilphen. I talked to somebody in his office. 

32. Major Clausen. Do you recall whether John Martin told you 
that there was nothing against this Hans Wilhelm Rohl ? 

Mr. Stilphen. First of all, we had a recommendation as to Rohl's 
character from Wyman. 

33. Major Clausen. What kind of a recommendation was it? 

Mr. Stilphen. That he was of excellent character, above reproach, 
et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. 

34. Major Clausen. Was that in writing? 

Mr, Stilphen. It was some sort of a communication ; I do not know 
whether it was in writing, telegram, or telephone conversation. 

35. Major Clausen. Did you hear that over in the Office of the 
Chief of Engineers? 

Mr. Stilphen. I remember getting that in the Office of the Chief 
of Engineers. 

36. Major Clausen. From whom? 

Mr. StiLphen. The impression I have is that I got it from Colonel 
Lorence. Whether he had the document or whether he had a tele- 
phone call from Wyman, or what it was all about, I don't know. 

37. Major Clausen. If you got it from Colonel Lorence, was 
Colonel Gesler there ? 

Mr. Stilphen. I cannot remember. 

38. Major Clausen. Did you have other talks before you went to 
the telephone to phone the Bureau ? Did you have other talks with 
either Colonel Lorence or Colonel Gesler concerning it? 

[154-6] Mr. Stilphen. Not outside of my original talk that I 
have already mentioned. 

39. Major Clausen. You must have gotten this information while 
you were in that office. 

Mr. Stilphen. I would say that would be a reasonable inference. 

40. Major Clausen. Is that the first case you ever had of getting 
citizenship papers for somebody? 

Mr. Stilphen. Yes ; it was the first case of that kind. 

4L Major Clausen. It was very unusual for you to ask for citi- 
zenship expedition ; is that correct ? 

Mr, Stilphen. I did not consider it unusual. I just thought it was 
another routine matter at that time. It was in August of 1941, and 
people were not quite as excited then as they are now. 

42. Major Clausen. But you had never had that kind of a routine 
matter presented to you, had you ? 

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir. 

43. General Grunert. Have you had any since ? 
Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir. 

44. General Grunert. In your same position ? 

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir. That was with the Navy Department. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 809 

45. Major Clausen. Did Mr. Martin tell you that Hans Wilhelm 
Rohl had falsely documented some vessels and would have to pay a 
fine of $25,000 before he could receive favorable consideration? 

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir ; he did not tell me anything about that. 

46. Major Clausex. Did he tell you anything at all about an 
[154?] investigation by the F. B. I.? 

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir; he did not. 

47. Major Clausen. After you had this first talk with this unknown 
party down at the Bureau of Immigration, what did you next do ? 

Mr. Stilphen. I waited to hear from them again. They were go- 
ing to look up the case, and I subsequently heard from them, and, to 
the best of my recollection, I was informed that this case was all com- 
plete ; it was just a matter of routine paper work. 

48. Major Clausen. You mean you had, then, only two telephone 
calls? 

Mr. Stilphen. I think I went over there in person once, if I remem- 
ber correctly. 

49. Major Clausen. When you went over in person whom did you 
see? 

Mr. Stilphen. I cannot remember. 

50. Major Clausen. Did you go down to the Department of Justice 
Building? 

Mr. Stilphen. I went down to the Department of Justice Building. 

51. Major Clausen. Did you report back to your superiors what 
you had been informed? 

Mr. Stilphen. Yes. By the way : Parden me if I am interrupting 
you, but the reason for that letter was that I was requested to write 
that letter by whomever I talked to in the Department of Justice. 

52. Major Clausen. When you went down to the Department of 
Justice were you told substantially the things you have set [1^4^] 
forth in this letter? 

Mr. Stilphen. I would say so, yes. In other words, I brought out 
that Colonel Wyman had said it was essential to have Mr. Rohl in 
Hawaii for the completion of these defense projects; and I imagine 
I went into his background, and so oil. 

53. Major Clausen. In connection with the letter itself, you knew 
that this work that was to be done by Mr. Rohl was secret work? 

Mr. Stilphen. I knew it was defense work of some sort. I did not 
know what type it was. 

54. Major Clausen. I invite your attention to this sentence of the 
letter : 

It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States 
is beyond question. 

What was the basis for that, Mr, Stilphen ? 

Mr. Stilphen. The statements by Wyman, and then this investiga- 
tion that I found out about that had been completed over at the 
Department of Justice. 

55. Major Clau.^en. It says in the letter that the petition was filed 
on January 15, 1041. This letter is dated August 28. Do you know 
whether or not Wyman made more than one request? 

Mr. Stilphen. I do not know that, sir. 

56. Major Clausen. Do you know when the first request was made 
by Wyman? 



810 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir. 

57. Major Clausen. Did you talk about this with General Robins? 
[15Jf9'\ Mr. Stilphen. No, sir. 

58. Major Clausen. Did you talk about it with General Kingman? 
Mr. Stilphen. No, sir. 

59. Major Clausen. In connection with the sentence which I just 
read : 

It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United 
States is beyond question. 

Is it your intent to say that the investigation that was made resulted 
in that conclusion? 

Mr. Stilphen. The investigation and the recommendations of Wy- 
man, and this investigation that I made that I just previously men- 
tioned, about the Department of Justice. 

60. General Frank. Did the instructions to you convey the thought 
that they wanted this matter gotten through in a hurry? 

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir. 

61. General Frank. Was a result of that the lack of thorough inves- 
tigation of Rohl before this letter was accomplished ? 

Mr. Stilphen. That is rather a difficult question to answer specifi- 
cally. I would say that the Corps of Army Engineers would not have 
adequate facilities, in my opinion, to thoroughly investigate Rohl. It 
would have to take somebody else's opinion. Those opinions would be 
of people that knew him personally or had been associated with him, 
such as Wyman; and then the investigation made by the Bureau of 
Immigration and Naturalization, whose business it is to investigate 
these people, these aliens. 

62. General Frank. Did you realize at that time that this man 
[]550'\ was a German alien? 

Mr. Stilphen. Oh, yes ; I recognized that. 

63. Major Clausen. Did you also realize that the letter would be 
presented to the Court and would have very persuasive power with the 
Court in granting the petition? 

Mr. Stilphen. No. My idea ,of using the letter, as I previously 
mentioned, was that I was requested by the Department of Justice, 
Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, that they would like to 
have a letter requesting that these papers be expedited. That was the 
reason for that letter. 

64. General Frank. Were you in this position, that you were called 
in and told something about this as a "go-getter," and you were then 
operating under two controls, namely, to get something done about 
this, if possible, and write that letter, or, rather, first to find out the 
story about Rohl, and then to write the letter? 

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir. 

65. General Frank. Could you, in the zealousness of haste have 
slighted somewhat the question of the investigation of Rohl before 
you wrote that letter? 

Mr. Stilphen. Generally speaking, that is a fair statement; but 
when I received my instructions there was no question at that time of 
writing a letter. The idea was to get this thing fixed up if possible, 
and the letter came up after I investigated the matter over at the 
Department of Justice, because they wanted a letter. But I of course 
would not be competent or qualified and would not have the necessary 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 811 

facilities to investigate Eohl. I was not in a position to be able to 
investigate Rohl personally. I would have to rely uj^on [7557] 
other agencies and other people. 

66. General Frank. Did the fact that yon in person were not going 
to sign the letter, but it was somebody else's onus, lead you to be 
careless at all about what you put into it 'i 

Mr. Stilphex. No. If I was writing a letter for someone else's 
signature it would be the same as writing it for my signature. I 
would never worry about the onus. 

67. General Grunert. While we are on the subject of that particular 
paragraph of the letter about RohPs loyalty, why did you consicler 
it was necessary at all to put that in, if you were just going to write 
a letter to attempt to expedite the consideration of his case? 

Mr. Stilphen. I suspect you would call that a little "window-dress- 
ing," General. 

68. General Grunert. A little persuasion or a little influence, in 
a way? 

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir. 

69. Major Clausen. So that there will not be any mistake about 
it, up in the upper right-hand corner are the initials "B. L. S." 

JNIr. Stilphen. Those are my initials. 

70 Major Clausen. You have no question in your mind now that 
you prepared that letter, have you? 
Mr. Stilphen. I am convinced of that. 

71. Major Clausen. Let me invite your attention to this sentence: 

The qualifications of Mr. Eohl are of vital importance to the expeditious 
completion of the general construction project because of his [1552] pe- 
culiar qualifications. 

AVhat peculiar qualifications were you informed that Mr. Rohl 
possessed ? 

Mr. Stilphen. He was one of the foremost construction engineers 
in the world, I was told, and it w^as absolutely necessary that he be 
sent to Hawaii for the completion of these so-called defense projects. 

72. Major Clausen. Who told you that? 

Mr. Stilphen. I got that by somebody from AVyman. I don't 
know whether I got it from this communication of Colonel Lorence, 
but from somebody around there somewhere. 

73. Major Clausen. Did you get it at the time you had this pre- 
liminary meeting with Mr. Martin, Colonel Gesler, and Colonel 
Lorence ? 

Mr. Stilphen. Yes. 

74. Major Clausen. Is your memory refreshed at all as to when 
the conversation occurred with respect to the date of this letter, 
August 28, 1941 ? 

Mr. Stilphen. It might have been perhaps a week before or two 
weeks. I seem to be able to associate it with the fact that the letter 
was written — some sort of a period of time elapsed between the meet- 
ing and the writing of the letter. It might have been a period of 
days or a ])eriod of a week or two weeks; I just can't remember. 
Too many things have happened since that time. 

75. Major Clausen. At any rate, on the date when you had this 
meeting, was Martin there when you phoned the Department? 

Mr. Stilphen. Yes ; he sat at my desk. 



812 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

76. Major Clausen. Was it in this telephone conversation that 
[loo3] you M^ere askerl to go down and see the Immigration De- 
partment? 

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir. I could not get hold of the proper party; 
he was not in, or something. I talked to a girl — I remember that — 
and stated that I wanted to get some information about an immigra- 
tion case. I think she said that I would have to "come down here." 
So nothing more was said on the telephone. 

77. Major Clausen. When did you go down? 

Mr. Stilpiien. That day. If I remember correctly, this meeting 
occurred in the morning. That is wdien I first met Martin and 
was called in to Colonel Lorence's office. 1 don't think he sat any 
longer at my desk than perhaps five or ten minutes. I got Kohl's 
full name and his address from him, and tried to develop something 
from him about his background, as to the kind of work he did, and 
what projects he had worked on. So I am sure it did not take longer 
than ten or fifteen minutes. 

78. Major Clausen. Then you went down there in the afternoon? 
Mr. Stilphen. Yes. 

79. Major Clausen. This party tliat you saw in the afternoon: 
Do you remember his title ? 

Mr, Stilphen. I don't remember a thing. 

80. Major Clausen. You told General Grunert that you had other 
cases afterwards. Did you see the same party afterwards? 

Mr. Stilphen. I did not have other cases afterwards in Washing- 
ton, D. C. I had other cases v/hen I was with the Navy at New York. 

81. Major Clausen. In any event, inviting your attention again to 
this letter, it says : 

It is therefore requested that the granting [155.'/] of those final citizen- 
ship papers be expedited. 

Was that the topic of discussion in this conference you had with 
Colonel Gesler, Colonel Lorence, and Mr. Martin ? 
Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir. 

82. Major Clausen. In other words, they wanted the application 
granted ? 

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, they stated it was 
very important to get it done. 

83. Major Clausen. The question of investigating to see whether 
it should be granted before you wrote the letter was not brought up ; 
is that right? 

Mr. Stilphen. I would not say that exactly. If I remember cor- 
rectly, I was to look up the case to see what it was all about and, if it 
was possible to get it done, to get it done. 

84. Major Clausen. After you had this first talk down at the 
Department of Justice, did you ever see this party again that you 
talked with? 

Mr. Stilphen. No ; it was a telephone conversation. 

85. Major Clausen. I thought you said that you went down there 
after the telephone conversation. 

Mr. Stilphen. I did. 

86. Major Clausen. The next thing that happened was when you 
prepared this letter? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 813 

Mr, Stilpiiex. That is right. 

87. Major Clausen. How long did you talk with this party, Mr. 
Stilphen ? 

Mr. Stilphen. I was down there at the Department of Justice on 
all kinds of business in those days. I had a tax [1S55] case in 
Alaska. They had some school tax law where they could imprison 
people that did not pay, and they had half of the construction force 
in jail. I was down there on that, and I was down on all sorts of 
things. 

88. Major Clausen. It sticks in your mind that Mr. Martin was 
in your office for only five minutes? 

Mr. Stilphen. I just happened to remember that? 

89. Major Clausen. In any event, did you have any other com- 
munications with the Immigration authorities following the telephone 
conversation, the visit down to see this party, the subsequent telephone 
conversation, and the writing of this letter? 

Mr. Stilphen. I would not say so, sir. 

90. Major Clausen. Did it ever come to your knowledge later on 
that Mr. Rohl had illegally entered the country and had paid a fine 
of $25,000 for violating a law with regard to immigration matters? 

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir; I never heard of him since that time. I was 
never concerned with him, except when I read about it in the papers 
here, when i\Ir. Truman brought it up. 

91. Major Clausen. Were you ever asked by your superiors to do 
any checking up after you had written this letter? 

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir. 

92. Major Clausen. That is all. 

93. Colonel Toulmin. JMay I ask a question ? 

94. General Grunert. Yes. 

95. Colonel Toulmin. You have stated that the Corps of Engineers 
had no means of investigating IVIr. Hold ; is that correct? 

[15S6] Mr. Stilphen. I said that in my opinion they had no 
means. They do not have an investigative agency themselves. I 
suppose if they wanted to investigate Mr. Rohl they could have gotten 
Army Intelligence, the F. B. I., or any other such agency. But I 
meant specifically the Coips of Engineers. 

96. Colonel Toulmin. In this case did they make any investigation, 
to your knowledge, prior to your writing this letter? 

Mr. Stilphen. What is very strong in this case, to me, at least, and 
I assume 

97. Colonel Toulmin. I am asking for the fact now, not for your 
opinion. 

Mr. Stilphen. To answer that question, I wanted to bring out 
that Colonel Wyman recommended this man — not only recommended 
him, but he wasthe particular one that wanted him. Colonel Wyman 
was the District Engineer, and he certainly had means at his disposal 
to know about this man. I understood he had worked with him for 
years and knew all about him. To me, at least — and I am sure the 
same would apply to Gesler and Lorence — that would be very 
important. 

[1567] 98. Colonel Toulman. Well, did you see yourself the 
recommendation of Colonel Wyman about Rohl? ■ 



814 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Stilphen. Well, I cannot remember whether I did or not, sir. 
I heard it. I know I heard it. Whether I saw it afterwards or not, 
I can't remember. 

99. Colonel Toulmin. So that the total extent of investigation by 
the Corps of Engineers was the Wyman recommendation, so far as 
you know? 

Mr. Stilphen. And my inquiries at the Department of Justice. 

100. Colonel Toulmin. But I am confining it now. 

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir; as far as the Corps of Engineers go, that 
policy, that is a correct statement. 

101. Colonel Toulmin. And the other investigations were made by 
the Department of Justice and the Bureau of Immigration; is that 
right? 

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir. 

102. Colonel Toulmin. Well, doesn't it strike you as strange that 
you write a letter of strong recommendation, such as this document 
of the 28th of August, 1941, on behalf of the Corps of Engineers, 
certifying as to this matter, when you did not have any means of 
investigation except Wyman's recommendation, and you were writing 
the letter to the people who did have the opportunity of making 
investigation? Isn't that rather the reverse of what is ordinarily 
done ? 

Mr. Stilphen. Well, other letters of recommendation had been 
written, I don't suppose about citizenship papers, but I was asked to 
write a letter requesting that this case be [1'5S8~\ expedited 
by the agency that had cognizance of it; and, as I said before, any- 
body that makes a recommendation in the Corps of Engineers 
through the Chief of Engineers out in the field, usually his recom- 
mendation, unless it is very, very wrong, would be accepted ; I don't 
care what the matter would be. I mean, if a man is out in the field 
he knows what he is talking about ; unless it is way out of line, 
obviously, and at that time I do not think anybody thought it was 
out of line. 

103. Colonel Toulmin. Well, you have a letter here, Mr. Stilphen, 
which you wrote on August 28, 1941, in which you give a very ex- 
tended and positive recommendation of Mr. Rohl to the people who 
had made the actual investigation, and it is just puzzling, I think, 
to us why the people who knew the least should be doing the recom- 
mending to the people who knew the most. 

Mr. Stilphen. Well, that, sir, I am afraid I can't answer; and if 
Colonel Wyman and my superiors in the Corps of Engineers wanted 
that man over there, and it had to be done that way, as far as I was 
concerned it was going to be done that way. They had the perfect 
liberty to change that letter. As a matter of fact, I have written lots 
of letters for all the gentlemen involved, and they have no doubt 
changed a great many of them before they got into the final form. 

104. Colonel Toulmin. All right. Now that brings me to the next 
question : Was this letter, which was drafted by you originally, finally 
signed in this form without change from your original draft, or was 
it revised by anybody ? 

Mr. Stilphen. I couldn't answer that. I wouldn't know. 
[J'559] 105. Colonel Toulmin. You don't remember? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 815 

Mr. Stilphen. I don't remember, no, sir. 

106. Colonel Toulmin, It was customary to have your letters re- 
vised, Avas it not, when you submitted them for somebody else's 
signature ? 

Mr. Stilphen. It wasn't customary, but if they didn't like some- 
thing they could change it ; I had no pride of authorship. 

107. Colonel Toulmin. You don't remember it in this case, whether 
anybodj^ changed this letter? 

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir, I do not. 

108. General FpvAnk. Might not your initials up there in the corner 
indicate that the letter was not changed ? 

Mr. Stilphen. That didn't mean anything at all. That didn't 
mean anything at all as far as office procedure Avent. In other words, 
if I drafted the letter originally and it went through, and say they 
wanted to change one sentence here or add something, or had any- 
thing that should be changed, it would come back again and be typed 
again, and my initials would still go out on it. 

109. Colonel Toulmin. That is all I want. 

110. General Russell. So either Gesler or this other Colonel who 
was out in the outer office that morning, the office into which you went, 
introduced you to this man Martin as Rohl's attorney? 

Mr. S'hlphen. Yes, sir. 

111. General Russell. Do you know how long Martin had been out 
there with these gentlemen? 

[1660'] Mr. Stilphen. No, sir. I do not. 

112. General Russell. At this conference you were directed by one 
or both of these Colonels, whose names you have given, to follow a 
certain procedure and accomplish a certain purpose? 

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir. 

113. General Russell. The decision that the Corps of Engineers 
would expedite, insofar as it could, this application for citizenship 
by Rohl had been made, therefore, when you were called in ? 

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir. 

114. General Russell. Do you know how long Martin had been in 
conference with these two Colonels before you went into that room ? 

]VIr. Stilphen. No, sir, I do not. 

115. General Russell. Was anything said between Martin and 
those two Colonels after you went into the conference room ? 

Mr. Stilphen. No, I couldn't — if I remember, if I can possibly 
remember, I think that I was introduced to him, and he was identified, 
and then the statement was made about Wyman and the construction 
project, and it was necessary to get him over there, and would I see 
to it, take all steps to see that it was done. Would I take Mr. Martin 
in tow, as it were, and get what information I needed and then go to 
work on it. 

116. General Russell. The instructions which were conveyed to 
you by these two Colonels, one or both of these Colonels, at that con- 
ference, indicated very definitely that your only job was to expedite 
those papers? 

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir. 

[ISGl] General Russell. They, in other words, had adopted 
whatever had been sent in by this man Wyman or information they 



816 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

had from other sources, and had decided to go along in getting Rohl 
these naturalization papers ? 

Mr. Stilphen. Yes. I was to investigate the case. 

118. General Russell. Well, that is what I am getting at. How 
much investigating were you to do ? 

Mr. Stilphen. Well, I was to look up and see what the status of 
the case was. Obviously, if I found out by looking it up that the man 
was some sort of notorious citizen, I would report that back to them 
just as a matter of doing my job; but if there was nothing wrong, 
why, get him out of there. 

119. General Russell. Then, your activities were to be along two 
lines: First, an investigation was to be conducted; and, second, if 
that investigation was favorable to Rohl, you would press his 
application ? 

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir. 

120. General Russell. Then, you did have a burden of investigat- 
ing Rohl's desirability as an American citizen ? 

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir. I wouldn't say that, sir. My part in this 
was to look up the status of his papers at the Bureau of Immigration 
and Naturalization, which was far from an investigation of whether 
Rohl would make a desirable citizen or not. The burden of proof was 
not upon me for the investigation or to determine his desirability. I 
was merely to determine the status of his citizenship papers at the 
Department of Justice. 

121. General Russell. Now, is that what we are going to stay by ? 
Is that the only thing that you were to investigate, the [1562'] 
status of his papers? 

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir. 

122. General Russell. Tlierefore, your evidence now is that you 
were not to make any investigation to determine his desirnbility as 
an American citizen? 

Mr. Stilphen. Oh, absolutely. I had no instructions as such. 

123. General Russell. Did you discuss this situation with General 
Kingman ? 

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir. 

124. General Russell. You never talked to him about it? 
Mr. Stilphen. No, sir. 

125. General Russell. I may have asked you this; I am not sure. 
But do you recall how long you were in conference with these two 
Colonels and where Martin was present that morning? 

Mr. Stilphen. Oh, not more than five minutes, I would say. 

126. General Russell. How did it come that this problem was in 
Washington at all? 

Mr. Stilphen. Well, the way I get it, or I got it, was that it came — 
how it came about, I don't know, but Martin, I was told, was back 
there on business, some other business. 

127. General Russell. Well, let me approach it another way: Is 
it true or not that this application for the granting of citizenship to 
this man Rohl was pending in a Federal Court on the West Coast? 

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir, I think it was. 

128. General Russell. It would be in that proceeding, therefore, 
that all of the evidence would be, and there is where the [1563] 
judicial conclusions would be reached and the decision made? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 817 

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir. 

129. General Russell. By the Federal Judge out there? 
Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir. 

130. General Russell. Now, 1 am just ignorant on these immi- 
gration matters, but there was a file here in Washington relating 
to this West Coast application? 

Mr. Stilphen. Well, now, I don't know that, whether it would 
be a file here or whether they called or telegraphed out to the Coast. 
If I am not mistaken, I have a hunch but I certainly wouldn't swear 
to it; I just can't recollect; I think they wired out there regarding 
this case, or telephoned. 

131. General Russell. When you were over talking with these 
people in the Department of Justice, did they have a Rohl file there? 

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir. As a matter of fact, it took them several 
days to get the information that they wanted, if I remember correctly. 

132. General Russell. Now, you don't remember whether they 
showed you a telegram or a letter from the West Coast in which this 
information was set forth? 

Mr. Stilphen. They showed me nothing, sir. They showed me 
nothing. 

133. General Russell. I may be confused, but as I remember you 
said that 3"ou had a telephone conversation and then immediately 
and on — not immediately, but then4)n the same day you went over 
to the Department of Justice and talked with them? 

Mr. Stilphen. That is right. 

134. General Russell. And Avhen you were .over there did they 
[1564] have a record or information that Rohl was seeking citi- 
zenship in a Court on the West Coast of the United States ? 

Mr. Stilphen. I think I stated the case to them orally at the time 
I went over there, and told them what we were after. Then I left 
there, and they in turn got the information. At no time did I see any 
papers of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization on this man. 

135. General Russell. What information did the Department of 
Justice get from the West Coast ? 

Mr. Stilphen. I suyjpose Hie status of his papers out there, along 
the lines that I have brought out. 

136. General Frank. Do you know? 

Mr. Stilphen. Do I know? No, sir, I don't. 

137. General Russell. Now, when you were in all of your confer- 
ences with this Department of Justice group here in Washington, 
what information did they convey to you about Rohl ? 

Mr. Stilphen. AVell. the nub of it, the way I recollect, was that 
their investigation of him had been completed. 

138. General Russell. Now, "their investigation." What do you 
means by "their investigation"? 

Mr. Stilphen. The Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. 

139. General Russell. That was their Washington office? 

Mr. Stilphen. Yes. I speak of that as the office for the country ; 
I don't speak of it just as specifically the Washington office, because 
I know as well as you know that they operate through field offices and 
that they would have to, naturally would have to, couldn't all just be 
down in Washington. 



818 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

140. General Kussell. All right. Go ahead now. Give me the 
facts if you have them as to what they told you. 

[1665] Mr. Stilphen. Well, I don't have an awful lot of facts, 
sir. It was a long time ago, and I am trying to do my best to recol- 
lect this thing. There has been a lot of water over the dam since 
that time. 

141. General KnssELL. Well, let me ask you this question: Is it true 
or not that, had the Office of the Chief of Engineers not intervened 
in this thing, would the Washington office either of the Department 
of Justice or the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization have ever 
known anything at all about Rohl's application? 

Mr. Stilphen. Well, that is a point of procedure I wouldn't know 
about. That would be a procedure between the field office of the 
Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization and the Washington office 
of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. Now, whether 
they clear their papers with the Washington office, I don't know. 

142. General Russell. You are not informed as to whether or not 
these people in routine procedure here in Washington, whom I have 
named a moment ago, normally know what is going on in District 
Courts throughout the United States relating to naturalization? 

Mr. Stilphen. I am not informed, sir. 

143. General Russell. But it is your impression now that when 
you contacted the Washington offices of these two Departments it was 
necessary for them to go to the West Coast to find out what was going 
on, including the desirability of Rohl to become a citizen ? 

Mr. Stilphen. Well, I would go so far as to state it w^as [1566'] 
necessary for them to go somewhere and get some information, be- 
cause, as I recollect it, it took them several days to get the informa- 
tion. In other words, they couldn't give me an answer right away. 

144. General Russell. And they didn't give you memoranda or 
other writings in wdiich such information was conveyed to them? 

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir. 

145. General Russell. Did they give it to you in the office or over 
the telephone ? 

Mr. Stilphen. Gave it to me over the telephone. 

146. General Russell. Did they tell 3^ou in that conversation over 
the telephone that Rohl's loyalty to the United States could not be 
questioned ? 

Mr. Stilphen. No sir, I don't think they said that. 

147. General Russell._ Wliat did they say about his desirability 
as a citizen, to become a citizen? 

_Mr. Stilphen. As far as I can recollect, they said that he had filed 
his papers, that everything was completed about it. and that all that 
had to happen was that he had to take his turn to get into the District 
Court to take his oath to become a citizen. That was a question of 
routine red-tape procedure. 

148. General Russell. You are not acquainted with these naturali- 
zation proceedings in the Federal District Court? 

Mr. Stilphen. I am not. I have a very small knowledge of them. 
I am certainly no authority on them. 

149. General Russell. It did come to pass, as a result of the 
[1567] Office of the Chief of Engineers intervening, that all this 
machinery was set in motion in Wasliington : the Bureau of Immigra- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 819 

tion and Naturalization and the Department of Justice, and these 
three offices cooperating together were responsible for influencing the 
Western District Court to call up Rohl's case and dispose of it rather 
quickly ? 

Mr. Stilphen. Well, that is the conclusion you are draAving, sir. 
I assume it is correct. 

150. General Eussell. Well, you are on the inside to know what 
the facts are. Is that conclusion correct or not ? 

Mr. Stilpiien. Well, I would say it is a fair statement. In other 
words, the way the field offices operate, if they get some instructions 
from Washington they usually do it. See? 

151. General Russell. But all of this machinery that was put into 
action here in Washington, the Office of the Chief of Engineers, the 
Department of Justice, and the Bureau of Immigration and Natural- 
ization 

Mr. Stilphen". May I interrupt you, sir ? 

152. General Russell. All resulted from the appearance of one 
Martin in the Office of the Chief of Engineers, and his selling those 
people down there on the desirability of pressing it along? 

]\Ir. Stilphex. Yes, sir. I just make one statement there. I don't 
know whether Martin sold them or not. I don't know anything about 
that, but this chain started upon the appearance of Martin. You can 
put it that way. As far as I am concerned it started with the appear- 
ance of Martin. 

And there is one thing, just for the record. You are [ISSS] 
calling it the Department of Justice and the Bureau of Immigration 
and Naturalization. They are one and the same thing. That is, the 
Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization at that time was in the 
Department of Justice. 

153. General Russell. I think that is all. 

154. Major Clausen. Who was Colonel Lorence? 

Mr. Stilphen. He is colonel Walter E. Lorence, L-o-r-e-n-c-e. He 
was the assistant to Colonel Gesler. 

155. Major Clausen. You say Walter ? 
Mr. Stilphen. E. Lorence, L-o-r-e-n-c-e. 

156. Major Clausen. What was said, Mr. Stilphen, in this talk 
that you had with Colonel Gesler, Colonel Lorence, and yourself and 
Mr. Martin concerning the contract that was entered into in Decem- 
ber 1940? 

Mr. Stilphen. Nothing was said. 

157. Major Clausen. Well, you didn't get this information out of 
the thin air that is in the first paragraph. You got the contract num- 
ber and the information that the contractor was doing very important, 
as you say, defense construction at Honolulu. 

Mr. Stilplien. That is right. 

158. Major Clausen. Well, from whom did you get that? 

Mr. Stilphen. Well, on the statement that he was necessary on 
this work, I went to the files and got the number of the contract out. 

159. Major Clausen. Did you discuss that with anyone? 
Mr. Stilphen. No, sir. 

160. Major Clausen. You mean you just had a five-minute con- 
versation with Colonel Gesler, Colonel Lorence, and Mr. ^ [1569] 
Martin, and then see these instructions, and undertook all this action? 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 2 3 



820 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Stilppien. Well, my instructions were that way; yes, sir. 

161. Major Clausen. Now let me invite your attention to this letter. 
Exhibit 2. Alono;sicle your initials are some others. What are those 
initials, Mr. Stilphen ? 

Mr. Stilphen. There was a man there that was head of the — the 
Corps of Engineers, the finance section was divided up into a legal 
section. I was assigned to the legal section, but I didn't really report 
to him ; I reported directly to Lorence and Gesler on this labor stuff, 
and I was separate from the labor men on this legal section, but I did 
do legal work for him too, when I had some spare time, and I think 
these initials are of the man that was the head of that section. His 
name is Ralph — I can't think of his last name, but he would be known ; 
I know that. He was head of that legal section if I am not mistaken. 
It looks like the last initial is "H" to me, and I think his name begins 
with an H, but I can't remember now. 

162. Major Clausen. You say, head of the legal section of the labor 
division ? 

Mr. Stilphen. No; he was head of the legal section of the finance 
division of the Corps of Engineers at that time. It was Ralph some- 
body ; I can't think of his last name. 

163. Major Clausen. Let me invite your attention to these initials 
underneath the date. Do you know whom they represent? 

Mr. Stilphen. You mean this mark here (indicating) ? 

164. Major Clausen. Yes. 

Mr. Stilphen. I can't even decipher it. 

[1570] 165. Major Clausen. Now, referring to these initials 
ending in "H", was that an officer or a civilian ? 
Mr. Stilphen. It Avas a civilian. 

166. Major Clausen. Then on the second page there are three sets 
of initials. Can you tell me whom they represent? 

Mr. Stilphen. I think Gesler had a funny little thing; I think that 
is Gesler's, but now I wouldn't swear to it yet. I remember he had a 
funny little O. K. You see, the way when these letters went out, I will 
show you ; I might give you an idea of the procedure : 

I would draft the thing, and then there was a fellow in the section 
I was in ; it wovdd go to him, and he would read it and initial it if it 
was all right with him. Then from him it would go to the head of this 
legal section I just mentioned, and he would initial it, and then it 
would go to Lorence and tlien to Gesler, and then it would start going 
up channels to the assistants to the Generals and to the Generals. 
I mean it would go through nine or ten or fifteen hands. 

167. Major Clausen. They didn't go down that way to you, though, 
did they? 

Mr. Stilphen. You mean tJie letters ? 

168. Major Clausen. No. I mean your instructions didn't come 
down that way ? 

Mr. Stilphen. Oh, no. 

169. Major Clausen. In this case they went direct to you? 
Mr. Stilphen. That is right. 

170. Major Clausen. Did you ever see Mr. Martin again after this 
occasion ? 

[1571] Mr. Stilphen. No, sir. 

171. Major Clausen. Did you ever hear from him again? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 821 

Mr. Stilphen. If I remember correctly, I got a letter from him, 
tlianking me. 

172. Major CLAUSE>r. Thanking you? 

Mr. Stilphen. Saying that the papers had been granted, and thank- 
ing the Corps of Engineers and me for the assistance, in the letter. 

173. Major Clausen. That was about when? 

Mr. Stilphen. Oh, golly, at least a month and a half, I guess, or 
two months. 

174. Major Clausen. Addressed to you personally, was it? 

Mr. Stilphen. Addressed to me at the United States Corps of Army 
Engineers, yes. 

175. Major Clausen. Personally? 
Mr. Stilphen. Personally. 

176. Major Clausen. Did you keep that? 

Mr. Stilphen. "Benjamin L. Stilphen, Office of the Chief of Engi- 
neers, War Department." 

177. Major Clausen. I say, you kept that, did you ? 

Mr. Stilphen. I think I kept it for a while, but when I sold my 
house here in Washington I went with the Navy and moved down to 
New York. I went down there on the Normandie job. I had a lot of 
files, and I don't know whether I cleaned them out or destroyed them 
or not. 

178. Major Clausen. Was your action on this letter extracurricular 
or was it official ? 

Mr. Stilphen. My action on this letter? 

179. Major Ci-ausen. Yes. 

[157'2] Mr. Stilphen. I would say my action was — wait a min- 
ute. I don't know what exactly you mean, "official." I signed no 
correspondence myself. 

180. Major Clausen. You say you got a letter from Mr. Martin di- 
rected to you, and that you kept it for a while and didn't put that in 
the files of the Engineering? 

Mr. Stilphen. It was a personal letter. 

181. Major Clausen. Was your action in going down to Mr. Scho- 
fielcl a personal matter or was it official, in your mind? 

Mr. Stilphen. It was official. 

182. Major Clausen. Well, then when you got the letter from Mr. 
Martin did you take that and show it to anybody there? 

Mr. Stilphen. I showed it to Colonel Lorence. 

183. Major Clausen. I see. Anybody else? Did Colonel Lorence 
get one ; do you know ? 

Mr. Stilphen. I don't think so. 

184. Major Clausen. Colonel Gesler? 

Mr. Stilphen. I don't think so. It was, if I remember — I can 
remember it; it was about one sentence. It said: Mr. Rohl's papers 
were granted so-and-so date, and we want to thank you and your 
associates for your cooperation in this matter, or something on that 
order. 

185. Major Clausen. That is all. 

186. General Grunert. I have a few questions. The first one is to 
get me straightened out on that organization. Was the Bureau of 
Immigration and Naturalization at that time a part of the Depart- 
ment of Justice? 



822 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir. It had been recently transferred US7S] 
from the Department of Labor to the Department of Justice. 

187. General Grunert. And the F. B. I. was also a part of the De- 
partment of Justice ? 

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir. 

188. General Grunert. Now, in your investigation when you went 
down to the Department of Justice did you in any way know what was 
in the F B. I. files about this man Eohl? 

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir. 

189. General Grunert. From your investigation could you person- 
ally vouch for Kohl's loyalty ? 

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir. 

190. General Grunert. You didn't, then, have enough information 
as to be able to vouch for his loyalty ? 

Mr. Stilphen. I personally, no. 

191. General Grunert. Now, who passes on it, or what is the pro- 
cedure in an alien getting American citizenship? Does the Court 
grant it ? 

Mr. Stiphen, The Court grants it. He files 

192. General Grunert. Where does the Bureau of Immigration and 
Naturalization come in? Do they investigate and recommend to the 
Court? 

Mr, Stilphen. Yes, sir. 

193. General Grunert. Now, did it occur to you that the wording 
of the letter you drafted could have influenced the granting of citizen- 
ship because of the fact that the Government appeared to want and 
need this man badly, and because the Government appeared to vouch 
for this man's loyalty? 

Mr. Stilphen. I would say that is the tenor of the letter. 

[1574] 194. General Grunert. Now, do you know whether this 
letter itself ever got to the knowledge of the court or whether it just 
ended at the Bureau of Immigration and liad its influence there? 

Mr. Stilphen. That I don't know, whether it got to the Court 
or not, sir. 

195. General Grunert. Are there any other questions ? 

196. General Frank. You stated to General Russell that your in- 
structions from Colonel Lorence did not obligate you to look up Rohl's 
loyalty. Then, why did you put this in here about his loyalty was 
beyond question ? 

Mr. Stilphen. My instructions were to investigate the status of 
Ilohl's case at tlie Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. After 
I hud determined that there was nothing against him, and on the basis 
of Wyman's recommendation, that was put in there, as previously 
mentioned, to lift the letter up, to 

197. General Frank, Window-dress it? 
Mr. Stilphen. Window-dress it. 

198. Colonel TouLMiN. Selling? 
Mr. Stilphen. Selling. 

199. General Frank. As a matter of fact, you were the legman in 
this? 

• Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 823 

200. General Frank. And you were trying to do everything that you 
could to carry out the expediting instructions that you had gotten from 
Colonel Lorence ? 

Mr. Stilphen. That is right, sir. If it had been Mae West I would 
have done the same thing, or anj'one. The idea was, if [1575'] 
they needed her out there — him or her or anybody out there — to help 
the war, the idea was to get it done. That is what I tried to do. 

201. General Frank. That is all. 

202. Major Clausen. What was your employment prior to the time 
you went to work for the Chief of Engineers ? 

Mr. Stilphen. I was in the office of the Solicitor of the United 
States Department of Labor. 

203. General Grunert. There appear to be no more questions. 
T hank you for coming. 

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir. 

(The witness w^as excused, with the usual admonition.) 
(Thereupon, at 10 a. m., the Board concluded the hearing of wit- 
nesses for the day and proceeded to other business.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 825 



il57k'\ CONTENTS 



THURSDAY, AUGUST 24, 1944 

Testimony of — Pag* ' 
Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. Navy ; Commander, Air Force, 

Atlantic Fleet, Adroinistx-ative Office, Norfolk, Virginia 1575 

Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, U. S. N., on duty at Chief, Naval 

Operations, Washington, D. C 1644 

Mrs. Mary B. Kogan, Washington, D. C 1673 

Col. Walter E. Lorence, Corps of Engineers, United States Army, 

Columbus, Ohio 1678 

Rear Admiral Walter S. De Lany, United States Navy 1695 

^ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original transcript of proceedings. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 827 



[1575} PKOCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL 

HARBOR BOARD 



THURSDAY, AUGUST 24, 1944 

Munitions Building, 

Washington, D. C. 

The Board, at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted 
the hearing of witnesses, Lt, Gen. George Grunert, President of the 
Board, presiding. 

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. 
Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members. 

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. 
Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Ex- 
ecutive Officer. 

General Grunert. The Board will come to order. 

TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL P. N. L. BELLINGER, U. S. NAVY; 
COMMANDER, AIR FORCE, ATLANTIC FLEET; ADMINISTRATIVE 
OFFICE, NORFOLK, VA. 

(Admiral Bellinger was accompanied by Captain Logan C. Ramsey, 
U. S. Navy, Chief of Staff to Commander, Fleet Air, Norfolk ; Admin- 
istrative Headquarters, Norfolk, Va.) 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Admiral, will you please state to the Board your 
name, rank, organization, and station. 

xVdmiral Bellinger. Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. Navy ; 
Commander, Air Force, Atlantic Fleet ; administrative office at Nor- 
folk, Virginia. 

[1576] 2. General Grunert. Admiral, the Board is after facts 
as to what happened prior to, leading up to, and during the attack at 
Pearl Harbor. It is primarily interested in those things that per- 
tained to or could have been connected with the Army. From your 
assignment during that time, the Board hopes you will be able to give 
us some light on the facts, and also, possibly, leads to where we can 
get other facts. 

Will you please state to the Board your assignment, and generally 
your duties thereunder, during the year lOil, giving dates as far as 
you can remember. 

Admiral Bellinger. On December G, 1941, and for several months 
prior thereto, my duties were as follows: 

Commander, Hawaiian Based Patrol Wing, and Commander, Patrol 
Wing 2. Included in the larger command were the patrol squadrons 
and aircraft tenders attached to Patrol Wings 1 and 2. 



828 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Commander, Task Force 9. This comprised Patrol Wings 1 and 2, 
plus other units, as assigned by Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, 
for the conduct of specific operations. 

Commander, Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor. The responsibil- 
ities of this function included administrative authority in local mat- 
ters over all fleet aircraft actually based on the Naval Air Station, 
Pearl Harbor. 

Liaison witli Comjnanclant, 14th Naval District, for aviation devel- 
opment within the District, including Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and 
Johnston Islands. 

Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force. 

In connection with the above duties, I functioned under [1677] 
the following seniors : 

Commander, Aircraft Scouting Force, who. as Type Commander 
for patrol wings, was based at San Diego. 

Commander, Scouting Force, the force command of which Patrol 
Wings 1 and 2 were a part. 

Directly under the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in my capa- 
city as Commander, Task Force 9. 

Under Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in his capacity as 
Commander, Naval Base Defense Force, when performing my duties 
as Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force. 

Comanders of fleet task forces 1, 2, and 3, for operation of patrol 
planes assigned to those forces for specific operations. 

If I may, and it is the desire of this Board, I would like to continue 
giving further information. 

3. General Grunert. You appear to have some sort of prepared 
statement, and, if it will enlighten the Board and put its feet on 
the ground, I think it would be a good thing if you went ahead with 
your statement, and then we will piece it out with such additional 
information as we may want. Is that all right with the Board ? All 
right. Proceed. 

Admiral Bellinger. On December 6, 1941, and for several months 
prior thereto, in addition to my basic naval duties as enumerated above, 
I had the title of Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, under 
the then Commander, Naval Base Defense Force, who was Admiral 
Bloch, the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. A change 
in my sta^jis was contemplated in what was tlien the current Navy 
War Plan. Under its provisions, the [157S] units of my naval 
command were expected to make an early move to bases in the outlying 
islands, Midway, Wake, Johnston, and Palmyra. My own head- 
quarters were to be at Midway. 

Reverting to my status on Oahu, the most complicated of mv duties 
consisted of those in connection with the air defense of Pearl Harbor. 
About 1 March 1941, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, directed 
me to report to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to pre- 
pare an air defense plan in conjunction with the Commanding General, 
Hawaiian Air Force. I so reported, and proceeded with the assigned 
task, working directly with Major General F. L. Martin, U. S. Army, 
Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, who, incidentally, was 
senior to me. 

The operation plan for the Naval Base Defense Force included 
several subsidiary plans. The most important of these was the opera- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 829 

tion plan of the Naval Base Defense Air Force. In it was outlined 
the proposed employment of all units made available to the Naval Base 
Defense Air Force. In so far as Naval and JMarine Corps Air Units 
were concerned, it was an order requiring definite action when appli- 
cable. 

Orders from Army sources covering the function of air units in 
the Naval Base Defense xA.ir Force were the guides for these aircraft. 
Both Army and Navy orders on this subject were based on the estimate 
of the situation, dated March 31, 1941^, and signed by both General 
Martin and myself. That estimate was based on the conditions as they 
existed at the time it was drafted. Changes in the Naval Air Station 
between that date and December 7, 1941, were not of sufficient sig- 
nificance to warant a reestimate, and my information on the Army 
Air Force [1579] indicated an analogous condition. The esti- 
mate I believed and still believe to be sound, but the order based on 
that estimate, like a precept of international law, lacked sanction; 
and the missing sanction in this case was the absence of unity of com- 
mand. 

Specifically, the organization was designed to function through mu- 
tual cooperation between the Army and Navy for the defense of Pearl 
Harbor against air attack. As such the Naval Base Defense Air Force 
could function only in the event of an actual emergency or when 
proper authority so directed. The composition of the Naval Base 
Defense Air Force varied from day to day with the number of aircraft 
made available to it by the various air commands, both Army and 
Navy. The determining factor in this tactical availability was the 
daily employment schedule of aircraft belonging to the various air 
units. Aircraft reported as available were subject to the operational 
control of the commander. Naval Base Defense Air Force, or of the 
Army Pursuit Commander, in the prevailing category of readiness, 
only when the Naval Base Defense Air Force was in a functioning 
status. 

The normal procedure used for vitalizing this organization for drills 
was for the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in his capacity 
as Commander, Naval Base Defense Force, to send a dispatch reading : 

Drill. Danger of air raid on Pearl Harbor exists. Drill. 

This placed the search-and-attack groups in a functioning status. 
On receipt of this message, I in turn, as Commander, Naval Base 
Defense Air Force, sent a dispatch to all air units . [1S80] which 
made planes available to that organization, except Army pursuit units, 
ordering them to place all available aircraft in the highest degree of 
readiness. At this point, during such drills, searches were immedi- 
ately started by planes initially in a high degree of readiness, and 
their efforts were supplemented by orders to other aircraft as they were 
reported ready for flight. 

The term, "Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force,"' was actu- 
ally a misnomer, due to the limited composition of that portion of 
the Air Forces under my operational control, which included only the 
aircraft for scouting to locate enemy surface units and to attack them 
when located. It did not include fighter aircraft, radar detection de- 
vices, or antiaircraft guns. The term "Commander, Naval Base De- 
fense Air Force," was even more of a misnomer, as it implied authority 



830 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

over operating units to a degree which did not exist. Tliis authority 
was nonexistent until an emergency was apparent, or until appro- 
priate authority placed the Naval Base Defense Air Force in a func- 
tioning status; and when so called into existence, was limited in scope, 
in that it consisted only of operational control over Army units based 
upon mutual cooperation. 

In addition, my authority, limited as it was, extended only over the 
search-and-attack groups of the Naval Base Defense Air Force, and 
was non-existent so far as Army pursuit aviation and Navy fiighter 
aviation were concerned, which were to function under the operational 
control of Brigadier General H. C. Davidson, U. S. Army. 

To illustrate the lack of numerical strength of aircraft available 
to the Naval Base Defense Air Force, attention is [1S81] in- 
vited to the report of a Joint Army and Navy Board, dated 31 October 
1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation 
of aircraft operating areas in the Hawaiian area. Paragraph 4 (a) 
of this report, which was signed by Major General Martin, as Senior 
Army member, and myself, as senior Navy member, reads as follows : 

Paragraph 4. The problem confronting the Board as pertains to Army aviation 
was summed up by the Army representatives as follows : 

a. The mission of the Army on Oahu is to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval Base 
against all attacks by an enemy. The contribution to be made by the Hawaiian 
Air Force in carrying out this mission is : 

(1) To search for and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action 
by bombardment aviation. 

(2) To detect, intercept, and destroy enemy aircraft in the vicinity of Oahu, 
by pursuit aviation. 

It was pointed out that under the Army 54 Group Program, 170 
B-l7s and two groups of 163 Pursuit planes each, would be assigned 
to fulfill the above missions. 

Naval planes called for 84 patrol planes and 48 VSO planes, to be 
directly under the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to sup- 
plement or function in lieu of the 98 patrol planes of Patrol Wings 1 
and 2, which might be ordered to advance bases on the outlying Islands 
of Wake, Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra. Further, the planes actu- 
ally present on Oahu were not free until ordered to concentrate on the 
naval ba.se Air Defense. Both Army and Navy were in the process of 
receiving replacements of obsolescent planes. Army B-18s were being 
replaced by the [1S82] more modern B-17s, and Patrol Wings 
1 and 2 PBY-ls, -2s, and -3s were being replaced by PBY-5s. The 
new types were subject to the usual shake-down difficulties and main- 
tenance problems. 

The placing of the Naval Base Defense Air Force organization into 
a functioning status would have necessitated the substantial cessation 
of training activities in order to concentrate on defense. With the 
patrol planes constantly scouting to a maximum range, and the bomber 
aircraft standing by for attack missions, a situation would have been 
soon reached wherein the Navy planes would have been greatly reduced 
in material readiness and their combat crews approaching an opera- 
tional fatigue point, while the Army pilots would have been in need 
of refresher training. Hence, as pointed out in the Martin-Bellinger 
estimate, the problem resolved itself into one of timing with respect 
to the current status of our relations with Japan and the necessity 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 831 

for specific information as to the expectation of an air attack within 
I'ather narrow time limits. 

The Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, did not have the 
authority to place that organization in a functioning status, except in 
the case of an actual emergency. The Naval Base Defense Air Force 
assumed a functioning status immediately after the start of the attack 
on December 7, 1941, without orders from higher authority. Orders 
to planes in the air were sent and received by 0805, and a message — 

Air raid Peai-1 Harbor. This is no drill. 

was ordered broadcasted at 0758 that morning. 

4. General Grunert. Did the Naval Base Defense Air Force have 
anything to do with the outlying islands, Wake, Midway, and so 
forth? 

[1S83] Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

5. General Grunert. That was not part of the responsibility of 
defense or air action of the Naval Base Defense Air Force? 

Admiral Bellinger. The Naval Base Defense Air Force was based 
on the joint estimate. 

6. General Frank. The joint air estimate? 

Admiral Bellinger. This joint estimate, prepared by General 
Martin and myself does not state, "air estimate," but it is based pri- 
marily on air, this joint estimate covering joint Army and Navy air 
action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu, or fleet units 
in the Hawaiian area. 

7. General Grunert. The Hawaiian area did not include anything 
outside of the Hawaiian Islands proper, did it? 

Admiral Bellinger. No. 

8. General Grunert. Now, the Board is interested in the terms 
used, when the plan is "effective," and when iti is "operative." These 
plans became effective when they were signed, but as I understand, 
you say they were not to become operative until an emergency arose, 
and then, I believe, that they could be ordered to become operative 
by the Army or the Navy Department, or by local commanders, when 
so agreed upon. Is that your understanding? 

Admiral Bellinger. The question is, who were the "local com- 
manders" — the senior Army and senior Navy officers present? 

General Grunert. Are you familiar with the Hawaiian Coastal 
Frontier Defense Plan of approximately February 1941, to which 
this air operational plan was a sort of supplement or appendix? I 
have here what is known as the "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense 
Plan," which was dated as of 11 April 1941, and [ISS^] in that 
plan, paragraph 15 (c) , (2) , it states : 

Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior 
to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed 
upon by local commanders. 

Now, just who are referred to, there, as "local commanders," the 
Board has not yet determined. At least, I do not know who are meant. 
I would interpret it off-hand to mean that the "local commanders" in 
Hawaii would be the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, 
and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, whether or 



832 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

not it went down below that. But what was your understanding as 
to when the joint air agreement became effective and operative? 

Admiral Bellixger. In this joint estimate signed by General Martin 
and myself, in paragraph 5(e), the first sentence reads as follows : 

Establish a procedure whereby the condition of readiness to be maintained 
by each unit is at all times prescribed by the senior oflBcers present of the Army 
and Navy as a result of all information currently available to them. 

10. General Grunert. I thought I understood you to say, in your 
statement, that this naval air plan functioned only during an emer- 
gency ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Or when set into the functioning status by 
proper authority. Now, the question is, what is "proper authority"? 
My understanding of it is that the Commander, Naval Base Defense 
Force, could issue an order. Whether it would be complied with 
completely by the Army, lacking an [loSS] emergency, would 
depend on the iniderstanding of the Army commander, whether that 
was a state of emergency which required concentrating on that type 
of work. That question, as I say, never came up except in connection 
with drills, and when a drill was held it was arranged by mutual con- 
sent prior to the time of the drill, in order to make sure that the forces 
involved, particularly with the Army, would be available to take part 
in the drill. 

11. General Grunert. Then, for each such drill or maneuver, it 
required cooperation for that particular period, and did not extend 
beyond that period ? Is that right ? 

Admiral Bellinger. During the joeriod of the drill, the cooperation 
existed ; yes. 

12. General Grunert. That was because the two senior commanders 
agreed upon having such a drill and maneuver? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

13. General Grunert. To your knowledge, did the Commandant 
of the Fourteenth Naval District and the Commanding General of the 
Hawaiian Department agree at any time prior to December 7 to make 
this joint air operation agreement effective as an emergency? 

Admiral Bellinger. I remember a situation wherein the Army 
were having a 3-day period of drills, in which the Navy cooperated 
in these drills, to get both Army and Navy forces working together. 
This was subsequent to the plans and directives, and this estimate we 
have just been discussing, which were in effect. 

14. General Grunert. That, again, does not answer the question. 
[1580] Admiral Bellinger. Excuse me — may I continue ? 

15. General Grunert. Go ahead. 

Admiral Bellinger. The first day, the operations were carried out 
under the plans of the Naval Base Defense Air Force. That night, I 
received a dispatch from Army headquarters, stating that the bomber 
command was no longer "under my command," or "operational 
control" — I have forgotten the term used in the dispatch. I wondered 
what caused that dispatch, and what it meant. It arrived late at 
night. The next morning, there was an air-raid drill in connec- 
tion with these operations scheduled, and in carrying out the plans 
for this drill the question, to me, was, was the Army Bomber Command 
going to function, or not? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 833 

About 5 o'clock in the morninir. the Wiuo- Commander. Colonel 
Farthing, called me up and asked if we were going to ask for the 
Ai-niy to assist the Navy. I said, "No; I don't know of any plan to 
do that," that I was not the one to ask for the Army to assist the Navy ; 
that would be for the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, if they 
wanted the Navy to ask for the Army to assist the Navy. He said 
to me that they would like to work in this problem. Well, I said I 
would like very much to, and that I would keep them informed, and 
they could carry out their directives, as they might think, acting on 
the information I gave them, as they saw fit, in accordance with their 
directives. 

In checking later to find out why this dispatch was sent, changing 
the plan, so to speak, I was informed that it related to the provisions 
of joint action, which, in my understanding, were superseded, to the 
extent as indicated, in the plans [1587] embodied in the de- 
fense of Pearl Harbor. 

After that, I proposed a letter to General Short, for the signature 
of Admiral Bloch, to endeavor to straighten that situation out, and I 
believe it was more or less straightened out in so far as I could see 
from the preliminary phases of it; the idea being that if an emer- 
gency did exist and was present, then it would not require authority 
or sanction of Greneral Short for the Bomber Command to function; 
and it was in that way and in that echelon that I am speaking about, 
now. 

16. General Grunert. Did the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet 
ever indicate his approval of that joint air agreement as signed by 
Admiral Bloch and General Short ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I assume he did approve it, because Admiral 
Block functioned under the Commander-in-Chief in his capacity, in 
the defense of Pearl Harbor. 

IT. General Grunert. Now, of course, that was an incident in the 
case of straightening things out so you could cooperate. What I want 
to start in with is to get down to the basis. This Joint Hawaiian 
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was based on joint action of the Army 
and Navy, as agreed to in Washington. Under paragraph 9 (b) 
thereof, is reads : 

Operations of Army and Navy forces will be coordinated by exercise of unity 
of command in tlie following cases : 

1. Where ordered by the President ; or, 

2. When provided for in joint agreements between the Secretary of War and 
the Secretary of the Navy ; or, 

3. When Commanders of Army and Navy forces agree tliat the situation re- 
quires the exercise of unity of command, and further agree as to the service that 
shall [ Z5SS] exercise such command. 

Was there at any time, up to December 7, any discussion as to the 
necessity for agreeing on the exercise of unity of command, under the 
conditions that then existed? 

[loS9] Admiral Bellinger. I had mentioned it. In other words, 
I was not satisfied with the setup under the estimate and directives 
concerning the Naval Base Defense Air Force. I thought that it was 
necessary to have a unity of command to make such an operation a 
success. 

18. General Frank. You mean a unity of command before some- 
thing happened ? 



834 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Beixinger. Yes. 

19. General Frank. Rather than when it happened? 
Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

20. General Grunert. Up to December 7th was there ever a period 
that in your mind made it necessary to brin^ that thing to a head be- 
cause things were about to happen? In other words, an imminence 
of possible attack? You apparently in your estimate figured that an 
air raid or attack was highly possible, if not probable. Now, was there 
such a period that it seemed to be more necessary than ever to bring 
that to a head? 

Admiral Bellinger. I would like to point out this : that this joint 
estimate is based on 

21. General Frank. Between 3?ou and Martin? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes; the joint estimate signed by General 
Martin and myself. 

22. General Grunert. But approved by the 14th Naval District and 
by the Admiral of the Fleet? 

Admiral Bellinger. This estimate (indicating) ? I assume so. I 
was directed to cooperate with the Army and work out a plan. 

23. General Frank. By whom? 

Admiral Bellinger. By the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, 
[1S90] Admiral Kimmel. I was directed to report to the Com- 
mandant of the Naval Base to do this, who was Admiral Block ; and 
the most logical procedure w^as first to make an estimate of the situa- 
tion, and this was the first step in the effort to bring about a plan of 
action, but this estimate, as you see, was based on in the event of a 
sudden hostile action against Oahu and fleet units in the Haw^aiian 
areas. It was not an estimate of Japanese war plans. 

24. General Frank. Doesn't that estimate state that a surprise Jap 
air attack was the most probable action expected ? 

Admiral Bellinger. "It appears that the most likely and dangerous 
form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack," is a quotation from 
the estimate. You asked me, Was this estimate approved. In carrying 
out my instructions, the estimate and my directive for carrying out 
the Navy end of the estimate, the decisions of the estimate, w^ere sent 
to the Commander Naval Base Defense Force, who was my superior 
in command. 

25. General Frank. That was Admiral Bloch ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Admiral Bloch. I assumed that General 
Martin sent his copies to General Short, and the agreement between 
General Martin and myself was that on the basis of this estimate he 
would get out a directive for his part of the forces involved, and I 
would get out a directive for my part of the forces involved, and that 
was done. 

26. General Grunert. Presumably it was approved, because it was 
done? 

Admiral Bellinger. Beg pardon ? 

27. General Grunert. The presumption is that it had the approval 
of higher headquarters because action was taken in [1591] get- 
ting it out ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I am sure it had the approval. I am sure it 
had the approval because I was complimented on the cooperation as 
indicated between Army and Navy. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 835 

28. General Grunert. I want to get this fact: But that was not 
to become operative until an emergency was on your neck, but I want 
to find out if there wasn't a period of imminence there in which those 
concerned should have tried to force to a conclusion to make it opera- 
tive now or to have declared a state of affairs so that unity of com- 
mand could have been put into effect, and you said you had that in 
mind but that it was not done ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No. Pardon me. That could have been done 
at any time by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, who was 
Commander Naval Base Defense Force, if it was approved by and 
agreed upon by General Short. 

29. General Grunert. That is what I want to get at. Why didn't 
they get together and agree upon it? 

Admiral Bellinger. Or it could have been put in effect by General 
Short if proposed by him and agreed upon by Admiral Bloch. 

There was one point I wish to raise, though, in that: that naval 
planes that were scheduled and which were made available when 
available to function under this Naval Base Defense Air Force were 
not separate and distinct from other functions for which they were 
assigned, which the Commander had a great deal to do with, the 
Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet. 

30. General Grunert. But this is the thing that confuses me : the 
Naval Defense District and the Commanding General of the [1592] 
Hawaiian Department could get together and agree to do this and 
that, and then suddenly the Comander-in-Chief of the Fleet comes 
in and he may issue orders that are not in consonance with the agree- 
ments that General Short and Admiral Bloch had. In other words, 
he got out an instruction which was late — I don't know — in October, 
and whether or not that was in consonance with the Hawaiian defense 
plan and with the air operational agreement, I do not know, but 
where does the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet come in on these 
agreements between the District and the Department? Does he have 
to approve them? If he doesn't approve them, he has most of the 
means or some of the means that will be involved therein. 

Admiral Bellinger. In view of the fact that Admiral Bloch func- 
tioned under the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, for those pur- 
poses I am sure that what was done in preparation of the plan had 
his approval. 

31. General Frank. For what purposes? You said, "for those pur- 
poses." I am trying to get what they were. 

Admiral Bellinger. For the Pearl Harbor defense force. 

32. General Frank. I would like to ask a question here. 

33. General Grunert. Go ahead. 

34. General Frank. Will you give us a little explanation of your 
official relationship to Admiral Bloch and to the Commander of the 
Fleet? 

Admiral Bellinger. My direct relation with Admiral Bloch was by 
a directive from the Commander-in-Chief to report to him for duty 
in connection with the preparation of a plan coordinated with the 
Army for the air defense of Pearl Harbor, and as such and in con- 
formity with such I reported, and then as a result of [15931 
that I became what was known then as Commander Naval Base Air 

79716 — 4G— Ex. 145, vol. 2 4 



836 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Force functioning- under Admiral Bloch, tlie Commandant of the 
14tli Naval District. 

35. General Frank. All right. Now, as that Commander what were 
your responsibilities to Admiral Block and what were they to Admiral 
Kimmel ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Admiral Kimmel had super authority over all 
the rest of the Navy, and my forces could be removed at any time on 
any million that he saw fit to assign them ; and as an instance, about 
December 4th there were two squadrons of planes, one at Wake and 
one at Midway, in connection with an operation which the Commander- 
in-Chief Pacific had directed. Those planes were subject to being 
utilized in the Naval Base Defense Air Force when available. 

36. General Geunert. When and if they were available. When 
they are ashore and available, they could be used for that defense, but 
he. Admiral Kimmel, could pull out anything that pertained to the 
fleet at any time needed ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

37. General Frank. Who was responsible for this Martin-Bellinger 
agreement, the next higher man? Admiral Bloch or Admiral Kim- 
mel, or both, or you ? 

Admiral Bellinger. The joint estimate signed by Martin and Bel- 
linger was the result of the initiative taken by Admiral Kimmel. It 
was signed by General Martin and myself. Therefore we are re- 
sponsible for the joint estimate. 

38. General Frank. We know who was the next man above General 
Martin, and it was General Short, and there is no question about it ; 
but I still do not know who was the next man above you to [-?<^^4] 
be responsible for this thing. 

Admiral Bellinger. Admiral Bloch was the one who was responsible 
above me in connection with the Naval Base Defense Air Force. 

39. General Grunert. But Admiral Kimmel at any time could butt 
into Admiral Bloch's business in the defense line and sort of disrupt it 
by taking out some of his means ? 

Admiral Bellinger. That is correct. The naval war plans in ex- 
istence at that time required me to base at Midway and my patrol 
planes to operate from the four islands, Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and 
Johnston, and possibly some at Oahu. 

40. General Grunert. Here in this case through the direction of the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet he initiated or he told you to 
get bus}^ on that estimate, and as a result of that estimate there came 
about this joint air operations agreement which was signed by General 
Short and by Admiral Bloch, but in that agreement it envisaged using 
air forces that pertained to the Fleet, and your use of them was only 
when they were ashore, and they could be taken out from under you 
at any time as far as the actual defense of Hawaii was concerned ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Correct. 

41. General Frank. They could be taken out from under you as 
Naval Base Defense Air Force Commander ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, but not 

42. General Frank. But you still would have them under jouv 
command ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 837 

Admiral Belijngek. As Commander Patrol Wings, Hawaiian Area. 

43. General Frank. In which event you no longer Avere under 
[1595] Admiral Bloch? 

Admiral Bellinger. No. I was under Commander-in-Chief Pacific 
in that capacity. That was what I tried to indicate when I answered 
the first question, and I think you will find that very clearly put as an 
answer to the question. 

44. General Frank. Now I would like to ask this question. Let us 
assume that somebody did say that, "Here is unity of command." 
AVith the forces that you had wliat would you have done about it ? 

Admiral Bellinger. As unity of command in connection with the 
Naval Base Defense Air Force? 

45. General Frank. With the whole situation, unity of command; 
suppose that were on December 1st. 

Admiral Bellinger. In that case whoever had unity of command 
would be responsible for all phases of action which he initiated. 
Therefore, if he took planes av/ay for one purpose, he is responsible. 
If he takes, sets the planes for one purpose at another place, he is 
responsible there. In other words, if he has a certain amount of forces, 
he would be responsible for the distribution of those forces. 

46. General Frank. I know, but what I am trying to get at is this : 
In view of the lack of equipment, assuming that you had had com- 
mand of it as a result of the Navy having command under the principle 
of unity of command, what could you have done? 

Admiral Bellinger. I do not know that I could have done any- 
thing more unless — that is I. 

47. General Frank. Yes. 

Admiral Bellinger. The Commander who had unity of command 
may have done more, yes, because he would be in a position, as 
[1596] I say, to make distribution of forces, complete distribu- 
tion, as he saw necessity therefor. 

48. General Frank. Were you familiar with the messages that ar- 
rived along the Ifith of October up through the 27th of November? 

Admiral Bellinger. 16th? 

49. General Frank. October 16th, and November 24th and 27th. 
Admiral Bellinger. 1 6th of October ? 

50. General Frank. Yes. 

Admiral Bellinger. No, I never saw any of those messages. I do 
not remember one on the 16th. 

51. General Frank. Well, there was one on the 16th. 

Admiral Bellinger. That is, I never saw these messages prior to 
December 7th. 

52. General Frank. Well, there was a message on the 16th, a Navy 
message. In effect it said, "Take due precautions including such pre- 
paratory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor con- 
stitute provocative action against Japan." That was the Navy message 
as of the 16th of October. 

Admiral Bellinger. I do not remember, sir. 

53. General Frank. You did not know anything about that ? 
Admiral Bellinger. No. There was a conference in connection 

with the reinforcement of Wake and in connection with Midway, and 
in the first tentative plan it was contemplated that Army pursuit 
planes might be put out there. Then that was not agreed upon, so 



838 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Marine planes were put out there. I attended a conference in the 
Commander-in-Chief's office. I have forgotten the date. It may have 
been on the basis of that dispatch. I do not remember ever having 
seen that dispatch. 

54. General Frank. On the 24th of November there was another 
[1597] message : Caution relative possibility of surprise attack on 
Guam or Philippine Islands. 

Admiral Bellinger. Never saw it. I never saw it prior to Decem- 
ber 7. My statement with regard to not having seen these dispatches 
refers to prior to December 7. 

55. General Frank. Did you know that they had arrived? 
Admiral Bellinger. Not prior to December 7. 

56. General Frank. You did not. 

Then there was one of the 27th of November : War warning. Guam 
Samoa warned re sabotage . Jap action versus Philippines, Thai, or 
Kra Peninsula, Borneo, expected. You did not know anything about 
that? 

Admiral Bellinger, Not prior to December 7. 

57. General Frank. And the Army sent out a message. Since then 
you have known that those messages had gone out ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

58. General Frank. But at that time you knew nothing about it? 
Admiral Bellinger. I did not. 

59. General Frank. Did you know that there was a tense situation 
existing? 

Admiral Bellinger. The paper indicated quite a tense situation. 
As a matter of fact, the tense situation had been rising and falling, 
as you remember yourself, out in that area for some time. It caused 
me to write considerable letters trying to build up my forces and to 
get action. I realized thoroughly that it was a tense situation, and as 
I say the papers indicated a tense situation, but I had no knowledge 
of [1S98] secret dispatches at that time prior to December 7th. 

60. General Frank. How many P. B. Y.s did you have then? 
Admiral Bellinger. We had a total of 81 P. B. Y.s in the Patrol 

Wings 1 and 2. And when I say "we had" that included those that 
were at Midway as well. 

61. General Frank. How many did you have right there in Pearl 
Harbor and Kaneohe ? 

Admiral Bellinger. On what day ? 

62. General Frank. December first to seventh. 

Admiral Bellinger. On December 5th one squadron that had been 
away, that is, a squadron of 12 planes that had been away for over 
a month or so, basing on both Midway and Wake, returned, and one 
squadron was at Midway on December 6th. 

From December 1 to 5 we had 57 P. B. Y. planes. 

63. General Frank. OnOahu? 

Admiral Bellinger. On Oahu or in the Hawaiian area. 
On December 5 to 7 we had 69, with 9 out of commission. 
Excuse me. I have to check this a little bit. I have got figures to 
show all this, and I want to make sure that I am right on this. 

64. General Frank. Well, you have the records of the exact number 
of planes, haven't you ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 839 

Admiral Bellinger. On December 7th we had at Kaneohe 36 phmes, 
at Pearl 33 planes, and at Midway 12 planes, making a total of 81 
planes. 

[ISW] 65. General Frank. What I am getting around to is 
this: What kind of reconnaissance or patrolling did you carry out 
between November 27th and December 7th ? 

Admiral Bellinger. There was a requirement by a directive from 
the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, to patrol wings — not Naval Base 
Air Defense, but patrol wings — to search fleet operating areas in the 
early morning at sunrise. 

66. General Frank. Those are task force operating areas? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. That was a daily occurrence. 

[IGOO] 67. General Frank. About how many planes did you 
send out? 

Admiral Bellinger. From three to six, depending on the amount of 
area covered by these assigned operating areas. 

68. General Frank. Is that the total number that went out during 
the da}', or did thej^ relieve each other ? 

Admiral Bellinger. The search was in the early morning, and 
when that was accomplished, that was the search for that day on 
that particular job. 

69. General Grunert. What was the purpose of the search? 
Admiral Bellinger. To guard against submarine attack, primarily, 

or Japanese ships in the area. 

70. General Grunert. And that was primarily done in order to 
know that in that area a task force could operate with comparative 
security ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes; from surface or sub-surface craft. 

71. General Grunert. It had nothing to do with searching or mak- 
ing reconnaissance for the defense of Oahu ? 

72. General Frank. Against a surprise attack? 

Admiral Bellinger. No. Excuse me. There was patrolling being 
carried on from Midway. 

73. General Frank. What I would like to know is this: Was any 
patrolling being done as a prevention against a surprise attack? 

Admiral Bellinger. Only in the vicinity of Midway. There was 
a movement in connection with putting these planes that I spoke 
about, these Marine planes, on Midway and Wake, and in connection 
with the movement of the carrier task force which was charged with 
that job we had patrol planes on Midway and Wake that did certain 
security patrol which was in connection with the security of the task 
force at sea. 

74. General Frank. What instructions did you receive with 
[10011 respect to conducting patrols or reconnaissance for security 
purposes ? 

Admiral Bellinger. The ones I spoke about, which required a 
search of operating areas in the early morning each day. 

75. General Frank. You had no instructions from anybody to con- 
duct any search against a force to protect you from a surprise attack? 

Admiral Bellinger. We had had on specific occasions, when there 
was some apparent reason for doing so. That instance had occurred 
for one or two different periods during the year. 



840 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

76. General Frank. Was Naval Combat Intelligence information 
made available to you ? 

Admiral Bellinger. That depends on the echelon or kind of in- 
telligence. 

77. General Frank. During this period? 

Admiral Bellinger. Those dispatches were not made available to 
me. 

78. General Frank. Did you have any information about a Japanese 
task force with carriers in the Marshalls about the first of December? 

Admiral Bellinger. No ; not to my knowledge. 

79. General Frank. Such information would certainly put you on 
your high horse to get busy, would it not ? 

Admiral Bellinger. In order for me to get busy I would have to 
initiate some proposition to higher authority; that is, to get busy 
lacking some definite actual emergency. 

80. General Frank. If you had gotten that information would you 
not have done some recommending? 

Admiral Bellinger. That is something that I would like to 
say [1602] yes to. I hope I would have done so. But this 
IS post-Pearl Harbor, and then was ante-Pearl Harbor when we were 
at peace. But I think I would have. 

81. General Frank. But at the time 3^ou knew nothing about it? 
Admiral Bellinger. No. 

82. General Grunert. I would like to go back to the subject of 
what we call distant reconnaissance. You may call it patrol or 
whatnot. If you had received instructions to do some distant recon- 
naissance or patrolling with a view to finding out whether there was 
any air force that might come in to attack Hawaii, in the line of 
discovering the location of carriers, from whom would you have 
received that directive for such a reconnaissance. 

Admiral Bellinger. Either Admiral Bloch, by his status as Com- 
mander, Naval Base Defense Force, in which case I assume he would 
have conferred with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific prior to 
issuing the order, or I might have received it direct from the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Pacific. 

83. General Frank. All the planes that you had to perform any 
missions as Commander of the Naval Base Defense, Air Forces, were 
sent over there from the fleet, were they not ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Will you repeat that, please? 

84. General Frank. You had a series of six hats that you wore. 
Among them was Commander of the Naval Base Defense Force, 
which was under Admiral Bloch; but Admiral Bloch, as the Com- 
mander of the Fourteenth Naval District, had no airplanes. There- 
fore any airplanes that were made available for work as such in the 
Naval Base Defense Air Force were sent over there from one of these 
several units? 

[1603] Admiral Bellinger. Or else the Army Bomber Com- 
mand. 

85. General Frank. Therefore, as long as the commander of the 
fleet left the planes there. Admiral Bloch and. in turn, you — but 
principally Admiral Bloch because you belonged to both of them — 
Admiral Bloch 's plans for carrying out his missions were secure; 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 841 

but if the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet wanted to pull some of 
those planes away, that left Admiral Bloch high and dry, so far as 
carrying out the missions he wanted carried out was concerned. Is 
that correct ? 

Admiral Bellinger. That is correct. In other words, the planes 
comprising the Naval Base Defense Air Force were a "movable 
feast". In other words, there was no stable organization set aside 
to form the Naval Base Defense Air Force prior to December 7th. 
After December 7th, and on Deecember 7th, the main mission became 
Naval Base Defense Air Force, and all planes functioned on that 
duty, unless otherwise specifically directed by the Commander-in- 
Chief, who also took cognizance, and direct cognizance, of the activi- 
ties of the Naval Base Defense Force. 

May I inject one thing on this matter? As I said before, the 
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, initiated the formation of this 
Naval Base Defense Force, including the Naval Base Defense Air 
Force. He did it, so I understand, in order to endeavor, with the 
forces available, to prepare the best plan, considering all the other 
factors involved in operation, and to bi'ing about some kind of 
coordinated effort through mutual cooperation, utilizing what existed 
or might exist in case the need for it arose. 

86. General Frank. One question I would like to ask about this 
agreement. I asked you who was the one man in the Navy [1604-] 
responsible for the execution of the Martin-Bellinger Agreement. We 
have three names, Bloch, Bellinger and Kimmel. Under which of 
the three shells do we find the peanut? 

Admiral Bellinger. General Short was — — 

87. General Frank (interposing). I say, just in the Navy. 
Admiral Bellinger. It was not within my authority to start the 

Air Defense Force unless there was an emergency existing. In other 
words, it could not be started by me to meet a thought that I might 
have of danger, unless there was some definite reason to indicate it, in 
which case I would have had to get some sort of backing from General 
Martin in order to present this idea to higher authority, because it 
would have to be a mutual agreement to start it, by General Short and 
Admiral Bloch. 

88. General Frank. That is what I am getting at. We knew to 
whom Martin would go ; tliere is no question about that. He would go 
to Short. But to whom would you go? You would go to Bloch or 
Kimmel ? 

Admiral Bellinger. With reference to the Naval Base Defense Air 
Force I would go to Bloch. He was my boss. 

89. General Frank. All right. Thank j'ou. 

90. General Grunert. I want to exhaust two subjects before we go 
on with another, in so far as they are exhaustable with the present light. 

Let us continue what we might call this command phase. Here we 
have the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan executed between the 
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant 
of the Fourteenth Naval District. Therein, as agreed to and appar- 
ently approved all around, it is provided, under [1605] para- 
graph 18, that 

The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, shaU provide for — 



842 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

{ind it runs from A to P and paragraph I thereof is "Distant Recon- 
naissance". It is agreed that the Navy shall provide distant 
reconnaissance. 

As far as the Navy is concerned, in the signatures to that there is 
the signature of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. He is 
to provide for something, but apparently he has nothing to do that 
providing with, unless he can get it from his senior, who happens to 
be the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. If he is not given the means 
A\ herewith to do that, what was the use of having him agree to do it? 

Admiral Bellinger. It sounds a little bit worse than it actually 
might have been, in view of the fact that Admiral Bloch was responsi- 
ble and functioned under the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for 
that purpose. The Commander-in-Chief did have an onus in con- 
nection with that also, because Bloch was his man for that purpose, 

91. General Grunert. This is my understanding of it. Here is the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. That is not only Hawaii : 
it is the Pacific. He has his headquarters at the same place as that 
of the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. Therefore, 
he is in command, and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval Dis- 
trict is his subordinate and under him, and he is charged with the 
defense of the Hawaiian Islands. They make an agreement as be- 
tween the Army, which is charged with defense, and the Fourteenth 
Naval District, which is charged with defense, and he agrees to do 
some distant reconnaissance. [1606] He has no means, appar- 
ently, for this distant reconnaissance, or he did not have except such as 
the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet saw fit to make available to him. 
In the absence of sufficient aircraft to meet all the demands there neces- 
sarily was a sort of pool, and that pool was primarily for the fleet 
and secondarily for the District. Ordinarily, most of the time the 
fleet used it and it could not be made available to the District if the 
fleet was going to use it. So it resulted in what? It resulted in your 
being put in command of practically all the air forces and the activi- 
ties of all the air forces, and you had four or five or six different 
propositions and you had three or four people to go to : You had the 
Commander-in-Chief of the fleet; you had the District Commander, 
and you also had some task force commanders, I believe. 

Admiral Bellinger. The task force commanders came into the pic- 
ture when the task forces were operating. 

92. General Grunert. So, about the only thing you could do, ap- 
parently, was to agree with the Army Air Force commander and say, 
"We will do what we can with what we have got; and in order to 
know what we have got, my part of the plan is seaward, and your 
part of the plan is over the land or nearby." And you agreed on 
what each other would do, and you agreed that when the time came 
the fighters of the Navy would be turned over to the Army, and what 
we may call the reconnaissance of the Army would be turned over to 
the Navy. That is, generally speaking. So each day, or periodically, 
you made reports to each other as to what was available ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Each day. 

93. General Grunert. And, therefore, you agreed that 

When and [1607] if the time comes that we may have to put this plan 
into effect, that is our working scheme. 

Is that generally a fair statement? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 843 

Admiral Bellinger. Generally speaking, I would say that is 
correct. 

94. General Grunert. Without any details. 

Now, apparently the inherent weakness in making such plans is the 
question of their not becoming operative in time to meet an attack? 
Is that true? 

Admiral Bellinger, That is correct. In other words, it is not 
operative until made operative. 

95. General Frank. It depended on a period of strained relations? 
Admiral Bellinger. Yes. There was dependence on information 

that indicated that it was very advisable to put it into operation ; and 
then that required, I would say, mutual consent from Admiral Bloch 
and General Short in which the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, would 
have a good deal to do about it with reference to how many planes 
could be used for that. For instance, he might send planes away. 
As I say, these two squadrons of planes that went to Midway and 
Wake were on the direct order of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. 

96. General Frank. It could have been put into effect, that is, this 
unity of command, by direction from Washington in accordance with 
joint Army and Navy action? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

97. General Grunert. Washington did not direct it. 

The only way you had an idea of whether or not this prepared plan 
would work would be by a number of drills and exercises, which I 
understand were had ? 

\16'08] Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

98. General Grunert. But there was no period of imminence of 
war that impressed itself upon the minds of those present to decide 
to get together to make this plan operative and to do it every day 
until something broke ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Apparently not. 

99. General Grunert. Would it then have been better, and would 
it have given a better chance to meet an attack on December 7, had 
that plan been made operative as of the 27th of November, and from 
that time on you had exercised daily ? 

Admiral Bellinger. As a result of hindsight and the proper selec- 
tion of a sector for distant reconnaissance, I would say yes. The ques- 
tion which has to be taken into consideration in looking back now, 
with out minds built around ante-December 7 days, is this, and I would 
like to bring this point out: We were in the process of getting new 
planes; in other words, replacements with new planes, and between 
28 October, 1941 and 23 November, 1941, we received 54 new types of 
planes. 

100. General Frank. P. B. Y.-5's? 

Admiral Bellinger. P. B. Y.-5's ; and those planes were experienc- 
ing the usual shake-down difficulties, and we were hampered in main- 
tenance by almost a complete absence of spare parts. We also were not 
overstocked with personnel. One of our main problems, as I know it 
was in the Army at that time, was what we termed expansion training, 
with the idea of endeavoring to develop an additional and adequate 
number of combat air crews. So that when this was put into effect, 
in so far as the Navy planes were concerned, that would have to be 
taken into consideration. 



344 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[1609] 101. General Geunert. Those are what you might call 
handicaps under any condition ? 

Admiral Bellinger. That is correct. 

102. General Grunert. But if it had been decided that the emer- 
gency was such as to go all out in preparedness, then, under existing 
conditions, would it not have been better to have made that decision 
before anything happened and not have to implement a plan upon a 
hostile attack? 

Admiral Bellinger. There is no doubt about that, because the 
whole basis of the plan was to discover the enemy before it could make 
an attack. 

103. General Frank. I would like to ask a question there which 
is pertinent to that. Had unity of command been in effect and had 
the whole Army and Navy been in the same frame of mind that they 
were on the 7th of December with unity of command in effect, what 
difference would it have made ? 

Admiral Bellinger. That is rather difficult to answer, because there 
are so many questions of command relations from the highest echelons, 
which I am not familiar with, and you would know as much about 
that as I do. One man who has got the responsibility and the author- 
ity to make decisions, instead of trying to influence another man to 
think as he thinks, is the better plan. 

104. General Grunert. If one man had to make the decision and he 
could get better action, then if two men had to make decisions by coop- 
eration, even with the same means available, do you think you could 
have gotten better action? 

Admiral Bellinger. I think undoubtedly unity of command would 
have brought better action, starting from the day unity [16101 
of command was established. 

105. General Grunert. Then if any mistake was made in not estab- 
lishing unity of command, it may have been made by the Powers 
That Be in Washington or could have been made by joint agreement 
between the commanders out there. Even unity of command, under 
the Joint Army and Navy Agreement here in Washington that I 
read 

106. General Frank. But the frame of mind, the attitude toward 
the situation, would have been the same in any event, would it not? 

Admiral Bellinger. That I am unable to answer, because I do not 
know what attitude of mind Admiral Kimmel and General Short had. 

107. General Frank. Do you think that any information was avail- 
able in the hands of either of the supreme commanders that would 
have led to different action had either one of them been supreme? 

Admiral Bellinger. If I answered that question it would be en- 
tirely supposition on my part ; and I do not think that I am competent 
to really answer it. 

108. General Frank. It is just a matter of logic. 

Admiral Bellinger. Logically speaking, starting back in August, 
1941, 1 felt that to place something into existence that was then based 
on mutual cooperation would be much better if they had unity of 
command; and I still persist in that. 

[1611] 109. General Grunert. We hear considerable about the 
question of cooperation and the lack of it, and so forth, versus unity 
of command, and what might have been done thereunder; but this 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 845 

joint action of Army and Navy, as promulgated here, is part of the 
'"bible" here among the Army and the Na^y, from Washington on 
down, on which this Hawaiian Defense plan is predicated. It says, 
as I read it, in paragraph 8, B (3) : 

Operation of Army and Navy forces will be coordinated by the exercise of 
unity of command in the following cases, 1, 2, and 3. 

The third one is : 

When the Commanders of Army and Navy forces agree that the situation re- 
quires the exercise of unity of command, and further agree as to the service 
that shall exercise that command. 

That unity of command could have been put in force any time those 
Commanders out there thought the situation demanded it ; and ap- 
parently they did not think the situation demanded it? 

Admiral Bei.lixger. ]\Iaybe one did, and the other didn't ! I don\ 
know. 

110. General Grunert. Have you any more questions on this sub- 
ject of command ? We can go to another subject, now. 

111. General Russell. Admiral, as I understand it, Bloch's function 
as Base Commander in connection with these islands was limited to 
the islands and the waters adjacent thereto. The Pacific Fleet, on 
the contrary, operated over a very immense area, relatively speaking; 
is that true ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

[J612] 112. General Russell. The Commander-in-Chief of the 
Pacific Fleet had all of this area away from the islands, and Bloch 
had this narrow area about the islands, as his immediate concern: 
is that true ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes: under the Commander-in-Chief. 

113. General Russell. Well, of course, he was in the chain of com- 
mand. You were immediately concerned with and in command of 
all the aircraft with the Pacific Fleet, and that which may have been 
assigned to the Base Commander, with what exceptions'? 

Admiral Bellinger. In the first place, the fleet planes that I had 
command of in the Naval Base Air Defense Force consisted of those 
that were made available to me. 

114. General Russell. Well, let us not jump the track. Admiral. 
That is the trouble we are having. 

Admiral Bellinger. Well, but you have to come down to "brass 
tacks" on this, because it is too confusing. 

115. General Russell. Let me state my question, and see if it can 
be answered. 

Admiral Bellinger. All right. 

116. General Russell. What aircraft in the Pacific Fleet or in the 
Fourteenth Naval District did you not have command of? 

Admiral Bellinger. The Fourteenth Naval District had under 
it certain air stations, and there were certain small utility-type planes 
attached to them, and those planes were directly and specifically undc^ 
the commanding officer of the air station, and they were directly under 
the Commandant of the Naval District. 

117. General Grunert. That is what you call "housekeeping"? 
1161S] Admiral Bellinger. That is correct. 

Now, there was a utility wing. The utility wing was not under me, 

118. General RussEiii,, What was that? 



846 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Bellinger. That was a wing composed of various types of 
planes, to do service to the fleet, such as towing targets, drone control, 
and various other utility works for the fleet. Also, the carrier planes 
based ashore were not under me, except when they were made avail- 
able to me, and when based ashore, and only those, of those based 
ashore, that were made available to me. 

119. General Frank. And the carrier planes available? 
Admiral Bellinger. Those carrier planes were attached to aircraft 

carriers, and while on board the carriers I had nothing to do with 
them. Wlien they were on shore, those that were made available to 
the Naval Base Defense Air Force, with the exception of the fighter 
planes; certain ones of those that were available were made available 
to the fighter command. General Davidson, in the same method and 
means as the bomber and scouting planes were made available to me 
as Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force. And in addition to 
that there was a Marine group, which was not under my authority 
except as the planes were made available to me for the Naval Base 
Defense Air Force; likewise, the fighter planes of that outfit were 
made available to General Davison of the fighter command. 
Does that answer your question? 

120. General Russell. Yes. 

Now, we are dealing with four groups. Admiral; certain utility 
planes that were available to the installation command- [^^^4] 
ers, and utility planes available to the sea units; the carrier-based 
planes, when they were on the carriers ; and the Marine group. Now, 
those were the types of planes out in that area, that only on occasions 
were under your command ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Eight. 

121. General Russell, And probably the utility planes were never 
under your command? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

122. General Russell. Because they were "housekeeping"? 
Admiral Bellinger. No, they were under my command for that 

purpose — for this purpose only — Naval Base Defense Air Force 
purposes. 

123. General Russell. Now, let us think about that third group, 
there, the carrier-based planes. Those were the ones on the two car- 
riers, the LEXINGTON and the ENTERPRISE, operating out of 
Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

124. General Russell. About how many carrier-bnsed planes did 
each of those carriers have? 

Admiral Bellinger. Normally, they carried at that time, I believe 
their complement was 93 planes. 

125. General Russell. 93 each ? 
Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

126. General Russell. That would give them 186 ? 
Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

127. General Russell. Now, let us go to the Marine group. Where 
were they, and what were they ? 

Admiral Bellinger. The Marine planes were at the Ewa base and 
they functioned under the Commander of Carriers of the Pacific Fleet 
at that time, was his title. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 847 

[161S] 128. General Russell. How many were there? 

Admiral Bellinger. I don't remember how many planes they had. 
It was something about, as I recall, one squadron of bombers, one 
squadron of scouts, and about two squadrons of fighter planes, perhaps. 
I am not sure whether that was their full complement or not. 

129. General Russell. And where were they, from November 27 to 
December 7, 1941 ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Some had been moved to Wake. A fighter 
squadron had been moved to Wake, and I think it was a squadron of 
dive-bombers that was at Midway. 

The remainder of the planes were at Ewa air station. 

130. General Russell. Was there any plane arrangement or agree- 
ment which regulated the functioning of the planes under your com- 
mand, the planes with the carriers, and the Marine planes, for recon- 
naissance purposes ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Either reconnaissance or for attack purposes ? 

131. General Russell. Let us talk about reconnaissance. 
Admiral Bellinger. When the Air Defense Force was functioning, 

they automatically came under my command. Those planes were 
available and received orders as required, either for scouting or for 
bombing. In other words, standing by for attack. We did not intend 
using them normally for scouting, because their range was entirely too 
short. 

132. General Russell. Let us go back to realities, from November 
27 to December 7. Now, there were these planes with the carriers, 
there were these planes under your command, and the planes of the 
Marine people. There was no plan in existence, [1616] then 
which coordinated the reconnaissance functioning of these three groups 
of planes out there? 

Admiral Bellinger. The plan for reconnaissance was primarily for 
the patrol planes to carry out reconnaissance. In other words, they 
were the only ones trained and capable of carrying it out, and these 
54 new planes that I am speaking about as having arrived after 28 
October were supposedly the best aircraft we had for reconnaissance 
out in Hawaii. 

133. General Russell. Under whose command, then, between No- 
vember 27 and December 7, were all of tlie planes in the areas which 
we have discussed, capable of conducting patrol missions? 

Admiral Bellinger. That is a question you have got to elaborate 
on to get a practical answer. Now, speaking from practical experi- 
ence, after December 7. 

134. General Frank. In the first place, they were all under the 
Commander of the fleet, at the top side, were they not ? 

Admiral Bellinger. All fleet planes are subject to the orders of 
the Commander-in-Chief, as he sees fit, and they each have different 
commands, but the reconnaissance planes were the PBYs and the 
4-engine bombers of the Army, 

135. General Russell. We are not talking about the Army, now. 
Admiral Bellinger. They were used, and proved the best for re- 
connaissance work in practice, after December 7. 

136. General Russell. We are not talking about that, and I will 
approach it from another angle. Were there any planes out there 



848 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

which you have described as "Marine planes," on reconnaissance duty, 
prior to December 7, 19-11? 

Admiral Bellinger, You mean, under me, functioning? 

137. General Russell. No, sir. I asked you a simple question. 
[1617] Admiral Bellinger. Well, yes; there were. 

138. General Russell. Were those planes on reconnaissance? 
Admiral Bellinger. They were going to Midway for that purpose. 

139. General Russell. They were functioning, then, on reconnais- 
sance ? 

Admiral Bellinger. They went to Midway to do jobs at Midway 
which would i-equire reconnaissance as well as combat. 

140. General Russell. All right. Then you did have Marine planes 
doing reconnaissance from Midway prior to December 7? 

Admiral Bellinger. I did not have, no. I just happened to know 
that they were there. 

141. General Russell. Do you know of any of the other Marine- 
commanded planes that were doing reconnaissance or patrol prior to 
December 7, 1941, except those at Midway ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No. Their planes were not actually designed 
for reconnaissance work, unless perhaps they were operated from a 
carrier. They at one time used these planes for operating from 
carriers, and when they were so operated they did carry out reconnais- 
sance duties from the carrier; but from land their range was not 
satisfactory for that sort of work. 

142. General Russell. So, therefore, from land bases their range 
was not satisfactory for that; then their operations from Midway 
would not have been satisfactory, because they would have been land- 
based, there? 

Admiral Bellinger. Early information is very desirable. Now, 
the question is, how early can you get it. If you get information 100 
miles away, it is better than having it from 20 miles away. Therefore, 
they did carry out, I know, [767<S] reconnaissance work within 
their limitations, when they were based on islands; and I don't think 
any commander who is in charge of an island base would hesitate to 
use some sort of plane, even a fighter plane, to try to get early informa- 
tion of an attack, or an approaching enemy. 

143. General Russell. What would have been the range of those 
planes based at Midway, that were from the ISIarine Corps? 

Admiral Bellinger. As a matter of fact, those planes flew from 
Honolulu to Midway with special tanks on them. It was stretching 
it pretty far, but they did it. 

144. General Frank. That is around 1100 miles? 

Admiral Bellinger. Midway to Oahu, I think, is 1200 miles, isn't it? 

145. General Frank. That is near enough. 
Admiral Bellinger. It is 1138 miles, 

146. General Russell. Do you know where all of these Marine 
planes were disposed, or where they were based, on 7 December? 

Admiral Bellinger. Those in the Hawaiian area were based at Ewa. 

147. General Russell. Do you know about how many there were, 
there? 

Admiral Bellinger. I am not positive. 

148. General Russell. Do you know how many were at Midway? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 849 

Admiral Bellinger. I think it was one squadron of 18 planes. I 
am not positive of that, but I think so. 

149. General Russell. Where could we get that information, Ad- 
miral, as to where the Marine planes were? 

Admiral Bellinger. That is two years and four months ago, Isn't 
it? I am trying to think where you could get it, now. [16191 
If IS only just by luck I have certain papers. 

150. GeneralRussELL. All right. Now, let us think about the third 
group. 

Admiral Bellinger. Excuse me. Perhaps you have gotten the 
wrong impression, when I said that the Marine planes flew from Oahu 
to Midway. As I say, that was with special gasoline tanks and spe- 
cially loaded, as lightly as possible, to get the maximum range possible, 
the normal range combat load — "normal radius of action," you might 
say, practically, was about 175 miles, the radius of action. 

151. General Russell. Then they would be available for recon- 
naissance from their bases, 175 miles out, and return, or 87 miles out 
and 87 miles back? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

152. General Russell. Which one? They go out 175, and come 
back, or they go out 87, and come back ? 

Admiral Bellinger. If you wanted them for reconnaissance work 
you would take off some of the load and put more gas on, and get more 
distance. Normally speaking, I think the plane could search a sector 
of a radius of 100 miles. 

153. General Russell. Then, as a matter of fact, it is a mere gen- 
eralization to say that the Marine planes were capable of only rela- 
tively close-in reconnaissance? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. As a matter of fact, that was an auxiliary 
mission. 

154. General Russell. Now, let us discuss the planes that were on 
the carriers at that time, 93 on each carrier. Those planes were avail- 
able to these two carriers? 

Admiral Bellinger. Available to them. 

[16W] 155. General Russell. Yes. I mean, they had been 
issued. They had them ? 
Admiral Beli.inger. Yes. 

156. General Frank. They were their complements ? 

Admiral Bellinger. They were either on the carriers, out at sea, 
or, when the carriers get in, the planes, the air group, are based ashore. 

157. General Russell. Now, the LEXINGTON, that morning of 
December 7, was about 200 miles westerly of Oahu, isn't that true? 
One of them was with a task force ? 

Admiral Bellinger. One of them was returning. The ENTER- 
PRISE was returning. 

158. General Russell. They had with them, or should have had, 
these 93 planes? 

Admiral Bellinger. 1 am not familiar with all the details of this 
operation, because I did not have charge of it. 

159. General Russell. You do not know ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I don't know for a fact, no. I know from cer- 
tain information what was going on, and I knew it at the time, but 
this is two years and some months since then. 



850 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

160. General Frank. Did you have any authority over or anything 
to do with the airplanes on the carriers ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Not on the carriers ; no. 

161. General Frank. Did you have anything to do with, or any 
authority over, the Marine planes. 

Admiral Bellinger. Only when the Naval Base Defense Air Force 
functioned, and then I had operational control over those that were 
made available to me. You must remember that these various com- 
mands had commanding officers. They had the [1621] job of 
running them. 

162. General Russell. The point I was attempting to illustrate, 
Admiral, is, that there were certain planes out there that you did not 
command, and that did not confuse your operation, simply because 
they were somewhere else, doing something under another command. 
Those were the utility planes, the marine planes, and the planes that 
were with the carriers. They did not trouble you, because you had 
nothing to do with them except when they were attached to your com- 
mand, isn't that true ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, they didn't trouble me. 

163. General Russell. With respect to the planes which you had 
under your command, it did not confuse you a lot, whether you were 
operating under orders from Kimmel or whether you were operating 
under orders from Bloch, if you understood your orders ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, it didn't confuse me, so long as I got 
orders. 

164. General Russell. But there was no plan set up, and operative, 
by which you were working with the Army planes, out there, prior to 
December 7 ? 

Admiral Bellinger. You say there w^as no plan operating ? 

165. General Russell. Operative. 

Admiral Bellinger. A plan was made operative, at times. 

166. General Russell. From November 27 to December 7, was it 
operative ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Oh, excuse me. I beg your pardon, was that 
question from November 27 ? 

167. General Russell. I was going to limit it, so Ave could not take 
in so much territory. From November 27 to December 7, [1632] 
were any of those plans operative? 

Admiral Bellinger. They were not in a functioning status. 

168. General Russell. Is there a great difference between "oper- 
ative" and "in a functioning status," please, Admiral ? 

Admiral Bellinger. There is a great misinterpretation of words in 
the English language, and I want to make sure that it is understood 
that this plan was not actually functioning at that time. 

169. General Russell. Well, I like your language, and we will just 
adopt it. That will avoid a lot of trouble. 

Admiral, on the morning of December 7, 1941, how many Navy 
planes were available on the Island of Oahu, or in the Avaters immedi- 
ately adjacent thereto, to have aided in repelling this Japanese attack? 

170. General Frank. That is, for reconnaissance, as well as for 
fighting purposes ? 

171. General Russell. For fighting. I am going into the fighting. 
Admiral Bellinger. That is a question which is entirely under the 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 851 

control of the Commander of the fighter group, U. S. Army, as they 
made their reports to him. They were not under me. 

172. General Russell. Then your answer is that you do not know 
how many naval aircraft were available on the Island of Oahu and the 
waters adjacent thereto, on the morning of December 7, 1941 ? 

173. General Frank. That is something to get from Davidson. 

Admiral Bellinger. In accordance with the estimate of the situa- 
tion, signed by General Martin and myself, it was \^1623'\ 
agreed that there would be daily reports of planes that were avail- 
able to the various commands ; and on the afternoon of December 6, 
I received a dispatch from the Marine Air Corps 21, which stated : 

Availability as follows. Ei;;hteen scout bombers, three condition four ; fifteen 
scout bombers, condition five ; applicable for December 5, 6, and 7. 

I sent this dispatch to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air 
Force : 

Seven fighters, five condition five; nine scouts, three condition four, six con- 
dition five. 

Now, those planes were presumably marine planes that were re- 
ported to me available, and the scouts w^ere reported because they 
functioned under the fighter command, the pursuit command, in the 
normal plan we had drawn up, with the idea that they might be able 
to track the planes from a hostile air raid back to the carrier, and 
thereby give the position of the carrier. 

[162If\ 174. General Eussell. Now, were the Marine planes all 
that were available there at Oahu, or were there some Navy planes in 
addition thereto available for fighting? 

Admiral Bellinger. The regular air groups that were out there 
were available. 

175. General Frank. By that you mean that they were on the car- 
riers? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. I am practically sure that there were 
no other planes of that type or of that general size except the Marine 
planes. 

176. General Russell. So there was nothing there available from 
the Navv aircraft for the defense of the Island that morning, at Peai'l 
Harbor? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes; those that I just spoke to you about and 
mentioned. 

177. General Russell. I though you described those as Marine 
planes. 

Admiral Bellinger. I think they are Marines. 

178. General Frank. Those are Navy planes. 

Admiral Bellinger. But they are Navy planes. The}'^ came in the 
same category, 

179. General Russell. All right. I will ask you if there were any 
other planes except 

Admiral Bellinger. Excuse me one second. You must remember 
that the condition of readiness that existed and was in the state of 
being on the morning of December 7th was Baker 5. Now, that meant, 
that is for the defense air force setup. 

180. General Russell. Yes. 

79716—46 — Ex. 145, vol. 2 5 



852 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

\_1625^ Admiral Bellinger. Now, you understand what Baker 
5 is? 

181. General Russell. We understood it to mean, Admiral, that 
condition of readiness. 

Admiral Bellinger, So when you speak of readiness, that is the 
readiness that they were in. 

182. General Russell. We are trying to count the planes out there 
from the Navy that were available to this defense. That was all? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

183. General Russell. And those that you have given me are all? 
Admiral Bellinger. That is all I know of. 

184. General Russell. Yes. 

185. General Grunert. I would like to find out what Baker 5 is. 
Is that four hours' readiness ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Baker 5 is one-half of aircraft in four hours' 
readiness. Now, that was a reciuirement 

186. General Grunert. They could be used in the air? 

Admiral Bellinger. Excuse me. That was a requirement by the 
order by the Commander Naval Base Defense Force. It did not mean 
necessarily that all planes were only kept in that condition, because 
planes were not standing by for this [indicating] except within the 
category that was demanded. In other words, there was a lot of work 
to be done both by the Army Air Force and myself as well as all the 
rest of them out there, and that was being done ; and if they didn't 
set this at a lower, a priority which would permit this work to go on, 
why, it would have been a question of standing by and no work being 
done. 

\^1626^^ 187. General Grunert. Then, after notice was given, in 
four hours you could furnish the number of planes that the General 
was talking about? 

Admiral Bellinger. If they still were in 5. 

188. General Frank. Such other work as was to be done, one of the 
things would be training? 

Admiral Bellinger. Training was one of the big jobs. 

189. General Russell. That was what you were discussing, Ad- 
miral, some time ago, that maintaining a constant high state of alert 
out there w^oukl produce a weariness of personnel and obstruct other 
necessary work? 

Admiral Bellinger. It was a question of whether we were to im- 
prove our conditions out tliere or take a status quo and never be 
better than that for some time and rather deteriorate, rather than 
to improve. 

190. General Grunert. Of course, had you known the attack was 
coming December 7th, it would not have been a long period in which 
to be on the alert, would it ? 

Admiral Bellinger. If anyone knew the attack was coming, why, 
I assume they would have been in a functioning status. 

191. General Grunert. Then, if you had received the intelligence 
that you learned of after December 7th, would that not have given 
you an idea of the imminence of something coming that would have 
been greater than attempting to perfect yourselves in training, but to 
do the best that you could with what you had? I do not mean as to 
your knowledge about the attack, but I mean as to your knowledge 



PROCEED! iSfGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 853 

as to the information that was available to create in your mind a 
question at least [1627] as to the imminence of an attack. 

Admiral Bellixger. In other words, you mean if I had had access 
to all dispatches, would I have recommended that the Naval Base 
Defense Air Force be put in a functioning status? 

192. General Grunert. Yes. 

Admiral Bellinger. As I said before, I hope I would have. 

193. General Grunert. All right. 

Admiral Bellinger. But that is making a statement two years and 
four months subsequent to December 7, as an aftermath and not as an 
ante bellum. 

194. General Grunert. Admiral, Avill you. tell us the number of 
planes that were available to you as of December 7th for your, we will 
say, functioning responsibilities? 

Admiral Bellinger. As Commander Xaval Base Defense Air Force ? 

195. General Grunert. Right. 

196. General Frank. Did you contemplate using B-18s for any 
purpose ? 

Admiral Bellinger. B-18s had a very limited range, so it certainly 
was not in a good position for reconnaissance. It was hoped that they 
could make a bombing attack if a carrier came in, in within their 
radius of action. 

197. General Frank. On the other hand, they had very little de- 
fensive armament ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Correct. As a matter of fact, also they were 
used as well as various other types that were not considered suitable 
for distant reconnaissance but which we sent out in order to find out 
anything that we ma}^ be able to find out within their radius of action 
on December 7th. 

[1€38] Answering the former question by General Grunert, data 
contained in reports which were sent in accordance with provisions of 
the joint estimate for the Naval Base Defense Air Force indicate that 
there were 66 VP planes, 11 utility planes, and from the Army 8 B-l7s, 
21 B-18s and 6 A-20s. These planes were reported in various con- 
ditions ranging from condition of readiness 5 and less. 

198. General Grunert. That means what in thne? 

Admiral Bellinger. Condition 5 means ready in four hours. I 
would like to bring one point out, though : that the Commanding Gen- 
eral, Hawaiian Air Force, had their conditions in w4iat was termed 
Easy 5. "Easy" means E-5, and E-5 states that, "All aircraft con- 
ducting routine operations, none ready for the purpose of this plan," 
in Condition of Readiness 5, that is, within four hours. 

199. General Grunert. You mean to say any reported number of 
planes would not be ready within four hours ? 

Admiral Bellinger. The report means to me that these planes were 
conducting routine operations, which I assume were carrying out his 
normal jobs, and they were not ready for the purpose of the Naval 
Base Defense Air Force plan, but that they could be made ready in 
four hours. 

200. General Grunert. All right. Then they are within four 
hours? Four hours after they got back? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 



854 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

201. General Grunert. What I am trying to get at is how many were 
available. 

Admiral Bellinger. I am interpreting, because I assume that is 
what he meant, in other words, because that differs \1629] 
from the other reports. That is, material readiness Easy or E was 
different from the others; and, as I say, that "E" means, 

AH aircraft conductiug routine operations, none ready for the purpose of this 
plan. 

202. General Grunekt. Meaning, then, that after they got through 
with the operation they would be made ready in four hours, after 
they get back ? Is that the operation ? 

Admiral Bellinger. My interpretation was that they were con- 
ducting exercises or else were doing something else, but they were 
not standing by for this plan, but that they could be made ready in 
four hours. 

203. General Grunert. You were not actually able to make the 
plan function on December Tth, were you ? Or did it function ? 

Admiral Bellinger. The plan began functioning with planes that 
were available, insofar as scouting was concerned, immediately by 
radio to the planes that were in the air, and by instructions to get 
other planes going; and of course the planes that were not in the air 
were gotten going at various times, some very quickly. 

204. General Grunert. Will you tell me how many there were in 
the air? 

Admiral Bellinger. And some, a great many of course, were 
damaged. 

205. General Grunert. Do you know, can you tell me approximately 
how many were in the air on a scouting mission at the time when 
the attack first struck or shortly before that, and what their scouting 
mission was? 

I will change that: Were any planes on distant reconnaissance 
[16S0] that morning? 

Admiral Bellinger. There were no planes on distant reconnais- 
sance in the true sense of the term "distant reconnaissance." Seven 
planes were conducting search between 120 to 170 degrees to 450 
miles from Midway. Four planes were on the surface at Midway, 
armed each with two 500-pound bombs and on ten minutes' notice. 
These four planes took departure at 10 : 30 and covered a sector from 
east towards north. Four planes were in the air conducting intertype 
tactics with submarines. 

206. General Frank. At Midway? 

Admiral Bellinger. Off Oahu. Captain Ramsey informs me it 
was off Lanai. 

Therefore, considering Midway and Oahu, Patrol Wings 1 and 2 
had 14 planes in the air, 7 of which were on search from Midway. 
58 were on the surface at Kaneohe or Pearl Harbor ready for flight 
within four hours or less. 9 planes were undergoing repairs, making 
a total of 81 planes. 

207. General Frank. How many were destroyed in the attack ? 
Admiral Bellinger. 38 were completely destroyed. 38 were never 

able to be repaired. 

208. General Frank. What about the rest of them ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 855 

Admiral Bellingkr. 57 planes were put out of commission either 
temporarily or completely. 38 of those were not able to be put back 
in commission. 

209. General Frank. You then had 24 available after the attack? 
You said you had 81 and you lost 57. That leaves 24. 

Admiral Bellinger. Captain Ramsey says we only had 12 at 
Midway. 

[1631] 210. General Frank. Well, it leaves 12 in commission 
at Oahu after the attack? 

Admiral Bellinger. I am informed by Captain Ramsey that that 
is correct. 

211. General Grunert. Now, a few questions on intelligence. I 
believe this question was answered. If so, why, we will just say, 
''answered," but I wanted to make sure that it was understood by you : 
Did you know of the presence of a Japanese task force in the vicinity 
of Jaluit between November 27th and 30th? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

212. General Grunert. You did not. Nor were you kept advised 
as to anything about that force later than that, up to December 7th? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

213. General Grunert. Now, what was the customary procedure 
insofar as what we would call air intelligence was concerned? Was 
that a separate intelligence from other intelligence? 

Admiral Bellinger. No. 

214. General Grunert. It was not? 
Admiral Bellinger. No. Naval Intelligence. 

215. General Grunert. Do you know whether the air part of the 
Naval Intelligence was transmitted to the Army Air Forces? 

Admiral Bellinger. I do not know. I w^as not informed. 

216. General Grunert. Do you know of any efforts made by the 
Navy to get intelligence, including intelligence about aircraft or car- 
riers that may have been in or about the mandated islands? 

Admiral Bellinger. The Navy is very seriously interested 
\1632] in intelligence, and they have an intelligence branch of 
the Navy whose job it is to get all intelligence they can get, and un- 
doubtedly everyone in the Navy is interested in getting the maximum 
amount of intelligence they can get. 

217. General Grunert. Your definite interest, though, was pri- 
marily, I presume, to know about the possible opposing aircraft and 
carriers? 

Admiral Bellinger. That was something in which I was very 
much interested. 

218. General Grunert. Did you get any such information? 
Admiral Bellinger. But, as I said before, my war plans job was 

to base at Midway. Therefore, with my forces on the various islands 
including Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston, I would therefore 
be very much interested in all information about Japanese air effort. 

219. General Frank. But you didn't have any that morning? 
Admiral Bellinger. I beg pardon. 

220. General Frank. You didn't have any on the morning of De- 
cember 7th ? 

Admiral Bellinger. December 7th I didn't have any inforinatiou 
about a task force in Jaluit, you say ? 



856 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

221. General Grunert. Yes, or the Marshalls. I will put it both, 

222. General Frank. When is the first time since then that you 
have heard of that'? 

Admiral Bellinoi.r. 1 think it is today. 

[16331 223. General Grunert. If you were based on Midway 
then it would be more than that ? 
Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

224. General Grunert. Anxiety as to information about the man- 
dated islands would be greater? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

225. General Grunert. Did you ever needle the powers that be to 
give you more information than you had? You apparently had not 
known about it. Did you ever get after them and say, "Here, in order 
to do my work in the future I have got to have information" ? 

Admiral Bellinger. As to this information about a task force in 
Jaluit, I do not remember anything about it. This is my first infor- 
mation about that, now, that there was information about this task 
force in Jaluit. Certainly I am interested and was interested in every 
form of readiness which includes naval intelligence. As a matter of 
fact, we were discussing this subject with General Martin and others 
some time considerably prior to this, wondering if we would have 
intelligence on the movement of a Japanese force. 

226. General Grunert. My understanding is that you did not get 
any information about the movement of Japanese forces in or about 
the mandated islands ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I remember nothing about it at the present 
time, and I do not think I ever got it. 

227. General Grunert. Did you take any positive action in at- 
tempting to get such intelligence from the Navy or from any other 
source? Not that intelligence, but any intelligence about the Jap- 
anese Navy? 

[1634}. Admiral Bellinger. We were supposed to be kept in- 
formed, as a force commander or commander of an operating out- 
fit, and presumably information of that kind would be distributed 
as it was known to have been distributed in the past. I do not remem- 
ber any special efi'ort or special demand for information that I ever 
made to the Navy Department. When it came to demands it was 
mainly demands for increasing the material readiness. But I do not 
know of any particular definite specific demands for naval intel- 
ligence. 

228. General Frank. You assumed that if it was available it would 
be given to you? 

Admiral Bellinger. I assumed that and I expected that. 

229. General Grunert. We will go to a different subject now. 
Were the submarines of the fleet or of the naval district, if any, 

used for reconnaissance purposes? Did they fit into your scheme 
of reconnaissance? 

Admiral Bellinger. The submarine force was not under me. We 
worked that submarine force in various ways. For instance, we had 
drills to work out with submarines and we had something to do 
with operations connected with reconnaissance duties. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 857 

23Q. General Grunert. Were they ever used in a scheme of distant 
reconnaissance? While you did not have quite enough planes to 
cover 300 degrees, there were certain areas that might be covered by 
subs. Was that ever done ? 

Admiral Bellinger. They were not put in the scheme of things con- 
nected with that, presumably because they would be used offensively 
rather than on defensive missions. 

231. General Gruxert. Any intelligence they might furnish would 
be incidental to other duties? 

[lG3o] Admiral Bellinger. Submarines have been used for in- 
telligence work in war games and in plans. Whether any submarines 
had been sent out for any specific intelligence work, I do not know. 
That was not under me. 

232. General Grunert. They were not under the air reconnaissance? 
Admiral Bellinger, They were not working under me and were 

not in the picture in connection with the defense of Pearl Harbor, 

233. General Grunert, It is the Board's understanding that these 
task forces that went out from Pearl Harbor had no definite job in 
distant reconnaissance for the defense of Oaliu ; that they scoured the 
areas for security purposes and then were used by the task forces for 
their own purposes, and not for distant reconnaissance purposes for 
the defense of Oahu, Is that your understanding ? 

Admiral Bellinger, I do not think that any task force was sent out 
as a job for the security of Oahu, Some task forces that were oper- 
ating at that time, that I have spoken about, were in connection with 
Midway reinforcement and Wake reinforcement. When on those 
missions, of course they conducted search to the maxinmni of their 
capabilities; and in addition to that we had patrol planes that were 
tliere for that purpose, too. That is what the squadrons were out 
there for. 

234. General Grunert. The patrol search was intended primarily 
to safeguard from subs, to look for subs primarily, and any air recon- 
naissance was incidental as far as protection for Hawaii was 
concerned ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Not being the task force commander, I 
[16S6] cannot say; I do not know. Submarines were there on 
December 7th and for many days after that. Aircraft were there on 
one day. 

235. General Grunert. Let me put it this way : As Navy Defense 
Air Force commander, j^ou had no assignments made for any air mis- 
sion so far as the task force was concerned? In other words, they 
were not given any assignments in so far as your job as the Naval Base 
Defense Air Force commander was concerned ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No. In my status as commander of Patrol 
Wings 1 and 2, in that capacity I furnished planes as directed, or 
squadrons as directed, by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to 
work with that task force in accordance with the plans of that particu- 
lar task force commander. 

236. General Grunert. How was the so-called cooperation between 
you and General Martin ? Was it satisfactory to you ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I should say it was very close, friendly cooper- 
ation. I have a high opinion of him and I think he is a very fine 
officer and gentleman. 



858 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

237. General Grunert. Outside of his being a fine officer and gen- 
tleman, did you get out of him what you needed to carry on your work, 
and did he get out of you what he needed to carry on his work? 

Admiral Bellinger. I think so, because shortly after he arrived — I 
had arrived just shortly before he arrived, and we immediately agreed 
to endeavor to work out exercises together and we conducted many 
exercises which were entirely arranged between him and me, and then 
we would have a critique over at the Naval Air Station where several 
Army officers came over to attend, I think for a while those exercises 
took place once [16S7] a week, and maybe later once every two 
weeks, and then finally when this Naval Base Defense Air Force came 
into being the exercises were planned more in accordance with that. 

238. General Grunert. Then the gist of the whole thing is that you 
got along well together officially and socially. Aside from unity of 
command, do you think you got about as much as the two of you could 
get by cooperative action? 

Admiral Bellinger. That can never be attained, because 

239. General Grunert (interposing). \1 say, aside from that, did 
you get as much of cooperation as you think the two of you could have 
gotten short of unity of command ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I do not see how we could have. Cooperation 
is fine, but there is always the responsibility of one man to one boss and 
the other man to the other boss. 

240. General Grunert. You did not have that; but did you get as 
much out of it as you expected, short of that? 

Admiral Bellinger. I was thoroughly satisfied with the cooperation 
between General Martin and myself. 

241. General Grunert. Did you know what action the Army took, 
or General Short took, as a result of a message which he received from 
the Chief of Staff on November 27 ? The Army went on what they 
called Alert No. 1, sabotage alert. Were you informed that the Army 
was on such an alert? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. 

242. General Grunert. You did not know anything about that ? 
Admiral Bellinger. I cannot remember knowing anything about it. 

One second ; excuse me. This was a long time ago. (xVfter a pause :) 
I do not recall knowing about it; at least, if I knew about it, I did not 
know about it officially. 

[16S8] 243. General Grunert. Would it have affected your re- 
sponsibility one way or the other had you known ? 

Admiral Bellinger. That is, that the Air Force was on an alert? 

244. General Grunert. The entire Hawaiian Defense Command 
was on Alert No. 1, which is an alert against sabotage. They went on 
that Alert on November 2Tth. My question is, did you know about it? 
You say you did not know about it. 

Admiral Bellinger. I did not know the reasons for it. If I knew 
. they were on their alert, I did not know it officially. 

245. General Grunert. Would it have made any difference whether 
they were on alert or not as far as your responsibility was concerned? 

Admiral Bellinger. It would depend on for what reason they went 
on thq alert. That I knew nothing about. 

246. General Grunert. And you knew nothing about the message 
received by the Army from the Chief of Staff, or the message received 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 859 

by the Navv wliich started with the words ''Consider this a war warn- 
ing?" 
Admiral Beixinger. No. 

247. General Grunert. You were not informed of that? 
Admiral Bellinger. No. sir. 

248. General Grunert. Tell us what you know, if anything, about 
the Army's Interceptor Command which included its air warning serv- 
ice and its ability to operate December 7. What did you know about 
it and what was your opinion of it? 

Admiral Bellinger. It w^as my understanding that it was in the 
process of building up; that they needed more ]:)ersonnel, more equip- 
ment, and more experience. 

[1639] 249. General Grunert. Did you have any confidence in 
its ability to operate ? 

Admiral Bellinger. I had never had any definite experience that 
would give me that assurance. 

250. General Grunert. Did you have any similar scheme within the 
Navy itself, such as was contemplated in the Interceptor Command, 
where one officer, the controller of the information center, controlled 
the operation of the device in the air or controlled antiaircraft and 
controlled the radar? Did you have any such thing to control your 
antiaircraft aboard ship ? li not, how were they handled in the Navy ? 
Here was a bunch of antiaircraft on each ship, with quite a bit of fire 
power, and you had radars. "Were the}' each independent on the ship, 
or was there some coordinated system of handling all that intelligence 
and operation while they were together ? 

Admiral Bellinger. You are speaking about ships at sea, I 
presume ? 

251. General Grunert. Yes. In handling your aircraft was it nec- 
essary for you to have any such system as the Army established as an 
Interceptor Command ? 

Admiral Bellinger. Apparently it was not practical to do that. I 
have forgotten whether this was subsequent to December 7 or prior to 
it, but I know that efforts were made to try to see whether radar on 
ships in harbors, with the interference of the surrounding land, would 
prevent the radar from being effective. 

252. General Grunert. Presumably the radar on ships in the har- 
bor did not operate while in the harbor ? 

Admiral Bellinger. They did not function very satisfactorily 
[1640] at that time. I am speaking now about approximately that 
time. I am not so sure whether this was before December 7 or after 
December 7, because the radar on ships was something that was just 
coming into being and every effort was made to try to get them on the 
carriers first. 

253. General Grunert, After the attack occui'red on Pearl Harbor 
of course the Interceptor Command scheme was broadened so as to 
weave into the antiaircraft defense those guns aboard ship while in 
the harbor. They supplemented the land-based antiaircraft, and then 
it was all woven into one whole. Up to that time, as far as you 
know, those had not been included in the antiaircraft scheme ? Is that 
right? 

Admiral Bellinger. The effort to utilize the ships in the harbor wdth 
their guns was placed in effect in conjunction with the effort for the air 



860 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

defense, and came into beinfr under the Naval Base Defense Force, 
commander. 

254. General Gkunert. Was that prior to December 7 ? 
Admiral Bellinger. Yes. 

255. General Grunert. But it had not been woven into the Inter- 
ceptor Command control? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. It was not under the Interceptor Com- 
mand control; it was under the control of the operating staff of the 
Naval Base Defense Force. There was a requirement which the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Pacific, had in effect at the time, and had for some 
time, with reference to the manning of gun crews continuously. There 
was a regular scheme laid out for their control, so far as practicable, 
by the ships that were in the harbor, by the senior officers in certain sec- 
tors of the harbor. That was a different situation, maybe, eveiy day. 
We [IG4I] hoped it Avas a scheme that would work and fit con- 
ditions that existed on any day. But the general phms and instructions 
for manning the guns were in effect. 

256. General Russell. After November 27, 1941, did you receive any 
part of the record which indicated to you, as Commander of the Air 
Force which j^ou then commanded, that there was a tightening up in 
the operations in the Navy with respect to reconnaissance or being on 
the alert for impending attack or trouble with Japan ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No. 

257. General Russell. There were no new instructions, therefore, 
that reached you on November 27 or thereafter, which you could inter- 
pret as meaning that the relations between the Iavo powers were be- 
coming more strained ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, not officially ; only through newspapers. 

258. General Russell. As a result of what you saw in the news- 
papers did you take any different action from what you would have 
taken had you not read the newspapers? 

Admiral Bellinger. The question is how to interpret the news- 
papers. As a result of the newspapers, I took no special action. We 
were in a condition of trying to get ready to such an extent that I was 
endeavoring to indoctrinate the aircraft in my patrol wings, 1 and 2, 
that if they were on a flight and they got word that war was on they 
would be ready in their training point of view, combat crew disci- 
plined and the equipment in the planes to carry out the job that might 
be assigned. That was the kind of training that were trying to 
perfect. 

259. General Russell. So you did not regard the newspaper in- 
[1642] formation as changing your operations at all? 

Admiral Bellinger. As a matter of fact, I was laid up a few days 
from December 2nd to the 6th, and I saw ncAvspapers. 

260. General Russell. You testified a little while ago that certain 
planes were operating from Midway to a distance of approximately 
450 miles, and you gave the directions of those operations by language 
with which I am not familiar. I wonder if you could tell me this: 
Were you operating those planes to the north, the east, the west, or to 
the south? 

Admiral Bellinger. In regard to Midway, the sector covered was 
to the southeast from MidAvay. After word was received out there 
at Midway the four planes that were remaining and ready for flight 
were on a sector towards the northeast, 



PROCEEDIIsrGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 861 

261. General Russell. Do you have another copy of that map which 
is before you ? 

Admiral Bellikger. No. This is an original and is the only one I 
have. 

262. General Russell. Yon Avould not want to give it to us? 
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir, 

263. General Frank. If one of those planes had met with some 
Zeros it would have been too bad? 

Admiral Bellinger. It would have. 

264. General Frank. If all four together met with Zeros it would 
have been too bad? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes; although patrol planes have "shot it out" 
with some Jap planes. 

265. General Grunert. Is there anything else that occurs to you 
that you thinlc; might be of assistance to this Board in getting at facts 
or getting leads towards sources of such facts? [164S^ If so, 
if you could add it now to your testimony we would appreciate it. 
Is there something that sticks in your mind that ought to be consid- 
ered, outside of what we have covered in our questions and your 
answers ? 

266. General Frank. Let me ask this question : The general activi- 
ties of the Navy operating out of Pearl Harbor were in what direction 
from Oahu? 

Admiral Bellinger. On December 7? 

267. General Frank. No ; in the period prior to December 7, in 
November and up to December 7. 

Admiral Bellinger. Toward the northwest and west. On the 
routes toward Midway and Wake there were two task forces of sur- 
face craft and aircraft that went out in connection with the rein- 
forcement of those two islands, Midway and Wake, by Marine air- 
craft. These forces were operating in that area going out and coming 
back. 

268. General Grunert. You do not think of anything else that you 
think ought to be put before the Board ? 

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. I think it has been covered as far as I 
can see. I know of nothing more to bring out. 

269. General Grunert. Thank you very much for giving us of your 
time and assistance. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 
(Thereupon, at 1 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m.) 

[164-4] AFTERNOON SESSION 

(The Board, at 2 o'clock p. m., continued the hearing of witnesses.) 
General Grunert. The Board will come to order. 

TESTIMONY OF COMMANDEE JOSEPH J. ROCHEFORT, U. S. N.; ON 
DUTY AT CHIEF, NAVAL OPERATIONS; WASHINGTON, D. C. 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Commander, will you state to the Board your 
name, rank, organization, and station, please. 



862 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Commander Rochefort. Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, U. S. N., 
on duty at the Chief, Naval Operations; Washington, D. C. 

2. General Grunert. Commander, this Board is after the facts, both 
as to what happenned prior to, leading up to, and during the attack 
at Pearl Harbor. From a study of the Roberts Commission's report, 
we find that you were in a position, by reason of which I think you can 
give us some information that will help us. 

First, then, will you state to the Board what your assignment was 
in the latter part of 1941, and then explain what the duties of that as- 
signment Avere, so that we may get clearly just what your position was 
and how you fitted into the picture. 

Commander Rochefort. About June 1941, 1 was ordered from duty 
as intelligence officer of the Scouting Force to combat intelligence at 
Pearl Harbor. This combat-intelligence assignment was to an office 
which was a field unit to the home office, which was in Washington ; 
the other field unit being in Cavite, and operating under the Sixteenth 
Naval District. I was attached to the Commandant of the Fourteenth 
Naval District, and theoretically had no connections with the Com- 
mander-in-Chief [164S] or with any other organization, there. 

The duties of the office were extremely technical in nature, and had 
nothing to do with ordinary intelligence; it was primarily radio in- 
telligence. The method of operating was, we were given assignments 
by the head office in Washington as to the type of work they wished us 
to work on. 

3. General Grunert. Before you go any further, let me see if I un- 
derstand that. You w^ere then the combat-intelligence officer, in mat- 
ters pertaining to the Fourteenth Naval District; at least, you were 
attached to that district for combat-intelligence work? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

4. General Grunert. There existed also a fleet-intelligence officer? 
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

5. General Grunert. And a district intelligence officer ? 
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

6. General Grunert. There was also an Army intelligence officer ? 
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

7. General Grunert. Those were the other echelons of intelligence 
work going on at that time ? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

8. General Grunert. You had nothing to do with local intelligence, 
nor with the ordinary intelligence that the fleet needs ; you had to do 
with special intelligence work? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

9. General Grunert. That was mainly in the line of radio intercep- 
tion ? 

[1646] Commander Rochefort. Radio interception. I might 
say, General, that when I first went there it had no name whatever. 
It was called the "radio unit" of the district, but we changed it 
after I went there and called it "combat intelligence," and then en- 
larged it to include such things as providing situation maps for 
the Commander-in-Chief, and plots of all vessels in the Pacific, and 
so on, and so forth; and generally we consisted of an intercept 
station, a radio-direction-finder station, and, in the crypto-analytical 
units in Pearl Harbor, proper. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 863 

10. General Grunert. If there is anything, in answering any of 
our questions and in explaining anything to us, that may be of future 
value to the enemy, we had better consider what should be on, and 
what should be off, the record; so keep that in mind in answering 
these questions. 

Just what is the set-up, so that you could perform the duties that 
you were required to perform out there? 

Commander Rochefort. I don't understand your question, by 
"set-up," sir. 

11. General Grunert. All right. Now, there is radio intercept? 
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

12. General Grunert. You spoke of direction finders; and now, 
what is the physical set-up? How do they do that. Give us an un- 
derstanding of that. 

Commander Rochefort. We had what we termed the "'intercept 
unit," which during 1941 was located at Heeia, at an old naval 
radio station. 

13. General Grunert. That is on an island in the Hawaiian 
[lOIf':"] group ? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. That is just beyond Waialua 
over on the other side. 

14. General Grunert. That intercept station works by itself? It 
doesn't have to have anything farther out, does it? 

Commander Rochefort. No, sir. It might be understood a little 
more clearly, sir, if we called it a monitoring station. I believe that 
is what the FCC calls it — a monitoring station. In other words, we 
intercept any traffic that is going, either way. 

15. General Grunert. In any direction? 
Commander Rochefort. In any direction ; yes, sir. 

16. General Grunert. All right. Now, I understand it. What 
are your "direction finders"? 

Commander Rochefort. The task of the direction finders was to 
take bearings on transmissions of vessels or units in which we were 
interested. 

17. General Grunert. That requires more than one station, does it? 
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir; that does require more than one 

station, 

18. General Grunert. Did you have charge of those stations, or 
were those independent groups, too? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. In addition to the combat in- 
telligence unit at Pearl Harbor, there was established in 1937 what 
we called the "Mid Pacific strategic direction-finder net," which were 
all high-frequency direction finders, and those direction finders were 
physically located at Dutch Harbor, Samoa, and Pearl Harbor, plus 
one at Guam, which for administrative [-?6'4<?] purposes came 
under the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, but who took bearings 
for us, so we had four stations which were included in the Mid 
Pacific net. 

19. General Grunert. Was the direction finding primarily for the 
fleet, or was that incidental in following up your radio-intercept, and 
so forth? 

Commander Rochefort. That was incidental to the radio intelli- 
gence job, sir. The function of that, or rather the mission of that 



864 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

was to tell the Commander-in-Chief and any other interested parties 
where certain units of any nation, other than our own — and our own, 
if so directed — were. 

20. General Grunert. That is, w^here they were physically located ? 

Commander Rochefort, Yes, sir. 

21.General Grunert. Although you might have picked it out of 
the air about their being there, but you located them through the 
direction finder? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. That was the function of the 
radio direction finder. 

22. General Grunert. To whom was this information you got 
through the radio intercept and direction finding transmitted? 

Commander Rochefort. That came into the office which was 
located in the administration building in Pearl Harbor, and was 
evaluated there with other information, and was disseminated to 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet by means of a daily 
bulletin, which included locations of enemy vessels and estimates 
and evaluations regarding future operations. Also, if anything 
of any importance was determined that was sent by radio to a group 
of addresses, a standard group of addresses, which included the 
Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, 
the Commandant of the [164^^ Sixteenth Naval District. 

23. General Frank. That was in Manila? 

Commander Rochefort. That was Cavite; yes, sir; plus the Com- 
mandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and the Commander-in-Chief, 
Pacific Fleet. 

24. General Grunert. Did you have any responsibility as to any- 
thing sent by direct transmission to the Army in Hawaii ? 

Commander Rochefort. No, sir. 

25. General Grunert. If that was transmitted, it was somebody 
else's business? 

Commander Rochefort. Our relations with the Army in Pearl 
Harbor were more on the personal basis. We had no directives to 
my knowledge, to do such and such, with Colonel Fielder. He hap- 
pened to be my opposite number, there. I worked through Colonel 
Fielder; but everything that was done was on a personal basis, and 
if we determined anything or heard anything, it would be delivered 
to Colonel Fielder, personally. 

26. General Grunert. But it was not your responsibility to keep 
him informed? 

Commander Rochefort. I did not consider it was; no, sir. 

27. General Grunert. Was most of this work that you were doing 
considered to be of a high degree of secrecy ? 

Commander Rochefort. It was considered to be the very top, sir. 

28. General Grunert. Therefore, you were probably limited in 
the dissemination? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

29. General Grunert. And he was not on your list for dis- 
semmation ? 

[1650] Commander Rochefort. No, sir ; we were not permitted 
to deal with anybody other than the Commander-in-Chief of the 
fleet. 



PROCEEDlNCiS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 865 

30. General Grunekt. And the Commandant of the District? All 
right. 

Now, on all diplomatic or consular stnif, could you "pick" or 
"butt into" that? 

Commander Rochefort. No, sir. In this allocation of work that 1 
mentioned before, the diplomatic and consular work was done by 
the unit in Washington; and, to a certain extent, it was assisted 
by the unit in Cavite. 

31. General Grunert. But if it were in the air, could you not pick 
it out ? 

Commander Rochefort. We could have, sir, if it was in the air; 
but — it may sound funny, now — it was not our job, sir. 

32. General Frank. When you refer to "the unit in Washington," 
do you mean the naval unit in Washington ? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir ; in so far as we were concerned, 
it was tlie naval unit. Actually it was both the Army and the Navy 
here, together, but in so far as we were concerned. 

33. General Grunert. Was it against the law for you to pick 
that up? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

34. General Grunert. And trying to decode it ? 
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir ; it was. 

35. General Grunert. Now, we get down to cases. This informa- 
tion that you got was furnished by daily summaries to the fleet and 
the District? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

30. General Grunert. And to other people, but not directly to 
[165 1^ the Army? 
Commander Rochefort. No, sir. 

37. General Grunert. If you got any special information, I sup- 
pose it was furnished to the same people ? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. The arrangement we made. 
General, was again on a personal basis, that anything pertaining to 
the islands, themselves, in so far as I was concerned, was the function 
of the district intelligence officer and of the Army ; anything pertain- 
ing to outside of the islands was my job, and the arrangement I had 
was that if any information such as — oh, say an unauthorized radio 
transmitter, perhaps, on the Island of Oahu, if that came up, I would 
communicate that information to the district intelligence officer and 
to Colonel Fielder. 

38. General Grunert. And they would handle the local matters? 
Commander Rochefort. They would handle the stuff in the island, 

proper. In other words, they were interior, and I was not at all inter- 
ested in anything that went on, on the beach, or within the island. 
I didn't consider that part of my job. 

39. General Grunert. But suppose you picked up something a way 
out to one side, you then could not be the judge as to whether it was 
Navy, Army, or the district ? 

Commander Rochefort. Then I dealt only with the Commandant 
of the District, sir. 

40. General Grunert. What I am trying to find out is, if it had 
to be transmitted to the Army, that would be transmitted on his 
judgment? 



866 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir; either by the Commandant, the 
Commander-in-Chief, or by the Chief of Naval Operations, here. 

[1652] 41. General Grunert. All right, now; I tlijnk I under- 
stand the set-up. 

Along about the latter part of November, or, I believe, as testified 
by you before the Roberts Commission, along about the 1st of Novem- 
ber, you started picking up some stuff which appeared to be of great 
interest and probably some question, and then, along about tlie latter 
part of November, you picked U]) some stuff that showed concentration 
of Japanese vessels. Now, will you give us the story to that, from the 
beginning to the end, until you lost it, or Igst part of it, or whatnot. 
Give us that story, please. 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. Well, in any of this radio intel- 
ligence work, sir, by experience, trained men or trained officers can 
make a very, very good estimate of what the intentions will be of the 
enemy, by means of just a study of the^ traffic, itself; and from our 
experience in Hainan, the movement which had happened about nine 
months before, and watching the traffic during the late fall of 1941, 
it became apparent that the Japanese were preparing for a major 
operation. As time developed, and along about the 20th or 25th of 
November, things had progressed to the point where our views crystal- 
lized, and we accordingly prepared an estimate, which was sent to all 
the addresses that I mentioned previously. 

42. General Grunert. That was in the form of a summary, was it ? 
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir; you call it a "summary." We 

call it a "summary." 

43. General Frak. How was that sent — by radio ? 
Commander Rochefort. That was sent out by radio, sir. [1653] 

The procedure was that it was sent by radio to a single addressee, 
which included Chief of Naval Operations, two Commanders-in-Chief, 
and the two District Commandants involved. That summary indi- 
cated to us that the Japanese were engaged in a major operation, 
which w^ould start in the immediate future, and that it was composed 
generally of two task forces; and Ave gave the location and the com- 
position and the general heading. In addition to that, there appeared 
to be a very strong concentration in the Marshalls ; as I recall, we said 
at least one third of the submarines, and at least one carrier division 
unit — at least that. We sent that out, as I recall, about the 25th or 
26th of November. 

44. General Grunert. Would you tell me what a carrier-division 
unit consists of, how many carriers ? 

Commander Rochefort. Normally, two, sir, w^ith the Japanese. II 
could be three, but normally, two. 

45. General Grunert. And the submarines, you said about a third? 
Commander Rochefort. About one third of the submarines. They 

were as I recall two squadrons, which would be probably about 15 to 
20 submarines. 

46. General Grunert. Were there any battleships in that force? 
Commander Rochefort. Not that we noted, sir ; not that we noted. 

47. General Grunert. All right. Go on. 

Commander Rochefort. That summary was sent out about the 
25th or 26th of November, and the reply was received from the Asiatic 
unit, the so-called "Cavite unit," in which they agreed with us in prac- 



PKOCEEDIN(JS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 867 

tically all particulars, other than the location of the carriers in the 
Marshalls. 

11654] Their reaction was that they did not have sufficient 
evidence that would indicate there were carriers in the Marshalls. 
Aside from that, they agreed with us. 

48. General Grunekt. They had a similar unit to yours, in Cavite? 
Commander Rociiefgrt. Yes, sir, the only difference being the 

type of work that they were working on, the type of stuff that they 
were working on. 

49. General Grunert. Then, what happened, after the 25th, after 
that summary? 

Commander Rociiefort. After the summary, sir, why, things got 
very quiet, and there was considerable action and traffic and indica- 
tions in the area generally to the westward of the Empire; that is, 
between the Empire and Indo-China, which made it very clear that 
the Japanese were moving in that area. There was some traffic indi- 
cating a move down toward the Philippines. 

50. General Grunert. Was there anything indicating that this 
force which vou had estimated or figured out to be in about the Mar- 
shalls had left the Marshalls? 

Commander Rochefort. No, sir; there was not. Aside from those 
t wo groups or forces that I have mentioned ; that is, going toward the 
Philippine«, and toward Indo-China, there was no information of 
any sort available from a study of radio traffic that indicated any 
move to the eastward from the Empire, or any move out of the 
Marshalls. 

51. General Grunert. About when was it that, from all the evi- 
dence, this force in the Marshalls dropped out of existence? 

Commander Rociiefort. About the latter part of November, 
[16S5] I would say, sir ; perhaps in the last five days of November. 

52. General Grunert. You could not get anything on the carriers, 
or you could not get anything on any part of the force, or what? 

Commander Rochefort. They were not transmitting. That is, if 
they were transmitting messages, we were not hearing them. 

53. General Frank. They were on radio silence, completely ? 
Commander Rochefort. Apparently so, sir ; apparently, they were 

on radio silence. 

54. General Grunert. Was that indicative to you there was some- 
thing serious in the air? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir; there was; but not toward the 
eastward. 

55. General Grunert. Did you enquire of Cavite again to find out 
whether they got anything more on them ? 

Commander Rochefort. There was a series of dispatches between 
Cavite and ourselves and Washington, beginning with our message, 
about the 25th. I don't recall any specific message though, or what it 
said, but we had been for months of course in constant communication ; 
but whether any of the messages subsequent to that asked that specific 
question, sir, I don't recall. 

56. General Grunert, You did not have any reaction, though, from 
Washington, on your summary? 

Commander Rochefort. No, sir. There was no reply. 

79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 2 6 



868 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

57. General Grunert. There was no reaction, indicating that they 
believed in it, or disbelieved in it ? 

Commander Rochefort. No, sir ; there was no reply from [16561 
Washington, sir, 

58. General Frank. Did you get anything from Dutch Harbor or 
Samoa ? 

Commander Eochefort. No, sir ; I didn't get anything from Dutch 
Harbor and Samoa, General. They only had either three or four 
radios, and they were merely a direction-finding unit, that was all, and 
they were supposed to be trained direction-finder men ; but that's about 
all they were good for. 

59. General Grunert. In this radio intercept stuff about the force 
being in the Marshalls, did you get the names of any of the vessels? 

Commander Rochefort. No, sir. 

60. General Grunert. Do you know whether this force that you 
located in the Marshalls was the force that attacked Hawaii? 

Commander Rochefort. We believed it was, afterwards, sir. 

61. General Grunert. What led you to believe that? What led you 
to believe that they were the same vessels ? 

Commander Rochefort. We were reasonably sure, sir, in so far as 
the submarines were concerned, because we had, of course, numerous 
submarines off Pearl Harbor, beginning on or about the 7th of Decem- 
ber, and the logical place for them to come from was the Marshalls, 
particularly in view of the fact that the force commander of the sub- 
marines was in the Marshalls during November and remained there 
during December and probably January. 

62. General Grunert. Was there any talk in the air by radio, later 
on, from Japanese sources, that gave you information as to where they 
had been, or what they had done ? 

Commander Rochefort. No, sir. We knew, of course, who had 
come to Pearl Harbor, but where they had come from, we didn't 
[16r57] know. 

63. General Grunert. There was something I did not quite under- 
stand, in your testimony before the Roberts Commission. The Chair- 
man said something to the effect, 

Now, you had information on Wednesday — 

I presume that is the 3rd — 

that the consul here was burning his papers, did you not? 

You replied. 

We are the ones who gave that to Washington. 

He appeared to be surprised, and said, "Oh!" And then you said: 

We talked — we told them he was. They told us that London and Washington 
were burning papers. 

Presumably that was the 3rd of December, Wednesday ? 
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

64. General Grunert. Now, was that information from Washing- 
ton that the consulates in London and Washington were burning 
papers transmitted to your district commander? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

65. General Grunert. And to the Chief? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 869 

Commander Rochefort. It was transmitted to the District Com- 
mandant, sir, by me, personally, and it was transmitted to the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, by reason of the fact that he was an addressee. In 
other words, all of those dispatches were automatically addressed to 
the Commander-in -Chief, but whether or not he personally saw them, 
of course, I couldn't say. 

66. General Grunert. And you do not know whether that informa- 
tion got to the Army, or not ? 

Conmiander Rociiefort. No, sir; I do not. There were some of 
those messages. General, which indicated that, "Please show to the 
Department commander," or, "Please inform the Army authorities 
of this decision." 

[1658] 67. General Grunert. Those were some messages that 
came from the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy? 

Commander Rociiefort. Yes, sir. Some of those dispatches indi- 
cated that he was to confer with the Army authorities. 

In conection with that diplomatic situation, sir, if I may clear up 
that one point, the task, as I have indicated, of the diplomatic stuff, 
was being done in Washingon on a joint basis. I think it was Mr. 
Sarnoff who came out to Honolulu, September, October, or something, 
and we had been endeavoring to my knowledge since 1925 to get some 
of this traffic, unsuccessfully. Mr. Arnoff indicated we should get it. 

68. General Grunert. Mr. Sarnoff was acting in what position? 
Commander Rociiefort. He was head of the RCA, at the time, sir, 

President of the RCA. It was suggested we make some sort of effort, 
and, on a personal basis, with the district intelligence officer, he gave 
me some of the traffic which he had obtained. It was very recent 
traffic, and that is how we sent that one dispatch to Washington, indi- 
cating that he was burning the stuff, because of some stuff, there. 

69. General Grunert. That has covered all the ground I wanted 
to cover. Have you some questions? 

70. General Russell. Did you know anything about the effective- 
ness of the radar which was in possession of the Navy at Pearl Harbor ? 

Commander Rociiefort. No, sir ; I did not. 

71. General Russell. You did not know whether they could search 
out anything with those radar installations? 

Commander Rochefort. No, sir ; I did not. 

72. General Russell. You state that you were not permitted 
[16-59] to pick up or evaluate information intercepted from the 
consular service, is that what you said ? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir ; that is correct. 

73. General Russell. You were precluded by law from doing that? 
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

74. General Russell. Didn't you have to get some of it, before you 
knew whether it was consular, or not ? 

Commander Rochefort. Well, actually, general, it had been ob- 
tained, but it was being done by people other than us. That was part, 
again, of the allocation of work. In other words, we had, say, five 
jobs to do. AVashington, we will say, would handle two, and they 
would give us two, and they would give Cavite the fifth one, ancl 
we would work on them ; and if any information was obtained from 
one of the other jobs, that would be passed on to us; but we were not 
supposed to work with that type of traffic. 



870 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

75. General Russell. So, as soon as it was distributed by your 
operators, then they lost interest? 

Commander Rochefort. No, sir. We didn't cover those "printers" 
on which it would be sent. 

7G. General Russell. I understand. , 

Commander Rochefort. In other words, we were only interested 
in one thing, in Pearl Harbor. We were interested in the Japanese* 
Fleet. That's all we cared about. 

77. General Russell. You were interested only in what? 
Commander Rochefort. In the Japanese Fleet. That's all we 

were interested in. 

78. General Russell. Now, you say there was a summary, about 
[16601 the 20th of November, in which this task force in the 
Marshalls was discussed? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

79. General Grunert. You say the 20th ? 
Commander Rochefort. The 25th, sir. 

80. General Russell. The 25th? 
Commander Rochefort. About the 25th. 

81. General Russell. Do you know whether or not a copy of that 
estimate is in existence, in Hawaii ? 

Commander Rochefort. A copy should be available, sir, in the 
office of Naval Communications. That would be the normal cus- 
todian, in the Office of Naval Communications. 

82. General Grunert. Here, in Washington? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. They should be the custodians 
of all that traffic. 

83. General Grunert. Is there any record of it in Hawaii, do you 
know ? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. Yes, there would be a record, 
there. 

84. General Russell. Now. about this task force with the carrier 
unit in it, would it be divulging anything that you should not divulge, 
if you told US where you first picked that up? 

Commander Rochefort. That would be very difficult to answer, Gen- 
eral. In estimating these things, it was more by sense than by any- 
thing else. I used to explain it by saying that in any major operation 
started by the Japanese there would be three definite stages. There 
would be the stage of a large flurry of traffic ; that is, messages, and 
one thing and another; and then there would be a stage of apparent 
confusion, in which [1661] they would send a message to Gen- 
eral Soandso, and Admiral Soandso, and they would say, "He isn't 
here, send it somewhere else" ; and quite a bit of confusion, which was 
caused apparently by the regrouping of the ships and the units. That 
would be the second phase. [1662] The third phase was radio 
silence, and when radio silence started then you knew something was 
up. So we could always tell by these various conditions or phases 
they would go through just about how far advanced they were in this 
thing. And I think the estimates that were made by both the unit 
at Pearl Harbor and Cavite were accurate in everything except one 
respect, that is, that one task force from Pearl Harbor. Everything 
else was absolutely correct. The make-up of them, the composition, 
we knew that. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 871 

85. Greneral Grunert. There was one other question I wanted to ask 
you : In that force going clown to Hainan, had any of that force ever 
assembled as far away as the mandated islands in order to go down 
to the southeast ? 

Commander Rochefort. No, sir. 

86. General Grunert. Then did it seem strange that they should 
be assembling in the Marshall Islands in order to go southeast? 

Commander Rochefort. No. As I recall, General, we said in our 
summary that that force might possibl}^ be a force that was to cover 
the flanks. I believe we made such a statement as that, something 
.-similar to that. It was our assumption at the time that that group of 
submarines there, with or without the carrier group, would be used 
to secure the flanks against any possible move on the part of the 
United States. 

87. General Grunert. Now, at that time was your service I'ather 
new? 

Commander Rochefort. The service in Pearl Harbor, sir, was rela- 
tively new. 

[1663] 88. General Grunert. What I am getting at is, did the 
rest of the Navy believe in what you were doing and what you could do ? 
In other words, how much credence did they give the output of what 
you did, in your opinion ? 

Commander Rochefort. The naval officers who had access to the in- 
formation believed in it very strongly, sir, but those were only a frac- 
tion of one percent, possibly, of the naval officers. That is, for reasons 
of security we were not permitted to discuss the matter with anybody 
or to show them anything. So that Admiral Kimmel came over very 
frequently and discussed matters with us, but whether he discussed 
them with members of his own staff or not, referring to our work, I do 
not loiow. 

89. General Grunert. Did you consider that force a threat against 
Hawaii? 

Commander Rochefort. Personally, no sir. 

90. General Grunert. Although it had aircraft carriers in it that 
could strike at Hawaii or most any other near-by point ? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. The organization that we had 
identified, General, is not a type of organization you would have for 
a striking force. In other words, it lacked two elements: it lacked 
either cruisers or destroyers, and it lacked a supply, that there were 
no indications of tankers there, no indication of any cruisers or de- 
stroyers. For that reason it did not seem that it was coming to the 
eastward, because they would not move carriers and submarines. 

91. General Grunert. Of course, that was none of your business? 
You picked the information up and gave it to them in a summary, and 
it was up to them to figure it out? 

[1664] Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir, because we had nothing 
else available, sir, no other information available aside from that we 
gathered by radio. 

92. General Grunert. All right. General Russell, have you fin- 
ished? 

93. General Russell. I am a little bit intrigued about their moving 
out there to protect the flank, the southern movement of a major por- 
tion of the Japanese forces. What was on the flank that they should 
have been troubled about ? 



872 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Commander Rochefort. The United States Fleet, sir. 

94. General Russell. Where ? 
Commander Rochefort. Pearl, sir. 

95. General Russell. Pearl Harbor ? 
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

96. General Russell. Where would it have been easier for them to 
have destroyed that fleet ? 

Commander Rochefort. Well, if I were Admiral Yamamoto, sir, 
I would like to have them in the Marshalls somewhere. 

97. General Russell. Would it have been better to have attacked 
them or attempted to have destroyed them w^hen they were in battle 
formation moving to the west, or when they were not steamed up and 
lying in the harbor at Honolulu ? 

Commander Rochefort. Probably when they were out to the Mar- 
shalls, I think it would be easier. 

98. General Russell. If they had a force out there to have fought 
it out with these naval forces in the Marshalls ? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. I think probably it would have 
been better from the Japanese point of view to have had us in the 
Marshalls. 

[1665] 99. General Russell. With no cruisers, no destroyers, 
no battleships ? 

Commander Rochefort. No ; all they would need there, sir, would be 
the air bases. 

100. General Russell. Oh, you mean move in with the land-based 
planes ? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

101. General Russell. As it developed, that was not what they were 
thinking about. 

Commander Rochefort. No, sir, that was not in their mind at all. 

102. General Russell. Wasn't it true that this report that you had 
in the latter part of November indicated the names of the carriers 
that you had contacted ? 

Commander Rochefort. I am not sure of that, sir, but I do not 
believe that it did. 

103. General Russell. Is it true or not that the radio stations or 
the sending sets, if that is the accurate description of what the trans- 
mitter is, on the carriers were relatively weak and could not be de- 
tected for a long distance ? 

Commander Rochefort. Oh, no, sir. No, sir ; that is not true. 

104. General Russel. That is not true ? 
Commander Rochefort. No, sir, that is not true. 

105. General Russell. That when these carriers went into port they 
changed the type of radio set that they operated with, and you lost 
sight of them? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

106. General Russell. So long as the carriers then were in [1666] 
liome ports you had very little way of checking on them ? 

Commander Rochefort. We had what we called collateral, sir. We 
do the same thing. Everybody does the same thing. When a ship 
goes into port it usually utilizes the communication facilities of that 
navy yard or naval base, whatever it is going to be. In other words, 
he may send his messages by blinker or land-line or telephone or any- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 873 

thing else. When he is at sea, of course, then he has to transmit his 
own. 

I might say in passing that at that time, though, we got relatively 
few dispatches transmitted by a certain vessel as transmitted from 
that vessel. "We got them on the second or third or fourth transmis- 
sion. In other words, the carrier might send a message to Tokyo. If 
that carrier were close to Truk he would probably transmit it to the 
station at Truk, and then Truk would transmit it on up to Saipan 
or perhaps direct to Tokyo, and we would get it on what we called the 
second or third or fourth bounce ; and then if there was an informa- 
tion addressee in it, possibly Ominato, Tokyo would put that on the 
air again for Ominato ; and by means of that information which we call 
collateral you could usually determine where a vessel was or where 
a unit or a commander was. 

107. General Russell. Do you know an officer of the Navy by the 
name of Layton ? 

Commander Rochefurt. Yes, sir. 

108. General Russell. What was his function out there at this time? 
Commander Rochefort. Layton, Lieutenant Commander Layton at 

that time, was the fleet intelligence officer for the Commander-in-Chief. 

[1667] 109. General Russell. Did he have an independent 
agency for collecting data on the Japanese fleet? By "independent" I 
mean different from the agency which you were operating. 

Commander Rochefort. I am not sure that I understand, sir. Lay- 
ton received all radio intelligence pertaining to the Japanese from me, 
to whicli he added other types of intelligence that he might have re- 
ceived from other sources, perhaps from documents or letters or some- 
thing of that nature from someone else. His radio intelligence was 
received from us. 

110. General Russell. Therefore such information as he had about 
the location of the different elements of the Japanese fleet during the 
year 1941 probably came from you ? 

Commander Rochefort. It probably came from us, yes, sir. 

111. General Russell. Is it true or not that during the year 1941, 
or to limit that period a little further, during the six months next 
preceding December 7, 1941, there were a great many periods of time 
when you had little or no information on the Japanese Navy? 

Commander Rochefort. I think 

112. General Russell. Let me ask you this, Commander : Have you 
seen the statement which was furished by Lieutenant Commander Lay- 
ton to the Roberts Commission ? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir, 

113. General Russell. Have you made a study of that table that 
was there? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

114. General Russell. I am confining this question purely to the 
accuracy of the table, and not to any construction that was placed on it. 
Do you regard the information in that table [1668} as accu- 
rate? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir; the statements made there are 
accurate. 

115. General Russell. Well, did that table, or not, indicate that 
there were relatively long periods of time during the six months 



874 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

preceding Pearl Harbor when there was little information about the 
Japanese fleet available to you? 

Commander Rochefort. The information contained in the table 
indicated that there were relatively long periods in which we did not 
have positive information of the location of some specific unit or 
task force, but from collateral information or other information we 
did not consider that we had lost those units or forces. 

116. General Russell. I want to ask you one thing as a matter of 
information before I discuss this table in one or two of its details 
with you. There is an entry which I could not interpret; I do not 
know what it means. The entry was: Cruisers second fleet less the 
word c-o-n-d-i-v or -u. 

Commander Rochefort. C-o-n-d? 

117. General Russell. C-o-n-d-i-v. What is that? 
Commander Rochefort. "Com." 

118. General Grunert. C-o-n-d-i-v. What is it? It is a part of 
the fleet? 

Commander Rochefort. It would be a portion^ — it would be cruisers 
of the second fleet less the Nachi or Chikumi or Toni or something of 
that sort, sir. 

119. General Russell. Then there is an entry relating to that same 
word which describes it as "seven, very active on detached service." 
Nothing positive about that, 

[1669] Commander Rochefort. Seven, sir? 

120. General Russell. Seven condivs, if that is what it is. 
Commander Rochefort. Crudivs. 

121. General Russell. Crudivs? 

Commander Rochefort. Crudivs is probably what it should be, 
sir : cruiser divisions. 

122. General Russell. Crudiv? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. Crudivs. That would be seven 
cruiser division. We call it crudiv seven. 

123. General Russell. Well, being enlightened, I want to ask you 
about the carrier situation as reported in this table. 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

124. General Russell. The report was that the carriers with the 
crudivs out 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

125. General Russell. That there were 134 days in the last six 
months when the Navy was uncertain as to the location of the Jap- 
anese carriers, that the periods when they were lost during those six 
months numbered twelve, and that these periods varied from nine to 
twenty-two days. It seems that the 22-day period was in July 1941. 
Now, do you have any independent recollection of those carriers being 
lost all of those days ? 

Commander Rochefort. No, sir. I believe that the table is correct. 
The construction to be placed on those remarks I believe is incorrect. 
In other words, while it is true we did not have any concrete evidence 
of a unit or units for periods of from nine to twenty-two days, it 
did not mean that we were uncertain as to their whereabouts. It 
merely meant that we had nof heard them. In other words, we still 
had not lost them. 



PKOCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 875 

[1670\ 126. General Russell. But you were very well satisfied 
that you knew soniethino- about them or knew a great deal about them 
during these periods when yon heard nothing from them? 

Connnander Rochei-ort. Yes, sir. 

127. General RusselI;. And the table, then, reflects periods when 
you just didn't have anything? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir, when we did not hear them. Either 
they had not transmitted or, if they had, it was over circuits that we 
did not hear. 

128. General Russell. Now may I develop briefly, and I will be 
through, the remark which you made in reply to some of General 
Grunert's questions about identifying the submarines in the waters 
near Oahu in the Hawaiian area, that you knew were based out in 
the Marshalls ? 

Commander Rocheedrt. Yes, sii . 

129. (jeneral Russell, As I recall, your logic there was that you 
discovered the commander of this submarine group in the Marshalls. 

Commander Rocheidrt. Yes, sn. 

130. General Russell. You knew the commander of the group oper- 
ating in the Hawaiian waters was there. Did your station, intercept 
station, operate during the attack and immediately thereafter on the 
morning of December 7th ? 

Commander Rochee'ort. Yes, sii . 

131. General Russell. Could you tell us briefly what information 
you picked up that would give you identity as to the vessels operating 
there, the craft operating in that attack ? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. I would say by 1000 we had 
determined that the officer commanding the striking force . [1671] 
was comcardics, Commander Carrier Divisions, what we call Com- 
mander Aircraft. We had determined the fact that he had carriers 
with him, cruisers, and destroyers, and with one bearing that we had 
obtained we determined his bearing from Pearl Harbor. The sub- 
marines did not show up until that evening and the next day, aside 
from the midget submarines. The regular submarines, the fleet sub- 
marines, did not show up until that night. I would say, sir, that by 
noon of the 7th we had fairly well identified the surface forces. 

132. General Russell. How many carriers do you think were in 
that convoy ? 

Commander Rochefort. Four, sir. 

133. General Russell. Four ? 
Commander Rochefort. Yes. 

134. General Russell. The complement of each was about how many 
aircraft, or do you know that ? 

Commander Rochefort. About sixty, sir; sixty to sixty-four. 

135. General Russell. Then they could have had a total striking 
force of aircraft of some 250? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

136. General Russell. And cruisers or destroyers that appeared in 
the task force there ? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. They had enough — they had one 
division of cruisers, as I recall it, and approximately one squadron 
of destroyers. 



876 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

137. General Kussell. What time did you begin operating that 
day? On the morning of the 7th what time did you begin operating? 

Commander Rochefort, We were on a 24-hour basis. 

[1672] 138. General Russell. And you picked up nothing in 
tlie night preceding the attack? 

Commander Rochefort. No, sir. 

139. General Russell. So they moved in with radio silence? 
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. We were on a 24-hour basis then, 

sir, seven days a week, and had been for about four or five months. 

140. General Russell. Of course, you had no means for detecting 
aircraft in the air? 

Commander Rochefort. No, sir. 

141. General Russell. By radar operation? 
Commander Rochefort, No, sir. 

142. General Russell. That was not part of your function? 
Commander Rochefort. No, sir, that was not part of our function. 

143. General Russell. I think that is all. 

144. General Grunert. General Frank ? 

145. General Frank. No. 

146. General Grunert. Colonel Toulmin ? 

147. Colonel Toulmin. Nothing, sir. 

148. General Grunert. Colonel West ? 

149. Colonel West. No. 

150. General Grunert. Major Chiusen? 

151. Major Clausen. No, sir. 

152. General Grunert. That appears to be all. Thank you very 
much for coming. 

We shall take a brief recess. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

[1673] (There was a brief informal recess.) 

TESTIMONY OF MRS. MARY B. KOOGAN, WASHINGTON, D. C. 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of her rights 
under Article of War 24. ) 

1. Colonel West. Mrs. Kogan, will you state to the Board your 
name and address, please? 

Mrs. Kogan. Mrs. Mary B. Kogan, 1340 Taylor Street, Northwest, 
Washington. 

2. Colonel West, Are you employed now, Mrs, Kogan ? 

Mrs. Kogan. I was up until two months ago, with the Corps of 
Engineers here in Washington. 

3. General Grunert. Mrs. Kogan, the Board is after facts regard- 
ing the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and anything that may 
have led up to that or what happened at the time. Now, it has come 
to the knowledge of the Board that you have some information that 
may assist the Board in its investigation. That is why we asked you 
1 o come here. 

Now, will you please state to the Board where you were just prior 
to and during the attack on Pearl Harbor ? 
Mrs. Kogan. In bed. 

4. General Grunert. Where was the bed ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 877 

Mrs. KoGAN. We lived in Wahiawa, which is about three or four 
miles from Schofield Barracks. The Barracks was unable to house all 
of its officers due to the great impetus or influx of new officers. 

5. General Grunert. Then you did not live on the post of Schofield 
itself? 

Mrs. KoGAN. Not until after the attack. 

[1674'] 6. General Grunert. Now, information has come to the 
Board that you, in an article which appears in the Washington Star 
of March 23, 11)42, stated in effect, "that the warning of a Hawaiian 
newspaper a week earlier than the attack predicted the attack"; also, 
"that prior to December 7th we hadn't even been told what to do in 
case of an air raid." 

Now, is this substantially true? 

Mrs. KoGAN. We had never been advised what to do in the event of 
an air raid. 

7. General Grunert. You mean you had never been told, you had 
never been instructed, as to where to go, where to seek shelter? 

Mrs. KoGAN. That is right. 

8. General Grunert. Where to get food, how to take care of your- 
selves, or anything of the kind ? 

Mrs. KoGAN. Absolutely. 

9. General Grunert. Now, do you know whether those on the post 
of Schofield itself knew or had been told ? 

Mrs. KoGAN. I feel confident that they did not know. 

10. General Grunert. They did not know. How long after the 
attack were such instructions given to you, if ever? 

Mrs. KoGAN. To my knowledge, they were never given. 

11. General Grunert. They were never given? 

Mrs. KoGAN. Immediately after the attack we drove — or I might 
say this : that my husband was in the Dental Corps, of course which 
was a part of the station hospital, and after hearing all of the commo- 
tion he went to the phone and called the hospital to learn what was 
happening, and the person who answered the phone at the other end 
said that he didn't know, [1675'] but whatever was happening, 
real ammunition was being used. 

That didn't add up, so we called a number of friends, and they didn't 
know what was happening. The radio was still playing lovely church 
music, and that didn't help, so we went out in front of the house 
and saw a lot of planes in the sky that were flying quite low, and 
they started to machine gun us, and we thought, well, that is a crazy 
thing for maneuvers to be doing, and we saw the rising sun insignia, 
dashed back into the house, and the radio became silent for a few 
minutes, and when it went back on again an announcer advised all 
military personnel to report to their various stations. 

12. General Grunert. To report to what? 

Mrs. KoGAN. Military stations. Living off of the post, that meant 
that we were to go to Schofield Barracks. So we dashed over there, 
and I went to the hospital and helped with surgical dressings while 
my husband assisted in other ways, and at about two o'clock we were 
placed — the women and children were placed in different quadrangles 
of Schofield, and we waited there until about ten o'clock at night not 
knowing what was going to happen to us and in complete blackout. 
We were put ijito busses not knowing where our destination was to be, 



878 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and we were driven over the hig-hway past Pearl Harbor. And I 
might add, at that time there were lots of tracer bullets flying through 
the sky and lots of people milling around on the highway, and it just 
seemed like all hell had broken loose again. The bus that I was in 
turned off about a quarter of a mile from Pearl Harbor, and several 
hundred of us were put into a little schoolhouse in Kalihi Valley. We 
just did what we were told to do; we followed the leader, and that 
was the only instruction, [1676] that was momentary and im- 
pulsive, as to what to do in the event of an air raid. 

lo. General Grunert. And had you ever discussed with your hus- 
band what should be done in the event of an attack? In other words, 
did he know what to do if you didn't ? 

Mrs. KoGAN. I don't believe he did. 

14. General Grunert. Well, let us get back to this article which 
appeared in the Washington Star in which apparently you had some 
information that a warning had been given in a Hawaiian newspaper, 
something about predicting an attack. What was that about ? 

Mrs. KoGAN. Well, I think that time is approximate, and the exact 
reading of the headline I don't recall. However, a short time before 
the attack I remember that an extra paper appeared, and the headlines 
were very startling to us, and I was terribly frightened by them, and 
we dashed over to friends of ours and sort of went into a huddle, I 
think, and the essence of it was what I said there. Now, I can't recall 
the exact words of that headline. 

15. General Grunert. All right. Who were your friends that you 
went into a huddle with? 

Mrs. KoGAN. A Captain and Mrs. Rosen, in the Dental Corps. 

16. General Grunert. And as a resnlt of that huddle did the alarm 
spread ? 

Mrs. KoGAN. No. 

17. General Grunert. Or did everybody else think that there was 
going to be an attack in a week ? 

Mrs. KoGAN. I don't know that they thought of it that seriously, 
but we felt that there was something in the air. 

[1677'] 18. General Grunert. You didn't know any of the 
higher-ups that pooh-poohed it or agreed, or anything, do you? 

Mrs. KoGAN. No. Of course, an awful lot of rumors ran rampage 
all over the place, such as General MacArthur having sent a telegram 
the night before the attack advising something was in the wind, and 
to go on hundred percent alert. Another rumor had it that the alert 
that was on was called off at seven o'clock that morning and all the 
planes were supposedly unloaded, that is, tlie anumuiition, and the 
guaixl was slackened up. 

11). General Grunert. Do you know whether any of these rumors 
^vas every traced down to find out what its origin was? 

Mrs. KoGAN. No, I can't say that I do. I couldn't substantiate any 
of them. 

20. General Grunert. Has the Board any questions? 

21. General Russell. No. 

22. General Grunert. General Frank? 

23. General Frank. No. 

24. General Grunert. Anybody else? (No response.) 
All right; thank you very much for coming down. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 879 

Mrs. KoGAN. Yoli are welcome. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

[1678] TESTIMONY OF COLONEL WALTER E. LORENCE, CORPS 
OF ENGINEERS, UNITED STATES ARMY 

{The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you state to the Board your name, 
rank, organization, and station? 

Colonel LoRENCE. Colonel Walter E. Lorence, Corps of Engineers, 
Chief of the Maintenance Division, Military Supply, Office of the 
Chief of Engineers, stationed at Columbus, Ohio. 

2. Major Clausen. Colonel, what w^ere your duties and assignment 
in August, 1941? 

Colonel LoKENCE. Assistant Chief of the Finance Section, Office of 
the Chief of Engineers. I believe the reorganization had not gone 
into effect at that time. I believe I was still under Colonel Gesler, 
at that time, in 1941. 

3. Major Clausen. About that time do you recall having met one 
Hans Wilhelm Rohl? 

Colonel Lorexce. I do not remember. 

4. Major Clausen. Did you ever meet Hans Wilhelm Rohl? 
Colonel Lorence. I don't know whether I have or not, because in 

those days we processed prett}^ nearly — well, the peak of our personnel 
action was 50,000 people a month. 

5. Major Clausen. Do you recall having met an attorney by the 
name of John Martin who had an office in Los Angeles and represented 
;his party, Hans Wilhelm Rohl? 

Colonel Lorence. No; I do not. That is, I do not definitely recall, 
unless I have something in the record of the business I was doing at 
; hat time. 

6. Major Clausen. I show you our Exhibit 2 and ask you if you 
recognize that as having been before you or discussed with [1679] 
you at one time ? 

Colonel Lorence. Yes ; I remember it. 

7. Major Clausen. Will you exi^lain the circumstances? 
Colonel Lorence. May I read the rest of it first? 

8. Major Clausen. Yes. 

Colonel Lorence. (after reading Exhibit 2). Yes; I remember 
this particular communication. 

9. Major Clausen. Will you tell the Board how you recall that 
communication ? 

Colonel Lorence, I don't know all the details of this particular one, 
but as near as I can remember — because you have to bear in mind that 
I was receiving pretty nearly a thousand letters a week pust like that 
from people looking for jobs, and so forth. That was in the midst 
of very heavy construction. Most of them were before Pearl Harbor, 
not after Pearl Harbor. We were recruiting. We had recruiting 
offices throughout the entire country recruiting for our construction 
program in the United States and for overseas. We handled all 
recruitments for overseas; and my recollection of this is that Mr. 



880 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Rohl, if I am not mistaken, was wanted by the Hawaiian Department 
for work in Hawaii, and of course all assistance that we could render in 
the Chief's office, with reference to clearing and moving them overseas, 
of course we did. I believe there was a question of whether or not he 
was a citizen at the time. 

10. Major Clausen. Do you recall that he was supposed to be a 
German alien? 

Colonel LoRENCE. I don't know, at that time. Of course I don't 
know all the details of this, any more than any of the other thousands 
of items we were handling at that time ; but my [1680] recol- 
lection is that they were anxious to get this man to work on this 
project; that he had worked with the Hawaiian Construction pre- 
viously in their activities; that the Hawaiian Constructors was then 
getting this work overseas, and his ability as an engineer on this work 
was needed. My recollection is that in New York he had already put 
in his citizenship papers, his first, second, and so forth, and it was a 
matter, under present regulations, that if they had been approved 
or would be approved by the Bureau of Immigration and Naturaliza- 
tion, he would comply with the requirements we had at that time 
for shipment overseas. 

11. Major Clausen. Specifically, Colonel, what did you have to 
do with the preparation of that letter or the sending of it? 

Colonel LoRENCE. I would have to look at the top of it. (After 
examining letter referred to:) I don't know, to tell the truth, other 
than this, that looking at the initials on the top, I think this is Mi". 
Stilphen, who was then my labor relations man. 

12. Major Clausen. He was in your department? 
Colonel LoRENCE. Yes. 

13. Major Clausen. Do you recall now a Mr. John Martin who 
appeared before you and requested the action that is set forth in that 
letter on behalf of Hans Wilhelm Rohl ? 

Colonel LoRENCE. I don't recall. I know somebody appeared be- 
fore me on this case, and that I sent either Mr. Stilphen or somebody 
to the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization in order to see 
whether or not the papers had been cleared or to push the clearance 
of them in order that he could be processed for overseas. 

14. Major Clausen. AVhen this party appeared before you who 
[1681] was present at that time? 

Colonel LoRENCE, I have no idea. I had as many as two or three 
hundred interviews a day at that time. 

15. Major Clausen. Is this the first case of your assistance to a party 
desiring naturalization ? 

Colonel LoRENCE. The only case that I know of. It was not assist- 
ance to naturalization ; it was checking to see whether the papers had 
been cleared in the Bureau. 

16. Major Clausen. Do you recall that after this party appeared 
before you, you sent somebody, you say, to check over and see the 
status of the affair? 

Colonel LoRENCE. Yes ; to see whether the papers had passed through 
the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. As far as I know, 
there was no assistance. 

17. Major Clausen. Have you seen that letter before ? 
Colonel LoRENCE. I have not seen this letter; no, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 881 

18. Major Clausen. Yon never saw it before? 
Colonel LoRENCE. I do not think so. I may have. 

19. Major Clausex, Are your initials on there any place? 
Colonel LoRENCE. Not on here; I don't believe so. However, it is 

quite possible that this came through me. I don't know whetlier it 
did, or not. I can see Colonel Gesler's initials underneath here, and 
any matters of personnel under him were my responsibility. Mr. 
Stilphen did part-time work for me and part-time w^ork for Colonel 
Gesler, because he was a part-time man on labor relations and a part- 
time man on contracts. So, whether it went through me at the time 
or not, I don't know ; but the instructions to check up with the Bureau 
of Immigration and Naturalization as a persomiel matter, to see 
[16S2] whether or not his papers were m order so that he could 
be processed for overseas, were my instructions on that. 
• 20. Major Clausen. Do you recall now having given those instruc- 
tions ? 

Colonel Lorence. Oh, yes. I always did that. 

21. Major Clausen. To whom did you give them. Colonel? 

Colonel Lorence. That I don't know. You see, complete process- 
ing of the papers would have two courses : One through our Procedure 
Section to see that all the papers were in order for appointment ; and 
if it was for liaison work with another federal agency it could be one 
of many people ; sometimes myself, in order to see whether there was 
a clearance on it. At the time we were trying to clear men and women 
for another agency for transfer overseas, and many of those things 
took place daily. 

22. Major Clausen. Are you sure that your only instructions were 
that the party should investigate the status of the papers? 

Colonel Lorence. I think that is all ; I don't know. 

23. ]Major Clausen. With respect to the part of this letter. Exhibit 
2, which reads as follows: 

It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United 
States is beyond question 

do you recall what, if any, investigation was made to determine that 
as a fact ? 

Colonel Lorence. I think it was, based on the evidence which was 
submitted. I would not know unless I had all the other papers, if there 
are any other papers. But we have regular procedure in the checking 
up. The procedure at that time was prior to the Pearl Harbor pro- 
cedure, which set up in- [1683] vestigation through the Provost 
Marshal General's office. They didn't have that form. The investi- 
gation which was made was the character of investigation which was 
made partially by us and partially by the Civil Service Commission 
at that time. 

24. Major Clausen. Specifically in August, 1941, what was your 
procedure to check on the loyalty of a prospective contractor wnth the 
government? 

Colonel Lorence. A contractor or as an individual? 

25. Major Clausen. A prospective contractor. 
Colonel Lorence. I did not do any checking. 

26. General Frank. Let us say, an individual contractor. 
Colonel Lorence. An individual person ? 



882 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

27. General Frank. A contractor is an individual person, is he 
not? 

28. Major Clausen. Specifically in August, 1941, what, if anything, 
was the procedure of the Engineer Corps to which you have referred 
in your previous testimony that you put into effect with regard to an 
individual contractor? 

Colonel LoRENCE, I didn't handle contractors; I only handled in- 
dividuals that moved in on the federal pay roll as Civil Service em- 
ployees or as the equivalent of Civil Service Employees, overseas. I 
made no investigation of contractors. 

29. Major Clausen. When you told the Board about the procedure 
for checking 

Colonel LoRENCE. That is on the individual. 

oO. Major Clausen. What was that procedure? 

Colonel LoRENCE. The procedure prior to the security regulations 
which came out after Pearl Harbor was the usual character investiga- 
tion, to see whether or not a man complied [1684] with the 
law and also his statement and affidavit which he came in with, under 
the oath of office, that he was not contrary to the Hatch Act — that is, 
communistic activities and things like that — whether or not he was a 
citizen or that his papers were in sufficient order. 

31. Major Clausen. That was conducted with respect to what ques- 
tions? When did you put that procedure into operation in your divi- 
sion, you, yourself? 

Colonel LoRENCE. That has always been in effect. 

32. Major Clausen. With respect to what questions? What ques- 
tion would come before you, Colonel, which would cause you to put that 
procedure into effect ? 

Colonel LoRENCE. That procedure is checked on every individual 
that comes into the federal service. It is not a question of checking on 
his loyalty to the government, unless some adverse letter or other mat- 
ter which was presented in his Civil Service form or on his oath of 
office, or something of that nature, brought it to our attention. We 
never questioned, on a security basis, anybody at that time, which was 
prior to Pearl Harbor, if he was a citizen or the equivalent of a citizen, 
his last papers having gone in, as to whether or not there was any 
disloyalty. 

33. Major Clausen. This procedure you say you followed in August, 
1941 — did that apply with respect to persons who wished to be em- 
ployed by the Engineer Corps ? 

Colonel Lorence. Yes. 

34. General Frank. Under Civil Service ? 

Colonel Lorence. Yes, sir. Here is the point I want to make : Per- 
sonnel who were recruited by us for overseas assign- [1685] 
ment on the federal payroll, which was the equivalent of Civil Serv- 
ice — they are not classified Civil Service people; they are federal em- 
ployees, but not Civil Service. 

35. Major Clausen. Was that procedure followed with regard to 
contractors ? 

Colonel Lorence. I don't know, sir ; I didn't handle that. 

36. Major Clausen. Were your functions to deal solely with 
civilian employees? 

Colonel Lorence. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 883 

37. Major Clausen. Do you know how it was, then, that this matter 
came to you to be directed by you to somebody to perform the function 
of trying to get this man's citizenship papers through, when it related 
to a contractor ? 

Colonel LoRENCE. Yes; because you see we also handled labor rela- 
tions, which means — let me put it this way : In recruiting for an over- 
seas job you cannot differentiate between contractors, employees, and 
federal employees. You have got to set up wage scales for both. Each 
one has to assist the other in pushing the papers and the procedure 
through, because you must remember that we were processing on an 
average of 10,000 people a week for overseas, not only for Hawaii, but 
for Panama and for the island bases. 

38. Major Clausen. Did you check on their citizenship? 
Colonel LoRENCE. We had two methods on that. 

39. Major Clausen. What did you do in August, 1941, on that? 
Colonel LoRENCE. This is the way that was handled. Our system 

was decentralized to the district or division office in the area where the 
actual recruitment was taking place. Those that were recruited in 
Washington were handled by my group. The [1686] general 
procedure was the same. For federal employees a check was always 
made on citizenship, because that was a necessary attribute. 

40. Major Clausen. Did that include also an F. B. I. investigation — 
to see what they had, if anything? 

Colonel LoRENCE. No, sir. 

41. Major Clausen. Do you recall having had before you about 
August, 1941, axLj recommendations from one Theodore Wyman, a 
Colonel, or at that time a Lieutenant Colonel ? 

Colonel LoRENCE. I think that is how the matter originated; that 
he was the one that asked us to get the man or to help clearance on that. 

42. Major Clausen. Do you recall whether you had a letter or some 
communication orally or in writing from him ? 

Colonel LoRENCE. I don't know whether it was oral or in writing. 
It may have been in writing, or oral ; it may have been a teletype or a 
cable from Hawaii, because we got communications all three ways in 
those times. 

43. Major Clausen. You have read this Exhibit 2 over, have you 
not? 

Colonel LoRENCE. Yes. 

44. Major Clausen. Just what was the basis for those statements, 
if you know ? 

Colonel LoRENCE. The basis for the statement, as I remember, was 
that the final papers, through some red tape and so forth, were being- 
tied up in the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. 

45. Major Clausen. Who told you that? Where did you get that 
information ? 

[1687] Colonel Lorence. I don't know where the definite infor- 
mation came from at that time, whether it was from Colonel Wyman 
or some other source, but it all emanated from the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment. 

46. Major Clausen. Do you know of your own knowledge whether 
Colonel Wyman had any relation to that letter whatsoever? 

Colonel Lorence. I think he did, but I don't know definitely. 

47. Major Clausen. Your thought in that regard is in what respect ? 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 2 7 



884 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel LoRENCE. I think he did, because in every district or divi- 
sion we had an unvariable rule. We never sent anybody to anyone 
just for dumping them. That was the rule. Only when they wanted 
certain people. The same thing applies right now. Most people are 
sent this way, by name, because they know their particular qualifica- 
tions, either as an engineer or as an administrative man; and it was 
our job to try to get those people, whether they worked in another 
department or for a contractor, and see whether or not we could get 
them. This is another case of the same sort. 

48. Major Clausen. After you gave the instructions to whoever 
you gave them to, did you check up on the instructions to see if they 
were followed out? 

Colonel LoRENCE. No, sir; I don't think so, because if I did that, 
then I would have to get myself another checker to recheck, with the 
number of cases we used to have on that. 

49. Major Clausen. Did you ever get any communication from this 
John Martin? 

Colonel LoRENCE. I don't know, sir. I don't know him at [1688] 
all. 

50. Major Clausen. Did you ever get a letter thanking you for your 
assistance in the matter ? 

Colonel LoRENCE. I probably could have. I got thousands of let- 
tei'S. I don't want to be hazy on this thing, Major, but we had a 
tremendous business in those days. Our average, as you know, at our 
]:»eak — we had 279,000 federal employees in our construction program 
which I supervised, and 1,300,000 cost-plus-fixed-fee contract employ- 
ees, and I would not know individuals in each case. 

51. Major Clausen. Did you ever find out that this Hans Wilhelm 
Eohl was a German alien? 

Colonel Lorence. No, sir ; not that I know of. 

52. General Frank. As far as you were concerned, it was just 
another case? 

Colonel Lorence. Just another case, just like any other case, where 
they needed a man and needed him badly. A job had to be done, and 
we sent the people that they asked for. 

53. General Frank. Notwithstanding the fact that this man was a 
German alien, it was just another case? 

Colonel Lorence. No; I would not say that, General. I didn't 
know about that, General. 

54. General FrxVnk. You just got through telling me that. 
Colonel Lorence. Not quite, sir. You mean, there is something in 

this letter? 

55. General Frank. You said that is the only one you remembered. 
Colonel Lorence. On a naturalization case, that is the only one I 

can remember. 

56. General Frank. Yet you just pushed it right out as if 
[1689] you were handling a thousand a day; and he was a Ger- 
man alien? 

Colonel Lorence. General, I can remember, for instance, of thou- 
sands where we made special exceptions, where they were not citizens. 
I have in mind now an important case. This brings up recollection 
of it; a Doctor Casagrande, who is supposed to be one of the greatest 
soil experts in the United States, from Massachusetts Institute of 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 885 

Technology. We were requested to take special action so that he 
could go down to Panama in order to make a report on deep founda- 
tion work on the third lock system. 

57. Major Clausen. It says in this letter that Hans Wilhelm Rohl 
has peculiar qualifications. Did you tell that to the party to whom 
you gave instructions? 

Colonel LoREXCE. No. sir. 

58. Major Clausen. If you gave the instructions to this party, 
whom you say you cannot recall, do you know where he got the in- 
formation that he would have to have in order to write that letter? 

Colonel Lorence. It must have been from the correspondence that 
he got from the Hawaiian Department. 

59. General Frank. Or could it have been from ]Mr. Martin? 
Colonel Lorence. It could have been from Mr. Martin ; yes, sir. 
CO. General Frank. But you do not know ( 

Colonel Lorence. Xo, sir ; I don't know which it is. 

61. Major Clausen. You say 3'ou never got the information, so you 
are sure you did not give it to this party to whom you gave instruc- 
tions ? 

Colonel Lorence. I don't know definitely. I don't think [1690'] 
I gave the instructions second-handed after listening to Mr. Martin. 
I think I turned over the matter to Mr. Stilphen in connection witli 
the case in order to process it, because Mr. Stilphen used to be in the 
Labor Department before I brought him over into the Engineers. 
He was one of the Bacon-Davis lawyers whom I used to deal with 
over in that section. He was a good man. He is a cracker-jack on 
labor work. I handled wage rates and so forth under the Bacon- 
Davis Act among other things. 

G2. Major Clausen. Do you know what, if anything. Colonel Ges- 
ler had to do with the drafting of this letter? 

Colonel Lorence. Nothing, other than that he was the boss and it 
j^assed through me or Mr. Stilphen as one of the executives along that 
line, looking it over to see if it was in proper order, and so forth. 

63. Major Clausen. At this point do you recall having had a con- 
ference with Mr. John Martin and Colonel Gesler concerning the 
subject matter of this letter? 

Colonel Lorence. No, sir; I do not. 

64. Major Clausen. All right. 

65. Colonel Toulmin. Colonel, what caused you to recognize that 
letter immediately when you read it, in view of the fact that you 
just stated that everything was routine to you and you remembered 
nothing? 

Colonel Lorence. There were a lot of outstanding things that came 
up during the period. The reason for that, more than anything else, 
was that after the telephone conversation to me at Columbus stating 
that they wanted me here, I didn't know what they wanted me for. I 
could think of a dozen things about \1001] Hawaii that they 
might want to know. I went there as Budget Officer when I handled 
the labor problem over there, when we were trying to get funds and 
they would not give them to us; and a do/en other things. When I 
talked to our investigator I asked him whether there was any partic- 
ular phase that I should bring papers in, or something like that, and 
he said he did not know, but he thought it was in connection with some- 
body in connection with citizenship papers, or something like thaf. So 



886 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

1 cudgeled my brain to find out who that person was in connection 
with that. It is the same problem, as I say. We have certain things 
that stand out. It is very unusual for us to check in on citizenship 
papers, and it was even at that time, and it is very unusual for us to 
ask for exceptions for people who are not citizens. That is the reason 
I call it an unusual case. 

66. Colonel Toulmin. In view of the fact that it is so unusual and 
so exceptional, how do you account for the fact that you remembered so 
immediately about the letter and the circumstances in which it was 
written ? 

Colonel LoRENOE. Because, only the facts of what the action is and 
what the action should be in order to process the man stand out, and 
not the detailed facts of the writing of the letter. 

67. Colonel Toulmin. Do you want us to understand that you have 
no independent recollection of this incident other than the fact that 
that letter was written and you remember having seen it ? 

Colonel LoRENCE. I do not even remember whether I saw the letter. 

68. Colonel Toulmin. You do not even remember that? 

[l()9id] Colonel Lorence. No, Sir. I may have, because I sign a 
basketful 20 times a day. 

69. Colonel Toulman. You have no recollection of it? 
Colonel Lorence. Not this particular one. 

TO. Major Clausen. Do you know Colonel Wyman? 

Colonel Lorence. Yes. He used to be the District Engineer when 
I was in the General Staff School. However, I never served with him 
or came in contact with him, even out at Fort Leavenworth. Of 
course, I knew him by reputation. 

71. Major Clausen. Before you came here to testify did you ever 
hear of this letter incident in the press or on the radio ? 

Colonel Lorence. Yes; I have read of the incident in the papers. 
Not that letter incident, but I have read the incidents in connection 
with the tie-up. 

72. Major Clausen. Between Rohl and Wyman ? 
Colonel Lorence. Yes, sir. 

73. Major Clausen. Did that refresh your memory? 
Colonel Lorence. No, sir. 

74. Major Clausen. When you read those incidents did you re- 
member then this letter incident? 

Colonel Lorence. No. 

75. Major Clausen. Who do you think in the Engineering Corps 
might be able to give us information on that ? 

Colonel Lorence. I don't know, sir, unless it is Wyman himself. 
The i-eascjn I say that is that in practically all recruitment, which w^e 
did on field recruitment, it was either the District Engineer or the 
Division Engineer or the Area Engineer or one of the people who 
were doing the actual recruiting at the time, and our office dealt with 
that- 

[16'93] 76. Major Clausen. What you did in August, 1941, was 
that if an opening appeared for an employee in Hawaii you would 
check his citizenship? 

Colonel Lorence. Yes. 

77. Major Clausen, You did that same thing back in December, 
1940, did you not? 

Colonel Lorence. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 887 

78. Major Clausen. How did you do it? 

Colonel LoRENCE. The check on citizenship, of course, for an ordi- 
nary person, is on his Civil Service application, that he is a citizen and 
so forth. We don't question that. We don't do any checking on that. 
That was the investigating authority of the Civil Service Commis- 
sion. The only kind of check we make is where a case comes in where 
we are told that a man is not a citizen, or that his papers are in and 
that he had been trying to check his papers. There may have been 
other cases like that, but I have no recollection. That is what I am 
getting at. Normally, there is no check on citizenship papers. 

79. Major Clausen. Except by the Civil Service Commission hav- 
ing done it for you ? 

Colonel LoRENCE. That is correct. The Civil Service Commission 
was 9 months to a year behind schedule, and they finally had to turn 
it over to the War Department. 

80. General Grunert. I have a question or two to clear the record. 
Did I understand you to say that you passed on about 10,000 cases a 
week for overseas service ? That would be over a thousand a day. 

Colonel Lorence. That was during our peak. 

81. General Grunert. This was in August, 1941. Did they have 
[1694] that amount of construction in the overseas bases at that 
time ? That is over a thousand a day. 

Colonel Lorence. That is correct, sir. 

82. General Grunert. And for ten weeks it would be 100,000 ? 
Colonel Lorence. General, we had a tremendous attrition rate over- 
seas. 

83. General Grunert. All I wanted was to make sure that that was 
correct — 10,000 cases a week for overseas bases. 

Colonel Lorence. During the peak. 

84. General Grunert. How long was the peak, approximately? 1 
just want to make sure about it. 

Colonel Lorence. The peak on that, General, as I remember, lasted 
about three months. 

85. General Grunert. You made a statement to the effect that you 
received about a thousand telegrams or radiograms or telephone mes- 
sages from overseas bases a day ? 

Colonel Lorence. Not from overseas bases ; from all over the United 
States. 

86. General Grunert, That is what I wanted to get the record clear 
on. because it sounded extravagant to me. 

Colonel Lorence. It was a big program, sir. 

87. General Grunert. As long as you have cleared the record and 
you are sure of your statement, that is all. Thank you very much for 
coming. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

\1695] TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL WALTER S. De LANY, 
UNITED STATES NAVY 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Admiral, will you please state to the Board 
your name, rank, organization, and station ? 



888 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral De Lany. Rear Admiral Walter S. De Lany, Assistant 
Chief of Staff for Readiness on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief 
of the United States Fleet. 

2. General Grunert. Admiral, I believe you understand the pur- 
poses of this Board and that we are after facts or leads toward facts, 
and because of your assignment during 1941 and your having testi- 
fied before the Roberts Commission, we asked you to come in in order 
that we might delve for facts. Will you tell us of your assignment 
and, generally, the duties of that assignment in 1911 ? 

Admiral De Lany. At the beginning of the year 1941 I was Chief 
of Staff to Commander, Cruisers, Battle Force, and when the Com- 
mander, Cruisers, Battle Force became Commander-in-Chief, of the 
United States Fleet about 1 February, 1941, I then became assistant 
Chief of Staff for Operations on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, 
United States Fleet. 

3. General Grunert. Who was that? 
Admiral De Lany. Admiral Kimmel. 

4. General Grunert. Will you give the Board your idea of the 
command setup that existed in Hawaii at that time and explain just 
what the chain of command was ? 

Admiral De Lany. So far as the Navy was concerned, the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, commanded all United States 
Navy forces attached to the fleet, and as I consider the [1606] 
setup, generally saw to it that the responsibilities of the Army and 
the Commandant of the Naval District were coordinated and matched 
the requirements of the fleet in the Pearl Harbor area. 

5. General Grunert. Then the Commandant of the Fourteenth 
Naval District was a subordinate of the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Pacific Fleet? Is that true? 

Admiral De Lany. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, 
did issue directives to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval Dis- 
trict, but he made him a task force within the fleet organization ; but 
that, as I saw it, pertained only to the relationships that had to exist 
between the Commandant of the Naval District and the Commander- 
in-Chief, United States Fleet. 

G. General Grunert. You speak of the Commander-in-Chief, 
United States Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. 
They are two separate things, but they both were Admiral Kimmel ? 

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. 

7. General Grunert. Are you familiar with the Joint Coastal Fron- 
tier Defense Plan drawn up between the Hawaiian Department and 
the Fourteenth Naval District? 

Admiral De Lany. I cannot say that I am now. General. I think 
that if the paper is presented to me I can recognize it. 

8. General Grunert. Not that it is going to make any particular 
difference, but I would like to see whether we know what we are talk- 
ing about. (Handing a document to the witness.) 

Admiral De Lany. Yes; I have seen this paper. 

9. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not Admiral Kimmel 
in his position approved of that joint plan or acted upon it in any 
way ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 889 

[1697] Admiral De Lany. No, sir; I cannot answer that now. 
I cannot hook this specific paper up ^yith any approval that I per- 
sonall}^ know of, sir. 

10. General Grunert. In most of those plans and agreements yon, 
as correspondmg to the Operations Officer that we have on our staff, 
would normally pass and see such papers ? 

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. 

11. General Grunert. Are you familiar with what they call the 
Joint Air Operations Plan, generally, as drawn up? 

Admiral De Lany. I think that is the one that was signed by Gen- 
eral Short and Admiral Bloch, as I remember it, sir. 

12. General Grunert. Yes; drawn up by the respective air com- 
manders, Bellinger and Martin. You are familiar with that? 

Admiral De Lany, Yes, sir. I am generally familiar with it. 

[1698] 13. General Grunert. Were you, in your position, kept 
informed of the Army's defensive measures, those taken by the Army 
generally ? 

Admiral De Lany. Generally speaking, yes. 

14. General Grunert. Do you recall whether the Commanding- 
General, Hawaiian Department, informed Admiral Kimmel of the 
special measures, if any, that he proposed to take, after November 27, 
as a result of a message he got from the War Department? 

Admiral De Lany. I know that Admiral Kinnnel and General Short 
discussed the general situation, and I am quite sure that Admiral 
Kimmel knew of the plans that General Short had placed in effect 
within the Hawaiian area, which, as I understood at the time, were 
primarily set up as a precautionary measure against sabotage. 

15. General Grunert. Were you at this conference to which you 
refer ? 

Admiral De Lany. I think I was ; yes, sir. 

IG. General Grunert. Do you recall whether that conference was 
held in the morning or afternoon of the 27th ? 
Admiral De Lany. No, sir ; I do not recall. 

17. General Grunert. Do you recall whether it was held before or 
after the receipt of the Navv message which began, "Consider this a 
war warning"? Was that message discussed in that conference? 

Admiral De Lany. No, sir ; I can't say that, definitely. I cannot 
answer that question. I know that there were discussions between 
Admiral Kimmel and General Short, in wdiich this matter of the 
precautionary measures that were to be taken [1699] within 
the Island on the part of the x^Lrmy, and the steps that the Navy took in 
their own operating areas, were discussed. 

18. General Grunert. Presumablj^, then, the conference must have 
taken place after the receipt of the message. 

Admiral DeLany. I think so; yes, sir. 

19. General Grunert. Otherwise, they could not have discussed it. 
Now, let us go back a little further. Were you on duty with 

Admiral Kimmel in February 1941? 
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. 

20. General Grunert. It appears from the Roberts Commission's 
report that Admiral Kimmel inspected the Pearl Harbor defenses in 
February, and he declared himself astounded at the then existing weak- 
nesses; and that lie pointed out the inadequacy of the antiaircraft guns. 



890 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the obsolescence of land-based aircraft, and the lack of aircraft detec- 
tors. Do you recall that inspection? 

Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir; I think I accompanied him on that 
inspection. 

21. General Grunert. Do you know whether he communicated those 
views on that subject to General Short, or did you communicate them 
to the Army for him ? 

Admiral De Lany. I can't answer that, specifically ; but as I recall 
the thing, the letter that the Commander-in-Chief wrote regarding 
the defenses of Pearl Harbor was either shown to General Short before 
it was sent, or he was furnished a copy of it. 

22. General Grunert. Throughout the year, then, up until the latter 
part of November, were there any other inspections made ? [1700] 
Do you know of any progress made toward curing what they thought 
was wrong? 

Admiral DeLany. I know that on at least two other occasions I 
accompanied Admiral Kimmel, and I believe General Short was in 
the party, around the Island in connection with joint headquarters. 
The Army were building quarters up in the cave, up there, and we went 
there and inspected all the installations. There was also the question 
of the joint air center, and as I remember it. General Short, Admiral 
Bellinger, and General Davidson or General Martin, I have forgotten 
who, were on that party. We drove down towards the area'^here the 
location was being proposed at the time. 

23. General Grunert. Then, in your mind, you thought that prog- 
ress was being made toward bettering the conditions, from what had 
been noted earlier in the year ? 

Admiral DeLany. So far as material and personnel were being 
furnished, I believe that the conditions were better, as the year 
progressed ; but it would be my observation that the amount of mate- 
rial that had been originally requested was not forthcoming. 

24. General Grunert. Then you think that they were making prog- 
ress with what they had, but they needed more ; is that correct i 

Admiral DeLany. Definitely so: yes. 

25. General Grunert. Now, on the subject of intelligence, did you 
know of the presence of a Japanese task force in the vicinity of Jaluit, 
between November 27 and 30 ? 

Admiral De Lany. As I recall the intelligence, now, as I knew it 
then, I recall that the information I had was that one [1701] 
carrier task force was operating in the South China Sea, and the 
remainder of the Japanese main fleet was in home waters. 

26. General Grunert. That leads me to believe that you do not 
recall that a Japanese task force was in the Marshalls. 

Admiral De Lany. That is correct, as I recall it, now. I may have 
known about it • but I cannot recall. 

27. General Grunert. Mv next question that I wanted to ask was 
whether, if you had such information, you knew whether or not it had 
been transmitted to General Short. Generally, do you know what 
sort of information of that kind was transmitted to the Commanding 
General of the Hawaiian Department, or have they any policy on that? 

Admiral De Lany. I understood that there was an exchange of 
information between the naval intelligence center in Pearl Harbor 
and the Army center at Shaffer, or wherever it was located, and that 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 891 

in addition I feel sure that the intelligence as it came in to the Com- 
mander-in-Chief was information that normalh^ came through the 
district intelligence center, and for that reason I felt that what was 
available in the naval intelligence center was also available to the Army 
intelligence, because I believe they exchanged information. 

28. General Frank. Do you know whether or not that included 
combat intelligence? 

Admiral De Lany. I cannot answer that. I do not know. 

29. General Grunert. We understood from previous testimony that 
the combat intelligence, at least certain parts of it, was so highly secret 
that it was very carefully guarded and disseminated only to a few, and 
I wanted to find out whether or not that dissemination included the 
Commanding General of the [1702] Hawaiian Department, 
and who decided what to turn over to General Short, and what they 
thought was too secret even to turn over to General Short. Could you 
answer anything in that line? 

Admiral De Lany. No, sir. I cannot answer your question defi- 
nitely, General, but it seems to me that I recall instances where General 
Short was in the office, there, where Admiral Kimmel had his general 
Pacific chart, and that I can recall the intelligence officer of the fleet, 
who was then Commander (I think) Leighton, being in there and 
pointing out on the wall chart the summary of the information that 
we had at the time that the General was in there. 

30. General Grunert. And that would include combat intelligence? 
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir; that was the location of Japanese fleets 

and forces. 

31. General Grunert. You think Admiral Leighton, I believe it is 
now, was present? 

Admiral De Lany. No, sir ; he is a captain, right now. 

32. General Grunert. Captain Leighton would be our best source 
of information on that? 

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir ; I think so, sir. 

33. General Grunert. Do you know whether efforts were made by 
the Navy to secure information of Japanese naval activities in the 
mandated islands? 

Admiral De Lany. No, sir. 

34. General Grunert. Did the fleet have any particular means of 
getting information from the mandated islands? 

Admiral De Lany. No, sir. 

[170S] 35. General Grunert. Upon what source did they de- 
pend for that information ? 

Admiral De Lany. Our information came primarily from the main 
Naval Department from Washington. 

36. General Grunert. That was the combat naval intelligence? 
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. 

37. General Grunert. From Washington? 
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. 

38. General Grunert. Do you know whether Washington sent you 
anything on this subject of what was in the Marshall Islands, about 
November 25 or 26 ? 

Admiral De Lany. There is a naval intelligence bulletin, dated 1 
December, which I am of the impression we did not have in our files 



892 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

on the 7th of December, which states the fact that there was a carrier 
group, I believe, in the Marshalls. 

39. General Grunert. Do you recall where that came from, 
whether from the District or from Washington ? 

Admiral De Lany. That was an ONI bulletin from Washington, 
dated 1 December; but the information that we had prior to the 
receipt of that bulletin, as I recall it, was based on information that 
came out of the Sixteenth Naval Department, and, I believe, sub- 
stantiated in dispatches from Washington. 

40. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not General Short, 
as Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, was kept 
informed of the movement of the task forces of the fleet, in so far 
as it pertained to whether they were in or out of the harbor, and, 
while they were out of the harbor, what areas they covered that might 
give him protection? 

Admiral De Lany. I am sure that that information was [1704] 
available to Army sources in the Hawaiian area, but whether Gen- 
eral Short had it, personally, I cannot answer that. 

41. General Grunert. By "available," do you mean, "It's here ! 
Come and get it !" or whatt 

Admiral De Lany. No, sir; I mean that when the fleet went into 
an operating area we discussed our operating program with the Army 
opposites in our staff organization, and so far as I was concerned 
we always arranged drills for range-finder check. Coast Artillery 
training. We checked our range finders and submitted our plots 
against theirs. There was also an arrangement with the Army as 
to the fact that they knew where we were operating, so that their air 
forces came out and did whatever searching or bombing or anything 
else they wanted to do. 

42. General Grunert. Did these task forces that were sent out from 
time to time, especially in the latter part of November and early 
in December, have any definite "distant reconnaissance" missions, as 
we call them, in so far as the defense of Hawaii was concerned? 

Admiral De Lany. No ; not as I interpret your question. 

43. General Grunert. The defense of Hawaii was under whom, in 
the Navy? 

Admiral De Lany. Well, the defense of Hawaii was under the 
Army; and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District co- 
ordinated naval activities with them, as I understand it. 

44. General Grunert. The Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval 
District? 

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. 

45. General Grunert. In that joint plan that you recognized, 
there, the Fourteenth Naval District contracts to have the Navy 
[lyOS] provide, among other things, distant reconnaissance? 

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir ; and I believe the agreement provided, 
too, that the Army would assist in it, as I recall the agreement. 

46. General Grunert. That afterwards came in the joint air agree- 
ment. That is right. 

Now, what I am trying to get at is the subject of distant recon- 
naissance — whether or not it was made; if so, how; and whether it 
was just made periodically; whether these task forces were woven into 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 893 

a pattern in making it; or wliat. Could you enlighten us on that 
general subject? 

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. I say this, that the general mission 
of the naval forces in the Hawaiian area had been, and, with the ap- 
proval of the Navy Department, continued to be, training. So far as 
distant reconnaissance is concerned — and presuming that you mean 
by that, aircraft 

47. General Grunert. Primarily, yes. 

Admiral De Laxy. The number of planes, pilots, and spare 

jjarts, and so fortli, that were available in the Hawaiian area, and the 
fact that the planes in the Hawaiian area required such wartime work 
on them as installing bullet-proof cells and other wartime equipment, 
there just were not enough planes, pilots, or time available to do the 
job of training and preparing the planes for wartime requirements, 
and conduct a distant reconnaissance. 

I believe I am safe in saying that the same thing that I say about 
Navy planes prevailed in the aviation situation so far as the Army 
was concerned. 

48. General Grunert. Then I gather from your answer to that 
[1706] question that there was practically no so-called "distant 
reconnaissance," as such. 

Admiral De Lany. That is correct, sir. 

49. General Grunert. And that was due primarily to the lack of 
means ? 

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. 

50. General Grunert. When the task forces went out, whatever 
patroling or searching they did was primarily for the task of train- 
ing while they were out there, to protect themselves, and was not a 
part of a so-called "distant reconnaissance" for the protection of 
Hawaii against an air attack? 

Admiral De Lany. That is correct. The plane coverage that was 
given to naval forces, whether they operated in close proximity to 
the islands or whether they operated as we did on certain problems 
four or five hundred miles to the northward of the island, our cover- 
age was always designed with the idea that we were protecting the 
service forces against submarine attack. 

51. General Grunert. The reason I am asking these particular 
questions is to see whether or not the presence of task forces in cer- 
tain areas outside the Island of Hawaii gave the Commanding Gen- 
eral of the Hawaiian Department a false sense of security, thinking 
that he would be secure from anything coming in that direction, be 
it surface or air. If he had been kept informed of their presence, 
and of what they did out there, and of what they did not do, he might 
then have had a different picture. 

That is just an explanation of the line of questioning, so that if 
there is anything wrong with that sort of reasoning [1707] 
you might tell me. If there is not, I will assume that it is fairly 
correct. 

Admiral De Lany. The task forces that operated out of the Hawai- 
ian area as surface task forces always operated in assigned areas, 
which, in my opinion, were known to the Army and the Commandant, 
of the Fourteenth Naval District. I believe, too, that the Army was 
entirely familiar with all the plane flights that were made by both 



894 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Army and Navy planes, and tliat with that knowledge the Command- 
ing General knew just what the status of surface and air forces in 
the Hawaiian area was, at all times. 

52. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not the Com- 
mandant of the Fourteenth Naval District had any air means for 
long-distance reconnaissance, or did that which existed pertain to 
the Navy, proper? 

Admiral De Lany. They were a part of the U. S. Fleet, but there 
is no question but what the Commandant knew exactly what the 
planes were doing. 

63. General Grunert. In any use of those PBYs that were flying 
in and about Honolulu daily, they were probably engaged in opera- 
tions pertaining to a task force going out or coming in, or whatnot ? 

Admiral De Lany. Plus training ; yes, sir. 

54. General Grunert. Were submarines ever used for this distant 
surveillance? 

Admiral De Lany. There were submarines stationed off Midway 
and Wake for observation. 

55. General Grunert. We have been told that because of the lack 
of means, there could not be a 360° protective distant [1708] 
reconnaissance, and I wondered whether or not in naval tactics, or 
whatnot, they often or sometimes used submarines to cover part of 
a ring around the place. 

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir ; I think that is entirely possible. 

56. General Grunert. But you do not know whether any of that was 
done? 

Admiral De Lany. It was not done. 

57. General Grunert. Now, I go into the subject of cooperation 
and coordination. Will you tell me what you thought of the coop- 
eration between the Army and the Navy, as a whole, and particularly 
that which existed with the fleet, of which you know directly, and 
that which existed between the Army and the District, if you know 
about that. 

Admiral De Lany. I am more familiar with what existed between 
the fleet and the Army that I am, between the district and the Arm3\ 
In so far as the fleet is concerned, I felt that from the top down 
through my echelon there wasn't any question about amicable under- 
standings and coordination. 

58. General Grunert. Was there any question about knowing suf- 
ficiently of each other's business to be able to carry out your own 
responsibility, when it came to cooperative action ? 

Admiral De Lany. So far as I personally am concerned, no, be- 
cause I was generally familiar with the strength of the Army in the 
Hawaiian area, what their antiaircraft defense amounted to, the 
number of planes, type, and so forth, that were available, I felt that 
the Army knew our general operating schedules, and, as I said before, 
there wasn't any question about amicable understandings and coordi- 
nation. 

[1709] 59. General Grunert. Who was your opposite number 
in the Army ? 

60. General Frank. Hayes? 

Admiral De Lany, Yes ; I did business with Hayes, 

61, General Grunert, Might it have been Donegan? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 895 

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir ; I did business with Donegan, and I also 
did business with Fleming, who was closer to General Short, out there, 
than anybody else that T knew of in the Army set-up, sir. 

62. General Grunert. Did you know the Army system of alerts that 
was in effect, say in November and the early part of December — not in 
effect, but which could be put into effect? 

Admiral De Lany. I cannot describe them ; no, sir. 

63. General Grunert. You Iniew that the one they put into effect 
was called "No. 1," the so-called sabotage alert? 

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. 

64. General Grunert. You would not know what No. 2 and No. 3 
were ? 

Admiral De Lany. No, sir ; I cannot describe them. I do not know. 
I cannot recall. 

65. Genera] Grunert. Was there any question in the mind of the 
command of the fleet — not the Commander, but the command of the 
fleet; by that, I mean the commander and his staff — as to the adequacy 
of that alejrt for the protection of the fleet in Pearl Harbor, in view of 
the information or "messages" we will call them, that had been received 
by the Army and the Navy? 

Admiral De Lany. No, sir; not so far as I am concerned, because I 
felt that if the island were alerted against sabotage, that was the extent 
to which the defense of the island should go. 

\1710] 66. General Grunert. Then it did not enter your mind, 
did it, that j^our fleet would have been better protected had it gone into 
a more protective alert such as Alert No. 2, which carried a spreading 
out of their planes and a readiness to get them into the air in a hurr}^? 

Admiral De Lany. Not on the information we had ; no, sir. 

67. General Grunert. Then the messages received from the Navy 
Department, particularly the one on November 27, which started out, 
"Consider this a war warning," together with the message from the 
Chief of Staff of the same date, did not alarm you or your Commander- 
in-Chief to the extent of thinking that war was quite imminent? 

Admiral De Lany. Well, we knew that Japan was on the move. 
We knew that she was headed south. We had no statement as to what 
the policy of Washington was towards the Japanese, and what would 
occur in the event that Japan committed an overt act against the 
United States; and, with no further information than that, the war 
warning meant just that. 

68. General Grunert. Then as far as you were concerned, the 
Army's going on a sabotage alert was O. K. with you ? 

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. 

69. General Frank. There wasn't an understanding of any kind as 
to what a warning in that language! meant? 

Admiral De Lany. General, we had no M-Day. I do not know what 
you call it in your war plans, but there had been no mobilization, there 
had been no mention of anything that indicated anything like that. 

[17J1] 70. General Grunert. Who had to bring about that 
designation ? 

Admiral De Lany. Sir ? 

71. General Grunert. Who had to bring about the designation of 
M-day? 



896 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral De Lany. It had to come from Washington, sir. 

72. General Grunert. Are you sure ? I will refresh your memory 
on the Joint Act of The Army and The Navy, as set forth in Chapter 
II, paragraph 9b : 

(Except from Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, Chapter II, 
is as follows:) 

Operations of Army and Navy foi'ces will be coordinated by the exercise of 
unity of command in the following cases : 

(1) When ordered by the President; or 

(2) When provided for in joint agreements between the Secretary of War 
and the Secretary of the Navy ; or 

(3) When commanders of Army and Navy forces agree that the situation 
requires the exercise of unity of command and further agree as to the service 
that shall exercise such command. 

That was not just exactly what I had, what I meant and wanted to 
bring out then, but I am glad I brought it out now, and I will come 
back to the other question. 

Was the question of the desirability of unity of command ever 
taken up in conference or discussed with a view to possibly putting it 
in effect under this that I have just read, in case it became necessary, 
prior to December 7th? 

Admiral De Lany. Not that I recall, no, sir. 

[1712] 73. General Grunert. Did you ever turn the matter over 
in your mind as to whether you thought unity of command was 
desirable prior to December 7th, and whether or not it could have 
accomplished more than cooperation was then accomplishing? 

Admiral De Lany. There was never any question in my mind that 
there should have been unity of command iDefore the 7th of December. 

74. General Frank. When did you think that? At that time, 
or is this back sight? 

Admiral De Lany. No, sir. I make that statement as a thought on 
my part within a month after the — well, by the first of March, 1941. 

75. General Frank. But it was not in your mind prior to the 
attack ? 

76. General Russell. He said March 1, 1941. 

77. General Frank. Oh, March 1, '41. All right. 

Admiral De Lany. As a matter of fact, I don't recall the dates, 
but I know that General Short and Admiral Kimmel, as I mentioned 
before, had visualized this thing and had actually inspected the 
places where the Army was putting up their command stations in 
the mountain out there, with the idea that the whole command setup 
would move up there and there would be a unity of command. 

78. General Grunert. That was provided for when war broke? 
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. 

79. General Grunert. But the unity that I was referring to was 
unity of command prior to any emergency, so that the preparations 
could be unified instead of waiting until sometliing broke. 

[1713'] Admiral De Lany. General, I think in answer to your 
previous question I had said there that I don't recall Admiral Kimmel 
or General Short discussing unity of command either before the 27th 
or subsequent to the 27th of November. Whether it was discussed, 
or not, I do not know but I know that, as I said, both the Admiral 
and the General had visualized this because of their interest in getting 
a place, a post where the command could be exercised. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 897 

80. General Grunert, Now, goin<^ back to the former question or 
discussion of the M-Day, I refer now to a paragraph in this Joint 
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, paragraph 15c (2) : 

(Excerpt from Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Ee: M-Day, 
is as follows:) 

(2) M-Day is the first day of mobilizatiou, and is the time origin for the 
execution of this plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war. As a pre- 
cautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into 
effect certain features of their respective plans prior to INl-Day. Such parts of 
this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as 
ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local 
commanders. 

Admiral De Lany. That is right. 

81. General Grunert. So they could have put any or all of this 
thing into effect by mutual agreement? 

Admiral De Lany. That is right. 

82. General Grunert. Between local commanders? 
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. 

83. General Grunert. But as far as you know it never came to such 
mutual agreement? 

[1714-] Admiral De Lany. It never came to such a mutual agree- 
ment because — well, I think I am correct in saying that nobody out 
there considered that it was essential to do it. 

84. General Grunert. Then, it all boils down to the fact that they 
were sort of sabotage minded but not really war minded at that par- 
ticular time? 

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. 

85. General Grunert. Is that a broad statement of it? 

Admiral De Lany. That is a correct statement, and I think it is 
based entirely on factual information that we had available to us at 
that time. 

86. General Grunert. Then really, before you got into a different 
state in which you would actually expect an attack, you expected to 
have more information of more critical conditions than you actually 
did get ; is that the idea ? 

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. 

87. General Frank. You well knew, however, that the Japs were 
known traditionally to hit and then let that strike be the opening gun 
in the declaration of war ? 

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. 

88. General Frank. You feel, I take it from your comments, that 
in the face of the information that you had, if the situation were known 
in Washington to be sufficiently acute to require the announcement of 
M-Day, that that announcement should have come from him? 

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir, or we should have had more informa- 
tion in order to have us make preliminary deployments or anything 
else that we would have made prior to receipt of an M-Day dispatch. 

[1715] 89. General Grunert. Tell me. Admiral, about what you 
knew about the Army's interceptor and air warning service, as to its 
completeness, as to your confidence in it or your lack of such confi- 
dence. Just what did you know about it ? 

Admiral De Lany. I knew that there were, as I recall it, three radar 
sets on the island. I knew that the Army was drilling personnel on 
those sets. I knew that there was normal communication between radar 



898 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and headquarters that was not reliable but could be used. I personally 
conducted a conference between the Army and the representative of 
the Fourteenth Naval District at which, as I recall it, personnel from 
the telephone people in Hawaii were present when Commander Taylor, 
who was entirely familiar with the intercepts system as it was installed 
in U. K., was out there. I saw the outline of the system as it was to 
be put in, I saw the list of equipment that w^as required, the number of 
persons that were required to man it ; but beyond the fact that there 
were, as I said, I believe, three radars on the island, I don't believe that 
the intercept system was in effect beyond any stage except where the 
Army was training on the radar and could get telephone communica- 
tion back to some place at headquarters. 

90. General Frank. And could pick approaching planes up? 
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. The operators were being trained on 

their radar sets, sir. I believe the scheme out there, as I recall it, was 
that the men were sent out on a truck that went out on a morning pa- 
trol, and then when the truck came back from that they picked these 
operators up some place around 7 : 30 or something like that in the 
morning and brought them back for their breakfast, and then they 
went out later on in the after- [1716^ noon, as I recall the thing. 

91. General Grunert. The evidence that you gave before the Roberts 
Commission appears to be somewhat to the effect that you were push- 
ing the establishment of this service, that you were straining to get 
it into position and action. Do you know, what was that pushing and 
what was this straining, and what were the results? Do you recall 
that? 

Admiral De Lany. X^s, sir. As I say here, before the 7th of De- 
cember, as far as I know the system, the only thing that we had was 
the radars, and none of the appurtenances and equipment and so forth 
that go to make an aircraft warning or a fighter director system. 

92. General Grunert. Did you ever visit the Information Center? 
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. 

93. General Grunert. Wasn't that complete ? 
Admiral De Lany. Partially so, yes, sir. 

94. General Grunert. Were not all the connections made, with not 
three but five radar stations ? 

Admiral De Lany. Not that I know of, sir. I thought there were 
three. 

95. General Grunert. These that I am speaking of are mobile sta- 
tions. 

Admiral De Lany. That is right ; yes, sir. 

96. General Grunert. I note that you said there was no direct wire 
to your headquarters or your office. 

Admiral De Lany. That is right, sir. 

97. General Grunert. Now, what was there about getting the direct 
wire to your office? Did that take materials that they [17J7] 
had trouble getting ? 

Admiral De Lany. Well, there just wasn't any available, sir, or it 
wasn't put in, because after the 7th of December we did rig some port- 
able cable down there. 

98. General Grunert. That seemed a little bit strange to me, that 
after the 7th of December everything started popping and getting 



PROCEEDINGS OK AHMY FKAKL HAKBOK BOAHI) 899 

done, and prior to that they seemed to have trouble getting started, 
getting things in. Tliat is why I wondered wliy you were pusliing 
and straining to get action. 

Admiral De Lany. Well, General, I do not think there is any differ- 
ence between what happened in the Army and what happened in the 
Navy. We couldn't get a 20-mm gun out there before the 7th of 
December, and after the 7th they poured in. The same way with 
other equipment. 

99. General Grunert, That is true in a number of weeks afterwards, 
but shortly after, practically on the 7th of December and the 8th and 
from there on that system started working, without waiting for any- 
thing to come from the United States? 

Admiral De Lany. Not on the 8th, sir, or any time within a week 
afterward, sir. It was possible to get the information through, yes, 
sir; and had we known on the first of November that there was going 
to be an attack any time subsequent or close to that, we could have 
put the string up then, but the plans were in effect and the material 
was being shipped to install a permanent installation as it now exists. 
It would have been possible to have done anything, sir. 

100. General Grunert. The whole thing goes back again as to just 
how deeply they were impressed with the imminence of war. I just 
have one or two more questions, and then I will turn you [1718\ 
over to the mercies of somebody else here. 

Outside of the conferences held between General Short and Admiral 
Kimmel, what was the nature of the conference held between their 
respective staffs ? Were there any periodic conferences or special con- 
ferences, or just individual talks, or what? 

Admiral De Lany. I can only speak for my section of the staff and 
say that they were mostly individual conferences between the giui- 
nery people, the communicators in the Operations Section, sir, and 
that pertained primaril}^ to joint training exercises that were match- 
ing our operating schedule, and then also to the joint base defense drills 
that were held in the Pearl Harbor area. 

101. General Grunert. When did you leave the vicinity of Pearl 
Harbor permanently for change of station ? 

Admiral De Lany. I left there in May '42 and was down in the South 
Pacific and then came back in November '42, and that is the last time 
I have been assigned on anything in Pearl Harbor. 

102. General Grunert. The last time you saw Pearl Harbor was 
November, 1942 ? 

Admiral De Lany. No, sir. The last time I saw Pearl Harbor was 
the 2nd of July, 1944. I came back through there from Saipan, sir. 

103. General Grunert. What I want to get about the Army defenses 
for Pearl Harbor. Do you know whether they have improved to the 
extent that you Navy people now think that the Army, with the means 
it now has available, can give the Navy protection in Pearl Harbor? 

[1719] Admiral De Lany. I can't answer that, General. I 
talked with some people on the staff out there when I came through, 
and I get the general impression from talking to people on CINCPOR's 
staff that generally speaking the requirements of the Army that were 
asked for starting in April, 1941, have gradually ac-cumulated out there 
and they do have enough stuff. 

79716—46 — Ex. 145, vol. 2 8 



900 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

104. General Grunert, I gather from, I tliink it was, your testimony 
I read before the Roberts Commission that at that time you were pretty 
well convinced that Pearl Harbor was not a good place for the fleet to 
be, to be protected, to be secure. Is that right or not ? 

Admiral De Lant. Yes, sir, I make no hesitancy in saying that 
on the 7th of December, 1941, Pearl Harbor w^as not a fleet base as I 
would visualize a fleet base. 

105. General Grunert. I think I shall give General Frank a chance 
now to piece in anything that I may have missed that may be in his 
Qiind. 

106. General Frank. Do you know the different responsibilities that 
the Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District had ? 

Admiral De Lant. By Commander-in-Chief's directive he was the 
base defense officer, sir, and he was also required to maintain liaison 
with the Army. 

107. General Frank. "What I am getting at is this : In the first place, 
he was Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District? 

Admiral De Lant. Yes, sir. 

108. General Frank. On a basis on which he was the representative 
of the Chief of Naval Operations % 

Admiral De Lant. Yes, sir. 

109. General Frank. That is one hat ? 
\_1720'\ Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. 

110. General Frank. He was a commander under the Commander- 
in-Chief of the Fleet, was he not '\ 

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. He was commander of Task Force 4, 
sir. 

111. General Frank. Commander. What was that ? 

Admiral De Lany. That was Base Defense Officer and as such in- 
cluded the outlying islands of the Hawaiian Group, but I mean Johns- 
ton, Midway, Wake, Palmyra. 

112. General Frank. That is two hats he had ? 

Admiral De Lany. Well, that as a task force commander he was the 
Base Defense commander who was responsible for his sea frontier 
which included the outlying islands. 

113. General Frank. Yes. But in this other capacity, which I just 
mentioned, he reported direct to headquarters in Washington. Now, 
in this capacity he reported to the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet. 

Admiral De Lany. As a base defense officer, yes, sir. 

114. General Frank. Yes. Now, he had another responsibility with 
respect to the joint Army-Navy coast defense plan, did he not? 

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir, with the Army. 

115. General Frank. And who was his immediate superior with 
respect to that ? Did he report with respect to that to the Commander- 
in-Chief of the fleet or to Washington ? 

Admiral De Lany. I believe by his original orders he would report 
to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington. 

116. General Grunert. That seemed to be a dual one to me. 

117. General Frank. Another subject: Generally speaking, there 
[i7^i] actually was not an activity known as distant reconnais- 
sance carried out for the express purpose of providing security of 
Oahu against a surprise attack? 

Admiral De Lany. Against a surprise air and surface attack, no, 
sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 901 

118. General Frank. No. And I gathered that that was because 
of the state of mind that generally existed as a result of conclusions 
arrived at from information, messages, and the general situation; is 
that correct? 

Admiral De Lany. Partially, yes, sir. 

119. General Frank. Amplify it, will you ? 

Admiral De Lany. And also, as I said before, that the mission of 
the fleet activities in the Hawaiian area was at that time primarily 
training, and in addition to the fact that there were neither planes, 
pilots, nor equipment available to conduct a continued distant 
reconnaissance. 

120. General Frank. Now, do you feel that the authorities in Wash- 
ington were conversant with the lack of material and the lack of train- 
ing necessary for adequate protection of the place? 

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir, I think they were fully cognizant of 
it, because not only had the Commanding General and the Com- 
mander-in-Chief repeatedly outlined the deficiencies of the fleet and 
the defenses of Pearl Harbor, but in addition to that I am quite cer- 
tain that all the plans such as you refer to here had copies of them — 
I speak for the fleet now — had copies of them sent back to the Chief 
of Naval Operations in Washington. They w^ere entirely familiar 
with our training and operating schedule, and they knew that we were 
not conducting distant reconnaissance. 

[1722] 121. General Frank. Have you any reason to believe 
that the state of mind in Washington was different than the state of 
mind in Honolulu? 

Admiral De Lany. No, sir, I have no way of knowing. 

122. General Frank. Have you any opinion that you would like 
to express on it ? 

Admiral De Lany. Well, mj^ own opinion is that people who sit 
close to the throne probably hear a whole lot more than those who 
don't sit quite so close to the throne, and with that general opinion I 
believe that the people here must have heard more than we did out in 
Pearl Harbor. 

123. General Frank. With the knowledge, had they had knowledge 
that led them to believe that you were on a hot seat and needed help 
to take care of yourself, should that impetus have come from here, 
you think? 

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. I believe a commander in the field is 
entitled to every bit of information that can be furnished him, sir. 

124. General Frank. There was a lot of help arrived right after 
the Pearl Harbor attack? 

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir ; some supposed to come in that morn- 
ing, I believe. 

125. General Frank. Even had it been there, the state of mind 
which led to the conclusions that they had wouldn't have made any 
difference under the circumstances, however, would it? 

Admiral De Lany. Well, I do not think that that is an entirely fair 
supposition, because I believe that if the Commander-in-Chief had 
not had his fleet depleted for months prior to the 7th of December, 
and had both the Army and the Navy re- [1723] ceived equip- 
ment for which they asked as equipment being required in emergency, 
that the opinion of the Commanding General and the Commander-in- 



902 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Chief would probably have been quite some diiferent because I believe 
they would have felt that since the material that they needed was 
forthcoming there would have been some different point of view on 
the thing. 

126. General Frank. You generally remember the messages that 
arrived from the 16th of October, the 24th of November, and the 27th ? 
I do not mean the exact wording, but generally ? 

Admiral De Lany. I don't know what you refer to on the 16th of 
November, sir. 

127. General Frank. October. 
Admiral De Lany. 16th of 

128. General Frank. October. 
Admiral De Lany. Oh, yes, sir ; I know. 

129. General Frank. Just to refresh your memory a bit, on October 

16th: 

Take due precautions including preparatory deployments that will not disclose 
strategic intention. 

Navy message of the 24th : 

Caution relative probability of surprise attack on Guam or P. I. 

Navy, the 27th : 

War warning. Guam Samoa warned Jap action versus P. I., Thai or Kra 
Peninsula, Borneo. 

Army message of the 27th : 

Hostile action possible. Desire Japan commit first overt act. Do not alarm 
civil population. In case of trouble carry out Rainbow Five. 

Now, what were the reactions from the amount of information that 
you did get ? You knew that there was an acute situation ? 

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. Well, as I said in answer to a little 
differently phrased question, I felt that Japan was on [IT^^] 
the move, as I said, and from the information that we had, the infor- 
mation that appeared in those dispatches mentioning P. I., Guam, and 
so forth, that the movement was toward the south. There was no 
question about that. But I certainly never thought that there would 
be an air or a surface attack on Pearl Harbor. 

130. General Frank. What I am trying to get is the statement as 
to how much the contents of these messages influenced your thinking, 
you see. 

Admiral De Lany. Well, my line of reasoning, my line of thought, 
was exactly as I expressed here. I thought that the movement was 
down in that direction. The latest information we had on the em- 
ployment of the Japanese Fleet, even presuming that I had known 
that there was a carrier group in the Marshalls, would not have led 
me to believe that the Japanese carrier force was going to make an air 
attack on Pearl Harbor. I never would have believed it. I didn't 
think that Japan would ever choose that as an initial act of war. 

[1725] 131. General Russell. As a matter of fact, Admiral, 
nfter these messages that General Frank has talked to you about had 
been received and considered by the naval authorities, no change at all 
in their plans were made? 

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir ; there were. 

132. General Russell. In what way ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 903 

Admiral De Lany. We did what we thought was against a pos- 
sible hostile act on the part of Japan, and that is that we increased 
our protection against submarine activities. 

133. General Eussell. In what way? 

Admiral De Lany. In that the ships in the operating area were 
required to take their war-time dispositions, with the anti-submarine 
screens, maintain air patrols, and generally take war-time precautions 
as they would do in cruising in enemy submarine waters; outside of 
the fact that, as you know, carriers were sent to put planes on both 
Midway and Wake. 

134. General Russell. I have wondered about those two move- 
ments. What was the purpose of those two movements? 

Admiral De Lany. That was part of the defensive deployment. 

135. General Russell. Those would be land-based planes on those 
two islands to be used for what purpose? 

Admiral De Lany. Probably reconnaissance, but primarily defense. 

136. General Russell. It has been mentioned in the testimony here- 
tofore that tlie situation was influenced in 1941 by the transfer of 
part of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Ocean. Do you recall when 
that was done, and about how much of the Navy was affected? 

I i7i?(>] Admiral De Lany. No, sir ; I cannot give the exact dates, 
but I know there was a carrier and battleship divisions and one or 
two squadrons of destroyers, plus some transports, both large and 
small, that we had set up in San Diego to commence amphibious 
training. 

137. General Russell. Do you know about when that occurred? 
Admiral De Lany. No ; but I would say, offhand, some time around 

July or August. 

138. General Russell. Early in your testimony this afternoon you 
discussed with General Grunert the inspection that was made by 
Admiral Kimmel and you in the early part of 1941, as I recall. As 
a result of that inspection a letter was sent to the Navy Department, 
and probably a copy furnished to General Short. That is the letter 
which prompted the correspondence between the Secretary of the 
Navy and the Secretary of War touching the subject of the inadequacy 
of the Arni}^ defense on Oahu. Did you know that such a communica- 
tion was sent? 

Admiral De Lany. I cannot answer that ; I do not know. 

139. General Grunert. The Secretary of the Navy's letter to the 
Secretary of War was dated January 24. The Secretary of War's 
reply to the Secretary of the Navy was dated February 7. The in- 
si)ection that was made was not until after the Secretary of War had 
replied to the Secretary of the Navy; so I do not think there is any 
connection. 

140. General Russell. I think that the record will show that the 
letter was written from out there on the 25th, and I am trying to 
find out about it. Admiral Kimmel's letter is dated the 25th of 
January and the Secretary of the Navy's letter is dated the 24th. I 
am just wondering how many inspections were [17B7~\ made. 
Do you know whether or not an inspection was made before the 25th 
of January? 

Admiral De Lany. No, sir; I cannot say that, sir; I do not know. 
I cannot recall the dates. 



904 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

141. General Eussell. So far as you Imow, there was not an in- 
spection out there until shortly before Admiral Kimmel wrote the 
letter of January 25 ? 

Admiral De Lany. I believe that Admiral Richardson, as the 
former Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, had presentedjorior letters 
about the inadequacy of the defense of Pearl Harbor. 

142. General Russell. In the letter of the 24th of January refer- 
ence was made to the probability of a combined air and submarine 
attack as being the most probable form of attack by the Japanese 
Nation. Do you know about that? 

Admiral De Laxt. Yes, sir; and I think you will find that the 
Commander-in-Chief's security letters provide for furnishing the 
facilities of the fleet to the Army and the Base Defense Commander 
in the event that an air attack occurred while the ships were in 
Pearl Harbor. 

143. General Russell. The interest seems to have been rather acute 
in the early part of 1941, January and February ; that is, the interest 
in a surprise attack by aircraft and submarines. Is that true? 

Admiral De Lany. No, sir; that is not true, because, as I recall 
it, the last Base Defense air drill was held some time around — well, 
after the 20th of November. 

144. General Russell. At that time there was not such an intense 
interest in the form of attack out there, was there? 

Admiral De Lany. I do not know what you mean by interest. 

[17^8] 145. General Russell. It was a fact that there was abso- 
lutely no protection or screen thrown out on the morning of December 
Tth or attempt to obtain information about the launching of an attack 
on Oahu? 

Admiral De Lany. That is true not only of the Tth of December, 
but every other day before that, sir, 

146. General Russell. If you people were so intensely interested 
in the type of attack, why was it that no diligence was exercised at 
all to discover the force which might have launched that sort of an 
attack ? 

Admiral De Lany. Oahu is an island. There are no probable sec- 
tors of approach. Therefore, the only way that the Island can be 
completely protected and an enemy approaching the Island can be 
discovered is to maiiftain a 3G0-degree circle of coverage around the 
Island. There were neither planes, pilots, nor other facilities avail- 
able to conduct and maintain such a continuous reconnaissance. 

147. General Russell. You realized the danger, but there was simply 
nothing that you could do about it ? 

Admiral De Lany. Generally speaking; yes, sir. 

148. General Russell. What effect on the damage suffered at that 
time would the dispersion of the ships have had? 

Admiral De Lany. Within the harbor, you mean ? 

149. General Russeix. No. If the ships, instead of being berthed 
in the harbor, had been at sea. 

Admiral De Lany. If the battleships that were eventually salvaged 
and which are now fighting in the Pacific Campaign had been at sea 
and had received the same number of torpedo hits that they received 
in Pearl Harbor I believe they would be sunk. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 905 

[1739] 150. General Russell. It would have been necessary for 
the task force to have sought these ships out wherever dispersed and 
attacked them at sea ? 

Admiral De Lany. Yes. 

151. General Russell. Would it have been a considerably larger 
undertaking than the attack that was made ? 

Admiral De Laxy. Yes ; very decidedly so. And T would like to add 
to that, that had the fleet not been in Pearl Harbor and had the 
attack changed from fleet ships as their objective to shore installa- 
tions as their objective, I believe that the ultimate damage and sub- 
sequent results would have been very much more far-reaching. 

152. General Russell. In answer to one of General Grunert's ques- 
tions 3'ou stated that you did not regard Pearl Harbor and Honolulu 
as a desirable Navy base. I attempted to follow the reasons assigned, 
l)ut. if they were given, I was confused about it. What were your 
reasons for saying that? 

Admiral De Lany, My concept of a naval base is one to which fleet 
forces may go and obtain the necessary recreation for their crews 
and overhaul of their materiel during the time that they are in port. 
Facilities were not available in Pearl Harbor, because the ships were 
required to maintain a condition of readiness that permitted them to 
get underway almost immediately, and the crew was required to stand 
condition watches and live on boai'd a ship that was almost completely 
l)ottled up, so far as light and ventilation was concerned. Under 
tliose circumstances I believe that the general morale and health of 
a crew would soon deteriorate if they had to keep that up continuously 
not only during the time they cruised at sea but [17o0] also 
during the time that they were supposed to be in their bases. 

153. General Russell. What caused this condition of semi-alert- 
ness which prevented the crews from obtaining the necessary 
recreation ? 

Admiral De Lany. Tlie condition of readiness that was set aftei' 
(he Tth of December, as I said, required the ships to be ready to get 
underway. 

154. General Russell. We were at war then. Prior to Decembei' 
Tth did this condition obtain? 

Admiral De Lany. I am talking about something different, then, 
General. I am talking about Pearl Harbor as a base after war was 
declared. 

155. General Russell. I meant, prior to the war. 

Admiral De Lany. Prior to the war it was a very good operating 
base. The weather was good ; there was plenty of deep water as soon 
as you left port. 

i56. General Grunekt. What good is a base if you are not going to 
use it in a war? The whole thing is prepared for the purpose of war. 
Therefore, a place that is good for a iieace base and is not good for a 
war base is not a good base, is it ? 

Admiral De Lany. No, sir. I have said it is not a good base. I 
have said it is not a good base for war operations. The General 
asked me about peace time. I said, "Yes, it made a very good operat- 
ing base during peace time,'' because you luid no festrictions on the 
security of the bases. 



906 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

157. General Russell. As a matter of fact, what happened was that 
the fleet was moved out there before Pearl Harbor had been completed 
and was ready to receive and to protect the fleet. [1731'] Is not 
that true ? 

Admiral De Lany. That is correct ; and if you see the facilities in 
Pearl Harbor as pertained to November and that existed to the 7th 
of December, and those that existed on the 1st of July, 1944, you 
would appreciate exactly how correct your statement is. 

158. General Russell. Admiral, what is your view of the desir- 
ability of a base for a large part of our Navy where the surrounding 
territory is on the Island of Oahu and is inhabited largely or pre- 
dominantly by people whose nation is hostile to the United States? 

Admiral De Lany. I think it is very undesirable. 

159. General Russell. That is all I have. 

160. General Frank. General Russell brought up the point of your 
dispersing the elements of the fleet that were in Pearl Harbor as a 
defense measure against air attack. What is your reaction to the 
presence of a large number of submarines with the Japanese task 
force? Did you or did you not know that therfe was a large sub- 
marine force with this attacking force? 

Admiral De Lany. I knew after the attack that they had been there ; 
and I can only say that if the air and submarine coordination in the 
attack on Pearl Harbor was as efficient as it was down in the Coral Sea 
and in the area where I operated six months afterwards, we would have 
had a very sad experience had we stood to the northward and run 
into those submarines. 

161. General Grunert. Admiral, there appear to be no more 
questions, except that I would like to give you an opportunity to add 
anything to your testimony that you think might be of value to the 
Board in sizing up the situation, which is mainly [1733] from 
an Army viewpoint, but not ail-inclusively an Army viewpoint. Is 
there anything that occurs to you ? 

Admiral De Lany. The only thing that I would like to add to my 
statement, sir, is that from my personal knowledge and observation 
I am certain that there w^ere no disagreements or misunderstandings 
between Admiral Kimmel and General Short, and that any statements 
that are made to the contrary are not true. 

162. General Grunert. We thank you very much for coming here 
and giving us of your time and helping us. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 
(Thereupon, at 5 : 20 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of 
witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 907 



[17S3] CONTENTS 



FRIDAY, AUGUST 25, 1944 
Testimony of — 

Pagu ' 
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, United States Navy, Retired 1734 

DOCUMENTS 

The Pacific Fleet in the Command Organization of the Navy as of 

December 7, 1941 1740 

Excerpt from Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan 1754 

Excerpt of Fortnight Summary of Current International Situations 1770 

Report of United States Ambassador to Japan 1778 

' Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original transcript of proceedings. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 909 



[rr-m PEOCEEDINGS BEFOEE THE AEMY PEAEL HAEBOE 

BOAED 



miDAY, AUGUST 25, 1944. 

Munitions Building, 

Washington^ D. C. 

The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted 
the hearing of \Yitnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the 
Board, presiding. 

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. 
Russell, and Maj. Gen. AValter H. Frank, Members. 

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. 
Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., 
Executive Officer. 

(Leon M. Golding was sworn as a reporter.) 

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED 
STATES NAVY, RETIRED. (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, 
EDWARD B. HANIFY, LIEUTENANT, JUNIOR GRADE, UNITED 
STATES NAVY.) 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Admiral, will you state to the Board your name, 
rank, organization, and station ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Husband E. Kimmel, R^ar Admiral, United 
States Navy, Retired. 

2. General Grunert. Admiral, you probably know what this Board 
has been appointed for. It is to find out the facts as to what happened 
prior to. leading up to, and during the so-called Pearl Harbor attack. 
By reason of your position and {17r35^ assignment out there 
we hope that we can get some facts from you or some leads to where 
we can get facts. That is the main reason for asking you to come over. 

I have prepared a number of questions based on the list of subjects 
I sent over to you. Of course, we will try to stick to those subjects 
as closely as possible, but when we get to questioning you we will 
broaden out a bit. 

First, will you please state to the Board your assignment and, gen- 
erally, your duties thereunder, during the year 1941, giving us dates 
as far as you can recall them? 

Admiral Kimmel. I took over the office of Commander-in-Chief, 
LT. S. Pacific Fleet, the 1st of February, 1941. I was relieved of that 
command on December 17th, 1941. During that time I was responsi- 
ble for the Pacific Fleet. 



910 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

3. General Grunert. Will you tell the Board generally what your 
official relationship was to the Commandant of the 14th Naval Dis- 
trict and to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department? 

4. General Frank. Is there any kind of a chart in existence which 
shows the relationship of the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet to the 
Commandant of the 14th Naval District and to Admiral Bellinger? 

Admiral Ktmmel. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District 
was a subordinate of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. 
The reason I hesitate a moment is that I want to get the thing straight. 

5. General Grunert. Use your own time, Admiral. 

Admiral Kimmel. The Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval 
District was the subordinate of the Commander-in-Chief, but the 
[17S6] had many duties; he was authorized to perform many 
duties by direct correspondence with the Navy Department. He, by 
orders of the Navy Department, War Plans, Joint Action of the Army 
and the Navy, was charged with and in charge of the Hawaiian Naval 
Coastal Frontier Defense, and the Commandant of the district, to- 
gether with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, 
made up a Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. The Commandant 
of the district was charged most directly with cooperation with the 
Commanding General in Hawaii. He was responsible for details 
of Army and Navy cooperation. As my subordinate he kept me in- 
formed of what was going on, and I naturally was responsible for 
what he did. 

6. General Grunert. That is what I wanted to get at next. Any 
plans that were made, although he made them in his capacity under 
the Navy Department as Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval Dis- 
trict, he kept you informed of; and did you approve such plans? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. He kept me informed, and I knew what 
he was doing. 

7. General Grunert. You did not actually have to sign those plans, 
did you? 

Admiral Kimmel. No. My recollection is that I did not sign any 
plans, but I knew the plans and I approved the plans. 

8. General Grunert. You were generally familiar, then, with the 
Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes, by all means. I initiated the business 
of perfecting the cooperation betwixt the Army and Navy air forces 
in Hawaii and was very much interested in it and thoroughly ap- 
proved what they did and was informed of it. 

[17S7] 9. General Grunert. Admiral, see if I am generally 
correct in what my understanding is of the chain of command, as 
we might call it, and of action thereunder. For instance, the District 
Commander was a subordinate of yours? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think I have a document here which may tend 
to clarify the minds of the Board on that point. It is an attempt 
to simplify the various provisions of the Navy Regulations, General 
Order No. 142, General Oi-der No. 143, and the orders contained in 
directives from the Navy Department as provisions in the war plan. 
I submit that for the consideration of the Board and for their future 
study. I think it is accurate. It at least will bring you to the place 
where you can find what is laid down in the documents. I hesitate 
to testify as to just what the document means, I think you are en- 
titled to get that meaning yourselves from the document. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 911 

10. General Frank. The Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval 
District wore one hat — I take that as a phase of responsibility^ — in 
which for certain things connected with the Fourteenth Naval District 
he was responsible directly to the Chief of Naval Operations here in 
Washington, was he not ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes; matters that had to do with the ad- 
ministration of the district, the expenditure of funds, the expansion 
of the plant out there — all manner of administrative affairs ; and, as a 
practical matter, he was under me primarily for military reasons. 

11. General Frank, That was one phase of his work. The second 
phase of his work was his responsibility for the Joint Coastal Frontier 
Defense Plan ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. His responsibilities were laid down 
[17-38] in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and were the 
result of agreement; and, due to the lack of Army equipment in the 
Islands, in order to utilize everything that we had to the fullest extent, 
be agreed to supply the deficiencies that did exist there to the best of 
his ability. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was a realistic 
plan based on what was available and an attempt to utilize it in the 
best manner possible without regard to the responsibilities — not with- 
out regard — but going beyond the responsibilities as laid down in the 
Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935. In the Joint Action 
of the Army and the Navy, 1935, the responsibility for the defense of 
Oahu lay with the Army; even the long-range reconnaissance was a 
function of the Army General Headquarters, Air Force. When it 
came to making plans in Hawaii there was no General Headquarters, 
Air Force, out there, and we had to rig up a plan to utilize what we 
had; and at the time that the Commandant agreed to this plan he 
had been informed that he would eventually have 108 patrol planes 
assigned to him and that the Army would have something on the order 
of 200 flying fortresses, and if and when that condition obtained he 
would have been in very good case to defend Hawaii with other ele- 
ments that would have been present. 

Those are the primary things. However, there being no district 
patrol planes in existence, there being only 

12. General Frank (interposing). That is, Naval District patrol 
l^lanes ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. — and there being only a handful, I think, 
six flying fortresses suitable for distant reconnaissance and bombing, 
it was manifestly impossible for the Commanding General and the 
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to dis- [1739] charge 
their responsibilities with this equipment, and it was planned to utilize 
so many of the patrol planes of the fleet as might be available at any 
one time, augmented by such planes as the Army could supply to do the 
distant reconnaissance. The number of patrol planes in the- fleet was 
81, all told. Of those approximatley between 50 and 60 were in the 
Island of Oahu and suitable for service on the 7th of December. I 
cannot tell you the exact number, because I do not know which ones 
were laid up for check and various things like that, but those 81 
patrol jjlanes were fleet planes and they had to cover all the Hawaiian 
Islands and cover all actions of the Pacific Fleet. They could not, 
and the Commandant knew they could not, be made permanently 
available for the defense of Oahu. nor was the fleet out there to defend 



912 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Oahii; the fleet was there for different purposes. However, we rec- 
ognized, thoroughly and fully recognized, the conditions as they ob- 
tained and endeavored to make the very best use of the equipment that 
we had available. I found General Short most cooperative in his 
efforts to get things done and, as you have probably heard already, 
our relations from the time we first met up to the present day have 
been most cordial. I, in my experience, have never seen any locality 
where the Army and Navy had closer cooperation or more whole- 
hearted desire to make the best of what we had then we had in Hawaii 
tkiring the term of my command as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific 
Fleet. 

I thought I would give you that general picture. 

13. General Grunei^t. Admiral, this document which you have 
handed me, which shows a chart of the organization as of December 
7th, 1941, together with a statement — I believe that if [IT'J/.O] 
we take time out and read this into your testimony it would be well. 
It may obviate the necessity of asking some of the more detailed ques- 
tions, and we can get down to the point with a definite understanding. 
With your permission, I will read it, or your counsel may read it. 

Admii'al Kimmel. I have no objection to its being read, and my 
counsel may read it or you may read it, just as you please. I want you 
to understand, however, that this paper was prepared and is, to the 
best of my knowledge and belief, an accurate, although restricted, 
presentation of the orders and instructions that governed the actions 
of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and the Commandant of the 14th 
Naval District. 

14. General Grunert. This document starts out by saying [read- 
ing] : 

(Document "The Pacific Fleet in the Command Organization of the Navy as 
of December 7, 1941", is as follows :) 

1. Normal command cliannel. 

2. A legal channel rarely used. 

3. Navy Regs. 1481 — The Commandant is the direct representative of the 
Navy Department, including its Bureaus and Offices, in all matters affecting 
district activity. 

a. Art. 1484 (7) — In intercourse vpith government, state and foreign officials 
and with local authorities in matters of interest to the Navy, the Commandant 
shall himself, or through his subordinate, represent the Navy Department. 

b. General Order 142 — The Commandant has dual authority as Commandant 
of the district operating [17^fl] under orders of the Navy Department. 

c. General Order 143 (7) — Commandants of districts * * * have admin- 
istrative responsibility direct to the Navy Department for Naval local defense 
forces. 

4. Navy Regs. 1480 (4) — All matters pertaining to military operations in 
Naval districts shall be under the Office of Naval Operations. 

a. Navy Regs. 1485 (5) — All correspondence relative to changes in the assign- 
ment of district craft to CNO via Bureaus concerned. 

5. CinO, U. S. Fleet and CinC, Pacific Fleet are identical. The relation of 
Cincus to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Atlantic and Asiatic Fleet is ex- 
pressed in General Order No. 143, "Under the CNO the Cincus will, through 
type Commanders, prescribe standards and methods of training for all the sea- 
going forces and air-craft of the Navy. The U. S. Fleet is an administrative 
organization for training purposes only, and is a task organization only when 
two or more fleets are concentrated or operating in conjunction." 

G. General Order No. 142 — In his dual capacity, the Commandant of the 14th 
Naval District as an officer of the fleet operates under the orders of the 
Commander-in-Chief thereof. 

a. With duties corresponding to those of a senior oflScer present afloat. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 913 

b. In command of a task group of the fleet when and as directed by its 
Commander-in-Chief. 

The following excerpts from official publications are [1742] pertinent 
to the investigation : 

"Navy Regs. 1482 — ^In the administration of affairs in the districts, the Com- 
mandant * * * will transact necessary business with the officer commanding 
the group or unit. These groups or units will be coordinated and every effort 
will be made to develop complete intercommunication and cooperation among 
several groups and units in regard to all matters requiring joint action. 

"Navy Regs. 1484 (3) — The Commandant shall cooperate with Army com- 
manders and Commanders of Fleet Forces within the district, in the preparation 
of defense plans in time of peace, as well as their execution in time of war. 

"Navy Regs. 1484 (5) — He shall be charged with the maintenance of an efficient 
information and communication service within the district in accordance with 
instructions issued by ONI and Offices of Naval Communications. 

"Navy Regs. 1486 (1) — The mission of a Commandant of a Naval District in 
coast defense is to control the sea communications witliin the district * * * The 
limits of the Naval districts extend to seaward so far as to include the coastwise 
sea lanes. 

"Navy Regs. 1486 (5) — The Commandants of Naval districts will cooperate 
with the Army officers commanding corps areas in the preparation of plans in 
time of peace, determining the more probable situations likely to arise and enter- 
ing into advance agreements upon plans of joint action for each such situation. 

"General Order 142 — The duties of the Commandants will include the local 
Naval Defense Forces. 

[ll'^S] "a. The duties of a Commandant as an officer of the fleet will be 
guided by such instructions as the CinC of the Fleet may consider desirable. 

"b. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District will report to the Commander- 
in-Chief of the Facitic upon assuming command." 

JOINT ACTION AEMY AND NAVT 

This publication states under paragraph 19 (d) 3, "Army shall provide, operate 
and maintain communication and intelligence systems to include air-craft wai"n- 
ing service, with provision for prompt exchange with the Navy." 

Paragraph 19 (g) — "Navy will provide and operate: 

"h. A system of off-shore scouting and patrol to give timely warning of attack." 

Paragraph 21 (b)l — "The Army Air Components will operate over the sea in 
directing defense of the coast." 

Paragraph 31 (d) — "Category 'd' requires long range air reconnaissance plans 
made for use of GHQ, Air Force." Category "d" is defined as — "Coastal fi-ontier 
that may be subject to major attack." 

Paragraph 31 (g) 2 — "In all categories the Army Commander Is responsible 
for AA Defense within the corps area and Naval districts, to include air-craft 
warning service." 

Paragraph 42 (d) — "Strategic freedom of action of the fleet must be assured. 
THE FLEET MUST HAVE NO ANXIETY IN REGARD TO THE SECURITY 
OF ITS BASE." 

Paragraph 31 (f) — "Regardless of the presence or absence of the fleet, the 
GHQ. Air Force, retains responsibility for reconnaissance." 

[17 H] Page 49 (d) — "The Army is responsible for the defense against 
aerial attack on all Naval facilities ashore in a harbor area." The air-craft 
warning .service is defined on page 150 of this publication. 

THE JOINT COASTAL FKONTIER DEFENSE PLAN FOR THE HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER. 

This plan, signed by General Short and Admiral Bloch, is prepared in accordance 
with the basic war plan and joint action Army and Navy. The Hawaiian Naval 
Coastal Frontier is defined as including Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Canton and 
Wake Islands. The defensive sea areas are defined and Hawaii is considered as 
in category "d". The tasks are: 

a. Joint — Hold Oahu as a main outlying Naval base. Control and protect 
shipping in the coastal zone. 

b. Army — Hold Oahu against land, sea and air attack and against hostile 
sympathizers. Support Naval forces. 

c. Navy — Patrol coastal zone and patrol and protect shipping therein, to sup- 
port the Army forces. In this joint plan the Commanding General of the Army 
is to provide for ; 



914 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

a. Beach, land, sea, coast and anti-air craft defenses of Oaliu, with particular 
attention to Pearl Harbor, Honolulu, Schofield Barracks, Wheeler Field and 
Lualualei. 

b. AA and gas defense, intelligence and warning service. 

f. Establish an in-shore air patrol in cooper- [i7//5] ation with Naval 
in-shore patrol, and an aerial observation system in outlying islands. Establish 
an aircraft warning system for the Hawaiian Islands. 

i. In conjunction with the Navy establish a system of land communication 
(teletype, telegraph loops, radio interceptions, etc.) to insure prompt transmis- 
sion and interchange of hostile intelligence. 

e. Establish a joint intelligence service. 

The Commandant of the 14th Naval District shall provide for : 

a. In-shore patrol. 

b. Off-shore patrol. 

c. Escort force. 

e. Maintain harbor Control Post for joint defense of Pearl and Honolulu 
Harbors. 

f. Install and operate underwater defense for harbors (Hydro-Acoustic Posts). 

g. Plant submarine mines if necessary. 
h. Sweep channels. 

i. Distant reconnaissance. 

1. Local communications (in conjunction with the Army). 

n. Operate Naval intelligence for the collection, evaluation and dissemination 
of hostile information. 

[1746] 15. General Frank. I would still like to ask just a couple 
of questions. 

16. General Grunert. Go ahead with your questions. 

17. General Frank. Prior to this I was asking about the jobs of 
the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, and we determined that 
he had a responsibility where he reported direct to the Navy Depart- 
ment. Then it was brought out that he had a responsibility with re- 
spect to the joint coastal frontier defense plan. In that capacity was 
he responsible directly to you or to the Chief of Naval Operations in 
Washington ? 

Admiral Kimmel. The Chief of Naval Operations sent out instruc- 
tions to each District Commandant as to the form, scope, and the con- 
tents of a defense plan, and they laid down and prescribed certain 
parts of the plan. The Commandant, I should say, was responsible 
directly to the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chief of Naval 
Operations approved or disapproved his action on that. Naturally 
I had a chance to get my ideas into the defense plan or any other plan 
that the Commandant made. However, it was his job to go ahead 
and do it, and unless I interfered, why, he did the whole thing. 

18. General Frank. All right. Now another thing: I notice in 
this paper that General Grunert just read into the record that it states 
in there that the Commandant of the Naval District, being responsible 
for the local defense forces, was responsible to the Navy Department, 
and that coincides with what you just said. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

19. General Frank. Now, he had a third responsibility, which was 
that he had command of a task force ? 

\ 174-7] Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

20. General Frank. And as commander of that task force he was 
responsible to you ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. Now, as commander of the task 
force that is laid down, if you would like to have that, just what it 
was. 

21. General Frank. Will you state it? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 915 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, I can give it to you. 

He was in command of Task Force 4 of the Pacific Fleet. Task 
Force 4 under the command of the Commandant 14th Naval District, 
Rear Admiral Claude G. Bloch, U. S. Navy, included that part of 
the 14th Naval District activities which involved the island bases, 
primary missions to organize, train, and develop island bases in order 
to insure their own defense and provide efficient services to fleet units 
engaged in advance operations. Now, by the provisions of my letter 
2 CL-41 of 14 October 1941 the Commandant was also designated 
as Naval Base Defense Officer, and his duties were laid down in con- 
siderable detail in that publication. I think it would be well to pre- 
sent now to this Board a copy of Pacific Fleet confidential letter No. 
2 CI^-41, revised, of October 14, 1941. 

22. General Frank. This, then, constitutes a fourth responsibility 
for the District Commander? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct; I should say yes, that is about 
right. The number I presume is correct. 

23. General Frank. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmel. At any rate, immediately after I. took command 
of the Fleet I wanted to get an organization for the use of all the 
naval forces which happened to be ni Pearl Harbor [^74-8] at 
any one time, so that they could be used in the event of any kind of 
an attack. In the middle of February we issued the first letter on this 
subject. This letter which I have just quoted was a revision of the 
original letter. 

24. General Gkuxert. That was in October, was it? 

Admiral Kimmel. This is October 14th. This letter tied up some 
loose ends and tucked them in where they should be, but made no 
material change in the letter of the 15th of February, 1941. 

25. General Grunert. May I ask at this point whether your instruc- 
tions there were in consonance with this joint coastal frontier defense 
plan? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think there is no question about it. If there 
had been any conflict we would have discovered it in the course of the 
numerous drills which we had, and this letter was the subject of con- 
siderable thought and effort on the part of the Commandant, 14th 
Naval District, the forces afloat, and tlie Commanding General, Ha- 
waiian Department. He knew all about tliis order; and in this 
order — I think I can touch on some of the high spots of the order 
profitably — we disposed the ships of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor as they 
came in so as to cover all of the various sectors upon which aircraft 
could approach. It was the duty of the senior officer present afloat, 
exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, to so place those ships. We 
had a sector commander appointed for each sector — that is, of the 
ships afloat; and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District was 
placed in charge, as Naval Base Defense Officer, of coordinating the 
efforts of the Navy, of whatever happened to be ashore, with those of 
the Army in the defense of the Pearl Harbor base. 

[174^] The other big point that we covered in this and in the 
joint agreement betwixt the Commanding General and the Comman- 
dant of the 14th Naval District was a fjuestion of cooperation of the 
aircraft. I tliink you should have that presented to you. In general 
it provided that the bombers and long range planes should be under 

7971G— 40- -Ex. 145, vol. 2 9 



916 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the command of the Navy ; tlie fighters shoiikl be under the command 
of the Army, and there were certain otiier provisions. I won't go 
into them because I see you have had it here and it is contained in the 
papers. 

Incidentally, I came to Washington in June of 1941, and I told the 
Chief of Naval Operations about this agreement which we had arrived 
at in Pearl Harbor, and he was very much pleased with it, and I 
undertook to dictate from memory the terms of the agreement, in his 
office, and tell him about it. 

2G. General Grunert. Were not those agreements forwarded to 
Washington ? 

Admiral Kimmel, Yes, it was. He hadn't seen it apparently, and 
I had tried to bring him up to date on it. At any rate, I think it had 
already been forwarded, and later on another copy was forwarded; 
I know that. 

Well, he was pleased with it and said that we had gone further in 
that respect, of getting a coordinated action of the Army and Navy 
air forces out there, than anywhere else, and he wanted to use it as 
a model to send to other places, and I think he mentioned the Caribbean 
as a place where at that time they hadn't been able to arrive at a 
definite agreement. 

This order, as you will see if you take the trouble to read it, is quite 
comprehensive. It covers all forseeable [1750] contingencies 
and prescribes in general the action to be taken by each element of the 
Army and Navy in the event of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. 

Now, this letter is quite long. There are plenty of copies of it. 

27. General Grunert. We have a photostat copy of what you are 
referring to. 

Admiral Kjmmel. I see. Well, then we don't need it. 

28. General Grunert. So I do not think there is any need of putting 
it in the record. I think that photostatic copy is the one from the 
Roberts Commission. 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, there is one there, if you have that. 

29. General Frank. Yes. 

30. General Grunert. There are copies of both your February one 
and the revised one of October. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. I think they are both in that 
testimony. 

31. General Grunert. All right. You may complete your examina- 
tion. General Frank. 

32. General Frank. I should like to go back to a statement that you 
made with respect to airplanes and the responsibilities of the Com- 
mandant of the 14th Naval District. I think you stated, no planes 
in existence. I do not believe you meant that. There were types of 
planes in existence, but they were not in Honolulu. That is what 
you meant ; wasn't it ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I don't know what I said, now. I don't know 
what you are talking about. I can't make it out. It is not clear what 
you are asking, the question you are asking me. 

33. General Frank. Well, you were discussing the [1751] 
responsibilities of the Commandant of the Naval District with respect 
to conducting reconnaissance, and you stated there are no planes 
in existence. There were planes in existence, but they were not in 
Honolulu and available to him ; is that what you mean ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 917 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, it is a fact that the Commandant of the 
14th Naval District had no planes assigned to him at this time. 

34. General Frank. Well, that is what you meant. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is a fact. I don't know what I said. I 
can't recall. 

35. General Frank. All I was trying to do is to straighten out the 
record. 

Admiral Kjmmel. I see. 

36. General Frank. So that we don't come back and find that you 
made a misstatement. 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I don't want to make a misstatement if 
1 can help it. 

37. General Frank. You see what I am trying to do? 
Admiral Kimmel. Yes, certainly. Thank you. 

38. General Frank. Now, when you read this — how is that identi- 
fied [indicating]? 

Admiral Kimmel. I might add that, as the Commandant 14th Naval 
District had no planes assigned to him, the only place that he could 
get planes was from the Fleet. 

39. General Frank. Or from 

Admiral Kimmel. Or from the Army. 

40. General Frank. Or from Washington, having the Chief of 
Naval Operations assign him planes? 

[1752] Admiral Kimmel, Well, again I am trying to be realistic, 
sir. 

41. General Frank. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmel. He made his best efforts to obtain planes from 
Washington. He wrote letter after letter to obtain planes from 
Washington. 

42. General Frank. But he didn't get them? 
Admiral Kimmel. And he didn't get them. 

43. General Frank. Now, in this paper that General Grunert just 
read is the statement : 

Regardless of the presence or absence of the fleet, the GHQ Air Force retains 
responsibility for reconnaissance. 

Admiral Kimmel. I didn't make any such statement as that. That 
statement is made in Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 11)35, as of 
December 7, 1941, and if you get a copy of Joint Action of the Army 
and Navy you will find it in there. 

44. General Frank. It was just read out of this paper right here 
[indicating]. 

Admiral Kimmel. That was taken from this publication here [indi- 
cating]. Did he say what page it was? I don't recall myself. 

45. General Frank. Page 3, Paragraph 31 (f). 

There would seem to be a little confusion between this statement and 
the provision in this agreement that was'inade between the Army and 
the Navy in which the Navy takes over responsibility for all recon- 
naissance. 

Admiral Kimmel. The agreements arrived at in Hawaii were an 
honest and energetic effort to use the forces available to [1753] 
the best advantage, and there weren't any general headquarters Army 
aircraft available in Hawaii, and we knew that there weren't going 
to be all}'. 



918 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

46. General Frank. I am just trying to straighten out the record. 
Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir; I understand. 

47. General Frank. That is all I am trying to do. 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I am too. That is all I am trying to do. 

48. General Frank. And this statement that you presented gave 
this impression that the GHQ Air Force was responsible for recon- 
naissance irrespective of the presence of the fleet; whereas actually, 
as a result of this agreement that was made between the Army and 
the Navy in Hawaii, the Commandant 14th Naval District, under 
18 (i) was made responsible for distant reconnaissance. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes; he accepted the responsibility for distant 
reconnaissance, because he couldn't do anything else and be sensible. 

49. General Frank. All right. I see. 

50. General Grunert. Now we go back to a few general principles ; 
we may call them general principles. I am now referring to the 
joint Hawaiian coastal frontier defense plan. It appears that that 
plan was made and it became effective when signed, but was not to 
become operative until something happened. I want to read to you a 
paragraph from that plan and then ask you a question. Paragraph 
15 says "Forces." Subparagraph "c" says, "Overseas reinforcements." 
Subparagraph [17S4] (2) to paragraph c is as folows : 

(Excerpt from Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan is as 
follows:) 

M-Day is tlie first day of mobilization, and is the time origin for the execution 
of this plan. 

In other words, the plan was not to be executed until M-Day had 
been decided upon. 
Then it goes on : 

M-Day may precede a declaration of war. As a precautionary measure, the 
War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of 
their respective plans prior to M-Day. Such parts of this plan as ai"e believed 
necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War and 
Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders. 

That is the end of that paragraph. 
Admiral Kimmel. Yes, I know that. 

51. General Grunert. Therefore, parts of this plan could have been 
put into effect prior to M-Day had the local commanders so agreed. 
Now, in that, as to local commanders, what is your interpretation of 
what "local commanders" means? Does that mean to you the Com- 
manding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant 
of the District? Or does that mean you and the Commanding General 
of the Hawaiian Department, or does it mean both combinations? 

Admiral Kimmel. I feel that it does not make much difference what 
it means. 

52. General Grunert. This is mv question. My next question 
[17S5] was this : 

Admiral Kimmel. I will answer. I am perfectly willing to answer 
that. 

53. General Grunert. All right. 

Admiral Kimmel. I think the Commandant of the 14th Naval Dis- 
trict and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, if 
they felt that they should put into effect the mobilization, they could 
have recommended it to me. That is, the Commandant, 14th Naval 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 919 

District, would have recommended such to me ; and if he had so rec- 
ommended it to me, I would have referred it immediately to Wash- 
ington, We were in communication with Washington. Washington 
knew much more about this situation than we did. They were the 
fountain head of the information, and if any action looking towards 
the execution of this plan were necessary, it appears to me that there 
is no question but what Washington should have taken the action. 

Now, these provisions of what to do on mobilization and what mobi- 
lization meant were laid down in the basic plans, and they were laid 
down in the subsidiary plans which went to the execution of the basic 
plans ; and I venture to say that, had we put into effect mobilization 
order in the Pacific at any time during the year that I was in com- 
mand, we would have been most severely criticized by Washington for 
having done so without prior reference to them, and they would have 
quite promptly pointed out that you can get an answer in an hour 
and a half or two hours, and why go ahead and put into effect a plan 
like this when you are in direct communication? 

54. General Frank. Why? What would that have done? 
[1756] Admiral Kimmel. What is that? 

55. General Frank. Why should you not have done it ? What would 
have been the result to which Washington would have objected? 

Admiral Kimmel. It would have alarmed the population. It might 
have been considered by Japan an overt act. It would have tended to 
upset the Japanese-American relations, which we had been enjoined 
to maintain in status quo ; and it would have required, so far as the 
Navy is concerned, certain movements of the fleet and certain action 
which should not have been taken without reference to the Depart- 
ment. 

56. General Frank. In Washington? 
Admiral Kimmel. In Washington, yes. 

57. General Grunert. That has answered the next question I had; 
but now I have one : Was there ever a discussion as to whether or not 
to make parts of this plan operative, and so recommend to Wash- 
ington ? 

Admiral Kimmel. In this 2 CL-41 letter which deals with the secur- 
ity of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor and in the operating areas outside of 
Pearl Harbor also, we prescribed certain security measures to be taken, 
and they were placed in effect ; and at the time or prior to the Japanese 
attack the ships at sea in the operating areas were operating with full 
security measures. Those in Pearl Harbor had a considerable number 
of them in effect, but not so much as in the operating area, because in 
oiir estimate of the situation (which, incidentally, we revised almost 
daily ; I meaji, went over almost daily, in accordance with the intelli- 
gence information which we received) we felt that if. as intimated in 
the dispatches of 27 November, [17571 if the Philippines were 
attacked or if Guam were attacked, that the principal assault would 
be there. We felt, too, that it was quite possible that we would have 
a mass submarine attack on the ships in the operating areas and off the 
entrance to Pearl Harbor. Against such a contingency we took com- 
plete precautions. 

58. General Grunert. Of course. Admiral, this Board is primarily 
interested wherever anything touches the Army, and it is not going 
into the naval i^hases. So wliatever you have to say we will be glad 



920 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to hear, but if it isn't exactly pertinent to what we are after we shall 
save a lot of time and tell yon. 

Admiral Kimmel. Well. I am sorry. I am very sorry. 

59. General Grunert. So these plans as such were really plans to 
be prepared to do something, but nothing could really be done except 
by agreement prior to the time M-Day was decided upon or the time 
something hit. That is why my question here : Was there no time prior 
to December 7 where things appeared imminent to the respective 
Commanders over there that caused them to want to implement the 
plan, even if they had to apply to Washington to do it? 

Admiral Ki^imel. Well, t think, if I have given the impression 
wliich your question implies, I have created a wrong impression. We 
(I, speaking for myself) would have had no hesitancy in placing into 
effect any provision of the plan that I thought necessary to put into 
effect prior to any word from Washington; and had I considered it 
necessary to place into effect these things, I would have done so. As 
a matter of fact, [17S8] we did actually place into effect some 
of the provisions of the plan, and not all of them, but I think that the 
significance of this paragraph and of ordering the full mobilization is 
different from that, and the full mobilization was something that I 
would not have ordered without reference to the Navy Department, 
but any specific provisions which are contained in these plans I would 
not have hesitated at all to order, and did not hesitate to order, as I 
considered necessary. 

60. Genera] Grunert. Then let me ask this question : At no time 
up to December 7 did you consider the conditions over there as justi- 
fying you in asking the War Department to declare M-Day in exist- 
ence ? 

[17-59] Admiral Kimmel. No, I did not; and had I considered 
that I liad information wliich the Navy Department did not have, or 
had I considered that the information which it supplied to me, or that 
the information which had been supplied to me from any source de- 
manded that M-Day be proclaimed, I would have so recommended to 
the Navy Department. 

61. General Grunert. Do you recall any particular provisions of 
this joint plan, that were made operative by agreement, prior to De- 
cember 7, generally speaking? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, I think I can give you those. Of course, I 
am more familiar with what happened in the Fleet, with what I did 
with the Fleet. My main preoccupation was with the Pacific Fleet 
and not with the defense of Hawaii. 

02. General Grunert., Then what you told me relates primarily to 
tlie Fleet? 

Admiral Kt^imel. Yes. 

63. General Grunert. And not between the District and the De- 
partment? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, yes; correct. 

64. General Grunert. Then whatever was done under that joint 
plan, unless it was brought to your attention, you could not tell us 
very well what was done ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I think that's true; yes; yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 921 

65. General Grunert. Let me read to you, or refresh your mind 
about a paragraph in the joint action of the Army and Navy, chapter 
2, paragraph 9 (b) , wliich reads as follows: 

Operatious of Army and Navy forces will be coordinated by exercise of unity of 
command in the following cases : 

[17G0] 1. When ordered by the President; or, 

2. When provided for in joint agreements between the Secretary of War and 
the Secretary of the Navy ; or, 

3. When commanders of Army and Navy forces agree that the situation re- 
quires the exercise of unity of command, and further agree as to the service 
which shall exercise such command. 

Did that question come up as to the necessity for unity of command 
prior to anything that might happen in the future ? If so, was it dis- 
cussed and ever contemplated that the commanders over there would 
agree on unity of command? 

Admiral Kimmel, To the best of my recollection. General Short 
and I never discussed the question of unity of command. We had 
worked out a formula for cooperation, and we never had any dis- 
agreement which we couldn't resolve amicably and to the satisfaction 
of both of us. I think neither one of us raised a question of unity of 
command, because, as you know, it has been a touchy subject in the 
Army and Navy for many years; and I am certain that had either one 
of us recommended that unity of command be placed in effect in 
Hawaii prior to the Japanese attack it would not have been done. I 
think you gentlement are just as well able to judge that as I am. That 
is merely my opinion. In any event, we did not discuss it, and made 
no recommendations. That, I can state. 

66. General Grunekt. The Board has had testimony to the effect 
that, had there been unity of command at that time, it would probably 
have improved matters, including plans and agreements under plans, 
and a possible decision to take action prior to December 7; so I just 
wanted to get your reaction as [1761] to that question of unity 
of command. 

Admiral Kimmel. I would like to add one thing to that. Unity of 
command in the field isn't going to be truly effective as long as the com- 
manders are receiving their orders from different sources. It will 
help. 

67. General Frank. Had you and General Short, prior to December 
7, come to an agi-eement to have installed a unity-of -command basis 
out there, from whom would that single head have received his orders 
in Washington ? 

Admiral Kimmel. The President, I presume. There is no other 
agency that could give the orders to both of them. I think you gentle- 
men can answer that just as well as I can. 

68. General Geunert. Now, as to deficiency of means to implement 
the plans that existed, can you generally give the Board an idea of what 
deficiency in such means there was, as far as the Navy was concerned, 
that would prevent this plan from having the best results when any- 
thing happened? Not in detail, but just generally. 

Admiral Kimmel. I think the primary deficiency in Hawaii was in 
aircraft; and next to aircraft, both Army and Navy, it was in the 
antiaircraft guns, means for repelling air raids. My recollection is 



922 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAKL HAKBOR ATTACK 

that we had, on December 7, 1941, 12 B-17 bombers in the ishmds, and 
we had 81 patrol planes in the islands, altogether. I may be wrong 
in detail, but this is a general picture that I think I can give you. Of 
the 12 B-l7s, six of them were in operating condition, six had been 
stripped and were inoperative. 

69. General Frank. Stripped for parts? 

Admiral Kimmfx. Stripped of parts — and you know why — to send 
the ones to the Philippines by the ferry. Of the 81 [1762] pa- 
trol planes, 12 of them were up at Midway, 12 of them had just 
leturned from an extensive covering operation, escorting the task 
force which went to Wake, We had had a great many difficulties 
with new planes — patrol planes, I am talking about — so I think it is 
fair to say that we had in the neighborhood of 50 planes, between 50 
and 60 planes, over-all. Army and Navy, fit for distant reconnaissance 
or for an attack on a task force. That is, based on Hawaii, now. 

70. General Grunert. What should you have had, to be reasonably 
prepared for stich work ? 

Admiral Kimmel. There was an allowance established of 108 patrol 
planes for the Navy, for the District, and about 180, as I remember it, 
for the Fleet. In other words, about 270 planes. Maybe my arithmetic 
is bad, there — 270 or 280 planes, of the 15,000-plane program, and 
plans were to assign that many patrol planes. 

71. General Frank. As a metter of fact, there was a plan worked 
out which stated that number ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

72. General Frank. Or, rather, it stated the number required. 
Admiral Kimmel. It stated the number required, and it was in the 

neighborhood of 270 planes, all told, including the 108 for the District. 
Also, the Army expected to get, I think it was, 200 B-17 bombers out 
there. Now, had those planes arrived, they would have been in fairly 
good shape not only to provide a searching force but to provide a 
striking force; which is just as important as a searching force; and 
it is very difficult to accomplish anything from the surface ships 
against an airplane attack, and that was very well recognized, and 
has been [1763] proved over and over again in this war. We 
had three aircraft carriers which could be used for this purpose, sup- 
ported by the fleet, of course ; other elements of the fleet. I am speak- 
ing now particularly of what did happen in an aircraft raid against 
Pearl Harbor. Of these three carriers, one of them was on the coast 
getting some repairs, and was going to ferry some planes out from 
San Diego; one of them was returning from Wake, having discharged 
some Marine fighters at Wake; and one of them was about 400 miles 
southeast of Midway, ferrying some planes up to Midway. They were 
not badly placed in case of an attack, as it worked out, provided we 
had had sufficient planes left on Oahu to do the job of locating the 
enemy. 

There has been some misconception, I think, about the question of 
distant reconnaissance with surface vessels. I think it is generally 
accepted that proper reconnaissance against aircraft attack requires 
that the patrol planes run out to about 800 miles from Oahu, around 
a 360 degree arc, if you want a full coverage, and this will take about 
84 planes, assuming a 15-mile visibility, for one day. Now, the pe- 
riphery of that 800-mile circle is some 5,000 miles, and to put ships 30 
miles apart, you can divide 30 into 5,000 and get the number of ships 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 923 

that it would be necessary to place out there on that periphery. We 
didn't have enough ships to do any such stuff as that. 

Furthermore, had they been placed on the periphery, it would not 
have been effective, because all the enemy had to do was to run by 
them at night and get inside the line ; and then you would have nothing 
to back them up, because we didn't have any more ships. I just wanted 
to dispose of that as being too absurd to even think of. So we had 
left, as the only means of [-?7'(?4] locating an enemy, planes, 
searching planes, and, of course, radar. 

And in addition to the shortage in planes — you asked me about 
that — while I do not carry the figures in my head, my impression is 
that the Army had about one-third of the anti-aircraft guns that the 
Commandant of the 14th Naval District, after a study, considered 
necessary. 

73. General Grttnert. Of course, we like to have 100 per cent of 
anything, but we never get to 100 per cent. 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, no; that is true. 

74. General Grunert. But that brings up this question: Was that 
which you had used to its capacity and to its limits, or was it not pos- 
sible to use what you had for certain protection without getting a 
360-degree protection ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Certainly; it admits of no argument that if 
you send out one plane to 800 miles, you have covered something, but 
I have given you, up to the present, only a part of the picture. These 
were the forces available. That was the question that I was trying 
to cover. 

Now, there are many other considerations. The principal one that 
arises at once is the question of personnel, the necessity for training 
personnel, from the fact that certainly the Navy was training per- 
sonnel and shipping them back to the States, that we were constantly 
getting new personnel. That intensive training program was essential 
if we were not to have a fleet that was utterly impotent. I have been 
informed, and I believe firmly, that the Army had just as many 
troubles as we had, if not more. They brought pilots out there that 
needed training, and they were depleting their trained airmen of all 
ratings. [J765] and in the weeks immediately preceding the 
attack on Pearl Harbor, the primary effort for their Hawaiian Air 
Force, I think it is fair to say, was in ferrying planes to the Asiatic 
station, and they very greatly depleted their stuff. 

75. General Grunert. To what extent, if you know, was General 
Short, as Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, familiar 
with what j^ou are telling us? 

Admiral Kimmel. With what? 

76. General Grunert. To what extent was he familiar with condi- 
tions that existed in the Navy, which would affect his defense? In 
other words, what did he know about what you are telling us? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think he knew it all. I think he knew every- 
thing about it; and, as a matter of fact, as a part of our daily work 
down there, the available aircraft were reported each day to the Army,^ 
and the Army reported their available aircraft to the Navy. I mean 
the ones based on shore at Hawaii. That is, so far as the aircraft was 
concerned. I think that in our various conversations — and we had 
many and extended conA^ersations on all phasfes of the business — we 
covered practically everything that I can think of. 



924 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

77. General Grunert. Now, we take the other side of the picture. 
Admiral Kimmel. Of course, you know the difficulties, when you 

assume somebody knows something, and you don't mention it — and 
we all do that — but I don't think there was much of that, if any. 

78. General Grunert. Taking the other side of the picture, how 
well were you informed as to the Army's deficiencies for [1766^ 
a proper defense ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think I was very well informed. 

79. General Grunert. Was your staff well informed about details? 
Admiral Kimmel. Generally speaking, yes; I think they were. It 

is fair to say that they were well informed. As a matter of fact, I 
reported in a dispatch to the Navy Department, in the week before 
Pearl Harbor — I have got it here, somewhere or other — that there 
were just 6 B-17 bombers that were capable of flying, in Hawaii. I 
know I was familiar with that, because I reported it. I know, too, 
that I was quite familiar with the pursuit strength out there; and this 
proposal from the War and Navy Departments, supplied to General 
Short by the War Department and to me by the Navy Department, to 
relieve Marine units with Army units, both aircraft and troops, out 
on the islands, brought up in considerable detail what we actually did 
have there at the time; and, incidentally, there was a case where Gen- 
eral Short got certain instructions, and I got certain instructions, and 
we didn't know exactly what they wanted us to do; but we ironed it 
out, and there was no disagreement betwixt us when we did iron it 
out. 

80. General Grunert. I think the Board is pretty well informed on 
the actual conditions regarding materiel, personnel, and so forth, that 
existed at the time. 

Admiral Kimmel. All right, sir. 

81. General Grunert. I would like next to develop the phase of 
what I call "intelligence", or information; and before we go into 
that, I think it would be well to take about a 5-minute recess. 

(Brief recess.) 

[1767] 82. General Grunert. Do you want to add something, 
Aclmiral? 

Admiral Kimmel. I wanted to say, in regard to the conditions that 
existed in Hawaii with reference to defense, that in January of 1941, 
early January, the Commandant of the 14th Naval District submitted 
to the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Richardson, a letter pointing 
out what he considered deficiencies in Army and Navy means for the 
defense of Oahu. The Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Richardson, 
sent that in with a forwarding letter. This letter, I believe, was the 
basis of the letter which the Navy Department drew up and sent to 
the War Department, pointing out the deficiencies in Hawaii, as to 
defense, and the Secretary of War wrote an answering letter, to the 
Navy Department, in which he recognized these deficiencies and stated 
that the remedying of them was given top priority. All those letters 
I presume you have. 

83. General Grunert. We have them. We have also had testimony 
on them. But the only new thing, or which appeared to be new, in 
what 3^ou said, is that the letter was based on Richardson's report. 
We did not know just what it was based on. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 925 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes; it was based on Ricluu'dson's report; and I 
believe that Herron knew all about it and approved what Richardson 
was doing, and he sent in a parallel recommendation himself. 

84. General Grunert. That brings up a point in the Roberts Com- 
mission report. You testified as to an inspection you made of the 
I'earl Harbor defenses in February of 1941, in which you stated that 
you were astounded at the then existing weaknesses, and that you 
pointed out the inadequacy of the antiaircraft guns, the obsolescence 
of land-based aircraft, and the lack of air- [1768] craft de- 
tectors. As far as that is concerned, did you communicate your views 
on that subject to General Short ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think there is no question about that. If you 
mean in writing and formally, no. If you mean in conversations, yes ; 
and he thoroughly agreed with me. 

85. General Grunert. During the time from that inspection in 
February, 1941, up to, we will say, the latter part of November, 1941, 
did 3'ou know what corrective action was taken? Did you notice any 
improvement in what you had found before that? 

Admiral Ivimmel. Yes. Roughly, at the time I made that statement 
which you have referred to, the Army had no modern planes in Hawaii 
at all, none. 

80. General Grunert. That was in February of 1941 ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. The antiaircraft guns were even fewer 
than they Were on December 7, 1941. In the spring we made two trips 
with airplane carriers to bring pursuit planes for the Army to Hawaii. 
I think it was two trips ; it may have been more. I knew by December 
7. 1941, that they had approximatel}^ 100 effective pursuit planes in 
the islands. So that was an increase from zero to 100. In that same 
time they had as high as 27 B-17 bombers out there. I followed this 
very closely because I was very much interested in it; and as I have 
previously testified, you know we had just six effective ones on Decem- 
l;er 7th. They had a number of other planes in the Army at that time, 
that is, B-18's and A-20's, as I recall it. At any rate, I was informed 
that they were practically useless for offensive work, and they were so 
short that they could not get anywhere at sea, anyway. 

87. General Grunert. Let us go into that. Did you know of 
[17(10] the presence of a Japanese task force in the Marshall 
Islands, in the vicinity of Jaluit, between November 27th and 30th? 
If so, was this information transmitted to General Short? 

Admiral Kimmel. We had radio intelligence, as I recall, of prob- 
ably one or two Japanese carriers in the Marshalls. Along within 
this period — I do not remember the exact date, but it was only a few 
days before the attack — we also had information b}^ which we thought 
we could place with reasonable accuracy all the Japanese carriers. 
I do not recall all the details, but I went over this daily with my 
intelligence ofiicer, with my war plans officer, and with my Chief of 
Stuff, and we made a re-estimate based on the new intelligence and 
took whatever action we thought was necessary. Practically every 
time that General Short came to my headquarters, which was on an 
average of two or three times a week throughout the time I was out 
there, I called in the intelligence officer. I had a great wall map in 
my office, and he gave us a little lecture on what the latest intelli- 



926 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

gence was. That was done during the week of the 27th of November 
to 7 December, and we had a report from the Navy Department dated 
1 December, 1941, wliich phiced the Japanese carriers, the major part 
of them, in the home waters. I think I can read you from this report, 
if I may. 

88. General Grunert. Yes. We would like to hear it. 

Admiral Kimmel. This is the Fortnightly Summary of Current 
International Situations issued by the Office of the Chief of Naval 
Relations, Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, and dated De- 
cember 1, 1941. It is signed by T. S. Wilkinson, Director of Naval 
Intelligence. The portion which I am about to read is on page 9, 
sub-paragraph C, ''The Japanese Naval Situa- [1770] tion." 

(Portion of Fortnightly Summary of Current International Sit- 
uations is as follows :) 

Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that 
extensive preparations are underway for hostilities. At the same time troop 
transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and north- 
ern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and 
Formosan ports. Present movements to the south appear to be carried out 
by small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, 
not definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next few days. 
To date, this task force, under the Command of the Commander in Chief Second 
Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually con- 
centrating oft the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each 
constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the 
Combined Air Force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one divi- 
sion of battleships may also be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains 
in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers. 

The equipment being cari-ied south is a vast assortment including landing 
boats in considerable numbers. Activity in the Mandates, under naval control, 
consists not only of large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions but 
also of construction material with yard workmen, engineers, etc. 

In addition to that, of course, there was a radio intercept unit to 
obtain combat intelligence in the 14th Naval District, [1771] 
directly under the command of the Commandant, 14th Naval District, 
and they reported to me what they obtained. There was another 
unit, the principal one, out in Manila, in the 16th Naval District, and 
a unit in the Navy Department. 

89. General Frank. In Washington. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. In Washington. These three units with 
their intercepts and summaries of information exchanged informa- 
tion, and generally the Navy Department made up a summary and 
sent it out. of their estimate, after having received the other two. 

During this period the Navy Department directed the Commandant, 
16th Naval District, to prepare the summaries, and gave more weight 
to the 16th District than to the 14th District. We of course got all 
those and, generally speaking, they confirmed what was in this sum- 
mary of December 1st. We had no reason to believe, from any intelli- 
gence we had, that the Japanese were going to make any air attack 
on Pearl Harbor, or even that any attack was going to be made on 
Pearl Harbor. Wliile we had received these messages, all of our in- 
formation taken together resulted in the action that we took, and 
there was no disagreement as to wliat we felt about the situation. 

90. General Grunert. Do you believe that General Short was kept 
generally informed of all that you have told us^ 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 927 

91. General Grunert. Was this stuff all highly secret ? 
Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes. This stuff was highly secret; and these 

secret matters about the enemy — we did not have any secrets from 
Short himself. 

92. General Grunert. Did you judge what to give General Short, 
[1772] or did you give him practically everything? 

Admiral Kimmel. I gave him everything. I did not tell him any- 
thing about our plans for operation overseas. I gave him all the 
information which I thought would help him in the defense of Oahu. 

93. General Frank. How did you give him that information ? 
Admiral Kimmel. Mostly by word of mouth, because that seems to 

me to be the safest way. 

94. General Frank. You gave it to him yourself? 

Admiral Kimmel. I gave it to him and, as I have told you, by the 
lectures in my office ; and his staff officers consulted with mine. So 
far as the fleet plans of what we proposed to do were concerned, fol- 
lowing the principle that the fewer people that know about any oper- 
ations, the better off you are, he was not directly concerned and I did 
not tell him about those, and he did not inquire. 

95. General Grunert. Skipping down to a question that I had in 
mind to ask, he probably had no definite interest in your plans as 
far as your responsibilities were concerned, except inasmuch as it 
might have affected his? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

96. General Grunert. When the task forces left Pearl Harbor to go 
out into areas to either maneuver or for any special task which would 
probably cover some of the area that would worry him for fear of 
an attack coming from that particular direction, was he informed 
generally about these task forces and where they were? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

97. General Grunert. But these task forces did not do what we 
[1773] call distant reconnaissance for the defense of the islands, 
did they? 

Admiral Kimmel. It is a fact that wherever they were and what- 
ever they did covered the areas, and to that extent it was reconnais- 
sance. The ENTERPRISE, under Admiral Halsey, went to Wake 
and was covered by aircraft all the way out, or patrol squadrons, in 
addition to scouting of their own, and they cut a swath across there, 
which was, in effect, a reconnaissance. 

98. General Frank. It was incidental to the operation of the task 
force, however ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

99. General Grunert. Primarily reconnaissance for submarines, for 
their own protection? 

Admiral Kimmel. No. When Admiral Halsey went to Wake we 
did not know what was going to happen to him. Wake w'as a consid- 
erable distance. Patrol planes were not a great deal of protection 
against submarines, and he did not bother about submarines particu- 
larly, because he had an escort of 9 destroyers around his three cruisers 
and aircraft carrier. He was looking for bigger game than sub- 
marines. 



928 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

100. General Grunert. You evidently had some suspicion, if you 
sent a task force like that, that was well able to take care of itself. 
You thought they might run into something? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes ; we thought they might run into something. 
We were taking all precautions, always. 

101. Genera] Grunert. But you did not think that that something 
might come as far as Hawaii, or attempt to ? 

Admiral Kimmel.. Based on the messages we had and our inter- 
pretation of the messages and the information we had, we felt 
[1774^] that they would not come to Hawaii. Otherwise w^e would 
have done something somewhat different. Wake, you know, is 2,000 
miles to the westward. 

102. General Frank. You stated that your combat intelligence 
had told you that there was this force in the Marshalls? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is my recollection at the present time. I 
cannot be sure of that. 

103. General Frank. Which would put it in the vicinity of Jaluit. 
That force, in your estimate of the situation, was supposed to consist 
of some submarines and aircraft carriers. Did not that disturb you ^ 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes; but we watched that very closely. 

104. General Frank. It disappeared, did it not, about Decem- 
ber 1st? 

Admiral Kim^iel. No : I do not think so ; not as I recall it. 

105. General Frank. I think we have some testimony before the 
Board that it went on radio silence and disappeared. If you w^ere 
conversant with that, did not that cause you some concern? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes. But you must realize that in radio in- 
telligence you cannot locate every ship every day. Throughout the 
year in which I was in command and conversant daily with the situa- 
tion units would disappear for four or five or six days, and then they 
would come back again. That was something to be expected. 

106. General Frank. What is your explanation, to your own mind, 
of the reason for the presence of this Jap force at Jaluit? 

Admiral Kimmel. I thought they were taking supplies of various 
kinds down there, planes, all manner of things, and deploying. I 
thought they were going to make an attack in south- [1775'] 
east Asia and that they were looking to see that they were not going 
to be interfered with. 

107. General Frank. Will you state how you felt with respect 
to the possibility of a Japanese attack on the Hawaiian Islands at 
this time? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, after reading all the messages and getting 
all the information it boiled down to an estimate by the Navy Depart- 
ment that the Japanese were on the move, and they included as possible 
points of attack the Philippines and Guam. Of course, Guam would 
have fallen at once. 

108. General Frank. This estimate was by the Navy Department 
in Washington ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is the message wdiich came. It mentioned 
several places. Let me read the message to you. 

109. General Grunert. The message of November 27th started 
out: 

Consider this dispatch a war warning. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 929 

Admiral Kimmel (reading) : 

The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific 
have ended. Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next 
few days. An ampliibious expedition against eitlier the Pliilippines, Thai or 
Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo, is indicated by the number and equipment 
(if Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. You will 
execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned 
in WPL 46 only. Guam, Samoa, and Continental districts have been directed to 
take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent 
by the War Department. Inform naval district and Army authorities. British 
to be informed by Spenavo. 

[1776'] The first sentence is : 

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. 

Everytliing else in this dispatch is a characterization of that first 
sentence, and it laid down in considerable detail where they expected 
the attack — that and succeeding- messages which told of scouting 
on the Indo-China coast, the proposal to transfer planes and personnel 
to relieve troops on the Islands, and numerous other actions by the 
War and Na\\y Departments, including the stress on sabotage, guard- 
ing against sabotage in Oahu. It all led us to believe that the attack 
would probably be down in southeast Asia; that if they did attack 
the United States, it would be in the Philippines ; and if such an attack 
were made in the Philippines it might be accompanied by some sub- 
marines in the area. 

I have said that some time ago. I have tried to repeat just what I 
said before. 

[1777] 110. General Frank. What I was after was an explana- 
tion of how you arrived at a state of mind that led you to believe that 
you were at that time secure against a Jap attack in Hawaii. 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I have tried to tell you. 

111. General Frank. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmel. I might add that the decisions I made were my 
own. They were made after consultation with my staff and with my 
senior assistants, the senior commanders, those that were present; 
and that I have no reason to believe that General Short disagreed 
with any of these decisions or the conclusions. 

112. General Frank. The Army was sending planes, B-lTs, into 
Honolulu from time to time ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

113. General Frank. What was happening to them? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think you ought to get that from the Army, but 
I can tell you as well as I know. I am perfectly willing to do so. 

114. General Frank. They were being sent — 
Admiral Kimmel. You are talking now of the B-l7s ? 

115. General Frank. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmel. The B-17s were being transported to the Philip- 
pines, and they were going to the Philippines by way of Oahu, Mid- 
way, Wake, Port Moresby, and Manila. 

116. General Frank. Did the fact that those planes were going 
elsewhere and were not building up the force in Hawaii lead you to 
any frame of mind ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Tlie conclusion was inescapable that, if [1778] 
the War Department liatl had any real belief that Hawaii was going to 
be attacked, they would not have denuded them of B-17. 



930 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

117. General Grunert. I want to go back to a little background on 
information which might or might not have influenced the state of mind 
early in 1941. Were you advised of the report of the United States 
Ambassador to Japan by telegram to the Secretary of the Navy on 
January 27, '41 (as contained in "Foreign Relations of the United 
States; Japan 1931-41," Vol. II, Department of State, Washington) 
reading as follows : 

(Report of United Stales Ambassador to Japan (Grew) is as 
follows :) 

"The Ambassador in Japan (Cfrew) to the Secretary of Navy 

(Paraphrase) 

Tokyo January 27, 'Jfl — 6 p. m. 
(Received January 27, '41 — 6:38 p. m.) 
A member of the Embassy was told by [name omitted] colleague that from' 
many quarters, including a Japanese one, he had heard that a surprise mass 
attack on Pearl Harbor was planned by the Japanese military forces, in case of 
"trouble" between .Japan and the United States ; that the attack would involve 
the use of all the Japanese military facilities. My colleagues said that he was 
prompted to pass this on because it had come to him from many sources, although 
the plan seemed fantastic. 

(Signed) Grew. 

Did you in 1941 know anything about that ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, I had the substance of that sent to 
[1779] me. It arrived out there in, oh, I imagine somewhere in 
February of 1941, and it was sent by a subordinate in the Navy De- 
partment in a routine manner. There was no stress laid on it, and 
certainly if the Navy Department and the War Department took that 
seriously they didn't take the action to meet the attack that they could 
well have taken. 

118. General Grunert. I think you have covered the question of 
cooperation quite well, unless some member of the Board wants to 
ask questions on the question of cooperation ; but I want to bring it 
down to, say, two primary messages. One was this message you have 
just referred to which starts out, "Consider this a war warning," and 
the other was the Army message which apparently was sent as the same 
information passed to the Army as was passed to the Navy, although 
the two messages were worded entirely diJfferent. 

Do you recall whether or not you had a conference on those messages 
with General Short? 

Admiral Kimmel. I received the message of 27 November from the 
Navy Department in the afternoon in Hawaii, and I immediately sent 
that message : gave it to my intelligence officer and departed from the 
usual routine in order to get it to General Short. 

119. General Grunert. Who was your intelligence officer? 
Admiral Kimmel. Commander Layton. 

120. General Grunert. Layton ? 
Admiral Kimmel. L-a-y-t-o-n. 

And departed from the usual routine in delivering it in order to get 
it to him promptly. He was in the office, [1780] brought the 
message into the office to me. And while he was still in there General 
Short sent me the message which he had received from the War De- 
partment on the subject. I read it and gave him back the message. I 
didn't keep a copy of his message. As I recall it, I got the message 
from the Navy Department the next day, which repeated, as you say, 



PROCEEDINGS OF AKMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 931 

the substance of the message which liad ah-eady been delivered to 
General Short. I knew that General Short had been directed to make 
his report to the War Department of the dispositions he had taken, 
and I knew that he had made sncli a report. 

On succeeding daj's, the 28tli — I don't get the dates ; I have them in 
here somewhere (indicating papers) — we had a meeting and we dis- 
cussed everj^thing that had to do with these messages. We did dis- 
cuss all phases of the situation and the steps that we should take. The 
discussion of the transfer of Army units to the islands involved in itself 
a discussion of the Japanese situation and what measures we should 
take, not only in Hawaii but in the islands. 

121. General Frank. You mean the Philip])ine Islands? 
Admiral Kimmel. No, no. We were talking about the outlying 

islands when I spoke of the islands. 

122. General Frank. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmel. I might clarify it here. The islands that I re- 
ferred to were ^Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, Canton, and Christ 
mas, and even down in — we were talking about Noumea and New 
Caledonia and Fiji and also Samoa; and how you can discuss move- 
ments of the troops to these islands witliout discussing the Japanese 
situation is beyond me. It couldn't be done, and we did discuss that 
and every phase of it and the [1781] warnings that we had 
received. 

I don't know what else you asked for. 

123. General Grunert. That covers it. 
xldmiral Kimmel. What else? 

124. General Grunert. That covers my question as to what confer- 
ence you had and what was discussed. 

Admiral Kimmel. Does that cover tlie question? 

125. General Grunert.* Yes. 

Now, in that discussion you understood, then, that the Army was 
going on Alert 1, for sabotage? 

Admiral Kimmel. I knew the Army was on a sabotage alert, yes. 

126. General Grunert. And under the circumstances did you con- 
sider that sufficient so that that would give you the jirotection that you 
needed while your shijis were in the harbor? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, in the absence of an air raid, yes. 

127. General Grunert. And evidently if you and General Sliort 
were satisfied with the Army and tlie measures taken, tlien there must 
have been a frame of mind that there would be no air raid ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, that is right. 

128. General Grunert. So everything seems to be j^redicated on 
that frame of mind and the reasoning and the conclusions reached as to 
what might happen. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. 

129. General Grunert. Now, then, of course- we know what did 
happen; but, had it been in your mind that an- air raid might be pos- 
sible, then that alert would not have been sufficient. 

Admiral Kimmel. In addition to what you have just stated. T knew 
that General Short had reported to the War Department the [1782] 
measures he had taken. I had every reason to believe that the War 
Department, who had much more information or was in a position to 
have more information than we had, was satisfied with what he had 

79716 — 4(3 — Ex. 145, vol. 2 10 



932 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

done, and that went to add another reason why we thought that what 
we liad done was all right. 

130. General Grunert. Now, in ordea' to make sure about this ques- 
tion of cooperation between the Commanders oA^er there, 'I want to ask 
you an impertinent question. 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I shall try to answer it. 

131. General Grunert. Is it a fact that you and General Short 
mutually, whilst maintaining the utmost in cordial personal relation- 
ship, felt such a delicacy as to interest in one another's affairs that 
neither of you really got down to the details of your respective respon- 
sibilities and inquired into each other's business, so that there was a 
lack of true teamwork and cooperation based upon definite factual 
knowledge of exactly what was happening? 

Admiral Kimmel. That's a mouthful. 1 will answer that this way. 
I served for a great many years in the Navy. One of the things that 
I had observed was the lack of cooperation betwixt the Army and the 
Navy in the various theaters that I had served. I was Chief of Staff 
with Admiral Tom Craven when he was Commander of the battleships 
of the battle force, and he made every effort he could at that time to get 
some joint exercises on the West Coast, to get some joint exercises in 
the Canal Zone, and to get a joint exercise in Hawaii, and he was 
unsuccessful at every turn. 

We went on a problem into Pearl Harbor, I think it was in '35, 
spring of '35, winter and early spring of '35, and we [17S3] ar- 
rived off the entrance along in the middle of the night and steamed 
up and down in front of that harbor awaiting an entrance plan; 
and during the course of the night the Army turned searchlights on 
us. They were friendly, you see; we were entering our own port. 
They exposed us to the enemy. 

So Admiral Craven got ahold of the Commanding General and 
twitted him with this business about how he had turned the search- 
lights on them. The Commanding General said he didn't know we 
were coming in, didn't know anything about it; and then he went 
to our Commander-in-Chief and he spoke to him about it. He said, 
"It is none of the Army's business when we come in." 

I knew all this, and when I took command of the Fleet I decided 
I was going to cultivate friendly relations with General Short and 
to exchange information fully and freely with him. 

He came to Honolulu a few days ahead of time and lived in a 
house out in town, and I went out in civilian clothes, and while he 
was still in civilian clothes, and called on him, and I told him then 
that I wanted to cooperate and do everything we could together. In 
that and succeeding conferences I took up the question of cooperation 
and coordination of our effort in Hawaii. 

General Short responded as a man should, and our relations were 
always cordial, and we discussed all matters that had to do with a 
defense of Hawaii fully, frankly, and completely. To be sure, he 
did not inquire as to the organizations that I had in the ships, and 
I did not inquire as to the organization of his troops on shore. That 
was his job. He knew more about [iT'^-l] that than I did, 
on the one hand, and I thought I knew more about the other than 
he did, and it was not where our paths crossed. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 933 

I fool that I was very well infoniied as to the rondition of the 
defense of Hawaii as far as the Army was concerned, and I think 
he was very well informed as to the Navy, It was a question of 
details that I knew nothing about, and many details in the naval 
service are left to subordinates. I had to trust them, and did. 

I think that constitutes an answer to your question. 

Is that an answer to your question ? 

132. General Grunert. That is an answer. 

Did that same cordiality of cooperation extend down tlirough the 
staffs, as far as you know ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, I think it did. I am sure it did. 

133. General Grunert. Was there ever any discussion or question 
as to the necessity of getting the staffs physically together with a 
view toward furthering each other's interests? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think they were physically together, and they 
were on the ends of telephone lines which they used freely and 
frequently. 

134. General Grunert. Then, no such idea existed as, "Well, hell, 
that's their business. Although it affects my responsibility, that's 
their business. Therefore I won't inquire into it"? 

Admiral Kimmel. No; I think less than in any place I have ever 
seen. And there was a certain courtesy which goes with all relations 
and must be maintained, and I think it was maintained. 

[17S5] You ask about that. I think it would be of interest to 
you to have an account of cooperation in training radar crews. 

135. General Grunert. I was coming to it next. 

Admiral Kimmel. We had radar in four of five ships out there. It 
was brand-new in the Navy, but we got it a little before the Army got 
it on shore ; and immediately we got it we told the Army about it ; and 
they, knowing that they were going to get radar, wanted to put some 
men on the ships to send them to sea so that they could see radar op- 
erated and learn how to operate it, take lessons in it. For weeks there 
we had Army personnel on every ship that was equipped with radar, 
every time they left the harbor, and most of the time while they were in 
port too, and they learned a great deal about the only equipment of that 
kind that was available in the Islands. 

Subsequently the Army obtained their radar, and along in August of 
'41 I had a letter from General Short in which he thanked me for the 
cooperation given him by letting his men go on the ships, and saying 
that he expected to have his radar in operation very shortly. 

About the same time he wrote to me asking that I detail a liaison 
officer for radar. I replied to his letter and detailed my communica- 
tion officer. Commander Curts, and told him he would be available 
for consultation at all times and liaison, and that was the last request 
I had for any liaison officer to be detailed to General Short. 

Subsequently a Lieutenant Taylor — W. E. C. Taylor I think his name 
is — came to the Fleet, and he was a naval reserve officer and he had been 
in the Marines, in the British Navy, British Air Force, had quite a 
career. At any rate, he knew [1786] something about the 
operation of radar, and I think he knew more about the reception in 
the plane than he did about anything else. At any rate, the Army 
asked us to let him come over there and advise them. General Martin 



934 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

requested it, as I remember, and so I sent him over on verbal orders 
to do anything he could to help. He worked \\itli the Army in an 
advisory capacity in trying to get their information center — I think 
that is what they called it — working over thei'e. 

Of course I didn't follow his activities in detail, but I have since 
been informed that he did do considerable to assist the Army, and on 
24 November he submitted a report to the responsible Army people, 
the Colonels in the information center, and I believe he stated that 
he had given a copy of his report to my operations officer. I had never 
seen it until just the other day. It was quite a good report. I do not 
know how sound the recommendations were, but he covered the situa- 
tion very well, and it was his views on the situation. 

I cite those things to show how we tried to work together and how 
we did exchange information. 

Now, of course, any liaison officer required in the information center 
should have been supplied by the Commandant, 14th Naval District, 
rather than by the Commander-in-Chief. That was his function, to 
see that that was done, and my information, which I have no way of 
checking — at least I haven't checked — was that no specific request had 
been received for the detail of liaison officers up to December 7. 

13G. General Grunert. That was insofar as tlie information center 
of the air warning service was concerned? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

[1787] 137. General Grunert. But I believe that the Com- 
mandant of the 14th Naval District did have a Lieutenant Burr as a 
liaison officer with the opei'ations section of the General Staff, did he 
not? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes. I was talking merely of the aircraft 
warning. 

138. General Frank. A. W. S. 

Admiral Kimmel. Now, all of my i-emarks there should be restricted 
to the aircraft warning service. 

139. General Grunert. All right. 

Admiral Kijimel. And I do not know of my own knowledge A^•hat 
the Connnandant, 14th Naval District, did, but tliat is what I have 
been informed. 

140. General Grunert. As to this liaison officer, Lieutenant Burr, 
with what we call the G-3, which corresponds to your Operations: 
was he considered both as liaison officer for you and the 14th Naval 
District, or just for the 14th Naval District ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I would say that he was the liaison officer for the 
14th Naval District primarily. 

141. General Grunert. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmel. And I think that you should understand that 
the ordinary and most of the contacts betwixt the Army and Navy in 
Hawaii were headed up as between General Short and Admiral Bloch : 
that is, the Commandant of the 14th Naval District and the Com- 
mander of the Hawaiian Department. The Connnander-in-Chief was, 
theoretically at least, a bird of passage, and it was a fortuitous circum- 
stance that I went ashore at all. The only reason I went asliore was 
that I could [1788] not house an adequate staff on board the 
ships, any ship without practically demcjbilizing it. My communica- 
tion was much better when I w^ent on shore than it was on a ship, and 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 935 

I had much freer coinmuiiication. Every tmie I cut loose on the ship 
it would lay it open to location by the radio direction finders. 

That and various other considerations led to my going on shore. 
It was inevitable that while I was on shore certain of the decisions 
that had to be made as betwixt the Army and the Na\'y would neces- 
sarily have to be referred to me. At practicall}^ every conference that 
I conducted or that I attended with General Short, Admiral Bloch was 
))resent, and Admiral Bloch was primarily concerned with carrying 
out the decisions made there. 

142. (leneral Grunert. What ])rompted that question about Lieu- 
tenant Burr as liaison officer was something that came up in some 
former testimony to the effect that that liaison officer was suposed to 
transmit everything to the Navy that went on about the Army in 
which the Navy was interested. 

[17<S9] Admiral Kimmel,. Well, of course, in the set-up. Ad- 
miral Bloch was responsil)le for keeping me informed of all his deal- 
ings with the Connnander of the Hawaiian Department in which he 
thought I would have any interest or that it w^ould be necessary for 
me to know. There were a great many things that he did witii the 
Commander of the Hawaiian Department, that he never told me 
anything about, quite properly to. 

143. General Grunp:rt. Let us go forward with the intercepting 
command; and we included as one of its functions the Air Warning 
Service. I want to find out from you just what you know about that 
in the latter part of November and early in December, and what you 
thought of it as to its status and its ability to operate. 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, at the time, I thought the aircraft warn- 
ing service of the Army was probably somewhat better than it later 
proved to be. I knew that in the drills that we had conducted they had 
been quite successful in following the planes, and I recall that General 
Short, on one occasion, told me that he thought he could give us a 
coverage up to 150 miles and probably to 200 miles. This was just 
conversation. I didn't inquire too closely into it, because that was 
quite satisfactory to me; and if he could do that, that was, I thought, 
doing pretty well. 

I knew that they were standing watches in the aircraft warning 
center to the limit of their personnel and equipment; and I knew that, 
even though I think now I had somewhat overestimated the capacity 
of it, I knew it was far from perfect and far from a finished product ; 
but it was all we had, and I believed they were doing the very best they 
could with it. 

[1790] 144. General Grunert. Did you know they were "stand- 
ing watch," as you call it, only from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m., ancl that that was 
only for practice purposes? 

Admiral Kimmee. In detail, I didn't know^ just the hours that they 
were standing watch. The aircraft warning service was manned dur- 
ing most of the day. I had been informed of that. 

145. General Frank. Did you get the impression that it was manned 
most of the da}^ just for training purposes, or for actual, effective 
operation? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I thought wdiile it w^as manned it was effec- 
tive. Now, so far as effective operation is concerned, the aircraft warn- 



936 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ing service, I knew and everybody else knew, was in a state of infancy, 
and we couldn't expect too much of it, 

146. General Frank. You knew that? 
Admiral KiMMEL. Oh, yes. Why, of course ! 

147. General Frank. You knew that it had not been formally 
activated to the point of where they were providing full-hour service ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I knew that on the many drills that we 
had had, they had manned this center, and sent out a lot of informa- 
tion and drill messages of various kinds. 

148. General Frank. Did you realize that, for them to have been 
operative, it would have been necessary for several different agencies 
like the Navy and the Civilian Defense and others to have had people 
on duty all the time at the information center ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I was talking about radar; and the in- 
formation center, while it is a part of the system, it is [179J'\ 
not radar, but the information center is to use the radar information 
that is obtained. 

149. General Frank. That is right; but it all has to be integrated 
into a system, for any part of it to be successful? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, it can be partially successful, even when it 
is only partially integrated. For instance, if a young man on the 
radar calls up and says he has got planes at such and such a place, 
that in itself is some information to him. Now, I agree thoroughly 
that to be fully effective it must be fully and completely manned. 

150. General F^ank. Yes. You realize that it was not? 
Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes; but the radar was different from the 

information center. 

151. General Frank. Yes, I know. We are fully conversant with 
that. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, I know. I just want to clarify my position, 
that is all. 

152. General Frank. When did General Short make the state- 
ment that he could give coverage up to 150 miles ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, I don't know. I couldn't give you that by 
line and date, to save my life. 

153. General Grunert. Knowing what you did about radar and the 
information center, did you feel that, on December 7, that had let 
you down ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Of course, I knew nothing about the receipt of 
any inform atiton at all in the Army radar, until the Tuesday, I think 
it was, following the attack; and when I found out that they had 
known where these planes came from and located within rather nar- 
row limits the attacking force [1792] yes, I felt let down, 

because that was the information we wanted above everything else. 
I have been informed that the Navy, Admiral Bellinger, and Captain 
Logan Ramsey, called the Army information center several times 
each, during this attack of December 7, and asked them if they had 
been able to locate the direction from which these planes had come, 
and to which they returned ; and each time they were informed they 
couldn't get anything. 

Then, when this information was reconstructed two days later, we 
felt that it was unfortunate that we had not had that information 
available. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 937 

154. General Gkunkrt. I have one more (luestion, then T w ill turn 
you over to one of the other nienibers, to piece out. 

It appears that one Raymond Coll, editor of a Hawaiian newspaper, 
was quoted by a Washington newspaper shortly after the submission 
of the Roberts Commission's report, on January 1^4, 1942, as having 
said, in substance : 

General Short and Admiral KLmmel had made clear by their utterances before 
December 7 the probability and imminence of a Japanese attack at an early 
date. 

Is there any basis of fact for that statement ? 
Admiral Kimmel. No. 

155. General Grunekt. As far as you remember? 

Admiral Kimmel. As far as I remember, no newspaperman quoted 
me to any such effect. In any event, I did not make any such state- 
ment. Now, the only possible basis that he could have had for such 
a statement was a speech which I made at the Chamber of Connnerce 
meeting — that is, as far as I am concerned — at the Royal Hawaiian 
Hotel, and I indicated certain measures [179^] that they 
could take in the islands which would improve things considerably, 
from our standpoint ; and I forget the exact term. I think it was 
along the lines of ''You might even have an attack, here." That was 
the sentiment. Other than that, I don't know of anything. And 
that was made in September, not in November. 

156. General Grunert. General Russell, or General Frank? 

157. General Russell. I think you have explored most of it, Ad- 
miral. There are tMO or three details. In discussing the aircraft 
available to the Army and Navy, early in your testimony, I do not 
recall any mention which you made of the aircraft that were on the 
carriers. We have had testimony to the effect that the ENTER- 
PRISE and the LEXINGTON had a complement of aircraft con- 
sisting of some 83 planes. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. They were shy. They were 
short of torpedo planes, and they were short of fighter planes — every 
one of our carriers. 

158. General Russell. Let us count what we had. 
Admiral Kimmel. All right. 

159. General Russeli.. I believe we had 83 planes on each of those 
carriers? 

Admiral Kimmel. Something of that kind. 

160. General Russell. What type of planes were they? 
Admiral Kimmel. They were fighters and torpedo bombers. I 

think that is all — and scouts, yes — dive bombers, fighters, and torpedo 
bombers; that is right, isn't it? 

161. General Russell. To what extent were they effective as recon- 
naissance planes? 

Admiral Kimmel. To a very limited extent, probably a \^179Jf\ 
maximum of 300 miles, Halsey told me that he could send his planes 
out to 300 miles. 

162. General Grunert. And have them come back? 

Admiral Kimmel. And have them come back. I said, "How far 
have you sent them?"' He said, "I have never sent them ofut more 
than 200." That was long prior to Pearl Harbor. As to distant 



938 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

reconnaissance, there was nothing in those carriers which was capable 
of distant reconnaissance. 

163. General Russell. They could have a maxinnnn total flight,' 
then, of from 400 to 600 miles'? 

Admiral Kimmel. When they were armed and ready for action. 

164. General Russell. Well, were they armed and ready for action 
on these carriers, prior to December 7? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, 3'es; Halsey had them all armed and ready 
for action. 

165. General Russell. So this was a reconnaissance force which 
we did not mention earlier? This was a reconnaissance means that 
you did not mention earlier in the testimony? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, it wasn't a reconnaissance means. That is 
just what I have said. 

166. General Russell. They could go out 200 miles, and look, and 
come back? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, well, yes, sir; that is true; but I mean as 
bearing on the subject of distant reconnaissance in the Hawaiian 
Islands. They were practically useless for that. 

167. General Russell. What aircraft was being used by these task 
forces for reconnaissance, for their protection? 

Admiral Kimmel. Those. Those were the aircraft that were used 
for reconnaissance for their protection. 

I / 7,9 J] 168. General Russell. Then that left some 50 aircraft 
based on Oahu available for reconnaissance from those bases? 

Admiral Kimmell. Yes — loi>g-range aircraft; that is right. Now, 
I think I should make it clear that the aircraft based on the car- 
riers were not in fact available for reconnaissance, and to stick an 
aircraft carrier out into an area where you were expecting an attack 
of this kind as a reconnaissance force was just suicidal. 

169. General Russell. Let us go back to the question, then that 
was answered a while ago, and that seems to be departed from, now. 
What aircraft was used by these task forces that went on to INIidway 
and Wake and those other islands, for the reconnaissance which was 
conducted by the task forces ? 

Admiral Kimmel. The aircraft, as you framed the question, were 
those that were on the carriers ; but in addition to the reconnaissance 
conducted by the aircraft on the cai-riers, we had the long-range 
patrol planes operating and covering the areas that they were travers- 
ing on the way out and back, and basing on Pearl Harbor, Johnston, 
Midway, and Wake. 

170. General Russell. That clears it up, for the first time. 
Now, we had testimony here about some marine planes. 
Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

171. General Russell. That is, as distinguished from the categories 
that you have already described. 

Admiral Kimmel." They w^ere the Marine Expeditionary planes. 

172. General Russell. What was their reconnaissance capacity? 
Admiral Kimmel. They were about equal to the planes that go 

onto ships — the same thing, the same kind of planes that go onto 
the ship, the scout dive-bombers. 

[J796'] 173. General Russell. In answer to a question by Gen- 
eral Grunert, or General Frank, you stated that, once having located 



PROCEEDINGS OF AHAIY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 939 

the task force in the mandated islands — and I am not sure that you 
confined that answer to the Marshall Islands — you watched it rather 
closely. What means did you employ to watch it? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, the radio interception; that is all we had. 
Well, I said, "radio interception, that is all we had" — I am not now 
and never have been familiar with all the means available to the 
Navy Department in Washington. 

174. General Russell. As a matter of fact, Admiral, if that Jap- 
anese task force was in the Marshalls, it was some 400 or 500 miles 
south of one of our positions — I believe. Wake Island — was it not? 

Admiral Koiimel. About GOO miles, something like that. 

175. General Russell. About 600 miles from Wake? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, if you locate the task force at Jaluit, it is 
considerably more than GOO miles. 

176. General Russell. It would be 100 or 200 miles farther? 
Admiral Kimmel. Yes: that is right. 

177. General Russell. In other w^ords, the situation was that we 
actually discovered carriers at Jaluit, and we had an operating base 
600 or 700 miles away from there? ' . 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right; that is right. 

178. General Russell. And it came to pass that, if this Japanese 
task force left Jaluit, it traveled, by this route, or by Wake, for some 
2,000 miles, and launched their air attack on Hawaii? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

179. General Grunert. I think the upper one of those maps will 
YOU show you the location of Jaluit. 

\1797] x\.dmiral Kimmel. Here is Wake, here is Jaluit, and there 
is Hawaii. This is not a scale map, but it gives you the general idea. 

ISO. General Russell. Now, while we are looking at the map, we 
had forces on Wake, and we had forces at Midwaj^, and we had forces 
at Johnston ? , . ; : , 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

181. General Russell. Let us assume, now, that the Japanese task 
force from which the carrier aircraft w^ere launched reached a point 
1?)5 miles north of Oahu, and launclied their attack on Pearl Harbor. 
Then they had to make their way through the open sea, through these 
outposts of ours, for a distance of approximately 2200 miles, to reach 
that point from which to launch their aircraft? 

Admiral Kimmel. More than that, if they were going to the north- 
ward — and that's where the Army says they found them — consider- 
ably more than that. I have no idea that they came inside of the 800- 
mile circle, when they were going up there, until they got ready to 
come in. 

In other words. General, I cannot prove it, but I believe now that 
the carriers that took part in that attack came from Japan, they didn't 
come from the Marshalls, at all ; and I have felt that the most probable 
direction of the attack, after it had taken place, was from the north- 
ward ; and there are many reasons for that — many reasons for that. 
You have given a good many of them, already, yourself — that is, the 
outlying islands, and the fear of discovery if they came in from the 
south. 

182. General Rltssell. They had to pass through whatever screen 
of reconnaissance was set up by our installations ? 



940 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[1798'] Admiral Kimmel. That is right. 

183. General Russell. That is, on the islands we have named ; and 
by the barriers of tlie task forces that moved back and forth to these 
outlying islands ? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. That is correct. 

184. General Russell. And you regard that as one of the prin- 
cipal reasons why they came from some other place? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. Now, my estimate at the time 
was, it was northward. I got information that they were to the south, 
which later I think proved to be wrong. "Bill" Halsey was in the 
operating area at the time — and he is good; always has been — he 
thought they would come from the south ; but, there you are ! I think, 
though, now, they didn't. 

185. General Russell. Let me ask you this : Is it true or not that 
there was considerable activity of hostile submarines in and around 
the Hawaiian Islands on tlie 7th of December, and two or three days 
thereafter ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, yes. 

186. General Russell. If it were brought to your attention and you 
were convinced that the commander of that submarine force which 
operated in that area was located down in the Marshalls, would that 
influence your thinking as to where the carriers came from? 

Admiral Kimmel. No. 

187. General Russell. Not at all ? 

Admiral Kim3iel. No, no. Those two forces could assemble in 
that area, coming from different directions, and could have arrived 
at specified points, or to be at the specified points at the time of the 
attack, and then operate from that on ; and [1799] there is no 
particular evidence to show as to where the submarines came from. 
They could have come from any direction. When I say "any direc- 
tion," they could have come either from Japan or from the Mandates. 

188. General Russell. About what was the speed of these carriers 
of the Japanese Navy at that time? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, I think the best of them, about 27 knots. 

189. General Russell. That is approximately 30 miles ? 
Admiral Kimmel. A little over; adding %, 31 or 32 miles, or 14. 

190. General Russell. Could they average that over a considerable 
period of time ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, I think so, long enough to make a 24-hour 
dash, or something of that kind. 

191. General Russell. If they came from Japan, they would have 
been on the open sea for about a week, would they not? 

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, I estimated — and this was all part of it — 
if they came from Japan, they had to start at least two weeks, maybe 
longer, because when they made the attack, they had to be full of 
fuel, and they had to fuel at sea before they made the attack; and 
fueling at sea at that time of year and in those latitudes was a pretty 
difficult proposition ; and I don't think that they came there and made 
an attack when they were empty of fuel, as they would have been after 
coming all the way from Japan; and therefore these fellows must 
have started, oh, I would say at least two weeks beforehand, consider- 
ing all the things that I think they had to do. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 941 

192. General Russell. If they had come out of the Marshalls, 
[JSOO] How lono; before that would they have had to start, to 
have made that attack on December 7 ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, it is about 3500 miles from Japan to Oahu. 
From the Marshalls to Oahu approaching Oahu from the north and 
skirtino- the 800-mile circle, it would be about 3,000 miles. Those are 
offhand estimates. You see what I mean by skirting, do you not? 
They would have to keep out of the Oahu 800-mile circle. 

193. General Russell. Admiral, this testimony has been given on 
this question — and it is a matter of opinion 

Admiral Koimel. A good many of these things are. 

194. General Russell. Yes, sir; we have gotten opinions both from 
Army and Navy personnel. 

If four Japanese carriers, each with a complement of 50 or 60 planes, 
or a total of from 200 to 250 planes, reached a point from which an 
attack on Honolulu could have been launched, say 125 to 150 miles out ; 
having 150 to 200 aircraft available for that attack; do you believe 
that, with the defensive means available to the Army and Navy at 
Pearl Harbor on that day defense could have been set up which would 
have been completely successful ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, I think that every bit of evidence in the 
war indicates that, once an aircraft attack is launched, it is never 
stopped. I mean an attack in force, like that. 

195. General Frank. A determined attack? 

Admiral Kimmel. A determined attack; yes; and the only excep- 
tions to that, that I know of, are the reports that came back from 
Saipan, where they practically annihilated the Jap force, with no 
damage to ourselves; but those were against moving targets; and 
certainly, with the defenses that we had in [1S01~\ Hawaii at 
that time, we were going to be hurt somewhat if they drove in. 

[1S03] 196. General Russell. Before w^e go aw^ay from the 
probabilities of Japanese action in early December : You did con- 
clude that there were probabilities of attack against your forces by 
submarines ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes; if they attacked the Philippines, if they 
attacked- United States possessions, yes. 

197. General Russell. If war came you expected submarine at- 
tacks? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. I expected submarines in that area, 

198. General Russell. Around Oahu ? 
Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

199. General Russell. But you did not expect an air force attack? 
Admiral Kimmel. No; not at that time. 

200. General Russell. I want to ask }^ou one or two questions about 
your letter. You did not write the letter of January 25, did you? 
You had not been on duty there? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think it was a letter of January 11, was it not? 
There were two letters. 

(Informal discussion off the record.) 

201. General Russell. I think your counsel has suggested what I 
wanted to know. He stated that you collaborated with Admiral Rich- 
ardson in the letter which motivated the Secretary of the Navy in 



942 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Avriting to the Secretary of War and calling attention to the weak- 
nesses of the defenses at the Pearl Harbor base. 

Admiial Kimmel. I did not collaborate in the writing of this letter. 
Early in January a letter was written by Admiral Richardson, and 
that letter I knew about, although I did not collaborate in writing it. 
In the latter part of January an- [1S03] other letter on the 
same subject was written, and at the end of the letter it said, "Rear 
Admiral Kimmel, who is to be my relief, concurs in what I have said." 

I think that was on the 25th of January. 

202. General Russell. As a part of the estimate of the situation, 
as stated in that letter, that the most probable form of attack on Oahu 
or the harbor would be a surprise air attack in conjunction with a 
submarine attack, the reference to the outstanding weaknesses of the 
defenses on Oahu related to this surprise air attack. Do you recall 
that? 

Admiral Kimmel. Which letter is that? 25 January? 

203. General Russell. I did not see your letters, and have not until 
now. 

Admiral Kimmel. You are talking now about the letter from the 
Secretary of the Navy? 

204. General Russell. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmel. No ; I did not agree to that. I have stated that 
I felt that the most probable form of attack out there was a submarine 
attack. I thought they might drop some mines. The mining was 
easily taken care of, because there was only a limited area in which 
they could plant mines effectively. 

205. General Russell. Do you have a copy of the Richardson letter 
here? 

Admiral Kimmel. No. 

206. General Russell. Do you have a copy of any letter that came 
to the Secretary of the Navy in which the probabilities of Japanese 
action out there were described? What I am attempting to say, 
Admiral, is this : Do you know whether or not the letter of the Secretary 
of the Navy to the Secretary of War set up a [iS'04] different 
probability from that contained in other letters? 

Admiral Kimmel. I could not state that from memory. . At any 
rate, the probabilities set up in the Secretary of War's letter to the 
Secretary of the Navy, and of the Secretary of the Navy to the Secre- 
tary of War, and of the Commander-in-Chief, are somewhat influenced 
by the needs of the situation, by what was needed to be remedied at 
the time, and trying to emphasize for all time the things that need to 
be done now. 

207. General Frank. A conclusion reached at any time depends 
upon the series of circumstances surrounding the situation at that time ; 
is not that true ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Exactly. The conclusion arrived at, in which I 
might concur in January, 1941, I would not w'ant to be held to in 
November of 1941, under different circumstances. 

208. General Russell. Were not the probabilities that the Japanese 
would strike from the air the same in November as they were in 
January ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No. 

209. General Russell. What was different ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 943 

Admiral Kimmei.. Not necessarily. It all d('[)ends upon Avhat the 
Japanese intentions were and M'hat other eniploj^ment they had for 
their aircraft at that time. 

210. General Russell. What evidence did yon have of changes in 
their intentions between January 1st and November which might have 
made the probabilities of air attack less? 

Admiral Kimmel. AVe are considering now — at least I am — the prob- 
abilities of a specific time under specific circumstances. I have given 
you my estimate of that. To ask me what the changes were from the 
previous January — I do not remember exactly [1(S'0S'] what the 
conditions were the previous January. If you mean the physical con- 
ditions of Pearl Harbor and such things as that, that is one thing. 

211. General Russell. Admiral, what occurs to me — and I am at- 
tempting to get at a rather big conclusion — is this : You have testified, 
and it has been supported by a line of evidence here, that there was not 
available to the Army and Navy any means for distant reconnaissance 
to ascertain the location af a Japanese task force. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. 

212. General Russell. Prior to the time that it might reach a point, 
from which it could launch aircraft from carriers. That seems to me 
a conclusion that the witnesses agree upon. It has also been testified 
rather consistently that such a task force having reached the point 
from which aircraft could be launched, the attack could not be stopped. 
Hence the conclusion seems inevitable that there was not any way for 
the American force at Hawaii to prevent a very great danger to our 
installations there by aircraft attack from carriers on the 7th of De- 
cember, 1941. Is that true ? 

Admiral Kimmel. In general, I think it is. 

213. General Russell. If the success of such an attack was assured 
and the Japanese seemed to have known everything about the situation 
out there, why would they not have made an attack which had to be 
successful ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, of course, there are two or three answers 
to that. One is that the Japanese Air Force, I think, without question, 
was much more efficient than we had believed it to be. The attack 
was a Avell-planned and well executed at- [1806] tack. An- 
other phase is that the greatest damage done there was done by air- 
craft torpedoes. We believed prior to the Tth of December that they 
could not launch an aerial torpedo in Pearl Harbor. We thought 
that the water was not deep enough. Our air service had not been 
able to do it; and we had received official information fi'om the Navy 
Department which convinced us that it could not be done. We were 
wrong. The major part of the damage was done by such torpedoes. 

So far as reconnaissance is concerned, we had plans for reconnais- 
sance and could run reconnaissance of a sort, but in our estimate 
which had been submitted to Washington, and wdiich was on file in 
both the War and Navy Departments, it was clearly stated that w-e 
had to know the time of the attack, within rather narrow limits, in 
order to have anything like an effective search, because we could not 
maintain a search exce])t for a very few days. Then of course we were 
hoping to get more jilanes all the time, and M^e had been promised 
additional planes, patrol planes, and additional Army bombers, all of 
which were necessary for the defense of Oahu. 



944 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

214. General Ritssell. It occurs to me, Admiral, that we have gone 
over rather carefully all of those elements. 

Admiral Kimmel. I am talking about what we were basing our 
estimates on. The question of torpedoes is a very vital one, because 
that is where the major portion of the damage was done. If it had 
been a pure bombing attack I do not think it would have been anything 
like the same amount of damage. 

215. General Russell. Let me ask you this question : It occurs to 
me that your answer now as to the incorrectness of your esti;nate is 
based on your under-estimate of the capacity of the [1807] Jap- 
anese Air Force. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes ; a considerable part of it. 

216. General Russell. Where did you receive the information from 
which you made your estimate as to the capabilities of the Japanese 
Air Force. 

Admiral Kimmel. From all sources : The Navy Department, people 
who had been in Japan. It was all taken together, you might say, 
a resultant of many opinions. 

217. General Russell. Was the estimate made up by you and your 
staff in your official capacity, or was it sent out to you from the Navy 
Department ? 

Admiral Kimmel. We got information from the Navy Department 
about it ; but so far as the efficiency of the Japanese Air Force is con- 
cerned I do not think I can at present put my finger on it. I am 
merely speaking now of a general feeling, and I think that a good 
many people have testified to that feeling, that they had underesti- 
mated the ability of the Japanese Air Force, and that tliat was not 
confined to the fleet, by any means. 

218. General Russell. I think we are all agreed that w^e had a bad 
estimate, and we are trying to find out where it came from. That is 
largely the purpose of this. Before I go from that : I have asked some 
questions heretofore about our failure to know anything about what 
was going on in the Mandated Islands except by the radio intercept, 
which of course presupposes, to be at all effective, the existence of 
some elements of the Japanese forces there using radio on their part. 
What efforts were made, after you came into the command of the 
fleet out there, up to December 7th, to send people to the Mandated 
Islands to discover [180S] what the Japanese were doing. 

xVdmiral Kimmel. My recollection is that our orders were not to 
go anywhere near them. 

219. Genera] Russell. From whom did those orders come? 
Admiral Kimmel. We wanted to go into the Gilberts to make some 

surveys down there and find out something about the Gilberts, and 
the answer was that we should not evince any interest in the Gilberts, 
because the Japs might find out that Ave were interested. 

220. General Russell. Do you know specifically where the orders 
came from to stay out the Mandated Islands? 

Admiral Kimmel. As far as I am concerned, they came from the 
Navy Department. 

221. General Russell. Do you have any recollection of any such 
orders ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Any specific orders, you mean? 

222. General Russell. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 945 

Adininil Kimmel. AVell, the Navy Department restricted the Com- 
mander-in-Chief to a considerable extent. A movement such as that 
would have had to be approved by the Navy Department. While I 
cannot put my finoer on it, I am convinced that no reconnaissance of 
the Mandates would have been permitted by the Navy Department 
at that time. The only time while I was out there that a reconnais- 
sance of the Mandates was authorized was a proposal to send a 
B-24 over and do some photographing. 

223. General Russell. Could you look into that and present the 
information to the Board? 

Admiral Kimmel. I have nothing on it. 

224. General Russell. One more question, and then we will go 
[1809] away from the reconnaissance feature. Did you know as 
a result of your contacts with General Short that the maximum limit 
of reconnaissance of which any means available to him was capable 
ended at the extreme range of the radar? Do I make myself clear? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. I think you mean that having turned over 
all planes capable of reconnaissance to the Navy, the only thing left 
to him was the radar. Is that right? 

225. General Russell. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes ; I think that is correct. 

226. General Russell. So you knew, then, that when the Army's 
radar range of 130 miles was reached, beyond that the Army could 
discover nothing about Japanese movements and convey information 
to you, whatever the range was? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

227. General Russell. So that the responsibility for watching the 
departure of Japanese convoys beyond that limit was the responsi- 
bility of the Navy? 

Admiral Kimmel. I knew also that even if he had available all of 
his own planes he could not have gotten the necessary information 
from reconnaissance. 

228. General Russell. Admiral, I have had some curiosity about 
what was done with your radar as far as the ships in the harbor 
were concerned. 

Admiral Kimmel. I have been informed by experts, and knew 
at the time, that the radar on ships in port was virtually useless on 
account of the surrounding hills, and the towers and buildings in the 
Navy Yard, and we never made any attempt to use it, but depended 
entirely on the shore for radar informa- [ISIO] tion. Further- 
more, radar pro])erly mounted on shore, and high up, has nmch longer 
range than anything we could get, because one of the elements in the 
range of the radar is the height above the sea at which it is mounted. 

229. General Russell. Did the military people who came down 
to the ships while they were in the harbor to receive instructions in 
the operation of the radar receive instructions in the operation while 
the ships were there in the harbor ^ 

Admiral Kimmel. They went to sea. That is where they got their 
real instruction, but they played with it in port. While you can play 
with it in port and learn how to work it, the indications are erratic 
and unreliable, if you get any. I am not a radar expert, and you can 
run me up a tree very quickly on that. 



946 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

2o0. General Russell. Someone else will have to do that. I am not 
a radar expert, either. 

I believe you stated that General Short on one occasion said that 
he could cover 150 to 200 miles? 

Admiral I^mmel. Yes. 

231. General Russell. Did you interpret that as meaning that he 
was then giving you a coverage of that distance ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Not at that time; no, 

232. General Frank. As a result of the success of the Jap attack you 
were prevented from employing your planes, were you not? 

Admiral Kimmel. To a considerable extent; yes. 

233. (jieneral Frank. You had some PBYs numbering about 50 that 
may have been used for reconnaissance had you not felt secure without 
using them, did you not? 

Adnural Kimmel. Something of that kind, but we had a very 
[JSir\ difficult decision to make. We wanted to maintain our 
training status. Up to the last minute we had received no orders to 
mobilize. We had received these which were quite similar to the 
ones we had received previously, and we felt that we w^ere entitled 
to further information, and even orders, before we changed our status. 
^Ve felt that we must conserve what planes we had. 

234. General Frank. I have notliing more. 

235. General Grunert. Has anyone any other questions? (No 
i-esponse). If not, I have only the following question: 

Admiral, is there anything that you want to tell the Board now 
which may not have been said by you or not brought out by other wit- 
nesses in the hearing before the Roberts Commission, as to the Army, 
your relationship with the Army, or what may have influenced the 
.Vrmy decision? 

Admiral Kimmel. You mean, any further statement that I have 
to make ? 

23G. General Grunert. Any further statement or anything that 
you want to bring to the Board's attention that may assist it in getting 
facts or leads. 

Admiral Kimmel. I have a statement that I would like to make 
to the Board with regard to the information wdiich was supplied to 
the two responsible commanders in Hawaii. We thoroughly consid- 
ered all such information and took the action which we deemed ap- 
propriate. There was no disagreement between the Army and Navy, 
and none between me and my personal advisers. 

Since Pearl Harbor information has come to my knowledge that 
vital information in the hands of the War and Navy Departments 
was not supplied to responsible officers in Haiwaii; in [1812] 
particular, that the War and Navy Departments knew that Japan 
had set a deadline of 25 November, later extended to 29 November 
for the signing of an agreement, after which they would take hostile 
steps against the United States; that on 2G November an ultimatum 
was delivered to Japan by the United States. This was done not- 
withstanding a joint recommendation to the President by General 
Marshall and Admiral Stark that no ultimatum of any kind should 
be made to Japan, I had been advised of this recommendation and 
had received no qualification of that information. I had no knowl- 
edge of the delivery of the ultimatum to Japan on 2G November, 1941. 



procf:edings of army pearl harbor board 947 

I am further certain that several (hiys prior to 7 December, 1941, there 
was information in the War Department and the Navy Department 
that Japan wonld attack the United States and, very probably, that 
the attack would be directed against the fleet at Pearl Harbor, among 
other places; that there was information in the War and Navy De- 
partments on 6 December, 1941, tliat the hour of attack was momen- 
tarily imminent, and that early on 7 December, 1941, the precise time 
of the attack was known. It was known at least three or probably 
four hours before the attack. All this information was denied to 
General Short and to me. I feel that we were entitled to it. I felt then 
that if such information was available to the War and Navy Depart- 
ment it Avoukl be sent to ns. Had we not l)een denied this, many 
things would have been different. Had we been furnished this in- 
formation as little as two or three hours before the attack, which 
was easily feasible and possible, mnch could have been done. 

237. General (iRunert. Are tliere any questions now that yon have 
heard this additional statement? (No response.) 

\1SI3] How about our counsel and recorders? Have you any- 
thing to suggest ? 

238. Major Clausen. I have nothing, sir. 

Admiral Kimmel. May I ])lease have a transcri]^t of my testimony 
when it is made up ? I should like to request that. 

239. General Grunert. I will take it up with the Department. 
I do not see any objection to it. 

Admiral Kimmel. Of course you will give me an opportunity to 
verify my testimony ? 

240. General Grunert. If you so desire. Tomorrow morning we 
are starting west. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is up to you, if you don't want me to 
verify it. 

241. General Grunert. We are starting west tomorrow, and I do 
not know how soon the notes will be written up. I will talk to the 
Board and see wlietlier oi- not there is a copy that can be sent to you 
to be verified. 

Admiral Kimmel. Thank you. 

242. General Russell. I would like to make this request. Admiral. 
With reference to the last statement Avhich you made relative to infor- 
mation in the War and Navy Departments which was not sent out to 
you and General Short, under the division of the work of this Board 
which was made by General Grunert I have had considerable to do 
with investigating in the field which you have last discussed. Some 
of the things to whicli you liave referred may become the subject of 
further investigation before the Board is through. I was wonder- 
ing if we could get in touch with you after I have sufficient time to 
look at your statement as transcribed. It might come to paas that 
we would [1814'] want the source of certain information re- 
ferred to by you in your statement. Would you be willing to cooperate 
with us to the extent that we might be furnished the source of the in- 
formation contained in your st atement ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I will coojjerate to the best of my ability, in con- 
formity with the restrictions which have been imposed upon me. 

243. General Russell. I will say, further, that my failure to de- 
velop a line of questions or to intei-rogate you was largely the result 

7!t"l(l — 4r.--E\. H.-, vol. 2 11 



948 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of a feeliiio- that there might be some parts of that about which you 
would not want to testify freely if I questioned you at this time. I 
hope you will consider the matter and that we may get in touch with 
you again. 

Admiral KiMMEL. All right. Thank you, sir. 

244. General Grunekt. We thank you for giving us of your time, 
Admiral. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of 
witnesses for the day, and proceeded to other business). 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 949 



asm CONTENTS 

TUESDAY, AUGUST 29, 1944 

Testimony of— Pas®' 

Maj. Gen. F. L. Martin, United States Army, Retired 1816 

Colonel Jack W. Howard, Quartermaster Corps, Presidio of San 

Francisco 1914 

Colonel William J. McCarthy, 260th Coast Artillery Group, Fort Bliss, 

Texas 1918 

Colonel William Donegan, G-3, Fourth Army, Sam Houston, Texas 1928 

DOCUMENTS 

Navy Message of November 27, 1941 1989 

Message to General Short, November 27, 1941 1839, 1942 

^ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original transcript of proceedings. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 951 



UsiG] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL 

HARBOR BOARD 



TUESDAY, AUGUST 29, 1944, 

Presidio of San Francisco, Cal. 

Tlie Board, at a. ni., pursuant to recess on Friday, August 25, 1944, 
conducted the liearino- of witnesses, Lt. Gen. Geoi'ge Grunert, Presi- 
dent of tlie Board, presiding. 

Pi-esent : Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President, Maj. Gen. Henry D. 
Russell, and ]\Iaj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members. 

Present also: Colonel Charles AV. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. 
Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry T. Toulmin, Jr., 
Executive Officer. 

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL F. L. MARTIN, UNITED STATES 

ARMY, RETIRED. 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. General, will you ]dease state to the Board your 
name, rank, organization, and station? 

General Martin. Major General F. L. Martin, Retired. My pres- 
ent address is 401 North Boiling Green Way, West Los Angeles, 
California. 

2. General Grunert. Now, General, you probably know what the 
Board has been ai){)ointed for. We are after facts and background 
and viewpoints and leads that will give us facts about the attack on 
Hawaii. So we hope that in view of your former assignment in Hawaii 
you will be able to help us. 

Now, I am going to skip around and ask a number of questions 
{1817] about a number of things in oixler to piece out here and 
there other testimony we have had; and after the Board gets through 
asking questions, then if you have anything else that you wish to offer 
we shall be glad to hear it. 

Are you familiar with the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Fi-ontier Defense 
Plan?' 

General Martin. Well, of course, you understand, GeiuM-al, it has 
been nearly three years ago since I have seen that. 

?). Genei'al Grunert. Yes. 

General Martin. I know all about it, because it was formulated 
at the time that I was in connnand of the Hawaiian Air Foi'ce, now the 
7th Air Force. 

4. General Grunert. Do you recall your Joint Air Operations 
Agreement? 

General Martin. I can state as to my memory as to its provisions, 
that the searching was to be done by the Navy, calling upon the Army 



952 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

at such time as they needed additional assistance. The coast line, 
that is, contingent to the Island of Oahu — reconnaissance over that 
area was to be conducted by the Army. 

5. General Grunert. Now let me ask you a few questions, and then 
if I do not bring anything out you may add anything you want. 

First, was the Army charged witli the tactical command of defensive 
air operations over and in the vicinity of Oahu ^ 

General Martin. For the defense of Oahu, yes, but if the targets 
were located at sea the Navy had control of the mission, would assign 
the mission and call on the Army for such bombardment as they felt 
was necessary. 

[1818] 6, General Grunert. Now, under the Joint Air Opera- 
tions Agreement, were all concerned well aware of this agreement and 
their respective functions under that? 

General Martin. Yes, sir. 

7. General Grunert. Was the agreement lived up to ? 

General Martin. Well, it was not on the morning of this attack on 
Pearl Harbor, because there was no call made upon us for any assist- 
ance whatever. 

8. General Grunert. What tests and exercises did you have that 
were held under this agreement? 

General Martin. Will you please repeat that? 

9. General Grunert. What tests and exercises did you have under 
that agreement in practising for it? 

General Martin. We had a number of exercises where targets would 
be sent out by a small task force, and they would tow what they call a 
slick sled. The slick sled would be bombed by components of the 
Hawaiian Air Force under the direction of the Navy. These exercises 
were never a great distance from our base, not to exceed probably 100 
miles. 

10. General Grunert. From the time the agreement was reached 
up to the time of the attack, about how many exercises had been held 
under that agreement? 

General Martin. You have reference to the full compliance with 
the joint agreement between the Army and Navy? 

11. General Grunert. Yes; whenever the Army and the Navy got 
together in any test or exercise. About how many such exercises had 
been held? 

General Martin. I would not say that we ever had had a full com- 
pliance with the agreement. The only opportunity the [181911 
Army Air Forces had of entering into a joint exercise with the Navy 
was these exercises that I have described where they would tow these 
slick sleds in rear of a cruiser or battleship. They would have out a 
task force that would have in it destroyers and the cruisers and battle- 
ships. We would make an attack upon the slick sled. They would 
train their gunners on board, but as to actual firing at any targets that 
we had, we did not, have them, but we would drop practice bombs on 
the slick sleds. 

12. General Grunert. Now, I understand that for tactical air fight- 
ing over the land all fighting aircraft came to the Hawaiian Air Force, 
whether it was Army, Navy, or Marine • and for work at sea the bomb- 
ers and long-distance reconnaissance craft went to the Navy. 

General Martin. That is correct; yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 953 

13. General Grunert. Now, was that practiced ? Did they ever call 
out all you had for practice, so as to get in the habit of doing what 
the Navy told them, or did any of the Navy and Marine ever come to 
you for practice? 

General Martin. Yes, sir. We had one particular maneuver in 
which the Navy and Marine fighters joined with the Hawaiian Air 
Force for the purpose of such an exercise. 

14. General Frank. When was that ? 

General Martin. Oh, that was about May, I think, in '41. I cannot 
remember the exact dates. Unfoi'tunately, General, I have no record 
of the files that are in the 7th Air Force, which was formerly the 
Hawaiian Air Force, or the Hawaiian Department. 

15. General Grunert. Are those files on record in Hawaii? 
General Martin. They should be, yes, sir, and I just have to trust 

to memory here as to the statements I am making, which you may find 
not to be exactly correct, but they are correct so \1820] far as 
my knowledge is concerned. 

16. General Grunert. All right. Now, did the Nav}' conduct dis- 
tant reconnaissance regularly? 

General Martin. Yes, sir, they did. They had task forces out, of 
which we had no knowledge. They were secret task forces. They 
were out of communication even Avith their home station so far as we 
knew. 

17. General Grunert. You say that was distant reconnaissance? 
General Martin. Well, by task force, the Navy 

18. General Grunert. You mean just because the task force covered 
an area you thought they were having distant reconnaissance in the 
defense of Hawaii? 

General Martin. Well, they had some patrol boats that went out 
on what was called the early morning mission. They left at approxi- 
mately 5 o'clock in the morning. But there were only two or three 
of those that went out on i)atrol duty. 

19. General Grunert. What were they supposed to do? Do you 
know? 

General Martin. They made a reconnaissance in that particular 
area. Of course, you know how much of a reconnaissance two or three 
ships can make, nothing to amount to much. 

20. General Grunert. How about air reconnaissance? 

General Martin. That is air reconnaissance I am talking about now. 

21. General Grunert. You are talking about that. 

General Martin. Now, they had task forces out at various and 
sundry times, no regular intervals, that went out. As to what they 
did, I cannot say, because I didn't know anything about it excepting 
they did have them go. 

[1821] 22. General Grunert. Now, are you sure that these pa- 
trol boats that went out were not to just cover the task forces that 
were going out about that time? 

General Martin. I cannot give you any accurate information as to 
what the Navy did when they had their task forces out. 

23. General Grunert. Now, did we have an inshore i)atrol? 

General Martin. Nothing more than the airplanes that were flying 
in the vicinity of Oahu that were always on the alert for enemy sub- 
marine. 



954 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

24. General Grunert. Were they armed ? 

General Martin. No, sir, no more than they would be for the normal 
performance of a mission. That is, they usually went up, ]:)erformed 
<iunnery missions at the same time. So they were armed with that: 
they had their guns and ammunition, but not for a regular combat 
mission. 

25. General Grunert, Then, any reconnoitering they did was inci- 
dental to their training; is that right? 

General Martin. It was incident to the training of a day, and not 
as a well-organized reconnaissance for the area. 

26. General Grunert. They just happened to observe what they 
could see in their training; is that right? 

General Martin. Well, a little more than that. General : They were 
instructed to observe that area at all times. 

27. General Grunert. They were just looking for subs; is that tlie 
idea ? 

General Martin, Looking for submarines, yes, sir. There was no 
other danger from any other source than submarines in the immediate 
vicinity of the island. That only extended just four [1822] or 
five miles offshore. 

28. General Grunert. So that, as I understand, your understand- 
ing is that the task forces went out, and apparently they covered cer- 
tain areas of the sea ; and outside of that, as far as you know, there was 
no distant reconnaissance by the Navy? 

General Martin. Excepting for the two or three patrol boats that 
went out each morning. 

29. General Grunert. Did you know where they went? 
General Martin. No, sir, I do not. 

30. General Grunert. Did you think that in any way covered a 
defense against an air raid? 

General Martin. No, sir. I complained to Admiral Bellinger about 
the lack of patrolling that was being done. 

31. General Grunert. What did he say? 

General Martin, Well, he said, "This is all that I have. This is 
all I can put up." 

32. General Grunert. But you actuallv complained about the lack 
of it? 

General Martin. Yes, sir. I told him that I was not at all satisfied 
with the amount of patrolling that the Navy was doing in so far as 
covering the area was concerned. 

33. General Grunert. Now, do you recall your air agreement with 
Admiral Bellinger, that is, of the 31st of March, '41, the Joint Air 
Operations Agreement ? 

General Martin. Very well ; yes, sir. 

34. General Grunert. Was General Short well aware of that agree- 
ment? 

General Martin. Yes, sir. 

35. General (trunert. Did he a])prove it? 
[1823] General Martin. Yes, sir. 

36. General Grunert. Now, in there there was an estimated possible 
enemy action, and you stated the "high probability of a surprise dawn 
attack." Now, that was in the mind of you airmen at the time you 
drew up the agreement? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 955 

Geiiei-Jil Martin. Yes, sir. 

37. General Gri^nert. Now, what was dour to avoid such a surprise 
attack that you people thought was highly probable ^ 

General Martin. Well, nothing more than what I stated. The 
search of the area was in the hands of the Navy. 

38. General Grunert. Now, there were Addenda i and 2 to that 
plan. Addendum 2 to the Agreement described the various states of 
readiness by the Interceptor commander using recently-installed 
equipment and controlling operations from his central board. 

General Martin. Yes, sir. 

39. General Grunert. That was just a theory at that time, then, was 
it? 

General Martin. Well, it was more than that, because it actually 
had been used and practiced. 

40. General Grunert. Well, that seems to indicate the existence of 
the Interceptor Command with an installed air warning service and 
a control board as of September 20th or prior to November 17th. But 
did you actually try that out during that test? 

GtMieral Martin. Well, here is what happened with reference to 
the establisliing of this control. Tlie location for the station was 
tein])orary. The ])ennanent location was to be under ground, and this 
Avas being constructed, and there Avere perma- [18:24] nent 
locations for these five instrument stations, and there were permanent 
installations to be made, but the engineers had not completed those 
sites. So the five reporting stations were in temporary locations, and 
the Department Commander would not turn those over to the Com- 
manding General of the Hawaiian Air Forces until he had completed 
the training under his Department Signal Officer. He refused to turn 
them over until he considered they were properly trained. So they 
were still training under those conditions and not been turned over to 
the Air Force the mornino; of the attack on December 7tli. 

41. General Grunert. But you had an exercise somewhere around 
November ? 

General Martin. Yes, sir. ■ 

42. General Grunert. 17th to 22nd ? 

General Martin. Yes, sir, about that time; I don't know\ 

43. General Grunert. Now, at that time the air w^arning service, 
such as it w^as, and the control board operated, did they ? 

General Martin. Yes, sir. 

44. General Grunert. Then they were capable of operating? 
General Martin. They were capable of operating. The personnel 

was being trained for the operation of tlie equipment. The temporary 
statious were located, the temporary control station had been located, 
and the equipment used primarily in the training of personnel to take 
over the operation of the control area. 

45. General Grunert. Now, when was the Interceptor Command 
actually activated as a part of the Department setup in full control 
uf the Interceptor Command ; do you know ? 

[18!BS] General Martin. I couldn't give you that date, General; 
I don't remember. 

46. General Grunert. It was not ]irior to December 7tli? It must 
have been afterwaril : is that riji'ht ? 



956 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General jNIaktin. It \\a.s set up and (he men were beiiiji' trained foi", 
I would say, possibly a month prior to the attack on December 7th. 
Now, that is just an estimate. The actual time should be a matter of 
record in the Hawaiian Department. 

47. General Grunert. Now, let us consider just prior to the attack, 
from late in November. Were you in on a conference between General 
Short and Admiral Kimmel after General Short received the Chief of 
Staff's message of November 27th ? 

General Martin. Well, as to the exact date, I do not know, but I 
was at a conference with Admiral Kimmel and General Short at 
about that time. This was after General Short and Admiral Kimmel 
had had a conference with reference to information that they had. 

48. General Grunert. What did they discuss at that conference? 
General Martin. I do not know as I could tell you definitely, Gen- 
eral, just exact! V what was discussed. 

49. General (jrunert, Mollison was with you, wasn't he? 
General Martin. Yes, sir, he wa.s. 

50. General Grunert. Well, do you know whether they discussed 
what interpi-etation to })lace on these messages received from Wash- 
ington and what action they should take? Do you know whether that 
was discussed or not ? 

General Martin. Well, no doubt it was, but as to the subject matter 
under discussion at that particular time, it is very hazy in my mind. 
We were discussing the different possi- [ISM] bilities under 
the instructions that had been received from the War Department 
by General Short and from the Navy Department by Admiral 
Kimmel. 

51. General Grunert. Do you recall that the message to the Navy 
started out by saying, "Consider this a war warning" ? 

General Martin. No, I do not remember that statement being made. 

52. General Frank. Did you see the message ? 

General Martin. The only messages I saw^ were, as I remember it, 
two that came to General Short which he showed to me. One was 
something to the effect that no overt act would be committed by the 
Army ; that is, the first overt act would not be committed by the Army. 
And the next, the other one, as I remember it, was something in con- 
nection with preventing undue publicity with reference to his prepa- 
rations for the defense of the island becoming known to the public. 

53. General Grunert. Were you present at the discussion or was 
there discussion that you know of concerning what form of alert 
General Short should take under these warnings? 

General Martin. Well, as to whether this occurred at a conference 
or whether it was just General Short and myself talking, he did discuss 
with me the type of alert that he felt was appropriate. 

54. General Grunert. You say he did or did not? 

General Martin. He did, under the circumstances, and his estimate 
of the situation was that under the conditions and the information 
that he had his danger lay within the population of the island and 
that he was going to order Alert No. 1, which is concentration for 
protection against sabotage and internal up- [1S27] rising. 
That seemed to be correct and in keeping with the information we had 
at the time. 

55. General Grunert. Did he ask your advice on what alert to 
take, or did he tell you what he had taken or what he decided to take? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 957 

General Martin. 1 cannot sa}^ as to whether he asked my advice. 
General Short and I usually just discussed these things as man to 
man. He made the decision. I had an opportunity to present my 
viewpoint. • 

56. General Grunert. Then, you concurred in his decision? 
General Martin, I didn't see any more danger from attack than 

General Short did, that is, from a surprise attack with the informa- 
tion we had. 

57. General Grunert. Did you concur with him that it would be 
all right to have your planes concentrated and not dispersed? 

General Martin. Of course, I never wanted to concentrate my 
planes, but we had practiced these different alerts, Alerts No. 1 and 
Alert No. 2, and they were concentrated under Alert No. 1 for protec- 
tion against sabotage. We did not have the manpower to effectively 
protect them in dispersed position. That was the purpose of concen- 
tration. Under Alert No. 2 we had them dispersed in dispersal areas 
at the different airdromes. As to whether it was Alert No. 1 or Alert 
No. 2 was just a question out of the estimate of the situation. Now, as 
to how seriously General Short and I discussed the necessity of using 
Alert No. 1 or Alert No 2, 1 am not capable of saying at this time, but I 
will say that I always had the liberty of discussing these matters with 
General Short. 

58. General Grunert. You tell me you did not lilve to have 
\1S:^S] your planes concentrated. Did you object to having them 
concentrated? 

General Martin. I don't tliink I made any serious objection to him 
about it. because at the time that the alerts were decided on, as to 
wdiat they constituted, I explained to him the danger of always pulling 
your ships in if there was any opportunity of attack from the air, and 
we weighed all of those things against the possibility of their being 
defended in a dispersed area, and on account of the large number of 
men that would be requii-ed they were brought into concentrated areas 
w'hen alert No. 1 was in vogue. 

59. General Grunert. You then put it on the question of shortage 
of personnel. Was there such a shortage of personnel ? 

General Martin. There was so far as I am concerned. General. I 
Avas charged with the defense of the airdromes with the air persomiel, 
and I could not give it. 

60. General Grunert. How much more personnel would it liave 
taken if you had dispersed them instead of having them concentrated, 
approximately, in percentage ? 

General Martin. As a rough estimate, it would take about four 
times the men than we had. You see, these were around the perimeter 
of the field, and both Wheeler and Hickam Fields, which were two 
large stations, covered considerable area. We discussed the matter 
of having high fences around the areas. There was a high fence around 
part of the area at Hickam Field, but not the entire area. This was 
considered to be too expensive, as we were still having trouble getting 
funds for some of the things that w^e considered very essential, and 
to properly protect the planes in a dispersed area would take a large 
number [1820] of men. 

61. General Grunert. Had there been any evidences of sabotage? 
General Martin. No. 



958 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

62. General Gru:nert. But 3^011 were all sabotage-minded; you were 
all afraid of it? 

General Martin. Absolutely. 

63. General Grunert. If tliey had taken Alert No. 2, wouldn't that 
have covered sabotage also? 

General Martin. No. The greater danger was from the air and 
not from internal sabotage. The opportunity for sabotage would 
probably have been prevalent under either type of alert. 

G4. General Grunert. I want to find out what went on in your 
minds to convince you that defense against sabotage was sufficient 
to protect you after you had had these warnings? 

General Martin. A large per cent of the population there was Jap- 
anese. As to how loyal those who had been there for the second gen- 
eration would be, no one knew. 

65. General Grunert. Suppose you had been on Alert No. 2, couldn't 
3'ou have l)een just as w^ell protected as far as they were concerned? 

General Martin. General, there is no question if you are going to 
be attacked from the air that you must not have your planes concen- 
trated. Kegardless of what other threats might have been, the con- 
trolling factor is the fact that you could not have your planes con- 
centrated at the time they were going to be attacked from the air. 

66. General Grunert. That is what I want to get at. Here you 
make an estimate and you almost dope out just exactly what the Ja]:)s 
did, but wdien the time comes, and you get warning, you [ISSO] 
apparently' forget your estimate and go to sabotage. I cannot under- 
stand what went on in the topside here. 

General Martin. All I can do is to say this: All tliese things had 
been considered. They had not been overlooked. You come back to 
making a final decision. Which is it going to be? They are almost 
diametrically opposed to each other. And the decision was made by 
the top conmiander that his greatest danger lay in the sabotage and the 
uprising that might take place on the islands themselves. They didn't 
have guns. We didn't know what they had in the way of dynamite 
and other exj^losives. It was hoped they had little or none. But in 
making the decision he was governed largely by the information he 
had from the War Department as to what he might expect. There 
was no indication whatever on the |)art of anyone that he could exj^ect 
an attack from the surface of the sea or the air on the Hawaiian 
Islands. 

67. General Gri^nert. That is wdiat he was out there for, was it not? 
General Martin. That controlled his decision to the point where he 

decided there was no danger from the air, that his only danger was 
from the ground. 

68. General Grunert. When Alert No. 1, the sabotage alert, was 
called, did you then telegraph to the various airports to tell them to 
carry out sabotage Alert No. 1 and concentrate their planes? 

General Martin. We had communication with all of our air sta- 
tions. We had both teletype and telephone and telegrai)h. 

69. General Grunert. Now, in discussing the matter with General 
Short, after which he made his decision to go on Alert No. 1, and you 
as his air force commander well knowing there was [18SJ] no 
competent distant reconnaisance that would cover the areas, how do 
you then justif}^ your agreeing with him that Alert No. 1, sabotage, 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 959 

would })robably be the best thin<^ to do? You kuew there was no ail' 
reconnaissance to cover you from the outside. Therei'oie, you had no 
knowledge of what might come in from the sea, and if you had taken 
Alert No. 2 you would have covered both your air defense and your 
saDotage; but still you concurred on the sabotage alert only. It does 
not seem to make sense, unless you have some arguments back of it. I 
am just trying to get facts. I am not bhiming you or anyone else. 

General Martin. Let us cover the reasons. Let us say we had not 
been attacked from the air and we were under Alert No. 2 and the 
attack had come from within. We would have had all our shi]is dis- 
persed in the dispersal areas. Then the embarrassment would have 
been almost as great as it was before, because you are not prejiared to 
defend them in the dispersal areas. They could have been destroyed 
by little hand grenades or any soi't of a crudely-constructed bomb or 
fire, or anything of that nature by a few indivicluals. A few individ- 
uals could destroy each one of the areas if properly dispersed, and the 
vv'hole thing would go up in smoke. We could be just as severely criti- 
cized for having them in that position as we were when the attack took 
])lace from the air instead of from the ground. So the choice is, wliich 
is the greater threat, and as the Department Conunander made his 
decision, which I think was correct, on the infornuition he had, and I 
subscribed to it, that the defense should be made from sal)otage and 
internal uprising. 

70. General Grunert. You subscribed to it because you thought 
there was more danger from sabotage if they were dispersed than 
\1S32] if they were concentrated? 

General Martiist. Yes, sir. 

71. General Grtinert. And in concentrating them, you put them 
[)ractically wing-to-wing, or overlapped them, where, if a fire started, 
you could not get them out to save your neck. 

General Martin. Well, they are not serviced or are not armed when 
in that condition. That was one of the conditions of the alert. 

72. General Grunert. Did you have any evidence as to any actual 
danger from sabotage, outside of your knowing that a great number 
of Ja]:)anese nationals was part of your population? 

General Martin. No, sir; and as far as I know thei-e has been none 
since the islands were attacked. 

7?>. General Gruxert. It was just that bugaboo of a possible 
chance ? 

General ^Martin. That was in the minds of all of us, tliat we could 
expect trouble from that source. 

74. General Grunert. Did you know whether or not these sources 
of explosives had been checked and guarded and one thing and an- 
other? What gave you the impression that there might be individ- 
uals who would have explosives to make individual bombs for sabo- 
tage }>iu-poses? Do you know anything about that part of it? 

General Martin. No, sir, I do not, because our G-2 activities were 
imder the Department itself. 

75. General Grunert. When I mentioned the message of Novem- 
ber 27th from the Chief of Staff you seemed to recall just the things 
about "Let Japan commit the first overt act; don't alarm the public; 
don't show your intentions." You recalled those [1833] 



960 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(hiiios, })u( do you recall this part of the niessap;e : "If hostilities can- 
not be avoided, the United States desires Japan to commit the first 
overt act. This policy should not be construed as restricting you to 
a course of action that might jeopardize your defense!"' ^ 

General Martix. Yes, I knew that that was in there. 

76. General Grunert, Evidently at the time that course of action 
taken to guard against sabotage was not considered as jeopardizing 
the defense of the island ? 

General Martix. It was not so considered. General Short informed 
me that the War Department was thoroughly advised of the action 
he had taken. He had no criticism from the War Department as 
to the action he had taken in reference to putting the troops under 
Alert No. 1. We had had a maneuver just before this and, as I recall, 
we went directly from the maneuver into the alert and remained on 
there, but for wdiat period of time I do not recall now. However, we 
liad been on Alert No. 1 for some period of time before the attack 
took place. 

77. General Grunert. After the attack, then they took the extreme 
alert, No. ?>, didn't they? 

General IMartin. We started to make that disposition without any 
orders whatever, as soon as the attack took place. 

78. General Grunert. How long was that kept up, that No. 3? 
General Martin. I cannot tell you. 

70. General Grunert. When did you leave? 

General Martin. I ffol my orders on the 8th of January. As I 
recall, I left the 13th or l-tth"of January. 

80. General Grunert. 1942? 

General Martin. 1942 ; yes, sir. 

[18341 ^'^- General Grunert. Then it was kept up at least from 
December 8th until January, when you left? 

General Martin. I was relieved of duty part of that time; about 
December IHth, I think. 

82. General Grunert. What I am getting at is this : If you could 
do it afterward and you took the chance against sabotage, you could 
have done it before. You had personnel enough to do it afterward, 
didn't you ? 

General Martin. There is a difference there. It had been actually 
demonstrated that we could be attacked from the air. Therefore, 
your greatest menace then was from such an attack. 

83. General Grunert. Still you demonstrated to yourself when you 
made your estimate that yon conld be attacked from the air. 

General Martin. General, when you make an estimate of a situa- 
tion 3^011 consider all things that may happen. Then you come down 
to your decision and weigh one against the other, and finally your 
decision is predicated on what is more probable to happen. Your 
decision is going to be contradictory to some of the other points in 
the estimate you make. 

84. General Grunert. Now, when you make an estimate and say 
this is the most probable thing that is going to happen, then why not 
be pre})ared to meet the most i)robable tiling that is going to happen, 
instead of taking something way down the scale? It does not look 
consistent. Here you make an estimate and you seem to hit it right 
on the nose as to what actually did happen, and then when the time 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 961 

comes you pay no tittention to that. You .say, "1 am afraid of 
;>abotage." 

General Martix. You will have to consider. General, what infor- 
mation was being received. I do not know actually what [1835} 
the Xavy received, I do know a part of what the Army received, 
because those things that it was essential I know were told to me by 
General Short, or he let me read the messages. From the informa- 
tion he had. he was not of the impression they were alarmed about 
an attack on the Hawaiian Islands. 

85. General Grukert. Suppose yon had no information at all, then 
what? 

General Martix. That is a little bit different. 

86. General Gruxert. Then what are you out there for? Y'ou are 
there as an outpost, aren't you? 

General Martix. Absolutely. 

87. General Gruxert. Then you ought to be prepared to meet any- 
thing that may happen, isn't that right ^ 

General Martix. Y^ou can put it that way. 

88. General Gruxert. And you made an estimate as to what w^as 
going to happen and then along came additional information. This 
message did not say anything about sabotage, the message on which 
the decision was made, did it? 

General Martix. You mean the estimate of the situation sa^-s noth- 
ing about sabotage? 

89. General Gi;ijxert. No ; this decision that was made on the Chief 
of Staff's message said nothing about sabotage. 

General INIartix. No. it did not. 

00. General Gruxert. And the decision was made, on this Chief 
of Staff message, to go into a sabotage alert? 

General Martix. I cannot recall the chronological order of dates 
and circumstances in their exactness. All I can say to you is that that 
decision was based upon what was considered to be the logical thing 
to do at the time. Now, it happened [1S36] that the estimate 
(if the situation as to what was the most probable thing to guard 
against was exactly correct. It could have been the exact opposite of 
that and the thing the Department Commander prepared for was 
exactly what would have l)een correct. It so happened it was not. 

91. General Gruxert. If you had had no information from the War 
Department or from the Navy Department, what would have been the 
thing to do to protect yourselves? 

General Martix. I think that requires a lot of thought before you 
make that decision. 

92. General Gruxert. All this requires a lot of thought. That is 
what we are here for. 

Genei-al Martix. Why should I have to make that decision now? 

93. General Gruxert. Y"ou don't have to. I am not attacking you. 
I am trying to develop something so as to get ideas and thoughts as to 
what was back in your minds while you were in Hawaii in making 
your decision. Anything I say here, do not take as personal, because I 
do not mean it that way. I just want to develop the subject to see if 
we can find out what happened in the minds of the command out there. 
So we beat all around the bush and occasionally go right through it to 
try to get some reaction. 



962 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Martin. Let us go back please. Assume that this attack had 
not taken place and we are making this decision without the informa- 
tion that they could do it. All the best minds out there, including 
Commander i^rowning. whom (xeneral Frank knows quite well 

94. General Grunert. Of the Navy ? 

\1SS/] (ieneral Martix. OftlieNavy. Had pondered this ques- 
tion; General Street, then a Lieutenant Colonel, and various other 
individuals, from every conceivable viewpoint before that was written. 
The probability of that taking place was considered the best oppor- 
tunity the Japanese had. As to its possibility, it was very, very doubt- 
ful that anything so hazardous would occvir, because if it failed, it 
meant such a reduction in their striking power that they would be con- 
fined to their own home waters from then on. We felt as though it 
was just too much of a risk for them to take. These task forces were 
out. Very little information was coming in from tlie War and Navy 
Departments. I am sure, having no knowledge of a possibility of an 
attack taking place, other than it was probable that it could take place, 
those things affect you in making a decision. Why should I disperse 
my aircraft and get prepared for an air attack, when in all probabili- 
ties, under existing and present circumstances, my threat is going to 
come from within the population, the Japanese population of the 
islands? No, it is very hard for you under those circumstances, this 
attack having not been demonstrated that it could be accomplished, 
to say that it will be accomplished and my all-out effort must be to 
ward that off, when something is right there under your nose that is 
full of dynamite. I am afraid that is going to have a very marked 
influence on your decision. It did for us. 

95. General Grunert. You did get some information through the 
Navy and from the Chief of Staff that war was impending. The mes- 
sage that went to the Navy started out with the word, "Consider this 
a war warning." Then in this message from the Chief of Staff, of the 
27th, it also gave intimations of a hostile at- [1838] tack ; and 
you peo])le still thought that sabotage was your biggest immediate 
danger, is that right? 

General Martin. General, I do not believe that you can read into 
those messages any specific warning that you can expect attack from 
the surface or the air. The possibilities for those tilings, of course, 
are always in our minds, but the avertige opinion was very vague as 
to there being an actual attack, as I recall it. 

96. General Grunert. Did you expect the War Department to tell 
you what to do all the time, or just give you certain information on 
which to use your judirment as to what to do ? 

General Martin. We wanted information on which to exercise our 
judgment. The decision had to be made by the Department Com- 
mander there as to the defense of the islands. 

97. General Grunert. Let me read you the dispatch received by the 
Navy, which they were insti'ucted to transmit to the Army. This was 
the dispatch of November 'J7th from the Navy to the Commander-in- 
Chief, Pacific Fleet, or a ])araphrase of it: "Consider this dispatch a 
war warning." If you are given a war warning, what do you expect 
to do? 

General Martin. Aren't you reading a Navy dispatch. General? 

98. General Grunert. Yes. 



J 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 963 

General Maktin. I have no knowledge of that. As to whether Gen- 
eral Short had it, or not, I could not say. 

90. General Grunert. That was the next thing I was going to bring 
up. Outside of the November 27th dispatch from the Chief of Staff, 
did General Short keep you informed of other messages received 
t hrough the Navy or otherwise, or is that dispatch of [18S9] the 
27th from the Chief of Staff the only one you knew of? 

General Martin. As to the things received through the Navy, I 
could not answer it, but as to anything else, he considered I should have 
knowledge of, he very probably gave me the information, so far as 
I know. 

100. General Grunert. Then you do not know about this dispatch? 
I will read it to you to make sure of it. 

Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an 
pffort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make 
an aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against 
either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo, is indicated 
by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their 
naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for 
carrying out the task assigned in WPL 46 only. Guam, Samoa, and Continental 
districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A 
similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform naval district 
and Army authorities. British to be informed by Spenavo. 

You do not recall ever having been made acquainted with that? 
General Martin. General Short got something similar to that. I 
have some of that information, but not all. 

101. General Grunert. General Short got tlie message of the 27th 
we have just been talking about and which reads as follows : 

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with 
only the barest possibilities [iS//0] that the Japanese Government might 
come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hos- 
tile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be 
avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the tirst overt act. This 
policy should not, repeat, not, he construed as restricting you to a course of 
action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you 
are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem 
necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as to not, repeat not, 
alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hos- 
tilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as 
they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information 
to minimum essential officers. 

That appears to be the counterpart of the other message. 

General Martin. I do not recall the text of the message you read 
that the Navy received, but from some source I received the informa- 
tion, I believe from General Short himself, that anticipated a move 
might be made down through the East Indies and French Indo-China 
or in that direction. 

102. General Grunert. In other words, you thought that they would 
hit far out first and not hit you ? 

General Martin. We had no idea they were going to make this bold 
attack from the sea. It was possible. And that possibility had been 
weighed, but v/e thought it was too much of a risk for them to take. 

103. General Grunert. When you weighed that ])ossibility in your 
estimate, you concluded it was highly probable, but when it came to 
actual conditions you concluded it was highly improbable; is 
imi] that right? 

78716 -46— Ex. 145. vol. 2 12 



964 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Maetin. Circumstances cause you to change your mind. 

104. General Grunert. Now, what was it that Washington said or 
did that caused you people to elect sabotage instead of an air attack as 
your biggest danger? It was not any particular thing that Washing- 
ton did, was it? 

General Martin. No, I would not say it was anything that Wash- 
ington did that decided us on Alert No. 1. With the number of car- 
riers we thought the Japanese had, we felt they would not risk that 
number of carriers that we felt they had to bring up. 

105. General Grunert. You did not think they had the nerve to 
attempt such an almost suicidal attack? 

General Martin. That is right. 

106. General Grunert. And if you had been on Alert No. 2, would 
it have been successful, in your opinion, or do you think you could 
have caught them? 

Genral Martin. No, General ; we never had enough equipment to 
stop them. We could have prevented them from being so successful, 
but not to have stopped them. 

107. General Grunert. Could you have knocked out those slow- 
moving torpedo-bombers ? 

General Martin. You might knock out some of them, but you are 
not going to get all of them, because they had too many for the forces 
we had. 

108. General Grunert. Of course, it is like every other situation, 
you cannot tell what you would have done, but at least you would have 
been in the air and you could have prevented a lot of what was done? 

General Martin. It would not have been so severe; no [184-2] 
question about that. 

109. General Grunert. About this reconnaissance referred to in 
that directive of the 27th, it said "take such reconnaissance and other 
measures as you deem necessary", or words to that effect. What did 
that mean to you ? 

General Martin. The observation and patrolling around the coastal 
areas, so far as the Army was concerned, were very alert. They were 
looking for submarines that might be in the shallower waters or tak- 
ing shelter from the conformation of the islands in different parts of 
the areas in the islands. That did not extend out to sea to any large 
extent, although we were sending training missions right along to the 
small islands south of Oahu and others to the northwest, that is out 
about five or six hundred miles, for the training of navigators and of 
the crews for these long missions over water. All of those M-ere always 
on the alert for anything that might be suspicious. 

[1843] 110. General Grunert. What could this inshore aerial 
patrol do in the line of or for the defense of Hawaii ? 

General Martin. It did nothing more than to give information as 
to any suspicious looking objects under the water m that area or that 
might be on the surface. 

111. General Frank. To whom? 
General Martin. For submarine. 

112. General Grunert. That was patrolling for submarines, to the 
Navy? 

General Martin. In that area for submarine. 

118. General Grunert. But that was for the Navy purposes, wasn't 
it? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 965 

General Martin. That was for the Army too. 

114. General Grunert. What were subs going to do to the Army 
defenses? 

General Martin. Well, we were charged with the defense of Pearl 
Harbor. 

115. General Frank. To whom did you give the information if 
you got it ? 

General Martin. Oh, that would come directly to the Air Force 
headquarters and then on to the Department: go to the Department, 
the Department would give it to the Navy. They would conmiunicate 
in that respect. 

UG. General Gbunkrt. Did you ever find any subs? 

General Martin. No, never found any. 

117. General Grunert. But what could subs near to the Island do 
to the Army defenses of Oahu? 

General Martin. Well, the joint agreement was that they were to 
have charge of the reconnaissance of that particular [1S44] 
area within the immediate shore line of Oahu for 

118. General Frank. Who was? 
General Martin. The Army. 

119. General Frank. Yes. 

General Martin. Yes, and of course that comes on down to the air 
forces. 

120. General Grunert. You did it under that agreement? 
General Martin, Yes, sir. 

121. General Grunert. But as far as the actual Army defense of 
Oahu was concerned, what danger were subs to you ? 

General Martin, Well, there would be no gain excepting our mis- 
sion was to defend the Navy Yard ; that's all. 

122. General Grunert. And they could get within distance to 
shell the Navy Yard, could they ? 

General Martin. No, no ; it wasn't considered that they might shell 
the Navy Yard, but they would have been in position to lurk in there 
to attack ships of the Navy, carrier or capital ship, anything that they 
wished to consider targets. 

123. General Grunert. Then, it was really defense for the Navy? 
General Martin. And for such observation as they might make in 

putting up their periscope ; that was all. 

124. General Grunert. This message says, "Prior to hostile Japa- 
nese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and 
other measures as you deem necessary." Now, was any additional re- 
connaissance ordered, or did the Commanding General not consider 
any additional reconnaissance necessary? 

General Martin. Well, the reconnaissance around the shore line was 
increased when they went into alert. 

125. General Grunert. Increased? 

[1845] General Martin. That was very definitely increased in 
the vicinity of the Island, 

126. General Grunert. Sabotage alert? Increase it? 

General Martin. We did have a very direct concern about the activi- 
ties of submarines, but we didn't have any feeling that they were going 
to take the gamble of attacking from the surface. 



9G6 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

127. General Grunert. As a matter of fact, the Army was sabotage- 
minded, and the Navy might be classed as submarine-minded ; does that 
about cover it ? 

General Martin. Well, I think you are apt to give a wrong impres- 
sion to others if you use that statement. You might say, from the 
testimony we have given here, that that is true. I would not say that 
we were absolutely sabotage-minded and submarine-minded. 

128. General Grunert. But at least it was uppermost in your mind ? 
General Martin. I think it would be dangerous to convey that 

thought because that isn't quite true. We had considered all these 
other things. Now, what we actually did would indicate that what 
you said is true, but it also indicates that we cast aside serious con- 
sideration for these other things that actually did take place, which is 
not true. 

129. General Grunert. You were not satisfied with the distant re- 
connaissance being made by the Navy ? 

General Martin* Oh, no; I knew it was not sujfficiently complete. 

130. General Grunert. And you complained to Admiral Bellinger, 
did you? 

General Martin. Yes, sir. 

[1846] 131. General Grunert. About when was that? Late in 
the game or early in '41 or late in '41, or several times? 

General Martin. No. I did it on two different occasions. I did 
it shortly after I went over there and then specifically along in August 
after we had submitted a scheme for the reconnaissance and pro- 
tection of the Hawaiian Islands from the air that had been worked 
out by my staff and had resulted from a CPX we had had in the 
spring of 1941 after I arrived there in November in 1940. 

132. General Grunert. Was that orally or in writing? 
General Martin. Sir? 

133. General Grunert. Were those complaints oral or in writing, 
or what? 

General Martin. Yes, sir. You will find a copy of it in the Army 
Air Force headquarters and in the War Department. 

134. General Grunert. Then, we ought to find in Hawaii, when 
we go there, at least two letters from you complaining against the 
inadequacy of the distant reconnaissance? 

General Martin. In writing? I thought you were talking about 
this plan for the defense. 

135. General Grunert. No, no. Your complaints to Admiral 
Bellinger. 

General Martin. I don't know whether you will find them in writ- 
ing or not. You should, but whether you do or not, I won't be able 
to say. 

136. General Grunert. Rather you think probably, it was oral, do 
you? 

General Martin. Sir? 

137. General Grunert. You think probably you just talked to him 
about it in complaining? 

[184.7] General Martin. Well, I know I did that. 

i38. General Grunert. Which might be nothing 

General Martin. It is possible it was in writing too, because it was 
a subject of considerable moment. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 967 

139. General Gkunert. But if there are copies of those things they 
would be in the Hawaiian Air Force record? 

General Martin. Yes; if it is in writing it should be either in the 
— it should be in the Air Force files or 

140. General Grunep.t. Well, now, you say there was a lack of these 
patrols. You knew they were not covering you outside. Was that 
discussed when you decided to take the sabotage alert and not go to 
the air alert ? 

General Martin. Why, of course. 

141. General Grunert. But you discounted that because you didn't 
think the Japs had the nerve or the equipment to pull anything like 
that ; is that generally the idea ? 

General Martin. We just felt that it was too much of a gamble in 
the beginning for him to take. 

142. General Grunert. Now, how about your air fields? They do 
not appear to have been properly protected by taking necessary meas- 
ures to protect themselves. 

143. General Frank. From what point of view? 

144. General Grunert. From the idea of protection of personnel, 
from having air raid shelters designated, from having places where 
persons could jump into a slit trentch, and having machine guns set 
uj) against possible air attack. Now, those things, most of them, 
iippear to have been done after December 7, but how much was done 
])rior to December 7 ? 

General Martin. Well, there was quite a bit had been done prior 
to December 7. The plans were made as to the distribution [IS^S] 
of the airplanes at the airports. The dispersal positions had been 
revetted and slit trenches put in at Wheeler Field. The dispersal 
positions had been selected at Hickain Field. The revetments had 
not been constructed because it was considered — now, whether I am 
quoting correctly or not, but it was my understanding that the De- 
partment had requested this and the War Department turned it down 
as being too expensive. Now, it may be 

145. General Grunert. What was that? 

General Martin. The revetments for the bombers at Hickam Field. 
It may be that those revetments were turned down in the Department 
as being too expensive for the amount of funds that he had. It was 
one place or the other, but they had been refused after having been re- 
quested. The fields that were being constructed on the other islands 
had provisions for shelter for at least one guard company at each 
one of these stations. 

146. General Frank. What kind of shelter ? 

General Martin. They were the theater-of -operation type, except- 
ing down at Morse Field ; they were a little more permanent there, a 
part of that construction. 

147. General Grunert. None of tliat is protection from an air 
attack ? 

General Martin. No, no, excepting as to concealment. The effort 
was made to put them in among the algarroba. Any other protection 
that might be available on the edge of the airport, and also they were 
staggered in and placed in lines and streets : more to represent a little 
native town than anything else. 

[184^] 148. General Grunert. Most of them in the line of 
camouflage ? 



968 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Martin. Oh, they weren't strictly camouflage, but an ef- 
fort was made to make them as inconspicuous as possible without 

149. General Grunert. Which, in a form, is camouflage so as t(j 
make it fit in with the scenery : that is camouflage. 

General Martin. Yes, sir. That is, at Barking Sands the roofs 
were green very much like these buildings here, and they were among 
the algarroba, which were green all the year round. 

150. General Grunert. How about setting up machine guns to be 
prepared in case an air attack came? 

General Martin. The machine-gun pits were at various points 
around Hickam Field and also at Wheeler Field. Remember, Gen- 
eral, your Alert No. 1 pulled the antiaircraft in from these positions. 
The antiaircraft had dispersal points throughout the island. And 
Alert No. 1 pulled them in from those positions into their home posts, 
so they were not in those positions the morning the attack took place. 

151. General Grunert. That seems to be the trouble: Alert No. 1 
did everything that should not have been done. 

General Martin. Absolutely. 

152. General Grunert. That is, in the light of what we know now. 

General Martin. Yes, sir ; that is correct. It did exactly the oppo- 
site of what the dispersal should have been to meet the attack that took 
place. 

153. General Grunert. But I still do not understand how after 
December Tth we appear to have had plenty of personnel to do 
[ISSO] all this dispersion and take care of that in addition to 
sabotage, but they seemed to blame the sabotage on the drain on per- 
sonnel — why you came to that conclusion. 

General Martin. General, we had already been stung. We knew 
it could be done. The improbability of it was a thing of the past. 
The probability of its happening again was quite dangerous. 

154. General Grunert. Now, you made several remarks here to the 
Roberts Commission that I just want to call your attention to. 

General Martin. I want to make one comment with reference to 
something I said before the Roberts Commission which I mentioned to 
General McNarney afterward, and he said, Well, he didn't think it was 
of sufficient importance to come back before the Commission and prove 
it. Admiral Standley showed me a copy of the Navy order which 
embodied parts of the estimate of the situation here that I didn't rec- 
ognize, and I told him that while these things had been discussed, so 
far as I knew, that I had not seen that paper. Well, I had not seen 
the paper, but it was an extract from the estimate of the situation 
which we have been discussing right here, and that is the only thing I 
know of that is in error with reference to the testimony I gave. 

155. General Grunert. General Russell. 

156. General Russell. I have only two or three things. 

General, as I understand your testimony there was no complaint 
of an inadequacy of ships available to theArmy to conduct this close-in 
reconnaissance : aircraft. 

General Martin. Now, wait a minute. I am not following 
[1861] what you are saying. 

157. General Russell. The mission of the Army in connection with 
the defense of Oahu was to conduct the close-in reconnaissance ? 

General Martin. There was no objection to our doing it? 

158. General Russell. No. Was that your mission? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 969 

General Martin. It was assigned according to the joint agreement. 

159. General Russf.ll. All right. Now, did you have sufficient air- 
craft to conduct that? 

General INIartin. Oh, yes, for close reconnaissance. Goodness, you 
go around the island in just a few minutes. 

160. General Grunert. Was there any definite plan for conducting 
this close-in reconnaissance? 

General Martin. As to whether you will find an operation order in 
<lie operation files at the 7th Air Force that says how this will be 
done, I cannot say. It was being done by everyone that went out on 
a mission. That was a general understanding, that they were always 
alert for these specific things that might be an indication of the pres- 
ence of the enemy, particularly under water. We thought he would 
be spying upon us, because they would send submarines into that area 
to detect the movements of the Navy, of the Fleet. 

161. General Russell. Then this reconnaissance was conducted as 
a part of some other mission? 

General Martin. Normally, yes. 

162. General Eussell. Do you recall ever having sent out any Army 
aircraft for the specific and sole purpose of conducting this close-in 
reconnaissance ? 

[1852^ General Martin. I can't recall specifically that that was 
done. We had an observation squadron there, you see, that you will 
find in their files, I am sure, specifically assigned to some missions for 
them. Now, as to the making of that, I wouldn't know. 

163. General Russell. Yes. 

General Martin. They were given general instructions that this 
was a part of their duty. It was a part of the duty of the bombers 
and fighters as well. They all had the same responsibility for observ- 
ing the area in which they were flying. 

164. General Russell. General, your testimony or your evidence 
as given in reply to General Grunert's questions indicated a rather 
close relationship between you and the Department Commander, Gen- 
eral Short. 

General Martin. Yes, sir. 

165. General Russell. Were your transactions with him quite fre- 
quent or infrequent? 

General Martin. No ; I would say they were quite frequent. If I 
had any business to transact on which it was necessary to get his de- 
cision, I would ask permission of his Chief of Staff to have an audi- 
ence with him, which was always granted at as near the time I had re- 
quested as was possible for him, and he would call on me quite often 
to come into headquarters to discuss different matters. 

166. General Russell. Wlien did you go out there ? 

General Martin. I reported for duty there the 2nd of November, 
1940. 

167. General Russell. Was the Department in a condition of alert 
when you arrived ? 

[1853] General Martin. No, sir. 

168. General Russell. Were you informed when you arrived that 
the Department had been on an alert? 

General Martin. No, sir. 

169. General Russell. That year? 



970 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Martin. Oh, I think there had been some sort of a maneu- 
ver or something of that kind. As to being alerted, I didn't have any 
knowledge of that, don't remember of anything of that kind. I won't 
say that they were not. 

170. General Russell. Were you, or not, conscious of the fact that 
the relation between the American Government and the Japanese Gov- 
ernment grew more tense from the time you arrived until the attack 
on December 7, '41 ? 

General Martin. Yes, sir; that is right. That is correct. Had 
full knowledge of that. 

171. General Russell. You had full knowledge of that? 
General Martin. Yes. 

172. General Russell. How did you acquire that knowledge? 
General Martin. Well, I acquired it through the press relations 

and through information that the Department Commander gave me. 

173. General Russell. Then, the Department Commander and you 
were agreed that the relationship between the Japanese and American 
Governments was growing more tense through the year 1941 ? 

General Martin. Yes, sir. 

174. General Russell. Was there anything occurring on the Island 
itself which would lend color to this growing tenseness between the 
1 wo Governments ? 

[18S4-] General Martin. No, there was none, no indication of 
anything on the Island that would cause unnecessary suspicion, al- 
lliough the G-2 section of the Department was unusually alert and 
they were searching for information as such a large percentage of the 
population were of Japanese descent or native Japanese, natural Jap- 
anese, that they felt that it would be almost impossible for them to 
ferret out all the things that might be taking place. So there was 
naturally cause for great concern as to what this great mass or large 
percentage of population could do that would be harmful to us. 

175. General Russell. In the fall of 1941 or in November, to limit 
the period a little more, in middle and late November of 1941, what 
were the conclusions reached by you and the Department Commander 
as to the probable imminence of war with Japan ? 

General Martin. We thought it quite probable. 

176. General Russell. When you went on Alert No. 1 as of late 
November, were you and the Department Commander, insofar as you 
knew his thoughts, impressed that war might begin at any day or at 
any hour with Japan ? 

General Martin. I think that is a little bit further than we consid- 
ered. The probability of war, yes. And when you say "the probabil- 
ity of war," it is apt to break out at any particular time. The fact that 
it was going to break out within the next month or two, as far as I 
am concerned, I will say I did not think that it would. I felt that the 
Japanese were anxious to accomplish or to gain and hold what they 
had, rather than to bring additional trouble on their shoulders. 

177. General Russell. Yes, sir. Well, do you know. General, 
whether or not the opinion which you have just expressed as to 
\J8S5] the imminence of war at that time was entertained also by 
the Commanding General of the Department, General Short ? 

General Martin. All I can say is, he discussed it with me, and the 
information he had, which indicated that the negotiations were not 
progressing as they had expected. 



r'HOCKKDI i\(iS OK AI»'MV I'KAK'I; IIAHlU)i; HOARD 971 

178. Geiie'/al Kussell. Yes, hut you ;iiv uol able 

General Mahtin. And thev were <iel! ing at the critical stap'. 

17U. General Kusskll. 1 under^^land, then, that you are in.-l in a 
l)osition to irive any too clear a ))ictni'e ol' General Slujrt's thouLiJn 
about war at that time. 

I will ask you this, General : Do you think that in the estimate of the 
situation, upon wliich the order for Alert No. 1 was issued, the ])r()b- 
ability or i!n[)rol)a])ili{y of immedia.te war with Ja})an playi'd any 
]wrt^ 

General Makmn. You mean to say as to probability of immediate 
war takinji; place with Japan being given considcu-ation at the tiiut^ 
Alert No. 1 was decided'^ 

180. General Russell. xVnd affecting the order. 

General Martin. I don't think there is any doubt but what it was 
consitlered. 

ISl. Genei'al Russell. General, suppose that a conclusion had be(Mi 
i-eached by you that war with Jaj)an was likely at any hour: would 
you have thought tlien that Alert No. 1 was sufticient? 

General Martin. Yes, under the circumstances that I stated to Gen- 
eral Grunert. You weigh all the information you have available to 
you. One counters another, and it is up to tlie Department Com- 
juander and his assistants to make a decision as to what he thinks is 
the greatest set to him. Under the circumst ances and the infoi-mal ion 
that was available to him at [JSoG] tha.t time T felt that his 

decision was correct. 

182. Genei'al Russell. Whether war v.wnv ov not '^ 

General JMautin. Yes. 

IS-'"). General Rltssell. Gener;d, in the discussion by General 
(irunert of the 

(ieneral ISIartin. 1 Mould like to add something right there, sir, in 
addition to the question. 

184. Genera] Russell. Veiy well. 

General Martin. I feel that our decision was influenced to a certain 
extent by the fact that the Navy was patrolling v^-ith task forces in 
\^aters of which we had no knowledge. Now, as to what areas they 
were covering, v.e did not know, but it did ailect a decision as to the 
liaramount danger coming from within rather than from without. 

185. General Russell. You didn't know where they wer(>'? You 
didn't know where they went to, did you? 

General Martin. No. 

186. General Russi;ll. Whethei' north, south, east, oi' west i 
General Martin. No, sir ; they didn't tell us. 

187. General Frank. Did you have confidence in the efi'ectiveness 
of these task forces? 

General Martin. Well, not complete, no, but 

188. Genera] Frank. But? But what? 

General Martin. Well, but wliat, I don't know v.liat T was intend- 
ing to say. 1 was going to say: the task force, not knowing as to 
where it had gone av not knowing wliat iirfoiination it had tliaT would 
indicate (luit it should go ceilain j)]aces. I couhhrt nnswer tlie rpiesi ion. 

iSi). (leneral Frwk. But you just said th.nt iIh> fact that tli(> 
I lSf//'\ Navy had task foives out influenced muw (j('ci:^ion. 

Genei-a] Martin. AVell, I am sure that it did. 

ino. (h^neral Frank. Well, wliy did it ? 



972 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Martin. Well, if there was anything so large as a task force 
of proper size to make a successful attack against the Island on the 
ocean, I just had a feeling that the Navy, in the spreading of their 
task force to pick up information, would contact it in some way. 

191. General Frank. Therefore, you had confidence that the Navy 
was conducting task force operations that would furnish you a certain 
protection ? 

General Martin. That is right. 

192. General Frank. And because of that feeling of confidence in 
the Navy to do it, you felt a certain security ? 

General Martin. That is perfectly true. Now, as I stated a moment 
ago, we were not completely satisfied with the way this reconnaissance 
was being done, because there wasn't enough in the air, and your 
reconnaissance from the air would extend over a larger territory in the 
limited amount of time, and that was the thing 1 was complaining to 
Admiral Bellinger about. There wasn't sufficient air reconnaissance, 
but we did have a feeling that the task forces going out were going 
out with the specific purpose in mind of conducting reconnaissance 
of the waters in that vicinity. As to where they went, I didn't know. 

I am sorry to interrupt, but I just wanted to bring out that point. 

193. General EtrssEU.. Well, you were not the one that interrupted, 
General. 

I want to talk to you about what General Frank has injected here, 
this question of confidence in the Navy, not [18S8'] from a 

reconnaissance standpoint but from a defensive standpoint. You 
seem to have some idea, for an air force commander, General, about 
naval operations, of the task forces necessary to support this air 
attack, and so forth. 

What was your feeling about the ability of the Navy based on 
Pearl Harbor to destroy such a task force before it could launch the 
planes from the carriers, assuming that the Japanese task force was 
discovered in time? 

General Martin. I felt the Navy was strong enough and the task 
forces were strong enough to be such a threat against any concentra- 
tion excepting the entire Japanese fleet, which I didn't think they 
would ever contemplate sending, that it would be a very decided 
deterrent to the Japanese ever sending a task force into that area. 
They were strong enough to have defeated any except a very unusually 
strong and well constituted task force with plenty of capital ships 
in it, because they had capital ships and they had cruisers, a goodly 
luunber of destroyers, submarines, and the other lighter ships essential 
to the protection of the capital ships and carriers. There were four 
carriers that were in and out at various and sundry times which could 
have been a part of any task force. 

194. General Russell. There were four carriers? Now, I didn't 
get the full import of that. 

General Martin. Yes, sir. I say "in and out." Now, there were 
the Hornet and the Enterprise and the Yorktown and the 

195. General Russell. Oh, that is out. 

196. General Frank. Lexington. 
General Martin. Yes, Lexington. 

\1S'^8A^ 197. General Grttnert. Four of our own carriers? 
General Martin. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 973 

Now, as far as we knew, the Japanese — all the information we had 
was that the Japanese had about eight fairly good-sized carriers and 
probably about the same number of converted carriers, and the naval 
forces that were then in the Hawaiian Islands were perfectly com- 
petent of taking care of any normal task force that might be sent 
against them. It was a question of their finding them. 

198. General Russell. Now, General, this final question: Earlier 
in your examination you referred to the fact, when asked about means 
available to you to have intercepted and destroyed this air attack 

General Martin. Yes, sir. 

199. General Russell. You made reference to that and stated that 
before you left you wanted to discuss that. 

General Martin. Yes, sir. 

200. General Russell. And I would like to ask you to discuss it 
noAV. 

General Martin. Well, I would like to do two things: I would 
like to make just a general statement as to conditions, and then I 
would like, if I may, to read extracts from personal letters I have 
written to General Arnold on the subject, so you can see the thing was 
being discussed at the time. And I'll admit I didn't get any very 
definite answers with reference to how it Avas going to be corrected, 
but it had been under discussion for some time. 

"Wlien I took over from General Frank in the Hawaiian Islands 
we had, you might say, no combat equipment. We had some P-26s, 
an old obsolete type of fighter which we then [1859] called a 
liursuit airplane. We had some old observation planes, some B-18 
bombers which could never protect themselves in any combat at all. 
They could be used for reconnaissance, but you would lose them as 
fast as you sent them out, if they went into combat. They were always 
recognized as not being a combat ship. 

In the spring of 1941 we received possibly 50 P-36s. They were 
obsolescent at the time they came over. A little later — as I remember 
it, about May — we received some P-40 fighters. These ships were 
brought in on carriers and flown off to the station after they arrived 
in Hawaii. About May we received 21 B-17s that were ferried over 
by air. 9 of these, about the 5th or 6th of September, were trans- 
ferred to the Philippines by air. 

The 12 remaining were ordered to proceed to the Philippines; and 
upon our request that they be delayed that we could continue the 
training of combat crews for that type of ship, as the two bombard- 
ment groups at Hickam Field woulcl be equipped with that type of 
airplane, they would go on the tail of some 60-odd airplanes that 
were being transferred from the mainland to the Philippines. At 
the time this attack took place the preparation of these 12 B-17s for 
transfer to the Philippines had progressed to the point where 6 of 
them were on the ground with fuel tanks being replaced, in which we 
found some deterioration ; engines being replaced so that they would 
have the requisite amount of lack of time on the engines that they 
would be sure to be in a position to function properly in transit. 
The types of ships which could have been used in combat, which is 
the P-40, B-17, and 10 A-20s, were always possibly 50 percent out 
of commission due to spare parts. In the beginning of our production 
program [1860] all monies, as possible, were placed into the 



974 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

producing of additional engines, and the spare parts requirements 
were neglected at the time. Therefore, the new airplanes coming 
out were deficient to meet the requirements of spare parts. 

We had sent cablegrams and letters on the subject of spare parts 
through proper channels to our supply agencies, and they were not 
in a position to help us. I knew that, but I did want them to be sure 
to realize how important it was to improve the spare-part situation 
as rapidly as possible. If we had an accident in one of our ships, 
we used what they call cannibalism to rob it of certain spare parts 
to repair other ships. 

Now, that was directly forbidden by regulations, but the situation 
was such that I knew that I would be always justified in taking such 
action. They were never destroyed in any way but what the parts 
if received could be put back in and the ship put back into commis- 
sion again. But even the taking of a part from any part of the air- 
plane or engine was forbidden as far as our regulations at the time 
were concerned, 

Now, as to information we may have that you may find in the files, 
1 am sure you will find plenty of it explaining this situation, the 
exact time when these airplanes were received, and the efforts we 
were making to train combat crews. The type of airplane we had was 
entirely different from the type we were receiving. Therefore the 
training program had to be rather extensive for the fighters. We 
were receiving men just out of the schools, who had not had advanced 
training at the time : that is, a limited advance training but not on any 
of the modern equipment. So they were put through a [1861] 
demonstration of their ability to handle the old, obsolescent P-26, 
then through the P-36 and on to the P-40, and considerable progress 
was being made in training these men to take over the P^O equip- 
ment. 
201. General Frank. How about the bombers? 
General Martin. The bombers, as soon as we got B-l7s, in I think 
it was some time in May, we had a few of our pilots that had flown 
the B-l7s. They started training others, and as I remember there 
were one or two officers remained with the first flight of bombers that 
came over, and helped train other additional crews. So they had to 
train the pilots to operate the ship, the co-pilots and all other members 
of the crew. We had no knowledge of repairing its engines or any 
of its equipment. We had schools because the schools on the main- 
land — the technical I am talking about, now — had not progressed to 
the point where they could meet the requirements. In other words, 
they had consumed some of their own fat, so to speak, to meet the 
enlargement of the technical school facility. We were getting but 
a few technically trained men. 

I inherited from my predecessor certain schools which were in be- 
ing, and others were established afterwards to give radio, engine me- 
chanics, airplane mechanics ; and different types of training and repair 
by the artisans in the handling of this new equipment was given at 
Wheeler and Hickam Fields. There were possibly 400 men in these 
schools, as I remember. 

My contention, the only dissension of note that I ever had with 
General Short, was with respect to the Air Corps performing its spe- 
cific fimctions and taking care of its own, and the ground forces fur- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 975 

nishing protection for the airdrome. The regulations at the time 
specified that the air force are [1862] responsible for the de- 
fense of the airdrome, but on account of my intensive training program 
and the fact that I expected this new equipment to come, the Hawaiian 
Air Force having just been set up in November of 1940, there was a 
tremendous amount of loose ends to be picked up, and I complained 
very bitterly to General Short to have the men relieved that he insisted 
be trained as infantry for the defenses of the airdromes and for other 
duty ; and his idea was that, when this attack was pressed home to a 
point that the air forces had been liquidated, then the ground troops 
would be used as infantry. That part of it was perfectly sound and 
all right, but my contention was that until I was prepared to meet my 
primary mission I could not spare the men to be trained for this sec- 
ondary mission. 

Now, I would like to read you some extracts from letters. 

202. General Russell. Before you get away from training. General, 
in order to make the record more or less logical: What effect on this 
training program would your having gone into Alert 2 or 3 have had ? 

General Martin. So far as training for the defense of the airdromes 
is concerned? 

203. General Russell. This general training that you are talking 
about. 

General Martin. As soon as you went into one of those alerts then 
it was assumed by the Department that these men had taken their posi- 
tions for the final protection of the Island, and parts of them were to 
report to the military police, and parts of them, a certain number of 
troops were in defense of the airdromes on the Island. Therefore 
they would be taken completely away from their essential positions — 
those that had [186S] been trained for other positions — with 
the air force units. After they had been trained as infantry for this 
defense and the alert had been called, they had by that time qualified 
for a classification in the air corps or the ground forces, ground crews 
for these ships. 

[1864-] 204. General Frank. It is not quite clear to me. Let 
me ask a question. 

General Martin. Perhaps it was not made clear. 

205. General Frank. On Alert No. 1 j^ou could continue your Air 
Corps training, is that right ? 

General Martin. Now so far as these troops that were performing 
the duty of infantry was concerned 

206. General Frank. Did you perform infantry duty on all three 
alerts? 

General Martin. Yes, for those troops that had been trained as 
infantry. 

207. General Frank. lii all three alerts ? 
Ge]ieral Martin. Yes. 

208. General Frank. Was there any advantage to conducting Air 
Corps training in any one of the three alerts ? 

General Martin. Well, as to the training in the alert 

209. General Frank. No, Air Corps training. 
General Martin. Yes. 



976 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

210. General Frank. Technical training. Was there any advan- 
tage to conducting Air Corps training in any one of the three alerts ^ 

General Martin. By Air Corps training you mean technical train- 
ing? 

211. General Frank. Yes. 

General Martin. Pertaining to the Air Forces ? 

212. General Frank. Yes. 

General Martin. There most certainly was, because we were hard 
pressed to get the men properly trained to meet our requirements in 
the new organization. 

213. General Frank. Could you do more technical training for the 
[1865'] Air Force in No. 3 Alert, No. 2 Alert, or No. 1 Alert, or 
was there no difference ? 

General Martin. Of course there was a difference. There wouUl 
be more under Alert No. 1. 

214. General Frank. More technical training? 

General Martin. Yes. Under Alert No. 2 your ships are dispersed 
and your crews are with the ships. 

215. General Grunert. Under Alert No. 1 your ships were concen- 
trated. Did you take them out of parking then, to train, or what? 

General Martin. The point you have in mind and what I am an- 
swering may be different. There is one thing, as to technical training 
in the schools we had on the ground. If you are talking about the 
opportunity for training in the crews assigned to the ships, then it is 
different. 

216. General Frank. No. I am talking about the schools. 
General Martin. Your Alert No. 1 gave them great opportunity 

for technical training on the ground. 

217. General Eussell. What happened with respect to training 
crews under Alert No. 1 ? 

General Martin. You have no planes at all. 

218. General Russell. They are all placed together? 

General Martin. Yes. You could not ti-ain crews under those con- 
ditions. 

219. General Russell. After December 7th what happened to your 
training eft'ort? 

General Martin, I should say it started about 8 o'clock on December 
7tli. The men were moving the ships out of the dispersed areas so far 
as they could. In fact, considerable of [1866] them were 
caught in getting them to dispersed areas. 

220. General Russell. Let us go to December 8th. What sort of 
training did you carry on on December 8th and thereafter? 

General Martin. There was very little training there, or you could 
not call it training. We went to our established stations. 

221. General Russell. That was Alert N'o. 3? 
General Martin. Combat stations. 

222. General Russell. That was Alert No. 3? 

General Martin. Yes. While it was training, I would not call it 
training. 

223. General Russell. General, I want you to be sure or be accurate 
on the answ^er that you made a moment ago about under Alert No. 1. 
Under Alert No. 1 you assembled all your planes on the aprons and 
runways close in ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 977 

General Martin. That was to protect them against trouble. 

224. General Russell. All day long they were kept there ? 
General Martin. They were kept there, excepting those required 

for missions and other assignments, which were withdrawn and put 
back into this concentration upon returning. 

225. General Russell. Were any of those missions training missions 
for which you took those planes out? 

GenerarMARTiN. In a sense, yes. It was flexible to a certain extent 
when permitted by the Department command. A strict interpretation 
of the alert would mean you put them there and have them there, but 
for training they were withdrawn and taken out and continued to be 
used and put back in their concentrated positions at night, or when- 
ever they came back. They were training at night as well as day time. 

[1867] 226. General Russell. I am going to leave the develop- 
ment of your fighting strength, if there is any development, to General 
Frank; he knows more about it than I do; but I do want to ask you 
one other question. What help could the Hawaiian Department con- 
sidered as a whole, Army, Navy and all, have expected in the way of 
fighters from the Navy ? 

General Martin. It would have helped to take from the Navy, 
under our control, such fighters as were flown off the carriers that were 
within the harbor. That is all. 

227. General Russell. Do you know that strength as of December 
Tth? 

General Martin. Let me add : And such Marine Corps fighters as 
were based on Hawaii. 

228. General Russell. Do you know what that effective strength 
was as of December Tth, 1941 ? 

General Martin. There were no carriers in the harbor, for one 
thing. I think there were about 25 ships belonging to the Marines out 
at Ewa Air Base. As to what the Navy may have had on Ford Island, 
I cannot say. I think you will find those figures of the ships that were 
actually on the Island at that time in the Operations file of the 7th 
Air Force, because there was a record being made of the fighting 
effectiveness of the Hawaiian Air Force from the standpoint of its 
real defense. 

229. General Russell. When these carriers were in the harbor, the 
aircraft which normally accompanied them to sea were taken off the 
carriers, were they not? 

General Martin. "When they came in ? 

230. General Russell. Yes. 

General Martin. They always wanted them to go ashore to 
\J868] some air field for training. As to whether they were 
always flown from the carriers to a shore-based station, I cannot say, 
but it was my understanding they were, because there w^as great dis- 
cussion between the Army and the Navy as to the number of air 
fields that should be made available to the Navy. 

231. General Russell. We had some testimony during this hearing 
about the probable Jap strength in carriers and aircraft. Do you 
liave any independent opinion as to their strength, both in carriers 
and aircraft, involved in the attack on December 7th ? 

General Martin. I think I said at the time that we felt we could 
expect them to have approximately 8 specially designed carriers, and 
possibly the same number of converted carriers. 



978 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

232. General Russell. I am talking about those in the task force 
which made the attack on Pearl Harbor. How many do you think 
were there ? 

General Martin. I did not think any such number would ever be 
in any such task force to leave the Japanese Islands. I would not 
expect them to have all of their carriers in the task force. 

233. General Geunert. How many Japanese planes attacked 
Hawaii, do you know ? 

General Martin. No one knows. 

234. General Grunert. Your estimate? 

General Martin. I would estimate from a hundred to two hundred. 
It is my opinion they were in the neighborhood of 150. It is further 
my opinion that a great number of those that made the attack never 
did return to their carriers. I may be wrong about it, but I believe 
that is true. 

[1S69] 235. General Russell. General, you stated that you had 
some letters that you wanted to discuss. Would you discuss those 
now ? 

General Martin. I wish to read extracts of personal letters that I 
have written to General Arnold. I wrote letters to General Arnold 
from time to time to keep him apprised of what was going on in the 
Hawaiian Air Force. I will take them up chronologically. 

He had written me a letter on October 16th, 1940, which I received 
after I reported for duty in the Hawaiian Department. The extract 
from that letter that I wish to read is as follows : 

From the most accurate information available to date, provided further re- 
leases of equipment are not made unexpectedly, it is quite probable that new 
equipment will be available for assignment to Hawaii not later than the first 
of July, 1941. 

From a letter that I had written to him shortly after my arrival in 
the Hawaiian Department on the 17th of December, 1940, I wish to 
read the following extract : 

In my opinion we have in the past and are still practicing a very faulty policy 
with reference to providing our foreign possessions with modern equipment. The 
importance of these stations from the standpoint of national defense dictate 
that they receive first consideration in the assignment of modern equipment and 
the full quota of personnel for its operation. We have been satisfied in the 
past to supply our units in foreign possessions with obsolescent equipment until 
organizations in the States had been equipped with modern types. This to me 
is very faulty [1870] and could, in these times of uncertainty, be very 
detrimental to our scheme of national defense. Our foreign possessions are 
outposts of great importance and should by all means receive first consideration 
as to quantity and quality of equipment. 

In reference to that, from his reply of the 3rd of February, 1941, I 
quote the following : 

You are correct in that it is of great importance to provide our foreign depart- 
ments with modern equipment. I am sure that you can appreciate the many con- 
flicts which arise witli respest to the assignment of aircraft, based upon tactical 
needs as determined by the War Plans Division. At this writing, your heavy bom- 
bardment groups setup for B-17 airplanes; the 18th Pursuit Group for P-40's, 
and the 15tli Fighter Group for P-38s. It appears that we may be able to send 
to Hawaii a few of these B-17s around August of this year. Likewise, we expect 
to send a small number of P-40s late this spring. Indications are that the 
P-38s are not going to be available until the spring of 1942. We are right in the 
midst of completing the plans on the assignment of aircraft, pursuant to the 54 
group program. As soon as more definite data has been worked out, I will 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 979 

advise you as to when your unit should be equipped, in accoi'dance with the plans 
now in progress. 

In a letter which I Avrote to him on the 25th of July, 1941 I liave the 
following extract that I wish to read : 

As a result of an Air Force CPX which I held last winter, a study has been 
prepared, under tlie direction of Colonel Farthing assisted by Major Morgan and 
Captain [1871] Coddington of the Oth Bombardment Group, which gives 
a clear presentation as to how these islands can be given a positive defense by the 
operation of long-range bombardment. It also dictates the number of this type 
of airplane required. This study is going forward witliin the next few days and 
I am sending a copy of tliis study, which is siibmitted through the Department 
Commander, directly to you. To me it is tlie most important study which lias ever 
been prepared for the solution of the problem of the defense of the Hawaiian 
Islands and should receive most serious consideration. This is particularly im- 
portant in view of the fact that by a memorandum addressed to the Commanding 
General, U. S. Air Forces, dated July 17th, 1941, a study was requested to be made 
of the air situation in Hawaii to include but one heavy bombardment group for 
this Department. Any other increases to be limited to pursuit and light and me- 
dium bombardment and observation types, holding any additional heavy bombard- 
ment in readiness on the mainland. Due to the unusual circumstances associated 
with the proper solution of air defense of these islands, it would be impossible 
to attain efficient operation from organization reinforcing the Hawaiian Air 
Force after hostilities begin. The solution of our problem requires special train- 
ing in the search of water areas and the bombing of precision targets represented 
by aircraft carriers and other surface vessels. Fortunately the preparation of 
landing fields on the other islands of this group are underway as a result of the 
approval of projects which have been submitted some time ago. 

[1S72] I would like to enlarge on that particular statement 
that has just been made in that paragraph. 

A CPX was conducted, I think it w^as in January 1941 or early 
February, with three officers of the Hawaiian Air Force who were 
capable of operating our estimate of the Japanese air strength in an 
attack upon the Islands. I myself conducted the defense with the 
obsolete and obsolescent equipment that was then available to us, 
using B-18s for bombardment missions because that was all we had. 
The radius of action of these B-]l8s with any appreciable bomb load 
was approximately 300 miles. 

This CPX brought out that the enemy could bring his carriers 
within easy range of the islands before darkness fell, running in at 
night, and could launch an attack with comparative ease against the 
islands and get back to safety beyond the range of the existing bom- 
bardment type of airplane before we could make an attack against 
them. 

236. General Frank. That is the B-18? 

General Martin. The B-18. As a result of this information and 
knowing that we had been allocated the B-17 type, a study was made 
as to the total number required for proper reconnaissance and to 
provide a striking force of that type of airplane. This stud}'' was 
started by Colonel Farthing, as he had full knowledge of the informa- 
tion we had gained from our CPX. His study was in a compara- 
tively crude state and the details of his final form were worked out by 
my G-3 Section on consultation with myself. 

This resolved into an estimate of a requirement for 72 long-range 
bombardment airplanes on reconnaissance each day flying at an inter- 
val of five degrees. In going out, after [J87S] passing ap- 
proximately 600 miles distance from their base, they would not be 
able to see between the two courses of adjacent ships. Therefore, 

79716— 46--EX. 145, vol. 2 13 



980 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

when they went to the limit of their radius, which was estimated to 
be a thousand miles, they would turn to the left, and in doing so, in 
coming back, they would cover the area in between that was beyond 
their field of vision on the outward journey. 

An additional 72 ships were required for the next day's reconnais- 
sance mission, with 36 remaining on the ground as the striking force. 
Those 36 would be augmented, if pilots were found, from the recon- 
naissance planes which had been on mission the previous day. This 
brought the total of heavy bombardment to 180. 

This plan was completed and forwarded to the Department Com- 
mander in Hawaii about the middle of August, sometime before the 
end of August. 

237. General Frank. That made a total equipment of how many 
B-I7s? 

General Martin. 180. There were 72 for each day's reconnaissance, 
72 resting on the ground after having completed one day's recon- 
naissance — all the daylight hours that were available to us they would 
be out, so they needed rest — and 36 that were a permanent striking 
force. 

238. General Grunert. And that presumed that the Army Air 
Force would do all of its distance reconnaissance? 

General Martin. I might explain that this was submitted, due to 
the fact that I had a feeling that the Navy was not properly equipped 
to conduct a reconnaissance that would be completely satisfactory to 
me; and on the assumption that if [1874] trouble arose the 
Navy might be quite distant from Oahu, and we were charged with 
the responsibility of defending that base so they could always return 
to it. It was on the assumption that the Navy would be absent from 
Pearl Harbor while we were charged with its defense. 

239. General Grunert. And that the District would not have enough 
to do that distant reconnaissance? 

General Martin. That is right. 

240. General Grunert. Outside of the fleet ? 
General Martin. That is correct. 

Another quotation from my letter to General Arnold dated the 25th 
of July, 1941, reads as follows: 

Another problem which is causing very grave concern is the fact that there is 
in existence such a limited quantity of spare parts for the modern combat air- 
plane, which grounds for long periods of time ships which are sorely needed for 
combat training. I know how this came about and I know you are aware of this 
condition and I am sure you are as fully aware as I am of the effects of this 
condition upon our efforts to make all possible progress in providing combat 
teams as rapidly as possible. 

We are making progress in achieving our goal but it is very irritating that it 
cannot be more rapid. 

Here is a little more accurate information on the date of forwarding 
that secret plan for the reconnaissance and protection of the Hawaiian 
defense by air. This is a letter from me to General Arnold on the 15th 
of August, 1941 : 

There has been mailed under separate cover a secret study which was being 
made at the time the memorandum from the [^875] Secretary of the 
General Staff was received requesting that "a study be made of the air situation 
in Hawaii." 

This study was originally made by Colonel Farthing as commanding officer 
of the 5th Bombardment Group (Heavy) assisted by Major Rose and Captain 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 981 

Cuddington. It has been prepared as a staff study and carefully checked as to 
its contents with certain additions being made by the G-3 Section of the Ha- 
waiian Air Force. It represents to me the complete possibility of the Ha- 
waiian Islands being defended from attack by carrier-based aircraft. It is not 
making a statement which cannot be fully realized upon to say that "The defense 
of the Hawaiian Islands can be accomplished with the 180 heavy bombardment 
airplanes which are set up for the mission by this study." That being true, then, 
by occupying outlying fields on this island group and with the requisite number of 
airplanes and of the combat crews as called for by this study, the defense of the 
Hawaiian Islands has been accomplished and need cause the War Department 
nor the Army Air Force further concern. 

On the 25th of September, 1941, 1 wrote General Arnold as follows : 

Your letter of August 12th, giving information on the augmentation of the 
Army Air Force and the sis charts showing the successive build-up to the 84 
Group Program was most valuable information for us. It is strange how quickly 
you become adjusted to figures in large denominations as to the numbers of 
aircraft and personnel which but two years ago would have had a staggering 
effect as to the possibility of accomplishment. We now accept the plans [1816] 
for the future with the confidence of achievement without a thought of failure. 

Since the departure of our nine B-17s we have but 12 of this type left in the 
Hawaiian Air Force. We have competent crews which can be sent to the main- 
land at any time to ferry additional B-17s as soon as they can be made available 
to us. For our preparations for the future and for the carrying out of our defense 
mission in the Hawaiian Islands, it is extremely important that we get as many 
of these ships as can be allocated to us as soon as possible. 

Further along in this same letter I wrote as follows : 

The following progress is being made on the establishment of outlying fields on 
the other islands. At Barking Sands, on Kauai, one runway is inider construc- 
tion ; mobilization housing for two squadrons and one National Guard company 
for the defense of the airdrome has been completed ; one bombing target for day 
and night bombing has been completed. One bombing target for day and night 
bombing is partially completed ; protected gasoline storage is under construction. 
At Morse Field, on Hawaii, two squadron barracks and mobilization housing for 
one National Guard company, with utility buildings, have been completed; 
protected storage for gasoline and runway are under construction. At Hilo 
mobilization housing has been provided for one National Guard company for 
the defense of the airdrome and work is progressing nicely on one rimway con- 
struction and mobilization housing for one squadron will be started in the near 
future. At Homestead Field, on [1877] Molokai, the CAA has presented 
money which has been placed at the disposal of the District Engineer who has 
started work on the extension of runways, and mobilization housing for one com- 
pany of National Guard for the defense of the airdrome has been completed. 
On Lanai work has started on the construction of the runways, and mobilization 
housing is yet to be completed for one squadron. Bellows Field has been desig- 
nated a permanent station at which barracks, mess hall and utility buildings, 
for the strength of 1200 men are nearing completion — the construction of runways 
is underway. 

At the end of that same letter I again call attention to the fact that 
"Our great need for progress at the present time is for our allotment 
of new equipment. 

The underground excavation for the Interceptor Command is nearing comple- 
tion and we expect to have this in operation within 30 days. 

General Frank. What is the date of that letter? 
General Martin. The 25th of September, 1941. 

Five mobile RDF stations have been established on Oahu but the permanent 
stations on this and the other islands will not be available to us until March 1942. 

From a letter from General Arnold dated the 7th of October, 1941, 
I wish to read the following extract. In preparation for this, I will 
say that I had given him a report on the nine B-l7s transferred by air 



982 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to the Philippines, in which I had called his attention to the limited 
experience of the great mass of personnel and particularly the excellent 
work which had been done by Sergeant Griflin as the principal navi- 
gator. I stated [1878] that his work was of an outstanding 
nature and should be so recognized. In his reply he said : 

The status of Sergeant Griffin's application for commission is being determined. 
As you have been informed, your need for equipment has been taken up. So far 
as the shortage of B-17s is concerned, I know how you must feel when you have 
set up an efficient lieavy bombardment organization only to lose part of it because 
of the greater need elsewhere. I hope that conditions soon will permit the 
allocation of new ships to the Hawaiian Air Force. 

[1879] I wish to read the following letter from General Arnold 
dated the 25th of September, 1941 : 

There has just been brought to my attention the Hawaiian Department Tenta- 
tive Standing Operating Procedure publication July 14, 1941. I note under Sec- 
tion 2 that the Hawaiian Air Force is charged with being prepared to release 
a provisional battalion totaling 500 men to assist the auxiliary police force. It 
is further observed that the Hawaiian Air Force is charged with defending 
Schofield Barracks against ground and sabotage attacks. 

The combat units, together with the auxiliary and service units set up for 
the Hawaiian Department, have been designed primarily to insure the full effec- 
tiveness of air force operations during that critical time indicated under the 
Hawaiian Department Alert No. 1. It would appear, however, that we have 
overestimated the requirements for the Hawaiian Air Force. Obviously, it 
would be impo.ssibIe for the Hawaiian Air Force to carry out the mission above 
noted, in addition to its Air Force combat mission, unless there were a surplus 
of Air Corps and related troops. 

As we are so short of trained officers and personnel in the Air Force, it is 
most undesirable to employ such personnel for other than Air Corps duties, ex- 
cept under most unusual circumstances. 

It would seem that the proper step to be taken [1880] would be a 
request made on the War Department to increase the Hawaiian Department by 
the number of personnel required to assist the auxiliary police force and to 
defend Schofield Barracks. Our action would then be to reduce the numbers 
of Air Corps and auxiliary personnel by that number. 

However, before any official steps are taken, I would appreciate your unofficial 
and informal comment. 

Sincerely. 

H. H. Arnold, 
Major Oeneral, V. 8. A., 
Chief of the Army Air Forces. 

This letter is from me to General Arnold dated 3 November 1941 : 

In reply to your request for unofficial and informal comment upon the use of 
Air Corps troops as ordered by "Hawaiian Department Tentative Standing Op- 
erating Procedure," dated July 14, 1941, the following information is submitted. 

During the department maneuvers, which lasted from the 12th to the 24th of 
May of this year, the Department Commander, General Short, became very 
much interested in the proper employment of all military personnel in a last 
stand defense of Oahu. At that time he mentioned the fact that the Air Force 
had approximately 4,000 enlisted men at Hickam Field and nearly 3,000 at 
Wheeler Field ; he saw no reason why these men should not receive some training 
as Infantry so that after the Air Force was destroyed [1881] they could 
assist the ground forces in the defense of the island. I told him it was not 
possible to give such training at this time as the Air Force's fiist mission, that 
of training combat crews, was in a most unsatisfactory state. In lortler to obtain 
these combat crews the men must be processed through our technical school^ and 
in addition thereto gain experience in the actual performance of these duties 
under proper supervision. 

As no further comment was made at the time, I thought the matter was a 
closed issue. Without further warning a letter was received from the Hawaiian 
Department, dated 5 June 1941 on the subject of training Air Corps personnel 
for ground defense missions. This letter directed that — 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 983 

"a. At Hickam Field : The training of two battalions of 500 men eacli to per- 
form the following missions : 

"1. One battalion to provide ground close-in defense for Hickam Field. 

"2. One battalion to be prepared to take over initially under the direction of 
the Provost Marshal, Hawaiian Department, the anti-sabotage mission within 
Police District No. 1, City and County of Honolulu, now assigned to the 1st 
Battalion, 27th Infantry, under tlie provisions of Field Order No. 1, OHD 38. 

"b. At Wheeler Field: The training of one [1S82] battalion of 500 men 
to perform the following missions : 

"1. Provide ground close-in defense of Wheeler Field. 

"2. Be prepared to take over initially under the direction of the Headquarters 
Commandant, Hawaiian Division, the protection of the Schofleld Area, now 
a.ssigned to the 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, under the provisions of Field Order 
No. 1, OD 40. 

The training of these 1500 men was conducted under the supervision of Infantry 
instructors, after three o'clock in the afternoon, four afternoons per Aveek. The 
men who were placed in these battalions were the most recent arrivals in the 
islands, plus a cetrain number of noncommissioned officers required in the organ- 
ization. The officers for these battalions were reserve officers regularly assigned 
to these two stations but from other arms of the service. As the Air Corps 
training for the enlisted men in these battalions progressed they received assign- 
ments with the Air Corps commensurate with their ability and training. The 
Infantry drill in the afternoon, which usually lasted from 3 : 00 p. m. to 4 : 30 p. m. 
interfered a great deal with the performance of their normal duties and when an 
alert was called these men were required to take their defense positions which 
took them away from their Air Corps assignments. This left the organizations 
to which these men belonged extremely short of the necessary personnel for 
carrying [1S8.3] on the functions required of the Air Corps organizations. 
In other words, there was imposed upon these men the performance of a duty 
assigned to them for the last defense of this island when the Air Force was still 
carrying on this primary mission in the defense of the island. As soon as suffi- 
cient reliable data could be collected as to the inroad this was making on Air 
Force activities, a letter dated August 25, 1941 was prepared on this subject and 
taken to the Department Commander, General Short, in person showing that it 
was inconsistent with the Air Force mission to require its men to train as Infan- 
try and take their Infantry positions when an alert was called, leaving vacant 
their proper assignment with the Air Force. The only relief from the perform- 
ance of these duties General Short would give at the time was that those a.ssigned 
to such duties and properly trained for the performance of these duties need not 
receive more training than was necessary to insure that they would be properly 
prepared to assume these duties when called upon. 

A new "Standing Operating Procedure" is being prepared but has not yet been 
published. A copy of this procedure which was submitted to this headquarters 
for comment made no mention of the assignment of Air Corps troops for Infantry 
missions, other than Air Corps troops will be trained for the close-in defense 
of Army airdromes on the Island of Oahu. I have delayed answering your letter 
awaiting the publication of this "Standing Operating Procedure". \1S84] 
that I might be sure that the provisions of the existing "Standing Operating Pro- 
cedure" had been changed as indicated above. 

It is my belief that the letter which I mentioned above, pointing out the un- 
necessary handicaps placed upon the Air Force in training as Infantry at a 
time when they were unable to conduct sufficient training to meet their primary 
mission as Air Force troops, has received consideration. In this letter I asked 
the Department Commander to rescind his instructions requiring Air Corps 
troops to train as Infanti*y at least until such time as we had developed suf- 
ficient combat and maintenance crews to meet the Manning Tables for the num- 
ber of airplanes allotted to the Hawaiian Air Force. I am attaching hereto a 
copy of the letter on the subject of diversion from Air Force training dated 
August 25, 1941. 

It is my firm belief that no attempt would be made by an enemy force to make 
a hostile landing on these islands until the Hawaiian Air Force has been de- 
stroyed or reduced in effectiveness to the point where they could offer little if 
any resistance. When the present allotment of airplanes has been received and 
these airplanes are properly manned by competent combat crews, there is no 
enemy In these waters strong enough to destroy the Hawaiian Air Force or effect 
a landing on these ehorea. 



984 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I can well understand how one charged with the defense of these islands, as- 
suming that the Hawaiian [1S85] Air Force had been destroyed, would 
wish to utilize to the fullest extent the military manpower available to him in 
carrying out his mission of the defense of Oahu. For Air Corps troops to be ef 
fective under such circumstances they should be properly trained for the parts 
they are required to play in such defensive action but I just do not wish my Air 
Force troops to receive training for this "last ditch fight" until they have been 
properly trained for their primary mission with the Air Force. 

General Short is a very reasonable man of keen perception. It is now my 
belief that he sees more clearly the training problems confronting the Air Force 
and realizes its enormous proportions. I do expect that the training of Air Force 
trooi)s as Infantry will not be permitted to seriously interfere with their proper 
training for their normal mission. 

I feel very strongly that a War Department policy should be established or 
orders issued which will prescribe that troops from the ground forces have the 
responsibility of the defense of airdromes and performance of interior guard duty. 
If the interior guard duty is to be performed by Air Force troops, then a special 
table of organization should be issued for a Military Police Company to be estab- 
lished at each post for the performance of interior guard duty. Due to the im- 
portance and value of property on Air Corps stations, troops performing interior 
guard duty should be esnecially well trained for this service. These [iSSfi] 
services can never be efBciently performed except by those who are regularly 
and permanently assigned to such duty. The duties to be performed by troops 
for the close-in defense of an airdrome are quite similar and require the same 
training as that given to all ground troops for a similar mission. As to the num- 
ber of men required, it makes no difference whatever whether the defense of 
airdromes and interior guard duty are performed by Air Force troops or troops 
from other arms. In either case troops performing these duties must have this 
as their sole responsibility and assignment. 

I am happy to say that this problem of training Air Force troops with Infantry, 
which has caused me such deep concern, seems now on its way to a satisfactory 
solution. Having given me this opportunity to unoflBcially and informally bring 
this matter to your attention I shall, if in the future this burden becomes unbear- 
able, bring it to your personal attention. 

I am forwarding under seperate cover a study which has been made of our 
personnel requirements to meet the allocation of airplanes for the Hawaiian 
Air Force. As you will observe tables of organization for the respective units 
liave been adhered to as far as possible. Our experience indicates the number 
of men in these organizations barely meet the demands on this personnel for our 
operations. 

Expressing to you my high esteem, I beg to remain. 

Most sincerely, 

F. M. Mabtin, 
Major Oeneral, U. S. Artny. 

[7557] I would like to read an extract from a letter to General 
Arnold on the I7th of November, 1941 : 

With the transfer of the nine B-17s and accompanying spare parts we have 
practically exhausted all spares for B-17s at Hickam therefore it is important 
that future flights have distributed among the planes in each flight such spare 
parts as exnerience has dictated may be required for these ships while in 
transit. Tail wheels and inverters are two items for which tliere has been the 
greatest demand. 

That had reference to the 19th bombardment group, heavy, which 
passed through Honolulu en route to the Philippine Islands. 

241. General Grunert. Are there any other questions as far as 
those letters read ? I have a few if no one else has. 

When you in one of your earlier letters referred to units in the 
United States being equipped prior to those in overseas departments, 
was there any reply to that as to whether or not that was true that 
they were equipping units in the United States before they were giving 
overseas departments their proper equipment? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 985 

General Martin. I know that was true before I left the mainland. 

242. General Grunert. But there was no reply to that effect veri- 
fying it? 

General Martin. Nothing more than General Arnold acknowledged 
the importance of the outpost position of Hawaii. 

243. General Grunert. Did he in any reply to you on that subject 
make any reference to the requirements for aircraft that was going 
across seas to other nations? 

[JSSS] General Martin. "Would you please state the first part 
of that question ? I didn't get it. 

244. General Grunert. In his reply to you did he at any time 
explain to you that possibly there were demands on him for aircraft 
to be sent to other united nations or allied nations? 

General Martin. Oh, he just inferred that. 

245. General Grunert. Just inferred it? 

General Martin. If you remember, in one of his statements he 
inferred that; he didn't say that. 

246. General Grunert. Now, you referred to the search of water 
areas by that force of 180 bombers, I believe you asked for. Then, 
that was really under the joint Army-Navy action arrived at in Wash- 
ington in which the Air Force was to do such searching; is that right? 

General Martin. Now, I don't get all what you have said. I will 
answer it in this way: this plan was conceived by the Air Force, 
prepared 

247. General Frank. Where? 

General Martin. — immediately, shortly after the CPX in the 
winter of '41. 

248. General Frank. Conceived by the Air Force in Hawaii? 
General Martin. Yes, Air Force — oh, I see. By the Hawaiian 

Air Force? 

249. General Frank. Yes. 

General Martin. The study was made. It was followed by a staff 
study. The study was originally made by Colonel Farthing and his 
assistants, and it was followed by a staff-study of my own G-3 section 
of the Haw^aiian Air Force. The plan was drawn up and submitted 
to General Short and approved [1S89] by him. Then it was 
submitted through General Short to the War Department, excepting 
this one copy that had been sent directly to General Arnold. 

250. General Grunert. Then, as far as you were concerned, it was 
based on your own studies and own plan ? 

General Martin. Yes, sir; no, not — our own study and the expe- 
rience we had, dictating what was necessary to accomplish the mission. 

251. General Frank. As a result of these exercises? 
General Martin. As a result of command post exercises, yes. 

252. General Grunert. Now, you referred to the construction of air 
fields. In that construction work were there any appreciable delays 
and, if so, to what did you attribute the delays? 

General Martin. Well, it was a perfectly natural delay that you 
had t« experience from bringing materials ; first, getting it approved ; 
sometimes that was difficult. I didn't have so much trouble with 
General Short, but I had a terrible time with General Herron to 
convince him of the necessity for outlying airdromes. General Short 
came there lecpptive as to the need for outlying airdromes. Then 



986 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the estimate had to be made as to the cost, approved, and sent to the 
War Department, approved by them, and the monies made available. 
Then and only till then could materials start to move from the main- 
land to Hawaii for the purpose of construction, such as were needed 
from the mainland. 

253. General Frank. With respect to the construction of these air- 
dromes, when did you begin to get money for Air Force construction 
for airdromes and other projects? 

[1890] General Martin. I cannot say specifically. 

254. General Frank. Well, money was scarce up to a certain point? 
General Martin. Yes, up to a certain time. 

255. General Frank. And then? 

General Martin. Well, it wasn't free until after the attack, or ap- 
proximately the time of the attack, was it ever free to the Department. 
The things that General Short had been requiring for further de- 
fense of the Islands had been given to him very niggardly until the 
attack took place, and then he had more. 

256. General Frank. Well, did you actually have any money for 
the construction of airdromes prior to December 7th ? 

General Martin. Yes, on the outlying stations, the runways, and 
the temporary housing. Now, as to how much of that was taken 
from the Department Commander's funds, I could not say. As to 
whether he gave the funds prior to the funds being received for the 
project that was submittted to the War Department, I do not know. 

257. General Frank. Did you feel that there was any delay in any 
of your construction, including the aircraft warning service, that was 
attributable to the contractors? 

General Martin. No, I did not. I had no contact with the contrac- 
tors, but I did have contact with Colonel Wyman, who was the Divi- 
sion Engineer of that Engineering — District Engineer. He was not 
a District Engineer. 

258. General Frank. Yes, he was. 

General Martin, The district was here. Division Engineer. He 
is most cooperative and operated very rapidly within his [1891] 
limitations. Now, he was limited in getting equipment and getting 
materials. 

259. General Frank. How? 

General Martin. Due to the fact that it had to come from the main- 
land. 

260. General Frank. W^ell. how did that hold it up? 
General Martin. First he had to convince them as to its need. 

261. General Frank. Had to convince whom? 
General JMartin. The War Department. 

262. General Frank. Well, if you had the appropriation, the need 
was 

General Martin. Oh, after the appropriation had been granted, then 
as to how he dealt with the contractors, I do not laiow. Whether 
the Government purchased the supplies and shipped them or Avhether 
the contractors purchased them and shipped them, I do not know, but 
I surmise that the contractors made the purchase of the supplies and 
shipped them as a part of the contract. 

268. Genernl Frank. But so far as you were concerned, did you have 
any complaint to make as to the manner in which Wyman functioned? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 987 

General Martin. No, I did not. 

264. General Frank. Or the manner in whicli the contractors func- 
tioned? 

General Martin. No, I did not. I complained with reference to 
the time that was required to get these permanent stations for the 
RDF installation ; but as T remember, those stations were being con- 
structed under the supervision of [J892] Colonel Wyman 
rather than Colonel Lyman, who was the Division Engineer. Now, 
as to who actually had charge of the construction, I will not be posi- 
tive, but it is my impression at the present time that Colonel Lyman — 
at least, he was pushing it at the time, trying to unravel the knots 
that were preventing progress. 

265. General Frank. Did joii ever have any difficulty with Colonel 
Wyman? 

General jMartin. I thought that he was the most aggressive and 
active engineering officer I ever came in contact with. 

266. General Frank. Did you ever come in contact with a man by 
the name of Rohl, R-o-h-1, the civilian contractor? 

General Martin. No, I did not; not to my knowledge. If I met 
him it was just casually. 

267. General Frank. I see. That is all I have along that line. 

268. General Grunert. This S. O. P. of November 5th, did that cure 
the thing of which you complained, requiring Air Corps personnel to 
do guarding duty for sabotage purposes, or were the provisions of 
that still in there that required you to turn out Air Corps troops for 
such purposes ? 

General Martin. Yes, sir. T was just disappointed. I thought 
that the thing had been so definitely presented to General Short that 
there wasn't any question about his making provision for it in his 
orders; but after the attack took place and these men were still on 
guard at these stations I asked that they be relieved, tliat they could 
take charge of the salvaging of equipment and getting as much of our 
equipment back into the air as possible : and he said definitely no, and 
\i89S] they were still on that duty until General Emmons ar- 
rived about the middle of December. They were relieved before sun- 
dovni that night, though. 

269. General Grunert. Did the Commanding General of the De- 
partment approve your plan for air defense, your 20th of August, 
1941, air defense plan that you sent in to your chief? 

General Martin. Yes, sir. 

270. General Grunert. He. approved that ? 

General Martin. Yes, sir. You have reference to the use of the 
180 heavy bombardment planes? 

271. General Grunert. Yes, that is right. 
General Martin. Yes, sir. 

272. General Grunnert. Now except having plans for the use of 
what you thought was the ultimate in protection, did you have plans 
for the use of what you had ? 

General Martin. 'Oh, the plans for the use of what we had ? Well, 
we could not do much planning with what we had. General. You 
just do the best you can, depending upon the situation that confronted 
you at the time, knowing full well that you could never fully meet it 



988 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

until additional equipment and trained personnel were available to 
you. 

273. General Grunert. Well, we all like to have everything we 
think is necessary, but our job requires us to make the best use of what 
we have. Did you have plans to make the best use of what you had ? 

General Martin. Well, they were not in concrete form, because I 
cannot see any reason for writing up a plan to guide everyone as 
to the use of the equipment today when it is going to be different to- 
morrow. We do have a plan for the equipment [1894.] that 
is promised and which we expect will be available to us in the future : 
but the thing that I think is important is this, General: that that 
equipment was never stable; it was always in a state of flux, and 
you can never lay down that you are going to use so many planes 
and so many tomorrow because in all probability that particular 
number is not going to be available to you. So it is from a day-to-day 
proj^osition of utilizing, in keeping with the situation, to the best 
of your judgment, that equipment which is available to you. So 
you can have no fixed plan for any such operation, 

274. General Grunert. Not to the detail that you describe; I 
agree with you there; but you must have plans for the use of what 
you do have. They must be flexible, and when you get more you 
can do more ; but up to the time you get more you have to use what 
you have. 

General Martin. Absolutely. 

Now, as to plans, I think you have to use that word advisedly. 
It is just to make the maximum use of what is available to you on 
this particular day when it is needed. Now, that is in the minds of 
everyone there that has anything to do with the operation. 

275. General Grunert. But if they have no plan by which to 
use it, how can they use it intelligently or effectively? There is a 
difference between a complete detailed plan and a plan to operate. 

General Martin. You have a plan, the master plan that you are 
going to operate on, but as far as I know there are no troops that 
go into battle that lay down a hard and fast ]Dlan and say, "This is 
the one we are going to follow," and, if they {18951 only 
happen to have a small percentage of what they expected to have, 
still follow this strict plan, because your plans have to conform to 
what you have available to you. 

276. General Grunert. But they are plans, aren't they? 
General Martin. But not from the standpoint of writing them 

down and putting them away in the secret archives to be referred 
to when they are needed. They are plans to meet the situation of 
the moment. 

277. General Grunert. Well, with what you had available, did 
all that stuff that you had available know what to do on December 7th ? 

General Martin. They not only did that, but they did it to the 
maximum of their ability. I was extremely proud of the behavior 
of all those men because practically without orders they immediately 
rushed to the positions, grabbed the ships, got them out of the con- 
centration, got them into the dispersion area, and took such steps 
as were indicated by the conditions existing at the time. Both officers 
and enlisted men. I am extremely proud of their conduct under those 
circumstances, which were most unusual and trying. They left noth- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 989 

ing to be desired so far as being competent to carry out that which 
was their assigned or intended mission under the circumstances. 

278. General Grunert. That finishes my questions so far as that 
letter was concerned. He was yours before we left and got on this. 
Go ahead. 

279. General Russell. After December 7th did men and materiel 
for employment by your forces begin to arrive much more rapidly 
than before December 7th? 

General Martin. Nothing arrived prior to that excepting [1896] 
(he 21 that I spoke about that were being sent on to the Philippines. 

280. General Russell. Well, did any arrive ? 

General Martin. On the morning of December 7th we had nothing 
but our 12 B-17s coming from the mainland. Those ships arrived 
during the time the attack was taking place. We warned them in 
the open, because that is the only way we could warn them, to remain 
in the air as long as possible ; that we had no airdromes at other islands 
that would accommodate them as yet. They were only partially com- 
pleted. Four of the eight were lost from the attack of the Japanese. 
Eight were made available to the Air Force afterwards. Some were 
damaged in landing. One landed at a golf course. One landed at 
Bellows Field with the prevailing wind, on a very short runway. 
The new runway was not yet completed there and it was badly crashed. 

281. General Russell. What happened beginning December 8th and 
thereafter up until you left out there? Did you get a lot of ships or 
none, or what? 

General Martin. Oh, I wouldn't say a lot, but they were beginning 
to come in. As to the exact dates of the arrival of airplanes to supple- 
ment the meager force we had there, you can get that from the record. 

282. General Russell. Yes. 

General Martin. I cannot give you the exact dates. 

283. General Russell. Well, I will quit there on that, then. 
What about troops? Did they send you more troops out there after 

December 7th ? 

General Martin. They didn't while I was there. 

284. General Russell. All right. Was this statement which 
[1897] you have read from the letters a while ago. General, given 
to the Roberts Commission? 

General Martin. No, sir. 

285. Generad Russell. It was not. That is all I have. 

General Martin. I don't remember that I read any of these to the 
Roberts Commission. 

286. General Frank. How many B-17s did you have available? 
General Martin. On the morning of this attack ? 

287. General Frank. Yes. 
General Martin. Six. 

288. General Frank. You had six. 

General Martin. And three of those were damage in the attack, 
so it left just three. 

289. General Frank. All right. If you had to have a plan to 
operate six B-l7s when you needed 180, where would you have sent 
those six ? 

General Martin. Well, that is rather — not a difficult question to 
answer. You send them where you think they will do the most good, 
but you don't expect to get them back. 



990 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

290. General Frank. Well, where would you have sent six airplanes ? 
General Maktin. I would have tried to get the carrier if I could ; 

but inasmuch as I couldn't find the locaton of the carrier and I would 
have estimated they would have been lost anyway in the attempt to 
get the carrier, I don't think they could have done a particle of good 
without protection or without great numbers. 

291. General Frank. If six airplanes had barged into this Jap force 
that was making the attack, what would have happened ? 

[1898] General Martin. They would all have been lost, in my 
estimation, I don't see how any of them could have come back. And 
it is probable that they would have been lost before they did very 
much damage. At least, they would have not stopped the attack. 

292. General Frank. Will you give me a little analysis by compar- 
ing the probability of a Japanese air attack against the probability 
of a sabotage attack? 

In the first place, I would like to ask you this question: In race 
track parlance what in your opinion were the odds for and against 
a Japanese air raid succeeding? 

[1899] General Martin. Succeeding? 

293. General Frank. Yes. 

General Martin. Well, they were very, very large. I do not think 
it is possible to be very accurate about it, but if I were betting I 
would have said that it was at least 50 to 1, probably greater. 

294. General Frank. What? 

General Martin. Of their not succeeding; not being made. 

295. General Frank. In other words, you considered it what kind 
of a venture ? 

General Martin. Considered that with the improbable attack from 
carrier-based aviation that far from Japan, would be at an odd of 
about 50 to 1. Therefore the greater menace to the defenses of the 
islands was right in our own midst among the Japanese people which, 
as I remember, in about 400,000 are approximately 165,000 of Japanese 
descent. Of that number there are possibly 25,000 that are foreigners. 

296. General Frank. In other words, you thought that a Japanese 
raid such as happened was a very daring, unusual risk ? 

General Martin. It was a terrific gamble. Everything was based 
on its success ; everything to be lost with its failure. 

297. General Frank. All right. Now will you give me an analysis 
by comparing the probability of the air attack versus the probability 
of the sabotage attack ? 

General Martin. Well, I think, from the information we had and 
the terrific gamble that would be entailed in risking a sujficiently 
large task force of the Japanese Navy with its carriers into those 
waters which they knew were frequented by our own Navy, that 
would indicate that it would be practically a suicide mission to attempt 
anything of the kind. But within our own population we had a very 
explosive mixture that could [1900] come to the surface, have 
a complete understanding and organization as to what they would do, 
without our being able to know anything about it. There are great 
areas in the islands that are mountainous and rugged and practically 
inaccessible, in which the average person never goes. Those are won- 
derful opportunities for caches of explosives, incendiary equipment, 
everything of that nature, and it seemed impossible for anyone to be 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 991 

completely informed, to be assured that there would be no attack from 
within. That seemed to be the most dangerous source of damage in 
the defenses of the Hawaiian Department. 

298. General Frank. In other words, the sabotage effort was there 
present, and the Jap air attack you considered a 50-to-l gamble ? 

General Martin. I wouldn't say that the sabotage effort was present. 
I would say the probability of sabotage was extremely great. It could 
be on you at a moment's notice. The attack from the air, on account of 
the extreme gamble that was involved, could be highly successful or 
be a complete failure, and we did not believe that they were going to 
gamble to that extent in the beginning. 

299. General Frank. I see. Now, do you know any place where the 
Japanese have been as considerate of Americans as the United States 
was considerate of Japanese in Hawaii ? 

General Martin. Never. 

300. General Frank. What do you think would have been the plight 
of 160,000 Americans in Japan under similar circumstances? 

General Martin. Oh, it is quite definite they would be in concentra- 
tion, they would be carefully investigated and certain ones would be 
destroyed. Others would eke out an existence as [1901^ cap- 
tives in a foreign country. On the other hand, there were only about 
800 of the Japanese that were immediately taken into control by the 
military authorities after the attack took place, and this was increased 
somewhat, later. As to how many, I do not know. 

301. General Frank. Now, had you been alerted so that your fighters 
could have taken the air, to what extent do you estimate 80 fighters 
could have interfered with the attack? 

General Martin. Well, they could have done considerable damage. 
They could not have prevented it. It would have been impossible to 
have prevented it, but they could have reduced its effectiveness quite 
materially. 

302. General Frank. How many Jap planes actually were shot 
down over Oahu ? 

General Martin. I do not know. The Air Forces shot down about 
10. The antiaircraft shot down others. As I remember, it was pos- 
sibly 29 or 30. There is a record of that. 

303. General Frank. Yes, I know. 

General Martin. I do not remember exactly. I think it was about 
29 or 30. But in my opinion, seeing a large number of those ships 
leaving the area with gasoline streaming out behind tliem, they never 
made the carriers, and that was true in many cases that I saw where 
there would be a white plume of gas — why it didn't catch fire I never 
knew — leaving the tanks of the airplanes that were making for the 
sea. 

304. General Frank. Well, had tlie No. 2 or 3 Alert been active and 
if they got, we will say, 25 Jap planes on the sabotage alert, with the 
antiaircraft and 80 fighters operating, the chances are that a No. 2 or 
3 Alert would have made it most expensive for the Japs. 

General Martin. There isn't any question about that. You see, we 
lost about approximately 50 per cent of our total {^1902'] 
strength in this attack. 50 per cent was already on the ground out 



992 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of commission. After we dispersed them we lost very few ships 
in the dispersed areas. 

305. General Frank. You entered into this agreement with Admiral 
Bellinger, and wlien yon entered into this agreement you knew that 
you didn't have any airplanes to give him to make it effective? 

General JMartin. That is true. 

306. General Frank. And you also knew that he didn't have very 
many air planes to make it effective? 

General Martin. That is true. Simply gazing into the future. 

307. General Frank. Therefore it was pretty much of a paper de- 
fense that you had ? 

General Martin. At that time it was, and known to us to be in that 
status. 

308. General Frank. Now, did you ever have any knowledge of a 
Japanese task force with carriers in it in the vicinity of the Marshalls 
on the 1st of December ? 

General Martin. Oh, no. No, sir. 

309. General Frank. Wliat would have been your reaction to that 
information? 

General Martin. Well, I think I would have been a little more 
concerned about the possibilites of their getting nearer, if that had 
been true, if I had known that had been true. 

310. General Frank. You doubted the audacity of the Japs to risk 
carriers, when they had only eight large carriers, in an attack on 
Hawaii ? 

General Martin. In the beginning. In the beginning of the 
[1903] fight I thought that would be too much of a gamble for 
them to take on the assumption that they would meet with success. 

311. General Frank. With that as a background, what would have 
been your reaction had you been told that there was a division of car- 
riers in the Marshalls on December 1st? 

General Martin. Oh, you would have to assume then that they may 
be going to take that one big chance ; at least it is a threat that you 
hadn't considered, that they would concentrate a large force so far 
from their home base. Then you would have to consider it as a threat 
and give it consideration in your estimate of the situation. 

312. General Frank. Did you have any information along that 
line? 

General Martin. No, sir, I did not. This is the first I have ever 
heard of it. 

313. General Grunert. What was your opinion of the Japanese 
air force as such, compared to your own? 

General Martin. I thought the}^ were very good, the older members, 
and their equipment was not the most modern but would be very effec- 
tive. The number of airplanes that could be carried on their carriers 
was very much less than that which we could carry on our own large 
carriers. Therefore it would require more carriers. The number of 
carriers would indicate a smaller force than would be carried by the 
same number of our own aircraft carriers. 

314. General Grunert. Did you ever have any discussion as to the 
necessity for unity of command in place of action by cooperation ? 

General Martin. Well, General, as to that being discussed 
[1904] between the different oflScers in Hawaii, I do not remember 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 993 

having such a discussion ; but to my way of thinking that is one of the 
prime essentials for the success of the military force of any country, 
particularly this one, to have a central control. It was discussed at 
the War College, and we were allowed to discuss it very freely there, 
and did, and we believed that that is one of the prime essentials. 

315. General Grunert. But inasmuch as you were only on Alert 1, 
sabotage, the question of unity of command didn't show up, whether 
cooperation proved a handicap or unity of command would have 
helped things, because they never came to conclusions ? 

General Martin. I think unity of command would have been a direct 
help in the solution of the problems in the Hawaiian Islands, and I 
believe 

316. General Grunert. You didn't make use of what you had, no 
where would unity of command have come in to help out^ 

General Martin. What was that last question ? 

317. General Grunert. I say, they didn't use what they had, the 
Army or the Navy, in the attack, because the attack surprised them, 
or they were not ready for it or they didn't anticipate it ; hence you 
don't know whether unity of command would have helped the situa- 
tion then or not, do you '? 

General Martin. I can't tell you too much about that because it 
would be between Admiral Kimmel and General Short, quite fre- 
quently. I seldom attended those; and the cooperation between the 
two, as to whether it was a 100 percent or not, I am not in a position to 
say, but I have always felt that cooperation was one of the weakest 
possible props for successful operation requiring united effort. 

[1905] 318. General Grunert. Now, if you had had unity of 
command, wherein would your Joint Air Agreement have been 
changed ? 

General Martin. It would have been changed in that all the infor- 
mation available to the Army and Navy would come to the central 
headquarters. 

319. General Grunert. Then you realized the lack if information 
or the dissemination of that information, or wdiat? 

General Martin. You mean, would it be received, not only received 
but disseminated from the central headquarters, which would have 
made for strength and unity of effort. 

320. General Grunert. What I am getting at is, your reply led me 
to believe you felt there was weakness in getting information and 
disseminating it. Is that right? 

General Martin. Well, it probably is no weaker there. General, than 
it would be elsewhere where cooperation is depended upon for unity of 
action. 

321. General Grunert. You don't know of any information that 
you ought to have that you didn't have ? 

General Martin. I don't know of any specific instance where there 
was lack of cooperation. 

322. General Grunert. Then, you don't know whether the Navy 
failed to transmit something to you that you should liave used ? You 
don't know that as a fact, do you ? 

General Martin. Well, tliis thing General Frank has just men- 
tioned, that either the Navy or the Department Commander has that, 



994 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I think it would have been of value to me in helping me form an 
opinion as to the advice I should give my Commanding General. 

328. General Grunert. Well, now, General Short kept you pretty 
[1906] well informed generally, did he ? 

General Martin. Yes, sir ; I thought he did. 

324. General Grunert. How did it work on the other end of tlie 
game? Did you keep your commanders well informed? 

General Martin. I tried to. 

325 General Grunert. Rudolph doesn't seem to have known any- 
thing about any of these warning messages. 

General Martin. Rudolph? 

326. General Grunert. Yes. 

General Martin. Well, he only knew certain phases of it because 
they were absolutely secret, and the more people that know a secret the 
less opportunity there is to keep it from being spread about. Now, he 
knew that certain conditions were imposed upon operators of an air 
force. He may, and I am sure he did — I don't know that he had 
knowledge of the wording of the message, any of those messages. 

327. General Grunert. Did Davidson know? 

General Martin. My Chief of Staff had knowledge of it. 

328. General Grunert. Did Davidson know ? 

General Martin. That I could not say, General. I wouldn't say. 
I couldn't say, to give you factual information. 

329. General Grunert. But then you didn't know about the Navy 
message that started out, "This is a war warning" ? 

General Martin. Not the naval message, but a similar message. 

330. General Grunert. And you didn't laiow about the task force 
that may or may not have been out in the Mandates? So you appar- 
ently were not fully informed, anyway ? 

General Martin. Well, I will say this : In any organization if you 
want unity of effort and the proper evaluation and [1907] dis- 
semination of information, you must have central control of that unit. 

331. General Grunert. Did we have unity within the Army as to 
spreading of information ? 

General Martin. Well, I can't answer to what others do. I don't 
know whether they do or not. I think I have suffered from lack of 
information on many instances. 

332. General Frank. You are highly in favor of unity of com- 
mand. Let's 

General Martin. Oh, nov*- I am speaking of task forces or — well, 
it is a unit sent out to do a certain thing. 

333. General Frank. Well, I am talking about the situation in 
Honolulu on December 7th. 

General Martin. Well, I am answering General Grunert here as to 
dissemination, receipt and dissemination of information. Had one 
person been responsible for the defense of Oahu, the information 
should have come to him and should have been evaluated and dis- 
tributed by him. Now, you had a dual situation there. There was 
a commander of the Pacific Fleet present. The local defense com- 
mander had nothing to do with the operation of that fleet. 

334. General Frank. What defense commander. Army or Navy ? 
Genera] Martin. The Army defense connnander. 

335. General Frank. That is right. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 995 

General Martin. He had nothing to do with the orders received 
or issued to that fleet. Information coming to that CINCUS might 
not have been properly distributed as to its value to the defense 
commander of the Hawaiian Department. 

336. General Frank. Did you then believe that there should have 
[ld08] been unity of command between the Army and the Navy 
in Honolulu? 

General Martin. You are going to cover too much territory there. 
You can't possibly have unity of command when there is one organi- 
zation headquarters operating a fleet that is 3,000 miles from that base, 
and another charged with the defense of particular islands them- 
selves. 

337. General Frank. They have it now. 
General Martin. Well, I don't agree to it. 

338. General Grunert. They have it now. 

339. General Frank. They have it now. 

General Martin. We had to put something above those fellows. 

340. General Grunert. And, as a matter of fact, as soon as war 
broke they had it right on that day, didn't they, December 7th and 
8th? 

General Martin. As soon as General Emmons arrived they had it. 
General Emmons and Admiral Nimitz were given those instructions. 

341. General Grunert. Yes. 

342. General Frank. Now, the question for which I have been try- 
ing to prepare you is this: Assuming that there had been unity of 
command prior to December 7th, what organization in the War De- 
partment or the Navy Department, or both, would have handled it ? 

General Martin. There is no head to it at all. There is no what 
you may call national defense headquarters which should control, 
in my opinion — this is simply my opinion — the military operations of 
the Army, Navy, and Air, which I feel should be separate and distinct 
from each other, but controlled by this [1909] central plan- 
nmg body : a national defense organization, call it. 

343. General Frank. At that time the President of the United 
States was the only one. 

General Martin. That is right. He was the only could be acting. 

344. General Frank. And we now have the joint Chiefs of Staff. 
General Martin. Yes, which is a 

345. General Frank. All right. 

346. General Grunert. You don't blame the attack on Pearl Har- 
bor on the lack of such an organization, do you ? 

General Martin. Oh, no. No, not at all. I did not think that the 
organization was weak to that extent. 

347. General Russell. General Frank asked you some questions a 
moment ago. General, about what could have been accomplished by 
80 fighters on December 7th. I want to ask you: Did you have 80 
fighters available on December 7th before the Japanese came in and 
destroyed a great part of your force ? 

[1910] General Martin. Now, let me see. We had approxi- 
mately 100 P-40s. 

348. General Russell. And they are fighters ? 

General Martin. Yes, they are fighters. We had approximately 50 
P-36s. 

79716—46 — Ex. 145, vol. 2 14 



996 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

349. General Russell. And they are fighters ? 

General Martin. They are fighters. At least half of those were 
always on the ground, on account of lacking spare parts, so I reduced 
it to 75. Out of the 75 there is always probably ten or fifteen per cent 
that would be out of commission from day to day. They would be 
in today and out tomorrow. So it is something less than 75 that 
would be the maximum that could have been put in the air on that 
day. 

350. General Russell. Do you mean to say when you have 150 
planes you liave less than 75 you can fight with? 

General Mabtin. That is what I am telling you was true of the 
Hawaiian Air Force. 

351. General Grunert. Due to tlie peculiar circumstances at that 
time ? 

General Martin. I don't want to be misunderstood. If I had 150 
planes I would try to keep 150 planes in the air, but you can't do it, 
nor can anyone else. But I was subjected to an additional castigation 
with that force by having approximately 50 per cent at all times on tlie 
ground, simply because I could not get the requisite spare parts from 
the mainland. 

352. General Frank. That was a special situation that existed at 
that time, which at this time does not exist ? 

General Martin. You can expect to have 10 to 15 per cent of your 
ships on tlie ground. 

[1911] 353. General Grunert. That is normal ? 
General Martin. That is normal. 

354. General Grunert. Then you could have turned out approxi- 
mately between 50 and 55 fighters to meet the attack? 

General Martin. Yes. 

355. General Frank. And did the mobile AWS trail back the re- 
turning attackers to their carriers ? I am speaking of your radar. 

General Martin. Oh, no. You could not do that. There was so 
much confusion in the air. You look at those plots afterwards, and 
there was just a mass of lines. Of course, the people that saw those 
could get an indication of a trend, but the operators at the time, re- 
gardless of how skilled they might have been, could not have gotten 
any particular trend from the tracks on the bands. There were too 
many of them. 

356. General Frank. Did you feel there was Japanese radio ac- 
tivity interfering with your radar? 

General Martin. We knew it. They started in as soon as the 
attack began. And these stations which had not been in operation 
at all were extremely active as soon as the attack began. You were 
getting spurious messages that parachutes were dropping on certain 
parts of the island, that there were carriers off shore in every direc- 
tion except those where we feel now they were. Messages of that 
nature were coming in over our frequencies at all times. If you asked 
for landing instructions or anything of that kind, it would be garbled 
for days afterwards. It was in the neighborhood of ten days or two 
weeks before those instruments were located and confiscated. 

357. General Frank. You did have sabotage then, didn't you ? 
[19121 General Martin. Sabotage? 

358. General Frank. That kind of sabotage. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 997 

General Martin. By jamming the air frequencies; yes. It was very 
much in evidence and there was no indication of it prior to that. 
We had two monitorino- stations in existence there, under whose con- 
trol I do not kiuny; I think they were F. B. I. They had no indica- 
tion of these stations being in existence, because they had not been 
operated. But as soon as this attack took place and got under way, 
the air was full of Japanese conversation and our own language to 
the point where it was very difficult to carry on operations using the 
radio for that purpose. 

359. General Grunert. When they located these stations, did they 
get the personnel that operated them? 

General MARnx. They had the personnel that had operated them. 

360. General Grunert. I mean, did they capture the personnel with 
the stations when they located these interfering stations? 

_ General Martin. Oh, yes. But they were not always fixed sta- 
tions. They were mobile stations. In fact, the last one we had had 
been located out in the direction of Ewa, which had been a Marine 
Base, but when we got there there was nothing but a thicket, nothing 
out there at all, no possibility of a station. 

361. General Grunert. But they captured the personnel with them ? 
General Martin. Yes. 

362. General Grunert. General, have you anything else j^ou would 
like to present to the Board which may give us leads or be of evidence 
as to facts about the Pearl Harbor attack that you can think of now? 

11913] General Martin. As far as I can think of the different 
factors at the present time, I know of nothing but what has been 
touched upon or covered in the testimony that has been given. 

363. General Grunert. Are there any other questions? There 
being no more, thank you very much. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 
(Thereupon, at 12 : 30 p. m. a recess was taken until 2 p. m.) 

[1914] AFTERNOON' SESSION 

(The Board at 1 : 55 p. m. continued the hearing of witnesses.) 

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL JACK W. HOWARD, aUARTERMASTER 

CORPS. 

(The witness was sworn bj^ the Eecorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your 
name, rank, organization, and station? 

Colonel Howard. Jack W. Howard, Colonel, Quartermaster Corps, 
07991, Permanent Boards, 9th Service Command, S. C. U. 1939, Pre- 
sidio of San Francisco. 

2. General Grunert. Colonel, this Board is after facts about what 
happened prior to and leading up to and during the attack on Pearl 
Harbor, and because of your assignment there during that time we 
thought we could probablj^ get some facts from you. 

What was your assignment in Hawaii during the latter part of 1941, 
and give us the dates. 



998 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Howard. I was the Supply Officer of the Hawaiian Quar- 
termasters Depot, stationed at Fort Armstrong in 1941 up until after 
Pearl Harbor. 

3. General Grunert. The Adjutant General just had you listed 
there as commanding officer of that supply depot? 

Colonel Howard. I took over the command of the depot in June of 
1942. 

4. General Grunert. And who then was in command of the Supply 
Depot during the attack and just prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor? 

Colonel Howard. Roland Walsh. I think he is now a Brigadier 
General of the Quartermaster Corps in command of the [1915] 
Philadelphia Depot. I took over the duties at the time of Pearl 
Harbor, on the day of Pearl Harbor, the duties of the executive of- 
ficer. I was the next senior second in command. 

5. General Grunert. You testified before the Roberts Commis- 
sion, did you? 

Colonel Howard. I did, sir. 

6. General Grunert. What in gist was your testimony there? 
Why did they call you? 

Colonel Howard. Well, I think that General Walsh could prob- 
ably give you more information as to why I went before the Com- 
mission than I could. In fact, he called me in and told me this Roberts 
Commission was sitting at Sh after and that he wanted me to go up as 
a rej^resentative of the Depot to see and meet the Commission. 

7. General Grunert. What did the Board ask you when you were 
before it? 

Colonel Howard. They asked me in effect what I was doing and 
what I did do on the day of Pearl Harbor. 

8. General Grunert. And I will ask you the same question : What 
did you do? 

Colonel Howard. I got to the Depot as soon as — or I would judge 
around 8 : 30. I was living at that time out of Fort Armstrong, out 
in Kahala, and I got to the Depot I would judge about 8 : 30, and 
from that time on I was very busy, not only supplying troops but 
answering and giving all the information I could over the phone. 

9. General Grunert. Wliat protection was there for the Depot 
or the surrounding grounds there as far as you were concerned in 
that post, the defense measures taken ? 

[1916] Colonel Howard. Well, of course, there was a small coast 
artillery setup there on Fort Armstrong. I think they were 3-inch 
guns. 

10. General Grunert. Antiaircraft? 

Colonel Howard. No, sir. The antiaircraft guns were right across 
the entrance to Pearl Harbor. 

11. General Grunert. Yes. 

Colonel Howard. I mean the entrance to Honolulu Harbor, on 
Sand Island. 

12. General Grunert. What protective measures were taken to pro- 
tect the personnel against air raids and bombing ? 

13. General Frank. Any slit trenches? 
Colonel Howard. Sir? 

14. General Frank. Did you have any slit trenches? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 999 

Colonel Howard. I was trying to think, General, whether we built 
those before or after Pearl Harbor. I am of the opinion that they 
were not built until the day of Pearl Harbor. 

15. General Grunert. Did you have any air raid shelters where 
all women and children and the persorinel could run to to get out 
of bombing range? 

Colonel Howard. No, sir, not at the day of Pearl Harbor, time of 
Pearl Harbor; no sir. 

16. General Grunert. Were there any standing orders as to pro- 
cedure in case of an air attack? In other words, did you know what 
to do, and the men and officers under you, in case of an air attack? 

Colonel Howard. Well, I don't know how to answer that question. 
No. I would say no ; my duty was as a supply officer, and my men of 
course were — my employees were mostly civilians, and I would have 
been operating on the supjDly standpoint of view entirely. Now, the 
post of Fort Armstrong was under the command of Roland Walsh, 
and he in turn had an adjutant operat- [1917] ing up there 
who had command of the troop, and they did have some kind of a 
standard, an S. O. P. in which they were to operate under an at- 
tack, but I had nothing to do with that. 

17. General Grunert. Your men were in warehouses and one thing 
another ? 

Colonel Howard. Yes, sir ; warehouses and clerks. 

18. General Grunert. Did they have any instructions what to do? 
Colonel Howard. Nothing except for fire. 

19. General Grunert. Evidently you didn't have much to offer to 
the Roberts Commission, and have you anything now that you would 
like to offer that you think would be of assistance to the Board in 
getting at the facts? 

Colonel Howard. I have nothing, sir. As a matter of fact, I have 
less information of that than several officers that were around the 
Depot at that time. 

20. General Grunert. Any questions? 

21. General Frank. Wasn't there a casemate or something that was 
a bomb-proof in which they could take shelter ? 

Colonel Howard. Yes, but that at the time, General, was operated 
by some coast artillery men from Fort De Russy, and they were quar- 
tered in there. 

22. General Frank. Did the women and children actually take ref- 
uge in there? 

Colonel Howard. No, sir. All the women and children that day 
were moved right off of the post and moved on up into the Nuuanu and 
Moana canyons. 

23. General Frank. All right. 

24. General Grunert. That will be all, Colonel. Thank you. 
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

[WIS] TESTIMONY OF COLONEL WILLIAM J. McCARTHY, 260TH 
COAST ARTILLERY GROUP, FORT BLISS, TEXAS 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your 
name, rank, organization, and station? 



1000 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel McCarthy. William J. McCarthy, Colonel, 260th Coast 
Artillery Group, Fort Bliss, Texas. 

2. General Grunert. Colonel, the Board is after facts and leads 
toward facts ; and because of your assignment in Hawaii in the latter 
part of 1941 and also because you testified before the Eoberts Commi? 
sion we asked that you be sent here to this Board to testify to give us 
such facts as you may know of your own information, and then I have 
one particular fact that I wanted to inquire into that I didn't under- 
stand in your testimony before the Roberts Commission. 

Now, tell me first : What was your assignment in Hawaii, and give 
me the dates. 

Colonel McCarthy. I arrived in Hawaii on October 6th, 1939, and 
was assigned to Fort Kamehameha. 

Does that call for my complete assignments all the time while I 
was there? 

3. General Grunert. Carry it right on through. 

Colonel McCarthy. At that time I was a Captain. I was assigned 
to the 41st Coast Artillery, railway. I remained with the railway 
artillery until July 1, 1940, when I was assigned as battalion com- 
mander of the railway battalion. I remained there in various capaci- 
ties as battalion commander and artillery engineer of the harbor de- 
fense up until July 1, 1941, when I was assigned as battalion com- 
mander of the 55th Coast Artillery, which is a 155 tractor-drawn 
battalion, and I remained in command of that battalion until I left 
Hawaii. Among [1919] other assignments I was the Group 
Commander of the so-called Ewa Group, which was a sector of the 
defense on the west shore of Hawaii that the 155 regiment covered. 

4. General Grunert. Where were you during the attack? 
Colonel McCarthy. In Fort Kamehameha, sir, right in the fort. 

5. General Grunert. And you had a coast artillery assignment 
with the heavy weapons? 

Colonel McCarthy. Yes, sir, with tractor. 

6. General Grunert. Didn't you have any antiaircraft? 

Colonel McCarthy. No, sir. The only antiaircraft that we had 
with us were .30-caliber machine guns which were assigned for our 
own immediate defense, but that was not anti-aircraft. 

7. General Grunert. In the report of the Roberts Commission it 
says that you testified that from November 22, '41, until December 
2nd or 3rd, Alert 2 had been in effect. You stated the post c(3m- 
mander did this. Now, the post was Kamehameha, was it? 

Colonel McCarthy. Yes, sir. 

8. General Grunert. And what Alert 2 was in effect up to De- 
cember 2nd or 3rd, and why was it then called off? 

Colonel McCarthy. If I am not — that may be a mistake. I think 
I said the 27th. 

9. General Frank. 27th of what? 

Colonel McCarthy. Of November, and not 

10. General Frank. Well, that is immaterial. 

Colonel McCarthy. It is immaterial. The 27th. Colonel Walker, 
who commanded Fort Kamehameha, had instituted a series [1920] 
of practice alerts. We would blackrout the post at certain times, and 
we would go in the field ; sometimes we would never leave the post ; 
to determine how proficient the units were in getting ready to go 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1001 

into the field. You see, besides the 55th Coast Artillery there was 
a battalion of railway coast artillery and the loth, which was the 
harbor defense regiment, they having command of the fixed guns: 
The 16s and l'2s, that were about Fort Kamehameha. There is Fort 
Weaver and Fort Barrett. 

It so happened that during one of these practice alerts that Colonel 
Walker had called the thing suddenly went ofi^ about 2 o'clock in the 
afternoon, and battalion commanders were ordered to report to 
Colonel Walker's office at once. In fact • 

[1021] 11. General Grunert. What date was this? 

Colonel McCarthy. I f am not mistaken, it was about the 27th of 
November. 

12. General Frank, v^ne of these guns went off? 

Colonel McCarthy. No. I say this practice alert went on in the 
post. The thing suddenly stopped in the middle of it and the bat- 
talion officer suddenly ordered us to report to Colonel Walker's head- 
quarters. When we got there we were told to forget it, everything is 
over. "I just received a call from the Commanding General of the 
Hawaiian Department that we are now going on an antisabotage alert, 
and we will guard our own installations in Fort Kamehameha and 
we will send a sufficient guard to protect the various stations from 
being damaged by people wandering around." 

13. General Grunert. Then from that time on, which you estimate 
to be November 27th, you were on a Department Alert No. 1 or 
sabotage ? 

Colonel McCarthy. Or sabotage; yes, sir. 

14. General Grunert. What was this No. 2 alert that you were 
practicing? 

Colonel McCarthy. The No. 2 Alert, as we understood it, was one 
where we were ready to go into the field, but not actually gohig out 
into the field. No. 3 would take us right out into the field. Under 
No. 2 we were all supposed to go, and that was what we were working 
on. 

15. General Grunert. That was just a post practice alert? 
Colonel McCarthy. Yes. 

10. General Grunert. It was not a Department No. 2 Alert? 
Colonel McCarthy. It was not called by the Department, 
[1922'] not that one that we were working on. 

17. General Grunert. Did your command have anything to do 
against an alert called against an air attack? 

Colonel McCarthy. No, sir. 

18. General Grunert. You would have no function during an air 
attack alert? 

Colonel McCarthy. No, sir; I would have none. 

19. General Grunert. Then that explains why you were on Alert 
No. 2 and it was called off about November 27th, and you went on a 
Department alert? 

Colonel McCarthy. Yes. 

20. General Grunert. But the No. 2 Alert that you were on was a 
post practice alert which got you ready to take the field, but you did 
not go into the field? 

Colonel McCarthy. Yes, sir. 



1002 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

21. General Grunert. Do you know anything about the protective 
and defensive measures for the post that were in effect prior to the 
attack ? For instance, what were the measures for the defense of the 
post itself, what were the protective measures for the care of person- 
nel, the protection of personnel and so forth ? 

Colonel McCarthy. Under the SOP that we operated under from 
headquarters of the 7th Coast Artillery Brigade. 

22. General Grunert. Who had that brigade? 

Colonel McCarthy. At that particular moment General Burgin 
was in command, but he had relieved General Gardiner. In the event 
of a No. 3 Alert all organizations had sepi ^te sectors, I myself hav- 
ing the so-called inner sector. That cons - d of all of the defenses 
of 155s and some searchlights from a poiii just north of Barbers 
Point. 

[1933] 23. General Grunert. We will stop right there. I think 
you mistake what I am after. I want to find out what measures there 
were to protect the post proper in the line of machine guns to fire upon 
airplanes, slit trenches to jump into, air raid shelters, and so forth. 

Colonel McCarthy. There were no air raid shelters as such. The 
only air raid shelter that was figured on being used was at Battery 
Hasbrouck, which was a 12-inch battery, and that was a regroup CP, 
all underground. Perhaps I better go back a little further. Let me 
interpolate here that on the 17th of June, 1940, we were suddenly 
alerted very quickly, and everybody moved out into the field. That 
is the only time that I know of where we actually took the live ammu- 
nition for the gims. I at the moment had the railway battalions on 
the north shore. I had one railway battalion and one 155 battalion, 
which was manned by the 11th Field Artillery, and we took live H. E. 
ammunition and powder out into the field with us. 

At that time the Commanding Officer, Colonel Walker, advised that 
all officers and enlisted men who had families to make some provision 
to evacuate the post to Fort Kamehameha in the event of an attack. 

24. General Grunert. Advised the individuals to make arrange- 
ments ? 

Colonel McCarthy. Yes. The advice took this form : To collect 
a certain amount of food that you could carry, a certain amount of 
clothes that the family could carry, and the idea at that moment was 
to move back into the hills behind the Pali in the event of a landing. 
I personally had not figured on an air raid attack. I was thinking of 
a landing by troops. 

[19^4] 25. General Grunert. Was there ever an S. O. P. issued 
that told everybody what to do in the case of an air attack or a landing ? 

Colonel McCarthy. No, sir. 

26. General Grunert. Were there measures taken after the attack, 
protective measures ? 

Colonel McCarthy. Yes. 

27. General Grunert. What happened then ? 

Colonel McCarthy. After the attack all the women and children on 
the post were put into Battery Hasbrouck, and they remained there 
for three days and nights. Some of the women and children were 
evacuated into civilian homes in Honolulu, but they came back after 
a couple of days and returned to their quarters on the post. 

28. General Kussell. Aftei- this alert of June 17, 1940, what was 
the subsequent history ? How long did you stay out ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1003 

Colonel McCarthy, We stayed out, if my memory does not fail 
me, until almost the 4th of August. 

29. General Grunert. And then did the entire unit move back to 
the post? 

Colonel McCarthy. Yes, sir, when the alert was declared off 
everybody came back to the post. 

30. General Grunert. You were out on it for about six weeks? 
Colonel McCarthy. Yes, sir. 

31. General Grunert. What effect on your training and morale did 
this six-week period of training have ? 

Colonel McCarthy. It did not hurt ; it helped, as a matter of fact. 

32. General Grunert. You liked it ? 
[1925] Colonel McCarthy. Yes, sir. 

33. General Grunert. Then there was no interference with your 
training or your morale ? 

Colonel McCarthy. No. We carried out gunnery instructions un- 
der drill just the same as we would have had we been back at the post. 
In addition, we had to stand two alerts, day and night. 

34. General Russell. What excitement among the populace pre- 
vailed or obtained as a result of this June I7th alert? 

Colonel McCarthy. Well, General, I could not answer that. I do 
not know. You see, I was at Fort Kam and we went right out to the 
north shore, where I was stationed at the time, and came back to Kam. 

35. General Russell. And your testimony is to the effect that in 
moving in and out you did not come in contact with any of the 
civilian population? 

Colonel McCarthy. No, sir. Of course, we saw a certain amount on 
the road, but the only contact I had with any civilians whatsoever, in 
view of this procedure, was with the plantation people, securing rights 
of way or permission to go on their ground. 

36. General Russell. If there had been a great deal of excitement 
among the civilian population on the island, including those of Japa- 
nese descent and Japanese who had not been naturalized, such a state 
would naturally have reached your ears, wouldn't it ? 

Colonel McCarthy. Yes, it would. On the Waialua Plantation a 
great portion of their employees were Japanese. They didn't bother 
us any, so far as I know. We were right there encamped on their 
property. 

[1936] 37. General Frank. What did you have command of on 
the north shore ? 

Colonel McCarthy. A railway battalion. They called it the North 
Group, General, but it consisted of one railway battery. 

38. General Frank. You said the 11th Field Artillery manned it. 
Colonel McCarthy. Yes. 

39. General Frank. The 11th Field Artillery belonged to Burgin at 
Schofield, didn't it? 

Colonel McCarthy. Yes. Two batteries of the 11th Field Artillery 
manned 155s which belonged to the Coast Artillery and they were 
under my control as group commander. 

40. General Frank. The Coast Artillery down at Kamahameha 
commanded some of the 11th Field Artillery that belonged under 
Burgin at Schofield ? 



1004 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel McCarthy. Yes, that is right. Those batteries were as- 
signed to man the 155s, which were presumably harbor defense guns 
on the north shore. I don't know why, except that they were. 

41. General Grunert. Colonel, have you anything that you know 
of that you might offer to the Board in the line of testimony that would 
throw light on any facts that pertain to the attack ? 

Colonel McCarthy. General, the only thing I could tell you is what 
happened where I was. 

42. General Grunert. What was that, briefly ? 

Colonel McCarthy. At about a quarter of 8 in the morning of 
December 7th, I heard airplanes passing over Kamehameha and I 
heard this firing, machine gun firing. At the moment I thought 
[1927] it was the Navy practicing. I had seen them flying around 
a good deal. 

43. General Frank. On Sunday ? 

Colonel McCarthy. This was on Sunday morning, sir. 

44. General Frank. Had the Navy been flying on Sunday and 
shooting? 

Colonel McCarthy. No, but we had this alert and I didn't know 
what was happening. I thought they were practicing. We had 
blank ammunition for machine guns for ground shooting, but I had 
never heard of them being in an airplane. I was curious and ran 
out to see, and just at that time I heard the swish of an explosion. 
I didn't know what that was. I ran out of my quarters and a Japa- 
nese plane was flying overhead with machine guns going. I immedi- 
ately tried to raise headquarters. The phones were all dead. I got 
my car and chased the battery out, told them to go out and man their 
war positions, take over their battle stations. 

It so happened that A Battery was in position right at Fort 
Kamehameha. C Battery guns were in position at Fort Weaver, but 
the personnel was at camp. B Battery's guns and personnel were 
at camp. B Battery's position was at Barbers Point. 

When I got to the battery area I found B Battery in the middle 
of a dog fight with some planes right over their heads. They were 
firing .30 caliber machine guns at them. So far as I know, they 
shot down two planes. When I got to headquarters Battery they 
had knocked down one plane, and a plane had caromed off a tree 
and the pilot was lying on the ground. It was one of those single- 
seater affairs and was a total wreck. The pilot was dead. 

[W^S] About the second wave was just starting to come over 
at that time. I started to move out into Hickam Field. I saw 
Hickam Field was burning. I didn't know what was causing it, but 
I could see it burning. But after the battalion was on the road getting 
ready to move, I reported into headquarters for instructions. Colonel 
Ryan, who was in the group at headquarters, advised me he had 
received a report that there were 25 transports 4,000 yards off 
Kaena Point and for me to get into position as quickly as I could, 
because I was the biggest thing north of Pearl Harbor at the moment, 
with 155s, to be ready to repel what he naturally assumed would be a 
landing in force. Those transports never materialized. Where he 
got his information, I do not know, except that he gave me that. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1005 

I went out in the field and remained in tlie field until I was relieved 
on April 12tli or 13th and came back to the United States. 

45. General Grunert. Tliank you very much. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL WILLIAM DONEGAN, G-3, FOURTH ARMY, 
FORT SAM HOUSTON, TEXAS. 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your 
name, rank, organization, and station? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. William N. Donegan, Colonel, General Staff 
Corps, 01174, G-3, Fourth Army. 

2. Colonel West. Wliere are your headquarters ? 
Colonel Donegan. Fort Sam Houston, Texas. 

3. General Grunert. Colonel, this Board is attempting to get facts 
or leads to facts pertaining to tlie background of the period leading 
up to and also concerning the attack on Pearl Harbor. [1929] 
Because of your assignment in the Hawaiian Department in the latter 
part of 1941 we hope that we can get some such facts from you. I have 
prepared a number of questions based primarily upon your position 
at that time, which was what? 

Colonel Donegan. G-3. 

4. General Grunert. G-3 of what? 

Colonel Donegan. G-3 of the Hawaiian Department. 

5. General Grunert. I will ask you these questions and if you can- 
not give us the answers, just say so. If you can, naturally we expect 
the answers, but I understood from an interview with you that I 
would probably be expecting too much from you. Are you familiar 
with the provisions of the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense 
Plan? 

Colonel Donegan. Could I take about 1 minute. General, just to 
give my background, and then I think I can be in step ? 

6. General Grunert. Go right ahead. 

Colonel Donegan. I was in the G-3 Section. Hawaiian Department 
from September, 1940, until Pearl Harbor. From September 1940 
until November 1941 I was Assistant G-3, with a typical G-3 Section 
on a desk. I was appointed G-3 in November. During most of my 
time in the G-3 Section, now Brigadier General, then Major Hobart 
Hewitt was the so-called specialist on the G-3 Section, on Army and 
Navy agreements and also working with the Air Force. Colonel 
William Lawton, then Major Lawton, came in and understudied 
Hewitt for a period of six months, and then he took over Hewitt's 
task and was the specialist on the Hawaiian Defense Plan, Joint Army 
and Navy Agreement, and aircraft warning. On these questions he 
was my adviser at G-3, and I sat in at all principal meetings with the 
[WSO} Navy and Air Force. 

7. General Grunert. The Board expects to hear Major, now I 
believe Colonel, Lawton later on. In the meantime I will see what 
information you can give me on these questions. 



1006 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

8. General Frank. From what branch does Colonel Lawton come ? 
Colonel DoNEGAN. Both Hewitt and Lawton are Coast Artillery. 

9. General Grunert. And you are what? 
Colonel DoNEGAN, Infantry. 

10. General Grunert. Under that plan was not the Army charged 
with the tactical command of the defensive air operation over and 
in the immediate vicinity of Oahu? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. That was my understanding. 

11. General Grunert. They were providing the antiaircraft de- 
fense of Oahu, with particular attention to the Pearl Harbor Naval 
Base and the naval forces therein ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Honolulu and Pearl Harbor; yes, sir. 

12. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not the Command- 
ing General kept himself informed as to the naval forces present in 
Pearl Harbor? 

Colonel Donegan. I cannot answer that. General. There is another 
point I would like to bring out, based on the Roberts Commission 
report. We also had in the G-3 Section, now Colonel, then Major, 
Dingeman, who was the liaison officer between the G-3 Section, 
Hawaiian Department, and the 14th Naval District. I don't believe 
he appeared before the Roberts Commission and he is still on duty in 
Hawaii. 

13. General Grunert. What is his name? 

[iPJi] Colonel Donegan. Dingeman, Ray E. Dingeman. He 
was in the G-3 Section. 

14. General Grunert. And he is still in the Hawaiian Islands ? 
Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir. They also have an Air Corps officer in 

the G-3 Section who has not been injected into the picture. That is 
Wilfred Paul. He was there I believe three months before December 
7th and at least three months after December 7th. He was one of the 
advisers on the Air equipment. I don't believe he appeared before the 
Roberts Commission. 

15. General Grunert. What do you suppose he would know that we 
cannot find out otherwise ? 

Colonel Donegan. He worked up several of the joint Army and Navy 
exercises in which the Air participated. 

16. General Grunert. He was particularly concerned in M^orking up 
exercises that General Martin wanted and that were to receive the 
approval of the Department? 

Colonel Donegan. I would say the other way. He was working for 
General Short and he coordinated our Air Corps and Interceptor Com- 
mand and Navy in these joint exercises. He was working more or less 
as general air adviser in the General Staff Section. 

17. General Grunert. He would not know anything that General 
Martin would not know ? 

Colonel Donegan. He should not, no. 

18. General Grunert. General Martin would probably know all 
that Paul knows ? 

Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir. 

19. General Grunert. Our time is limited and we cannot branch 
out too much, unless they are leads for facts that we cannot [1932] 
get otherwise. 

Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1007 

20. General Grunert. Do you know whether the Commanding Gen- 
eral of the Hawaiian Department knew what elements of the fleet were 
in or out of the harbor ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. I do not know. 

21. General Gruneut. Do you know whether such information was 
ever requested from the Navy through G-3 ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Not throuoh G-3. I do not recall, no, sir. 

22. General Grunert. Would the knowledge whether the fleet was 
in or out of the harbor make any difference in taking defense measures 
or applying them or implementing them? 

Colonel Donegan. I don't believe it would have at that time. The 
Navy was constantly in and out. I can recall that distinctly, because 
at one time they alternated a program so the Navy could be out over 
the week-end and come back during the week. 

23. General Grunert. Did you consider that you had a greater re- 
sponsibility when the fleet was in than when it was out ? 

Colonel Donegan. Frankly, I did not think so, as G-3. 
21. General Grunert. I understand 3'ou had in your office a naval 
Lieutenant by the name of Burr. 
Colonel Donegan. Yes. 

25. General Grunert. Who was the naval liaison officer for the 14th 
Naval District. 

Colonel Donegan. Yes. 

26. General Grunert. Was he capable? 

Colonel Donegan: Well, he was selected by the Navy. He 
[193S] was there. He was not of much value to us. 

27. General Grunert. Did he keep j^ou informed of what the Navy 
was doing? 

Colonel Donegan. My recollection of Burr is that when we wanted 
information we told him what we wanted aiid he went out and got 
it for us. But he gave us very little, as I recall, on his own initiative. 

28. General Grunert. Did you give him whatever the Navy wanted ? 
Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir. There was no question al3out that. 

Anything we had in our Section was available to him. 

29. General Grunert. Did he often ask for it or did he have to 
ask for it or did you, whenever you had anything new, tell him about 
it or ask him whether the Navy was interested? I am trying to get 
at what actual liaison there was there in getting information from 
one to the other. 

Colonel Donegan. It was there for him. I don't believe he asked 
for much. I think at that time Major Lawton was in daily contact 
with his corresponding number in the 14th Naval District. 

30. General Grunert. His corresponding number would be what? 
Colonel Donegan. There was a series. One time Hewitt and I 

would frequently be contacting a Captain Goode, who was the 14th 
Naval District, like the Chief of Staff. Then a Captain Munson. 
Our liaison was back and forth. I had many trips over there and 
would go with either Lawton or Hewitt. I have also gone to now 
Admiral, then Captain, McMorris, on board the cruiser Indianapolis. 
I had been over there frequently to arrange these missions. He had 
a Scouting Force at that time! [1934] Then I know several 
times a G-3 representative went out to Admiral Halsey's carrier, to 



1008 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Commander Miles Browning, when the carrier would come in from 
a "raid", testing out. 

31. General Gkunert. Then you did not depend on this naval Lieu- 
tenant, Burr, for your contacts? 

Colonel DoNEGAN, No, sir. 

32. General Grunert. In G-3? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. He was an Intelligence man. 

33. General Grunert. Intelligence or intelligent? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. No, Intelligence, Naval Intelligence. He was 
not like a line, tactical or combat officer. He was a Navy Intelligence 
reserve officer. We used him very little. 

34. General Grtfnert. Would he know anything about the Inter- 
ceptor Command ? 

Colonel Donegan. Very little. 

35. General Grunert. And the war warning service? 

Colonel Donegan. We did not deal with him for anything like that. 
We discussed the aircraft warning service and dealt with a man in 
the 14th Naval District who was an expert. 

36. General Frank. He was a sort of a technical liaison man? 
Colonel Donegan. That is right. 

37. General Frank. Rather than an efficient operating liaison man? 
Colonel Donegan. He did not have the background, Dingeman, 

our man, did have the background, particularly on this harbor control 
post. He spent full time over at the Navy. He came in our office at 
8 o'clock in the morning to rheck up on what we had and then went 
immediately over to Pearl Harbor, and came back at about 11 : 30 to 
have luncheon with us, and would go liack to Pearl Harbor at 1 o'clock 
and spend the rest of the day there. He spent full time at Pearl 
Harbor. 

38. General Grunert. That was Dingeman ? 
[19S5] Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir. 

39. General Grunert. Now I am going to read you some extracts 
here from the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and 
ask you a few questions about it. 

Paragraph 4 of Section 1 of that plan designates G-3 as the plan- 
ning representative for the Army, in paragraph 15c (2) ; Section 3 
states in part: 

Snch parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior 
to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed 
upon by local commanders. 

Paragraph 21, Section 6, states in part : 

This agreement to take effect at once and to remain effective until notice 
in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or disap- 
proval in part or in whole by either the War or Navy Departments. 

Now, do you know whether or not the War and Navy Departments 
approved that plan ? 

Colonel Donegan. I do not know. Was that not dated some time 
in April ? 

40. General Grunert. Right. 
Colonel Donegan. 1941. 

41. General Grunert. Do you know whether they disapproved all 
or part of the plan ? 

Colonel Donegan. I do not. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1009 

42. General Grunert. Did the War and Navy Departments ever 
order any part of the plan put into effect prior to M-Day? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Not to my knowledge. 

43. General Grunert. Did the local commanders ever mutually 
agree to put into effect any part of the plan ? 

Colonel Donegan. I do not recall. If I could talk to General Frank 
off the record? That comes under something about [1936] 
plans being put into effect. As to G-3, 1 do not know. 

44. General Grunert. My next question is, if so, would that sort 
of thing be put on record and be of record in the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, do you know ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. I would not say so ; to my knowledge, no. 

45. General Grunert. What is M-Day? 
Colonel DoNEGAN. Mobilization Day. 

4G. General Grunert. What does that mean ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. That is the day that the Department command- 
ers would be notified by Washington. 

47. General Grunert. Could the Department commanders initiate 
M-Day? 

Colonel Donegan. My understanding was that Washington was 
going to do it. 

48. General Grunert. I think the plan provided that M-Day could 
be put into effect for reasons of the imminence of war of anything 
like that, by local agreement between the two commanders. Of 
course, it would have been reported to Washington or probably a 
request made on Washington to put M-Day into effect. 

49. General Frank. What is M-Day? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. According to that plan, the War Department 
was going to stage an M-Day in preparation for war, prior to which 
we would get a maximum war strength garrison. I may add here 
that just a week before Pearl Harbor, after a very comprehensive and 
complete study, we submitted a report which was mailed not later 
or not earlier than the 1st of December to Washington, stating our 
requirements for an initial war garrison. It was in the mail on 
December 7th, I am sure. In that our G-3 Section worked out what 
we considered the essentials of what the War Department called 
an initial war garrison, and I believe they gave us the figures. 

[19S7] 50. General Frank. What is the necessity for declaring 
an M-Day? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. In this way, I would say, they would build up 
the garrison to war strength. That is the only reason I know of. 
They certainly did not have a sufficient garrison there. 

51. General Frank. Suppose the Commander of the Hawaiian De- 
partment had declared an M-Day ; what would have happened ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. I believe my reaction to that would be, if it was 
necessary for the local commanders to declare an M-Day and they 
believed the situation was serious enough for that, we would have gone 
on to a so-called Alert No. 3, instead of the sabotage alert, or No. 1, 
which we were on at that time. I do not believe that they thought 
the conditions warranted calling an M-Day. I never thought of 
M-Day that way before, but the emergency did not exist at that time. 

52. General Frank. What I am trying to find out is what happens 
in a place like Honolulu, when M-Day is declared by anybody ? What 
is the sequence of events ? 



1010 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel DoNEGAN. I don't know. It should be in that plan. They 
refer to M-Day in that. 

53. General Grunert. I will read it for the benefit of the record. 
It is paragraph 15 C (2) of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, 
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. 

M-Day is the first day of mobilization and is the time origin for the execution 
of this plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war. As a precautionary 
measure the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain 
features of their respective plan prior to M-Day. Such parts of this plan as are 
believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day, as ordered by the 
War and Navy Departments, or as mutually agreed upon by [1938] local 
commanders. 

M-Day therefore appears to be when you take steps just as if i^ou 
expect war in the near future, and in taking those steps mobilization 
consists of the various steps to be taken, as to the civil population, 
as to recruitment for the Army, reception of Army personnel, opera- 
tion of martial law and various other steps that you would take only 
in case you think war is in the immediate oflBng. Is that your 
understanding? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Yes. As G-3 I didn't think war was in the 
immediate offing, from my knowledge of the situation at that time. 

54. General Grunert, Wliat was your position in January, 1941? 
Assistant G-3? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Assistant G-3 and the section I had, I believe, 
was that I was in charge of ground troops. I remember particularly 
tables of organization and so forth. 

55. General Grunert. While in G-3 there did you know of a letter 
written by the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War and 
the Secretary of War's reply to the Navy, a copy of which was sent 
to the Hawaiian Department, that pertained to the defenses, called 
attention to certain weaknesses, and especially called attention to the 
need for preparation to meet air attacks? Do you remember that 
letter at that time? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. No, sir, I don't believe I do. 

56. General Grunert. General Short acknowledged receipt of a 
copy of that letter of February 19, 1941. Do you know what was done 
between February and December in the line of increasing the defense 
against air attack, generally speaking? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Well, from a training viewpoint I know 
[19S9] we had considerable training. We had exercises with the 
Navy at least once a month, sometimes twice a month. I think we 
had it with the Hawaiian Air Force. We had CPX. I recall an 
Air Force communications officer running CPXs. 

57. General Grunert. Do you know that they were building an air 
warning service? 

Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir. 

58. General Grunert. Was that considered progress toward air 
defense ? 

Colonel Donegan. I would consider it such. 

59. General Grunert. What other things were done ? 

Colonel Donegan. I believe during the year 1941 they built that 
Information Center at Fort Shafter. 

60. General Grunert. Who in G-3 would know more about this line 
of questions? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1011 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Lawton. 

61. General Grunert. Lawton? 

Colonel DoxEGAN. He was a specialist in G-3. 

62. General Grunert. Then our best source, outside of General 
Short, would be whom ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. The Chief of Staff, General Davidson, who had 
the Interceptor Command ; Colonel Paul, Department Signal Officer, 
and Lawton, who was the General Staff man. 

63. General Grunert. Can you, of your own knowledge, give us 
any information that they cannot ? 

Colonel Donegan. No, sir, and it would not be as accurate. 

64. General Grunert. Then I will see if I can find something else 
that you may be able to give us better information about than they 
may. What was your conception or understanding of the [IHO] 
generally increasing tautness of the international situation as between 
the United States and Japan during the latter part of the year 1941? 
What did you know about it and where did you get your impressions, 
and what were your impressions? 

Colonel Donegan. Is this personal, official or a combination? 

65. General Grunert. Combination. Tell me what you know. 
Colonel Donegan. I think we all felt that there was a tenseness 

there. We were working every night during the month of November. 
I think Lawton, Dingeman and I worked every night till 10 or 11 
o'clock. 

66. General Grunert. What did you work at? 

Colonel Donegan. At that time we were planning to take over from 
the Navy the occupation and defenses — well, we were going to send 
task forces to Canton, maybe Christmas. We were going to take over 
Palmyra. 

67. General Grunert. Let us stick to Hawaii. 

Colonel Donegan. This was all under the Joint Hawaiian Depart- 
ment. The tempo had increased, because, as I say, we figured out an 
initial war garrison if the War Department knew our requirements. 
It stepped up the garrison to around 60,000. I knew we were flying 
some ships out to the Far East. We were building an air field down 
in the South Pacific under the Department's control. We had a time 
date. I think the time date the War Department sent was March, 
1942, for Christmas and Canton. I don't know whether it is both, but 
it sticks in my mind as March. General Short fixed it by a directive 
for January. He stepped it up about two months. 

68. General Grunert. Let us get back to your state of mind of 
IJ941] the relationship between Japan and the United States. 
You say you realized, on account of all this, that the situation was 
growing more and more tense. Wliat did that indicate to you ? Did 
it alarm you in any way as to the defenses of Hawaii or the possibility 
of an attack on Hawaii ? 

Colonel Donegan. That, sir, would come from G-2. I have no 
such information. 

69. General Grunert. But there was a General Staff. You were all 
one family and one set of brains. G-2 is not supposed to know every- 
1 hing. What did G-3 know ? What did you know ? 

Colonel Donegan. I didn't know a thing as to an attack coming 
when it came. 

79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 2 15 



1012 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

70. General Grunert. Did you know what information was being 
received, wliat alarm or what warning as to the danger of that attack? 
Did it come home to yo'ii that it might come or was in the offing or away 
in the distance, or what? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Frankly, I did not visualize an attack was com^ 
ing. I did not expect it. 

71. General Grunert. Were you acquainted with or did you have, 
knowledge of the Navy message that was received and transmitted 
to the Army which started out "Consider this a war warning."? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. No, sir, I never saw it. 

72. General Grunert. You never saw it, but did you ever hear of it? 

Colonel Donegal. I was called up to the Department Command- 
er's office, I believe, when that message of November 27th was received, 
when we had a staff conference, or the Chief of Staff had it, and I later 
Avent into General Short's office 

73. General Grunert. That message is the one known as the Chief 
of Staff message of November 27th? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. It might be. Tliat is the last one I [IQ^^] 
recall before Pearl Harbor. 

74. General Grunert. That was an Army message, was it? 
Colonel DoNEGAN. That was an Army message. 

75. General Grunert. That is the Chief of Staff message of Novem- 
ber 27th? 

Colonel Donegan. That is the one where they mentioned the Rain- 
bow plan ? 

76. General Grunert. Yes. Tell us what happened then? 
Colonel Donegan. We stepped up the tempo of this antisabotage. 

77. General Grunert. What do you know about that message ? 
Colonel Donegan. That is a long time ago, General. 

78. General Grunert. Were you called into conference as to its 
meanings? 

Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir. We discussed it, and later I went into 
General Short, with one or more others of the G-3 Section, and we dis- 
cussed it. 

79. General Grunert. I think it would be well if I read that mes- 
sage and refreshed your memory here, because I want to ask you a few 
more questions about it. This is th& message of November 27th, 1941, 
from the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General, Hawaiian De- 
partment : 

(War Department message of November 27, 1941, was read as fol- 
lows:) 

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with 
only the barest possibilities that the .Japanese Government might come back and 
offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action iwssi- 
ble at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United 
States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, 
repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeo- 
pardize your defense. Prior to hostile [19Ji3] Japanese action you are 
directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem neces- 
sary but these measures should be carried out so as to not, repeat not, alarm 
civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities 
occur you will carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they per- 
tain to .Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to mini- 
mum essential officers. 

That refreshes your mind ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1013 

[^944-] Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir. 

General Grunert. Now, where did yon get in on that discussion of 
that message ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. The Chief of Staff called a conference, up in his 
office. I will go back. I was out in the field, and I returned from the 
field. The conference had started, and the Chief of Staff was reading 
that message. Prior to that time, I believe that Major Horner, in 
the G-3 section — he is now Colonel Horner, G-2, of the Ninth Corps — 
had gone over the Rainbow plan with General Short, and I further 
believe that after the Chief of Staff's conference we restudied that 
telegram in the G-3 section. That is the best I can recall it. 

80. General Grunert. Now, where did you come in on it? What 
advice did you give about it ? 

Colonel Donegan. As far as the Chief of Staff, the decision had 
been made, as I say, when I returned from the field, and I believe this 
directive had been issued about this sabotage or Alert 1. 

81. General Grunert. Then the decision had been made? 
Colonel Donegan. It had been made. 

82. General Grunert. You were not called upon to recommend 
what was to be done under that, before the decision was made ? 

Colonel Donegan. No, sir. I was not present at the headquarters. 
I was, I say, in the field, and wdien I returned, the conference was in 
session, and I think the Staff study had been made on it. 

83. General Grunert. Do you know who represented G-3 in the 
discussion before the decision was made? 

Colonel Donegan. I am sure that then Major Horner did. 

84. General Grunert. Would it have been natural for them to call 
on G-3 Operations for recommendations as to action to be taken under 
such a warning, or did the Commanding General make the [194S ] 
decision with his Chief of Staff, or what ? 

Colonel Donegan. Of course, that was the first time we had ever 
received such a warning, and there was no precedent for the staff pro- 
cedure in the headquarters. 

85. General Grunert. But there had been other decisions made that 
pertained to operations before that, undoubtedly ? 

Colonel Donegan. In other decisions pertaining to G-3, invariably 
I was called up. 

86. General Grunert. But in this, you had no say, personally ? 
Colonel Donegan. I w^as not available, at the time. 

87. General Grunert. Or, the discussion afterwards, after the 
decision was made ? Then you reread this thing? 

Colonel Donegan. I think that G-3 went into a conference among 
ourselves, and we put in effect the directive of the Chief of Staff, and 
we made no other recommendation. 

88. General Grunert. In your discussion was any question raised 
as to whether or not an antisabotage alert was sufficient to cover what 
was required and what was intimated in that radiogram ? 

Colonel Donegan. I do not believe there was, in the G-3 section. 

89. General Grunert. In your own mind, did you ever give it a 
thought as to whether or not the "Old Man" was going far enough ? 

Colonel Donegan. I will be frank, with you, General, I didn't. I 
was fooled as much as anybody else — if we were fooled. That is my 
honest opinion. 



1014 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

90. General Grunert. Do you think that the antisabotage alert 
covered the requirements of the situation ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. I would rather not state, in that there was a de- 
cision of the Department Commander. That was his decision, and 
I would rather not comment on it. 

91. General Gruxert. Were you free to state your opinion and to 
hammer it home as long as no decision had been made? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. I feel that at headquarters 1 was always 
[1946] free to say anything I wanted to say. 

92. General Grunert. Then you feel that, the decision having been 
made, from that time on your thoughts were not to be expressed, but 
the decision was to be carried out ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. No, sir; I did not feel that way. The decision 
was made, and if I had taken exception to it, which I had done several 
times in the past, I would have gone up and recommended a modifica- 
tion. In this case I didn't. I don't believe anybody in the G-3 
section recommended I do it. 

93. General Grunert. Since the Chief of Staff had been G-3, was 
there any inclination on his part to make decisions for G-3 without 
consulting G-3 ? 

Colonel DoNEOAN. I don't think you can say that he was G-3. If 
he had been G-3, it was only for aboiit a month. ' Colonel "Phil" Hayes 
was the G-3. He was relieved by Colonel Throckmorton ; and Colonel 
Phillips was not G-3, to my knowledge, over six weeks. He was just 
waiting to step in to take over the Chief of Staff's job. He never was 
a G-3. 

94. General Grunert. How was that staff team, over there? Was 
it a cohesive team, or were there some disagreements among them, 
any jealousies, or backbiting, or disappointments, or what? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. I don't think there were any disappointments, 
if you are referring to the appointment of the Chief of Staff — not to 
my knowledge. 

95. General Grunert. Did the staff, or did you, consider Phillips 
competent to be a Chief of Staff of the Department? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. I would rather not answer. We have been 
warned on this thing. I would rather not discuss this thing. I think 
that is perfectly all right, isn't it ? 

96. General Grunert. We will not require you to discuss it. You 
spoke of Captain McMorris, of the Navy ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Yes, sir. 

97. General Grunert. What was his position in the fleet, do 
[1947] you know? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. He was the Chief of Staff of the Scouting Force, 
and I remember I went over there with Hobart Hewitt, and visited 
him aboard the flagship, and also I think, with Lawton, and we did a 
lot of our training with him. 

98. General Grunert. Did he ever express himself to you as to 
what he thought about this Japanese situation and the dangers of it, 
or anything of that kind ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. No, sir. I think we worked quite closely with 
him, because I saw considerable of him when he was Admiral Nimitz' 
Operations Officer for Pearl Harbor ; and he never expressed himself 
to me. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1015 

99. Genercal Geunert. Wliat did you have to do with getting up the 
SOP of November 5 ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. I had a chance to go over it and delete anything 
I didn't like, I think, and that SOP, I signed it. I read it before I 
came to this Board. It is dated November 5, and I think I was 
appointed Chief of Staff about November 7, and I couldn't have been 
Chief of Staff 24 hours when I signed that thing ; but I helped work 
on it in the section, as an Assistant G-3. 

100. General Gruneet. And you became Chief of Staff of the 
Department ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Not more than a month before Pearl Harbor. I 
mean, the G-3. 

101. General Grunert. Oh; I did not understand that you had been 
Chief of Staff. 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Oh, no. I was G-3, appointed G-3 of the 
Hawaiian Department in November 1941. 

102. General Grunert. But then, you had been in the G-3 section ? 
Colonel Donegan. The G-3 section. I worked on that SOP. 

103. General Grunert. Then you were the next senior in the G-3 
section, were you ? 

[1948] Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir; I was. 

104. General Grunert. By the way, how did the staff section work 
together? Did they work in isolated groups, or in "compartments," 
you might call them ? 

Colonel Donegan. No. It was customary in that headquarters to 
have a staff conference every Saturday morning at 8 o'clock. The 
Chief of every General and Special Staff section, or the senior or 
president of the section was present, and it was conducted by the 
Chief of Staff, and at that conference it was supposed that each 
General Staff would bring out the principal activity of the week; 
and G-2 was called in for an orientation, to bring out numbers of 
things going on. That was customary. 

105. General Grunert. Let us ask you a little bit about those orien- 
tations. "When was the last staff meeting held before December 7? 

Colonel Donegan. I would say, on the morning before. It must 
have been. 

106. General Grunert. That was on a Saturday, and your meetings 
usually took place on Saturday? 

Colonel Donegan. Every Saturday morning at 8 o'clock. I don't 
know whether it was held on Saturday, December 6, or not; if not, 
it was an exception, because they were held every Saturday morning 
at 8 o'clock. 

107. General Grunert. All right. If it was held December 6, and 
the Saturday before that, did G-2 come up with anything alarming 
about the situation? 

Colonel Donegan. It did not. 

108. General Grunert. Did not? Then you concluded there was 
nothing, inasmuch as you heard nothing said, and G-2 told you noth- 
ing at these conferences? Or do you suppose G-2 did not put out, 
there, but kept a lot to himself, or between hita and his Commanding 
General, which? 

Colonel Donegan. I don't think the G-2 visualized what was 
\i943] impending. 



1016 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

109. General Frank. Did G-2 ever have any information that was 
very "hot?" 

Colonel DoNEGAN. I never o;ot any of it, as G-3. I don't think 
there was much "hot." I know he didn't pass it out. 

110. General Grunert. ITow, were these conferences "hot," or were 
they just — "Oh, well ! we have to get together once a week and tell 
them something!" 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Well, you say about being "compartments." 
That certainly took us out of the "compartment," and let us know 
what the other fellow was doing, if we had anything. It was kind 
of instructive to all the staff. I would tell them, from G-3, what the 
problems were, what we were doing, and each section would do the 
same thing. 

111. General Grunert. But, in the last two conferences, on the 
last two Saturdays before Pearl Harbor, there was no particular 
discussion about what might come ; or was there any particular dis- 
cussion about sabotage? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. I cannot recall. 

112. General Grunert. That was a "hot" subject then, was it not? 
Colonel Donegan. A "hot" subject in G-3. In our section, every 

officer went out to make visits, for sabotage, went around to see that 
the guards were on these water plants and power plants, and down 
by the docks, and the oil fuels, down there ; and we thought sabotage 
was the real thing, and practically every officer in the section was 
out daily checking on activities. 

113. General Grunert. In your section, or in the General Staff 
meeting, either one, did the question ever come up as to, "Well, the 
Navy is doing its job of distant reconnaissance, to ward off an attack, 
or to let us know if there is anything coming"? Did that subject ever 
come up? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. I can't say whether it did or not. 

114. General Grunert. It apparently did not impress itself on 
[1950] ^ you, if it did come up, because, otherwise, you might re- 
member it. 

Colonel Donegan. To my knowledge, I think reconnaissance was 
effective. I personally thought so. 

115. General Grunert. You thought distant reconnaissance was 
effective ? 

Colonel Donegan. I thought so. 

116. General Grunert. Wliat made you think that distant recon- 
naissance was effective — your confidence in the Navy ; or did you know 
anything in particular about it? 

Colonel Donegan. Well, I thought I knew something about it. I 
tried to keep abreast of it, and my reaction is, I thought it was effec- 
tive, that they were doing as much as could be expected. 

117. General Grunert. Would the Navy liaison officer attend these 
General Staff meetings ? 

Colonel Donegan. Only the Chiefs of sections attended. 

118. General Grunert. The naval liaison officer was not in on it? 
Colonel Donegan. No, sir. 

119. General Grunert. So, even if he had had any information on 
it, he was not there to give it to you ? 

Colonel Donegan. Well, he would have told me. It was my liaison 
officer, and I could have told them at the staff section. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1017 

120. General Grunert. What did Dingeman ever tell you about the 
Navy reconnaissance ; anything ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Not to my knowledge. 

121. General Grunert. Did you ever make any definite inquiries 
as to what the Navy was doing in the line of distant reconnaissance? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. I think we would go direct. I would go over 
with Lawton, direct, over to the Navy, and ask those questions. 

122. General Grunert. All right. Did you go directly ? 
Colonel DoNEGAN. We visited frequently. 

[WSl] 123. General Grunert. Did you ask about the distant 
reconnaissance ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. I don't recall whether we did or not. 

124. General Grunert. But you were interested in it, weren't you ? 
Colonel DoNEGAN. Yes, sir. That was going on three years, which 

is a long time. I don't know whether we discussed that, or not. 

125. General Grunert. Then you thouglit they had distant recon- 
naissance, but you rcall}' didn't know. You don't remember anytliing 
about it? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. I believe at this time that they were having 
effective distant reconnaissance. If they didn't, I didn't know it. 

126. General Grunert. Was that in the line of 360° patroling? 
Colonel DoNEGAN. Well, I would say west of Hawaii. 

127. General Grunert. West of Hawaii? 
Colonel DoNEGAN. Yes ; west. 

128. General Grunert. Were you depending on the task forces that 
went out, or on the planes that were sent out or ordered, or did you 
just have general confidence that they were doing what you thought 
they ought to do ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Frankly, I feel that is more G-2 than G-3. You 
are asking me this, G-3, and I should think that would be a G-2 thing 
for the Hawaiian Department. 

129. General Grunert. Well, the G-3 is operations, and in case 
anything happens, you have to control the fighting of the defense, 
do you not? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. I understand that, but I get my information 
from G-2. He goes out and gets it ? 

130. General Grunert. Well, did you ask G-2 about it? 

Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir. He had no information, other than I 
think he gave me everything he had ; so far as I know he [1952'\ 
did. 

131. General Grunert. How was Fielder considered, as to G-2? 
Colonel Donegan. I would rather not discuss personalities. 

132. General Grunert. Well, discuss officialities, then. Officially, 
was he considered O. K. ? 

Colonel Donegan. As far as I know, he was O. K. I would say he 
was as good a G-2 as I was a G-3. I would just as soon let that go in 
the record. 

133. General Frank. That's fair enough. 

134. General Grunert. Yes; that's fair enough. 

What brought about this system of Alerts 1, 2, and 3? When you 
first went over there, they only had one kind of alert, didn't they, 
and that was an all-out alert ? 

Colonel Donegan. That is right. 



1018 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

135. General Grunert. Then why 1, 2, or 3? That must have been 
in your minds, or somebody started it. 

Colonel DoNEGAN. That was discussed a great deal, and I think the 
idea was that in the past when they had an alert they moved every- 
thing out, and this way they could continue their training and develop 
as necessary. 

130. General Grunert. You mean, then, it was a step from the 
less serious to the more serious, to the all-out ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. To the all-out. 

137. General Grunert. All right. 

Now, let us get down to this training. Just what training would 
be handicapped in Alert No. 2, which was a combination of defense 
against aircraft and antisabotage ? Just how did that interfere seri- 
ously with training, and whose training ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Well, I think it spread a considerable number 
of men all over the island, every vital installation, the [1953^ 
ground forces, and it was principally ground forces. You asked me 
about the antiaircraft. I will say it did not affect antiaircraft. 

138. General Grunert. That was part of the air defense, was it not? 
not? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Yes. 

139. General Grunert. How did it affect the air training? 
Colonel DoNEGAN. I don't believe it did affect the air. 

140. General Grunert. It did affect the ground troops, but they 
had the least to do, and would not have been put out in No. 2, would 
they ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Fifty percent, in No. 2; and I think SOP, as I 
recall it — you have it, I think — 50% went out on Alert No. 2; as I 
recall, one battalion, or one something, motorized. 

141. General Grunert. But that was primarily for antisabotage? 

142. General Frank. No. 2. 

143. General Grunert. No. 2 includes, against air and anti- 
sabotage ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. And sabotage. 

144. General Grunert. But what brought the infantry out, the 
"ground troops," as we call them ? The bringing out of the infantry 
in full force was No. 3 ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. 100% in the field. 
146. General Grunert. Yes. 
Colonel DoNEGAN. Everything. 

146. General Grunert. JEverything for the fact that they had cer- 
tain guarding duties against sabotage under No. 2, and so forth, they 
were not much concerned with No. 2 ? 

Colonel Donegan. Well, you take 50%. All right, now, they 
\j954] are considerably concerned. Fifty percent were altered 
under No. 2. 

147. General Grunert. Do you know the reason back of calling 
Alert No. 1 "antisabotage" instead of Alert No. 2, which would have 
been against air, and antisabotage? 

Colonel Donegan. No, sir. 

148. General Grunert. You do not know the reason, whether the 
reason was all training, part training, or what? 

Colonel Donegan. I don't; no, sir. I think they thought No. 1 
would do the job, otherwise they would have called No. 2. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1019 

149. General Grunert, Would do what job? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Whatever job it was, from the information re- 
ceived from Washington. 

150. General Grunert. The job that was intimated, appeared to be 
in the Navy message, which was transmitted to the Army — "this is a 
war warning"? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Yes. 

151. General Grunert. Now, would antisabotage take care of a war 
in the offing? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. I don't recall seeing it, as I stated. 

152. General Grunert. Then you referred to the job that the Chief 
of Staff's message which I read to you called for? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. November 27. 

153. General Grunert. We will go back to that message. In that 
message the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department was 
directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as he 
might deem necessary. Was any additional reconnaissance made, do 
you know, or did he not consider any additional reconnaissance neces- 
sary ? 

Colonel Donegan. I don't remember. If it was ordered, it 
[1955] is certainly a matter of record somewhere. I don't recall. 

154. General Grunert. Would such matters have been sent out 
through you in directives to do such, or not? I am not heckling you; 
I am just after information. 

Colonel Donegan. I think this has been handled direct by the Chief 
of Staff. It all came so fast, and I say, there was no precedent, this 
was the first time it was done; so you see normally you can't say 
whether it would be handled through G-3 or not, because there was 
no staff precedent or procedure for it. 

155. General Grunert. Is there anything now in the line of alerts 
or the influences or conclusions respecting this information that you , 
had, that you could tell the Board, that might give us further light 
on this thing, as to the state of mind or the reasons or causes, or any- 
thing in that line? 

Colonel Donegan. No, sir. I tell you, it all happened so fast, No- 
vember 27 to December 7, that we were, I will say, on Alert 1. Then, 
I couldn't get the reactions of other officers, after December 7. It was 
just a question of our being in the tunnel, we dug in, and it wasn't 
discussed, even, in fact, in my own section; we didn't have the time. 

156. General Grunert. The Hawaiian command was created and 
put out there as an outpost, and it was their business to be prepared 
for anything; and, if they were properly warned, if you had notice, 
why then of course it was the business of the command, your business 
as G-3, to make whatever plans the "Old Man" called for? 

Colonel Donegan. It was. 

157. General Grunert. And up to that time you considered the 
plans had been made and pretty well implemented, is that right? 

[1956] Colonel Donegan. From the information that I knew, 
I think the Department Commander took the steps that were adequate. 

158. General Grunert. From what you know of the training and 
stated training and efficiency of the conunand, had it been Alert 2, 
what would have been the results of this attack that did come ? Have 
you ever tried to visualize it that way? Could you have stopped it? 



1020 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel DoNEGAN. I have tried to visualize it from all angles. I 
don't know whether it could be stopped or not. 

159. General Grunert. Could you minimize the danger, or the 
amount of damage that was done? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Well, I don't have to answer it, but I will say I 
don't believe — it would have been negligible, is my opinion. 

160. General Grunert. If you do not answer some of these things, 
it leads me to believe that you have something for which you are afraid 
you might be hauled up. 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Oh, no, sir! Not a thing to worry me, about 
that ! 

161. General Grunert. I think I will turn you over to one of the 
other Members of the Board, here, until I think of something else. 
General Russell ? 

162. General Russell. You were out there when General Short 
came out, were you. Colonel ? 

Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir. 

163. General Russell. You had been out there some time before 
that? 

Colonel Donegan. I arrived in the Department in August 1940. 

164. General Russell. How many new officers did General Short 
bring out there with him ? 

Colonel Donegan. Very few. From the top down, he brought 
[1957] Phillips, he brought Truman. I don't know of anybody 
else I can recall right now. 

165. General Russell. Phillips became Chief of Staff, and Truman 
was an aide? 

Colonel Donegan. That is right. 

166. General Russell. All the other people who were functioning 
out there on General Short's staff as of December 7 he fomid when 
he got out there, if that be true ? 

Colonel Donegan. I would say, as my memory recalls it, I know of 
no one else that he brought out. 

167. General Russell. It was not a cleaning out of the staff when 
Short came out there and a moving in of a new staff? 

Colonel Donegan. No, sir. 

168. General Russell. How did you happen to be sent out there? 
Was it because it was your turn to go out there ? 

Colonel Donegan. I went out in the foreign service. I was as- 
signed to the Twenty-first Infantry at Schofield, and I was a Major 
of Infantry, in the G-3 section, on DS. I had a nervous breakdown 
and I was placed in the hospital. They let me out, and I asked to go 
out on DS. I went out there as assistant. 

169. General Russell. What I am trying to get at. Colonel, is this : 
Who sent people out to the Hawaiian Department ? Was it the War 
Department, or the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment ? 

Colonel Donegan. The War Department, always. 

170. General Russell. Did they require the Commanding General 
of the Hawaiian Department to take such people as he had and as 
tlie War Department sent him, and do what he could with them? 

Colonel Donegan. That is right. He selected his staff [1958] 
usually from the personnel available in the Hawaiian Department. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1021 

171. Genei'cal Eussell. These people who were on the stajff, there, 
Fielder, and you, and Throckmorton — and who was this man who 
was G-4 ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Marsden. 

172. General Russell. All those people were already on the staff 
wlien Short got there, were they not ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Let me get this, now. When Short arrived, 
"Empy" Potts w^as G-1. That is Adam E. Potts. Marsden was G-2, 
Throckmorton was G-3, and Carl Bankfield, I told you, was G-4. 
Carl Bankfield went back to the mainland, expiration of service, and 
Marsden was put into G-4. "Empy" Potts dropped out of or was 
called off of G-1 and went off with a Coast Artillery outfit. 

173. General Russell. As a matter of fact, this staff out there was 
just a sort of normal staff in the Army as it had operated at that 
time ; they were gradually leaving, and gradually coming in ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. That is right. 

174. General Russell. General Short had the same problem that 
anybody else would have had, to make the best he could out of what 
he had, is that right? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Oh, yes; it is the Commander's prerogative to 
select his staff. 

175. General Russell. He had to select them from within the 
Department ? 

Colonel DoNEGAX. I believe he inherited some that were sent out 
by War Department selection. I think Hobart Hewitt, in the G-3 
section, assistant G-3, was sent out by the War Department, the 
selection of the War Department General Staff. Then there was a 
transition, when the War Department no longer selected them, and 
the local commander selected detail on General Staff. 

176. General Russell. From where ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. From personnel available within the [1959] 
Department. 

177. General Russell. From within the Hawaiian Department? 
Do you think these people who were selected to l^e on General 

Short's staff were selected and sent to him, because they were specially 
fitted as General Staff officers? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Which people are you talking about, General ? 

178. General Russell. You and Marsden and Phillips — all of you 
people. How did you happen to get an assignment on this staff? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. It was selected as an assistant G-3 by Throck- 
morton, on his recommendation, and was then G-3, and I was placed 
on General Staff on the recommendation of Colonel Hayes, when 
Hayes was Chief of Staff. 

179. General Russell. Some questions were asked you about your 
not being called upon to express an opinion on tliis November 27 
message. I did not get your testimony any too clearly, but as I recall, 
you said that if you had disagreed with the Commander's decision, 
and had you thought that antisabotage was not sufficient, you would 
have felt perfectly free to go in and discuss it ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Yes, sir. 

180. General Russell. With the Chief of Staff, or the Command- 
ing General, or with whom ? 



1022 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel DoNEGAN. My channel would have been to go to the Chief 
of Staff. 

181. General Russell. Were they arbitrary, up there? 
Colonel DoNEGAN. No, sir. 

182. General Eussell. They permitted you to discuss matters with 
them ? 

[1960~\ Colonel Donegan, I always felt free to go in. 

183. General Russell. I got the impression from your testimony, 
Colonel, that in these night jobs that were being carried on, and the 
work being done in G-3, your thinking was in the terms of Japan 
and Wake ? It was directed toward Japan and Wake ? 

Colonel Donegan. No, that was based on War Department direc- 
tives. The War Department told us to make studies of task forces 
necessary to take over certain islands, and I think Palmyra was one 
which was then occupied by the Navy, and we figured out a "TO," 
a table of organization, naturally involving Coast Artillery, Infantry, 
and Antiaircraft, and we worked those out with the Navy representa- 
tive, who was Colonel of Marines, and submitted those to Washing- 
ton. 

184. General Russell, But this work that you G-3 people were un- 
der pressure to do did not relate to Oahu and the defenses there, but 
related to islands which lay between you and, generally, the Philip- 
pines ; is that right? 

Colonel Donegan. That was just an additional job. Our defense 
of Oahu was the primary mission we had, there was no question about 
it, you can't get away from it. This was just additional work, prior 
to December 7. I was trying to give you a background of what we 
M^ere doing, and that was one of the major works going on in the sec- 
tion during the month of November, the latter part of November. 

185. General Russell. Did General Short step up the defensive 
preparations after he got there ? 

Colonel Donegan. Considerably. 

186. General Russell. Pardon? 
Colonel Donegan. A great deal. 

[1961] 187. General Russell. He was defense-conscious, you 
feel? 

Colonel Donegan. Very much so. In fact, I think a great deal was 
done, there, on the defense, on bunkers, pill bunkers for the Air Corps, 
):)ill boxes, beach defense, being constantly carried on. 

188. General Russell. Reference was made to Hawaii as an out- 
post, it being the area nearest the mainland, which had been fortified 
and occupied by us; but were there not many other installations be- 
tween us and Japan and Wake and Midway and the Philippine 
Islands and Guam, whatever was done on Guam? 

Colonel Donegan. That is correct. 

189. General Russell. That is all. 

Colonel Donegan. Wliat has that got to do with it? 

190. General Russell. How? 

Colonel Donegan. May I ask a question ? What has that got to do 
with it? 

191. General Russell, I don't know what anything has to do with 
it! 

192. General Gruneet, Have you any questions, General Frank? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1023 

193. General Frank. Had you ever discussed the possibility of au 
air attack or an air raid on Oaliu? 

Colonel DoNEGAN, Discussed it many, many times, every time we 
had a joint Army and JN avy exercise, when they came in on Navy car- 
riers, and so forth. 

194. General Fil\nk. What was your thought about the possibility 
of a raid on Oahu by a Jap carrier force? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Well, I believed it was possible; I didn't think 
it was probable. I discussed that with staff officers Street and Hagen- 
bero-, and they discussed it many times. 

[1962] 195. General Frank. Had you ever gone into it in a very 
detailed manner? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. I had gone into it with your man Farthing, in 
connection with patroling. He had a patrolling plan, there, and I 
had gone into it and studied it with him — the number of planes nec- 
essary to patrol, and the 360° patrol. All those things were discussed. 

196. General Frank. Speaking in race-track parlance, what did 
you consider the possibility of a Jap air raid? 

Colonel Donegan. Frankly, I didn't expect one or anticipate one. 
I didn't think they would attempt it; but I had not made up my mind 
that way. 

197. General Frank. What were the chances, did you think? 
Colonel Donegan. I hadn't even thought it out in chances. 

198. General Frank. If you did not think they would do it, why 
wouldn't they do it ? Let us approach it from the other side. Let us 
approach it from the Japanese side. That is what I am trying to 
get at. 

Colonel Donegan. Well, you could ask every officer in the Hawaiian 
Department, over there, the same question, and it's "second guessing" 
now, three years later. I think, to ask them, "Why don't you think 
they attempted it?" I don't believe anybody over there, whether it was 
the Department Staff or the Air Force Staff or Antiaircraft, thought 
it. That is what we were there, for, but nobody expected it. 

199. General Frank. If you thought the Japs would not attempt it, 
why. from the Jap point of view, wouldn't they attempt it? 

Colonel Donegan. I don't know why — I will say the same thing — 
I don't know why I should answer these questions. 

[J96S] 200. General Frank. I am trying to get it as a point of 
view, and we are building up a point of view and a background on 
this thing. That is the reason I would like to get it. You are a pro- 
fessional soldier, you have been in the Army over a period of time. 

Colonel Donegan. That is correct. 

201. General Frank. And yon must have some sort of professional 
opinion. From that point of view, then, I would like to have a pro- 
fessional opinion from you on that subject, if you have one. 

Colonel Donegan. Well, I can say that with contemporaries there. 
I discussed it many, many times, and we had our defenses set for it. 
and we studied and supervised the training in connection with the 
anti-air defense, antiaircraft, and I personally did not anticipate a 
raid on Hawaii. 

202. General Frank. Well, I have asked you two or three times, 
why. Was it because it was hazardous, it was a risky thing to do, they 



1024 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

were hazarding too much to attempt it, or what was behind your rea- 
son for thinking they would not attempt it ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. My reason would be that I thought that their 
interest lay more in Asia than that they would care to jeopardize the 
chances, or their limited fleet, in coming to Hawaii. That would be 
my reaction. 

203. General Frank. How much of a risk were the Japs taking in 
pulling a raid on Honolulu? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. The answer is, "Zero," right now, based on De- 
cember 7 ; but I should think it would be a great risk. 

204. General Frank. All right. Well, that was the reason ? That 
is one of the reasons that you thought they would not attempt it, 
was because you thought it was too great a risk? 

[1964.] 205. General Frank. Had everything not clicked for 
them, it might have resulted in a disaster ? Had both the Navy and 
the Army been sufficiently alerted to have gone after them, it might 
have resulted in a disaster? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Well, it could have been a 100% failure, there is 
no question about it^ — just as bad a failure as it was a success, if things 
were 100% the other way. 

206. General Frank. Now, did you read the Martin-Bellinger esti- 
mate of the situation ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. When was it published ? 

207. General Frank. I refer to the air estimate of the situation that 
they got out in the spring of 1941. 

Colonel DoNEGAN. The spring of 1941 ? 

208. General Frank. Yes. 
Colonel DoNEGAN. I don't recall it. 

209. General Frank. They made an air estimate on the situation. 
Colonel DoNEGAN. Who is Bellinger — the Admiral? 

210. General Frank. The Admiral in command of Patrol Wing 2. 
Colonel DoNEGAN. PAT-2? I have sat in conference with him in 

connection with the use of air. 

211. General Frank. Do you remember this air estimate of the situ- 
ation that was submitted? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. No doubt I have read it, if he wrote it. 

212. General Frank. To get back to this air attack again, did you 
ever make any comparison between the probaility of damage from an 
air raid and the probability of damage from sabotage? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. No, I didn't. 

213. General Frank. Or as to which was more probable? 
Colonel DoNEGAN. Let me say this. General. I think, now, 

[196S] that, after three years, to come here and ask a lot of ques- 
tions about what we did or what we didn't do three years ago, I think 
it's rather unfair, whether I am a professional soldier of 27 years' serv- 
ice, or not. Since Pearl Harbor, like many others, we have been trying 
to win this war, working about 12 to 14 hours a day, and to come in 
here "cold" and ask me what I thought in December 1941, 1 think it is 
unfair for the Board to do it. 

214. General Frank. I asked you if you had ever made that com- 
parison. 

Colonel DoNEGAN. I never compared the damage that an air-raid 
would do, and the damage by sabotage. I feel certain I don't recall 
going through any such mental operations. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1025 

215. General Grunert. The witness may think that he is under some 
compulsion to answer these questions. If you don't know the answer, 
say so. 

Colonel DoNEGAN. I would like to give you the answer, if I can. 

216. General Grunert. If you haven't thought it over, say, "I don't 
remember" ; but to the questions asked, give him an answer, or say, "I 
don't want to answer anything." You are not under compulsion to 
try to think back three years ago and actually remember details. 

Colonel Donegan. I would like to make my stand clear. I would 
like to assist the Board as much as possible. 

217. General Grunert. That is all we want. 

Colonel Donegan. But I would like to have the questions within 
bounds. 

218. General Grunert. If they are out of bounds, you need not 
answer them, if you cannot answer them, as far as you know. 

Colonel Donegan. All right. 

[1966] 219. General Grunert. But we have to get facts, and 
we have to dig. We have to do a lot of digging, and this is one of the 
methods of digging, to see, to get the state of mind, and everything; 
and so we are going to continue to dig. 

Go ahead. 

220. General Frank. No, I have no more. 

221. General Grunert. Are there any suggestions by the Recorder, 
the Assistant Recorder, or the Executive Officer? 

222. Major Clausen. No, sir. 

223. General Grunert. That appears to be all. Thank you for 
coming up. 

(The witness was excused with the usual admonition.) 
(Thereupon, the Board, having concluded the hearing of witnesses 
for the day, took up the consideration of other business.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1027 



[my] CONTENTS 



WE1DNESDAY, AUGUST 30, 1944 

Testimony of — Page ^ 

Colonel John S. Pratt, Retired 1968 

Brig. Gen. William R. White, U. S. Army; Mira Loma Quartermaster 

Depot, Mira Loma, Calif 1989 

Major George S*. Welch, Air Corps, Orlando, Florida 2008 

Colonel W. A. Capron ; Ordnance Department ; Ogden Arsenal, Ogden, 

Utah 2015 

Brig. Gen. Warren T. Hannum, Retired; San Francisco, California 2030 

DOCUMENTS 

War Department Message of November 27, 1941 2020 

Letter, November 6, 1940, Colonel Hannum to Lt. Col. Wyman 2033 

Letter. February 14, 1942, Colonel Lyman to Maj. Gen. Reybold 2038 

Letter, February 27, 1942, Colonel Lyman to Maj. Gen. Reybold 2042 

Letter, January 22, 1941, Colonel Wyman to Rohl 1 2056 

' Pases referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original transcript of proceedings. 



79716— 46— Ex. 145, vol. 2- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1029 



[1968-] PEOCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL 

HARBOR BOARD 



WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 30, 1944 

Presidio or San Francisco, Cal. 

The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the 
hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, 
presiding. 

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D 
Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members. 

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. 
Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Houlmin, Jr., 
Executive Officer. 

General Grunert. The Board will come to order. 

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL JOHN S. PRATT ( RETIRED ) 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
imdei- Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your 
name, rank, organization, and station. 

Colonel Pratt. Colonel John S. Pratt. I am retired. I live in San 
Francisco, 2230 Washington Street. 

2. General Grunert. Colonel, the Board is after facts. It wants 
facts and background and viewpoints in order to get leads as to where 
it can develop facts ; that is, both prior to and during the Pearl Harbor 
attack. Because of your assignment during 1941, particularly, we 
thought you might give us some facts or lead us to where we might get 
facts. 

[1069] Will you tell the Board what your experience has been 
in the line of assignments in Hawaii, and give approximate dates. 

Colonel Pratt. I arrived in Hawaii the latter part of June 1937, and 
left Hawaii April 22, 1942. I was on the Department Staff as Officer 
in Charge of Civilian Component Affairs, which included the National 
Guard, me organized Reserve, and the R. O. T. C. My office was in the 
business section of the city, and not at Fort Shafter. 

3. General Grunert. Then you had experience in and about Hono- 
lulu for nearly five years ? 

Colonel Pratt. That is true. 

4. General Grunert. That included the time leading up to the 
attack of December 7, and during the attack, and after the attack, for 
several months ? 

Colonel Pratt. Yes, sir. 

5. General Grunert. Now, in your position as Officer in Charge of 
Civilian Affairs, you evidently had an opportunity to know consider- 
able about the civil population, is that right? 



1030 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Pratt. I think I probably did have an opportunity to know 
more than the average civilian out there. 

6. General Frank. You had an opportunity to know more than 
the average officer, too, did you not ? 

Colonel Pratt. Probably; yes. 

7. General Grunert. I will skip around considerably here, but the 
background of what I am getting after is that your position probably 
gave you an opportunity to observe, and from that, you may throw 
some light on the situation ; and the Board is after such light. 

Now, suppose you go back into 1940. I understand that at 
[Id'W] that time there was an alert pulled, in 1940. Will you tell 
us about that alert, just in general terms. 

Colonel Pratt. I believe I understand the particular alert you mean. 
It happened as I recall approximately four or five months before the 
arrival of General Short. We were in a conference at Fort Shafter, 
at which General Herron was presiding, and an orderly came in and 
handed a message to the Chief of Staff, Colonel Hayes. He in turn 
handed it to General Herron, but excused himself and said that he 
would be back after awhile. Later, he returned. The meeting was 
finished, and I had occasion to go to the Chief of Staff's office upon 
a matter. 

While there, I couldn't help but hear him dictating an order, which 
in effect was to place the entire command on the alert and at battle 
stations, with full supply of ammunition; and I asked Hayes what 
it was all about. I said, "I couldn't help but hear what you were 
saying." He said that the Navy had lost contact with the high-seas 
Japanese fleet, and that General Herron was turning the command 
out. 

8. General Grunert. At that time was there just one alert, or were 
there two or three or four types of alert? 

Colonel Pratt. To my knowledge, at least, there was Field Order 
No. 1. Now, what other alerts there may have been, I don't know of 
them. 

9. General Grunert. Wliat, generally, did that Field Order No. 1 
prescribe as to being prepared for action ? 

[1971] Colonel Pratt. Well, Field Order No. 1 sent all units to 
tlieir battle stations and their battle jobs, with the necessary supplies, 
ammunition, and so forth. 

10. General Grunert. Later, was that field order superseded by 
other instructions that required a different gradation of alerts? 

Colonel Pratt. I believe it was. I was not acquainted with those 
gradations of alerts, though I knew they were in effect. I had never 
seen them. 

11. General Grunert. But for this 1940 affair, there was just one 
getting out and getting ready, is that right? 

Colonel Pratt. So far as I know. 

12. General Frank. That was a full-out effort ? 

Colonel PRiVTT. Yes. Just a moment, please. May I correct that, a 
little? 

13. General Grunert. Yes. 

Colonel Pratt. They would turn us out on alerts, generally at 
night, to see how fast the office forces could get to their places of 
business and ready for business ; and that was done quite frequently. 

14. General Grunert. When you turned out for this alert in 1940, 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1031 

and you took your battle position, you were ready for business, you 
had all the ammunition and everything you needed, is that right? 
Colonel Pratt. Yes, sir. 

15, General Grunert. Do you know whether or not that alarmed the 
public, at the time ? 

Colonel Pratt. I could see no visible effect on the public, because 
we had had practice alerts before, and I think they were fairly well 
used to them at that time. 

16. General Grunert. Did going on such an alert disclose your 
intent, except that you were ready to defend yourselves ? 

Colonel pRATr. Not to my knowledge. 

[1972] 17. General Grunert. At the time of that alert, what 
w^as your assignment, and how did you participate in that alert? 

Colonel Pratt. I was then Officer in Charge of Civilian Compo- 
nent Affairs, and it was my duty to report to my office with my entire 
force, and stay there, on a 24-hour basis. 

18. General Grunert. What opportunity did you have to size up 
whether or not the public was alarmed by the troops going on the 
alert? 

Colonel Pratt. None other than the newspapers. In other words, 
the public did not seem to be unduly interested in the thing, any more 
than they had been in the past. 

19. General Grunert. Under how many Commanding Generals did 
you serve during this period of nearly five years ? 

Colonel Pratt. General Drum, General Moses, General Herron, 
General Short, and General Emmons. 

20. General Grunert. And under how many Chiefs of Staff? 
Colonel Pratt. To the best of my recollection, the original Chief 

of Staff when I arrived was Colonel Osborne. I am not sure of that. 
No, I am wrong about that. There was another man ahead of him, 
I think. Osborne was G-3 when I arrived, but I can't remember the 
Chief of Staff's name in 1937 ; then Osborne, and then Colonel Hayes, 
who was G-3 prior to his assignment as Chief of Staff. Then, when 
General Short came out there, Colonel Phillips became the Chief of 
Staff; and he was there when I left. 

21. General Grunert. In your assigned duties, with whom was 
most of your business done, at headquarters ? 

Colonel Pratt. With the Commanding General, with the Chief of 
Staff, with G-3, G-2, and the Department Surgeon, I would say. 

22. General Grunert. Was most of it done with the Chief of Staff? 
[W7S] Colonel Pratt. I would say most of it ; yes. 

23. General Grunert. What was your connection with G-2? 
What line of work did you have to do? 

Colonel Pratt. Well, if I had any information that I thought might 
be of value to G-2, 1 would tell them about it. 

24. General Grunert. Were there many such occasions? 
Colonel Pratt. Not many. 

25. General Grunert. How did you size up the Japanese element 
of the population — as particularly dangerous, or can you give us an 
idea on that ? 

Colonel Pratt. My attitude towards it, from all I could learn and 
hear and see, was that the great majority of the Japanese population 
would be loyal, except when the time came when Oahu was just about 



1032 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to capitulate ; then I felt that they would turn on us, the great major- 
ity would. I had reason to believe that an espionage organization 
existed among them, or a military, you might say, espionage organiza- 
tion, and that was confirmed later when I was a member of a Military 
Commission that tried one Otto Kuhn, a German spy, who had been 
operating out there and elsewhere for a number of years ; and he was 
found guilty and sentenced to death. 

26. General Grunert. During the trial of this German, did it indi- 
cate where this espionage system headed up ? 

Colonel Pratt. It appeared from the evidence, as I recall it, as 
FBI presented it, that he was in close contact with the Japanese con- 
sulate there in Honolulu. 

27. General Grunert. Then you think there were a number of Jap- 
anese agents in and about Honolulu ? 

Colonel Pratt. That is my opinion ; yes, sir. 

[1974] 28. General Grunert. Was there any evidence of this 
training against the United States during or shortly after the attack 
on Pearl Harbor, that you intimated, there, that the Japanese ele- 
ments might turn against the United States ? 

Colonel Pratt. None that I personally know of, except on the 
night subsequent to the attack, I listened in on a local police radio 
net, and there were certain indications then, and I fully, myself, per- 
sonally, expected an attack at dawn in force on the beaches. 

29. "General Frank. On the 8th, you mean ? 

Colonel Pratt. Yes. I thought an attack might come in on the 
8th, the morning of the 8th; and in listening in on this network and 
hearing the return messages from the "prowl cars," the police patrol 
cars. Different colored lights would blink, and then be turned out, 
and rockets would go up; and I believe, if I recall correctly, several 
cases, of roman candles ; and that occurred, as I recall, all along the 
district from Hawaii to Kahala ; that is, from the northwest coast to 
the east coast. 

30. General Grunert. That gave the impression it might be the 
signal for a general attack the next morning ? 

Colonel Pratt. Well, they were signalling something, and I 
couldn't imagine what it would be, other than the enemy units at sea, 
possibly submarines. 

31. General Grunert. Did you anticipate any organized movement 
from within, in connection with the possible attack? 

Colonel Pratt. I thought it possible that they might engineer such 
a thing if and when an attack came in. 

32. General Grunert. Did you inform anyone on the staff as to 
what your observations were? In other words, was your knowledge 
[1075] ^ made the knowledge of the General Staff ? 

Colonel Pratt. Well, I think G-2 was tuned in on the same radio 
I was. I think he got all of that. 

33. General Grunert. What staff conferences were held while you 
were there in 1941, or late in 1941? Did you participate in any staff 
conferences ? 

(yolonel Pratt. I participated in one, which might be of interest 
to this Board. I was ordered to attend a conference, at once, at head- 
quarters. I was a little late in getting a car, so I was late, and arrived 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1033 

late at the conference. In the meantime, the Staff had assembled 
and I am told that the order or the radio message received from the 
Chief of Stalf in Washington to General Short was read to the 
assembled staff, thongh I am not sure of that; and I was handed the 
copy, in the clear, of that message, and read it at the time ; and some 
instructions were given to certain members of the staff that were more 
intimately connected with the alert plan than I was. 

34. General Grunert. Let me refresh your memory, or let me ask 
you whether this message that I read is the one that you refer to. 
This is a message from the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General 
of the Hawaiian Department, 27 November 1941: 

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with 
only the barest possibility the Japanese government might come back and offer 
to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at 
any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat not, be avoided. United States desires 
Japan commit first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed 
as restricting you to a course of action that [1976] might jeopardize 

your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake 
such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these meas- 
ures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population 
or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will 
carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5, as far as they pertain to Japan. 
Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to the minimum essential 
officers. 

Is that the message to which you have reference ? 

Colonel Pratt. To the best of my recollection, that is, sir. 

35. General Grunert. Now, will you tell us anything more about 
that conference — what was discussed, and what impression it created 
on those conferring, or what impression it created on you, as one of 
the conferees? 

Colonel Pratt. Well, it was a very serious message, to me, and I 
thought the possibilities of danger quite grave. 

36. General Grunert. Had the decision been made as to what ac- 
tion to take upon it, at that time, do you know ? 

Colonel Pratt. That, I do not know. 

37. General Grunert. What action was taken on it, to your 
knowledge? 

Colonel Pratt. Not to my knowledge. I do not know. 

38. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not the Command- 
ing General ordered an alert, and what that alert covered ? 

Colonel Pratt. This is hearsay information. I was told that Alert 
No. 1 was in effect. As I say, I don't know what it was. 

39. General Grunert. Then what was the conference about? 

[1977] Colonel Pratt. The reception of this message, and doubt- 
less the Chief of Staff wanted to give some instructions to certain 
members of the Staff. That was what I gathered, at least. 

40. General Grunert. Did you know that the command was alerted 
against sabotage? 

Colonel Pratt. I did not personally notice it, except I believe, as I 
recall that, I did see some soldiers posted at certain bridges and 
communications systems. 

41. General Grunert. As to the purport of this message, did it 
occur to you, or did you turn it over in your mind, whether or not the 
action taken was sufficient under those instructions and warnings? 



1034 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Pratt. Well, it occurred to me, in the light of what General 
Herron had previously done, that Field Order No. 1 might have been 
put into effect. 

42. General Grtctnert. And Field Order No. 1 provided for an all- 
out alert? 

Colonel Pratt. Yes. 

43. General Grunert. Then I gather from the tenor of your testi- 
mony that the occasion called for an all-out alert, in your opinion; is 
that right? 

Colonel Pratt. Well, that was my opinion ; yes, sir. 

44. General Grunert. You spoke of General Herron's taking an 
all-out alert. Does that lead me to believe that there was a differ- 
ence in the way Herron and Short looked at the thing ? 

Colonel Pratt. Apparently. 

45. General Grunert, How about the two Chiefs of Staff, Hayes 
and Phillips; were they different? 

[197S] Colonel Pratt. They were different personalities; yes, 
sir. 

46. General Grunert. Which did you consider the stronger per- 
sonality? 

Colonel Pratt. Colonel Hayes. 

47. General Grunert. Do you know anything about the cooperation 
between the Army and Navy, and its effectiveness? 

Colonel Pratt. Only by hearsay. 

48. General Grunert. From the impression you gathered, were 
tliey getting along, were they cooperating, or was there a lack of 
such cooperation? 

Colonel Pratt. I would say that, from what I heard, the coopera- 
tion between the Army and Navy was not what it might have been. 

49. General Grunert. Was that more evident early in your service 
over there, or late in your service ? 

Colonel Pratt. It was evident all the way through, with one excep- 
tion. There was an Admiral, and I can't remember his name, who 
was in a subordinate position at Pearl Harbor, who went out of his 
way to cooperate. His name commenced with an F, as I recall. 

50. General Frank. Was it Fitch? 
Colonel Pratt. No. 

51. General Grunert. Who was the Admiral of the fleet, just prior 
to Kimmel, do you remember? 

Colonel Pratt. Admiral Richardson, I believe. 

52. Major Clausen. There was an Admiral Furlong, may I ask? 

Colonel Pratt. No, it was not Furlong. It was as I recall some- 
thing like Friedlander or Fridenthal. I don't remember the admiral's 
iiame. 

\J979] 53. General Grunert. So Admiral Richardson was in 
command of the fleet prior to Kimmel ? 

Colonel Pratt. Yes, sir. 

54. General Grunert. During Richardson's regime and during 
Kimmel's regime, do you know anything about their policy of keeping 
ships in or out of the Harbor? 

Colonel Pratt. Personally, I had never seen what their policy was, 
except it was noticeable in passing Pearl Harbor on occasions that you 
would see more ships in there, of different types, during Admiral 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1035 

Kimmers regime than you would when Admiral Richardson had the 
fleet ; and that was particularly true of capital ships. 

55. General Gkunert. Have you some questions, General Frank? 

56. General Frank. No. Do you have some questions, Major 
Clausen ? 

57. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. May I put the question? 

58. General Grunert. Yes. 

59. Major Clausen. Sir, you mentioned some investigation con- 
cerning a German citizen. I wondered if you had met or were ac- 
quainted with Hans Wilhelm Rohl? 

Colonel Pratt. I was not. 

60. Major Clausen. Did you hear any derogatory comments con- 
cerning this Hans Wilhelm Rohl in connection with espionage ? 

Colonel Pratt. Not at that time ; no. 

61. Major Clausen. Did you, later? 

Colonel Pratt. Only as I learned it from the newspapers and other 
reports. 

62. Major Clausen. And when was that, sir? 
Colonel Pratt. That was after I got back. 

63. Major Clausen. And, with respect to Colonel Theodore 
Wyman, [19S0] Junior, did you know him ? 

Colonel Pratt. Very casually. He was on the staff when I was out 
there. 

64. Major Clausen. Did you hear rumors as to his inefficiency? 
Colonel Pratt. No, I did not. At the time, he was considered to be 

quite efficient in getting things done, but he gained the antipathy of 
a number of persons, both in the militiiry service and civil life, by what 
they termed his "rather high-handed methods," but I never heard any 
criticism of his efficiency in getting things done. 

65. Major Clausen. Did you hear any remarks concerning the rela- 
tionship which existed in Hawaii between Colonel Wyman and Hans 
Wilhelm Rohl? 

Colonel_ Pratt. Not until after I got back to the mainland. 

66. Major Clausen. In connection with this German that was tried 
and sentenced to death, did you hear the name of Werner Plack ? 

Colonel Pratt. I did not. That is my recollection. I do not 
remember hearing such a name. 

67. General Grunert. Have you any questions, General Russell ? 

68. General Russell. Yes. 

Colonel, as Officer in Charge of Civilian Component Affairs, you 
were not about Department headquarters a lot, you were in the field 
where the various units were, is that true ? 

Colonel Pratt. My office was in the business district of Honolulu, 
and the only time I visited headquarters was when I had occasion to 
do so on official business. 

69. General Russell. Of what did these civilian components con- 
sist? _ That is to enable me to know the sphere of your [1981] 
activities and the people whom you contacted. 

Colonel Pratt. They consisted of an Adjutant General and staff' of 
the National Guard, two regiments of infantry. We administered at 
one time about 1700, as I recall, organized Reserve Officers, some of 
them from the mainland, and all the R. O. T. C. units there in Hawaii. 



1036 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

70. General Russell. Were there numbers of Japanese people in 
these units which you have described, or people of Japanese origin? 

Colonel Pratt. In the National Guard there were a few American 
citizens of Japanese extraction, in the enlisted branch. To my knowl- 
edge there were I think no American citizens of Japanese extraction in 
the commissioned ranks. There may have been one or two. But I 
think that the Adjutant General of the Territory, Colonel Smoot, made 
an honest and a good endeavor to get rid of as many American citi- 
zens of Japanese extraction as possible, and I think he did a pretty 
good job of it. 

71. General Russell. Then it came to pass, Colonel, that the people 
who were on the ground, who knew the Jap and the American citizen 
of Jap origin, had so little faith in his loyalty that they were almost 
entirely excluded from civilian military organizations out there ? 

[1982'\ Colonel Pratt. Well, we had some Japanese officers, of 
Japanese extraction, in the reserves, Organized Reserves. Some of 
them are doing very well in Italy today. 

72. General Grunert. How about R. O. T. C. ? 

Colonel Pratt. No ; they were Organized Reserves people. 

73. General Grunert. But your R. 0. T, C. units; were they prac- 
tically all of Japanese extraction ? 

Colonel Pratt. The University of Hawaii and the McKinley High 
School R. O. T. C, roughly, were about, I would say, 90 percent of 
Japanese extraction. 

74. General Russell. Well, now let us approach it a little more 
directly. Were you in frequent or infrequent contacts with Japanese 
and Americans of Japanese origin ? 

Colonel Pratt. Well, I knew quite a number of — I knew a few 
Japanese, officers of Japanese extraction that I had contact with in 
the Organized Reserves, but I had very little contact with people of 
Japanese extraction in the R. O. T. C. 

y5. General Russell. Colonel, was it a fact, or not, that you were 
more intimately associated with civilians and had much more fre- 
quent contact with civilians than the average soldier out there, pro- 
fessional soldier, because of your assignment ? 

Colonel Pratt. I would say so ; yes, sir. 

76. General Russell. And by virtue of this contact with civilians 
who in turn were in contact with the Japanese elements on the Island, 
you seem to have developed a suspicion of the Japanese elements or a 
feeling toward them which probably is somewhat different from what 
we have found elsewhere. Could that be accounted for by virtue of 
your contact with our own people, our civilian people out there, who 
in turn were in \^198S'\ touch with these Japs? 

Colonel Pratt. As to the question of the loyalty of the Japanese 
in Hawaii, it depends utterly on whom you contact. If you contact, 
for instance, the managers of sugar plantations or if you contact the 
economic leaders of the Territory, you would get one attitude which 
is very favorable toward the Japanese; but if you contact the lunas 
of tlie plantations and the men who became more intimate in actual 
contact with the people, you get an entirely different estimate. 

77. General Frank. A luna is a supervisor or overseer? 
Colonel Pratt. Overseer of work. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1037 

78. General Eussell. Now, you contacted both of these groups, I 
assume from your testimony, the huger ups, the upper brackets, and 
the overseer brackets ? 

Colonel Pratt. In some cases, in some few cases, but I have heard 
the opinions of certain people also who have contacted these people. 

79. General Russell. Now, either because of unloading coal over 
here or because I didn't hear your evidence very clearly, I did not get 
the full import of your testimony relating to the radio broadcast 
that you listened to that night prior to the attack or 

Colonel Pratt. No ; it was after the attack. 

80. General Russell. Oh, after the attack ? 
Colonel Pratt. Yes. 

81. General Russell. As I recall, General Frank asked if it was on 
the 8th, and you replied, "Yes," and I became somewhat confused. 

Colonel Pratt. Well, it was the night of the 7th-8th. 
[1984] 82. General Russell. Yes. It was after the attack on 
the morning ? 

Colonel Pratt. That is correct. 

83. General Russell. Now, on the evening prior to the attack or 
any time prior thereto, was there evidence of the possibility of a Jap 
attack out there, from the sources that you described which gave you 
information on the 8th? 

Colonel Pratt. No, sir. 

84. General Russell. There was nothing to indicate an attack on 
the morning of the 7th ? 

Colonel Pratt. Not to my knowledge. 

85. General Russell. And there were no signals of any sort that 
were sent up on that night that indicated anything out of the ordi- 
nary ? 

Colonel Pratt. Not to my knowledge. 

86. General Russell. Had anything developed on the Islands 
proper. Colonel, within the two or three months prior to the Japanese 
attack which indicated growing tension or the possibility of trouble 
between the Japanese Empire and the American Government? 

Colonel Pratt. Nothing to my knowledge, other than what one 
read generally on the question of relations between the United States 
and Japan, and we all had the feeling that the situation was becom- 
ing tenser and tenser due to that influence alone, but as to local indi- 
cations I would say no. 

87. General Russell. General Grunert in discussing your reac- 
tion to the sabotage alert of General Short, on about the 27th of 
November, elicited from you an opinion that you thought an all-out 
alert should have been ordered. 

[1985] Colonel Pratt. In the light of the message that we re- 
ceived from the Chief of Statf in Washington and the action that 
General Herron took almost a year before, I was led to believe that 
it warranted an all-out effort. 

88. General Russell. Do you think the fact that General Herron 
went on an all-out alert a year before played any considerable part 
in the formulation of that idea ? 

Colonel Pratt. I think so. 



1038 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

89. General Kussell. Do you know upon what order from the 
War Department the alert of General Herron was directed? 

Colonel Pratt. I do not. 

90. General Russell. You do not know, then, that the message to 
Herron on June 17, '40, directed him or ordered him onto an alert 
to repel an air attack from overseas? 

Colonel Pratt. I did not know it. 

91. General Russell. Colonel, your impression was that the coop- 
eration between the Army and Navy during your entire stay on Oahu 
left considerable to be desired ? 

Colonel Pratt. That was my impression ; yes, sir. 

92. General Russell. Did you obtain that or did you form that 
impression from information obtained from official sources or just 
discussions among officers in a social or private way? 

Colonel Pratt. Discussions among officers. 

93. General Russell. At social affairs and other places ? 
Colonel Pratt. Well, yes. 

91. General Russell. It was based on the talk which went on be- 
tween and among Army officers as to these relations? 

Colonel Pratt. As far as my knowledge is concerned, yes. 

95. General Russell. In your prior testimony. Colonel, you 
[1986] stated that you were impressed that more ships were in 
Pearl Harbor after Admiral Kimmel took command? In other 
words, he had more ships in Pearl Harbor than Richardson ordinarily 
had in there ? 

Colonel Pratt. It seemed to me so ; yes, sir. 

96. General Russell. Could you make any comparison between the 
number of ships in the harbor customarily during the week and the 
number in there on week ends, Saturdays and Sunday ? 

Colonel Pratt. I couldn't, no, sir. 

97. General Russell. You noticed no difference? 
Colonel Pratt. As far as I am concerned, I didn't. 

98. General Russell. I think that is all. 

99. General Grunert. Did General Short ever make use of the R. O. 
T. C. units in the defense of Hawaii ? 

Colonel Pratt. Yes, he did. 

100. General Grunert. Prior to December 7th or afterward ? 
Colonel Pratt. Subsequent to it. 

101. General Grunert. Subsequent to it? 

Colonel Pratt. Subsequent to December 7th, I would say a day or 
two, the Territorial Adjutant General came into my office and in- 
formed me that the Commanding General and the Governor of the 
Territory had held a conference in which it was agreed that certain 
units of the R. O. T. C. should be turned out for guard duty in the city ; 
and if I recall correctly I believe it was either then or later limited to 
those of 18 years of age and older, though I am not sure of that. 
Well, it seemed to me to be rather important, because of the high 
percentage of Americans of Japanese extraction, that I didn't take 
the word of the Territorial Adjutant General for this. [1987] 
He requested me to order the units out, but I got General Short in 
person on the telephone at the command post and told him what the 
Adjutant General had told me; and he said Yes, there had been a 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1039 

conference in wliich it had been agreed that these units would be 
turned out for guard duty. I called his attention to the fact that there 
was a high percentage of citizens of Japanese extraction in some of 
these units, and he said he thought they might prove to be perfectly 
loyal and thought we should go ahead and direct the PMS&Ts to take 
ahold and get them out, which I did. 

102. General Grunert. In this impression you received through 
conversation that the cooperation between the Army and Navy was 
not what it might be — was not as it might be desired, we will put it — 
was there any lack of that cooperation manifested? In what form 
did it show itself ? Can you give us any light on that ? 

Colonel Pratt. Well, to the best of my recollection — this is three 
years ago now — there was a request made upon the Navy to do certain 
things for the Army. 

103. General Frank. Such as? 

Colonel Pratt. Well, furnishing boats of certain descriptions, and 
sometimes participating in certain maneuvers that the Army wanted 
to engage in there. As I say, as far as I could see there was one 
Admiral there who went out of his way to cooperate, but he was in a 
subordinate position and I can't remember his name. 

104. General Russell. Any other questions suggested to the Re- 
corder? 

Colonel West. That German that was tried and sentenced [1988] 
to death : Do you recall whether that sentence was ever, executed, or 
what was the outcome of that case ? 

Colonel Pratt. I didn't know it until I met Mi*., or Major now, 
Angus Taylor here in San Francisco quite recently, and he informed 
me that the sentence had been commuted to a life term and that it was 
being carried out now, if I recall correctly, at Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas. 

105. General Grunert. Colonel, can you think of anything now 
that may assist the Board in getting at facts or leads that might assist 
the Board in getting witnesses who might have knowledge from 
which we might adduce some facts ? 

Colonel Pratt. No, sir. 

106. General Grunert. Do you know of any witnesses now in 
Hawaii that can help us get the true story ? 

Colonel Pratt. Well, there was a gentleman named Mr. Harold 
Kay, K-a-y, who I believe now is military aide to the present Governor 
of the Territory, who on the morning of the attack observed the attack 
from his home at an altitude of 900 feet, which overlooked the whole 
south seaward coast of Oahu, through binoculars and made notes of 
what he saw at the time ; and I think he might be of some aid to the 
Board in finding out or corroborating testimony as to what actually 
did happen so far as he saw it there. 

107. General Grunert. And you do not think of anything else, that 
you could of your own knowledge assist the Board with any more 
evidence ? 

Colonel Pratt. No, sir. 

108. General Grunert. There appear to be no more questions. 
Thank you very much. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 



1040 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[19S9] TESTIMONY OF BKIG. GEN. WILLIAM R. WHITE, U. S. 
ARMY; MIEA LOMA QUARTERMASTER DEPOT, MIRA LOMA, 
CALIFORNIA. 

(The witness was sworn by the Kecorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board youi 
name, rank, organization, and station? 

General White. William R. White, Brigadier General, U. S. Army^ 
Quartermaster Corps, stationed at Mira Loma Quartermaster Depot, 
Mira Loma, California. 

2. General Grunert. General, the Board is after facts as to back- 
ground as to events leading up to what happened at Pearl Harbor 
during the attack of December 7, '41. Because of your long service in 
the Hawaiian Department and because you were present prior to and 
during the attack, we called you hoping that we can get some facts or 
leads toward facts. There is nothing particular except that you were 
over there a long time and undoubtedly accumulated a lot of infor- 
mation about the situation. 

And so, tell us first what your assignment was, how long you were 
over there, when you came back, and what your assignments were 
while over there. 

GeneraLWHiTE. I arrived in Honolulu the end of February 1940. 
My first station w^as Schofield Barracks, as Quartermaster at that sta- 
tion. In March of 1941 I was ordered to Fort Shafter as the Depart- 
ment Quartermaster, which position I held until February 13, 1944, 
when I returned to the mainland. Immediately following the attack 
on December 7th I was appointed Director of Food Control for the 
entire Territory, which duty was in addition to my work as Depart- 
ment [1990] Quartermaster. 

3. General Grunert. Now, the Board is primarily interested as to 
what happened prior to the attack and during the attack. Can you, 
first, give us your impression of that cosmopolitan population of 
Honolulu, especially regarding the Japanese population, both foreign- 
born and American citizens ? 

General White. My impression, especially of the Japanese was that 
what we term the alien Avas probably a better behaved and more on his 
guard as to his behavior than the American-born. It was quite appar- 
ent that the American-born soon adopted the Western customs, and in 
their recreation and usual habits' they more or less approached the 
habits of our own people : I mean by that, in their manner of dress, in 
their consumption of food, their love of entertainment, and their et 
cetera. 

4. General Grunert. Give us some sidelights on the question of 
loyalty. 

5. General Frank. What was your last word ? 

General White. Et cetera. Now, that is not a good word. We 
might stop at that last there, but I am just trying to cover it. 
May I have that question again ? 

6. General Grunert. Give us your impression of the loyalty of the 
Japanese American-born American citizens. 

General White. I doubt the loyalty of the American-born Jap- 
anese citizens just the same as I do the alien-born. In my opinion 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1041 

their being American citizens is simply a matter of circumstance, of 
having been born under the American flag, and I have never seen why 
they should be particularly loyal to this [1991] country, espe- 
cially in a place as far off as Honolulu where they are not in contact 
with our people as much as the Japanese on the mainland would be. 

7. General Grunert. If there was any disloyalty, we will call it, 
what form did that take, and what were your chances to observe and 
form an opinion on this class of people ? 

General White. You couldn't put your fingers on any particular 
thing that would stand out as a disloyal act. It was their attitude of 
superiority, their pushing a white person around, you might say, in 
the stores that are run by the orientals practically entirely over there. 
It was quite common for the white person to go in to buy something 
and find very little for sale in the front part of the store, and a lack 
of interest in making the sale to the white person, while on the other 
hand in the rear of the store would probably be a good assortment of 
merchandise and probably Japanese back there getting the pick of 
whatever was available. It was this type of attitude, you might say, 
and the fact that it was difficult to believe that there would be any great 
loyalty to this country, that caused me to form the opinion that I 
wouldn't trust any of them. 

8. General Grunert. To your knowledge were there any acts of 
sabotage committed while you were over there ? 

General White. To the best of my knowledge and belief there were 
no acts of sabotage committed before or during the attack. 

9. General Grunert. In your capacity as Department Quarter- 
master did you have anything to do with the shipping plying between 
the United States and Hawaii? 

[1993] General White. Before the attack, of course, we were 
interested in getting Quartermaster supplies. We used to requisition 
60 days in advance on San Francisco's Depot, and no difficulty was 
experienced in getting Quartermaster supplies. As a matter of fact, 
on December 7, 1941, I had abundance of food and all other types of 
Quartermaster supplies available to the Army. 

[1993] 10. General Grunert. Did you have anything to do 
with the requisitioning or arranging for shipping of construction 
supplies ? 

General White. I did not. 

11. General Grunert. Do you know approximately what time it 
took for ordinary quartermaster supplies, from date of requisition 
to date of receipt? 

General White. We used to figure 45 days as a turn-around ; that 
is, a ship to leave Honolulu, get to the port, San Francisco, pick up 
our supplies, and get back to Honolulu. As I stated before, we were 
required to submit requisitions 60 days in advance of our actual 
needs. There was no difficulty in transportation problems previous 
to December 7, 1941. 

12. General Grunert. Then you did not experience any particular 
delays on account of shipping, as far as anything you were con- 
cerned with? 

General White. I did not. 

13. General Grunert. What knowledge have you of the tenseness 
of the Japanese-American situation toward the latter part of 1941 ? 



1042 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General White. I saw no evidence of any tenseness on the part of 
any Japanese, previous to the attack of December 7, 1941. 

14. General Grunert, Were the newspapers full of stories abovit 
what was happening? 

General White. Just ordinary accounts. I recall distinctly when 
Kurusu came through, he was met by our G-2, and the paper car- 
ried an account of this interview; and such communications as you 
might expect in view of the war situation that was going on at the 
time ; but there was nothing that would create [1994-'] a tense- 

ness, that I recall, being published. 

15. General Grunert. How about the headlines in the morning 
paper, say, of November 30, which predicts a war within a week? 
Did that make any impression on the people over there? 

General White. I must truthfully say I don't recall that headline. 

16. General Grunert. Were you kept informed of any so-called 
"warning messages" received by the Navy, transmitted to the Army, 
or received by the Army directly, from approximately November 24 
up to the attack? 

General White. Some time just before Thanksgiving, I am not 
sure of the exact date, I was ordered to report to headquarters at 3 :45 
one afternoon, and upon arrival, I found the chiefs of all the serv- 
ices had gathered, and we were taken into General Short's private 
oflSce, and the door was closed, and General Short stated that he had 
a very serious message to read, from General Marshall. He then 
proceeded to read a "radio" that was worded approximately like this : 

All negotiations have been broken off. Take all measures for defense. Be 
prepared for any emergency, but do nothing to alarm the populace, 
Signed "Marshall." 

He stated to us that this was secret; that he was ordering Alert 
No. 1 into effect immediately ; that this would not be discussed except 
insofar as to put Alert No. 1 into effect. 

That is the only warning order that was made known to me. 

17. General Grunert. Will you listen to this message and see if 
tliis is the one to which you refer. This is* a message from the Chief 
of Staff to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, 27 No- 
vember 1941 : 

[19951 Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical 
imrposes, with only the barest possibility the Japanese Government might come 
t)aclj and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile 
action possiblte at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided. 
United States desires Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, 
repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might 
jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to 
undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but 
these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil 
population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, 
you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 as far as they i)ertain to 
•Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to the minimum 
essential oflScers. 

General White. That is the first time I have ever heard that com- 
plete message. 

18. General Grunert. But was that the message to which you re- 
ferred ? 

General White. That was not. 

19. General Grunert. That was not? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1043 

General White. I might say that the message that I refer to was 
much shorter, and that the only thing that I recognize in that mes- 
sage that was in the one that I spoke of, was the one statement, "Do 
nothing to alarm the populace." My message started off, as I said, 
that "All negotiations have broken off." It was very much shorter 
than that message. 

[1906] 20. General Grunert. Did you actually see the message? 

General White. I did not. General Short read the message to us. 

21. General Grunert. It could have been paraphrased, and it could 
have been just extracts of the message, or was the whole message read, 
word for word, do you remember? 

General White. It could have been extracted. It was apparent at 
the time that General Short was reading word for word, but I did not 
see it. 

22. General Grunert. But at that time, had he made a decision to 
take Alert No. 1 ? 

General White. He had. 

23. General Grunert. And what did you understand Alert No. 1 
to mean ? 

General White. Alert No. 1 was to protect all installations against 
sabotage. 

24. General Grunert. Did you turn over in your mind whether or 
not you considered that alert sufficient under the warning then re- 
ceived ? 

General White. I don't understand. 

25. General Grunert. Did you think to yourself, "Well, is that suf- 
ficient protection under this warning?" or anything of that kind? 
Or didn't you think about it? 

General White. I did think about it, and I thought seriously about 
it ; and I immediately called my people, the chiefs of my installations, 
and gave them this information on the Alert No. 1, and before midnight 
that night every installation was guarded, and the Alert No. 1 was 
in full effect ; and at that time, I honestly believed that sabotage was 
the thing that we [1997] had to look for. 

26. General Grunert. All right. Now, as far as your installations 
are concerned, if they had taken Alert 2 or 3, what difference would 
it have made as to your installations, as to the protective measures 
taken ? 

General White. Alert 2 provided for an internal uprising, and had 
Alert 2 been put in, then it would have been necessary to have placed 
more guards around the installations to protect them against an at- 
tack from the inside. If Alert 3 had been called, which called for an 
all-out attack of the Japanese against the islands, then guarding 
my installations would have presented no more problem than Alert 2. 
It would have required all troops to have taken the field, in field posi- 
tions, for a defense of the island against a Japanese attack from the 
outside. 

27. General Grujstert. Wliat troops did you have that would have 
had to go out? 

General White. Well, we had actually no troops of my own, except 
that at Fort Armstrong, for instance, we had our own war plan, and 
we had a battalion of our own troops that had been drilled. We had 
our own machine guns, and we had our positions for them to go, in 
case Alert No. 3 or 2 was put into effect. 

79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 2 17 



1044 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

28. General Grunert. Did you ever hear of a warning that was sent 
through the Navy, which started out to this effect — 

Consider this a war warning? 
General WurrE. I did not. 

29. General Grunert. Then, so far as you were concerned, you con- 
sidered an alert against sabotage as of sufficient protection under the 
instructions received, is that right? 

[199S] General White. Under the instructions as I knew them. 

30. General Grunert. I gather from your testimony as to what you 
understood of the situation prior to the attack, that you were not 
alarmed about an attack coming, is that right? 

General White. That is correct. I would like to add right here that 
the reason I make that statement is that, in my War College class of 
'32, we had 10 or 12 very bright naval officers, and I distinctly remem- 
ber, and have carried it in my mind ever since, that the theory which 
they spoke openly at all times was that in any war between this 
country and the Japanese, we would have to take that war to Japan, 
that Japan would never risk a naval engagement further than a 
thousand miles from her shore ; and throughout the whole year, as I 
say, the concensus of those men was to the effect that we would take the 
war to Japan in case of a war. 

31. General Grunert. Then you never visualized the ability of the 
Japanese to bring the war over as far as Hawaii, initially, at least? 

General White. I must say I did not. 

32. General Grunert. Have you any questions. General Frank? 

33. General Frank. Yes. 

From your analysis of the feeling that you had against the Japs, 
I infer that it was a general state of uncertainty and suspicion. 
General White. That is correct. 

34. General Frank. But the background for this so far as any fac- 
tual proof of it is concerned, is very nebulous, isn't it? 

General White. That is correct. I might say that altogether I 
have been in the Hawaiian Islands, to my knowledge, six of the ten 
past years, and have noticed among the Japanese [19991 this 
shrewdness, this grinning of theirs, indications all the way along that, 
"Well, if I could knife you in the back, I would be delighted to do it, 
if I was sure I wouldn't be punished." It is that attitude. 

35. General Frank. That is an impression that you got? 
General White. That is correct. 

36. General Frank. As a inatter of fact, their characteristics are 
very different from the characteristics of an American ? 

General White. Yes. 

37. General Frank. Their cultural background and practices are 
completely different from the American, is that right? 

General White. That is right. 

38. General Frank. What about their ethics ? 
General White. I am not prepared to answer that. 

39. General Frank. How do they compare with the ethics of Amer- 
icans? 

General White. I would say they didn't have any to speak of. 

40. General Frank. All right. Now, let us analyze their patriot- 
ism a little. 



PROCEEDINGS OF AKAIY PEARL PIARBOR BOARD 1045 

General White. I think their patriotism is ])nrely a veneer. You 
were speakin<j:; of i)atriotisni toward our country? 

41. General Frank. I am talking just about patriotism. If you 
are going to discuss it, discuss it under (a) and (b) — (a), their pa- 
triotism for Japan, and (b) their patriotism for the United States. 

General AViirrE. All right. Then we will discuss it under (a), 
their patriotism to Japan. That was manifested on all occasions 
where any celebration such as the emperor's birthday [2000] 
or any holiday that would be in Japan, They would tiy their flags 
for all kinds of ceremonies, and it was quite evident that their loyalty 
to Japan was just as one might expect. 

42. General Frank. Were j'ou conversant with the Japanese law in 
their homeland relative to the status of a Jap born of Japanese parents 
in the United States or in Hawaii ? 

General White. It is my understanding that the Japanese never 
gave up that particular person as a citizen of Japan, notwithstanding 
the fact that he was an American citizen under our law. In other 
words, there was a dual citizenship, so far as the Japanese were con- 
cerned. 

4o. General Fi;.\n k. Now, for him to become a full-out citizen of the 
United States and cease to be claimed as a citizen of Japan, do you 
remember what was necessary ? 

General White. As I remember, he had to go to court and sign 
away his allegiance to the emperor and all connections with his coun- 
try. I am not in a ])osition to discuss all the details, but I know that 
something like that had to be done. 

44. General Frank. And he had to do that even though he were a 
native-born Jap ? 

General White. Yes. 

45. (general Frank. With respect to this impression that you got 
from the naval officers at the War College in 1932 about the "1,000 
miles,'' did it ever occur to you that there has been technical and in- 
dustrial progress in the meantime which greatly increased the range 
of aircraft and service craft to an exte;it such that that 1,000 miles 
might have been considerably altered? 

General White. Yes, sir; and on the other hand, in late years, of 
course, we taught that you don't put battleships and [£001] 

naval craft up against land-based aircraft, and that in thinking this 
thing over, what thought we gave to it over there was that an armada 
or a task force suflicient to attack the Hawaiian Islands would be of 
such size that it certainly would be reported long before it approached 
the islands, especially as the Navy were carrying on their observations 
daily, on the lookout for just such an event. 

46. General Frank. Did you ever analyze the possibilities of a raid 
such as that which occurred ? 

General White. No. 

47. General Filvnk. Did you ever believe that such a thing would 
happen ? 

General White. Definitely, I didn't believe it could happen. 

48. General Frank. How risky an undertaking do you consider it 
was? 

General White. I think if that had hai)pencd at any time other 
than Sunday morning it might have been quite disastrous for the 



1046 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Japanese, and while that doesn't answer your question, I think your 
question must be answered that it was quite risky, in my opinion. 

[2002] 49. General Frank. Do you think it was a very daring 
unusual venture? 

General White. Not necessarily so, under the circumstances. War 
had not been declared. It was an aerial attack with, as we have been 
told, two carriers ; and for a nation 

50, General Frank. How many carriers? 

General White. I understand there were two, may have been more ; 
but for a nation at war to undertake such a mission, it was quite risky. 

51 General Frank. I would like to ask one more question: What 
do you think would have been the attitude of Japan toward the same 
number of Americans in Japan as there were Japanese in Hawaii? 

General White. What do you mean by "attitude" ; I mean in that 
case? 

52. General Frank. Do you think they would have been interned, 
or what would have happened to them ? 

General White. I am quite suie they would have been interned. 

53. General Grunert. Prior to the declaration of war? 
General White. Oh, no. No, I didn't understand that was prior 

to the declaration of war. I might state that I was in Japan on one 
occasion, in uniform, and at every train that I got off there would be 
an official at my side asking me my name, my business, where I was 
going, how long I expected to remain. Now, whether that happened 
to all other officers in uniform, I don't know, but it was quite apparent 
from that that they were watching very closely American officers 
who were in Japan. 

[2003] General Frank. Did you ever see a similar scrutiny of 
Japanese in the United States? 

General White. I did not. I have not. 

55. General Grunert. Did you ever see any Japanese officers in the 
United States in uniform ? 

General White. No, although I have seen them in the Hawaiian 
Department, which is a territory of the United States. 

56. General Russell. Was this flag-flying on national holidays 
carried on by native-born Japs as well as by those who were born in the 
Empire ? 

General Whtte. It is my impression that it was. 

57. General Russell. Your impression is that there was a sharp line 
of demarcation out there between the Japanese and all other groups? 

General White. In their patriotism? I mean, their attitude 
toward their native country ? 

58. General Russell. Well, in their living together, going together, 
worshipping the Emperor, and those things, they were a sort of unity 
in the Hawaiian Department ? 

General White. That is correct. 

59. General Russell. They didn't amalgamate with other races 
at all? 

General White. Let me state it this way: In '35-'37 when I was 
over there it was unusual to see a Japanese with anyone else but a 
Japanese. When I returned in 1940 it was not unusual to see a Japa- 
nese fraternizing with the American soldiers, going to the picture 
shows, going to parties and dances with them, and I know of two cases 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1047 

where Chinese have married Japanese women. That happened on my 
second tour. Durino; my first tour [SOO^] I saw none of that 
and I think but very little of that existed at that time. 

60. General Russell. So far as you know- those two cases that you 
have referred to are the only two cases of intermarriage of Japanese 
with other nationalities ? 

General White. So far as I know of the Chinese intermarrying with 
the Japanese, but I think there have been some American soldiers 
that have married some of the Japanese. 

61. General Eussell. Did they dominate the commercial life of 
Honolulu and other towns out there ? 

General White. The Japanese and Chinese practically control all 
of the small business. 

62. General Russell. The larger businesses were American? 
General White. The larger businesses were the Americans. 

63. General Russell. Did you buy goods from many Japanese in 
connection with your duties as Quartermaster? 

General White. Yes. 

64. General Russell. You had an opportunity, then, to deal with the 
Japanese and get his outlook on life ? 

General White. Yes ; and I might say, in business it was no different 
from any American concern. 

65. General Russell. There was nothing out there just prior to the 
attack that convinced you that war was imminent, including this mes- 
sage that General Grunert read to you in whole or in part? 

General White. No, I would not say that. That message indicated 
that the relations were right at the breaking point, and I didn't ques- 
tion — I never have questioned — the fact that some day Japan and the 
United States would figlit a war, but [£005] there was nothing 
in my mind that indicated that such an attack as happened would 
happen. 

66. General Russell. General, you discussed or you made a state- 
ment that other than on Sunday morning you do not think that 
attack would have had any chance at all? 

General White. No, not exactly in those words. I stated this : that 
if the attack had come any other morning but Sunday it would have 
found our men more prepared. Sunday morning a great many men 
were off duty that normally during a week day would be at their post 
and would be on duty, but I think that attack would have had. con- 
siderably less chance and might have been quite serious for Japan 
had it happened on a morning other than Sunday. 

67. General Russell. And your sole reason for that conclusion is 
that we would have had more men on duty any other morning? 

General White. I think so. 

68. General Russell. That is all I have. 

69. General Geuneet. From part of your testimony I was led to 
believe that j^ou believe that the Navy was conducting long-distance 
reconnaissance practically regularly. 

General White. That is my understanding. 

70. General Gkunert. Now, do you have any definite knowledge as 
to whether they did or not? 

General White. Other than that I was told and that the Navy sent 
their ships out a certain number of miles, and then from there their 



1048 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

planes took off and it is my understanding that it was at least 600 
miles out : in other words, that the ships went out a certain distance, 
and then the planes went out farther than that, and that they cov- 
ered approximately 600 miles out. 

\2Q06^ 71. General Grunert. You did not know, then, what 
these task forces went out for, whether reconnaissance or whether it 
was maneuvers of their own, or whether they were covering the per- 
imeter around the islands or not, did you? 

General White. Now, you must remember that my job was the 
Department Quartermaster, the Supply Officer, and I was not in on a 
lot of the conferences, and all, where the tactical 

72. General Grunert. Then, it appeared to be just your impres- 
sion without any definite knowledge on the subject. 

General White. Other than having been told in more or less words 
to that effect, that there was such a mission. 

73. General Frank. By whom? 

General White. Well, I can't recall right now any particular per- 
son, but it was generally understood. 

74. General Frank. It was just general conversation, however? 
General White. That is correct. 

75. General Frank. And impression? 
General White. Yes. 

76. General Grunert. What gave you the impression, then, that the 
Navy was doing the job of taking care of the outside? 

General White. We understood that that was their mission. 

77. General Gruneirt. Now, then, from your military education and 
from what you know of the past tactics and strategy of the Japanese 
and the Germans, is it not true that the Japanese usually attempted to 
get in the first blow, which was practically a blow with a declaration 
of war at the time the blow was given ? 

General White. I know that happened in the Russia War, Russia- 
Japanese War; but at the same time there was part of the Russian 
Fleet very close to the Japanese Islands at the time of that naval 
engagement. 

78. General Grunert. And is it not true that the Japanese followed 
the German tactics and had been instructed by Germans \_W07'\ 
in their military education ? 

General White. It is my understanding that that is a fact and that 
their general staff is taken right from the German General Staub, as 
they call it, or more or less copied from them. 

79. General Grunert. And also that the Germans usually sought 
surprise, and particularly on Sunday morning? 

General WnrrE. That is correct. I think we were all influenced by 
the great distance between Japan and the Hawaiian Islands as to such 
a surprise move on the part of Japan. 

80. General Grunert. Just one more question : Have you anything 
that you think might be of assistance to the Board in getting at facts, 
that you can add to your testimony or give the Board any leads as 
to where they might get at such facts, that has not been brought out 
during your testimony ? 

General White. No. I would simply like to add one statement: 
that I knew a great many people in the Hawaiian Islands ; I talked to 
a great many oflScers, Army officers, Navy officers; and I have my 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1049 

doubts that any officer in the Army or Navy at that time over there 
had any idea that such an attack as happened on December 7th, 1941, 
was possible. Now, that is my opinion and my impression gamed 
from spending quite a time over there and discussing at various times 
what might happen. 

81. General Grunert. Anything further? (No response.) 

Thank you very much. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

[2008] TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GEORGE S. WELCH, AIR CORPS, 
ORLANDO, FLORIDA. 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Major, will you please state to the Board your 
name, rank, organization, and station? 

Major Welch. My name is George S. Welch, Major, Air Corps, 
0398557. I am stationed with the A. A. F. Board, Orlando, Florida. 
I am now on terminal leave from that organization. 

2. General Grunert. Major, the Board is after facts as to what 
happened before and during ths attack on Pearl Harbor. Because 
you were a witness before the Roberts Commission we called on you 
to appear before this Board, to see what you could give to us. I have 
but one point as far as your testimony is concerned that I want to look 
into, but if there is anything else which you can give to the Board 
which will assist it we shall be glad to get it. 

Now, will you tell us what your assignment was, and when, during 
1941 in Hawaii? 

Major Welch. You mean, sir, before the war started, up to the 
war ? 

3. General Grunert. Yes. 

Major Welch. I was a Second Lieutenant, sir, assigned to the 47th 
Pursuit Squadron, stationed at Wheeler Field in February, 1941, and 
I arrived in the Islands and was stationed there still at the time that 
the war started. My squadron was on temporary duty at an auxiliary 
field, Haleiwa, actually when the war started, the day it started. 

4. General Frank. What were you doing down there ? 

Major Welch. Our squadron was out there, sir, for gunnery 
[£009j camp. 

5. General Frank. That is how you happened to have ammunition? 
Major Welch. Well, we had some ammunition. We had .30 

caliber. 

6. General Frank. What kind of planes did you have? 

Major Welch. As nearly as I can remember, sir, we had four or 
six P-40Bs, about a dozen P-36As, two A-20s, and a B-12 and about 
five P-26s. 

7. General Grunert. The one particular question I have here: 
You testified that the guards at M-a-1-a-i-w-a Field had no instruc- 
tions as to what to do if the enemy planes came over. Now, what 
field was that ? I haven't heard this name mentioned before. 

Major Welch. Haleiwa, sir. H-a-1. 

8. General Grunert. That is H-a-1? 
Major Welch, Yes, sir. 



1050 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

9. General Grunert. Now, what was the guarding system at that 
field and what were the instructions in the event of an attack, if 
any ? Do you know ? 

Major Welch. Sir, as far as I can remember there were no in- 
structions to cover any possibility of aerial attack. The only possi- 
bility of attack that was covered was either sabotage or an enemy 
landing. 

10. General Grunert. What was this field ? Just a gunnery range ? 
Major Welch. No, sir. Haleiwa Field was a very short, sandy 

field originally used as an emergency landing field, and probably 
about six months before the war started they had [2010] 
chopped down a few trees and were allowing fighter squadrons to 
operate out of there as an emergency field to practice shortfield land- 
ings; and a month before the war started, the 15th Group, of which 
the 47th Squadron is a part, was sending each squadron out there 
for two weeks in rotation to operate off of the field in simulated 
combat conditions. 

11. General Grunert. Who was the commanding officer of that 
field at that time ? 

Major Welch. Well, the commanding officer, sir, was the com- 
manding officer of the squadron that happened to be there. 

12. General Grunert. Then the commanding officer was changed? 
Major Welch. Yes, sir. 

13. General Grunert. Was there no permanent post complement 
there? 

Major Welch. Yes, sir. There was a Lieutenant Currie who was 
Post Quartermaster PX. Really, sir, there was nothing there, no 
installations. We brought our own tents and everything with us. 

. 14. General Grunert. That is, it was just a question of guarding 
your own planes, was it? 

Major Welch. Yes, sir; just our own personal equipment. 

15. General Grunert. What happened to that field when the at- 
tack took place? 

Major Welch. The 'Japs passed right over it, apparently didn't 
notice its existence or didn't know that we were using it ; and about 
the second raid I think one or two planes made a pass at the field, 
shot up a couple of P-36s. 

16. General Grunert. So there was little damage done there? 
Major Welch. There was no damage done, sir, except to a few 

X2011] airplanes. 

17. General Grunert. And then, as a matter of fact, the lack of 
such a guard and instructions what to do in case of an attack didn't 
have much effect as far as the actual attack was concerned, did it? 

Major Welch. No, sir. By the time the Japs did make one pass 
at the field, the men had machine guns out, .30 caliber ground guns, 
and they shot back at this man, this Jap. 

18. General Grunert. Well, now, about how many planes all told 
were on that field at the time of the attack ? 

Major Welch. The original attack? 

19. General Grunert. Yes. 

Major Welch. Everything we had. I imagine it was — I just gave 
you an approximate idea of what we had. I suppose it was about 
16, 18. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PKARL HARBOR BOARD 1051 

20. General (Ji;tiNi:RT. About 1<). Wcih' tlicy bnncluHl. all put to- 
gether, or Avere they spread or dis])ers(Ml. or w hat ? 

Major Wia-cir. No. sir. They were lined up in a jx-id'cct line right 
down one side of the field. 

21. General GitUNKUT. Is that \\ha( is always done in ])(>acetinie. 
or is that a sjiecial measure against sabotage, or what!' 

Major ^A'klcii. At Wheeler Field, sir, we liad revetments, and the 
airplanes had been called back from the revetments because of sabo- 
tage. At Ilaleiwa we had no revetments, and we just ])arked them 
there just to look nice, and also to keep them bunched so we could 
guard them easier. 

22. General Grunekt. Then, the concentration of jtlanes Avas really 
normal ])i'ocedure? 

^bijor "Welch. Yes, sir. 

I'^OLJ] General Grunert. Routine ])rocedure. 

Major Welch. Except, sir, that they had started thiidcing about 
dispersal at Wheeler Field and had built revetments which were un- 
occupied. 

24. General Frank. You took oft' in a ])lane and conducted a little 
attack, didn't you? 

Majoi- Wei.cli. Yes, sir. 

25. General Frank. What did you take off in? 
Major Welch. A P-40B. 

2C).' General Frank. P-40B. 

Major Welch. That is the second or tliird model. 

27. General Frank. What hap])ened ? Did you shoot any down? 

Majoi* Welch. Yes, sir. 

2S. General Frank. How many? 

Major Welch. I claimed four definitely, sir. 

29. General Frank. All right. Did anybody else take off from 
up there? 

Major Welch. Yes. sir. Lieutenant Taylor took off witli me as 
my wing man, at fii'st. 

30. G-eneral Frank. All right. 

Major Welch. About half an hour or an hour later three or fowv 
othei' pilots took off from Haleiwa. 

81. General Frank. How uuiuy did they get? 

Major Welch. Between the planes that took off from Si'hofield 
and the ones that they finally got off from Wheeler Field. T think we 
shot down 12 planes definitely. 

32. Genei'al Frank. All right. Taking that as a background and 
assuming that you had been on a different kind of an alert at Wheeler, 
so that they could have taken off in a matter of a [2013] feAv 
minutes with GO or 75 planes, and considering the state of gunnery 
training of the fighters at Wheeler, what do you think they could liave 
done to that Jap attack? 

Major Welch. Providing, sir, that the pilots were ready to go. as 
you said, and had ammunition in their planes, we could have shot every 
one of them down except the fighters before they got to the Island. 

33. General Frank. You think? 

Major Welch. I know, sir; I mean from what T have seen Avith the 
same type of equipment they used against us there and down in the 
Pacific. We have fought the same thing. Their dive bombers wouldn't 



1052 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

have gotten through. They might have strafed a bit with their 
fighters, but there wouldn't have been any bombs in there or torpedoes. 

34. General Frank. This boy has a very outstanding reputation as 
an accurate shot. 

35. General Grunert. Then naturally that is why he assumes if all 
the rest of them were of his caliber they would have gotten quite a 
number. 

36. General Frank. I simply mention that in passing. 

Major Welch. No, sir. I have seen — in New Guinea at one time I 
had a squadron of average pilots and trainee pilots that knocked down 
the same type of Jap ship, and not a one got through. 

37. General Grunert. How about the torpedo bombers ? They are 
pretty slow, aren't they ? 

Major Welch. Yes, sir. 

38. General Grunert. Are they easier to get at than the others 
as far as shooting is concerned ? 

[2014] Major Welch. Yes, sir; the Japanese dive bomber and 
torpedo bomber are sitting ducks. 

39. General Frank. That is all I wanted to bring out. 

40. General Russell. Sitting ducks for the type of aircraft that you 
had out on Oahu on December 7, '41 ? 

Major Welch. For our 75 P^Os; not for our other equipment. 

41. General Russell. How many of those 75 P-40s did you have out 
on Oahu available for action that morning? 

Major Welch. Well, sir, they were all available. Of course, they 
didn't have guns in them. 

42. General Russell. Well, I know. If they had had the guns and 
ammunition, how many P-40s were out there ready to go into action ; 
do you know ? 

43. General Frank. He wouldn't know. 

Major Welch. I believe at least 75 or 100, sir. You could find that. 

44. General Russell. You are on terminal leave from what? 
Major Welch. I am on terminal leave from the air forces boards. 

I have been donated to North American by the Air Corps to be an 
engineering test pilot. 

45. General Grunert. Any other questions? (No response.) There 
appear to be none. Thank you very much. Major, for coming. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 
(Thereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, a recess was taken until 2 o'clock 

p.m.) 

[WJ6] afternoon session 

(The Board reconvened at 2 p. m., and continued the hearing of 
witnesses, as follows:) 

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL W. A. CAPRON; OEDNANCE DEPARTMENT 
OGDEN ARSENAL, OGDEN, UTAH 

(The witness Avas sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24. ) 

1. Colonel West. Colonel, would you please state to the Board 
your name, rank, organization, and station. 

Colonel Capron. Capron, W. A. ; Colonel, Ordnance Department. 
My station is Ogden Arsenal, Ogden, Utah. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1053 

2. General Grunert. Colonel, this Board is after facts, and leads 
that may get other facts ; and because of your assignment and position 
during 1941 we asked you to come here to testify, with the hope 
that we might get something that would help us. What was your 
position and assignment in the Hawaiian Department in 1941, and 
give us the dates. 

Colonel Capron. From August 1938 until December 30, 1941, I had 
the dual function of Department Ordnance Officer of the Hawaiian 
Department, and as Commanding Officer of the Hawaiian Ordnance 
Depot. 

3. General Grunert. Then, because of that assignment, you had an 
accurate knowledge of ordnance equipment, did you ? 

Colonel Capron. Yes, sir. 

4. General Grunert. Generally speaking, was the Department well 
equipped in ordnance items, or was it deficient in some material items ? 

Colonel Capron. When, sir, may I ask? 

5. General Grunert. At the time of the attack. 

Colonel Capron. It is very difficult to answer that [2016] 
question with any degree of accuracy, on account of the time period 
that has elapsed. 

6. General Grunert. Give us your general impressions as to the 
equipment of the department in the ordnance line, as you remember 
it. 

Colonel Capron. As I remember, sir, the seacoast, in both arma- 
ment and ammunition, was in excellent condition. The mobile 
ground weapons, I think we lacked 105 howitzers; we had some but 
not the full complement; and 90-mm. antiaircraft, of which we had 
none. That was a new weapon, sir, at that period. 

7. General Grunert. How about ammunition for antiaircraft 
weapons ? 

Colonel Capron. Our auumnition for the weapons which we had, 
the 3-inch M-1, was good ammunition. We had been using the 
powder-train fuse. Before the blitz, however, the new fuse centers 
which handled the mechanical fuse arrived and we had changed over 
a large portion of the ammunition into mechanical-fuse items. 

8. General Grunert. Give us a few facts about the storage of am- 
munition. What was the status of that at that time ? 

Colonel Capron. Ammunition storage for what we had was ex- 
cellent — no, I will say superior. The total reserve was underground 
in tunnels, the Department reserve. 

9. General Grunert. Did you lose any ammunition on account of 
the attack? 

Colonel Capron. Absolutely none of the reserve. One bomb hit 
in the floor of the Aliamanu crater, which is drilled from the inside, 
but it had no effect. 

10. General Grunert. Now, what can you tell us about the ship- 
[W17] ment of supplies from the mainland to the islands, as far 
as you recall ? Were there any unusual delays, or was the transporta- 
tion about what you expected? 

Colonel Capron. There are two answers, there, sir, before and after 
the 7tli of December, 1941. Before, it was usual and normal. It was 
not so much a question of transportation ; it was, as I remember, the 
items were not on hand on the mainland or that the Philippines, hav- 



1054 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ing a higher priority than we had, a large number of items "were going 
over there which we would have liked to have had, but they just didu't 
have them. 

11. General Grunert. Do you recall when the Philippines had a 
higher priority than you did on ordnance materials ? 

Colonel Capron. ISTo, sir. 

12. General Grunert. But that was your own understanding and 
impression ? 

Colonel Capron. That was my impression. 

13. General Grunert. You don't know, then, when suddenly toward 
the latter part of 1941 they might have had a higher priority, but be- 
fore that, they did not have as high a priority ? 

Colonel Capron. I believe. General, all of that is a matter of record 
on the status report, the ordnance status report for the Hawaiian De- 
partment. I wouldn't venture a definite answer; but it was my im- 
pression that they were getting things that we would love to have had. 

14. General Grunert. That was your impression ? 
Colonel Capron. Yes, sir. 

15. General Grunert. But you have no evidence to that eifect ? 
Colonel Capron. No, sir. It is a matter of record, after the 7th — 

if I may finish that first question, sir — transportation [2018] 
poured in there. We couldn't have had better service. 

16. General Grunert. You mean, then, after the attack on Decem- 
ber 7, things started pouring in? 

Colonel Capron. Yes, sir. 

17. General Grunert. They came at a more rapid rate than they did 
prior to that time? 

Colonel Capron. They poured in so fast, sir, we could hardly un- 
load it. 

18. General Grunert. Now, as to any deficiencies in ordnance ma- 
terial that may have existed, did that in any way affect the taking of 
appropriate defensive measures with what you had? 

Colonel Capron. No, sir. 

19. General Grunert. You told us that you were the Department 
Ordnance Officer. As such, did you attend conferences of the De- 
partment staff? 

Colonel Capron. All of the conferences. 

20. General Grunert. Do you recall attending a conference any 
time about November 27 or thereafter, before the attack — any particu- 
lar conference? 

Colonel Capron. There were so many urgent conferences called 
along in that period that I couldn't pin it down, sir. 

21. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not General Short 
ordered the alert which they call the "sabotage alert," about that time ? 

Colonel Capron. We had had alerts, sir, beginning in April, one 
after the other. They became more frequent and of longer duration, 
with more confinement of troops to their arms, as December ap- 
proached. 

22. General Grunert. Do you recall whether you were at a 
[WIO] conference wherein the Commanding General or the Chief 
of Staff referred to a message then received from the Chief of Staff 
concerning the Japanese-American situation, in which they were given 
directives to do so and so, and cautioned not to do so and so ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1055 

Colonel Capron. I remember somethino; about the American-Japa- 
nese relations comino; up in an urgent conference that had been called. 
The "radio" was read and discussed, but I am hazy on any indicated 
action by the War Department. 

23. General Grunert. What was your state of mind as to the im- 
minence of a war with Japan toward the latter part of 1941? 

Colonel Capron. I felt that it was reasonable to suppose that we 
would have war; that if we had, it would not come as soon as it 
actually did, and that if it should, we would have plenty of advance 
notice. 

24. General Grunert. From whom did you expect such notice ? 
Colonel Capron. From the War Department, sir, who presumably 

would get the idea from the State Department. We had always 
counted on a period between the announcement of war and the actual 
meeting of the enemy. In fact, we had programs which postponed 
construction, to hold it for this — I have forgotten what we called the 
period. 

25. General Frank. Was it a "period of strained relations"? 
Colonel Capron. Yes, sir; that was it, a "period of strained rela- 
tions." 

26. General Grunert. Did this message that was read to you at this 
conference indicate to you, as you considered it, a period of strained 
relations ? 

Colonel Capron. Now, which conference, was that, sir? 

[2020'] 27. General Grunert. That is the one you just mentioned. 

Colonel Capron. The one in November ? 

28. Geiieral Grunert. Approximately November 27. Did you have 
other conferences in which messages were read or referred to ? 

Colonel Capron. Yes, quite a number of them, sir. 

29. General Grunert. Messages from the United States ? 
Colonel Capron. Yes, sir. 

30. General Grunert. From the Chief of Staff ? 
Colonel Capron. In my remembrance ; yes, sir. 

31. General Grunert. Does any one of these conferences stand out 
in your mind as being of great importance, of more importance than 
other conferences you had ? 

Colonel Capron. We had one alert in November. The only way I 
can fix it. General, is that it was so intense and so sustained that after 
things eased up, I assembled my ordnance battalion and gave them a 
talk, made a speech to them, in which I had obtained a verbal com- 
mendation from General Short to them. If that is the principal one, 
I presume it might have indicated strained relations, 

32. General Grunert. I will ask the recorder to read to you the 
Chief of Staff's message to the Commanding General, Hawaiian De- 
partment, 27 November 1941, to see whether or not that will bring back 
to your memory whether a particular conference was held on that 
message. 

Colonel West (reading) : 

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes 
with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back 
and offer to continue. .Tapanesce future action impredictable but hostile 
[2021] action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, 
be avoided, U. S. desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy 



1056 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that 
might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed 
to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, 
but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the 
civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Sliould hostilities 
occur you will carry out the tasks assigned In Rainbow 5 as far as they pertain 
to Japan. Limit discussion of this highly secret information to minimum essential 
ofBcers. 

33. General Grunert. Do you recall whether there was a conference 
on that message ? 

Colonel Capron. Yes, sir. May I ask what the date of that was? 

34. Colonel West. November 27, 1941. 

Colonel Capron. I remember the wording, sir, now — "Let Japan 
commit the first overt act," and that we couldn't do anything that 
would alarm the population on the island. 

35. General Grunert. Those two things seem to stand out in your 
mind. If they stand out in your mind, why do not these other things 
stand out in your mind, such as : 

This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of 
action that might jeopardibze your defense. 

Then, another thing is, in the message, the part which says : 

You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you 
deeim necessary. 



Wliy do certain things stand out in your mind, there, as 
compared to other things in that message? Were they emphasized, or 
was it because they went on a sabotage alert, or what ? Have you any 
recollection of why those two things that you mentioned stood out 
more than any others? 

Colonel Capron. No, I have not, sir. 

36. General Grunert. If any other measures were adopted, how 
in your opinion would they alarm the populace, or disclose the intent? 
Have you thought on that ? 

Colonel Capron. I don't quite understand. General, what you mean. 

37. General Grunert. Now, you picked out two parts of the mes- 
sage, "don't alarm the public," and the "overt act." Now, if other 
measures had been taken, besides antisabotage measures, how in your 
opinion would the public have become alarmed ? Have you thought of 
it in that line ? 

Colonel Capron. I had not ; no, sir. 

38. General Grunert. Did anything in particular come up at this 
conference as to discussion of the various parts of this message, or 
were any reasons expressed why they went into an antisabotage alert 
instead of an all-out alert? 

Colonel Capron. I can't remember any particular conversation or 
any words in connection with that particular message. 

39. General Grunert. Now, you stated in your testimony something 
to the effect that there was a period which you afterwards identified 
as "a period of strained relations," in which certain construction 
should go forward. 

Colonel Capron. Yes, sir. 

40. General Grunert. That intimates that up to that time 
[2023] certain construction was not to be prosecuted. What sort 
of construction was that? Do you recall what was delayed until 
strained relations came into being? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1057 

Colonel CArRON. There is a large number of those items, sir. I can't 
remember one, any detail on it, but that is a matter of record, and I 
am sure it is on file in the records of the Hawaiian Department. 

41. General Grunert. There are a lot of things to be done, later, 
when you declare M-Day, which is presumably declared when strained 
relations reach such a point that war is practically imminent, but you 
think there were some actual construction projects that would go for- 
ward in that period ? 

Colonel Capron". Absolutely, sir; and as I recall, they were engi- 
neer's construction. They didn't have any funds to do this, that, or the 
other. One of the things I cheated and I used Ordnance money to do, 
a job which the engineers didn't have any funds on, rather than put 
the thing off until we happened to have a fight. 

42. General Grunert. Then it was your understanding that when 
this period of strained relations came across, there would be funds 
available and additional authorizations and some additional construc- 
tion would take place ? 

Colonel Capron. I always considered that as being — we all sort of 
looked forward to that as "Christmas Day," when all of these things 
that we had been after would suddenly come forth. 

43. Generall Grunert. They started to come forth after the attack, 
didn't they ? 

Colonel Capron. Yes, sir ; they did. 

44. General Grunert. That was along toward Christmas, wasn't it? 
[2024.] Colonel Capron. Yes, sir. I did not mean to be face- 
tious. 

45. General Grunert. Now, there is one other item I would like to 
get some facts or some opinions on. As Department Ordnance Officer, 
among other things you were particularly interested in antiaircraft 
and antiaircraft ammunition ? 

Colonel Capron. Yes, sir. 

46. General Grunert. Do you know whether antiaircraft was kept 
in position, where its ammunition was, for varicms types of alert? 

Colonel Capron. Not off-hand. We had three types of alert. I 
think we w^ere in a No. 1 on the 7th. We went in, Saturday, I think. 
I do know, before the morning of the attack, that the antiaircraft regi- 
ments — there were three regular-service and one very good National 
Guard regiment out in the field in position. We had the proper am- 
munition at all of the fixed AA positions, right at the guns, and in 
most cases it was out in the field with the n:iobile AA's. 

47. General Grunert. Of course, it was your business to furnish 
ammunition, but it was not yoiir business to put it at the guns, was it? 

Colonel Capron. No, sir. However, it was up to me. General, to 
have ordnance machinists, ordnance troopers out with these units to 
look after them, the mechanisms of the weapons, and so on, and also 
to look after the treatment of the ammunition ; and I had those ord- 
nance soldiers who were out there at these places. 

48. General Grunert. Do you know whether any of the antiair- 
craft positions for defense against air attack were in and about the 
populated parts of the City of Honolulu ? 

Colonel Capron. Well, the only one I know of, sir, was [2025\ 
the fixed weapons up in Fort Euger. We had, I think, four guns up 
there near a hospital. We had never proved or fired them for fear 



1058 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of the noise. It miglit frighten people ; but those are the only weap- 
ons that I remember of, off-hand as being right in Honolulu. 

49. General Grunert. Do you know where the mobile antiaircraft 
weapons were to be mobilized in the defense ? 

Colonel Capron. No, sir. That was a variable situation. General. 

50. General Grunert, Do you know whether or not the actual plac- 
ing of what we call "live ammunition" near positions would have 
alarmed the population ? 

Colonel Capron. Well, I doubt it very much. I don't believe it 
made any difference. We were always having maneuvers, sir. There 
was ammunition being hauled all over the island. There were truck 
trains, and so on. We were shipping it on the ONL Railway, and we 
had a long series of maneuvers up, I think, around October, where the 
Navy actually flew some planes over to assimulate an attack ; so there 
was so much commotion, so much going on from the Army standpoint, 
that I doubt if the mere placing of live ammunition, there couldn't 
have been any particular reaction. 

[2026] 51. General Grunert. Have you any questions. Gen- 
eral Russell ? 

52. General Russell. What was the state of supply of antiaircraft 
ammunition on December 7, Colonel ? 

Colonel Capron. I indicated, sir, as I remember, that it was in sat- 
isfactory condition ; yes, sir. 

53. General Russell. How many calibers did you have? How 
many types of ammunition? 

Colonel Capron. Three 37s and — I may be wrong on the 37s. I am 
not sure of the 37s. We had 3-inch Cal."50, Cal. 30. We had no 40s, 
of course, nor 20s nor anything of that sort. 

54. General Russell. You had your full equipment of antiaircraft 
weapons except those 90 millimeters ? 

Colonel Capron. Yes, sir ; we didn't have any 90s. That was a very 
new weapon then, sir. 

55. General Russell. But everything else, you had a full comple- 
ment of weapons ? 

Colonel Capron. I am a little hazy on the 37s. We had some of 
those, but I doubt if we had many. 

56. General Russell. I guess that is all. 

57. General Frank. How did you stand on bombs and ammunition* 
Colonel Capron. The bombs were fine, as I remember. General, but 

as to the aimnunition I am hazy. 

58. General Frank. All right. 

Colonel Capron. Cal. 50 later became a low point : we gave so much 
to the Navy that we starved the Army. 

59. General Grunert. Now, Colonel, we have had many witnesses 
and we shall have many more, so the Board does not want simply to 
pile up evidence just to have a fat record, but we would like to find 
out whether there is anything that stands out in [20^7'] your 
mind that might assist us, and for us to judge whether or not we 
have already covered it. 

Now, is there any one thing that stands out in your mind, or two 
or three, that you ought to tell the Board about that might have 
some bearing on this problem ? 

Colonel Capron. I have two things, sir. I have a lasting impres- 
sion that when I heard these Jap ships come over I thought, Well, 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1059 

the gang arrived from the mainland a little ahead of time. They 
had been ferr3dng in, and we were looking for some. The reason 
I knew that : when I heard the shooting, our airplanes had been 
coming over there, sir, and they had their armament unmounted. 
It was boxed up somewhere in the shops, and we had sent — or it 
hadn't come (3ver at all. I had wired, or we had all urged that here- 
after when ships came over they have the guns not only along with 
them but also mounted for doing business. Well, when we heard all 
these airplanes and all the shooting, we thought, Well, at last it 
percolated and they are arriving here as thej^ should have. 

60. General Grunert. Did they arrive shooting? 

Colonel Capron. It was the Japs, sir. That w^as the outstanding 
impression which I had. 

Another one was this ; it may be irrelevant here : Shortly after the 
blitz a representative of the White House, a young civilian, came over 
to the Islands to discuss presumably the subject of handling scrap 
metal. We had a staff meeting in the headquarters office at Shafter. 
Well, after this Aieeting was over and, oh, about two weeks later a 
nast}^ report came down from the War Department saying that they 
had gotten a report from this young civilian, sir, that the ordnance 
[B02S] anticraft ammunition had been so foul during the blitz 
that they had sprayed Honolulu and killed quite a few people. 

I want to bring out the fact that on the afternoon of the 7th, 
because there had been people killed in the city and something, pre- 
sumably Japanese bombs, had gone through houses — they had func- 
tioned ; they had hit out in the street ; they had killed people — I or- 
ganized a bomb squad of three, of civilian ammunition technicians. 
They went around and checked up every incident. We found what 
these things were. They were not Japanese; they were not Army 
ammunition. I would like to bring that out too 

61. General Grunert. What were they? 

Colonel Capron. I made a secret report on that, sir, to General 
Short in writing on the 9th or the 10th of December, and am I at 
liberty to say ? 

62. General Grunert. This is all secret and you are at liberty to 
state anything that you think may assist the Board in getting at the 
facts, sir. 

Colonel Capron. They were antiaircraft ammunition of another 
service, sir, whose time fuses had failed to function in the air. This 
particular type of ammunition had a base fuse with a tracer which 
would function on impact, and it was those items which led to the 
belief that the Japanese had bombed the city. 

63. General Grunert. Then, if the Board should consider it de- 
sirable or necessary to examine this report of yours, do you know where 
it is now located ? 

Colonel Capron. It should be, sir, in the safe of the Hawaiian De- 
partment. In fact, I sent — which was wrong — I sent [2029] the 
original up — it was a secret paper. The original went up to the for- 
ward echelon. It was locked in the safe and retained in the files of 
the Department Ordnance Office. Subsequently some question came 
up on that thing, and the original had disappeared, and I made a 
copy of my copy and sent it up to the then Chief of Staff, Colonel 

64. General Grunert. Of what? 
Colonel Capron. Sir? 

79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 2 18 



1060 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

65. General Grunert. Of what? Chief of Staff of what? The 
Hawaiian Department? 

Colonel Capron. Yes, sir. Colonel Phillips. 

66. General Grunert. Then, the reason or one of the reasons that 
you bring out now is to show 

Colonel Capron. To show that our ammunition, sir, was good. 

67. General Grunert. Your ammunition was good ? 
Colonel Capron. Yes, sir. 

68. General Grunert. And somebody else's ammunition was not 
so good? 

Colonel Capron. Yes, sir; the other fellow. 

69. General Grunert. And this ammunition was thrown in the air 
and didn't explode, and when it came down on the ground some of it 
did explode and some didn't? 

Colonel Capron. Yes, sir. 

70. General Grunert, When you said that the ammunition per- 
tained to another service, you meant other than the Army? 

Colonel Capron. Yes, sir. 

71. General Grunert. All right. Has anyone any other questions ? 
[2030] Colonel West. No. 

72. General Grunert. Then, that appears to be about all that you 
can think of that you think might be of value to the Board ? 

Colonel Capron. May I say one more thing, sir? I had heard 
there was a rumor the Army-Navy relations before the blitz had been 
not healthful. As far as the Ordnance was concerned, sir, I per- 
sonally, and my Ordnance agency, had fine relations with the Navy. 
We were almost hand in glove, and I have frequently gone over to 
the Chief of Staff over there of the District and gotten anything I 
wanted; and the Navy Ordnance and the Army Ordnance, who had 
a lot in common, were fine. 

73. General Grunert. All right. Thank you very much. 
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. WARREN T. HANNUM, RETIRED; SAN 
FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA. 

(The witness was sworn by the Kecorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board your 
name, rank, organization, and station ? 

General Hannum, Warren T. Hannum, Brigadier General, Re- 
tired, I was retired February 1st. On February 4th by appoint- 
ment of Governor Warren I was made Director of Natural Resources 
of the State of California, and hold that office at the present time. 

2. Colonel West. Where is your office, sir? _ 

General Hannum. My residence address is Apartment 21, 1201 
Greenwich Street, San Francisco. Office address is [20S1] 
Department of Natural Resources, State Office Building No. 1, Sacra- 
mento. 

8. (Teneral Grunert. Your retirement date was in 1944, was it, or 
104?>? 

General Hannum. It became effective February 1, 1944, 

4. General Grunert. You mentioned the date but not the year. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1061 

General Hanxu^m. Yes. 

5. General Gkunert. In our attempts to get at facts and to accom- 
plish the mission charged to the Board, the field is so broad that we 
divided some of these phases up between the Board members, and 
General Frank has this particular line of special investigation, so 1 
shall ask him to lead in questioning you, and the other members of 
the Board will piece out where they think they ought to get more 
information. 

General Hannum. Yes, sir. 

('). General Gruxert. (xeneral Frank. 

7. General Fraxk. Will you state, please, what position you held 
in 1941? 

General Haxxum. I was Division Engineer of the South Pacific 
Division, under the Chief of Engineers, which included all river and 
harbor, flood-control, and military construction work in the Pacific 
Coast States of California, Nevada, Arizona, part of Utah, and also 
the Hawaiian Islands. There was a district under my supervision 
in Hawaii, Honolulu, a district in Sacramento, a district in San 
Francisco, and one in Los Angeles. 

8. General Fraxk. You held the same position in 1942? 
General Haxxum. Yes, but in that year the South Pacific and 

North Pacific and Mountain Divisions were abolished and [203^'] 
combined into one division known as the Pacific Division, which in- 
cluded practically everything west of the Rocky Mountains except 
Hawaii, which had by that time been transferred to the control of 
the Conmianding General of the HaAvaiian Department. 

9. General Fraxk. Was Colonel Wyman in charge of one of your 
districts ? 

General Haxxum. He was the District Engineer in Honolulu, 
Hawaiian Islands. 

10. General Fraxk. Had you been Division Engineer when he was 
previously in Los Angeles? 

General Hax^xum. Yes. 

11. Major Clausex. Sir, are you familiar with the negotiations for 
the contract which was W-41-t-Eng-()02, dated 20 De'cember 1940, 
with the Hawaiian Constructors, for defense projects in Hawaii? 

General Haxxum. Yes. I do not know the contract by the number. 
I know it by the name, under Hawaiian Constructors. 

12. Major Clausex. You initiated the contract, didn't you, sir, by 
a letter to Colonel Wyman when he was stationed in Hawaii ? 

General Haxxum. No. As District Engineer he was responsible 
for the initiation. 

13. Major Clausex. Well, did you write him, sir, this letter, a copy 
of which is attached to the I. G.'file, report by Colonel Hunt, letter 
dated November 6, 1940, which I show you ? 

General Haxxuji. That is not my signature, but it is probable that 
I signed it, yes, sir. 

[2033'] 14. Major Clausex. But do you recall having sent a sim- 
ilar letter to him, if you cannot say that that is it? 

General ILvxxum. That is in conformity with my recollection of 
the circumstances, yes. 

15. Major Clausex. Yes. I would like to introduce this letter in 
evidence and read it into evidence, so that the Board may understand 
it. We then do not have to make photostats. 



1062 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

This is a letter dated November 6, 1940, on the letterhead of the 
Office of the Division Engineer, 351 California Street, San Fran- 
cisco, California. It is to : 

(Letter of November 6, 1940, Colonel Hannum to Lt. Col. Wyman, 
is as follows:) 

Lt. Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr., C. E., 
U. S. Engineer Office, 
Honolulu, T. H. 

Dbiae Wyman : I inclose herewith a letter received from Colonel Gesler, Office, 
Chief of Engineers, in reference to negotiated contracts on the basis of fixed 
price and also cost-plus-fixed-fee. The form for cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts is 
inclosed. 

If you negotiate on the basis of a fixed price, it appears, since you will not 
have the plans and specifications ready until December 20, that you could not 
negotiate before that time. After arriving at an agreement, it would take some 
time to execute it and then an additional month or two before equipment could 
be placed in Honolulu on the job. On the other hand, if you use a cost-plus- 
fixed-fee form, negotiations [203Jf] could be conducted without waiting 
for the detailed plans. Since the contractors interested are mainly on the main- 
land, it seems to me it would be well for you to come to the mainland to conduct 
the negotiations with specified parties on specified dates. We will sit in with 
you on these negotiations. 

Since the Navy contractors over there are on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis, it 
occurred to me that a contractor working for you on a fixed price basis would 
be at a disadvantage since the Navy work is much larger in amount than you 
would have. 

However, I prefer that you examine various methods in the light of existing 
conditions in Hawaii and come to your own conclusions as to methods and 
procedure. 

Sincerely yours. 

Warren T. Hannum, 
Colonel, Corps of Engineers, 

Division Engineer. 

Now, following that letter, sir, did Colonel Wyman come to the 
mainland and confer with you? 

General Hannum. Yes; he came to the mainland and conferred 
with me. 

1. Major Clausen. And would you state fully the particulars con- 
cerning what then happened, sir? 

General Hannum. He went to Los Angeles to confer with possible 
contractors at Los Angeles. Later I advised him, in view of the fact 
that neither I nor my office had had any [20J5] experience in 
cost-plus-fixed-fee work, and the contract would have to be approved 
in Washington, I advised him to proceed to Washington, to the Chief 
of Engineers Office, and conduct the negotiations there in order to 
expedite the completion of the contract and get the work started. 

2. Major Clausen. Well, now, between the dates that Colonel 
Wyman arrived and you had this preliminary talk with him, and 
your instructions that he proceed to Washington, you are aware, are 
you, that he went to Los Angeles and there discussed this contract 
with Hans Wilhelm Rohl ? 

General Hannum. I do not know that he conducted it with Hans 
Wilhelm Rohl. I understood, or my impression is, that he conducted 
it with Callahan Construction Company, Mr. Paul Grafe, and my un- 
derstanding is that Mr. Paul Grafe went to Washington and was in 
consultation in Washington. 

3. Major Clausen. Well, do I understand from what you say, sir, 
that when Colonel Wyman reported to you as to his trip to Los An- 
geles he did not tell you that he had seen Hans Wilh6lm Rohl? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1063 

General Hannum. I do not recall that he had said anything to that 
effect. 

4. Major Clausen. But you do recall that he did say he had seen 
Paul Graf e? 

General Hannum. Yes. I am sure about that because later on Paul 
Grafe went with me to Honolulu in May of '41 to look over the work 
over there, and all my contacts regarding that contract were with 
Paul Grafe of the Callahan Construction Company. 

5. Major Clausen. Do you recall if Colonel Wyman had [2036] 
discussed this contract with anyone beside Paul Grafe as a possible 
contractor between the 

General Hannum. I think he did. I think that Mr. Guy Atkinson 
of the Guy Atkinson Construction Company was in contact with him 
in Los Angeles, as I recall. 

6. Major Clausen. And so far as your memory now serves you, you 
do not know whether he discussed it with Hans Wilhelm Rohl ? 

General Hannum. No, I don't know. 

7. Major Clausen. Well, did you know at that time, sir, Hans Wil- 
helm Eohl? 

General Hannum. I had heard of him. I did not know him. 

8. Major Clausen. Did you know at that time that he was an alien, 
a German alien? 

General Hannum. No; that didn't come up until later. 

9. Major Clausen. Specifically, General Hannum, whose responsi- 
bility in the Corps of Engineers would it be to see that the Govern- 
ment did not make a contract of a secret nature such as this with a 
German alien? 

General Hannum. I don't know that — Rohl had made — contracts 
had been made by the Engineer Department with Rohl several years 
before that in the construction of the breakwater in Los Angeles 
harbor. 

10. Major Clausen. Mr. Reporter, would you read the question 
please ? 

General Hannum. And 

11. Major CIjAusen. Pardon me. I thought you had finished. 
General Hannum. I am bringing out the point that no one knew ; 

it wasn't known that he was not a citizen. He had been in this coun- 
try for quite a number of years, he was a reputable contractor in Los 
Angeles, and if there was any idea that he was an alien, and I don't 
know; if he was an alien at that time, the rules and regulations and 
laws forbade the employment of aliens. 

[2037] 12. Major Clausen. Well, my question was this : Who in 
the Corps of Engineers had the responsibility to ascertain ? 

General Hannum. Initially the District Engineer. Above that, the 
Division Engineer and the Chief of Engineers office. 

13. Major Clausen. So in this case the responsibility primarily or 
initially would rest upon Colonel Wyman; is that correct, sir^ 

General Hannum. That would be my correct interpretation of the 
rules, yes. 

14. Major Clausen. Now, as I understand it. Colonel Wyman came 
to the mainland and he conferred with you in San Francisco here? 

General Hannum. Yes. 



1064 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

15. Major Clausen. And then you gave him certain instructions, he 
went to Los Angeles, and. then did he come back here and report to 
you? 

General Hannum. I don't recall whether he came back to San Fran- 
cisco and went from San Francisco or whether he went to Los An- 
geles — or went to Washington diiect from Los Angeles. I can't recall 
that. 

16. Major Clausen. In any event, he then went to Washington? 
General Hannum. Yes. 

17. Major Clausen. And were any further conferences had with 
you, sir, concerning this contract before Colonel Wyman returned to 
Hawaii ? 

General Hannum. No. No, because that contract was left in Wash- 
ington for final execution in Washington, and it was some months 
later before it was finally executed, as I recall. 

18. Major Clausen. Sir, I show you a letter dated 14 February 
[W3S~\ 1942, from Colonel A. K. B. Lyman, Department Engi- 
neer in Hawaii, to INIajor General Reybold, and I am going to intro- 
duce this in evidence and I would like to read it. Perhaps I should 
read it, sir, and then the witness will hear what I am going to say. 
It is certified as a true copy by Colonel Brown of the Corps of Engi- 
neers. 

19. Major Clausen. This letter is dated 14 February 1942, on the 
letterhead of the Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Office of the 
Department Engineer, Fort Shafter, T. H., too: 

(Letter of February 14, 1942, Colonel Lyman to Major General 
Reybold, is as follows :) 

Major General Eugene Reybold, 

Chief of Engineers, Washington, D. G. 

Dear General Reybold: We have had an unfortunate and unpleasant situa- 
tion develop here in the Hawaiian Department. The District Engineer has 
executed some of his work in a most efficient manner, however, due to an un- 
fortunate personality he has antagonized a great many of the local people as 
well as some of the new employees and officers who have recently been assigned 
to his office. Since this atmosphere of antagonism exists whenever any condition 
arises such as slowness in making payments to dealers or to employees, even if 
this condition is beyond the control of the District Engineer, the people wrath- 
fully rise up in arms against him. 

Prior to December 7 I did not have very many official dealings with the District 
Engineer and I know little about the efficiency of his administrative and 
[2039] engineering organization, but since December 7, when it was believed 
that it would be more economical and in the interest of efficiency to continue 
using his office as the procurement and dispersing agency for the Department 
Engineer's office, I have had many dealings with him. Some of the work which 
they were called upon to perform for me has been carried on in a highly satis- 
factory manner but there are many other items of work, which for some reason 
or other there was a slowness in getting results. This, I am told by various 
Post and Station Commanders, obtains generally and as a result many of their 
assistants carry resentment towards the office of the District Engineer. I shall 
have to state that there was rather a very abrupt change made when the ZCQM 
was taken over by the District office and some of the difficulties were undoubtedly 
created by lack of a suitable transition period. 

Even though this area has been ofHcially declared a Theatre of Operations, the 
District continues to function independently or under the Division Engineer on 
certain work over which I have no control, and as a result there is a lack of 
cohesion in our operations, and the whole engineer program is suffering with a 
consequent loss of prestige by the Engineers in both civilian and military circles. 
However, this could be overcome by certain cori-ective measures in the District 
Engineer's organization and methods, and many of these are now being under- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1065 

taken. It is extremely questionable whether a change in sentiment or method 
of operation by [2040] the District Engineer at this time could better the 
situation in the future due to the intense antagonism that now exists among 
civilians and worse among military i)ersonnel towards the District Engineer. It 
may be that the present District p]ngineer has outlived his usefulness in this 
Departnient. 

The Department Commander discussed this situation with me two days ago and 
suggested that I warn you that he may conclude that a change is necessary. I 
know that General Emmons thinks very highly of the present District Engineer 
in some of the work that he has performed ; however, the General feels that pos- 
sibly an insurmountable condition has developed which is a handicap to eflScient 
operation and he may decide to recommend a change. Before doing this, how- 
ever, he has directed me to confer with the District Engineer and suggest changes 
in both his organization and his method of operation in an attempt to improve 
the existing unsatisfactory service. 
Very truly yours, 

A. K. B. Lyman, 
Colonel, Corps of Engineers, 

Department Engineer. 

Sir, do you recall having seen that or a copy of it? 

General Hannum. No, I don't recall having seen that letter at all. 
This is the first I have heard of it. 

[2041] But it confirms in a way what Colonel Lyman told me 
when I went out there in May 1942. 'l went out there in 1942 on the 
request of the Department Commander. That was after Colonel 
Lyman had taken over as Department Engineer, taking over the work 
of district engineer, and the district was abolished, and was no longer 
under the division engineer. 

20. Major Clausen. Sir, with respect to this portion of the letter 
where it says — 

There were many other items of work, on which, for some reason or other, 
there was a slowness in getting results. 

What did Colonel Lyman tell you about that? 

General Hannum. He didn't tell me anything about that, specifi- 
cally. What he mentioned was that he said to me when I was over 
there that Wyman's administration had not been efficient or effective. 

21. Major Clausen. And this was May that you were there, or 
October, 1942, did you say? 

General Hannum. I know it was in May that I went over there. 
No, I guess it was probably in October. I was over there in October 
1941 ; it may have been that Lyman mentioned something to me about 
that time. There were differences between Wyman and Lyman at 
that time when I was over there in October 1941. 

22. Major Clausen. This trip that you made in October 1941 was 
a sort of inspection trip, was it not, sir? 

General Hannum. It was. I made one in May 1941 — I think it was 
May 1941 — and also in October 1941. 

23. Major Clausen. AVhen you were informed by Ol)lonel Lyman 
of this mess that existed with respect to j^our district engineer, what 
did you do about it? 

General Hannum. I made inspections with Colonel Wyman, 
[2042] and also sent over later administrative assistants to assist 
him in getting his office reorganized. 

24. Major Clausen. When were they sent over, sir? It was after 
Pearl Harbor, wasn't it ? 



1066 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Hannum. I think it probably was ; yes, sir, I do not want 
to say that I agreed with everything that Colonel Lyman said in that 
letter. I would like to have that understood, because that's his opinion. 
While Colonel Wyman had a personality which was irritating when he 
was under pressure in conferences with others, because he was abrupt 
at times, he was a very efficient engineer officer and a driver, and got 
things accomplished. 

25. Major Clausex. I am going to ask you if you ever received 
this letter, or a copy of it. It is dated 27 February 1942, from Colonel 
Lyman to General Reybold, and I will read it : 

Dear General Reybold: I wrote you on 14 February 1942 in regard to the 
unsatisfactory situation in the District Engineer office here. Since that time 
I have personally investigated conditions and find that they are unsatisfactory, 
particularly in the administrative branches. The administration of his office 
and his handling of the air field construction program are not altogether pleasing 
to the Department Commander and the general unpleasant feeling toward him 
makes it desirable to effect his replacement. 

With ani organization as large as the present one of the District Engineer, 
decentralization of authority is essential. Colonel Wyman appears unwilling to 
grant authority to subordinates and attempts to carry too much [204-3] of 
the load himself. As a result some phases of the work suffer from lack of 
sufficient attention. In addition three of the officers whom he lias selected for 
important line island projects have had unfavorable reports submitted against 
them evidencing lack of judgment on the part of the District Engineer in the 
selection of key personnel. 

When I wrote before, the Department Commander had not definitely decided 
that a change in District En,^ineers was necessary. He realizes that Colonel 
Wyman has done an excellent job in many respects and does not want to take 
official action that would tarnish the record of the officer. General Emmons feels 
that perhaps Colonel Wyman has lieen in this semitropical climate too long or 
that the pace at which the District Engineer has been driving himself lias 
clouded his judgment. On several occasions Colonel Wyman has received im- 
portant verbal instructions and failed to carry them out, either through forget- 
fulness or failure to understand. A reconsideration of the entire situation by 
the Department Commander has resulted in asking me to informally request 
the replacement of Colonel Wyman as District Engineer. 

I sincerely hope that you w^ill see fit to ease Colonel Wyman out of the Ha- 
waiian Department in such a manner as to reflect no discredit on him and re- 
place him with someone who can visualize the high degree of cooperation which 
is necessary between the various commanders, civilians, and the District Engi- 
neer's office in order that the Engineer Service may function to the fullest extent. 
I, personally, do not believe there is any solution to the [2044] problem 
short of the relief of the present District Engineer. 

In the event that you see fit to make a change I strongly recommend that two 
experienced administrative assistants, thoroughly familiar with Departmental 
procedure, be either transferred here or sent on temporary duty to reorganize 
the administrative branch of the District office to permit it to carry the tre- 
mendous mass of detail expeditiously and effectively. The present administra- 
tive heads have not had sufficient experience to manage the large organization 
that is now required to perform the administrative detail. Errors in the prep- 
aration of pay rolls and vouchers and delay in making payments have resulted 
in some hardsli^ and unpleasant feeling among local labor, contractors, except 
possibly the one large company handling tlie bulk of his work, and supply firms. 
Sincerely, 

(s) A. K. B. Lyman, 
Colonel, Corps of Engineers, 

Department Engineer. 

You recall having seen a copy of that, sir ? 

General Hannum. No, sir ; I have never seen it. 

26. Major Clausen. Do you recall having been informed of that 
letter ? 

General Hannum. No. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1067 

27. Major Clausen. Do you recall having discussed some of the 
things mentioned in this letter, with Colonel Lyman? 

General Hannum. May I see it? 

28. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. 

[2045] General Hannum. Kegarding the statement — 

that tlie pace. at which the District Engineer has been driving himself has 
clouded his judgment. 

I do not know that he had clouded his judgment, but I know that he 
was driving himself very hard, even before Pearl Harbor. 

29. Major Clausen. In Los Angeles ? 

General Hannum. And particularly so, after Pearl Harbor, No, 
he was district engineer in Honolulu at the time of Pearl Harbor. 

30. Major Clausen. I say, sir, was he driving himself hard in 
Los Angeles, when he was assigned there ? 

General Hannum. He was district engineer. Yes. He was in 
charge of the Los Angeles District at a time when they had a great 
deal of flood-control work in Los Angeles, and at one time he had over 
20,000 men under his employ, and a great many of them, WPA men. 
He had them organized and doing the work by force account, and he 
did a very splendid job. 

31. Major Clausen. Wasn't that Captain, then, now Colonel Flem- 
ing, that had that, with General Connolly ? 

(jeneral Hannum. No, that was WPA work. 

32. Major Clausen. In any event, sir, do you care to comment upon 
the statement in there that Colonel Wyman would not carry out in- 
structions? 

General Hannum. I had not heard of that. I received no infor- 
mation at any time that he was not carrying out instructions, unless 
it be instructions which Coloney Lyman had given to him as Depart- 
ment Engineer. 

33. Major Clausen. Sir, do you know Colonel Row, who was De- 
partment IG in the Hawaiian Department? 

[20Ii.6'\ General Hannum. No, I do not recall him. 

34. Major Clausen. Do you recall that he made a derogatory re- 
port concerning Colonel Wyman ? 

General Hannum. No. no; I do not know that, I don't recall that, 
now, if he did, 

35. Major Clausen, That is, he made several, but one in particular 
was dated the same date as the first letter from Colonel Lyman to 
General Reybold, February 14, 1942, which indicated that certain un- 
satisfactory conditions existed, and among these there were seven 
specific conditions that were unsatisfactory, which existed, and among 
them was : 

(e) That the district engineer's ofl5ce as a whole has not been organized in 
such a manner as to operate with efficiency. 

General Hannum. The first time I have heard of that accusation! 
The first time I have heard of such report by the Inspector General of 
the Hawaiian Department. It did not come, as I recall, to my office. 

36. Major Clausen. I am referring to a report of the FBI investi- 
gation, and I am reading from that. On page 58, here, it states : 

It was discovered during the course of inspections of District Engineer activi- 
ties prior to 7 December that his administrative set-up was improperly coordi- 
nated and was so mentioned in these reports of inspection. The District Engi- 



1068 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

neer in bis replies has stated that steps had been initiated to correct the irregu- 
larities and deficiencies reported. It is now evident that many of these irregu- 
larities and deficiencies still existed on [20^7] 7 December 1941, and have 
been aggravated by tlie increased volume of his activities incident to the outbreak 
of war and the taking over of the functions of the Zone Construction Quarter- 
master on 16 December 1941. 

Colonel Wyman's methods of administration have been such as to antagonize 
many persons, military and civil, both within and without his organizations. His 
actions have also been ridiculed and criticized in the community. I believe that 
this condition is to the great detriment of the Army as a whole and the Engineer 
Corps in particular. 

Did you ever discuss those allegations with any member of the IG in 
Hawaii ? 

General Hannum. No. 

37. Major Clausen. When you made your inspections, prior to 
7 December 1941, did you discuss the District Engineer's functions 
and office with any member of the IG in Hawaii ? 

General Hannum. No. 

38. Major Clausen. Do you recall, sir, an investigation by another 
IG, Colonel Hunt? 

General Hannum. Yes, because Colonel Hunt stopped by my office 
to consult with me on his return from that inspection. That was in 
1943, 1 believe it was. 

39. Major Clausen. As a matter of fact, you testified at that time 
before Colonel Hunt? 

General Hannum. Yes, sir. 

40. Major Clausen. You had been informed by Colonel Lyman of 
these conditions. I believe you recommended Colonel Wyman for the 
DSM, is that correct? 

[£048] General Hannum. I recommended Colonel Wyman for 
a DSM, yes. 

41. Major Clausen. Was that your own idea, sir? 

General Hannum. It wasn't only by own idea. I discussed it with 
others. In fact, I discussed it with General Emmons when I was out 
there in May 1942, and General Emmons admitted that he had done a 
magnificent jobj but the said that no one, up to that time, had been 
recommended, or had been given a DSM, except General Somervell, 
and he didn't want to, he didn't feel that it would be a propitious time 
to submit a recommendation for a DSM ; and I think Wyman deserved 
a DSM at that time for what he had done; and I can say something 
about that, if you would like to know. 

42. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. 

General Hannum. In October 1941, 1 was in Hawaii on one of my 
inspection trips out there. Wyman and I had gone out to all the 
other islands on a trip, and when we arrived back, on Sunday morning, 
we received word that General Short desired to see us that afternoon, 
Sunday afternoon ; and when we reported to General Short, we were 
informed that he had received a very secret order from Washington 
to construct an air ferry route from Honolulu to the Philippines 
by way of Australia, and that all the facilities of the district and 
division engineer were placed at his disposal. We discussed the 
matter with General Short that afternoon, the possible locations for 
the air fields en route to Australia, and the next day I believe it was, 
there was a conference which I attended with General Short, and 
Wyman was present at the same time, and the Commandant of Pearl 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1069 

Harbor, at which arrangements were made for assistance by the 
[204:9] Navy, particularly with the reconnaissance planes, to start 
parties out. Within 48 hours thereafter, as I recall. Colonel Wyman 
had reconnaissance parties out, starting out to various places, such as 
Canton and Christmas, those two islands particularly, and plans were 
being made for him to start the work at once, using, as I recall, the 
Hawaiian Constructors' forces. 

I remained with him about two days and came back to San Francisco 
by plane, commercial liner, and after getting things started in San 
Francisco, a place to procure supplies, and get them over to him, and 
other things which he needed, I went to Washington; and while in 
Washington I reported to General Arnold, to describe to him what 
we were doing, and General Arnold was much interested in it because 
he had apparently initiated the order to construct the air ferry route. 

He asked me. He stated that, naturally, to get to the Philippines 
by way of Guam and Wake, he would pass through these Japanese 
possessions, and would have difficulty conducting any air ferry route 
along that line, and therefore he waiited one by way of Australia, to 
avoid the Japanese possessions. He asked me when we would have 
it completed, and I said it would not be completed for some months, 
but that we would have it available for use with one strip available at 
each of the four places in three months — by the 15th of January, 
1942— and he said to me, "Well, you don't think they can do that, do 
you T I said, "Do you know Wyman ?" He said he knew him fairly 
well. "Well," I said, "he hasn't failed me yet, when he was given a 
mission like that to do." It was completed, ready for use, on Decem- 
ber 28, nearly three weeks ahead of time. And [2050] when 
it was reported to Colonel Fleming, he told me that in a conference 
with Admiral Nimitz, after Pearl Harbor, at Pearl Harbor, he was 
present at a conference at which this air ferry route came up, and 
when Admiral Nimitz learned that it had been constructed, or had 
been ready for use in less than three months, he said it was one of the 
miracles of the war. 

43. Major Clausen. By the way, sir, was one of the reasons why 
you recommended a cost-plus contract, such as was afterwards signed, 
the secret nature of the work? 

General Hannum. No, no; it was mainly after discussing it. I 
was opposed to cost-plus contracts. In the South Pacific Division I 
didn't make any, I didn't allow any cost-plus contracts to be made, 
and at the time this came up over there, I didn't want to make theni ; 
but after discussing it with Wyman and knowing the situation with 
regard to the Navy, how the Navy were making nothing but cost-plus 
contracts over there, I couldn't see any method of accomplishing the 
work other than by a cost-plus contract. 

Since we didn't make any cost-plus contracts in the South Pacific 
Division, and even at the time that this problem came up, the features 
of the cost-plus contract were not familiarly known outside of Wash- 
ington, and they were not particularly well known even in Washington 
at that time, in the Army. 

44. Major Clausex. You recall having written a letter dated 5 June 
1944, to the Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs? 

General Hannuih. Yes, I did. 

45. Major Clausen. Do you have a copy of that, sir? 



1070 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Hannum. I think I retained a copy ; yes. 

[2051'] 46. Major Clausen. Would you make that available to 
the Board, please, or a copy of your copy ? 

General Hannum. I would be very glad to, if I can find it. Have you 
a copy, there ? 

47. Major Clausen. No, sir ; that is the reason I am asking you for 
the copy, sir. I have not seen the original, and my notes state that you 
informed the Chairman that you authorized Colonel Wyman to nego- 
tiate the basic contract as a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, because of the 
urgency of initiating the work, the secret nature of the work, and the 
indefiniteness. Does that refresh your memory as to whether one of 
the reasons was the secret nature of the work ? 

General Hannum. Well, there were some features of the work that 
were secret, yes. 

48. Major Clausen. Why, General, Avould a cost-plus contract be 
more desirable from the secret nature aspects of the work? 

General Hannum. If j^ou made a fixed contract, you would have to 
write out your plans and specifications, and, normally, advertise; if 
3'ou didn't advertise, you would have to call in a number of contractors 
and negotiate with them, showing them the plans and specifications. 

49. Major Clausen. And was that discussed, then, with Colonel 
Wyman, when he had to come over to the mainland from Hawaii? 

General Hannum. Well, he knew in a general way what he was nego- 
tiating for, the work at that time, but he also realized, we all realized 
that the amount of work would undoubtedly be increased over what was 
contemplated initially, and it was increased. There was CAA work 
involved I think at Canton Island — yes. 

[£0S£] 50, Major Clausen. I refer specifically, General, to one 
of the reasons assigned, the "secret nature of the work," as to whether 
the secret nature of the work and the desirability therefore of having 
a cost-plus contract for that reason in part, were discussed with Colonel 
Wyman ? 

General Hannum. It was possible to keep any nature of work secret. 
It was more possible to keep it secret under a cost-plus-fixed- fee con- 
tract than it would be under a firm contract, due to procedure. 

51. Major Clausen. Did you discuss that with Colonel Wyman, is 
my question. 

General Hannum. No, I don't know that I did discuss that with 
Colonel Wyman. Colonel Wyman, of course, knew what he had to do ; 
he knew that certain features were secret, and particularly as I recall, 
the AWS work was involved at that time, the aircraft warning service 
work. 

52. Major Clausen. By the way, had you met Hans Wilhelm Rohl 
on any occasion up to December 1940? 

General Hannum. No; I did not meet him until just before he went 
over to Hawaii. 

53. Major Clausen. Did you ever receive any information. General 
Hannum, as to the relations which existed in Los Angeles between your 
district engineer, there, Colonel Wyman, and Hans Wilhelm Rohl, 
which were apart from business? 

General Hannum. No. I have heard some rumors. I heard some 
rumors. 

54. Major Clausen. What were they, sir ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1071 

General Hannum. What was published in the newspapers — that 
he had some drinks with Rohl. Rohl, I think, was a heavy [2053] 
drinker, Wyman was not a heavy drinker, and he took a social drink 
with many people, on occasion. I never knew Wyman, if you are 
leading up to that point of Wyman's sobriety, I would say that I have 
never known Wyman in mv experience to be drunk. 

55. Major Clausen. With regard to the other relations that are 
alleged to have existed between Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl during 
the Los Angeles tour of duty by Colonel 'Wyman, such as accepting 
expensive entertainment from Rohl, and then giving Rohl's company 
important contracts. Did you ever hear of that during the time that 
Wyman was stationed at Los Angeles ? 

General Hannum. No, no ; I don't think Rohl ever had a contract 
under Wyman, after — ^Wyman was district engineer at Los Angeles 
when I came out here as division engineer, and it was a contract for 
the breakwater which Rohl had, which had been made before I ar- 
rived, and I think the contract was completed before I arrived out 
here. 

56. Major Clausen. When did you arrive out here. General? 
General Hannum. In January 1938. 

[£054] 57. Major Clausen. In any event, I understand, then, 
that you know nothing of these alleged conditions that existed at 
Los Angeles? 

General Hannum. I have no first-hand information of any dis- 
creditable or dishonorable action of Wyman with Mr. Rohl. 

58. Major Clausen. And when was it. General, that you heard 
these rumors that you stated you heard concerning the drinking ? 

General Hannum. It was only after it came out in the newspapers, 
the relation between Rohl and Wyman, when it was publicized. 

59. Major Clausen. Did you ever hear of this party, Werner Plack? 
General Hannum. Beg pardon? 

60. Major Clausen. AVerner Plack, P-1-a-c-k. 
General Hannum. No. 

61. Major Clausen. Have you read this House Committee on Mili- 
tary Affairs report (indicating) ? 

General Hannum. No. 

62. Major Clausen. Are you acquainted with the fact that shortly 
after this December 20, 1940, contract was executed it developed that 
the contract had been made with the Rohl-Connolly Company, of 
which Mr. Hans Wilhelm Rohl was a German alien? 

General Hannum. The contract was made with The Hawaiian Con- 
structors, and The Hawaiian Constructors was a partnership as — 
well, of course the records will show" what it was. As I recall, it was 
the Callahan Construction Company represented by Mr. Paul Grafe, 
Rohl, and Shirley, are the names, as I recall. The contract was dated 
December 20, 1940. It was later than that before Rohl took out his 
final papers, citizenship papers. 

[£055] 63. Major Clausen. Well, my question is this: When 
did you know that Rohl would have to take out his papers? 

Gerieral Hannum. Not until Wyman requested — we got a telegram 
I think in the Division office from Wyman to the Chief of Engineers, 
asking that the matter of Rohl's citizenship papers be expedited. 



1072 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

64. Major Clausen. And with reference to December 20, 1940, the 
date of the contract, when did you receive that wire? 

General Han num. That was Later, some months later, several 
months ; in the next year, I would say, 1942, because it was 1942 when 
I was over there in May of 1942. Mr. Paul Grafe went over by plane 
with me. We went together with Wyman to look over the work on 
Oahu that was under construction, and that evening Wyman told Mr. 
Paul Grafe very forcibly that he would have to remain in Hawaii to 
supervise that work; that his superintendent of construction wasn't 
accomplishing what should be accomplished, and he insisted that Mr. 
Grafe or some member of the firm remain in Hawaii to supervise the 
work; that his superintendent of construction was not satisfactory. 

65. Major Clausen. When was it that Colonel Wyman sent the wire 
requesting that Rohl's application be expedited? 

General Hannum. It was after that date, I think, because it was 
after that that Mr. Paul Grafe probably suggested Rohl's coming over 
because Paul Grafe didn't want to remain over there. 

66. Major Clausen. Now, sir, you mentioned that that occurred 
in 1942. Aren't you mistaken as to the time when that occurred? 

General Hannum. Yes, I am mistaken. I should have said May '41. 

67. Major Clausen. Well, now, do you recall. General, that 
[£0S6] prior to that, in specifically January of 1941, Colonel 

Wyman wrote to Mr. Kohl to come to Hawaii ? 
General Hannum. January '41 ? 

68. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. I will show 3'ou a copy of the letter. 
General Hannum. I don't know about that. When did Rohl go? 

69. Major Clausen. He went later. 

I show you a letter, sir, which is an exhibit in this I. G. report of 
Colonel Hunt, dated January 22, 1941, which reads as follows; this is 
to Mr. Rohl from Colonel Wyman : 

(Letter of January 22, 1941, Colonel Wyman to Mr. Rohl is as 
follows:) 

Mr. H. W. Rohl, Rohl-Connoixy Company, 

4351 Alhambra Avenue, Los Angeles, California. 

Dear Sir : Reference is made to Secret Contract No. W-414-eng-602 with The 
Hawaiian Constructors for work in the Hawaiian Islands. 

As you are actively interested in this venture, I desire you to proceed to Honolulu 
at your earliest convenience to consult with the District Engineer relative to ways 
and means to accomplish the purpose of the contract. You will be allowed trans- 
portation either by clipper or steamboat, both ways, and travel allowance not to 
exceed $6.00 per day while enroute in accordance with existing laws and 
regulations. 

You will make application to either the District [2051] Engineer at 
Los Angeles or the Division Engineer, South Pacific Division, San Francisco, 
for transportation. 

Do you recall having a copy of that about that time ? 
General Hannum. No. Now, I don't know whether that is on file 
in the Division office, or not. I don't believe it is. 
(There was a brief, informal recess.) 

70. Major Clausen. I was asking you. General, concerning the 
letter that Colonel Wyman sent to Mr. Rohl in January, 1941. I 
believe you testified that you did not recall having seen a copy of that. 

General Hannum. No; that my present recollection is that this is 
the first time I have seen that or known about it. 

71. Major Clausen. I see. All right. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1073 

With regard to the request from Colonel Wyman for expediting 
the application for citizenship, do you know whether the wire was 
supplemented by letters or phon"^ calls from Colonel Wyman directed 
to that same point ? 

General Hannum. I don't recall at the present time whether there 
are any wires or not. That would be a matter of record, I think, in 
the Division Engineer's office. 

72. Major Clausen. Did yon take any action in that respect? 
General Hannum. No. 

73. Major Clausen. Do you recall, sir, having seen a letter from 
General Kingman to Mr. Schofield at the Bureau of Immigration 
and Naturalization, dated August 28th, 1941, a copy of which is set 
forth on page 5 of this House Committee Eeport [indicating] ? 

General Hankum. I don't recall having seen that letter, but I do 
recall now that General Kingman did — I did hear that he [2058] 
had taken steps to assist in expediting the matter. 

74. Major Clausen. When did you first hear that. General? 
General Hannum. It was during the time that, I would say, just 

before Rohl — it must have been probably early in '42, just before — 
or '41, just before Rohl went over there. 

75. Major Clausen. When was the first time that you learned that 
Rohl was a German alien ? 

General Hannum. Not until the whole matter came up, as is in- 
dicated in those papers which you have presented. 

76. General Frank. Which was about when? 

General Hannum. I would say in the spring of '41. I don't know 
that it came up before that. I could tell better if I could fix definitely 
when Rohl went to Honolulu. 

77. Major Clausen. We are informed that he went there around 
about September 15th of 1941. 

General Hannum. Yes. Well, it was in the spring or summer, in 
'41, spring or summer, then, before — and I didn't know that he was 
an alien until the question came up of his going to Honolulu and we 
finding out that he had not taken out citizenship papers, final citizen- 
ship papers, although he had been in this country for quite a number 
of years and had been in the contracting business for quite a number 
of years. 

78. Major Clausen. Now, with regard to the delays in the construc- 
tion program, some of these delays mentioned by Colonel Lyman, 
what knowledge did you have, sir, that the contracts and job orders 
were not being completed on time with respect to the air raid warn- 
ing system? 

General Hannum. The air raid warning system was delayed not 
only in Havraii but in this country due to the lack of receipt [2059] 
of instructions from Washington. 

79. Major Clausen. Instructions as to what, sir? 

General Hannum. As to just where they were to be placed and 
the type of installation. We received word about aircraft warning 
service, I guess it was in '40. We got instructions suspending action 
later, and it was nearly a year from the time we received the first 
word about it before we got final word to go ahead ancl we got final 
definite instructions. All that, I think, can be verified, if you wish, 
by getting copies of records from the Division office, 



1074 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

80. Major Clausen. You mean in Hawaii? 

General Hannum. No. Tlie Division office in San Francisco. 

81. Major Clausen. Have you seen those records yourself? 
General Hannum. Well, the instructions came through the office 

at various times about the aircraft warning service, and they all were 
filed in the office there, in the Division office undoubtedly as well as 
in the District office. 

82. Major Clausen. Well, they would be forwarded to Honolulu. 

83. General Frank. Do you remember what office in Washington 
was responsible for the delay ? 

General Hannum. I don't know. I think perhaps the delay was 
justified because at that time they didn't know just what form the 
installation should take nor the locations where they should be 
placed. For example, they thought initially that a station high up 
would be the best place for a station, that was unobstructed, and later 
they found that a plane running, skimming alon^ low, would not be 
contacted. So in many places where we put stations, where stations 
were i^lanned high up, they were either moved down or alternate 
stations placed lower down. 

[meO] 84. General Frank. Well, was it the Signal Corps that 
was 

General Hannum. The Signal Corps were responsible for the de- 
sign and the installation, and the Engineers were the construction 
agency. The Engineers were not responsible for the initiation of it. 

85. General Frank. The Signal Corps were responsible for the 
design and for the selection of the sites? 

General Hannum. Yes. We did not select the sites. 

80. General Frank. All right. 

87. Major Clausen. Now, isn't it correct, though. General, that as 
early as 1939 studies had been made by a board of officers of which 
then Captain Fleming was a member, and sites determined for fixed 
A. W. S. stations? 

General Hannum. That is probably true. 

88. Major Clausen. And isn't it also true • 

General Hannum. I don't know. I say it is probably true. I 
don't recall. 

89. Major Clausen. Yes. 

90. General Frank. In Honolulu, you mean ? 
General Hannum. Yes. 

91. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon, sir. 
General Hannum. In Honolulu? 

92. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. 

General Hannum. Yes. Captain Fleming was at that time, I be- 
lieve. Assistant to the Department Engineer. 

93. Major Clausen. And in this study by the Board at that time 
there were certain fixed stations which were later carried over to this 
contract ? 

General Hannum. With perhaps modifications, I would say. 

[2061] 94. Major Clausen. Yes. Well,inany event,no A. W. S. 
stations of a permanent type were constructed prior to December 7, 
were they, sir, 1941? 

General Hannum. I don't know, but I recall very definitely that 
that work in Hawaii was suspended by instructions from Washington. 

95. General Frank. All of it? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1075 

General Hannum. Yes, on account of the lack of indefiniteness of 
just what features were to be carried out. 

96. General Frank. Lack of definiteness or indefiniteness? 
General Hannfm. Lack of definiteness, or it was not definitely 

settled at tliat time. There were some changes, modifications, wdiich 
apparently in Washington they discovered would have to be made, 
from the experience which had been gained presumably abroad. I 
don't know. I never understood why the work was delayed or 
suspended. 

97. General Frank. In any event, you think it was technical ? 
General Hannum. Technical, yes. 

98. Major Clausen. And you attribute the delays to the suspension 
of the work ? 

General Hannum. Yes. 

99. Major Clausen. All right. Well, now, you say these instruc- 
tions came from Washington to the Division Engineer at San 
Francisco ? 

General Hannum. Yes. 

100. Major Clausen. And you were the Division Engineer? 
General Hannum. I was the Division Engineer. They were trans- 
mitted through me to Honolulu, in so far as Honolulu was affected. 

[2062] 101. Major Clausen. I see. And when were those in- 
structions received here, sir? 

General Hannum. Well, I don't know. I would have to look up 
the records to find out. 

102. Major Clausen. Will you do that, sir? 

General Hannum. Well, of course, my station at Sacramento, I think 
you could get that by telephoning to the Division office. Colonel 
Corey is the executive office in the Division office down town. 

103. Major Clausen. I perhaps could not describe it, sir, with the 
particularity that you could, if you jogged your memory on that. 

General Hannum. Yes. 

104. Major Clausen. I think the Board would appreciate it, since 
we are working against time, if you could do that. 

General Hannum. Very good. I will try to have that assembled. 
I will have to come down next week some time, then. How long will 
the Board be in town here? 

105. Major Clausen. We shall be in town for a week. And in the 
event the records could be searched by somebody down there at your 
request, if the Board has already left we could perhaps review them 
in Hawaii. 

General Hannum. Very good. 

106. Major Clausen. Or on our return. 
General Hannum. Yes. 

107. General Grunert. May I ask a question there : You have refer- 
ence now to fixed stations as such, as distinguished from mobile sta- 
tions? 

General Hannum. Oh, yes. 

108. General Grunert. For air warning? 

[206o] General Hannum. Yes. We completed the filter here. 
We were able to complete the filter stations and the control stations 
in San Francisco and Los Angeles about a week before Pearl Harbor 
happened. A week or two weeks, something like that. 

79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 2 19 



1076 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

109. Major Clausen. Sir, what knowledge do you have concerning 
delays in the construction of underground gasoline storage tanks? 

General Hannum. That was delayed due to lack or difficulty of 
getting the Navy — I think that was the combined storage you are 
speaking of, for the Army and Navy ; is that right ? 

110. Major Clausen. All we know is that there were contracts for 
underground gasoline storage. 

General Hannum. Yes. 

111. Major Clausen. Including facilities at Bellows Field. 
General Hannum. Yes. That was at Bellows Field? 

112. Mayor Clausen. Yes, sir. 

General Hannum. Or was it up near Wheeler Field? 

113. Major Clausen. Bellows Field is one in particular. 
General Hannum. I do not recall that one. I recall the one up 

near Wheeler Field. 

114. Major Clausen. Well, in any event 

General Hannum. That was up near Wheeler Field. As I recall, 
that was the combined underground gasoline storage, combined for 
Army and Navy, and there were technical difficulties involved in the 
plans for that, and also difficulties involved in getting coordination 
between the Army and Navy requirements, particularly as to the un- 
loading point in JPearl Harbor for pumping the gas up to the storage 
tanks. 

115. Major Clausen. Now, with regard to these delays, did you 
[2064] inform high^^r authority of the fact that there were these 
delays occurring? 

General Hannum. The delays were due to action coming from 
Washington. 

116. Major Clausen. Well, I state: Did you inform the Chief of 
Engineers of those delays? 

General Hannum. The Chief Engineers knew of them because he 
was the one, or they were issued from his office. The instructions were 
issued from his office. 

117. Major Clausen. I understood you to say that they were issued 
from the Signal Corps, concerning the A. W. S. 

General PI annum. Whatever came from the Signal Corps came 
through the Chief of Engineers Office to us out here. The Chief 
Engineers was in contact with the Signal Corps in Washington and 
received the plans and other details from the Signal Office presumably 
in Washington, and then transmitted them to the field. 

118. Major Clausen. I see. 

Now, General, what did you do about speeding up the work over 
there on these things? Did you complain to people of these delays 
that were occurring in the A. W. S. ? 

General Hannum. What delays are you speaking about? 

119. Major Clausen. Well, I am just referring to the A. W. S., 
the air raid warning system. 

General Hannum. There was nothing to be done. We got in- 
structions to suspend and await further instructions. 

120. Major Clausen. Did you have any instructions to Colonel 
Wyman at any time that this w^as a matter of prime importance, that 
these defense installations be constructed as speedily as [206S] 
possible ? 

General Hannum. Certainly. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1077 

121. Major Clausen. Did you tell liim that? 

General Hannum. Certainly, and he realized that, too. Everybody 
realized it. 

122. Major Clausen. I mean did you specifically tell him that? 
General Hannum. "Well, I don't know that I did specifically tell 

him that. There was plenty of correspondence which might, relating 
to the matter, probably still in the files. 

123. Major Clausen. Now, during 1941 when the construction was 
going on up to December Tth, did you — or rather, let me ask the ques- 
tion this way: What were y^ur functions with regard to the carrying 
out of the contract that we have referred to ? 

General Hannum. Supervision only. - - 

124. Major Clausen. Of whom and of what? 

General Hannum. Supervision of the work that was being carried 
on in the district. 

125. Major Clausen. How did the Hawaiian Department Com- 
mander, Commanding General, get into that picture? 

General Hannum. Pie didn't fit into it until after the work was 
turned over to him in the spring of 1942. Wait a minute. Well, he 
did fit into it in this way : For instance, when that air ferry route to 
Australia was constructed we were directed to have the Division Engi- 
neer and the District Engineer to report to General Short, the Depart- 
ment Commander, and we did so. In addition to that, when I was out 
there, I think it was in May of '41, I directed Colonel Wyman to put 
the installations in in accordance with General Short's wishes. 

For example, we had money for Wheeler Field and for certain 
[2066] installations at Hickam Field, and General Short did not 
wish to put those installations in there and crowd and congest those 
places, and he wanted to open up Bellows Field, and authority was 
given to open up Bellows Field; and construction that was intended — 
barracks and things like that which were intended for Hickam Field, 
Wheeler Field, were put in at Bellows Field and the work was pushed 
hard, including the preparation of a flight strip, although the flight 
strip had not been approved as a project in Washington, and that flight 
strip was not completed on December Tth because it couldn't be com- 
pleted with the mone}' and time available, mainl}^ the money available. 

126. Major Clausen. Well, did you ever get any request from the 
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to speed up this 
work ? 

General Hannum. No. When I saw General Short he seemed to be 
very well satisfied. I went around with him in May of 1941 and also in 
October of 1941 when I was out there. 

127. General Frank. Did you have any functions at this end of 
procuring, getting priorities on, or expediting delivery of supplies or 
equipment ? 

General Hannum. Yes; we were the procurement agency here in 
the division office for all the supplies and personnel for the district 
engineer, and particularly after Pearl Harbor and even before Pearl 
Harbor we had great difficulty in getting transportation to get them 
out there. 

128. General Frank. Did you have any difficulty in getting equip- 
ment because of the scarcity ? 

General Hannum. It took time, but we were able to get them. 

129. General Frank. Priorities? 



1078 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[£067] General Hannum. The critical items under the priority 
system didn't go into effect, I believe, until some time after Pearl 
Harbor, but we got numerous pieces of equipment. 

130. General Frank. Scarcity of material and lack of shipping; 
was that it ? 

General Hannum. No; it was lack of shipping space. Both the 
Army Transport Service, and particularly the Army Transport Serv- 
ice at that time, and the Navy, how^ever, helped us out on getting over 
a good deal of supplies and personnel. 

131. General 1^'rank. There was no scarcity of shipping? 
General Hannum. Scarcity of shipping? There was scarcity of 

shipping, yes. There was no scarcity of materials. I thought you 
referred to materials. 

132. General Frank. I know, but I am trying to find out what could 
have delayed construction, if there was a scarcity of shipping. 

General Hannum. What delayed construction was mainly a scarcity 
of qualified labor. If there is any delay in construction, construction 
could have gone ahead a good deal faster if we could have gotten 
qualified labor over there promptly, and qualified supervision. That 
office, the work in the District office increased perhaps ten-fold in 
December of 1942, and they didn't have the personnel there to handle 
it, the qualified personnel either in the field or in the office, and it was 
very ditlicult to secure qualified personnel at that time. 

133. General Grunert, Wliose business was it to get that qualified 
personnel ? The contractor ? 

General Hannum. No. The contractor, yes, for his oAvn work, and 
the Division office helped him on that. For the office work [2068] 
in the District office, initially the District office itself, which in so far 
as local sources were concerned, in so far as sources here were con- 
cerned, we did endeavor to secure the personnel which was requested, 
and even after Colonel Lyman took over that office, even for some 
months after that it still was not operating efficiently administra- 
tively. 

134. Major Clausen. Sir, with reference to the letters that I read 
to you from Colonel Lyman to General Reybold, do you recall that 
Colonel Wyman was relieved shortly after that second letter was 
written ? 

General Hannum. He was relieved, as I recall, by an order w^hich 
placed the work directly under the Commanding General of the 
Hawaiian Department, the same as it had been placed under the Com- 
manding General in Alaska. 

135. Major Clausen. Did you get a copy of a letter from General 
Reybold answering the letter of 27 February, 1942, this letter from 
General Reybold to Colonel Lyman dated March 16th, 1942, stating 
that the re-assignment of Colonel Wyman was going to be effected? 

General Hannum. No. 

136. Major Clausen. Well, in any event, did you have anything to 
do with his relief yourself? 

General Hannum. No. 

137. Major Clausen. Did you have anything to do with his assign- 
ment to the Canol Project? 

General Hannum. No, sir. 

138. Major Clausen. Or up there to Alaska? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1079 

General Hannum. No. 

139. Major Clausen. Do yon know whether on this Canol Project 
[2069] he was reprimanded under the 104th Article of War for 
failing to observe safety precautions, resulting in part in the Dawson 
Creek explosion ? 

General Hannum. No. That Canol Project was not under my 
direction. 

140. Major Clausen. I see. 

Sir, with regard to this letter from General Kingman to Mr. Scho- 
field dated August 28th, 1941, what did you have to do with that letter 
yourself ? 

General Hannum. With this letter? 

141. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. 

General Hannum. By General Kingman to Schofield? 

142. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. 

General Hannum. I don't know that I had anything to do with it 
unless I sent a letter to Kingman about the case. I don't recall that, 
though. 

143. Major Clausen. Well, would you make inquiry in that respect 
also at the Division Engineer's office here? 

I have no further questions. 

\2070'] 144. General Frank. Did you state that you knew noth- 
ing about the association of Wyman and Rohl in Los Angeles? 

General Hannum. No ; I did not know of any relationship between 
Wyman and Rohl. I Imew that Rohl was a contractor, but I had no 
knowledge of any particular social relations or other relations, other 
than official, that Wyman may have had with Rohl. 

145. General Frank. When Wyman had the supervision of this 
contract in which Rohl was involved, in Los Angeles, was he then 
under your jurisdiction ? 

General Hannum. No, General Kingman was then Division Engi- 
neer, here. I relieved General Kingman, here, in January 1938, and 
that contract, as I recall, for the breakwater had been made the year 
or two before that. 

146. General Frank. The contract had been made, but Wyman was 
operating down there, in 1938 and 1939, while you were the division 
engineer here? 

General Hannuini. Wyman went out there in 1935, I believe. 

147. General Frank. Out where. 

General Hannum. To Los Angeles. He was assigned as district 
engineer in 1935 or 1936, along about that time. 

148. General Frank. And when did he go to Honolulu? 
General Hannum. He went out there in 1939 or 1940, as I recall. 

149. General Frank. Therefore, he was in Los Angeles for over a 
year under your jurisdiction while you were division engineer here? 

General Hannum. Yes, yes; that is correct. 

150. General Frank. And you knew nothing of his associations? 
[2071] General Hannum. No, no. I don't know that he had 

any association with Rohl during the period that he was district engi- 
neer, after my arrival. It never came to my attention. We had no 
contracts with Rohl in the Los Angeles district, at that time. 

151. General Frank. When did they have the breakwater contract 
down there ? 



1080 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Hannum. That breakwater v;as finished, as I recall, in 
December 19o8. 

152. General Frank. What kind of system or arrangement did you 
have as division engineer to check on your district engineers? 

General Hannum. Well, when the engineering papers came in, 
these plans and specifications were reviewed in the engineering divi- 
sion in my office, and comments submitted to me, and I passed on them, 
and the contracts at tliat time had to be approved in Washington. 
Copies of the contract came to my office. We had copies of the con- 
tract, plans and specifications, and I went out and inspected the work 
with the district engineer, to inspect the progress, and also see whether 
the work was being carried out, and discussed with him as to whether 
it was being carried out in accordance with the plans and specifications. 

153. General Frank. Did he know when you were coming, gener- 
ally? 

General Hannum. Generally speaking, I think he did ; yes. I cus- 
tomarily let him know when I was coming, to make sure that they 
would be there when I arrived. 

154. General Frank. Did you have any organization under which 
[£072] you had an administrative inspector go into a district t(? 
find out how the work was being done ? 

General Hannum. Yes; that is required by the Engineer Depart- 
ment regulations. Administrative auditors and inspectors go out, as 
1 recall now it was at least tw^ice a year — at least once a year, and 
perhaps twice a year. 

155. General Frank. But they are more in the nature of auditors, 
and their work is not in the nature of making inspections along the 
line that the War Department inspectors generally make, is that 
correct ? 

General Hannum. It is an audit of the accounts, and the records of 
the district office, yes — an administrative inspection of all the admin- 
istrative records of the office. 

156. General Frank. You did not have any arrangement in your 
system of finding out what the personal operations of your district 
engineers were, did you? 

General HANNu:\r. I don't know what you mean by "personal opera- 
tions." 

157. General Frank. I mean socially. 
General PIannum. Personal contacts? 

158. General Frank. Yes. 

General Hannum. No, no ; only what would be observed by the di- 
vision engineer going out and contacting the district engineer and 
knowing the persons with whom he happened to be associating. 

159. General Frank. If he knew you were coming, and he had good 
sense, he would not disclose anything that was not proper, do you 
think ? 

General Hannum. So far as I observed at any time there was no 
suspicion of any guilt on the part of Wyman in his social [£07S] 
contacts. 

160. General Frank. That is, so far as you know; but I am still 
talking about some sort of set-up in your machinery to find that out. 
Did you have any sort of arrangement to find that out ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1081 

General Haxnum. You would set np such an arrangement as that 
only if you were suspicious of somebody, wouldn't you? A brother 
officer, you wouldn't suspect that he was carrying on some improper 
relations with someone. 

161. General Frank. The War Department has a whole Inspector 
GenoraFs system set up that makes just that kind of inspection ar- 
rangement; and the engineers had none of it in their districts and 
divisions, evidently. 

General Hannun. Nothing — no, no regular set program of any- 
thing like that ; no. 

162. General Frank. A condition of injudicious, improper asso- 
ciation between a disti'ict engineer and a contractor could have existed 
then without your knowing anything about it ? 

General Hannun. Oh, you mean in a monetary or a pecuniary 
way? 

163. General Frank. I mean this : Do you think that it is proper 
for a district engineer to accept entertainment continuously, to be on 
parties continuously, to be over a period of time intoxicated with a 
contractor with whom the district engineer is doing business? 

General Hannum. No, no. 

164. General Frank. That is what I am talking about. 
General Hannum. Yes, yes; but I don't know that that has been 

established, in the case between Wyman and Rohl, [3074] 
though. 

165. General Frank. You have heard no reports to that effect? 
General Hannum. I have heard in recent months some allegations 

to that effect. 

166. General Frank. This happened when he was operating under 
your jurisdiction. 

General Hannum. Where and when, if I may ask? Well, I don't 
know that that is important, sir. 

167. General Frank. I am trying to find out if the organization in 
the Engineer Corps was based on an absolute trust of the next sub- 
ordinate, with almost no check on him. 

General Hannum. There are numerous checks, to see that the work 
is being carried out as planned and as specified, in accordance with 
the regulations. 

168. General Frank. What was your measure of efficiency and 
achievement ? 

General Hannum. The character of the work, and the progress of 
the work. 

169. General Frank. Specifically, who finds that out, or who did 
find that out when you were division engineer {' 

General Hannum. Well, I found it out, myself, by the reports that 
came in. The reports of operations that came in, under the various 
contracts, and also by personal inspections, and when the work be- 
came so lieavy that there were so many projects, one man couldn't 
cover it, I had additional assistants to go out and check the progress 
of the work. 

170. General Frank. Did you ever check on Wyman's sobriety? 
General Hannum. I have been with him on a number of occasions, 

and have taken a social drink with him. My custom [3075] is 



1082 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to take one or two, and stop, because I never like to lose control of 
myself mentally. Wyman would take more than that; but I have 
never seen him, as I say, lose control of himself, or be drunk. 

171. General Frank. Are you conversant with the congressional 
investigation of the Rohl- Wyman association? 

General Hannum. No. 

172. General Frank. Are you conversant with the California State 
investigation that involved Rohl and Wyman? 

General Hannum. No, only what I saw by way of extracts of what 
was published in the newspapers. 

173. General Frank. I suggest you read them. 

Now, in answer to the question that I asked about a type of asso- 
ciation between district engineer and contractor, you did not answer 
that question, if it were proper for a district engineer to continuously 
do those things. 

General Hannum. I think I answered no to your question. General. 
I think I answered no to that general question that you gave. 

174. General Frank. That it was not ? 

General Hannum. It was not a proper thing, as you say, to accept 
entertainment from him, and gratuitous gifts. 

175. General Frank. No, I didn't say anything about gratuitous 
gifts, but continuous entertainment, and to establish an intimate per- 
sonal association. 

General Hannum. Well, I don't think that an engineer officer or 
any contract officer should be denied the privilege of social contact 
with a contractor just because he happens to be a contractor. That's 
a personal, social relationship outside [2076] of business; 
provided he doesn't let that interfere with his business, official status. 

176. Major Clausen. When you discussed with Colonel Hunt, his 
report, if you did, do you know that that report of Colonel Hunt 
shows, wholly aside from the other aspect, that the intimate social 
relationship which existed between Rohl and Wyman impaired 
Wyman's efficiency as an officer? 

General Hannum. I don't. I haven't seen Colonel Hunt's report. 
He did not show that to me. 

177. Major Clausen. You wouldn't condone, for example, would 
you, sir, the entertainment of an Army officer by a contractor, with 
booze and liquor and women and wild soirees in a hotel? 

General Hannum. Well, I wouldn't condone that on the part of 
an officer with a contractor, nor anyone else that he might associate 
with. 

178. Major Clausen. When you made your answer to General 
Frank, you did not mean that that is the type of entertainment he 
should accept? 

General Hannum. No. 

179. Major Clausen. As a matter of fact, that is wrong, isn't it, 
sir? 

General Hannum. That is not proper conduct ; no. 

180. General Frank. And when that continues over a period of 
several months or years, as in Los Angeles, it seems peculiar that it 
should continue without the next higher authority in some measure 
knowing something about it, over that length of time, through some 
kind of reporting or inspection system. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1083 

General Haxxum. Well, all I can say is that in all my visits, there, 
neither he nor anyone in the office, nor anyone [2077] else 
with Avhom I met down there ever mentioned it to me; and I met quite 
a few people in Los Angeles, at vai-ious times. 

181. General Frank. Did you ever get any report on him through 
General Connoll}^, who was operating down there in that vicinity? 

General Hannum. As to his conduct ? No. 

182. General Frank. Do you ever inquire as to the standing of 
your district engineers in the community ? 

General Hannum. Yes, yes; tliat is quite evident, in many places 
and cases. 

183. General Frank. Did you ever inquire as to his standing in 
Los Angeles, through other than the contractors, of course? 

General Hannum. Well, I don't know that I specifically made a 
point of inquiring as to his conduct, but by talking to contractors and 
others who were associated with the district engineers, personalities 
or rumors would naturally come up, if there were any. I saw Con- 
nolly down there several times, and Connolly's remark about Wyman's 
work was that he found difficulty in coordinating his work with 
Wyman, on account of W3"man's insistence on getting specific qualified 
personnel instead of taking run-of-the-mine, that is to say, the WPA 
personnel. 

184. General Frank. The congressional investigation and the Cali- 
fornia State investigation have indicated a continuous situation of 
close personal association, with constantly recurring, rather wild 
parties, over a period of time. 

General Hannum. Well, I don't see how that could have been true, 
while Wyman was in Los Angeles and I was division engineer, because 
he showed no sign of the effects of it, whatever, on my visits. 

185. General Frank. Nevertheless, we have tliese investigations 
[2078] and reports by governmental agencies; and you cannot 
ignore a congressional investigation, nor a State investigation. 

Now, what I am coming to is, this situation existed, and the next 
higher commander, who was responsible for keeping W}inan in line, 
was yourself. 

General Hannum. Well, as I say, I don't know who gave the testi- 
mony, nor the character of the testimony that was given; and was 
there anything to indicate that there was any connivance with the 
contractor in a pecuniary way? 

186. General Frank. I suggest you read the official reports that 
exist. What I was after was trying to determine what kind of system 
existed in your office, to check on the behavior of your subordinates, 
and evidently other than your own visits? 

General Hannum. Yes, other than my own visit, or reports; per- 
sons who might be sent fi'om my office down there to visit, and what 
they might have observed ; and there were others who went down 
there, under my orders, administrative officers and engineer personnel ; 
and no such reports of conduct like that ever came to me. 

187. General Frank. In other words, the man was out there on 
his own, and if the reports of such operations came to you, they were 
incidental rather than tlirough predetermined methods? 

General Hannum. Yes; they were incidental to a visit for other 
purposes, and not the check on a man's personal conduct. 



1084 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

188. Major Clausen. Sir, do you know Mr. Martin, the attorney 
for INIr. Kohl, of the Rohl-Connolly Company ? 

General Hannum. No ; I do not know him. 

189. Major Clausen. Yon said that von discussed Wyman's eon- 
duct with Mr. Connolly? 

[2079] Genera] Hannum. No. 

190. Major Claifsen. You meant General Connolly? 

General Hannum. General Connolly. I did not discuss his conduct, 
I discussed the relationship between General Connolly, when he was 
in charge of WPA in Los Angeles, and Wyman, who was district 
engineer. Wyman was securing WPA personnel from General Con- 
nolly, to carry on his work. 

191. Major Clausen. I understand. 

General Hannum. His work, which was flood-control work, was 
being carried on to relieve unemployment. 

192. Major Clausen. Did you ever discuss Colonel Wyman with 
Mr. Kohl at this time, when Colonel Wyman was stationed down at 
Los Angeles? 

General Hannum. No. 

193. Major Clausen. Or with any member of Rohl-Connolly Com- 
pany ? 

General Hannum. No; and as I say, I don't think I saw Mr. Rohl 
but once, in my office. 

194. General Frank. After this kind of association that we have 
just mentioned, do j^ou think it was good judgment on the part of 
Wyman to ask for Rohl to be sent over, to become intimately associated 
with him again in Honolulu ? 

General Hannum. No; if he had that relationship, and he knew of 
it, I think he was foolish to ask for him to come over there to continue 
it ; but the reason that Rohl was taken into the partnership was because 
he had floating plant, and he was the only one that had floating plant 
available, which was needed over there in carrying on the work over 
there in Hawaii. Floating plant was very difficult to get at that time, 

195. JNIajor Clausen. Aren't you mistaken as to that, sir ? [2080] 
Wasn't the floating plant desirable with respect to the Canol project? 

General Hannum. No. We needed floating plant over there. We 
had very great difficulty in getting suitable floating plant to do the 
work on those outlying islands where there was no water, no fresh 
water, no food, everything had to be imported, had difficulty in getting 
ships to take it out to the islands. 

196. Major Clausen. When was it, sir, that Mr. Rohl was in your 
office? 

General Hannum, As I recall, just before he finally went over to 
Honolulu. He came in to see if we could assist him in getting trans- 
portation over, and he saw me at that time, and I didn't likehis ap- 
pearance at the time. 

197. Major Clausen. What was wrong with it? 

General HANNuar. Well, he didn't appear to be absolutely sober. 

198. Major Clausen. And what did you do about it? 

General Hannum. I fissumed that he had been out to the Club, or 
somewhere, and had just come in to see me, and that it was just a 
temporary matter. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1085 

199. Major Clausen. What did you do about it, sir? 
General Hannuivi. 1 did nothino- further about it. 

200. Major Clausen. That is all. 

201. General Frank. Were you at all conversant with the deal 
under which the yacht VEGA, belonging to Mr. Rohl, was taken to 
Honolulu ? 

General Hannum. The yacht VEGA was taken to Honolulu on 
request of Colonel Wyman that it be sent over. He had great diffi- 
culty in getting any kind of transportation to carry things [20811 
between the islands out thei'e, and it was doubtful, in our opinion, 
whether the VEGA would be suitable; but some work was done on 
it to try to make it suitable, and it was sent over. 

202. General Frank. Do you know anything about the cargo, be- 
tween California and Honolulu? 

General Hannum. No, I do not know about the cargo. 

203. General Frank. Do you know whether the VEGA ever was 
used or not ? 

General Hannum. No, I don't know whether it was used after it 
got over there, or not, or to Avhat extent it was used. I think perhaps 
the records in the office might show that. 

204. General Frank. While Colonel Wyman was under your juris- 
diction, you know of no incident in which his conduct w^as not above 
I'eproach ? 

General Hannum. His wife divorced him, and after being divorced 
he was remarried — if that is to his discredit, why that's about the 
only thing that I can think of, at the present time. 

205. General Frank. You knew nothing whatever about his general 
conduct ? 

General Hannum. You are going back to his relations now with 
Rohl. again? 

206. General Frank. Yes. 

General Hannum. No, no; I think I have said. 

207. General Frank. And you knew^ nothing about his capacity for 
consuming liquor? 

General Hannum. No. 

208. General Frank. Do you know whether he was put on a pledge 
by Colonel Lyman? 

['308'2] General Hannum. I did not know that. I do not know 
wliat authority Colonel Lyman would have to put him on a pledge. 

209. General Frank. When Cololnel Ljanan first went to Honolulu, 
Colonel Wyman was then up in the engineer regiment at Schofield; 
he had not yet been designated as district engineer. 

General Hannum. I think that, as I recall it. General, Wyman was 
ordered from Los Angeles to Honolulu as district engineer. 

210. General Frank. I think if you will look up the records, for 
your own information, now, down in the division engineer's office, you 
will find that Wyman was sent from the Engineer Regiment to Hono- 
lulu as district engineer. 

General Hannum. Oh, I recall, now ; I believe you are right. Gen- 
eral. I think he was temporarily on. Yes. that is right; he was sent 
over to deal with troops originally. Major Burnell was the district 
engineer at that time, and then Burnell was relieved and Wyman was 
put in his place. You are right. I recall that, now. 



1086 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

211. Major Clausen. Do you recall, when you testified before Colo- 
nel Hunt, with regard to Colonel Wyman, you said : 

On one occasion, not necessarily in serious conversation, I know that he indi- 
cated that he could hold his liquor, indicating that lie had a capacity to consume 
a considerable amount, without it very seriously affecting him. 

General Hannum. I recall it. 

212. Major Clausen. When did you have that discussion with 
Colonel Wyman ? 

General Hannum. With Colonel Wyman ? I don't recall the exact 
incident, whether it was on this side, or over in Honolulu. 

[WSS] 213. General Grunert. Will you give me a little line-up 
on just the relationship between the division engineer and his district 
engineers ? Are your district engineers inider you for administration, 
for disciplinary action, for control and supervision? Does all that 
apply as with troops? They were actually under your command, but 
are there certain limits, or what ? 

General Hannum. No, the division engineer has supervisory con- 
trol over the operations personnel in the district. 

214. General Grunert. Suppose the district engineer does commit 
himself as to conduct, is it j-our business to take action against him? 

General Hannum. I would take action against him, yes, or warn 
him, and consult with him, and advise him. 

[2084-] 216. General Grunert. In other words, he is under your 
command for his conduct ? 

General Hannum. Yes, I think I could say so. 

216. General Grunert. For instance, did W3'man have to get your 
O. K. to give Rohl a contract ? 

General Hannum. No. That was an arrangement that w^as made 
between — Wyman was carrying out the contract. He had, of course, 
authority to contact the contractors as contractors directly and direct 
them. He did not have to come to me for authority to secure Rohl's 
services over there. 

217. General Grunert. Because they were the contracting firm with 
which the District Engineer was doing business; therefore he could 
get them over there on his own without your O. K. ? 

General Hannum. Yes. He would issue the necessary instructions 
to his contractors initially without consulting me. 

218. General Grunert. Did you ever get any report about Wyman's 
conduct from any source, as to his lack of sobriety or his conduct 
otherwise ? 

General Hannum. You mean, in Los Angeles or Honolulu ? 

219. General Grunert. Anywhere while he was under your com- 
mand. 

General Hannum. No, I don't believe so. General. I do not 
recall hearing any adverse criticism of his conduct except his person- 
ality and ability to irritate people. There was brought up one morn- 
ing the question of his administration and the differences between 
Wyman and Lyman. When December 7th came the troops on Hawaii 
needed a lot of supplies and other things, which they did not have, and 
in taking their positions, their combat positions, they secured mate- 
rials from the various merchants around the island, and in many cases 
they did not give [208S] receipts for the materials which they 
obtained. Then later Wyman, according to his report to me, tried to 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1087 

have the Department Engineer issue instructions or have them issued 
by Department Headquarters tliat in securing these materials the com- 
manding officer, or even a non-commissioned officer, whoever got the 
materials, should give a receipt to the merchant from whom he received 
them, merchant or other person. That apparently was not done, 
according to what I understood. 

After things quieted down, the bills were receiA'ed and tui-ned over 
to the District Engineer for payment. Wyman had very great diffi- 
culty in getting anyone to certify that the materials had been received. 
He had no authority to make payments of equipment money imless 
he could get a proper certificate of the receipt of those things. That 
led to a confusion and a difference between Wyman and Lyman at 
the time. It also irritated a great many merchants and others who 
were delayed in receiving payment until there was an- opportunity 
to find out whether the materials had actually been delivered by 
that merchant to someone in the military service. 

220. General Grunert. Then in answer to my question do I under- 
stand that you never received any complaint about Wyman that would 
cause you to take disciplinary action ? 

General Hannuji. No, sir, I did not receive any such complaint. 

221. General Grunert. And during the time he was under your 
jurisdiction, you know nothing about his conduct that would require 
any such action ? 

General Hannum. No. 

222. General Grunert. Do you know of any delays in construction 
[^086] that are properly chargeable to the District Engineer 
through inefficiency or neglect? 

General Hannum. No, sir. My experience with Wyman was that 
he was a driver and he pushed things and pushed them hard, and 
in doing so he did irritate some of his subordinates and other persons. 

223. General Grunert. You know that of your own personal knowl- 
edge? 

General Hannum. Yes, sir. he was a hard taskmaster. 

224. General Grunert. Do you know of your own knowledge 
whether or not any action of the contractors in Hawaii resulted in 
delay of construction there ? 

General Hannum. No, except unless it be inefficient labor. Of 
course, they had very great difficulty in getting efficient labor and 
they did not accomplish what might have been accomplished in normal 
times in this country, on account of the lack of qualified labor. 

225. General Grunert. Then I might ask you this question : Do 
you know whether any such delays were intentional on the part of 
any contractor ? 

General Hannum. I would say that they would not have been in- 
tentional. I think that they were trying to execute the contract as 
rapidly as possible and to the best of their ability. 

226. General Grunert. With your knowledge of construction, as 
an engineer officer experienced in construction, had someone else been 
in Wyman's place under the conditions that existed, do you think 
they could have done a better job, as good a job, or a job with less 
success or progress ? 



1088 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Hannum. I do not believe they could have accom- [£087] 
plished more in the way of construction work. I do believe that they 
could have established better relationships with the public and within 
their own organization. 

227. General Grunert. Any more questions ? 

228. General Kussell. There has been considerable testimony about 
a man named Lyman. Lyman died out there, didn't he ? 

General Hannum. Yes, sir. He went out there. He was on dutj) 
as district engineer in Boston along about 1936 or 1937. He was 
advised by the doctors to retire. He did not want to retire. He 
thought that by going and taking duty with a regiment out at Hono- 
lulu he would not work under such heavy pressure and he would get 
along all right and when he completed his assigmnent to the engineer 
regiment out there, after two years he would retire and live out in 
Honolulu or in the Hawaiian Islands. 

229. General Etjssell. He was a native Hawaiian ? 

General Hannum. Yes. The family was from the Island of 
Hawaii. 

230. General Russell. You state this man Wyman was rather diffi- 
cult to get along with and irritated people considerably. What about 
Lyman ? 

General Hannum. Lyman had a different personality, a pleasing 
personality. He made friends easily. 

231. General Russell. And he did not irritate people? 
General Hannum. No, I don't think he did. 

232. General Russell. If any friction existed between Wyman and 
Lyman, it would be your judgment that Wyman would be responsible 
for the friction? 

General Hannum. Not necessarily so. There were differ- [£088] 
ences of opinion. Lyman was a positive character, too, and when he 
made up his mind he was just as positive as Wyman was, and because 
they were not, either one. under the otlier, there would naturally be 
friction there on that particular matter. 

233. General Russell. That is all. 

234. General Grunert. Knowing what you did, if you had to do 
it over again would you choose Wyman to get that sort of a job done, 
or would you trust it to somebody else ? 

General Hannum. Under the present conditions and what has de- 
veloped, I would not want to use Wyman again in the same place, under 
the same conditions. 

235. General Grunert. General, It may happen that as our investi- 
gation proceeds we may want to ask you a few jnore questions when we 
come back through here. Do you expect to be here off and on for the 
next month or so ? 

General Hannum. I will be in the States somewhere. 

236. General Grunert. But not necessarily here in San Francisco? 
General Hannum. No, but I can be obtained through San Francisco, 

here. 

237. General Grunert. There may be a few points which the Board 
wants to clear up, of which they may think you have knowledge, and, 
therefore, although we are through with you now we may want ask 
you a few more questions if points come up to be cleared up. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1089 

General Hannum. Yes, sir. I can leave my office and phone number 
in Sacramento. 

238. General Grunert. From what questions that have been asked 
and the testimony that has been given, do you know of anything that 
has not been brought out wliich might be of assistance to the Board, 
that you would like to introduce as evidence ? 

[2089] General Hannum. This relates particularly to Wyman's 
relations with Rohl and Wyman's performance of duty as District 
Engineer in Honolulu preceding and following Pearl Harbor? 

239. General Grunert. Yes, as limited to anything that had to do 
with the attack on Pearl Harbor, either background or leading up to 
it, or personalities concerned with, not any ancient history or things 
that happened afterwards, unless they have some bearing upon what 
happened then. 

General Hannum. And Wyman's conduct included? 

240. General Grunert. And Wyman's conckict included. 
General Hannum. AVell, I can tell you something which I heard 

circumstantially that took place on December Tth in Honolulu, regard- 
ing Wyman's conduct there, but I think that you can get that first- 
hand possibly better from the personnel in the Honolulu office who 
w^ere there with regard to that matter. 

On December 7th, which was a Sunday, I was coming back from 
Washington and was on the train this side of Chicago, when the radio 
recorded Pearl Harbor was being bombed. When I arrived here in 
San Francisco Colonel Matheson, w^ho was my assistant, reported to 
me that Wyman had called up by radio phone from Honolulu on earl}'^ 
Sunday afternoon, tried to get me, could not get me and finally got 
Colonel Matheson at his house in Burlingame. Colonel Wyman re- 
ported to Colonel Matheson "We are being bombed." Colonel Mathe- 
son asked him whether he could do anything. He said nope, he 
couldn't do anything ; he just wanted to report they were being bombed. 
That was all the conversation. 

When I went to Honolulu later, which I think was in May 
of 1942, I learned or it was reported to me that Wyman on 
the [2090] evening of December Tth, Sunday evening, when 
the troops were being disposed for defense of the island, happened 
to be along the waterfront at Honolulu and saw that the little ship 
harbor there to the east of the main harbor, where a lot of little boats 
were collected and into which theie was an opening from the sea, 
with a shallow depth of water of 6 or 8 feet over the reef, that that 
area was not covered, not protected. He proceeded to take measures 
to get civilians and secured arms from the Ordnance Depot nearby, 
and had them armed, and within a few hours had taken defense 
measures and had the place covered, with rifle fire, of course ; he had 
no other means. 

I will be very glad, if there is anything more that occurs to me, 
to report it to you, any circumstances which I think might be of use 
to you in your investigation in connection with, as I understand, 
Wyman's conduct as District Engineer in Honolulu, and the conduct 
of his work. 

241. General Grunert. Yes, as to his conduct, his work, delay in 
construction, generally about the construction work in Hawaii prior 
to December Tth. 



1090 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Hannum. Very good, sir. 

242. General Grunert. That may have a bearing upon delays that 
may have influenced the defenses against the attack of December 7th. 

General Hannum. Yes, sir. 

243. General Grunert. Thank you very much. 
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 
(Thereupon at 5 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of wit- 
nesses and proceeded to other business. ) 



I 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1091 



[_mn CONTENTS 

THURSDAY, AUGUST 31, 1944 

Testimony of : Paga ' 

Colonel Lathe B. Row, Temporarily Assistant Inspector General, 

Western Defense Command, Presidio of San Francisco, California^- 2092 
Major Howard F. Cooper, Air Corps, Army Air Force Base, Unit 

ATC 2130 

Thomas E. Tillman, 1230 Shafter Street, San Mateo, California 2134 

Thomas Ernest Connolly, 2400 Fulton Street, San Francisco, Cali- 
fornia 2158 

Walter Wilton Home, 9425 Wilshire Boulevard, Beverly Hills, Cali- 
fornia 2200 

DOCUMENTS 

Memorandum, 14 February, 1942, Department Inspector General to Chief 

of Staff 2094 

Confidential Report to Colonel Row 2107 

Excerpts from page 10 of Colonel Hunt's Report 2113 

Excerpts from page 11 of Colonel Hunt's Report 2114 

Excerpts from page 31 of Colonel Hunt's Report 2115 

Excerpts from F. B. L Report, October 29, 1942 2122 

I Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original transcript of proceedings. 



79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 2- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1093 



{2092-] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL 

HARBOR BOAR]) 



THUBSDAY, AUGUST 31, 1944. 

Presidio of San Francisco, Cal. 

The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted 
the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the 
Board, presiding. 

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. 
Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members. 

Present also: Colonel Charles AV. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. 
Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., 
Executive Officer. 

General Grunert. The Board will come to order. 

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL LATHE B. ROW, 03601: TEMPORARILY 
ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL, WESTERN DEFENSE COM- 
MAND : PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO. 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. General Grunert. Colonel, the Board is after facts concerning 
the attack on Pearl Harbor, incident to that attack, or connectecl 
therewith. It is charged with investigation of certain things that 
happepned in and about Honolulu, connected with Colonel Wyman, 
and for that purpose you have been called to give the Board some 
information. General Frank has charge of this particular part of 
the investigation, and he will lead [£093] in questioning, and 
the Board will fill out where it sees fit. General Frank. 

2. General Frank. Will you state any assignment which you had 
with respect to an investigation that you made concerning the ac- 
tivities of Colonel Wyman. 

Colonel Row. I was assigned as Inspector General, Hawaiian De- 
partment, some time in May 1941, and continued on that assignment 
until March 1943. One of the assignments given to the Commanding 
General of the Hawaiian Department which I found when taking 
over the office was inspections of cost-plus-fixed-fee contract opera- 
tions within the Department. At that time nothing had been done 
relative to the inspections, and during the summer and fall of 1941 
this work was started. 

The inspections were turned over to the Inspector General, Hawai- 
ian Department. 

3. General Frank. That was yourself? 

Colonel Row. That was myself. These inspections and investiga- 
tions were in the main made by subordinates in a section which was 



1094 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

organized as a Cost-Pliis-Fixed-Fee section. A very small part of 
the work of inspections and investigations were made by me person- 
all}^, although under my supervision. 

4. General Frank. Were you thoroughly familiar with the re- 
sults and the details? 

Colonel Eow. I supervised the reports, and interested myself in 
the progress of them. 

5. General Frank. All right. 

6. Major Clausen. Sir, did you have occasion to make a report con- 
cerning Hawaiian Constructors, Colonel Wyman, et al.. about Feb- 
ruarv 1942? 

im94.] Colonel Row. I did. 

7. Major Clausen. And would you let me have that, please? The 
record shows the witness handed me a document consisting of three 
pages, with a fourth page containing a little note, on the top. By 
the way, in whose handwriting is this, Colonel, "recommending relief 
of," on this little note? 

Colonel Row. That was mine, personally. 

8. Major Clausen. I am going to read this report into the record, 
if I may, so that the Board may hear. It is dated 14 February 1942, 
on the stationery of the Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, Office 
of the Department Inspector General. 

Memorandum: To the Chief of Staff. 

1. The preliminary portion of the investigation now being made by Lieutenant 
Colonel Emil W. Leard, I. G. D., of this office regarding the operations of the 
U. S. District Engineer indicates that the following conditions exist : 

a. That the District Engineer has antagonized the business firms of Honolulu 
and private individuals of the community by his failure to properly meet 
obligations, peremptory actions, and lack of tact on the part of himself and certain 
members of his staff. 

h. That due to the District Engineer's failure to coordinate the procuring, 
auditing, and disbursing sections of his organization payments to dealers for 
merchandise delivered and services rendered are in some cases long overdue. 
Some firms are threatening to refuse further sales unless outstanding obliga- 
tions are paid in full and kept current. Many smaller businesses now are 
faced with financial difficulties due to their inability [2095] to collect 
amounts due them from the District Engineer. It has been ascertained that 
of the larger firms approximately $.500,000.00 is due Lewers & Cooke and ap- 
proximately $60,000.00 is due Mr. Murphy, the owner of Murphy Motors and 
Aloha Motors. There are indications that similar large amounts are due other 
firms. 

c. That the District Engineer's delay in paying wages, sometimes for periods 
of several weeks, is adversely affecting the prosecution of defense projects and 
the morale of employees engaged on these projects. 

d. That the failure on the part of the District Engineer to properly and syste- 
matically take over the activities of the Zone Constructing Quartermaster on 
16 December has resulted in disruption of administrative functions to a marked 
degree. 

e. That the District Engineer's office as a whole has not been organized in 
.such a manner as to operate with efficiency. 

f. That there is evidence that the District Engineer has harassed the former 
employees of the Zone Constructing Quartermaster and has subjected them to 
mental persecution to such an extent that many of the key men have refused 
to work in his office. 

(J. There is evidence to indicate that the employees of the former Zone Con- 
structincT Quartermaster who have been transferred to the office of the District 
Engineei' are discontented and dissatisfied over conditions existing therein. 

2. Mr. Murphy, the owner of the Murphy Motors and [2096] Aloha 
Motors, stated to Lieutenant Colonel Leard yesterday (13 February 1942) that 
he has been unable to collect past due obligations for trucks and automobiles 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1095 

purchased by the District Engineer. He further stated that he is going to the 
mainland by clipper within three days and that he contemplates bringing these 
matters to the attention of Delegate King and such other authorities in Wash- 
ington as may be necessary to secure rem.edial action unless he can be assured 
his vmpaid bills will be settled promptly. He also stated that he contemplates 
refusing to make delivery on orders now on hand for more motor transporta- 
tion. Mr. Murphy is extremely bitter over the manner in which he and other 
automobile dealers have been treated by the District Engineer. 

3. In addition to the matters mentioned above, past inspections and recent 
numerous incidents requiring investigation have disclosed that the administration 
and oi)eration of the District Engineer activites since 7 December 1941 have been 
exemplified by extravagance and waste and general maladministration. It was 
discovered during the course of inspections of District Engineer activities prior 
to 7 December that his administrative set-up was improperly coordinated and 
was so mentioned in these reports of inspection. The District Engineer, in his 
replies, has stated that steps had been initiated to correct the irregularities and 
deficiencies reported. It is now evident that many of these irregularities and 
deficiencies still existed on 7 December 1941 and have been aggravated by the 
increased volume of his activities [2097] incident to the outbreak of war 
and the taking over of the functions of the Zone Construction Quartermaster on 
16 December 1941. Colonel Wyman's methods of administration have been such 
as to antagonize many persons, military and civil, both within and without his 
organization. His actions have also been ridiculed and criticized in the com- 
munity. I believe that this condition is to the great detriment of the Army 
as a whole and the Engineer Corps in particular. 

4. In my opinion Colonel Wyman does not possess the necessary executive and 
administrative ability or the leadership to cope with the present situation exist- 
ing in this Department. In addition to the matters set forth in paragraph 1 
above, inefficiency of his office has further been demonstrated by : 

a. His methods of purchase, assignment and use of motor vehicles. 
6. His wa.ste of luoney in the renting, remodeling and furnishing of offices 
for himself and his stafC. 

c. The building of elaborate and expensive ($21,652.46) air-raid shelters at 
the Punahou School for the use of himself and the executives of the contractor. 
These shelters have sufficient capacity to protect only a small percentage of the 
number of employees on the Punahou Campus. 

d. Directing his contractor to take over and operate the Pleasanton Hotel at 
an estimated loss of $2,500.00 per month when a mess is operated and at the 
rates and room assignments fixed by the District Engineer. [209S] The 
principal beneficiaries of the use of this hotel to date have been Colonel Wyman 
and wife, and his staff and their dependents. This hotel was taken over on 
16 January 1942 and a mess was established on 26 January 1942. 

e. Failing to utilize to best advantage the services of Lit^utenant Colonel Har- 
rold, former Zone Constructing Quartermaster, and his highly trained assistants. 

f. His failure to stabilize assignments of personnel to positions of responsi- 
bility, and his failure to delegate authority to his administrative assistants to 
act for him. 

g. His failure to establish a system of accountability to insure the proper 
accounting for the receipt and issuance of construction material. 

h. His failure to issue directives in necessary detail and to organize his staff 
to insure compliance with directives issued by him. 

i. His disregard for and violation of orders of the Military Governor concern- 
ing the curfew law. 

5. Although several of the investigations relative to matters mentioned in 
paragraph 4 have not been completed, the evidence already olttained substantiates 
the statements made above and indicate that Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., C. E., 
does not possess the necessary executive and administrative ability to properly 
conduct the affairs of his office. The fact that Mr. Murphy contemplates such 
drastic action and the fact that business firms threaten to refuse delivery on 
future orders submitted by the District Engineer indicate the seriousness of the 
situation [2099] and the need for immediate remedial action. 

6. I strongly believe that vmless a change in the administration of the office 
of the District Engineer is accomplished within a short time, most serious reper- 
cussions will result. 

7. CONCLUSION: 

That it is to the best interests of the United States and of the Hawaiian De- 
partment that Colonel Wyman be relieved at once as District Engineer. 



1096 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

8. RECOMMENDATION: 

That Colonel Wyman be relieved as District Engineer at once. 

(s) Lathe B. Row, 

Colonel, I. G. D., 
Department Inspector General. 

I will read the note which is attached to the face of the document : 

Informal Memorandum by Dept Inspector General to Dept Commander recom- 
mending relief of Col. Wyman as District Engineer. 

The words, "recommending relief of" are inserted over the words, 
which formerly took their place, as follows : 

which resulted in relief of 

in other words, the pencil notation. 

In view of the seriousness of these allegations and the conduct 
which had gone on for some time, will you tell the Board how it was 
necessary for you to expose these conditions, rather than the immediate 
Commander of Colonel Wyman, the Division Engineer ? 

[2100] Colonel Row, The operations of the District Engineer 
had increased so rapidly, and in our opinion the organization set-up 
was so deficient to take care of it, that it seemed to be impossible to 
get any corrective action taken. These matters were brought to the 
attention of Colonel Wyman at various times in the form of reports 
both written and verbal. 

9. General Geuneet. What did the Department have to do with 
Wyman ? He was a district engineer under a division engineer — how 
did the Department inject itself into it? 

Colonel Eow. These inspections were directed by the Secretary of 
War in a letter of February 1941. 

10. Major Clausen. Now, sir, you have stated to me, and I will ask 
the question of you now, about prior inspections ; that is, prior to the 
one of February 14, 1942. You have stated to me the fact that copies 
are not available in your office, here. 

Colonel Row. That is right. 

11. Major Clausen. But that they are available in Honolulu ? 
Colonel Row. They should be available. 

12. Major Clausen. And I have informed you, have I not, that 
I was not able to locate the copies in Washington, at that time? 

Colonel RoAV. Yes, that is so ; a great many. You may have found 
some, there, but not all of them. 

13. Major Clausen. I am sure that, although I requested, I was 
unable to find any that preceded 7 December 1941, concerning the con- 
duct that is referred to in your report of February 14, 1942; and I was 
informed that they would be available either through you, or in Hono- 
lulu ; so I have asked you for them, and 3'^ou now tell me that they are 
not available to you here, but that we will get them in Honolulu ? 

\[2J01] Colonel Row. I might explain these inspections, the 
form of the inspections. They were considered of the continuing 
type, which allows inspections to be made over several months or an 
entire year, and then a final report made at the end of the year, and 
for that reason these reports did not in all cases reach Washington. 

14. General Grunert. Then as I understand it, the War Depart- 
ment, as a routine matter, charged the local commander with having 
his Inspector General investigate or keep track of certain things in 
the District Engineer's administration. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1097 

Colonel Row. That is correct, 

15. General Grunert. And this was just one of the inspections car- 
ried on for that purpose ? 

Colonel Row. Yes, sir. 

16. General Grunert. And did that, in a way, take some of the re- 
sponsibility off the division engineer's shoulders as to administration 
of the districts? 

Colonel Row. In no manner did it relieve the district commander 
of his responsibilities. 

17. General Grunert. The division engineer's responsibility? 
Colonel Row. Yes, sir; the division engineer's responsibility. 

18. General Frank. Were copies of these inspections sent to the di- 



vision ens'ineer 



Colonel Row. Oh, yes, sir; in all cases, the reports were sent — not 
to the division, to the district engineer; but not to the division engi- 
neer. 

19. General Frank. Do you know the organizational set-up in the 
Corps of Engineers? 

[2102] Colonel Row. In general ; yes, sir. 

20. General Frank. You know that the district in Honolulu was 
under the division engineer here in San Francisco ? 

Colonel Row. That is correct; yes. 

21. General Frank. He, in turn, was responsible back to the Chief 
of Engineers, in Washington? 

Colonel Row, Yes, 

22. General Frank. Now, do you know what machinery the di- 
vision engineer here in San Francisco had for checking up on the 
district engineer in Honolulu ? 

Colonel Row. I don't, at the moment ; no. 

23. General Frank. While making those inspections, did you run 
onto any activity en the part of the division engineer to check or in- 
spect his district engineer in Honolulu? 

Colonel Row. I don't recall at this time. 

24. General Frank. Do you know of any systematic arrangement 
that he had for inspecting his district engineer ? 

Colonel Row. I do not; no. 

25. General Frank. Do you know the circumstances which prompt- 
ed the War Department to have that district engineer's office inspected 
by the inspector of the HaAvaiian Department? 

Colonel Row. All of those activities were to be inspected by an In- 
siiector General ; that was the general plan. In the continental United 
States, all of these inspections were conducted from the office of the 
Inspector General in Washington, but clue to the remoteness of the 
activities in the Pacific, these duties were charged to the Commanding 
General of the Hawaiian Department. 

26. General Frank. You say that the copies of the inspections 
[f!103] were not furnished to the division engineer? 

Colonel Row. No, sir; it is to the district engineer. 

27. General Frank. Yet the district engineer was operating under 
the supervision of the division engineer, and if there were some dis- 
crepancies that you had determined in your inspection report, the man 
to require the correction was the next higher commander to the district 
engineer, who was the division engineer ; that is correct ? 

Colonel Row. That is correct, yes. 



1098 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

28. General Frank. And yet you didn't give it to the division engi- 
neer, you gave it to the district engineer? 

Colonel Row. That is true. Of course, these inspections were of a 
local nature. 

29. General Frank. Well, but you found things wrong; you re- 
ported them to the district engineer, and then you found they were 
not corrected, and there was no superior of his to whom they were 
referred ? 

Colonel Row. These reports went through the office of the Depart- 
ment Commander. 

30. General Grunert. In other words, you were responsible to your 
Department Commander for them, and any distribution he made was 
up to him ; is that the idea ? 

Colonel Row. Well, I think it would be the duty of the Inspector 
General to properly advise the Department Commander on those 
matters. 

31. General Grunert. But you did not think it necessary to send it 
to the division engineer? 

Colonel Row. It had not been done before. 

32. General Grunert. I think it should have been done, but 
[2104] it wasn't done, that is all. 

33. General Frank. I was following through with a line of ques- 
tions which ultimately would indicate that the organization and ad- 
ministration both were rather loose. 

Colonel Row. In practically every case, Colonel Wyman replied 
that corrective action would be taken. 

34. General Frank. But there was nobody in Honolulu who could 
require him to take that corrective action. The man who would re- 
quire him to take the corrective action was the division engineer here 
in San Francisco ; that is correct, is it not? 

Colonel Row. That is true. 

35. General Frank. I am not getting after you, at all; I am just 
trying to uncover the strength or the weaknesses of the system. 

36. Major Clausen, Sir, along that line, do you know why it was 
that, coincident with your report of February 14, 1942, which is ad- 
dressed to the Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Department, a letter 
from Colonel Lyman, dated that same day, was sent to the Chief of 
Engineers, requesting the reassignment of Colonel Wyman? 

Colonel Row. I think that letter was the result of the memorandum 
which you have read. 

37. Major Clausen. The point that I inquired about is, why did 
not that letter go to the division engineer, who was the immediate 
superior of Colonel Wyman, if you know? Is there any reason that 
you know of ? 

Colonel Row. I know of no reason. 

38. Major Clausen. You are familiar, sir, with the investigation 
by Colonel Hunt ? 

[2105] Colonel Row. All I know is that he made an investiga- 
tion. 

39. Major Clausen. Sir, I assume that your report of February 14, 
1942, speaks for itself. I am going to read, some very brief extracts 
from the report of Colonel Hunt. On page 9 of his report, he states : 

The charge relating to Colonel Wyman's questionable association with Mr. Rohl 
while in Hawaii, his alleged drunkenness, and occupation of rooms adjoining 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1099 

those of Mr. Rohl, is not wholly sustained by the known facts and the testimony 
adduced, although elements of that associatiou strongly suggest a relationship 
entirely inconsistent with the relative positions of the two men. If, as implied 
by news articles on the Tenney Committee hearings, and by various individuals. 
Colonel Wynian was aware that Mr. Rohl was not a United States citizen when 
he signed contract W-414-eng-602, these allegations take on a more sinister 
aspect. 

Do you recall, of your own knowledge, having investigated any of 
those allegations, sir? 

Colonel Row. As I recall, the fact that Mr. Rohl was not a citizen 
or had not been a citizen until a short time before December 7, 1941, 
came to light in an investigation that was conducted as to misuse of 
gasoline by the engineers, and during the course of that investigation 
it was discovered that he had not been an American citizen until a 
short time previously. 

40. Major Clausen. Now, in connection with that investigation of 
Mr. Rohl, did you hand me three pages, which I now show you, repre- 
senting some notes on that investigation ? 

Colonel Row. I did. 

41. Major Clausen. And what are those notes, sir ? 
\2106~\ Colonel Row. An extract from these notes, is : 

During the course of the above referred to investigation 

42. General Frank. Just what is that ? 

43. Major Clausen. I just asked you what those pages were. You 
describe them to me. 

Colonel Row. I don't recall what these notes are, but apparently 
they are notes made by one of my assistants for my information. 

44. Major CLausen. I think it is advisable, sir, to read these notes, 
marked "Confidential." 

In other words, your statement is that these apparently are notes 
made by one of your subordinates, of the investigation that you have 
already testified to ? 

Colonel Row. For information of the Department Inspector 
General. 

[2107] 45. General Fkank. For information of the Department 
Inspector General, who was yourself? 

Colonel Row. Yes. 

46. Major Clausen. Paragraph 1 says: 

(Conficlential report to Colonel Row is as follows:) 

In connection with an investigation directed by the Department Commander 
regarding alleged illegal issues of gasoline to military personnel and employees of 
the District Engineer and Hawaiian Constructors, the testimony of several 
witnesses indicated that Mr. H. W. Rohl, present head of the Hawaiian Con- 
structors, had authorized the issuance of USED plates 

That is United States Engineering Department? 
Colonel Row. That is right. 
Major Cr.AusEN (reading) : 

plates to privately owned vehicles of several of his employees for the purpose of 
official identification and to enable them to obtain gasoline from the government 
operated gasoline station on Beretania Street. The testimony further indicated 
that Mr. Rohl authorized his transportation superintendent, Mr. Box, to issue 
gasoline without charge to other employees of the Hawaiian Constructors who 
were operating privately owned vehicles for business use. 

2. During the course of the above referred to investigation, correspondence 
came to the attention of the investigating officer which indicated that [2108] 



1100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Rohl was born in Germany and was, on 15 August 1941, still not a citizen 
of the United States. 
(Exhibit "A") 

May I interpose here this question : Do you know where that Ex- 
hibit A wall be found ? 

Colonel Row. It should be in the Inspector General's Office in Ha- 
waiian Department. 

47. Major Clausen. Do you know what significance the date of 15 
August 1941 has? 

Colonel Row. I have no knowledge of that. 

48. Major Clausen. I shall continue reading. Paragraph 3 : 

The testimony of Mr. Kohl was deemed essential in the investigation regard- 
ing the gasoline, and it appeared desirable to obtain from Mr. Rohl information 
as to his status in regard to his citizenship. 

4. Repeated attempts were made by the investigating ofBcer to obtain an inter- 
view with Mr. Rohl. On the first occasion an appointment was made with Mr. 
Rohl by telephone to meet him in his office at 10 : 00 AM the following morning, 
April 4th. At the appointed time the investigating officer was told that Mr. Rohl 
was not in. Mr. Cades, the attorney for the Hawaiian Constructors appeared and 
stated that Mr. Rohl desired him to be present when testimony was taken. Mr. 
Cades was advised that this would not be permitted. After waiting approximately 
one-half hour for Mr. Rohl, the investigating officer was told by Mr. Middleton, 
administrator for the Hawaiian Constructors, that Mr. Rohl would not be 
[2109] able to appear as he had an appointment with General Tinker and 
Colonel Lyman. Two days later, April 6th, the investigating officer contacted 
Mr. Rohl personally and informed him that the testimony would have to be taken 
sometime during that day. Mr. Rohl stated that he was just leaving for an 
appointment with General Tinker and General Emmons, but that he would come 
to the Office of the Department Inspector General later in the day, or possibly that 
evening. At 9 : 30 PM, April 7th, Mr. Middleton called this office and put Mr. 
Rohl on the phone. Mr. Rohl then agreed to meet the investigating officer at 9 : 00 
AM the following day, April 8th. The inspector visited Mr. Rohl's office promptly 
on time and waited until 10:15 AM for Mr. Rohl to appear. He then asked 
Mr. Rohl's secretary if she could locate him. She telephoned the Pleasanton Hotel 
and^then stated that Mr. Rohl was not there and was probably out with General 
Lyman. In passing the Pleasanton Hotel after leaving Mr. Rohl's office the 
investigating officer observed Mr. Rohl's car parked in the hotel grounds, where- 
upon he stopped and asked the hotel clerk the whereabouts of Mr. Rohl. He 
was informd that Mr. Rohl was asleep in his room and was not to be disturbed, 
and further, that he had informed Mr. Rohl's secretary of that fact when she 
had called a few minutes earlier. The clerk was asked to call Mr. Rohl's room 
by telephone. Mr. Rohl did not answer. Mr. Kina, the manager of the hotel, was 
then asked to awaken him and advise him that a representative of the [2110] 
Department Inspector General was there to see him. Mr. Kina went to Mr. 
Rohl's room and then reported that Mr. Rohl would not be in his office until after 
1 : 00 PM, and that he thoroughly disliked being disturbed. No further direct 
attempt was made to contact Mr. Rohl, as it was believed useless to waste further 
time in view of his evasive actions. The following morning the Office of the 
Military Governor was contacted and requested to take necessary action to 
compel Mr. Rohl to report to the Department Inspector General at a designated 
time for the purpose of taking his testimony. The following morning the Office 
of the Military Governor informed this office that Mr. Rohl had left for the 
mainland several days before, apparently on the afternoon of the day that he 
was found asleep in the hotel. 

5. Neither Mr. Rohl nor anv of his representatives informed the Inspector 
at any time that he intended to leave the Territory, but on the contrary apparently 
tried to conceal the fact. j x v 

6. The matter of irregularities in gasoline distribution is not believed to be 
sufficiently serious to warrant Mr. Rohl's evasiveness. I am of the opinion that 
something else, perhaps his citizenship status or other matters, may account for 
his actions in persistently avoiding being questioned. , x^ <- 

7. This matter has been held in abeyance, as this office was informed that 
Mr. Rohl would return in about two weeks. As he has not yet returned and 
[2111] no definite information can be obtained as to whether he will return, 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1101 

it is recommended that the Federal Bureau of Investigation be requested to 
malce a thorought inquiry into his citizenship status from the time he first 
became connected with tlie organization l^nown as the Hawaiian Constructors 
(Cost-Plus-A-Fixed-Fee Contractors) up to the present date, with a view of 
criminal prosecution against all responsible persons if the facts so warrant 

That is the end of that. 

Do you recall whether Mr. Rohl was finally interviewed? 

Colonel Row. Mr. Condon of the F. B. I., who is now on duty in 
San Francisco, was on duty in Honolulu at that time. Yesterday, in 
order to refresh ni}^ memory as to what was done, jNIr. Condon stated 
that authority was obtained from the Department Commander to ask 
for the assistance of the F. B. I. in this matter and that the F. B. I. 
conducted investigations relative to this matter. 

49. General Grunp:rt. What were the dates of those notes? 
Colonel Row. I don't recall it. 

50. General Grunert. They refer to April. April what year? 
I am in the air as to the date that these notes were made and handed 
in. Was it April '41, April '42, or what ? 

51. Major Clausen. Do you remember, sir ? 
Colonel Row. It would have to be in April '42. 

52. General Grunert. And at that time there w^as question about 
Mr. Rohl's citizenship ? 

Colonel Row. It would be from — that would be so. 
\2112] 53. General Grunert. And wasn't it well known that 
he became a citizen in '41 ? 

54. General Frank. September. 

55. General Grunert. September of '41. 

Colonel Row. I believe that is correct, according to the reports. 

56. General Grunert. Then, I wonder why he evades being inter- 
rogated on accotint of citizenship when he Ijecame a citizen, as the 
Board understands, in September of '41. That is Mvhj I wondered 
what that "April" there referred to, whether April of '42 or April of 
'41. I just wanted to bring that out in the record because it leaves 
an impression that that was prior to the time that he actually became 
a citizen. 

Colonel Row. No ; he became a citizen 

57. General Frank. I gather from this that he was over there in 
August of '41 before he got his citizenship papers; is that correct? 

Colonel 'Row. I can't recall when he went over there. I am not 
familiar with that. 

58. General Grunert. Wlien was this investigation about gasoline? 
When was that conducted ? In '42 or '41? Do you recall that? 

Colonel Row. Do you have that ? 

59. Major Clausen. No, sir. 

Colonel Row. That would be sometime in 1942. 

60. General Grunert. Well, then evidently the April date, the 
month of April referred to therein, must be '42 ? 

Colonel Row. Yes, sir. I am sure. 

61. General Grunert. Therefore, that still confuses me more, 
[211S1^ why they should be thinking that he was evading being 
investigated because of citizenship. 

But carry on. I just wanted to put that in the record. 

62. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. 



1102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Sir, I am going to read from page 10 of Colonel Hunt's report, 
as follows: 

(Excerpt from page 10 of Colonel Hunt's report is as follows :) 

It is difficult, therefore, to escape the conclusion that Colonel Wyman knew 
of Mr. Rohl's noncitizenship when the contract was entered into, or at latest 
shortly after writing the unanswered letter summoning him to Hawaii. In such 
circumstances any close relationship between Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl 
thereafter would have involved the former in dealings with a man of doubtful 
loyalty to the United States. 

Well, my question was much similar to the one put by General 
Grunert: whether you of your own knowledge know the basis for this 
conclusion by Colonel Hunt. 

Colonel Row. No, I am not familiar with that. 

63. Major Clausen. In other words, did you follow up on that 
asj)ect, or was that later on followed up by the F. B. I. ? 

Colonel Row. It was followed up by the F. B. I. It was handled 
as a civilian matter. 

64. Major Clausen. Until Colonel Hunt came out to Hawaii; is 
that so? 

Colonel Row. I think that is right. 

65. Major Clausen. Now, from page 11 of Colonel Hunt's report : 
[21 H'] (Excerpt from page 11 of Colonel Hunt's report is as 

follows:) 

"Various witnesses testified to having seen Colonel Wyman with Mr. Rohl at 
various semi-public functions, — 

This is referring to Hawaii. 

— when both men indulged freely in intoxicating beverages. So far as could 
be ascertained, most of these instances were prior to the attack of 7 December. 
No witness was found who could testify to drunkenness on Colonel Wyman's 
part. His own testimony and that of other witnesses in this respect indicates 
that Colonel Wyman maintained a totally unnecessary, and in the circumstances, 
an undesirable social familiarity with the active head of an organization whose 
prime business it was to profit from work under his supervision. If there is 
reasonable doubt that this .relationship was with a man whose non-citizenship 
at the commencement of the contract was known to him, there is no doubt 
whatever that it was with a man who at the time of this relationship in Hawaii, 
had been proven to Colonel Wyman to have concealed the fact of his alien 
status. The least that can be said of that relationship is that it displayed a 
callousness on Colonel Wyman's part, not only toward the character of his 
associate, but toward the possible consequences of its public display. 

Do you recall any facts being brought to your knowledge con- 
cerning these incidents that are referred to on this page 11? 
[2115'] Colonel Row. I don't ; don't recall. 

66. Major Clausen. Do you recall whether any reports in the 
Hawaiian Department were given to the Department Commander on 
those aspects ? 

Colonel Row. No; so far as I know, no reports were rendered nor 
any investigations made in connection with that phase of the matter. 

67. Major Clausen. Now, on page 31 Colonel Hunt says: 
(Excerpts from Colonel Hunt's report are as follows:) 

The flattery of Colonel Wyman personally and professionally, which was be- 
stowed upon him by his wealthy associate, Mr. Rohl, evoked in Colonel Wyman 
so complete a confidence in the former as to lead him to an unwise acceptance 
of Mr. Rohl's judgment and advice during their subsequent association in Hawaii. 
He thereby relinquished to some extent that independence of judgment required 
of an officer in charge of the Government's interests, ^s, indicated in his too 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1103 

ready acceptance of Mr. Rohl's recommendations relating to equipment pur- 
chases and appraisals. 

Then on this page there is this statement concerning one item : 

Colonel Wyman did not act in the Government's best interest when in pur- 
chasing Rohl-Connolly equipment at a cost of $166,423.17 against the appraised 
value of $131,411.03— 

And also this statement: 

Colonel Wyman did not act in the Government's best interests in the pur- 
chase of equipment from the 121161 Hawaiian Contracting Company 
at a cost of $156,000, in that he based that payment upon a prejudiced appraisal — 

Sir, do yon recall having received information concerning the 
matters which Colonel Hnnt has disclosed on this page 31 in these 
prior investigations ? 

Colonel Row. I recall that we did make investigations relative to 
the pnrchase of equipment, but the details I don't recall. 

68. Major Clausen. Now, Colonel Hunt infers, by reason of the 
discovery of these particular instances of acts of Colonel Wyman not 
in the best interests of the Government, that there were others. Do 
you recall other instances ? 

Colonel Row^ I don't at this time, but the records in the office of 
the Department of Inspector General should show them. 

69. General Frank. Who is the Inspector General there now; do 
you know ? 

Colonel Row. Colonel Milard Pierson is the Inspector under Gen- 
eral Richardson. I don't recall the Inspector of the Service Com- 
mand, the Base Command. 

70. Major Clausen. Colonel Hunt on page 391 states as follows, in 
questioning a certain witness : 

Now, I want to talk about the Hawaiian Constructors. Most observers seem 
to agree that their work was not efficiently performed. 

Did you get reports to that effect, sir ? 

Colonel Row. We did receive reports to that effect, and we reported 
on them. 

[2117 j 71. Major Clausen. And what did you do with reports 
as to the inefficiencies of the Hawaiian Constructors? 

Colonel Row. These reports were rendered to the District Engineer, 
and efforts were made to correct the deficiencies when found. 

72. Major Clausen. Did he say so, you mean ? 

Colonel Row. He reported that he was taking steps to correct de- 
ficiencies. 

73. Major Clausen. And these reports to that effect were rendered 
over what period of time, sir ? 

Colonel Row. It is my estimation that these reports started in the 
early fall of 1941. 

74. General Frank. What really happened here was that the chain 
of command and control did not uncover this unsatisfactory opera- 
tion, but that an agency outside the chain of command of the Engi- 
neer Corps, namely the Department Commander, uncovered it and 
asked for the relief of this man who was not doing satisfactory work ; 
and that, therefore, the system of the Engineer Corps in administering 
Wyman's work was not sufficient to uncover this condition and this 
situation ? 



1104 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Row. That is correct. 

75. Major Clausen. Now, sir, do you recall a Robert Hoffman who 
was an area superintendent of the Hawaiian Constructors? 

(^olonel Row. I met him one morning. 

76. Major Clausen. Do you recall an incident which occurred in the 
office of General Farthing when Mr. Hoffman had complaints as to 
delays and inefficiencies of the Hawaiian Constructors? 

Colonel Row. I do. 

[2118] 77. Major Clausen. Will you state to the Board what 
3^ou recall concerning that incident ? 

Colonel Row. As I recall, at some date about April or May 1942, 
Brigadier General — Is it Farthing? 

78. Major Clausen. Farthing. 

Colonel Row. Brigadier General Farthing, Air Corps, telephoned 
to me and stated that there was a party in his office who desired to make 
a complaint. General Farthing asked me if I would come to his 
office and receive this complaint. I did go to Hickam Field and there 
met a Mr. Hoffman. I have forgotten his name. 

79. Major Clausen. Robert Hoffman. 

Colonel Row. Robert Hoffman. Mr. Hoffman gave me a sworn 
statement of a number of pages in length. As I recall, his complaints 
referred to operations at Bellows Field and included inefficiency of the 
engineer operations and of the USED: United States Engineer De- 
partment. As I recall, the complaints included conflicts of authority, 
dual control, waste, and so forth. These complaints criticized Colonel 
Wyman and other personnel. 

Do you want me to go right ahead with the story? 

80. Major Clausen. Yes, I think so. 

Colonel Row. Before leaving Mr. Hoffman, General Farthing told 
me that he had just given Mr. Hoffman a letter of commendation due 
to the fact that Mr. Hoffman had been closely associated with Colonel 
Farthing at Bellows Field. 

81. General Frank. And had done good work ? 

Colonel Row. And apparently had done good work, in the estima- 
tion of General Farthing. 

[2119] 82. General Grunert. Wliat work? 
Colonel Row. Engineering work. 

83. General Grunert. What kind of work? 

84. Major Clausen. Area superintendent. 

Colonel Row. As area superintendent at Bellows Field. 

85. General Grunert. Was he working for Farthing or for Wyman ? 
Hoffman. 

Colonel Row. For Wyman. But General Farthing was in com- 
mand of Bellows Field, as I recall. 

86. General Russell. Was Hoffman a soldier? 

87. Major Clausen. No, sir. He was employed by Hawaiian Con- 
structors. 

88. General Russell. Well, that is different. 

89. Major Clausen. Yes. 

90. General Frank. Nobody said he was a soldier. 

91. General Russell. He could not work for the Engineers if he 
was working for the contractor. 

92. Major Clausen. Well, the Engineers on many occasions issued 
orders directing the employees. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1105 

By the way, the statement to which I invited your attention yester- 
day, which is already an exhibit before this Board as being a state- 
ment given in writing, with exhibits, by Mr, Hoffman to General 
Farthing : do you recall whether you saw that statement on the occa- 
sion when you went to the office of General Farthing? 

Colonel Row. No, sir, I did not, as I recall. 

93. Major Clausen. All right. 

Colonel Row. I don't recall of ever seeing that statement. 

94. General Grunert. Before we leave this subject of Hoffman, 
[2120'] where is that sworn statement he made that you saw? 
Is it available to the Board ? 

Colonel Row. This report was typed. . 

95. General Frank. What report? 

Colonel Row. That Mr. Hoffman gave to me in the form of a sworn 
statement. I transmitted it to the Commanding General, Hawaiian 
Department, by memorandum recommending 

96. General Grunert. Then you think it should be on file in the 
records of the Hawaiian Department? 

Colonel Row. It should be, sir. 

97. Major Clausen. At this point I would like to show the witness 
again the sworn statement or the statement that was furnished by 
Mr. Hoffman. 

98. General Grunert. You have it, then, have you? 

99. Major Clausen. I have one, sir, and I would rather assume 
that this that I have is the statement, although he informed me yes- 
terday that he didn't think it was. I would like to get it. It will 
just take me a moment. 

(There was colloquj^ off the record.) 

100. Major Clausen. I show you, Colonel, Exhibit No. 8-B in 
evidence before this Board. I will ask you to take a look again and 
see if that is the statement with the supporting documents that you 
received — rather, a copy of the statement you received from Mr. 
Robert Hoffman. 

101. Colonel Toulmin. Give the date now. 

102. Major Clausen. That was in '42, 

Colonel Row. I examined this document day before yesterdaj^, and 
I wouldn't say definitely that this document was never in the office 
of the Department Inspector General, but I don't believe it was. 
I don't recognize any feature of it except [2121] as to some 
of the content, which was similar in nature to the sworn statement 
that was given to me by JMr. Hoffman sometime in the spring of 1942. 

103. Major Clausen. On page 16 of this Exhibit 8-B there is a 
signature of Robert Hoffman and the date April 29, 1942. There 
are attached to this statement of Robert Hoffman various documents 
which are dated in 1941. 

104. General Frank. What months? 

[2122] 105. Major Clausen. There are July, September, Novem- 
ber, December, August and so forth, and they refer to delays anc?- 
inefficiencies. 

I first want to ask the question as to whether you had any conver- 
sations with General Farthing after this occasion that Mr. 'Hoffman 
was in the office ? 

Colonel Row. I may have, but I do not recall them. 



1106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

106. Major Clausen. And with regard to the months of 1942, do 
you know when that was that you had this conversation with Mr. 
Hoffman and General Farthing ? 

Colonel Row. It seems to me it was either in March or April of 
1942. 

107. Major Clausen. And did the statement that Mr. Hoffman 
make to you refer to items of delays and inefficiencies that occurred 
in 1941 ? 

Colonel Row. That is my impression at this time. 

108. Major Clausen. And did they refer to items of delays and 
inefficiencies prior to 7 December, 1941 ? 

Colonel Row. It is my impression that that is so. 

109. General Russell. What is the date of that statement? 

110. Major Clausen. This is dated April, 1942. 

Now, for the record and in order that one thing may tie to another, 
I am going to read from an F. B. I. report that was furnished to this 
Board by G-2, which is dated October 29, 1942, on page 49, as follows : 

(Excerpt from F. B. I. report, October 29, 1942, page 49, was read 
as follows:) 

Confidential informant T-1 related that his division conducted the investiga- 
tion which precipitated the transfer [2123] of Colonel Theodore Wyman, 
Jr. as District Engineer of the Hawaiian Islands. In connection with that 
investig'ation, one Robert Hoffman, Area Superintendent, Hawaiian Construc- 
tors, voluntarily furnished information to Confidential Informant T-1 which 
indicated many inefiiciencies in connection with construction work performed 
by the Hawaiian Constructors and described in detail instances where major 
work performed by them had cost the government at least 50 per cent more than 
it should have cost under the circumstances. According to Informant T-1, 
Hoffman is considered a capable engineer of wide experience and training whose 
opinions would undoubtedly carry a considerable amount of v/eight. 

This report is by the party you mentioned from the F. B. I., John 
Condon. Do you recall having a conversation with Mr. Condon con- 
cerning this incident ? 

Colonel Row. I do not recall any such conversation with him. 

111. Major Clausen. Do you recall if some other member of your 
division did ? 

Colonel Row. It might have been some other member of my divi- 
sion. 

112. Major Clausen. I have no further questions. 

113. General Frank. Will you state if, as a. result of your investi- 
gations of this situation, whether or not in your own mind you con- 
cluded, as to the efficiency or inefficiency of the contractors' work, as 
to whether or not there was waste and so forth ? • 

Colonel Row. I was definitely of the opinion that there \2WJi\ 
was a great deal of waste and unnecessary expenditure of time and 
funds. 

114. General Frank. That was based on what? 

Colonel Row\ Our inspections and investigations made by our office. 

115. General Frank. A series of them ? 
Colonel Row. A series. 

116. General Frank. But those reports were submitted to the Dis- 
trict Engineer and not to the Division Engineer? 

Colonel Row. That is correct, as I recall it. 

117. General Frank. Do you know whether or not copies were sent 
to Washington? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1107 

Colonel Row. I believe that some of them, in certain instances, were 
sent on. I believe the records in the office of the Inspector General 
will show that. 

118. General Frank. Otherwise the report just passed back and 
forth between the Department Commander and Wyman, and the De- 
partment Connnander had no authority in 1941 to put the screws on 
Wyman direct? 

Colonel Row, No, sir. No cooperation between the Commander and 
the District Engineer. 

119. General Russell. Colonel, I want to see if I can tie the evidence, 
or some of it, up with a few questions. You became the Department 
Inspector about when? 

Colonel Row. May of 1941. 

120. General Russell. How soon after you became the Department 
Inspector was it before you were directed to investigate any phase or 
phases of the construction which was being done in the Hawaiian 
Islands ? 

[2125] Colonel Row. The order for inspections had been re- 
ceived in the Department some time in February or March, as I recall, 
of 1941, but no inspections had been made until after my arrival. 

121. General Russell. Do you recall when this Colonel Emil W. 
Leard made the inspection, the report of which has been read into the 
record by Major Clausen ? 

Colonel Row. I should think some time between January and March, 
the early part of March, 1942. As I recall, the report was a memoran- 
dum to the Chief of Staff, which was made about the 14th of February. 

122. General Russell. Is your testimony now that from the time 
that you took over as Department Inspector, no investigation into that 
construction work was made until the year 1942 ? 

Colonel Row. Inspections were made more or less continuously from 
early fall, at least, in 1941, somewhere in the early fall of 1941. 

123. General Russell. Then this division in your office that was set 
up to investigate the type of contract under which the work was done 
was actually set up in the fall of 1941 ? 

Colonel Row. Yes, sir. 

124. General Russell. We have to this time no records of any in- 
spections up until the Leard inspections, is that true ? 

125. Major Clausen. I have none, sir, except from the witness. The 
witness says they were made, but I have not seen the inspections. 

126. General Russell. Colonel, did you believe, based upon the 
inspections made after you became the Department Inspector and 
[2126] down to the completion of the work, that you are in any 
position to give an opinion as to the efficiency of the work that was 
being done by the contractors prior to December 7th, 1941 ? 

Colonel Row. Our opinion was that due to the great expansion of 
work, engineer work, in Hawaii, the organization of the office of the 
District Engineer was not properly reorganized to handle the great 
amount of work that came there. While the engineers were having all 
of these difficulties, the Zone Construction Quartermaster operating in 
Hawaii on construction work was properly organized and was having 
little or very little difficulty. Our inspections included inspections of 
the Construction Quartermaster, and I would say the results of those 
inspections were excellent. 

79716— i6— Ex. 145, vol. 3 31 



1108 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

127. General Frank. Who was the Zone Construction Quarter- 
master? 

Colonel Row. Lieutenant Colonel Clinton Harrold, Quartermaster 
Corps. 

128. General Russell. How did the work being done under the 
supervision of the Zone Construction Quartermaster and that being 
done under the supervision of the District Engineer compare as to 
extensiveness ? Or in size or complexity ? 

Colonel Row. I believe that the work of the District Engineer was 
greater in volume and more extensive. 

129. General Russell. And more complex? 
Colonel Row. And possibly more complex. * 

130. General Russell. Colonel, in your opinion were the waste, 
inefficiency and other inadequacies inherent in the construction in 1941 
attributable solely to the expansion of the work and the failure of the 
District Engineer's office to keep his administrative work apace with 
this expansion ? 

[2127] Colonel Row. Yes, sir. 

131. General Russell. Then you do not believe that his personal 
conduct, including drinking, if any, his association with and contacts 
with Hans Wilhelm Rohl, had anything to do with this ineffective- 
ness of the work, the inefficiency or the waste? 

Colonel Row. I am unable to answer you on that, because I was not 
familiar with the personal conduct of Colonel Wyman. 

132. General Russell. Laying aside familiarity with the personal 
conduct of Wyman and the conduct of Rohl which might have to come 
to your attention by virtue of facts, did rumors of such conduct reach 
your ears, either as Inspector or as an officer resident in Hawaii ? 

Colonel Row. As I recall this familiarity between Mr. Rohl and 
other officials with Colonel Wyman came about largely as a result of 
our inspection of the Pleasanton Hotel matter. That, as I recall, was 
the first time that it came to my attention that they were very closely 
associated. 

133. General Russell. Can you tell the approximate date of the 
inspection of the Hotel matter? 

Colonel Row. It would be some time in 1942. 

134. General Russell. Did that inspection then discover facts re- 
lating to improper relations between Rohl and Wyman in the year 
1941 ? 

Colonel Row. No, sir, I do not think so. 

135. General Grunert. I have some questions. 

I am not quite clear as to the character of inspections that were 
required from your office as to construction matters. Did those in- 
spections actually include any inspection of engineer work in the field, 
or was it limited to paper work and [3128] administration 
and management within the office ? 

Colonel Row. It was largely administrative inspections. We did 
not at any time go into the technical engineer matters. 

136. General Grunert. Would such inspections as were made dis- 
close the causes for any delays in the matter of completion of engineer 
projects ? 

Colonel Row. Yes, I believe it would be within the province of the 
inspection. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1109 

137. Geiioral (thunert. Did any siicli iiisi)ecli()ii sll()^v the reason 
for an}' particular clela3's in the eoni})letion of such i)rojects? 

Colonel Row. No, sir. 

138. General Gkunekt. Then you will not l)e able to tell nie whether 
or not such delays as were discovered were intent ional on the part of 
the military or the contractors? 

Colonel "Row. No, sir. 

13D. General Gkunekt. The waste and extravagance and suc.'h de- 
lays as were incident to the faulty adnnnistration, as you mifrht call 
it, do you know whether or not they were limited to what happened 
prior to Deceml)er 7th, or contimied after Decern Iter 7th, or increased 
after December 7tli, compared with prior thereto? 

Colonel Row. I think the waste naturally increased after Pearl 
Harbor, when the urgency for rai)id construction was more apparent. 

140. General Gruxert. Then is there anything through those in- 
spections to indicate to you that there were intentional delays caused 
prior to the Pearl Harbor attack which might have been of advan- 
tage to the attackers? 

Colonel Row. No, sir, that was never brought into it. [2129] 

Intentional delays were never brought to our attention at any time. 

141. General Frank. Do you think the delay and waste was greater 
than what might be expected in such a large expansion and under the 
stress of accomplishing work for war purposes? 

Colonel Row. Yes, sir. We felt that correct organization of the 
District Engineer's setup would have eliminated a great deal of this 
waste, which was largely a dehciency in organization, as we saw it. 

142. Major Clausen. Do you have a copy of the letter from the 
Secretary of War asking the Hawaiian Department or the Inspector 
General to conduct these investigations? 

Colonel Ro\v. I do not have, but it should be on WW in the office 
of the Department or the Inspector General. 

143. Major Clausen. And you say the date is February, 1941? 
Colonel Row. About that time, Feln'uary or March, probably 

March. 

144. Major Clausen. And you were Department Insjjector when? 
Colonel Row\ From May ll)41. 

145. Major Clausen. A\'lien you assumed that position did you see 
and read that letter? 

Colonel Row. Oh, yes. 

14G. General Grunert. Colonel, is there anything else that you 
can think of to add which might throw light on the entire held of 
our investigation, anything that has not been liroiight up, tluit you 
think you might add ? 

Colonel Row. No, sir. 

147. General (trunert. All light. Thank \-ou, \erv nuich. 

(The witness was excused, with thi- usual admonition.) 

[2130] TESTIMONY OF MAJOR HOWARD F. COOPER, AIR CORPS : 
1466 ARMY AIR FORCES BASE UNIT, ATC. 

(The witness was sworn bv the Recorder and advi-cd of his riuhts 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Will you please state to the Board yoiu- name, 
rank, organization, and station. 



1110 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Major Cooper. Howard F. Cooper; Major, Air Corps; 1466 Army 
Air Forces Base Unit, ATC; APO 938, care of Postmaster, Minne- 
apolis, Minn. 

2. General Grunert. Major, the Board is after facts, and is trying 
to get a lead to facts, to find out what happened prior to and during 
the attack on Pearl Harbor. Your name having appeared as a wit- 
ness before the Roberts Commission, we asked that you be sent to us 
so that we could find out what facts you know, and how you can help 
us out. 

Now, tell us, first, what was your assignment, at the time the attack 
took place, December 7, 1941 ? 

Major Cooper. At the time of the attack, I was a First Lieutenant, 
Command Headquarters, and Headquarters Squadron, Seventeenth 
Service Group, 

3. General Grunert. And where was that organization stationed at 
that time ? 

Major Cooper. It was stationed at Hickam Field. 

4. General Grunert. What can you tell us, briefly, about the attack, 
itself, from what you personally know about it ? 

Major Cooper. On the morning of December 7, 1941, at about 5 to 7, 
I heard loud explosions, which got me out of bed, immediately, and I 
raised the shade and looked over Pearl Harbor and saw huge billows 
of smoke arising. In a few minutes [2131'] after that, loud 
explosions came from the hangar line, ancl I immediately ran to the 
bathroom and looked out over the hangar line and saw planes bombing 
the hangars. 

I got into my clothes with my pistol and gas-mask and helmet and 
ran down to the squadron ; got the First Sergeant to disperse all of the 
members of the organization, armed with rifles, and walked out onto 
the parade grounds, where there were two 50-calibers set up. They 
were not in operating condition. I stayed with one gun until it was 
in operation, and I walked down to the other gun and ordered the 
fellows to fire, and they said that one part was missing, for which they 
were waiting, and they assured me that the part was on its way, any 
efforts to get it faster would be to no avail since there were two fellows 
dispatched to get this particular part; and at this time, a third forma- 
tion of bombers came over and dropped bombs on the barracks. The 
fellows at the gun were all killed. 

5. General Grunert. Was it part of your duties to man those guns 
during a defense against an air attack ? 

Major Cooper. No, sir. 

6. General Grunert. You just took charge of them, did you ? 
Major Cooper. Yes, sir. 

7. General Grunert. How did you know they were down there ? 
Major Cooper. I walked out onto the parade ground and saw them. 

8. General Grunert. And you say there were some machine guns in 
position, but they were not ready to fire because of missing parts? 

Major Cooper. Yes, sir. 

9. General Grunert. And were these machine guns part of the 
\2132] defensive set-up of Hickam Field ? 

Major Cooper. No. sir. 

10. General Grunert. What were they doing out there, do you 
know? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1111 

Major Cooper. As a result of the attack, attack methods were de- 
vised to protect the field, on the spot. 

11. General Grunert. You mean they were suddenly pulled out 
there ? 

Major Cooper. Yes, sir ; from the ordnance. 

12. General Grunert. It had not been arranged beforehand? 
Major Cooper. The}^ were pulled out from the ordnance. 

13. General Frank. After the first attack ? 
Major Cooper. Yes, sir; after the first attack. 

14. General Frank. They had not been out there all night ? 
Major Cooper. No, sir. 

15. General Grunert. I understood you to say it was about 5 to 7. 
Was it 5 to 7, or was it 5 to 8 ? 

Major Cooper, Oh, that was 5 to 7. No, that was 5 to 8. 

16. General Grunert, You are sure it was 5 to 8, not 5 minutes to 
7? because I thought you said 5 to 7. 

Major Cooper. Yes, sir ; I am positive it was 5 to 8 because when I 
did finally return to my quarters, my electric clock had stopped at 8 
o'clock, and it was about five minutes before that, that the attack 
started. 

17. General Grunert. In your testimony before the Roberts Com- 
mission you stated, at the time of the attack, you were on Alert No. 3 
for about two weeks. What were the forms of alert, and what was 
No. 3? 

\2133'\ Major Cooper. I am not positive as to the number of the 
alert. We had three forms of the alert, there. One was, alert against 
external invasion; and the other was, alert against internal sabotage; 
and the third was a combination of the two, which was the very serious 
alert. 

18. General Grunert. Wliich one were you on ? 

Major Cooper. We were on the second, the alert against sbotage. 

19. General Grunert. Then, though you named it "No. 3," it might 
have been some other number, but it was the alert against sabotage 1 

Major Cooper. Yes, sir ; it was the alert against sabotage. 

20. General Grunert. Because No. 3 happens to be the all-out alert. 
Major Cooper. We were not on that ; no, sir. 

21. General Grunert. I wanted to clear up that point in the testi- 
mony before the Roberts Commission, because it says "Alert No. 3," 
and Alert No. 3 is an all-out alert ; and you were alerted for sabotage ? 

Major Cooper. Yes, sir. 

22. General Grunert. That happens to be No. 1. 
Major Cooper. No. 2, sir, I believe. 

23. General Grunert. In your remembrance, it was No. 2, but it 
was the sabotage alert? 

Major Cooper. Yes, sir. 

24. General Grunert. That was the only thing I had to bring out. 
Have you any questions ? 

Thank you very much for coming in. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

(Thereupon, at 10 : 40 a. m., the Board, having concluded the hearing 

of witnesses for the morning, took up the consideration of other 

business.) 



1112 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
[2IS4.] AFTERNOON SESSION 

The Board reconvened at 2 p. m., and continued with the hearing 
of witnesses, as follows : 

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS E. TILLMAN, 1230 SHAFTER STREET, 
SAN MATEO, CALIFORNIA. 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Mr. Tillman, will you please state to the Board 
your name and address. 

Mr. Tillman. Thomas E. Tillman, 1230 Shafter street, San Mateo. 

2. Colonel West. San Mateo, California? 
Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir. 

3. General Grunert. Mr. Tillman, the Board is after facts con- 
cerning certain things that happened in Hawaii prior to the Pearl 
Harbor attack and during the attack. We have also been charged 
with making an investigation of certain things that happened in 
Hawaii, in which Colonel Wyman was concerned. I believe you have 
information on that phase, and I will ask General Frank and the 
Assistant Recorder, Major Clausen, to develop whatever you may 
know. 

4. General Frank. Where were you employed, in 1941? 
Mr. Tillman. U. S. Engineers, at Honolulu. 

5. General Frank. What was your position? 
Mr. Tillman. I was in the estimating section. 

6. General Frank. In what office? 

Mr. Tillman. In the Operations Office, U. S. Engineers. 

7. General Frank. Is that the district engineer ? 
Mr. Tillman. That's right. 

8. General Frank. Who was your immediate superior? 

[2135] Mr. Tillman. It was first a civilian, that I can't remem- 
ber his name. It was later Colonel B. L. Robinson. 

9. General Frank, Colonel Robinson was Colonel Wyman's assist- 
ant, is that right ? 

Mr. Tillman. Colonel Robinson was Operations Officer for the 
district engineer. 

10. General Frank. What were your duties? 

Mr. Tillman. Estimating the cost of various phases of work that 
the contractor was going to do for the U. S. Engineers. 

11. Major Clausen. You recall that, after Colonel Wyman was 
relieved from the position as district engineer in Hawaii, you did 
some work on the air-raid warning system stations ? 

Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir. 

12. Major Clausen. And you explained to me, today, the reason for 
that. What was the reason? Why were you called in to do that, 
sir? 

Mr. Tillman. I think the principal reason was that they didn't 
seem to get them completed, and the progress wasn't satisfactory, 
and they called me in as more of a trouble-shooter, to see if something 
couldn't be done to speed up the completion of it. 

13. Major Clausen. And who gave you directions to do that? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1113 

Mr. Tillman. Lieutenant Colonel Weimer. 

14. Major Clausen. When were those instructions given you? 
Mr. Tillman. I would say either the very latter part of April, or 

the first of June — right in that. 

15. General Frank. What year? 
Mr. Tillman. 1942. 

16. Major Clausen. Now, you also stated to me, when I asked you, 
today, as to the reasons why the work had been lagging, [2136] 
several reasons. Would you tell the Board what you told me. 

Mr. Tillman. You want me to explain it in about the same words 
that I exjjlained it to you ? 

17. Major Clausen. Yes. This is informal. You told me some- 
thing about the work lagging, and you said the reasons were such and 
such and such. Just start in as you did with me and explain to the 
Board. 

Mr. Tillman. Well, the stations were located in various areas 
around the island of Oahu. That is the one I am speaking of; and 
the Island of Oahu was divided up into areas. Each area had an 
area engineer and a superintendent for the contractors. It so hap- 
pened that I believe every AWS station was situated at a consider- 
able distance from the otHce or headquarters of the superintendent 
and area engineer. It was my observation, while I was area engineer, 
and other times, too, that the superintendent was not paying a great 
deal of attention to the construction of the AWS stations. By the 
way, you understand that the AWS stations were a tunnel drilled in 
the various places, and usually it was on a hill or a "mountain" as you 
might call it, there. After the tunnel was completed, certain other 
phases ©4 work had to be done, there, and when those were completed, 
then the signal corps made their installations. They would not 
move any equipment there until they were completed, painted, and 
the civilian crew ready to move out. 

18. General Frank. You are talking about the permanent installa- 
tions ? 

Mr. Tillman. That is correct. 

19. General Frank. Do you remember where they were? 
Mr. Tillman. Yes, I do. 

20. General Fr.\nk. Will you state where they were? 

Mr. Tillman. Koko Head, Opana, Uliipau, Kaena Point, Pumana- 
hu, Mt. Kaala, and Fort Shafter. 

[£137] 21. General Frank. Was there a tunnel to be con- 
structed at each one of these places ? 

Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, the installations were 
in a tunnel, and the specifications called for a 48-foot minimum cover- 
age over it. 

22. General Frank. You are giving the name "tunnel" to what 
they called a "bomb-proof," aren't you ? 

Mr. Tillman. Well, yes. 

23. General Frank. All right. 

Mr. Tillman. It was a tunnel, by the way. 

24. Major Clausen. Now, Mr. Tillman, you said that the superin- 
tendent didn't pay much attention to these AWS constructions. The 
superintendents to which you refer were superintendents of whom? 

Mr. Tillman. For the contractor. 



1114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

25. Major Clausen. In other words, the Hawaiian Constructors' 
superintendent ? 

Mr. Tillman. That is right. 

26. Major Clausen. And what is the basis for your statement in 
that respect? 

Mr. Tillman. The areas in which the superintendent had control 
of the work were all large areas. He not only had the AWS stations, 
but in most instances he had a multitude of other work in progress. 
And I just think that he had too much work to do. 

27. Major Clausen. How long had this lagging of this work con- 
tinued, to your knowledge? 

Mr. Tillman. At the time of the attack 

28. Major Clausen. You mean December 7, 1941 ? 

Mr. Tillman. December 7 — ^the runways were given, if I \2138'] 
remember right, a No. 1 priority. I believe the AWS stations were 
given No. 2 priority. 

29. Major Clausen. Given by whom? 

Mr. Tillman. The district engineer. The work involved in build- 
ing the AWS stations at the beginning of course was all tunnel work 
or excavation. This excavation or tunnel, whichever one you want 
to call it, was as I say in every instance at the top or near the top of a 
mountain. Some of those — in fact every one of them with one excep- 
tion, was inaccessible to anything but foot traffic and mules. Couldn't 
get a truck or any kind of equipment near them. It was a tremendous 
job of digging this so-called "tunnel," it was slow work, very slow. 

Does that answer it? 

30. Major Clausen. Well, I just would like to have 3^ou tell the 
Board and tell me what was the basis for your conclusioii that the 
work was lagging ; and I suppose you have told, as much as you can. 

Mr. Tillman. At the time I took over the so-called "trouble-shoot- 
ing" of the stations, there was quite a complaint from the signal corps 
that we were not making any progress. Colonel Weimer sent me out. 
. 31. Major Clausen, that is not "Wyman"? 

Mr. Tillman. No, that is not "Wyman." 

32. Major Clausen. All right. Proceed, please. 

Mr. Tillman. He sent me out to Fort Shafter to interview a Major 
and a Colonel in charge of the Signal Corps, I can't recall their names, 
to find out just what the.v wanted and required. I went out there and 
interviewed them, and they just put me right on the spot to get them 
completed to where they could make their [3139] installations. 

33. Major Clausen. NoWj Mr. Tillman, in connection with your 
activities, did you as an estimator have some dealings with the Ha- 
waiian Contracting Company, one of the joint adventurers in the 
Hawaiian Constructors? 

Mr. Tillman. Not while I was in the estimating section ; no. 

34. Major Clausen. Did you receive instructions from Colonel 
Robinson to appraise certain equipment belonging to the Hawaiian 
Contracting Company? 

Mr. Tillman. I did, Major, but that was after I was placed in charge 
of the Plant Control section. 

35. Major Clausen. All right. Let me have the date, please, on 
chat. 

Mr. Tillman. That date was December 9, 1941. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1115 

36. Major Clausen. And your position at that time was what, 
Mr. TiUman? 

Mr. Tillman. Head of the PLant Control section. 

37. Major Clausen. Tell the Board exactly what you did. 
Mr. Tillman. I rounded up equipment, rented it, bought it. 

38. Major Clausen. No, I mean you received some instructions from 
Colonel Robinson ? 

Mr. Tillman. Yes. 

39. Major Clausen. Concerning equipment of the Hawaiian Con- 
tracting Company ? What instructions were they ? 

Mr. Tillman. "I received a typewritten list of equipment owned by 
the Hawaiian Contracting Company. 

40. Major Clausen. From whom? 

Mr. Tillman. From Colonel B. L. Robinson, priced out, [21^] 
itemized and priced, with a request that I go out and make an appraisal 
of it with a view to buying it. I went out to the Hawaiian Contract- 
ing Company's yard, took an equipment expert with me, started to 
make the appraisal, and was called to the telephone by the superin- 
tendent of the yard, and Mr. H. P. Benson, former president of the 
Hawaiian Contracting Company, and on the board of directors for the 
Hawaiian Constructors, was on the phone, and asked me what I was 
doing out there. I told him I was making an appraisal of the equip- 
ment. He said, "That equipment has already been appraised, and 
I am very much concerned with what you are doing, ancl I wish you 
v.'ould get out of there." I did. I went back and picked up my man 
and went back to the office, reported to Colonel Wyman that so far as 
I could see the equipment was nothing but junk and we wouldn't be 
interested in any of it. 

41. Major Clausen. You say you reported to whom? 
]Mr. Tillman. I mean to Colonel Robinson. 

42. Major Clausen. Did you later receive additional instructions 
from Colonel Robinson concerning the same equipment ? 

Mr. Tillman. I did. I was ordered to go back there and make an 
appraisal, and not let anybody stop me. 

43. Major Clausen. That was how soon after the first time? 

Mr. Tillman. I would say that was approximately two weeks later. 

44. Major Ct^ausen. All right. Then what did you do? 

Mr. Tillman. I then took this one appraiser, and also another one, 
with me, and went out and made an appraisal of it, turned in a report, 
it was practically junk and we had no use for it, and would be unable 
to use it. The equipment was out- [2141] dated and not equip- 
ment suitable for our needs at all. 

45. Major Clausen. You sav you turned in a written report to that 
effect? 

Mr. TiLLJiAN. Yes, sir. 

46. Major Clausen. To whom did you give your report? 
Mr. Tillman. Colonel Robinson. 

47. Major Clausen. Have you a copy? 
Mr. Tillman. No, I haven't. 

48. Major Clausen. Do you know where we can obtain a copy, other 
than in Hawaii? 

Mr. Tillman. No, I don't. 



1116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

49. Major Clausen. Do you know, then, what happened, after you 
had turned in this adverse report, with respect to Colonel Wyman? 

Mr. Tillman. I was told, and I don't remember who told me, and 
I think it's a fact that Colonel Wyman, the week prior to his being 
relieved over there, ordered that that same equipment be purchased 
and the deal completed before he left office. 

50. Major Clausen. All right. 

At this point, I invite the attention of the Board to page 31 of the 
written report. It is a confidential report. 
What is your present position ? 
Mr. Tillman. Engineer. 

51. Major Clausen. By whom are you employed? 
Mr. Tillman. Donald R. Warren Company. 

52. General Frank. Wlio was Mr. Benson? 

Mr. Tillman. Mr. Benson was on the executive board of the 
Hawaiian Constructors, and formerly was president of the Hawaiian 
Contracting Company. 

53. General Frank. Well, who was he to give you instructions, 
[214^] when you were working for the district engineer? 

Mr. Tillman. Except that I was on his property, he had no 
authority. 

54. General Frank. Was this equipment later purchased by the 
Government ? 

Mr. Tillman. It was my understanding that it was. 

55. General Frank. Wlio was the co-adventurer? Who was the 
contractor who had charge of building the aircraft warning service 
stations ? 

Mr. Tillman. The contractor was the Hawaiian Constructors. 

56. General Frank. I know, but when those projects came up, 
were they handled by the Hawaiian Constructors, as a whole, or were 
they assigned to different contractors? 

Mr. Tillman. No, sir; they were handled by the Hawaiian Con- 
structors. 

57. General Frank. As a whole? 
Mr. Tillman, As a whole. 

58. General Frank. In other words, the Rohl-ConnoUy Company 
did not handle one series of projects, and the Woolley Company 
another ? 

Mr. Tillman. No, sir. 

59. General Frank. And the Callalian Company, another group? 
They all handled them as a single, definite group ? 

Mr. Tillman. That is right, in so far as I knew. I didn't know 
anything about the Rohl-Connolly Company, Mr. Woolley, a Ralph 
Woolley, was also in the same capacity with Mr. Benson, in the 
Hawaiian Constructors. 

60. General Frank. Do you remember how much was paid for this 
Hawaiign Contractors' equipment? 

[214^3] Mr. Tillman. The price as it was listed to me was 
$170,000. 

61. General Frank. How much was it worth, as a result of your 
evaluation? 

Mr. Tillman. You mean in so far as the engineers were concerned ? 

62. General Frank. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1117 

Mr. TiLLMAx. Worth nothing, 

63. General Fkank. Had it been used by the Hawaiian Contracting 
Company on government projects? 

Mr. Tillman. No, sir. You understand this equij^ment was some 
of it 30, 35, and even 40 years old. It had laid in their yard until it 
was overgrown with weeds, rusty, and — well, in other words, equip- 
ment that had been discarded many years before. 

64. General Frank. Do you know why the engineers wanted to 
buy it? 

Mr. Tillman. No, sir. 

65. General Frank. Do you know whether or not it was ever used ? 
• INIr. Tillman. By the engineers? 

66. General Frank. Yes. 
Mr. Tillmamn. No; I don't. 

67. General Frank. Or by the contractors? 

Mr. Tillman. No; I don't. I know some of it could not be used. 

68. General Frank. Who comprised the rest of the firm with Ben- 
son, in the Hawaiian Contracting Company ? 

Mr. Tillman. Mr. Kalph Woolley, Paul Graef— G-r-a-e-f— 

69. General Frank. No, I am talking about the Hawaiian 
[2144] Contracting Company. 

Mr. Tillman. Oh, I don't know. I do know wdio was supposedly 
the money in back of it, and that was — I can't recall it right now. It 
is a very well known one. 

70. Major Clausen. Dillingham? 

Mr. Tillman. Dillingham — right. He was supposed to own the 
company, and Benson was the front for it. 

71. General Frank. The Hawaiian Contracting Company was a 
Haw^aiian firm, it was not a California firm? 

Mr. Tillman. That is right. 

72. General Russell. The Hawaiian Constructors were referred 
to as a "joint group" or "joint adventurers," who took on all of this 
work out there; is that true? 

Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir. 

73. General Russell. Then Hawaiian Contractors was a local cor- 
poration? 

Mr. Tillman. That is right. 

74. General Russell. Ancl was Hawaiian Contractors a member of 
this group which was going to do all that work? 

Mr. Tillman. No. Shortly after the raid, the conditions there 
were such that no local contractor — or, I won't say "no", but hardly 
any of the local contractors could get any equipment or material to 
work with. They were left you might say stranded, and it w^as my 
understanding that they took in Ralph "Woolley and Mr. Benson 
just as sort of co-partners in the Hawaiian Constructors. 

75. General Russell. As additional parties? 

Mr. Tillman. I don't mean that they took in the firnL I mean 
that they just took in these two men. 

[214-5] 76. General Russell. Let us go back to the Hawaiian 
Contractors ; the people with the money in that outfit were the Dil- 
linghams? 

Mr. Tillman. That was my understanding. 



1118 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

77. General Russell. The Dillinghams are quite big operators out 
there ? 

Mr. Tillman. They are. 

78. General Russell. They own a great deal of real-estate? 
Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir. 

79. General Russell. They are charged with being rather powerful 
in that area ? 

Mr. Tillman. They are. 

80. General Russell. They are powerful ? They could go directly 
to Washington and have some influence? 

Mr. Tillman. I don't know about that. 

81. General Russell. Have you ever heard of a Colonel Hunt ? 
Mr. Tillman. No, sir. 

82. General Russell. Did he approach you at any time and secure 
from you a statement as to your relation with the worl^ that was car- 
ried on out there in the Hawaiian Department? 

Mr. Tillman. I don't recall, if he ever did. 

83. General Russell. Have you been called as a witness before 
anyone, or any body of people, prior to today, for the purpose of 
giving the testimony which you are giving to this Board ? 

Mr. Tillman. The day before I left Hawaii, I was called in by the 
FBI in Honolulu and asked almost these same questions. 

84. General Russell. And what date was that, Mr. Tillman? 
Mr. Tillman. That would be August 5, 1942. 

85. General Russell. With the exception of the statement that 
you made to the FBI, are there any others ? 

\^2H6'] Mr. Tillman. Well, they also called, when I was on a 
secret station for the engineers up at Petaluma, and interviewed me 
again. 

86. General Frank. The FBI? 
Mr. Tillman. The FBI. 

87. General Russell. Other than to the FBI, you have testified to 
nobody, or to any Board ? 

Mr. Tillman. No. 

88. General Russell. Benson represented Hawaiian Contractors, 
and he told you, when he ordered you off the property, that this 
equipment had been previously appraised ? 

Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir. 

89. General Russell. Do you know now what the basis of that 
statement by Benson was? 

Mr. Tillman. I think so. 

[2147] 90. General Russell. Would you tell us, please. 

Mr. Tillman. I found out later that one of Mr. Benson's employees 
and a machinery equipment representative and one other man — I 
can't recall who he was — had made an appraisal of the equipment. 

91. General Russell. Do you know of your own knowledge what 
the appraisal value on this machinery was, as fixed by those three 
people ? 

Mr. Tillman. That was where the $170,000 came from. That was 
their appraisal. 

92. General Russell. Do you know of any appraisal of this ma- 
chinery which may have been in the neighborhood of $130,000 ? 

Mr. Tillman. No, sir, I don't. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1119 

93. General Russell. You state that you submitted with your 
appraisal report a list of this equipment? 

Mr, Tillman. No. I was given a list by Colonel Robinson. 

94. General Russell. Did you turn that list back in to Colonel 
Robinson ? 

Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir. 

95. General Russell. Did you make any effort upon your second 
visit to the place where this equipment was located to fix a value on 
the items of the equipment? 

Mr. Tillman. Yes. 

96. General Russell. I believe your testimony was to the effect 
that the Engineers didn't want it at any price, that it would be of 
no value to them. 

Mr. Tillman. I don't believe I made the statement that the Engi- 
neers didn't want it. It was my recommendation that we do not pur- 
chase it, that we would have no — could not use it. 

\_21Jf8'\ 97. General Russell. Do you recall what the aggregate 
appraisal value that you placed upon it was ? 

Mr. Tillman. No, I don't. 

98. General Russell. But you did place a value of some sort? 
Mr. Tillman. Yes. 

99. General Russell. Now, one more question about the air warning 
service : As a result of 5^our efforts was the work on these air warning 
service stations accelerated ? 

Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir. 

100. General Russell. Would you please tell the Board what steps 
you took to accelerate that work ? 

101. General Frank. May I ask one question : What date was this 
that you were put on the acceleration of this work ? 

Mr. Tillman. Probably the last of April or right around the first 
of June. 

102. General Frank. Of what year? 
Mr. Tillman. 1942. 

103. General Frank. Yes. 

104. General Russell. That answer was made a little while ag( 
and seems a bit queer to me : last of April or the first of June. Why 
was May left out ? Do you remember those two 

Mr. Tillman. Wait a minute. I should have said May. Pardon 
me. 

105. General Russell. Now, to go back to my question: the steps 
that you took to accelerate the work on these air warning stations. 

Mr. Tillman. Well, I don't know whether I could just tell you 
exactly the steps I took. 

106. General Grunert. What did you do that wasn't done before ? 
[214^] Mr. Tillman. As a matter of fact, the station that I was 

ordered to complete first, when I arrived there there was nobody work- 
ing on it, and I went right down to the area engineer who was in 
charge of that area and wanted to know why there were no men work- 
ing there, and he said. Well, they had no equipment, nothing to work 
with. I went back up there then and made a survey to see just what 
they had to have, and got in touch with the foreman who had been in 



1120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

charge of it, and got a list of equipment from him, or material that 
he had to have, and I went out and rounded up this equipment. 

107. General Russell. Well, that is exactly what we are thinking 
about. On that station nothing was being done, and you got equip- 
ment and people and started to work? 

Mr. Tillman. That is right. 

108. General Russell. Now, do you have any recollection as to what 
happened at other stations? 

Mr. Tillman. The other stations, they were working, but they were 
not making suitable progress. The tunnels were all completed; that 
is, the tunnel crew were finished with their work and out of there. 
It was more or less concrete and carpenter work and electrical work, 
plenty of electrical work, after the tunnel crew got out of there. They 
were very short of electrical supplies to complete these stations. In 
other words, I think I told the Major some of the items that they didn't 
have and that were practically nonobtainable : for instance, 5000-watt 
KVA — 5000-volt hotheads, varnish cambric tape, 6-inch pipe cover, 
60-amp. double-throw switches, in which I went into a shop where I 
linew the man in charge, and had him make these switches. We had 
certain stations completed \2150\ up to the point where noth- 
ing was left to do but a 60-amp. double-throw switch ; that was all we 
had to do to complete them. Well, I went into the shop and had them 
made and took them out there and handed them to the electrician. I 
did the same thing with pipe cover. I did the same thing with various 
other items. I just scouted around until I found them, and took them 
out there and handed them right to the men. Each station had a hun- 
dred-foot steel tower to be erected. They sent inexiDeriencecl steel men 
up there, or men, to erect these towers. They couldn't make any 
progress with them at all. At one station I had three different crews 
before I got a tower erected. 

109. General Russell. What did you say was wrong? Why couldn't 
they complete them ? 

Mr. Tillman. The towers ? 

110. General Russell. Yes. 

Mr. Tillman. They didn't know anything about steel erection. 

111. General Russell. Lack of skill in that work? 
Mr. Tillman. That is right. 

112. General Russell. Well, there were various things that you did? 
Mr. Tillman. Oh, yes. 

113. General Russell. Procurement of the necessary personnel and 
procurement of materiel, things of that kind ? 

Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir. 

114. General Russell. I think that is all I have to ask. 

115. General Grunert. Along this same line : Do you know any- 
thing about the status of completion of those air warning service in- 
stallations as of December 7, '41? 

\2151\ Mr. Tillman. I really don't. 

116'. General Grunert. Do you know what caused any delays prior 
to December 7, '41, on them? 

Mr. Tillman. I would say the same reasons that I cited before. 

117. General Grunert. I believe 3^011 told us that there was a ques- 
tion of an area engineer or supervisor, whatever he is, having a number 
of engineering projects to process at the same time, and that the air 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1121 

warning service stuflf was, say, Priority 2. Do you know of any 
reason why they shouldn't work on both projects simultaneously? 
Was it a question of lack of material, lack of personnel, or what? 

Mr. Tillman. They were working oh both projects simultaneously. 
They were working on all projects simultaneously but preference was 
given to runways immediately following the raid. They were given 
hrst preference. 

118. General Grunert. Immediately following December 7? 
Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir. 

119. General Grunert. But prior thereto do you know whether they 
w^ere given preference ? 

Mr. Tillman. I don't believe we had a priority system set up prior 
to that. 

120. General Frank. As a matter of fact, prior to that they didn't 
have any money to build the runways, did they ? 

Mr. Tillman. Yes, I think so. 

121. General Grunert. Do you know of your own knowledge 
whether or not any of these delays were intentional on the part of 
anyone ? 

Mr. Tillman. I have no way of knowing, no, sir. I don't — 
[2162'] I can't believe that they were. 

122. General Grunert. Would there be anyone then in the Hawai- 
ian Constructors that would have the power to delay if he had such an 
intent ? 

Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir. 

123. General Grunert. Who ? 

Mr. Tillman. I would say that Paul Graf e and Mr, Rohl, either one, 
could have delayed the progress or completion of work of any kind. 

124. General Grunert. In that case would that delay have been with 
or without the knowledge of the District Engineer ? 

Mr. Tillman. I think it could have been without his knowledge. 

125. General Frank. Do you know or believe that either one of them 
did delay any work? 

Mr. Tillman. No, I don't know. If you want an opinion I would 
be glad to express an opinion. 

126. General Frank. Let us have the opinion. 

Mr. Tillman. It is my opinion that both Mr. Grafe and Mr. Rohl 
did everything they could to complete any work that they were inter- 
ested in there. Now, the reason that I say that is that while I was 
head of the plant control section I sat in with Mr. Rohl at his meetings 
with his field superintendents at night, and I heard him express his 
attitude in no uncertain terms too many times to think that, unless he 
was a lot smoother than I give him credit for, that there was any intent 
other than to push that work. 

127. General Russell. Wlio were these people to whom Rohl was 
talking on these occasions? 

[2153] Mr. Tillman. Those were the superintendents of the 
various areas that I have mentioned before. 

128. General Russell. All native Americans? Who were they? 
Mr. Tillman. I think so. I think so. 

129. General Russell. How many would be in those meetings? 
Mr. Tillman. Oh, anywhere from eight to twelve or fourteen. 



1122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

130. General Grunekt. Now let me see if I have this straight. The 
Hawaiian Contractors 

General Frank. No. 

131. General Grunert. Was it a local firm ? 

Mr. Tillman. The Hawaiian Contracting Company. 

132. General Grunert. The Hawaiian Contracting Company. 
And the Hawaiian Constructors was the over-all firm that had the 
contract to start with, consisting of various other firms ? 

Mr, Tillman. Yes, sir. 

133. General Grunert. Now, as to this equipment that you spoke 
about that you were sent out to appraise, to whom did that equipment 
belong? 

Mr. Tillman. The Hawaiian Contracting Company. 

134. General Grunert. And not to the Hawaiian Constructors? 
Mr. Tillman. No, sir. 

135. General Grunert. Yes. 

Mr. Tillman. It was the Hawaiian Constructors who were sup- 
posedly to make the purchase. 

136. General Grunert. From the Hawaiian Contracting Company ? 
Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir. 

137. General Frank. But the Government was going to pay for it ? 
[215^'] Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir. You understand the purchase 

arrangement between the contractors and the Government? 

138. General Frank. Yes. 

Mr. Tillman. They made the purchase. We paid them a monthly 
rental of one-twelfth of the cost of the equipment for a year's time 
in which it became the property of the Government. 

139. General Grunert. Then, whose primary interest, whose finan- 
cial interest was it, to get the Hawaiian Constructors to buy this 
equipment which the Government would eventually pay for? 

Mr. Tillman. You mean who would benefit by it ? 
■ 140. General Grunert. Yes. 
Mr. Till.man. The Hawaiian Contracting Company. 

141. General Grunert. Would the Hawaiian Constructors benefit 
by it? 

Mr. Tillman. I do not think so. 

142. General Grunert. I do not think of anything else. Does 
anyone think of any other questions? 

143. General Russell. I think we have developed a point there that 
may best be clarified a little. 

144. General Grunert. Go ahead. 

145. General Russell. Now, at the time that you were making this 
appraisal of this equipment of the Hawaiian Contracting Company, 
they had become one of the associates in the Hawaiian Constructors? 

Mr. Tillman. I do not think so. 

146. General Russell. Wasn't it after Pearl Harbor that you were 
making this appraisal? 

Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir. 

[fids'] 147. General Russell. Well, didn't you testify a little 
while ago that they came in and they began, or they allowed them to 
work on the common project after December 7th ? 

Mr. Tillman. No. No, I didn't say that. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1123 

148. General Russell. Well, I was just mistaken about it, then. 
Mr. Tillman. No. They had no more work shortly after the 

raid. 

149. General Russell. Yes. 

Mr. Tillman. They did have an organization and they had this 
equipment. Mr. Benson, who was president of the Hawaiian Con- 
tracting Company, joined the Hawaiian Constructors as one of the 
members of the executive board; that is, in an individual capacity. 
The company did not join the Hawaiian Constructors. 

150. General Russell. They did not take their organization and 
their modern equipment and go in and start to work, then, on this ? 

Mr. Tillman. No, sir. 

151. General Russell. All right. But Benson as an individual 
went over and gave his services ? 

Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir. 

152. General Russell. Well, that clears that up. I am through. 

153. Major Clausen. Sir, you have mentioned several things that 
called into play your judgment on engineering matters. Would you, 
for the record, tell the Board your engineering schooling background ? 

Mr. Tillman. Well, I have been in the construction end of the 
engineering for 31 years. Prior, at that time, it had been about 28 
years. I took a constructional engineering [2156^ course from 
the I. C. S. School. 

154. Major Clausen. Worked on major projects? 
Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir. 

155. Major Clausen. That is aU. 

156. General Grunert. Then, you were certain that you knew equip- 
ment and what its value was, as to its present shape, and what it could 
be used for in the future ? You were a good judge of that, were you ? 

Mr. Tillman. I think so. 

157. General Grunert. Whom did you have to assist you in this? 
You spoke of the equipment man, did you ? 

Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir. 

158. General Grunert. What was he ? 

Mr. Tillman. We were buying considerable equipment from the 
Allis-Chalmers people. They sent two equipment experts over to the 
Islands to assist us in any way possible that they could be of assistance 
to us. The Allis-Chalmers were paying all of the expenses; it cost 
us nothing. When they reported over there they were ordered to 
report and make my office their headquarters. I took them along — 
they weren't working under my direction, you understand. I took 
them along as so-called experts. 

159. General Grunert. And did you testify that that identical 
equipment that you went to appraise and did appraise was actually 
sold to the Hawaiian Constructors afterward ? 

Mr. Tillman. No, I can't state that it was definitely sold. I think 
I stated that it was reported to me that it was sold. 

160. General Grunert. That could not have been confused, then, 
[3157] with any other batch of equipment that was afterward 
purchased ? 

Mr. Tillman. I do not think so. 

161. General Grunert. Anything else? 

79716—46 — Ex. 145, vol. 2 22 



1 1 24 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

162. Major Clausen. I would like to know if these two men who 
went with you, Mr. Tillman, to appraise this equipment concurred 
in your judgment. 

Mr. Tillman. Yes, they did. 

1(33. Major Clausen. That is all. 

164. General EussELL. What were their names ? 

Mr, Tillman. I don't remember their names any more. 1 think 
I could get their names. I think I have some papers at home that 
might give me their names, but right now I don't remember. 

165. Major Clausen. Will you ascertain and let me know ? 
Mr. Tillman. I could, yes. 

166. General Grunert. Are there any other questions? 
(No response.) If not, I thank you very much for coming. 
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

[mS8] TESTIMONY OF THOMAS EENEST CONNOLLY, 2400 FUL- 
TON STREET, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA. 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Mr. Connolly, will you please state to the Board 
your name and address ? Full name and address. 

Mr. Connolly. Thomas Ernest Connolly. I live at 2400 Fulton 
Street, San Francisco. 

2. General Grunert. Mr. Connolly, the Board has a broad field to 
cover. In addition to looking into the attack on Pearl Harbor it has 
been assigned the task to look into certain phases of that attack in 
which one Colonel Wyman, a District Engineer at Honolulu, was 
concerned. It is that phase particularly, I believe, in which the testi- 
mony from you may help us, and in this broad field that particular 
special part of it was assigned to General Frank, and to be assisted by 
Major Clausen, so I shall ask them to start the questioning. 

3. General Frank. Mr. Connolly, will you state your position as a 
contractor during 1940 and '41 ? Do you remember? 

Mr. Connolly. I had work of my own; I had work of or I was 
associated in work with other contractors. I was the president of the 
Rohl-Connolly Company, president of T. E. Connolly, Incorporated, 
and I was sponsoring a joint venture by the W. E. Callahan Con- 
struction Company. 

4. General Frank. Wliere? 

Mr. Connolly. The Rohl-Connolly Company and the Gunther- 
Shirley Company at Caddoa, Colorado. 

5. General Frank. For whom was this work being done at Caddoa, 
Colorado ? 

Mr. Connolly. The Army Engineers. 

[21S9] 6. General Frank, You stated you were president of the 
Rohl-Connolly Company? 

Mr. Connolly. Yes, I think that is right. I was not president. 
I was vice president and I was president. 

7. General Frank. When? 

Mr. Connolly. The latter half of 1940, from '40 on through to the 
present time. 

8. General Frank. What is Mr. Rohl's position? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1125 

Mr. Connolly. Now he is in the position of sitting on the board 
while we distribute the assets of the Rohl-Connolly Company. 

1). General Frank. Well, what was his position in 1941 ? 

Mr. Connolly. He was a member of the board and vice president of 
the company. 

10. General Frank. Was he ever president of the company? 
Mr. Connolly. Yes. 

11. General Frank. When? 

Mr. Connolly. Well, we took turns about on that. He was presi- 
dent of that company in early '40, '39 probably. I was probably 
president in '38. 

12. General Frank. What determined who was president and who 
was vice president? 

Mr. Connolly. Just a matter of turnabout, nothing of any conse- 
quence. It was really a partnership. It was incorporated. 

13. General Frank. I see. 

14. Major Clausen. When did you first meet Mr. Rohl, Mr. 
Connolly ? 

Mr. Connolly. Oh, some twenty-odd years ago, I presume. 

[2160] 15. Major Clausen. When did you first meet Colonel 
Wyman? 

Mr. Connolly. I first met Colonel Wyman when he was District 
Engineer in the Los Angeles area, I would say about '34. 1934. 

16. Major Clausen. In any event, Mr. Connolly, in the early part 
of 1940 the Rohl-Connolly Company was a corporation doing business, 
of which Mr. Hans Wilhelm Rohl was the president; is that correct? 

Mr. Connolly. That is right. 

17. Major Clausen. All right. Now let's go down to December 
1940. Isn't it true that you didn't just take turnabout for no particular 
reason, but that in December 1940 you specifically telephoned from 
Washington to Mr. Rohl and advised him that he be not president? 

Mr. Connolly. That is correct. 

18. Major Clausen. Yes. And because he was a German alien? 
Mr. Connolly. That's right. 

19. Major Clausen. All right. Now, in connection with the Rohl- 
ConnoUy Company, before this change in status occurred of your 
assuming the presidency in December 1940, what was the stock own- 
ership ? 

Mr. Connolly. I owned 50 percent of it, 25 percent of it was 
owned by Mrs. Rohl, 25 percent by Mr. Rohl. 

20. Major Clausen. And the same stock ownership continued, did 
it, Mr. Connolly, throughout 1940 and throughout 1941 ? 

Mr. Connolly. Yes. 

21. Major Clausen. So that when you had this turnabout because 
Mr. Rohl was a German alien, there was no turnabout or cancellation 
of any stock ownership, was there? 

[2161] Mr. Connolly. No, sir. 

22. Major Clausen. And he continued as a director, did he? 
Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir. 

23. Major Clausen. When did you first know about a contract, Mr. 
Connolly, which later became Contract W-41^Eng-602, which is the 
one that was later in effect with respect to the Hawaiian defense 
projects? .*.. . . * 



1126 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Connolly. When did I first learn about that contract ? 

24. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Connolly. I was advised from here by telephone to Denver 
that the contract was to be let in the Hawaiian Islands, but I didn't 
know whether it was that or not. That was the specific contract I 
learned about the week prior to Christmas, in Washingon, D. C. 

25. Major Clausen. Yes. But now when you say you were advised 
concerning defense projects, as a matter of fact it was Mr. Rohl who 
telephoned you ; isn't that so ? 

Mr. Connolly. That is right. 

26. Major Connolly. And he telephoned you from Los Angeles? 
Mr. Connolly. No. 

27. Major Clausen. From San Francisco? 
Mr. Connolly. Yes. 

28. Major Clausen. And he was then here in the office of the Engi- 
neers, wasn't he? 

Mr. Connolly. Well, I don't know. He was in San Francisco. 

29. Major Clausen. Yes. He had talked with Colonel Wyman ? 
Mr. Connolly. Yes. 

30. Major Clausen. With whom else in the Army had he talked? 
\216^^ Mr. Connolly. Well, that I don't know. I was in 

Colorado. 

31. Major Clausen. And this was December 16, a Monday, was it? 

32. General Frank. What year? 

33. Major Clausen. 1940. 

Mr. Connolly. Yes, that is about right. Presumably that is cor- 
rect. 

34. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon, sir. 
Mr. Connolly. That is probably correct. 

35. Major Clausen. Now, at that time you were in Denver, Col- 
orado ; is that right ? 

Mr. Connolly. That is ri^ht. 

36. Major Clausen. Specifically, what did Mr. Rohl say to you? 
Just try and tell the Board exactly what he said at that time in this 
telephone conversation, or the substance. 

Mr. Connolly. Well, he said, "Colonel Wyman is here and has some 
work to offer in the Islands, and he is looking over some contractors 
to go out to do it." And I asked Rohl what the nature of the work 
was, and he said that Wyman would tell me, for me to meet Wyman at 
Cheyenne on his plane and go on to Washington with him; and I 
couldn't meet him at Cheyenne because I couldn't get on the plane, 
but I could take a plane from Denver to Chicago and there connect 
with Wyman's plane, and which I did, and we flew down to Washing- 
ton together, and I asked Wyman what was the nature of this thing 
and what was the amount of it, and he told me. 

37. Major Clausen. As I understand, then, you met Colonel Wy- 
man in Chicago ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Connolly. At the airport in Chicago. 

[2163'] 38. Major Clausen. And you then continued in com- 
pany with him from Chicago down to Washington, D. C. ? 
Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir. 

39. Major Clausen. And didn't you all go to the Carlton Hotel ? 
Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1127 

40. Major Clausen. And stay there? 
Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir. 

41. Major Clausen. And you were in his company then for how 
many days? 

Mr. Connolly. Well, three or four days; maybe a day or two one 
way or the other ; four days, five days. 

42. Major Clausen. And this contract the number of which I have 
previously given you, was that signed, sir, on December 20, 1940 ? 

Mr. Connolly. I left at that time. Grafe signed it on the 20th. 

43. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. When had you left? What was the 
date? 

Mr. Connolly. I left the day before that. 

44. Major Clausen. So that you left on the 19th? 
Mr. Connolly. I think so. 

45. Major Clausen. Now, did you have discussions with Colonel 
Wyman there concerning the nature of the work and the kind of work 
that you would do and the kind of work that these other co-adventurers 
would do ? 

Mr. Connolly. No. He had one man to do the work. Grafe was 
to do the work. 

46. Major Clausen. I mean the kind of work that your firm, 
[2164] the Rohl-Connolly Company, was to do in connection with 
the contract. 

Mr. Connolly. No. The work was to be handled by Mr. Grafe. 

47. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon. 

Mr. Connolly. The work was to be handled by one man for the 
joint — for the co-adventurers. 

48. Major Clausen. I don't mean the representation, Mr. Connolly, 
of the joint venturers by Mr. Grafe. I mean you sat down with some- 
body there, surely, and discussed the nature of the work that was to be 
done by these joint ventures, your firm and the Gunther-Shirley Com- 
pany? 

Mr. Connolly. The over-all job, yes. 

49. Major Clausen. Callahan Construction Company? 
Mr, Connolly. That is right. 

50. Major Clausen, And you went into that deeply and fully, did 
you not, to find out what you would do ? 

Mr. Connolly. No, not so deeply and not so fully, because, for the 
very simple reason that it wasn't formulated deeply nor fully. It was 
very, very sketchy. 

61. Major Clausen. Well, the contract itself sets forth that there 
were to be hangars and runways and defense projects? 

Mr. Connolly. No, sir. 

52. Major Clausen. Air raid warning systems ? 
Mr. Connolly. No, sir. 

53. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon, sir. 
Mr. Connolly. The contract doesn't state that. 

54. Major Clausen. Will the Board permit me to go and get the 
contract, sir ? I will be right back. 

[2166'] It is one of the exhibits out there. I couldn't find it. 

55. Colonel West. I will find it. 

56. Major Clausen. I see. It is one of the exhibits to the 

57. Colonel West. Which one is it? 



1128 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

58. Major Clausex. The contract of December 20, 1940. 

59. General Grunert. Suppose you let somebody else do the looking 
up, and we can go on. 

60. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. I will proceed along. 

61. Colonel West. I will go out and see if we can find it. 

Mr. Connolly. You are speaking now of the contract that I saw in 
Washington ? 

62. Major Clausen. I am speaking of the contract that is dated De- 
cember 20, sir, 1940. It sets forth the general 

Mr. Connolly. Not all those multitudinous supplements? 

6.']. Major Clausen. No, sir. I am speaking of the basic contract. 

Mr. Connolly. That is right. 

64. Major Clausen. The one that was signed and executed in Wash- 
ington. 

Mr. Connolly. That is right. 

65. Major Clausen. And it states general terms, various subdivi- 
sions and types of work to be done. 

Mr. Connolly. That is right. 

66. Major Clausen. And the air raid warning system. 

Mr. Connolly. There are five subdivisions stated in that contract. 

67. Major Clausen. Well, I mean it did, then, set forth the general 
character of the work? 

Mr. Connolly. That is right. There was no runway in it 
[2166] and there are no hangars in it. 

68. Major Clausen. Well, whatever is set forth in the contract — let 
me put the question this way — you discussed in Washington, did you 
not, sir ? 

Mr. Connolly. Yes. 

69. Major Clausen. All right. You also had telephone conversa- 
tions between yourself in Washington and Mr. Rohl in Los Angeles; 
isn't that true ? 

Mr. Connolly. Yes. 

TO. Major Clausen. Concerning the work of the contract? 
Mr. Connolly. Not the work. Concerning the financing of the 
contract. 

71. Major Clausen. The only financing that was to be done con- 
cerning the contract was concerning the work to be done under the 
contract; isn't that so? 

Mr. Connolly. Well, that is correct, if that is what it means. 

72. Major Clausen. Well, I mean you talked over with Mr. Rohl, 
your theoretic partner in this corporation, the financing of this par- 
ticular work; isn't that right? 

Mr. Connolly. Sure. 

78. Major Clausen. All right. And isn't it true that in addition 
to being in the company of Colonel Wyman there, you also met John 
Martin ? 

Mr. Connolly. Accidentally, yes. 

74. Major Clausen. Well, you met him, sir, did you not? 
Mr. Connolly. In the lobby of the hotel. 

75. Major Clausen. Now, in point of time from when you arrived 
in Wasliington, when did you meet John Martin ? 

[3167] Mr. Connolly. Well, I met John Martin — when I got 
to the Carlton Hotel there was a note there from John Martin saying 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1129 

he wanted to see me, but whether I met him that day or the next day 
I don't know, but I met him just immediately thereafter. 

76. General Frank. Just a minute. This is on the trip to Wash- 
ington around the 20th of December in 1940 that all this occurred? 

Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir. 

77. General Frank. This was at that same time that John Martin 
was there present when you met him ? 

Mr. Connolly. Well, I met him in the hotel, yes, sir, in the lobby 
of the hotel. 

78. General Frank. Wlio is Mr. Martin? 
Mr. Connolly. He is a Los Angeles attorney. 

79. General Frank. For whom ? 

Mr. Connolly. Oh, for various people. For Kohl-Connolly. 

80. Major Clausen. Now, when you met Mr. Martin he told you 
that he was there for the purpose of assisting in acquiring citizenship 
for Mr. Rohl, didn't he? 

Mr. Connolly. Well, I don't think he did. 

81. Major Clausen. Let me refer to your statement given to the 
House Military Affairs Committee, as follows : 

I met John Martin, Mr. Rohl's attorney, who told me he was in Washington in 
the interests of acquiring citizenship or furthering citizenship applications for 
Mr. H. W. Rohl. When I thought that there was a likelihood that we would 
acquire the contract I further thought that I should have Mr. Rohl resign as 
an officer of the Rohl- [2168] Connolly Co. and substitute myself and I so 
phoned him and it was so done, and he was neither officer nor a director of the 
Rohl-Connolly Co. until after he obtained his naturalization papers. 

Did you make that statement? 
Mr. Connolly. Yes. 

82. Major Clausen. To Mr. Weiner? 
Mr. Connolly. Yes. 

83. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon? 
Mr. Connolly. I think I did, yes. 

84. Major Clausen. All right. Well, now, as a matter of fact, 
then, Mr. Connolly, Mr. Martin did tell you just exactly what you said 
here ; isn't that correct? 

Mr. Connolly. Yes, but not in the way that you put it. 

85. Major Clausen. Well, you put it to me, then, in the correct way. 
Mr. Connolly. I asked John Martin what he was doing there — out 

in the lobby in front of a lot of people, — what he was doing there. He 
said he was there on business. The next time I see John Martin he 
advises me that Eohl is not a citizen and I had not ought to sign a 
contract, that is, I had not ought to sign any contract to take Rohl out 
of the country. So I knew then that Rohl was not a citizen for the 
first time, but I didn't think it made any difference, so I signed the 
contract. 

86. General Frank. How long had you been associated with Mr. 
Rohl up to this time ? 

Mr. Connolly. Since 1932. 

87. General Frank. Eight years, about ? 
Mr. Connolly. Yes. 

[2169] 88. General Frank. And this was the first time that you 
knew that he wasn't a citizen ? 
Mr. Connolly. Yes. 



1130 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

89. Major Clausen. And so you then phoned Mr. Rohl and told him 
that he should resign ? 

Mr. Connolly. Probably I did. 

90. Major Clausen. Well, is there any doubt about it, Mr. Con- 
nolly? You said in this statement here to the House Military Affairs 
Committee 

Mr. Connolly. He resigned. He resigned; I became president. 
That's ri^ht. 

91. Major Clausen. Yes, but I say it says here that when you 
thought "that there was a likelihood that we would acquire the con- 
tract I further thought that I should have Mr. Eohl resign as an officer 
of the Rohl-ConnoUy Co. and substitute myself and I so phoned him 
and it was so done." 

Mr. Connolly. That is right. 

92. Major Clausen. That is correct, is it? 
Mr. Connolly. Yes. 

93. Major Clausen. You telephoned him for that purpose? 
Mr. Connolly. Yes. 

94. Major Clausen. All right. Well, now, when did you learn this 
in point of time of being in Washington ? On this first day that you 
met Mr. Martin ? 

Mr. Connolly. No, I don't think it was the first day. I think it was 
later on. I think it was a good — after we had been there for two or 
three days. We were up to the point of signing the contract. I didn't 
learn that the minute I got in Washington, the minute I saw John 
Martin. 

[2170] 95. Major Clausen. All right. Now, whom did yon 
tell that to ? You told Mr. Rohl the situation about his not being in 
the corporation because of the fact that he was an alien. Now, then, 
what did you say about that to Colonel Wyman ? 

Mr. Connolly. Nothing. 

96. Major Clausen. What did you say about that to Paul Grafe? 
Mr. Connolly. I told Grafe that Rohl was not a citizen. 

97. Major Clausen. Why did you tell it to Grafe and not to 
Wyman ? 

Mr. Connolly. Because I don't know whether — whether Rohl — 
whether Grafe and I would agree to sign the contract knowing that 
Rohl is not a citizen, or not. 

98. Major Clausen. Whom else did you tell in Washington at that 
time? 

Mr. Connolly. No one that I recall. 

99. Major Clausen. Now, here is a photostatic copy, Mr. Connolly, 
of articles of agreement dated December 20, 1940. I wish you would 
look that over and tell me if that is the basic contract to which you 
have reference? 

Mr. Connolly. Yes, I think it is, with the exception of these first 
four leaves which are seemingly an indication of supplements, job 
orders, dates of transmittal. Of course those were not in existence 
at that time. And it further states in this contract we were to do five 
things, First, ammunition storage magazines; second, warning sta- 
tions; third, railway trackage; fourth, fixed fortification structures; 
and fifth, in addition to the then existing radio station that was sup- 
plemented by an estimate of yardage to be excavated, which amounted 



fKOCEEDINiiS OK AKAIY PEAKL HAK150K liOAKU 1131 

I'JJ?!} to o80,U00 yards, backiill oT 150,000 cubic yards, concrete 
of o(;,000 yards, reiiii'orcino^ steel of 0,000,000, some few culverts and 
some pavement. 

100. Major Clauskx. Now, in your telephone talks with j\lr. Rohl 
from ^Vashin<i•ton — I am referrino- to December 19-10 — what did you 
say in talking to Mr. Rohl concerning the air raid warning stations? 

Mr. CoNxoLLY. Not a word, 

101. Major Clausex'. A\'hat did you say after that time to ]\Ir. Rohl 
regarding those air raid warning stations? 

Mr. CoxNOLLY. Nothing. 

102. Major Clausex. Now let me refer to your testimony or state- 
ment given to the House Military Atfairs Committee, as follows : 

Questioii : >Subsec]uent to receiving the eoiitract for the Hawaiian Ishiu(l.s, did 
Mr. Kohl discuss with you the nature of the contract, and so forth? 

Answer: No. There was no detailed discussion of this conlraet at all. Per- 
sonally, I iiever saw a written description of it or a blueprint on any part of it. 
Kohl and I discussed the necessary linancial arran.uements, advancement of 
moneys, because after all we were linancing this, ^ye were building certain air- 
fields. We knew what that meant, just simply movefaient of materials and stabili- 
zation of a base without a bhieiirint at all. When you are told to run a 7,500 
runway we knew what it takes. 

Questiiai : But it would be most usual t\ir him to discuss with you the nature and 
type uf contract that you received for the Hawaiian Islands? 

An.swer : Yes. I don't doubt but what we mentioned [217.^1 building an 
airiiort there. I don't thiidc that we ever got into some of these installations 
out there. I don't think Kohl and I ever discussed anything of that nature. We 
talked of those warning stations because I was curious as to what they were 
Tiiafs all that I know that we ever got into any detail about. 

Mr. CoxxoLLY. That's not our telephone conversation. 

103. Major Clausex. I beg your pardon, sir? 

Mr. CoxxoLLY. That is long after Rohl was out of the islands. 

104. Major Clausex. That was after he was out of the islands? 
Mr. CoxxoLLY. Sure. 

105. Major CLAUSEX^ Well, with regard to the contract, do you 
mean ? You mean 

Mr. CoxxoLLY. I would like to know what an air warning station 
was. I didn't know what it was. He was out there, and they built 
them. 

10(5. Major Clausex. Ail right. You mean you t:ilkcd with Mr. 
Rohl concerning these items only after you were out to the islands? 

Mr. CoxxoLLY. Why, yes. We were not building any airfields liere 
[indicatin*.^ papers]. 

107. Major Clausex. Well, how many telephone ctdls, Mr. Con- 
nolly, did you put in to Mr. Rohl from Washington or did he put in to 
you and have with you ? 

Mr. CuxxoLLY. I don't know. 

108. Major Clausex. Well, give tis an a[)[)roximation. 
Mr. CoxxoLLY. Two or three. 

109. Major Clausex^ And wluit did you say in these two or three 
[2173] conversations? 

Mr. CoxxoLLY. I stiitl we htive to fiiKincc this job. It would be 
about so much. You have got so nnich of a fee. 

110. Major Clausex. And wdiat else? 

Mr. CoxxoLLY. Thtit I ought to ttdvc over tliis cdiiipany or else stay 
out of it. 

111. Major Clausex. What else did you .say, Mr. Connolly? 



1132 CONGRESSIONAL IN \ KSTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Ml". Connolly. I don't know what I said, but what I am saying now 
is what I think I said. There was no occasion for us to discuss this, 
the matter of movement of yards. That doesn't mean anything to a 
conti'actor. He knows how to move dirt. 

112. Major Clausp:n. Well, does the fact that you didn't know what 
an air raid warning station was and the fact that you were curious as 
to what they were — -I mean does the contractor know what an air raid 
warning station is? 

Mr. Connolly. Well, I didn't. 

113. Major Clausen. Well, then are you sure, now, Mr. Connolly 
that you didn't discuss it with your partner? 

Mr. Connolly, Of course not. 

114. Major Clausen. As to building something that you didn't 
know what it was ? 

Mr. Connolly. Yes. 

115. Major Clausen. I see. 

116. General Frank. You mean to say you were taking on a con- 
tract for building sometiiing when you didn't know what it consisted 
of? 

Mr. Connolly. No, General. In this contract it sets out you are 
putting in, doing so many cubic yards of excavation, placing so many 
cubic yards of concrete and so many thousands [217J^\ of 
pounds of steel and so much bituminous pavement. Well, that's all 
right, but putting an air warning station on, I wanted to know what an 
air warning station was, after this attack, what were the things, and 
how did they work, and why. 

117. Major Clausen. After the attack? 
Mr. Connolly. Sure. 

118. General Frank. This contract was let long before the attack. 

Mr. Connolly. I know it, but there was never a print or a descrip- 
tion or anything. There's the whole business : There is nothing in this 
contract to tell you what it is. 

119. Major Clausen. You mean you were to get a fee of fifty thou- 
sand for doing something and you didn't know Avhat you were going 
to do? 

Mr. Connolly. No. I mean we were going to get it for moving this 
much dirt and placing this much concrete, and part of it I presume 
was going to be an air warning station. It said so much roads and 
this, that, and the other. The contractor never installed the equip- 
ment, you know, In these things; it was never his job to do it. 

120. Major Clausen. Now, isn't it true, Mr. Connolly, that even 
in 1940 Paul Grafe had gone to the Hawaiian Islands with some men 
and had surveyed the situation and come back and reported to you 
that the work was to be thus and thus and thus ? 

Mr. Connolly. No, that's not correct. Mr. Grafe sent two men to 
the islands way early in the summer. 

121. Major Clausen. Of 1940? 

Mr. Connolly. Of 1940. And they come back and reported 
[2J75] to him, but they did not report to me. 

122. Major Clausen. Well, you were there with Mr. Grafe in Wash- 
ington. Didn't he discuss that with you ? 

Mr. Connolly. No. 

123. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1133 

Mr. Connolly. I never saw a report that those men ever made. 
That was never discussed. 

124. Major Clausen. Didn't Mr. Grafe talk to you about the fact 
tliat he had gone to the islands or had sent two men to the islands 
in 1940 and surveyed the situation from the standpoint of this defense 
project ? 

Mr. Connolly. Well, he sent two men to the islands, but whether 
it was that same party or not, I had no means of knowing. 

125. Major Clausen. Is your testimony that Mr. Grafe did not dis- 
cuss it with you in Washington, the fact that he had sent two men to 
the islands to survey the field for these defense projects? 

Mr. Connolly. Well, Grafe never gave me any report on what these 
men did for him in the islands. 

126. Major Clausen. Did you discuss this with him in Washington? 
is my question. 

Mr. Connolly. I don't think I did. 

127. General Frank. You are financially interested in this firm, 
aren't you ? 

Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir. 

128. Major Clausen. Well, now, when you found out in Washington 
from Mr. Martin that your partner was a — by the way, you knew that 
was a secret contract, didn't you, Mr. Connolly? 

[J17'6'] Mr. Connolly. When we were talking about it, I didn't. 

129. Major Clausen. I beg your pai-don? 

INIr. Connolly. When it was first shown me it was, yes. I didn't 
know it when I went to Washington, though. 

130. Major Clausen. AYell, when you saAv the contract you knew 
it was a secret contract, didn't you? 

Mr. Connolly. That is right 

131. Major Clausen. Now, before you were shown the contract or 
after, when was it that you knew that Mr. Rohl was an alien ? 

Mr. Connolly. Before. Before I saw the contract. 

132. Major Clausen. All right. And when you saw the contract 
was it in the form that you see it there (indicating) with the exception 
of those pages that you say refer to supplements? 

Mr. Connolly. Well, it was on white paper, stamped with the 
SECRET stamp upside down and downside up, as I recall, along all 
four margins of the front page, as I recall. 

133. Major Clausen. Well, you were taken considerable aback, 
weren't you, by the information that Mr. Rohl was an alien, German 
alien ? 

Mr. Connolly. Yes. 

134. Major Clausen. I mean that was a big shock to you, wasn't it ? 
Mr. Connolly. Yes, I was a little surprised. 

135. Major Clausen. All right. You had gone on the plane with 
Colonel Wyman from Denver, or rather, from Chicago to Washington, 
you had been there with Colonel Wyman. and what did you say about 
this big shock, if anything, to Colonel Wyman ? 

Mr. Connolly. Nothing. 

[2177] 136. Major Clausen. What did you say about it to— by 
the way, did you go over to the office of the Chief of Engineers ? 
Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir. 
137. Major Clausen. And whom did you meet over there? 



1134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Connolly. Well, the man that did most of this work there I 
think was then Major Newman. 

138. Major Clausen. What did you say about this alien status of 
Mr. Rohl to Major Newman, if anything? 

Mr. Connolly. Nothing. 

139. Major Clausen. What is that? 
Mr. Connolly. Nothing. 

[£178] 140. Major Clausen. Whom else did you see in the 
office of the Chief of Engineers ? 

Mr. Connolly. Well, I remember meeting General Robins. 

141. Major Clausen. What did you say to him about it? 

Mr. Connolly. Nothing. Two or three other gentlemen, I think. 
I don't recall who they were. 

142. Major Clausen. When you came back to California, you say 
you think you left on the 19th of December, is that correct ? 

Mr. Connolly. I do not know. I have got a diary that will give 
you the dates, if they are important, but I left and got home prior 
to Christmas. I left before that was signed. 

143. Major Clausen. Do you have a diary that indicates the num- 
ber of telephone calls you had with Mr. Rohl when you were in 
Washington ? 

Mr. Connolly. No, but I will have a diary that indicates when I 
talked to him. 

144. Major Clausen. When you came back, thoiigh, from Washing- 
ton, this deal had been made, had it not? 

Mr. Connolly. Yes. 

145. Major Clausen. And in order to make that deal you certainly 
talked over the contract with Mr. Martin, did you not ? 

Mr. Connolly. Never. 

146. Major Clausen. What is that? 
Mr. Connolly. No. 

147. Major Clausen. You did not talk it over with Mr. Martin, 
who was the attorney for your firm ? 

Mr. Connolly. Mr. Martin wasn't there as an attorney for Rohl- 
Connolly. 

148. Major Clausen. In what capacity was Mr. Martin there? 
[B179] ^ Mr. Connolly. That, I can't tell you that. 

149. Major Clausen. Is it your sworn testimony now to this Board 
that Mr. Martin had nothing to do with the drafting of that contract ? 

Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir. 

150. Major Clausen. And is it your sworn testimony that he had 
nothing to do with any of the papers — just for example, the joint- 
venture agreement that would naturally precede the contract? 

Mr. Connolly, I don't think any joint-venture papers did precede 
this contract. 

151. Major Clausen. Well, what is the fact as you state it to the 
Board, now? What is tlie fact as to whether Mr. Martin drew any 
legal papers, or dictated any legal papers, or did anything at all, 
whatsoever, legally, with regard to that contract? 

Mr. Connolly. Nothing. 

152. Major Clausen. In point of truth, now, when you came back 
from Washington to California you sat down and talked to Mr. Rohl, 
did you not, concerning the contract? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1135 

Mr. Connolly. I told Rohl that that contract wasn't to come into 
our office down there, nor any papers concerning that contract to come 
in there; and there was no further discussion on that contract; nor 
was there, ever ; nor was there any plans, papers, nor the contract to 
be in that Kohl-Connolly office while he was still an alien. 

153. Major Clausen. Mr. Connolly, let me show you this contract, 
signed, in which Rohl-Connolly Company joins with the Hawaiian 
Constructors, of Honolulu, and I see it is described as consisting of 
the W. E. Callahan Company, Gunther & Shirley Co., and Rohl- 
[2180] Connolly Company. Now, the Callahan Company,^ the 
Gunther & Shirley Co., and the Rohl-Connolly Company were joint 
adventurers, were they not? , , . . , ; ,• ■ 

Mr. Connolly. Yes. 

154. Major Clausen. Well, who drew up the papers for that, for 
the Rohl-Connolly part ? 

Mr. Connolly. There were no papers drawn prior to the signing 
and execution of this contract. The Rohl-Connolly Company, the 
Callahan Company, and the Gunther & Shirley Company were build- 
ing a joint venture in Colorado, and we were going in on the same per- 
centages as existed on that job, and we had no legal papers drawn 
up prior to this contract, for this contract, at all. 

155. Major Clausen. You are speaking of the Cadoa project? 
Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir. 

156. Major Clausen. So far as this contract is concerned, is it your 
statement that you were just to continue on in the same relative per- 
centages? 

Mr. Connolly. That is correct. . ' 

157. Major Clausen. When you say that no papers came into the 
Rohl-Connolly Company, isn't it true now that papers had to be 
signed and given to the engineers, which showed that Mr. Paul Graf e, 
here, had authority to sign on behalf of the Rohl-Connolly Company ? 

Mr. Connolly. Certainly not ! Unlimited power of attorney to go 
to the islands and execute it and carry on this job. 

158. Major Clausen. Yes, and who drew that up for the Rohl- 
Connolly Company ? 

Mr. Connolly. That, I don't know; but the Rohl-Connolly 
[:2181] Company did not have it drawn up. I probably executed 
it to Grafe, had it drawn up, here, probably John Martin — might be 
some othei" attorney ; I don't know. 

159. Major Clausen. And that was done before this contract was 
signed? 

Mr. Connolly. It was not. 

160. Major Clausen. So far as this contract is concerned, Mr. 
Connolly, is it your testimony, here, to the Board, that you did not 
discuss it, or anything connected with the deal, with Mr. Rohl, at all, 
until he became a citizen ? 

Mr. Connolly. No ; I talked to Rohl, as I stated here a while back, 
about this contract, any arrangement necessary to carry it on. 

161. Major Clausen. All right. When did you talk to him? 

Mr. Connolly. I talked to him from Washington before we ob- 
tained the contract. 

162. Major Clausen. And on how many occasions? 



1136 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Connolly. Oh, I don't know — two or three. I was only there 
three or four days. 

163. Major Clausen. And then, when you came back to California? 
Mr. Connolly. I told him he w^as to have nothing to do with that 

contract, until his status changed. 

164. Major Clausen. By the way, when was it that you told him 
that, Mr. Connolly? 

Mr. Connolly. Well, when I next saw him. 

165. Major Clausen. When was it after you got back? 

Mr. Connolly. That, I can't tell you. I don't know. It was 
shortly after I got back, certainly. 

166. Major Clausen. It would be in the neighborhood of Decem- 
ber? 

[2182] Mr. Connolly. In January, I would say, off-hand. 

167. Major Clausen. It would be December or January '-11, is that 
correct ? 

Mr. Connolly. I think so. 

168. Major Clausen. All right. From that time down to the time 
that Mr. Rohl became a citizen, do you want to say to the Board, or, 
rather, do you testify that vou did not discuss the work or the contract 
with Mr. Rohl? 

Mr. Connolly. Rohl and I never discussed that work, I never saw 
a plan myself, and I never had a copy of the contract, and there was 
no scrap of paper with anything pertaining to that contract ever in 
the Rohl-Connolly Company office in Los Angeles, that I ever knew 
about ; and I think I would have known ; and that contract I discussed 
with Grafe and told him to set it operating. He had an unlimited 
power of attorney, to go ahead and do it. 

169. Major Clausen. Concerning Colonel Wyman, do you recall 
when he came to Los Angeles as district engineer ? 

Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir. 

170. Major Clausen. You called on him, did you not, Mr. Con- 
nolly, very soon after he arrived, in the company of Mr. Rohl ? 

JNIr. Connolly. I don't think so. The first time I saw Colonel 
W3anan, as I recall it, was when we were putting in bids on the section 
of breakwater along the Los Angeles-Long Beach breakw^ater. That 
wasn't a call on Colonel Wyman, that was a call on the division engi- 
neer. It had been changed within the week. 

171. Major Clausen. Did you ever call on Colonel Wyman when 
he was Captain Wvman or Major Wyman, and accompany him to any 
[2J83] parties? 

Mr. Connolly. I don't think I was ever in a party with Wyman. 

172. Major Clausen. Were you ever on a yacht trip with Colonel, 
then Captain or INIajor, Wyman? 

Mr. Connolly. No, sir. 

173. Major Clausen. Did you ever give him a drink? 
Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir. 

174. Major Clausen. How many times ? 

Mr. Connolly. I have had him in my home in this town, and gave 
him some drinks. How many times ? I don't know. 

175. Major Clausen. When did you have him in your own home in 
San Francisco? 

Mr. Connolly. I had him in my own home in San Francisco after 
he returned here from Washington. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1137 

176. Major Clausex. You mean, as he got back from Washington, 
from this December 1940 trip, is that right? 

Mr. Connolly. That is right. 

177. Major Clausen. How did he come to go to your home? 

Mr. Connolly. I invited him. He came out to my home for din- 
ner, the only guest, my wife and me; ate dinner with me and the 
members of my family. We had dinner, and he left at 10 o'clock. 

178. Major ClaI'Sen. On this occasion did you tell him this infor- 
mation that had taken you aback in Washington? 

Mr. Connolly. No. 

179. Major Clausen. Concerning Rohl's alien status? 
Mr. Connolly. I have never told that to Wyman, yet. 

180. Major Clausen. Did you ever have Colonel Wyman, or 
[2184] Captain or Major Wyman to your home on other occasions ? 

Mr. Connolly. That is tlie only time. 

181. Major Clausen. I think I have nothing further. 

182. General Russell. What percentage did Rohl-Connolly operate 
on in this joint-adventure agreement? 

Mr. Connolly. To start out, 80%. 

188. General Russell. Was that the percentage that you went into 
the 1910 contract on, Mr. Connolly? 
Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir. 

184. General Russell. Now, you state that you talked to Mr. Rohl, 
back in San Francisco, about financing that work. Was all that be- 
cause it was necessary to put new moneys into the project, other than 
that that was available to the Colorado operation? 

Mr. Connolly. No. I got this impression : It was my impression 
that that contract offshore in that amount was not wholly desirable, 
and Wyman wanted new equipment on that job. Well, new equip- 
ment takes new money. The group of us probably had $5,000,000 
worth of equivalent equipment with some age on it. Wyman, to do 
this job, had to put new plant on it. That takes money, and we put 
in a lot of money and bought the equipment to put on this job. 

185. General Russell. Where did this new money come from, Mr. 
Connolly ? 

Mr. Connolly. We put it in, in our proportions,' from our relative 
companies, from our companies. 

186. General Russell. Do you know how much money Mr. Rohl 
as an individual had to put in, in order to enable the group to buy new 
equipment incident to starting the work? 

Mr. Connolly. Rohl-Connolly's 407o of the necessary capital 
[3185] was furnished by Rohl-CohnoUy Company. 

187. General Russell. The Corporation, Rohl-Connolly Company, 
had the necessary money ? 

Mr. Connolly. Yes. 

188. General Russell. Then why did you have to talk to him about 
the financing, if you were representing the corporation, and the cor- 
poration had the money? 

Mr. Connolly. Well, if two contractors associated together for 
years, and you are going to do something, you just as a matter of 
course discuss those things. 

189. General Rttssell. In the course of arriving at a joint judg- 
ment by you and Rohl ? 



1138 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Connolly. Well, taking a new step, you tell your partner what 
you are going to do. 

190. General KussELL. But the Rohl-Connally Company had money, 
already, plenty of money ? 

Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir. 

191. General Eussell. That is all. 

192. General Grunert. Who was the "spark plug" in getting the 
work done in Hawaii for the Hawaiian Constructors ? Was there any 
one man ? 

Mr. Connolly. Graf e was supposed to be. 

193. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not that work in 
Hawaii started to lag, and that that was the reason they got Rohl to 
go out there, to put more punch into it, or what? 

Mr. Connolly. Well, Rohl was more aggressive than Grafe, and 
Wyman want/ed Rohl to go out there. 

194. General Grunert. In your past contacts, working together and 
in combinations, who was the more aggressive man, Rohl [2186] 
or Grafe ? 

Mr. Connolly. Well, Rohl would be the most aggressive, but Rohl 
had never had overseas or offshore experience, and Grafe had built the 
Madden Dam in Panama, and he had those four or five men with him 
who had been key men down there, and we figured we had a "natural." 

195. General Grunert. Is that why you co-adventurers chose Grafe 
to represent you and get this contract started ? 

Mr. Connolly. That is right. I thought it was a good nucleus. 

196. General Grunert. But if Rohl had been a citizen, would Rohl 
have been the man to go out there and put things through, or not ? 

Mr. CoNNLOLY. Well, General, I am not sure on that, because the 
key men that Rohl-Connolly had were with me at Cadoa, and they 
would have to rob that job, to go offshore. That would be a mattei 
of discussion, but I thought Grafe with his group was good. 

197. General Grunert. Were Rohl and Wyman pretty thick so- 
cially ? 

Mr. Connolly. They were always good friends ; yes. 

198. General Grunert. Good drinking companions ? 
Mr. Connolly. Good ! 

199. General Grunert. Both about the same type, hard-fisted, go- 
getters, punchers? Did they naturally click, that way? 

Mr. Connolly. General, they are both that way. They are both 
tough, and they get it done, and they drive everybody that is about 
them. 

200. General Grunert. And ^ou think that was a sort of natural 
[2187] affinity? 

Mr. Connolly. Well, they could fight about the way to do a thing, 
and get it done. One was somewhat like the other. As long as it got 
done, that's all that counted. To somebody else, less tender-skinned, 
that wouldn't suit so well. 

201. General Grunert. In the contracting business and other busi- 
nesses, is it natural to do a certain amount of entertaining in connec- 
tion with obtaining contracts? Do the parties often fraternize and 
drink together, or are they afraid that one will influence the other? 

Mr, Connolly, Well, they always do that. General, 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1139 

202. General Grunert. They always do that ? So you didn't think 
it unnatural that Rohl should entertain Wyman, and that. Wyman 
should accept that entertainment from Rohl ? 

Mr. Connolly. I thought it was a natural thing to do. 

203. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not there is any 
gain on one side or the other through that association? 

Mr. Connolly. I don't think there is any. 

204. General Grunert. Financial gain, or otherwise? 
Mr. Connolly. I am certain there is no financial gain. 

205. General Grunert. Did you establish a residence in, or go to 
Honolulu, while the work was being done over there ? 

Mr, Connolly. I did not. 

206. General Grunert. You never went over ? 
Mr, Connolly. No, sir. 

207. General Grunert. Then you know nothing about the process 
or the progress of the work over there ? 

Mr. Connolly. Oh, yes; I know a lot about the progress of the 
work. 

[2188] 208. General Grunert. Personally, as a matter of per- 
sonal knowledge ? 

Mr. Connolly, From personal inspection, I know nothing, 

209, General Grunert, You didn't go over there ? 

Mr, Connolly, No, sir, 

210.' General Grunert. Then I think the information I am after 
I cannot get. 

211. Major Clausen. That is right, sir. I thought as much. 

212. General Grunert. All right. 

213. Major Clausen. I had a few more questions. Sir, when you 
discovered that Mr, Rohl was a German alien, you were so taken aback 
that at first you didn't wish to sign the contract, isn't that correct? 

Mr. Connolly. No; that wasn't it. I was so taken aback that I 
kept my mouth shut. 

214. Major Clausen, And you thought it over and decided that you 
might not be a proper party to sign, isn't that true? 

Mr. Connolly, I thought it over, and then I asked Grafe what he 
thought of it. He didn't see that it made any difference, and neither 
did I ; so we signed it. 

215. Major Clausen. And you debated the advisability of signing 
the contract ? 

Mr. Connolly. With Graef , yes. 

216. Major Clausen. All right. 

Mr. Connolly. "What would be the influence of Rohl, an alien, on 
this contract?" Well, we decided that if Paul runs it, if Grafe runs 
it and handles it all, it don't mean anything. 

217. Major Clausen. Then you say it did not mean a thing ? 
Mr, Connolly, I wouldn't think so, 

[21 89] Major Clausen, All right, Wlien did you then phone 
Mr. Rohl and tell him to resign? Was it after this decision that you 
made following your talk with Mr, Grafe ? 

Mr. Connolly. I don't know. I did make a phone call; whether it 
was before or after, I don't know. 

219. Major Clausen. And specifically, what did you tell Mr. Rohl ? 

79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 2 23 



1140 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Connolly. Four years ago, I can't tell you, but I told him to 
keep out of it, that I would handle it — about that many words, elab- 
orated. 

220. Major Clausen. What did you say about being president ? 

Mr. Connolly. "I will be president" — just like that, I would say. 

221. Major Clausen. And was the change then from Mr. Rohl, as 
president, to you, as president, effected after that? 

Mr. Connolly. After that? 

222. Major Clausen. Yes, after your talk from Washington to Mr. 
Eohl in Los Angeles, in which you told him that you would be president 
instead of his being president. Was that then accomplished, that 
change in officers ? 

Mr. Connolly. Well, we were changed. The minute book will tell 
you better than I could tell you ; but we changed the officers, there, in 
December. 

223. ]\Iajor Clausen. And w^as it after this telephone call that you 
had with Mr. Rohl concerning the change, and concerning his alien 
status ? 

Mr. Connolly. Well, I presume it was. 

224. Major Clausen. Is there any doubt in your mind? 

Mr. Connolly. No, except you must know something I don't, 
[21,90] the way you are questioning me. 

225. Major Clausen. Is there any doubt in your mind? 
Mr. Connolly, Well, you have created one. 

226. Major Clausen. Let me ask you, then, have I created a doubt 
in your mind as to whether you told anything to Colonel Wyman 
about this undecisiveness on your part as to whether you should sign 
the contract? 

Mr. Connolly. Not a bit. 

227. Major Clausen. You are sure of that ? 
Mr. Connolly. You bet I am ! 

228. Major Clausen. Now, what did Mr. Rohl say to you when you 
told him this, about the fact that since he was an alien, he should not 
be president? What did he say? 

Mr. Connolly. Practically nothing. 

229. Major Clausen. That is all. 

230. General Grunert. I just want to develop this a little bit more. 
What does the president of the company do? 

Mr. Connolly. He obligates the company. 

231. General Grunert. Were you president in name only, and did 
Rohl continue to run the company as usual? 

Mr. Connolly. Not as usual. When that company was formed, 1 
ran it and financed it, not Rohl. 

232. General Grunert. This was not just a subterfuge in order to 
get the contract that you couldn't have gotten or shouldn't have 
gotten because Rohl was an alien? 

Mr. Connolly. No, no; there was no subterfuge. 

233. General Frank. Who was in this group in Washington dis- 
cussing this contract? 

Mr. Connolly. Just Wyman, Graf e, and myself. 
[2191] 234. General Frank. Where did you stop? 
Mr. Connolly. We stayed at the Carlton Hotel. 
235. General Frank. All three of you? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1141 

Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir. 

236. General Frank. And did you get rooms together ? 

Mr. Connolly. No. I had wired on to the Cai'lton for rooms, and 
when I got there with Wyman there were no rooms. "We didn't have 
any place to go, and Grafe had a reservation, and we took Grafe's 
room. He had a bedroom and a sitting room, and Wyman and I tooli 
that, until Grafe showed up, and then Wyman got another room. I 
stayed with Grafe until I left. 

237. General Frank. Who was responsible for getting this group of 
contractors interested in this Hawaiian venture? 

Mr. Connolly. Why, Wyman. 

238. General Frank. Wyman was the man who proposed that these 
three contracting firms take on this job in Honolulu? 

Mr. Connolly. Well, my understanding is that Wyman came to the 
continent to interest contractors, and he interviewed several, that Grafe 
wanted this thiling himself, but Wyman wouldn't give it to him alone, 
but he would give it to the group that was functioning in Colorado. 

239. General Frank. And with that in mind, you and Graff and 
Wyman went on to Washington to consummate this contra.-t? 

Mr. Connolly. We went on to Washington to negotiate it and de- 
termine whether or not we would get it. We didn't have it when we 
went to Washington. 

240. General Frank. Now, how soon after getting to Washington 
did you find out that Rohl was a German alien ? 

Mr. Connolly. Why, I think within the next couple or three 
[2192] days. 

241. General Frank. That had a very direct bearing on the par- 
ticipation of the Eohl-Connolly Company in the contract, did it not? 

Mr. Connolly. What do you mean, ''it had a very direct bearing"? 

242. General Frank. Well, if Mr. Rohl stayed in there as a Ger- 
man alien, he legally had no right to accept a defense contract? 

Mr. Connolly. Well, I don't know. 

243. General Frank. That was just plain law, was it not, at that 
time? So it was not a question of judgment, it was a question of 
legal responsibility ? 

Mr. Connolly. You mean Rohl legally could not participate in 
the contract? 

244. General Frank. Not unless he was a citizen; and that, in 
accordance with the law. That is exactly what I mean. Therefore, 
the status of the Rohl-ConnoUy Company in this venture depended 
upon Rohl's status, did it not? 

Mr. Connolly. Well, I don't know. I am a layman, not an 
attorney. 

245. General Frank. You were doing business as the president of 
the company? 

Mr. Connolly. That's right. 

246. General Frank. And you certainly had l)etter know some- 
thing about the law that restricted your operations. 

Mr. Connolly. Well, I didn't know there wms any law that re- 
stricted that. General. 

247. General Frank. Didn't this man Martin tell you that? 

Mr. Connolly. Well, if I discussed it with him, he probably would 
have. 



1142 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

248. General Frank. What I am getting around to is this : When 
\2193'] you learned that Rohl was a German citizen, you started 
to "scratch gravel" to eliminate his being an officer in the company, 
did you not i 

Mr. Connolly. Well, that wasn't what prompted me to do that. 

249. General Frank. What was it? 

Mr. Connolly. What prompted me was the fact that that thing was 
secret. 

250. General Frank. Did you get any advice whatever from a 
hiwyer on this question? 

Mr. Connolly. No, I never developed it with them. 

251. General Frank. With Rohl's status in the company as a Ger- 
man alien being as disturbing as it was, and with Wyman asking 
that group to come into Honolulu, you want me to believe that you 
never mentioned it to Wyman ? 

Mr. Connolly. General, that is the truth; I never mentioned it 
to Wyman. 

252. General Frank. That is what you want? That is what you 
want? 

Mr. Connolly. No, it isn't a matter of wanting. That is a fact. 
I never mentioned Rohl's status to Wyman. 

253. General Frank. Why shouldn't you have mentioned it to him? 
Mr. Connolly. Well, I didn't. 

254. General Frank. Why shouldn't you ? 

Mr. Connolly. No reason at all, except I am the son of an immi- 
grant, myself, who had his papers, of course. I guess, so were most 
of us; but Rohl seemed to think that not being a citizen was a terrible 
thing. I guess it is, after that many years; and I seemed to feel 
that I was rather a chump, not \219Ji.'\ knowing more about my 
immediate associate than I did, after all those years, and I probably 
thought I didn't like to express it around, about what a damned 
fool I was. I had more or less pride, I guess, on my part; but 
that's it. 

255. General Frank. All right. 

256. Major Clausen. So, when you learned of this alien status in 
Washington, you not only learned that he was a German alien, but 
that he had been an alien since 1913, didn't you ? 

Mr. Connolly. No. Well, he had always been an alien. 

257. Major Clausen. Yes. Well, you knew though that he had 
come to the country in 1913? 

Mr. Connolly. All his life. 

258. Major Clausen. You knew that he had come to this country 
in 1913, didn't you, Mr. Connolly? 

Mr. Connolly. Well, now, I don't think I knew when he came to 
this country. 

259. Major Clausen. Maybe you don't recall your answer. What 
the General asked you was, "why didn't you tell Wyman?" And you 
said, "Well, it was such a terrible thing to have been an alien all those 
years." 

Mr. Connolly. I had known him 20 years. 

260. Major Clausen. Yes. 

Mr. Connolly. That was 20 years he was an alien. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1143 

261. Major Clausen. Well, you knew then that he had not only 
been an alien, but you he had been an alien for at least 20 years, because 
you had known him for 20 years, didn't you ? 

Mr. Connolly. Yes — plus the rest of his life. 

2H2. Major Clausen. And you did not discuss that with him ? 

Mr. Connolly. No. 

[219S] 263. Major Clausen. Did Rohl tell you it was a terrible 
thing to be an alien for those 20 years ? 

]\Ir. Connolly. No. 

204. Major Clausen. Do you make the assertion to the Board here, 
as a statement of fact, that you did not discuss the law as to Rohl's 
participation in this contract with Mr. Martin, in Washington, in 
December 1940? 

Mr. Connolly. Of course, I didn't. If I did and he had expressed 
to me what you gentlemen as attorneys now express to me, I would 
have never executed it. 

265. ]\Ia jor Clausen. And that is as true as everything else that you 
have said, isn't it? 

Mr. Connolly. And it's all the truth. 

2()(;. Major Clausen. Now, as a matter of fact, you shared a room 
with Colonel Wyman, did you, in this Carlton Hotel ? 

Mr. Connolly. Yes. 

267. Major Clausen. You not only went to Washington, but, in 
response to a question by General Frank, you said you slept in the 
same room with Colonel Wyman? 

Mr. Connolly. That's right. 

268. Major Clausen. While you were there? 

Mr. Connolly. No — till Wyman got a room, when Grafe came in. 

269. Major Clausen. And where was Mr. Martin at this time? 
He was in the same hotel, wasn't he? 

Mr. Connolly. I do not think so. I never saw him in any room in 
that hotel. 

270. Major Clausen. Where was he when you saw him in 
Washington ? 

Mr. Connolly. I saw him in the lobby, but I never Imew [£196] 
that he had a room in that hotel. I don't think he did. 

271. Major Clausen. Did you just have a casual conversation with 
Mr. Martin in the lobby ? Is that all that you saw of Mr. Martin on 
that occasion? 

Mr. Connolly. No ; I saw Martin in the lobby, and of course, I saw 
liim upstairs, too, but I never went into any "legal discussions with 
Martin about this contract. 

272. Major Clausen. Did you see Mr. Martin there on more than 
one day, or was it just the one day ? 

Mr. Connolly. I say I saw him more than once. 

273. INIajor Clausen. Several days, on several occasions ? 

Mr. Connolly. I saw him two or three times, there. That's 
reasonable. 

274. Major Clausen. DidMr. Martin go to dinner with you? 
Mr. Connolly. I don't think so, ever ; no. 

275. Major Clausen. Did you see Mr. Martin when you were with 
Colonel Wyman ? 

Mr. Connolly. Yes, I think I did. 



1144 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

276. Major Clausen. Did you have any discussion concerning Mr. 
Martin with Colonel AVyman ? 

Mr. Connolly. I don't think so. 

277. Major Clausen. Well, as a matter of fact, didn't Colonel 
Wyman say to you, "Why do you have your lawyer here?" and get 
"peeved" at the fact that you did have him there ? 

Mr. Connolly. I didn't have him there. He was there. I didn't 
have him there. 

278. Major Clausen. Well, didn't he say that to you ? That is my 
question. Didn't lie remonstrate at the fact that there was a lawyer 
on the scene representing Rohl-Connolly Company, he thought? 

[2197] Mr. Connolly. There was no lawyer on the scene repre- 
senting the Rohl-Connolly Company. 

279. Major Clausen. My question, sir, is this: Did not Colonel 
Wyman say to you, "Why do you have Mr. Martin here, your lawyer?" 
or words to that effect? 

Mr. Connolly. I don't think so. 

280. Major Clausen. Well, are you sure? 
Mr. Connolly. Reasonably sure. 

281. Major Clausen. All right. 

Mr. Connolly. I don't think I discussed Martin with Wyman. 

282. Major Clausen. Did Mr. Martin sit around with you when 
you were discussing the contract ? 

Mr. Connolly. Certainly not I 

283. Major Clausen. Did he go to dinner with the group of you ? 
Mr. Connolly. Not that I recall. 

284. Major Clausen. In these discussions that you had with Mr. 
Paul Graf e. Colonel Wyman sat in on those, did he ? 

Mr. Connolly. No. 

285. Major Clausen. Just you and Mr. Grafe? 
Mr. Connolly. When I remarked about Rohl, yes. 

286. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon, sir ? 

Mr. Connolly. If you mean it was the contract business that Wyman 
was discussing Avitli me, why, of course, he was there ; but if you mean 
my discussion with Grafe, as far a Rohl was concerned, Wyman wasn't 
there. 

287. Major Clausen. You are sure of that, now ? 
Mr. Connolly. I know it. 

288. Major Clausen. In these discussions that you had with Mr. 
Grafe concerning the contract — that is, the details of this [£198] 
contract — was Wyman present? 

Mr .Connolly. Why, they were read to us, in the Chief's office. 

289. Major Clausen. By whom? 

Mr. Connolly. By Wyman and Newman, whoever was around 
there. There was no contract in anyone's possession around the Carl- 
ton Hotel. These papers were in the Chief's office, to stay there. 
There was no contract in our hands to discuss, ever. 

290. Major Clausen. Mr. Grafe was present with you and Colonel 
Wyman, then, in the Chief's office, is that correct? 

Mr. Connolly. Sure. 

291. Major Clausen. In other words, Colonel Wyman was there, 
also? 

Mr. Connolly Sure. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1145 

292. Major Clausen. Now, who paid for Colonel Wyman's room 
at this hotel ? 

Mr. Connolly. I don't know, but I suppose he paid for his own. I 
know Grafe paid for his room, when I took it over. He had the 
reservations. Wyman and I slept there one night before Grafe showed 
up. When I left, I left Grafe with the bill ; so he paid the bill, for the 
first night, for the night I stayed there. 

293. Major Clausen. I have no further questions. 

294. General Gruneet. Is there anything else, Mr. Connolly, that 
you might tell the Board, that might assist us in getting at facts, that 
you have in mind ? 

Mr. Connolly. General, anything that I could tell you, that would 
help you, I would be glad to, if you would just indicate what else you 
think I might do. 

295. General Grunert. I just wondered, possibly there had been 
sometliing we haven't brought up, that you might have in mind, 
[2199] and could tell us. 

296. General Frank. Have you anything. Colonel Toulmin? 

297. Colonel Toulmin. Nothing, now. 

298. General Grunert. Apparently there is nothing else. 
Thank you very much for coming. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

[2£00] TESTIMONY OF WALTER WILTON HORNE, 9425 WIL- 
SHIRE BOULEVARD, BEVERLY HILLS, CALIFORNIA 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Mr. Home, will you please state to the Board 
your full name and address ? 

Mr. Horne. Walter Wilton Home, 9425 Wilshire Boulevard, 
Beverly Hills. 

2. General Grunert. Mr. Home, what the Board needs is help to 
get at facts that will lead to other facts. 

Mr. HoRNE. Yes, sir. 

3. General Grunert. So I am going to ask General Frank and his 
adviser there to get at some facts that they think you may be able to 
help us on. 

4. General Frank. Go ahead. 

5. Major Clausen. Mr. Horne, what is your present business? 
Mr. HoRNE. I am a realty operator, an insurance broker, have had a 

great deal of yachting experience in days gone by. 

6. Major Clausen. And in your experience previously did you meet 
aHansWilhelmRohl? 

Mr. HoRNE. I did, sir. 

7. Major Clausen. And did you ever have occasion to discuss with 
him his preference for things Germanic ? 

Mr. HoRNE. I did, sir. 

8. Major Clausen. Well, just briefly narrate to the Board some of 
those discussions that you had with him, and when they took place. 

Mr. HuRNE. I had the good fortune to own a German-built yacht, 
the AliMGAARD, built in Germany for the German Prince 
[2^01] Lippe, a 65-ton vessel, racing yacht 106 feet long, one of 
the outstanding racing yachts of Germany, brought to America, and 



1146 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

we raced it in two races to Honolulu. It was an outstanding^ very 
fast ship, built of German manganese-nickel steel ; and Hans Wilhelm 
Rohl, known to us in the yachting circle as Bill Kohl, was always very 
interested in that boat, several times tried to buy it, even helped in 
connection with Honolulu races by supplying masts and gear that came 
off of his smaller Swedish boat, the PANDORA. 

The PANDORA and the ARMGAARD, then renamed yacht CON- 
TENDER, were anchored next door to each other, as neighbors in the 
Long Beach harbor ; and I, as Commodore of the Long Beach Pacific 
Coast Yacht Club, went down to Spain in 1928 to bring back the 
trophies from King Alfonso and to take over to Spain the American 
trophies for the trans- Atlantic Ocean race. I did not consult Rohl 
as to my going, and when I returned he asked particularly why I went 
on a British ship, the Cunard Line, why I hadn't consulted him ; that 
I had made a mistake, that he could have helped me, and go on the 
Hamburg- American Line. He made the direct, postive statement that 
his uncle, whom he was very close to and who was his financial backer, 
was the managing director of the Hamburg- American Line and the 
North German Lloyd Steamship Company, a most influential, high 
German financially and politically, and that he could have gotten me 
the very finest of accommodations aboard this trans-Atlantic passage, 
and he criticized me for going twelfth hour with any accommodations 
I could get. 

9. Major Clausen. Now, with regard to Germany and things Ger- 
man, did you have talks with him in which he boasted of [2202'] 
things German ? 

Mr. HoRNE. Yes. 

10. Major Clausen. By the way, before you answer that question, 
when was it that you had this talk with him about his uncle being 

Mr. HoRNE. On my return in the fall of 1928. 

11. Major Clausen. All right. 

Mr. HoRNE. I went down to Spain on July 4, 1928. 

12. Major Clausen. All right. Did you have other talks with him 
about the subject of preferences for Germany? 

Mr. Horne. I kept my yacht in commission through the winter and 
took numbers of yachtmen who owned other yachts that were out of 
commission, and he went on some of these trips, local trips, where we 
were practicing navigation, racing crews, and he was always bragging 
about the yacht CONTENDER being the finest and fastest yacht 
because she was German-built, and there was no one could build as fine 
a manganese steel yacht as the Germans could, and his whole boastful 
braggadocio attitude was entirely German, and things German were 
by far the best and by far the finest built ; and he was very free in those 
days, in 1926 to 1938, in claiming his relationship with the managing 
director of the North German Lloyd Line. 

13. Major Clausen. Did he ever say anything about the fact that 
he was a German citizen himself, not a United States citizen ? 

Mr. HoRNE. I think he kept that pretty well covered up. "We didn't 
really know at that time that he was a German citizen, until he bought 
the large American yacht VEGA, and that was in [2203'] _ his 
wife's name, and it was registered in New York, and he bought it for 
$48,000. That is the ship that he chartered to the Army Engineers 
for $75,000, reported in the newspapers at one-dollar charter, how- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1147 

ever; and we knew, checldng into the thing afterwards, that it was 
because of his alien birth, and he had the yacht registered in his wife's 
name, his wife Floy Rohl. She received the charter money. 

The PANDORA, the first yacht he owned, which was moored next 
to me, was under 75 feet in length and therefore could be registered 
in the name of an alien German, and the PANDORA was really his 
yacht, registered as his yacht. 

14. Major Clausex, Now, did you ever have a talk with Mr. Rohl 
concerning an acquaintance by him with visiting Germans of high 
rank, in business and diplomatic service of the German Republic ? 

Mr. HoRNE. On my return from this yacht race to Spain bringing 
back the King Alfonso trophy I had occasion or was called upon as 
commodore of the yacht club to entertain and did see considerable of 
Count Von Luckner, who was an outstanding German, known as the 
sea raider, the skipper of the SEA ADDER that came out of the 
North Sea at Christmas night and escaped the blockade, in the first 
war. 

He wanted to see this fine German racing yacht because he had 
sailed on the yacht in Travaminda. He had sailed the same yacht in 
Kiel and Travaminda, and he wanted to go with me to Honolulu as a 
navigator on this very fine German yacht. 

I did not invite Hans Wilhelm Rohl to these receptions and enter- 
tainments of both Count Von Luckner and his Norwegian princess 
wife, and Rohl became incensed over the fact that I [2204] did 
not do so, and his friendship or acquaintanceship as a next door neigh- 
bor was chilled because of the fact that I had ignored him and had not 
invited him to these receptions to Count Von Luckner. 

I understood that he had made Von Luckner's acquaintance and had 
entertained him when he came here, but the outstanding Von Luckner 
reception, a dinner party aboard his own ship, which was his own 
birthday party, which was very much of a German — the whole char- 
acteristic of the whole thing from beer drinking up and down — Hans 
Wilhelm Rohl was not invited to that party. Rather strange that he 
wasn't, but he was not invited. 

There is no question but that Rohl was a true Nazi German: his 
braggadocio, his drinking, his excessive excesses in every way, bull- 
headedness and domination, overrunning everybody's rights in con- 
nection with yachting entertainments. On the return from the Hono- 
lulu race he made himself very, vei'y obnoxious because of his foreign, 
German attitude and excessive drinking. 

In 1926 when I first met him I was associated politically with three 
gentlemen who were my partners in the insurance business, and had 
been the campaign manager that had succeeded in arranging the large 
bond issues for the Long Beach breakwater, and Rohl came to us 
wanting to become a preferred, intimate, friendly contractor, to buy a 
lot of insurance from us and bid and secure the breakwater contracts 
that he later did actually build in Long Beach, and he offered us all of 
his insurance, and it was a left-handed way of bribery, and we were 
very suspicious of his methods and his foreign influencing of contracts, 
and we withdrew from the thing and have had nothing whatsoever 
to do with him. 

He did not buy or have anything to do with our office [2205] 
because three of my partners were councilmen and were really sitting 



1148 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL, HARBOR ATTACK 

as a board letting the breakwater contracts ; and I went to the officft 
of the Pacific Indemnity Company to try to get the back records of 
Ted Woods, the executive vice president, in reference to liis investi- 
gation of Kohl's financial position ; and the whole status of his pres- 
entation of his qualification for bonds financial, heavy — heavy finan- 
cial bonds — was not only his own personal resources, which he ad- 
mitted he brought from Germany some years previous, but that he 
had a strong financial backing and could command any amount of 
money or resources