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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."

.No 1)^l ft'^. QjQyK^ \(\\),\l> 




.Given By 

u, s, surr. ( > ' vcumknts 



PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEAEL HABBOB AHACK 

CONGKESS OF THE UNITED STATES ^ ., . 
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGKESS " -^''^ / 

S. Con. Res. 27 p^ -^^q 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN / 



FIRST SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 



INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 29 
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 



Printed for the tim of the 
Joint ConuuittM on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONGEESS OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS '*'-?^^? 

FIRST SESSION 



PURSUANT TO 



S. Con. Res. 27 



A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



mi 

AN / 



PART 29 

PROCEEDING^ OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 





UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

79716 Washington : i946 



,92. 

AS" 

^. S. SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS // V"© 

AUG 13 .m /^-^^ 



JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL 
HARBOR ATTACK 

ALBr^N W, BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman 
JERB COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Yice Chainnan 
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from 
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania 

OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa- 

HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tive from California 

gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from 

J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin 
North Carolina 



COUNSEL 



(Through January 14, 1946) 
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel 
Gekhaud a. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel 
JULE M. HANXAFOUD, Assistant Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 

(After January 14, 1946) 
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel 
Samuel H. Kaufman. Associate General Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel 
LOGAN J. Lane, Assistant Counsel 



HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 
No. 



10 
11 



Pages Transcript Hearings 

pages 

1- 399 1- 1058 Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 

401- 982 1059- 2586 Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945. 

983-1583 2587- 4194 Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13. 1945. 

1585-2063 4195- 5460 Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 

2065-2492 5461- 6646 Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946. 

2493-2920 6647- 7888 Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946. 

2921-3378 7889- 9107 Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946., 

3379-3927 9108-10517 Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946. 

3929-4599 10518-12277 Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946. 

4601-5151 12278-13708 Feb. 15, 16. 18, 19, and 20, 1946. 

5153-5560 137G9-14755 Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 

No. Exhibits Nos. 

12 1 through 6. 

13 7 and 8. 

14 9 through 43. 

15 44 through 87. 

16 88 through 110. 

17 111 through 128. 

18 129 through 156. 

19 157 through 172. 

20 173 through 179. 

21 180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations. 

22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings. 

26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings. 

27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings. 
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings. 

34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings. 

35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings. 

36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 

39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- 
ments. 



IV 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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Joint 

Consrcssional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1940 


Pages 

5269-5291 

3814-3826 
3450-3519 

"""5089-5122 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

149 , 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 



""471-510" 




Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


llTf< lIllllll-TtHfOl 

iiOiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiCiOi 

« 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 IrH 1 1 

^1 1 11 Oi 1 

(? ; 1 ! ; ; 1 1 1 ; 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ; "^ 1 


Joint 

CoTumittee 

Exhi[)it No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i(N 

^ ; ; 1 M 1 M M M i : M 1 r 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

140 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 
""660-(388" 


Joint 
Committee 
E.xhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

Ju!v 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

3105-3120" 

2479-2491" 

4022-4027" 
148-186 

2567-2580' 

3972-3988 

2492-2515 

1575-1643" 

3720-3749" 
1186-1220 

1413-1442" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

""391-398" 
'"115-134" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jau. 23, 1942) 


Pages 
203-209 

1127-1138 
1033-1038 

1719-1721" 

1219-1224' 

""886-951" 
1382-1399 

""377-389" 
1224-1229 

""314-320" 




Allen, Brooke E., Maj 

Allen, Riley H 

Anderson, Edward B., Maj 

Anderson, Ray 

Anderson, Walter S., Rear Adm 

Anstey, Alice 

Arnold, H. H., Gen 

A.sher, N. F., Ens 

Ball, N. F., Ens 

Ballard, Emma Jane 

Barber, Bruce G 

Bartlett, George Francis 

Bates, Paul M., Lt. Comdr 

Beardall, John R., Rear Adm 

Beardall, John R., Jr., Ens 

Beatty, Frank E., Rear Adm 

Bellinger, P. N. L., Vice Adm 

Benny, Chris J 

Benson, Henry P 

Berquist, Kenneth P., Col 

Berry, Frank M., S 1/c 

Betts, Thomas J., Brig. Gen 

Bieknell. George W., Col 

Bissell, John T., Col 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



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VI 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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INDEX OF WITNESSES 



VII 



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VIII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 
Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1915, 

to May 31, 

1946 


Pages 
4797-4828 

463-457, 

551-560, 

605-615, 

5367-5415 ' 

4221-4366 
26-34, 36-38, 
40-49, 55-73, 
75-79, 82-92, 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

428-432 
414-417 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1915) 


iiiiiiiCOi—ilM -HI iiii 

iliiiiii-HiOOOiiiiiOi IIII 
«iiiiiiiC<li<-i'-iiiiii'-il IIII 

g. 1 1 1 ' ' ' ' JL ' IIII 

(N 'O 1 1 1 1 lO 1 IIII 

QilllllllrHlO 01 IIII 

l(Nl'-l lllllr-11 IIII 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944: July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


^^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 till 
'^ ' ' 1 ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 


Joint 
Committee 
E.xhibit No. 

140 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

,'Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 
1070-1076 

461-469 

""763-772" 

816-851 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


lO"-! !■* 1 iO(N 1 1 1 i-<tH^ 111 100 1 1 

iCil>it-ii-<*^'«*<illi'-^^iii il>il 

» i005 1 (N 1 1IN05 1 1 1 i(NO III ir- 1 1 

§,iC^COi| ii|!Niiii(Nt-iiii i| 11 

e 1 1 1 1 -H 1 1 t^ i 1 1 1 1 1 1 III 1 10 1 1 

lii iOt> 1^ 1 lO-* 1 1 1 lO^ III 1 -rt< 1 1 

iCCi-OKNiKNCOiiiiO^iii H>il 

lOOi iiOiillKMCliil 1 11 

1 (M CO 1 1 1 IM 1 1 1 1 (N — 1 1 1 1 1 11 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


1 1 1 ! 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 1 

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ICO 1 

« 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -* 1 

&. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

s,\ \ w \ \ \ \\ \\ w \ \ \ w \ \^ \ 

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Tf< 1 

II 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 II 1 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

toJan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 

1571-1574" 

1664-1676 
"'469-473" 


"Witness 


Hamilton, Maxwell M., State Dept 

Hannum, Warren T., Brig. Gen 

Harrington, Cyril J 

Hart, Thomas Charles, Senator 

Hayes, Philip, Maj. Gen 

Heard, William A., Capt., USN 

Henderson, H. H., Lt., USA 

Herron, Charles D., Maj. Gen 

Hill, William H., Senator 

Holmes, J. Wilfred., Capt., USN 

Holtwick, J. S., Jr., Comdr 

Hoppough, Clay, Lt. Col 

Hornbeck, Stanley K 

Home, Walter Wilton 

Howard, Jack W., Col 

Hubbell, Monroe H., Lt. Comdr 

Huckins, Thomas A., Capt., USN 

Hull, Cordell 

Humphrey, Richard W. RM 3/c_ 

Hunt, John A., Col 

Ingersoll, Royal E., Adm 

Inglis, R. B., Rear Adm 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



IX 



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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to JVIay 31, 

1946 


O1IIII1C500II1II1IIIII ^- -O 1 1 
CD 1 1 1 1 1 lOcD 111 mS^^ ' ' 

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.= 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 c-i CO 1 1 1 ' 1 1 2 § t> 1 1 

ft,lO IIIIIIM lllllllllll^5JrHll 

10 -^ 111 °„>^'l 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

541-553 
182-292 

"146^142" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1915) 


Pages 
103 
107-112 

186 
219-222 

102 


Joint 

Committoe 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aus. 

4, 1945) 


1 ,— 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 

,0 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 II 
►^ ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ! 1 1 1 II 


Joint 
Committee 
E.\hibit No 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


lllilliCOiilliCOiilloiO 11 
r-( 1 '1 1 1 1^ 1 1 1 i-rt* 1 00 11 

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53III1111-+ GOllllT+H|(N II 

ftiillllliO (NiiliCOiiO II 

C73 CDiiiit^iOO II 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

266.5-2695' 
3028-3067 

1161-1185" 

2787-2802' 
1014-1034 
1678-1694 
3226-3250 

2362-2374" 

2-54" 

T. S. 2-52, 

192-226 

3126-3152 

1816-1913 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

214-225 
363-367 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


1 1 CD 1 -H 1 (M i-O 1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 1 -^ 1 1 1 10 1 IM 1 Oi 

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1 1 TT 1 lO 1 CD 1 1 1 t^ 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 iCO 
11^1^1 OiiilNi it^ 1 


3 


Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN 

Kroner, Hayes A., Brig. Gen 

Landreth, J. L., Ens 

Lane, Louis R., Ch. W7O 

Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col 

Laswell, Alva B., Col. USMC 

Lawton, William S., Col 

Layton, Edwin T., Capt., USN 

Leahy, William D., Adin 

Leary, Herbert F., Vice Adm 

Lewis, Fulton, Jr ^ 

Litell, S. H 

Locey, Frank H 

Lockard, Joseph L., Lt., USA 

Lorence, Walter E., Col 

Lumsden, George, Maj 

Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN 

Lynch, Paul J 

Lynn, George W., Lt. Comdr 

MacArthur, Douglas, Gen 

Marshall, George C, Gen 

Marston, Morrill W., Col 

Martin, F. L., Maj. Gen 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



XI 



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XII 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION TEARL HARBOR ATTaCS 



Joint 

Congres.sional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1940 


Pages 

5210 
4933-5009 


Joint 

Conirnitt'^e 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1915) 


Pages 

""387-3S8" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

14S 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Ol rH 1 (Nil ll^ll 

^#11 III IICO r COii it^ii 
« 1 1 1 111 11^ 1 (Mil Mil 

teLO 1 1 1 II "P > ' 

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Q^ !>• 1 1 1 1 1 1 

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1— 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xliibit No. 

147 

(Clarlie 

Invcstiftation, 

Sept. 14 to 

IG, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


^O ' ' ' III III 1 III i 1 1 1 

^111 III III 1 11 III 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

14G 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


1 1 lO III 111 .-„f^lM'"t--'"(N 1 1 CD 1 1 00 CO 
1 i05 III III I^KKo^"^^ ' "^ ' 'O^ 

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I iTti f^:f;;cocolO i i^ i i»oo 

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Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

1107-1160," 
1210-1252 

3635^3640 
2375-2398, 
3990-3996 
3153-3165 
2 [123-2933 
3885-3915 

1968-1988" 
1035-1070 

778-789 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
147-169 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


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i 

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Pettigrew, Moses W., Col 

Phelan, John, Ens 

Phillips, Walter C, Col 

Pickett, Harry K., Col 

Pierson, Millard, Col 

Pine, Willard B 

Poindexter, Joseph B., Gov 

Powell, Boiling R., Jr., Maj 

Powell, C. A., Col. 

Powers, R. D., Jr., Lt. Comdr 

Prather, Louise 

Pratt, John S., Col 

Pye, William S., Vice Adm 

Rafter, Case B 

Raley, Edward W., Col 

Ramsey, Logan C, Capt., USN 

Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



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PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1625 



[SM6] CONTENTS 



WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 10 44 

Testimony of — • Page" 
Colonel Morrill W. Marston, General Staff, G— 4, U. S. Arnij' Forces, 

POA _^ 3P26 

Governor Joseph B. Poindexter, 45S5 Kahala Avenue, Honolulu, T. H 3153 

Raymond S. Coll, Editor, The Honolulu Advertiser, Honolulu, T. H___ 3166 

George H. Moody, Old Pali Road, Honolulu, T. H 3184 

Colonel Ray E. Dingeman, Commanding OflBcer, 144th Group Coast 

Artillery, Fort Ruger, Territory of Hawaii 3190 

Robert L. Shivers, Collector of Customs, Hawaiian Islands, 4775 Aukai 

Street, Honolulu, T. H 3201 

Major George Lumsdeu, Inspector General's Department, Central Pa- 
cific Base Command, Fort Shafter, T. H 3226 

Captain Angus M. Taylor, Junior, Coast Artillery, Office of Internal Se- 
curity, Honolulu, T. H 3250 

Philip Chew Chun, 1453 Alancaster Street, Honolulu, T. H 3258 

George A. Sisson, Civil Engineer, 1545 Donionis Street, Honolulu, T. H_ 3265 

Miss Helen Schlesinger, 254A Lewers Road, Honolulu, T. H 3287 

Lt. Col. Robert W. Hain, General Staff, Headquarters, U. S. A. F. P. 

O. A., Fort Shafter, T. H 3304 

DOCUMENTS 

Headlines in Honolulu Advertiser : 3168 

Editorial in The Honolulu Advertiser, 1/27/42 3177 

Message of November 27, 1941, Marshall to Hawaiian Department 3197 

Analysis of Inspection of Station X 2/19/42 3228 

Excerpts from Reiwrt of Colonel Hunt 3259,3267,3298 

Messages read by Colonel Hain 3305 

Field Order No. 1 (Mission Orders) 11/2/40 3324 

Study of the air situation in Hawaii, 8/20/41 . 3344 

1 Pages referred to arc represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original tran.script of _i)roceedings. 



79716 — 46 — Ex. 14.^, vol. S- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1627 



13126] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL 

HARBOR BOARD 



WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1944 

Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawah. 

The Board, at 8 :30 a. m,, pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted 
the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the 
Board, presiding. 

Present : Lt. Gen, George Grunert, President ; Maj. Gen. Henry D. 
Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H, Frank, Members. 

Present also : Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder ; Major Henry C. 
Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A, Toulmin, Jr., 
Executive Officer. 

General Grunert. The Board will come to order. 

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL MOREILL W. MAESTON, GENEEAL STAFF, 
G-4, TJ. S. AEMY FOECES, POA 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your 
name, rank, organization and station? 

Colonel Marston. Morrill W. Marston, Colonel, General Staff, 
G-4 ; headquarters, U. S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Area. 

2. General Grunert. Colonel, what was your assignment in the 
latter part of 1941 and during the attack? 

Colonel Marston. I was assigned as G-4, Headquarters, Hawaiian 
Department, on the 19th of October, 1941, and I remained in that or 
the corresponding assignment ever since. 

3. General Grunert. Prior to that assignment what duty were 
[^3127'] you on over here ? 

Colonel Marston. I was G-2, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, from 
the 14th of September, 1939, until the 21st of July, 1941, at which time 
I went in as Assistant G-4 in the Headquarters, Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, and remained there from that time until assigned as G-4, as 
previously stated. 

4. General Grunert. Then you were with the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, on the Hawaiian Department General Staff, from September, 
1939, until after the attack, were you? 

Colonel Marston. Yes. 

5. General Grunert. As Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, presumably 
you knew about the materiel pertaining to the command. Do you 
know what deficiencies existed, in general terms, what was short and 
not on hand ? 

Colonel Marston. In very general terms, the antiaircraft defense 
was still not up to the desired standard but was being brought so by 



1628 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the arrival of additional regiments just prior to and at fibout the time 
of the attack. 

6. General Grunert. Meaning there was a deficiency in personnel ? 
Colonel Marston. There was a deficiency in personnel, which was 

being made up and was made up by the arrival of the 98th Coast 
Artillery antiaircraft, and there was one other unit came in at about 
that time. We were engaged in an expensive housing program for 
these units at the time that the attack came. 

7. General Grunert. The antiaircraft organizations that were here, 
liow were they equipped? Well equipped, partially equipped, lack- 
ing certain things, or what? 

[S138] Colonel Marston. Compared to other such organiza- 
tions in the American Army, they were very well equipped. Com- 
pared to modern standards, they were not well equipped. The arma- 
ment was the 3-inch antiaircraft, which has since proved to be too 
light, but was the best available at that time. 

8. General Grunert. They had no 90s at that time, did they ? 

Colonel Marston. There were none available at that time. How- 
ever, as an illustration of the relative importance placed on antiair- 
craft defense in this Department, at the time that I came over in 1939 
there were more active antiaircraft guns in this department in the 
hands of the 64th Coast Artillery Kegiment, I believe, than there Avere 
in the entire continental United States. 

9. Geneial Grunert. Kelatively speaking, they were relatively well 
equipped at that time with what was available? 

Colonel Marston. They were, and that equipment was being 
brought up just as fast as the War Department, at the instigation of 
the Department Commander, could bring it. 

10. General Grunert. When you went in as G-4, did you become 
aware of the Secretary of War's reply of the 7th of February to 
a letter the Secretary of the Navy wrote on the 24th of January 
wherein he, tlie Secretary of War, states, in effect, that all material 
for the air warning service would be there, meaning Hawaii, not later 
than June 1941. Did you know of that letter? 

Colonel Marston. I did not know of that letter at the time that I 
took over the G-4 office. 

11. General Grunert. You know of it now, do you? 

Colonel Marston. I have recently looked over back corres- 
[3129] pondence and I believe that that was included in the back 
correspondence. 

12. General Grunert. What I am getting at is that the Secretary 
of War said that air warning service material would be here by June 
of 1941. Do you as G-4 know when that material got here? 

Colonel Marston. I do not Imow the exact date. I do know that a 
substantial amount of material did arrive during the summer of 1941 
and that this material was being installed at the time of the attack and 
temporary installations had been effected on several stations, particu- 
larly the station at Kokee on Kauai, and one or two stations on Oahu. 
I am not sure of the exact location of the stations which were in opera- 
tion or being installed but preliminary work had been initiated for 
the station planned on, on the top of Mount Kaala and the station on 
Haleakala on Maui. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1629 

13. General Grunert. These were all permanent stations, were 
they? 

Colonel Marston. These were all to be permanent stations. There 
was an argument or a difference of opinion as to whether the stations 
should be installed as mobile stations or as permanent stations. I did 
not personally get into the technical features of that discussion, as 
the work was handled by the Engineer, the Signal Officer, and the 
antiaircraft 

14. General Grunert. Who can give us the best information on 
that? Colonel Powell? 

Colonel JNIarston. Colonel Powell can give you the best technical 
information from the Signal Corps standpoint. The actual work at 
the time was handled by Colonel Murphy of the [3130] Signal 
Corps, who later was killed in the Orient, but Colonel Powell was Sig- 
nal Officer at the time. Colonel Fleming, Robert J. Fleming, of the 
Engineer Corps, first as representative of the Department Engineer 
and later as an assistant to G-4, handled the technical details from 
the G-4 and engineering standpoint. The District Engineer's office, 
Mr. Perliter, who is still present, is familiar with the details of design, 
and Mr. Sisson of that office, the principal engineer of that office, was 
more directly connected with the work. 

15. General Grunert. We have those witnesses on our list. Tell 
me about what you know, if anything, about the supervision of con- 
struction for the Commanding General. Who did the supervising? 
Did you as G-4 or did Fleming as the representative? 

Colonel Marston. I exercised a general supervision, with Fleming 
handling the exact details of the work. 

16. General Grunert. Can you testify as to any delays or the 
leason for such delays, who was responsible and so forth, if there were 
sucli delays? Can you testify as to that? 

Colonel Marston. I was aware that there was delay in the discus- 
sion of the aircraft warning stations, due to a difference of opinion 
over the technical features of the installations, which, being new, was 
not fully developed. As I stated before, there was some difference of 
opinion on the question of the fixed and the mobile stations. There 
was a very decided difference of opinion as to whether the station 
should be on the highest point on the various islands or down near 
the shore line or at an intermediate location. 

17. General Grunert. Who was this difference of opinion between ? 
[S131] Colonel Marston. So far as my knowledge goes it was 

between experts in general in the Signal Corps who had developed 
this material. The fact that there was a definite difference of opinion 
is shown by the fact that the high stations, with the exception of the 
one at Kokee on Kauai, have proven not of use since they were in- 
stalled. The one on Kaala has had to be abandoned for use as a radar 
station and has been used entirely for radio communication. 

18. General Grunert, Where did the delays come in? You may 
have a difference of opinion, but if there was something decided, who 
made the decision as to what to do? Was there any delay caused by 
discussion or was there a delay by argument to put it there or put it 
somewhere else or not put it up at all, or what? 

Colonel Marston. There was a delay in construction due to the lack 
of adequate construction personnel to execute this work simultane- 



1630 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ously with the other work which was going on at the time. The Army 
expansion here did not get under way in force as soon as the Navy 
expansion did. There was a shortage of skilled personnel for the 
amount of work which was approved. Then there were delays due 
to the fact that all details of construction had to be approved from the 
War Department, even to the extent of very minor changes, before 
they could be effected. This type of delay is illustrated in the delays 
incident to the installation of the underground field storage. 

19. General Grunert. Is all of this prior to December 7th that you 
are talking about? 

Colonel Marston. There was a delay prior to December 7th due to 
the lack of adequate qualified construction personnel. 

20. General Grunert. Tell as about the staff meetings that 
[31o2] were held by the Chief of Staff, and how often they 
were held, and what happened at these staff meetings. 

Colonel Marstox. Well, as a general thing there would be a staff 
meeting on an average of about once a week, in which the General 
and Special Staffs would be represented. At these meetings the 
Chief of Staff would bring out any new developments or policies. 
There would be a discussion by each staff representative concerning 
the problems which were under solution by his staff section and 
general discussion of the operation of the staff with a view to 
coordinating its activity. 

21. General Grunert. Did you have any such meeting between 
November 27th and December 7th, realizing that December 6th was 
on a Saturday? When did you usually have these staff meetings? 

Colonel Marston. They usually came on Saturday morning. 

22. General Grunert. Did you have any on or about November 
27th? 

Colonel Marston. I do not know of my own knowledge whether 
they did, or not. I understand that one was held, but I was per- 
sonally on an inspection trip on the Island of Hawaii at the time. 

23. General Grunert. Then if they held one on November 27th, 
you were not present? 

Colonel Marston. I was not present. 

24. General Grunert. Then you were not present when the ques- 
tion came up on which the Commanding General decided to alert 
the command on what is known as Alert No. 1 ? 

Colonel Marston. I was not present at that time and my knowl- 
edge of the details of how the decision was arrived at it hearsay and 
not personal knowledge. 

[S133] 25. General Grunert. Any questions? 

26. General Frank. You stated there were certain delays due to 
differences of opinion about these radar stations. As ;a matter of 
fact, was it npt rather a matter of unforeseen operating difficulties, 
which difficulties were matters of fact rather than differences of 
opinion? 

Colonel Marston. That might be a better description of it, beciause 
the actual experience with each location did not always bear out 
the previous conception, the theoretical conception of the operation 
of that station. As I have already stated, the high stations, with 
one exception, proved inoperable, due to echoes, and the interme- 
diate stations or the stations of intermediate elevation later were 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1631 

found to be more effective. That, I woiiid say, would be a question 
of fact. As the stations were established I know that tests were made 
in each position and as far as possible with mobile equipment. 

27. General Frank. What I am getting at is this: You should 
not condone a delay in vital construction due to a squabble because 
of difference of opinion, whereas if there were technical difficulties 
of operation which were unforeseen those were things that had to be 
tested and handled. 

ISJ34.] Colonel Marston. Well, the differences of opinion, I 
gained that impression from the reports which I received on this 
construction, and I did not personally talk to the various experts 
who were handling this construction ; but I do know that, first, there 
was an opinion that the high stations would be the best places to put 
them. There was also a question of the use of mobile stations. 

28. General Frank. That was theory ? 

"Colonel Marston. That was theory; and then the actual installa- 
tions developed the opinion on the part of the people engaged in its 
execution that the theory was not correct. It is true and probably 
better to state that the difficulty was a matter of factors developed by 
experience as against the theoretical opinion before the fact was 
determined. I think that would be a better way to state it. 

29. General Frank. Did you know Colonel Wyman? 
Colonel Marston. Yes ; I knew Colonel Wyman. 

30. General Frank. How closely did you work with him? 
Colonel Marston. I didn't have a great deal of close contact prior 

to the 7th of December. I had a great deal of contact after that time. 
I did have a fairly frequent contact prior to the 7th of December. 
I did not know Colonel Wyman prior to his arrival in the Hawaiian 
Department. 

31. General Frank. Did you have any difficulties with him? 
Colonel Marston. Not prior to the time of the attack. 

32. General Frank. Was construction progressing satisfactorily 
with no delays prior to the attack ? 

Colonel Marston. Well, that, of course, is a matter of opinion. I 
believe that the construction was progressing as [31351 fast 
as was physically possible under the conditions at the time. 

33. General Frank. What were the conditions ? 

Colonel Marston. Well, the conditions were that details of design, 
frequently, and of modification in the projects, had to be cleared to 
the minutest detail with the War Department, in accordance with the 
standard peacetime procedure. This did cause very serious delays 
in the progress of work on some of the projects. 

That is particularly illustrated on the underground gasoline stor- 
age project; and then there was difficulty in the obtaining of high 
enough priorities for the critical materials involved. We found that 
the Navy in many cases was able to get much higher priority than we 
could, for the equivalent material, and that relative priority meant 
that the construction work was delayed, due to the non-arrival of 
construction material with which to execute it. 

34. General Frank. Were you familiar with the cost-plus-fixed- 
fee contract? 

Colonel Marston. Yes, I know the general features of such con- 
tracts, and the fact that there was such a contract in existence. 



1632 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

35. General Fkaxk. Was it not possible through that contract for 
the district engineer to give decisions on the retails of construction? 

Colonel Marston. It may have been so for the district engineer, for 
the details of construction, but that it did not affect his relationship 
with the War Department, on which decisions had to be based. 

[3136] o(\ General Grunert. What were some of those deci- 
sions ? I do not understand ; if there was a cost-plus contract, then the 
details of that contract were made locall}^ ; what had to go to Washing- 
ton, that delayed these things? 

Colonel Makston. The plan for the work which was to be executed 
by that contract, which would have had to go to Washington, whether 
there was such a contract or not, or whether the work was being done by 
purchase-and-hire with district personnel. 

37. General Frank. Are you sure about this ? 

Colonel Marston. I can give you an illustration specifically in the 
case of the underground fuel storage. This will be brought out chron- 
ologically in later testimony from the district engineer's office. . 

-58. General Fraxk. How do you know? 

Colonel Marston. Well, I know that he was directed to prepare a 
chronological account of all the correspondence and of the activity on 
certain projects, and that he has prepared that account. 

39. General Frank. By whom was he directed to prepare that? 
Colonel Marston. By the Chief of Engineers. 

40. General Frank. And to present it to this Board? 

Colonel Marston. I presume, to have it available in case the Board 
should ask for it. 

41. General Frank. Go ahead. 

Colonel Marston. I don't remember whether the presentation to the 
Board was specifically covered or not in the "radio." 

Well, in the case of the underground fuel storage, the general project 
was approved by the Secretary of War, 3 January [3137'] 1941, 
and preliminary surveys were authorized. Then, on 3 April, the cor- 
respondence acknowledges the visit of a representative of the Office of 
Chief of 'Air Corps to select the site. Then, also, at about the same 
time, on 5 April, the district engineer is advised that negotiations had 
been opened for the priorities for the steel, before the Army-Navy 
Priority Committee, but that the priority for the steel could not be 
obtained, until the contract for the tanks is made. 

The storage was increased. On the 19th of May, directions were 
received to increase the storage from 100,000 barrels to 250.000 barrels. 
We got the priority rating on the 13th of June. The allotment of 
funds was made on 17 June, but stated that they had to be utilized 
before 1 July. 

42. General Frank. That means "obligated," does it not? 
Colonel Marston. Yes. Well, it is stated "utilized," but that meant 

"obligated" ■ that is, the contract let. 

43. General Frank. Was there any difficulty in that? 

Colonel Marston. Well, the contract was let to cover this, but there 
could be no details of course included in the contract, because the design 
had not yet been approved by the War Department. That would be, 
by the Chief of Engineers, acting for the Secretary of War. 

Well, there Avere several other things happened in between, but on 
23 Julv there was a "radio" from the division engineer to the Chief 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1633 

of Engineers, requesting an authorization to proceed with the excava- 
tion, that the sites and general layout are satisfactory. On 26 July the 
reply was received from the division engineer in San Francisco to the 
district engineer, stating that the Chief of Engineers advises the ex- 
cavation [3138] should not be started until the proposed in- 
stallation has been approved. 

44. General Frank. By whom ? 

Colonel Marston. By the Chief of Engineers, I presume; by the 
War Department at least ; and on 7 August, another "radio" was re- 
ceived from the division engineer advising that we were not to start 
work, since plans are being materially changed. 

45. General Frank. By whom ? 

Colonel Marston. By the War Department. 

46. General Frank. By whom, in the War Department ? 
Colonel Marston. Well, that would be the Chief of Engineers, 

working in conjunction with the Chief of Air Forces, as to the avia- 
tion-gasoline features of the plan. 

Then there was a letter from the Adjutant General to the Chief 
of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, of the Navy, on 12 August, request- 
ing that the plans be reviewed and concurrence or further recom- 
mendations be given by the Bureau of Yards and Docks of the Navy. 

47. General Frank. What has the Navy to do with Army construc- 
tion? 

Colonel Marston. It was a joint Army-Navy war-reserve fuel sys- 
tem. 

Concurrence was received on 18 August through the Adjutant Gen- 
eral of the Army, and then the Chief of Engineers was directed on 3 
September, requested that plans be revised to conform to established 
policy worked out by the Chief of Engineers for other locations with 
reference to the protection, concealment, and dispersion. 

[3139'] 48. General Frank. How long have you been conversant 
with these details that you are reading off, there ? 

Colonel Marston. I have been conversant with the development of 
the system since the time that I went into the G-4 office. The rest 
of it I get from the file. 

49. General Frank. When did you get this from the files ? 
Colonel Marston. I got it within the — reviewed the files, or went 

over the files and this summary of them, at the office of the engineer, 
here, about a week ago. 

50. General Frank. And have you had any help in that, during the 
last two or three days ? 

Colonel Marston. Well, this is the same review which I stated that 
the engineer was preparing under the direction of the Chief of En- 
gineers. 

51. General Frank. Have you had any help in this within the 
last two or three days ? 

Colonel Marston, In the last two or three days? 

52. General Frank. Yes. 

Colonel Marston. No. Let's see, it was Sunday morning that I 
went over this with the engineer office. 

53. General Frank. Has General Bragdon consulted you ? 
Colonel Marston. I have not seen General Bragdon ; no. 

54. Genera] Frank. Have j'ou seen Major Lozier? 



1634 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Marston. No, I have not seen him, either. 

55. General Frank. Have you seen Major Powell? 

Colonel Marston. I don't believe that I have seen any of these 
gentlemen; I certainly have not seen them to confer with them. 

56. General Frank. Who gave you this information in the office 
[3140] of the engineer ? 

Colonel Marston. Mr, Perliter. 

67. General Frank. In summing up, what would you say ivas the 
reason for the delays that occurred, generally ? 

Colonel Marston. Well, I would say that the reason for the delay 
which occurred, generally, on these storage tanks, was the necessity 
of clearing everything with the War Department, before the tanks 
were installed, first ; second, the delay in getting the delivery of steel 
for the tanks, after the final design was approved. We did not have 
the detailed plans for these tanks until 22 December 1941 ; which was 
some time after the attack was started. We had no authority to start 
construction until 31 October 1911, when a "radio" was received from 
the division engineei- to the district engineer, informing him that the 
Chief of Engineers authorizes procedure with construction based on 
their report of Board of Petroleum Consultants, who had reported 
on 9 October 1941. 

Now, actually what happened then, it was in the following April, 
14 April 1942, 1 held a conference at Hickam Field with representa- 
tives of the Air Force, of the engineer, and of the Navy, at which time 
the view of the Chief of Air Forces that the S3^stem should be a hydrolic 
or aqua system was presented by representatives of the Air Force, and 
at that meeting I insisted, and finally was able to obtain an agreement, 
that the system should be installed as designed, regardless of the views 
of the Chief of Air Forces or of any other individual, because other- 
wise it would not have been completed up to the present time. The 
system was installed as originally designed, and has been in use for 
some time. 

[3141-314^1 58. General Frank. Obviously, the system must 
have been designed in the Corps of Engineers, rather than in the Air 
Force ? 

Colonel Marston. It was. 

59. General Frank. Because, had the Air Force designed it, they 
would have designed an aqua system. 

Colonel Marston. That is probably so. However, the Chief of 
Engineers did obtain the recommendation of a board of experts from 
the petroleum industry in the design of the system, and the final deci- 
sion to go ahead with the system as designed was based upon the fact 
that gasoline was actually delivered to the planes at the two main 
fields, Hickam Field and Wheeler Field, through an aqua system. 

60. General Frank. In what department in the War Department 
would you say was the responsibility for most of these delays? 

Colonel Marston. Well, I can't say that any one department of 
the War Department was responsible for them. I would say that it 
is the pef^cetime system of centralized control by the War Department 
of all details of construction in the field that was to blame for the 
delay. 

61. General Frank. Who handles construction in the field, in the 
War Departinent ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1635 

Colonel Marston. At the time, prior to the war, that this took place, 
the construction of fixed fortifications, construction at airfields, and 
the river and harbors construction work was handled by the Chief of 
Engineers. All other construction for the Army at that time was still 
handled by the construction branch of the Quartermaster General's 
office. That has since been consolidated, all have been consolidated, 
under the Chief of Engineers. 

[31JiS\ 62. General Bank. As a matter of fact, in the begin- 
ning of 1941 all air force construction went over to the Engineer Corps, 
didn't it? 

Colonel Marstox. It was about that time that it went over, yes, sir. 

63. General Frank. Yes. 

Colonel Marston. It formerly had been done by the construction 
branch of the Office of Quartermaster General. 

64. General Frank. You seem to think that the delays in the con- 
struction of the A. W. S. system were due in the main to delays caused 
in trying to overcome the difficulties of technical operation of the 
radar. 

Colonel Marston. That is a correct statement. And those difficul- 
ties have continued for a considerable time after the war broke out, 
as illustrated by the fact that we have had to abandon two of the 
most expensive stations for radar operation. 

65. General Frank. Namely ? 

Colonel Marston. Namely Mount Kaala on Oahu and Haleakala 
on Maui. 

66. General Frank. Did you ever go down to Colonel Wyman's 
office? 

Colonel Marston. Yes. 

67. General Frank. How often? 

Colonel Marston. Well, I would say an increasing number of times, 
about two or — well, starting in with once or twice a month to I should 
say an average of approaching once a week toward the — as the 

68. General Frank. Starting when ? 
Colonel Marston. Starting in November. 

[S144] 69. General Frank. Were you always able to find him? 
Colonel Marston. I was always able to find him. He wasn't there 
every time, but I was able to find him the majority of the time, 

70. General Frank. Could you always do business with him? 
Colonel Marston. Yes, I could always do business with him. 

71. General Frank. Did you ever find him incapacitated? 

Colonel MarstoIst. I have never found Colonel Wyman incapaci- 
tated, either before or after the war, but I know^ that there have been 
charges made that he was not always in shape to carry out his duties, 
but that was not my observation, my personal observation. 

72. General Frank. How would you size him up ? 

Colonel Marston. I would size him up as a veiy energetic and com- 
petent engineer whose methods of operation, however, were frequently 
lacking in tact. In other words, if he had a job to do he would go 
ahead and issue instructions to get that job done, without any regard 
to the feelings of the people with whom he dealt. 

73. General Frank. Did you have any occasion to come in con- 
tact with the organization of his office ? 



16,36 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Marstox. Yes, I had occasion to come in contact with the 
or^anizaiton of his office, but did not ^o into the detailed organization. 

74. General Frank. Did you ever know a Hans Wilhelm Rohl ? 
Colonel Marston, I have met him, and as far as I can recollect I 

have seen him either present when I was dealing with Colonel Wyman 
or when I was making inspections of [314^^ activities, a total 
of about maybe six or eight times. 

75. General Frank. I see. 

Colonel Marston. I have had no personal contact with him at all. 

76. General Frank. Did you ever talk to him? 

Colonel Marston. Not directly. He has been present at other — 
when I visited Colonel Wyman, but I haven't talked to him directly 
as an individual. 

77. General Frank. Do you know what his position was over h§re ? 
Colonel Marston. He was the head of the Hawaiian Constructors, 

which was a fixed-fee contractor for executing the engineer construc- 
tion work. 

78. General Frank. Did you ever see him in a condition in which 
you believed he was unfit to take care of himself ? 

Colonel Marston. No, I did not. As a matter of fact, I haven't 
seen anyone in the office of the Engineer or connected with his con- 
struction work who was under the influence of liquor and incapacitated 
for work. 

79. General Frank. Were your contacts with the District Engineer 
Office always entirely satisfactory ? 

Colonel Marston. They wei-e not always satisfactory after the — in 
the early days of the war, to the extent that there was considerable 
friction due to arbitrary acts on the part of the Engineer Office. There 
was also some friction betAveen that office and the Department Engineer 
due to personal differences of opinion. 

80. General Frank. Did you. hold up construction ? 

Colonel Marston. I don't know of its having held up any [314^] 
construction. I think it was merely a personal clash of opinion. 

81. General Frank. Did your difficulties with the District Engineer 
Office that you just mentioned ever hold up construction or impair the 
war effort? 

Colonel Marston. No., they did not. 

82. General Frank. Have you anything? 

83. Major Clausen. Yes. Do you want met to ask questions ? 

84. General Grunert. Go ahead. But if you have every witness 
covering the same thing we are using up twice as much time as you 
figured on, but if you want the stuff go after it. 

85. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. 

Sir, do I understand that the testimony that you gave when you read 
that paper was based upon information you received from the office 
of the District Engineer? 

Colonel Marston. TJiat is correct. We has the files, however, upon 
which this is a summar.y, were present at the time I picked this up. 

86. Major Clausen. Did you consult any other source, Colonel? 
Colonel Marston. I did not consult any other source other than my 

own memory, and I ver ified some of the entries in here from the records 
of my own office. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1637 

87. Major Clausen. Well, you knew, when you consulted the En- 
gineers, that they were the ones under charges, according to the rumors 
that you have testified to ; isn't that correct ? 

Colonel Marston. Well, if the question is a question of Colonel 
Wyman's connection with Mr. Rohl, and the effect of that on the war 
effort, that is correct. If it is a question of the actuab conditions here 
before the attack came, the [3^4-'^] Engineer records are the 
official records — those and the Adjutant General's files are the official 
records of the headquarters. 

88. Major Clausen. Well, sir, you know that the I. G. here main- 
tained a section for the purpose of reviewing the activities of the 
Engineering Department. 

Colonel INIarston. I should have stated that I have talked to the 
Inspector General here, who made a detailed investigation of the 
activities of the Engineer, and that I was informed by the Inspector 
General that there was no evidence of fraud developed as a result of 
his investigation. 

89. Major Clausen. Well, were you informed by the Inspector Gen- 
eral as to the reasons for the relief of Colonel Wyman from his 
assignment here as District Engineer ? 

Colonel Marston. No, I wasn't informed of the reasons for his relief. 
It was my impression from discussion in General Emmons' office that 
he was relieved because of friction in the conduct of his operations, 
arbitrary acts, and which had caused friction in the community, and 
that General Emmons still felt that he had clone an excellent job in 
getting the work done. That was evidenced by General Emmons' 
signing a letter of commendation for him w-hen he was relieved, at 
the time that he was relieved. 

90. Major Clausen. Did you ever see the I. G. report which im- 
mediately preceded that relief, Colonel ? 

Colonel Marston. No, I have not. 

91. Major Clausen. Did you ever ask to see it? 

Colonel Marston. No, I haven't asked to see it. I perhaps should 
have, but I have not. 

[314^] 92. Major Clausen. Did you ever know of it, sir? 

Colonel Marston. I knew there was an investigation report, but I 
understood that no fraud was shown in this report. 

93. Major Clausen. Now, you stated something regarding delays 
and your assigned reasons for the delays. Can you tell the Board 
whether you are familiar with the completion dates that were required 
under the job orders and the contract? 

Colonel Marston. I am not familiar with those now, no. 

94. Major Clausen. Can you tell the Board whether you are fa- 
miliar with any derogatory comments, rumors, at all, concerning the 
Hawaiian Constructors? 

Colonel Marston. I am not familiar from my own laiowledge with 
those. 

95. General Frank. Weren't you in charge of general supervision 
of those for the Department Commander ? 

Colonel Marston. Well, in what way? With the general super- 
vision of the — the checking on the contracts is clone by — the sufficiency 
of the contract, by the finance officer. The checking on the — on our — 



1638 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

any reports of illegal transaction is investigated by the Inspector 
General. 

96. General Frank. Well, just what do you do as a supervisor ? 

Colonel Marston. What I do as supervisor is to coordinate the con- 
struction with the — requirements of the construction with the other 
activities of the^ headquarters as to the necessity for the construction, 
its coordination between the construction of one branch with another 
and with the general check on the sufficiency of the construction, but 
not a check as to its technical — technical features of its execution. 

97. General Frank. You didn't care when it got done ? 
IS14^] Colonel Marston. I certainly did. 

98. General Frank. Well, then why didn't you check on the 
limitation dates and the job orders? 

Colonel Marston. Well, there was a check made in the office, but 
I did not personally make that, and I don't know — I don't remember 
what the completion dates were. I do know, however, that, for 
instance, 

99. General Frank. Then you really don't know whether there 
was any delay in the contracts or not? 

Colonel Marston. I would have to get the record to determine 
that. I do know that the contract on this underground gasoline 
storage could not have been completed prior to the time that the 
authority for going ahead was given. 

100. General Frank. That is because you have looked that up 
recently ? 

Colonel Marston. Well, but I knew that that delay was taking 
place at the time and that we could not go ahead until the approval 
was received from the Chief of Engineers. 

101. General Frank. But you didn't know anything about how 
the other job orders were coming? 

Colonel Marston. We got a — we did get a — we got a report: a 
periodic report of all of the construction jobs was received at our 
office, and we had on that report a list of every job, the estimated 
date of completion, and the progress, and the expected date of 
completion. That report was put in and was initiated just after 
I took over the office in the fall of 1941, but I don't remember the 
dates of that — which were shown on that report. I think that copies 
of the report can be obtained, although I am not sure whether I still 
have in the [3150] files of the G-^ office those particular re- 
ports. I know that copies of them can be obtained. They probably 
are in the Engineer files at the present time. 

102. General Frank. Well, the point about it is, if the reports 
were made and stuck away in a file, and delinquencies not followed 
up so as to hasten the work, the reports were useless. 

Colonel Marston. Well, but I think that — I don't think that I 
have given the right impression there. Those reports were presented 
to General Short when they came in, and the progress on each — on 
these jobs was discussed. In the case, for instance, of the Quarter- 
master construction there were bar charts showing the progress of 
construction as against the actual — ^the expected date of completion; 
and I believe that I can get the — those were checked at the time, T3ut 
the completion date of the contract — I don't remember what those 
dates were. And I do know that when a sufficient reason showed 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1639 

for delay in attaining the completion date of a contract, such as a 
failure to receive up to that time the authority to go ahead with the 
job, that other pressure was not brought on the Engineer to go ahead 
with the job prior to the time that he received the authority to do so. 

103. General Frank. That is all. 

104. General Grunert. Now, as to deficiency of means, as to delays, 
and as to the status on December 7, what did they have to do with the 
taking of appropriate defense measures with the means available? 
Anything ? 

Colonel Marston. I don't think that they had anything to do with 
that. 

[3151] 105. General Grunert. Any questions ? General Russell ? 

Colonel Marston. There is one thing that I might offer, and that 
is that a thirty-minute warning, which is all that can be expected 
from a pick-up from the radar plot, is not suflScient to deploy the 
garrison unless it is in at least the Class 2 Alert, as was given at 
that time. 

106. General Grunert. Have you anything that you want to offer 
to the Board on any subject that has not been brought up nor ques- 
tions asked on it, anything that you have that you think will assist 
the Board in coming to conclusions on this matter? 

Colonel Marston. Well, I can offer that General Short did take 
a very definite interest in the modernization of the defenses and 
that he held very frequent conferences with the Engineer, with the 
Signal Officer, with all concerned in the modernization of the de- 
fenses and that he held very frequent conferences with the Engineer, 
with the Signal Officer, with all concerned in the modernization of 
the defenses ; that he on his own responsibility pushed the construction 
of the various airfields. I believe that he did all that was physically 
possible to do in pushing the preparations prior to the time of the 
attack. 

107. General Grunert. You mean his organization locally? Do 
you know whether or not he represented conditions to Washington 
frequently or at times to show what delays were taking place? 

.Colonel Marston. I believe that he did. I can't cite the specific 
instances right now. I do know that the deficiencies in antiaircraft 
armament were represented, and in seacoast armament, and that steps 
were being taken to remedy those at the time that the attack came. 

108. General Grunert. Anything else anyone wants to bring up? 

109. Major Clausen. Were these deficiencies in this armament 
[3152] on the seacoast part of the construction program? 

Colonel Marston. They were part of the long-term construction 
program, yes. 

110. Major Clausen. Being? 

Colonel Marston. For instance, there were not enough 155 milli- 
meter guns available. Those were being furnished with the troops 
coming over in the fall of 1941. 

111. General Grunert. You have nothing else you want to bring 
up? 

Colonel Marston. No. I would like to state further on the ques- 
tion of the checkup on these construction jobs, when I first got the 
question I didn't connect it with the periodic construction reports 
which we got in and which did show the actual progress on each 



1640 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

job. Those reports were gone over with the Engineer and with the 
Department Commander at the time they came in. It is now my 
recollection and I believe, but I cannot be absolutely sure, that the 
completion contract date did show on those reports and that any 
delay in the meeting of that date was discussed at the time. But if 
there was a question of priority or of — in materials, delivery of ma- 
terials, or the detailed approval of construction plans, while all steps 
were taken to expedite the overcoming of those difficulties, after 
those steps were taken they were accepted as being a justification 
for the contract not being completed. 

112. General Grunert. There appears to be nothing else. Thank 
you very much for coming. 

(The Avitness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

[3153^ TESTIMONY OF GOVERNOR JOSEPH B. POINDEXTER, 
4585 KAHALA AVENUE, HONOLULU, T. H. 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Governor, will you please give the Board your 
name and address? 

Mr. PoiXDEXTER. Joseph B. Poindexter. My home address is 4585 
Kahala Avenue, Honolulu. 

2. General Grunert. Governor, this Board was appointed to ascer- 
tain and report the facts relating to the attack made by the Japanese 
armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on the 7th of December 
'41. We are after facts or leads to where we can find facts. General 
Short has furnished the Board a list of representative citizens living 
in Hawaii who he says may have information of value to the Board. 
Your name being on that list, we have asked you here with the hope 
that you may have some facts to present to us. General Short did 
not refer to any particular subject on which you might testify, so we 
leave it up to you to open the subject, and then may ask some questions 
regarding it. 

Now, do you recall anything that you think may be of assistance to 
the Board or why General Short referred to you particularly as a 
witness who might be able to furnish the Board with some facts ? 

Mr. Poindexter. Well, my information in regard to the military 
situation here in Hawaii at that time, of course, came largely from 
others. Of course, I talked with General Short and had many con- 
ferences with General Short. 

3. General Grunert. You at that time were Governor ocf the 
Territory ? 

[3154] Mr. PoiNDEXT'ER. I was Governor of the Territory at that 
time. I became Governor of the Territory on the first day of March, 
1934, and I went out of office the latter part of August in '42; and 
during that time, of course, the Territory had considerable business 
with the War Department. That was always, of course, through the 
Commanding General. And during General Short's term of service 
here I talked with him many times about the situation ; and incident- 
ally, of course, we talked about the war situation. So that so far as 
the military end of it is concerned my knowledge would be largely, 
what we would say in court, hearsay, because it came from other people. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1G41 

I had no direct knowledge, for instance, of what General Short's 
orders were or what the Army was supposed to do or what the Navy 
was supposed to do. 

4. General Grunert. The Board can hardly expect you to testify on 
those military matters, but if you will give us what your impressions 
were and what you know of your own accord and from your position 
as the Governor here, I think that will be about what we can expect. 
Suppose I ask a few questions that will open up the subject. 

Mr. PoiNDEXTER. Yes, I would much prefer to have you ask 
questions. 

5. General Grunert. Now, how did General Short cooperate with 
the Territory authorities in building up his defense or preparing the 
civil population for any eventuality? 

Mr. PoiNDEXTER. Well, his cooperation was complete, and it was, 
I might say, constant. He was greatly concerned about the situation 
here with reference to the civilian population and the community. 
We built up an organization which finally ended in what we called 
the O. C. D. General Short was very largely responsible for that or- 
ganization and was very largely responsible for the results that we 
accomplished through that [SlSo] organization at the time of 
the attack, and I am confident that, if it were not for the interest that 
he showed in developing this organization, that our situation so far 
as the civil end of it was concerned would have been very much worse 
than it was. 

The result was that when the attack came, while there was some 
confusion early in the day in this organization, they did a magnificent 
job so far as the civilian casualities were concerned and so far as the 
caring for the situation as it presented itself ; and I have no hesitancy 
in saying, whatever, that I attribute that result very largely to General 
Short and the officers under him who cooperated with the civilian 
population in our efforts to perfect this organization. 

[3166] 6. General Grunert. Then 1 gather from your testimony 
that you had complete confidence in General Short's ability and his 
desire to improve the entire situation to meet most any eventuality ? 

Mr. PoiNDEXTER. Absolutely, and I doubt if you would find an in- 
dividual in this community who knew the situation who would say 
otherwise, because he was constantly at it, he and his officers were 
constantly developing this thing, telling us how it ought to be or- 
ganized and what should be done. Of course, we got many directives 
from Washington and other places on the organization, but I think 
it was largely through his efforts that he made the people conscious 
of the situation which we were in and the response of the public was 
splendid, everybody got in. It was all a voluntary organization at 
that time. Of course, nobody was being paid. We did not have much 
money to pay wit»h. They built up a fine organization, which -was 
operated, I think, very efficiently under the circumstances. I repeat, 
I think it was largely due to General Short's interest and efforts that 
we accomplished what we did. 

7. General Grunert. Having that confidence in General Short and 
then the attack taking place, do you or your people feel that the' 
military let you down because of what I may call lack of means to 
meet such an attack ? 

79716 — 40 — Ex. 145, vol. ?,— — ?, 



1642 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. PoiNDEXTEii. I cannot speak for the people oenerally, but I can 
&peak for myself, and I would say very definitely that that thought 
at that time never entered my mind. 1 felt then and I feel now that 
General Short and his officers with whom I came in contact did every- 
thing that could possibly have been done to prepare us for what 
happened. We had complete confidence [31S7] in him and 
still have. I think that he did a fine job here. 

8. General Grfxeet. Do you know of anv handicaps that he had 
in doing that job, as far as anybody in the Territory was concerned, 
or any group or any interests in the Territory, that handicapped him 
in any wa};- in preparing for the defense or in meeting the attack? 

Mr. PoiNDEXTER, Of course prior to the attack, we, like every other 
community, had people with differences of opinion. We had a very 
large Japanese population, as you know. There were many people 
who felt we were going too far in these preparations, that it was 
unnecessary. 

9. General Grunert. Why was that? Because it affected the pock- 
etbook or the morale or disturbed their comforts, or what? 

Mr. Poindexter. That is difficult to say just what caused it. My 
own impression is that sentiment of that kind arose from several 
reasons. One, of course, was the apparent desire of Washington to 
do nothing that would disturb relations with the Japanese Govern- 
ment. Then, of course, there was another thought that it was un- 
necessary, that we were too far from Japan, and there was no danger 
of any attack on Hawaii. 

10. General Grunert. Was that generally the state of mind of the 
civilian population or the military population, as far as you know? 

Mr. PoiNDEXTER. I clou't think so. 

11. General Grunert. What brought it to you mind now to men- 
tion that, if that was not the state of mind ? 

Mr. PoiNDEXTER. Well, I was just saying there was an element of 
the population that had that view. 

12. Genera] Grunert. An element? 

[SISS] Mr. PoiNDEXTER. That is right. Now, I want to say 
there was some justice for that point of view. I did not carry it. But 
I think some of these people here were influenced by the attitude of 
the mainland with regard to the possibility of war with Japan. 

I visited Washington every year. I was in Washington — I believe 
it was during my visit in 1941, at least the incident I am about to 
relate was during the time the President was meeting Prime Minister 
Churchill on the Atlantic. Was that in 1941? Can you gentlemen 
tell me when the Atlantic Charter, so-called, was promulgated? 

13. Major Clausen. 1940, sir. 
Mr. PoiNDEXTER. Was that 1940 ? 

14. Colonel West. I thought it was about May of* 1941. 

Mr. PoiNDEXTER. It was in July and August that I was in Wash- 
ington, and it was at that time. 

15. General Russell. It was 1941, August. 

Mr. PoiNDEXTER. Ill 1941, was it ? Well, that was my recollection. 
Prior to that time we had all the fleet in the waters out here, and 
they began to move them out. Of course, there was no publicity given 
to it, but I knew it and a great many people here knew that the ships 
were being taken away from us. Personally, I was considerably 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1643 

alarmed about it, because I felt we were being left without any defense 
if the Japs should come in. 

When I went to Washington I took that up with the Secretary of 
the Interior,' who was the liaison agent for the Territory with other 
Departments of the government, and complained to him about their 
taking these ships away from us and leaving us [3169] pos- 
sibly defenseless in the event of an attack. "Oh," he said, "you people 
need not be alarmed whatever. There is going to be no attack on 
Hawaii. It is too far away. The battle is on the Atlantic." 

Now, I do not quote him exactly, but when he said "The battle is on 
the Atlantic" those are his exact words. 

I intended to take it up with the President, but I never got the 
opportunity, because in the meantime he may have gotten back before 
I left but, anyhow^, I was unable to see him, but I took it that that was 
the attitude of Washington and I dropped the matter. I think that 
same feeling was here to some extent. His idea was that our concern 
out here was with sabotage, that we should guard against the possi- 
bility of sabotage. 

16. General Grunert. Was that the Secretary of the Interior 
speaking ? 

Mr. PoiNDEXTER. Yes, sir, Mr. Ickes. As I say, I did not go to the 
War Department, because in the first place, he is our liaison agency 
and, in the second place, I felt that if a member of the cabinet ^elt 
that way probably all the members of the cabinet felt that way and it 
was useless for me to speak of it, and I dropped that subject, but I 
felt then and I do feel to tliis day very keenly that that attitude was 
very largely responsible for conditions out here. 

17. General Grunert. Did you happen to discuss the matter with 
General Short and Admiral Kimmel after you got back and expressed 
the sentiments you found in Washington ? 

Mr. PoiNDEXTER. Oil, yes. I discussed it more with General Short. 
I do not recall ever discussing it with Admiral Kimmel. I was very 
well acquainted with Admiral Kimmel and frequently saw [3100] 
him, but our business in the Territorj^ was more with Short. I would 
say that Admiral Kimmel was very much interested also in develop- 
ing our organizations, the O. C. D., and I recall one time he appeared 
before the Chamber of Commerce meeting and was rather critical of 
the situation, he felt that we had not been doing enough, and some of 
the people were critical of the Admiral, thinking that he was getting 
out of his — we say kuliana here. Kuliana is a small holding of land. 
It is the native way of saying where you live. You sometimes talk 
about "That is my kuliana". That means that is my jurisdiction, that 
is my province. 

18. General Grunert. Do you know if anybody else in Washington 
outside of Secretar}^ Ickes had that belief that sabotage was about the 
only thing to be feared here in the islands ? ' 

Mr. PoiNDEXTER. Well, I was thinking about that. General, and I 
was trying to recall. I cannot conscientiously say that any particu- 
lar individual did. I talked with a number of people there about it. 
It seemed to be a rather general impression that Hawaii was safe, too 
far aw^ay. 

Then, of course, there was this attitude that I spoke about a while 
ago, of soft-pedalling anything that might give offense to the Japa- 



1(544 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

nese Government. These negotiations were going on some time dur- 
ing 1941. It may have been after that particular time. I do not 
recall just when the Japanese envoy went to Washington. 

19. General Grunert, If you came back and talked to General 
Short about what you found the attitude in Washington to be, is it 
natural to conclude that that may have influenced him somewhat in 
his attitude also? 

[3161] Mr, PoixDEXTER. Undoubtedly. General Short told me 
that his orders stressed sabotage, that is, warning against sabotage. 
We had 140,000 Japanese here, a great many of them citizens, but 
nobody knew what their real attitude was toward the government or 
their loyalty in the event we should come to blows. 

20. G^eneral Grunert. _ What did you think it was going to be? 
Mr. PoiXDEXTER. I beg your pardon? 

21. General Grunert. AVhat did you think it was going to be, 
when and if? 

Mr. PoiNDEXTER. I did not know. I will be frank with you, I 
did not know. I knew there were some bad ones among them and 
I knew, on the other hand, there were some of them loyal. I knew 
that a great many of them were loyal. I know that the F. B. I. 
and the Army Intelligence and Navy Intelligence, as well as the 
Territorial Intelligence, had Japanese young people who reported 
instances where they heard this man making remarks and that man 
making remarks. As a result of this intelligence work we had a 
list, the F. B. I. and the Army had a list and the Territory had a 
list — we knew some of them — whom we considered bad actors or 
would be bad actors. Wlien the thing broke, those were all gathered 
right in. 

Now, I am of the belief that the precautions taken against sabotage 
and the picking up of these men put the fear of God into the hearts 
of those who might have attempted it or otherwise would have at- 
tempted it. General Short was very much concerned with this sabo- 
tage business. 

22. General Grunert. What was the number that were picked up, 
do you recall ? 

Mr. PoiNDEXTER. No, I could not tell you that. 

[316B] 23. General Grunert. 300, a thousand ? 

Mr. PoiNDEXTER. I think it exceeded 300; perhaps not on that day 
or the second day, but there was a large number taken up. I do not 
know. 

24. General Grunert. 300 out of how many thousand ? 

Mr. PoiNDEXTER. As I Say, there were about 140,000, but that in- 
cluded Germans and Italians as well, although there were not as 
many of them, but there were some Germans picked up and some 
Italians. 

25. General Grunert. Then you think that that act of itself de- 
terred others from committing acts of sabotage? 

Mr. PoiNDEXTER. Undoubtedly. General Short was so much con- 
cerned about this sabotage business that some time prior to Decem- 
ber 1941, he came into the office and we discussed the matter of pro- 
tection to the personnel who were on guard duty on these facilities, 
on the bridges and on the electric light and water works. You see, 
we were not at war then, and these men were off the reservation. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1645 

and the question arose as to whether, if anytliing should happen, 
somebody would fail to heed the challenge and somebody might get 
bayonetted or shot, if the individual would not be personally liable, 
and he was very much concerned about it and he was very much 
concerned with the guarding particularly of the bridges and the pub- 
lic utilities. 

So under the Organic Act I made a request on him that he take 
over, not particularly the guarding, but that he use liis forces to pro- 
tect the Territory against possible invasion and against sabotage. 

26. General Grunert. That made it legal, did it ? 

Mr. PoiNDEXTER. We concluded that would protect the private 
1316S\ who- was out there on duty at this particular bridge or 
wherever he might be. Now, that was some months before i^earl 
Harbor. It just illustrates, I thought, and I believe, his great interest 
in an effort to protect this community in the event that anything 
happened. 

27. General Grunert. Do you think that on account of that he 
went all out for sabotage and did not go all out in defense against an 
air attack? 

Mr, PoiNDEXTER. You See, General, I do not know what preparations 
the General made in regard to an attack. That was a military matter 
that did not come to my attention. 

28. General Grunert. While you were talking to Secretary Ickes 
did he talk about any soft-pedalling as to the Japanese? 

Mr. PoiNDEXTER. No, I do not recall that he did. 

29. General Grunert. Or where did you get that impression ? 
Mr. PoiNDEXTER. I do not recall that he did. 

30. General Grunert. Where did you get that impression ? 

Mr. PoiNDEXTER. But I am quite sure that General Short told me 
that he was cautioned in that regard. 

31. General Grunert. Did you get anything from the press or 
radio in that line ? 

Mr. PoiNDExi'ER. It was a matter of comment, I think, in the news- 
papers that we should be very careful about the attitude and the gov- 
ernment should be careful of its attitude while these negotiations were 
going on, not to bi-ing on an attack or to give Japan an excuse for 
some attack. 

32. General Grunert. Any questions ? 

33. Major Clausen. I have just one, sir. 

Sir, were you the Territorial Governor on December 7th, \^SlGIf.\ 
1941? 
Mr. PoiNDEXTER. Ycs, sir. 

34. Major Clausen. And were you the Territorial Governor when 
you gave this information that you received in Washington to General 
Short? 

Mr. PoiNDEXTER. Oh, yes. I was Governor during all the time Gen- 
eral Short was here. 

35. Major Clausen. Who is the Territorial Governor now ? 

Mr. PoiNDEXTER. Staiuback, Ingram W. Stainback. He took office 
in August of 1942. 

36. General Grunert. Is there anything, Governor, that you think 
of that we have not brought up that you might tell the Board, that 
might be of material value to the Board in coming to a conclusion 
as to its mission, anything you want to add ? 



1646 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. PoiNDEXTER. Yes, I would like to say this, General: General 
Short talked to me about the attitude of the War Department in supply- 
ing his needs, in honoring his requisitions. I gathered from him that 
he would ask for planes and personnel and guns and things and he was 
turned down, until finally they told him to make no more requests, 
because they could not be honored. I don't know whether it was be- 
cause of lack of means or what not, but he definitely told me that, and 
I must say he was very much disappointed that he could not get the 
means out here that he thought he ought to have and that were needed 
in the defense of these islands. 

37. General Grunekt. Do you know whether he made full use of 
what means he had on December 7th ? 

Mr. PoiNDEXTER. From what knowledge I have of military matters, 
I would say he did. I think that General Short was a [3165] 
very efficient officer. I had contact with all of them during the period 
that I was governor and of course my contact with him was rather fre- 
quent, and while comparisons are odious I would say that I think he 
was as efficient and able an officer as any we had here during that time. 
And I think the public generally felt that way. I know the public had 
great confidence in General Short. He was actually very popular with 
the civilian population. 

38. General Grunert. We thank you very much for coming up and 
helping us out. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

[3166] TESTIMONY OF RAYMOND S. COLL, EDITOE, THE HONO- 
LULU ADVERTISER 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West- Mr. Coll, will you state to the Board your name 
and address, please. 

Mr. Coll. Raymond S. Coll. My home address is at the Halekulani 
Hotel; business address, The Advertiser. 

2. Colonel West. You are the editor of the Honolulu Advertiser? 
Mr. Coll. I am. 

3. General Grunert. Mr. Coll, this Board is after facts about what 
happened prior to and during the Pearl Harbor attack. We asked you 
to come here because there is one point particularly that I would like 
to clear up your testimony. I believe you were quoted by a Wash- 
ington newspaper, shortly after the submission of the Roberts Com- 
mission's report, January 24, 1942, in substance, that "General Short 
and Admiral Kimmel had made clear by their utterances before De- 
cember 7 the probability and imminence of a Japanese attack at an 
early date." Do you recall anything about that ? 

Mr. Coll. I don't recall any statement of that sort. After the Rob- 
erts report was printed, we expressed ourselves editorially on the mat- 
ter, but that language is not used in that editorial. I don't recall 
talking to anyone, there was no agent of the government that I recall, 
whatever, who ever asked me for a statement about it; and not in those 
terms. 

4. General Grunert. Have you any knowledge whether or not 
General Short and Admiral Kimmel did make such remarks as to 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1647 

[-3167] lead anyone to believe that they thought an attack was 
imminent ? 

Mr. Coll. Not directly from either one of them, although I knew 
General Short, and met him at different times, and on two occasions 
had conversations with him, prior to December 7, 1941 ; and I think 
that was in the spring of that year, when he was distressed because 
he was not able to get and make as much progress as he would like to 
have done for airfields and planes and defenses of Oahu ; and of course 
in that same conversation as we all knew at that time and were per- 
fectly aware, at least we were, in our own opinion, that war was to 
come, and come shortly, with Japan, and as time progressed up to and 
immediately preceding that, as early as the spring, when the M-Day 
Act was in process of passage in the session of the legislature at that 
time, why, of course, we were all reconciled that war was coming, 
and it just progressed in its intensity, as you might see from the first 
editions of our newspaper, starting on the 28th, and those are the 
only ones that I have, there, from the 28th to the 5th, in which our 
sense of approaching events was very clearly indicated in our head- 
lines, and we seemed to be certain of what was about to take place. 

5. General Grunert. Do you recall a speech or talk made by General 
Short, I believe it was at a Chamber of Commerce meeting, in which 

. he in attempting to assist in preparing the public for a possible future 
attack made remarks that might have been interpreted to mean that 
he thought war was in the offing? 

Mr. Coll. I don't recall any such a speech of General Short, al- 
though that's entirely probable that he did. The one that caused 
the greatest comment was one that Admiral Kimmel made at the 
Royal Hawaiian Hotel, in which he took the community [3168] 
to task very severely for their lack of preparation, and stressed the 
importance of it and the possibility of attack in the immediate future, 
or words to that effect. 

Now, General Short might have and undoubtedly did speak, al- 
though I couldn't state at this time and swear that I recall that spe- 
cific speech by him, although it was customary to have both the 
commandant of the Navy and the Commanding General of the Ha- 
waiian Department make such addresses on it ; and I am certain that 
he would have stated that. 

6. General Grunert. How did you citizens feel about the matter? 
Did you think your public needed a little waking up, or not? 

. Mr. Coll. At that time, we did. After December 8, we thought 
that the community was better prepared right at the moment than 
what the services might have been. 

7. General Grunert. You at that time were editor of the Honolulu 
Advertiser, were you? 

Mr. Coll. I was. 

8. General Gruxert. Do you recall these headlines as having ap- 
peared in your paper on the dates mentioned, or on approximately 
the dates mentioned : 

(Items appearing in the Honolulu Advertiser:) 
Headline of Sunday, 30 November, 1941 : 

Japanese May Strike Over Weekend. 

Kurusu Bluntly Warned Nation Ready For Battle. 



1648 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Headline of Monday, 1 December 1941 : 

Hull, Kuriisu In Crucial Meeting Today. 

Headline of Tuesday, 2 December 1941 : 

Japan Called Still Hopeful of Making Peace With U. S. 

[3169] Headline, again, of Tuesday, 2 December 1941 : 

Japan Gives Two Weeks More to Negotiations. 

Headline of Wednesday, 3 December 1941 : 

Huge Pincer Attack on U. S. by Japan, France Predicted. 

Headline of Friday, 5 December 1941 : 

Pacific Zero Hour Near ; Japan Answers U. S. Today. 

Headline of Saturday, 6 December 1941 : 

America Expected to Reject Japan's Reply on Indo-('liina. 

Headline, also of Saturday, 6 December 1941 : 

Japanese Navy Moving South. 

Headline, again, of Saturday, 6 December 1941 : 

Detailed Plans Completed For M-Day Setup. 

Headline of Sunday, 7 December, 1941 ; 

F. D. R. Will Send Message to Emperor on War Crisis. 

Do you recall those headlines? 

Mr. Coll. Yes; I recall them all, generally, of course. 

9. General Grunert. I would like to ask you about this one of No- 
vember 30 : 

Japanese May Strike Over Weekend. 

In view of what happened, that was a pretty clear or a pretty ac- 
curate prediction ? 

Mr. Coll. That was based purely on following the war news, as you 
do in a newspaper office, when we are following the trend. The head- 
lines there that you have just read of course were based on the United 
Press and other services that we had that came each night from the 
mainland, some from Washington, and other places. That headline 
in a newspaper office was just following \3T70] a trend of 
thought, that so far as we were concerned there in our office, we felt 
certain that things were about to happen. I didn't have any specific 
information from anyone in Honolulu, except to follow the trend, 
which is frequently done in newspaper offices, a sort of sixth sense that 
something is about to happen ; and the percentage of it quite fre- 
quently is almost as accurate as calculations could be in something 
mathematical. 

10. General Grunert. When that headline appeared, or when you 
put it in there, did you have any idea that the Japanese might strike 
Hawaii early in the game ? 

Mr. Coll. Not specifically, at that time, although as early as July 
29 I think it was we printed with my permission a feature story in our 
magazine section, which is illustrated with planes attacking, and the 
first three or four paragraphs of it started with the introduction that 
Japan would attack overnight, and that everything would be perfectly 
peaceful and people in their homes, and all of thai, and then suddenly 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1649 

the crash would come and there would be death and desolation in their 
wake. That is in there. That was on July 29. Now, that was based 
on and written by a man who had been in China for seven years, and 
who was a memter of our staff, and who simply wrote what he had 
seen there, and which was likely, here. 

11. General Grunert. Did you have confidence in the military and 
naval commanders and their preparedness to meet any eventuality? 

Mr. Coll. I had great confidence in General Short. I couldn't 
say that I knew him intimately. I knew him as well as I had every 
commanding general of the Hawaiian Department since General Sum- 
merall's time, going back to 1922. My observation [3171] and 

the comment, both civilian and army acquaintances, were of the high- 
est character of his ability as a soldier and as a working General. 

12. General Grunert. Do you know that in preparation to meet 
any eventuality at that time, or about November 27, the Army was 
alerted against sabotage only? Was that common knowledge here, 
or not ? 

Mr. Coll. I knew it, that the order of the 27th, I believe, of Novem- 
ber. Naturally I heard that through my acquaintances. I do not 
know that I could recall the names. I knew that the order had come, 
and my understanding was it had been discussed at considerable length 
as to just what interpretation to place upon it, and then that the alert 
against sabotage of course was the decision that was made; and my 
understanding at that time was that that was to keep the community 
quiet, and evidently with the fear of Japanese uprising, which I per- 
sonally did not think much of; but unquestionably there was a very 
great effort both in the community itself and by the Army and the 
Navy at that time. 

13. General Grunert. You, having confidence in General Short, 
and then knowing what happened Devember 7, do you feel that the 
Army, as such, commanded by General Short, let you and the public 
down ? 

Mr. Coll. Well. I wouldn't go that far, because in a conversation 
I liad with General Short at the Willows, I think it was, when some 
sort of an entertainment was given by a distinguished party, or some- 
thing of that sort, at the Willows, which was a popular place for affairs 
of that sort, and he discussed with me there, or rather made the com- 
ment that he was [3172] distressed because be was not able 
to get what he wanted and make as much progress as he certainly 
wanted to do, in air, airfields, and aircraft, ancl defenses, both anti- 
aircraft and all of the strengthening equipment that he needed for the 
islands. I distinctly recall that conversation. 

14. General Grunert. Wlien was that conversation, do you recall? 
Mr. Coll. That I think was along in the spring of 1941, because 

I am certain it was the time the legislature was in session, which must 
have been along in February or March, I would say. 

15. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not he made full use 
of what he did have, when the time came? 

Mr. Coll. I couldn't say that. General. Only one instance, if you 
will permit me to go on, was the only incident that I know, was rather 
a confused state of affairs at Schofield at that time, where orders were 
not given immediately, and some immediate sections of the community 
were taken over by subordinate officers without any order, and the 



1650 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

order not being issued for some time afterwards, notwithstanding the 
fact that they took complete control and issued orders. 

16. General Grunert. Was this during the ''blitz"? 

Mr. Coll. That was the morning of the "blitz," and the day ; and 
they took over, I think; in one instance I heard of some four days 
that lasted before any order was issued. Wlien this officer who took 
that over went to Schofield, he was not able to get any order from the 
commandmg officer, and then, on his own initiative, he took over. 

17. General Grunert. What is the general impression here, 
[S173] whether the sabotage alert was General Short's decision 
under the information he had, or whether that order came from 
Washington ? 

Mr. Coll. Oh, I think the community as a whole believes in nothing 
else on it, that it was from Washington. 

18. General Grunert. That the order to go on a sabotage alert 
came from Washington? 

Mr. Coll. As they interpreted it. 

19. General Eussell. Exactly what do you mean by that state- 
ment, "as they interpreted it" ? ^ 

Mr. Coll. Well, my understanding, General, was that the staff, 
itself. General Short's staff, was not able to decide immediately what 
to do. In other words, that the directive or orders or whatever came 
through from Washington on that date were not very clear, and that 
there was no specific order. That really is the feeling, if I may go 
on, on that, that I had on that, that Washington, at that time — and I 
have no desire whatever to criticize the administration or the War 
or Navy Departments, but rather that nothing decisive was done. 
If they knew what was going to happen, it seemed to us that it ought 
to have been there, either to have sent an order or a directive of just 
exactly what to do. 

20. General Russell. Then the impression is not so much that there 
was a direct order for an antisabotage alert here, but that confusion 
arose because of the data which reached the department from Wash- 
ington; and to that extent, Washington was responsible for what did 
happen ? 

Mr. Coll. I think that's right. 

[ol74] 21. General Russell. That is a m(5re accurate descrip- 
tion of wdiat occurred ? 
Mr. Coll. Yes. 

22. General Russell. Now, in the summer of 1941, do you remember 
the transfer of a part of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Ocean? 

Mr. Coll. Yes. 

23. General Russell. Do you recall the unpact on the thinking of 
this community that that action on the part of the Navy had? 

Mr. Coll. Didn't like it. 

24. General Russell. Could you elaborate on that a bit, as to 
whether or not it indicated Washington's thinking as to possible and 
probable trouble ? 

Mr. Coll. Well, that has been a discussion from that time, and that 
was the first that it became acute in the community. Honolulu, and, 
of course, Hawaii, were closer to the war, in any area of the globe, I 
might say, so far as America was concerned. This was America's war, 
out here, and Honolulu was closest to it, and I think that we felt closer 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1651 

to it here, and knew more accurately the whole situation, and after 
December 7, and even before that time, I think, were conscious of 
what might happen to us, because of all these preparations that were 
being made. The medical outfits were all arranged and organized, 
and all of that, and of course that very clearly indicated that there 
were going to be casualties and wounded and killed, and all that, on it. 
That could not help but make an impression upon the community; 
and of course, when any strength was drawn from the Pacific, natu- 
rally, we thought out here we ought to protect America, rather than 
to go along and help out in the [r3175] European area. That 

went right along, of course, and the grand strategy of course on what 
happened afterwards, of course, was just as critically discussed out 
here as it was in other parts of the country, and by other officers, in 
high command, as to what they ought to have in the Pacific. Certainly 
we felt that we ought to have everything that was here at that time, 
and more. 

25. General Russell. Earlier in your evidence, you indicated that 
you had brought along with you certain papers, I assume, from the 
Advertiser's files. Is that true ? Is that the package ? 

Mr. Coll. Will you repeat that. 

26. General Russell. Does that package you have in front of you, 
there, contain papers from your files ? , • 

Mr. Coll. Yes ; it indicates. 

27. General Russell. We have everything up to and through the 
7th of December, 

Mr. Coll. Yes ; I am quite certain that you do not have this. At 
least, I understand that that file is not there, because it did not go 
back. This was an early edition that we printed early and circulated 
in the afternoon. It came out on it. It was what was called a "blue 
streak" edition. I doubt whether there are unj files of this, or this; 
I am not sure. That is on that feature story. But there is, up from 
the 28th to the 5th, is what we thought was about to happen. 

28. General Russell. I think we have had access to these in the 
Washington files. I was just wondering if you had with you any- 
thing after December 7; but this is through the 5th, I believe. 

[3176] Mr. Coll. No; the file of the 8th is not available, and 
I wouldn't permit it to be taken, unless, accompanying that issue, for 
the records back there, was the source of the information on which 
our headline was based ; and they didn't seem — the Army or the Navy, 
or whoever asked for it at that time, wasn't willing to guarantee that 
an official statement, or a statement from me, stating where the in- 
formation came from on which we based the headline, which was 
written early in the evening of Sunday the 7th, and then our press 
broke down, and had' broken down at 8 o'clock the night before, and 
that edition went over to the afternoon newspaper; we never were 
able to go to press with it until very late on Monday morning, and 
just almost for the records of our files on it; and it carried this sensa- 
tional headline. 

29. General Russell. What was that headline, do you recall? 
Mr. Coll. It said that saboteurs had landed, or rather, parachute — 

the enemy, describing their armed vans, and so forth and so on ; and 
that if that was going to be made a matter of record in Washington, 
I wanted a statement there by myself explaining how that came ; that 



1652 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

it was not an individual statement ; at any rate, the authority of it 
was just as authoritative as it could have been at that time. 

30. General Grunekt. Are you required as a newspaper publisher, 
or is your publisher required to send a copy of each one of your pub- 
lications to the Library of Congress ? 

Mr. Coll. No ; they subscribe for it. 

31. General Grunert. They subscribe? Then, except for that one 
that you referred to, these are in the Library of Congress? 

[31771 Mr. Coll. I don't know where those are, because those 
are a special edition, and we even did not keep any regular bound vol- 
ume of that. 

32. General Kussell. I have nothing else, sir. 

33. General Grunert. Are there an}^ questions by the advisors of 
the Board? 

34. Major Clausen. No, sir. 

35. General Frank. Colonel Toulmin ? 

36. Colonel Toulmin. No. 

37. General Grunert. Mr. Coll, is there anything else that you 
would like to tell the Board, that may assist it in coming to conclu- 
sions, or in getting the complete story ? 

Mr. Coll. Well. I don't know whether you have the editorial that 
Ave carried after the Eoberts report; you perhaps have, and that ex- 
pressed our opinion ; and that opinion still stands. 

38. General Grunert. I do not recall having seen that, now. If 
you have it there, will you read it into the record, or will you turn 
it over to the Recorder, and let him read it into the record? 

(Editorial, the Honolulu Advertiser, January 27, 1942:) 

Colonel West. This is from the editorial page of The Honolulu 

Advertiser of January 27, 1942. It is the leading editorial, reading 

as follows : 

The Roberts' Report 

Errors in judgment and laxify in finding a true miderstanding of the serious- 
ness of the danger that confronted the United States were not alone those of 
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Lieut.-Gen. Walter C. Short. 

They belonged to all America, and, thus, all America \_3118] must share 
in the national complacency that found us unprepared. 

This is not to excuse Admiral Kimmel and General Short. If, however, the 
Roberts' commission report can be taken as essentially correct, then it must be 
accepted as a page in American history now peiTnanently relegated to the past. 

Admiral Kimmel and General Short were two Americans whose misfortune 
found them in command while America slowly awakened from slumber. How 
much different were they from the congressman who time and again blocked 
this or that military appropriation or voted against conscription? The con- 
gressman is an American, you know. How much different were they from the 
labor leaders who called senseless, damaging strikes and the worker who wanted 
more and more money, and t'hell with production? They are Americans, too. 
How much different were they from the men and women who headed the 
hyphenated organizations whose preachings created disunity and confusion of 
thought? They were Americans. Were they any different than the millions 
who said that it couldn't happen here? 

Yet, beyond all this, there are questions which appear to defy answers. Why 
was it when an enemy submarine was sunk off Pearl Harbor one hour and ten 
minutes before the attack began, that an alert was not sounded for both army 
and navy? Why was Pearl Harbor not emptied and its great fleet dispatched 
to sea and why did not squadrons of planes roar into the air? Why was the 
detector report of approaching (enemy) planes ignored? Why was [3119] 
the sub gate in the channel left open until after the first attack and why had 
not previous navy or war department orders been carried out? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1653 

Such questions and answers belong to another era. They are of the past. So 
is the America that created the thinking that dwelled in the GHQ's and 
wardrooms. 

39. General Grunert. Now, is there anything else that you think 

Mr. Coll. Only that I would just like to leave this with you ; that 
is, that what would impress a person such as I am, sitting in a news- 
paper office, at the head of its editorial paper, and in entire control of 
its news and the assignments on it, that there was a feeling; of course, 
there was an unseen hand, for the bigger part of a year, in soft-pedal- 
ing and "shushing" incidents that came up that were aggravating and 
vvhicli we were particularly active in publishing, because we were rated 
of course as being anti -Japanese, and because we had made a consistent 
fight against the foreign-language schools, against the foreign-lan- 
guage newspapers, which had threatened to boycott us, and did take 
action through their Chamber of Commerce; in such instances as 
occurred, where speeches were made, and one was at the Central Union 
Church, the largest congregation of course of people that are prominent 
in the community, by a representative of the Japanese Chamber of 
Commerce, which was alien-controlled, and its membership was largely 
that, almost exclusively; he made a sensational speech, in which a 
reporter named Harry Albright, who now is a Major I think at Pre- 
sidio, and Avent into the service. He was a Reserve Officer at that time. 
That night, of course, very strong pressure was brought [3180^ 
to bear on The ADVERTISER to not print any report of that meet- 
ing. I denied that report, and it was published, maybe not in just 
frank terms, as it might have been otherwise, but I gave no orders to 
color it in any way. 

The incident appeared, too, where cameras were taken from 
civilian men in the Army and not restored to them until they got down 
to the police station,- and force was used there by officers, and others, 
of Japanese tankers, and Navy vessels, appeared in Hilo, where the 
famous picture which we printed of the sentry compelling visitors to 
bow to the sentry in the name of the emperor. On another series of 
stories which Albright wrote, of course, exposing the Japanese consul 
general's office, here, in sending, through tankers and Japanese express 
liners, large quantities of goocls that should have gone through the 
customs, and they were clearing it through the consul general's office. 
The collector of customs, who has now passed away, of course, called 
on me personally to apologize to the consul general, which I didn't, 
of course, and refused to do ; and that request had come to him from 
the consul general. And incidents of that sort, there was a disposi- 
tion of the part of the commimity; and in one other instance where 
there were labor troubles with the two newspapers, and the Labor 
Board, through its office manager here, was bringing action against 
the newspapers from what the^ called "unfair labor practices" ; they 
were adjusted. The Nippu Ji]i newspaper, of course, the conditions 
were infinitely worse, there, and they had, as everyone believed, and 
Wills, the agent; that was of course outstandingly bad. That was 
called off without any reason why it should have been called off, at all ; 
and those were the [SJSl] sorts of things that at that time of 
course impressed me as indicative, that I don't question but what thej 
were sparring for time, and all that, but there certainly was a disposi- 
tion from high sources somewhere, and of course that came, in my 



1654 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL, HARBOR ATTACK 

estimation, from Washington ; and I didn't have any donbt but Avhat 
that was true. 

I was sentenced 60 days to jail, and it was suspended, for contempt 
of court in the United States Court, here, for permitting a headline 
writer at night, although I was out of the office, to carry a line which 
was not exactly in accordance with the proceedings that were going 
on at Kewalo Basin, where the Sampans had been seized by the United 
States District Attorney's office, because they had been placed in the 
names of domestics who had no connection or relationship to those 
who owned them, and all of that; and that headline stated that further 
investigation, or words to that effect, would be carried on in the south 
Pacific, on the operations of these Sampans. It was purely a technical 
question, but nevertheless, the judge, who is now tlie Governor of the 
Territory, appointed a friend of court, and I was summarily brought 
in and cited for contempt of court. 

[3182] That, of course, was rather technical, I thought, on his 
part, because I had been in the Naval Reserve as a reserve officer for a 
number of years just prior to the outbreak of the war and had been 
retired on age; and naturally I had attended for a number of years 
meetings in the Naval Intelligence and was quite familiar with what 
was being investigated at that time. 

At that time I also, of course, was in close contact, beginning with 
General Patton's time and General T witty, who then was a Captain, 
in dealing with both the Intelligence of the Army and the Navy, and 
worked closely with them. Frequently we were asked to get pictures 
of Japanese officials or officers iii civilian clothes, that they asked us 
to do on that, and to help them in checking tanker crew lists which 
would leave San Diego with a certain number aboard and wind up 
in Honolulu with 20 or 30, or whatever it was, more than were the 
actual crew. It seemed to be common knowledge, of course, or was 
with us in there, and the understanding, that Japanese agents were 
being consistently put into the Territory. 

There were so many things. General, that led up to all of this that, 
so far as I was concerned and the newspaper was concerned on it, 
there wasn't any question whatever in our mind that war was liable to 
break out at any minute. We also had the same opinion that prevailed 
in some sources of the Army and the Navy that Pearl Harbor and 
Honolulu could not be attacked very successfully. That was the gen- 
eral impression. As the months went on I think that changed, par- 
ticularly with high ranking officers in the Navy and the Army both, 
on it, but it was the general impression that had prevailed for some 
[3183] time, and that the Japanese fleet would be a setup. 

Of course, others knew better than that on it, but for that reason 
there wasn't any question why we predicted these things, because we 
felt that it was coming. Newspaper instinct tells you that, without 
just having the fact. AH you need to know is to see what is happen- 
ing. You saw the clouds there and you knew it was going to rain ; 
that is all. 

40. General Grunert. Are there any questions? 

41. Colonel TouLMiN. May I ask a question. General? 

42. General Grunert. Just one more, just one question. 

43. Colonel Toulmin. Did you communicate these things to General 
Short in person that you have just expressed here this morning ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL, HARBOR BOARD 1655 

Mr. Coll. No, I never discussed it after that meeting. I didn't see 
him after December 7 on it, and if that was not — I think I attended 
one dinner at which he was present, but I never discussed it with him. 

44. Colonel Toulmin. Any more than prior to December 7th ? 

Mr. Coll. No. What brought the remark up at that time was that 
the other paper was not in sympathy with the M-day Act, and as 
strong as it was on that, and we were supporting the Army in its prep- 
aration of the M-day Act giving the Governor the great power that 
he had under that on it; and the afternoon paper, of course, didn't 
agree with that, and they were fighting that, and for that reason, of 
course. General Short was sympathetic with us, and I think that is 
how the conversation arose. I don't know just how it came up, but I 
know that the General at that time^ — his first greeting on that evening 
was to thank me for what we had said. 

[3184] 45. General Grunert. Thank you very much for assisting 
us. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

TESTIMONY OF GEORGE H. MOODY, OLD PALI EOAD, 
HONOLULU, T. H. 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Mr. Moody, will you please state to the Board your 
name and address? 

Mr. MooDT. George H. Moody, Old Pali Road, Honolulu. 

2. Colonel West. Wliat is your occupation, Mr. Moody ? 
Mr. Moody. I am manager of Grossman-Moody, Limited. 

3. General Grunert. Mr. Moody, the Board is after facts or leads 
that will produce such facts. Now, the amount of territory and the 
subject that the Board has to cover is so broad that we parcel this out 
somewhat. General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen, will take over 
this particular part, and the rest of the Board will ask such questions 
to fill it out as they see fit. 

Mr. Moody. Yes, sir. 

4. Major Clausen. Mr. Mood}', you said you are a member of the 
firm of Grossman-Moody. Were you a member of that firm during 
1941, sir? 

Mr. Moody. Yes, sir. 

5. Major Clausen. 1942? 
Mr. Moody. Yes, sir. 

6. Major Clausen. And did you at one time become an employee, a 
civilian employee, of the Engineering Corps? 

Mr. Moody. Yes, sir. 

[3185] 7. Major Clausen. Of the United States Army? 

Mr. Moody. Yes, sir. 

8. Major Clausen. And in the course of your activities as an em- 
ployee of the Engineering Corps and also prior to that time, did you 
become acquainted with the activities of Colonel Wyman ? 

Mr. Moody. No, sir. 

9. Major Clausen. Did you know Hans Wilhelm Rolil? 

Mr. Moody. Not at all. I met Colonel Wyman once when I was seut 
to his office by Colonel Lyman to see about opening some camouflage 



1656 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

factories. After the blitz I went down to Davies to handle the feed- 
ing for the Red Cross, which I did for about, oh, I think seven or eight 
or ten days. Then Colonel Lyman phoned me and asked me to come 
here to Shaf ter, and I came here, and he said he wanted camouflage fac- 
tories started and started that day, and to hurry up. And I asked him 
how to do it, and he said, "Well, I will send j^ou in to Colonel Wyman, 
and he will tell you the procedure of hoAV to do it." And that was the 
only time I met Colonel Wyman. 

10. Major Clausen. Did you ever meet a Hans Wilhelm Rohl, Mr. 
Moody ? 

Mr. Moody. No. 

11. Major Clausen. When you were a civilian employee of the En- 
gineering Corps you were working under Colonel H. B. Nurse ; is that 
correct ? 

Mr. Moody. Not while I was in the camouflage department. I 
worked under Colonel Nurse later, in a division that was set up that 
was called the B. B. Division, which was supposed to be an investiga- 
tion division on all the activities of the Engineers. 

IS1S6] 12. Major Clausen. And this B. B. stood for Bottleneck 
Busting; is that correct? 

Mr. Moody. That is correct, yes. 

13. Major Clausfn. So in the course of your activities as an em- 
ployee in this Bottleneck Busting Division did you investigate the 
activities of the Engineering Corps with respect to delays and deficien- 
cies? 

Mr. Moody. Any problem which came up that Colonel Nurse wanted 
to send us on, he sent us, if it was a truck delay or if it was why a ware- 
house wasn't finished, or almost any other problem that came up in any 
of the Engineer activities, whether it was trouble with a contract or 
what it might be. 

14. Major Clausen. Specifically, Mr. Moody, when did your activi- 
ties as an employee of the Bottleneck Busting Division commence? 

Mr. Moody. It was around Christmas. 

15. Major Clausen Of what year, sir? 
Mr. MooDY. It must have been '43. 

IC). Major Clausen. '43? 

Mr. Moody. Or '42. It was around Christmas, and I was there for a 
year; I mean, for — until summer. Six months I was in there with 
Colonel Nurse. 

17. Major Clausen. Do you recall an occasion when Colonel John E. 
Hunt of the Inspector General's Department of the Army came to the 
Islands in connection with an investigation of the affairs of Colonel 
Wyman ? 

Mr. Moody. Yes, I was in Colonel Nurse's office at that time. That 
will set the date of it. 

18. Major Clausen. I believe you have already testified before 
[31S7] the House Military Affairs Committee that at that time 
Colonel Hunt did not go over the records in detail. 

Mr. Moody. Not that I know of, no, sir. 

19. Major Clausen. And you also said that Colonel Hunt 

was out to prove that nobody was wiUing to testify tliat Colonel Wyman was 
crooked. 

Could you give us the basis foi- youj- assumption in that regard, sir? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1657 

Mr. Moody. Only from discussion in Colonel Nurse's office. 

20. Major Clausen. And what was that, Mr. Moody ? 

Mr. Moody. Just discussion between Colonel Nurse and. Colonel — 
and General Hunt. 

21. Major Clausen. Yes? 

Mr. Moody. In which General Hunt said that he didn't think that — 
while people were willing to gossip about things, they were not willing 
to get up and make a sworn statement as to what was right and wrong, 
and that he felt it as so hard to get anybody to go on record that a man 
was dishonest or that anything was wrong, that they would talk about 
it but that they wouldn't give any proof. That was it. 

22. Major Clausen. Now, with regard to Colonel Hunt not going 
over the records in detail, what records did he fail to go over? 

Mr. Moody. Oh, I said that as far as I knew he did not go over Col- 
onel Nurse's records in detail on his investigation, group that were 
turned in by Colonel Nurse, into the office there. Colonel Nurse has 
all those records still in his private file in San Francisco, or had last 
March when I was there. 

23. Major Clausen. You also stated you had some records which 
[31881 would be pertinent to the general inquirj^ on which Colonel 
John E. Hunt was engaged at the time ? 

Mr. Moody. I don't think so, no. I don't know. Of course, I don't 
know all that — I don't know whether General Hunt— was it General 
or Colonel ? 

24. Major Clausen. Colonel Hunt, sir. 

Mr. Moody. — was here to investigate the whole Engineer setup or 
whether he was pust liere to investigate Colonel Wyman. Now, I 
have no records on Colonel Wyman. My records are only copies of 
the reports that I turned in, everything, to Colonel Nurse, but whether 
some of those things might be on things that were started by Colonel 
Wyman or not, I wouldn't know. 

25. Major Clausen. Do you have any information, Mr. Moody, 
which in your opinion may be of interest and value to this Board ? 

Mr. Moody. I have my records of the reports that were turned in. 

26. Major Clausen. Would you make those available to me? 

Mr. Moody. Yes, if vou want them. They are pretty hard to read, 
I think. 

27. Major Clausen. Well, if you just turn them over to me some- 
time soon, in the next few days. 

Mr. Moody. May I have them back? 

28. Major Clausen. Yes. 

Mr. Moody. Now, I think the best place to look is in Colonel Nurse's 
records, and I am sure he will make them available to you. 

29. Major Clausen. All right, sir. 

[S189] Mr. Moody. Now, those will have— I don't know whether 
he kept the men's daily reports or not, but I know that he kept a 
record of his reports to General Kramer or to whoever was in charge 
at that time. 

30. Major Clausen. That is General Hans Kramer? 
Mr. MooDY. Yes. 

31. Major Clausen. I see. I have no further questions, sir. 

32. General Grunert. Apparently you have nothing else to offer 
the Board. I don't know what to ask questions on. What has been 
I wrought up there is nothing to be questioned about. 

797J6 — 46 — Ex. 14.5, vol. 3 4 



1658 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

These records that you are going to turn over to Major Clauson, 
what are they about ? 
Mr. MooDT. Activities of the Engineer Department at that time, sir. 

33. General Gkunert. Reports on those things that you went out 
to"B. B."? 

Mr. Moody. Yes, sir. And some of them are ridiculous: whether 
a man goes to work, whether — small details, a great many of them. 

34. General Grunert. They were negative as well as positive, were 
they ? 

Mr. Moody. Yes, sir ; both types of things. 

35. General Grunert. Any other questions ? 

Mr. Moody. I really think, sir, that Colonel Nurse's records would 
be of great value to you. 

36. General Grunert. Thank you very much for coming. 
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

37. General Grunert. We shall take a five-minute recess. 
(There was a brief informal recess.) 

[3190^1] TESTIMONY OF COLONEL EAY E. DINGEMAN, COM- 
MANDING OFFICER, 144TH GROUP COAST ARTILLERY, FORT 
RUGER, TERRITORY OF HAWAII 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your 
name, rank, organization and station? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. Colonel R. E. Dingeman, Commanding Officer 
of the 144th Group, Fort Ruger, Territory of Hawaii. 

2. General Grunert. Colonel, what was your position or asisgn- 
ment in the latter part of 1941, including that held at the time of 
the attack? 

Colonel Dingeman. I was Army liaison officer with the 14th Naval 
District, Pearl Harbor. 

3. General Grunert. As such were you an assistant to the Assist- 
ant Chief of Staff, G-3, of the Department? 

Colonel Dingeman. I was. 

4. General Grunert. Who was he? 
Colonel Dingeman. Colonel Donegon. 

5. General Grunert. Colonel Donegon in his testimony before the 
Board stated that you were the liaison officer or was the liaison officer 
between the G-3 Section of Department Headquarters and the 14th 
Naval District ; is that right ? 

Colonel Dingeman.- Yes, sir. 

6. General Grunert. Will you tell us what your duties were as 
liaison officer with the District? 

Colonel Dingeman. I was detailed primarily to handle the harbor 
control post. We were setting up a harbor control post by order of 
the War Department and we were installing that [3192] facil- 
ity at Pearl Harbor, Pearl Harbor itself, getting the communications 
set up and working out joint exercises to test it out. In addition to 
that, I had as my duty the arranging of trips on battleships and 
arranging for clearing the field of fire and high-speed towing mis- 
sions and also we did quite a lot of calibrating of the Navy range 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1659 

finders, which was handled through me, used to have stereo points on 
the range finder, and we did a lot of that for the task forces when 
they came into Honolulu. 

7. General Grunert. Wliere was your post of duty, as you might 
call it? Were you with the 14th Naval District or at Fort Shafter 
and went to the District, or what? 

Colonel DiNGEMAisr. I was on duty at the 14th Naval District, I 
had my office and desk in Admiral Bloch's headquarters. 

8. General Grunert. Then you were the counterpart of what 
Lieutenant Burr was for the Navy ? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. Yes, sir, 

9. General Grunert. For the District? 
Colonel DiNGEMAN, Yes, sir. 

10. General Grunert. Now, as I understand it, your duties were 
primarily concerned with what we might call training? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. That is right, yes, sir. 

11. General Grunert, Making the necessary arrangements so the 
training could be coordinated ? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN, Yes, sir. 

12. General Grunert. Did you have any duties with respect to 
getting information from the District and transmitting it to the De- 
partment, and vice versa ? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. Prior to the war, practically none; after 
[SWS] the war that was my pricipal job. Prior to the war I had 
practically none. As a matter of fact, part of the time I helped 
Colonel Lawton in organizing a task force for taking over Canton, 
Christmas and Midway. He and I worked that out, the details of that. 

13. General Grunert. If the District wanted to do business with 
the Department, was that business arranged through you, or not? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. Very little, if any, sir. M^jor Fleming at the 
time was the Engineer Officer and most of the things that were being 
done were rights to go into Canton and Christmas and those advance 
bases and practically all of it was handled direct through Captain Earl, 
who was then Chief of Staff for the 14th Naval District, and Admiral 
Bloch himself. I was rarely in on that at all. 

14. General Grunert. Then, as I understand it, you were sort 
of a leg man between the two ? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. That is right. 

15. General Grunert. But when it came to any particular subject 
they wanted to talk about, they talked directly ? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. That is right, practicaly always. I transmitted 
messages sometimes, an officer-to-officer message, but it was enclosed 
in envelopes. I never knew the contents. 

16. General Grunert. If there was any intelligence information 
transmitted from the District to the Department, that would or would 
not go through you ? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. Not necessarily through me. Very often the 
individual that was handling that activity went direct. I started 
this job on the 17th of October, September or October, [3194^ I 
cannot just recall the month, but it was in the latter part of the year 
1941. 

17. General Grunert. Colonel Donegon left the impression with 
the Board that you could give us a lot of information that he did 



1660 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

not have. Apparently you have not much of such information; or 
what have you that you can tell the Board that may assist us ? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. Of course, up to now I have been talking about 
up to the 7th. After the 7th 

18. General Grunert. Supose you limit yourself, first, to what you 
think would be of interest to the Board during the period prior to 
and including December 7th. 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. Well, I do not believe I have anything more 
than I have told you, sir, prior to the 7th. It was a new job and I 
was just detailed to see — it was up to me to make the job. 

19. General Grunert. Then the information you have pertains 
primarily to after the 7th ? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. That is right. 

20. General Grunert. The Board is interested only to the extent to 
which that may have a bearing on what happened prior to and includ- 
ing the 7th. 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. I am afraid I do not have a great deal that can 
help you on that. As to information, much of that stuff was more 
or less hearsay, because I was not in on it. General Short handled 
through Fleming lots of things very direct. 

21. General Grunert. And Fleming was concerned primarily with 
construction ? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. That is right. That was the biggest 
[SIO^-A] thing, I was just trying to recall one incident where I 
did know something about it, about the bases in the South Pacific, but 
I do not know that it is of particular interest. It was in regard to 
some sovereignty rights of the British. Other than that I cannot 
recollect anything, sir. 

22. General Grunert. Do you know anything about the messages 
that came to the Navy which the Navy transmitted to the Army? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. Not prior to the 7th. I handled all of them 
after the 7th, but none prior to the 7th. 

23. General Grunert. Do you Imow anything about the message of 
November 27th from the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General 
of the Department which resulted in the adoption of Alef t No. 1 ? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. Yes, sir, I saw that some time after we had been 
in an alert condition. 

24. General Grunert. Then you know of the message? 
Colonel DiNGEMAN. Yes, sir. 

25. General Grunert. But you know it only after "the decision was 
made to go on Alert No. 1 ? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. That is right. We were on more or less of an 
antisa'botage alert. 

26. General Grunert. That is Alert No. 1, is it not? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. Yes, sir. That was the way it was being exe- 
cuted. 

27. General Grunert. Was the decision regarding that alert or the 
message which apparently caused the adoption of that alert discussed 
in G-3, do you Imow? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. To a very small extent, so far as I am person- 
ally concerned, and not at all with the Navy. I know we [SlOSli 
did discuss it some. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1661 

28. General Grunert. Did you discuss the question of whether or 
not that alert covered what you thought was nec^essary to cover because 
of the message received, or not? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. Yes, I thought that came up as part of the 
situation. 

29. General Grunert. What was the discussion like? How did it 
run? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. Well, there is a little background in connection 
with that. In 1940 we put in alert conditions here. I have been here 
since 1939. At that time I had a battery. We went on and on with- 
out much information to the line troops. It was sort of considered a 
phoney war. We did get armed and had all our ammunition out and 
we spread out very thm over everything. So with that as sort of a 
background we wondered if this was kind of the same thing, after 
being in an alert condition, after a while. 

30. General Grunert. But you were not in the same alert, were 
you? What was that 1940 alert? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. No, sir. That was a real alert. 

31. General Grunert. An all out? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. Yes. We were ordered in the field ready to 
shoot with ammunition and everything. 

32. General Grunert. And this Alert No. 1 was sabotage, antisabo- 
tage ? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. Antisabotage, yes, sir. 

33. General Grunert. Did that cause discussion ? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. No. I think we rather accepted that as more 
or less a normal thing. Of course, as I say, I had no [3196] fur- 
ther information than the telegram that we were not to unnecessarily 
alarm the populace here. 

34. General Grunert. That seems to stick in all your minds, not to 
alarm the public. Do you remember any of the other parts of that 
message, outside of not alarming the public? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. Well, it said to take full precautions as to local 
security. It seems like the local security stood out. Local security 
was interpreted then as antisabotage, because of the preponderance 
of Jap population here. 

35. General Grunert. Just give us the gist of what you recall about 
that message. You mentioned that you were not to alarm the public 
and take care of local security. 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. As I recall, there was something about that an 
attack or a war was imminent, and I have forgotten now whether 
it stated in there that negotiations were proceeding. As you say, it 
does stand out in my mind that we were to take care of local security 
and not unnecessarily arouse the populace. 

36. General Grunert. This message has often been read, but I 
think we will have to read it again. 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. I suppose so, as I have not seen it since then. 

37. General Grunert. To refresh your memory, I will have the 
Recorder read it again, and then I want to find out, as you listen to 
this, why the other parts of that message did not stand out the way 
the question of alarming the public stood out. Just have it in mind 
when he reads, will you ? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. Yes, sir. 



1662 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

\3197'] 38. Colonel West. This is a radiogram dated November 
27, 1941, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort 
Shafter, T. H., signed "Marshall", for body of which reads as follows : 

(Message of November 27, 1941, from War Department to cominand- 
ing general, Hawaiian Department, is as follows:) 

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with 
only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and 
offer to continue period Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action 
possible at any moment period If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma 
be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act 
period This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restrict- 
ing you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense period Prior 
to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance 
and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried 
out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil population or disclose 
intent period Report measure taken period Should hostilities occur you will 
carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan 
period Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minmum essen- 
tial oflBcers. 

39. General Grujstert. No wjoii see there that does not refer in any 
way to local security. It does refer to not alarming the public. But 
in that it says to the effect that whatever you do, do not jeopardize 
your defense. That does not stand out in your memory, does it ? 

Colonel DixGEJviAx. It does not seem to, no, sir, in con- \^3198^ 
trast to the message received in the one prior to that. It said you will 
immediately go into a condition of active defense and not unnecessarily 
alarm the public. This is a very liberal paraphrase of it. But you will 
go into the field and be prepared for an air attack. 

40. General Grunert. Now you are talking about 1940 ? 
Colonel DiNGEMAN. Yes, sir. It was very positive. 

41. General Grunert. That was a positive message? 
Colonel Dingemax. Yes, sir. 

42. General Gruxert. This was just an informational message? 
Colonel DiNGEMAx. No. Of course, I did not study that at the time. 

The thing is, on this island you cannot move unless they know it. You 
can hardly do anything on this island unless everybody can see it 
and know it. Perhaps we did, I did or anybody else, give a little more 
weight to that fact of not unnecessarily alarming the public. You 
could not move trucks or anything. 

43. General .Gruxert. You had former alerts, did you not ? 
Colonel DixGEMAx. We had them on an average of once a month, I 

would say. 

44. General Gruxert. Did any of those alerts alarm the public ? 
Colonel DixGEMAX. I don't think so. 

45. General Grunert. Then what about takmg Alert No. 2, which 
was protection or preparedness to meet an air attack, and Alert No. 3, 
which was an all-out alert? What would you do there that you had 
not been doing in your practice alerts that would alarm the public? 

Colonel DixGEMAX. WeU, I don't think there would have been much 
more. There were quite a few changes in antiaircraft gun positions 
that we would not take up, because we had to go [3199'] into 
private fields here, rather than just go on the beach line and simulate 
field conditions. There was quite a change in the setup for a war 
condition. The searchlights, for instance, and antiaircraft guns. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1663 

46. General Grunert. Then this message did not alarm G-3 to the 
extent where they thought they ought to have gone on an all-out alert? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. I do not think it did, no, sir. 

47. General Grttxert. The thing that stood out in all your minds 
was the antisabotage measures? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. Yes, sir. 

48. General Grunert. Because of the state of mind that had been 
built up from the past ? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. That seems to be it. And we depended on the 
Navy to give us information of any fact like that being imminent. 
I do not know where they got the information for the 1940 alert, but 
they evidently got it. 

49. General Grunert. Had you been getting information from the 
Navy that assured you that when and if the time came you could 
depend upon them to get information ? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. I cannot answer that, sir, because I do not 
know what they were getting, but I know that I have been on joint 
boards here, on which there have been search missions for the islands 
and which was the Navy's responsibility. 

50. General Grunert, Do you know whether or not they were carry- 
ing out that responsibility at the time? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. I do not, no, sir. I knew there were a lot of 
difficulties about having insufficient planes and things like that. Of 
course, Admiral Bellinger often in these discus- [S200] sions 
would indicate the shortage of planes and personnel. 

51. General Grunert. Then you had confidence in the Navy? 
Colonel DiNGEMAN. Yes, sir. 

52. General Grunert. To the extent that you thought you were se- 
cure with an antisabotage alert, unless you got additional information 
for doing something else ? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. That is right, and coupled with the Navy in- 
telligence agencies which w^e knew to exist. 

53. General Grunert. But did you know what they had given you, 
or were they keeping you informed, so far as 3^011 know? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. No, sir, I could not answer that. 

54. General Grunert. Any other questions from the Board? 

55. General Frank. What element of the population were you fear- 
ful about ? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. I think the Japanese, sir. I personally was 
fearful of all the Japanese population. I did not trust them at all. 

5(). General Frank. In other words, this message, you thought, 
applied particularly to the Japanese? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. Yes, sir. 

57. General Frank. Suppose you disturbed the Japanese; so what? 
Colonel DiNGEMAN. To my own personal opinion, I would not care 

whether it disturbed them or not. 

58. General Frank. Had there not been any evidence of an actual 
attack from without by Japan, do you believe that the Japs on the 
islands could have been handled, so far as any disturbing of them was 
concerned, by peacetime measures? 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. Oh, yes, I think so. I do not think [3201] 
that was any problem at all. 



10G4 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

59. General Grunert. Have you anything in the back of your mind, 
or the forward part of it, as to anything that yOu know that might 
assist the Board? If so, this is the opportunity to discuss it. 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. I would like to ask what you mean by assist- 
ance? In what phase? As to responsibilities? 

60. General Grunert. As to anything that led up to the attack 
and during the attack. We are here to ascertain the facts as to the 
attack on Hawaii- Anything that is pertinent to that may be of as- 
sistance to us. A great many w^itnesses have something they want 
to tell when they get up and they don't get an opportunity to tell it 
by the questions asked, so we are giving you this opportunity in case 
you have any such thing in your mind. 

Colonel DiNGEMAN. No, I cannot think of anything now. Maybe 
my mind stopped trying to think of all the things I might go on and 
tell you and will think of later. 

61. General Gruni:rt. Thank you very much. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

TESTIMONY OF EGBERT L. SHIVERS, COLLECTOR OE CUSTOMS, 
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, 4775 ATJKAI STREET, HONOLULU, TERRI- 
TORY OF HAWAII 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Will you please state to the Board your name 
and address, Mr. Shivers? 

Mr. Shi\ters. Robert L. Shivers, 4775 Aukai Street, Honolulu. 

2. Colonel West. And what is your present assignment, Mr. Shiv- 
ers? You are no longer with the F. B. I., are you? 

[S202] Mr. Shivers. I am at present Collector of Customs for 
the Hawaiian Islands. 

3. General Grunert. Mr. Shivers, this Board is appointed to ascer- 
tain and report the facts relating to the attack made by the Japanese 
armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on the 7th of December, 
1941. We hope that you will be able to give us some of those facts, or 
give us leads to where we can get such facts. The breadth of the 
investigation is such that we have divided phases of this among the 
Board members, although all the members are interested and will 
ask questions as they occur to them. But I have asked General Russell 
to conduct this part of the investigation, so he will lead in the 
questioning. 

4. General Russell. Mr. Shivers, you and I had a conversation a 
little while ago in which we discussed the relation of the F. B. I. to 
the Hawaiian Department of the Army and the naval operations here 
on the Island of Oahu, is that true ? 

Mr. Shivers. That is right, yes, sir. 

5. General Russell. In that conversation it developed that the office 
memorandum which had been submitted to this Board by the Wash- 
ington office of the F. B. I., that you had received a copy of that 
memorandum. 

Mr. Shivers. I have seen a copy of it, yes, sir. 

6. General Russell. We want to preface the evidence which you may 
give the Board by stating that the F. B. I. in the Washington office 



/ PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1665 

did furnish us with this memorandum and the memorandum covers in 
some detail the greater parts of the evidence which you gave before 
the Roberts Commission during its earlier investigation of the Pearl 
Harbor disaster, dealing with the [-32031 subject of jurisdic- 
tion and many other subjects, and since this data is available to us 
from the memorandum submitted, we can limit your examination con- 
siderably. In other words, there are many details here that we won't 
cover with you. Have you read this memorandum? 

Mr. Shivers. I have, yes, sir. I prepared most of the information 
that is contained in the memorandmn myself. 

7. General Russell. Do you regard it as an accurate statement of 
the facts relating to the subjects covered by the memorandum ? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes, sir, it is. 

8. General Russell. Now, there are two or three subjects, how- 
ever, that we would be pleased to discuss with you. Do you recall the 
messages or the information which you had given to the military and 
naval authorities here touching possible activities of the Japanese 
prior to December 7th? I do not in that question refer to such data 
as you may have furnished them on individual Japanese or Japanese 
organizations, but more definitely as to combat intelligence, if that 
statement is clear to you. 

Mr. Shivers. It is clear, yes. 

9. General Russell. Would you tell the Board what information 
of that type you had furnished to the military and naval authorities 
prior to December 7th, 1941 ? 

Mr. Shrivers. The only information that I recall which could be 
related to combat intelligence which was furnished to the military 
and naval intelligence services in Honolulu by the F. B. I. were two 
messages. One message was intercepted by a telephone tap which 
we had placed or the F. B. I. had placed on \320Jf\ the tele- 
phone at the Japanese consulate which was used by the Japanese con- 
sulate cook. The naval intelligence had all of the other telephones 
going into the consulate tapped at that time. They did not tap this 
one telephone. I suppose they did not know it was there. We did 
tap that phone about some time in November, and there was one mes- 
sage or one telephone conversation which we intercepted on Decem- 
ber 3rd. 

The cook at the consulate had telephoned to somebody out in town 
and told this person that the Japanese consul general was burning 
and destroying all of his important papers. I immediately furnished 
that information to Lieutenant Colonel George W. Bicknell, who 
was then Assistant Chief of Staff and assigned to the G-2 office under 
Colonel Fielder. I also furnished that information to Captain I. H. 
Maytield, who was the District Intelligence Officer of the 14th Naval 
District. 

10. General Russell. Were any steps taken to verify this telephone 
conversation from the cook of the Japanese consulate, whether you 
could discover evidences of the actual burning of those papers ? 

Mr. Shivers. We made no attempt to discover any visual evidence 
of that fact. We assumed it to be true. 

11. General Russell. Was there any other message or data which 
you gave to the military and naval authorities prior to December 7th. 

Mr. Shivkrs. There was a telephone intercept between n Doctor 



1666 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mori, a Japanese agent who resides in Honolulu, and an individual in 
Tokyo. This individual, I do not recall his name, but I think he was 
connected with some newspaper in Tokyo, or some press association in 
Tokyo. This conversation occurred at [S205] 5 o'clock or ap- 
proximately 5 o'clock on the afternoon of December 5th. We got 
the message translated at about noon on December 6th. I furnished 
a complete translation of that message to Lieutenant Colonel George 
Bicknell and to Captain I. H. Mayheld at about 6 o'clock Saturday 
afternoon, December the 6th. I did not give it to them earlier, be- 
cause I was unable to contact either of them until 5 o'clock that after- 
noon. As soon as they got to the office, after I got in touch with 
them, they came to my office and copied this message. 

12. General Russell. Was not Bicknell in an office adjacent to 
your office in downtown Honolulu ? 

Mr. Shivers. He was, yes, sir. 

13. General Russell. Did not he have any representative in his 
office during the afternoon of December 5th to whom you could have 
delivered that message for transmission to General Short? 

Mr. Shivers. He did, yes, sir. 

14. General Russell. Do you know now why the message was not 
delivered to whoever may have been in Bicknell's office ? 

Mr. Shivers. I considered the message of such importance or such 
consequence that I did not want to give it to a subordinate officer. 

15. General Russell. Tell us what, if any, construction you placed 
on this intercepted telephone message? 

Mr. Shivers. I knew or at least I thought I knew that there was 
military significance in the message. What it was I did not know. 
I pointed out to Colonel Bicknell and to Captain Mayfield certain 
things in the conversation that struck me as being significant. One 
I recall was the question about the patrol planes [3206] that 
were flying out of Honolulu at that time. Another was the question 
about the flowers that were in bloom at that time. Personally I 
thought that that information would probably be used for the pur- 
pose of locating the islands and so pointed out to Mavfield and Bick- 
nell. 

16. General Russell. Did you have any authority for tapping these 
telephones ? 

Mr. Shivers. I had authority from the Attorney General to tap the 
overseas telephone. 

17. General Russell. I believe that appears in this memorandum. 
Mr. Shr-ers. That does ; yes, sir. 

18. General Russell. There has come to the attention of the Board 
elsewhere information about a system of signals which apparently 
has been instituted here on the Island of Oahu to convey information 
to Japanese forces off the coast of Oahu. Do j^ou know how that infor- 
mation was developed? 

Mr. Shivers. Well, after the attack on December the 7th my office, 
the F. B. I., immediately asked the police department to place a guard 
at the Japanese consulate, which was done. In the course of the 
operations of that police guard they ran across certain material at 
the consulate which had not been burned. Among that material was 
the telegraph file of the Japanese consulate. They brought that tele- 
graph file to my office. I sent the telegraph file to the Navy Intelli- 
gence Office and asked the District Intelligence Officer, if he could get 



PROCEEDINGS OP ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1667 

the messages translated. They were all in code. One of the messages 
that was translated was this radiogram that was sent by the Japanese 
consul general in Hawaii to the Foreign Office in Tokyo which out- 
lined an alternate system for the one [3207] that had been 
previously furnished to him by a man, by a German by the name of 
Otto Kuhn. That system of signals provided for certain signals to 
be — are you acquainted with that telegraph file? 

19. General Russell. Yes, I think we put it in evidence. I think 
we have the details of it. The reason for bringing it up was to ask 
what if any thinking the F. B. I. did to reconcile the telephone con- 
versation of December 3rd to the effect that documents were being 
burned with the existence of these documents which were discovered 
after December 7th ? Why weren't they burned ? 

Mr. Shivers. As I recall, one of those telegrams that we found in 
the consulate instructed the Japanese consul general to hold on to 
his code book up until the last before destroying it. We know now 
that he held on to his telec-raph file too long. Why he did not burn it 
in the beginning, I do not know. 

20. General Rtjssell. This message which you discovered in the 
seizure of December 7th relating to the system of signals to offshore 
Japanese forces, were you able to identify any of the parties here on 
the island who may have been charged with responsibility in connec- 
tion with furnishing those signals ? 

Mr. Shivers. We were, yes, sir. 

21. General Russell. What did joii do with those people? 

Mr. Shivers. One of the individuals was Otto Kuhn himself who 
■prepared the system. He was later prosecuted before a military com- 
mission and sentenced to death by the commission. The sentence was 
later commuted to 50 years in prison. 

22. General Russell. Any others? 
Mr. Shivers. No others prosecuted. 

[3208] 23. General Russell. But you did discover the existence 
of others who had definite functions in connection with these signals? 

Mr. Shivers. We did not discover any other people who had any 
definite function in connection with carrying out that system. 

[3209] 24. General Russell. While we are on this subject, do 
you recall the prosecution by federal authorities, either civil or mili- 
tary, of any of the Japanese who were interned following the attack 
on December 7, 1941? 

Mr. Shivers. So far as I know, none was prosecuted. Let me qualify 
that by saying the matter of the prosecution of Doctor Mori and his 
wife was presented to the then Military Governor's office. The Mili- 
tary Governor had some member of his staff consult with Angus 
Taylor, who was at that time the Acting United States Attorney, and 
for some reason which is not clear to me now they were nevet brought 
to trial before the Military Commission or in the United States Courts. 
They could not be brought to trial in the United States Courts at that 
time, because under the proclamation declaring martial law here the 
operation of those courts was suspended. 

25. General Russell. Did the FBI make an investigation to de- 
termine Japanese activities prior to December 7 which might have had 
as their mission the discovery of facts relating to the presence of the 
Navy at Pearl Harbor? 



1668 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Shivers. I do not understand that question. 

26. General Kussell. I say, did the FBI make an investigation fol- 
lowing December 7, to determine or to discover activities of Japanese 
agencies prior to December 7, which agencies were seeking information 
about the presence of the fleet at Pearl Harbor ? 

Mr. Shivers. We did ; yes, sir. 

27. General Russell. In connection with that investigation were 
you furnished captured documents or maps which had been taken from 
Japanese submarines ? 

[S^IO] Mr, Shivers. We were; yes, sir. 

28. General Russell. Would you tell the Board about the map 
which you exhibited to me a little while ago, entries on which indicated 
to you as you stated to me that a Japanese submarine had been in 
Pearl Harbor, had gone through Pearl Harbor, rather in detail, and 
had entered on the map data as to the location of ships of the Pacific 
Fleet. 

Mr. Shivers. Some time after the attack, we were able to, or rather 
we tried jointly with the naval intelligence to get access to some of the 
captured material, that was captured on December 7, or shortly there- 
after, for the purpose of trying to reconstruct the intelligence opera- 
tions of any agent who may have been operating in Hawaii prior to 
the attack. We felt if we had access to some of the maps, which we 
had heard were in existence, we might probably be able to identify 
some of the people in Hawaii who may have furnished information, 
that was reported to us to have been on the map. We were able to 
get from naval intelligence two maps which were reported to me as 
having been found on one of the Japanese submarines. 

We examined those maps and translated all of the Japanese char- 
acters and writing appearing on the maps. Some of the writing on 
the map had been printed, as though it had been made up some time 
before. There were other characters on the map which had been 
written in by someone, and appeared to have been written in very 
recently. 

An examination of the map indicated to me rather definitely that 
there had been Japanese submarines in Pearl Harbor immediately 
before the attack. 

29. General Russell. Will you tell the Board what that [3211] 
information was that indicated the presence of this submarine in Pearl 
Harbor. 

Mr. Shivers. Well, I have the map, which I can show to the Board. 

30. General Russell. Could you read from that map this data ? 
Mr. Shivers. And mind you, this is purely my interpretation. It 

is not an official interpretation of the Navy, nor is it an official inter- 
pretation of the Army, although the Army intelligence did see these 
two maps I have. 

These two maps have been designated "Map No. 1" and "Map No. 2." 
There are some 210 items appearing on the map which were trans- 
lated by the FBI. I don't know whether you want me to read those 
or not. 

31. General Russell. No. I think it would be interesting to the 
Board to know the places where this submarine was, and at what 
times — just as you showed to me the course of the submarine through 
the harbor. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1669 

Mr. Shivers. There is one notation on this map here which has been 
designated "No. 36." There are Japanese characters written on the 
map which, translated, reads : 

Enter harbor (written in dark letters) leave harbor (written in light letters). 

There are other Japanese characters appearing on the map, desig- 
nated as "No. 40," which read : 

Course taken in entering harbor, 331 degrees (nearly certain) 335 degrees 
(assumed). 

Now, on this map is various information relating to the installations 
at Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor, and areas adjacent to both places. 

[3212] There is also on the map, which was written in Japanese 
characters, designated as "9," a code, which was midoubtedlj^ to be 
used by the submarine commanders in communicating with their 
mother ship or the Japanese task force that was en route to Hawaii. 

32. General Russell. For example? 

Mr. Shivers. For example, one of the code words is "Ito" or 
"(Kito)." That word would mean "indication strong that enemy 
fleet will put out to sea." 

There is another code word, "Kaki," which would indicate, "Enemy 
fleet put out to sea from or through"; then the other code words tio 
describe the movement of the fleet. 

Now, it is believed that this map shows the course of the Japanese 
submarine that went into Pearl Harbor. A course is charted, and it 
shows that this submarine reached a certain poi/it at 12 : 40 a. m., 
going into the harbor. Another point, going in, at 12 : 45 ; another 
point, at 1 o'clock; another point, at 1: 15. The point it reached at 
1 : 15 is the place where the submarine gate stretched across the harbor. 

The next entry is just a fraction of an inch from the 1 : 15 entry, and 
is "4 : 10." We learned from the Navy that the submarine net opened 
at Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7, at 4 o'clock, to permit 
the garbage scow to go out. 

33. General Russell. Indicating, therefore, what? 

Mr. Shivers. Indicating, therefore, that this submarine arrived at 
the gate at 1 : 15 a. m., and remained there until the gate was opened, 
at 4 : 10 a. m. The course is then plotted around the harbor, and shows 
that he came out at the point where he entered, at 6 o'clock ; and there 
is plotted on the map [321S] presumably by the submarine 
commander the location of the Arizona, the Pemisylvania, Maryland, 
West Virginia, Tennessee, California, Wyoming, and Saratoga; we 
learned, also, the San Fra^icisco, Omaha, and Trenton. 

34. General Frank. When was this submarine supposed to have 
made this trip ? 

Mr. Shivers. That, I wouldn't know, sir. 

35. General Frank. About? 

Mr. Shivers. I wouldn't know that. 

36. General Frank. I thought you stated, just before you started 
to describe this, that it was just prior to the attack some time. 

Mr. Shivitrs. I would say, although there is nothing on the map to 
indicate when the submarine went in there, that it had to be at some 
time when the ships plotted were actually in the harbor. 

37. General Frank. But some of those ships were not in the harbor ? 
Mr. Shivers. Some of those ships were not in the harbor. As I 

understand it, there were no cruisers in the harbor at that time. 



1670 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

38. General Frank. And no aircraft carriers? 

Mr. Shivers. And no aircraft carriers. Apparently, from what 
happened, the Utah was mistaken for the Saratoga. 

39. General Russell. Wall the Utah shown, and the Saratoga was 
in ? Is that the way, or was the Saratoga shown ? 

Mr. Shi\^rs. The UTAH was in, and the SARATOGA was shown 
as beiiig at the mooring where the UTAH was moored. 

40. General" Russell. And the SARATOGA was pretty badly 
\_321Ji.'\ destroyed by the enemy? 

Mr. Shivers. The UTAH was badly destroyed. 

41. General Russell. The UTAH was badly destroyed by the 
enemy? Now, does the other mark which you have indicated show 
the submarine departed, which entered the harbor? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes, sir. 

The other map was also translated by the FBI, and circle Xo. 73, 
there has been written on the map in Japanese characters the word 
"start"; 74, the words "leave tube"; 72, there are apparently some 
words that could not be deciphered, but those that could be deciphered 
read, "that I found the mouth of the harbor." 

I may not be able to give you an exact statement ; what I am going 
to say now may not be exact, but you can have it properly translated, 
and it will indicate the exact status about which I am going to relate 
now. It appears that there was a rendezvous between two of the 
Japanese submarines at a certain point on the map indicated as "Map 
No. 1," and that ea^h of the submarines went into Pearl Harbor on a 
different course. 

42. General Russell. Following a question asked by General Frank, 
has the FBI made any effort to determine on what day the ships as 
shown on Map No. 2 were actually in the harbor ? 

Mr. Shivers. The FBI didn't consider that any of its business. 
It felt that it was purely a matter for naval intelligence. 

43. General Russell. Is there anything else that you want to tell 
us about those two maps ? 

Mr. Shivers. No, there is nothing else that I can tell you [3215'] 
about them. The maps speak for themselves. 

44. General Russell. Would you make those available to us ? 
Mr. Shi^t:rs. I would have to get permission, sir. 

45. General Russell. From FBI, in Washington? 
Mr. Shrters. Yes, sir. 

46. General Russell. Are copies of those maps in Washington? 
Mr. Siirv^Rs. Yes, sir. 

47. General Russell. With the entries that you have discussed with 
us this morning on them ? 

Mr. Shi\^rs. Yes, Sir. 

48. General Grunert. Where did those maps come from ? 

Mr. Shi\t:rs. These maps were delivered to me by the Office of Naval 
Intelligence. 

49. General Grunert. Do you know where they got them ? 

Mr. Shivers. They said they came from the Japanese submarines. 

50. General Grunert. From a destroyed or captured submarine ? 
Mr. Shivers. Submarine; yes, sir. 

51. General Grunert. And that was destroyed or captured on 7 
December, do you know ? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1671 

52. General Gruxert. In your deductions, you presumed then they 
kept these maps after they made a reconnaissance, and probably kept 
them too long, or did not expect to be captured; or, if they had all 
the information thereon, and it was gotten subsequent to the attack, or 
prior to the attack, then if they feared if they took any more action 
they might expect them to be destroyed or captured, they should have 
destroyed their maps ; hence, would it be a reasonable deduction that 
[3216] this happened on 7 December, or shortly prior thereto? 

• Mr. Shivers. I think the reasonable deduction is that these sub- 
marines were supposed to have either been inside the harbor at the 
time of the attack or out sufficiently close so that they could observe 
the results of the attack, because that is provided for in this code, 
here. One of the code words reads "Tora," which would mean, "Sur- 
prise attack successful." Another is "Tsui," which would mean "Num- 
ber enemy B (battleships seriously damaged," and the other words 
which would indicate the extent of the damage that was done by the 
attacking planes, "enemy aircraft carriers, ships seriously damaged," 
"number of enemy cruisers, ships seriously damaged," "enemy ships 
sunk," and so forth. 

53. General Grunert. Then if they had remained in the harbor, 
how could they have gotten this information to the task force without 
detection ? 

Mr. Shivers. I don't suppose they could have gotten it to the task 
force if they had remained in the harbor, without being detected, 
because certainly the harbor would have been blocked after the attack, 
and the only way they could have gotten that to the task force would 
have been to have surfaced and tried to get ashore. 

54. General Grunert. In view of what happened, this information 
would not be of much value to the submarine, unless they got it to 
that attacking task force, would it? 

Mr. Shivers. I wouldn't think so. 

55. General Grtjxert. All right. 

56. General Russell. I am going into something else, now, as a 
finale. Is there anything that anybody wants to bring up on [3217] 
this? 

57. General Grunert. I have a few questions on something, but you 
may cover it. 

58. General Russell. You are no longer with the FBI ? - 
Mr. SnnrERS. No, sir. 

59. General Russell. You had a number of years to observe the 
working of the plan by which the duties of the FBI, the Military In- 
telligence Division, and the ONI were all delineated by these agree- 
ments and whatnot? 

Mr. Shivers. I was with the FBI for 23i/^ years. 

60. General Russell. And you. were here on the island for some 
time ? 

Mr. Shivers. I was here from August 24, 1939, to May 6, 1943, in 
charge of the FBI office in Honolulu. 

61. General Russell. Is it your opinion that with the proper or- 
ganization, properly guided, information and data were available 
here on the island which might have indicated the possibility or prob- 
ability of Japanese attacks on the island ? 

Mr. Shivers. Will you repeat that? 



1G72 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

62. General Russell. Based on your experience, do you now think 
that data was available here on the island, if it could have been ob- 
tained, which would have indicated the probability or possibility of 
the Japanese attacks on the island, and about the time that they would 
be made ? In other words, if we had had the proper agencies operat- 
ing along independent lines, could we have discovered something here 
that would have given away the Japs' hand on this attack? That is 
the practical question. 

Mr. Shivers. I don't think you would have discovered [3218] 
anytliing that would have indicated that the Japanese were going to 
attack Pearl Harbor. If we had been able to get the messages that 
were sent to Japan by the Japanese consul, we would have known, or 
we could have reasonably assumed, that the attack would come, some- 
where, on December 7; because, if you recall, this system of signals 
that was devised by the Otto Kuhn for the Japanese consul general 
simply included the period from December 1 to December 6. 

63. General Russell. Suppose this submarine which went into 
Pearl Harbor and came out and prepared this map had been destroyed 
prior to December 7 and the map obtained, wouldn't that have been a 
rather fruitful source of information as to the possibility of an attack 
on Pearl Harbor? 

Mr. Shivers. If this map could have been obtained any time before 
December 7, why, I certainly would think it would have been very 
indicative of that fact. 

64. General Russell. This final question : Based on your experience 
here and your observation of the functioning of this cooperative plan 
between the three agencies that we have described already, and having 
in mind the necessity for the development of "combat intelligence," to 
use a rough term, what would be your recommendation as to future 
procedure along that line here in the Territory of Hawaii ? 

Mr. Shivers. Well, I would prefer, sir, not to answer that question 
off-hand. I think that I would have to give it some thought. 

65. General Russell. That is all I have. 

66. General Gruistert. During your incumbency in the office of the 
FBI, here, did you have any information that might have [3219'] 
been of value to the Army and the Navy, which you were not permitted 
to disclose to the Army or the Navy? 

Mr. Shivers. On the contrary, sir, I was directed to furnish the 
Army and the Navy with any and all information that came into my 
possession ; and I did. 

67. General Grunert. As to the alleged or suspected Japanese 
agents that were functioning in and about the Island of Oahu, do you 
attach any importance to the fact that they were not prosecuted under 
the Alien Registration Act? 

Mr. Shivers. You mean the consialar agents? 

68. General Grunert. Yes. 

Mr. Shivers. Do I attach any importance to the fact, in the light of 
subsequent events? 

69. General Grunert. Yes ; and if they had been prosecuted, what 
would have been the result in the line of causing any particular danger 
to the war effort — exciting the public, or whatnot? 

Mr. Shlv-ers. Well, there are several schools of thought on that. 
My organization felt they should be prosecuted, and recommended 
their prosecution to the Attorney General. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1G73 

70. General Fraxk. Wlio stopped it? 

Mr. Shivers. It was stopped by the War Department. 

71. General Grunert. Did they advance any reason for their not 
concurring in your recommendation? 

Mr. Snr^'ERS. They advanced the reasoning which General Short 
gave to the War Department for opposing their prosecution, and con- 
curred in his recommendation. 

72. General Kussell. All of that correspondence is in the files, 
here. 

73. General Grunert. Do you think it had any effect on what 
[3220] happened, or would it have hud any effect on what hap- 
pened, if they had been prosecuted? 

Mr. Shivers. I am satisfied the failure to prosecute had no effect 
whatsoever on what happened. 

74. General Grunert. Now, going into a different field, did the 
FBI have any special means of communication with Washington that 
was faster in transmission than the Army or Navy or the EGA or 
other commercial lines? 

Mr. Shi\:ers. We did not have any faster means of transmission, 
I don't suppose. We had our own radio station. 

[3221] 75. General Grunert. Approximately how long did it 
take you to get some of your messages through to Washington? 
Have you any estimate of that time ? 

Mr. Shivers. I would say within — depending on the length of the 
message ; a 20-word message could be probably gotten to Washington 
by— could have gotten to the receiving station in Washington within 
a period of twenty minutes. 

76. General Grunert. Were the channels jammed at any time? 
Was it better at night or day, early in the morning, late in the 
afternoon, or what? 

Mr. Shivers. No, our channels were not jammed at any time, 

77. General Grunert. What channels did you use? Your own 
radio ? 

Mr. Shivers. Our own radio, yes, sir. 

78. General Grunert. And was most of your stuff coded ? 

Mr. Shivers. We used a frequency that was assigned to us by the 
F. C. C, and all of the 

79. General Grunert. What I mean, all of your stuff was sent in 
code? 

Mr. Shivers. All of the stuff that went out from here to — that 
went out over that radio, was coded. 

80. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not that was in 
working shape on the morning of December the 7th ? 

Mr. Shivers. It was, yes, sir. 

81. General Grunert. And did you so use it ? 
Mr. SntVERS. It was, yes, sir. 

82. General Grunert. Then, any message that Washington wanted 
to get to you during that morning or just prior to the attack [3222] 
on that morning you think could have gotten to you within the leeway 
of an hour ? 

Mr, Shivers. The message could have been sent out within an hour, 
yes. Yes, sir. 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 3 5 



1674 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

83. General Gruxert. Was there an interchange of those facilities 
between the Army and Navy and the F. B. I. ? Could they use one 
another's equipment or frequency, or whatnot, if they so desired? 

Mr. Shr^rs. There had been no provisions worked out for such, 
but I had understood that after the F. B. I. radio was put up here, 
that in the event of war the Army might want to use it, and there 
would have been no objections interposed. 

84. General Grunert. But they hadn't used it up to that time ? 
Mr. Siin^RS. They had not, no, sir. 

85. General Gruxert. Nor had Washington used your facilities for 
either the Army or Navy ? 

Mr. Shivers. No, sir. 

86. General Gruxert. I have no other questions. 

87. Major Clausex. Mr. Shivers, you conducted, under your super- 
vision, investigation of one Hans Wilhelm Rohl, did you, sir? 

Mr. SHI^^RS. Yes, sir. 

88. Major Clausex. By the way, were you in charge during the 
rendition of reports bv Mr. John I. Condon commencing October 29, 
1942, and down to April 3, 1944? 

Mr. SHm:RS. I was not in charge after May 6, 1943. 

89. Major Clausex. I see. Well, now, I have here nine reports ren- 
dered by the F. B. I. at Honolulu, which include some that were 
rendered by Mr. Condon during the time that you were in [3223] 
charge. Do you know of any facts concerning this Hans Wilhelm 
Rohl, the subject of investigation, which would not be contained in 
these reports, Mr. Shivers ? 

Mr. Shivers. No, sir, I do not. 

90. Major Clausex. Do you know of any facts concerning the re- 
lated subject of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., that would not be in 
these reports ? 

Mr. Shivers. I don't know what is in those reports subsequent to 
the time I left here, but I am satisfied that I wouldn't know anything 
additional to what appears in the reports. 

91. Major Clausex. I have nothing furthet. 

92. Colonel Toulmix. I would like to ask him one question. What 
other means of communication did the Japanese consul have with the 
homeland and other than a telephone connection. 

Mr. Shivers. He had commercial communication system. 

93. Colonel Toulmix. Did you have any opportunity of tapping the 
commercial lines or of securing any information oif the commercial 
lines? 

Mr. Shivers. Off of the lines themselves. 
Colonel TouLaiix. Yes. 
Mr. SHT^^:RS. No, sir. 

95. Colonel Toulmix. So that he did have a free, undisturbed com- 
munication over those lines ? 

Mr. Shi\t:rs. Yes, sir. 

96. Colonel Toulmix. That is all. 

97. General Gruxert. Mr. Shivers, do you think of anything else 
that hasn't been brought up that j^ou think might be of assistance to 
this Board in carrying out its mission ? 

Mr. Shivers. No, sir, I don't. General. 

[3224-] 98. General Gruxert. We thank you for coming. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1675 

Ml*. Shivers. I would like to add one thing and make it distinctly 
understood that I did not present these maps and the information con- 
tained in them with any attempt to place the responsibility for what 
appears to me the maps indicate, on either the Navy or the Army. 
They were to some extent involuntarily produced, and I am satisfied 
the Navy has the originals of the maps, and certainly they have trans- 
lated the information appearing on the maps, and 1 assume that that 
information will be made available to the Naval Board if they want 
it. 

99. General Russell. Probably this statement should be made on 
the record. I was advised by G-2 of the Department that these maps 
were in the possession of Mr. Shivers, and when I contacted him I 
insisted that he make them available to the Board. He did not volun- 
teer, to voluntarily produce them ; I discovered that he had them, and 
asked for them. 

Mr. Shivers. Well, the Military Intelligence office here has known 
that we have had these maps ever since the day we got them, and as 
a matter of fact the maps were examined by Lieutenant Colonel George 
W. Bicknell, who was at that time Colonel Fielder's assistant, on the 
day the maps were turned over to us, which was sometime in January 
1942. 

Shall I ask for permission to file these maps with you ? 

100. General Kussell. I wish you would. Will they be delivered 
to us before we leave here, or will you want us to procure them from 
the office in Washington ? 

Mr. Shivers. I am satisfied that they can be made available to you 
within six hours. 

[32£5] 101. General Russell. From now ? 
Mr. Shivers. Yes, sir. 

102. General Russell. We would appreciate it if you would. 
Mr. Shivers. Will you be here tomorrow ? 

103. General Grunert. Yes. 

104. General Russell. Oh, yes, we shall be here tomorrow. 

105. General Grunert. Thank you very much for coming. We 
appreciate your assistance. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 
(Whereupon, at 12 : 38 p. m., the Board, having concluded the hear- 
ing of witnesses for the morning, took up the consideration of other 
business.) 

afternoon session 

• (The Board, at 1 o'clock p. m., continued the hearing of witnesses.) 
General Grunert. The Board will please come to order. 

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GEORGE ROBERT LUMSDEN, INSPECTOR 
GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT, CENTRAL PACIFIC BASE COMMAND, 
FORT SHAFTER, T. H. 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Major, will you please state to the Board your 
name, rank, organization and station? 

Major Lumsden. Major George R. Lumsden, Inspector General's 
Department, Central Pacific Base Command, Fort Shafter. 



1676 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

2. General Grunert. Major, General Frank, assisted by Major 
Clausen, will develop this part of the investigation, so I will turn it 
over to them. 

3. Major Clausen. Major Lumsden, your present assignment is in 
the office of the Inspector General ? 

Major Lumsden. Yes. I am the executive officer of the Base Com- 
mand,, Inspector General's office. 

4. Major Clausen. And you have been assigned to that office now 
and are on duty there for what period of time ? 

Major Lumsden. Since December 26th, 1941. 

5. Major Clausen. Did you at my request produce inspection re- 
ports from the official files of your office relating to the Hawaiian Con- 
structors, Hans Wilhelm Kohl, Colonel Theodore Wyman and related 
subjects? 

Major Lumsden. I did. 

6. Major Clausen. Are those reports represented by that stack sit- 
ting alongside your elbow ? 

[S££7] Major Lumsden. This is the pile that I brought to you. 

7. Major Clausen. And you are able to give certain information as 
to some of those reports, some being those on which you worked and 
some being merely those of which you may have some information 
which has come to you since, from other sources; is that correct? 

Major Lumsden. That is correct. 

8. Major Clausen. Those are all official records, are they ? 
Major Lumsden. They are. 

9. Major Clausen. Just indicate to the Board the one you hold in 
your hand, which you have just taken from the top. 

Major Lumsden. This first report classified "SECRET" is the 
report of inspection of Station X, Christmas Island. The inspection 
date was the 27th to the 30th of January, 1942 and the inspecting offi- 
cer was a member of the Corps of Engineers, Captain W. E. Wilhelm, 

10. Major Clausen. May I have it, please. I would like to read a 
portion of this for the record. This is the only one in which I am 
going to follow this practice, but I would like to read a portion of the 
report contained in the record referred to by the witness, which was 
submitted by Lieutenant Colonel Leard, I. G. D. Will you tell me 
who Lieutenant Colonel Leard was on the 19th of February, 1942 ? 

Major Lumsden. As I recall. Colonel Leard was sent to our office on 
an attached basis, I believe, for a short period. I think he remained 
there perhaps from four to six weeks. Subsequent to that I believe he 
became post commander at Fort Shafter. 

11. Major Clausen. This is the portion that I am reading: 
[S^^S] (Analysis of Report of Inspection of Station X, dated 

February 19, 1942, from the files of Fort Shafter Inspector General's 
Department, is as follows:) 

19 Febeuary, 1942. 
Memorandum for Colonel Lathe B. Row. 
Subject : Analysis of Report of Inspection of Station X. 

1. An analysis of the report of inspection of Station "X", made by Captain 
W. E. Wilhelm, C. E. shows : 

a. That conditions at Station "X" are very bad. 

b. That these conditions are entirely due to the fault of the District 
Engineer. 

2. The following specific failures of the District Engineer are indicated : 

a. Material for assembling various types of tanks were sent, but no hardware, 
valve fittings, etc. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1677 

b. A ship load of lumber was sent, but no door jambs, window jambs, door 
sci'eens, etc. 

c. Insufficient laundry facilities have been provided. 

d. Insufficient motor transportation has been provided. 

e. Insufficient heavy machinery has been provided. 

f. Insufficient messing and cooking equipment has been provided for personnel. 

g. Necessary quantities of asphalt, plumbing material, electrical material, 
hardware, sinks, showers, lights, fans, and furniture have not been provided. 

[3229] 3. The following conditions have been permitted to exist without 
apparent remedial action : 

a. Sanitary conditions are very bad. 

b. No effort has been made to provide adequate living conditions for personnel. 

c. Apparently no effort has been made to provide recreation and comforts. 

d. The Navy has been permitted to take over Pan-Air facilities and Hotel, 
and the engineers operate a mess for the Navy and perform all their chores. 

e. The medical officer has not been required to fully perform his duties. 

4. The following indicates that the work of the engineers has not been satis- 
factory : 

a. Too much time is required for the construction of runways. 

b. Runways and bays are not properly completed. 

c. Radio equipment is left unpacked and untried, and some equipment is out 
of order. 

d. One laundry is not in operating condition. 

e. No effort has been made to provide the work camp with water. 

f. No apparent effort has been made to utilize the filters and purifying appara- 
tus of the Pan-Air Station. 

5. The above resume taken from the report submitted by Captain Wilhelm to 
the office of the District Engineer indicates that a very bad state of affairs exists 
at Station X, and that this state of affairs can be attributed [3230] only 
to lack of proper supervision and competent personnel from the office of the 
District Engineer. ' 

E. W. Leaed, 
Lt. Col. I. G. D. 

What Avas Station X, Major Liimsden? 

Major LuMSDEN. I assume it was Christmas Island from the nota- 
tion on the fact of the report. 

12. Major Clausex. And who was Colonel Lathe B. Row on the 
19thof February, 1942? 

Major LuMSDEN. Colonel Lathe B. Row was the Inspector General 
of the HaAvaiian Department at that time. 

13. Major Clausen. And who was the District Engineer on that 
date?_ 

Major LuMSDEN. The District Engineer was Colonel Wyman. 

14. Major Clausen. Theodore Wyman, Junior ? 
Major LuMSDEN. Theodore Wyman, Junior. 

15. Major Clausen. Now, will you take the next report and tell me 
what that is ? 

16. General Grunert. Just a minute. Was the Commanding Officer 
responsible, or the District Engineer, who apparently is alleged to be 
responsible for those conditions? Did he have a chance to reply to 
this sort of accusation about inefficiency and so forth? 

Major LuivisDEN. Sir, I have no record or any knowledge of what 
happened to that particular report. 

17. General Grunert. Is not that the usual case of an inspector's 
report, that it goes to the man in question, who explains why and tells 
them what has taken place to remedy things ? 

Major LuMSDEN. Yes, sir ; that is true. 

\3231'] 18. General Grunert. But you do not know if that 
record shows that that went to Colonel Wyman and his answer to 
these things appears therein? 



1678 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Major LuMSDEN. No, sir, there is no indorsement on that record to 
show that Colonel Wyman replied, sir, to the basic communication 
of Colonel Leard. 

19. General Gkunert. Do you know whether or not Colonel Wyman 
was acquainted with the things found and did he have recourse of 
any kind? 

Major LuMSDEN. His own officer, Captain Wilhelm, made the in- 
spection, and I presume that that inspection report was first given 
to Colonel Wyman, since it was one of his own men. I presume he 
was a Corps of Engineers officer who made the report. 

20. General Grunert. But you do not know ? 

Major LuMSDEN. No, sir, I do not knoM\ May I clarify that, sir? 
Captain Wilhelm, later Major Wilhelm, remained with the District 
Engineers' headquarters. That is why I cannot understand just how 
that report first came out, what record, because I am certain at that 
time he was one of Colonel Wyman's own officers. 

21. General Grunert. It seems strange to me that an accusation or 
an indictment of that sort should be contained in the record without 
any comeback from the man who is indicted. As far as that record 
shows there was no comeback from Wyman, and nobody appears to 
know whether he knows anything about that particular report. 

Major LuMSDEN. Yes, sir; that was completely unfamiliar to me. 
I merely got it from the records. 

22. Major Clasen. Sir, the evidence before the Board already 
\^3232'\ contains evidence by Colonel Row to the effect that he 
did make inspections and present them to Colonel Wyman, and 
Colonel Wyman promised to make corrections of irregularities and 
deficiencies. That report was the report produced before the Board 
at San Francisco. 

23. General Grunert. But you do not know whether Colonel Row 
referred to this particular report? 

24. Major Clausen. No, sir. He suggested, sir, if you recall, 
that he did not have the reports there, that we could get them at 
Honolulu. So I have asked Major Lumsden to bring over to the 
Board whatever reports he had. These are now the reports we are 
having presented. 

25. General Russell. This file appears to me to be a lot of state- 
ments of fact, opinion, or whatnot, over the signature of a Captain 
Wilhelm, and Colonel Leard has taken that and digested it. 

Major Lumsden. Yes, sir, I believe that is right, 

26. General Russell. Leard did not go down there and make 
these inspections at all? 

Major LuTNiSDEN. To my knowledge, sir, he did not leave on any 
trips during the short stay he had with us. 

27. General Russell. As I recall, Leard is the man who made some 
inspection of the operation here on the island. 

28. Major Clausen. Yes, sir, I think he made the inspection of 
February 14th, 1942. 

May 1 suggest to the Board that I mark this Lumsden A and I 
will mark the others with the succeeding alphabetical letters. 
- What is the next report you hold in your hands. Major? 

Major Lumsden. The next one is a confidential report, which 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1679 

[32SS] is a momorandum dated 14 February, 1912, to the Chief 
of Staff from Colonel Lathe B. Kow, I. G. D., Department Inspector 
General on that date. 

29. Major Clausen. Could you tell the Board exactly what you 
recall concerning the circumstances of the rendition of that report? 

Major LuMSDEN. There is very little that I personally know of it, 
except that I do recall Colonel Kow calling us in the office, in his 
office, and the matter appeared quite important to him, because he 
made a list of the number of copies of the report that was typed 
and made an inquiry around the office to ascertain whether there 
were any loose copies about, and when he had us in his office he 
discussed this report which was made by Colonel Leard, and then 
the report, as I recall, was personally taken by Colonel Row to the 
Chief of Staff; possibly he saw General Emmons on that occasion. 

30. Major Clausen. For the record, that is a report which was 
introduced in evidence at San Francisco, copy of which was set forth 
in the F. B. I. file, which I have authenticated with the evidence 
of Colonel Row. 

31. General Grunert. That does not identify it to me. What 
is it about? 

32. Major Clausen. Shall I read it? 

33. General Grunert. I want the gist of it. 

34. Major Clausen. The gist of it was highly derO;gatory to 
Colonel Wyman. It stated some conditions that existed with respect 
to his office and wound up by recommending that Colonel Wyman 
be relieved as District Engineer at once. 

35. General Grunert. I recall it now. 

[S2S4-] 36. Major Clausen. And coincident, sir, with the date 
of this report, which is February 14th, 1942, the I3oard may recall a 
letter was introduced in evidence, bearing the same date, from Colonel 
Lyman to the Chief of Engineers as suggesting that Colonel Wyman 
be relieved. That letter was then followed b}^ a subsequent letter to 
the same effect, but in more affirmative language. 

If the Board has no objection I will mark this Lumsden B. 

[S2S6] 37. Major Clausen. What is the next report, sir? 

Major Lumsden. This next is a compilation of all matters pertain- 
ing to the Engineers and Hawaiian Constructors which we had in 
our files shortly before the departure of Colonel Row in March of 
1943 from this area. I compiled these data for Colonel Row at his 
request. 

38. Major Clausen. That was compiled under your supervision, 
w^as it? 

Major Lumsden. Yes, it was. In fact, I think I did it, all of it. 

39. Major Clausen. May I have it, please ? I will mark this volume 
Lumsden C. 

40. General Frank. What about it? 

41. 'Major Clausen. It is a compilation of various data that is 
from the I. G. office, that I haven't had a chance to read. 

Now, what is the next report that you have there, sir? 

Major Lumsden. This report is entitled, "Transfer of activities 
from the CQM to USED, request for Inspector General." 



1680 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

42. Major Clausen. Did you have anything to do with that, Major 
Lumsden ? 

Major Ltjmsden. I did not. 

43. Major Clausen. I will mark that Lumsden D. 
Tell me what the next report is, Major. 

Major Lumsden. This next is a confidential file: "Correspondence 
and papers relating to report of investigation of construction activi- 
ties, Hawaiian Department, made hj Colonel John E. Hunt, IGD, 
Office of the Inspector General, Washington, D. C., relative to activi- 
ties of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., CE, formerly District Engineer, 
Hawaiian Department." 

\_3236'\ 44. Major Clausen. And did you have anything to» do 
with that, Major? 

Major Lumsden. I gave Colonel Hunt several bits of information 
during his stay here while he was conducting the investigation. 
Colonel Hunt saw several of our reports. 

45. Major Clausen. You also, did you not, in addition to assisting 
Colonel Hunt, assisted the local Bureau of Investigation, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, in some of their activities and reports on 
these same subjects. 

Major Lumsden. I did. 

46. Major Clausen. May I have that, please? I will mark that 
Lumsden E. 

Will you take the next and explain what th^t is ? 

Major Lumsden. This next is a report of investigation and allied 
papers, the subject of the investigation being, "Eeport of investigation 
of allegations charging slow-down on defense construction work per- 
formed by the USED." The date of the investigation report is 18 
November 1942. It was addressed to the Commanding General, 
Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H. It was made by Lieuten- 
ant Colonel Edward H. O'Rourke, IGD, then Assistant Department 
Inspector General. 

47. Major Clausen. I will mark that Lumsden F. 
And explain what the next one is, please. 

Major Lumsden. This next file is titled, "Investigation of accounts 
of Zone Constructing Quartermaster, Hawaii, and the Office of the 
District Engineer, Honolulu, T. H." Also appearing on the cover 
of this report or this file is, "Complaint of Lieutenant Colonel C. J. 
Harold, QMC." 

48. Major Clausen. Did you have anything to do with that. Major? 
[3237^ _ Major Lumsden. I did not. 

49. Major Clausen. May I have it, please? And I will mark that 
Lumsden G. 

Will you explain what the next one is, please ? 

Major Lumsden. This next is sworn testimony of Clinton J. Harold, 
Lieutenant Colonel, Quartermaster Corps, and I believe is testimony 
which is also in the file just previously handed to you. 

50. Major Clausen. Did you have anything to do with this? 
Major Lumsden. I did not. 

• 51. Major Clausen. I will mark it Lumsden H. 

Explain what the next one is, please. 

Major Lu]msden. This next file I believe is a copy of the one I 
previously handed to you, which was the report of investigation into 
the allegations charging slow-down of defense construction work 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1681 

performed by the USED, which investigation was made by Lieuten- 
ant Colonel b'Kourke, IGD. 

52. Major Clausen. If that is a copy, just put that to one side, and 
we won't put that in the record. 

Did you have an3^thing to do with that inspection? 
Major LtJMSDEN. I did not. 

53. Major Clausen. All right. Will you explain what the next 
one is? 

Major LuMSDEN. This is a copy [indicating]. This next file is 
titled, "Investigation relative to Mr. H. W. Kohl, member of joint 
venture as contractor for Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu," and 
there are allied papers appended to it. 

54. Major Clausen. Did you have anything to do with that investi- 
gation. Major ? 

[3238] Major LuMSDEN. I did. 

55. Major Clausen. Explain to the Board what part you played 
in the preparation of the report and also the investigation. 

Major LuMSDEN. May I clarify that? As far as investigation con- 
cecrning Mr. Rohl, I assisted in securing data pertaining to the sale 
of his equipment to the Government while he was a member of Ha- 
waiian Constructors. That is the extent — and also one other investi- 
gation wherein certain members of Hawaiian Constructors and the 
USED secured Government gasoline for their own private vehicles. 
This report that I have just mentioned consists of a letter from Lieu- 
tenant Colonel H. B. Nurse, Corps of Engineers, dated April 2, 1942, 
wherein Colonel Nurse transmitted certain copies of correspondence 
which I had requested of him, in the District Engineer's office. This 
correspondence consisted of — do you want all that ? Would you like 
allof that, Major? 

56. Major Clausen. You might briefly just state to the Board what 
it consists of. 

Major LuMSDEN. It consisted of a letter or several letters pertain- 
ing to the status of citizenship of Mr. H. W. Rohl. 

57. Major Clausen. May I have that, please? I will mark this 
Lumsden I. 

Would you explain what the next report is, please ? 
Major Lumsden. This next file is an additional copy of testimony of 
Colonel Harold. 

58. Major Clausen. Well, if we already have it, just put it to one 
side. 

Major Lumsden. I don't have to state it? 

[3239] 59. Major Clausen. No, sir. 

Major Lumsden. This next file pertains to the Precision Grinding 
case. 

60. Major Clausen. Tell the Board, in a few words, if you had 
anything to do with that and, if so, just what you know about that 
case. 

Major Lumsden. I recall its being discussed in the office, but I don't 
recall any positive action being taken. I believe the F. B. I. had 
something to do with this inasmuch as there is a letter in this file 
dated 9 July 1943 to Colonel Millard Pierson, Department Inspector 
General, Fort Shafter, Oahu, T. H., from Mr. J. E. Thornton, Special 
Agent in charge of the local office of the Federal Bureau of Investi- 
gation. 



1682 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

61. Major Clausen. What was the controversy there? What was 
the point involved, Major? 

Major LuMSDEN. The point involved, as I recall it, was that the 
Engineers paid far too much for this business. There were several 
appraisals made. One was exceedingly low, which was made by Mr. 
Mahoney, who was still affiliated with the USED as a shop superin- 
tendent. The whole question involved the price that the USED was 
paying for this. 

62. Major Clausen. Paying whom. Major? 

Major LuMSDEN, Paying the owners of the business, the president 
and director of which was Mr. Henry H. Gaylord of Honolulu. 

63. Major Clausen. May I have it, please? I will mark that 
Lumsden J. 

Tell the Board what the next file is, please. 

[3^4-0] Major Lumsden. This next file pertains to the reported 
questionable business practices of Mr. Harry A. Hart and contains 
a newspaper clipping from the Honolulu Advertiser dated 12 Febru- 
ary 1942, the title of the clipping being "Fraudulent Pay Claim 
Charged." 

64. Major Clausen. May I have that, please? I will mark that 
Lumsden K. 

What is the next file ? 

Major Lumsden. This next file is titled, "Report of investigation 
of employee's complaint, 13th field area," and in parentheses, "Mr, 
Fred M. Lewis." 

65. Major Clausen. Did you have anything to do with that. 
Major? 

Major Lumsden. I had nothing to do with this. 

66. Major Clausen. May I have it, please ? Mark that Lumsden L. 
Tell the Board what the next one is, please. 

Major Lumsden. This next file contains data pertaining to the 
complaints of a Mr. John H. Paluszak who, at the time he made the 
complaint, was a civil service employee of the District Engineer. I 
know nothing of the circumstances surrounding this complaint. 

67. Major Clausen. May I have that, please? I will mark this 
Lumsden M. 

Tell the Board about the next one. 

Major Lumsden. This next is a special report on the Pleasanton 
Hotel, Honolulu, T. H. The report is dated 7 January 1943. It was 
addressed to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort 
Shafter, T. H., through the District [3^41] Engineer and 
Hawaiian Constructors, Punahou Campus, Honolulu, T. H. 

68. Major Clausen. In a few words. Major, what was the point 
of that investigation concerning the Pleasanton Hotel ? 

Major Lumsden. There had been much discussion as to the need 
for the continued lease of this hotel. We had made several pre- 
liminary inspections, the first of which, soon after the hotel was occu- 
pied by Engineer and Hawaiian Constructor personnel, revealed the 
hotel to be operating at a decided loss, and it appeared at that time 
that it was unnecessary, as the main occupants were Colonel Wyman 
and his wife, and several other officers and their wives and families. 

69. Major Clausen. Mr. Rohl? Do you remember? 

Major Lumsden. I remember later, and perhaps it was at this time, 
when Mr. Rohl had his name on the hotel list as having six rooms. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1683 

70. Major Clausen. May I have that report, please? Mark it 
Liimsden N. 

Tell the Board, please, what the next is. 

Let me first ask you, though, whether you had anything to do with 
this investigation of the Pleasanton Hotel. 

Major LuMSDEN. I believe I made that one. 

This next file contains miscellaneous complaints and investigations. 
It is File No. IG 333.5. 

Is that all ? 

71. Major Clausen. Did you have anything to do with the com- 
plaints that refer to any of the matters that we are investigating? 

Major Lumsden. I don't believe there would be anything [324^] 
in here that I had to do with that would assist jou. 

72. Major Clausen. All right. May I have that, please? I will 
mark that Lumsden O. 

What is the next, please ? 

Major Lumsden. The next is entitled, "Report of investigation re 
irregularities in office of 14th Field Area, USED, Pearl City, T. H., 23 
May 1942." 

73. Major Clausen, Did you have anything to do with that. Major? 
Major Lumsden. I had nothing to do with this particular trans- 
action. 

74. Major Clausen. May I have it, please? Mark that Lums- 
den P. 

Major Lumsden. This next file is a report of an investigating officer 
appointed to investigate lost secret drawings at Hilo, Hawaii. 

75. Major Clausen. Did you have anything to do with that? 
Major Lumsden. I had nothing to do with this. 

76. Major Clausen. Let me have that, please. Mark that Lums- 
den Q. 

Explain what the next is, please. 

Major Lumsden. This next file contains reports of inspection made 
by the Inspector General's Department in this area for the fiscal year 
1942. 

77. Major Clausen. Fiscal year 1942 covers what period, Major? 
Major Lumsden. From 1941, July, to June 30, 1942. 

78. Major Clausen. And did you have something to do with those 
inspections ? 

y32Jf3] Major Lumsden. I see here that several of my inspections 
are contained in this file, one of them being the report of annual general 
inspection of the transportation section, USED ; another one the report 
of annual general inspection of the reproduction plant, USED, and a 
special report of the District Engineer's real estate section. The 
other officers listed on this mdex to this file, and who made the reports, 
are 1st Lieutenant Elmer Cook, Lieutenant Colonel E. B. Wliisner, 
Colonel Kow, Lieutenant Colonel Millard Pierson, Captain A, G. 
Fisher, and Lieutenant Colonel H. F. Newell. 

79. Major Clausen. Mark that Lumsden R. 
Tell the Board what the next is, please. 

Major Lumsden. The next file is a report of investigation relative 
to the illegal issue of gasoline by Hawaiian Constructors. The report 
of investigation dated 3 May 1942 was addressed to the Commanding 
General, Hawaiian Department. 



1684 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

80. Major Clausen. Did j^ou have anything to do with that, Major? 
Major LuMSDEN". I materially assisted Lieutenant Colonel Newell 

with this investigation. 

81. Major Clausen. May I have that, please? Mark that Lums- 
den S. 

Tell the Board what the next is, please. 

Major LuMSDEN. This next file is titled, "Alleged improper conduct 
of a Government employee by misappropriation of meal tickets." It 
is a report of investigation dated 2 August 1942, to the Commanding 
General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H. The investiga- 
tion was conducted by Edward H. O'Kourke, Lieutenant Colonel, IGD, 
and was based on ' \32^Jf\ a memorandum from me to the In- 
spector General, Headquarters, Hawaiian Department. 

82. Major Clausen, May I have that, please? I will mark this 
Lumsden T. 

Will you tell the Board what the next is ? 

Major Lumsden. The next file is a report — is relative to the use of 
passenger cars by the Area Engineer on the Island of Hawaii. 

83. Major Clausen. Did you make that or have anything to do 
with the report? 

Major Lumsden. I had nothing to do with this. 

84. Major Clausen. May I have it, please ? I will mark it Lumsden 
U. 

Tell the Board, please, what the next is. 

Major Lumsden. The next document I have appears to be a letter 
to Hawaiian Constructors from J. Russell Cades of the law firm of 
Smith, Wild, Beebe & Cades, who was justifying the pay he received 
from the Government for the lost services he rendered Hawaiian 
Constructors. 

85. Major Clausen. May I have that, please? I will mark that 
Lumsden V. 

What is the next, Major Lumsden ? 

860. Major Clausen. From whom is the letter, Major? 

Major Lumsden. This next document appears to be another letter 
to Hawaiian Constructors setting forth the exact amount of time ap- 
plied to duties with Hawaiian Constructors. 

Major Lumsden. From Mr. J. Eussell Cades of Smith, Wild, Beebe 
& Cades. 

87. Major Clausen. All right. I will attach that to Lumsden V. 
{32If5'\ What is the next folder you have there? 

Major Lumsden. The next folder is entitled, "Routing slip endorse- 
ment relative to change in procedure in approving construction con- 
tract and changes thereto." 

88. Major Clausen. Did you have anything to do with that? 
Major Lumsden. I had nothing to do with it. 

89. Major Clausen. I shall mark that Lumsden W. 
What is the next, please ? 

Major Lumsden. The next is entitled, "City and Comity contract," 
and appears to be a contract entered into by the City and County of 
Honolulu with the U. S. Department Engineer Office, Honolulu, T. H. 

90. Major Clausen. I will mark that Lumsden X. 
What is the next folder, please? 

Major Lumsden. The next folder contains testimony of Robert J. 
Fleming, Jr., Major, GSC, Corps of Engineers. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1685 

91. Major Clausen. Did you have anything to do with getting that ? 
Major LuMSDEN. I had nothing to do with this. Also included in 

this folder is district circular No. 104, the United States Engineer 
Office, Honolulu, T. H., appended to which is a letter the subject of 
which is authorizations for emergency projects, which was signed by 
Walter C. Short, Major General, U. S. Army, then Commanding Gen- 
eral of the Hawaiian Department. Also appended to the first letter 
of General Short is a second one with the same subject. Both letters 
are addressed to the District Engineer, United States Engineer Office, 
Honolulu, T. H. 

92. Major Clausen. I will mark that Lumsden Y. 
l^£4S] What is the next folder, jNIajor ? 

Major Lumsden. It is another one of those duplicates. 

93. Major Clausen. Just put that to one side, then. What is the 
next folder'^ 

Major Lumsden. The next folder is titled, "Payment of salaries 
to administrative personnel of Hawaiian Constructors by the USED." 

94. Major Ci^ausen. Did you have anything to do with its prepara- 
tion 'i 

Major Lumsden. I believe I was in on several discussions concerning 
whether or not the local office of the Hawaiian Constructors was a 
branch office of the parent concern on the mainland. 1 did not write 
any of the notes in that folder. 

95. Major Clausen. I will mark this Lumsden Z. 
What is the next folder, please ^ 

Major Lumsden. The next folder is entitled, ''Complaints by em- 
ployees of the Hawaiian Constructors." 

96. Major Clausen. Did you have anything to do with its prepara- 
tion? 

Major Lumsden. I had nothing to do with that. 

97. Major Clausen. I will mark that Lumsden AA. 
What is the next one, please ? 

Major Lumsden. The next folder is entitled, "Report of investiga- 
tion from contact office, Honolulu, relative to conditions in Hawaii 
wdth reference to Government contractors. Big Five Naval Con- 
tractors; Thomas L. Fowler, complainant." I had nothing to do with, 
the material in this folder. 

98. Major Clausen. I will mark that Lumsden BB. 
What is the next, please ? 

[324,7] Major Lumsden. The next one is entitled, "Conduct of 
employers, Hawaiian Constructors." I had nothing to do with the 
material in this folder, 

99. Major Clausen. I will mark that Lumsden CC. 
What is the next, please ? 

Major Lumsden. The next file is a special report on the Department 
Engineer's 4th Field Area, Waimea, Kauai, T. H. 

100. Major Clausen. Did you have anything to do with that? 
Major Lumsden. I did not, 

101. Major Clausen, I will mark that Lumsden DD, 
Major Lumsden, This is a duplicate, Kauai, 

102. Major Clausen, All right. 

Major Lumsden. The next folder contains information relative to 
the inspection of priority work being performed at Kaneohe Bay 
area and Kuhuku under the supervision of the District Engineer. 



1686 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK « 

Inspection conducted by the Department Inspector General on 14, 15 
December 1941. 

103. Major Clausen. May I have that, please? Did you have 
anything to do with this ? 

Major Lir&iSDEN. I did not. 

104. Major Clausen. I will mark that Lumsden EE. 

Major Lumsden. The next file contains the complaint of Mr. 
Kobert Hoffman, who was, at the time he made the complaint, an 
area superintendent on the pay roll of Hawaiian Constructors. 

105. Major Clausen. I will mark that Lumsden FF. 
Did you have anything to do with that ? 

Major Lumsden. I did not. 

106. Major Clausen. What is the next, please? 

Major Lumsden. The next contains the report of informal 
[3248] investigation relative to the absence of Major J. A. Ostrand, 
Corps of Engineers, from Christmas Island. 

107. Major Clausen. Did you have anything to do with the prepa- 
ration of that ? 

Major Lumsden. I did not. 

108. Major Clausen. I will mark that Lumsden GG. 
What is the next, please? 

Major Lumsden. The next is a compilation of notes which I per- 
sonally made and which is not included in the oflEicial files of our 
section. This is a bunch of notes which I retained for my own per- 
sonal file, pertaining to the sale to the Government of Rohl-Connolly 
Company equipment. I assisted the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
in obtaining certain data pertaining to this transaction. 

109. Major Clausen. Is that the report that involves Mr. Parker 
as an appraiser ? Maurice Parker? Do you recall? 

Major Lumsden. I believe that is the report. 

110. Major Clausen. All right. We will mark this Lumsden HH. 
Do you have any more, sir? 

Major Lumsden. This one is District Engineer classified documents. 
I don't know whether you want that or not. It is just a list of — it 
may assist you in knowing the type of work they had. 

111. Major Clausen. Well, just let me have it, then, and I will 
mark that Lumsden II. 

Major Lumsden. And these are copies (indicating). 

112. Major Clausen. Major, were you at my request asked to 
ascertain the basis of a report which the Board received that Colonel 
Wyman in the spring of 1942 was supposed to have stated, [S2i9] 
in the presence of three other officers, after an evening of drinking. 

There are pi-obably a great many things that I have done during my life 
that are not exactly right, but there is one thing I have not done and that is 
to sell out my country the way that s. o. b. Rohl did to his German friends. 
I should never have trusted him, and what I should do now is to take this 
service revolver, go out and shoot him, and then blow my own brains out. 

Did you ever find any records concerning that statement? 
Major Lumsden. I did not. 

113. Major Clausen. Now, you told me something about the Moana 
Hotel. Did you have reports concerning the Moana Hotel and drink- 
ing by Colonel Wyman ? 

Major Lumsden. There was much hearsay about the campus at 
Punahou which came to my attention to the effect that Mr. Rohl, 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1687 

who maintained, as I am told, an apartment at the Moana Hotel in 
addition to his room at the Pleasanton Hotel, had frequent parties 
where he became quite intoxicated, and it was also rumored that 
Colonel Wyman occasionally attended those parties. 

[S250] 114. Major Clausen. Do you know anything concerning 
the letter that was sent from Colonel Lyman, dated February 14, 
1942, to General Keybold, suggesting that Colonel Wyman be relieved ? 

Major LuMSDEN. I know nothing of that letter. 

115. Major Clausen. That is all. 

116. General Grunert. Major, have you anything else that you 
think would be of value to the Board in its determination or conclu- 
sions, as to its mission? Is there anything else you want to tell the 
Board? 

Major LuMSDEN. Sir, I have nothing. 

117. General Grunert. Thank you very much. 
Major LuMSDEN. Thank you, sir. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

TESTIMONY OF ANGUS M. TAYLOE, JUNIOR, CAPTAIN, COAST 

ARTILLERY 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Captain, will you please state to the Board your 
name, rank, organization, and station. 

Captain Taylor. Angus M. Taylor, Junior; Captain, Coast Artil- 
lery ; and I am presently stationed at the Office of Internal Security, 
in Honolulu, T. H., as part of the Pacific Ocean Area Staff. 

2. General Gbunert. Captain, I am going to turn you over to Gen- 
eral Russell, who has this particular, special part of the investigation, 
that we think you. may be able to offer some facts on, or leads to facts, 
to the Board. 

Captain Taylor. Very well, sir. 

3. General Grunert. General Russell. 

[S251] 4. General Russell. Captain, we have just discussed 
your testimony before the Roberts Commission, and attempted to 
bring the material parts of it in line with present-day conditions, is 
that true ? 

Captain Taylor. That is correct, sir. 

5. General Russell. In that conversation, you stated to me that in 
your opinion the prosecution or failure to prosecute the consular 
agents played no part in what happened here on December 7, 1941? 

Captain Taylor. That is correct, sir ; and may i. make one addi- 
tional statement? 

6. General Russell. Yes. 

Captain Taylor. That we did not have those facts available on 
December 7 or immediately subsequent to that time; only a few of 
those consular agents had been investigated, so that the remaining 
number were unknown quantities, and their loyalty was also unknown. 
We didn't know to what extent they had engaged in activities for the 
consul. 

7. General Russell. That is, subsequent investigations convinced 
you that the activities of this large number of consular agents, in so 
far as they related to military operations, were harmless ? 



1688 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Taylor. That is correct, sir. With the exception of one, 
there was nothing found to indicate that any of these 234 sub-consular- 
agents had collected any data that had even tended to relate to 
military activities or naval activities in the territory. 

8. General Russell. Now, in your testimony before the Roberts 
Commission, as I recall, there was some rather pointed criticism of the 
then cooperative plan existing between the FBI, the ONI, [S£5'2] 
and the MID. Have you had occasion to observe the functioning of 
those agencies since that time ? 

Captain Taylor. I have, General ; and up until September 16, 1943, 
I was the United States Attorney for the District of Hawaii and was 
closely connected with the district intelligence office of the Navy, the 
G-2 counter-intelligence office, working out there, and the FBI, that 
was working in a limited capacity as far as investigative work was 
concerned. They were assisting him more or less after February or 
March 1942. 

9. General Russell. Have you any suggestions to make as to the 
plan which should be in effect here, which would have for its purpose 
obtaining combat information? 

Captain Taylor. Well, I don't know just to what extent we would 
be able to collect — that is, when I say "we," any of the agencies — would 
be able to collect combat information, but in counter-intelligence work 
in the territory, I think it is oiily basic and sound that one organiza- 
tion should be the central clearing house for all information, and the 
main responsibility put on the head of that organization, so that there 
would not be a duplication of effort, and so that if anything were in 
the air it would be known by all agencies and could be worked out. 

We should not have to stop because something was committed on 
the naval reserve or a military reserve or down-town, or be limited in 
any way ; and we had peculiar things happening back in the old days, 
because the Navy would investigate their difficulties within the yard 
and handle Japanese suspects in the yard and outside, the Army would 
handle their own personnel and certain problems, the FBI at first 
were not equipped, in 1939 and 1940. Later on them became equipped, 
and assumed, if they were not designated, the principal agency as far 
as [32S3] espionage and sabotage work is concerned. 

10. General Russell. What do you think of a civil agency and its 
equipment to collect information for the Navy or the Army, without 
the immediate supervision of military or naval personnel? 

Captain Taylor. Well, it is a very difficult question to answer. Gen- 
eral • but I will endeavor to do it, because it covers an enormous field. 
I mi'oht go back. When I first came to Honolulu in 1935, 1 was with 
the FBI,*'and in tliose days the district intelligence officer of the Navy 
was one commander and a yeoman, and the G-2 office, m those days 
General Patton was over here as G-2. Colonel Patton was G-2, and 
I think he had two officers and three or four enlisted men, and naturally 
they leaned toward the civil agencies, that had already gone mto the 
field of fingerprinting, crime detection, and preventmg crime, and 
other scientific methods of handling things. They wanted that back- 
oTound, so they would lean on the civilian agencies, and as we come 
alono- we find that even up as late as 1939 and 1940, the naval and 
Army investigative agencies were in serious cases leaning on a civil 
agency which had :i great deal more experience, although the Array 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARAIY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1689 

and the Navy both at that time were enlarging tlieir investigative per- 
sonnel, and establishing sound, experienced men in positions to carry 
on investigative work, but whether or not a civilian investigative out- 
fit similar to the FBI should function independently of the Army or 
Navy in an area, and especially a theater of war — well, there is cer- 
tainly a great question in my mind. 

As I remember it, early in March 1942, under a state of martial law, 
and after we were well in the war, here, the FBI was relieved of all 
responsibility; that is, of being the main \_32oIf\ organization 
to handle espionage, sabotage, and related investigations; and it was 
put on the Army and Navy, and the}^ were assisted by the FBI, but only 
in that manner. 

11. General Russell. General Grunert, I think those are the only 
subjects that the Captain and I agreed would be material for us to 
discuss at this time, unless some other Members of the Board have 
questions on something. 

12. General Grunert. I have one or two. Referring to this lack of 
prosecution of these Japanese agents for failure to register under the 
Alien Registration Act, was any of that due to politics or so-called 
"diplomacy" ? 

Captain Taylor. I think it would be well — and probably it never 
did get in the Roberts Commission record — to tell this Board just how 
the thing terminated. 

13. General Grunert. Good. Go ahead. 

Captain Taylor. And it was not because of General Short's recom- 
mendation solely that these sub consular agents were not prosecuted, 
but it was bickered back and forth, and it is true that General Short 
did make a recommendation against prosecution, because it was incon- 
sistent with his propaganda program that was then under way to win 
over the Japanese — a kind of an Americanization program in the 
territory — but when the General, through the Secretary of War, 
advised the Attorney General of the United States that he would 
recommend strongly against prosecution of these sub consular agents 
and recommended a warning, the Department of Justice then wrote to 
me and suggested four or five different ways that they might be 
handled. Among the ways that they might be handled was, that no 
action be taken at this particular time, no warning be [3265] 
given, and that we make further investigations to determine whether 
or not there were any more serious crimes connected with their activi- 
ties which we didn't know at that time. As I have already testified, 
that seemed to appeal to me more than any of the rest of the suggested 
plans. Some of the other plans were, to give them a warning, on 30 
days, to register ; if they didn't, at that time, to prosecute them ; and 
other plans ; so that was along in October. 

In view of the seriousness of the whole situation then in existence in 
the Pacific I asked the Attorney General if I might come to Washing- 
ton and discuss the matter with him, and when the war broke out on 
the 7th, the matter was still being held in abeyance by the Department 
of Justice and by my office and the criminal division of the Depart- 
ment of Justice, and it was out of the hands — true, there was a recom- 
mendation against prosecution, by the War Department, but had the 
Department of Justice decided to go ahead, even over the objections 
of the Secretary of War, it could have been done. It was not done, 

79716—46 — Ers. 145, vol. 3 6 



1690 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

but on the 7tli of December this was being held in abeyance, due to 
departmental desires of the Department of Justice. 

14. General Grunert. You do not know whether there was any 
request on the part of the State Department to hold that in abeyance, 
to avoid any controversy, or any ill feeling on the part of the Japanese? 

Captain TxWlor. I do, sir. When I originally made my recom- 
mendation that these sub consular agents be prosecuted, I made it 
contingent on the approval of the State Department, and inquiries 
were made in early June 1941 of the State Department as to whether 
or not they had any objection to a prosecution \32S6'] and 
second, whether or not any of these men had been notified to the 
Secretary of State by the consul general of the empire of Japan at 
Honolulu, and he replied that they had not, and that he had no objec- 
tion, it would not conflict with any policies or plans of the Department 
of State, and so we readily had the "green light" to go ahead, except 
over the objection of the War Department, and it was the Depart- 
ment of Justice's own decision to hold them in abeyance and complete 
the investigation of all the sub consular agents prior to making its 
final decision as to whetlier or not prosecution would be instituted. 

15. General Grunert. Have you knowledge of any facts or any 
leads to facts that may be of assistance to the Board. I will read 
to you a statement of our mission, so you can judge whether or not 
you have any. We are here to ascertain and report on the facts relat- 
ing to the attack made by the Japanese armed forces upon the Terri- 
tory of Hawaii on the '7th of December 1941, and in addition thereto, 
to consider phases which related to the Pearl Harbor disaster, of the 
report made by the House Military Affairs Committee. The latter 
concerns itself more with the question of the conduct of certain in- 
dividuals, and construction, over here. 

Now, knowing what our mission is, have you, of your own knowl- 
edge, any facts, or any leads to facts, that you think might be of as- 
sistance to the Board ? 

Captain Taylor. The only thing, sir, that I would like to state is 
this — that in my official capacity as United States Attorney, it was 
my duty to confer with high officials of the Army and the Navy, dur- 
ing the year 1941, prior to the [3257] war, and I found that 
the relationship between the two was very cordial. We had condem- 
nation suits and other matters of mutual interest that came up from 
time to time, and the conferences on this particular matter we have 
just been discussing — that is, whether or not the consular agents should 
be prosecuted or not — I had the pleasure of going out and talking with 
General Short and talking with his Chief of Staff of Military Intelli- 
gence, talked with Captain Mayfielcl, and they were friendly rela- 
tions. We sat down together, and there was nothing strained, every- 
thing was friendly and cordial, and when there was something to 
get done, or to be attended to, I saw nothing that led me to feel that 
there was not perfect cooperation between the forces at that time, 
although I was not too closely related. 

16. General Grunert. Now, aside from the cordiality and the 
good feeling, and so forth, was this cooperation effective? 

Captain Taylor. Well, that I cannot say, sir, because as far as I 
was concerned, the condemnation suits, acquiring land for the offi- 
cial use of the Army and the Navy, is where I came in contact with 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1691 

them to the largest extent, and I might say, from that standpoint, was 
effective; from a military standpoint, that is, from a defense stand- 
point, a tactical standpoint, I cannot, because I was not acquainted 
with the work at that time. 

17. General Grunert. Is there anytliing else in the back of your 
mind ? 

Captain Taylor. No, sir ; I have nothing else that I would like to 
say. 

18. General Grunert. Thank you very much for coming. 
Captain Taylor. Thank you, sir. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 
(Brief recess.) 

[S^SS] TESTIMONY OF PHILIP CHEW CHUN, 1453 ALANCASTER 
STREET, HONOLTJLIJ, TERRITORY OF HAWAII 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24. ) 

1. Colonel West. Mr. Chew Chun, will you please state to the Board 
your name and address ? 

Mr Chun. My name is Philip Chun, address 1453 Alancaster Street, 
Honolulu. ' 

2. Colonel West. What is your occupation, Mr. Chun? 
Mr. Chun. I am at present in business for myself. 

3. General Grunert. Mr. Chun, this particular part of our in- 
vestigation will be conducted by the Assistant Recorder, Maior 
Uausen, so you answer his questions and if we have any more we will 
propound them later on. 

^ 4 Major Clausen. Your name is Philip Chew Chun, is it not 
sir? ' 

Mr. Chun. Yes. 
,,\^^ipi; Clausen. You were formerly administrative head of the 
United states Engineering Department here ? 

Mr. Chun. T was. 

?V -^^i^^ Clausen. For what period of time ? 

Mr. Chun. Approximately ten years. I cannot give the exact date 
when I was promoted to the head of the Administrative Division 
Around 1935 to 1944. 

7. Major Clausen. During the years 1940 and 1941, Mr. Chun, were 
you the administrative head? 

Mr. Chun. I was the administrative head. 

8. Major Clausen. You are the one across whose desk there would 
^^r^^ri^ ^^^^ correspondence, papers and other documents? 

ISB59] Mr. Chun. Yes, sir. 

9. Major Causen. Do you recall when a Colonel John Hunt was out 
here conducting an investigation involving Colonel Wyman and the 
Hawaiian Constructors ? 

Mr. Chun. I recall that. 

10. Major Clausen. Do you remember Colonel Hunt asked you to 
produce for him papers that had to do with negotiations and confer- 
ences leading up to a contract dated December 20th, 1940 with the 
Hawaiian Constructors? 

Mr. Chun. Yes, sir. 



1692 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

11. Major Clausen. And you said to him at that time that you 
were unable to find any such papers or documents ? 

Mr. Chun. He asked specifically for letters, certain letters, that 
Colonel Wyman is said to have received from headquarters. There 
was a big project coming up. I did produce several letters, which is 
not the letter he wanted. 

12. Major Clausen. I have the testimony right here and I will read 
it to you : 

(Excerpt from Colonel Hunt's report is as follows) : 

Q. Now, with reference to the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract, W-414r-Eng-602, 
Colonel Wyman has testified that he proposed doing the work that was outlined 
in and covered by the basic contract without entrance into any contract, but by 
the hiring of labor directly by his office, and the purchase of materials by his 
office. Presumably at the time of the work covered by the basic contract was in 
consideration, there was some correspondence as to the manner in which the 
work would be performed. Do you recall any such correspondence? 

[3260] A. No, I do not recall that part of it. That question was asked of 
me several times, and the only reply I could have given to that few persons that 
asked me was that he made the trip to Washington, to the Division Engineer's 
office, and my understanding was that the whole thing was consummated in the 
Division and the Chief's office. I do not recall prior to the contract was made 
that negotiations or correspondence, or seeing such correspondence up to that. 

[S^^l] Now, you had several more questions and answers on the 
same subject. Did you find any correspondence at all on that subject, 
Mr. Chun? 

Mr. Chun. I did not. 

13. Major Clausen. Did you look for any ? 

Mr. Chun. I looked for it, yes. I went through the file. After Col- 
onel Hunt asked me, I went back to the file and spent several days over 
there and I could not find that letter. I think I did tell him after- 
wards, subsequent to the testimony I gave, that I could not find the 
letter. 

14. Major Clausen. You were the person to whom Colonel Hunt 
was supposed to go ; you were head of the administrative division ? 

Mr. Chun. Yes. 

15. Major Clausen. You said here: 

(Excerpt from Colonel Hunt's report is as follows:) 

Q. (By Colonel Hunt:) What I am trying to get at here is to establish by 
inquiry the identity of the person to whom I should look for documents that 
would indicate preliminary action with respect to the work that was started in 
late 1940 under that contract, and I understand from your statement that you 
are the person who is in effect the custodian of such records and documents. 

A. Yes, all files come under the Administrative Division. I am responsible for 
them. 

Q. Then, in addition to the original papers relating to the work on the contract 
602, I am going to ask you to secure for my review any other documents bearing 
upon the question why that work was done under a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract. 

A. Yes, sir; that will be included in this list that you are going to give me? 

[3262] Q. That's right. 

Now, after these questions and answers you looked and could find 
nothing ; is that correct ? 
Mr. Chun. That is right. 

16. Major Clausen. Colonel Hunt also asked you about the yacht 
VEGA. Do you recall that? 

Mr. Chun. I do. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1693 

17. Major Clausen, What did you find about that? 

Mr. Chux. I told him I didn't have any records or any knowledge 
of that. 

18. Major Clausen. Yet you were the head of the administrative 
division ? 

Mr. Chun. Yes, sir. 

19. Major Clausen. After you talked to Colonel Hunt here at this 
time, did you look for those papers concerning the yacht VEGA ? 

Mr. Chun. I did. 

20. Major Clausen. What did.you find ? Did you find any papers ? 
Mr. Chun. I did not find any papers about the negotiations for the 

VEGA and the renting of the VEGA. 

21. Major Clausen. Did you know anything about either one of 
these two things? 

Mr. Chun. The only laiowledge I have is that the VEGA was in 
port one time. That is the only thing I know. And its proposed use 
by contracts with the different divisions, one by a conservation party. 

22. Major Clausen. The lack of papers in your files was certainly 
out of the ordinary, so far as administrative routine was concerned, 
though, was it not? 

Mr. Chun. Probably so. yes, sir. 

[32631 23. Major Clausen. Do you account for that in any way ? 

Mr. Chun. You mean, my method of filing papers ? 

24. Major Clausen. No, the fact that you had these papers, you 
say, involving the District Engineer's office and you could find no 
records or correspondence concerning them. 

Mr. Chun. Figures were never put in black or white or in writing. 

25. Major Clausen. I don't think I have any more questions. 

26. General Grunert. Does anyone have any questions? Do you 
know whether there were ever any papers on that subject or those 
subjects that might have been removed from the files before j'ou looked 
for them ? 

Mr. Chun. No, I don't. I don't have any reason to doubt it. 

27. General Grunert. As far as you know, there were never any 
papers on that subject in the file ? 

Mr. Chun. As far as I know, yes, sir. 

28. General Grunert. Have you any other statement you wish to 
make on this subject to the Board that may help the Board? 

Mr. Chun. No; I don't believe I have. 

29. Major Clausen. I have one further question. 

As a matter of fact, Mr. Chun, Colonel Wyman was very careless 
in his paper work, wasn't he ? 
Mr. Chun. In some respects, yes. 

30. Major Clausen. He was very lax in administrative details, was 
he not? 

Mr. Chun. That is a matter of opinion. I don't know, really. 

31. Major Clausen. Let me read you your opinion that you gave 
[3261^] to Colonel Hunt, on page 370 : 

Q. If there had been any such record, do you feel that you would have known 
it? 

A. That's right. 

Q. Well, looking from the inside point of view, what would it mean? 

A. Well, I always think that Colonel Wyman was very careless in his paper 
work. I felt there was nothing that I could do about him. He was very lax in 
administrative details, and it was awfully hard to keep up with him. 



1694 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Do you recall giving that testimony ? 
Mr. Chun. I do, yes. 

32. Major Clausen. Is that a correct statement; did you tell the 
truth there ? 

Mr. Chun. That is my opinion of it. 

33. Major Clausen, xou told the truth there, did you? 
Mr. Chun. I did. 

34. Major Clausen. Did you know anything about the purchase of 
equipment ? 

Mr. Chun. No. 

35. Major Clausen. From the Rohl-Connolly Company of Los 
Angeles at a cost of about $166,000? 

Mr. Chun. No, that don't come across my desk at all. That would 
be a matter of the supply division. 

36. Major Clausen. That is all. 

\_3265'\ 37. General Grunert. All right, thank you for coming. 
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

TESTIMONY OF GEORGE A. SISSON, CIVIL ENGINEER, 1545 DOMONIS 
STREET, HONOLULU, T. H. 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Will you please state to the Board your name and 
address, sir? 

Mr. SissoN. George A. Sisson, 1545 Domonis Street, Honolulu. 

2. Colonel West. What is your occupation, Mr. Sisson ? 
Mr. Sisson. Civil Engineer. 

3. General Grunert. Mr. Sisson, I am going to ask Major Clausen 
to lead in this particular part of our investigation, and the members of 
the Board will ask any questions that appear pertinent after that. 

4. Major Clausen. Your occupation, Mr. Sisson, during the years 
1940 and 1941, was what? 

Mr. Sisson. In 1940 I had charge of the Engineering Section of 
the District Engineer's Office at Pier 2. Tliat is where the office was 
at that time. In 1939 I transferred here from the Huntington Dis- 
trict, West Virginia. 

5. Major Clausen. This was as a civilian employee of the United 
States Engineering Department ? 

Mr. Sisson. Right. 

6. Major Clausen. You were at one time principal engineer, were 
you, or area engineer, at the Hickam Field area ? 

Mr. Sisson. Yes, sir, in 1942. 

7. Major Clausen. And in connection with your duties at that 
[3266] time, that position and that work extended over what 

period ? 

Mr. Sisson. I went out there, if I remember correctly, on the 13th 
of January, 1941, and stayed there until February, 1943, as area 
engineer. 

8. Major Clausen. The Hawaiian Constructors was the contractor 
on that job, was it not? 

Mr. Sisson. Well, they were one of the contractors. At that time 
there was quite a little other work being done in that area. 

9. Major Clausen. They did, though, a considerable amount of 
frame building construction under supervision, did they not? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1695 

Mr. SissoN. That is right. 

10. Major Clausen. And what was the nature of that construction 
work, Mr. Sisson ? 

Mr. Sisson. Well, they built a lot of barracks there at Hickam Field, 
mess halls, latrines, and put in a water and sewer system, and also 
they started, as I recall, before that building the casemates of Battery 
Clausen at Fort Kam. 

11. Major Clausen. How did they do the work on Battery Clausen ? 
Mr. Sisson, Well, they did the work as any contractor would do it. 

12. Major Clausen. Let me ask you your opinion of the manner 
in which they did all this work to which you are testifying. 

Mr. Sisson. Well, frankly, all of the work here at that time was 
badly handled. 

13. Major Clausen. That, Mr. Sisson, is not my question. I am 
asking you your opinion of the work done by the Hawaiian Construc- 
tors under your supervision. 

Mr. Sisson. I tliink they did as well as any contractor [S£67~\ 
could have done at that time under the conditions. 

14. Major Clausen. As a matter of fact, it was not handled in an 
efficient manner, isn't that correct? 

Mr. Sisson. As efficiently, I would say, as it was possible under the 
conditions. 

15. Major Clausen. With whom, Mr. Sisson, did you talk before 
you came here to testify, just recently? 

Mr. Sisson. I did not talk to anyone. I have been gathering data 
for General Bragdon and others. I have been doing that for the last 
two weeks, getting data in connection with some of the work, particu- 
larly A. W. S. work. 

16. Major Clausen. For General Bragdon? 

Mr. Sisson. Yes, sir. Well, Colonel Gesler is the one that gave the 
instructions to get up the information. 

17. Major Clausen. Do you recall having been interviewed and 
giving certain testimony before Colonel John E. Hunt of tlie Inspector 
General's Department, sir? 

Mr. Sisson. Yes. 

18. Major Clausen. Do you remember having given this testimony, 
at page 391 : 

(Excerpt from Colonel Hunt's report is as follows:) 

Q. Did they as the Hawaiian Constructors do any considerable amount of 
frame building construction under your supervision ? 

A. Yes, sir. 

Q. What was the nature of it? 

A. Oh, it varies at Hickam Field, the mess halls, the warehouses — as a matter 
of fact, I would say the bulk of their work was construction in the Sector Field 
area and also the other areas, as far as I know. 

Q. What was your opinion of the manner in which they did their work? 

[3268] A. Well, it wasn't handled in an efficient manner. I don't think 
really any of their work handled in a highly eflBcient manner due to, well, having 
poor workmen, and generally speaking, not efficient management. I know for 
a fact that some of the, well, say, tournapul operators, were brought over here, 
hired on the coast as tournapul operators, and had to be trained after they got 
over here, and some of them didn't know anything about a tournapul. That was 
also true of some of their crane operators. I was told that one crane operator, a 
new man, came over and didn't even know how to operate the crane when he was 
put on it to operate it. 



1696 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Do you recall having given that testimony, Mr. Sisson ? 
Mr. Sisson. Yes, sir. 

19. Major Clausen. And did you state the truth at that time? 
Mr. SissoN. I did. 

20. Major Clausen. That is all. 
Mr. SissoN. As I saw it. 

21. Major Clausen. No further questions. 

22. General Grunert. Any questions. 

23. General Russell. Are you in the Engineering Department now ? 
Mr. SissoN. Yes, sir. 

24. General Russell. Have you been with them constantly since 
this time ? 

Mr. SissoN. Yes, sir. 

25. General Russell. What caused you to change your mind, Mr. 
Sisson ? 

Mr. SissoN. Well, I would like to explain it this way : In comparing 
the Hawaiian Constructors as contractors doing work, [3269] 
as they were on a fixed-fee basis, they were not as efficient as a con- 
tractor, for instance, other contractors we had at Hickam Field who 
had taken their work on a lump-sum basis and taken it several, or a 
considerable time earlier. That is, I mean, where they could. For 
instance, I am comparing Robert McKee, who took his contracts 
probably two years earlier, and who shipped his own material from 
the mainland, got plenty of material here in advance, was able to 
hire his men when he could get good experienced men. I understand 
the Hawaiian Constructors did not land here, did not get started, if 
I remember correctly, until in January, 1943. 

26. General Frank. What? 

Mr. SissoN. January, 1942. January, 1941. Excuse me. At that 
time good help, good construction help, was scarce on the mainland. 
The other contractors here, like Tucker McClure and Robert McKee, 
who were doing work at Hickam Field, they had been over here a 
year and a half earlier when good construction men were plentiful 
on the mainland. They had an existing organization, but the Hawai- 
ian Constructors had to form their organization when good help was 
scarce, when there was lots of work on the mainland. 

27. General Russell. Wlien you were testifying before there was 
not a thing relative in your testimony. You stated that their super- 
vision was, in effect, inefficient, or words to that effect. 

Mr. SissoN. Yes, sir, apparently did. 

28. General Russell. What? 

Mr. Sisson. It was inefficient in comparison to the old contractors. 

29. General Russell. Don't you know that the Callahan Company, 
[3270'] the Rohl-Connolly Company and Gun ther- Shirley were 
old organizations in the States and were imported over here, so that 
the government might have the benefit of their old and experienced 
organizations ? 

Mr. SissoN. Yes, I understand they are capable men on the main- 
land. Frankly, I don't believe they sent their best team over here, 
putting it in football terms. 

30. General Russell. What you mean to testify now is that they 
had a second-rate outfit over here and did as well as a second-rate 
outfit could effectively do ; is that true ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1697 

Mr. SissoN. Their main handicap over here 

31. General Russell. Could you answer that question, since we 
are talking about football terms, and second teams ? 

Mr. SissoN. No, I would say they did not sent their first team over 
here. 

32. General Eussell. In other words, you think they had a scrub 
outfit over here ? 

Mr. SissoN. I would say it was not their first team. 

33. General Russell. Do you know whether or not the United 
States Government was paying them on the basis of sending a first- 
rate team over here ? 

Mr. SissoN. That, I cannot say. 

34. General Russell. If the government picked them out and sent 
them over here as a first-rate team and paid for first-rate service, it 
did not get what it was paying for, did it ? 

Mr. SissoN. No, they did not, if they were paying them for first- 
rate service. 

35. General Russell. In other words, it was a second-rate job that 
they were doing over here ? 

[327 J] Mr. SissoN. I still stick to my statement. 

36. General Russell. Could you answer that question? It was a 
second-rate job that they were doing over here? 

Mr. SissoN. They did as good a job 

37. General Russell. Pardon me? 

Mr. SissoN. They did as good a job, I think, as it was possible to do 
under existing circumstances. 

38. General Russell. Suppose they had had a first-rate team over 
here, could they have done a better job? 

Mr. SissoN. If they could have gotten first-rate carpenters and top- 
notch foremen and top-notch machinists, and so forth, they could have 
done better work. 

39. General Russell. Did not they import a lot of that type of labor 
over here from the mainland? 

Mr. SissoN. Yes, at a time when good help was scarce. 

40. General Russell. Were you cognizant of conditions on the 
mainland? 

Mr. SissoN. Yes. 

41. General Russell. How ? 

Mr. SissoN. I take engineering papers and read them. I know 
there was a lot of construction work under way on the mainland. 
Frankly, our own organization brought a lot of men over in 1941 and 
1942 that were really second-rate men. 

42. General Russell. You are an employee of the federal govern- 
ment, are you not? 

Mr. SissoN. Yes. 

43. General Russell. And you have been for a long time ? 
Mr. SissoN". Yes. 

44. General Russell. And you have given testimony here to a 
[3272'] government investigator to the effect that this was not an 
efficient operation out here, haven't you ? 

Mr. SissoN. Yes. 



1698 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

45. General Russell. And you are in here giving testimony to an- 
other government body today that it was an efficient operation, aren't 
you ? 

Mr, SissoN. I am saying as efficient as it could be under existing 
circumstances in 1941 and 1942. 

46. General Russell. Why didn't you qualify that testimony in 
that way when you were testifying as Major Clausen has read to you? 

Mr. SissoN. Well, frankly, I think I should have. I was compar- 
ing them with contractors in 1941 and 1942, contractors who had taken 
their work two years earlier. 

47. General Russell. Let us develop these recent occurrences here 
on the island. Do you know a General Bragdon ? 

48. Major Clausen. He has testified that he has talked with him. 
Mr. SissoN. I met him, yes, sir. 

49. General Russell. How long ago? 
Mr. SissoN. About three days ago. 

50. General Russell. You had been back digging into these old 
records for some ten days when you met Bragdon, hadn't you? 

Mr. SissoN. Yes, that is right, on one particular subject. 

51. General Russell. At whose instance did you go back and begin 
the investigation of these old documents and records ? 

Mr, SissoN. Colonel Gesler gave me the assignment to dig up that 
information. We had a cable from the Chief of Engineers to prepare 
certain data chronologically in connection with that, 

[327S] 52, General Russell. What did this Colonel that you 
a,re talking about, who sent you on this search, tell you he wianted 
evidence to prove? 

Mr. Sissox, He didn't tell me. The cable was turned over to me 
and he told me to dig up that information requested on the A. W. S. 
installations, and I had to go through a number of files. 

53. General Russell. You have not made any recent investiga- 
tion, then, relating to this construction work about which you are 
testifying to Major Clausen, have you? 

Mr. SissoN. Not recently, no, sir. 

54. General Russell. Then you have changed your story without 
any rhyme or reason since you testified before? 

Mr. SissoN. Well, I think, sir, that I have been able to see this 
whole picture in a broader light as to conditions that existed at that 
time. 

55. General Russell. Did you ever know anything about the Rohl- 
Connolly crowd ? 

Mr. SissoN. No. I have met Mr. Rohl, that is all. I know Connolly. 

56. General Russell. As you dealt with those people out there on 
the job, the supervisory personnel, did you know the difference be- 
tween the supervisors of Callahan and Rohl-Connolly and the other 
units of that construction group? 

Mr. SissoN. No, sir. I simply dealt with representatives of the 
Hawaiian Constructors, their general superintendent and their local 
superintendent, 

57. General Russell. They had supervisors extending all the way 
down to these workers, didn't they? 

[3274.] Mr, SissoN, Yes, I knew their general superintendent, 
a fellow named Ashlock, He visited the work periodically and I 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1699 

would say this : that Ashlock, I considered him a very capable con- 
struction man. 

58. General Russell. And you considered him that way when you 
were testifying originally? 

Mr. SissoN. Ashlock. The inefficiency that I testified to, they were 
inefficient further on down, due to a lack of good workmen, par- 
ticularly good carpenters, good mechanics. In 1941, and it existed 
in 1942 and 1943, any man that could go out and buy a square and a 
saw and a hammer, he could get a job as a carpenter, just because the 
help was very scarce, but he is still a poor carpenter. 

59. General Eussell. That was true in 1941 on the island? 
Mr. SissoN. On the island, yes, sir. 

60. General Russell. And it was true in 1941 on the mainland ? 
Mr. Stsson. I believe good help was scarce over there. 

61. General Russell. And you believed that because you saw it in 
some paper? 

Mr. Sisso]sr. Well, I read technical journals and I read the papers 
also. 

62. General Russell. Do you know what the conditions were in 
Los Angeles where they were recruiting their common labor and 
carpenters ? 

Mr. SissoN. No, sir, I do not. 

63. General Russell. The testimony now, in order that we may 
light somewhere and know what to depend on when we are considering 
your testimony, Mr. Sisson, is that they brought a sorry crowd of super- 
visors, laborers and carpenters over here to do [327S] that job ? 

Mr. SissoN. Their carpenters and mechanics were not first-class 
men. Their general superintendents, I say, were good. Ashlock, I 
would say, was a very good man. 

64. General Russell. How about the intermediate supervisors be- 
tween Ashlock and the laborers? 

Mr. SissoN, I would say they were not quite as high a quality as 
Ashlock and the men further up. 

65. General Russell. Would you say the supervisory men were a 
second-grade lot, or a good lot, or if they belonged in one category? 

Mr. SissoN. The supervisory, I would say, the men below the grade 
of the general men, below Ashlock — and Mr. Grafe was over here as 
supervisor. He was not here all the time. A very capable man. 
Their foremen down below them, I would say, were only fair. 

66. General Russell. With a poor crowd of foremen and a fair 
crowd of supervisors you got the results which you might expect, that 
is, unsatisfactory results, when regarded from the standpoint of 
normal standards, didn't you? 

Mr. SissoN. Yes. We did not get the best results. 

67. General Russell. That is all. 
Major Clausen. I have another question. 

68. General Frank. Let me ask this first: 

What did Major Powell say to you about this testimony? 
Mr. SissoN. Major Powell? 

69. General Frank. Yes. 

Mr. SissoN. The only thing he told me was "You will probably be 
asked a lot of questions and" he said, "don't get [3276'] rattled. 
If you don't understand the question, why, say so." 



1700 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

70. General Frank. What did Major Lozier tell you? 
Mr. SissoN. Nothing. 

71. General Frank. You were conversant with the McKee organi- 
zation out at Hickam, weren't you? 

Mr. SissoN. Yes, sir 

72. General Frank. Was that a pretty good organization? 
Mr. SissoN. I would say it was a good organization. 

73. General Frank. First class? 

Mr. SissoN. The local organization of McKee's was good. Now, 
we had some trouble with McKee's. They had quite a lot of work at 
Hickam Field when I went out there. I inherited it from the con- 
struction Quartermaster. 

74. General Frank. He had an efficient operating organization, 
didn't he? 

Mr. SissoN. An efficient local operation organization, yes. 

75. General Frank. He had good workmen? 
Mr. SissoN. Yes. 

76. General Frank. They were here present with an organization 
and were equipped and ready to do work in the Hawaiian Islands 
before the Hawaiian Constructors were brought in here, weren't they ? 

Mr. SissoN. Yes, but at that time, I will say this : They were loaded 
up. They were loaded to their full capacity at that time. They were 
building a lot of quarters, officers quarters, and so forth, at Hickam 
Field, and other buildings. 

77. General Frank. Just as soon as the Hawaiian Constructors 
came in what happened to McKee ? 

[3277] Mr. Sisson. They finished up their woi-k, but it took them 
several months. They were not done with all their work at the time 
of the blitz. 

78. General Frank. But their contracts were dependent upon com- 
pletion of the work on which they were engaged ? 

Mr. Sisson. That is right. 

79. General Frank. And there was a good organization, with good 
workmen, that was turned loose, and this second-rate organization 
was brought in ? 

Mr. Sisson. Well, they were in here before McKee was turned loose. 

80. General Frank. Wliat is that ? 

Mr. Sisson. They were brought in almost — I would say they were 
brought in a year before McKee finished up. 

81. General Frank. But they had a first-rate organization in here 
and they brought in a second-rate organization ? 

Mr. Sisson. Yes, but at the time when the District Engineer's force 
had to be increased, McKee with his local organization was loaded up 
to the hilt. I don't think they were in position to take on any more 
work. 

[3278] 82. General Frank. Was any use ever made of McKee's 
superintendents and supervisors? 

Mr. Sisson. Yes, sir. 

83. General Frank. By the Hawaiian Constructors ? 

Mr. Sisson. Well, let me qualify that in this way: Immediately 
after the blitz their superintendent came to me and said he wanted to 
help out any way he could, and we put them right away — see, their work 
was, I won't say stopped entirely, but it was cramped considerably due 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1701 

to shortage of supplies and one thing another, and we put them to work 
at Hickam Field, remodeling that big barracks. You know the big 
barracks there of 3200. They rehabilitated that. 

84 General Frank. They built it in the first place. 

Mr. SissoN. They built it in the first place. Consequently they were 
much better qualified to rehabilitate it, and we put them to work at 
rehabilitating that right away, and one or two other buildings, the 
fire station and some of the other buildings. 

85. General Frank. But they didn't do that as part of the Hawaiian 
Constructors ? 

Mr. SissoN. They were supposed to do that as subcontractors of the 
Hawaiian Constructors, and I understood that the Hawaiian Con- 
structors and the District Engineer tried to get them to become a part 
of the Hawaiian Constructors, and McKee refused to. It is my under- 
standing of it. I have never seen any correspondence on it. 

86. General Frank. McKee refused because he didn't like the man- 
ner in which the Hawaiian Constructors did business. 

Mr. SissoN. That might be. I can't say. But I know [S279] 
they did quite a lot of work, as some of them — at that time we were 
carrying all of the contractors' pay rolls. We carried McKee's pay 
roll for his men that worked after the blitz on rehabilitating these 
v^arious buildings. 

87. General Frank. Prior to thgt McKee carried his own pay roll? 
Mr. SissoN. That is right. His work was lump-sum work. 

88. Major Clausen. How did Major Powell know what to tell you 
as to the manner that you should act before this Board? Did you go 
to him and tell him you were going to be a witness ? 

Mr. SissoN. I told him — I was working in the same room, preparing, 
digging up data — rather, talDulating data that I had dug up on his 
A. W. S. stations when the call came through, and I just mentioned 
that they knew that I was — would be called. I mentioned that I was 
supposed to go over here this afternoon. 

89. Major Clausen. Now, so the record is entirely clear, Mr. Sisson, 
you are not going to have General Russell believe that you believe 
other than that the Hawaiian Constructors sent over here what you 
considered their scrub team, are you ? 

Mr. SissoN. What I considered not their first team. 

90. Major Clausen. You thought they were a scrub team, to use 
football parlance, didn't 5?^ou? 

Mr. SissoN. No. I would say they were not their first team. They 
were probably the second team. 

91. Major Clausen. You deny that, do you? 

Mr. SissoN. I would say they were probably their second or third 
team. 

92. Major Clausen. All right. Then let me follow that with this 
question : When you made this statement to Colonel Hunt, [3280^ 
you thought then that not only they sent over a scrub team but that 
they had gypped the Government, didn't you ? 

Mr. SissoN. No, I don't think they gypped the Government. I 
didn't think so then, but I — in comparison I will say that they are 
not as capable, not as efficient contractors as Tucker-McClure or 
McKee. 

93. Major Clausen. Would you listen while I read your testimony? 
Mr. SissoN. Yes, sir. 



1702 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

94. Major Clausen. Reading from the top of page 396, question by 
Colonel Hunt : 

Would you say that management by the Hawaiian Constructors was honest, 
even though it was InefBcient? 

Answer. As far as I know, yes, sir. I think their main fault was the ineffi- 
ciency, sort of a don't care a darn what the costs were. 

Qttestion. And I believe that at one time you made the remark that you felt 
that if the Rohl-Connolly outfit and the Callahan outfit were efficient builders, 
that they surely must have sent this "scrub team" over here to do it? 

Answer. That's right. 

Question. Does that pretty accurately describe your judgment of the Rohl- 
Connolly and Callahan outfits? 

Answer. Yes, it does. 

Question. Is there anything else you can think of that would be of value to thi.s 
record ? 

Answer. Well, there is only one thing. I have thought that there was a laxity, 
or I would say that [3281] the Hawaiian Constructors or members of the 
Hawaiian Constructors have gipped the Government to a considerable extent in 
the renting of the equipment. I am thinking in particular of some of the equip- 
ment that WooUey rented. There was in particular one crane that I would 
say a contractor normally would/ hesitate to pay $2,000 for, due to the fact 
that the crane was worn out, and yet that was rented from Mr. Woolley for 
record ? 

You gave that testimony, did you ? 
Mr. SissoN. Yes, sir. 

95. Major Clausen. That is all. 

96. General Grunert. Any other questions? 

97. Colonel Toulmin. I would like to ask the man a question. May 
I, General ? 

98. General Grunert. Yes. 

99. Colonel Toulmin. I was out of the room, Mr. Witness, when you 
testified that a General Bragdon had talked to you; is that correct? 
He did talk to you? 

Mr. SissoN. I have talked — yes, sir, he talked — I talked to him 
some, and he's talked to me. 

100. Colonel Toulmin. What was the occasion for the conversation ? 
Mr. SissoN. Well, I was preparing data in the same room in con- 
nection with A. W. S. stations. 

101. Colonel Toulmin. Who else was in the room with you besides 
Bragdon and Powell, and yourself? 

Ml", Sisson. Mr. Perliter, and Mr. Lozier. 

[328£] 102. Colonel Toulmin. Is Mr. Perliter working on this 
job of getting up evidence, too? 

Mr. SissoN. He is working. Yes, sir, he is digging up data, going 
through the files, arranging it in chronological order. 

103. Colonel Toulmin. The whole group of you 

Mr. SissoN. The files. 

104. Colonel Toulmin. — were working on this same subject ; is that 

Mr. SissoN. Yes, sir. 

105. Colonel Toulmin. When did you first talk to General Brag- 
don ? 

■ Mr. SissoN. Monday, I believe. 

106. Colonel Toulmin. You talked to him every day since then? 
Mr. SissoN. Very little. I have been working, working in the 

same room, but I have talked to him very little. 

107. Colonel Toulmin. What did he say to you ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1703 

Mr. SissoN. He's asked me questions, some questions in connection 
with A. W. S. work. About any conversation we had has been pri- 
marily in connection with the A. W. S. service. 

108. Colonel Toulmin. What did he say to you about coming over 
here and testifying before this Board? 

]Mr. SissoN. He didn't say anything to me about coming over here. 

109. Colonel Toulmin. Powell was the man 

Mr. SissoN. Powell is the man. 

110. Colonel Toulmin. — who prepared you for that? 

Mr. SissoN. Yes, sir. I think — let me qualify that, I think Brag- 
don — I asked Bragdon. I had a folder of materials, [3^831 
copies of letters that I had dug out of the files, all in connection with 
A. W. S. stations, and had written up a memorandum on it and 
asked him if I should bring that along, and he said he didn't think so, 
because, for the reason that the work that I have been on, that I am 
personally acquainted with, had nothing to do — in other words, where 
I worked in the second — and had charge in the Second Field Area 
there were no A. W. S. stations built in that area; consequently I 
have — my information regarding A. W. S. stations is information 
that I dug out of the files. I have no personal information regarding 
those. 

111. Colonel Toulmin. So General Bragdon didn't want you to 
bring that testimony 

Mr. SissoN. No, sir. 

112. Colonel Toulmin. — over here before this Board; is that 
right? 

Mr. SissoN. Well, it wasn't testimony, it was data. 

113. Colonel Toulmin. All right. He didn't want you to bring 
those data over before this Board ; is that right? 

Mr. SissoN. Yes, sir. 

114. Colonel Toulmin. And General Bragdon is the man that 
made that request or gave you that instruction ; is that it ? 

Mr. SissoN. I asked him if I should bring it, and he said he didn't 
think so, that you would — that I should only probably be questioned 
and should only deal with information that I had personal knowledge, 
as of my construction work in the Second Field Area. 

115. Colonel Toulmin. Did you discuss with General Bragdon 
your previous testimony before Colonel Hunt? 

Mr. SissoN. No, sir. 

[S284-] 116. Colonel Toulmin. Did you discuss that testimony 
with Major Powell? 
Mr. Sisson. No, sir. 

117. Colonel Toulmin. Now, you are here, you know, Mr. Witness, 
under oath. 

Mr. Sisson. Yes, sir. 

118. Colonel Toulmin. And I would like to have you think very 
carefully before you answer this next question : Is there any other 
statement made by General Bragdon or Colonel Powell to you during 
the last three days, or by you to them, that you have not reported 
to this Board this afternoon ? 

Mr. Sisson. Well, I don't remember everything that we talked. 
We talked very little because it was in connection with the A. W. S. 
work. 



1704 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

119. Colonel Toulmin. You don't remember everything that was 
said, then? 

Mr. SissoN. No, sir. 

120. Colonel Toulmin. There may be a great many other things 
you haven't reported to this Board in your testimony this afternoon 
that was said between Bragdon, Powell and j^ourself ; is that it? 

Mr. SissoN. I don't think there is anything pertinent. 

121. Colonel Toulmin. No; I am asking you not whether there is 
anything pertinent or not ; whether there was anything else that was 
said. 

Mr. SissoN. There may have been, but I can't remember everything 
that has been — that we have talked about, but I think Bragdon has 
been a very busy man, and he has asked me questions about A. W. S. 
work where I have been digging up data, [328S] but that's all 
our conversation has been, just in connection with that; and, as I say, 
I asked him whether I should bring the folder I had. 

122. Colonel Toulmin. That is all. Thank you. 
Mr. SissoN. Yes, sir. 

123. Major Clausen. I just have one further question : When you 
gave this testimony to Colonel Hunt, Mr. Sisson, did you tell the truth ? 

Mr. SissoN. I told the truth as I saw it. I always tell the truth. 

124. Major Clausen. At that time? 
Mr. SissoN. As I saw it at that time. 

125. Major Clausen. Yes. That is all. 

126. General Grunert. Have you anything else that you would like 
to tell the Board pertaining to the questions that have been asked you, 
as pertaining to this matter, now that your memory has been sort of 
refreshed by what they have said ? This will be an opportunity for you 
to tell the Board anything that may be in the back of your mind. 

Mr. SissoN. The only thing I could say in that way was that in '41 
we were all working under severe handicaps, both the Engineers and 
the Hawaiian Constructors, due to the fact that good experienced con- 
struction help was scarce, due to the fact that we were very shy of 
materials, also shy of construction equipment. The District Engineer 
at that time could only buy materials for approved projects. He 
couldn't buy materials and stock them to have them on hand. We were 
also handicapped clue to the fact that we had to follow pre-war pro- 
cedure. That is, the District Engineer was working under the Division 
Engineer [S286] at San Francisco, under the Chief of Engi- 

neers in Washington. A set of plans had to be prepared here, sent 
to the Division Engineer, and then — for approval — and back. That 
sort of thing definitely delayed the work and was definitely a handi- 
cap, and at that time we had an enormous amount of work. We had 
airfields to build, gasoline storage at those airfields, barracks, quarters. 

And I would like to bring out one point that has come to my mind, 
in studying over these records, that had there been in '41 a priority 
established on the most — setting up as a higher priority the most 
im^Dortant jobs, those jobs could have been probably completed earlier. 
As it was, there was no priority. We had airfields to build, we had 
ammunition storage to build, war storage for gasoline on five different 
islands. Every damn thing was important, and one job would be hot 
today and probably another job hotter tomorrow, depending upon the 
using agency putting pressure on a certain job. Consequently, there 
was a certain amount of — considerable inefficiency and what I like to 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1705 

term as fumbling of the ball, due to conditions. And I would say this : 
I think the whole cause of not being prepared there was just because 
we started about two years too late. We were trying to do three years' 
work in one year, under difficult circumstances, and I think everybody 
did their darndest. 

127. General Grunert. Are there any more questions? (No re- 
sponse.) 

Thank you very much for coming. 

Mr. Sissoisr. You are welcome, sir. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

[S287] TESTIMONY OF MISS HELEN SCHLESINGER, 254A 
LEWEKS EOAD, HONOLULU, T. H. 

(The witness was sworn by the recorder and advised of her rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Miss Schlesinger, will you please state to the 
Board your name and address? 

Miss Schlesinger. Miss Helen Schlesinger, 254A Lewers Road, 
Honolulu, 

2. Colonel West. And by whom are you employed. Miss Schles- 
inger ? 

Miss Schlesinger. The Engineer Office. 

3. Colonel West. Is that the United States District Engineer 
office? 

Miss Schlesinger. That is right. It is now officially known as the 
Office of the Engineer. 

4. Colonel West. Major Clausen. 

5. Major Clausen. Miss Schlesinger, what was your occupation 
in the year 1940-1941 ? 

Miss Schlesinger. In 1940 I was in Chicago, employed by the U. S. 
Engineers there, in charge of their contract section. 

6. Major Clausen. And you then later came here? 

Miss Schlesinger. And in February, 1941, I came, transferred to 
Honolulu, to work for the Engineers. 

7. Major Clausen. By the way, you recall having testified before 
Colonel John E. Hunt ? 

Miss Schlesinger. I do. 

8. Major Clausen. An Inspector General ? 
Miss Schlesinger. Right. 

9. Major Clausen. Before you came here today, Miss Schlesinger, 
did you talk this case over with anyone ? 

[S£8S~\ Miss Schlesinger. I didn't talk it over with anyone. 
General Bragdon and Colonel Wyman did call me over to the office. 
They asked me if I had any idea what I might be called to testify 
for or for what reason I might be called to testify, and I told them that 
I had no idea at all what I might be asked. 

10. Major Clausen. You knew Colonel Wyman out here. Colonel 
Theodore Wyman, Junior, did you not ? 

Miss Schlesinger. I worked while he was here in the District; 
right. 

11. Major Clausen. Yes. You also met this party, Hans Wilhelm 
Rohl? 

Miss Schlesinger. Yes. 

79716— 46— Ex. 145, vol. 3 7 



1706 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

12. Major Clausen. You attended social functions at which Mr. 
Rohl was present ? 

Miss ScHLESiNGER. I attended one social function at which Mr. 
Rohl was present. 

13. Major Clausen. You saw him drunk, did you not? 

Miss ScHLEsiNGER. He had very definitely been drinking, and at 
the time I left there he indicated that he was having a heart attack, 
and I am not qualified to pass judgment on whether it was a case 
of drunkenness or the heart attack which Mr. Rohl maintained he 
had. 

14. Major Clausen. Where did this occur. Miss Schlesinger? 
Miss Schlesinger. At the Pleasant on Hotel. 

15. Major Clausen. Pleasanton Hotel ? 
Miss Schlesinger. That is right. 

16. Major Clausen. You saw him in that same condition on other 
occasions ? 

Miss Schlesinger. No, I never did. There was only one [3289] 
other time that I was with him when there had been some drinking, 
and that was one night when I had been working very late, and he 
took me home in his car, and we stopped at his room at the Moana 
Hotel for about half an hour, and I think had one drink there, and I 
went on home from there, and he was not drunk at that time. 

17. Major Ci^vusEN. This occasion, this social function at the 
Pleasanton Hotel, who was present. Miss Schlesinger? 

Miss Schlesinger. At the time I arrived there, which was very late 
in the evening, probably about 11 o'clock, when I had been called 
supposedly to come down to work, as had happened on many other 
occasions, and arrived down there I think about 11 o'clock, with 
Colonel Wyman's secretary, Elaine Heilman, and I believe Mr. Middle- 
ton of Hawaiian Constructors was there, and Colonel Robinson, and 
it wasn't until after I had been there quite a little while that I found 
out they had been having a farewell party for Colonel Wyman, but 
apparently by the time we got there everybody else had left. 

18. Major Clausen. In other words, this occasion at the Pleasanton 
was one for Colonel Wyman ? 

Miss Schlesinger. That is right. 

19. Major Clausen. You .saw Colonel Wyman? 
Miss Schlesinger. I didn't see him that night, no. 

20. Major Clausen. I think that is all. 

21. General Russell. When was it you had this conference with 
the General and the Colonel ? Today ? 

Miss Schlesinger. No. Monday. 

22. General Russell. Monday. What time Monday ? 
Miss Schlesinger. About 4 : 30. 

[3290-91] 23. General Russell. Afternoon? 
Miss Schlesinger. That's right. 

24. General Russell. Where was it that— he called you to some 
place, as I recall. 

Miss Schlesinger. You are speaking of 

25. General Russell. Colonel — General- 



Miss Schlesinger. General Bragdon and Colonel Wyman? 
26. General Russell. And Colonel Wyman, yes. Monday of this 
week? 
Miss Schlesinger. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1707 

27. General Russell. And they called you to the headquarters or 
some official place ? 

Miss ScHLESiNGER. They are stationed over on Punahou campus 
now. They have office quarters, have been made available for them 
there. 

28. General Russell. Wyman and General Bragdon have offices at 
the place you just described ? 

Miss Schlesinger. That's right. 

29. General Russell. And it is in headquarters ? 

Miss Schlesinger. That's the Engineer Office headquarters. 

30. General Russell. Are all engineering functions on this Island 
of Oahu supervised and controlled out of that office ? 

Miss Schlesinger. That is right. 

31. General Russell. The chief engineer officer on this island has 
his office there where these people were ; is that right ? 

Miss Schlesinger. That is right. 

32. General Russell. And you are an employee of the Engineering 
Department here on the island ? 

Miss Schlesinger. Yes. 

[S292] 33. General Russell. Is your office over there where these 
gentlemen were, in that same building? 

Miss Schlesinger. Not in the same building. There are a number 
of buildings on Punahou campus, and I am in one of the buildings 
on Punahou campus ; in other words, Cook Library building. They 
are in Bishop Hall on Punahou campus. 

34. General Russell. Who was present in the room when these 
people were talking to you ? 

Miss Schlesinger. There were two other people present, and 1 
don't know who they were. 

35. General Russell. Were they officers or were they civilians? 
Miss Schlesinger. One was an officer and one was a civilian. 

36. General Russell. Wliat rank did the officer have ? 

Miss Schlesinger. I don't recall. I was not facing him at the 
time, 

37. General Russell. You don't remember his 

Miss Schlesinger. He was on the other side of the room, and I 
paid very little attention. I was in there only a short time. 

38. General Russei.l. When did you first know that you were going 
to appear before this Board as a witness ? 

Miss Schlesinger. I believe it was about a week or a week and a 
half ago that an MP came in and notified me that I was to appear 
here. 

39. General Russell. Did these gentlemen tell you how they knew 
that you were going to come down here as a witness before this Board ? 

Miss Schlesinger. No, they did not. 

40. General Russell. Now, they asked you what the subject of 
[S293] your testimony might be ; is that true, what you might tes- 
tify about ? 

Miss Schlesinger. That's right. 

41. General Russell. And you expressed ignorance ? 
Miss Schlesinger. Definitely. 



1708 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

42. General Kussell. Then you got up and left ? 

Miss ScHLESiNGER. Very shortly after that. Primarily Colonel 
Wyman called me over to see if I could locate a circular letter that he 
wanted, and during the time I was there in the office General Bragdon 
spoke to me, in very general terms. 

43. General Russell. They were very general terms ? 
Miss ScHLESiNGER. Very general. 

44. General Russell. And to what general effect ? 

Miss Schlesinger. Principally cautioning me that, if I was asked 
questions that I didn't know the answers to, that I could say I didn't 
know, and just giving me some good advice. 

45. General Russell. Yes. Now, let's see. The first piece of advice 
was, if you do not know the answer, say "I didn't know". That's the 
first piece of advice ? 

Miss Schlesinger. Yes, sir. 

46. General Russell. You knew that already, didn't you ? 
Miss Schlesinger. That's right. 

47. General Russell. Do you know why he might have been insist- 
ing on your not telling us something that you did not know ? 

Miss Schlesinger. No. 

48. General Russell. Then, now, what is the second piece of advice 
he gave you ? 

Miss Schlesinger. He didn't give me any other advice. 

49. General Russell. Let's see. There were but three things 
{329Jp\ talked about : A letter ; the second, 

What are you going to be questioned about? 

I don't know. 
And, third, 

If you don't know, tell them you don't know. 

That is the whole subject? 

Miss Schlesinger. The sum and substance of it. 

50. General Frank. There was something else that the witness said. 
Would you go back and read her former answer, Mr. Reporter? 

(The record was read by the reporter, as above recorded.) 

51. General Russell. What good advice, now, was given you? 
Miss Schlesinger. Well, I considered their telling me that if I 

didn't know the answers, that I didn't — I should say I didn't know, 
and that I would get the information if possible and furnish it to 
the Board later. 

52. General Russell. Did you get the impression that your adviser 
was attempting to convey to you the impression that it wouldn't be 
particularly bad if you didn't know a lot down here before this 
Board? 

Miss Schlesinger. No, I did not. 

53. General Russell. You did not get that impression? 
Miss Schlesinger. Definitely not. 

54. General Russell. Now let's see about the Rohl heart attack. 
What were the symptoms of that heart attack, as you recall it? 

Miss Schlesinger. He put his hand over his heart, and he moaned 
and leaned back in the chair. 

55. General Russell. How long did that go on ? 

Miss Schlesinger. I left in about two or three minutes. Mr. Mid- 
dleton stayed there with him. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1709 

56. General Russell. Did you find that letter that they were 
[S295'] looking for over there ? 

Miss SCHLESINGER. No. 

57. General Russell. Was that letter in that office where they were ? 
Miss ScHLESiNGER. Not the circular letter that they were looking 

for. 

58. General Russell. Were there any files in that office at all, file 
cases in that office ? 

Miss ScHLESiNGER. I think not. 

59. General Russell. Was there any reason for them to send for 
you to come into that room to look for that letter, circular letter? 

Miss ScHLESiNGER. The reason was, Colonel Wyman wanted to de- 
scribe to me what the circular was, and see if I could locate it some- 
where among the records at the Engineer Office. 

60. General Russell. What was this circular letter that he wanted? 

Miss ScHLESiNGER. A circular letter that came out in July or Au- 
gust, probably, of 1940, covering awards of contracts on a negotiated 
or cost-plus-a-fixed-fee basis, and indicating the respective areas in 
which contracts would be awarded, that is, from which contractors 
would be selected for work in certain locations; in other words, that 
the country had been divided up into certain areas and that Honolulu, 
for example, would be required to pick its contractors from a certain 
geographical region. 

61. General Russell. Did that embrace an}^ part of the West 
Coast of the United States? 

Miss ScHLESiNGER. From his description, it embraced the entire 
United States. 

[3^96] 62. General Russell. Did you find that letter? 
Miss ScHLESiNGER. No, uot yet. 

63. General Russell. Are you continuing to look for it ? 

Miss ScHLESiNGER. I think there are several people on the track 
of it. 

64. General Russell. I think that is all. 

65. General Grunert. Did you ever know of the existence of such 
a circular letter ? 

Miss ScHLESiNGER. I have never read the one that he referred to 
specifically. 

66. Major Clausen. As a matter of fact. Miss Schlesinger, this 
heart attack of Mr. Rohl was brought on by drinking, in your opinion, 
was it not ? 

Miss Schlesinger. In my opinion, yes. 

67. Major Clausen. In other words, you had seen him consume 
and imbibe enough to think that the heart attack was the result of 
drinking ? 

Miss Schlesinger. Well, ^ssibly not just when I was there, but I 
was under the impression that there had been some drinking going 
on before. I got there. 

68. Major Clausen. What gave you that impression about Mr. 
Rohl ? 

Miss Schlesinger. Possibly reputation more than anything. 

69. Major Clausen. And that was what. Miss Schlesinger f 

Miss Schlesinger. Well, I don't suppose that going on hearsay and 
reputation is very good testimony, is it, here ? 



1710 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

70. Major Clausen. We collect all kinds. We have had all kinds. 

Miss SciiLESiNGER. I havc heard that he did drink. 

IS297] 71. Major Clausen. As a matter of fact, he was reputed 
to be a confirmed drunkard, wasn't he ? 

Miss Schlesinger. That I don't know. 

[2298] 72. Major Clausen. Now, what about Colonel Wyman — 
you have seen him drunk, on occasion ? 

Miss Schlesinger. No, I didn't. Colonel Wyman did not asso- 
ciate with his employees, normally. 

73. Major Clausen. Miss Schlesinger, why did you hesitate be- 
tween my question and your answer for such a long time? 

Miss Schlesinger. I was trying to recall whether I had ever seen 
him drink. 

74. Major Clausen. I am going to read a portion of your testi- 
mony, given to Colonel Hunt, and ask you if you gave this testimony. 
It is on page 441 : 

(Excerpt from Colonel Hunt's report:) 

Question. Did you ever attend any soci'al function at which Mr. Rolil was 
pi-esent? 
Answer : Yes. 
Question : Did you ever see him drunk? 

Answer : Yes. 

You gave that testimony ? 

Miss Schlesinger. That's right. 

75. Major Clausen. That is all. 

Miss Schlesinger. I believe I changed that later. Isn't there some- 
thing farther down in there ? 

76. Major Clausen. Yes, you have. You say, here, in another 
answer, concerning a question as to whether Colonel Wyman was 
present, that 

it all depends on what you call "drunk," 

and then they say to you, 

Mr. Rohl's idea of somebody being drunk is somebody that is so intoxicated 
that he can't stand up. 

So they ask you if that is your definition of being drunk. 

[3299] Miss Schlesinger. No, but I think I changed my testi- 
mony about Mr. Rohl, to bring out the point about the heart attack, 
a little bit later in my own testimony. 

77. Major Clausen. Oh, yes ; you say here, at lines 30 and 31 : 
(Excerpt from Colonel Hunt's report:) 

I just recall that one night he possibly had a heart attack brought on by 
drinking. 

That is all. 

78. General Russell. When had y^\ seen that testimony, Miss 
Schlesinger ? 

Miss Schlesinger. Well, I gave it. 

79. General Russell. How long ago? 

Miss Schlesinger. And it has been quite a number of months ago ; 
I have forgotten. 

80. General Russell. And you have not seen it recently ? 
Miss Schlesinger. Yes, 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1711 

81. General Russell. Last week? 

Miss ScHLESiNGER. No, I haven't seen it within, oh, three or four 
months. I did see it when the report was sent out here. 

82. General Russell. Now, do you think, if you would hestitate 
just a little minute, that you could remember some more of the good 
advice General Bragdon gave you, Monday afternoon? 

Miss ScHLEsiNGER. Yes; I can remember one more thing, now. 

83. General Russell. Wliat is it ? 

Miss ScHLESiNGER. He told me, if the Board asked me if they had 
talked to me, that I was perfectly at liberty to say that they had. 

84. General Russell. That is all. 

[SSOO] 85. Colonel Toulmin. I would like to ask this young 
lady a question ; may I ? 

86. General Grunert. Go ahead. 

87. Colonel Toulmin. When General Bragdon was kind enough 
to give you this advice, as I understood your testimony he said that 
if you didn't know, to say you didn't know but you would look up 
the information and get it ; is that right ? 

Miss ScHLESiNGER. That is right. 

88. Colonel Toulmin. Did you make an arrangement that you 
would report to him what information was asked for ? 

Miss SoHLESiNGER. No, I did not. 

89. Colonel Toulmin. Did he offer to help you get the information ? 

Miss ScHLESiNGER. No. 

90. Colonel Toulmin. Did he offer to have any of the organization 
over there, Colonel Wyman or Major Lozier or Major Powell, help 
you get the information? 

Miss SCHLESINGER. No. 

91. Colonel Toulmin. Then what was the purpose of his making 
that suggestion? 

Miss ScHLESiNGER. Because he knows that I have access to the files 
there at the office. 

92. Colonel Toulmin. If you had, then why did you need any help 
by way of advice, if you already knew where to go to get it ? 

Miss ScHLESiNGER. His advice was on my conduct before the 
Board. 

93. Colonel Toulmin. I see. He was worried about that? 
Miss SCHLESINGER. Yes. 

94. Colonel Toulmin. That is all. 

[3301] 95. Major Clausen. If General Bragdon had not told 
you to tell the Board that he had talked with you, would you have 
told the Board? 

Miss ScHLESiNGER. I would have. 

96. Major Clausen. The advice then was really unnecessary, was 
it not? 

Miss SCHLESINGER. Apparently so. 

97. Major Clausen. That is all. 

98. General Grunert. Axe there any other questions ? 

99. General Frank. Yes, I have some, I would like to ask. 

100. General Grunert. Go ahead. 

101. General Frank. What was your position in the beginning of 
1941? 



1712 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Miss ScHUESiNGER. Wlien I came out here in February 1941, I 
organized a construction-contract section to handle the processing of 
the contract papers. 

102. General Frank. How long did you hold that ? 

Miss ScHLEsiNGER, At the end of about two months, they put a 
man in charge of the section, and I continued to operate under him. 

103. General Frank. And then? 

Miss ScHLESiNGER. I think that man lasted about — I am estimat- 
ing now — six months, and he was transferred to another job, and 
they put another man in charge of the section, w^ho remained in charge 
until Colonel Wyman left, and then I was given charge of the section 
again. 

104. General Frank. After Colonel Wyman left? 
Miss Schlesinger. That's right. 

105. General Frank. You never were his secretary then, were you ? 
[S302] Miss Schlesinger. Never. 

106. General Frank. How did it happen that on this night that 
you saw Rohl with the heart attack, you happened to be asked down 
to the office to work in the contract section ? 

Miss Schlesinger. I was called down to the Pleasanton Hotel to 
get out contract documents on more than one occasion. 

107. General Frank. At 11 o'clock at night? 

Miss Schlesinger. A telephone call, at 9, 9 : 30, thereabouts, to come 
down. 

108. General Frank. Did you get any papers that night ? 

Miss Schlesinger. Not that night, that I saw Mr. Rohl with the 
heart attack, or drunk, whichever it was. 

109. General Frank. Well, whose office was it — Mr. Rohl's office, or 
Colonel Wyman 's office? 

Miss Schlesinger. We went into Mr. Rohl's quarters that night, not 
into the office. 

110. General Frank. Was Colonel Wyman there? 
Miss Schlesinger. No ; he had left. 

111. General Frank. Did you get contracts out for Mr. Rohl, 
when he had called for them ? 

Miss Schlesinger. I never got contracts out for Mr. Rohl. I wasn't 
working for him. 

112. General Frank. Wlio sent for you this night ? 

Miss Schlesinger. Colonel Robinson called me; or, I believe he 
had somebody call me. 

113. General Frank. Was he there ? * 
Miss Schlesinger. He was ; yes. 

114. General Frank. Did he ^ive you any duty ? 
Miss Schlesinger. Not that night. 

115. General Frank. That is all. 

[3303] 116. Colonel Toulmin. What contracts were they you 
were asked for ? 

Miss Schlesinger. You mean the times that I came down ? 

117. Colonel Totjlmin. No, the night you went down there; what 
contracts did he say he wanted you to get ? 

Miss Schlesinger. None whatsoever. 

118. Colonel Toulmin. You just went down there to get out con- 
tracts, is that right ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1713 

Miss ScHLEsiNGER. When the telephone call came, it was just simply 
a request that I come down to the Pleasanton, and as that had hap- 
pened before, I thought I was going down to work. 

119. Colonel Toulmin. But you did not work ? 
Miss ScHLESiNGER. I did not do any work ; no. 

120. Colonel TouLMiN. All right, that is all. 

121. General Grunert. Are there any other questions? 

122. Major Clausen. No. 

123. General Grunert. Do you think of anything else you want to 
tell the Board ? You have an opportunity, now, to get anything off of 
your chest or your mind, or whatnot, that you may want to inform the 
Board. 

Miss ScHLESiNGER. I dou't think of anything. 

124. General Grunert. I wish the Recorder would caution the wit- 
ness, before the Board. 

(Witness admonished.) 

125. Colonel West. Yes, I will do that. 

Miss Schlesinger, as these proceedings are confidential, it is required 
that you do not discuss with anyone, after you leave, any testimony 
given by you, or anything which took place here, while you were here, 
this afternoon. Are you fully aware of that requirement? 

[3S04] Miss Schlesinger. I am, now. 

126. Colonel West. And you understand that nothing is to be dis- 
cussed, with anyone? 

127. General Grunert. Verj^well. Thank you for coming. 
(The witness was excused, with the above admonition.) 
(Brief recess.) 

TESTIMONY OF LT. COL. ROBERT W. HAIN, GENERAL STAFF CORPS, 
HEADaUARTERS, IJ. S. A. F. P. 0., FT. SHAFTER, T. H. 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your 
name, rank, organization, and station. 

Colonel Hain. Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Hain, General Staff 
Corps, Headquarters, U. S. A. F. P. O. ; Ft. Shafter, T. H. 

2. General Grunert. Colonel, I believe you are here at the request 
of a Member of the Board, to identify some documents, so he will lead 
you to those identifications. 

3. General Russell. I furnished you with a memorandum, request- 
ing the production of certain documents from the Adjutant General's 
files of the Hawiian Department ? 

Colonel Hain. Yes, sir. 

4. General Russell. Later, I requested you to reply to that memo- 
randum, telling me what documents you had found, and those that you 
had not been able to find ? 

Colonel Hain. I have tlie endorsement written up on that, but I 
have not gotten it down here. I forgot to bring it with me, sir. 

5. General Russell. But it will be brought down ? 
[330S] Colonel Hain. Yes, sir. 

6. General Russell. I wonder if you could make available to me, 
first, the personal file of General Short. Could you find in that, right 



1714 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

readily, Colonel, a memorandum or a message from the Navy, dated 
October 16, 1940? 

Colonel Hain. Yes, sir ; I have it, here. 

7. General Russell. You have just handed me a file, described as 
"AG201, Short, Walter C. (Gen. O.)"? 

Colonel Hain. Yes, sir. 

8. General Russell. All of these documents which you give me have 
been taken from the Adjutant General's files of the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment ? 

Colonel Hain. That is correct. 

9. General Russell. These are official files, are they, Colonel ? 
Colonel Hain. That is correct. 

10. General Russell. Here is the memorandum which is contained 
in the General Short file, just described, and which is headed, "Note 
for Commanding General, Hawaiian Department." I will read : 

(Memorandum or message from the Navy, October 16, 1940:) 

The following is a pai'aphrase of a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations 
which I have been directed to pass to you : 

I wonder if you would read that to the Recorder, if you will, please, 
sir. 

Colonel Hain (reading) : 

•Japanese cabinet resignation creates a grave situation. If a new cabinet] is 
formed it probably will be anti-American and strongly nationalistic. If the 
Konoye cabinet remains it will operate under a new mandate which [3306] 
will not include rapprochement with the United States. Either way hostilities 
between Japan and Russia are strongly possible. Since Britain and the U. S. 
are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also 
a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers. View of these possibili- 
ties you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will 
not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan. 

11. General Grunert. It is signed by whom? 

Colonel Hain. It is not signed, sir. It is on a U. S. Naval Com- 
munications service blank, and at the bottom it states : 

Originator OPNAV 
Action CINCL.\NT 

CINCPAC 

CINCAF 

12. General Grunert. It is presumably outcoming from the Chief 
of Naval Operations. Does that "OPNAV", there, mean that? 

Colonel Hain. That is correct, sir. 

13. General Russell. Colonel Hain, I show you another file, a secret 
file taken from the Office of the Adjutant General, which is described 
as "HHD AG 091 JAPAN, BINDER NO. 1." In that there is another 
message, which seems to have come to the Commanding General from 
the Adjutant General of the Army. Will you read that, giving its 
dates, and so forth ? 

Colonel Hain. This is a secret radiogram, headed "Washington, 
D. C, 12 : 34 p. m., October 20, 1941" : 

[SS07] (Secret radiogram, headed "Washington, D. C, 12:30 
PM, October 20, 1941":) 

Following War Dept Estimate of Japanese situation for your information 
STOP Tension between United States and Japan remains strained but no 
repeat no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent. 

(Signed) Adams. 
1I037A. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1715 

14. General Russell. Colonel, I show you, from the same file as that 
from which you have just read, another message, which was signed 
by the Chief of Staff, to the Commanding General, and" ask you to 
identify that message. 

15. General Grunert. I would like to ask whether it was signed 
by the Chief of Staff, or whether his name was appended to said 
message ? 

16. General Russell. There may be a very technical difference; I 
do not know. 

17. General Grunert. But the Chief of Staff's name appears on 
that message ? 

18. General Russeij.. On the message; yes. 

(Secret radiogram, dated Washington, D. C, Nov. 27, 1941:) 
Colonel Hain. This is a secret radiogram, 

War Priority, Washington, D. C, 6:11 p. m., November 27, 1941; C. G. 
Hawaiian Department, Ft. Shatter, T. H., 472 27th : 

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical pui'poses 
with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese government might come 
back and offer to continue STOP Japanese future action unpredictable but 
hostile action possible at any moment STOP If hostilities [3308] can- 
not, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the 
first overt act STOP This policy should not, repeat hot, be constinied as re- 
stricting YOU to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense STOP 
Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnais- 
sance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be 
carried out so as not, rejieat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent 
STOP Report measures taken STOP Should hostilities occur you will carry 
out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan STOP 
Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential 
officers. 

(Signed) Marshall. 
116P/27. 

[3309'] 19. General Russell. Now, is there anything on the rec- 
ords here which indicates the time that this message was received, 
Colonel? 

Colonel Hain. The only indication here which would indicate the 
time of receipt is that it was decoded at 2 : 22 p. m. November 27, 1941. 

20. General Russell. Is that the time that the decoding of the mes- 
sage was completed ? 

Colonel Hain. Yes, sir. 

21. General Russell. In that connection, Colonel, I call your atten- 
tion to a radiogram which apparently was sent by General Short, 
referring to that telegram, and ask you to read that into the record 
and tell us if there is indicated on it what time it was dispatched 
from the Hawaiian Department. 

Colonel Hain. This radiogram No. 959-27, dated 27 November, 1941, 
to the Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. : 

(Radiogram No. 959-27, dated November 27, 1941, to Chief of Staff, 
War Department, Washington, from Hawaiian Department, is as 
follows:) 

Radiogram 472 to C/S, 27 Nov. 41 1-27. 

Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy. 

Signed "Short". 

This message was encoded at 5 : 40 p. m., 27 November, 1941. There 
is nothing on here that indicates what time it was transmitted. 



1716 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

22. General Russell. I did not recall this one when I was examining 
the records with you, but do you have any records which might indicate 
the time that that message was sent to the Signal people for encoding ? 

['3310] Colonel Hain. I know of no record, 

23. General Russell. What does this "5 : 40" indicate ? That the 
encoding of the message had been completed at that hour ? 

Colonel Hain. That is correct, sir. 

24. General Russell. In other words, it was ready to go at 5 : 40? 
Colonel Hain. Yes, sir. 

25. General Russell. Do you know with a message of that length 
how long would be required to encode it after it was delivered to tlie 
Signal people? 

Colonel Hain. No, sir, I am not familiar with that. 

2G. General Russell. Colonel, I call your attention to another file 
which you brought to the Board in response to the notice referred 
to before. It seems to be HHD AG 384-4, Espionage. I call your 
attention to a message in that file and ask you if you will be good 
enough to read that into the record. 

Colonel Hain. This is secret radiogram 114 War KR 189 WD 
Priority. 

Washington, D. C, 8 42 P, Nov. 2S, 19^1. 
CG, Hawaiian Department, 

Fort Shatter, T. H.: 
482-28th Critical situation demands that all precautious be taken immediately 
against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War 
Department paren see paragraph three MID SC tliirty — dash forty five end paren 
stop Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary 
to provide for protection of you establishments comma property comma and 
equipment [3311] against sabotage comma protection of your personnel 
against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage 
stop This does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures ai'e authorized 
stop Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma 
avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm stop To insure speed of transmission 
Identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat 
not affect your responsibility under existing instructions. 

And that is signed "Adams" and it was decoded at 10 : 55 p. m. 
November 28th, 1941. 

27. General Russell. To complete the record, do you have a copy 
of any reply which was made to that radiogram which you have just 
read, in your records? 

Colonel Hain. I have a reply to that radiogram which I just read. 

28. General Russell. Would you read it to the Board, please. 
Colonel Hain. This is a radiogram : SECRET, PRIORITY, dated 

29 November, 1941. It was sent as radiogram No. 986-29th to the 
Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C. : 

Attention your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth comma full precau- 
tions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investiga- 
tive responsibility of War Department paren paragraph three MID SC thirty 
dash forty five end paren and military establishments including personnel and 
equipment stop As regards protection of vital installations outside of military 
reservations such as power plants comma telephone exchanges and highway 
bridges comma this headquarters by confidential letter dated June [3312] 
nineteen nineteen forty one requested the Governor of the Territory to use the 
broad powers vested in him by Section sixty seven of the Organic Act whicli 
provides comma in effect, comma that the Governor may call upon the com- 
manders of military and naval forces of the United States in the Territory of 
Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence comma invasion comma insur- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1717 

rection etc stop Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June twen- 
tieth confidentially made a formal written demand on this headquarters to fur- 
nish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to 
prevent sabotage comma and lawless violence in connection therewith comma 
being committed against vital installations and structures in the Territory stop 
Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being 
afforded vital civilian installations stop In this connection comma at the insti- 
gation of this headquarters the city and county of Honolulu on June thirtieth 
nineteen forty one enacted an ordinance which permits the Commanding Gen- 
eral Hawaiian Department comma to close comma or restrict the use of and 
travel upon comma any highway within the city and county of Honolulu comma 
whenever the Commanding General deems such action necessary in the interest 
national defense stop The authority thus given has not yet been exercised stop 
Relations with F. B. I. and all other federal and Territorial officials are and 
have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent mat- 
ters period 

That is signed "Short" and was encoded at 2 : 45 p. m. 29 November, 
1941. 

[SSJ3] 29. General Etjssell. Colonel, I show you a file from 
the Adjutant General's office, Hawaiian Department, AG 370.2, in 
which a message from the Chief of Staff to the Hawaiian Department, 
dated December 7, appears. Will you please read that message to the 
Board? 

Colonel Hatn. This is a secret radiogram,1549 WS Washington, 
D. C. 74/73 RCA USG ETAT 7 12 18 P, to the CG, Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, Fort Shafter, T. H. 

529 7th Japanese are presenting at 1 p. m. eastern standard time today what 
amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code ma- 
chine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not 
know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communi- 
cation period 

That is signed "Marshall". Decoded at 2:51 p. m. December 7, 
1941. 

30. General Russell. Is that 2 : 51 Hawaiian time? 
Colonel Hain. That is local time, Hawaiian time. 

31. General Russell. Could you refer to that radiogram and tell 
the time that it was dispatched from Washington ? 

Colonel Hain. This shows it as being dispatched from Washing- 
ton at 12 : 18 p. m., December 7th, 1941. 

32. General Russell. Are you familiar enough with the differenti- 
ation in time here and in Washington to tell us what time in Honolulu 
it was when it was 12 : 18 p. m. in Washington ? 

Colonel Hain. I do not recall whether the time differential was the 
same then as it is now, but if it was the same it would have been — by 
a rapid calculation I make it 7 : 43. I may be wrong. 7 : 42, some- 
thing like that. 

fSSU] 33. General Russell. That is about the time of the attack ? 

Colonel Hain. A. M. 

34. General Russell. In connection with the last message which 
you have read to the Board, will you please state whether or not on 
the 9th of December there was received a message from the War De- 
partment requesting information on the message of December 7th, 
1941 ? 

Colonel Hain. Yes, sir. This message I have here is headed "P 3 
War L 54 WD 1 Extra Urgent". 



1718 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Washington, D. C, 2 19 P, December 9, 1941. 
CG, Hawaiian Depaetment, 
Fort Shatter, T. H.: 

Five four nine ninth Please advise immediately exact time of receipt of our 
number five two nine repeat five two nine December seven at Honolulu exact 
time deciphered message transmitted by Signal Corps to staff and by what 
staff office received period 

That is signed "Colton Acting". 

35. General Russell, You do not know who Colton was ? 
Colonel Hain. I believe he was Chief of the Signal Corps. 

36. General Russell. Have you any record to indicate what reply 
was made to that message, Colonel ? 

Colonel Hain. Yes, I have a radio here. 

Secret Extra Urgent Radiogram Number 1087-9th. 
Chief Signal Officb2{, 
Washington, D. C: 
Re your five four nine radio five two nine received Honolulu by RCA seven 
thirty three morning seventh Stop [S315] This message delivered Signal 
Office Fort Shafter eleven forty five morning seventh paren this time approxi- 
mate but within five minutes paren Stop Deciphered message received by 
Adjutant General Headquarters Hawaiian Department two fifty eight afternoon 
seventh period 

That is signed "Short", and reported as "Secret Extra Urgent 315 
pm December 9, 1941." 

37. General Russell. I hand you a radiogram dated November 27, 
1941, purporting to be sent from G-2, General Miles, at Washington, 
to G-2 Hawaiian Department, and ask you if you will read that to 
the Board? 

Colonel Hain. It is a secret radiogram and reads : 

P 2 WAR WD Priority. 

Washington, D. C., November 27, 1941. 
G— 2, Hawaiian Department, 
Ft. Shafter, T. H.: 
473-27th Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate Stop Hos- 
tilities may ensue Stop Subversive activities may be expected Stop Inform 
Commanding General and Chief of Staff only 

Miler. 
144PM. 

And over here in pencil are some other markings. It is marked To 
AG-file. Noted C/S 11/27/41 WCP", with a stamp "Walter C. 
Phillips," Colonel GAC, Chief of Staff. 

This message I just read was decoded at 4 p. m. 27 November 1941. 

38. General Russell. May I ask a question or two on these SOP 
\3316] to clear it up ? 

Colonel, you have recently made a search of the records of the Ha- 
waiian Department for the purpose of determining whether or not 
the SOP of that Department of November 5, 1941 had been received 
in the War Department, is that true ? 

Colonel Hain. Yes, sir, 

39. General Russell. Did you discover, or not, any letter of trans- 
mittal of that SOP of November 5th to the War Department? 

Colonel Hain. No, sir. I discovered no such letter of transmittal, 

40. General Russell. What, if anything, did your investigation dis- 
close as to that SOP of November 5th having been sent to the War 
Department ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1719 

Colonel Hain. The only record which I found on the publication 
of the SOP separately was in the routing slip correspondence in the 
unclassified section of the Adjutant General. It merely shows this 
SOP as having been published by the A. G. on November 8th, 1941. 

41. General Frank. What A. G. ? 

Colonel Hain. The Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department, on 
November 8th, 1941, but there is no distribution whatever shown. 
I find no record of that. 

42. General Russell. In the normal course of things in the Adju- 
tant General's office or in its normal procedure would there have been 
a letter of transmittal of these SOPs to the War Department? 

Colonel Hain. I am not familiar enough with the Adjutant Gen- 
eral's Department, sir, to give an answer to that. 

43. General Russell. Would you get this man Earl in readiness 
\3317\ so at an opportune moment we may call him down here 
and question him on the distribution of those SOPs? 

Colonel Hain. Yes, sir. 

44. General Russell. Now, Colonel, I want to ask you a few ques- 
tions about the records touching the alert of 1940. I show you the 
Adjutant General's file 354.2, Special Maneuver File-1940, and call 
your attention to a radiogram from the War Department, and ask that 
you identify that and read it to the Board and into the record. 

Colonel Hain. This is a secret radiogram : 

20 WVY AB 89 WD Priority. 

Washington, D. C, 11 4 V, June 17, 19],0. 
Commanding General, Hawahan Department, 

Ft. Shatter, T. H.: 
Four two eight seventeenth Iramediatelj' alert coraplete defensive organiza- 
tion to deal with possible transpacific raid comma to greatest extent possible 
without greating public hysteria or provoking undue curiosity of newsptpers or 
alien agents stop Suggest maneuver basis maintain alert until further orders 
Stop Instructions for secret conmiunication direct with Chief of Staff will be 
furnished you shortly stop Acknowledge Stop 

Adamb. 
9 15 A. 

[3318] 45. General Russell. Have you a reply of General Her- 
ron's to that message which ordered the alert of June 17, 1940 ? 

Colonel Hain. I have here, in the handwriting of someone, a 
message- 



46. General Russell. Cable sent 11 : 30. 
Colonel Hain. Cablegram sent 11:30 p. m., June 17-40, and it is 

marked, "#1— 17th, Secret." 

General George C. Marshall, 

Chief of Staff: 

All antiaircraft observation and security detachments in position with live 

ammunition and orders to fire on foreign planes over restricted areas and in 

defense of any essential installation Stop Some local interest in ammunition 

issue but no excitement Stop Navy inshore and offshore air patrol in operation. 

Hebron. 

47. General Russell. Do you have another message there relating 
to this same alert, from the War Department ? 



1720 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Hain. I have here a secret radiogram headed : 

23 War Jr 123 WD. 

Washington, D. C, 658 PM, June 19, 1940. 
Commanding General, Hawauan Department, 

Fort Shatter, T. H.: 
Four three four nineteenth Concerning your one eight four eight June eight- 
eenth period You are authorized to modify gradually measures ordered in 
our four two eight but adequate guards on a semipermanent basis will be main- 
tained at all [3319'\ critical points period Guard detachments may be 
rotated at your discretion period In view of above resubmit your request for 
funds with concise explanation as to their application under each appropriation 
subhead period Every effort should be made to avoid publicity and to place 
maintenance of alert as modified herein on strictly a training basis period 
Acknowledge 

Signed "Adams 241PM". 

48. General Russell. When does that file show something else was 
sent from the Hawaiian Department to the War Department on this 
alert of 1940? 

Colonel Hain. A cablegram sent at 6 : 20 p. m., June 19, 1940, 
marked, "#2 — 19th, Secret," reads as follows : 
Chief of Staff, War Department cable code 

Yours of acknowledged: 

Then crossed out but I can still read it : 

Alert continues without incident. 

That whole sentence is crossed out. 

Stop Full aircraft and anti-aircraft precautions will be continued with easing 
in other lines Stop Local publicity on maneuvers favorable and not excited. 

49. General Russell. That is right interesting. Here is a radio- 
gram from General Herron touching the relation of the Navy to that 
alert of 1940. Will you read that to the Board and into the record ? 

Colonel Hain. This is cablegram, secret, marked, "#3 21st June," 
to"Chief of Staff W.D.": 

In interpreting your cables consideration is [3S20'\ given to the fact 
that Navy here has nothing from Navy Department regarding alert Stop Navy 
now turning over to Army inshore aerial patrol in accordance with existing 
local joint agreement Stop Will not modify Army air and anti-air alert before 
Monday except on further advice from you. 

Signed "Herron." 

50. General Russell. What is the date of that ? 21 ? 
Colonel Hain. 21 June 1940. 

51. General Russell. Well, did the Chief of Staff' reply to that 
message relating to the alert ? 

Colonel Hain. I have a secret cablegram, Washington, D. C, 11 : 20 
a. m., June 22, 1940, to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, 
Honolulu : 

One 22nd reference to your number three June 21st in view of present un- 
certainty instructions for the Navy other than local naval forces have not been 
determined continue your alert in accordance with modifications directed in our 
434. 

Signed, "Marshall." 

52. General Russell. That was what date ? 
Colonel Hain. That was the 22nd of June. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1721 

53. General Russell. Did General Herron send a cablegram to 
Washington on the 1st of July ? 

Colonel Hain. Yes, sir. 

54. General Russell. Would you read that cablegram into the 
record ? 

Colonel Hain, This is a cable marked, "4 — 1st," was encoded at 8 : 40 
a. m., July 1, 1940, and marked, "Transmitted [3321] 10:30 
a. m., July 1, 1940": 

Cable code to Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. Alert on two 
weeks today. All quiet locally. No ill effects on command except cumulative 
hours on plane engines and impaired overhaul facilities due to move from Ford 
Island. 

Signed, "Herron," 

55. General Russell. Was there any response to this ? 

Did Herron send another radiogram to the War Department on the 
8th of July about the conditions of the alert ? 

Colonel Hatn. Yes, sir. I have a cable here marked No. 5, the 8th of 
July. It is marked in handw^riting, "Cable code to Chief of Staff 
7_8-40 1 : 00 P. M." : 

Three weeks of alert completed today with no unfavorable reactions on personnel 
but a good deal of wear on mdtor transportation. Stop No developments in local 
situation 

Signed, "Herron." 

56. General Russell. I show you a radiogram of July, apparently 
July 10th, from the Chief of Staff to General Herron. Does it relate to 
this same alert of 1940? 

Colonel Hain, Yes, 

57. General Russell. Will you read that into the record ? 
Colonel Hain. This is a secret cablegram : 

Washington, D. C, 2 : 45 PM, 10 July 1940. 

Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, 

Honolulu: 
Two tenth can you not avoid undue wear on [SS22] motor transportation 
by putting present alert stations on a permanent basis without unfavorable reac- 
tion on convenience or morale or personnel question If this meets your approval 
submit an estimate for the necessary construction of temporary types as to your 
shortage of transportation It is expected that one and one half ton types will be 
delivered by October first and other types by December first 1940 These vehicles 
will be placed at ports of embarkation and sliipped as rapidly thereafter as ti'ans- 
port space permits period This in reply to your cablegram number five 

Signed, "Marshall." 

I have one from Herron to Marshall on the 15th of July. You want 
that one ? 

58. General Russell. Yes. 

Colonel Hain. Cablegram marked No. 6 — 15th, cable code to Chief 
of Staff, War Department, dated 7-15-40 : 

Alert entering fifth week. Stop As now conducted is without undue strain on 
personnel or materiel including motors Stop New construction unnecessary 
Stop Navy continues cooperation by outer aerial patrol. 

Signed "Herron." 



79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 



1722 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

59. General Russell. Any reply to that radiogram ? 
Colonel Hain. Reply to that is a secret cablegram : 

RE 29 Washington, D. C, USG 55/54 3.10 PM, 16 July JfO. 
Commanding Genekal, Hawaiian Department: 

[3323} Three sixteenth of our number six you are authorized at your discre- 
tion to relax alert provisions except that first comma precautions against 
sabotage will be continued on the basis of instant readiness and second com- 
ma aerial patrol measures can be reduced to a training status but so arranged 
as to be reestablished on an alert basis on short notice 

Signed, "Marshall". 

60. General Russell. Wliat is the date of that ? 
Colonel Hain. 16 July. 

61. General Grunert. The Board will take a five-minute recess. 
(There was a brief informal recess.) 

[3324] 62. General Grunert. All right ; you may proceed. You 
can finish in half an hour, can't you ? 

63. General Russell. I am going to let Colonel Toulmin put in the 
part of the orders which he has had a chance to check there, which 
he desires be made a part of the record ; and so far as I am concerned 
I don't know that there is anything else that I have. 

64. Colonel Toulmin. All right. There is Field Order Number 1 
(Mission Orders) ; Operations Orders, Hawaiian Department, under 
date of 2 November '40, consisting of pages 1 to 8, inclusive. The rec- 
ord should show that the administrative annexes to this order are 
omitted because of their volume and lack of immediate pertinency. 
If the Board is agreeable, the reporter could copy this and leave the 
original document in the possession of the Department. 

65. General Grunert. So be it. 

(Field Order Number 1 (Mission Orders) is as follows:) 

8ecr-et 
Operations Orders 
Hawaiian Department 
Field Ordeks secret 

No. 1 War Plans Section 

Auth : C.G., Haw. Dept. 
2 Nov. 40 R.C.T. 
(Date) (AC of S, G-3) 
Heiadquarters Hawaiian Department, 

Fort Sh after, T. H., 



(Date) (Hour) 

Date and hour this Field Order becomes effective will be announced by orders 
from this headquarters. 

[3325] MAPS: Topographic, Island of Oahu, 1/62,500 (1940 Edition); 
Terrain Map, Island of Oahu, 1/20,000 (1940 Edition) ; Island of Oahu, 1/180,000 
(1939 Edition) ; Hawaiian Islands, Eastern Part U. S. C&G.S. Chart No. 4102. 

1. a. For information of the enemy see Current Summaries of Intelligence. 

6. (1) The Army forces and the 14th Naval District, with attached U. S. 
Fleet units, are charged within the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier and the Coastal 
Zone thereof with the joint mission of holding OAHU as a main outlying Naval 
Base and of controlling and protecting shipping in the Coastal Zone. The 
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier consists of Oahu and such adjacent land and sea 
areas as are required for the defense of Oahu. 

(2) The 14th Naval District with attached U. S. Fleet units, personnel, ma- 
teriel and installations, will patrol the Coastal Zone, control and protect ship- 
ping therein and support the Army forces. It will protect all facilities and in- 
stallations of the 14th Naval District against sabotage. For details of organi- 
zation and Execution of Mission, see Annex No. 7, Naval Operations. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1723 

(3) For details of separate tasks, see paragraph 14-15, Section IV, JOINT 
COASTAL FRONTIER I'LAN— HAWAIIAN L^EPARTMENT AND FOUR- 
TEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT (HCF 39). 

2. a. The Hawaiian Department, supported by the 14th Naval District and 
such elements of the U. S. Fleet as may be available, will hold at all costs OAHU 
as a main outlying Naval Base, against attacks by sea, land and air forces, and 
against hostile sympathizers, by : 

[S326^ (1) Concentrating on OAHU a highly mobile defense of all arms, 

held in readiness to repulse any and all forms of attack, to suppress local up- 
risings, and to prevent sabotage. 

(2) Establishing on the main outlying islands military and civil organizations 
and minim.um defense to develop, control and utilize the military resources of 
those islands and to protect such areas and installations therein as are essen- 
tial to the defense of OAHU. 

6. The Hawaiian Department, in addition, will support the Naval forces. 

c. TROOPS: 

(1) Beach and Land Defense Forces: 

Commanding General : The Commanding General, Hawaiian Division. 
Troops : The Hawaiian Division — 

(Less elements of the 11th Field Artillery Regiment manning 155mm 
armament (under tactical control of Commanding General, Hawaiian 
Separate Coast Artillery Brigade), 3d Engineers (less 1st Battalion), 
Det 11th Ordnance Company (maintenance), Companies "A" and "B", 
11th Quartei-master Regiment). 

298th Infantry, Hawaii National Guard; Company "A" (less 1 
platoon) 1st Separate Chemical Battalion. 

72d Separate Quartermaster Company (Bakery). 
[3S27] 23d Quartermaster Company (Sep) (L. M.) Station 
Hospital, Schotield Barracks; Bakers and Cooks School, Farriers 
and Horseshopi-s School, Post Detachments, Schofield Barracks 
(less Ordnance personnel). 

(2) Seacoast and Antiaircraft Defense Forces: 

Commanding General : The Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate 
Coast Artillery Brigade. 
Troops: The Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade. 

Initially, elements of the 11th Field Artillery Regiment to man two 
(2) 155mm GPF batteries, plus the required command supply and 
communication personnel foi- said batteries and selected personnel to 
augment specified Groupment headquarters. 
Post Detachments : 

FORT SHAFTER (64th CA (AA)). 
FORT RUGER. 
FORT DERUSSY. 
FORT KAMEHAMEHA. 
(All less Ordnance personnel.) 

(3) Hawaiian Air Force: 

Commanding General: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force. 

Troops: Hawaiian Air Force (less 86th Observation Sq.), 18th Bombard- 
ment Wing (H), 58th Bomb. Sq. (1), 14th Pursuit Wing, 19th Trans. 
Sq., 17th AB Gp. (R), 18th AB Gp. (R), Post Detachments, Hickam and 
Wheeler Fields. 
[3S28] (4) Department Observation Aviation: 

Commander : The Commanding Officer, 86th Observation Squadron. 

Troops: 86th Observation Squadron (C & T». 

(5) Department Engineer Troops: 
Commander : Department Engineer Officer. 

Troops : 3d Engineers (less 1st Batalion). 

(6) Department Chemical Troops: 
Commander: Department Chemical Officer. 

Troops : Chemical Section, Department Headquarters Detachment. 
Hawaiian Chemical Warfare Depot Detachment. 

One Platoon, Company "A", 1st Separate Chemical Battalion (initially 
prior to assignment to Hawaiian Division). 

(7) Department Signal Corps Troops: 
Commander: Department Signal Officer. 

Troops: Aircraft Warning Company, Hawaii. 9th Signal Service 
Company. 



1724 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(8) Department Military Police: 

Commander : Provost Marshal, Hawaiian Department. 
Troops : Military Police Company, Hawaiian Department. 

1st Battalion, 27th Infantry and 11th Tank Company when released 
to Provost Marshal by Hawaiian Division. 
[3329'i (9) Oahu District, Department Service Command: 

Commander : Commanding Officer, Oahu District, Department Service 
Command. 

Troops: To be determined later. 

(10) Hawaii District, Department Service Command: 

Commander: Commanding Officer, Hawaii District, Department Service 
Command. 

Troops : Camp Detachment, Kilauea Military Camp. 

2d Battalion, 299th Infantry (Hawaii National Guard). 

Howitzer Company, 299th Infantry (Hawaii National Guard). 

Civil orgaization. 

(11) Maui District, Department Service Command: 

Commander: Commanding Officer, Maui District, Department Service 
Command. 

Troops: 1st Battalion, 299th Infantry (Hawaii National Guard). 
Company K, 299th Infantry (Hawaii National Guard). 
Civil organization. 

(12) Kauai District, Department Service Command: 

Commander: Commanding Officer, Kauai District, Department Service 
Command. 

Troops : Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 299th Infantry 
(Hawaii National Guard. 

[S330} 3d Battalion, 299th Infantry (less companies K and L) 
(Hawaii National Guard). 
Civil organization. 
3. a. The Hawaiian Division will defend OAHU against air, naval and land- 
ing attacks and/ior raids, and in addition thereto, will 

(1) Protest all vital installations on OAHU against enemy sympathizers 
(including command and fire control cable system), except those located within 
Police District No. 1, City and County of HONOLULU, or on garrisoned Army 
and Navy Reservations not under the control of the Division Commander and 
all observation and fire control stations of the seacoast and antiaircraft 
artillery defenses. 

(2) Protect Hickam Field and Wheeler Field from raids by hostile sym- 
thizers outside those reservations. 

(3) Be prepared to exercise Police Control of persons on OAHU, except 
within Police District No. 1. City and County of HONOLULU and within 
garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations not vmder the control of the Division 
Commander, when so directed by the Department Commander. 

(4) Regulate militarv traffic and circulation on OAHU, exclusive of the 
area AIEA JUNCTION-NUUANU PALI MAKAPUU HEAD. 

(5) Furnish on call direct from Provote Marshal, Hawaiian Department, 
the following troops: 

1st Battalion, 27th Infantry. 
11th Tank Company. 

6. The Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade will defend OAHU 
against attacks by aircraft, surface vessels and submarines and, in addition 
theerto, will 

(1) Support the Beach and Land Defense Forces. 

\_SS31] (2) Support Naval forces within the range of seacoast armanent. 

(8) Protect all vital installations on Army Reservations garrisoned by 
elements of the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade and all observation 
and fire control stations of the seacoast and antiaircraft defenses. 

(4) Cooperate with Army and Navy Air forces in safeguarding friendly 
aircraft from fire of antiaircraft artillery troops. 

(5) Coordinate the operations of aU antiaircrafts and seacoast intelligence 
agencies and will take such action as is necessary to coordinate the seacoast 
defense with operatiojis of the Inshore Patrol. 

c. The Hawaiian Air Force will defend OAHU against attacks by aircraft. 
Naval vessels, expeditionary forces, and, in furtherance thereof, will conduct 
operations as follows: 

(1) Offensive Action. Conduct air operations against hostile naval, air, 
and expeditionary forces. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1725 

(2) Defensive action. Reinforced by available ground forces, defend air 
stations, bases, and auxiliary fields on OAHU against air attack and sabotage. 
Provide antiaircraft machine gun defense for air planes on ground on all 
fields. 

(3) Reconnaissance. Conduct reconnaissance essential to the combat ef- 
ficiency of the Air Force and to supplement that of naval air forces in securing 
information of hostile fleet miovements. 

(4) Cooperation. In carrying out the above operations the Hawaiian Air 
Force may conduct independent [3332] (Operations or may operate in 
conjunction with, supported by, or in support of naval air forces, or tem- 
porarily under direction of the naval air f,orce commander, as provided in 
Chapter 2, Joint Action of the Army and Navy, and will cooperate with all 
forces in direct defense of OAHU. Air Corps base detachments stationed at 
air fields on the outlying islands will Gooperate with local ground forces in 
the defense of these fields. 

d. The S6th Observation Squadron (C&D) will support the defense of OAHU, 
furnishing observation, liaison, and pliotographic missions for all echelons of 
the Command. Requests for missions will be received, coordinated and as- 
signed by this headquarters. The Commanding Oflicer, 86th Observation 
Squadron will report to the Department Commander and wiU arrange for 
liaison and direct communication between this headquarters and the 86th 
Observation Squadron. 

e. The Department Engineer, with such troops and labor as are assigned 
under Department control, will assist the Operations of the field forces by 
means of engineering works. For initial tasks see Annex IV, Engineer Plan, 
to Administrative Orders No. 1, Headquarters Hawaiian Department. 

/. The Department Chemical Officer is charged with the general planning, prep- 
aration for, and technical supervision of the use of chemicals, and with such 
troops as are assigned under Department control will execute the tasks as listed 
in Annex No. 4, Chemicals. For details relative to use of chemicals, see Annex 
No. 4, Chemicals. 

g. The Department Signal Officer, with such troops and [3233] . labor 
as are under Department control will operate the Department Aircraft Warn- 
ing Service and will install, maintain and operate all Signal Communication 
Agencies under Department Control. 

h. The Departmet Provost Marshal, in addition to his normal duties, will — 

(1) Protect all vital installations within Police District No. 1, City and County 
of HONOLULU, exclusive of those located on garrisoned Army and Navy Reser-, 
vations. 

(2) Communicate directly with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Division, 
when necessary to secure the reinforcements indicated in paragraph 3 a (5), 
above. 

(3) Regulate militarv traffic and circulation within the area, AIEA JUNC- 
TION-NUUANU PALI-MAKAPUU HEAD. 

(4) Exercise such jurisdiction and supervision over all Military Police Forces 
within the Hawaiian Department as may be necessary to secure prompt action 
and coordinated effort in accordance with the instructions of the Department 
Commander. 

(5) Be prepared to assist civilian authorities in all Air Raid Precautions, in- 
cluding blackout, radio silence and evacuation of civilians from dangerous areas, 
when so directed by the Department Commander. 

(6) Perform such additional duties as are indicated in Annex No. 5, Provost 
Marshal, attached hereto. 

i. The Oahu District, Department Service Command, will be prepared to carry 
out its functions and duties as prescribed in the Mobilization Plan, H.D., and 
establish upon notice from this headquarters the following : 

l333Ji] (1) A labor Procurement Service. 

(2) A Food Administration. 

j. The Hawaii, Maui, and Kauai Districts, Department Service Command, 
will carry out their functions and duties as prescribed in the Mobilization Plan, 
Hawaian Department, prevent and suppress sabotage and civil disorders, protect 
loyal citizens, assist naval elements in protection of local installations, and delay 
and harass operations by an external enemy. Assisted by the Air Corps detach- 
ments stationed thereon, defend military airfields against acts of sabotage and 
raids by small hostile forces, paying particular attention to the defense of MORSE 
FIELD, BURNS FIELD, AND BARKING SANDS. 



1726 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Jc. In addition to his normal (x-2 functions, the Department G— 2 will — 

(1) Establish a counterespionage service that will not only guard against the 
subversive activities of the external enemy, but will also enable the Department 
(}-2 to keep the Department Commander constantly advised as to the attitude, 
trend or thought, and probable course of action of the civil jKjpulation, particu- 
larly that of alien extraction. This service will maintain close liaison with the 
Provost Marshal, with a view to : 

(a) Furnishing the Provost Marshal with all information gained through the 
counterespionage service, of value in the prevention of civil disorders, sabotagf 
and incipient uprisings. 

(b) Receiving and evaluating information relative to the internal situation 
collected by the Provost Marshal [3335-3336] through his agencies set up 
for the actual control of the civil population. 

(2) Collect, evaluate, and disseminate information relative to assemblies of 
enemy nationals or sympathizers, and overt acts of sabotage and terrorism. 

(3) Prepare propaganda and publicity for the encouragement of the loyalty 
and support of the civil population, particularly that of alien exti'action. 

X. (1) For Doctrines and Principles of the Defense see Part II, Operations 
Orders. 

(2) For details concerning defense against hostile sympathizers, see Part 
II, Operations Orders, Annex No. 2, Intelligence, and Annex No. 5, Provost 
Marshal. 

(3) All major units of the defense will cooperate with the 14th Naval District 
and with elements of the U. S. Fleet in all spheres of action compatible with 
their missions, armament, and equipment. 

(4) For details as to use of Chemicals, see Annex No. 4, Chemicals. 

(5) Elements of the 11th Field Artillery Regiment initially assigned to sea- 
coast defense missions under the tactical command of the Commanding General, 
Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, will revert to the control of the 
Commanding General, Hawaiian Division, upon orders from Department Head- 
quarters. 

4. See Administrative Orders No. 1, Hawaiian Department. 

5. a. See Annex No. 3, Signal Communications. 
b. Command Posts : 

Hawaiian Department, 

Forward Echelon, ALIAMANU. 
Rear Echelon, FORT SHAFTER. 
[3337-3S38] Hawaiian Division, 

Forward Echelon, WAIKAKALAUA GULCH, (98.3-92.2). 
Rear Echelon. SCHOFIELD BARRACKS. 
Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, 
Forward Echelon. ALIAMANU. 
Rear Echelon, FORT DERUSST. 
Hawaiian Fir Force, 

Foi-Avard Echelon. ALIAMANU. 
Rear Echelon, FORT SHAFTER. 
Fourteenth Naval District, 
PEARL HARBOR. 
District Service Conmiands: 

Oahu District. HONOLULU. 
Hawaii District. HILO. 
Maui District, WAILUKU. 
Kauai District. LIHUE. 
By command of Lieutenant General HERRON ; 

Philip Hayes, 
Coln^iel, General Staff Corps. 
Official: Chief of Staff. 

R. C. Throckmorton. 

Lieut. Colonel. General Staff Corps, 
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3. 
Annexes : 

No. 1, Operations Map. 

No. 2, Intelligence. 

No. 3, Signal Communications. 

No. 4, Chemicals. 

No. 5, Provost Marshal. 

No. 6, Search of Alien Communities. 

No. 7, Naval Operations. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1727 

[3339] Distribution 
Custodian ^°PV ^°- 

H.D., AG 1-3, 7-8, 11 

G-2 , 4 

G-3 5-6 

G-4 9 

Air O 13 

Dept. Engr 14 

C. G., Haw. Div 22-27 

C. G., HSCAB 30-35 

C. G., Haw. Air Force 38-42 

Comdt, 14th Naval District 45 

WPD, WD, Washington, D. C 52 

[S340] 66. General Eussell. I have here, on the subject of sab- 
otage from the standpoint of the airforces, a special report that was 
prepared by Burwell. I am attempting to find out what he had to do 
with it now : H. S. Burwell, Colonel, Air Corps, Special Inspector. It 
touches this subject of sabotage as it was viewed by the Air Corps at 
the time, under date of 9th of July, 1941. 

I will ask you, Colonel, to read this paragraph two, estimate of the 
situation. 

Colonel Hain. Paragraph two : 

Estimate of the Situation : 

a. In respect to the need for increased security for aircraft, suppliis and in- 
stallations, the undersigned has found from the viewpoint of the Commanding 
Generals of the Hawaiian Department, Hawaiian Air Force, and Hickam Field, 
that the prevailing attitude of mind toward the immediate need for positive 
preparations to prevent the success of predictable acts of planned and ordered 
sabotage does not fully reflect the priority and expressed policy of the responsible 
officers concerned and therefore must be reported as inadequate. 

b. Investigation indicates that a few bold, ruthless and intelligent saboteurs, 
consisting of iniside military operators or civilian employees, could incapacitate 
Hickam Field or a similar large post on any predetermined night. Also, that the 
controls now in effect are not and have not been responsible, primarily; [for 
the previous excellent [33^(1] antisabotage record, but instead that the 
principal deterrents have resided in the fact that no lone agent or single fanatic 
lias been operating on his own, while in the meantime no organized plan of con- 
certed sabotage has as yet been ordered 

and the words, "as yet been ordered" are underscored. 

or contrawise, that orders, without doubt are in effect forbidding premature acts 
of sabotage. In connection with the growing local union labor problem and the 
indication of the F. B. I., it should be taken for granted that Germany has 
prepared a subversive plan of action for Hawaii, similar to her invariable custom, 
although the existence of the plan may not have been discovered. 

c. In view of the precipitous world events that have occurred subsequent to 
the recently declared unlimited emergency, and to the crucial test now confront- 
ing Germany in her war with Russia, it is found that a considerable portion of 
the command do not see the mental picture of the interplay of relations now 
existing between inter-continental theati-es of war and our local sphere of action. 

(1) Hence, the probability of a local reaction in the form of a quick movement 
order by the War Department, at the behest of the Navy, of heavy reinforce- 
ments from the mainland, or vice versa, of quick movement of all heavy bombard- 
ment from Hawaii to Panama or to Manila when land bases are prepared on 
Midway, Wake and Guam, has not been [3342] deduced from such incipient 
events as ; 

67. General Russell. I was attempting to get the Air Corps esti- 
mation on sabotage, which I just happened to see. Unless other 
members of the Board are interested in the remainder of the letter, 
I am not. 

68. General Grunert. It is sufficient for me. 



1728 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

69. General Russell. Now, off the record. 
(There was colloquy off the record.) 

70. General Russell. For the record, I am reading some extracts 
from Adjutant General's file 381. It is paper numbered 76, which is 
a letter. Rear Admiral Bloch to General Short, in which he discusses, 
among other things, the cooperation of the Air Forces of the Army 
and Navy, in which he says that they have had joint practices hereto- 
fore; he is certain that these exercises 

have been most helpful to all concerned, 

and he hopes that they may be continued. 

Further, 

continuing the quote, 

if on certain occasions the Army desires to initiate similar exercises and would 
like the cooperation of the Navy, I am quite certain that a mutually satisfactory 
hour and date can be settled upon for such joint exercises. 

In the same file are contained, as a part of the records of the Ha- 
waiian Department, the joint agreements for the defense of the Island 
of Oahu. 

I ajn reading a letter dated May 29, 1941, or the copy of a letter dated 
that day, from General Short to Admiral Bloch. 

My Dear Admiilvl : In order that you may be acqainted with the steps taken 
by my command relative to the sabotage matter which you discussed with 
Colonel Throckmorton [3343] this morning I desire to inform you that 
during the holiday and week-end I have increased the guard over important 
installations, and have arranged for more detailed inspections of the guard 
during this period. Every attempt will be made not to bring this action into 
the limelight so that the community as a whole will not be aware of the increased 
surveillance. 

I believe this will be sufficient to handle the situation as far as the Army is 
concerned. 

With kindest personal regards. 
Very sincerely yours, 

Walter O. Short. 

[3344] 71. Colonel Toulmin. This is a report to the Command- 
ing General, Army Air Forces, through the Commanding General, 
Hawaiian Department, of August 20, 1941, under the title, "Study of 
the Air Situation in Hawaii," signed by General Martin, commanding 
the Hawaiian Air Force, together with inclosures, consisting of eight 
sheets, inclusive of all the papers concerned. 

(Study of the air situation in Hawaii is as follows:) 

20 August 1941. 
Subject: Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii. 
To : Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C. 
Thru : Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H. 

1. In compliance with copy of corrected memorandum for the Commanding 
General, Army Air Forces, OCS 1723-t-25, from the Secretary, General Staff, 
dated July 17, 1941, "that a study be made of the air situation in Hawaii", there 
is attached for consideration of the War Department a plan for the employment 
of long-range bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu. This plan clearly 
presents the air defense of the Hawaiian Islands. Attention is called to the 
recommendations therein. 

2. No increase in personnel of the permanent air garrison of Hawaii is neces- 
sary to bring the actual lieavy bombardment strength to one group. Under pro- 
visions of Table of Basic Allowances No. 1, War Department, dated December 
1, 1940, fourteen additional heavy bombardment airplanes will be required to 
provide a total strength of one group of thirty-five B-17D type airplanes. Thi§ 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1729 

force is so small for the [3345] mission to be performed that it is con- 
sidered entirely inadequate. 

3. When the RDF installation is completed and the 15th Pursuit Group has 
its full complement of 80 fighters no further increase for pursuit aviation is con- 
sidered necessary. Provision should be made to maintain at all times the 14th 
Pursuit Wing at full combat strength of 80 fighters and 105 interceptors. It is 
contemplated that pursuit aviation will perform its normal mission in the defense 
of these islands by intercepting and destroying enemy aircraft in the vicinty of 
or over the Island of Oahu. This is considered an adequate force to perform 
the pursuit mission in the defense of these islands. 

4. A combination medium bombardment-torpedo force is considered highly 
desirable in order that attack can be made under conditions of low visibility 
when horizontal bombing is not feasible and is therefore recommended as a 
component part of the Hawaiian Air Force. ( See Study No. 2 in attached plan. ) 

5. On the assumption that there is a possibility of enemy surface craft reaching 
the shores of Oahu, one squadron of dive bombers is considered necessary to 
assist the ground forces in withstanding an invasion effort by concentrating on 
denying the enemy any opportunity to establish beach heads. The quick and 
accurate striking power of dive bombers makes them particularly effective for 
close-in support of the ground forces and this premise is borne out by informa- 
tion contained in intelligence reports received on the war in Europe. Dive 
bombers would also be employed against hostile surface craft [33Jf6] and 
submarines which had penetrated close to the shores of Oahu. 

6. With the addition of the force of medium bombardment-toi-pedo airplanes 
and one squadron of dive bombers no further increase in the number of light 
bombardment airplanes is required. 

7. One additional observation squadron should be assigned the Hawaiian Air 
Force to supplement the new ground organization of the Hawaiian Department 
which is being reorganized into two triangular divisions. The ground forces 
of the Hawaiian Department should be provided with three observation squad- 
rons. At present there is assigned one observation squadron (C&D) and one 
light bombardment squadron which could be diverted to observation duty. 

8. To increase the number of aircraft in the Hawaiian Air Force as outlined 
in this letter and in the attached plan it is estimated that approximately 3,871 
additional men should be assigned. A minimum of 216 combat crews and 180 
maintenance crews are necessary to operate 180 B-17D type airplanes. Sufficient 
personnel are now present in the Hawaiian Air Force to man 70 combat crews 
and 70 maintenance crews for heavy bombardment aircraft. Additional per- 
sonnel equal to the differences above should be assigned to the Hawaiian Air 
Force to meet these requirements. Further personnel increases should be made 
to activate two medium combination bombardment-torpedo squadrons, one dive 
bomber squadron, one additional observation squadron and five air base squad- 
rons. The five air base squadrons will be used to maintain the outlying fields 
tabulated below which will house heavy bombardment squadrons [33.^7] 
as indicated. The two Air Base Groups (s) are to be used to maintain Bellows 
Field and the sites selected for the station of the 15th Pursuit Group. 

Barking Sands 2 

Morse Field 2 

Hilo 1 

Lanai 1 

Parker Ranch , 1 

9. The dive bomber squadron and three observation squadrons with allied serv- 
ices will become, in effect, an air support command and will be stationed at 
Bellows Field. 

10. Tables of Organization prescribe five enlisted men for each heavy bombard- 
ment combat crew. For continuous daily operation a minimum of fourteen men 
will be necessary for each heavy maintenance crew. Using these figures as a 
basis, personnel requirements have been computed as shown in Inclosure No. 2. 

11. There is at present available, under construction and awaiting approval 
of the War Department, housing for 12,288 enlisted men. This study will require 
housing for a total of 12,818 men to provide for all Air Corps and associated 
personnel. This leaves but 525 men to be cared for in a future project which will 
be submitted when this study has been approved. For detailed analysis of hous- 
ing see Inclosure No. 3, 



1730 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



12. It is my convictiou that by increasing tlie present strength of the Hawaiian 
Air Force by one observation squadron, a minimum of one dive bomber squadron, 
two squadrons of combination medium bombardment-torpedo airplanes [33^8] 
and by increasing the strength of long-range bombardment to a total of 180 
airplanes a positive defense of the Hawaiian Islands can be assured without 
any assistance whatever from the naval forces giving the Navy complete freedom 
of action. 

F. L. Mabtin, 
Major Oeneral, U. S. Army, 

Commanding. 
3 Incls— 

Incl #1 — Plan for the Employment of Long-Rauge Bombardment Aviation 

in the Defense of Oahu (In triplicate). 
Incl #2 — Personnel Requirement Recapitulation (In triplicate). 
Incl #3 — Air Force Housing Facilities ( (In triplicate). 
Basic (Ltr HAF, 20 August 1941, "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii") 



AG 381/264 HDP 



1st Ind. 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 

Fort Shaffer, T. E., August 1941. 



To : Conmianding General, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C. 



I concur in this study. 



3 Incls (dup). 



Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. 8. Army, 

Commanding. 



[3S49S350] Strength of Hawaiian Air Force (Air Corps Troops Oiily) 

HICK am field 



Units 



Hq Haw'n Air Force: 

Hq & Hq Sq, Haw'n Air Force. . 

19th Transport Sq 

Tow Target Det 

Total Hq Haw'n Air Force 

18th Bombardment Wing: 

Hq & Hq Sq 18th Bomb Wing... 

Hq & Hq Sq 5th Bomb Gp (H).. 

23rd Bomb Sq (H) 

31st Bomb Sq (H) 

72nd Bomb Sq (H) 

4th Reconn Sq (H) 

Hq & Hq Sq 11th Bomb Gp (H). 

14th Bomb Sq (H) 

26th Bomb Sq (H) 

42nd Bomb Sq (H) 

50th Reconn Sq (H) 

Hq & Hq Sq 17th AB Gp (R) 

18th AB Sq 

22nd Mat Sq 

23rd Mat Sq 

58th Bomb Sq (L) 

Air Corps Det., Weather 

Air Corps Det., Communications 

Total 18th Bombardment Wing 
Total Hickam Field 



Auth 



200 
161 
139 



500 



158 
232 
206 
206 
206 
233 
232 
206 
206 
206 
233 
131 
145 
203 
203 
192 
20 
20 



3,238 



3,738 



Actual 



203 

158 

4 



365 



194 
237 
219 
217 
222 
238 
237 
217 
215 
223 
232 
216 
259 
291 
304 
223 
28 
23 



Over 



85 
114 



101 
31 



561 



Short 



3 
135 



WHEELER FIELD 



14th Pursuit Wing: 

Hq & Hq Sq 14th Pur Wg_... 

Hq & Hq Sq 15th Pur Gp (F) 

45th Pur Sq (F) 

46th Pur Sq(F) 

47th PurSq(F) 



158 
204 
175 
175 
175 


142 
202 
174 
171 
169 













PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 



1731 



[3349-3350] Strength of Hawaiian Air Force (Air Corps Troops Only) — Con. 
WHEELER FIELD — Continued 



Auth 



Actual 



Over 



Short 



[3351-3352] Hq & Hq Sq 18th Pur Gp (Int). 

6th Pur Sq (Int) 

19th Pur Sq (Int) 

44th Pur Sq (Int) 

78th Pur Sq (Int) 

Hq & Hq Sq 18th Air Base Gp (R) 

17th Air Base Sq 

24th Mat Sq 

25th Mat Sq 



204 
157 
157 
157 
157 
131 
145 
203 
203 



187 




17 


Ifil 


4 




155 


2 


154 




3 


170 


13 

227 
48 




358 




193 




IS*? 


21 


137 




66 



Total 14th Pur Wg and Wheeler Field. 



2,401 



2,555 



292 



138 



BELLOWS FIELD 



86th Obsn Sq (C & D) .. .. 


142 


141 
306 




1 




306 










Total Bellows Field - .. 


142 


447 


306 


1 






Total Hawaiian Air Force. . .. -. - .- 


6,281 


7,162 


1,159 
881 


278 






Auth. Strength of an Air Base Gp (s) (Hq & Hq Sq-AB Sq- 

Material Sq) .. .. 


479 
958 














1— Bellows Field. 

1— 15th Pur Op (f) at new station. 









[3353] Strength requirements 

216 combat crews (less 70 now present) 146 

180 maintenance crews (less 70 now present) 110 

146 combat crews @ 5 men each 730 

110 maintenance crews @ 14 men each 1,540 

2 medium bombardment-torpedo squadrons @ 217 men each 434 

5 air base squadrons @ 145 men each 725 

1 observation squadron 155 

1 dive bomber squadron 210 

2 air base groups (s) 958 

Total 4,752 

Less present over-strength 881 

Net total requirement 3, 871 

[3354] Air Force housing facilities 

Present strength of Air Force personnel ^ 7, 192 

Increase as result of this study - 3,871 

Present strength other services 1,500 

Projected increase other services (Bellows & Kipapa) 250 

Total... 12,813 



Housing Available 





. Perma- 
nent 


Mobiliza- 
tion 


Total 


Hickam Field .. . . 


3,278 
1,537 


1,512 
441 
1,008 
1,294 
3.218 


4,790 


Wheeler Field . .. . 


1,978 


Bellows Field.- .. . .. 


1,008 


New Air Base 15th Pursuit Group (Kipapa Gulch) 




1,294 


Outlying Fields (other islands) now being constructed or projected 




3,218 








Grand Total. 






12,288 


(DLflference) Housing to be provided 






♦525 











Inclosure #3. 



[3355^ 72. General Grunert. All right. At this point the 
point the Board goes to other business. 

(Whereupon, at 5 : 40 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of wit- 
nesses for the day and proceeded to other business.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1733 



[3356] CONTENTS 



THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1944 

Testimony of— Page* 
Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., Corps of Engineers, Cherbourg Base 

Section, France 3357 

DOCUMENTS 

Statement of Qualifications and Experience 8366 

Excerpts from instructions on cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts 3525 

EXHIBITS 

No. 27. Special report 9/2/41 3446 

28. Special report 9/4/41 3446 

29. Priorities on Hawaiian Construction 8/29/44 3446 

30. Message 3/3/41, Adams to C. G. Hawaiian Dept 3446 

31. Message 3/4/41, Short to Adjutant General, Washington 3446 

32. Message 3/12/41, Adams to C. G. Hawaiian Dept 3446 

33. Letter 3/15/41, Marshall, to Short 3446 

34. Letter 5/29/41, McDole to Dist. Eng. Honolulu 3446 

34-A. Paraphrase, Adams to C. G. Hawaiian Dept 3446 

34-B. Wyman to C. G. Hawaiian Department 6/11/41 3447 

35. AWS Stations 3447 

36. Wyman to Dept. Engr., Hawn. Dept. 2/14/41 3447 

36-A. Grosse to Dist. Engr. Honolulu 3/6/41 3447 

37. AWS Information Center, Fort Shafter 3447 

38. Wyman to C. G., Fort Shafter 4/18/41 3447 

38-A. McDole to Dist. Engr. 5/17/41 3447 

39. Hannum to Hawu. Constructors 1/6/41 3447 

40. Fleming to Dist. Engr. 9/8/41 3447 

40-A. Wyman to Dept. Engr. Fort Shafter, 9/23/41 3447 

41. Wyman to Division Engr. 3/7/41 3447 

42. Adcock to Chief Signal Oflicer 8/5/40 3447 

42-A. Gripper to Chief of Engrs. 8/16/40 3448 

43. Person to Division Engineer 10/23/41 ■ 3448 

43-A. Matheson to District Engrs. 10/30/41 3448 

44. Person to Division Engr. 12/12/41 3448 

45. Wyman statement "Gasoline" 3448 

46. Basic contract 1/3/41 3483 

4&-A. Supplemental agreement 3/22/41, signed Col. Hannun, Mr. Grafe, 

and Mr. Patterson 3484 

46-B. Copy of Supplemental agreement No. 2, May 5, 1941 3486 

46-C. Supplemental agreement No. 3, 5/22/41 3486 

46-D. Supplemental agreement No. 4, 6/19/41 3487 

47. Letter 5/5/43, Commanding General, 8th Service Command 3521 

^ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original transcript of proceedings. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1735 



13SS7] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL 

HARBOR BOARD 



THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1944 

Fort Sh after, Territory of Haw ah. 

The Board, at 8 : 30 a. m., pursuant to recess on Wednesday, Sep- 
tember 13, 1944, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George 
Grunert, President of the Board, presiding. 

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. 
Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H, Frank, Members. 

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry 
C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder ; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., 
Executive Ofticer. 

General Grunert. The Board will come to order. 

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL THEODORE WYMAN, JR., CORPS OF 
ENGINEERS, CHERBOURG BASE SECTION, FRANCE 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your 
name, rank, organization, and station? 

Colonel Wyman. The name is Theodore Wyman, Jr., Colonel, Corps 
of Engineers. Serial number is 07925. Organization is the Cher- 
bourg Base Section, France, ETO. I am the commanding office of the 
Cherbourg Base Section. 

2. Genera] Grunert. Colonel, this Board was appointed to ascer- 
tain and report the facts relating to the attack made by \3368'\ 
the Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on Decem- 
ber 7, '41, and, in addition thereto, to consider the phases which re- 
lated to the Pearl Harbor disaster of the report of the House Military 
Affairs Committee, and the latter part is largely concerned with con- 
struction activities -gvmv to the attack. 

Now, we are after facts or leads to where facts can be found. Gen- 
eral Frank, assisted by Major Clausen, has this part of the investiga- 
tion, so he will propound the questions, and the Board will fill out 
where it sees fit. General Frank. 

3. General Frank. Where did you start your military career? 
Colonel Wyman. That is, with the United States Army? 

4. General Frank. Yes. 

Colonel Wtman. Washington, D. C. 

5. General Frank. In what capacity ? 

Colonel Wyman. As a graduate of the first training camp. Officers 
Candidate School, and was commissioned a 1st lieutenant in the En- 
gineer Reserve Section on August 15, 1917. 



1736 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

6. General Frank, When did you get your regular commission ? 
Colonel WyjMan. After returning from the A. E. F., France, I was 

stationed in the Chief's office, and, as I recollect it, I was examined 
by a board of officers who were commissioned in the regular Army, 
over a period of about three or four days, written examination. The 
chairman of that board was General Pillsbury. And it seems to 
me in September 1919 — no; that's wrong. Correction : September 
1920. 1920, and was commissioned a captain in the regular Army, 
Corps of Engineers, as of July 1, 1920. 

7. General Frank. Where were you on duty from '35 to '39 ? 
Colonel Wyman. From '35 — well, beginning the first of [3,359] 

January I was on duty in the Missouri River Division, Kansas City, 
Assistant to the Division Engineer, who is now Major General R. C. 
Moore, and in July I was, with very little notice, transferred to Los 
Angeles, California, and appointed District Engineer on or about 
July 20, 1935, and served as District Engineer at Los Angeles until 
I departed from the LTnited States on or about September — oh, I think 
I was relieved about August 25, 1939. 

8. General Frank. Did you ever meet Hans Wilhelm Rohl prior to 
going to Los Angeles ? 

Colonel Wyman. No, sir, I never knew him. 

9. General Frank. When and where did you first meet him? 
Colonel Wyman. The first time I knew Mr. Rohl, met Mr. Rohl, 

was in my office immediately after assuming duty as District Engi- 
neer at Los Angeles. A short time after I reported there bids were 
opened on a section of the Los Angeles-Long Beach breakwater. 
Those bids, the advertisement, the specifications, and the entire matter 
had been handled by my predecessor, who was Major Stickney. The 
bids were opened a short time after I arrived there, and Rohl-Connolly 
was the low bidder, and immediately after that, as I recollect it, they 
called on me in my office relative to their bid for a section of the Los 
Angeles-Long Beach breakwater. 

10. General Frank. Did you later become friends with Rohl ? 
Colonel Wyman. I knew Rohl while I was in Los Angeles, and I 

wouldn't say that I was ever a friend, but I was an acquaintance and 
met him several times. 

11. General Frank. The testimony has appeared which indicated 
that vou spent some time in his company under rather intimate 
[S36Ci] conditions. 

Colonel Wyman. I don't understand the question. 

12. General Frank. Read it. 

(The pending question, as above recorded, was read by the re- 
porter.) 

Colonel Wyman. I don't know what "intimate conditions" are. It 
will be necessary for you to explain that to me. Do you mean social 
conditions. 

13. General Frank. Yes. 

Colonel Wyman. Social ? Oh, yes, I met Mr. Rohl socially. 

14. General Frank. And yet he was not a friend of yours ? 
Colonel Wyman. No, no more so than other — other people with 

whom the District Engineer did business regularly from day to day, 
just the same as anyone else, 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1737 

15. General Frank. Did you carry on the same relations with all 
other contractors as you carried on with Kohl ? 

Colonel Wyman. I met them in my office from time to time as they 
had business with me. 

16. General Frank. Answer my question, please. 
Colonel Wtman. Maybe I didn't understand it. 

17. General Frank. Did you carry on the same relation with all 
other contractors that jou carried on with Rohl ? 

Colonel Wyman. In general, yes, sir. Yes, sir. 

18. General Frank. Who were the other contractors ? 

Colonel Wtman. Well, Standard Dredging Company had a job 
there. Guy Atkinson Company had a job. 

19. General Frank. Who is the head of the dredging company? 
Colonel Wyman. Standard Dredging? I don't know, now. I 

couldn't recollect his name. The Guy Atkinson Company 

[3361] 20. General Frank. Did yon know Mr. Atkinson ? 
Colonel Wyman. Oh, j^es. Yes, indeed. 

21. General Frank. As intimately as you know Rohl ? 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, I would say I knew Mr. Atkinson more inti- 
mately than I ever knew Rohl. 

22. General Frank. Did you go on as many social functions with 
Mr. Atkinson ? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, I met Mr. Atkinson on many occasions at 
dinners, public affairs, dinners of organizations, dinners of the asso- 
ciated contractors, annual dinners, and that sort of thing, from time 
to time ; yes, I did. 

23. General Frank. Ever on drinking ])arties with Mr. Atkinson ? 
Colonel Wyman. On a drinking party with Mr. Atkinson? Well, 

I take — a contractors' dinner was usually preceded with the usual cock- 
tails and that sort of thing, and I think that on some occasions — I 
remember one distinctly where Mr. Atkinson and I had drinks 
together ; yes, sir. 

24. General Frank. That's one? 
Colonel Wyman. That's one occasion. 

25. General Fr^vnk. That's all you remember? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, I would have to recollect. There are other 
occasions when I was with Mr. Atkinson. 

26. General Frank. Besides Mr. Atkinson and the head of this 
dredging company ? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, then I was — the Callahan Construction 
Company. Well, there were six or eight contractors concerned with 
the construction of the Prado Dam which I had charge of, which was 
a group of co-adventurers. I don't remember all their names. One 
of them was the Callahan Construction Company. [3362'] 
They were the sort of a leading — leading outfit. 

27. General Frank. Who represented them? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, Mr. William Callahan represented them 
chiefly. 

28. General Frank. Did you know him intimatelj^ ? 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, I knew Bill Callahan pretty well ; yes, sir. 

29. General Frank. Did he always represent the Callahan 
Company ? 

79716— 46— Ex. 145, vol. 3 9 



1738 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Wyman. No. The man on the job, right on the ground, 
was Mr. Paul Grafe, who was the project manager. He was a mem- 
ber of the Callahan Company; yes, sir. 

30. General Frank. How well did yon know him? 

Colonel Wyman. I knew him quite well, nsed to meet him frequent- 
ly along with business, met him socially with other people. I remem- 
ber one occasion where Mr. Walter Douglas, the consulting engineer, 
gave a dinner ; I was present and so was Mr. Grafe, Mrs. Grafe. I was 
a guest in his house on one occasion, with other officers ; he entertained 
at dinner. 

[S36S^ 31. General Frank. W[\o are some of these other seven 
or eight contractors, with whom 3'ou were just as intimate as you were 
with Rohl and Grafe? 

Colonel Wttvian. Well, I have named — I said seven or eight. I 
don't know whom you mean. 

32. General Frank. Well, I do not know whom you mean. 
Colonel Wtman. Well, I know there was Mr. Guy Atkinson. I 

don't remember the corporate structure of that outfit. There were 
quite a number of contractors who made up the Prado Constructors, 
the builders of the Prado dam. Yes, I do, too — I remember some. 
One was a company from Nebraska. It was headed up by a man 
named Cunningham — Mr. Cunningham. I knew Mr. Cunningham. 

33. General Frank. How well? 

Colonel Wyjnian. I knew him quite well. I knew him before he came 
to Los Angeles to work. I knew him when T was district engineer at 
Kansas City, Missouri. I think his name is Chetworth Cunningham. 
He is known as "diet" Cunningham. He represented some contractors 
from Omaha, Nebraska. 

34. General Frank. How often did you see him? 

Colonel Wyjnian. Oh, I would see these people maybe once a month, 
something like that. 

35. General Frank. How often did you see Rohl? 

Colonel Wyivian. Well, at different periods, at different times. In 
the early 1935, I would say I saw Mr. Rohl once — and '36, too — once 
every couple of months ; '37, '38, very infrequently, except at the time 
of a disastrous flood in Los Angeles, in the Los Angeles River and 
the San Gabriel River, which was in March 1938. I remember Mr. 
Rohl came to my [S364-] office and made available to the Gov- 
ernment, if they wanted it, his men and his plant, to do emergency 
work, and I recollect we did purchase some rock from Rohl, which 
we needed to safeguard government work that was under construc- 
tion at that time. I saw him quite frequently for a period of three or 
four weeks. 

In 1939, I think I saw Rohl — Mr. Rohl — maybe once or twice 
during the year, as I recollect it, 

36. General Frank. Where did this rock come from? 
Colonel Wyivian. The rock that we purchased from Rohl ? 

37. General Frank. Yes. 

Colonel Wyman. Wliy, I don't remember; but it came from a 
quarry. 

38. General Frank. Obviously ! 
Colonel Wyman. It was delivered by rail. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1739 

39. General Frank. Not by boat? 
Colonel Wyman. No, hj rail. 

40. General Frank. All right. 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, speaking of other contractors, I knew "Steve" 
Griffith, of the Griffith Company, very well. I also knew Connolly, 
of the Rohl-Connolly Company. I also knew Shirley, of the Shirley- 
Gimther Company. I also knew Foley, of the West Slope Construc- 
tion Company, the builders of the San Gabriel dam. 

41. General Frank. Were your relations just as complete and 
cordial and intimate, from a social point of view, with Foley and 
Shirley and Connolly and Cunningham and Atkinson, as they were 
with Graf e and Rohl ? 

Colonel Wyman. They were just the same. The district engineer, 
doing great construction work, which we were, was [3o65] bound 
to be cordial to people working for the engineer department ; otherwise, 
he wouldn't be discharging his duty as district engineer. A cordial 
relationship existed between most outfits working for the engineer 
department, who perfctimed faithfully their jobs. 

42. General Frank. So, you had no particular friendship for Rohl? 
Colonel Wyman. No, no particular friendship ; no, sir ; no more so 

than I have for any other man with whom I do business. 

43. General Frank. Did you ever do business with Walter Dilling- 
ham? 

Colonel Wyman. Yes, sir ; I had many contacts with Walter Dilling- 
ham, of Honolulu, especially in connection with the construction of 
docks and some dredging in Honolulu harbor. 

44. General Frank. Were your relations with Walter Dillingham 
the same as your relations with Rohl ? 

Colonel Wyman. I would say, in general, yes. I knew Mr. Dilling- 
ham, here. I was a guest at his home, if that is what you mean, and 
that sort of thing. 

45. General Frank. How many times were you ever in social con- 
tact with Mr. Dillingham? 

Colonel Wyman. Why, I was in social contact with Mr. Dillingham 
at his house on two occasions that I recollect, and once I was a luncheon 
guest at his farm over on the northwest corner of this island, where 
he had polo ponies. 

46. General Frank. When you were a guest at his farm, were you 
invited over there? 

Colonel Wyman. Yes, sir. 

47. General Frank. ()r did you go over there to see him about 
[3S6e] business? 

Colonel Wyman. No, sir; I was invited there to have lunch with him 
and to see his polo ponies perform between the trees, there, on a 
bending exercise. 

48. General Frank. What was Rohl's professional background? 
Colonel Wyman. Rohl? I have that in writing, here, if you would 

like me to read it to you. 

49. General Frank. How long is it ? 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, I would say a sheet of paper. 

50. General Frank. All right. 

Colonel Wyman. I would like to read it. I have prepared a state- 
ment here, which is as near as I could do, in the short time I have been 



1740 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

here, concerning the allegations contained in House Report No. 1638, 
which I would like to introduce in evidence. 

51. General Grunert. All right, go ahead and read your statement. 
Colonel Wyman. Read my statement ? All right, sir. 

First, I have a statement of my own qualifications and experience, 
because I note that my qualifications have been challenged as a district 
engineer and an officer of our Army. 

52. General Frank. By whom? 

Colonel Wyman. In this congressional document. And I can read 
this briefly, or just turn it in as an exhibit. 

53. General Frank. Read it. 
Colonel Wyman. Read it ? 

Statement of Quaufioations and Expeeience of Colonei. Theodoeb Wyman, Jr., 
AS an Engineer Officer. 

1908 completed three (3) year civil engineering course at Rutgers University, 
New Brunswick, N. J., class of 1908. During part of this time was employed 
[3S67] with the Pennsylvania Railroad at Long Jsland as an inspector of 
construction. 

1909, was employed by a contractor, MacArthur Brothers of New York City, as 
rodman and instrument man. 

1910-1917, was employed by the Board of Water Supply, New York City, and 
the Catskill Water Supply Project. Was employed in various capacities as in- 
spector, instrument man, line and grade parties, and later in charge of subsurface 
investigations for the Shandaken Tunnel. All on the Catskill Mountain Water 
Supply projects. 

That is 1910 to 1917, seven years. 

54. General Frank. Did you know Douglas McKay ? 
Colonel Wyman. Douglas McKay ? 

55. General Frank. Yes. 

Colonel Wyman. I don't know who Douglas McKay is. 

56. General Frank. All right. 
Colonel Wyman (reading). 

1917, entered the Army. First, Officers' Training Camp ; commissioned 1st 
Lieutenant, 15 August 1917; assigned to the Second Combat Engineer Regiment. 
Left the United States 10 Septeml)er 1917 and arrived in France about 3 October 
1917. 

I was a company commander at that time. 

Was engaged on military construction, chiefly construction of camps and hous- 
ing for the American Army. Served with the Second Division from December 
1917 until approximately 15 September 1919. Was present with the Second 
Engineers and the Division during all combatant periods. In October 1918 for 
about two weeks the Second Engineers were attached to the Thirty-Sixth Divi- 
sion after the Second Division was [3S68] withdrawn from the Cham- 
pagne battlefield. 

I was present. 

During this period, was promoted to Captain and later to Major. Received fol- 
lowing decorations for services during World War I : Silver Star, Croix de Guerre 
with palm. Fourageurre, French, War Department Orders. Battle record dur- 
ing World War I : Chateau Thierry, Belleau Woods, Battle of Soissons, Veixlun 
Defense, Pontamousson Defense, St. Mihiel Offensive, Champagne Offensive, 
Champagne Defense, Argonne Offensive, March to Germany, Occupation of Rhine. 
1919, upon return to the United States in September 1919 was placed in charge 
of construction of a bridge across the Republican River at Fort Riley, Kansas- 

That is the Clock Bridge, that I presume is still there. 

Late in October 1919, was detailed to the Office of the Chief of Engineers and 
was assigned to the Development of the Equipment Branch of the Supply Divi- 
sion, Office of the Chief of Engineers, and served there until December 1920. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1741 

Transferred as Engineer Supply Officer to the Schenectady General Reserve 
Depot, Schenectady, New York, and was in charge of the development of engi- 
neer equipment for the Office of the Chief of Engineers at that place. 

That included subaqueous sound ranging, search lights, various elec- 
trical gear, being developed specially by the General Electric Company 
at that place. 

In 1923 to 1927, on duty with the Engineer School at Fort Humphries, Va., 
and was the working member of the Board on Engineer Equipment; developed 
various items of engineer equipment such as ponton bridges, search lights, water- 
purification units, and numerous other projects assigned to the Board on Engi- 
neer Equipment from time to [3369] time by the War Department. 

1927 to 1928, attended the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leaven- 
worth, Kansas, and graduated with the class with the rating of Eligible for the 
General Staff duty and recommendation for further training in high command. 

1928-1929, from 1 July 1928 until September 1929, Assistant to the District 
Engineer, Kansas City, Missouri. 

1929-1933 : September 1929 until September 1933, District Engineer in Kansas 
City in charge of the improvement of Missouri River for navigation, flood control, 
and development of power. [3370] During this period made "308" studies 
of the Missouri River and its tributaries and submitted some 23 "308" reports 
which were eventually submitted to Congress and printed as House Documents. 
During the period that I was District Engineer at Kansas City I supervised con- 
struction costing approximately 70 million dollars. 

1993-1935 : In 1933, the Kansas City District was divided into three districts 
consisting of the Kansas City District, the Omaha District and the Fort Peck 
District, and the Missouri River Division created with Lieutenant Colonel R. C. 
Moore as Division Engineer. Was assigned as the principal military assistant 
to Colonel Moore and served in that capacity as his assistant and was in charge 
of engineering for the Missouri River Division from 1933 to 1935. 

1935-1939 : Transferred to Los Angeles, California, and made District Engineer, 
• Los Angeles District, and served until September 1939. During this period was 
in local charge of fortifications in that district, River and Harbor projects, and 
the flood control work for the Los Angeles County, for both the Los Angeles River 
and its tributaries and the San Gabriel River and its tributaries, especially the 
Santa Ana Branch and the building of the flood control dam known as Prado 
Dam. Was in immediate charge of construction of flood control works in the 
Los Angeles River and its tributaries including the Hanson Dam and the Sepul- 
veda Dam and planned the entire flood control system which was later adopted 
as an approved War Department project. During this period, made numerous 
flood control studies as authorized by Act of Congress from time [3371] to 
time of the rfvers flowing into the Great Salt Lake, rivers flowing into the 
Colorado River, the rivers of Arizona and New Mexico, and various rivers up 
and down the coast of California from the Mexican border to San Luis Obispo 
flowing into the Pacific Ocean. During this period I supervised construction 
costing approximately 70 million dollars. 

1939-1942: In 1939, was transferred to the Hawaiian Department and served 
from September 1939 to July 1940 as Battalion Commander with the 3rd Engineers 
at Schofield Barracks. In July, 1940, was appointed District Engineer in Hono- 
lulu. While serving as District Engineer in Honolulu was charged with the 
following projects, among others: 

a. Construction of ship channel and seaplane bases at Midway Island and 
disposition of dredgings for an airplane runway, that is, from the harbor to the 
island for the purpose of building an airfield. 

b. Dredging project for development of Palmyra for Navy outpost. 

c. I was Works Progress Administrator and had charge of activities involving 
principally Army and Navy projects, including repair work on posts, construction 
of military roads, operation of quarries, construction of airports, also construction 
of streets and boulevards in the city of Honolulu. 

d. CiviJ works and Navy projects, including survey and construction of seaplane 
basin at Keshi Lagoon, additional harbor facilities including piers, warehouses, 
railroad trackage in Honolulu Harbor, [3372] widening and deepening 
of entrance to Pearl Harbor, dredging operations, and so forth. 

e. Civil Aeronautics Authority Projects : This work involved the construction 
and enlarging of about seven airports to accomodate large commercial planes 
and large Army bombers. 



1742 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

f. Maintenance of fortifications: This worli consisted of repairs to military 
installations and supply of consumable materials. 

g. Emergency defense projects : This work consisted of the construction of 
underground bombproof ammunition storage, military roads, railroad spurs for 
use by mobile railroad artillery, observation and fire-control stations, gasoline 
storage projects, aircraft warning system, and so forth. 

h. Air Ck)rps construction projects : These projects consisted of hangars, shops, 
engine testing buildings, housing, hospitals, landing strips, and so forth. 

i. Airway Ferry Routes : This project consisted of making preparatory surveys 
of airway ferry routes from Honolulu to Australia and the construction of air- 
fields, runways, buildings, gasoline storage faciliites, and so forth. 

j. Quartermaster Construction Projects: These projects included housing pro- 
grams, underground storage for refrigerated stores, addition of Tripler Hospital, 
and so forth. 

The Engineer Department was placed under the Commanding General of the 
Hawaiian Department. I was relieved as District Engineer, Honolulu, in March, 
1942, and on the [3373] occasion of my relief I received the following letter 
of commendation from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department: 

"Deae Colonel Wyman : On the occasion of your relief as District Engineer, 
Honolulu, and from further duty in this Department, I want to express to you my 
appreciation of the work which you have done for this Department. Many of 
the projects under your office were initiated prior to my arrival. The most im- 
portant single one was opened for use after I arrived, and I am very familiar with 
the problems which you had to solve in accomplishing this work. Tlie fact that 
this air route was done at all is remarkable ; under peace-time conditions it would 
have been a very difiicult job. Its completion and opening for air traffic under 
war-time difficulties just 78 days after orders to proceed were received and almost 
three weeks before the date which you had set yourself is outstanding. The 
accomplishment of this job required force and initiative of the highest degree, 
and these same qualities were also required for the excellent progress which 
has been made on the other projects prosecuted under your direction. I am writ- 
ing this letter to express my official appreciation of your work. A copy of it is , 
being forwarded to the Chief of Engineers, through the Division Engineer, for 
your official records. 

"With best wishes for the future, 
"Very sincerely yours, 

"Dexos C. Emmons, 
"Lieutenant General, U. 8. Army, 

Commanding." 

[3374] In 1943 I was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal for services 
rendered while in Hawaii. 

1&44 : Since the first of August, 1944, I have been in command of the Cherbourg 
Base Section, which included the Cherbourg Harbor and vicinity. 

I left the United States in command of a General Service regiment 
in July, 1943, and was engaged in the construction of a housing project 
in West England and had under my command 12 Engineer General 
Service regiments. I was made the commanding officer of the 19th 
District of the Southern Base Section, ETO and while serving in that 
capacity I commanded about 60,000 troops. I was charged with con- 
ducting the exercise Duck 1, Duck 2, Beaver, Muskrat, Tiger, Fabius, 
which were the assault exercises in training the troops for the assault 
on the continent. Of course, as you know, we assaulted a beach in 
England, which was also prepared by me and under my charge during 
this period, and I devised a means of mounting troops and embarking 
troops which was new in England and adopted for the assault. I was 
in charge of mounting the 5th Corps, the 7th Corps, and 1st Army 
troops for the assault. 

Immediately after the assault, when the follow-up commenced, I 
was made Commanding Officer of the 18th District and was in charge 
of the American buildup to the ports of Southampton, Weymouth and 
Portland, and in 30 days, from about June 16th to July 16th, I put 
through those ports 117,000 vehicles and 560,000 men. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1743 

About the 16th of July I was transferred to Cherbourg Base Sec- 
tion, which included the Cherbourg Harbor and vicinity. I was put 
in charge of reconstructing the port facilities of the \3376^ 
port of Cherbourg and of course later charged with the supply of 
the armies, 1st and 3rd Armies. I was in charge of Omaha Beach, 
Utah Beach, five small French ports, Barfleur, Eseny, Careton, and 
Cherbourg. 

When I arrived at Cherbourg the tonnage being delivered was 
zero and when I left France we had gotten the tonnage up to about 
14,000 tons per day. We constructed 7,200 feet of wharfage for 
bridges and ships. At that time we were unloading on good days 
about 40,000 tons of supplies per day. 

57. General Frank. Did you take over from General Ross? 
Colonel Wym AN. General Ross ? 

58. General Frank. Yes. 

Colonel Wyman. No, I did not serve under Ross at all. General 
Ross was in charge of transportation on the staff of the Commanding 
General of Zone Communications. 

59. General Frank. Who was your immediate chief? 
Colonel Wyman. General Lee. 

For services in this connection I was awarded tlie Legion of Merit, the cita- 
tion for which reads : 

"Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., Army Serial No. 07925, Corps of Engineers, 
United States Army, for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance 
of outstanding service in connection with vast construction projects in the 
United Kingdom and on the Continent of Europe, during the period from 13 
April, 1943, to 25 August, 1944. While serving as Commanding Officer of an 
Engineer General Service Regiment, Colonel Wyman displayed keen foresight 
and outstanding initiative in preparing accommodations for the tremen- 
[3376'] dous troop buildup in the Southern Base Section, Communications 
Zone. Later, Colonel Wyman served as Commandant of the XIX District, 
and was charged with the responsibility of establishing and carrying out many 
of the numerous and detailed plans of the 'Duck' exercise. This exercise played 
a vital part in the amphibious training for the assault on occupied France. 
The leadership and ingenuity of Colonel Wyman is completely attested to by 
the successful completion of this exercise. Because of liis outstanding per- 
formance of duty in former construction projects. Colonel Wyman was assigned 
as Commanding Officer of the Normandy Base Section, and was charged with 
the development of various ports, camps and other installations in that part 
of liberated Europe. His untiring efforts and endless devotion to duty were 
shown by the rapid manner in which these various ports and installations were 
restored to usable condition. The professional skill and thorough knowledge of 
technical problems displayed by Colonel Wyman in completing these many tasks 
reflects great credit upon himself and the armed forces of the United States. 
Entered military service from Washington, D. C." 

I would like to submit this. 

I would now like to introduce a statement of Colonel Theodore 
Wyman, Jr., covering allegations contained in House Report 

60. General Frank. Just a minute. I asked you what was Rohl's 
professional background. We have gotten off the track. 

[3377^ Colonel Wyman. I have that in here. 

61. General Frank. Just read that for a moment. 
Colonel Wyman. Professional background ? 

62. General Frank. Wliat is this statement that you have there ? 

Colonel Wyman. This is a statement covering the allegations con- 
tained in House Report No. 1638, 78th Congress, 2d Session, relating 
to his responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster. 



1744 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

63. General Frank. It is a statement that yon have prepared and 
would like to read into the record ? 

Colonel Wyman. Yes, sir. 

64. General Frank. Read it. 
Colonel Wyman (reading) : 

It has been alleged in House Report No. 1638, 78tli Congress, Second Session, 
that my relations with Mr. H. W. Kohl were improper and impaired my effective- 
ness as District Engineer at Honolulu during the period immediately before 
the attack on Pearl Harbor when I was charged with the construction of various 
defense projects in the Hawaiian and South Pacific Area; and that I delayed 
and mismanaged these projects to the detriment of the United States, and to the 
advantage of Japan. (See pages 11, 25, 42 and 45 of the report.) 

I was overseas when the House Committee called me as a witness so it withdrew 
its request. I never knew that I was called as a witness. The House Committee 
did not call for a single other witness from the War Department in its investiga- 
tion of this matter. Accordingly, until now there has been no opportunity to 
answer these allegations which [S378] relate directly to the Pearl Harbor 
disaster and the alleged extent of my responsibility for this disaster. I offer 
the following testimony on these matters : 

The Congressional report alleges that I developed improper social relations 
with Mr. H. W. Rohl. To the best of my recollection I met Mr. Rohl for the 
first time when bids were opened on the Long Beach-Los Angeles breakwater, 
which was about August, 1935, shortly after I took over the duties of District 
Engineer at Los Angeles. On that occasion Mr. Rohl came to my office on this 
business matter. The bid of the Rohl-Connolly Company was the low bid and 
this contract was awarded to the Rohl-Conuolly Company, by the Engineers 
Department. 

Please understand at that time we were operating in peace time 
conditions under orders and regulations of the Engineer Department, 
and the District Engineer had no authority to award a contract. The 
awarding of a contract was by the Chief of Engineers of the United 
States Army. 

65. General Frank. Who made the recommendation ? 

Colonel Wyman. I made the recommendation, because he was the 
low bidder. 

66. General Frank. Did you have authority to make recommenda- 
tion that the low bidder be not accepted ? 

Colonel Wyman. The low bidder? Oh, no. It was required that 
he be accepted, by law. 

67. General Frank. Did you have authority to recommend that the 
low bidder be not accepted ? 

Colonel Wyivian. No. If a contractor qualified mider the law, 
it was my duty to recommend the low bidder. That is required by 
the law. 

[3379^ 68. General Frank. There is no way in which other than 
the low bidder can be awarded a contract ? 

Colonel Wyman. If he had failed to qualify, if he had no bond, 
then it would have to go to the next bidder, because a bond is required. 
If he had had no experience, it would go to the next bidder. But the 
Rohl-Connolly Company at the time these bids were opened was 
already engaged in the construction of the first section of this break- 
water and the contract was entered into by one of my predecessors as 
District Engineer at Los Angeles. 

69. General Frank. Proceed. 

Colonel Wyman (reading) : 

The following year, 1936, the Rohl-Connolly Company were also the low bidders 
for the balance of this project and were awarded the contract for continuing and 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1745 

completing this worls, on what was l^nown as a continuing contract. They were, 
in that case, it is my recollection, $200,000 lower than the next bidder. This work 
was completed in 1937. During the period from 1935 — 

70. General Frank. Is it not a fact that the man on the job has an 
advantage over a man bidding on the same contract who has to set up 
for it? 

Colonel Wtman. You mean, an advantage in the bidding? It de- 
pends upon whether or not he has the right kind of plant to do the 
work. 

71. General Frank. He is already on tlie job and doing the contract. 
All he has to do is to bid on the continuation of it, whereas an out- 
sider has to come in and set up for it. Therefore, the man on the job 
has an advantage in the bidding, [3380] does he not ? 

Colonel Wyman. Not necessarily, no sir. Very frequently the 
bid of the man on the job is higher than a competitor, in construction. 

72. General Frank. That is you opinion ? 

Colonel Wyman. No, that is a fact. There are many cases of that. 
Take in the Missouri River work, there are many cases where the man 
on the job is superseded by another contractor because his bid is lower. 

73. General Frank. That does not necessarily mean that the man 
on the job could not have afforded to put in a lower bid ? 

Colonel Wyman. No. Frequently the man on the job has lost money 
and is glad to get out of the job, does not want it at all. 

74. General Frank. That is very true. 
Colonel Wyman. Yes. 

75. General Frank. There is an advantage, though, to the man be- 
ing on the job and already set up to continue the work, is there not ? 

Colonel Wyman. If the work would be the same, the advantage 
would be that he is already mobilized and the expense of mobilization 
would not be as large as in the case of a new contractor that had to 
bring his plant there. There would be that saving. 

76. General Frank. All right. 
Colonel Wyman (reading) : 

During the period from 1935 to 1937, I saw Mr. Rohl, to the best of my recol- 
lection, on business relating to these projects not more than once every two or 
three months. 

[33S1] In 1938 Rohl-Connolly was awarded a small contract for furnishing 
stone, amounting to about $15,000, and in 1939 the Rohl-Connolly Company had 
no contract from my ofBce. During the period including 1938 and the first nine 
months of 1989, up to the time I was relieved from duty in Los Angeles, I did not 
see Mr. Rohl on business more than four or five times. 

To the best of my recollection my social contacts with Mr. Rohl consisted of 
the following : 

a. In 1935 my family and I were overnight guests on the Rohl yacht, 
together with other Army officers. The occasion of this social contact was a 
pleasure cruise from the mainland to Catalina Island. Incidentally a quarry 
being operated by the Rohl-Connolly Company was inspected during the 
cruise of this trip, since the boat allowed an inspection from the water side. 

b. In 1936 I was Mr. Rohl's guest on two overnight yachting trips, as I 
recollect them. One of these trips was a pleasure cruise with other friends. 
The second trip was from Newport Yacht Club to Los Angeles. 

I would like to correct that. One of these trips was a pleasure cruise 
with other friends from Los Angeles overnight to Catalina Island and 
return. The second trip was from Newport Yacht Club to Los Angeles. 



J 746 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I had been associated with — 

I had been in charge, rather, of — 

the PWA project of constructing a yacht basin at Newport, California, and 
on the occasion of the formal opening of the yacht basin a regatta was 
[3382] held and I was invited as an honored guest because of my connec- 
tion with the pi-oject as District Engineer. It was very late in the evening 
when the function was over and I was invited by Mr. Rohl, in view of the 
lateness of the hour, to return to Los Angeles aboard his boat. 

The only other yachting trip I took with Mr. Rohl was an overnight trip 
on the VEGA, at which time Mrs. Wyman and other guests were present for 
a pleasure cruise. 

There was no excessive drinking on the occasion of any of these yachting 
trips. In fact on some of these trips Mr. Rohl operated a "dry boat", that is, 
no liquor at all was served aboard. 
To the best of my recollection during my tenure year of office as District Engi- 
neer at Los Angeles from 1935 to September 1939, I was entertained in Mr. Rohl's 
home only twice. On one occasion my wife and I were invited to a dinner party 
given by Mr. and Mrs. Rohl at their home at which other guests were present. 
On another occasion I was a guest in Mr. Rohl's home in company with another 
Army officer. While cocktails were served on these occasions there was no 
excessive drinking by anyone present. 

Mrs. Wyman and I entertained Mr. and Mrs. Rohl in our home on one occasion, 
and Mr. Rohl was my guest at my club on several occasions together with other 
Army officers. The hospitality and courtesies that I extended Mr. Rohl through 
these invitations were in reciprocation of similar courtesies extended to me by 
him, and was no more extensive [3383] than called for under the cir- 
cumstances. My social relations with Mr. Rohl were no more extensive or different 
in nature from my social relations with other contractors and business associates 
during that period. 

Because of my position and functions as District Engineer in Los Angeles, I 
was frequently an official guest and speaker at a number of dinners and meetings 
held by professional societies, organizations, and so forth, at clubs and hotels in 
Los Angeles. On these occasions, while Mr. Rohl was frequently present — being 
one of the more prominent contractors and businessmen in that area — I was not 
his guest. 

After my transfer to Hawaii I was a guest of Mr. and Mrs. Rohl on only one 
occasion, which was a small dinner party given by Mr. and Mrs. Rohl at their 
home. I was invited with my wife. 

While I have taken social drinks with my friends and with Mr. Rohl on social 
occasions, I have never been a heavy drinker nor on any occasion been intoxi- 
cated either in the company of Mr. Rohl or other persons. 

During the time that I have known Mr. Rohl, I have not received directly or 
indirectly any loan, gift or any emolument from Mr. Rohl or from any company 
or organization or person with whom he has been associated. During that period 
I have never received any present from Mr. Rohl. I have never had relations 
with Mr. Rohl, either business, professional or social which have in the slightest 
degree tended to interfere with or hamper in any way my full and proper discharge 
of my duties or which would normally give [3384] rise to a suspicion that 
such was the effect. 

The Congressional Report contains an allegation that on the morning of the 
Pearl Harbor attack, I was at the home of Mr. Rohl, having spent the night 
there, and on being advised of the attack by radio telephone I rushed to my oflSee 
in civilian clothes and in a drunken condition and then changed from civilian 
clothes to uniform in the presence of my entire office staff, women as well as men. 
I spent the evening of December 6, 1941, at my home in the company of my 
wife. During the early part of the evening my assistant. Major Robinson and 
Mrs. Robinson had visited me at home and Robinson and I had engaged in a 
chess game. While we may have had a drink during the course of his visit, 
neither of us drank excessively or became intoxicated. I was not at the home of 
Mr. Rohl at any time on December 6 or December 7, 1941. My assistant. Major 
Robinson, is alleged in the Congressional Report (page 46) to be my brother-in- 
law. Major Robinson was not at that time my brother-in-law and is not now 
my brother-in-law, nor any relation whatsoever. 

On the morning of December 7, 1941, I was telephoned by Mr. E. S. Griffith, who 
now, I believe, lives at Fort Ruger, on this island — who called from Hickam Field 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1747 

and advised of the attack. I talked with him for some five minutes giving certain 
instructions. By virtue of War Department Orders in effect during the period 
of peace which had existed up to that time, I always wore civilian clothes when 
working at my office. That was a War Department order. With the attack on 
Pearl Harbor being in [3385] progress and a state of war existing, I felt 
it was my duty to change from civilian clothes to my military uniform. Because 
of the fact, however, that I had not been wearing the uniform it was necessary 
for it to be unpacked, the proper insignia attached thereto and to be otherwise 
prepared for wear. Wanting to get to my oflBce at once I dressed in civilian 
clotlies and requested my wife to prepare by uniform as soon as possible and 
send it to me at the office. Some time after arriving at the office my uniform 
was delivered to me and I changed into it in the privacy of my own private office. 
I did not change from civilian to military clothes in the presence of my office 
force of men and women. However, there was present in my office at that time 
Major Rubinson, Lieutenant Butts and Mr. Perliter. It should be noted that 
other officers followed the same procedure as I did in this respect. 

It is alleged in the Congressional report that although it was a general practice 
in the office of the District Engineer at Honolulu to record telephone conversa- 
tions relating to the conduct of such activities as placing contracts, nevertheless 
when I found the girls liad been placed in my office to make tliese recordings of 
my telephone conversations, I stopped them from doing so on the ground that it 
was not necessary for anybody to record my conversations. 

The only practice that existed in the office of the District Engineer at Honolulu 
with reference to recording telephone conversations was to record overseas radio 
telephone calls. Tliis was done principally because of [3386] occasional 
unsatisfactory reception due to interference, and so forth. There was no tele- 
phone recording machine in the office. The practice was for a stenographer to 
listen to the convei-sation on an extension and make shorthand notes of the con- 
versation. Usually only one copy of these shorthand notes was transcribed by 
the stenographer and this copy was delivered to me for my own personal use and 
personal file. As a rule I destroyed these transcripts of conversation at the time 
they were no longer useful. However, I have located a few of these transcripts 
which are still in the file. During my period of service as District Engineer at 
Honolulu, I did not stop or in any way limit the existing practice of recording 
telephone conversations. 

It is alleged that immediately upon my transfer to Hawaii, and after my 
appointment as District Engineer at Honolulu in June, 1940, I began planning 
to have contracts awarded to companies in which Rohl was the controlling factor 
and that I used every effort in favoring Rohl. 

In connection with the allegation that I used every effort in favoring Rohl it 
should be noted that official records show that during the period of my services 
as District Engineer at Los Angeles I was charged with the responsibility for 
about 70 million dollars in construction projects, and that tlie Rohl-Connolly 
Company received contracts for less than 4 million dollars of this construction. 
Furthermore, in each instance in which the Rohl-Connally Company received a 
contract it was the lowest competitive bidder. 

[3387] While I was District Engineer at Los Angeles I assessed Rohl-Con- 
nolly Company some $8,000 in liquidated damages in connection with delays in 
its performance of the breakwater contract. Rohl-Connolly contested this assess- 
ment, but I was sustained and the assessment was paid. 

On becoming District Engineer at Honolulu I w-as charge with the construction 
of a number of large projects, including the construction of a ship channel and 
seaplane base at Midway Island, dredging for development of Palmyra Island as 
a Navy outpost, enlarging the entrance to Pearl Harbor, and the improvement of 
Kaneohe Bay. I made no attempt whatever to award contracts for this work to 
Rohl-Connolly Company or to any company in which Mr. Rohl was a factor. 
The.se construction projects involved several million dollars. I elected to per- 
form this construction work directly by hired labor instead of by contractors. 

At the inception of the plans for the Hawaiian and South Pacific Defense Con- 
struction projects, which were later covered by Contract W-414-Eng-602 with 
Hawaiian Constructors, I planned and took steps toward doing this work directly 
with hired labor instead of by having it done through contractors. My plan in 
this regard was changed, however, by virtue of the issuance of War Department 
directives adopting the policy of effecting such w-ork through the use of contrac- 
tors instead of by doing it directly with hired labor. 

It should be pointed out that as District Engineer of Honolulu my maximum 
contracting authority was $50,000. In view of this limitation I was not in posi- 



1748 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

tion, even if [33S8] I had desired to do so, to place a large contract with 
any company with which Mr. Rohl was associated. 

It is alleged in the Congressional Report that there is little doubt but that a 
substantial part of the defense construction work in the Hawaiian area could 
have been handled by local contractors or those who were there from the main- 
land and readily available, but that all other contractors were forced out by 
me so that Hawaiian Constructors could get the contract. It is further alleged 
that I apparently made no effort to call local contractors together in order to 
find out whether they were in position to handle additional work. 

On being directed by the War Department directive to use contractors in 
effecting the Hawaiian defense construction work, I immediately conducted an 
investigation to determine what qualified contractors would be available for 
this work. As a result of this investigation, I concluded the Hawaiian Con- 
tracting Company was the only local company that could handle the job. I 
directed my assistant, Major Robinson, to interview Hawaiian Contracting Com- 
pany in the latter part of November, 1940, on the question of whether they would 
be interested in undertaking a contract for this work. We were advised that this 
company could not undertake this work because of commitments they had made 
to the Navy Department. 

Having determined that there were no contractors on the Islands of suflScient 
size, financial worth and experience, not otherwise engaged, who could under- 
take this construction, an investigation was made as to the availab- [3389] 
ility of contractors on the mainland of the United States for this job. 

I would like to introduce at this time various correspondence which 
is revealing and is during this period of negotiation. 

It is my recollection that in October, 1940, General Hannum and I 
made an inspection of Midway Island and while at Midway Island we 
discussed ways and means of doing the work proposed by the War 
Department. General Hannum promised that upon his return to the 
United States he would take tlie matter up with the War Department, 
that is, with the Office of the Chief of Engineers, and advise me the 
results of his investigation. 

I have here a letter which I would like to read : 

Wak Department, 
Office of Chief of Engineers, 
Washington, November 4, 1940. 
Via air mail 
Colonel Warren T. Hannum, 

Div. Engr., South Pacific Division, San Francisco, Calif. 

Dear Colonel Hannum : Pursuant to our telephone conversation, I am for- 
warding two copies of the current Cost-Plus-A-Fixed-Fee Contract Form. 

Since this work is being done out of fortification money, I discussed the general 
policy of performing the work by contract with Colonel Mayo and he has just told 
me that General Kingman approves that method of performing the work. Colonel 
Mayo will call you. 

The Finance Section is now working on a memorandum [3390] of in- 
structions about the use of negotiated and cost-plus contracts. A copy of this 
will be sent to you as soon as ready. In the meantime, I suggest that you consult 
Public 703, 76th Congress for the general authority, as well as the current appro- 
priation bills carrying National Defense Money, wiiich you are using. 

After you determine the type of contract you wish to use, authority of this 
ofiice will be required for a negotiated contract in excess of $50,000 and the 
approval of The Assistant Secretary of War will be required for a negotiated 
contract in excess of $50,000. 

That is an error ; I think it is a larger sum of money. 

The authority to negotiate a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract will be required from 
the Assistant Secretary of War regardless of the amount involved." Furthcer- 
more, the name of the contractor selected must be cleared through the Advisory 
Commission to the Council for National Defense. I therefore suggest that, as 
soon as you determine the type of contract to use, you submit the matter, with 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1749 

the name of the contractor you propose dealing with, together with an alternate 
or two, to this office for the necessary clearance. 
Sincerely yours, 

E. E. Geslbr, 
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers, 

Chief, Finance Section. 

[3391] On November the 6th another letter from General Han- 
num to me : 

War Department, 
Office of the Division Engineer, South Pacific Division, 
351 California St., San Francisco, California, Novemder 6, 19JfO. 
Air mail — Clipper 
lit. Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr., C. E., 

U. S. Engineer Office, honolulu, T. E. 
Dear Wyman : I inclose herewith a letter received fi'om Colonel Gesler, Office, 
Chief of Engineers, in reference to negotiated contracts on the basis of fixed price 
and also cost-plus-fixed-fee. The form for cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts is inclosed. 
If you negotiate on the basis of a fixed price, it appears, since you will not have 
the plans and specifications ready until December 20, that you could not negotiate 
before that time. After arriving at an agreement, it would take some time to 
execute it and then an additional month or two before equipment could be placed 
in Honolulu on the job. On the other hand, if you use a cost-plus-fixed-fee form, 
negotiations could be conducted without waiting for the detailed plans. Since 
the contractors interested are mainly on the mainland, it seems to me it would 
be well for you to come to the mainland to conduct the negotiations [3392] 
with specified parties on specified dates. We will sit in with you on these 
negotiations. 

Since the Navy contractors over there are on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis, it 
occurred to me that a contractor working for you on a fixed price basis would 
be at a disadvantage since the Navy work is much larger in amount than you 
would have. 

However, I prefer that you examine various methods in the light of existing 
conditions in Hawaii and come to your own conclusions as to methods and 
procedure. 

Sincerely yours, 

/s/ Warren T. Hannum 
Warren T. Hannum, 
Colonel, Corps of Engineers, 

♦ Division Engineer. 

Pursuant to that letter I journeyed to the mainland and had an 
interview with Colonel Hannum in which he stated that it was neces- 
sary for me to interview at least three contractors, and that he had 
arranged for Colonel Kelton, the District Engineer at Los Angeles, to 
get up an itinerary for me to visit in Los Angeles and to interview 
contractors who would be interested in doing this work. 

I stated here that I interviewed people from the West-Slope Con- 
tracting Company. They merely called me on the telephone and told 
me that they were not interested. 

Guy Atkinson Company. 

Griffith Construction Company. 

Bressi Construction Company. 

Rohl-Connolly Company. 

[3293^ West-Slope Contracting Company fFoley Brothers) 

Gunther-Shirley Company. 

Callahan Company. 
I stated here that I interviewed people from the West-Slojje Contracting Com- 
pany. They merely called me on the telephone and told me that they were 
not interested. 

At the time of these interviews, no plans, specificatons, or details were available 
with respect to the proposed construction projects. It was proposed to use a cost- 
plus-fixed-fee contract for this work, and this represented one of the first major 
construction projects handled on a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract. Consequently, 



1750 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

very little was known by either the contractors or by the Government repre- 
sentatives as to the exact nature anrl scope of the contract. 

The Guy Atkinson Company stated they would not be interested in the con- 
tract on a fee of less than 8%, which was more than could be allowed under 
regulations. 

The Griffith Construction Company, Bressi Construction Company, and the 
West-Slope Construction Company Indicated they were not in position to go to 
Hawaii or the South — 

well, that is immaterial — 

to go to Hawaii to undertake the construction of the projects. 

The Rohl-Connolly Company, Gunther-Shirley Company, and Callahan Com- 
pany were at that time associated in a joint venture for the construction 
[3394] of the Caddoa Dam. At first they indicated they were not interested 
in going to Hawaii in connection with tlie proposed construction projects, but 
on being advised of — 

This happened in Washington. I would like to read back and read 
this later. It is a little garbled. 

Prior to coming to California, and when I was thinking of con- 
tractors, I invited the Callahan Company to — or requested, rather; 
not invited — requested them whether or not they would have interest 
in coming to Hawaii ; and they sent two engineers to Hawaii, a Mr. 
McCullough and a Mr. Wolfe, who went over the general character 
of the work to be done, and then reported back to their employer^ 
the Callahan Construction Company, and I believe reported favorably. 

In the office — later it was agreed that the — now, this is garbled. I'll 
have to redraft this. 

On the first interview Mr. Rohl stated that he would have no interest 
in a job in Hawaii because he was fully engaged in work at the High 
Gate Dam at Parker, Arizona. Later he came back — he was present 
with Mr. Guy Atkinson. Later he came back and stated that he had 
spoken to Mr. Connolly of his company and that Mr. Connolly would 
probably be interested and would be glad to see me, and that Mr. Con- 
nolly would see me wherever I wanted to see him. 

After these interviews, I was directed to go to Washington and to invite these 
three contractors who had indicated an interest to come to Washington to 
negotiate this contract. Mr. Paul Grate and Mr. Thomas E. Connolly accepted 
this invitation and came [3395-3396] to Washington for the purpose of 
negotiating this contract. 

These three contractors were eminently qualified both by experience, financial 
backing, and size of organization to undertake this work. These companies had 
previously performed the following large construction contracts for the Govern- 
ment, among others : 

Callahan Company: 

Madden Dam, Canal Zone ' $4, 700, 000 

All American Canal, Bureau of Reclamation 5, 242, 000 

Casper Alcova Dam, Bureau of Reclamation 1, 806, 000 

Casper Alcova Tunnels, Bureau of Reclamation 888, 200 

Prado Dam, United States Engineer Department 4, 824, 000 

New York Aqueduct Shafts, New York City 1, 784, 000 

Shasta Dam ($23,000,000) proportionate share 2,000,000 

New York Tunnels, with Associates 10, 650, 000 

Ft. Isabelle Jetty, U. S. E. D 2, 648, 000 

Maverick County Irr. District 1, 796, 000 

New York Barge Canal 1,338,000 

Gunther-Shirley Company: 

Mormon Flat Dam, U. S. E. D 400, 000 

Roads— Wyoming 196,000 

Cochella Canal „ 500, 000 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1751 

Rohl-Connolly Company: 

El Capitan Dam, San Diego $2, 710, 000 

Los Angeles Breakwater, U. S. E. D 1, 484, 000 

Newport Jetties, City of Newport 469, 700 

Los Angeles Breakwater #2 950,400 

Los Angeles Breakwater #3 2, 219, 000 

[3S91] Seal BeachJetty for Seal Beach 72,600 

Rock Dyke, City of Long Beach -199, 100 

Headgate Dam, U. S. Indian Service 3, 446, 000 

Supply Rock, U. S. Navy 77, 900 

Pt Arguello Breakwater, U. S. Coast Guard 135, 000 

Dredging & Rip Rap, City of Long Beach 60, 000 

Redondo Breakwater, City of Redondo 457, 800 

Hueneme Breakwater, District of Hueneme 472, 600 

L. A. River Flood Control, U. S. E. D 856, 500 

That was done after my time. 

Joint Venture: 

John Martin Dam, U. S. E. D $7, 160,000 

Furthermore, it should be noted that under regulations in existence at that 
time, the contractors selected had to be cleared through the Advisory Commission 
to the Council for National Defense. 

At the time I was negotiating for the letting of a contract covering the defense 
projects, it was very difficult to obtain the services of large, responsible, and ex- 
perienced contracting organizations because of the greatly increased construction 
program that was being undertaken in this country. In awarding this contract, 
I did not in any way force out any contractor or group of contractors who 
indicated an interest and who possessed suflBcient organization, finances, and 
experience to undertake a job of this magnitude. 

The Congressional Report alleges that when I was in Washington with Mr. 
Paul Grafe and Mr. Thomas [3398] E. Connolly in connection with nego- 
tiating Contract W-414-eng-602 that I stayed at the Carlton Hotel from December 
17th until December 21st, 1940, at the expense of Mr. Grafe. On inviting the Rohl- 
Connolly Company, Gunther-Shirley Company, and Callahan Company to send 
representatives to Washington for the purpose of negotiating this contract, I was 
advised that Mr. Paul Grafe and Mr. Thomas E. Connolly would come to Wash- 
ington as representatives of these companies for this purpose. I made arrange- 
ments to meet these gentlemen at the Carlton Hotel. On arriving at the Carlton 
Hotel, I was advised no rooms were available and Mr. Connolly was also without 
a room. Later in the day it was discovered that Mr. Grafe had made a reserva- 
tion at the hotel, and he agreed that both Mr. Connolly and myself could use his 
room until a room could be provided for us. 

On completing our negotiations in Washington, Mr. Grafe and I were very 
anxious to get an airplane flight to the West Coast so that we could be at our 
homes for Christmas. However, the airline company advised us that no flights 
were being made from Washington to the West Coast at that time, but advi.sed 
that we probably could get a flight from New York to the West Coast. Mr. Grafe 
telephoned me from the hotel while I was at the War Department and gave me 
this information, stating that he had reserved space on a flight to New York but 
that we [3399] would have to leave immediately in order to get to the 
airport in time. Accordingly, I requested Mr. Grafe to pack my things and check 
me out of the hotel. He did this for me, and I reimbursed him in full for these 
charges while on the plane en route to New York that same day. 

The Congressional Report cites as an alleged illustration of mismanagement 
of the Hawaiian and South Pacific defense projects on my part the matter of the 
chartering of the yacht "Vega." The agreement covering the furni.shing, opera- 
tion, maintenance, and supply of the survey ship "Vega" is covered by a supple- 
mental agreement No. 43 (Part I) of Contract No. W-414-eng-602. At the time 
we were in urgent need of a seaworthy sailing vessel for use in hauling supplies 
from Suva to the Nandi Airport in the Fiji Islands and for use as a survey vessel 
in surveying certain proposed air ferry routes in remote areas of the Pacific. It 
was necessary that the boat not only be of sufficient size and seaworthiness, but 
also that it be a sailing boat, because in the remote areas in which it would work 
there were not adequate facilities for refueling. The schooner yacht "Vega" was 
reasonably well suited for the purposes desired, being 138 feet in length with a 
beam of 28 feet, and a fast sailing vessel with auxiliary Diesel power. Further- 



1752 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

more, it was known to be fully seaworthy, being constructed of steel and having 
sailed from the mainland to Hawaii on previous occasions. At that time ships 
[S'/OO] of this character were very hard to secure because of the great demand 

for them both by the Army and Navy and other maritime interests. 

I telephoned Mr. Rohl and sought to lease the vessel from him but he stated 
that he did not desire to do so because he thought he would sell the boat and that 
he had a prospective purchaser for it. Later, however, he agreed to lease the 
vessel at a rental of $1.00 jper year," — 

76A. General Frank. Who owned the boat? 

Colonel WyMxYN, I assume that ]Mr. Rohl owned the boat. I have 
no proof that he owned the boat. 

Later, however, he agreed to lease the vessel at a rental rate of $1.00 per year, 
the Government to pay certain costs incidental to its use and operation. Ac- 
cordingly Hawaiian Constructors on November 18, 1941, wrote the following letter 
concerning this matter : 

November 18, 1941. 
Contract No. W-414-eng-602 
Subject : Lease of Mr. H. W. Rohl's boat "Vega" 

The District Engineer, 
U. S. Engineer Office, 

Honolulu, T. H. 
In confirmation of verbal authorization given to Mr. Grafe on November 17th, — 

Mr. Grafe was the project manager here. 

we request your authority for the rental of the subject boat "Vega" belonging 
to Mr. H. W. Rohl at a rental rate of $1.00 [3401] per year, the government 
to pay the following costs incidental to its operation : 

1. Preparation of boat for trip from Los Angeles, California, to Honolulu, T. H. 

2. Cost of transportation of the boat from Los Angeles to Honolulu. 

3. Removal of the present cabins and fixtures and outfitting the boat as a 
schooner. 

4. Upon completion of its services, restoration of the boat to its original 
condition. 

5. Return of the boat to Los Angeles. 

The boat is to leave Los Angeles at once and the crew will be placed on the 
Hawaiian Constructors payroll. 

The value of this boat as established and agreed to is $100,000.00 
Very truly yours, 

Hawaiian Constructors. 

By C. C. MlDDLETTON. 

I authorized the rental of the vessel by the following letter written November 
25, 1941. 

November 25, 1941. 
Refer to file No. ND 600.114-602 560 Vega 
Contract No. W-414-eng-602. 
Hawaiian Constructors, 

Pier 2-A, Honolulu, T. H. 

Gentlemen: In reply to your letter dated November 18, [3402] 1941, 
and confirming verbal authority previously given, you are authorized to rent the 
yacht "Vega" from Mr. H. W. Rohl for use on Contract No. W-414-eng-602 at 
a rental rate of $1.00 per year, subject to payment of the following costs by the 
Government : 

1. Preparation of boat for trip from Los Angeles, California, to Honolulu, T. H. 

2. Cost of transportation of the boat from Los Angeles to Honolulu. 

3. Removal of the present cabins and fixtures and outfitting the boat as a 
schooner. 

4. Upon completion of its services, restoration of the boat to its original 
condition. 

5. Return of the boat to Los Angeles. 

It is understood that the crew will be reimbursed by the Hawaiian Constructors 
and that the vessel, valued at $100,000.00, will leave Los Angeles at once. 

77. General Frank. Who paid for provisioning the boat? 
Colonel Wtman. The operation of the boat? 

78. General Frank. Who paid for provisioning the boat at Los 
Angeles ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1753 

Colonel Wyman. At Los Angeles? I believe a Colonel Matson, 
an assistant to the Division Engineer at Los Angeles, issued a pur- 
chase order on some outfit to supply the boat witTi suitable supplies. 
I know very little about that. 

A thorough investigation was made by me to determine the value, ownership 
and fitness of the [3403] vessel for the work in which it was proposed to be 
used. 

Before the "Vega" could sail from the West Coast to Hawaii it was necessary 
that the required crew be obtained for it and that it be supplied and otherwise 
readied for the trip. In addition to this it was necessary to obtain a clearance 
from the Navy Department for the sailing of the vessel. 

The entire matter of taking over the boat, outfitting it for the trip 
to Honolulu, and putting stores aboard was handled by the Division 
Engineer of the South Pacific Division at San Francisco. However, 
I understand that the Division Engineer delegated the job to the Dis- 
trict Engineer at Los Angeles. 

Several attempts were made to obtain this clearance, and the Navy Depart- 
ment advised that owing to the importance of the safe arrival of this vessel 
in connection with naval defense projects in the Honolulu District, it was desired 
that the "Vega" sail with a convoy under escort.. Because of these factors the 
sailing of the "Vega" was delayed until February 19, 1942, when it departed from 
the West Coast with a convoy. It arrived in Honolulu about March 9, 1942. 

At no time during the period from the leasing of the "Vega" until it arrived 
in Honolulu about March 9, 1942, were plans for the use of the "Vega" abandoned. 
While other means were obtained during this period for conducting some of the 
survey work for which it had been planned to use the "Vega", it [3404] 
was still necessary to survey other air ferry routes and a vessel was still needed 
for hauling supplies in the remote areas of the Pacific. The "Vega" was to be 
used for these purposes. On February 11, 1942, in a telephone conversation be- 
tween myself and Mr. Scheffauer of the Division Engineer's Office in San Fran- 
cisco, the question of the use of the "Vega" was discussed. In that conversa- 
tion Mr. Scheffauer advised that the "Vega" would probably be leaving very 
soon, and in response to this information I said : 

This is from a recorded telephone conversation : 

"Col. Wyman. Yes. I wish they would. We'd like to get it down below on the 
survey work. I have lots of survey work that has been authorized for a new 
route south. I'd like to get it over because we could use it for a survey boat. 

"Mr. Scheffauer. Yes. It will be leaving pretty soon. 

"Col. Wyman. I see. 

"Mr. Scheffauer. Goodbye Colonel." 

After the arrival of the boat in Honolulu it was outfitted and made 
ready to go as quickly as possible under the war conditions that ex- 
isted in the Hawaiian Islands at that time. The survey crew was sent 
aboard, and we were waiting for the Navy to clear the departure 
of this vessel at the time I was relieved as District Engineer at Hono- 
lulu. The change in plans which rendered the use of the "Vega" un- 
necessary did not take place until after my depature [S^OS] 
from the Hawaiian Islands. This change in plans is reflected in the 
letter of April 4, 1942, from my successor to Hawaiian Constructors, 
vvhich reads as follows : 

April 4, 1942. 
Contract No. W-414-eng-602. 
Hawaiian Campus, 
Panahou Campus, 
Honolulu, T. H. 
Gentlemen : Reference is made to previous correspondence relative to the 
contemplated use of the auxiliary schooner "Vega" as covered by Supplemental 
Agreement No. 43 (Part one) to Contract No. W-414-eng-602. 
79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 3 10 



1754 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Due to a change in policy, it has been decided not to utilize the "Vega" as 
originally contemplated. It is requested, therefore, that the vessel be returned 
to its owner. 

Authorization is granted for the necessary expenditures to return the vessel 
to the mainland and for restoration to its original condition in accordance with 
the terms of the charter as revised, 
available convey. 

You are directed to return the vessel to Wilmington, California, with the next 
available convoy. 

Very truly yours, 

/S/ A. K. B. Lyman, 
Colonel, Corps of Engineers, Department Engineer. 

Correspondence in the files of the Division Engineer at San Francisco in- 
dicates that after the [3-^06] vessel retui-ned to the mainland it was 
accepted by the United States Coast Guard and later taken over by the Navy. 

United States Coast Guard, 

Eleventh Naval District, 
Long Beach, California, 2S July 19Ji2. 
Division Engineer, War Department, 

South Pacific Division, 351 California Street, San Francisco, California. 

(Attn : Legal Section.) 

Dear Sir : Re : YACHT VEGA. 

This acknowledges receipt of your letter relative to the above subject. 

This yacht was accepted by the U. S. Coast Guard on July 9, 1942, after having 
been offered by the owner upon Offer Form of the U. S. Coast Guard. The 
acquiring of the vessel in this respect by offer and acceptance is provided for 
by the U. S. Coast Guard Auxiliary Regulations. 

This yacht, however, has since been taken by the Navy, and the Coast Guard 
does not have same any longer. 

/S/ C. W. Thomas, 

C. W. Thomas, 
Lt. Com., U. S. C. G., 

Chief of Staff. 

79. General Grunert. When you 'get to a good stopping point we 
shall take a recess ; that is, at the eiid of any particular topic you have 
there. 

Colonel Wyman. Yes, sir. This is the end of that subject, the 
VEGA. 

[3i07] 80. General Grunert. You are through with the VEGA 
for the time being ? 

Colonel Wyman. Yes, sir. 

81. General Grunert. Ten-minute recess. 

(There was a brief informal recess.) 

[^4-08] 82. General Grunert. Let us proceed. 

Colonel Wy]man. In view of the question put to me about Mr. Wal- 
ter F. Dillingham, I would like to introduce in evidence a letter from 
Mr. Walter F. Dillingham, written to me : 

(Letter from Walter F. Dillingham to Colonel Theodore Wyman, 
April 13, 1942:) 

Walter F. Dillingham 
Honolulu, T. H. 
Cable Address : Retlaw Apbil 13, 1942. 

Colonel Theodore Wyman, 

In care of the War Department, Washington, D. C. 
Dear Ted Wyman : You were good to write me a good-bye letter on March 17. 
I was touched by the tribute which you pay to me. 

I have thoroughly enjoyed my contacts and work with you during your tour 
of duty under the most unusual conditions which prevailed. I consider your 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1755 

accomplishment in establishing and fortifying certain line bases on islands of 
the Pacific one of the greatest contributions to our war efforts. Perhaps because 
I was in a position to know what an impossible demand was made upon you, I 
appreciate how 5'ou surmounted the difficulties, secured the equipment, met an 
unbelievable time schedule, completed the job, and made possible the establish- 
ment of a flying service between the United States and Australia. I know 
of many other important jobs which wei-e pushed through by you under stress 
of circumstances, and I feel that your [3409] above achievement is de- 
serving of distinguished recognition, and I sincerely hope that this recognition 
will be given to you. 

I trust that in your new assignment to duty you will be given the further oppor- 
tunity of exercising your talents and ability. My every good wish goes with you, 
and if and when I can ever be of any assistance in the carrying out of any work 
in which you are interested, please give me the opportunity. 
Sincerely yours, 

(Signed) Waltee F. Dillingham. 

Continuing my statement : 

The congressional report also intimates mismanagement on my part in connec- 
tion with the purchase of the yacht SOUTHERN SEAS. On the outbreak of 
the war, I was ordered to take over all of the property of Pan American Airways 
which had been abandond by it in the South Pacific area. One item of this prop- 
erty was the yacht SOUTHERN SEAS. On January 9, 1942, I had the following 
telephone conversation with Colonel Hannum (now General) and Mr. Scheffauer 
of the Division Engineer Office at San Francisco. 

"Colonel Wyman. Down south, as you know, Panair had abandoned all the 
establishments, so I have taken them over. I have taken over the stations and 
also the supplies and whatnot, and of course later on there will have to be a 
settlement. I had trouble with the French, but no one else. They had down 
there as you know the SISTER (SOUTHERN SEAS)." 

That was a name we adopted for communication purposes. 

"Colonel Hannum. Yes, I wanted to take that up [S-^IO] with you. 

"Colonel Wyman. I'd like to tell you about it, first. They tried to seiz3 that 
down there, and our people decided it could be used to facilitate our jobs to 
transport supplies between the various places. I authorized Sverdrup to go 
ahead and negotiate, either charter or a sale, and he apparently agreed with the 
people down south and the sale was the thing to do. They asked $000,000, and I 
have my doubts that it is worth that much. Deal direct with Colonel Young" — 
who was a vice president of Pan Aii- — "whereby we will agree to buy and will 
agree to pay a substantial sum like $300,0C0 and the final price to be subj3ct to 
approval by qualified people to appraise the value. Don't you think that would 
be well? 

"Colonel Hannum. Yes, that is all right. I'd like to have Scheffauer tell you 
what information he got from the Chief's office about that. 

"Colonel Wyman. All right, sir. I will be glad to talk with him." 
The following was my conversation on the same date with Mr. Scheffauer : 
"Colonel Wyman. We took the gas and radio and then came the question of 
the boat. We want to use the boat from place to place. We have no transpor- 
tation down there. It is the Panamanian Government" — 

that means Pan American Airways. 

"The deal was made in New Zealand. I roerely gave authority to negotiate it 
in New Zealand and Australia. They sent in a price of $600,000. I told the local 
people here that I would get in touch with San Francisco and the entire arrange- 
ment could be made there. I'd like to have this appraised. Don't think it isi 
worth $600,000 or anywhere near it. What I suggest is that you get authority 
to negotiatie with Colonel Young, of Pan American Airways, [3411] with 
a view of purchasing. I would rather charter." 

83. General Frank. Is this 

Colonel Wyman. A telephone conversation. 

84. General Frank. No, just a minute. Is this in the congressional 
report ? 

Colonel Wyman. No, sir; it is about— yes, sir, the SOUTHEEN 
SEAS is in the report., i- 



1756 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

85. Major Clausen. It is in the last pages, from page 47 on. 
Colonel Wyivian. (reading) : 

"Mr. ScHEFFAUER. We'll see if we can arrange charter. 

"Colonel Wyman. I'd rather enter into an agreement with them to purchase 
the ship at a down-payment of $300,000 and to agree to a price to be determined 
by appraisal. You see what I mean? 

"Mr. SCHEFFAUER. YcS. 

"Colonel Wyman. You can do that best in San Francisco. Will you take over, 
and I will put what I know about it in a radio to you. I«don't know very much 
more than you do about it. The communications down south have been bad, 
and secret messages have come through pretty badly garbled. You can get in 
touch with Colonel Young, and you can arrange the whole thing. 

"Mr. ScHEFFAUER. All right. 

"Colonel Wyman. What we first did was to take possession for the United 
States, and then the second thing was, we have no other transportation, and they 
have been very much handicapped down there. We are getting supplies from 
Australia, and the boat will do the trick. 

[3Jfl2] "Mr. ScHEiTATjER. Should we get a crew? You have a crew there? 

"Colonel Wyman. They can get a crew right there. If you can arrange delivery 
with Colonel Young, and if they want it back, we'll return it to them. 

"Mr. ScHEFFAUER. I'll arrange the insurance and everything in case they are 
willing to charter It. 

"Colonel Wyman. All I know, now, it supplies for the people, and at one time 
it was a yacht, — " 

I think that is garbled, ".supplies for the people." 
"and at one time it was a yacht, and it was converted, and you can take it up with 
the maritime people. 

"Mr. ScHEFFAUER. I'll find out all about it. 

"Colonel Wyman. Take it up with the Maritime Commission, and get the 
thing done in accordance with regulations. 

"Mr. ScHEFFAUER. I'll get that all cleared up." 

The transaction involving the purchase of the SOUTHERN SEAS was from 
that point on handled to conclu.sion exclusively by the Office of the Division 
Engineer at San Francisco, and the Office of the Chief of Engineers, in 
Washington. 

The congressional report alleges that I rushed through the completion of the 
purchase of certain equipment at an excessive price from Rohl-Connolly Co., 
because of my expected depai'ture from the Hawaiian Department. It was 
decided in October 1941 that the equipment in question was needed on 
Christmas and Canton Islands in connection with the construction work being 
done there by [SJ^IS] Hawaiian Constructors under contract No. W^14- 
eng-602. It was discovered that the Rohl-Connolly Co. had the needed equip- 
ment available at a project it had just completed in Arizona, at Highgate 
Dam, Parker, Arizona. The Government could either rent or buy this equip- 
ment. Since it was to be shipped to these remote islands, it was agreed that 
the equipment should be bought by the Government. In view of tlie stepped-up 
defense construction program under way at that time, equipment of this type 
was scarce and hard to procure, especially for work in such i-emote areas. 

The equipment was shipped to Los Angeles and reconditioned by the Ha- 
waiian Constructors. 

This is wrong. It should read as follows : 

The division engineer requested that the office of the district engineer at 
Los Angeles supervise and check the reconditioning of the equipment and the 
shipment of it by Army transport to Christmas and Canton Islands. The equip- 
ment was shipped by the Army Transport LUDINGTON, I believe. This vessel 
reached Christmas Island around the first part of December 1941, anS. part 
of the equipment was unloaded there. However, before the vessel reached 
Canton Island to deliver the balance of the equipment there, the attack on 
Pearl Harbor took place, and the ship was ordered back to the mainland of the 
United States. On reaching the mainland the balance of the equipment, 
which is the equipment in question here, was unloaded on the west coast, at 
San Francisco, I believe. The equipment was delayed on the west coast 
awaiting reshipment to {S'tl^] Hawaii for use in connection with the 
defense construction projects being carried on by the Hawaiian Constructors 
under contract No. 602, While it was awaiting reshipment, additional reno- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1757 

vation work was done on the equipment by the Hawaiian Constructors. The 
equipment was finally reshippecl by the Army to Hawaii, where it was put to 
work in the first part of February 1942. 

Due to the extreme pressure of more urgent matters during the period im- 
mediately following the Pearl Harbor attack, it was impossible to keep paper 
work up to date, and accordingly no settlement liad been made with Hawaiian 
Constructors for this equipment up to the time it was known that I was to be 
relieved. At the time I was relieved, Colonel Lyman — that is. General Lyman, 
deceased — my successor, directed me to work with him for about a week before 
my departure in settling claims and other unfinished business of this kind that 
had been incurred during my administration. I did this, and one of the many 
claims that was settled during that period was the claim of Hawaiian Con- 
structors for this equipment. 

On March 11, 1942, the Hawaiian Constructors wrote a formal routine letter 
requesting written authority to purchase the equipment in question at stated 
prices. I had a conference with Colonel Lyman, Major Robinson, and the 
representatives of Hawaiian Constructors, on the question of the fair value of 
this equipment. In addition, I had an employee of my office appraise the equip- 
ment, and the equipment was actually inspected by me and by Colonel Lyman, 
together. On the basis of all of the information [S-'fl5] so obtained, we 
officially appraised the equipment and decided that under the circumstances 
its value was in excess of the prices which Hawaiian Constructors had re- 
quested authority to pay. Accordingly, I wrote Hawaiian Constructors a 
routine letter, formally authorizing the purchase of this equipment at the 
price stated by it. The statement in the congressional report that I disre- 
garded "the official appraisal" in making this settlement is untrue. 

The congressional report alleges that while I was District Engineer at 
Honolulu and supervising the construction of the defense projects under con- 
tract No. W-414-eng-602, I was guilty of mismanagement which contributed 
to the delay in the installation of vital defense projects, and particularly the 
aircraft warning system, which projects, it is alleged, lagged beyond any ex- 
cuse. It is further alleged that because of my mismanagement, the necessary 
orders to proceed with construction work promptly after the approval of the 
original contract on 3 January 1941 were not issued, and that no efforts were 
made on my part to prevent delays, and no complaints were made against the 
contractor for delays. The report concludes that as a result of this inefficiency 
on my part, the most important item, the permanent aircraft warning stations, 
were not complete on 7 December 1941, to the advantage of the Japanese and 
to the detriment of tlie United States. 

With respect to the general allegation of inefficiency on my part as District 
Engineer, I submit in rebuttal, as exhibit "A", the report of the Inspector 
General of the [3'tl(j] Hawaiian Department, dated 2 September 1941, 
three months before the Pearl Harbor disaster, and during the period when 
contract No. W 414-eng-602 was being administered by my office. This report 
covers the organization of the office of the District Engineer in Honolulu. Tlae 
deficiencies noted in this report were minor and were summarized by the In- 
spector General as follows : 

''General: This report on the organization of the office of the District En- 
gineer in Honolulu, deals with the administrative framework which has been 
set up by that government agency for the supervision of the construction proj- 
ects that are under its control. This report is informative in nature and is in- 
tended to serve as a background for a better understanding of the subsequent 
reports that will be submitted on the more detailed phases of the inspections 
of tlie cost-plus-fixed-fee construction projects in the Hawaiian Department. 

"CONCLUSIONS 

"27. After a study of the organization of the office of the District Engineer 
in Honolulu, and preliminary visits to the various construction projects under 
the supervision of the government agency, the following conclusions have been 
drawn : 

"a. That the system of safeguards, for tlie protection of government funds, 
property, and plant (inspection, cost accounting, and auditing), as directed by 
. the Chief of Engineers, have been established by the District Engineer. 

"&. That deficiencies do exist within the [34-^7] organization, appar- 
ently caused by inadequate inter-office coordination and a lack of sufficiently- 
skilled clerical employees. These deficiencies have generally allowed clerical 



1758 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

controls to lag behind the progression of actual construction, resulting in partial 
failure in the system of cost accounting, procurement, and storage-and-issue. 

"c. That conscientious efforts, on the part of the District Engineer and his 
key assistants, are apparently being made to correct these deficiencies, as soon 
as they manifest themselves. 

"d. That skilled clerical technicians for administrative duties are difficult to 
obtain because of the large number needed by other competing government agen- 
cies and because of higher wages offered by civilian firms for similar services. 

"e. That the field areas, established for the prosecution of the construction 
Ijrojects under contract, appear to be well organized and to be working generally 
in an efficient manner. 

"f. That progress on the construction of many projects has been delayed by 
the shortage of material, which in turn has been caused by (1) the shortage of 
transportation facilities from the mainland, (2) the inability of local firms to 
deliver materials on schedule, and (3) the status of defense priorities established 
for the District Engineer's office." 

That is exhibit "A". I will just pile these up. 

With respect to the efficiency and organization of Hawaiian Constructors, I 
submit in evidence a special report, exhibit "B", on the organization of the office 
of the Hawaiian Constructors, made by the Inspector [SJflS] General of 
the Hawaiian Department, dated 4 November 1941, or one month iDcfore the Pearl 
Harbor disaster. The report shows that irregularities and deficiencies were 
minor and concern chiefly tlie property and bookkeeping records, and that these 
deficiencies were caused principally by the need for additional personnel. The 
significant paragraphs from the conclusions of this report are : 

"9. That the corporation executives are attempting to effect an organization that 
will insure completion of project construction with the greatest degree of effi- 
ciency. 

"10. That shortages of building supplies, skilled clerical assistants and trained 
construction laborers are adversely affecting efficient operations ; that these 
conditions will continue for some time due to the lack of adequate transportation 
and manufacturing facilities, and to the time required to train personnel 
properly." 

This is "B". 

Throughout the period from the signing of contract G02 for the construction of 
defense projects to the time of my being relieved as District Engineer at Hono- 
lulu, I was constantly putting pressure on Hawaiian Constructors, on my own 
organization, on the Office of the Division Engineer in San Francisco, and on 
other branches of the service, to expedite and speed up the construction involved. 
Most of the efforts on my part to expedite these projects were in the form of 
personal interviews, telephone conversations, and conferences, and there are no 
written records covering the majority of these instances. In some instances, 
however, I have been able to locate written records which furnish an example of 
such efforts [SlfW] on my part. I offer in evidence, as exhibit "C", a 
memorandum dated 20 April 1941, written by me to Hawaiian Constructors cov- 
ering expediting of AWS projects. 

It is a memorandum to the Hawaiian Constructors, and also to the 
area engineer, Third Field Area, Fourth Field Area, Operations 
Division, U. S. Engineer Office; Engineering Division, U. S. Engineer 
Office; Supply and Transportation Division, U. S. Engineer Office; 
subject,"A. W. S. Jobs": 

(Letter by Colonel Wyman, 20 April 1941 :) 

1. The District Engineer has been notified that AWS materials will begin to 
arrive in the Hawaiian Islands about June 15. 

2. It is incumbent upon all concei'ned to expedite AWS construction, with 
the view of early completion. 

3. The following action will be taken : 

a. The construction of the access road to Mt. Kaala will be double shifted 
as early as practicable. 

h. A job order will be issued without delay for the construction of the access 
road to the fixed station on the Island of Kauai. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1759 

c. The necessary plant and personnel to construct the Kauai road will be 
mobilized either from plant owned by the Hawaiian Constructors, or rented 
plant, including opei'ating personnel. 

d. A job office under the Fourth Field Area will be opened at Port Allen, Kauai, 
and supervisory personnel detailed. The job engineer will exercise general 
supervision over AWS construction on the Island of Kauai, and the development 
of Barking Sands Airport, as an Army airfield, and the development of Burns 
Field, when and as [3^20] authorized. 

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr., 

Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers, 

District Engineer. 

I offer in evidence, as exhibit "D" on this point, a letter dated 23 
July 1941, written by me to the Hawaiian Constructors, urging the 
expediting of AWS projects. 

(Letter of July 23, 1941, is as follows :) 

July 23, 1941. 

Hawaiian Consteuctoes, 

Pier 2-A, Foot of Channel Street, 

Honolulu, T. H. 
Gentlemen : The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department is ex- 
tremely anxious to have the AWS Stations at Kokee and Haleakala completed 
for early use. 

You are requested to prosecute the work at those places with sufficient zeal 
to make them available to the Hawaiian Department for use in the early future. 
Very truly yours, 

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr., 

Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers, 

District Engineer. 

I also offer a document, "E," containing extracts from the minutes 
of the weekly meetings of the District Engineer Advisory Control 
Board which show examples of action taken by me to expedite these 
projects. This Advisory Control Board consisted of the heads of the 
[34^1] divisions and field areas, and representatives of Hawaiian 
Constructors. At its weekly meetings, all problems of delay were 
considered. I have not had time to search the files to discover all 
written documents showing actions taken by me to expedite these 
projects, but these are offered as examples of such action. 

I will read it. 

(Extract from minutes of weekly meetings of District Engineer's Advisory 
Control Board :) 

First meeting, 24 February, 1941 : 

"Colonel Wyman. I desire that plans and specifications be prepared and job 
ordei-s issued for 'all roads connected with the AWS Service both on the Island 
of Oahu and the outlying islands, with a view to early commencement of the 
actual work of construction of these roads. Contractor is ordered to organize 
the road construction force to construct these roads successively. If any prob- 
lems relative to curvature and grading of these roads arise, I desire them 
brought to my attention without delay." 

Fourth meeting, 17 March, 1941 : 

"Colonel Wyman. Request approved. In view of the emergency existing in 
connection with the completion of the National Defense Program being con- 
ducted by this office, and in accordance with the desires of the Commanding 
General of the Hawaiian Department, the employment of labor on Sundays and 
legal holidays and during hours of darkness on authorized projects is approved, 
for all future operations. Whenever the contractor desires to work on Sundays, 
legal holidays or during hours of dai'k- [3422] ness, the Job Engineer or 
Area Engineer will be notified 48 hours prior to the time, in order that an 
inspection force may be furnished." 

Ninth meeting, 21 April 1941 : 

"Colonel Wyman. I have two memoranda here which I will read :" (Reads 
two memos addressed to Hawaiian Constructors dealing with immediate com- 
mencement of work on projects under their jurisdiction.) 



1760 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Tenth meeting, 5 May 1941 : 

"Colonel Wyman. I desire the job orders and plans issued for the commence- 
ment of work on the AWS roads at Maui and Hawaii. Equipment for the AWS 
installations will arrive here about the 1st of July. The Commanding General 
wants it ready to be put to work without delay." 

Eleventh meeting, 12 M'ay 1941 : 

"Colonel Wyman. There appears to be considerable confusion and delay in 
the receipt and distribution of materials from the mainland. I desire the Chief 
of the Transportation and Supply Division to make a study of this condition with 
a view to more orderly receipt and distribution of supplies and materials, nnd 
to submit his report and recommendations at the next meeting." 

At this same meeting : 

"Grafe. Hawaiian Constructors request authority from the District Engineer 
to have their men consult with the Engineer Department men in connection with 
this study and procedure. 

"Colonel Wyman. Request approved." 

86. General Frank. May I ask if you intend to read all [S4^3] 
those exhibits 3' on have at your hand ? 

Colonel Wyman. No, sir; I do not; but I thought I would read 
this, because it is very important to me that I do have evidence that 
I did urge this construction. 

87. General Frank. Are those exhibits to be put in ? 
Colonel Wyman. They are all exhibits ; yes, sir. 

88. General Frank. Can you not, after stating the substance of 
them, submit them as exhibits and documentary testimony ? 

Colonel Wyman. I would like to make one other. You see, we 
opened with those two, but I did not read them. 

89. General Frank. All right. 
Colonel Wyman (continuing) : 

Thirteenth Meeting, 2 June 1941 : 

"Colonel Wyman. The Federal Government, under the teiins of the contract, 
is obliged to furnish the camp, and pay for all installations for the camp ; how- 
ever, any loss in the operation of the camp lue to poor management will be borne 
by the contractor." 

"Gkafe. The contractor wishes to protest against that decision. 

"Colonel Wyman. Hawaiian Constructors propose to protest ; however, that is my 
decision and consequently an audit will be kept, and if the loss is due to poor 
management, it is not a proper charge against the United States." 

[3424] "Kestly. I should like to bring to your attention that there are 
quite a few jobs short of labor — Job 5.0 and Job for Mt. Kaala are both short 
15 to 20 laborers. 

"Colonel Wyman. I have authorized verbally the employment of Filipino labor 
at both of these jobs." 

An instance comes to mind on the subject of my expediting these projects. 
In the early summer of 1941, Mr. Grafe, of Hawaiian Constructors, Brigadier 
General Warren Hannum, the Division Engineer, and I inspected various jobs 
the Hawaiian Constructors were doing under contract #602. On this occasion 
I informed Mr. Grafe, 

who was in charge for the contractors. 

that it would be necessary for him to stay on these jobs continuously from that 
time on, in order to prevent any delays and deficiencies of work. He complied with 
my instructions in this regard. General Hannum, the Division Engineer, is a 
witness to this fact. By the very nature of things, the time of performance 
of this CPFP contract was not definitely stated, and no penalties were provided 
for failure to complete performance within any stated time. The reason for 
this is the large number of uncertainties that existed with reference to the 
jobs to be done under the contract at the time it was made and the supplemental 
agreements were executed. It is anticipated by the very terms of the agreement 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1761 

that many changes would have to be made, both with respect to work to be done 
and time for completion of work, and in this connection it should be noted that 
the contract provided that the contractor should do all things necessary for the 
completion of the work in the shortest possible time and that no guarantee was 
made that the work would be [3425] completed in any stated period. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Hawaiian Constructors was constantly pressed 
for progress, some unavoidable delays did occur which were due primarily to 
circumstances attendant upon war conditions — such as deficiencies of material, 
labor, and transportation, which were beyond the control of both the contractor 
and the Government. There were no delays which could be ascribed to negligence 
or inaction on the part of either Hawaiian Constructors or the District Engineer's 
Office. 

[3426] One cause of delay in effecting the completion of these defense 
projects was the difficulty experienced in getting relatively high priorities for 
this Hawaiian construction work. In this connection it should be noted that 
Engineer Department instructions to contracting officers directed that under the 
standard form of construction contract, where completion was delayed through 
the observance by the contractor of a voluntary preference obligation assumed 
at the instance of the government under the system of priorities established by 
the Army and Navy Munitions Board, contracting officers should grant such 
extensions of time of performance as were warranted by the facts in each 
case. In connection with the difficulties experienced in getting high priorities 
for Hawaiian construction work during this period, I offer in evidence, as Exhibit 
F, an exhaustive study prepared by the Office of the Chief of Engineers on this 
subject. It will be noted from this report that until June, 1941, constructions 
pi'ojects in Hawaii were rated on the same basis as similar projects in continental 
United States, and were not rated as projects in Panama, which were uniformly 
rated A-l-b. This study very significantly points out : 

"The isolation location of Hawaii presented difficulties in procurement and 
transportation from the mainland which the Commanding General, Hawaiian 
Department, reported to the Adjutant General in letters dated 4 June, 1941, 3 
July, 1941 and again in a letter dated 28 July, 19^1. The Office of the Chief of 
Engineers, based upon a telephone request from the Division [^.^27] Engi- 
neer, South Pacific Division, dated 13 May, 1941, for a priorities rating on the 
aircraft warning service (Contract W-414r-eng-784, for the cableway for Mount 
Kaala), received and A-l-f rating. This rating was not considered sufficiently 
high by the Division Engineer since the 'Commanding General considers it urgent 
and necessary that the aircraft warning system be completed and placed in 
operation without delay.' A rating of A-l-c was obtained by the Office of the 
Chief of Engineers from the Army and Navy Munitions Board on 17 June, 1941. 
"Individual requests for ratings and for assistance in obtaining equipment, 
material and supplies for Hawaii have been received from Hawaii directly or 
through the Division Engineer. The assistance the Office of the Chief of Engi- 
neers had been able to render was not spectacular because the Army and Navy 
Munitions Board had to be guided by the Priorities Directives. Since the 
Hawaiian construction projects were considered in the same defense category as 
domestic projects, the priorities ratings in the early part of 1941 were A-l-g. 
It was not until July, 1941, that certain projects were authorized ratings of 
A-l-c. The general authorization to assign a rating of A-l-c to all contracts in 
Hawaii, even though Panama was authorized an A-l-b, was not favorably con- 
sidered. Each contract had to be submitted separately to the Army and Navy 
Munitions Board for a priorities rating and for a priorities certificate, [3-'i28] 
even though it was known beforehand what ratings the priorities directive 
authorized. It was not until 8 August, 1941, that the Office of the Chief of 
Engineers could advise the Division Engineer by teletype that a rating of A-l-c 
could be applied to all contracts in Hawaii and to any critical list item. It was 
not until 20 August, 1941, that an Army and Navy Munitions Board directive was 
published containing this authorization." 

Attention is particularly invited to the tabulation forming a part of this 
exhibit, pertaining to the aircraft warning system. This shows that a request 
was made for a highest possible rating for the aircraft warning system and that 
it was assigned a lower rating of A-l-c. It reveals, further, that a request was 
made for an A-l-b rating for the cableway needed for the Kaala Station, but that 
an A-l-c rating was obtained. This was followed up by other requests for still 
higher ratings for this particular job. 

In the light of the shortage of critical materials and the assignment of higher 
priority ratings to projects in other areas, the foregoing demonstrates that 
delays in the construction of defense projects in the Hawaiian Islands were 



1762 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

caused by the low priorities assigned and issued to the Hawaiian area. Every 
effort was made by all echelons in the Corps of Engineers and also by the Com- 
manding General of the Hawaiian Department to get better priorities but such 
requests were only partially granted. In addition to this, request was made for 
authority to stock-pile [3429] certain essential materials as lumber and 
cement in the Hawaiian Islands but this request was disapproved. Under regu- 
lations then existing, materials paid for by funds allocated for certain projects 
had to be earmarked and could be used only for such projects. These condi- 
tions greatly retarded the construction of these defense projects including the 
aircraft warning system. 

Another cause of delay peculiar to the Haleakala aircraft warning site was 
involved in the necessity of securing the permission to use this site from the 
Interior Department. A discussion on the use of National Park land for this 
site took place between the War Department and the Department of the In- 
terior prior to March, 1941. In January, 1941, Headquarters, Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, in a 5th Indorsement dated 3 January, 1941, to basic letter — subject : 
"Transfer to War Department of Haleakala and Maunaloa Sites, T. H.," which 
was directed to the Adjutant General — stated that careful consideration had 
been given to other sites suggested by the Parks Service but that they did not 
meet the necessary requirements. I offer in evidence as Exhibit G, showing 
the objection of the Department of the Interior to the transfer of land for the 
A. W. S. project, a wire from the War Department to the Commanding General, 
Hawaiian Department, dated March 3, 1941. In this connection I offer in evi- 
dence, as Exhibit H, a copy of a wire dated 4 March, 1S'41, from the Commanding 
General, Hawaiian Department, to the Adjutant General, advising that the 
Haleakala site was a most important one and protesting the submission of the 
matter to the Interior Department because of the [3430] delay involved. 
In addition I offer in evidence, as Exhibit I, a wire to the Commanding General, 
Hawaiian Department from the War Department, dated 12 March, 1941, which 
authorized the Commanding General to make Hnal decision on design and layout 
and other details of construction for A. W. S. projects in Hawaii, but subject 
to the approval of the Departntent of the Interior of all such projects located in 
National Park sites. It .should be noted from this telegram that the occupancy 
of the needed 40-acre tract was positively refused by the Interior Department 
at that time, but that the Park Service, with the concurrence of the Hawaiian 
Superintendent, would recommend approval of the Red Hill site for use by the 
War Department A'ith the understanding that the Department of the Interior 
approve the installation and buildings. At that time the Commanding General 
still desired an area at the summit of Red Hill and an area of approximately 40 
acres lower down on the mountain for the construction of a base camp. I offer 
in evidence, as Exhibit J, a letter from General Marshall, Chief of Staff, to the 
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated 15 March, 1941, in which 
it is stated that the Commanding General should continue to seek the Park 
Commission's approval for the use of the desired land. I also offer in evidence, 
as Exhibits K and K-1, a letter dated 29 May, 1941 from the Adjutant General 
to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, stating that the National 
Park Service had finally approved the building designs, the layouts, and was 
issuing a special use permit for the camp site. I also offer in evidence, as Ex- 
hibit K-2, a [3431 ] copy of a 1st Indorsement dated June 11, 1941, from me 
to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, stating that I planned to 
commence construction on the work at an early date. 

Under the pre-war administrative procedures prescribed at that time in con- 
nection with the construction of these projects, it was necessary to clear a great 
many phases of this program with various government agencies and difftu'ent 
branches of the military establishment. Demonstrating this point I have pre- 
pared and submit as evidence Exhibit L entitled "Necessary Principals, Decisions 
or Actions in Connection with AWS Station by Various Authorities." This ex- 
hibit shows that eight other agencies or authorities had to be consulted and gave 
their approvals at various stages in the development of the project ; and that of 
the 12 principal steps listed, the District Engineer, as the contracting agency, 
had exclusive authority in only three. 

In the Hawaiian Department It was necessary for these inter-departmental 
approvals, which resiilted In a constant interchange of information, especially 
between the Signal Corps and the Department Engineer, representing G-4, and 
the District Engineer. The concurrences of the Signal Corps were necessary 
in every change made, and before any part of the work could be started. The 
Department Engineer, representing the Commanding General, also had to give 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1763 

his approval. I have recently gone through the files and there are literally 
hundreds of staff memoranda illustrating this point. 

As an example of the time-consuming process I introduce [3432] in 
evidence as Exhibit M a memorandum dated 14 February, 1941, vpritten by me 
to the Department Engineer requesting the approval of certain preliminary 
sketches and plans. As a further Exh.bit, M-1, I introduce in evidence the first 
indorsement of the Department Engineer showing a partial approval and partial 
disapproval, a change in the proposed work, and a direction that one item be 
delated until further instructions. I give this merely as one example of hundreds 
of such instances. 

It should be borne in mind that this tedious process was in effect not only with 
respect to the AWS construction projects, but also with reference to the some 148 
other construction jobs underway at tiiat time. 

In consii'.ering delays in the completion of the AWS projects, it should be borne 
in mind that at that time both the designing agency and using service (which in 
both instances was the Signal Corps) was working with 'a project which was still 
in the development and experimental stage, and was new not only to the military 
establishment but to the scientific world. Of necessity progress was slow be- 
cause of the fact that few people could be considered experts in this field. 

I now propose to analyze the chronological history of the four elements of the 
AWS system which constituted the approved pi-oject for permanent stations when 
the Hawaiian Constructors Contract No. 6U2 was received by the District En- 
gineer, as approved on 6 January, 1941. In this connection it should be noted 
that the expanded final AWS program was not approved until 4 December, 1941, 
[3433] three days before Pearl Harbor. 

I offer in evidence as Exhibit N a study entitled "AWS Information Center, Fort 
Shafter, Oahu, J. O. 39.0." It will be noted from this exhibit that the actual 
location of the structure at Fort Shaf ;er was not fixed until 9 April, 1941, and that 
the structure was expanded in extent, which necessitated a revised la^out which 
was not approved by the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department until 

5 Octolier, 1941. 

I also offer in evidence as Exhibit O, a memorandum dated 18 April, 1941, from 
toe to the Commanding Genei'al, Hawaiian Department, submitting the general 
J3lan and sections for the AWS information center, and Exhibit 0-1, the first 
indorsement of the Hawaiian Department dirpcting the holding in abeyance of the 
design in view of tiie instructions received that this station would be combined 
with the Command Post of the Hawaiian Air Force and the Antiaircraft Group- 
ment. For this revised and enlarged project special tunnel equipment would be 
needed. However, the equipment on hand at that time would allow only the 
employment of hand methods. The nature of the job was such that the six 
months estimated for its construction was not excessive. This resulted in the 
estimated date of completion fallii»g .subsequent to the Pearl Harbor attack. The 
actual excavation on this project was finished 31 October, 1941, but at that time 
the using service had not yet decided on the interior arrangements with the result 
that the sidewalls could not be properly completed. For this reason the actual 
percentage of completion on 7 December, [SJfSJ/] 1941, was 72 percent. 
During the period imme'Uately after Pearl Harbor these tunnels were used as 
bomb shelters to protect the civilan population — 

and the women and children of officers' families stationed in this area: 

This further delayed their completion, which was not affected until some time 
in 1942. 

The files revealed that the following dates are shown for the approval of 
layout plans covering the three fixed AWS stations: Mount Kaala, 6 March, 
1941 ; Kokee on Kauai, 20 March, 1941, and Haleakala on Maui, 17 March, 1941. 
The time between the date of the receipt of the final approval of the contract, 

6 January, 1941, and these approval dates had been consumed in making 
necessary detailed surveys and preparations of layout and plans for submission. 
During this period of time very little work could be started because necessary 
construction equipment was not available on the island and was being procured. 
In this connectioni offer as Exhibit P a letter dated 6 January, 1941, to Ha- 
waiian Constructors from the Division Engineer, granting authority to Hawaiian 
Constructors to purchase equipment needed for this project. This schedule of 
equipment had been worked up while I was in the United States in connection 
with the negotiation of the contract, and was released at San Francisco imme- 
diately after the receipt of the Under Secretary of War's approval of the 



1764 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

contract. It will be noted that the total amount of the needed equipment 
ordered under this authority is approximately $275,000. At this time the con- 
tracting authority [3-^35] of the District Engineer was limited to $50,000 
in such cases. 

I merely cite this as an illustration of the peacetime restrictions and limi- 
tations on my actions that were still in effect during the administration of Con- 
tract No. 602. It was not until after the attack on Pearl Harbor that contracting 
limiations and other restrictions upon the authority of the District Engineer 
were considerably relaxed. 

In understnnding the construction of the AWS installations at Mount Kaala, 
Halekala, and Kokee. it should be kept clearly in mind that the District Engi- 
neer was to design and build the access road, the utilities, buildings necessary 
for living quarters, and communications buildings. The using service, the Signal 
Corps, was to design and furnish the tower and detector stations and the 
power buildings at the station sites. The District Engineer was to erect the 
tower and detector stations and power buildings upon delivery of the components 
at the station sites. The District Engineer was also to install the power unit 
in the main power building and also to install the fuel oil tanks upon delivery 
of these items b.v the Signal Corps at the station sites. The Signal Corps was 
to furnish and install the equipment in the communications buildings and in 
the detector stations. 

The construction of these facilities was rendered very difficult because of the 
fact that all of the sites were at very high elevations and base camps had to 
be established at convenient living locations some distance [3436] below 
the site of the AWS installations. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that 
some of these stations were at very remote and inaccessible locations. 

Mauna Loa : The Congressional Report (pages 39 and 41) critically states 
that orders to proceed with an aircraft warning station, road, and so forth, 
were given on June 30, 1941, and that no progress towards completion was 
reported until September 1, 1941, the projec-t being cancelled May 1, 1942. This 
was Job No. 46, or the Mobile AWS station at Mauna Loa. The fact in this 
situation was that plans were prepared and proceeding, but the project was 
actually cancelled on July 14. 1941, by orders of Headquarters, Hawaiian De- 
partment. The formal cancellation on May 1, 1942, was merely a confirmation 
of the actual cancellation for record purposes. 

Haleakala : The Congre.?sional Report (page 41) critically states that notice 
to proceed on Job 41, which was the Haleakala Fixed AWS Station, was not 
given until June 14, 1941. This was the station which was located on' lands 
belonging to the National Park Service and under cnotrol of the Department of 
the Interior. I have already cited the delays experienced in getting authoriza- 
tion from the Department of the Interior to use this land for this purpose. 
Authorization for the use of this land was noj^j received by the District Engineer 
until in June, 1941. The records indicate that this authorizaiton was acknowl- 
edged by Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, only three days before this notice 
to proceed was given. In connection with this project, I offer in evidence as 
Exhibit Q-18a [3437] letter from Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, 
to the District Engineer, dated September 8, 1941, advising that the necessary 
metal buildings and towers for installation at Haleakala were on hand at the 
Signal Corps yard at Fort Shafter and stated that if the buildings were complete, 
shipments to the site should be expedited. I also offer in evidence as Exhibit 
Q-2 my reply dated September 23, 1941, advising that the buildings and towers 
had been shipped to the site and that ei'ection would begin as soon as the Signal 
Corps employees arrived to supervise. This is another example of the coordina- 
tion that had to be effected between the Signal Corps, Headquarters, Hawaiian 
Department, and the District Engineer. At this time, a delay occurred inasmuch 
as no funds were locally available for the shipment of the buildings to the site 
of erection — 

That is, shiping from this island to the other island by means of the 
inter-island steamboat company. 

and under peace-time procedure Washington had to be consulted. 

Because it was illegal to use funds appropriated by Congress for 
one purpose and divert them to another purpose. 

It was finally decided that Engineer funds would be advanced and later repaid 
by the Quartermaster Corps. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD l765 

The fixed stations site at Haleakala is located on top of Red Hill on the crest 
of Haleakala Crater, an elevation of about 10,000 feet. A single lane, tortuous 
road extended to within approximately 3,800 feet of this site. Work on the 
necessary access road to this site was started about July 7, 1941, and was com- 
pleted about November 30, 1941. [SJ/SS] The transmiter detector was com- 
pleted on December 6, 1941, and the radio powerhouse was about 99 percent com- 
plete at that time. It is not known when the equipment was finally furnished 
and installed by the Signal Cori)s. One of the principal reasons contributing 
to the impossibility of having these stations completed earlier was the fact that 
the District Engineer did not receive the necessary drawings and plans in time. 
However, it should be noted that the construction activiites of the District En- 
gineer at this site were practically finished on December 6, 1941. I have been 
advised that later developments have proven that this site was not a suitable 
one for the operation of an AWS station. 

Mount Kaala : This fixed-station site is located at the highest point on Mount 
Kaala at an elevation of about 4,000 feet. The terrain at and around this site 
is swampy and covered with jungle growth. The annual rainfall in this area 
is approximately 100 inches. In order to gain access to this site for the con- 
struction and operation of an AWS station, it was necessary to construct a 
difiicult access road some 9,000 feet long with grades extending in excess of 15 
per cent, including numerous short radius curves and drainage structures. In 
addition, it was necessary to construct from the end of the access road to the 
station site a cableway some 7,360 feet long, arising from an elevation of 1,931 feet 
to an elevation of approximately 4,000 feet, up the sides of a rough and rugged 
steep mountainside. As an illustration of the diflSculties encountered in con- 
structing this project, it should be pointed out that the neces- [3Ji39] sary 
aggregate for the concrete detector footing had to be transported over a narrow 
trail by pack animals in 100 pound bags. 

Hawaiian Constructors was given notice to proceed on construction of this 
cableway on February 6, 1941. The cableway required a special design, and 
a contractor on the mainland, experienced in both cableway design and con- 
struction, was necessary. General plans and specifications were prepared by 
the District Engineer and the work was advertised by Hawaiian Constructors. 
The bid received was considered too high. The Division Engineer was then 
requested to advertise the work. In this connection, I offer as Exhibt R a radio 
dated March 7, 1941 sent by me to the Division Engineer urging that work be 
expedited. The Division Engineer — 

at San Francisco — 

advertised this work on March 31, 1941 and a contract was signed on April 30, 
1&41, with the low bidder. Interstate Equipment Company. The Interstate 
Equipment Company submitted a design with its bid and the equipment was to 
be fabricated and shipped within 126 days. During this period, the Commanding 
General, Hawaiian Department made many efforts to secure higher priorities 
for this equipment. I have discussed this previously. Due to the low priorities 
assigned to this contract, the contractor experienced difficulties in getting neces- 
sary materials and the components arrived in Hawaii in driblets. On September 
6, 1941, the construction work actually started in the field prior to the arrival of 
the cableway components. The last ship- [34^0] ment of components left 
the factory of the Interstate Equipment Company — 

at Elizabeth, New Jersey — 

on November 21, 1941. Obviously, it was impossible to finish the construction 
of this station by December 7, 1941. One of the principal causes of delay on this 
project was the low priority rating assigned work in Hawaii. In addition, my 
office was not supplied with the necessary drawings in time for the completion 
of the construction work to have been effected prior to December 7, 1941. I have 
been advised that after the final completion of this station, the site was found 
unsuitable for operation of an AWS installation. 

Kokee, Kauai : The site for this AWS installation was at an elevation of 
4,230 feet. The terrain at and approaching this site is rugged, swampy and 
covered with heavy jungle growth. The annual rainfall at the site is aproxi- 
mately 100 inches, and the annual rainfall in the vicinity of the site has been 
measured as high as 600 inches, and it is regarded as one of the wettest spots 
in the world. An access road more than 12,000 feet long with grades exceeding 
12 per cent had to be consti-ucted. A base camp, consisting of barracks, mess- 



1766 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

hall, recreation hall, radio shelter, water supply system, sewage system, and 
electrical system had to be provided for the operating personnel. 

The layout plan for this station was approved March 20, 1941. Plans for the 
access road were not approved by higher authority until May, 1941. Construc- 
tion work on the access road did not start until June 24, 1941. Great [SJf.'fl] 
difficulties were experienced in making surveys through the jungle and swamps 
through which the road had to be constructed. Furthermore, my office was short 
of qualified personnel for making such surveys. However, the access road was 
about 86 per cent complete on December 7, 1941, the detector building and tower 
and tower building were about 50 per cent complete. It would have been impos- 
sible for the construction work involved in this project to have been completed 
by the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor because of the late date on which my 
office received the necessary drawings and plans for preotion. 

I want to emphasize that one of the outstanding reasong why it would have 
been impossible to finish the mi'jor elements of the AWS stations before De- 
cember 7, 1941, was the fact that my oflice did not receive essential plans for 
erection and drawings from the using service in time. By this I do not mean 
to criticize the using service because it was known that it was developing a 
design of a major item which was entirely new and still in an experimental 
stage. I offer in evidence as Exhibit S-1 a letter from the Chief of Engineers, 
dated August 5, 1940, to the Chief, Signal Office, urging that he be furnished 
with designs of AWS structures at as early a date as possible. I also offer in 
evidence as Exhibit S-2 a first indorsement to this letter giving certain general 
features. The files of the office of the Chief of Engineers show additional 
exchanges on this matters. 

I offer in evidence as Exhibit T a communication dated O'tober 23, 1941, from 
the office of the Chief of [3'iJf2] Engineers to the Division Engineer at 
San Francisco, entitled "Aircraft Warning Service, Foundation Drawings." I 
also offer in evidence jis Exhibit T-1 a communication from the Division Engineer 
at San Francisco to the District Engineer at Honolulu, dated October 30, 1941,. 
transmitting aii'craft warning service foundation drawirgs. This communi- 
cation transmitting these drav^ings was received in my office November 24, 1941,, 
only 13 days before the attack on Pearl Harbor. 

The drawinojs received on November 24th which "were essential to 
the erection of this work are right liere in this folder. 

I also offer in evidence as Exhibit U a communication to the Division Engineer, 
San Francisco, from the office of the Chief of Engineers, dated December 12. 
1941, forwarding additional drawings and erection diagrams for aircraft warning 
service construction. It was necessai-y for my office to have these plans and 
drawings before it could undertake the completion of the construction involved 
in these projects. 

A review of the file in my office reveals that actual receipt of drawings of 
various elements of the AWS installations was as follows : 

May 12, 1941: Received foundation plans for the metal buildings and also for 
the detector. 

September 11, 1941. Received some small details for transmitter building. 

November 24, 1941, received floor plan for transmitter building with sketches 
of 100-foot tower and relative position of the detector and transmitter building. 
The \S'i4S] sketch of the detector, however, gives no designations of the 
fabricated members, which was necessary for erection purposes. 

December 24, 1941 : Received the first set of drawings which could really be 
fully used for proceeding with the erection of the detector and transmitter 
building. 

The detector for the Haleakala station was erect-^d before the complete draw- 
ings were received. However, this was only a 34-foot tower whereas the tower 
at Kokce was 100 feet high, for winch details were more complicated. Although 
the steel for the tower itself was shipped to Kokee in September, 1941, the" pieces; 
of steel were not marked with the frbrication marks which were necessary for- 
erection, in accordance with the usual practice. 

It is evi'ient. therefore, that it would have been impossible to have completed' 
prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster the erection of all the important elements of 
the AWS stations at their respective sites because indispensable plans and draw- 
ings were not available to the office of the District Engineer in time. 

[3444] In conclusion it is obvious that: 

1. Prompt steps were taken after receipt of the approved contract with 
Hawaiian Constructors on 6 January 1941, to put underway all work which 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1767 

could be started by the District Engineer without plans and specifications and 
without the equipment and buildings to be furnished by the Using Service. 

2. That continued pressure was applied by the District Engineer upon the 
contractor to keep his work on schedule. 

3. That low priorities delayed the work, although continuous efforts were 
made to secure higher priorities. 

4. That failure of the Interior D.^partment to grant permission to use Park 
Lands delayed the Haleakala A. W. S. Station project. 

5. That low priorities for critical material, notably steel, delayed execution 
of Contract W^14-eng-784 with Interstate Equipment Co. for the cableway for 
Mt. Kaala A. W. S. station ; that the unusual, natural and diflicult field condi- 
tions required a period of construction which was not abnormal for such diffi- 
culties and which threw completion after Pearl Harbor ; that, however, even had 
this not been so, other factors, beyond the control of the District Engineer, were 
also present and would have prevented completion of the Mt. Kaala project 
before 7 December 1941. 

6. That procedures necessary for coordination [34^5] and cooperation, 
such as securing of approvals for layouts and of all other major features and 
of changes desired by higher authority or by the Using Service, caused the initia- 
tion of actual work to be at later dates than If only engineering considerations 
to be decided by the District Engineer had been involved. 

7. That the foregoing factors made impracticable the issuance of notice to 
proceed before the dates such orders were in fact issued, namely, about in 
February for the cableway and June for A. W. S. Stations. 

8. That the District Engineer could not proceed without plans and specifica- 
tions ; that the earliest complete set of those which were necessary in order to 
properly execute the work were rrc^ived in the District Office on December 24, 
1941, seventeen days after Pearl Harbor. 

9. That had the foresight existed to have predicted the need of an emergency 
A. W. S. on or before 7 December 1941, the mobile sets which were received on 
the islands by August, 1941, could have been set up irrespective of the degree of 
completion of the three permanent projects from a construction standpoint. 
Roads were completed to two of the three sites. 

[3446] (The following exhibits offered by the witness, which 
does not include those read entirely into the record, were received in 
evidence and marked as indicated below:) 

(Wyman "A", special report dated September 2, 1941, was marked 
Exhibit No. 27 and received in evidence.) 

( Wyman "B", special report dated November 4, 1941, was marked 
Exhibit No. 28 and received in evidence.) 

(Wyman "F", priorities on Hawaiian Construction, dated August 
29, 1944, was marked Exliibit No. 29 and received in evidence.) 

(Wyman "G", message dated March 3, 1941, Adams to Commanding 
General, Hawaiian Department, was marked Exhibit No. 30 and re- 
ceived in evidence.) 

(Wyman "H", message dated March 4. 1941 , Short to Adjutant Gen- 
eral, Washington, was marked Exhibit No. 31 and received in 
evidence.) 

(Wyman "I", message dated March 12, 1941, Adams to Commanding 
General, Hawaiian Department, was marked Exhibit No. 32 and re- 
ceived in evidence.) 

(Wyman "J", letter March 15, 1941, Marshall to Short, was marked 
Exhibit No. 33 and received in evidence.) 

(Wyman "K", letter May 29, 1941, McDole to District Engineer, 
Honolulu, was marked Exhibit No. 34 and received in evidence.) 

(Wyman "K-1", paraphrase, Adams to C. G., Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, was markpd Exhibit No. 34-A and received in evidence.) 

[3U7] (Wyman "K-2", Wyman to C. G., Hawaiian Dept., dated 
June 11, 1941, was marked Exhibit No. 34-B and reaeived in evidence.) 



1768 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(Wyman "L", AWS Stations, was marked Exhibit No. 35 and re- 
ceived in evidence.) 

(Wyman "M", Wyman to Dept. Engr., Hawn. Dept., dated Febru- 
ary 14, 1941, was marked Exhibit No. 36 and received in evidence.) 

(Wyman "M-1", Grosse to District Engineer, Honolulu, dated 
March 6, 1941, was marked Exhibit No. 36-A and received in evi- 
dence. ) 

(Wyman "N", AWS Information Center, Fort Shafter, was marked 
Exhibit No. 37 and received in evidence.) 

(Wyman "O", Wyman to C. G. Fort Shafter, dated April 18, 1941, 
was marked Exhibit No. 38 and received in evidence.) 

(Wyman "0-1", McDole to District Engineer, dated May 17, 1941, 
was marked Exhibit No. 38-A and received in evidence.) 

(Wyman "P", Hannum to Hawaiian Constructors, dated January 6, 
1941, was marked Exhibit No. 39 and received in evidence.) 

(Wyman "Q-1", Fleming to District Engineer, dated September 8, 
1941, was marked Exhibit No. 40 and received in evidence.) 

(Wyman "Q-2", Wyman to Dept. Engr., Ft. Shafter, dated Septem- 
ber 23, 1941, was marked Exhibit No. 40-A and received in evidence.) 

(Wyman "R", Wyman to Division Engr., dated March 7, 1941, was 
marked Exhibit No. 41 and received in evidence.) 

(Wyman "S-1", Adcock to Chief Signal Officer, dated August 5, 

1940, was marked Exhibit No. 42 and received in evidence.) 

[Ji^8] (Wyman "S-2", Gripper to Chief of Engineers, dated 
August 16, 1940, was marked Exhibit No. 42-A and received in evi- 
dence.) 

(Wyman "T", Person to Division Engineer, dated October 23, 1941, 
was marked Exhibit No. 43 and received in evidence.) 

(Wyman "T-1", Matheson to Dist. Engrs., dated October 30, 1941, 
was marked Exhibit No. 43-A and received in evidence.) 

(Wyman "U", Person to Division Engineer, dated December 12, 

1941, Avas marked Exhibit No. 44 and received in evidence.) 
(Wyman "V, Wyman statement, "Gasoline", was marked Exhibit 

No. 45 and received in evidence.) 

90. General Grunert. We shall take a five-minute recess. 
(There was a brief informal recess.) 

91. General Grunert. Are you ready to proceed? 
[34.49] Colonel Wtman. Yes, sir, I am ready. 

The work that I have been able to do during the few days that I 
have been here is pretty well covered. However, it is alleged in the 
Congressional document referred to that there was certain delay in 
the construction of some gas tanks at airfields under a job order, on 
which I can make a statement. It is my recollection that some of those 
gas tanks were at South Point on the big island of Hawaii, and some 
were at Barking Sands on the Island of Kauai, and some were at 
Bellows Field on this island. In the case of the airfield at South Point 
it was constructed with WPA labor under my jurisdiction. Some 
work was also done on the Barking Sands airport by WPA labor, and 
some work was done at Bellows Field by WPA labor under my juris- 
diction, I being the WPA administrator for the Hawaiian Islands. 

92. General Frank. When? When was this work done by the 
WPA? 

Colonel Wyman. It was done in 1940 and carried through till the 
WPA was abolished, in about August 1941. When the District En- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1769 

gineer's office took over the construction of airfields early in '41, there 
was at Hickam Field a large amount of plate which had been stored 
there under the Construction Quartermaster and allowed to deteriorate 
due to the ravages of the weather. 

93. General Frank. What do you mean by "plate" ? 
Colonel Wyman. Plate, sections of tanks. 

94. General Frank. Oh, yes. 

Colonel Wyman. They were molded plate, molded plate for tanks. 

And it was decided by the Hawaiian Air Force, that is the 
[34^0] Commanding General, that he would like to utilize those 
tanks on the outlying islands if possible; but when the activity was 
turned over to the Engineer Department, the entire amount of money 
available for the construction of such tanks was about twenty-nine 
hundred dollars, as I recollect it; and I have not consulted — had an 
opportunity to consult the records. And, of course, facts in the mat- 
ter, the work of installing tanks in these islands Avas started in a big 
way after a large sum of money was appropriated by Act of Congress 
and allotted to this Hawaiian Department, as I remember it, in August 
1941. Prior to that time there was no money available in an amount 
necessary to make extensive installations, with the exception of Hick- 
am Field, which was being done by another contractor. 

In the case of Bellows Field various schemes w^ere proposed for the 
installation of the small tanks along the edge of the runways, for the 
servicing of airplanes. However, final decision as to their location and 
the method of construction was held off until the 19th of September, 
1941, and I have to offer in evidence a correspondence setting forth 
this point, as follows. It is first a letter from me to the Commanding 
General of the Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H. : 

Attached herewith are two (2) pi'ints of drawings, File No. F-20/2, sliowing 
the General Plan of Bellows Field — 

That is the whole plane of the proposed runways, the general develop- 
ment of the field. 

and the location of the existing and proposed site for the gasoline storage tnnnel. 

It had been decided to build a tunnel, 

[3451] Your attention is directed to the site originally chosen for the gaso- 
line storage tunnel as shown on the drawing. This site was inspected by this 
office and it was found that the tunnel will require considerable support during 
construction, and will be cause for considerable increase in cost. 

The recommended site as shown on the attached drawing offers greater struc- 
tural stability together with a lower initial construction cost. It is. therefore, 
recommended that this site be adopted for construction for the gasoline storage 
tunnel at Bellows Field. 

1st Indorsement 

H^^ADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN DepABTMENT. 

Fort Shafter, T. H., 16 August 1941. 
To : District Engineer, Honolulu, T. H. 

1. The location recommended for the gasoline storage at Bellows Field is 
approved. 
For the Commanding General : 

O. M. McDoLE, 
Major, A. G. D., 
Assistant Adjutant General. 
1 Incl : 1 Drawing w/drawn. 



79716— 46— Ex. 145, vol. 3 11 



1770 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ND G33 Gas Stor. Tanks (7-16-41) 2nd Ind. 4-E 

Office, District Engineeb. 
Honolulu, T. H., September Jf, lOffl. 
To Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Siiafter, T. H. 

1. The approved location of the gasoline storage tanks and dispensing system 
is shown on [3.'i52] the attached drawing. File No. F-20/2. This system 
of storage and dispensing differs considerably from the scheme outlined in basic 
letter dated July 16, 1941, subject : Installation of gasoline tanks at Bellows Field. 
Under this basic letter certain requests were made regarding the installation 
of an oil storage tank and an overhead oil filling station to fill oil servicing 
trucks. 

2. It is desired to know whether the items of work requested above and more 
specifically under paragraphs 1-g and 1-h, of basic letter are still required. 

Theodobe Wyman, Jr., 
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers, District Engineer. 

Third Indorsement 

Headquarters. Hawaiian Department, 

Fort Shaffer, T. H., 19 September 19J,1. 
To : District Engineer, Honolulu, T. H. 

1. The following additional information is submitted concerning the gasoline 
and oil storage systems to be installed at Bellows Field. Subparagraph numbers 
will correspond to those of the basir letter dated 16 July 1941, subject : "Installa- 
tion of gasoline tanks at Bellows Field." 

a. The location of the gasoline storage tanks as shown on your drawing, file No. 
F-20/2, has been approved by previous correspondence. 

b. Gasoline tanks will be tunneled into the hill as previously agreed upon. 
[SJ/SS^ c. The aqua system is not to be installed. Since the tanks are 

located at an elevation of approximately 100 feet above sea level, flow to the 
dispensing pits can be by gravity. 

d. The twelve pits along the taxi strip will not be installed. 

They were the original 12 pits. 

e. Nozzle flow should be sixty gallons per minute. 

f. The overhead type gasoline filling station to fill gasoline servicing trucks 
is not desired. This t.vpe of installation has been found too difficult to 
camouflage. In place of the overhead system, it is requested that you install 
twelve pits in the approximate location indicated on the attached map. These 
pits should be spaced sixty feet apart along the edge of the proposed road. 
Each pit should contain two hoses thirty-five feet long for filling the gasoline 
servicing trucks. The pits should be made of reinforced concrete and provided 
with a heavy steel-plate cover with hasp and padlock. These pits should be 
similar to those now installed in the servicing mat at Hickam Fi^ld. The access 
road which you have shown to the gasoline servicing area should be made wide 
enough so that gasoline servicing trucks may be stopped along the road and 
filled without leaving the road. This road should be continued across the reserva- 
tion to the oflBcers' beach. 

[3454] g. The 10,000-gallon oil storage tank previously requested is no 
lonser required. The luhricatins: oil is delivered in 55 gallon drums. A cor- 
rugated iron oil storage shed has been included in the project for Bellows Field. 

h. No overhead oil filling station will be required. The oil will be loaded into 
the servicing trucks directly from the drums. 

i. Since no gasoline pits are to be provided in the servicing mat, this para- 
graph is no longer applicable. 

2. It is requested that every effort be made to make the gasoline fillins: installa- 
tion as inconsnicuous as possible. The services of the CTmouflage Officer at De- 
partment Headquarters will be made available to the District Engineer on call, 
in order that the detailed design of these installations can be made to accord 
with camoufiage principles. 

For the Commanding General : 

IlOBERT H. DttNLOP, 

Colonel, A. G. D., Adjutant General. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1771 

I offer that to show that the plans of the Air Corps for the develop- 
ment of Bellows Field were still in a process of change, and that be- 
fore any moneys could be spent in construction it was necessary to 
have a complete meeting of minds between the construction agency, 
the District Engineer, and the using service, the Air Corps. I might- 
state that it was my — I was urged by the Commanding General of the 
Hawaiian [34SS] Islands, and also by the Commanding Gen- 
eral of the Hawaiian Air Force at that time, to start the construction 
of Bellows Field, of the runways; and then, after considerable urging 
and taking it up with the Division Engineer, I diverted funds into 
the extent of $1,000,000 from other projects, that is, other projects 
that were more or less where the money couldn't be spent right away, 
for the development of Bellows Field; and under a job order issued 
to the Hawaiian Constructors we built a runway which was about 
over 5,000 feet long and which was completed and ready for use on the 
7th day of December and was used in the training of fighter command 
aircraft and aviators stationed at Bellows Field. 

I merely state that to indicate my eagerness to make progress in the 
building of airfields, much-needed airfields, in the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment at that time, because both Hickam Field and Wheeler Field 
were being overcrowded with aircraft; and at one conference I at- 
tended the Commanding Officer of Wheeler Field stated that the 
number of aircraft thereat was so great that if the}'^ all took off the 
first one would be obliged to return to the field before the last one 
could get off. 

Now, I have been unable to find — I thought I had it with me — a 
statement on the installation of the gas tanks and of the war reserve 
gasoline storage. I mislaid my prepared statement, but I would like 
the opportunity to submit that as evidence. 

95. General Frank. Mark that as the exhibit next in order. 
[S^SG] Colonel Wtman. I understand it is being sent over by 

messenger. 

I would like to state at this time that I am at a great disadvantage 
of coming from France here on this short notice, with the short time 
I have had to examine into the files of my office here when I was Dis- 
trict Engineer, and also to state to you that on about the 25th of 
July I was in a terrible automobile accident. 

96. General Frank. This year? 

Colonel Wyman. Yes, sir. I managed the visit of the Prime Min- 
ister of England, Mr. Churchill, to Cherbourg and Utah Beach; and 
immediately after Mr. Churchill left the car that I was in, within 
ten minutes, the car collided with a truck, head-on collision, and it was 
travelling perhaps as high as 40 miles an hour. This accident oc- 
curred without warning. I was in the back seat of the car alone, and 
I struck the front seat with my head and shoulder — that is, the back 
of tlie front seat with my head and shoulder — with such force that 
the front seat was broken into two pieces. Of course, I was knocked 
out and lay on the floor of the car, but after being picked up and 
revived, and whatnot, I continued to supervise the picking up of the 
wreck, the clearing away of the things and was taken to my station by 
General Lee and General Plank, who were witnesses to the accident, 
and put to bed, but the next day I was back on duty. 



1772 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

But every little while I do have pains in the back of my head, which 
are very distressing, and I have them right now, and I would like to 
be excused until I have a few minutes to rest. 

[34^7] 97. General Grunert. We shall have lunch, and after 
lunch the Recorder will find out if you are ready to continue; other- 
wise we shall go ahead with some other witness. 

Colonel Wyman. Yes, sir. I think I will be ready to continue, Gen- 
eral ; just a matter of a little rest ; that is all. 

98. General Grunert. If you want more time, just let us know, 
and we will go ahead with some other witnesses. That will be entirely 
up to you. The Recorder will ascertain how you feel. 

Colonel Wtman. What time will we reconvene? 

99. General Grunert. At one oVlock. And if at that time you are 
not ready, ^vhy, we have other witnesses who will be here at that time. 

Colonel Wyman. Yes, sir. 

100. General Grunert. All right. 

(Whereupon, at 11 : 55 a. m,, tlie Board, having concluded the hear- 
ing of witnesses for the morning, took up the consideration of other 
business.) 

[•?^'55] AFTERNOON SESSION 

(The Board, at 1 o'clock p. m., continued the hearing of witnesses.) 
General Grunert. The Board will please come to order, 

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL THEODORE WYMAN, JR., CORPS OF ENGI- 
NEERS, CHERBOURG BASE SECTION, FRANCE— Resumed 

101. General Grunert. Where were we? You had not finished 
your statement? 

Colonel Wyman. No, sir. Continuing my statement, I would like to 
submit as evidence a statement of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., cov- 
ering allegations contained in House Rej^ort No. 1638, 78th Congress, 
2d Session, relating to his responsibility for Pearl Harbor disaster, 
with reference to war reserve aviation gasoline. 

I will read the first part of this paper and just submit the other as 
an exhibit. 

The Joint Board 314, 

That is the Army and Navj^ Joint Aviation Gasoline Board, 

on the .5th of Septemher l'.J40, contemplated storage for 250,000 barrels for the 
Army and 100,000 barrels for the Navy, on the basis of au estimated cost of $2 
per barrel iu commercial tanks of 2.j,000 barrel capacity. The directive of 28 
December 1940, raised the estimate of cost to $4 per barrel, reduced the quota 
(Army) for Hawaii to 100.000 barrels, and authorized preliiuinary surveys to be 
made. In March, 1941, $5,000 was made available to the District" Engineer for 
these surveys. 

The surveys were made in March, 1941, and during March a representative of 
Air Corps came to Hawaii, inspected sites and made recommendations. On 3 
April, [,3^59] 1941, the Commanding General forwarded to the Adjutant 
General his recommendations (in which the District Engineer and the Naval Com- 
mandant concurred) for locations at two sites. By letter, 5 April, 1941, the Chief 
of Engineers notified the District Engineer that priority for steel for tanks could 
not be obtained until the contract for the tanks had been let. 

By letter 9 April, 1941, the Chief of Engineers directed the District Engineer 
to prepare a definite project report for a total capacity of between 125,000 and 
133,000 barrels, and by letter 21 April, 1941, to submit recommendations regarding 
protection at both sites. On 21 June, 1941, the District Engineer received notice 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1773 

that the proposed Army storage had been increased from 100.000 to 250,000 barrels. 

On 17 June, 1941, the District Engineer was notified that funds had been au- 
thorized ($600,000 cash and $1,400,000 contract authorization) and directed to 
commit the contract authorization before 1 July. On 24 June, 1941, the District 
Engineer forwarded his definite project report, stating that the construction for 
200,000 barrels at Site "B" had been put under the Hawaiian Constructors con- 
tract, and that the estimated completion time would be eight months. Tlie Chief 
of Engineers, in forwarding this report to the Adjutant General, recommended 
25,000 barrel capacity tanks instead of 50,000. 

On 23 July, 1941, the Division Engineer relayed to the Chief of Engineers the 
District Engineer's request to be permitted to proceed with excavation work, but 
on [.3//60] 26. July, 1941, the District Engineer was instructed not to start 
work as the plans were being materially changed. 

On 3 September, 1941, the Adjutant General requested the Chief of Engineers to 
revise the plans. On 23 September, 1941, the District Engineer was directed to 
proceed with construction at Site "B" but not to start work at Site "A" pending 
arrival in Honolulu of the Engineer's Advisory Committee. On 27 September, 
1941, the District Engineer was notified that installation of eight 40,000 barrel 
capacity tanks had been approved and that negotiations for procuring these eight 
tanks had been begun. 

The tanks were procured by the District Engineer at Pittsburgh in 
the United States. 

On 9 October, 1941, the District Engineer forwarded the report of the Advisory 
Committee (wliich had been in Honolulu in September) and concurred in its rec- 
ommendations, and on 31 October, 1941, the District Engineer was directed to 
proceed with the work in accordance with the recommendation of the Advisory 
Committee. On November 15, 1941, the District Engineer informed the Division 
Engineer that he estimated the tanks and the pipe line could be installed sixty 
days after their arrival. Construction began 19 November, 1941, with a comple- 
tion date of 1 June, 1942. On 23 November, 1941, the Di.strict Engineer wired the 
Division Engineer requesting immediate shipment of the channel anchors and 
bars. By letter 25 November, 1941, the Division Engineer forwarded to the Dis- 
trict Engineer a copy of an indorsement for the Chief of Engineers to the Navy 
[3461] stating that four tanks would be shipped by 30 November and the steel 
for the other five by 15 January, 1942. On 28 November, 1941, the District 
Engineer was notified that the channel anchors and bars were shipped 26 
November. 

Plans and specifications for the 40,000 barrel tanks were received by the District 
Engineer 22 December, 1941. 

The foregoing history is conclusive that it would have been impossible to have 
completed the war reserve gas storage by the date of Pearl Harbor. 

I would like to state at this time — this is the end of my prepared 
statement — and due to lack of time these statements were made from 
memory, from events that occurred a long time ago. However, there 
may be many inaccuracies in the written report, either typographical 
errors or minor inaccuracies. Therefore, I would like the right to 
check some of this data that has been furnished, to make sure that it is 
correct and to submit any corrections by letter that I may find neces- 
sary. 

102. General Grunert. You mean corrections to your statement to 
the Board ? 

Colonel Wyman. Yes, sir. If there are any inaccuracies, small 
inaccuracies, or references. 

103. General Grunert. You mean, take your retained copy and 
check it? 

Colonel Wyman. Yes, sir. That is, I will keep a copy and L will 
check it and make sure the references are correct and that sort of thing. 

104. General Grunert. Thea-e appear to be no objections, except that 
the statement as given will be put in the record and any changes may be 
appended to that record. 

[S4j67] Colonel Wyman, Yes, sir. 



1774 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

105. General Frank. Do the statements that you have made today 
contain all and everything that you would like to say to the Board? 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, no, sir. There are many allegations in the 
Congressional Record that I have not had an opportunity to even work 
on at all. However, due to the lack of time, this is the best I am able to 
do, even with the assistance of some people I have had assisting me. 

106. General Frank. Did General Hannum ever visit the line of air- 
fields along the Christmas Island, Canton, Noumea route? 

Colonel Wyman. I have not the least idea. Not to my knowledge. 
I do not know. 

107. General Frank. Well, you were the 

Colonel Wyman. You mean while I was here ? 

108. General Frank. Yes. 

Colonel Wyman. He visited Midway, because I was with him. I do 
not recollect any time that General Hannum visited the islands between 
here and Australia. 

109. General Frank. How many times did you visit them ? 
Colonel Wyman. I did not visit them at all. 

110. General Frank. This line of airfields? 

Colonel Wyman. I never had the opportunity. Just at tlie time 1 
was leaving here General Tinker and I and Colonel Mollison had made 
a plan to take off and visit these fields, and, as a matter of fact, they did 
take off to visit the fields shortly after I left. 

111. General Frank. General Hannum was in charge of supervising 
your work ? 

[3463] Colonel Wyman. Yes, sir. He was the Division Engineer 
and acted in accordance with his official capacity as the Division 
Engineer and supervising work not only in my district but in the other 
districts. 

112. General Frank. How did he know the nature and satisfac- 
toriness of your work, if he never visited it? 

Colonel Wyman. I would say he can answer that best himself. I 
do not know. He visited this island, visited Midway, visited the outer 
islands here, several times while I was here, inspected the work at 
Hickam Field, and had conferences with the Commanding General 
of the Hawaiian Department. 

113. General Frank. In your statement you made a comment with 
respect to the return of the VEGA to the United States. Was the 
VEGA ever used on any one single trip ? 

Colonel Wyman. Not while it was in my charge. 

114. General Frank. Wliat influence did General Emmons have on 
the return of the VEGA to its owner ? 

Colonel Wyman. I do not know, but he had a great influence on 
the VEGA coming over here. There was a conference held with 
Admiral Nimitz, and General Emmons and General Collins — not 
General Collins — but the Chief of Staff, and a decision was made to 
make a survey of a second route, the eastern route, between Hawaii 
and Australia. Ways and means were discussed at great length as 
to how we could do things and we told them one of the things we 
needed was a survey boat, a sailing boat, and he directed that the 
boat be procured without delay ancl the survey start without delay. 

115. General Frank. How did he do that? 
Colonel Wyman. Verbally, right at the conference. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1775 

• 

116. General Frank. Who was there present at that time? 
\_SIf6Ii.] Colonel Wyman. General Sverdrup was present as I 

recall. I was present. 

117. General Frank. Who else? 

Colonel Wyman. I do not remember. Several other people, how- 
ever; I do not recollect. 

118. General Frank. Who selected the airfields at the places along 
the route at which yon constructed these airfields? 

Colonel Wyman, When the first instructions came over that they 
might build an air route to Australia, and to prepare for it, we dis- 
patched a destroyer with a reconnaissance party to Christmas Island. 
It was a naval destroyer. I have forgotten the engineer officer detailed. 
That will be a matter of record. In the case of Canton Island, the 
reconnaissance was made by General Sverdrup and Colonel Robinson, 
who landed there in a clipper and made a reconnaissance of the island. 

In the case of Nandi airport, the reconnaissance was made by 
Sverdrup and Parcel. The Nandi airport had already had some work 
done by New Zealand forces. 

In the case of Caledonia, Sverdrup and Parcel selected Plain des 
Gaiac as a site and also made plans for the extension of the Tontonta 
runway near Noumea. 

In the case of the extension of the runways at Townsville in Aus- 
tralia, the entire reconnaissance was made by General Sverdrup. 

119. General Frank. What eliminated the necessity for the use of 
the VKGA? 

Colonel Wyman. At the time I was here there was a survey crew on 
the VEGA. At least, it was all prepared to leave. I do not know that 
tliey ate on the VEGA, but I think they slept on [Sloes'] the 
VEGA. They were waiting for Navy concurrence to start south, with 
a view of making a survey of Tougareva Island. I think they were 
going there first, and then going to continue to Tahiti and then go 
over to Suva. Then one of the proposed uses of the boat was the 
hauling of small amounts of freight and personnel from Suva to Nandi 
airport. 

When the plan was changed, as I recall it, Admiral Nimitz agreed 
to furnish some naval flying boats to make certain portions of the 
survey by means of naval aviation and agreed to furnish these flying 
boats to Sverdrup and Parcel. 

120. General Frank. You stated there were certain delays in build- 
ing the access road to Kokee. What certain approvals were necessary ? 
Who had to make those approvals? 

Colonel Wyman. There was a large number of approvals necessary. 
First, it was necessary to gain the approval of the Territory, because 
the road was located on Territorial property. It was also necessary 
to gain the approval of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian 
Department, or his representative, the Department Engineer. After 
the site or location of the road was approved and the type of road, then 
it was necessary to make drawings in detail and submit them to the 
Division Engineer at San Francisco for technical approval. Then 
after that came back approved, theoretically, a job order could be 
issued for the construction. 

121. General Frank. Could not some of these approval be obtained 
simultaneously ? 



1776 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Wyman. No, sir. Approvals were obtained in accordance 
with orders and regulations governing the District Engineer and the 
Engineers Department. 

[3466] 122. General Frank. Wliat regulations prevent you 
from proceeding with getting the approval of the Territory and the 
Department Commander at the same time? 

Colonel WymajST. As a matter of fact, as I recollect it, the Depart- 
ment Engineer secured the approval of the Territory, and not the Dis- 
trict Engineer, because the Department Engineer's office as a repre- 
sentative of G-4 made all of the arrangements for the acquirement of 
property. I had nothing to do at that time with the acquirement of 
property. 

123. General Frank. I asked you some time back, at the beginning 
of this testimony, Avhat was Rohl's professional background. 

Colonel Wyman. I submitted in my written statement 

124. General Frank. I would like an answer to that. 

Colonel AVyMxVN. Yes, sir. I submit in my original statement a 
compilation of the work that had been performed by the Rohl-Con- 
nolly Company. Now, as to his personal background I have no knowl- 
edge whatsoever, except through the achievements of his company. 

125. General Frank. Who was the guiding spirit in the Rohl-Con- 
nolly Company? 

Colonel Wyman. I do not know what a guiding spirit is. There- 
fore, I cannot answer the question. 

126. General Frank. Do you know under what conditions Rohl 
came to the United States ? 

Colonel Wyman. I read about in in the Congressional report. That 
is the first knowledge I ever had of any such entrance into the United 
States, what I have read in this House document I have referred to. 

127. General Frank. What contracts did Rohl have with the Engi- 
neers other than the breakwater contracts in Los Angeles? 

[3467~\ Colonel Wyman. Well, he had the breakwater contract 
in Los Angeles. It is in the statement. I could pick tliem out of that, 
because I have listed them all. The Caddoa Dam, which I think is 
called in that the John ]\Iartin Dam. But the same three contractors 
were associated in that, the Callahan Construction Company, Gunther- 
Shirley and tlie Rohl-ConnoUy Construction Company. They were 
associated together as coadventurers, and known as the Caddoa Con- 
structors, building the great flood control dam at Caddoa, New Mexico. 

After I left the Los Angeles district I notice in here that the Rohl- 
Connolly Company built a section of the Los Angeles River under my 
successor, Colonel Kelton. 

128. General Frank. What social relations did you have with Rohl 
in Los Angeles ? 

Colonel Wyman. I have given that in my statement. 

129. General Frank. Will you state it now? 

Colonel Wyman. I would rather read it out of the statement. 

130. General Frank. Is that statement from your memory? 
Colonel Wyman. It is largely my memory, yes. I can try to review 

it from what is here. 

I was on Rohl's yacht in 1935, wjtli my family, in the company of 
other officers, and I took an overnight trij), which was a pleasure trip, 
from Los Angeles to Catalina and, incidentally, inspected a great 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1777 

quarry over there that was being operated for the benefit of the Los 
Angeles-Long Beach breakwater. 

Again, in 1936 I was aboard the Rohl yacht with two friends of 
mine, and there were some other guests aboard. That was also an 
overnight trip from Los Angeles to Catalina Island [3468] and 
return. 

Again, I was on the boat on the occasion of the regatta at Newport 
Yacht Club, where I was an invited guest of the Newport Yacht Club, 
and Mr. Rohl invited me to return to Los Angeles on his boat, which 
I did, in company with other guests. 

In 1939, 1 was on his yacht once with my wife, and I think there was 
Rohl and his wife, and there may have been one or two other people 
on the boat. 

131. General Frank. Did you see Rohl on your way over here on 
this trip? 

Colonel Wyman. No. You mean, to this Board? 

132. General Frank. Yes. 
Colonel Wyman. No, sir. 

133. General Frank. Did you see Grafe? 
Colonel Wyman. No, sir. 

134. General Frank. To what clubs did you belong in Los Angeles? 
Colonel Wyman. At Los Angeles I had an Army membership at 

the California Club. I had golf-playing privileges at the Los Angeles 
Country Club, which was extended to Army officers as is frequently 
done in the large cities of the L^nited States. 

135. General Frank. Were there only two clubs to which you had 
membership ? 

Colonel Wyman. At another time I had golf-playing privileges at 
the Bel-Air Country Club at one time. 

It was more than that. They issued a ticket, a courtesy ticket, at 
the Los Angeles Athletic Club that included a whole chain of clubs. 
You could use your privileges at the Los Angeles Athletic Club to a 
dozen clubs throughout southern California. You could use the same 
membership ticket. The [3^^^^] reason for that, as I recall, is 
that all these clubs were in a more or less state of bankruptcy due to 
the great depression, and in order to get some business at their golf 
courses and club houses these privileges were extended by the Los 
Angeles Athletic Club, and I had one of those memberships. I think 
the total cost for the card was just a minor sum of money, three or four 
dollars, something like that. 

[3^70] 136. General Frank. Were you ever entertained by Rohl 
in Los Angeles at the Biltmore Hotel? 

Colonel Wyman. As his guest at the Biltmore ? 

137. General Frank. Yes. 

Colonel Wyman. I don't recollect an occasion, not one, at any 
dinner or anything that Rohl gave. There might: have been, but I 
can't recollect the occasion, if there was. 

138. General Frank. Do you think you could have been up there 
on quite a series of occasions without knowing anything about it? 

Colonel Wyman. No, I couldn't be, not a series of occasions, not 
parties and that sort of thing; I would certainly remember; but I 
do remember Rohl being present at other parties that I attended 
in the Biltmore Hotel, 



1778 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

139. General Frank. If we had testimony to the effect that you had 
visited Rohl at the Biltmore Hotel on several occasions, at which 
there were parties, that testimony then would be in error ? 

Colonel WvMAN. If it is the testimony, that is, the statement that 
is in the congressional report, that I attended parties at the Biltmore 
Hotel, where, as I remember, "twenty cheap faced women" or some- 
thing of that order are waltzed in and out, that is a pure fabrication. 
The answer to that is no, I wasn't there. 

140. General Frank. That is not the testimony. 

Colonel Wyman. "Well, then, I don't — I was at parties at the Bilt- 
more Hotel, at dinner parties in the Bowl and other rooms of that 
hotel, in the big banquet rooms, where I was a speaker at the table, 
the speaker's table — Chamber of 1^4'^^] Commerce, Engineer- 
ing Societies, and others, and on some of those occasions Eohi was 
present, but I was not his guest. 

141. General Frank. I am talking about parties in apartments 
that were rented there by Rohl. 

Colonel Wyman. No. I do remember on one occasion where Gen- 
eral Sverdrup gave a dinner party, a very large dinner party, in the 
Biltmore Hotel, in which there were a great many Army officers and 
Army ladies present, the wives of Army officers; and it is my recol- 
lection that the Eohls were at that party. He served cocktails in a 
room before the dinner and then later we went to dinner, and I am 
certain that, as I remember it, among the various large number of 
guests present, the Rohls were present. 

142. General Frank. AVliere was Rohl's office? 

Colonel Wyman. Rohl's office? Rohl's office was located as I re- 
member it on Alhambra Boulevard, Los Angeles. 

143. General Frank. Did he have a home in Los Angeles ? 
Colonel Wyman. Yes, he had a home in Los Angeles. As I re- 
member it, it is on Hollywood Boulevard, Hollywood. 

144. General Frank. Did he frequently rent an apartment at the 
Biltmore ? 

Colonel Wyman. I haven't the least idea. 

145. General Frank. You have never been up to his apartment in 
the Biltmore? 

Colonel Wyman. You mean an apartment? What is an apart- 
ment ? 

146. General Frank. You do not know what an apartment is ? 
Colonel Wyman. Well, I have lived in apartments. 

147. General Frank. A constructing engineer? 

[S472] Colonel Wyjvian. I have lived in apartments. You 
mean like a bed room ? 

148. General Frank. I mean an apartment. 

Colonel Wyman. Well, I was in a room, once, where Mr. Rohl was, 
in the company of General Sverdrup. Now, whether or not it was 
an apartment, I don't know, but it was a room. 

149. General Frank. You do not seem to know any more about 
an apartment than you did about a "guiding spirit" in an organiza- 
tion. 

Colonel Wyman. Well, I know what an apartment is, in an apart- 
ment house, but I don't necessarily know what an apartment is at a 
hotel. I never lived in one, in my life. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1779 

150. General Frank. According to your testimony, then, you re- 
ceived almost no entertainment from Rohl ? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, except that that I stated I received. That, 
yes, sir; and I reciprocated, because I entertained him at my house, 
Mr. and Mrs. Rohl, on one or two occasions. I remember one, I 
entertained him at the California Club, at lunch with my officers 
who lunch with me there very, very frequently. We have a little 
luncheon table in the main dining room of the California Club, and 
I remember having him there for lunch and paying for his lunch, 
and I was very particular all my life, whenever I received entertain- 
ment from anybody, to return it with reasonable promptness, just 
as we of the Army always do. 

151. General Frank. Where did you meet Paul Grafe? 

Colonel Wyman. I first met Paul Graft, he was introduced to be 
by a very eminent engineer, now deceased — Mr. Walter Douglas, of 
the great firm of engineers in New York, of which he was a member — 
Parsons, Brinkerhoff, Clapp & Douglas. Mr. [3473] Doug- 
las had done work all over the world, a very eminent engineer, was 
employed by the Engineer Department, was a consultant on very 
large jobs, and one night, Mr. Douglas, who was a consultant on the 
Los Angeles River for the district engineer at Los Angeles, or for one 
Colonel Theodore Wyman, had a dinner party at the Ambassador 
Hotel, and among the guests present was Mr. and Mrs. Paul Grafe; 
Douglas having known Mr. Grafe when they built the Madden Dam 
at Panama, of which I believe he was a consultant. 

152. General Frank. Did he ever become a good friend of yours? 
Colonel Wyman, Grafe? Well, he was a business acquaintance of 

mine, and which I had many associations, due to the Prado Dam, due 
to his work over there. He was in charge of this work on this island 
from the beginning of the G02 contract until about January 1, 1942. 
He was here during the period of the attack on Pearl Harbor. 

153. General Frank. Was his work over here satisfactory ? 
Colonel Wyman. At times his work was not satisfactory; at least 

his progress was not satisfactory, to me, and at other times it was 
very satisfactory. When they first came over here, the Callahan 
organization did the work, and they brought along as superintendent 
a man by the name of McCullough, and McCullough got off, as I 
thought, to a rather poor start, and later, he became ill, had to be 
relieved, and at that time I was greatly concerned about getting a 
job under way, especially the ammunition storage at Wheeler 
Field, which was a very large job, and I remonstrated with Grafe 
about progress, and he said that he would bring a new man over, 
and he did bring a new man. His name was Ashlock. He had been 
the [3474] superintendent of construction of the Prado Dam, 
and after Ashlock got here and got going, things picked up pretty 
fast, and for some considerable time the progress was satisfactory. 
Then, when it came time to build the work at Christmas Island and 
Canton Island and New Caledonia, and Nandi Airport in the Fiji 
Islands, the Hawaiian Constructors just did everything in the world 
they could possibly do to organize expeditions to those islands, 
equipped for maintaining them and keeping them going, in order to 
build the ferry route to Australia, and I couldn't criticize them for 
the work on that project, because they certainly put out. 



1780 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

154. General Frank. Who inspected the work for acceptance on 
that line of airdromes? 

Colonel Wyman. All work was under the area-engineer system. 
That is, a district was divided into areas, and as I recollect, at one 
time there were as many as 14 or 15 areas. Each area had in charge 
of it a competent officer engineer, wdio was entirely responsible that 
the work be done in accordance with the specifications and the plans, 
and maintained a force of inspectors and accountants and clerks to 
keep track of the job. 

In the case of Canton Island, there was an officer by the name of 
Captain Baker. In the case of Christmas Island, there was an officer 
by the name of Major Shields. Those officers were relieved from time 
to time by other officers who superseded them, and were charged with 
that responsibility. 

155. General Frank. Who was responsible for the efficiency of their 
operation ? 

Colonel Wyman. The contractor is responsible for his efficiency. 
[34.76] 156. General Frank. For the efficiency of the operation 
of those engineer representatives? 

Colonel Wyman. Who was responsible for their efficiency? 

157. General Frank. Yes. 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, I would say the engineer department, who 
trained them. 

158. General Frank. Well, who was their immediate superior? 
Colonel Wyman. Well, they reported to the district engineer. 

159. General Frank. They reported to you? 
Colonel Wyman. Yes. 

160. General Frank. Did you heave any system of inspection on 
them ? • 

Colonel Wyman. Why, yes; we did, in the case of — "them" — any 
specific one that you have in mind ? 

161. General Frank. Any one. 

Colonel Wyman. Well, vou take on this island. 

162. General Fr-vnk. What island? 
Colonel Wyman. There were area engineers. 

163. General Frank. On which island? 
Colonel Wyman. On this Island of Oahu. 

164. General Frank. I am talking about the Canton, Christmas 
and Noumea. 

Colonel Wyman. Well, they were visited by people from time to 
time, not for the purpose of inspecting them, but for the purpose of 
learning what their problems were, and of trying to solve them. They 
had a very very difficult task to perform, especially after the com- 
mencement of hostilities. You see, at these islands there was also a 
military expedition [3476] along with it. 

165. General Frank. What supervision did they get from you? 
Colonel Wyman. They got it in terms of instructions, letters of 

instruction as to what to do ; also, the supply, which was the big thing. 

166. General Frank. Is there any follow-up on that, letters of 
instruction ? 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, yes; there was a constant exchange of both 
correspondence and messages by radio. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1781 

167. General Frank. Other than that, the man was out there by 
himself, and you depended upon his initiative and ability to put the 
job across? 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, yes; we selected excellent men. They had 
already had jobs. For instance, Baker had already been the area 
engineer over in the Island of Hawaii, with headquarters at Hilo. 
Shields was a very fine engineer with excellent qualifications, who 
had been associated with my office. 

168. General Frank. Who was at Christmas? 
Colonel Wyman. At Christmas was Shields. 

169. General Frank, He was outstanding, was he ? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, he finished his job. It is a matter of achieve- 
ment. He opened his airport on the 18th day of January. He arrived 
there on about the 1st of November ; or, in some 60 or 70 days, he built 
an airport that would accommodate a B-17 four-motored bomber. 
That had never been accomplished, in my knowledge, in the history 
of aviation, before, and I don't know whether it has been accom- 
plished since. It is a matter of achievement. He accomplished his 
mission. 

170. General Frank. What was your social status with Grafe? 
Colonel Wyman. Social status with Grafe ? Well, on one [34.77] 

occasion. Colonel and Mrs. Wyman were the guests of Mr. and Mrs. 
Grafe at their home in Los Angeles, and I think there were other 
guests present ; yes, there were other guests present, because I remem- 
ber that we played games after dinner. It is my recollection that on 
another occasion when the negro pugilist, the present champion, Joe 
Louis, fought a fight in Los Angeles, that Mr. Grafe invited all the 
district officers to attend that fight, and prior to the fight he gave a 
buffet dinner in, I think, the Biltmore Hotel. I am not certain ; or it 
could have been the California Club; to a large group of officers he 
knew; not only from the district engineer's office but other officers 
on duty in Los Angeles that he knew ; and then we attended the fight. 

171. General Frank. Were you ever present at the Biltmore Hotel 
in an apartment at an entertainment or at a social gathering with 
Grafe? 

Colonel Wyman. I, with Grafe? 

172. General Frank. Yes; in an apartment. 

Colonel Wyman. I don't remember any such event, with Grafe. 

173. General Frank. When were you first advised of the possibili- 
ties of the basic Hawaiian contract 602? 

Colonel Wyman. Advised of the possibilities of it? 

174. General Frank. Yes. 

Colonel Wyman. The first recollection I have of any proposal to 
go on a contract for this work was on the occasion of General Han- 
num's visit to Midway Island, and as I remember, we were on a dredge 
out there observing the work, when we had a discussion of the pos- 
sibilities of an extensive [34-78] program for the Hawaiian 
Department, and began to talk of ways and means of how we could 
do the job. I proposed to finish Midway at that time, by the 1st of 
December ; which I did ; and we did the work there by a hired-labor 
force, entirely government employees, and it was my idea that we 
would take our Midway force and bring them back as they came back 
and put them on this job, because it has always been customary to 
build light fire-control stations and that sort of thing with hired labor. 



1782 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

That was customary. That's not only here, but elsewhere. And we 
more or less played with our idea of doing the work, as I said, by 
hired labor, because we didn't know at that time the extensiveness 
of the program. We sighted it. After we got back to Honolulu I 
attempted to make plans for a hired-labor job, and I actually pur- 
chased the necessary lumber, cement, and steel for the ammunition 
storage at Wheeler Field, with the view of putting it in with our 
own labor. 

175. General Frank. This was about when? 

Colonel Wyman. This is in November; early November, 1940. I 
also approached various people regarding the hire of plant, and I 
remember discussing with a Mr. Hess, who was doing work in Hawaii 
near Hilo, the construction of a road, which had been stopped, I be- 
lieve, due to lack of funds, or some other reason, as to whether or not 
he would hire his plant ; and I also recollect that Robinson, my chief 
assistant, made inquiries about the place for the hire of plant, and 
made inquiries on the contracting, with the Hawaiian Contracting 
Company — that is the Dillingham outfit — as to whether they could 
help us, and they had no interest. 

[34-79] At about that time, I received a letter from Colonel 
Hannum, which I quoted, and I think that is one of my first exhibits, 
which 1 can read again. 

176. General FiLiNK. No. 

Colonel Wyman. In which he sets forth that he had inquired of 
the Chief of Engineer's Office, Major Gesler, as to how this work 
should be done, and what the Chief's proposal was. That is shown 
in Gesler's letter to Hannum and Hannum's letter to me; and after 
receiving that letter, I personally called up Grafe, because I knew 
that they were finishing the Prado Dam and had an organization 
available, and I requested over the telephone whether he would be 
interested in work in Hawaii. He was probably reluctant to make 
any commitment at all, but he finally said that he would send to Hawaii 
some engineers to take a look at the job, who would report to him later, 
and he would act accordingly, he would act after receiving this in- 
formation; and then at that time I received orders from the division 
engineer to proceed to the United States, and that he, General Han- 
num, would arrange for interviews with contractors, and he had 
Kelton, the district engineer at Los Angeles, make up a regular itin- 
erary for me, to interview contractors, and made inquiry of many 
contractors as to their interests; some of them showed up, and some 
didn't. 

177. General Frank. What information at that time did you have 
with respect to speed for this contract ? 

Colonel Wyman. Speed? The usual information we always have; 
that is, that funds must be spent or at least firmly obligated in the 
same year that they are appropriated by act of Congress ; otherwise 
the funds are covered back into the Treasury of the United States, 
and lost. 

[3480] 178. General Frank. I am talking about it from the 
point of view of military requirements. 

Colonel Wyman. Of the military requirements? 

179. General Frank. Yes. 

Colonel Wyman. Well, we always build things with speed if we can, 
as fast as conditions will permit us. That is an engineer department 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1783 

custom and directive. We never permit work to lag if we have the 
money to pay for it and the authority to go ahead with the work. 

180. General Frank. Did the Hawaiian Constructors, in the end, 
finish the work that was assigned to them ? 

Colonel Wyman. You mean after I left ? 

181- General Frank. Yes. 

Colonel Wyman. I haven't the slightest idea. I never made inquiry. 
I don't know. I notice that in the files I find out that the reserve 
gasoline storage was ready for use in 1943, about a year after I left 
here. 

182. General Frank. What are the relative duties of the district, 
division, and the Cliief of Engineers' offices on the award of a contract ? 

Colonel Wyman. The relative duties? 

183. General Frank. Yes. 

Colonel Wyman. Well, I can read that from Orders and Kegula- 
tions. 

184. General Frank. I would like to have you tell me. 

Colonel Wyman. Well, I can tell you. At what date? At this 
time ? 

185. General Frank. On December 20, 1940. 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, the relative duty ? Under the ability to make 
a contract, at that time, the district engineer I think [^4^^] was 
$50,000; anything above that had to go to a higher authority. The 
division engineer, as I recollect it, was probably $100,000, and as I 
remember it, the Chief of Engineers was $300,000; and above that, 
it had to go to tlie Secretary of War. Now, that is entirely from mem- 
ory, and that has changed many times. There was a time prior to 
that when the district engineer's authority to make a contract was 
limited to $10,000. 

186. General Frank. Did you conduct any investigation of the 
availability of contractors to take over this work, on your own initia- 
tive ? 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, yes. On my own initiative ; yes. We took a 
look. When General Hannum was here, we took a look of the con- 
tractors in Hawaii, and decided that all of them that were here, both 
local contractors and contractors from the mainland were fully en- 
gaged, and that we would make no effort whatsoever to utilize a con- 
tractor who was working for the Navy at that time or working for the 
Construction Quartermaster; that is, we would not interfere with 
their activity in any way by trying to take one of their contractors 
away from them, on this work; and he and I had even at that time 
agreed, as you can see by this letter that I quote, that the only place 
we could expect to get any contractors was from the mainland. 

187. Major Clausen. Let the record show that I am handling 
Colonel Wyman what purports to be the Articles of Agreement dated 
20 December 1940. Sir, is that a photostatic copy of the agreement, 
the basic contract, bearing that date? Would you take a look at it 
to see ? 

[34^2] General Frank. Between the Corps of Engineers and 
the Hawaiian Constructors? 

Colonel Wyman. What is the question? 

189. Major Clausen. Whether that is the contract. 

Colonel Wyman. No, that is not a contract. 



1784 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

190. General Frank. That is the basic contract, isn't it? 
Colonel Wyman. No. Oh, this here? I haven't the least idea what 

this is — "Articles of Agreement, Office, Chief of Engineers." 

191. Major Clausen. If you keep turning the pages, sir, you will 
come to your signature. 

Colonel Wyman. Yes, I see that. 

192. Major Clausen. Is that your signature ? 

Colonel Wyman. Yes; that is my signature. That is a reproduc- 
tion of it. It is not my writing. It looks like the contract; yes — a 
reproduction of the contract. 

193. General Frank. That copy of the contract has not been placed 
in the record, yet, as an exhibit, and I just wanted it identified and 
placed in the record as an exhibit. 

Colonel Wyman. Well, this appears to be a copy of the contract. I 
don't know that it is complete. It looks as though it might be. 

194. General Frank. It is taken from the records of the office of the 
Chief of Engineers. 

195. Major Clausen. The Engineers sent it over to us. Were there 
any paj^ers in there that are missing that you can tell. Colonel? 

Colonel Wyman. No, I can't. Yes, this is signed by Theodore 
Wyman, and by Paul Grafe for the contractors, approved by J. L. 
Schley, Chief of Engineers; approved, 3 January 1941, by Robert 
Patterson, the Under Secretary of War. 

[3Jf83'] 196. Major Clausen. This contract refers to an exhibit 
"B", which is attached. There is no exhibit "A" attached. Can you 
tell me why that is ? 

Colonel 'Wyman. I haven't the slightest idea. The contract was 
written by the Office of the Chief of Engineers. 

197. Major Clausen. We offer this in evidence, as exhibit 46. 
(The document referred to, being the so-called "basic contract," 

dated 3 January 1941, was marked Exhibit No. 46, and was received 
in evidence. 

198. Major Clausen. Now, I show you what purports to be a sup- 
plemental agreement between the contracting parties, dated March 22, 
1941, and ask you to look at that and see if you can identify the signa- 
tures, and that contract, as being a supplement to the basic contract. 

[34^4] Colonel Wyman. It is signed by Warren Hannum, Con- 
tracting Officer, Division Engineer; Hawaiian Constructors, Grafe; 
approved by Julian Schley, Chief of Engineers; approved by Robert 
Patterson, Under Secretary of War. 

199. Major Clausen. You identify those signatures, do you, Colo- 
nel, as being photostatic copies of the signatures of those persons? 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, I don't know. I know^ here is Hannum's. 
Yes, that looks like Hannum's, all right. It looks like Grafe, too. 
Schley, it look — I think so. 

200. Major Clausen. All right. We will offer that in evidence as 
the exhibit next in order. 

(Supplemental agreement dated March 22, 1941, signed by Colonel 
Warren T. Hannum, Mr. Paul Grafe, and Robert P. Patterson, was 
marked Exhibit No. 46-A and received in evidence.) 

201. General Frank. You had something to do with the work that 
was covered by those contracts, didn't you? 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, yes. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1785 

202. Major Clausen. I will show you this supplemental agreement 
No. 2 and ask you wliether you recognize this document, photostatic 
copy, dated the 5th day of May, 1941, as being a supplemental agree- 
ment to the basic contract of that date. It has no number. It is just 
called the supplemental agreement. 

Colonel Wyman. I think it was No. 3. 

203. General Grunert. Look at it. 
Colonel Wyman. No. I mean tlie other one. 

[S4^5] 204. General Grunert. I mean look at the other one. 
if there is anything on the record there, let's see. 
Colonel Wyman. Just a supplemental agreement. 

205. Major Clausen. That is all. 

206. General Grunert. It doesn't give any number, does it? 
Colonel Wyman. It doesn't give any number, no, sir. 

207. General Grunert. Wliat date? 
Colonel Wyman. 22nd day of March, 1941. 

208. Major Clausen. This is ''3" here. 

Colonel Wyman. This is supplemental agreement No. 2. 

209. Major Clausen. All these documents were given to the 
Board by the Engineers. 

Colonel Wyman. This is signed by me, by Grafe, approved by 
General Kingman and Robert Patterson, the Under Secretary of 
War. 

210. General Frank. You are conversant with the work covered 
in the supplemental agreement? 

Colonel Wyman. I haven't read them. I could read them. 

211. General Frank. Any question about it? 

Colonel Wyman. No, sir. I was just looking through. Yes, sir; 
some of these items I am familiar with. Some I don't remember so 
well. 

212. General Grunert. Since the witness is testifying about it, 
he has the privilege of saying yes or no and examining it to make 
sure that he knows what he is testifying to. 

213. General Frank. That is true. 

214. General Grunert. Although it takes time, it is necessary 
time and must be taken. 

215. Major Clausen. Have you looked it over, Colonel? 
[34^6] Colonel Wyman. Well, I have just glanced at it. 

216. Major Clausen. Those signatures represent the signatures, 
do they, of the parties? 

Colonel Wyman. That is, the question asked me is whether I am 
familiar with all this work. 

217. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. 

Colonel Wyman. Well, some I am and some I am not. I am not 
certain. The signatures appear to be authentic. 

218. Major Clausen. All right. We will offer that document — 
may I have it, please — in evidence as the exhibit next in order. 

(Photostatic copy of supplemental agreement No. 2, dated May 
5, 1941, was marked Exhibit 46-B, and received in evidence.) 

219. Major Clausen. I hand you supplemental agreement No. 3, 
dated May 22, 1941, and I ask you to take a look at this and see if 
you recognize the signatures as being those of the contracting parties. 

79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 3 12 



1786 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Wtman. Yes, they appear to be authentic. Some of 
these signatures, like on this here, there is a set here signed by Rob- 
inson. Signatures to the contract are signed by Benson. 

220. Major Clausen. You recognize those signatures, sir? 
Colonel Wyman. Yes, on the supplemental agreement I recognize 

them. 

221. Major Clausen. All right. We offer this in evidence as 
exhibit next in order. 

(Supplemental agreement No. 3, dated May 22, 1941, was marked 
Exhibit 46-C, and received in evidence.) 

[^4^7] 222. Major Clausen. Now, I show you supplemental 
agreement No. 4, dated June 19, 1941, and invite your attention to the 
terms and the signatures, and ask you whether you can identify those 
signatures as being the ones of the contracting parties. 

Colonel Wyman. That is right. 

223. Major Clausen. All right, sir. May I have it? We offer this 
in evidence as exhibit next in order. Those are the contracts, sir. 

(Contract was marked Exhibit 46-D, and received in evidence.) 

224. General Frank. How did it happen that in selecting contrac- 
tors to come to Hawaii you went only to Los Angeles? Why didn't 
you go to Seattle, Spokane, New York? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, I consulted with the Division Engineer, 
General Hannum, and I interviewed contractors in San Francisco in 
his office and in Los Angeles. The requirements were, under this 
board that cleared the contractors I think that you submitted three 
names only. That was the War Department requirement. So just 
going around interviewing contractors would not have much sense to 
it unless they — or because of the expense attached to it it wouldn't 
be justified, and also it was desirable to find contractors as soon as 
we could. 

Of course, you understand, I think, that — at least, I can tell you — 
that there was no contract made with this outfit or any other outfit 
except by the Engineer Department, in the Office of the Chief of 
Engineers. That's where the contract was made, and it was the — 
when Grafe and Connolly were there, it was brought to their atten- 
tion that as Caddoa Builders the construction of the Caddoa Dam 
might be curtailed by Act of [-^4^-^] Congress and the amount 
of w^ork cut clown in the interests of getting contractors engaged on 
war contracts ; and, they being the builders of the Caddoa Dam, it was 
suggested to them that they utilize their organization to do this work ; 
and there was no meeting of minds, no agreement whatsoever, of 
any kind, until a conference was held in the office of General Schley, 
and the matter was discussed, and General Schley of course knew 
Grafe because Grafe had worked for him on the Madden Dam at 
Panama while General Schley w^as Governor of Panama, and knew 
him very well and was satisfied with the employment of the company. 

225. General Grunert. Were there in existence at any time during 
that period any instructions, any division of the United States into 
territorial areas where contractors were selected from that area to do 
work within the area or nearby? 

Colonel Wyman. Yes, sir. There is a directive issued by the War 
Dapartment announcing construction policy, and attached to that di- 
rective there was an appendix issued which divided the United States 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1787 

into regions, and it directed district engineers, construction quarter- 
masters, and otlier agencies employing contractors, would employ con- 
tractors from the region in which the work was located, or perhaps 
in some cases in the state in which the work was located ; and in that 
document the region prescribed for Hawaii was the Pacific Coast in 
Califoi^nia. 

Now, I have been unable to locate the appendix to that document, 
but it is a War Department publication. I cannot remember whether 
it was issued by the Under Secretary of War's office, the Army and 
Navy Production — Munitions Board, but one ^489] of the 
high ranking levels of our War Department issued that directive, and 
I have been unable to find it, but of course it can be found. 

226. General Frank. Did that prevent you from going any place 
on the West Coast ? 

Colonel Wyman. I could only go on the West Coast as the Division 
Engineer directed me to. He issued my travel orders. I could not — 
have no authority to issue them to myself. And he did direct me to go 
to Los Angeles, and he directed Kelton to have ready an itinerary of 
contractors to be reviewed. 

227. General Frank. That eliminated all contracting talent, then, 
in the Northwest ? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, unless — you see, he was out — we were in 
the South Pacific Division. The North Pacific Division was another 
division of the United States, and the Engineer Department at that 
time — I think the Division Engineer was General Lee, General Han- 
num was at San Francisco. 

228. General Frank. Yes. 

Colonel Wyman. He could hardly go into another division engi- 
neer's area for contractors. But that is merely an observation of mine. 
But he did direct me to go to Los Angeles. When I reported back to 
him, he said that no contract could be made here, due to the special 
conditions obtaining, for a fixed fee, that is, a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee 
contract, and it was necessary not only to make the contract in Wash- 
ington but to get it cleared through this board that existed at that time, 
and also the approval of the Assistant Secretary of War's office. 

229. General Frank. Who initially determined on the contractors 
[SJfW] to be considered for this Hawaiian job? 

Colonel Wyman. The initial list that was gotten up for me was 
gotten up by General Hannum and Colonel Kelton, the District 
Engineer at Los Angeles. 

230. General Frank. I know, but who selected, who made the initial 
selection of the people to be offered the contract ? 

Colonel Wyman. I just stated, Colonel Kelton, the District Engi- 
neer at Los Angeles, and General Hannum, the Division Engineer at 
San Francisco ; and I in one case, as I said, had talked with Grafe of 
the Callahan Company, and he had sent some engineers out to take a 
look at the job, and they went back and reported. What they reported, 
I don't know. 

231. General Frank. Well, who determined that the Callahan Com- 
pany, the Gunther- Shirley Company, and the Rohl-Connolly Com- 
pany were to be considered as the co-adventurers ? 

Colonel Wyman. The Chief of Engineers, the Assistant Chief of 
Engineers, Washington, D. C., made the final decision, and they took 



1788 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the same outfit that was known as the Caddoa Builders, the builders 
of the Caddoa Dam, co- adventurers on that project, known as Caddoa 
Builders. 

232. General Frank. Well, the Chief of Engineers didn't have much 
opportunity to select anybody else when you went to Washington witli 
Grafe as the representative of that outfit. 

Colonel Wtman. I was sent to Washington by General Hannum 
and to assist the Chief of Engineers in negotiating the contract. 

233. General Frank. Somebody selected that group. Who was it 
that selected them ? General Hannum ? 

Colonel Wyman. General Hannum and I were satisfied with 
[3491] Grafe, and Connolly was showing interest in the job; and 
General Robins, now General Jim Newman, the Chief of Engineers 
General Schley, the head of the contract section in the Chief's office — 
I don't know who he was at that time — made the selection. Yes, sir. 

234. General Frank. However, there was one selection put up on 
a platter to them at that time, whether they took it or left it. 

Colonel Wyman. They could have rejected it and ordered other 
people in. 

235. General Frank. Yes, but they didn't do it. 
Colonel Wyman. Well, I don't 

236. General Frank. They accepted it? 

Colonel Wyman. They accepted it, yes, sir. But the whole negotia- 
tion was in the Office of Chief of Engineers. 

237. General Frank. And the next person below that who selected 
these people was General Hannum, from you ? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, General Hannum and Colonel Wyman to- 
gether. 

238. General Frank. I see. 

Colonel Wyman. Everything we did, we did after consultation 
with each other and jointly. 

239. General Frank. You did not, then, make the original recom- 
mendation to him that these people be the ones considered ? 

Colonel Wyman. To General Hannum ? 

240. General Frank. Yes. 

Colonel Wyman. They were the only ones that showed any interest. 
We saw the Steve Griffith Company, the Bressi Company, Guy At- 
kinson, talked to Guy Atkinson for a long time right in the General's 
office, in which he was adamant in [3492'] holding out for an 
8 percent fee, and there were others, and the only ones that showed 
any interest at all was Grafe, the Callahan Company, and Gunther- 
Shirley, and then later Connolly showed some interest and agreed — he 
showed enough interest to agree to journey to Washington and to 
interview the Chief of Engineers regarding it. And the only meeting 
of minds that was ever agreed to prior to the approval of the award 
to these people was in General Robins' office when he said to them, 
"You are the Caddoa Builders. There is a possibility of the Caddoa 
Dam being curtailed as to size and magnitude, and therefore your out- 
fit could take on this job." And they were the only ones who had 
agreed to show any interest in it, out of this whole crowd that I talked 
with, except Mr. Guy Atkinson, at a price, which we couldn't agree 
to, of course, had no authority to agree to any such thing, and 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1789 

241. General Frank. Mr. Grafe, for the Callahan Company, had 
been interested in it from the start, hadn't he ? 

Colonel Wtman. Well, he was interested in it, because he showed 
enough interest to send two engineers to Honolulu to look at the job, 
and to have them report to him as to the character of the work and the 
conditions of employment. 

There was another thing at that time. The use of the cost-plus-a- 
fixed-fee contract and the so-called negotiated lump-sum contract was 
first coming into use, under an Act of Congress of July 1940, and 
contractors knew little about it, and regulations were coming out 
from time to time and being sent out to district engineers, so they could 
explain the conditions of the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract. 

The contractors did not favor the idea because they [3493] 

thought when Congress was passing this Act that it was like the World 
War Acts or what is known as the cost-plus contract, where, whatever 
the work cost, they got a certain percentage, like 10 percent or 5 percent. 
But in the cost-plus-a-fixed fee the fee was agreed to beforehand, and 
it never changed. Regardless of what the work cost, the fee remained 
the same unless it was renegotiated due to being exorbitant, or that sort 
of thing. As, for instance, the fee on this Contract 602 of the total 
amount of work performed under the contract, I am informed that the 
fee was about 1 percent of the cost, which is a very cheap and probably 
one of the cheapest construction contracts we have had. 

242. General Frank. The Gunther-Shirley Company, according to 
the method that they operated with the Callahan Company, was sort of 
an allied corporation, wasn't it? 

Colonel Wtman. Well, I think it was allied due to — I don't know 
the reason. The Gunther-Shirley Company is a Nebraska corporation, 
and one of — the head of the company is a man by the name of Phil 
Shirley. He was the acting head and has always been associated with 
work, I think, with Callahan, but, however, they take on independent 
work of their own. 

243. General Frank. All right. Now, how did the Rohl-Connolly 
outfit fit into this picture ? 

Colonel Wtman. The Rohl-Connolly outfit were the co-adventurers 
with the Callahan Construction Company, the Gunther-Shirley Com- 
pany, known as Caclcloa Builders, who were building the Caddoa Dam 
in New Mexico. They were already co-adventurers on another project. 

244. General Frank. Who is the head of the Gunther-Shirley 
[3494] Company? Shirley? 

Colonel Wtman. Phil Shirley, as far as I know. Philip Shirley. 

245. General Frank. AVas Mr. Callahan living at that time ? 
Colonel Wtman. Bill Callahan ? Oh, yes, he was living. 

246. General Frank. Who was the head of it, Callahan or Grafe ? 
Colonel Wtman. Head of what? 

247. General Frank. Head of the W. E. Callahan Company. 
Colonel Wtman. Oh, Callahan. Callahan is the head of the 

company. 

248. General Frank. He was living at that time ? 

Colonel Wtman. I think so, but I think he was sick, ill. I am not 
certain about that. 

249. General Frank. Yes. Who is the head of the Rohl-ConnoUy 
Company ? 



1790 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Wyman. Well, I don't know who is head of it. I don't 
know. 

250. General Frank. Well, it must have had a head. 

Colonel Wyman. I would have to read their stock — their minutes 
of their last election as a corporation. They are a corporation, corpora- 
tion of Nevada. I don't know who is the head of it ; but in this deal 
that we are talking about, Mr. Connolly represented the Rohl-Con- 
nolly interests and was present in the Chief's office at Washington, D. C. 

251. General Frank. Why wasn't Mr. Rohl present? 
Colonel Wyman. I haven't the slightest idea. 

252. General Frank. Is there any question about the Rohl-ConnoUy 
Company coming into the contract ^ Did they want to come into the 
contract i 

[S495] Colonel Wyman. The first interview I had with Mr. 
Rohl in the office of the District Engineer at Los Angeles, he said no, 
he had no interest. Then he came back later in the day and stated 
that he had talked to Mr. Connolly, and Mr. Connolly had an interest 
in the job, and they would be glad to see me and discuss it, and he did 
journey to Washington and met me there in the War Department. 
That is, we went to the War Department together with Grafe, and 
the matter was discussed in the contract section of the Office of Chief 
of Engineers, in the office of the Assistant Chief of Engineers, in the 
office of the Chief of Engineers, before any meeting of minds was 
effected. 

253. General Frank. The contract was signed by this group on the 
20th of December and finally signed by Mr. Patterson about the 3rd 
of January, wasn't it ? 

Colonel Wyman. I think that's about correct. 

254. General Frank. Yes. Who represented the company in Hawaii 
at that time ? 

Colonel Wyman. ]Mr. Grafe was attorney in fact for all three outfits. 

255. General Frank. Was he here present? 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, yes, he was here. He came over in early Janu- 
ary and was here until — of 1941, and was here until January 1942, but 
he did make one or two trips back to the United States. 

256. General Frank. Who represented the Rohl-Connolly interests 
over here ? 

Colonel Wyman. Mr. Grafe. He was attorney in fact for the Rohl- 
Connolly Company. 

[3496] 257. General Frank. For all three outfits ? 

Colonel Wyman. All three outfits. 

258. General Frank. When did you start to try to get Mr. Rohl 
over here ? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, it is stated, I notice, that I wrote Rohl a 
letter, I think in February, and that was the time that we were having 
great difficulty with Mr. McCullough, who was the superintendent and 
who was not getting under way to our satisfaction; and I recollect 
talking to Mr. Grafe about it, and Mr. Grafe registered considerable 
anger and stated that we didn't pay enough to a superintendent to get a 
good superintendent, and that he could never get a good superintend- 
ent at the price that the United States permitted under this contract, 
which was $9,000 a year; that his superintendents earned fifteen, 
twenty, twenty-five thousand dollars, depending on the job, and there- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1791 

fore I could never expect to get a good superintendent. So I said, 
"Well, let's" 

259. General Frank. For whom was this superintendent working? 
For you or for the 

Colonel Wyman. He was working for Mr. Grafe, the project man- 
ager, who was resident and on the job. And I took exception to that, 
to the fact that the United States of America couldn't have a good 
superintendent on a job because law and regulations permitted only 
the payment of $9,000 a year as a maximum salary. And we had quite 
an argument about it, and the argument 

260. General Frank. Well, if he was working for the contractors 
were they limited? 

Colonel Wyman. Why, yes, sir; they are limited by regulations. 
All the prices paid the men had to be approved [S4&7] under 
orders and regulations, and the maximum they could be reimbursed 
for the employment of any official in their company was $750 a month ; 
and he complained that he couldn't get any good superintendent, that 
a good superintendent in the United States could earn anything from 
$1,500 to $2,500 a month in any good contracting outfit. 

And so as a result of that argument, and which I complained to 
General Hannum about it, I wrote a letter to Rohl and requested him to 
come over here for the purpose of seeing if we couldn't get a better 
superintendent to succeed McCullough, and as a result of that 

261. General Frank. What was his reply? 
Colonel Wyman. How ? 

262. General Frank. What was his reply ? 
Colonel Wy3ian. I got his answer — his letter reply ? 

263. General Frank. Yes. 

Colonel Wyman. I don't know that I ever got a letter. However, 
I do know 

264. General Frank. Well, whatever his reply was, what was it? 
Colonel Wyman. I don't know. I don't know that I got a letter. 

The only reason — I have not seen the letter. The only reason I recol- 
lect this is because it's in this document, but the point is that 

[34^8] 265. General Frank. Did you ever get a reply of any 
kind from him ? 

Colonel Wyman. From Rohl ? 

266. General Frank. Yes. I am just asking about a reply to this 
letter. 

Colonel Wyman. I do not recollect any reply at all. 

267. General Frank. What happened ? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, I think I wrote some letters to the Hawaiian 
Constructors, and finally Mr. McCullough was taken ill. He had, I 
believe, a slight heart disorder, or something, and then Grafe agreed 
to send over here Mr. Ashlock, who had been the superintendent of 
the New Prado Dam, and I believe the Hawaiian Constructors paid 
Mr. Ashlock out of their own pockets, the difference between what 
was a reimbursement item of $9,000 a year and whatever salary they 
paid him. I don't know what they paid him. 

268. General Frank. Did these corporations that you had have 
working organizations or did they have a working organization to rep- 
resent the Hawaiian Constructors ? 

Colonel Wyman. You mean here at this place ? 



1792 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

263. General Frank. Yes. 

Colonel Wyman. They had just one great working organization. 

270. General Frank, From where did they collect that? Did 
they bring that over from this dam, Martin Dani? 

Colonel Wyman. No, they brought them from Prado Dam in Cali- 
fornia, and some of them from Caddoa Dam in Arizona. Mr. Mc- 
Cullough — I don't know" where he comes from, but he was a Callahan 
man. In the early part of the job the Callahan [3499] Con- 
struction Company took over the management of the work on the 
pier in Honolulu. 

271. General Frank. How did you work with that outfit? Did j^ou 
give them the job orders and then let them proceed with the work in 
accordance with the organization over which they had control? 

Colonel Wyman. They had to do more than that. After a project 
was authorized and the plans were all made and an estimate of cost 
had been made, a job order was issued, and that job order had to be 
approved by the Division Engineer at San Francisco before it was 
authorized for construction. You will notice the job orders went to 
San Francisco and came back approved. 

IVlien a job order was approved, then field construction and the 
expenditure of money was authorized. In other words, that is the 
document that authorizes the expenditure of money. We were operat- 
ing in peace time, where the expenditure of money was a very serious 
matter and had to be accounted for dollar for dollar by the District 
Engineer and his subordinates. 

With the job order there was an estimate of materials needed, an 
estimate of man-hours of labor, an estimate of machinery that should 
be employed, to guide the contractor. Now, he might agree or dis- 
agree with that. In many cases he would disagree, and he with his 
force would consult with the District Engineer, until they had a 
meeting of the minds on what the job should cost. 

Also the time, the time was always under dispute, because the con- 
tractor had to buy his stuff in the United States largely, was dependent 
upon the transportation in getting ships to haul it. He had to buy 
his equipment in the United States and bring [3-500] it over 
here, and he had to bring his labor over here, because we entered into 
an agreement, which was largely brought about by the Navy Depart- 
ment, who had great activity on this island, that one agency of the 
government would not solicit the labor of other agencies by offering 
them higher wages. As far as I know, the Hawaiian Constructors 
religiously paid attention to that requirement and never tried to 
proselyte labor from any other contractor. They brought their labor 
in from the United States, which all takes time. 

272. General Frank. How much did the District Engineer influ- 
ence the operation of the contractor, once he had been given the job 
order and plans ? 

Colonel Wyman. The District Engineer maintained an advisory 
control board, which met once a week, and which consisted of the 
heads of all divisions, all area engineers in charge of the field work, 
and representatives of the constructor, that is the Hawaiian Construc- 
tors, and at these meetings every subject was discussed, that is, the 
engineering, the preparation of drawings, the purchase of equipment, 
the procurement of men, the progress being made on the work, the 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1793 

hours of labor, difficulties with labor. That is all in the minutes of 
these meetings. 

273. General Frank. You assumed a supervisory capacity over the 
contractor ? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, the contractor administered — the work in 
the field is administered by the area engineer in whose area the work 
is being done. That is the job and duty of the area engineer. He in 
turn has job engineers over each separate job. 

[3601] 374. General Frank. To what extent was the contrac- 
tor's organization allowed to function as an independent unit? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, they were permitted to function as an inde- 
pendent unit as far as they could. There was no interference except 
for things that they could not do. For instance, they could not get 
transportation sometimes and we would assist them. Very frequently 
they were unable to procure things on account of priorities, priorities 
established by the government, and our people would assist them. 
Frequently they could not get labor, and even the District Engineer 
at Los Angeles and other places assisted them in getting labor. They 
also assisted them in getting transportation for their labor from the 
United States to Honolulu. In this San Francisco office of General 
Hannum's they had an employment agency there both for the physical 
examination of people that came over here and also for the furnishing 
them their transportation. 

275. General Frank. How many talks did you have with Rohl 
before you got him over here ? 

Colonel Wyman. Talks? 

276. General Frank. Yes. 
Colonel Wyman. I do not know. 

277. General Frank. Did you call him on the phone? 

Colonel Wyman. I don't think I ever called Rohl on the phone, 
except once, that I recollect, and at that time I called him on the phone 
the subject matter was whether or not he would rent the VEGA to 
either the United States or to the Hawaiian Constructors. 

278. General Frank. Did he ever call you on the phone ? 
Colonel Wyman. Yes, he did. 

[3502] 279. General Frank. For what purpose? 

Colonel Wyman. In the calls that were made in late 1941j while 
he was in the United States, it was chiefly regarding the equipment 
that was going to Canton Island and Christmas, that is, what equip- 
ment he could furnish and low long it would take him to get it 
ready and that sort of thing, and also the extent of the work as to the 
number of gangs of men, concrete workers, cat operators, and so 
forth, that we would work. That was in late — that was in, I should 
say, late October and November of 1941. 

Beyond that I cannot recall any subject matter discussed by Rohl 
with me. I do know that on one occasion he got me up — I think it 
was either he or someone else — got me up early in the morning. It 
was one of these telephonitis parties where they call up people 
throughout the country, and it made me very angry. I believe that 
call came from — I think Washington or some point in the Eastern 
part of our United States. It was not California. But there were 
other calls of the same nature, telephonitis calls, where people were 
gathered together and they would call you on the telephone. Why, 
I do not know. Of course, anybody can call you on the telephone. 



1794 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

280. General Frank. How many of these telephonitis calls, as you 
term them, did you get from Rohl ? 

Colonel Wtman. I had several. Oh, he called me once — I can 
tell you another occasion he called me. I designed and wrote the 
specifications for the Sepulveda Dam in the Los Angeles flood control 
system at Los Angeles, in which I created my flood control plan for 
Los Angeles County, which is now approved as a national plan. The 
bids for the building of that [3503'] dam were advertised 

while I was in Los Angeles. I had a great interest in this dam, 
because it was something new, where you could build a da;m and 
reservoir right in the heart of a city, which that is. I recall I was 
on duty at Scofield Barracks. I was playing golf in the afternoon. 
I was called from the golf links and told there was an important 
call for me on the transpacific telephone. 

I got to my house, and it turned out it was Mr. Rohl, and the in- 
formation he gave me was that he had attended the bidding, the 
opening of bids that day for the Sepulevda Dam and that the low^^ 
bidder was the Bressi Construction Company, who would probably 
be awarded the job, and he said "Hello" and he also informed me of 
the death of Mr. Thaddeus Merriman, who was a very eminent en- 
gineeer in the United States and who died just about the time that 
I got into Hawaii. He informed me of that. I recall that very' 
distinctly. 

281. General Frank. Do you think that this series of transpacific 
calls evidenced just a casual interest and acquaintance between you 
and Kohl? 

Colonel Wyman. I don't know what to think. I would say it 
was a very silly idea to spend money calling me up on the telephone 
from parties under the spell of telephonitis. It was very, very silly 
to do. Especially I was amazed when I saw in the Congressional 
report the amount of money that was spent on some of those calls. 
I think in some cases he probably talked to more than one person, 
not only to me. 

282. General Frank. Wlien did you first learn that Rohl was an 
alien ? 

Colonel Wyman. I first learned that Rohl was an alien from 
[3504] Mr. Grafe in June, 1941, when Mr. Grafe informed me 
that Rohl was an alien, and I immediately sat down without delay 
and wrote a letter to the Chief of Engineers, announcing that I had 
been informed by Mr. Grafe of the Hawaiian Contractors that Mr. 
Rohl was an alien, also that Mr. Rohl had applied for citizenship. 
I do not recollect what else in the letter, I have forgotten, but I sent 
that through channels. It went to the Division Engineer, thence to 
the Chief of Engineers. That was in June, I am certain — the date 
of the letter is whatever the date of that letter is, that is the date 
Grafe told me that Rohl was an alien. 

283. General Frank, Did you meet John Martin in Washington 
while you were negotiating that contract? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, I remember a person came there while I 
was in Grafe's room whose name was John Martin, a lawyer. He- 
talked with — well, the group there, and I remember he stated that 
he was engaged on the claims of a contractor who, due to changer 
by orders, what we call orders, had accumulated a lot of claims 
on the Pennsylvania turnpike, and he discussed in some detail in 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1795 

my hearing the arguments for and against the claims of the con- 
tractor. He was there for a little while and then he departed. That 
was the only occasion I think I have ever seen Mr. John Martin. 

284. General Frank. You did not know that Marin told Grafe in 
Washington that Rohl was an alien ? 

Colonel Wyman. No, I did not know that. I did not know whether 
he did, or not. I do not know. 

285. General Frank. Don't you think it was rather queer, when 
there was some question about a defense contract being in the 
[SSOo] hands of an alien, that they should not have told you about 
it? 

Colonel Wyman. I do not know. If they told me about it I would 
merely have told the Chief of Engineers right on the spot. 

286. General Grunert. What was the occasion of Grafe informing 
you of Rohl's status as an alien ; what brought it up ? 

Colonel Wyman. You see, there was an act of Congress came out 
about employing aliens on defense work, and we wrote letters to 
everybody inquiring whether or not they had any aliens in their 
employ, and it came up as a result of that inquiry. 

287. General Grunert. This was the date you wrote the letter? 
Colonel Wyman. Yes, sir, that he informed me that he was an 

alien. 

288. General Grunert. Was this the time the War Department put 
ihisout? 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, no. I put the inquiry out some time before 
that. I don't know. That is a matter of record. The records show 
the date. You see, at this time Mr. Rohl was in the United States. 
He never had been in Honolulu as far as I know, he had never taken 
any part in the contract. 

289. General Frank. In these telephone conversations where you 
were discussing work on the Hawaiian Islands with Rohl, the Hawaiian 
Islands airdromes were defense contracts, were they not ? 

Colonel Wyman. Yes, but he was a citizen when I talked to him. 
That was after he became a citizen. You see he came to Honolulu 
after he became a citizen. Then he immediately went back to the 
United States to get plant and men to go to Canton and Christmas 
Islands, and he went back to the United States and [3S06] got 
plant from his job at Highgate Dam, brought it to Los Angeles, re- 
habilitated it, put it in good shape. He got men and organized them 
into gangs, superintendents, and put some aboard the transport 
LUDINGTON. It was during that period that I recall talking to 
him about the plant for the Canton and Christmas Islands. 

290. General Frank. You say you took steps to get him naturalized ? 
Colonel Wyman. No, I did not take any steps at all to get him 

naturalized. I suggested to the Chief of Engineers that something 
had to be done about it; he had to be, in my opinion, either taken 
off the job or— he complained, I believe, to Grafe that he was unable 
to get a hearing in a court, in a regular court, and I think in my let- 
ter, which I have not seen since I wrote it — I don't know what it says — 
it says that he had applied for citizenship, and Mr. Grafe told me he 
had applied for citizenship and was unable to get a hearing, or what- 
ever you get when you are applying for citizenship. 



1796 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

That letter went to the Chief of Engineers, just as a routine mat- 
ter. The idea was that the Chief of Engineers would do something 
about it. That is, it would take a court order or something to order 
him off the job or to dissolve himself from the company or to get 
citizenship. Of course, as I recall it, that was a matter more for the 
Secretary of War's office than any other office to handle, because they 
had the right of approval. 

291. General Fkank. We have some testimony from some witnesses 
from the Office of the Chief of Engineers relative to the fact that 
either a letter or telephone conversation from you asked [3S07] 
that his naturalization be expedited. 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, no. No, I did not. I asked that it be 
expedited ? 

292. General Frank. Yes. 

Colonel Wyman. No. I wrote a letter to the Chief of Engineers 
through channels. That went through General Hmnum over to the 
Chief of Engineers and, I understand, the Acting Chief of Engineers, 
General Kingman, wrote a letter to the Attorney General of the 
United States in which he suggested that Kohl be given a hearing, 
or whatever was required to get citizenship, and I understand he was 
given a hearing and was granted citizenship. 

293. General Frank. Did you say you sent out letters to the dif- 
ferent contractors calling attention to this provision of the law by 
virtue of which an alien could not participate in a defense contract? 

Colonel Wyman. I think my office sent out letters, yes. 

294. General Frank. Will you furnish the Board a copy of one 
of those letters ? 

Colonel Wyman. I would have to go into the files to find it. 

295. General Frank. Would you do that? 

Colonel Wyman. Yes, I will be glad to. It is a letter to the con- 
tractors requesting whether or not they employ any aliens. 

296. General Frank. And at the same time will you see if you can 
get a copy of the letter that you wrote to the Chief of Engineers about 
Rohl? 

Colonel Wyman. If I can find it, yes, sir. 

[3508] 297. General Frank. Rohl was associated with you 
more or less directly from the signing of that contract of December 
20th on through to June, when you learned he was an alien? 

Colonel Wyman. Associated with me ? 

298. General Frank. Yes. 
Colonel Wyman. I never saw Rohl. 

299. General Frank. You might not have seen him, but you talked 
to him ? 

Colonel Wyman. He talked to me over the telephone, as I have 
suggested. He talked to me on some occasions. I gave you the sub- 
stance of it. 

300. General Frank. Some of these conversations were official and 
some of them were personal ? 

Colonel Wyjian. No, they were chiefly — some of them were what 
I call telephonitis, as I said before, people at parties calling their 
friends throughout the country, people they are associated with, but 
I remember the one that I told you about, about the Sepulveda open- 



PROCEEDINGS OP ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1797 

ing of bids, when I was at Schofield Barracks, and another one that 
I remember that came in very early in the morning, I think about 
6 o'clock, that aroused my anger and then there were some others 
where they were just "Hello, how are you?" and that kind of stuff. 
Then in November I did talk to him or he did call me about how many 
shovels, how many this and how many that we needed to send to 
Canton Island and Christmas Island. 

[3S09] 301. General Frank. In these telephone conversations, 
however, between December and June, some of which were official in 
their nature, what official information did you discuss with him ? 

Colonel Wyman. From December to June ? 

302. General Frank. Yes. 

Colonel Wyman. I don't think they were official and I cannot recol- 
lect anything that was discussed, not a thing. As I said before, any- 
body can call you on the telephone, unless you have a means of pre- 
venting it, which I do not have. 

303. General Frank. How many times did you initiate calls to 
Rohl officially? 

Colonel Wyman. I have a recollection of one, and that was the 
time when we decided to start the surveys for the airfields projected 
from here to Australia, which was first to the Philippines, and then 
later a route up, I think, to the Ellice Islands, where we needed a sail 
boat for Sverdrup, and survey parties to make those trips, and it 
occurred to me that Rohl did own — I didn't know that he still owned 
it at the time — a sail boat which was seaworthy and had crossed the 
Pacific and would be suitable for the work. I called him on the tele- 
phone at that time and, as I said before, he was quite reluctant about 
letting us have the boat, because he said he had a probable buyer and 
he was anxious to get rid of the boat. 

304. General Frank. To whom did the boat belong? 

Colonel Wyman. I assumed it belonged to Mr. Rohl. I do not 
know to whom it belonged. 

305. General Frank. Do you know in whose name it was registered ? 
Colonel Wyman. No, I did not, not until later on. I think it was 

claimed it was registered in the name of his wife. 

[3510] 306. General Frank. When did Rohl finally arrive in 
Hawaii? 

Colonel Wyman. He came here, as I recall it, early in October, and 
then he left within a few days. 

307. General Frank. How long did he stay ? 

Colonel Wyman. I don't know. Not very long. He went back as 
soon as he could get transportation for the purpose of getting this 
equipment off the Highgate Dam, getting it down to Los Angeles, 
rehabilitating it and loading it out on a ship, a government ship, 
for Canton Island and Christmas Island, and to organize a force to 
go out there. He didn't come back here until the last Luriline, the 
Wednesday before Pearl Harbor. Sunday is the 7th. The 3rd of 
December. 

308. General Frank. What position did Rohl have after he arrived 
over here? 

Colonel Wyman. They had at that time a Board of Directors or 
executive committee — I have forgotten what it was called — with Mr. 



1798 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Grafe at the head and Rohl was a member of that operating commit- 
tee, the other members being Woolley and Benson. 

303. General Frank. Who was the head of the group, Rohl or 
Grafe? 

Colonel Wtman. Grafe, Mr. Grafe. 

310. General Frank. Grafe finally went back to the States, didn't 
he? 

Colonel Wyman. He went back some time about the middle of Jan- 
uary in 1942. He was at the head until he went back. He was at 
the head of the company until he sold part of his stock, which is a 
matter of record, to the Hawaiian Contracting Company. 

[3511] 311. General Frank. Was Rohl's service over here sat- 
isfactory to you ? 

Colonel Wyman. Yes, sir. He built the Kahuku, that big one way 
out here. He built Kapapa. He built that long runway out at 
Dillingham's farm tliere. He paved those runways, and those run- 
ways were all in use before I left here on March the 20th, 1942, which 
is probably a record in airfield construction. 

312. General Frank. Was Rohl a pretty reliable sort of engineer? 
Colonel Wyman. Rohl, is a very, very competent consftructor, 

builder of things, especially the movement of rock, breakwaters, 
heavy cconstruction, concrete, earth grading, or what is ordinarily — 
where we used heavy construction machinei-y. For instance, he built 
the El Capitan Dam across the San Diego River, which is a very big 
project. He built the Highgate Dam across the Colorado River at 
Parker, and he built other dams. He built the Long Beach-Los An- 
geles breakwater at a very cheap price. He built some very difficult 
highways along the coast of 

313. General Frank. What were your social relations in Hawaii 
with Rohl? 

Colonel Wyman. In Hawaii ? 

314. General Frank. Yes. 

Colonel Wyman. Prior to Pearl Harbor I recollect that I had din- 
ner in his house, Mrs. Wyman and I and other guests, among others 
Army officers and their wives. That is the only time I ever recollect 
having dinner with him at his house. Another time, at the house of 
another person here in Honolulu, a [351Si] rather prominent 
man, where Rohl and I were guests, when I was a guest there. 

Another time I remember someone gave a party at the Royal 
Hawaiian and among other guests there were Mr. ancl Mrs. Rohl. 

On one occasion I had Mr. and Mrs. Rohl at my house for dinner, in 
return for the courtesy they extended to me. That is all that I 
recollect. 

Oh, I met him at Schofield, at a party one night, in some officer's 
house. He and she were there. You see, the Rohls were well known 
in Honolulu, because they won with their boat the Honolulu race, 
which in the Pacific Ocean is considered quite a feat, and they knew 
a great many people here. 

315. General Frank. Whei-e did they live? 

Colonel Wyman. They lived, as 1 recall it, when I first came here, 
in what they call a beach house somewhere in the vicinity of Black 
Point, near Diamond Head. After the blitz, after Pearl Harbor, 
rather — please correct me on that — I think Mrs. Rohl moved with 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1799 

friends, Rohl and Mrs. Rolil moved to somebody's house here with 
friends, and lived with friends, because their house was right under 
the guns of Ruger and they were advised to get out. 

316. General Frank. Did she go back to the States? 

Colonel Wyman. She was evacuated to the United States on a 
Navy transport, I think in February. I am not certain. 

317. General Frank. When did you leave? 
Colonel Wyman. I left the last week in March. 

318. General Frank. Was there any friction between the engineer 
and the contractors ? 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, I think: there were spots here and there 
[SSIS] where there would be some friction between a local super- 
intendent, a foreman or inspector, and a local job engineer. There 
were many things we had to straighten out from time to time. How- 
ever, that sort of thing did not come to my attention much. That was 
more up to the operations officers and area engineers. But, in general, 
up to the time of the assault on Pearl Harbor, I think in the last few 
months, the engineers, District Engineer's office, and the constructors 
were getting along pretty good. 

319. General Frank. Was there any friction between you and the 
Department Engineer ? 

Colonel Wyman. The Department Engineer is dead. He was a 
great friend of mine. I would just as soon leave his name out of this 
discussion, if that is permissible. 

320. General Frank. It has to do with the matters at hand that we 
are discussing. I would like an answer to it. 

Colonel Wyman. There was friction between Colonel Lyman and 
Colonel Wyman at a conference held by Colonel Phillips, Chief of 
Staff of the Hawaiian Department, The friction was over the author- 
ity of the Department Engineer to assign to me work and order me to 
do it. The matter was discussed over the telephone with the Division 
Engineer, who told me to take the matter up with the Department 
Commander and to do whatever' the Department Commander told 
me to do. 

321. General Frank. Division Engineer? 

Colonel Wyman. Division Engineer told me to do. General 
Hannum. So I went to the Department Commander and discussed 
it with him, and as a result of the discussion there came an order out, 
at least instructions out, that all orders to the [3514] District 
Engineer from the Hawaiian Department would be issued by G-4 of 
the Hawaiian Department. From that time on there were no very 
cordial relations between Colonel Lyman and Colonel Wyman. 
However, we still ate together and the night before I left here he 
came down and had dinner with me at a hotel. 

322. General Frank. Wlio was G-4 at the time? 

Colonel Wyman. Colonel Marston, and his assistant was Colonel 
Fleming who formerly had been the assistant to the Department 
Engineer, Colonel Lyman. 

(There was a brief informal recess.) 

[Sol5] Colonel Wyman. General, I thought I could find a tran- 
script of a telephone conversation, where I took up with General 
Hannum over the telephone this question of jurisdiction of the De- 
partment Engineer over the district engineer, and such a transcript 



1800 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

does exist. I had it, but I don't seem to have it here, and I would be 
glad to try to produce it and submit it; but the sense of it is that I 
requested General Hannum to take up with the Chief of Engineers 
and secure for me approving authority for work to be done, especially 
in connection with airfields, and that I was receiving many requests 
for work which in my opinion had no merit and which I would start 
working on this week and then be called off of the next week; or pos- 
sibly would get an order today and we would go to a lot of trouble to 
organize, to carry out this order, where in a day or two the entire 
thing would be rescinded; and that sort of thing created great con- 
fusion not only in my office but also in the office of the constructor 
who would go to great trouble to organize a job and get it going and 
then someone would say to stop the job, and they just think that the 
people are gone crazy and are not capable of running the jobs under 
any such condition ; so I complained. General, to General Hannum, 
and he told me to take the matter up with the Commanding General 
himself. Well, the Commanding General was not accessible to me, 
except when he sent for me. More frequently I might get to his Chief 
of Staff, General Collins or General Phillips — or Colonel Collins and 
Colonel Phillips; but as a result of this clash of personalities in this 
conference, over where he abused me verbally. Queen Lyman, in the 
presence of a lot of other officers present in a conference held in these 
headquarters, [3S16] at which Colonel Phillips presided, and 
at which I am certain Colonel Marston was present. Colonel Fleming, 
and other staff officers of the Hawaiian Department; and Colonel 
Hannum told me in the telephone conversation if a project to me 
appeared absolutely worthless and had no merit at all to take it up 
with the Commanding General or to give it a low priority, or have the 
Commanding General give it a low priority. Well, as a result of all 
that it was agreed that all orders from the Hawaiian Department to 
the district engineer would come through G-4 ; and they did. 

Since then I have been informed by competent authority that during 
this period that I was district engineer the Department Engineer by 
law exercised no jurisdiction over me whatsoever. However, I had 
played ball with the Commanding General and had carried out his 
orders, whatever they might be ; which, of course, under martial law 
was correct. 

As you know, in March, the district engineer's office and the Depart- 
ment Engineer's office were more or less consolidated and placed under 
the direct jurisdiction of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian 
Department, and on the occasion when that was done, General Em- 
mons sent for me. ^Vyman," he says, "do you want to stay here 
with me, or would you rather go back to the United States, and I 
understand you can get a regiment and go overseas." And after 
thinking about it a few minutes, I told the General that I would be 
delighted to stay with him, but that I am a combat soldier, my entire 
training has been for that, and I would like to get' a combat engineer 
outfit and go overseas to any theater where there were any prospects 
of action ; and so he recommended on the strength of that that I be 
relieved from the Hawaiian Department; and I was, [3517] by 
order of the War Department ; and Colonel Lyman succeeded me. 

I might also state that during this period of difficulty due to 
misunderstandings, that Colonel Lyman did in my opinion unjustly 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1801 

censure, reprimand officers under my command. He did it in a man- 
ner, at the lunch table, where I felt it my duty to protect these officers 
and to say something in their behalf, because they were patriotic 
young officers under the district engineer who were giving everything 
they had to carry out the will of their superiors; and which did 
result in a clash of personalities, and which did cause ill feelings. 
However, it was my duty as a junior officer to make amends with 
Colonel Lyman, which I did, and he and I became very friendly again 
and we had been friends for years, and we had most cordial relations 
during the period of the turn-over and just before I departed from 
the Hawaiian Islands. 

323. Major Clausen. What do you mean by a "turn-over," Colonel? 
Colonel Wtman. The relief when Colonel Wyman took over my 

administration ; that is, relieved me as district engineer. 

324. Major Clausen. Sir, this morning you mentioned something 
about the AWS, and you assigned certain reasons as being the causes 
for delays. You also stated in that collection that there were 148 other 
projects? 

Colonel Wyman. 148 other jobs. 

325. Major Clausen. Other jobs? 

Colonel Wyman. Somebody has counted them up for me, and I 
believe that is true. 

326. Major Clausen. Yes. Now, that evidence you gave was in 
connection Avith the committee charges, as I understand it, [3S18] 
that you failed to complete these AWS installations or facilities on 
time, prior to Pearl Harbor, is that correct? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, nobody knew that Pearl Harbor was com- 
ing. I didn't know it. We were pushing the work as rapidly as we 
could under the conditions. 

327. Major Clausen. Yes. I say, your evidence was in connection 
with the charge contained in the committee report in that connection ? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, not necessarily. It is in connection with any 
charge. I tried to answer these charges in this committee report as 
they occurred — these allegations rather, not charges. Most of them 
are allegations. 

328. Major Clausen. Well, all right. These 148 jobs were jobs 
that were in the process of construction or work prior to Peat! Har- 
bor, were they ? 

Colonel Wyman. They were; I understand there were about 148 
jobs altogether. 

329. Major Clausen. Where did 3^ou get the basis for that testi- 
mony with respect to the 148 jobs ? 

Colonel Wyman. I counted them up. You see we had, I think it 
is, 98 jobs over here for the Hawaiian Constructors, alone. I had 
numerous other contractors operating under me in the construction 
of projects at Hickam Field. 

330. Major Clausen. You say you had 98 of these 148? 

Colonel Wyman. I understand that there are 98, which I have been 
informed was the number of job orders issued to the Hawaiian Con- 
structors prior to December 7. My authority for making that state- 
ment is the district engineer's office at Punahau Campus. I under- 
stand there is a map here that shows [3S19] the locations of 
those 98, that is available to you right now. 

79716—46— Ex. 145, vol. 3 13 



1802 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Now, in addition to those 98 jobs there were many other jobs under 
contract at Hickam Field and Wheeler Field, and I had dreging jobs 
for the Navy at Palmyra and at Pearl Harbor, Kaneohe Bay. I had 
dredging jobs for Kalihi Lagoon, I had dredging jobs for improve- 
ment of the reserve channel in Honolulu harbor. 

331. Major Clausen. These latter that you mention are not part 
of the 98? 

Colonel Wyman. No, no ; they are additional ones. 

332. Major Clausen, They are Hawaiian Constructors jobs? 
Colonel Wyman. I understand it is 98; yes; and they are all shown 

here on a map which can be brought here as an exhibit prepared by 
the district engineer's office at Punahou, 

333. Major Clausen. Now, these maps that you referred to this 
morning, or the plans that you put your hands on several times this 
morning — whose repsonsibility was it with respect to those plans, to 
furnish those to you 'I 

Colonel Wyman. The Signal Corps, 

334. Ma>r Clausen. The Signal Corps ? 
Colonel Wyman. The Chief Signal Officer. 

335. Major Clausen. And do I understand that the maps or plans 
that you have there were all furnished by the Signal Corps? 

Colonel Wyman. That is right. Would you like to see them ? 

336. Major Clausen. No, sir. 

Colonel Wyman. I can show them to you. Some of them were de- 
livered as late as December 4, 1942. 

337. Major Clausen. I do not want to see them. You also this 
morning made a rather elaborate statement of your military [3530] 
history prior to Pearl Harbor and after Pearl Harbor, but you skipped 
the Canol project? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, someone deleted it for me. I told you that 
when I came here. 

338. Major Clausen. You failed to mention in particular, sir, did 
you not, that you were reprimanded under the 104th Article of War 
for your negligence on that job? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, no, sir; I didn't. I wrote it in, but the 
sheet, if it was there, was not in this file this morning. 

339. Major Clausen. Let me show you. Colonel, a letter dated May 
5, 1943, to you, from General Somervell, administering you a repri- 
mand under the 104th Article of War for your activities up in Canada, 
and ask you whether you received this document ? 

Colonel Wyman. That is in connection with the fire at Dawson 
Creek, 

340. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. 

Colonel Wyman. That is right. I am quite sure I did. This has 
nothing to do with Pearl Harbor. 

341. Major Clausen. Wliat is that, sir? 

Colonel Wyman. I say it has nothing to do with Pearl Harbor. 

342. Major Clausen. What did your work at Cherbourg have to 
do with Pearl Harbor? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, it was in the interests of the United States 
for me to work at Cherbourg. 

343. Major Clausen. You recall this, do you not. Colonel? 
Colonel Wyman. I didn't have any more to do with that than you 

did. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1803 

[SS£1] 344. Major Clausen. You recall this document that I 
showed you ? 

Colonel Wyman. I have seen this before ; yes. 

345. Major Clausen. Yes ; and you accepted this reprimand without 
appeal? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, no. I had a long conversation with General 
Somervell regarding that reprimand. 

346. Major Clausen. It states on here : 

On May 17, 1943, receipt acknowledged, no request or demand for trial is 
submitted. 

Did you make that statement ? 
Colonel Wyman. I did. 

347. Major Clausen. We offer this in evidence as the exhibit next in 
order. 

(Letter dated 5 May 1943, to the Commanding General, 8th Service 
Command, signed by Brig. Gen. Madison Pearson, G. S. C, Deputy 
Chief of Administrative Services, was marked Exhibit 47 and was 
received in evidence.) 

Colonel Wyman. Well, may I have a chance to explain that ? 

348. Major Clausen. Yes; I have no objection. 

Colonel Wyman. The reprimand that you mentioned was in con- 
nection with a very disastrous fire and explosion at Dawson Creek, 
Alberta. I was not present at the fire at Dawson Creek, at the time 
of this explosion. At the time of the explosion I was w^ith a com- 
manding general of the Northwest Service Command, General O'Con- 
nor, ancl I had nothing whatsoever to do with the cause of the explo- 
sion and the fire — not a thing to do with it. The only thing is that I 
was the division engineer of the Northwest Division; and the first 
sentence in the orders for [352i^^] the division engineer in 
Orders and Kegulations is that the division engineer is responsible for 
every occurrence in his division. In other words, whatever happened 
in that division was my responsibility ; and I accept that responsibility. 

349. Major Clausen. Now, so far as your statements are concerned 
regarding Rohl, you referred to this committee report, and I am going 
to ask you whether you have read this report over in connection with 
the allegations against Hans Wilhelm Rohl? 

Colonel Wyman. No; I didn't read it all over. I read parts of it, 
and about his personal conduct, I didn't read it, at all. 

350. Major Cl.\usen. When did you get the report first. Colonel? 
Colonel Wyman. The first copy of the report was handed to me by 

the War Department at Washington, D. C. 

351. Major Clausen. Now, you made the statement before this 
Board this morning that the House Military Affairs Committee called 
lor no other witnesses ? 

Colonel Wyman. That is right. I was so informed by the War 
Department. 

352. Major Clausen. Did you ask the committee for the privilege 
of appearing before the committee ? 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, no. No. I was overseas, and I understand 
that they — this is all only understanding — that they requested me to 
appear before the committee, but when they were informed that I was 
overseas they withdrew the request. I had no knowledge of that 
request at all. I had no knowledge of this committee report until I 
arrived in the United States. 



1804 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

353. Major Clausen. Did you ever ask the committee, upon your 
return to the United States, to see the evidence that backed [S523] 
up this committee report? 

Colonel Wtman. No, I didn't ask the committee, at all. 

354. Major Clausen. You stated something about having met Hans 
Wilhelm Rohl in Los Angeles, I think, in the year 1935, and I believe 
you stated that the bids were opened for this breakwater. Did you 
meet Mr. Rohl before those bids were opened and the contract let? 

Colonel Wyman. I think it was at the same time. I arrived at 
Los Angeles on the 20th of Juh^, and I think the bids were opened the 
last part of the month or the first part of August; and it was on that 
occasion that I met both Mr. Rohl and Mr. Connolly, as I remember it. 

355. Major Clausen, So, as a matter of fact, the contract for this 
breakwater in the amount of $850,000 was approved by you with 
respect to the Rohl-Connolly Construction Company in August 1935, 
was it? 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, no; it was awarded to them by the Chief of 
Engineers. I had no authority to award a contract to them. 

356. Major Clausen. Well, I said, you approved the award of the 
contract ? 

Colonel Wyman. I did not approve the award of the contract. The 
Chief of Engineers approved the award of the contract. 

357. Major Clausen. Just what did you do with regard to the 
contract, Colonel ? 

Colonel Wyman. All I do is make an abstract of the bids, and then 
I send that forwai'cl through channels recommending that the bid of 
the low bidder complying with the specifications be accepted, 

[35S4] 358. Major Clausen. Yes; and in this case you recom- 
mended, therefore, that the bid of the Rohl-Connolly Construction 
Company be accepted? 

Colonel Wyman. That is right ; if they were the low bidders ; and I 
think they were. 

359. Major Clausen. Now, with regard to the Long Beach-Los 
Angeles breakwater job in the amount of $2,145,000, did you do the 
same thing, on August 6, 1936? 

Colonel Wymvn. Yes; they were the low bidders, and they did 
qualify. They had already built some satisfactory breakwaters, and 
it w;is my duty to recommend them because they were the low bidders; 
and it was done so. 

360. Major Clausen, So far as this cost-plus-fixed-fee contract was 
concerned, was the Hawaiian job the first one that you had to admin- 
ister and as to which you had anything to do ? 

Colonel Wyman, Cost-plus-fixed-fee? 

361. Major Clausen, Yes, sir. 

Colonel Wyman. This is the first one; yes, sir. 

362. Major Clausen. Do you recall that prior to the time that that 
contract was made you had received from the Chief of Engineers or 
Assistant to the Chief of Engineers this letter. November 24, 1941, 
subject, "Conduct of Work under Cost-Plus-a-Fixed-Fee contracts," 
which I hand yon, sir? 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, no. You see, this is November 24, 1941. This 
letter came a year later. This contract was made in November 1940. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1805 

363. Major Clausen. Well, did you ever receive similar instruc- 
tions? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, this is a circular I dare say came to my office ; 
I don't know. This is a year later. This is just a few days before 
Pearl Harbor. This was issued just a [35£5] . few days before 
Pearl Harbor; probably got to my office probably the 1st of January. 

364. Major Clausen. That is correct. 

Colonel Wyman. Didn't get here, because we didn't have a mail 
for a long time. 

365. Major Clausen. But the statement of the policy in there to be 
followed with regard to cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts, did you receive 
such instructions from the Chief's office? 

Colonel Wyman. I would have to look in our files to see when this 
came. 

366. Major Clausen. Well, all right. Let me read you a part of it. 
It says here : 

(Excerpt from instructions on cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts:) 

When work is to be done under a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract the Government 
exercises great care to select a contractor of outstanding ability and experience, 
and pays him a fee for the use of his organization. 

Colonel Wyman. Now, wait a minute. 

367. Major Clausen. Was that your concept of the cost-plus-a-fixed- 
fee contractor before you entered into or approved this one concerning 
the Rohl -Connolly Company? 

Colonel Wyman. I have told you several times that the meeting of 
minds to enter into this contract was in the office of the Chier of 
Engineers, with persons present like General Robins, the Assistant 
Chief of Engineers, the head of the contract section, General Schley, 
the Chief of Engineers; and there was no meeting of minds to make 
a contract with this outfit until that time. 

368. Major Clausen. That is not the question. Colonel. 

[3S2(J] Colonel Wyman. Well, I say, that is when it was made. 

369. Major Clausen. No. 

Colonel Wyman. There were other minds in the picture besides 
mine. 

370. Major Clausen. My question, sir, is this — whether this is your 
concept of a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract, that — 

The Government selects a contractor of outstanding ability and experience and 
pays him a fee for the use of his organization. 

Colonel Wyman. Well, please understand that I am a subordinate 
officer, I have no views of my own. I carry out the policy of the War 
Department as it is announced from time to time, whatever it may be. 

371. Major Clausen. Well, what was your understanding of a cost- 
plus-a-fixed-fee contract ? 

Colonel Wyman. I learned about it after I got to Washington, all 
about the features of it. 

372. Major Clausen. Had you never had one before? 

Colonel Wyman. I had none before; no; but I had a blank form 
which was sent out with a circular which gave us some idea about it. 

373. Major Clausen. Now, you said Rohl had done satisfactorily 
quite a few jobs for the Government. Was that work performed to 
your personal knowledge before you entered into this basic contract 
of December 1940? 



1806 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, yes. You see, he did work for the Reclamation 
Service, work for the Indian Service, worked for the State of Cali- 
fornia, and had worked for the Engineer Department. I got that 
in the report, here. 

374. Major Clausen. Well, this is true, isn't it, Colonel [3527] 
Wyman, that Mr. Rohl was an essential part of that organization ? 

Colonel Wyman. i have always understood that he was a stock- 
holder in the organization, and he exercised considerable supervision 
over work that they did ; yes. 

375. Major Clausen. And you mention that with regard to his 
work here in Hawaii ; you told General Frank that he had performed 
various jobs about the island in a highly satisfactory manner? 

Colonel Wyman. He did that in 1942, and in the months of Janu- 
ary, February, and March, when I was here ; very satisfactory. 

376. Major Clausen. And he had done that before December 1940, 
according to your testimony ? 

Colonel Wyman. Why, sure. Here is what he did. 

377. Major Clausen. I didn't ask you just exactly what he did. 
You can state it for the record if you want, but my question is this. 

Colonel Wyman. Yes; but he did the Los Angeles breakwater, 
U. S. E. D. ; the Newport Jetties, City of Newport ; Los Angeles break- 
water No. 2 ; Los Angeles Breakwater No. 3 ; Seal Beach jetty ; Rock 
Dyke, City of Long Beach; Headgate Dam, U. S. Indian Service; 
Point Arguello breakwater, U. S. Coast Guard; dredging and rip rap, 
City of Long Beach ; Redondo breakwater. City of Redondo ; Hueneme 
breakwater. District of Hueneme. I say he did all those things. 

378. Major Clausen. Now, you mentioned that to General Frank, 
before. My question now is, with regard to those various jobs, he, 
himself, personally — that is, Mr. Rohl — played an active part in the 
construction of those jobs, did he? 

[352^] Colonel Wyman. He did on the breakwater at Los 
Angeles. 

379. Major Clausen. Yes. Well, all right. Now, in December 
1940 when you entered into the contract or had these discussions at 
Washington, you expected that Mr. Rohl would do the same thing 
with the Hawaiian job, didn't you? 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, no. No. He built concrete work. He has 
built the Hellgate Dam at — this is, his company was — at Parker, 
Arizona. 

380. Major Clausen. Yes, but you were entering into a contract 
here in Hawaii, and you expected Mr. Rohl himself personally to 
help with this work over here, didn't you ? 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, no, he didn't have any interest in it when I 
first knew him. The only member of the outfit that had any inter- 
est was Connolly. 

381. Major Clausen. That isn't my question, Colonel Wyman. My 
question is: During the time in December 1940 when you had this 
contract approved in Washington, you expected Mr. Rohl personally 
to come over here to Hawaii and conduct the work ? 

Colonel Wyman. No. We agreed in Washington ; Mr. Graf e would 
conduct the work, and the Callahan outfit would furnish the super- 
visory help over here, at first. 

382. Major Clausen. In other words, in Washington in December 
1940 you did not expect Mr. Rohl to come to Hawaii ; is that correct? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1807 

Colonel Wyman. No. Mr. Grafe — I didn't know whether he would 
come or not, but Mr. Grafe accepted the responsibility of being the 
project manager in Hawaii. 

383. Major Clausen. And so far as the Rohl-Connolly organiza- 
tion is concerned, your testimony is that in December 1940 you did 
[3629] not expect him to pay any part in it here in Hawaii ? 

Colonel Wyman. I wouldn't know. 

384. Major Clausen. You wouldn't know? 
Colonel Wyman. How would I know? 

385. Major Clausen. Well, you said that you 

Colonel Wyman. Except that it was agreed with Tommy Robins, 
General Tommy Robins, and General Schley, that Grafe and the 
Callahan Company would use their force from their supervisors, 
superintendents, from the Caddoa Dam and from the Prado Dam, 
to supervise the work here in Hawaii. 

386. Major Clausen, And where was Mr. Rohl? What part was 
he to play in this Hawaiian job? 

Colonel Wyman. I don't know. He wasn't present at these con- 
ferences. 

387. Major Clausen. I didn't ask you that. What part was he to 
play 

Colonel Wyman. I don't know. 

388. Major Clausen. — in the Hawaiian job? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, you would have to ask the company that. 
I don't know. 

389. Major Clausen. You had no comment or no discussion con- 
cerning that at all ? 

Colonel Wyman. None at all in the offices of the Chief of Engineers 
or elsewhere. 

390. Major Clausen. Let me invite your attention, Colonel Wy- 
man, to a letter which you wrote to Mr. Rohl in January, January 
22, 1941, which you set forth as Exhibit I to this I. G. report of 
Colonel Hunt. Would you read that, please, and see if you wrote 
that letter to him on that date ? 

[S530] Colonel Wyman (reading) : 

Mr. Rohl, 

RoM-Connolly Company, 4351 Alhamibra, Los Angeles, California. 
Dear Sir : Reference is made to Secret Contract No. W-414-eng-602 with the 
Hawaiian Constructors for work in the Hawaiian Islands. 

As you are actively interested in this venture, I desire you to proceed to 
Honolulu at your earliest convenience to consult with the District Engineer 
relative to ways and means to accomplish the purpose of the contract. You will 
be allowed transportation either by clipper or steamboat, both ways, and travel 
allowance not to exceed $6.00 per day while enroute in accordance with existing 
laws and regulations. 

You will make application to either the District Engineer at Los Angeles or 
the Division Engineer, South Pacific Division, San Francisco, for transportation. 
Very truly yours, 

Theodore Wyman, Jr., 
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers. 

January the 22nd. I state in here that this is a secret contract, but I 
think it had been reclassified as a restricted contract as of that date. 

391. Major Clausen. Now, my question, Colonel, is whether you 
[SSSl] wrote that letter to Mr. Rohl. 

Colonel Wyman. I believe that I wrote such a letter. 



1808 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

392. Major Clausen, Is there any question about it in your mind? 
Colonel Wyman. Not any, except that I remember sending and ask- 
ing him to come over. 

393. Major Clausen. All right. Now, what answer did you get 
from him? 

Colonel Wyman. I don't know^, and I don't remember that, whether 
or not I ever got any answer. 

394. Major Clausen. From that clay, January 22, 

Colonel Wyman. He did not come. 

395. Major Clausen. — 1941, down to, as I believe you said to 
General Frank, — what date was it that he arrived here? September 
1941 ? 

Colonel Wyiman. I think it Avas in October. 

396. Major Clausen. Did you write him any other letters, at all? 
Colonel Wyman. I have no recollection of any. I might have. I 

don't know. But I don't remember. 

397. Major Clausen. We have asked the Engineers to furnish us 
copies of all such letters. We have received none so far. 

Did you have any telephone calls during that interim with Mr. Rohl 
concerning the subject matter of your letter of January 22, 1941 ? 
Colonel Wyman. No, I didn't call Mr. Kohl. I didn't call him. 

398. Major Clausen. I didn't ask you whether you called him. 
Did you have any telephone calls with him ? 

[S532] Colonel Wyman. Kegarding this matter? 

399. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. 

Colonel Wyman. I don't remember any telephone call regarding this 
matter. 

400. Major Clausen. Now, you testified also, to General Frank, that 
between certain dates you had certain telephone calls and that a lot of 
this was telephonitis. Did you indulge in this telephonitis on the 
mainland ? 

Colonel Wyman. I never did. 

401. ]\Iajor Clausen. Or did Mr. Eohl? 

Colonel Wyman. I never indulged in telephonitis. I never had any 
money to pay for it. 

402. Major Clausen. Yes. Did Mr. Kohl ? 

Colonel Wyman. But I notice that many, many contractors and I 
have even seen Army officers indulge in telephonitis and call in long- 
distance telephones, calls to their friends, from parties and places like 
that. I understand that Kohl is a person — I have been told so — who 
suffers terribly from telephonitis and calls people up throughout the 
United States at will. 

403. Major Clausen. As a matter of fact, he is also a person that 
charters planes, isn't he, at will ? 

Colonel Wyman. I don't know about that. 

404. Major Clausen. Or did. 

Well, in any event, on page 34 of this House Committee report there 
are listed some thirteen telephone calls between yourself and Mr. Kohl, 
Mr, Kohl being on the mainland and you being here in Hawaii, What 
proportion ■ 

Colonel Wyman, Between me and Kohl? 

\3533] 405, Major Clvufen. Yes. 

Colonel Wyman. Or between Kohl and me? 

406. Major Clausen. Well take it either. way. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1809 

Colonel Wyman. Rohl to me. 

407. Major Clausen. Yes. Either way at all. What proportion 
of those do you put down as telephonitis calls? 

Colonel Wyman. I would say that the calls here around October 
30, October 31st, October 31st ; there seems to be two ; November 3rd, 
November 8, November 12, were all calls in relation to the preparation 
of equipment and the transportation of the equipment to Los Angeles 
for loading on the U. S. transport LUDINGTON. Also the organiza- 
tion of gangs of men for excavation crews, concrete crews, asphalt 
crews, for the building of the runways of the airports at Canton Island 
and Christmas Island. That's the telephone calls, because I can recol- 
lect that he did call me regarding the amount of equipment, the size 
of the gangs, details of getting them aboard transport, and that sort 
of thing. 

408. Major Clausen. Now, I am struck by the significance of the 
calls you have selected, of those which occurred after he was 
naturalized. 

Colonel Wyman. That's right. 

409. Major Clausen. Tell me about these that occurred 

Colonel Wyman. I can remember back. 

410. Major Clausen. Tell me about those that occurred prior to 
that time. 

Colonel Wyman. In May 22, I do not know. March 19, I do not 
know. February 5th, I do not know. January, here's one I see 
that's — that is Robinson's to me; I don't know. [3S34] January 
17, I don't know. The 9th, the 4th, the 21st, July 15, 1940, I don't 
know. However, before this there was a call 

411. Major Clausen. You mean in 

Colonel Wyman. In addition to these. 

412. Major Clausen. In addition to these listed on this page? 
Colonel Wyman. I do remember one when I was on duty at Schofield 

when I got called off the golf course to answer a telephone call. It 
was from Mr. Rohl, and he was calling me up to tell me about the 
bids at the Sepulveda Dam. 

413. Major Clausen. The one you told us about? 

Colonel Wyman. I told you about that and the death of Thad 
Merriman. 

414. Major Clausen. All right. Now that you have had your 
memory refreshed maybe a bit, tell me whether in connection with 
this letter where you asked Mr. Rohl to come over here, this letter 
of January 22, 1941, where you say, since he is actively interested 
in the venture, that you desire him to proceed to Honolulu at his 
earliest convenience — whether you did not discuss that on the 
telephone. 

Colonel Wyman. I don't recollect discussing it on the telephone. 

415. Major Clausen. You want the Board to understand that the 
first tune that you knew that he was an alien was June ? 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, yes, absolutely. The first time that I knew 
that Rohl was an alien was on the occasion of Mr. Grafe coming to 
my office and informing me that Mr. Rohl was an alien and in — passed 
a letter to me setting — stating so, and also stating that Mr. Rohl 
had made application for citizenship; and immediately after that 
information was received I called in [SSSS] a stenographer 



1810 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and dictated a letter to the Chief of Engineers setting forth the state- 
ments made^ in Kohl's— in Grafe's letter. Just what I said in that 
letter, I don't know. I have forgotten, because I haven't seen it since 
the day I wrote it, but I understand the letter is in existence and there- 
fore can be read. 

416. General Grunert. Do I understand that Grafe told you this 
in a letter? 

Colonel Wtman. Oh, yes. He submitted a letter. 

417. General Grunert. Have you got a copy of that letter? 
Colonel Wyman. I don't have a copy of it, no, sir. There is a 

copy, though. 

418. Major Clausen. Where are these copies ? 

Colonel Wyman. Why, I suppose they are in the files of the District 
Engineer's office. 

419. Major Clausen. You mean here in Honolulu? 
Colonel Wyman. I think so, yes. 

420. Major Clausen. Well, we were informed that General Brag- 
don was going to get us certain letters. 

(There was colloquy off the record.) 

421. Major Clausen. All right. Then let me ask you this. Colonel 
Wyman : Have you looked for such letters since you have arrived here 
in Honolulu ? 

Colonel Wyman. I have just thumbed through files that were made 
available, and I have not come across those letters. However, I 
have not^ 

422. Major Clausen. Now, so far as the question that you were 
asked by General Frank concerning this basic contract and the neces- 
sity for speed, you said something about the the Engineers [3536] 
always proceeding with speed. Isn't it true, though, that in this par- 
ticular contract there was a need for greater speed than ordinary ? 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, we put on all the speed we could. 

423. Major Clausen. Well, what instructions as to this did you 
receive, and from whom? 

Colonel WY3rAN. Instructions about what? 

424. Major Clausen. This increased speed with respect to this con- 
tract. 

Colonel Wy]\ian. Oh, I received a request from the Commanding 
General of the Hawaiian Department in July, to try 

425. General Frank. July? 

Colonel Wyman. July 1941, to try to finish the A. W. S. stations as 
quickly as possible, because the equipment was arriving. I read that 
letter this morning. 

426. Major Clausen. As a matter of fact, there were also instruc- 
tions given you in Washington, weren't there, regarding the need for 
speed and the completion of this job? 

Colonel Wyman. In Washington? 

427. Major Clausen. Yes, sir; in December of 1940. 

Colonel Wyman. I don't remember any specific instructions from 
the Chief of Engineers or General Robins except that we would make 
the same speed as we usually do in consummating work. 

428. Major Clausen. You know at that time, in December 1940, that 
this job would run over the one million and some-odd dollars men- 
tioned, didn't you ? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, only by hearsay. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1811 

429. Major Clausen. And by hearsay you mean wliat, sir? 

[3537] Colonel Wyman. Well, we learned from General Han- 
num that there might be an increase in the size of the job due to the fact 
that large programs were being considered for the Hawaiian Islands, 
especially construction of airfields and that sort of thing. That was 
just hearsay, except that I can remember distinctly — I can't remember 
the exact occasion — where the General told me we should have very 
strong contractors, because we should organize somewhat like the Navy. 
The Navy had a combination of co-adventurers known as the Naval 
Constructors on their job; and that it might be a good thing for the 
Army to consider that arrangement too, and therefore for any work 
that came up, why, you would have the strength of organization to 
handle it as soon as you could get additional equipment, and that sort of 
thing. 

430. Major Clausen. When did Colonel Hannum tell you that, 
Colonel ? 

Colonel Wyman. We talked about that, I think, the first day that I 
was in San Francisco,, or it could have been earlier, or it might have 
been when we were at Midway. I don't know. It was in one of our 
conversations. 

431. Major Clausen. Well, when you went to Los Angeles then, sir, 
did you tell that to Mr. Rohl ? 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, no. No, I didn't tell him that. 

432. Major Clausen. You are sure you didn't tell him that ? 
Colonel Wyman. I couldn't have any reason to tell him. 

433. Major Clausen. Did you tell any other contractors down there 
the fact that the contract might be blown up ? 

Colonel Wyman. I don't think I told anybody, because I wouldn't 
have any just reason to tell them that. 

[3S38] 434. Major Clausen. In other words, you didn't tell 
these contractors, when you assembled them at Los Angeles, that this 
contract, while it was for $1,000,000, might be for much more? 

Colonel Wyman. No, but I think they were told in Washington by — 
in the Chief's office that there would probably be more work which 
could be done under this contract, because these are pretty large con- 
tractors and they are interested in big work, and if there is any possi- 
bility of getting big work, why, they would be interested, of course. 

435. Major Clausen. So far as Atkinson is concerned, the only thing 
that he knew was that this was a million and some-odd dollar job, and 
he demanded a certain fee ? 

Colonel Wyman, Well, he did most of his talking with General Han- 
num, and I couldn't tell you what General Hannum told him, but he 
did put in for 8 percent. 

436. Major Clausen. And is that the only time you told anybody 
about the fact that this contract would go higher? 

Colonel Wyman. I didn't tell it to them in Washington, and it was 
told to them by others. 

437. Major Clausen. And who told whom ? 

Colonel Wyman. And I think I was present in the room. I don't 
know who told them that, but it could have been General Robins; it 
could have been General Schley. I don't know who told them, but I 
can remember that some such statement was made, and that was made 
at the time when they suggested that the Caddoa Constructors take 
this job, and the Caddoa Constructors were these three companies. 



1812 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

438. Major Clausen, And this statement regarding the contract, this 
possibility of being increased, was told to whom? 

[3539] Colonel Wtman. I think it was told to Grafe and to Con- 
nolly in Washington. I an not certain, thoughj exactly about it. This 
happened — you know, you are asking me questions about hearsay stuff 
that happened four years ago. 

439. Major Clausen. Yes. Well, you recall 

Colonel Wyman. A long time ago. 

440. Major Clausen, At Los Angeles tliat you did have two spe- 
cific talks with Mr, Rohl, once when he indicated no interest 

Colonel Wyman. "No." He said, "No," 

441. Major Clausen, And once when he came back and indicated 
some interest? 

Colonel Wyman. And said Connolly would be interested, might be 
interested. 

442. Major Clausen. And then do you recall that you had also a 
talk with him in San Francisco in the Palace Hotel ? 

Colonel Wyman, No, I don't remember that I ,did. 

443. Major Clausen. Do you recall having had a talk with Mr. Con- 
nolly when you returned from Washington, at his home ? 

Colonel Wyman. Yes, I believe I did. I got caught in Los Angeles — 
I mean in San Francisco over Christmas and couldn't be — could not get 
back to Honolulu, and I remember that Mr. Connolly took mercy on 
me and invited me out to his family house, with his family, to eat din- 
ner one night. That's right. 

444. Major Clausen, And prior to that time you had met Mr, Con- 
nolly, hadn't you, en route to Washington from the West Coast? 

Colonel Wyman, When we went to Washington Mr, Connolly 
[S64O] got on the same plane that I did at Chicago, 

445. Major Clausen. Now% before that time the man who had 
indicated the interest was Mr. Grafe; isn't that correct? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, Mr, — well, not only Grafe but also Gunther 
and Shirley. 

446. Major Clausen. Well, Gunther and Shirley and Callahan 
Construction Company are represented by Mr. Grafe ? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, no, no. No. At that time when they came 
in to Los Angeles I think there was Shirley came in to represent 
Gunther and Shirley for Mr. Grafe, Mr. Grafe wasn't there. 

447. Major Clausen. Well, Mr. Grafe is the man who in the East 
represented these two firms, isn't he, Gunther and Shirley and the 
Callahan Construction Company? 

Colonel Wyman. I don't know, but he did — he was attorney in fact 
for these three companies on this 602 job. 

448. Major Clausen. But it was Mr, Connolly that came there rep- 
resenting the Rohl-Connolly Company? 

Colonel Wyman, That is right; or representing himself; I don't 
know which. 

449. Major Clausen. Well, you had these two men, then, represent- 
ing these contractors ? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, Grafe was an officer in the — I don't know 
what his capacity — in the Callahan Construction Company; and Con- 
nolly was an officer in the Rohl-Connolly Company and also in another 
company, which is the T. W. Connolly Company. The T. — that's a 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1813 

large construction company too, just finished some very large work, 
and which Mr. Connolly is interested in. It is a separate company 
from [35U'\ . the Rohl-Connolly outfit. 

Now, whether he was going to be interested in this job representing 
Eohl-Connolly or representing his own company, T. Connolly Com- 
pany, was unknown to me until the time it was suggested that this 
>vork be undertaken by the Caddoa Builders, and the Caddoa Builders 
consisted at that time of the W. E. Callahan Construction Company, 
Gunther-Shirley, Rohl-Connolly Company, or Construction Company, 
Avhatever it is. 

450. Major Clausen. Where did you meet Mr. Connolly going east? 
Colonel Wymax. I met him at — he got on the same plane that 

I did. I got off a plane, and I think I went into the station to get 
some sandwiches or something for breakfast, and as I came out, why, 
Connolly came walking across, and I told him to get on this same plane, 
and the plane went from Chicago to Cleveland. We got off the plane 
there and ^ot on another plane and went to Washington. 

451. Ma] or Clausen. You met Mr. Connolly and stopped off in 
Chicago ? 

Colonel Wtman. He didn't stop off at Chicago. I went right 
through, but he got on at 

452. Major Clausen. Where did you meet Mr. Graf e ? 

Colonel Wyman. He got on, Grafe — Grafe came into the Carlton 
Hotel after we had been there, and I met him there. 

453. Major Clausen. Now, isn't it correct that Grafe was the man 
who had sent the engineers to the Islands here ? 

Colonel Wyman. Yes, that's right. That is the Callahan Con- 
struction Company. 

[351(2'] 454. Major Clausen. And you suggested to them back 
there that this same group take ahold of this contract? 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, I thought that Grafe would take that con- 
tract all by himself, the Callahan Construction Company. This wasn't 
too big a contract. 

455. Major Clausen. When was it that you met Mr. Martin? 
Colonel Wyman. Martin came into the hotel, I don't know whether 

it was the first day or the second day we were there, in the afternoon, 
late in the afternoon, and sat there and talked to people in Grafe's 
room. There were a roomful of people : that is, Grafe, and I was 
there, and Connolly was there, and John Martin was there. It seems 
to me that some other person was there, too, that I remember. 

456. Major Clausen. And you talked about this job out here? 
Colonel Wyman. No, we didn't — no, I didn't talk to Martin about 

this job. He was talking about the — claimed that he represented the 
contractor who was engaged in the contracts of the Pennsylvania 
turnpike across the State of Pennsylvania, and it was about the engi- 
neers issuing change orders, and without entering — having a meeting 
of minds with the contractors as to whether or not it would affect 
the price. 

457. Major Clausen. Did you ever see Rohl drunk in your life? 
Colonel Wyman. I never saw Rohl drunk in my life ; no, sir. 

458. Major Clausen. Do you define drunkenness the same as Mr. 
Rohl does? 

Colonel Wyman. I don't know how he defines it. 



1814 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

459. Major Clausen. Well, he says a person is drunk only if he 
falls down. 

[SS4^] Colonel Wyman. No, I wouldn't define it — drunken- 
ness is a state of intoxication where a man has lost the use of his mental 
and physical faculties. 

460. Major Clausen. You were very intimate, weren't you, with 
Mr. Dillingham? 

Colonel Wtman. No. Not very intimate, no. Just see him occa- 
sionally. He usually came to my office. I don't think I ever went to 
his. 

461. Major Clausen. Do you recall having testified before Colonel 
Hunt? 

Colonel Wtman. I have never read that testimony before Colonel 
Hunt. I don't know what — anything that's in it. 

462. Major Clausen. I say, do you recall having testified before 
him? 

Colonel Wtman. Oh, I testified, yes. I was on a job, a flood job on 
the White River in the State of Arkansas. 

463. Major Clausen. Did you give this testimony on page 66 : 

The Hawaiian Contracting Company showed no interest that I recollect, and 
I was very intimate with Mr. Walter Dillingham, one of the principal persons 
in business in Honolulu and a part owner of that company? 

Colonel Wtman. Well, what time are you talking? When? 
What time does this refer to ? 

464. Major Clausen. Well, that is the testimony that you are sup- 
posed to have given, sir. 

Colonel Wtman. Well, I know, but is that 1940 or 1941 ? 

465. Major Clausen. Well, I don't know. What did you mean when 
you said that? 

[354-4-] Colonel Wtman. I have not read it. I don't know. 

466. Major Clausen. Well, now, did you give that testimony to 
Colonel Hunt? 

Colonel Wtman. I don't — if it is in his record, why, I probably did, 
but I don't recollect it, of course. 

467. Major Clausen. By the way, you had certain contracts — 
rather, you had something to do with certain contracts in which the 
Hawaiian Contracting Company was involved prior to the basic con- 
tract and afterwards; isn't that correct? 

Colonel Wtman. Oh, we had — I had some contracts with the Ha- 
waiian Contracting Company for paving over at Hickam Field, as I 
recollect, and I think there were some other jobs, small ; small, not too 
big, at that time. They were also working for the Construction 
Quartermaster and the Navy. 

468. Major Clausen. Dicl you ever get any equipment from Mr. Dil- 
lingham that was used in connection with the Hawaiian Constructors? 

Colonel Wtman. I never got a thing from Mr. Dillingham. I got 
it from Hawaiian Contracting Company. That is, I didn't, but the 
Hawaiian Constructors did. 

469. Major Clausen. Did you have anjrthing to do with the Ha- 
waiian Constructors' getting any equipment from the Hawaiian Con- 
tracting Company? 

Colonel Wtman. Well, I authorized it, yes, sir. We got equipment 
from everybody on these Islands after the attack on Pearl Harbor, and 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1815 

the plantations and everybody else, and put it to work on the construc- 
tion of airfields and other work in these Islands. 

[3545] 470. Major Clausen. Was Mr. Dillingham interested in 
the Hawaiian Constructors, to your knowledge? 

Colonel Wyman. Wliy, I think to this degree : that it — I think he 
is an officer in their company. He was not the president. 

471. Major Clausen. Did you receive any instructions from him, 
advice ? 

Colonel Wyman. I'll tell you if you give me a chance. You see, the 
Hawaiian Contracting Company bought some of the interest in the 
Hawaiian Constructors held by the Callahan Company, the Gunther- 
Shirley Company, and the Rohl-Connolly Company ; and in order to 
consummate that it was necessary to have the approval of the District 
Engineer, and that was written up in a supplemental agreement where- 
by the Hawaiian Contracting Company became part of the Hawaiian 
Constructors. 

472. Major Clausen. Did you ever — it wasn't quite clear from 
what you testified to General Frank — did you ever, during the course 
of the construction of these airfields to the south, personally visit those 
fields? 

Colonel Wyman. No, I didn't. Which ones do you mean ? Do you 
mean at Canton and Christmas ? 

473. Major Clausen. Christmas, yes. 

Colonel Wyman. No, I never got there, because General Tinker and 
Colonel Mollison, his Chief of Staff, and I were going to make a trip 
all the way through to Australia and visit all the fields, and his plan 
was upset, as far as I am concerned, by the fact that I left the Hawaiian 
Department. However, General Tinker and Mollison did make the 
trip. 

474. Major Clausen. Did you have a Captain W. E. Wilhelm 
[3546] working down there for you, W-i-1-h-e-l-m ? 

Colonel Wyman. We had a man in the District office by the name of 
Wilhelm that I recollect. I remember him. 

475. Major Clausen. You remember him? 
Colonel Wyman. Yes. 

476. Major Clausen. One of the men that worked for you ? 
Colonel Wyman. Well, I don't remember what duty he performed, 

except he did make a reconnaissance, a map reconnaissance, and he 
has charts and other information. He made a reconnaissance of pos- 
sible routes, alternate routes to Australia east of the route — the first 
built. He did that. 

477. Major Clausen. Would you call him a good man or a bad 
man? 

Colonel Wyman. Wilhelm? 

478. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, I don't remember him very well. I couldn't 
pass judgment. 

479. Major Clausen. You mentioned several times to General 
Frank, "General Sverdrup." 

Colonel Wyman. Yes. 

480. Major Clausen. But the time to which General Frank was 
directing your attention was with regard to the VEGA and its ac- 
quisition by the Engineers out here. At that time it was Mr. Sver- 
drup; isn't that correct? 



1816 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Wyman. Why, he was a — yes, he was an engineer of the 
firm of Sverdrup and Parcel, one of the high ranking bridge engi- 
neer outfits of the United States. 

481. Major Clausen. Later on commissioned, after these jobs were 
finished ? 

Colonel Wyman. No. Right during while the jobs were [3547] 

going on he was commissioned a Colonel of Engineers, and I under- 
stand that — now a General ; I understand that now he is the Engineer 
in charge of all the work in the South Pacific. He has been awarded 
the D. S. M., the Silver Star, for heroic action, and he has done a lot 
of other things to his credit, and therefore I feel that my faith in Mr. 
Sverdrup in the job that was assigned to the south was well placed. 

482. Major Clausen. Do you know anything about this statement 
on page 48 that Rohl was about to be made a General too? 

Colonel Wyman. Rohl was? 

48.3. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. 

Colonel Wyman. No, I haven't the least idea. 

484. Major Clausen. You don't have any knowledge as to that? 
Colonel Wyman. No. 

485. Major Clausen. By the way, concerning the VEGA, the value 
of that boat was established by you, was it, at a hundred thousand 
dollars ? 

Colonel Wyman. No ; I think that was established by the Division 
Engineer's office. 

486. Major Clausen. Now, it is correct, isn't it, that before the 
VEGA ever got to the Hawaiian Islands you had already agreed and 
had arranged to purchase the SOUTHERN SEAS to do the survey 
work that was contemplated for the VEGA? 

Colonel Wyman. No. The SOUTHERN SEAS was purchased be- 
cause we had to take it over. I went through all that. I'll go through 
it again gladly. 

487. Major Clausen. Don't go through anything that you have 
been through, again. If you are all through, have gone through, you 
tell me. I will take your word. 

[35481 Colonel Wyman. I have gone through it. The 
SOUTHERN SEAS had belonged to Pan-American. I was ordered 
to take over all Pan-American property on all these islands because 
they abandoned it and requested our people to take it over. In that 
property was the yacht SOUTHERN SEAS, which is the yacht, as I 
imderstand it now, that cost over a million dollars to build, and they 
used it as a hotel in the harbor of Noumea, for their passengers when 
the clipper landed at Noumea. They were taken off the clipper and 
put on this boat for overnight accommodations. And we took it over. 
Well, the boat was a seaworthy- 



General Frank. Because there were not good hotel accommo- 
dations at Noumea. 

Colonel Wyman. The boat was in good seaworthy condition, so 
Sverdrup recommended that the boat be acquired and operated. 

489. Major Clausen. As a matter of fact, you recommended it be 
purchased for $600,000? 

Colonel Wyman. No, I did not. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1817 

490. Major Clausen. Didn't you ? 

Colonel Wyman. No, I did not. I just gave you all the testimony, 
that I recommended to General Hannum that they pay $300,000 and 
that an appraiser and surveyor be put on the job to determine its value, 
and, after its value was determined, to pay the difference between the 
price, ^vhatever it was, and the $300,000. As a matter of fact, I did 
not have authority to authorize anybod}^ to pay $600,000 for a boat. 
I had to seek the authority from the — the authority would have to 
come from the Chief of Engineers, and the entire arrangement for the 
SOUTHERN SEAS was made by the Division Engineer and the Chief 
of Engineers, and not by me. 

[3S4fJ] 491. Major Clausen. Getting back to when Rohl's forces 
cama over here right after the contract, some of these men were to 
work on the Hawaiian job? 

Colonel Wyman. Rohl's forces didn't come over. I told you sev- 
eral times that the men who came over came from the Callahan or- 
ganization and not from the Rohl organization. 

492. Major Clausen. Do I understand, then, that no men from the 
Rohl organization came over here at all to Hawaii? 

Colonel Wyman. Not of the superintendents, no, sir. Mr. Mc- 
Cullough was a Callahan man and so was Mr. Ashlock. 

493. Major Clausen. Then the only part that the Rohl-Connolly 
Company played over here was to furnish equipment ? 

Colonel Wyman. Played? 

494. Major Clausen. You say there came no men from the Rohl 
(jrganization over here. 

Colonel Wyman. No. You say when they first came over. This 
job was Paul Grafe's and the superintendent from the Callahan Com- 
pany. Later on I dare say they brought many people from the Rohl- 
Connolly outfit or from Caddoa Dam. You see, they were all to- 
gether at the Caddoa Dam as co-adventurers. They had a big organi- 
zation. 

495. Major Clausen. You told us that. Now, just take this period 
of time from the date of the basic contract, December, 1940, down to 
the time that Mr. Rohl himself came here, in September, 1941. Did 
any personnel of the Rohl-Connolly Companj^ come over and work on 
this job in Hawaii? 

Colonel Wyman. I would not know that. You would get that 
information by consulting the records of the Hawaiian [3650] 
Constructors. 

496. Major Clausen. You do not know, then? 
Colonel Wyman. I do not, no. 

497. Major Clausen. With regard to the job orders, was it your 
statement in some testimony you gave General Frank that after the 
api3rovals. whatever approvals are required, are granted to you, the 
job order is issued? 

Colonel Wyman. Yes. 

498. Major Clausen. Is that coi'rect? 

Colonel Wyman. After the approval of the site — what particular 
sort of a job would you like? Take an airfield, for instance, like the 
building of a rtmway. General Frank knows about that. They have 
a Board that goes about. 

79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 3 14 



1818 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

499. Major Clausen. My question, Colonel, so we can save time, — 
there isn't very much to this. 

Colonel Wyman. It takes the approval of all the interests, every- 
body that is interested in the project, before you can commence any 
work or make any plans, and after the plans are made and specifica- 
tions written, they are approved by the Chief of Engineers and the 
Division Engineer, and after that a job order is issued, and if that 
job order is in excess of $10,000 — it was in those days — it had to be 
approved by the Division Engineer before one cent could be spent 
on the job. 

Now, that was peace-time procedure as outlined in orders and 
regulations which anybody can read, and it is very silly now, I will 
admit, but that was in effect in 1940 and 1941, up to the 7th day of 
December, or the day that war was declared I think was the 8th 
day of December, 1941. 

500. Major Clausen. So when you finally put your signature on 
a [36S1] job order you had already received those approvals? 

Colonel Wyman. No, no. 

501. Major Clausen. What would you do? Give an order? 
Colonel Wyman. No, listen: I issued job orders in order to save 

the money. I was directed to obligate the money for the reserve gaso- 
line storage by the Chief of Engineers prior to the 31st day of June 
1941, in order to save that money and to keep it from going back into 
the Treasury of the United States, and we would be completely out 
of funds. I issued many job orders in June of 1941 for the sole pur- 
pose of reserving our money, so it was not going back in the Treasury 
by law, obligated funds. 

502. Major Clausen. With regard to your statement concei-ning 
Rohl's application for naturalization and this letter of General King- 
man — you have read that, as set forth on page 5 of this committee 
report ? 

Colonel Wyman. I don't believe I did. I just glanced at it, I be- 
lieve. I don't know that I read it. 

503. Major Clausen. Do you know the source of the information 
that is set forth in that letter by General Kingman to Mr. Schofield? 

Colonel Wyman. I do not know because I did not know — I don't 
think I knew when he applied for citizenship, January 15, 1941. I 
don't know that. I don't know where it came from. 

504. Major Clausen. Did you write any letters, other than the one 
you said you wrote to the Chief of Engineers ? 

Colonel Wyman. No. I only wrote a letter to the Chief of Engi- 
neers announcing that Rohl was an alien, was so notified by Grafe; 
also the fact that Eohl had applied for citizenship. [365£] 
Whether I made any recommendation as to what action they take I 
do not recollect. I probably made a recommendation. I don't know 
what it is, though, because I haven't seen the letter. 

505. Major Clausen. Have you ever had, in addition to having 
written that letter, any talks with anybody connected with the Bureau 
of Immigration and Naturalization? 

Colonel Wyman. Nobody at all. 

506. Major Clausen. Concerning Rohl's naturalization? 
Colonel Wyman. No, nobody at all. No conversation at all. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1819 

507. Major Clausen. Did you have any coiTespondence with any- 
body 

Colonel Wyman, Nobody at all. 

508. Major Clausen. in the Bureau of Immigration and Nat- 
uralization on that subject? 

Colonel Wyman. Nothing that I can recollect. 

509. Major Clausen. You say, nothing you recollect. Is there a 
possibility that you may have had some such communication? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, I don't know. There is nothing that I rec- 
ollect. I think that I did not write anybody any letter about any- 
thing. However, sometimes, as I remember, you get applications 
from Bureaus as to whether or not somebody who worked with you 
or for you was an honest, reliable person and what their experience 
is and so on. I know I get many liters from the American Society 
of Civil Engineers on that, where people offer your name as a sponsor, 
but I have no recollection of any letters in this case. 

510. Major Clausen. That is all I have. 

511. General Russell. Just a couple of Questions. 

Colonel, this contract was finally approved about January 3rd, 1941, 
under which all the work was done that we have been [3S53\ 
discussing here ? 

Colonel Wyman. Yes, approved by the Assistant Secretary of 
War. 

512. General Grunert. Assistant Secretary of War? 
Colonel Wyman. The Under Secretary of War, Mr. Patterson. 

513. General Russell. Now, about when did the Connolly Com- 
pany or the Constructors begin to move their personnel and equipment 
out to Hawaii ? 

Colonel Wy3Ian. It is my recollection that the first act they made 
was the Division Engineer to grant them authority to buy around 
$275,000 worth of plant on January 6th and ship it over here to start 
this work. It is also my recollection that Mr. Grafe and Mr. McCul- 
lough and quite a large number of people arrived here, both by clipper 
and boat, in the first week or so of January, 1941, and they opened 
up an office, I think, in the Young Hotel Building very soon after 
their arrival here. 

514. General Russell. Actually when did they begin work on some 
job out here? 

Colonel Wyman. They got going — the first job of any importance 
that I recollect they started was the road job leading up to Mount 
Kaala AWS station. They also broke into the ammunition storage at 
Wheeler, the field for Schofield Barracks ammunition, very promptly. 
They moved materials on that job very promptly. They also built 
a camp in the woods along the main highway without any delay at 
all, except they had considerable trouble getting water from the well 
opposite Wheeler Field, due to some controversy wjth the Water 
Department of the County. 

515. General Russell. Do you have records before you this [3654^^ 
morning from which you could determine the date of the initial work 
on this road, which you say is the first major project that they worked 
on? 

Colonel Wyman. Yes, sir. The records should show that. No 
work could be done until a job order was issued, except such work like 
setting up an office. 



1820 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

516. General KussELL. Preliminary work? 

Colonel Wyman. Preliminary work. The job order had to be 
approved by the Division Engineer at San Francisco, before, at least 
theoretically, any work could be done. However, assuming that the 
job order would be approved, the contractor could move plant onto 
the job, but he could not start the work until the job order and plans 
had been approved by the Division Engineer at San Francisco. 

517. General Russell. From the data now before you can you tell 
me when these people started their first work ? 

Colonel Wyman. Here it is, here. On the Kaala job the layout 
plan was approved by the Commanding General on the 6th day of 
March, 1941 ; construction started on the access road on the 11th of 
March, 1941, or five days after the approval. 

518. General Russell. Now, would you say that was the first worlv 
of any importance done over here by the Hawaiian Constructors, and 
it began on the 11th day of March, 1941 ? 

Colonel Wyjiax. No, sir. There were other jobs — I don't have the 
date here, but I could dig it up. But take the big job, the one that 
cost a lot of money, was the ammunition storage job at Wheeler Field, 
and that is the one that theoretically could take the longest time. 

519. General Russell. Have j^ou any data there from which you 
[36S5] can tell me when the first work was clone by those people 
out here, even on a little job? 

Colonel WyjNian. Oh, I think they put up warehouses and camps 
and that sort of thing immediately. 

520. General Russell. You were not concerned with that. Colonel. 
I am talking about the work that they were doing that you were con- 
cerned with as a representative of the United States Government. 

Colonel Wyman. I was concerned with the camp, because that was 
a reimbursable item. The government had to pay the cost of it. 

521. General Russell. Do you want to tell me that you just don't 
know ? 

Colonel n^Vym AN. General, I think I should look up the records, and 
I can answer that question. 

522. General Russell. Would you say it was before the first day 
of February, 1941 ? 

Colonel Wyman. I do not know that. 

523. Genoj-al Russell. You have no idea about it ? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, it was very early, but the only way I could 
do it, between the time that elapsed and the things that occurred, is to 
look at the records and find out the day it started, 

524. General Russell. They had a man named McCullough out 
here? 

Colonel Wyman. That is right. 

525. General Russell. You objected to McCullough? 
Colonel Wyivian. That is right. 

526. General Russell. When was he replaced by a man named Ash- 
lock? 

[SSS6] Colonel Wyman. Ashlock, I think, came here in April 
or May. Mr, McCullough became ill and went home, 

527. General Russell. How long was it after you made your com- 
plaint to Paul Grafe before McCullough went home ? 

Colonel Wtman, Not very long. Just a short time. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1821 

528. General Russell. Would you say you made your complaint to 
Paul Grafe some time in March? 

Colonel Wyman. No, I complained way back in February, the way 
things were getting off to a slow start, and I kept complaining. 

529. General Russell. What time in February ? 

Colonel Wyman. I think right in the beginning, the middle of 
February or early in February. 

530. General Russell. Was it in January ? 

Colonel Wyman. No, I think the first was in February that I began 
to complain. I always give the man a fair chance to get a start. 

531. General Russell. Then if he did not get his contract approved 
by Washington until January 3rd, and they were moving in here in 
the month of January, there would have been no occasion for you 
to complain about McCullough in January ? 

Colonel Wyman. No, I don't think they got any plant over here, 
sir, until February. The plant had to be shipped from the United 
States. 

532. General Russell. You wrote Rohl, though, on the 22nd of 
January and told him you wanted him to come over here, didn't you? 

Colonel Wyman. Yes, I believe I did. 

533. General Russell. Didn't 3'ou tell General Frank this morning 
that the j-eason you wrote him to come over here is because you had a 
fuss with Grafe about this man McCullough ? 

Colonel Wyman. I did have a fuss with Grafe. 

[SSS7] 534. General Russell. Now you say you did not have 
that fuss on the 22nd of January, when you wrote Rohl. 
Colonel Wyman. I think I had. 

535. General Russell. A moment ago didn't you tell me you were 
certain it was in February; it could not have been in January? 

Colonel Wyman. I am certain it was in February. 

536. General Russell. Therefore you did not write this letter to 
Rohl in January to come over here because of this row with McCul- 
lough ? 

Colonel Wyman. I think I did. I did write it for that reason. 

537. General Russell. Therefore, you had a fuss with Grafe about 
McCullough before, in January ? 

Colonel Wyman. It was not necessarily about McCullough. It was 
about other things, too. 

538. General Russell. Didn't you say very definitely this morning 
the reason you wanted Rohl over here was because you wanted Mc- 
Cullough replaced? 

Colonel Wyman. That was one of the reasons, yes, sir. 

539. General Russell. What were the others ? 

Colonel Wyman. The other was hustling a plant over from the 
United States, which was not going along to my satisfaction ; also the 
procurement of material and the procurement of men. The job got off 
to a very poor start. 

540. General Russell. You want this Board to believe now, do you. 
Colonel, that as early as January 22nd, 19 days after the Under Sec- 
retary of War had approved this contract, and only a few days after 
all of this stuff had been purchased, that you saw that Paul Grafe 
and the crowd he had here, before they even started to work, could 
not run this job, and you needed Rohl? Is that what you want us to 
believe ? 



1822 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Wyman. All I am doing is to give you the facts [35S8] 
as I recollect them. 

541. General Russell. Well, give me the facts on that. 
Colonel Wyman. I have told you all I know, 

542. General Russell. It is not a very satisfactory answer from 
my standpoint. It leaves me very much confused about that issue. 

Colonel Wyman. I can state, which is to the best of my recollec- 
tion, that I had difficulty with Grafe. Grafe was spending more time 
trying to find out what his rights were under this contract than he 
was in getting work done, getting the equipment over, getting the 
materials, getting men and starting the job. You will find lots of 
correspondence in the files requesting interpretation of this and inter- 
pretation of that, and I remember that I wrote this letter to Rohl 
asking him to come over here, and in good faith, for the purpose of 
assisting in building up an organization for the Hawaiian Construc- 
tors to do this job, and one of the points that was in controversy was 
the feeble effort being made by Mr. McCuUough as the superintendent 
of the work. That was one of the points. 

543. General Russell. And you had come to all of those conclusions 
before the 22nd day of January, 1941 ? 

Colonel Wyivian. About that time, apparently, sir; yes, sir. 

544. General Russell. Now, soon thereafter you and this jnan Rohl 
began to have telephone conversations back and forth. 

Colonel Wyman. According to this record, we did. 

545. General Russell. And you have no recollection of that at all ? 
Colonel Wyman. I cannot recall what they were about, only these 

that I mentioned, the one at Schofield and those when he [35S9] 
was back 

646. General Russell. In the fall ? 

Colonel Wyman. In the fall, about the shipment of the equipment 
and the men on the LUDlNGTON to Canton and Christmas, and 
those in this other period I do not recollect what they were about. 

547. General Russell. Notw^ithstanding the fact that you testified 
that in response to your letter to Rohl to come over here, he did not 
reply 

Colonel Wyman. I would 



548. General Russell. Wait a minute. You now testify that in 
some of those telephone calls which you had with him in the spring 
nothing about what was going on out here was discussed ? 

Colonel Wyman. I would not say that, no, sir. 

549. General Russell. Wouldn't it have been a natural, normal as- 
sumption to think that if you had written him to come out here and 
you talked to him on the telephone five or six times in the next three or 
four months you would ask him "Why in the hell don't you reply to 
my letter or come out here?" 

Colonel Wyman. I may have done so. I don't know. I don't 
recollect it, sir. I may have done it. I don't know. 

550. General Russell, You were continuing to need Rohl out here 
during that period, however? 

Colonel Rohl, When Grafe agreed that he would furnish Mr. 
Ashlock from the Prado Dam. who was the superinendent on the 
Prado Dam, as soon as he could be released, then I had no further 
objection or no difficulty with Grafe over the superintendent, because 
Ashlock, he was the superintendent at Prado under my charge, and he 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1823 

did a good job, and I felt he would be [3S60] satisfactory for 
this job, and he was satisfactory, 

551. General Russell. Now, Colonel, when it came to your atten- 
tion in June that this man Rohl was a German alien, your testimony 
was to the effect that you called that to the attention of the Chief 
Engineer and forgot it? 

Colonel Wyman. No. In a letter. 

552. General Russell. In a letter? 
Colonel Wyman. Yes. 

553. General Russell. Tliat they could do what they pleased about 
it, that you had discharged your duty when you told the Chief of 
Engineers that Rohl was an alien? 

Colonel Wyman. No, that was not all there was too it. I remember 
discussing the matter with General Hannum as to what action should 
be taken; either the Hawaiian Constructors should be notified that 
an alien would not be permitted to come on the job, would not be per- 
mitted to see any plans and specifications, or what action should be 
taken. In view of the fact that in accordance with the law, as I under- 
stood it, only the Secretary of War can handle those things, the thing 
had to go to him. 

554. General Russell. But now it made no difference with you 
whether Rohl came out hei-e and operated, or not, did it? 

Colonel Wyman. Yes, sir. In June we were prett}^ well set up 
here and going, and Rohl's services were not needed at that time, as 
far as I was concerned, but they were needed in the fall, and very 
badly, when we were organizing the island work, because we got the 
use of his plant and his organization. 

555. General Russell. Did you think it was all right for Rohl, the 
German, to come out here and participate in this ? 

[3S61] Colonel Wyman. Oh, no, not after the Act of Congress 
prohibited an alien to be on a job, no, sir, except that the interpreta- 
tion out here, about aliens, there were no aliens to be used on any 
of the fortification work. 

556. General Russell. Tliat was the only objection you had to Rohl, 
the legal difficulties of his getting out here ? 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, so far as the person was concerned, as far as 
I know, Rohl was loyal to the United States. I never knew him to 
commit any act that he should not. 

General Russell. One more line of questions. I want this to get 
very definitely in the record, on an issue, the issue of your entertain- 
ment by Rohl. Is it your testimony that never at any time have you 
ever been in a hotel I'oom which was rented by this man Rohl and had 
liquor served to you in that hotel room ? 

Colonel Wyman. No, I think that would not be right. I have been 
in a hotel room with Rohl, with others. Whether it was he that 
paid for the room or someone else, I would not know. I have been 
there. That was when he was here at Hnolulu and also on the main- 
land. 

557. General Russell. How frequently were you in hotel rooms with 
Rohl and had drinks with him ? 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, I would say maybe — I can remember on one 
occasion here in the Royal Hawaiian. I don't know whether it was 
his room or Grafe's or somebody else's room. I can remember in Los 
Angeles in a room with Connolly and Rohl and Sverdrup and others 



1824 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

in it. But they were just visits. I visited with other officers who 
were present with me. There was no dinner parties or grand parties 
or anything to it. 

[3S62] 558. General Russell. How would you happen to get 
into these rooms ? Did you just get in without invitation ; you did not 
know whose room or whose liquor it was? 

Colonel Wyman. No. I recall on one occasion where an officer 
came down from San Francisco and we were going to an engineers' 
meeting at the University Club, and this officer said to me, "Mr. Tom 
Conolly is in the Biltmore Hotel and I have promised to go over and 
pay my respects. Won't you go along and then we will go to the 
University Club?" I remember that, which we did. We did go to 
the room of Tom Connolly and it was filled with people, many, many 
people, and they were serving drinks. Whether or not we got a 
drink, I do not recollect. 

559. General Russell. So those were the only two occasions which 
you recall? 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, no. I was there for four years. There could 
have been other occasions. I do not recall them in any detail. 

560. General Russell. You only remember twice that you ever had 
drinks in a room with Rohl? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, I did here in the Hawaiian Hotel one night. 

561. General Rltssell. Once here and once in Los Angeles? 
Colonel Wyman. Well, I would say twice I mentioned in Los 

Angeles. 

562. General Russell. All right. Now, in your written statement 
you say "Mr. Rohl was my guest at my club on several occasions, to- 
gether with other Army officers." 

Colonel Wyman. Yes. 

[So63] 563. General Russell. "The hospitality and courtesies 
thatl extended Mr. Rohl through these invitations was in reciproca- 
tion of similar courtesies extended to me by him." 

Colonel Wyman. That is right. 

564. General Russell. Do you mean you had gone to the club with 
him and had been entertained at his club? 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, no. I had lunch with him and I remember 
a little restaurant we used to eat at near my office, and he had lunch 
with me and my officers in the California Club, where we had a table 
of our own and ate there from time to time, and we had guests. 

565. General Russell. Your testimony is that you took him to your 
club on several occasions to pay him back for these times — 

Colonel Wyman. That is right. 

566. General Russell. Wait a minute. — when you and he ate 
luncheon together in a little restaurant ; is that your testimony ? 

Colonel Wyman. No. My testimony is he ate at my club at lunches 
in return for obligations that I was under to him. 

567. General Russell. How did you get under obligation to him ? 
Colonel Wyman. Because I had accepted his hospitality some place 

at lunch or dinner, I don't know. 

568. General Russell. You don't remember where? 

Colonel Wyman. Well. I remember at his house on at least one oc- 
casion. I was on his yacht. I ate on his yacht. I also ate at a small 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1825 

restaurant near my office. Then I would not be surprised that I ate 
in the grill room of the Biltmore Hotel with him at lunch. 

[SS64] 569. General Russell. Now, you say that the social con- 
tacts you had with Rohl were just the same as the social contacts that 
you had with numerous other contractors ? 

Colonel Wyman. That is correct. 

570. General Russell. Dictate into the record the names and ad- 
dresses of these other contractors srith whom you maintained the same 
social contacts that you did with Rohl and whom you had to eat 
with you at your club and whose homes you visited, as you did with 
Rohl? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, I was at Grafe's home, and also had dinner 
with him and lunch with him elsewhere. 

571. General Russell. That is Paul Grafe. 
Colonel. Wyman. Paul Grafe. 

572. General Russell. Name another. 
Colonel Wyman. Another is Guy Atkinson. 

573. General Russell. That is another. 

Colonel Wyman. And George Atkinson, his son. I can't remember 
his name, but I had lunch with the president or at least the principal 
person in charge of the Standard Dredging Company in Los Angeles. 

574. General Russell. I am asking you about other contractors with 
whom you maintained the same social intercourse that you did with 
Rohl, not a man that you had lunch with once in a while. 

Colonel Wyman. The ether contractors did not have any yacht. 
I could not go yachting with them because they did not have any. 

575. General Russell. Did you ever go to any night clubs with Mr. 
Rohl? 

[356S] Colonel Wyman. It is my recollection that Mr. Rohl was 
in a night-club party made up of officers of the Army and their fam- 
ilies on January 1, 193G. 

576. General Russell. Is that the only time? 
Colonel Wyman. That's one time I can think of. 

577. General Russell. Do you remember you and Rohl ever going 
to night clubs in 3^our automobile, driven by a man named Zucca, and 
Rohl's automobile coming along behind, driven by a man named Brown, 
on several occasions? Did that happen? 

Colonel Wyman. I can remember of one occasion where I went to 
a dinner of contractors, in — I thought it was the other way around, I 
don't know — in my car, with Mr. Rohl, at a dinner of contractors and 
some congressmen, in a restaurant, French restaurant in Beverly Hills. 
I don't remember the.name of it. It is a night club. 

578. General Russell. And those are the only two times that you 
can remember that you ever went to night clubs with Rohl? 

Colonel Wyman. That's all I remember. I never went to night clubs 
with him, in any great number of times. 

579. General Russell. That is all. 

580. Colonel Touljmin. I would like to ask a couple of questions, 
General, if I may. 

581. General Grunert. Go ahead. 

582. Colonel Toulmin. Colonel, I would like to get your assistance 
in clearing up some of the factual conditions that surrounded the exe- 
cution of these contracts during 1941. Now, first, is the question of 



1826 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

priorities, which I understood was quite troublesome at that time; 
am I correct in that understanding ? 

[^36661 Colonel Wyman. Yes, sir ; very troublesome. 

583. Colonel Toijlmin. And, of course, you had no authority here 
to issue priorities, or to change them ; that is correct ? 

Colonel Wymax. Oh, no; we had to make recommendations to 
higher authority. 

584. Colonel Toitlmin. And it went to the Corps of Engineers then, 
is that right ? 

Colonel Wtman, Eventually, it went to the Chief of Engineers. 

585. Colonel Toulmin. And the Chief of Engineers passed it on, to 
anyone beyond him, or did he assume final responsibility ? 

Colonel Wttniax. No, he had to pass it to the Army-Navy Munitions 
Board. 

586. Colonel Toulmin. And the representative of the Army-Navy 
Munitions Board was General Lucius Clay, is that correct ? 

Colonel Wyman. I don't know. , 

587. Colonel Toulmin. You do not know? Well, who was the 
representative of the Army on that board, who took care of these 
priorities ? 

Colonel Wyman. I don't know. 

588. Colonel Toulmin. You don't know ? So, whoever that person 
was, he was the man who had the responsibility for getting the ap- 
propriate priorities, is that right? 

Colonel Wyman. Why, I don't know that. I wasn't in on that 
phase of it, at all. All we could do, here, was urge to get a priority 
which we thought would get work done on time. 

589. Colonel Toulmin. All right, let us approach it from another 
view. Did you get priorities that were satisfactory ? 

Colonel Wyman. No. 

[3667^ 590. Colonel Toulmin. All right. Then that can be 
settled, that you had unsatisfactory priorities, and that you passed 
that responsibility to the Chief of Engineers ; is that right ? 

Colonel Wyman. No; the Commanding General of the Hawaiian 
Department, also, through the Adjutant General, also made recom- 
mendations to increase the priorities for the Hawaiian work. 

591. Colonel Toulmin. So you and the Department Commander 
were in agreement you needed higher priorities to get the job done, 
is that right ? 

Colonel Wyman. That is right, higher priorities to get materials 
in the United States, and to get materials manufactured. 

592. Colonel Toulmin. But there was no divergence of opinion be- 
tween you and the Department Commander on the subject of priori- 
ties, was there? 

Colonel Wyman. No, except we needed higher priorities to get the 
work done. We wanted to be rated as high as Panama. 

593. Colonel Toulmin. So both you and the Department Com- 
mander were in agreement that you needed higher priorities, to get 
this job done, is that right? 

Colonel Wyman. Yes ; I agree to that. 

594. Colonel Toulmin. All right; and did you pass that responsi- 
bility on to the Chief of Engineers ? Is that right ? 

Colonel Wyman. That is the only thing we can do, that I can do, 
is to make a request to the Chief of Engineers. • 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1827 

595. Colonel Toulmin. All right. Very well. Now, that settles 
priorities. Now, on the subject of the approval of drawings, did 
you have the final authority here to approve the [S568] con- 
struction drawings and tell the contractor to go to work, or did you 
have to send those drawings that you proposed to use to higher au- 
thority for approval? 

Colonel Wyman. I had to send to both the Commanding General 
of the Hawaiian Department and to the division engineer at San 
Francisco all drawings for approval. That is, for our part of the 
work, of course. 

596. Colonel Toulmin. Did the division engineer have final au- 
thority in passing upon those drawings, or did he in turn have to 
pass those drawings to the Office of the Chief of Engineers for final 
initialing and approval? 

Colonel Wyman. I don't know that, I would have to look it up. 

597. Colonel Toulmin. Will you look it up? 
Colonel Wyman. Yes, sir; I will. 

598. Colonel Toulmin. And will you advise this Board of that 
fact? 

Colonel Wyman. Yes, sir. 

599. Colonel Toulmin. So that you were not able here within the 
islands to finally pass upon the drawings; that is the sum and sub- 
stance of it? 

Colonel Wyman. Not prior to this. That's prior to the 7th of 
December. 

600. Colonel Toulmin. I am talking now, prior to December 7, 
because that is the inquiry we are directing ourselves to. 

Colonel Wyman. Yes, the drawings at that time had to go to the 
Commanding General for approval, and also to the division en- 
gineer at San Francisco. 

601. Colonel Toulmin. All right. Now, so we may have one clear 
[oS69] question and one clear answer, during the year 1941, up to 
December 7, the authority and responsibility for approving draw- 
ings finally did not rest in you but rested in the division engineer, or 
someone higher than the division engineer, is that correct? 

Colonel Wyman. That's right. 

602. Colonel Toulmin. Is that correct? 
Colonel Wyman. Yes, sir. 

603. Colonel Toulmin. All right. 

Colonel Wyman. Also, the Hawaiian Department. 

604. Colonel Toulmin. Now, who was responsible for what you 
said, the "tedious process''^ in connection with the 148 projects, in 
order to get them approved, coordinated, and put under way? Who 
were the people responsible for the "tedious process"? 

Colonel Wyman. The Orders and Regulations of peacetime is a 
very slow process. Ordinarily it takes from two to three months to 
make a contract and to get one going. Ordinarily, plans have got 
to be approved by higher authority, and no work can be commenced 
until they are approved. Yes, that is a tedious process. It doesn't 
make for speed. 

605. Colonel Toulmin. All right; and those rules of the game 
were rules promulgated by the Chief of Engineers, is that correct? 

Colonel Wyman. Most of them are acts of Congress. 



1828 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

606. Colonel Toulmin. And also, the Chief of Engineers, in 
carrying them out? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, the Chief of Engineers writes, I suppose, 
the Orders and Regulations, but they are interpretations of the law, 

[3570] 607. Colonel Toulmin. All right. So your position is, 
the responsibility for the "tedious process" was the joint responsibility 
of Congress and the Corps of Engineers, is that right ? 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, I don't mean anything of the kind. It is not 
for me to tell Congress how to pass legislation or to run the country. 

608. Colonel Toulmin. AVell, just answer my question. 
Colonel Wyman. Well, I would say I don't agree with it, at all. 

609. General Frank. You don't agree with what ? 
Colonel Wyman. How ? 

610. General Frank. What is it you do not agree with? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, I don't agree. He asked me, "You under- 
stand as follows." Well, I can't answer his question Yes or No, be- 
cause I don't agree with it. 

611. Colonel Toulmin. Well, I am content to let the record shotv 
the witness's full understanding of my question and his inability to 
answer. 

Colonel Wyman. If you will reframe the question I will try to 
answer it. I don't understand it. 

612. All right. I want to know — we will start all over again, 
now — I want to know who was responsible for the "tedious process" 
in the putting under way of the 148 projects during the year 1941 in 
this area? 

Colonel Wyman. I would like to look at it. That means we will 
have to give you all the "buck slips" of the Hawaiian Department, to 
check that. 

613. Colonel Toulmin. All right. I would like to have 3^011 
[So71] answer that. 

Colonel Wyinian. Well, I say, the answer to that is to produce the 
exhibits, which will be in the nature of the entire staff of correspond- 
ence between the higher — '— 

614. Colonel Toulmin. I am, asking now for those things outside 
of your control, and therefore, outside of the Hawaiian Department. 

Colonel Wyman. No; this is in the Hawaiian Department. 

615. Colonel Toulmin. I am limiting this, now, to who was respon- 
sible for the "tedious process" for the 148 projects in the year 1941 
that were to be undertaken in this department, prior to December 7, 
1941, as to those people outside of the Hawaiian Islands. 

Colonel Wy3ian. Well, I am referring chiefly to the "buck slip" 
process, which is right here in the Hawaiian Islands, and it is in the 
files. 

616. Colonel Toulmin. All right; will j^ou produce the answer? 
Colonel Wyman. Well, I can produce the "buck slips," but it means 

to get all the files from the district engineer — and there are plenty 
of them. 

617. Colonel Toulmin. All right. Now, we want to know who it 
was that was responsible for what you, as a responsible officer, have 
testified was a "tedious process," 

Colonel Wyman. It is. 

618. Colonel Toulmin. — in getting this job done. That is the 
issue before this Board, and we would like to know, if you are not 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1829 

responsible, who was responsible. If you cannot answer it now, we 
would like to have you give us an answer as soon as you can. 

[3573] Colonel Wyman. Well, I would like to answer it now. 

619. Colonel Toulmin. All right. 
Colonel Wyman. I will read again : 
As an example of this time-consuming — 
Well, put it this way: 

In the Hawaiian Department it was necessary for these interdepartmental 
approvals, which resulted in a constant interchange of information, especially 
between the Signal Corps and the Department Engineers, representing G^, and 
the District Engineer. The concurrences of tlie Signal Corps were necessary on 
every change made, and befoi-e any part of the work could be started. The 
Department Engineer, representing the Commanding General also had to give 
his approval. I have recently gone through the files and there are literally hun- 
dreds of staff memoranda illustrating this point. 

As an example of this time-consuming process I introduce in evidence as Exhibit 
M a memorandum dated 14 February 1941, written by me to the Department 
Engineer requesting the approval of certain preliminary sketches and plans. As 
a further exhibit, M-1, I introduce in evidence the first indorsement of tlie 
Department Engineer showing a partial approval and partial disapproval, a 
change in the proposed work, and a direction that one item be delayed until 
further instructions. I give this merely as one example of hundreds of such 
instances. 

Now, I can read the exhibit. 

620. Colonel Toulmin. Now, let mie ask you this question — if you 
are through with that. Are you through? 

[3573] Colonel Wy^iax. Well, I was going to read the exhibit. 

621. Colonel Toulmin. Just refer to the exhibit by number, so we 
won't have to go through the details of that. It is already in evidence. 

Colonel Wyman. I don't know what the number is. 

622. Colonel Toulmin. Just identify it by the title, and we will get 
at it later. 

Colonel Wyman. I just want to indicate. I just gave this as a 
sample. 

623. Colonel Toulmin. Well, let me ask you this question, that will 
clear it up. We are interested of course in your responsibility, and 
the extent you had power to carry that responsibility. Now, as I 
understand it, these various "tedious process" steps were steps taken 
by others than yourself, and upon whom you had to await their action 
before you could go forward with the project, is that right? 

Colonel Wyman. Yes. Oh, yes; I brought that out in another 
paper, here, that there are twelve agencies with whom I dealt, and of 
those 12, I only controlled three. 

624. Colonel Toulmin. All right. Now, that is what I want to 
bring out, that as to this "tedious process," the major portion, nine out 
of 12 major steps, were outside of yoiu" control and were in higher 
authority's hands ; is that right ? 

Colonel Wyman. Other agencies ; yes, sir. 

625. Colonel Toulmin. All right. 

Did you, at any time, write any letter or send any communication 
to higher authority asking that these "tedious process" steps be 
changed and the system be revised so that expeditious work be done, 
to get this work done for the Government of the United States on 
time, in order to take care of the defense [3574-] of these 
islands? 



1830 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Wymax. Well, in the case of the Chief of Engineers, it 
niaj^ not be within my prerogative to suggest that Orders and Regula- 
tions be changed in any way. That isn't done by district engineers. 

620. Colonel Toulmin. You wouldn't do that, then? 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, no. I would not feel that I had authority 
to do that. 

027. Colonel Toulmin. All right. 

Colonel Wyman. In the case of the staff procedure of the Hawaiian 
Department, it would certainly not be in order for me to try to tell 
the Hawaiian Department how to conduct its business. 

628. Colonel Toulmin. All right. Let me ask you this question, 
then : To what extent did the Chief of Engineers' Office, or repre- 
sentatives of that office, other than General Hannum, the Division 
Engineer, come to these islands to see your problems, inspect your 
operations, and to see what they could do to expedite matters, during 
the year 1941, prior to December 7, 1941 ? 

Colonel Wyman. You say, except General Hannum? 

029. Colonel Toulmin. Yes. 

Colonel Wy3ian. General Hannum was my superior, as division 
engineer. 

030. Colonel Toulmin. I am excepting him, now. Just answer the 
question as I have it. 

Colonel Wyman. I have to recollect. I don't know who came. I 
really don't know. 

031. Colonel Toulmin. You don't remember ? 
[S676'\ Colonel Wyman. No. 

032. General Frank. Did anybody come? 

Colonel Wyjian. I couldn't — they certainly, undoubtedly did; but 
I don't remember. 

033. Colonel Toulmin. All i-ight. Now, let me ask one more ques- 
tion. Have you received any complaint, reprimand, or other adverse 
comment on your conduct, either from the Commanding General of 
the Army Service Force, or the Chief of Engineers, as to how you 
conducted this construction job, during the year 1941, up to December 
7,1941? 

Colonel Wyman. I haven't received any commimication. 

034. Colonel Toulmin. That is all I have. 

Who was in charge, as Chief of Engineers, during 1941 ? Who was 
Chief of Engineers during 1941 ? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, let's see; 1940 was Julian Schley. He was 
succeeded by Reybold, I don't know the date — General Reybold. 

035. Colonel Toulmin. Who was the Chief of Engineering Con- 
struction ? I presume you had that same position that General Brag- 
don now occupies, in 1941. 

Colonel Wyman. I haven't the least 

030. Colonel Toulmin. Do you remember that ? 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, General Robins; yes; General Robins. 

037. Colonel Toulmin. .Vnd wlio was the Commanding General 
of the Army Service Force during this }:)eriod of 1941? 

Colonel Wyman. There wasn't any. 

038. Colonel Toltlmin. The Army Service Force did not come into 
the picture until after 1941 ? 

. Colonel Wyman. No. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1831 

639. Colonel TouLMiN. Is that correct? 

[3576] Colonel Wyman. He wasn't in charge. 

640. Colonel Toulmin. All right. Now, one final question. Whose 
responsibility was it to see that all these various organizations and 
agencies whose approval would have to be sought and secured should 
be coordinated and their work expedited and the thing brought to 
some conclusion, or was the matter allowed to drift without any respon- 
sible head ? 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, I would say the using service would be the 
greatest interest to push, would be the "spark plug" to push the work 
and urge it on. It was for them. Of course, we were merely the con- 
structing agency to build it. 

641. Colonel Toulmin. You mean by that that the Air Coqos. for 
these facilities, would demand expediting of the work? 

Colonel Wyman. The Air Corps certainly presses the engineer 
service to build their airfields and other things. They are right on 
their — oh, as far as the Hawaiian staff, why, qf course, it was G-4 
that was the coordinating agency. 

642. Colonel Toulmin. But, aside from G-4 ? Now, G-4 is the sole 
official coordinating agency, except that the using services pressed you 
for results, is that right ? 

Colonel Wyman. Now, you ask me who would — who should. I 
would say, the using service. 

643. Colonel Toulmin. But I asked you who did, during 1941 ? 
Colonel Wyman. Oh. the only one that pressed me was the Com- 
manding General of the Hawaiian Department, himself. 

644. Colonel Toulmin. The Army Air Force, here, did not press 
you? 

Colonel Wyman. Wliom do you mean? For what job? 

645. Colonel Toui-,min. To get their jobs done — the facilities. 
[3577] Colonel Wyman. Oh, General Martin was — yes, he was 

calling conferences every day or two. 

646. Colonel Toulmin. He was pressing you hard, wasn't he? 
Colonel Wyman. Well, he didn't have any money; that was the 

trouble. We planned, and we made our plans and got them all ready, 
but you see we didn't get any money for airfields in any quantity, 
until, oh, I guess it was after the "blitz." 

647. Colonel Toulmin. All right . Now, was the Signal Corps press- 
ing you in 1941 to get their establishments built so they could put 
their equipment in ? 

Colonel Wyman. I don't recollect that they put any great pressure 
on. I can remember that General Short was greatly interested in 
getting this work done, and spoke to me from time to time. 

648. Colonel Toulmin. Did General»Short press you to get this job 
done? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, he spoke about it, and he made inquiry, the 
progress we were making, and I know at one time I drafted a tele- 
gram for him to send to the United States about getting the cableway 
shipped over here, which is a matter of record, one of the exhibits here. 
Oh, yes, we also — some of the correspondence we drafted regarding 
the acquisition of land from the Department of the Interior, urging 
the transfer, you know, so we could get up on Haleakala. 



1832 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

649. Colonel Toulmin. I am aware of that; but confining j'onrself 
now to the Army activities — strictly to the Army activities — who else, 
in 1941, other than the Signal Corps and General Short, were pressing 
you to get this construction done? 

[SS78] Colonel Wyman. You mean, pressing me to get it done ? 

650. Colonel Toulmin. Yes. 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, my own engineer department. General Han- 
num would show the greatest interest in it, and came over here and 
inspected it that year, in May 1941, and went back and did everything 
possible to get the materials over here, and plant over here, in order to 
get things done. 

651. Colonel Toulmin. Now, would it be fair to say. Colonel Wy- 
man, that the situation, due to lack of priorities and lack of getting 
plans approved, and the other difficulties of the "tedious process," was 
made, to your mind, in 1941, an unsatisfactory one? 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, very. We had the greatest difficulty of getting 
electrical goods; hardly procurable at all. For instance, you get a 
tank in a building, like a big kitchen, the hot water tank, and without 
a fitting, and try to find some fittings to put on it, and go to extreme 
measures in order to get things working. That went along in every- 
thing, and especially the greatest difficulty of all was getting gas 
fittings for gas tanks; that is, big gas tanks, which have got to be 
special, as you know, specially made; and it was very difficult to get 
them. 

And here is a thing of interest. I found out from the district en- 
gineer's office, here — I was told by one of the engineers, that valves 
that we ordered in 1941 for the reserve storage built at Wheeler Field 
arrived here at Honolulu in 1944, and are now here. 

652. Colonel Toulmin. That is all. 

Colonel Wyman. He also told me that there were a great many 
orders that were placed by us, that the delivery was [3579] 
more than a year later. 

653. Colonel Toulmin. That is all. Thank you, s-ir. 

654. Major Clausen. Colonel, what did you. do before the basic 
contract of December 1940 was signed, regarding checking to see 
the loyalty of the parties who would enter into this contract ? 

Colonel Wyman. Why, hey had — what did I do ? 

655. IVIajor Clausen. Yes, sir. 

Colonel Wyman. I didn't do anything in particular. 

656. Major Clausen. Never? 

Colonel Wyman. These people had worked for the United States 
before. Eohl was a highly respected citizen, as far as I knew, of 
southern California, very popular with his 

657. Major Clausen. engineers? 

Colonel Wyman. other contractors and his associates. Connolly 

was an officer in the World War. I know that, because I saw a photo- 
graph of him. Grafe was a highly respected citizen in the locality 
where he lived. He was highly thought of by other contractors and 
associates and engineers. 

658. Major Clausen. Colonel, I do not like to interrupt, but the 
time is running on, and you have answered my question. 

Colonel Wyman. Oh, excuse me. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1833 

659. Major Clausen. Now, when you got this information, in June 
1941, that Rohl was an alien, a German alien, what was your reaction ? 

Colonel Wtman. Oh, I immediately wrote a letter to the Chief of 
Engineers in Washington. 

660. Major Clausen. I say, what was your reaction ? 
Colonel Wyman. Well, I just was surprised, that is all, 

661. Major Clausen. Just a sort of mild surprise ? 

[35S0] Colonel Wyman. No, not mild ; mild enough to get imme- 
diate action and write a letter to the Chief of Engineers, so stating. 
That was my first reaction. 

662. Major Clausen. But you never followed that up ? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, I am not certain I did or didn't. I took 
it up with General Hannum. He probably called me on the telephone 
about it. I am not certain, but I do remember discussing it with 
General Hannum that there was action necessary. No, he never was 
an enemy alien, as far as I understand it. 

663. Major Clausen. Now, you concede. Colonel Wyman, concern- 
ing these interocean telephone calls that are mentioned on page 34, 
that you had numerous telephone calls back and forth between your- 
self and Rohl, or vice versa ? 

Colonel Wyman. "Numerous telephone calls !" It records here 
eight calls over a peeriod of about ten months of time. 

664. Major Clausen. Yes. Now you said this morning to General 
Frank that interocean calls were recorded. Where are the record- 
ings of what you were saying and what Mr. Rohl was saying on those 
eight calls? 

Colonel Wyman. I don't know. I don't know where they are. 

665. Major Clausen. Well, where were they normally kept ? 
Colonel Wyman. Well, they would be the same recordings. Some 

of these are in the night-time. 

666. Major Clausen. Some of them are in the night-time? 
Colonel Wyman. I say some are in the night-time. 

667. Major Clausen. All right, where are the recordings of them? 
Colonel Wyman. I would say there was no recording made, 

\3681] at this time, because the office was closed. Well, I have 
no recordings, I can't find any. 

668. Major Clausen. You say you have none, you can't find any? 
Colonel Wyman. No, I- can't find any. 

669. Major Clausen. Did you look for some? 

Colonel Wyman, Yes, I look all through my files, all the files down 
in the office, for recordings. 

670. Major Clausen, There is a statement here, on page 38, by the 
War Department 

Colonel Wyman, You understand we had no recording machines in 
our office at that time, like they have now, 

6'7l, Major Clausen, You had stenographers, didn't you? 

Colonel Wyman, I had, yes, Mr, Epson and Miss Heilman, were my 
stenographers for a long time. 

672. Major Clausen. There is a statement here, on page 38 of the 
committee report : 

There is no record in this office (United States Engineers Office, Honolulu, 
T. H.,) of any formal complaints registered by the Government concerning 
delays of the contractor during 1941. 

79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 3 15 



1834 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Lyman. I read you those, this morning, that I had found, 
I found three. 

673. Major Clausen. Do 3'^ou say that this statement on page 38, 
purporting to be a representation by the War Department, is correct 
or incorrect? 

Colonel Wyman. By the War Department ? 

674. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. 
Colonel Wyman. Let me read it. 

675. Major Clausen. Page 38, representation by the War [3582] 
Department to the Connnittee on Military Affairs, of the House. 

Colonel Wyman. This seems to be signed and notarized December 
18, 1943. That is an affidavit made by Rea B. Wickiser. 

676. Major Clausen. Do you see page 38, Colonel Wyman? 
Colonel Wyman. Well, I am reading right at the top, here. 

677. Major Clausen. Yes. Well, the quotation is in small print. 
Colonel Wyman. "To confirm." 

678. Major Clausen. "There is no record in this office." 

Colonel Wyman. Well, I found some, myself, after I came out here, 
so the person who made this report made a defective report. 

670, Major Clausen. In other words, you say the person who made 
the record 

Colonel Wyman. No — made this report. It states, here : 

There is no record in this office (United States Engineers Office, Honolulu 
T. H.) of any formal complaints registered by the Government concerning delays 
of the contractor during 1941. 

What is a formal complaint ? "Concerning delays of the contrac- 
tor during 1941." Well, I found some. I introduced them as evi- 
dence, 

680. Major Clausen, Now, let me invite your attention to some- 
thing else, just to get the record clear. Was this Colonel B, L, Robin- 
son ever related to you. Colonel Wyman ? 

Colonel Wyman. Not at all. 

681. Major Clausen. At no time? 

Colonel Wyman. By act of Congress, he is my brother-in- [3583] 
law. 

682. Major Clausen. What's that? 

Colonel Wyman. By act of Congress. By this document, he is my 
brother-in-law, but he was never my broth^-in-law, and isn't now. 

683. Major Clausen. Now, you have occupied adjoining rooms 
with Mr. Rohl, at the Pleasanton Hotel, didn't you ? 

Colonel Wyman. No, I occupied adjoining rooms with Bernard 
Robinson, Colonel Robinson and his wife, and he lived in one room, 
and I and my wife lived in the next one. 

684. Major Clausen. Did you ever know a Bertha Andreen, in 
Washington ? 

Colonel Wyman. No, I don't know, 

685. Major Clausen. Were you ever arrested here for drunken- 
ness or any other cause ? 

Colonel Wyman. No, I was never arrested for drunkenness. 

686. Major Clausen. Or any other cause? 

Colonel Wyman. No. I was never arrested in Honolulu. Now, 
wait a minute. I might have been for speeding, or something. No, 
I was never arrested in Honolulu. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1835 

687. Major Clausen, Do you know a Werner Plack? 
Colonel Wyman. No, I don't know him. 

688. Major Clausen. This letter of November 24, 1941, to which 
I invited your attention, states, in paragraph 3 : 

It is directed that iu the future each cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contractor submit 
to the district engineer on the 10th and 25th day of each month a brief report 
setting forth his views as to progress being made, diflBcultles encountered, antici- 
pated difficulties, and [358Jf] recommendations for improving the conduct 
of the work. This report will be submitted through the project engineer, who will 
by endorsement thereon make such comments as are pertinent and then forward 
it within 24 hours to the district engineer. 

Did you make such reports? 

Colonel Wyman. That paper was issued in November 1941, and 
probably received here after the Pearl Harbor disaster. Maybe it 
wasn't received until as late as January 20, because that is the first 
mail came over here, 1942; and none of that was — that is, that paper 
wasn't, couldn't have been complied with before the Pearl Harbor 
disaster. 

689. Major Clausen. Did you make such reports? 

Colonel Wyman. I don't know. You will have to look, consult the 
files of the district engineer. 

690. Major Clausen. That is all. 

691. General Grunert. Are there any other questions ? 

Colonel, have you anything else you want to bring up that may 
assist the Board ? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, General, there are certain requests have 
been made to submit copies of letters from the files of the district engi- 
neer's office, if we can find them, and we will make a search, and we 
will have to quote Army orders. Army regulations and Army orders, 
or Engineer Ordei's and Regulations, to answer some of the questions 
of tlie Colonel as to the authorities of the Chief of Engineers, the divi- 
sion and the district, at that time. It can be done. 

692. General Grunert. Do you wish a rehearing, or do you wish 
to submit an additional statement? 

[SS8S] Colonel Wyman. Yes, sir. 

693. General Grunert. Then the limit on time for submission of 
that additional statement, I will have to set as September 25. 

Colonel Wyman. Yes, sir. Here, General, or elsewhere? 

694. General Grunert. No, we will be in Washington then. 
Colonel Wyman. Yes, sir, 

695. General Grunert. You can submit it any time you have it 
ready, or submit it in Washington, 

Colonel Wyman, Will I have an opportunity to read my testimony 
with a view of making any corrections ? 

696. General Grunert. That has not been granted heretofore. I 
do not see why you shouldn't read it, but you cannot change anything 
therein. 

Colonel Wyman. Except by additional information? 

697. General Grunert. Except by an addendum thereto. 
Colonel Wyman. Yes, sir, 

698. General Grunert. That has been granted to several others, and 
I see no reason why it should not be granted to you. It will have to 



1836 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

be done, though, in the presence of the Recorder or the Assistant 
Recorder. 

Colonel Wyman. Yes, sir. 

699. General Gkuxert. And as soon as it is typed. The Board ex- 
pects to get away from here Monday or Tuesday, next week, and it 
should be done before that time, because we cannot leave a copy. 

Colonel Wymax. Will there be any occasion for me to come back 
to the Board again, here ? 

700, General Grunert. Not unless it is of your own desire. 
Colonel Wyman. Yes, sir. 

[S586] 701. General Grunert. And if so, arrangements will 
have to be made, because our time is all taken up. 

All right. Thank you. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

(Wliereupon, at 5 : 15 p. m., having concluded the hearing of wit- 
nesses for the day, the Board took up other business.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1837 



VS587^, CONTENTS 



Friday, September 15, 1944. 

Testimony of — Page> 
Colonel Bernard L. Robinson, Corps of Engineers, 520 1st Engineers 

Construction, Hollandia, New Guinea 3588 

Chester R. Clarke, 114 Merchant Street, Honolulu 3623 

Colonel Millard Pierson, Inspector General's OflSce, Pacific Ocean 

Areas 8636 

Frederick M. Earle, Wai-rant OflBcer, United States Anny 3642 

Arthur T. Short, Pleasanton Hotef, Honolulu, T. H 3644 

Lt. Col. Robert W. Hain, General StafC, U. S. A. F. P. O. A., Fort 

Shafter, T. H. Recalled 3650 

Colonel Benjamin R. Wimer, Corps of Engineers, Engineer Central 

Pacific Base Command 3663 

Lt. Col. J. J. Kestly, Corps of Engineers, Engineer, Base Command 3066 

Ahoon H. Wong, Deputy County Engineer, Wailuku. Maui 3677 

Simon Perliter, 1901 Ualakaa Street, Honolulu, T. H 3695 

Henry P. Benson, Hawaiian Dredging Company, Honolulu, T. H 3720 

Ralph E. Woolley, 2349 Oahu Avenue, Honolulu, T. H 3750 

DOCUMENTS 

Memo dictated by Colonel Toulmin 3639 

Letter, 7/28/41, Short to Adjutant General 3651 

Excerpts from Adjutant General's File 121 3653 

G-2 Estimate of international situation (Japanese) Oct. 17, 1941 3684 

G-2 Estimate of international situation (Japanese) Oct. 25, 1941 3689 

EXHIBITS 

No. 48. Map No. 1 from Japanese submarine 3643 

49. Map No. 2 from Japanese submarine 3643 

50. Memorandum, 9/7/44, Lt. Gen. Grunert to Commanding General, 

USAFPOA 3643 

50-A. 1st indorsement, 9/13/44, to memo 3644 

51. Memorandum 9/12/44, by Admiral McMorris with map 3662 

1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original transcript of proceedings. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1839 



[35S8-] PROCEEDINGS BEFOEE THE AEMY PEARL 

HARBOR BOARD 



FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1944 

Fort Shatter, Territory of Hawaii. 

The Board, at 8 : 00 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, con- 
ducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President 
of the Board, presiding. 

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. 
Kussell and Maj. Gen. Waiter H. Frank, Members. 

Present also : Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C. 
Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., 
Executive Officer. 

General Grunert. The Board will come to order. 

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL BERNARD L. ROBINSON, CHIEF OF ENGI- 
NEERS, 520 1ST ENGINEERS CONSTRUCTION, HOLLANDIA, NEW 
GUINEA 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Colonel Robinson, will you please state to the 
Board your name, rank, organization and station ? 

Colonel Robinson. Bernard L. Robinson, Colonel, Corps of Engi- 
neers, 520 1st Engineers, Construction, Hollandia, New Guinea. 

2. General Grunert. Colonel, General Frank, assisted by Major 
Clausen, will develop this part of the investigation by which we hope 
to get some evidence from you. 

3. General Frank. Colonel Robinson, General Bragdon, who is 
counsel for Colonel Wyman, suggested you come here as a witness, and 
I assume there is some information you have to give {^3589^ that 
it is desired you give to the Board. Have you a statement to make ? 

Colonel Robinson. Well, sir, I did not go over this thing in any 
detail with General Bragdon. About the only point I discussed with 
him was the fact that particularly prior to Pearl Harbor the District 
Engineer's authority was considerably limited, that the method of 
making contracts and the limitation of funds that the District Engi- 
neer could expend on his own authority was exceedingly limited, in 
accordance with orders and regulations of the Engineer Department, 
Army regulations and Congressional statute, and that was quite a 
different picture from the way we operate now or the way we operated 
down in the Southwest Pacific area, for instance. Also, certain ap- 
provals had to be obtained from the Division Engineer, Chief of Engi- 
neers and, in certain instances, from the Department Commander at a 



1840 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

later date. That was the only point I discussed at all with General 
Bragdon. 

4. General Frank. How did you get along with Paul Graf e ? 
Colonel Robinson. I got along fairly well with him. I did not have 

any direct dealings with him. I was present at a number of meetings 
that he had with Colonel Wyman. 

5. General Frank. On what duty were you from about July, 1941. 
through 1942? 

Colonel Robinson. I was Chief of the Operations Division of the 
District office, directly under Colonel Wyman. 

6. General Frank. When did you take that position? 
Colonel RoBI^'soN. I believe it was about the 1st of July, sir. 

7. General Frank. What did you do before then ? 

[3o90\ Colonel Robinson. I was Disbursing Officer, under 

Major Burnell. Wait a minute, I think I am a year off on that, sir. 

8. General Frank. How about 1941, then? 

Colonel Robinson. I believe I was Operations Officer throughout 
that period, sir. I believe I stopped disbursing some time before that, 
around the early part of the year. 

9. General Frank. Then you did not have much contact with 
Grafe? 

Colonel Robinson. Not directly. I had more contact with his assist- 
ant, McCullough, than I did with Grafe. 

10. General Frank. How did you get along with McCullough? 
Colonel Robinson. Well, I didn't like the way he was tackling the 

job. I so reported to Colonel Wyman. There was no friction be- 
tween us particularly, except I felt at one stage of the game that the 
job was not moving fast enough, and I so reported. 

11. General Frank. He was not big enough to irieasure up to his 
responsibilities ? 

Colonel Robinson. In my opinion that was true, yes, sir. 

12. General Frank. Who took his place? 

Colonel Robinson. As I recall, a chap by the name of Ashlock. 

13. General Frank. What was Rohl's job when he came over here? 
Colonel Robinson. Rohl assumed the supervision of the work of the 

Hawaiian Constructors, general supervision, as he was the top man 
in the Hawaiian Constructors. 

14. (xeneral Frank. Was Grafe here at the time? 

Colonel Robinson. He was during a portion of the time, [3S91] 
yes, sir. 

15. General Frank. Who was in charge when Grafe and Rohl both 
were here? 

Colonel Robinson. As I recall, they had a committee to determine 
matters of policy for the Hawaiian Contructors which, to the best 
of my memory, was Grafe and Rohl, Benson and Woolley. 

16. General Frank. Who headed up the group for the Hawaiian 
Constructors? Somebody must have been chairman of the group. 

Colonel Robinson. I believe that Mr. Rohl had the over-all au- 
thority as to final decision. That is my recollection, sir. 

17. General Frank. How did he get that over-all authority? By 
an agreeement among the Constructors or by designation by Colonel 
Wyman ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1841 

Colonel Robinson. I believe it was by agreement among the Con- 
structors and it had probably to do with the amount of his financial 
interest in the joint venture. 

18. General Frank. Did you know Eohl? 

Colonel EomNSON. I knew him, yes, sir. I did not know him prior 
to this, until his coming to Hawaii. 

19. General Frank. Was his service entirely satisfactory while he 
was here ? 

Colonel Robinson. Up until about April 

20. General Frank. What year? 

Colonel Robinson. Of 1942, it was satisfactory. The last month 
or six weeks that he was here I did not consider that he was adding 
anything to the picture. 

21. General Frank. Why? 

[3S92] Colonel Robinson. He simply turned over his duties to 
his subordinates and took practically no active part in the adminis- 
tration of the contract during that month or six weeks. 

22. General Frank. Did his habits have anything to do with his 
lack of productiveness ? 

Colonel Robinson. You mean drinking, sir? 

23. General Frank. Yes. 

Colonel Robinson. I suspected that they did, but I had no direct 
knowledge of that. 

24. General Frank. Did you ever have occasion to go see him? 
Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

25. General Frank. Where? 

Colonel Robinson. I saw him on one or two occasions in the Moana 
Hotel, I believe it was. 

26. General Frank. Socially or on business ? 
Colonel Robinson. On business. 

27. General Frank. How did you come to go there to do business 
with him? 

Colonel Robinson. He had reported that he was ill and, as I recall 
it, I called him on the phone and he asked me to come out, and I 
believe I did that on one or two occasions. He was not drinking at 
the time. He was ill. 

28. General Frank. From what, do you think? 
Colonel Robinson. I do not know, sir. 

29. General Frank. What do you think? 

Colonel Robinson. Well, at that particular time I did not observe 
that it was due to liquor, but I think he had a heart condition and a 
general — he was not physically active and I think that his liquor 
habits probably contributed to his \oS9.3] physical condition. 

30. General Frank. Was that the general impression around the 
camp, around headquarters? 

Colonel Robinson. It was Colonel Wyman's impression. I do not 
recall discussing it with anyone else. 

31. General Frank. Well, you had a group of associates who knew 
what the topside organization among the contractors was, and you 
knew whether you had confidence in it, or not. Those are things that 
are discussed by a group that are in the know, is it not? 

Colonel Robinson. I had confidence in his subordinates? 

32. General Frank. You had confidence in his subordinates? 
Colonel Robinson. Yes. 



1842 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

33. General Frank. Did you have confidence in him? 

Colonel Robinson. Not at that time. I did prior to that time, yes, 
sir. 

34. General Frank. Why didn't you ? 

Colonel Robinson. Because he was not on the job. 

35. General Frank. And why wasn't he on the job? 
Colonel Robinson. I think I have stated that, sir. 

36. General Frank. In a different way you have ptated it. Now, 
state it straight out, your opinion, baldly. 

Colonel Robinson. In my opinion, Mr. Rohl was not able to do 
work because of the physical condition, to which his drinking prob- 
ably contribut-ed. 

37. General Frank. Did similar habits ever apply to Colonel 
Wyman ? 

Colonel Robinson. No, sir. 

[3594] 38. Major Clausen. You were Colonel Wyman's assist- 
ant, were you, sir ? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

39. Major Clausen. You had known Colonel Wyman quite some 
time? 

Colonel Robinson. I have known him since about June of 1940. 

40. Major Clausen. Did you talk with him before you came to 
testify today, just a few days ago, yesterday? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes. I talked with him last night. 

41. Major Clausen. Do you recall Maurice G. Parker, who was 
an employee of the U. S. E. D. at the time you were on duty as Colonel 
Wyman's assistant? 

Colonel Robinson. I do not recall him personally, no. I took occa- 
sion to read the Congressional document last night, and I ran across 
his name in there in connection with my name. 

42. Major Clausen. Do you recall an incident when the Hawaiian 
Constructors, acting under Hans Wilhelm Rohl, wrote a letter to 
the U. S. E. D. here at Honolulu requesting that the U. S. E. D. buy 
from Rohl's company, the Rolil-Connolly Company of Los Angeles, 
California, certain equipment which was later appraised by Mr. 
Parker? 

Colonel Robinson. I recall the incident, yes. 

43. Major Cl.\usen. Let me just ask you whether or not the ap- 
praisal by Parker was lower than the amount which was afterwards 
paid? 

Colonel Robinson. As I recall, his original appraisal was, yes, sir. 

44. Major Clausen. And you recall that the original appraisal — I 
don't want to hold you to exact figures — was in the [SSPS] 
neighborhood of $131,000? 

Colonel Robinson. The figure sounds substantially correct. I do 
not recall the exact figure. 

45. Major Clausen. Now, that appraisal was made under your 
direction, was it not ? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

46. Major Clausen. Do you remember that when Mr. Parker's 
appraisal came back at this figure that neither Rohl nor Colonel 
Wyman liked it. they objected to it ? 

Colonel Robinson. No, sir; I do not think that — that is not in 
accordance with my memory. As I recall the facts were that this 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1843 

appraisal was made as of the date that Mr. Parker investigated the 
pieces of plant in question. 

47. Major Clausen. In other words, Mr. Parker was your man, 
emploj'ed by the government, who went out and made an appraisal 
and came back and said this property is worth $131,000? 

Colonel Robinson. The value of the property that I had to deter- 
mine to make a recommendation to Colonel Wyman, who I believe 
made an independent appraisal, was the value at the time the gov- 
ernment received it from the contractors. Now, to enable me to arrive 
at such a figure I had to work backwards on it, because no investiga- 
tion of the equipment had been made when it had been initially re- 
ceived from the contractors. Therefore, I desired a figure of its 
present value in order that the value of its deterioration during the 
time the government had had it might be added to it. I did not look 
to Mr. Parker to determine the amount of that depreciation. 

48. Major Clausen. My question. Colonel, was this: Whether it is 
not correct that you sent Mr, Parker out to make an [3596] an 
appraisal, that he came back and said the property was worth $131,000? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

49. Major Clausen. Now then, my next question is this: as to 
whether Mr. Rohl.and Colonel Wyman objected that the price put 
upon the appraisal was too low? 

Colonel Robinson. I do not recall that they did. I do not recall 
that that was the figure that I turned over to Colonel Wyman. 

50. Major Clausen. Do you remembei- that when Mr. Parker came 
back with this appraisal of $131,000 you called a meeting of Mr, Mid- 
dleton, Mr. Rohl, Mr. Wodley and Mr. Benson? 

Colonel Robinson. I recall such a meeting was held, yes, sir. 

51. Major Clausen. Do 3'Ou recall that at this conference Mr. Parker 
was told that his appraisal was too low? 

Colonel RoBiNspN. I recall telling Mr. Parker that we would have 
to add to the appraisal the amount or the value that the government 
had gotten out of the plant in the several months that it had been in 
use prior to its appraisal. Whether that occurred at this conference, 
or not, I do not recall. It is my recollection that it was separately with 
Mr. Parker, but it may have come out at this conference. 

52. Major Clausen. Do you recall that at tljis conference Mr, Rohl 
said that the equipment had been overhauled in the States and that 
he had had his figures on the cost of the repairs and that he should be 
l)aid rent for the previous four months? 

Colonel Robinson. I recall that some such statement was made by 
Mr. Rohl some time during the proceedings, whether at the conference 
or not. 

[3506-A] 53. Major Clausen. And do you remember that when 
Mr. Rohl said that Mr. Parker then said that whoever did the work 
of repairing it did a very good job of covering up defects, to which 
Mr. Rohl objected ? 

Colonel Robinson. I do not recall that now, sir. 

54. Major Clausen. Do you recall that Mr. Parker said that so 
far as he was concerned the appraisal represented the actual worth of 
the equipment, but that if the difference between the two figures, that 
is, the amount asked by Mr. Rohl and the amount set upon the equip- 
ment as its value by Mr. Parker, was* rent claimed, he would put in a 



1844 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

letter to that effect, and that he did put in such a letter on March 12, 
1942? 

Colonel Robinson. I recall some such discussion between Mr. Parker 
and mj-self. Whether it was at this conference or not, I do not 
recollect. 

55. Major Clausen. And that later in actuality there was paid to 
the Rohl-Connolly Company for this equipment $166,423.17? 

Colonel Robinson. I assume that whatever figure was agreed upon 
wa.s paid, yes, sir. 

56. Major Clausen. Do you know that that sale represented a profit 
on the books of the Rohl-Connolly Companv to the Rohl-Connolly 
Company of $65,000? 

Colonel Robinson. No, sir; I do not remember that. 

57. Major Claltsen. Do you recall a Mr. Tillman who used to work 
for you. Colonel ? 

Colonel Robinson. Tillman, yes, sir. 

58. Major Clausen. Do you remember a transaction where he made 
some appraisals? 

Colonel Robinson. I do not recall ; no, ^ir. 

[3S97] 59. Major Clausen. Do you recall an occurrence when 
he went out and looked up some equipment at your request and he came 
back and said it was a pile of junk and you said, ""For God's sake, 
don't buy it then" ? 

Colonel Robinson. I would like to have my memory refreshed on 
that. I think if I knew the items of the equipment I could probably 
recall. 

60. Major Clausen. This equipment was equipment, I believe, that 
was owned by the company, the Hawaiian Contracting Company, 
over which Mr. Benson had something to say ? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, I recall that incident. 

61. Major Clausen. You recall the incident of the equipment? 
Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

62. Major Cl^vusen. Now, is it not a fact that Mr. Tillman was sent 
out to look at some equipment and he came back and told you that so 
far as the Government buying this equipment was concerned, it was a 
pile of junk? 

Colonel Robinson. As to certain items of it, yes, sir, I recall that. 

63. Major Clausen. And that you said to him "Well, if that is the 
case, let's not buy it", or words to that effect ? 

Colonel Robinson. I i)robably made some such statement. I do not 
recall. 

64. Major Clausen. Do you recall later on you sent him back again 
to look at this equipment, after some intervening time ? 

Colonel Robinson. I may have. . I do not recall the details at this 
time. 

65. Major Clausen. You cannot remember that? 

Colonel Robinson. I probably did. I just do not recall [3598] 
that. 

66. Major Clausen. Do you remember that that which was said 
to be a pile of junk was later bought by the Government? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

67. Major Clausen. That is all. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1845 

Colonel Robinson. May I add on that statement, rather than leave 
an erroneous impression in the record, that I recall the circumstances. 
There were a few pieces of equipment which the Hawaiian Contract- 
ing Company had which were not piles of junk and which were re- 
quired due to shortage of equipment which exisited in Hawaii at that 
time. Mr. Benson would not agree to sell us the satisfactory items 
of equipment, and we did agree to buy all of his equipment, his argu- 
ment being that if we took only the satisfactory items of equipment it 
would put him out of business as a contractor, as he could not replace 
it and it was therefore necessary to buy all or none of liis equipment. 

68. General Russell. In your earlier testimony. Colonel, you said 
that Mr. Rolil's experience here in 1942, some time before he left, was 
not satisfactory and you gave General Fr^nk the reasons therefor. 
You recall that? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes. 

69. General Russell. In connection with that same testimony you 
stated that you knew that the impression which you had about Rohl 
was entertained also by Colonel Wyman. 

Colonel Robinson. Colonel Lyman, sir, his successor. 

70. General Russell. Not Colonel W\ man? 

Colonel Robinson. Not Colonel Wyman, no, sir. He had at that 
time. 

[S599] 71. General Russell. You did not talk to Wyman, then, 
prior to his departure about the effectiveness of Rohl as chairman of 
this executive board of the Hawaiian Constructors? 

Colonel RoiiiNSON. No, sir. 

72. General Russell. That is all. 

Colonel Robinson. It was Colonel Lyman. It was after Wyman's 
departure. 

73. General Russell. Just a minute. The relation betAveen Colonel 
Wyman and Mr. Rohl was rather cordial, was it not ? 

Colonel Robinson. Not any more so than any other contractors. I 
don't know what you mean by cordial. 

74. General Russell. They were together quite a bit when they were 
not working? 

Colonel Robinson. Not to my knowledge, no, sir. 

75. General Russell. Don't you know whether they were together 
at night in a hotel prior to the time of the departure of Colonel Wyman 
from the islands? 

Colonel Robinson. I was with him a good portion of that time. 
Mr. Rohl was there on some of those occasions, yes, sir. 

76. General Russell. At a hotel ? 
Colonel Robinson. At the Pleasanton Hotel. 

77. General Russell. At the Pleasanton Hotel ? 
Colonel Robinson. Yes. 

78. General Russell. Were there offices in there used by Rohl and 
Wyman ? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

79. General Russell. Did any other contractors have offices in the 
hotel? 

[3600] Colonel Robinson. No, sir. Just the Hawaiian Con- 
structors. All of the Hawaiian contractors used that as an office, that 



1846 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

is, Benson, Woolley and all of the joint adventurers, and Colonel 
Wyman and I had an office in there. 

80. General Russell. That is all. 

81. General Grunert. Colonel Toulmin, any questions? 

82. Colonel Toulmin. No questions. 

83. Major Clausen. Do you know Miss Schlesinger? 
Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

84. Major Clausen. Do you rember the night there was a party for 
Colonel Wyman on his leaving the islands? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

85. Major Clausen. Do you recall that you plioned Miss Schlesinger 
to come down tKat night ? 

Colonel Robinson. I believe I did, yes, sir. 

86. Major Clausen. To dig up some contracts? 
Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

87. Major Clausen. Did she dig up some contracts for you ? 
Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. I think there were quite a number that 

we signed on that occasion. 

88. Major Clausen. Just tell the Board what they were. 

Colonel Robinson. Supplemental agi'eements that had been typed 
during the day. 

89. Major Clausen. This was during what hours that she dug out 
these contracts on that day or that night? 

Colonel Robinson. It was pretty late at night. I have forgotten. 
Probably around 11 or 12. 

90. Major Clausen. How long did it take you in the process of her 
digging out the contracts and you signing them? 

[o601] Colonel Robinson. I do not recall that, sir. 

91. Major Clausen. About how long^ 
Colonel Robinson. Oh, I do not recall that, sir. 

92. Major Clausen. You are positive that on this night she came 
down and dug out these contracts for you ? 

Colonel Robinson. I am quite certain it was that night. 

93. Major Clausen. That is all. 

94. General Grunert. Colonel, I want to ask a few questions about 
this Mr. McCullough. He was what ? The general superintendent 
of the Hawaiian Constructors, or what ? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir, he was general superintendent. 

95. General Grunert. And he was not satisfactory ? 
Colonel Robinson. In my opinion he was not, no, sir. 

96. General Grunert. When did you judge he was not satisfactory, 
about the month, do you recall ? When did they start construction 
over here under the Hawaiian Constructors? 

Colonel Robinson. It must have been in January or February be- 
cause the contract was dated in December. January or February of 
1941. I do not recall the exact month, but it was a month or so after 
that, as I recall it. 

97. General Grunert. On what did you judge him? 
Colonel Robinson. On the initiation of the Avork, sir. 

98. General Grunert. How long after they got over here was the 
work initiated? How long did it take them to set up to get the work 
started ? We assume now the contract was signed by the Under Secre- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1847 

tary of War early in January. Ho\y long did it take them to get the 
thing set up to get started ? 

Colonel Robinson. That is a matter of record, I believe, sir. 

[3603] 99. General Grunert. I want the matter of record out of 
you. I want you to testify to the best of your memory. 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir, 

100. General Grunert. You were over here. You saw^ it started. 
Now, why cannot you tell me? Was it two months, one month, two 
weeks ? 

Colonel Robinson. To the best of my recollection it was about one 
month or six weeks, I believe, sir. 

101. General Grunert. Then that would make it when, when the 
work went on, whereby you could judge McCullough? 

Colonel Robinson, That would make it in March, sir. 

102. General Grunert. March? 
Colonel Robinson. Yes. 

103. General Grunert. February, at the earliest? 
Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

104. General Grunert. March probably at the latest, when the work 
got underway? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes. 

105. General Grunert. By that time you were able to size up 
McCullough? 

Colonel Robinson. There was the questions of camps and things of 
that sort also that entered into it. 

106. General Grunert. How much did you have to do with camps? 
The company set up their own camps, didn't they? The Engineers 
did not come into this until the contract started, did they? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes. We had the supervision of their camps 
and it was also on government property. We had to arrange for power 
and light installations and also we were under obligations to furnish 
certain material. 

[3603] _ 107. General Grunert, All right. We will go to 
another point. You say that the plant material that the government 
purchased from tlie Hawaiian Constructors when received was not 
appraised, and therefore you had to allow some value later on when 
you bought it in order to make up for its use during that time? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

108. General Grunert. Why wasn't it appraised when you got it? 

Colonel Robinson. That I could not answer, sir, except it was re- 
ceived in Los Angeles, loaded there, and was sent to Christmas and 
was supposed to go to Canton Island. 

109. General Grunert. Whose business or duty was it to appraise 
this property upon its receipt by the Engineers? 

Colonel Robinson. The responsibility was the District Engineer's, 

110. General Grunert. Then there was a lack of good achninistra- 
tion, or somebody failed to do their duty in not appraising it when 
the government took it over? 

Colonel Robinson. No, sir, I don't think that is so at all. I think 
it was the contention 

111. General Grunert, When you get something what do you do, 
in order to protect the government? Do you appraise its value so 
the government will get a fair deal, or do you wait three or four or 



1848 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

five months and use it and then appraise it and then practically sell 
it on the contractor's say so? Why is it not poor administration if 
they do not appraise it when they get it? Wliy is it not a lack of 
doing their duty when that occurs? 

Colonel Robinson. General, in appraising items of plant we fol- 
lowed the A. G. C schedule. 

[360Jf] 112. General Grunert. A^Hiat is that? 

Colonel Robinson. It is a schedule which lists all items of engineer- 
ing equipment new and its value after so many years of use and is 
generally accepted as a basis of rental in government contracts. 
That, as I recall it, was the original basis. The cost out here was, of 
necessity, of course, higher than that shown in the schedule. 

113. General Grunert. Then you rented all of this property to 
start with ; I mean that is used as a basis for computation. Did you 
rent it wh^n they started? 

Colonel Robinson. I believe that is covered in the general terms of 
the contract. I am not quite sure of that. 

114. General Grunert. I do not see how you can protect the gov- 
ernment if you do not know the value of the property. Suppose it 
is destroyed ; then how are you going to reimburse the ones who 
owned it, if you do not know the appraised value when you get it? 
Suppose it had been sunk by enemy action on the way to Christmas 
Island; how then would you have known what to reimburse a con- 
tractor^ except on his own demand ? 

Colonel Robinson. Well, under such a hypothetical case, if I were 
negotiating it I would go to the A. G. C. schedule and negotiate it 
with the contractor on that basis. 

115. General Frank. What is the A. G. C. ? 

Colonel Robinson. Associated General Contractors. They have 
gotten out this schedule and it has been generally recognized by the 
gpvernment. 

116. General Grunert. It seems to me very loose administration 
and a lack of properly protecting the government, that sort of pro- 
cedure, and I do not quite understand it. That is why I [3605] 
want you to explain it. Here apparently the property is purchased 
at beyond its appraised value by a government agent who is competent 
to appraise it. Then that appraised value is raised and it is sold at 
that raised value, presumably to pay for some of its use in the past, 
and you state that it was not appraised when received. Therefore, 
it had to be lifted so as to compensate the contractor. That is what 
I want to get out of you. Is that correct ? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir, that is right. 

117. General Grunert. Then I cannot quite understand why it is 
not poor administration, the lack of somebody doing their duty to 
start with, if that sort goes on or did go on in the Corps of Engineers. 
1 do not expect you to admit that you did not do your duty or was a 
poor administrator, but I want it explained why the Corps of En- 
gineers had such an apparent laxity in its methods of doing business 
on behalf of the government. Have you anything to add in explana- 
tion of it? 

Colonel Robinson. Nothing, except that I think we got a very 
good price out of it at that, according to what it was worth to us. 
There was also a great rush to get this equipment. We were working 
on a very close deadline at Christmas and Canton Islands and that 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1849 

may have had something to do with the fact that it was not appraised 
prior to sailing from Los Angeles. 

118. General Gkunert. Why do you suppose Mr. Parker would not 
give way and agree to appraise it at the value that this committee 
apparently wanted it appraised at ? Why do you suppose he became 
bullheaded ? Do you suppose he thought that he was not going to be 
a party to putting something over on the government ? I wonder what 
was back of it. 

[S606] Colonel Robinson. He only appraised it at the value at 
the time. 

119. General Grunert. That is the value at which it should be pur- 
chased. A good administrator, I think, would have said, "Purchase 
it at that appraised value and pay the contractor for claims of rental 
for the time." Then it looks as if you would have been in the clear. 
Now it does not look good. Do you see what I mean ? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. I don't think there would be very 
much difference in the money value. 

120. General Grunert. Possibly there would not be any difference 
in the money value, but it does not look good on the record. Here a 
man appraises it and it is sold for something way beyond that ap- 
praised value, and naturally it looks suspicious. That is why I 
wanted to get what explanation there appeared to be. 

[3607] 121. General Grunert. Now, about the Benson equip- 
ment. I believe you said Benson had some items that could be used 
and some items that couldn't be used or were unserviceable, we will 
call it, and he wouldn't sell the good items unless he sold the un- 
serviceable items with it, because that would put him out of business ; 
is that right ? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir; that is correct. 

122. General Grunert. Do you recall what percentage of the items 
were good and what percentage were unserviceable ? 

Colonel Robinson. Not offhand. 

123. General Grunert. What was good equipment and what was 
unserviceable equipment ? 

Colonel Robinson. Not offhand, but it was a high percentage of 
stuff which we felt we were getting our money's worth out of, some- 
where around 80 or 90 percent, something of that kind. I have for- 
gotten. 

124. General Grunert. That was good or bad ? 

Colonel Robinson. That was serviceable, sir, that we expected to 
get our money's worth out of the over-all deal. 

125. General Grunert. Well, it seems strange, then, that your repre- 
sentative went down there on two occasions and came back on both 
occasions and said the stuff was junk. If 90 percent of it was service- 
able, it doesn't seem reasonable he would come back and say it was 
junk; the other, the 10 percent. It looks more to me as if it would 
be over 50 percent junk, or else he wouldn't have given you that sort 
of a report. 

Colonel Robinson. Of course, in this connection, as I recall it, a lot 
of the equipment which we purchased was not [SdOS] delivered 
to us until May 1942, new equipment which we placed orders on some 
eight, ten, or twelve months before. I recall just before I left here 
that our first shipment 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 145, vol. 3 16 



1850 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

126. General Grunert. And then there was some new equipment 
that was not on the ground at that time ? 

Colonel KoBiNSON. This is not in connection with this contract, sir. 
This is in connection with equipment which we had ordered, Govern- 
ment purchase. 

127. General Gruxert. But this lot of Benson equipment that was 
appraised and called junk by the appraiser or the man who went to 
look at it — then you figured that that part that was usable to the Engi- 
neers was worth paying the total amount for the whole business? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. The point I was trying to make was 
that we were desperately in need of equipment. We were grasping at 
straws to get the work done at that time. 

128. General Grunert. All I wanted to do was to have it explained. 
Who consummated these deals of purchasing these two sets of equip- 
ment, first the one that was appraised by Parker, and then the Benson 
equipment ? Who consununatecl those deals ? Who was District Engi- 
neer, and did the District Engineer consummate them by authorizing 
the purchase, or what, in both those deals? 

Colonel Robinson. The District Engineer authorized them, yes, sir. 

129. General Grunert. Who was he? Was he the same man for both 
deals ? 

Colonel Robinson. I don't recall whether some of those went over, 
consummated after Wyman left, or not. 

[3609] 130. General Grunert. Which was purchased first, the 
Parker-appraised equipment or what I call the Benson equipment? 

Colonel Robinson. I believe that the Hawaiian Constructors equip- 
ment was purchased first. 

131. General Grunert. And who was District Engineer at that 
time ? 

Colonel Robinson. Coloney AVyman. 

132. General Grunert. And then you don't know, when the Ben- 
son equipment was purchased, whether Colonel Wyman 

Colonel Robinson. When the purchase was consummated; I know 
that Wyman was District Engineer during the preliminary nego- 
tiations at least, but whether it was consummated while he was still 
District Engineer or not, I do not recall, sir. 

133. General Grunert. Anything else? 

134. General Frank. I would like to ask him a question. 

135. General Grunert. Go ahead. I though you had finished. 

136. General Frank. No, sir. 

Colonel, there was a great deal of pressure on getting this construc- 
tion of these airdromes down through the line of islands to Aus- 
tralia finished? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

137. General Frank. It was imperative that those airdromes be 
constructed as rapidly as possible and finished with the least prac- 
ticable delay? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

138. General Frank. Therefore, where possible, short-cuts were 
supposed to have been taken? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

139. General Frank. Now, it is traditional in the Army to 
[3610~\ handle Government funds and Government equipment 
with care, isn't it ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1851 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

140. General Frank. That is so in the Corps of Engineers, isn't it ? 
Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

141. General Frank. Yes. Now, notwithstanding the fact that 
there was a lot of pressure and the need for haste, wouldn't it have 
been possible, when that equipment was put on the LUDINGTON in 
Los Angeles, for arrangements to have been made, with a little fore- 
sight, to have had the equipment appraised there ? 

Colonel Robinson. I believe it would have been possible, yes, sir. 

142. General Frank. Yes. That would have been good admin- 
istration, wouldn't it? 

Colonel Robinson. Of course, I don't know the circumstances of 
where that equipment was- 



143. General Frank. I know, but 

Colonel RoB-iNSON. — or the rush, but I would say offhand 

144. General Frank. Well, it doesn't make any difference. 
Colonel Robinson. Hypothetical question ; yes. sir, it was possible. 

145. General Frank. It doesn't make any difference where the 
equipment was nor how great the rush. The Corps of Engineers has 
an expensive organization, with a District Engineer in Los Angeles. 
It was a Government boat, the LUDINGTON, on which it was going. 
Therefore, with a little foresight and a little preliminary arrangement 
and good organization, arrangements [3671] could very easily 
have been made to have had it appraised in Los Angeles; is that 
correct ? 

Colonel Robinson. I believe so, yes, sir. 

146. General Frank. Yes. Now let us get back to the fact that this 
equipment had been in use for some time before it was appraised. Jt 
was on a rental basis, wasn't it? Or was it? 

Colonel Robinson. I believe so, sir. I am not sure of that. 

147. General Frank. Well, if it was on a rental basis, then how long 
had it been in use when it was appraised by this Parker, about? I 
don't care for the exact dates. 

Colonel Robinson. Just a few weeks, sir, because it was delayed 
quite a bit in getting to Hawaii. I would say a month, six weeks at 
the outside. 

148. General Frank. A month or six weeks? 
Colonel Robinson. That is mv guess at the moment. 

149. General Frank. Well, if Parker appraised it at $131,000, and 
it was sold for how much ? 

150. Major Clausen. $166,000. 

151. General Frank. $166,000; do you feel, do you think, just as a 
a matter of common sense and good judgment, that it could have de- 
teriorated one-third of its value in that length of time? 

Colonel Robinson. Well, if it worked anything like the equipment 
we get down in the Southwest Pacific area, it could deteriorate a great 
deal more than that just in handling aboard and off ship, on board 
ship. 

152. General Frank. Therefore, there is all the more reason 
[3612] for having had it appraised before it went on the boat at 
Los Angeles, isn't there ? 

Colonel Robinson. Well, we didn't know that they were going to 
be turned around and have all of that time on the high seas, of course, 
at that time. 



1852 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

153. General Frank. Well, it is a question of good management or 
poor, careless management. All right. 

154. General Grunert. If there is deterioration of one-third in 
about a month, in 3 months the damn thing ought to be thrown over- 
board ; is that the idea ? It sounds exorbitant to me. I can't under- 
stand. But not being an engineer, possibly I can't get the idea. 

155. General Frank. I have a question. 

156. General Grunert. Go ahead. 

157. General Frank. Another thing, back to this property that was 
taken from the Hawaiian Contracting Company. How long have you 
been in the service ? 

Colonel- Robinson. 26 years, sir. 

158. General Frank. All right. Do you know of any authority in 
the world that an officer in the Engineer Coi-ps has for paying good 
Government money for worthless equipment ? 

Colonel Robinson." Do I know of any authority for it? 

159. General Frank. Yes. 

Colonel Robinson. No, sir; I know of no authority for paying Gov- 
ernment money without getting value received. 

160. Genera] Frank. As a matter of fact, when you buy equi])ment 
there is a certificate that it is in — generally the tliought contained is 
that is is in condition for the purpose for which it is purchased ; isn't 
that correct? 

[361S] Colonel Robinson. I believe that appears on the 
vouchers, some general statement to that effect. 

161. General Frank. It appears on the vouchers some place, doesn't 
it? 

Colonel Robinson. I think so. Some such similar statement. 

162. General Frank. Therefore, if this equipment were purchased 
and it was junk and worthless, somebody signed a false statement? 

Colonel Robinson. Well, not if all the equipment was on that 
voucher. 

163. General Frank. What is that? 

Colonel Robinson. Not if all of the equipment was on the voucher. 

164. General Frank. Well, if some of it, if the worthless equipment 
were on the voucher, all the equipment for which good Government 
money was paid was not in condition to be used for the purpose for 
which it was purchased, was it ? 

Colonel Robinson. I am not sure that there was any there that was 
absolutely unserviceable. I don't think we bought scrap metal, if 
that's what you mean. In other words, if you buy a brand-new car, 
you pay a high price. If you buy a car that may not run at the 
moment, with the idea of fixing it up, at a very low price, you are 
getting your money's value out of it. 

165. General Frank. But you yourself testified that Benson 
wouldn't sell the good equipment unless they included in it the pur- 
chase of the worthless equipment. So how, according to the Govern- 
ment system, did anybody have authority to buy [361If] the 
worthless equipment ? 

Colonel Robinson, Well, I doubt if any of those items were^ — we 
described them as junk, but I doubt if any of them were in such shape 
that they could not be fixed up and gotten some use out of them. 

166. General Frank. Well, now, the other side of it is : In accord- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1853 

ance with this understanding that you have put out here, if the worth- 
less equipment was not on the certificate, and they paid money for 

it, 

Colonel KoBiNSON. You must have misunderstood me. I made no 
such statement as that, sir. 

167. General Frank. I know you didn't make any such statement. 
I said, there is the other side of it. If what I just got through dis- 
cussing is not in accordance with the fact, the other side of it is that 
if they didn't take the worthless equipment, if it were not on the 
voucher, and compensation was paid, in accordance with Benson's 
demand, for all of it, then that is still worse, isn't it? It would have 
been, had that been the case ? 

Colonel Robinson. Well, I don't think there is any question that 
that was the case. sir. I am quite certain it was not. ^ 

168. General Frank. All right. 

169. Colonel Toulmin. May I ask him a question ? 

170. General Frank. Yes. , 

171. Colonel Toulmin. As a matter of fact, this man Benson was 
working a strong-arm game on the Government by saying that you 
couldn't have the equipment you wanted unless you took the junk 
off of his hands with it ; isn't that the truth ? 

[S615] Colonel Robinson. I wouldn't state it that way, no, sir. 

172. Colonel Toulmin. All right. You state it your way and see 
if you don't come out to the same conclusion. 

Colonel Robinson. The way that Mr. Benson stated it, as I recall, 
was that if we took a portion of his equipment, took the major por- 
tion of his equipment, and then he was out of business as a contrac- 
tor, we could use the other equipment, and therefore it was deter- 
mined to buy it, both in the interests of the Government and in the 
interest of playing fair with the contractor with whom we were 
dealing. 

173. Colonel Toulmin. And playing fair, so-called, with the con- 
tractor at the Government's expense by taking the junk off his hands 
because he wouldn't sell you the good equipment without the junk; 
isn't that it ? That's what you testified to. 

Colonel Robinson. Well, your wording is different than mine, sir, 
but it's all right. 

174. Colonel Toulmin. That is the net result, isn't it? 

Colonel Robinson. Well, I have stated it my way, Colonel. I don't 
care to state it your way. 

175. Colonel Toulmin. Well, then do you want us to understand 
that all the equipment you bought was good equipment ? 

Colonel Robinson. No, sir. I have testified to the condition of the 
equipment. 

176. Colonel Toulmin. All right. Some of it was good and some 
was worthless or substantially worthless; is that right? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

177. Colonel Toulmin. All right. Benson told you that he wouldn't 
let you have the good equipment unless you took the other stuff that 
wasn't so good or was worthless with it ; that is right, isn't it ? 

[3616] Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

178. Colonel Toulmin. All right. That is all I want. 



1854 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

179'. General Grunert. As a matter of fact, isn't it true that you 
needed this equipment so badly that you had to take what you could 
get and practically pay the contractor's price to get what you actually 
needed ? 

Colonel EoBiNsoN. Yes, sir. 

180. General Grunert. Isn't that about the game ? 
Colonel Robinson. We desperately needed equipment. 

181. General Frank. Isn't it also true that, notwithstanding all 
the need that you had for it, there is a requirement for doing it in 
accordance with standard practice ? 

Colonel Robinson. I believe it was so in this case, yes, sir. 

182. General Frank. Yes. 

183. Major Clausen. Let us pass from the junk of the Hawaiian 
Contracting Company to the equipment of the Rohl-Connolly Com- 
pany for a moment. General Grunert asked you questions as to dates. 
Isn't it true. Colonel, that the sum mentioned in the letter from Mr. 
Rohl, signed on behalf of the Hawaiian Constructors, suggesting 
that this property be bought by the Government, was the identical 
sum which was later paid, 166 some-odd thousand dollars? 

Colonel Robinson. I don't know that of ni}^ own knowledge. 
That must be a matter of record. 

184. Major Clau&'en. Yes, sir. And that letter, sir, was dated 
March 11, 1942; the appraisal by Mr. Parker was made on March 12, 
1942; the purchase was authorized by Colonel Wyman on March 13, 
1942; and Colonel Wyman was relieved on March 15, 1942. That is 
correct, isn't it? 

Colonel Robinson. Probably correct. I don't recall dates, sir. 

[3617] 185. Major Clausen. All right. Now, isn't it also true 
that all this equipment, this Rohl-Connolly equipment, was used 
equipment when it was shipped from Los Angeles on the LUDING- 
TON? 

Colonel Robinson. I believe that is true, yes, sir. 

186. Major Clausen. All right. And isn't it also true that one of 
the items that Mr. Parker discussed at this conference was the fact 
that there was no scrap of paper anywhere representing any kind of 
a deal whatsoever concerning this equipment ? 

Colonel Robinson. I don't recall that, no, sir. 

187. Major Clausen. Isn't it true that there was no written agree- 
ment entered into at any time before the Government got this equip- 
ment by this purchase on the 

Colonel Robinson. I believe it is covered in the general terms of the 
contract, sir. 

188. Major Claussen. No, I am not asking you that. 
Colonel Robinson. All right. 

189. Major Clausen. Now, I am asking you the question with the 
knowledge of what the contract says. I am asking you whether your 
memory isn't to the effect that it was discussed at this conference by 
Mr. Parker that there was no written document representing any such 
rent. 

Colonel Robinson. I don't recall Mr. Parker making any such state- 
ment, no, sir. 

190. Major Clausen. Well, what is the fact as to whether there was 
any written document, any kind of a formality of a record of any kind, 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1855 

regarding this equipment that the Government bought? What is the 
fact? 

Colonel KoBiNSON. I do not know the fact, sir, 

191. General Frank. He wouldn't know. 

192. Major Clausen. In addition to not appraising it at Los 
[o61S] Angeles, would there be any excuse that you know of for 
not putting these things down in writing ? 

Colonel EoBiNSON. There should be a record of it ; yes, sir. 

193. Major Clausen. Now, who was the District Engineer in No- 
vember 1941 ? 

Colonel Robinson. Colonel Wyman was, sir. 

194. General Frank. Isn't tliis the equipment that Colonel Wyman 
sent Rohl back to the United States to get started on its way? 

Colonel Robinson, I believe so, sir. I am a little hazy on that. 

195. General Frank. All right. Then, since Rohl was sent back 
to the United States to get this equipment on its way, all that was 
necessary to get system and control injected into it was for he Di- 
vision Engineer in San Francisco — to go back a little bit: all that 
was necessary was for Colonel Wyman to advise the Division Engineer 
in San Francisco, who in turn could work with the District Engineer 
in Los Angeles to accomplish the necessary check and procedure to 
have this done right; that's all that was necessary, wasn't it? 

Colonel Robinson. To have had it approved prior to shipment. 

196. General F'rank. Yes. 
Colonel Robinson, I believe so, sir. 

197. General Frank. Yes. There is nothing complicated or diffi- 
cult about it. All that was necessary was just a little foresight to have 
it done in accordance with some system ; that is correct, isn't it ? 

[SSld] Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

198. General Frank, Do you think you would have done that had 
you been in charge of it? 

Colonel Robinson. Well, I might have, sir. It's hard to say under 
those circumstances of working. 

199. General Frank. All right. 

200. General Russell, Let me ask you : You were in the office of 
the District Engineer on those days of the 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, and 
15th of March, weren't you ? 

Colonel Robinson, Yes, sir. 

201. General Russell, You were very closely associated with the 
purchase of this equipment from Rohl-Connolly by Wyman repre- 
senting the Government ; is that true ? 

Colonel Robinson, Yes, sir. 

202. General Russell, You knew that the offer of sale was made 
on the 11th, and the appraisement on the 12th, and the contract on 
the 13th; is that true? 

Colonel Robinson, I must have known it, yes, sir. 

203. General Russell. What impression did you get. Colonel, as to 
the haste in the negotiations for and the consummation of this sale? 
Did you think it was pretty much of a hurried-up job? 

Colonel Robinson. No, sir, I didn't get that impression at all. 

204. General Russell, It is common and ordinary, then, in the 
Engineers, and it was at that time, to buy $166,000 worth of equip- 



1856 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ment, second-hand equipment, on an offer and an appraisal and an 
acceptance in three days ^ 

Colonel Robinson. Well, I think it had been given the [36W] 
consideration for some time before. Of course, the actual — that was 
winding up the paper work on it. The need for the equipment existed 
some time before that. 

205. General Russell. The need did ? 
Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

206. General Russell. But it was necessary for the Division En- 
gineer's office to send out and have it appraised after the 11th day of 
March ? You didn't know the value, and had to fix a value, after the 
offer was made, didn't you? 

Colonel Robinson, Yes, sir. The paper had not been 

207. General Russell. Not the paper work. Colonel. 

Colonel Robinson. The value had not been fixed ; I will say that. 

208. General Russell. That's right. You had to fix the value on 
$166,000 worth of property and accept an offer for that amount, all in 
the course of three clays. Now, my question is. Was that common 
and ordinary practice in the Corps of Engineers at that time ? 

Colonel Robinson. I think you will find numerous instances of that 
in the Corps of Engineers, yes, sir, 

209. General Russell. Then, your testimony is that that was simply 
a routine way of handling business in the Corps of Engineers at that 
time ? 

Colonel Robinson. I say there is nothing unusual in that 

210. General Russell. Answer the question. 
Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

211. General Russell. That was normal and routine in the Corps 
of Engineers in handling business at that time ? 

Colonel Robinson, I would say so, yes, sir. 

[3621] 212. General Russell. All right. That is all. 

213. General Frank^ Would you say, in talking of delays that you 
had, would you say 

Colonel Robinson. I didn't understand, sir. 

214. General Frank. With respect to delays 

Colonel Robinson. Delays, yes, sir. 

215. General Frank. in your projects, where your plans had to 

be submitted to the Division Engineer and to the Corps of Engineers 
before you could start work, what length of time was taken up in 
submitting projects and getting approval ; first, those that went only 
to the Division Engineer's office, and those that went on into the 
Office of the Chief of Engineers, generally, in the period prior to 
December 7, 1941 ? 

Colonel Robinson. You are speaking of approved projects now, 
General ? 

216. General Frank. Yes. 

Colonel Robinson. For which money is available ? 

217. General Frank. Yes. 

Colonel Robinson. Yes. Well, there was nothing unusual about the 
project. After the plans were drawn, submitted to the division, we 
would get them back within ten days, and to the Chief's office prob- 
ably twice that long. If there was something unusual about it or 
something which required coordination with other agencies, it might 
take many times that length of time. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1857 

218. General Frank. All right. I have no more questions. 

219. General Grunert. Colonel, is there anything else that you 
think of that may be in the back of your head or the front part of it, 
or that you want to tell the Board, that will assist [36£2^ us 
in arriving at conclusions? 

Colonel Robinson. No, sir. 

220. General Grunert. Many times witnesses have something to 
say, and they say, "Well, I didn't get a chance to say it because they 
didn't ask me." I am asking you now whether you have anything you 
want to advance to the Board. 

Colonel Robinson. No, sir, except that I wonder if I may read a 
copy of my testimony before it finally goes into the record, if that 
would be available to me. 

221. General Grunert. Why, it just takes up a lot of time, unless 
you think you are an interested witness. 

Colonel Robinson. No, sir. I just want to be sure what I have said 
is the truth ; that's all, sir. 

222. General Grunert. I don't see any objection to your reading it, 
but it takes up a lot of the Recorder's time. If you wish to read it 
you may come here and see the Recorder and read it, but you may 
make no changes therein, except that such changes as you suggest may 
be appended to your testimony. 

Colonel Robinson. I don't know as it will be necessary, I am sure. 

223. General Grunert. All right. It is up to you. 
Colonel Robinson. All right. 

224. General Grunert. You see what I mean: the testimony is 
given by you, is taken down and recorded. If you have made any 
mistake or want to change any wording, you may do so, but that change 
will be appended to the testimony. 

Colonel Robinson. It stays in the record ; yes, sir. 

225. General Grunert. And the testimony will not be changed. See 
what I mean? 

[3623] Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir; I understand. 

226. General Grunert. That is fair to you, fair to everybody else. 
So if you want to, see the Recorder, and do it in his presence or the 
j)resence of the Assistant Recorder. 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

227. General Grunert. Thank you very much for coming up. 
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

TESTIMONY OF CHESTER R. CLARKE, 114 MERCHANT STREET, 
HONOLULU, T. H. 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Will 3'ou please state your name and address to 
the Board, Mr. Clarke? 

Mr. Clarke. Chester R. Clarke, 114 Merchant Street, Honolulu. 

2. Colonel West, And what is your occupation, Mr, Clarke? 
Mr. Clarke, I am a quarry operator. 

3. General Grunert. Go ahead. Major Clausen. 

4. Major Clausen. Mr. Clarke, your busines or occupation at the 
present time is what? 



1858 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Clakke. I am a quarry operator. I own and operate the Clarke- 
Halawa Kock Company. 

5. Major Clausen. You have been the operator of this quarry 
company for some time? 

Mr. Clark. Since 1939. 

6. Major Clausen. And your familiarity with that type of business 
has extended to what period? 

Mr. Clarke. Approximately 15 years, 

[3624] '<'• Major Clausen. In other words, you have been 15 
years in that ty})e of business or some comparable building business ? 
Mr. Clarke. Yes, sir. 

8. Major Clausen. You are pretty well known here in town, aren't 
you, Mr. Clarke, as an operator in that particular business ? 

Mr. Clarke. Yes, sir. 

9. Major Clausen. You have done some big jobs, little jobs? 
Mr. Clark. Yes, sir. 

10. Major Cl.\usen. And you are acquainted, are you, with other 
contractors in town that are engaged in the same type of business ? 

Mr. Clarke. I am. 

11. Major Clausen. And you are also acquainted with other con- 
tractors that are engaged in allied businesses; is that correct? 

Mr. Clarke. Yes, sir. 

12. Major Clausen. Men like Mr. Black, Mr. Wbolley; is that 
correct ? 

Mr. Clarke. That is correct. 

13. Major Clausen. Yes. Now, based on your knowledge of that 
particular business and what you know, let me ask you, first : Are you 
acquainted with the work that was done here by the Hawaiian Con- 
structors, the outfit that was composed of E,ohi-Connolly Company, 
Gunther-Shirley Company, Callahan ? 

Mr. Clarke. Considerable of it. 

14. Major Clausen. And your knowledge in that regard was ac- 
quired in what way, Mr. Clarke? 

Mr. Clarke. Mostly by personal contact and the supplying 
[36£6] of materials for various projects under their control. 

15. Major Clausen. In other words, were you a sort of subcon- 
tractor to them at the time? 

Mr. Clarke. Yes, sir. I was both subcontractor and material con- 
tractor. 

16. Major Clausen. And on the basis of efficiency, your knowledge 
of what efficiency is in the contracting business, and your knowledge 
of the way that the business was operated by the Hawaiian Construc- 
tors, can you tell me in general what 3'our personal opinion is as to 
whether the Hawaiian Constructors were a highly organized organ- 
ization or whether its work Avasn't prosecuted with the utmost 
efficiency ? 

Mr. Clarke. Well, in my opinion, tlie organization was not par- 
ticularly efficient and, again in my opinion, I would say poorly organ- 
ized. 

17. Major Clausen. By the way, you are acquainted with Mr. 
McKee, the McKee Contracting Company? 

Mr. Clarice. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1859 

18. Major Clausen. And just let me ask you this question. I want 
a frank answer from you. By the way, I think you have been inter- 
viewed already by Colonel John E. Hunt of our Inspector General's 
Office at Washington, haven't you ? 

Mr. Clarke. Yes, sir, I was. 

19. Major Clausen. Just tell the Board, Mr. Clarke, how the 
Hawaiian Constructors, this Rohl outfit, stacks up against, let us say, 
the outfit of Mr. McKee or Mr. Black or Mr. Woolley, or McClure. 

[3636] Mr. Clarke. Well, comparing with those contractors, I 
would say the Hawaiian Constructors would be placed at the bottom 
of the list. Their organization was rather lax in their pressing the 
work. They were lax in the planning of the work and coordination. 
In my opinion, at the time they were organized they were unable to 
secure the best of help, so they did the best they could. The work 
dragged a great deal, and when we offered assistance to them it did 
not alwaj^s seem acceptable. 

20. Major Clausen. I believe you testified somewhat along this line 
to Colonel Hunt. Was that the observation of yourself, more or less, 
here on the island? I mean, did everybody on the island have the 
same sort of idea, that the Hawaiian Constructors were more or less 
scandalously or notoriously inefficient? 

Mr. Clarke. I would say yes. 

21. Major Clausen. Now, with regard to the manner in which 
your organization was brought into this picture, that is, the company 
with which you are connected — I believe you testified with regard to 
this — do you believe that favoritism was shown by the Engineers under 
Colonel Wyman in charge of the work here with respect to allocating 
this work? 

Mr. Clarke. I do. 

22. Major Clausen. Tell the Board just how that favoritism was 
manifested ? 

Mr. Clarive. I would like to go back to approximately April, 1941, 
when my first real contact with Colonel Wyman and the Hawaiian 
Constructors occurred in the calling for bids on the island airports, 
one to be built on Hawaii and one on [3627'] Mauai — two on 
Hawaii, one on Mauai and one on Molokai. At that time our organi- 
zation and others were called in and shown plans for these various 
airports and informed that bids would be called for on individual 
airfields, and on the total series of airfields; that is, one bid. We 
went over the plans very thoroughly and visited the islands, myself 
and my engineers, and when the bids were opened on the 12th of 
May, 1941, a ^roup of contractors, local contractors, were the low 
bidders as individuals, on individual airfields, but the organization 
headed by Mr. Rohl, Gunther-Shirley and I think by Mr. Grafe, 
were the ones that had — and also a bid by McKee and Company — 
were high on the total for all the airfields. Adding up the indi- 
vidual bids we were several hundred thousand dollars low, and when 
I consulted with Colonel Wyman in regard to the saving to the 
government he informed me that all of the local bids were being 
thrown out and the contract would be awarded to the Rohl-Connolly 
organization. We thought that quite unfair at the time and wrote 
two letters to the Engineers in protest, and both of them were ignored. 



1860 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

23. General Frank. To whom did you address those letters? 

Mr. Clarke. To Colonel Wyman, to the United States District 
Engineer, attention of Colonel Wyman. One I mailed and one I 
delivered personally. Both were ignored. 

24. Major Clausen. By the way, this job that you bid on was an 
open bid, on a lump-sum basis, competitive bids, supposedly, isn't 
that right? 

Mr. Clarke. Supposedly. The bids were publicly opened. We 
were present at the opening. 

25. Major Clausen. But after going through this formality, 
[3628] the result was that the mainland bidders, that is, this Rohl 
outfit, got the job? 

Mr. Clarke. Yes, sir, they were awarded the job, but they never 
started. They did not get started on the work within the specified 
time limit. Had we been awarded these contracts, my own organi- 
zation on the Molokai and the Akiona on the Hawaiian one, and the 
Hawaiian Constructors on the Mauai field, all of us would have had 
those fields completed within the year 1941. 

26. Major Clausen. Before December 7th, 1941 ? 

Mr. Clarke. Yes, sir. That was the idea, to get the fields in 
usable condition, and the bids specified that they should be within use 
within a hundred days. The plan was to put in one runway and then 
to complete the field, but to give the Army the use of the fields. 

27. Major Clausen. How much time did the Rohl outfit take to 
do the job? 

Mr. Clarice. I wrote a letter to the United States Engineers on the 
100th day, asking them what was being done, and the letter was 
ignored, because we felt that we had a right to protest, owing to the 
fact that the jobs were being unduly hampered and not started. 

28. Major Clausen. Let me ask you this question: So far as the 
Rohl outfit was concerned, then, they did not have that job finished — 
or did they have these jobs finished by 7 December, 1941 ? 

Mr. Clarke. No, sir, they were nowhere near — they were hardly 
started. 

29. Major Clausen. Aside from the military aspects of the thing, 
how was the government affected from the standpoint of [3629] 
being gouged ? What was the difference in price ? How much would 
the government have saved had you people been awarded this contract? 

Mr. Clarke. I wrote that in the letter, and my guess at the moment 
is approximately $300,000. 

30. Major Clausen. $300,000 ; is that correct ? 
Mr. Clarke. Yes, sir. 

31. Major Clausen. Can you give some other instances of this 
gouging? 

Mr. Clarke. No, not specifically. Most of the work after that time 
was never submitted to local contractors. That was the last oppor- 
tunity we had to bid. Although we filed letters requesting permis- 
sion to quote on various projects, based on the fact that we had the 
material, the men, the organization and equipment, we were thor- 
oughly and always ignored. 

32. Major Clausen. Let me just invite your attention to the Scho- 
field Barracks job. Do you recall that, Mr. Clarke, where there were 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1861 

some 19,000 tons with respect to a bid on rock for delivery at Scho-* 
field Barracks, and there was a Mr. Kent ? Who is Mr. Kent ? 
Mr. Clarke. Mr. Kemp, K-e-m-p. 

33. Major Clausen. He was your rock superintendent? 
Mr. Clarke. He was my paving plant superintendent. 

34. Major Clausen. With regard to this 19,000 tons of rock aggre- 
gate, do you know, when the bids were opened, whether the prices 
were, in your opinion, exorbitant there ? 

Mr. Clarke. Yes, they were exorbitant, and we protested at that 
time. 

35. Major Clausen. What is your memory on that point? 
[S630] Mr. Clarke. I made a trip to Schofield in regard to that 

matter, but I cannot recall the details. I merely remember we also 
protested that in writing, and the bids were awarded at a considerably 
higher price to some other outfit, but I would have to refer to my files 
to give the actual information at this time. It has been two or three 
years ago. 

36. Major Clausen. You have referred in several instances to let- 
ters. Would you be able to furnish the Board, Mr. Clarke, copies of 
those letters ? 

Mr. Clarke. Yes, sir. I furnished them to Colonel Hunt before. 
I still have them. I can also furnish copies of those bids on the island 
airports. I have photostatic copies of those. 

37. Major Clausen. All right, sir, if you will do that, furnish the 
Board copies, we will greatly appreciate it. We are going to be here 
but a few days. How much time will you need? 

Mr. Clarke. I can have them by tomorrow. 

38. Major Clausen. Thank you very much. 

39. General Frank. Mr. Clarke, what construction work had your 
organization accomplished prior to this time ? 

Mr. Clarke. May I ask, do you jnean in its entirety or just for the 
Space of 

40. General Frank. What I am trying to do and the reason for 
that question is to determine whether or not you had done any work 
to establish a basis for the reliability of your firm. 

Mr. Clarke. I built Malai Airport road on Mauai for a federal aid 
organization. 

41. General Frank. What is that? 

Mr. Clarke. $172,000, 7 miles of paved road. And I built the road 
from Pearl Harbor to Pearl City for $158,000, also federal aid. I had 
three projects at Koko Head on this island, each totalling $40,000, 
$45,000 and $40,000. Those were [S6S1] all road work. 

Then I put in 32 acres of concrete at Hickam Field, that is, all the 
warming up aprons and the area around the hangars built by Mr. 
McKee. 

I also was a sub-contractor on the Army hangars at Hickam Field 
for Mr. McKee. 

I paved all of the runways at Hickman Field for Tucker McClure. 
I put in all of the streets at Hickam Field for Tucker McClure. 

42. General Frank. As a sub-contractor? 
Mr. Clarke. As a sub-contractor. 

43. General Frank. Do you know Walter Dillingham ? 
Mr. Clarke. Yes, sir. 



1862 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

44. General Frank, Did you ever do any work for him ? 

Mr. Clarke. Oh, yes, I have worked for Mr. Dillingham. In 1927 
I put in the concrete for the last 9 miles of road on the Island of Hawaii 
as a sub-contractor. 

45. General Frank. How did you get along with Mr. Dillingham? 
Mr. Clarke. Very well. 

46. General Frank. Would you work for him now ? 

Mr. Clarke. As a sub-contractor, yes, I would. In fact, I at the 
moment am supplying two of his organizations with crushed rock, 
the Hawaiian Bitumuls Company and the Hawaiian Hume Concrete 
Pipe Company. . • 

47. General Grunert. Any other questions ? 

48. Major Clausen. So far as your capacity for supplying rock is 
concerned, in response to the question of General Frank, what was the 
capacity in tons per day? About a thousand tons a day? 

[3632] Mr. Clarke. At what time, sir? 

49. Major Clausen. During, say, 1941. 

Mr. Clarke. In 1941 my plant, in February, was turning out 600 
tons a day. 

50. Major Clausen. You had control, did you, Mr. Clarke, of the 
only large rock deposit on the east side of the city at that time ; isn't 
that right? 

Mr. Clarke. Yes, I did. May I just add to that that on December 
7th I was turning out about 1,200 tons a "day. 

51. Major Clausen. Did you ever attempt work on Bellows Field 
and get turned down there, too ? 

Mr. Clarke. Yes. We offered to do some work on Bellows Field. 

52. Major Clausen. Wliat was that incident? 

Mr. Clarke. We had a large rock deposit at Kaneohe, maybe I better 
say Kuilua. We offered to open that deposit for the United States 
Engineers, with the idea of supplying rock to Bellows Field and also 
to take care of the Navy at Mokapu. We received a letter, of which 
I will give you a copy, from the Engineers, saying they were not 
interested. 

53. Major Clausen. If you will supply those letters we will ap- 
preciate it. 

That is all I have, sir. 

54. General Grunert. Any questions? 

55. Colonel Toulmin. No, sir. 

56. General Grunert. Mr. Clarke, can you think of anything else or 
recall anything else that you think might be of value to the Board, 
that you might tell us ? 

Mr. Clarke. I don't think so, General. 

[S6S3] 57. Major Clausen. With regard to Colonel Wyman, 
Mr. Clarke, will you give the Board some instances of his charac- 
teristics ? 

Mr. Clarke. I had several conferences with him from time to time. 
Only once during the entire conversations with him was I invited to 
sit down. He always seemed entirely too arrogant. We wrote 
numerous letters and offered to cooperate. The fact is, upon Colonel 
Wyman's arrival in Hawaii, in my usual manner of taking care of 
previous District Engineers, I wrote him a letter offering him the 
services of the company and our organization, explained to liim our 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1863 

position in the community, and willingness to cooperate; also ex- 
plained to him the condition of the rock situation on the island. 

He answered the letter — I will give you a copy of it — telling nie 
it was neither feasible — that was the word used— or necessary at this 
time to give out any information regarding Engineers operations. It 
kind of left us feeling that we did not amount to very much here. 

Thinking he had misunderstood my letter, I wrote him a second 
letter, apologizing for the first letter, explaining conditions, and re- 
ceived a reply stating that if I would read his first letter it covered 
the entire subject. 

He started out with a chip on his shoulder, which was an awkward 
condition for us, and of course we immediately took a dislike to him. 
I still tried to play ball, but was never able to get under his skin. I 
was never able to do anything for him that he seemed to think was 
useful. He was always very noisy in his statements to us. He would 
never make us feel at home, and he would walk up and down behind 
his desk, and one time he said "Wlien I want the rock I will tell you 
about it and I will [36S4.] write the ticket." 

So I left with the idea that we were not needed, and immediately 
entered into various contracts with the Navy, with the Navy rather 
than the Army. 

58. Major Clause^t. How about his predecessor; was that typical 
of the treatment accorded contractors here by the Engineer, or was 
his predecessor different? 

Mr. Clarice. His predecessor and all of his predecessors were very 
different. They were fine people to work for. I worked with his 
immediate predecessor in putting in all of the concrete for the Alia- 
manu ammunition dump here on the side of Red Hill. We had very 
pleasant connections prior to his arrival and subsequent to his leaving 
with the Engineers, and at the moment we are doing a large business 
with the Engineers, under very satisfactory conditions. 

59. Major Clausen. How about Mr. Rohl; you knew him, did you? 
Mr. Clarke. I have known Mr. Eohl many years. 

60. Major Clausen. Tell the Board something of his character- 
istics that you observed. 

Mr. Clarke. I have known Mr. Eohl since 1935. I have met him 
several times in Los Angeles on business trips. Mr. Rohl is a good 
engineer. He understands his business, and I think has for many 
years been considered in the contracting industry as capable and 
efficient. He is a hard driver, but he also drinks heavily. He likes 
to entertain lavishl3\ I have been of the opinion many times that 
Mr. Rohl quite thoughtlessly took those he entertained along with 
him, in that he gets them into jams that it is hard for them to get out 
of. They accept his entertainment in the proper spirit and then 
\_3635'] Rohl seems to try to benefit by it. I think very often 
people who accept it do so thoughtlessly and find themselves in a 
little bit of a jam. 

Down here I only saw Mr. Rohl three or four times in the time he 
was here — several months — and he was sober. He used to call my 
home at night and order materials for the following day, and was very 
profane over the telephone. It was easy to see that most times he 
was under the influence of liquor. 

61. Major Clausen. You mean, when he was here in Hawaii ? 
Mr. Clarke. Yes. 



1864 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

62. Major Clausen. From the way he talked you could tell he was 
probably obviously drunk? 

Mr. Clarke. Yes. Then I have seen him — I have called on him at 
the hotel, at the Moana. I have met him at his office and that was his 
condition. He did not seem particularly inclined to push the work 
here, and once or twice I went to Mr. Woolley or Mr. Benson with the 
idea of trying to get work done .that I knew had to be done, that Rohl 
just was not capable of doing, on account of his condition. 

63. Major Clausen. That is while he was here in Hawaii? 
Mr. Clarke. Correct. 

64. General Frank. His condition being that of drunkenness? 
Mr. Clarke. Yes. He just made Hawaii one round of good times 

for Mr. Rohl. There isn't any doubt of that. I am sure others will 
bear me out on that. 

65. Major Clausen. Have you seen Mr. Rohl and Colonel Wyman 
together in Hawaii ? 

Mr. Clarke. Oh, yes. 

66. Major Clausen. When they were both drunk? 

[36S6] Mr. Clarke. No, I have never seen Colonel Wyman 
drunk; only Rohl. Of course, Rohl's statement was that he did not 
consider anyone drunk — and he made this statement in public — until 
they fell down. So it was just a case of what you consider drunk. 

67. Major Clausen. How did he appear to you, to be drunk ; what 
symptoms did he evidence ? 

Mr. Clarke. He staggered; he was rather maudlin in his conversa- 
tion; there was no continuity to his statements; certainly not in his 
right mind. 

68. Major Clausen. I have no further questions. 

Mr. Clarke. I would say a very pitiful condition that that should 
occur when it did, because I frankly believe that had local contractors 
and mainland contractors like Mr. McClure and Mr. McKee and 
some of the others had this work, we would not have been in such a 
condition as we were when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. We 
were certainly far less progressed in our work than we should have 
been. 

69. General Grunert. Thank you very much. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL MILLARD PIERSON, INSPECTOR GEN- 
ERAL'S DEPARTMENT, INSPECTOR GENERAL, PACIFIC OCEAN 
AREA, APO 958 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your 
name, rank, organization and station ? 

Colonel Pibrson. Millard Pierson, Colonel, Inspector General's De- 
partment, Inspector General, Pacific Ocean Area, APO 958. 

2. General Grunert. Major Clausen will start the questioning. 
[S637] 3. Major Clausen. Colonel, your name was given us as 

a lead in connection with a situation where a certain report of the In- 
spector General was supposed to have been suppressed. Are you 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1865 

acquainted with a Captain King, formerly of the Judge Advocate 
General's Department on the island ? 

Colonel PiERsoN. We had two Captains King here. I presume the 
once you refer to is Captain William A. C. King ? 

4. Major Clausen. Yes. 

Colonel PiERSoN. I recall him. I knew him slightly. 

5. Major Clausen. I am pretty sure that the name given us was 
one with about three initials. That probably was the one. I talked 
to you some days ago and suggested you search your memory and the 
records for information concerning that incident. Would you tell 
the Board what you found and what you can recollect, Colonel? 

Colonel PiERsoN. You asked me at the time if I recalled an investi- 
gation or an opinion of the Hawaiian Constructors made by me which 
was suppressed. None of my reports has ever been suppressed. To 
my knowledge, I have never inspected the Hawaiian Constructors, 
nor did I ever personally conduct an investigation in which the Ha- 
waiian Constructors was involved. 

6. Major Clausen. How about Colonel Wyman or Hans Wilhelm 
Eohl? 

Colonel Pierson. I never met Mr. Eohl. I met Colonel Wyman the 
day after I arrived here, on the 15th of February, 1942. I have never 
made any inspections, nor had I conducted any investigation of either 
Mr. Rohl or Colonel Wyman. 

7. Major Clausen. Were inspections of these individuals or the 
Hawaiian Constructors made under your direction and super- 
[3638] vision. Colonel? 

Colonel Plerson. Colonel Wyman left here, as I recall, in the latter 
part of March, 1942. I took over the duties of Department Inspector 
General on the 20th of March, 1943. I arrived here on the 15th of 
February, 1942. At that time I was the fourth ranking officer in the 
office. 

8. Major Clausen. With regard to this Captain King, what can you 
recall regarding any instance concerning Captain King in relation to 
any inspections of the individuals in question and the Hawaiian Con- 
structors ? 

Colonel Pierson. No more than informal conversations. When he 
was on his way to the mess he would stop me on the street and we would 
discuss many matters. I might add here that the subject of the En- 
gineer and the Hawaiian Constructors, as I recall, was the talk of the 
entire island. Now, what the nature of our discussions, or what we 
talked about in relation to the Hawaiian Constructors and the En- 
gineer I am sorry I do not recall. It has been so long ago now and 
there has been so much taking place around here that I just do not feel 
that I could qualify to state just what my conversation with him was. 

9. Major Clausen. What was the trend of this conversation, 
Colonel? 

Colonel Pierson. The inefficiency, as I recall it, of the Hawaiian 
Constructors and the District Engineer's office. 

10. Major Clausen. That is all. 

11. General Grunert. Any more questions? 

Is there anything that you can add to give the Board anything of 
value on which to reach a conclusion, anything else that is in your 
mind? 

79716—46 — Ex. 145, vol. 3 17 



1866 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[36S9-3640] Colonel Pierson. I don't know what the Board is 
looking into, General. 

12. General Grunert. This Board was appointed to ascertain and 
report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces 
upon the Territory of Hawaii on the 7th of December, 1941, and, in 
addition thereto, to consider the phases which related to the Pearl 
Harbor disaster of the report of the House Military Affairs Commit- 
tee. Is there anything on those two subjects that you think of that 
you would like to tell the Board, which you think would be of value 
to the Board ? 

Colonel PiERSoN. I regret. General, I have no such information. 

13. General Grunert. All right, thank you. Colonel. 
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

(The following was dictated by Colonel Toulmin, Friday, Septem- 
ber 15, 1944, at 10 : 30 a. m. :) 

General Bragdon called me at about 10:25 and stated that he wished to in- 
quire as to exactly what was the information that we wanted, based upon the 
questions I asked Colonel Wyman, as to the responsibility for the delays, based 
upon Colonel Wyman's statement that the delays that occurred were due to two 
causes ; first, the restrictions and regulations, and difficulties he had with the 
Division Engineer and the Chief of Engineers, and, second, as to the difficulties 
he had in getting coordination in the complicated system existing vmder General 
Short's administration. 

I told him that the Board was utterly impartial as to Colonel Wyman and 
had authorized the asking of such questions for the purpose of bringing out 
Colonel Wyman's point of view as to what he thought was responsible for the 
delay, as that was a matter in issue in which he was concerned, and that any 
facts in particular that they could produce as to the approvals necessary on the 
mainland and by whom and under what regulations [3641] and condi- 
tions would of course throw light on the subject matter, and that as to the local 
coordination if he mentioned some typical specimens of the coordination neces- 
sary and then summarized the various types of coordination necessary under 
General Short's organization it would probably give the Board a complete state- 
ment of the facts; that the Board was interested in facts of any kind that 
would be pertinent and have a bearing on Colonel Wyman's activities, either in 
defense of him or otherwise. 

After I made the statement I asked General Bragdon if this was clear to him 
and was satisfactory to his understanding, and he said it was and that he would 
so proceed and submit the statement. 

[364^] TESTIMONY OF FREDERICK M. EARLE, WARRANT 
OFFICER, JUNIOR GRADE, UNITED STATES ARMY 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of "War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Mr. Earle, will you please state to the Board 
your name, rank, organization, and station ? 

Mr. Earle. Frederick M. Earle, Warrant Officer Junior Grade, 
U. S. A. 

2. Colonel West. You are stationed at PDA Headquarters? 

Mr. Earle. I am. We do work for both. We publish both, POA 
and Base Cormnand. 

3. General Russell. Mr. Earle, what were your duties in Novem- 
ber and December of 1941 ? 

Mr. Earle. Distribution clerk. 

4. General Russell. In the Headquarters of the Hawaiian De- 
partment ? 

Mr. Earle. Adjutant General's Department. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1867 

5. General Russell. As such clerk were part of your duties to see 
to the distribution of forms which were published by the Hawaiian 
Department ? 

Mr. Earle. Unclassified, yes, sir. 

6. General Russell. Unclassified. Have you before you now a 
record from the Headquarters of the Hawaiian Department showing 
the distribution of what is known as SOP Hawaiian Department, 
distributed as of November 5, 1941 ? 

Mr. Earle. Yes, sir. 

7. General Russell. Will you state into the record what that dis- 
tribution was? 

Mr. Earle. Distribution B, L, and G, less 1, 2, 3, 5. 
[364S] 8. General Russell. Did that include the War Depart- 
ment ? 

Mr. Eakle. No, sir, it did not. 

9. General Russell. Then, according to those records, copies of 
SOP of November 5, 1941, were not sent to the War Department? 

Mr. Earle. Not from the Adjutant General's Office, no, sir. 

10. General Russell. That is all. 

11. General Grunert. Any questions? (No response.) 
Thank you for coming down. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

12. General Russell. I want to tender in evidence two maps which 
were identified by Mr. Shivers, formerly of the F. B. L, which he 
identified and described to the Board. They purport to be copies of 
Map No. 1 and Map No. 2, purporting to have been captured from- a 
Japanese submarine on or about the 7th day of December, 1941. 

(Copy of Map No. 1, captured from Japanese submarine, was 
marked Exhibit No. 48 and received in evidence.) 

(Copy of Map No. 2, captured from Japanese submarine, was 
marked Exhibit No. 49 and received in evidence.) 

13. General Russell. I want to tender in evidence a memorandum, 
7th of September, 1944, from Lieutenant General Grunert, President 
of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, to the Commanding General, 
USAFPOA, ''Subject: Documentary evidence," and the 1st indorse- 
ment to said letter, dated 13th September 1944. 

(Memorandum elated September 7, 1944, from Lt. Gen. Grunert to 
the Commanding General, USAFPOA, was marked Exhibit No. 50 
and received in evidence.) 

[S644-] (1st indorsement, dated September 13, 1944, to memo- 
randum marked Exhibit 50, was marked Exhibit No. 50-A and re- 
ceived in evidence.) 

TESTIMONY OF ARTHUR T. SHORT, PLEASANTON HOTEL, 
HONOLULU, T. H. 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Mr. Short, will you please state to the Board your 
name and address? 

Mr. Short. Arthur T. Short, Pleasanton Hotel. 

2. Colonel West. What is your occupation, Mr. Short? 
Mr. Short. I am manager of the hotel. 



1868 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

3. General Geunert. Mr. Short, I will ask General Frank, assisted 
by Major Clausen, to develop this particular part of our investigation. 

Mr. Short. All right, sir. 

4. General Grunert. General Frank. 

5. General Frank. How long have you been manager of the Pleas- 
anton Hotel, Mr. Short? 

Mr. Short. About 11 years. 

6. General Frank. You were manager of this hotel in 1941? 
Mr. Short. Yes, sir. 

7. General Frank. And when it was taken over by the Engineer 
Corps ? 

Mr, Short. I was manager at that time. 

8. General Frank. Did you continue as manager while the Engi- 
neer Corps had it ? 

Mr. Short. No. They took it away from us on, I think it was, 
the 14th of December. I think that was it. 
[364S] General Frank. What year? 
Mr. Short. No. It was about the first of January. 

10. General Frank. What year? 
Mr. Short. '42. 

11. General Frank. Yes. 

Mr. Short. Colonel Wyman was there then, and he told me to stay 
there until they got somebody to take it over, and I stayed there until 
the 15th of January, under the military. 

12. General Frank. 15th of January, 1942 ? 
Mr. Short. '42, yes. 

13. General Frank. From when? When did they take it over? 
Mr. Short. They took it over, I think it was about the — well, they 

took it over on the 15th, the night of the 14th. 15th of January is 
when they took it over. 

14. General Frank. They took it over the 14th of January, 1942 ? 
Mr. Short. Of January. That's when they came in. 

15. General Frank. In 1942? 

Mr. Short. Nineteen forty — the blitz was what? '41? 

16. General Frank. Yes. 
Mr. Short. Well, it was '41. 

17. General Frank. Well, they took it 

Mr. Short. No. It was December that the blitz was. December 
'41. Yes, it was '42. 

18. General Frank. They didn't take it over until after the blitz? 
Mr. Short. No. Until after the 1st, no. 

19. General Frank. All right. Go ahead. 

20. Major Clausen. Mr. Short, you were acquainted with a Hans 
WilhelmRohl? 

[36^6] Mr. Short. Very slightly. I talked to him probably 
once or twice. He and Colonel Wyman were always together when 
they — but they had very little to say. They had a man by the name 
of Dykes that did all the work, that is, about the stuff. 

21. General Frank. Made arrangements with you ? 
Mr. Short. Yes. 

22. Major Clausen. You say Mr. Rohl and Colonel Wyman were 
always together ? 

Mr. Short. They were always together. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1869 

23. Major Clausen. Yes. Now, this Pleasanton Hotel, Mr. Short, 
is right directly across from the Punahou campus ? 

Mr. Short. Yes, sir. 

24. Major Clausen. The Punahou school; is that correct? 
Mr. Short. Yes. 

25. Major Clausen. And that is where the United States Engineers 
had the offices? 

Mr. Short. Yes, they have that. Yes, sir. 

26. Major Clausen. Do you remember that Mr. Rohl had offices in 
the Pleasanton Hotel on the first floor and that he occupied two rooms 
on the second floor ? 

Mr. Short. Well, you mean the first bedroom floor? 

27. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Short. Yes. I don't know how many rooms he had himself. 
I think he had two, and Colonel Robinsons had a room or so, and 
Colonel 

28. Major Clausen. Wyman? 
Mr. Short. Wyman. 

29. Major Clausen. In other words, Colonel Wyman, Colonel 
Robinson, and Hans Wilhelm Rohl had bedrooms on the same floor? 

[S64.7] Mr. Short. On the second floor. 

30. Major Clausen. Second floor? 

Mr. Short. That was the bedroom. The other was the office floor. 

31. Major Clausen. As a matter of fact, you have already been 
interviewed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, haven't you ? 

Mr. Short. Yes. 

32. Major Clausen. And you know that Mr. Rohl did a lot of 
drinking while living at the Pleasanton Hotel ? 

Mr. Short. Well, I know that he had the reputation for that, but 
I don't know personally, because by the time that he had moved in 
there he had taken over, with his outfit,- the chef from the Royal 
Hawaiian Hotel to run the place, and I stepped out. I kept the 
apartments and stepped out from the — on the — I think I had ten 
days in there with him before they put the other man in. 

33. Major Clausen. And you had knowledge, Mr. Short, as to the 
reputation that Mr. Rohl had for this heavy drinking, based on what ? 

Mr. Short. It was based on just hearsay from the people in the 
hotel. That is, the manager's wife of the hotel was particularly 
active, and the cooks were all. You see, my house is right next to 
the office and the kitchen there. 

34. Major Clausen. And what would they tell you about that sub- 
ject, Mr. Short? 

Mr. Short. Well, just simply the parties that they had up there, 
and things like that. 

35. Major Clausen. Parties up where, Mr. Short? 
[3648] Mr. Short. Up in the second floor. 

36. Major Clausen. And you say "they had." Wlio would be that ? 
Mr. Short. What? 

37. Major Clausen. I say, whom do you mean by "they"? Will 
you speak out real loud for the reporter to hear? 

Mr. Short. I am speaking now of Mr. Rohl's party. 

38. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Short. I don't know who was in it altogether. 



1870 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

39. Major Clausen. And what would they do on those parties, 
Mr. Short? 

Mr. Short. Well, just that they had more parties u'p there, danc- 
ing and drunks, and that is all. Don't you know, they would laugh 
about it. 

40. Major Clausen. I believe you mentioned the chef from the 
Royal Hawaiian Hotel. 

Mr. Short. Kina. He is now in charge of the Willard Inn Offi- 
cers' Club. He and his wife are there. 

41. Major Clausen. I have no further questions. General. 

42. General Grunert. ]Mr. Short, do you think of anything else 
that you think would be of value to the Board ? If so, we would like to 
have you tell us now. 

Mr. Short. No, I don't know; other than the way they came in 
and took the thing over, and this fellow Dykes was the head of it and 
threw all, practically — the first day they tore the whole thing to 
pieces and threw all our furniture from upstairs that was good enough 
for generals and admirals, and things — threw it all out of the windows 
and brought furniture from the Royal Hawaiian Hotel that they 
had borrowed. It was just thrown [S64d] out. 

43. General Grunert. Was this the contractoi*s' bunch or the Engi- 
neers ? 

Mr. Short. Well, I don't know. I think it was — while the Engi- 
neers had it. The Engineere had it, I think, for about ten days before 
Rohl Constructors took it over. 

44. General Grunert. Well, let's see. Then the Engineers took it 
over about January 14 of *42, and then the things that you told the 
Board happened after they took it over? 

Mr. Short. After they had taken it over, yes. 

45. General Grunert. Are there any other questions ? 

46. General Russell. Yes. 

Was that a literal statement that you made, Mr. Short, that they 
threw the furniture out of the windows ? 

Mr. Short. Yes, they threw it out, the beds out. They had about 
thirty or forty 

47. General Russell. Did they take them downstairs and throw 
them out in the yard, or throw them out through the window ? 

Mr. Short. Well, some of them went right through the window, 
the small things they got out, got stuff out. Everybocly was laughing 
about it, the baggage, and people — you see, they gave me about 14 
days to move about 150 people out of the hotel. "Colonel Wyman," 
I said, "how many — how long a time are you going to give me to move 
these guests that we have here?" 

He said, "Move. Give you until the 15th." The 15th we had to 
have everybody out of there. We had Admiral Bagley and his family 
and wife and a bunch of prominent officers, captains and things in 
there; probably more Navy people in [S650] there than any- 
thing else. 

48. General Grunert. Can you ascribe any reason for their throw- 
ing stuff out of the windows instead of carrying it downstairs? 

Mr. Short. No. I think they probably thought it would look better 
to get the Royal Hawaiian furniture in there. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1871 

49. General Grunert. But that didn't account for their throwing 
it out of the window instead of carrying it downstairs. 

Mr. Short. No. It was just that they had a bunch of youngsters 
there under this man Dykes, and they just — things went. I think 
that was the testimony I gave to the F. B. I., too, that they were throw- 
ing stuff out. 

50. General Grunert. All right, sir. Thank you very much for 
coming up. 

Mr, Short. All right, sir. Thank you. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

TESTIMONY OF LT. COL. ROBEET W. HAIN, GENERAL STAFF, HEAD- 
QUARTERS U. S. A. F. P. 0. A., FORT SHAFTER, T. H.— Recalled 

1. General Russell. Colonel Hain, we are recalling you, and you 
remain under oath. That is, you are still under oath, and all the 
cautions that were given you the other day continue to apply to this 
testimony. ' 

Colonel Hain. I see. 

2. General Eussell. I am going to show you Adjutant General's 
file, Hawaiian Department, 121.2, call your attention to a letter in that 
file which you have shown to me, dated 28th of July, 1941, and ask you 
to read that letter iijto the record. 

[3651] Colonel Hain. This is a letter, "Headquarters Hawaiian 
Department, Office of tlie Department Commander, Fort Shafter, 
T. H.," dated 28 July 1941 : 

(Letter dated July 28, 1941, from Lt. Gen. Short to the Adjutant 
General, Washington, D. C, is as follows:) 

Subject: Reallocation of Special Field Exercise Funds for Field Fortification 

and Camouflage Projects. 

To : The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. 

1. Special J^ield Exercise Funds are now available for use in this Department 
as follows: 

a. Carried over from fiscal year 1941 $32, 437. 15 

b. Recently allotted by War Department for combat training, 

small units, under P/A FD 1562 P 31-99 A 0310-2 133, 000. 00 

c. Recently allotted by War Department for Department Ma- 

neuvers under P/A FD 1562 P5-99 A 0310-2 22, 165. 00 

2. Under restrictions imposed by War Department letter, 16 April 1941, File 
AG 353 (4-7-41) M-C-M, subject "Special Field Exercise Funds", it has become 
increasingly difficult to expend these funds for the purpose intended. Under the 
special conditions existing in this Department, large sums are not required for 
rental of camp sites, trespass rights and additional tactical gasoline and lubri- 
cants. Training is necessarily restricted to well defined defensive areas of 
relatively limited extent. 

3. In this connection, considerable sums are required for field fortification and 
camouflage materials. The War Department has granted authority [3652] 
to lease numerous small areas of unimproved land tactically located for beach 
and laud defense purposes. These leases have been acquired and coiistructioji 
of field fortifications has been initiated. However, a minimum of $100,000.00 is 
needed for the purchase of materials for revetment of trenches, construction of 
gun positions, machine gun emplacements, etc. An additional $10,000.00 are 
required for the purchase of a trench-digging machine and other tools. Likewise, 
$15,0(30.00 are required for purchase of camouflage materials. 

4. Therefore it is requested that one hundred and twenty-five thousand dol- 
lars ($125,000.00) from the one hundred sixty-five thousand four hundred thirty- 
seven dollars and fifteen cents ($165,437.15) available under paragraph 1 a 



1872 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and 6, above, be reallocated to this Department under procurement authority 
purpose numbers which will permit the use of these funds for procurement of 
fortification and camouflage materials, including ten thousand dollars 
($10,000.00) for power equipment. 
5. Request reply by priority radio. 

Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. 8. Army, Commanding. 

3. General Russell. Do your records show what was done by the 
War Department to this request of General Short for those funds ? 

Colonel Hain. Yes, sir. The next paper appearing on [3653] 
this is a confidential radiogram headed : 

(Excerpts from Adjutant General's File 121, Headquarters Ha- 
waiian Department, are as follows:) 

10 WAR TG 61 WD 

Washn DC 252P Aug 12 1941 
CG Haw Dept Ft Shafter TH 
31 12th 

AGMC reurlet July twenty eighth AG one two one point two subject realloca- 
tion of special field exercise funds for field fortification and camouflage projects 
Stop Special field exercise funds are not available for purpose requested fur- 
ther information follows by mail 

Adams. 
1017A. 

4. General Russell. Have you got that letter that was referred to 
in the telegram in your file, that radiogram in your files? 

Colonel Hain. Yes, sir. I have the letter : 

Wae Department 

The Adjutant Geneeax's Office 

washington 

File "AG 353 (7-28-41) MC-D ESA/LFL/gjw— 1712 

August 13, 1941. 
Subject: Reallocation of Special Field Exercise Funds for Field Fortification 

and Camouflage Projects. 
To : Commanding General, Hawaiian Department 

1. The use of Special Field Exercise Funds for costs incident to the Hawaiian 
Defense Project [SGoJt] is contrary to War Department intentions that 
the expenditure of such funds be limited strictly to training purposes and is 
therefore not favorably considered. Essential requirements for field fortifications 
are properly chargeable to other available funds in an appropriated and allotted 

status. Special allotment of such funds cannot be made at present for the 
Hawaiian Department for purpose requested in letter, your headquarters, July 28, 
1941, AG 121.2, subject as above, in view of other priorities. 

2. The War Department is taking definite action to secure additional supplies 
and funds for Engineer operations in the field by task forces and for other 
emergency projects. Further information will be furnished you when these 
become available. 

3. In view of the contents of paragraph 2, letter referred to above, which indi- 
cates that Special Field Exercise funds now in an allotted status to the Hawaiian 
Department ai*e in excess of actual training requirements, report is desired 
showing the amount available for withdrawal for urgent training requirements 
elsewhere. The interest of the Hawaiian Department in providing the field forti- 
fications mentioned in letter referred to above, is appreciated by the War Depart- 
ment and a favorable reply is precluded only by other urgent requirements. 

By order of the Secretary of War : 

/s/ E. S. Adams. 

Major General, 

The Adjutant General. 

[S6S5] I have the first indorsement to the letter which I just 
read: 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1873 

Heiadquabters Hawaiian Department, 

Ft. Shafteb, T.H. 
To : The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. 

1. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3, basic letter, report is 
hereby submitted that the sum of forty thousand dollars ($40,000.00) of Special 
Field Exercise Funds allotted to this Department under P/A FD 1562 P 31-99 A 
0310-2 may be withdrawn. 

2. With reference to paragraph 1, basic letter, attention is again invited to 
statements contained in paragraphs 3 and 4 of letter from this Headquarters 28 
July 1941, AG 121.2, subject same as basic letter. In this connection, the War De- 
partment in classified radiograms Nos. 823-21 May and 838-29 May 1941, provided 

funds for the acquisition by lease of various small parcels of land on which 
field fortifications could be constructed. These leases have been acquired and the 
work of construction of field fortifications has been advanced as far as practicable 
with salvaged and other materials available locally. This work is now stalemated 
because of lack of funds to purchase necessary materials and tools. As previously 
stated, the sum of $100,000.00 is required for the purchase of materials for revet- 
ment of trenches, construction of. gun positions, machine gun emplacements, etc. 
An additional $10,000.00 [3G36] is reqijired for purchase of a trench 
digging machine and other tools. Also, $15,000.00 is required for purchase of 
camouflage material. 

3. I feel that the importance of this work is such as to justify an immediate 
allotment of $125,000.00 for this purpose. 

• /s/ Walter C. Short, 

Walter C. Short, 
Lt. General, U. S. Army, 

Commanding. 

5. General Russell. Colonel, apparently a couple of radiograms 
intervened before the War Department replied to General Short's 
indorsement. In order to develop it chronologically, can you find 
the radiogram from the Hawaiian Department to the War Depart- 
ment, No. 403, dated September 25, '41? 

Colonel Hain. I have a confidential radiogram from Headquar- 
ters Hawaiian Department, No. 403 — 25th September, to: 

The Adjutant General, 
Washington, D. C: 

Reference your letter AG three five three paren seven dash two eight dash 
forty one paren MC dash D comma thirteen August forty one subject realloca- 
tion of special field exercise fund for field fortification and camouflage projects 
comma and my first indorsement thereto fourteen September Stop Strongly 
urge immediate favorable action on my request for one hundred twenty five 
thosuand dollars for purchase of necessary materials and tools for execution 
of field fortifications [3657] and camouflage projects as requested in 
my first indorsement fourteen September Stop This work is now at a stand- 
still pending receipt of funds for essential materials Stop Request radio advice 
of action taken. 

Signed "Short." 

6. General Russell. Now, have you a reply to this radiogram which 
we have just read, from the War Department to General Snort? 

Colonel Hain. I have a confidential radiogram. 

7. General Russell. Numbered 173? 
Colonel Hain. It is headed: 

72 WAR 

Washn DC 647P Sept 29 1941 
C G Hawn Dept Ft Shaf ter TH. 

172 twenty ninth Your request for immediate allotment one hundred twenty 
five thousand dollars for materials for field fortifications is not repeat not 
favorably considered reurad four naught three Stop More complete informa- 
tion mailed you in reply to your first indorsement on subject. 

Adams, 
310P. 



1874 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

8. Genercal Russeix. Have you another indorsement to this basic 
letter, and will you read that, please ? 

Colonel Hain. I have the second indorsement to the basic. 

War Department, A. G. O., 

September 26, 1941. 
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. 

[3608} 1. Action is being taken by the War Department to withdraw the 
sum of $40,000 of Special Field Exercise Funds allotted to your Department 
under P/A FD 1562 P 31-99 A0310 — . The cooperation extended in this matter 
by you, has been of material assistance in the conduct of the present Army tield 
exercises. 

2. In reference to Pars 2 and 3 of 1st Indorsement, it is necessary for the 
War Department to restrict allotments for "Engineer Operations in the Field" 
to the most urgent pri(u-ities at this time. You will be informed of any change 
which will make additional supplies and funds available for the purpose re- 
quested. 
By order of the Secretary of War : 

/s/ E. S. Adams, 

Major General, 
The Adjutant General. 

9. General Russell, That apparently concludes the correspondence 
and the radiograms between the War Department and the Hawaiian 
Department touching the subjects which have been discussed. 

Colonel Hain. Yes, sir. 

10. General Russell. Colonel, do you have in the same file a couple 
of radiograms between the Hawaiian Department and the War De- 
partment in Xovember of '41 relating to field fortifications, camouflage, 
and so forth ? If so, will you please read those ? 

Colonel Hain. I have one, a copy of a radio telegram [3659] 
No. 660 — 28th October, from this headquarters to the Adjutant Gen- 
eral, Washington, D. C. 

11. General Russell. "Wliat year was it? 
Colonel Hain. 1941. Quote: 

Project letter being submitted requesting one million four hundred fifty five 
thousand five hundred forty two dollars for materials for field fortification works 
and camouflage Stop This is total requirement for structures to be erected by 
troops for field defense works in this department. Geological formation this 
island such as to require revetment materials x Local materials have proven 
unsuitable and works already completed within past six months have deteriorated 
to the point vi'here reconstruction is necessary Stop Projects so extensive and 
requirements of material and manpower are so great that this work should be 
undertaken immediately Stop Recommend that funds in the amount of five 
hundred thousand dollars be made available immediately and remainder included 
in an early emergency appropriation bill 

Short. 

12. General Russell. Was there a reply to this radiogram from the 
War Department? If so, please read that. 

Colonel Hain. I have a copy of the reply, headed : 

74 WAR. 

Washn DC November 4, 1941. 
CG Hawaiian Department. 
347 Fourth. 

[3660] Necessary for War Department reurad six six naught to restrict 
allotments for engineer operations in field to most urgent priorities at this 
time Stop You will be informed of any change which will make any additional 
supplies and funds in this category available to you for purpose requested 

Abams. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1875 

13. General Russell. Have you a radiogram from the War Depart- 
ment touching this subject of the expenditure of funds, on the 7th of 
December ? 

Colonel Hain. Yes, sir ; I have a copy of secret radiogram headed : 

23 WAR. 

Wash DC 7 : 00 P Dec 7 1941. 
CG Hawii Dept. 

531 — 7th You are authorized to incur all obligations necessary to meet urgent 
requirements of situation. Maintain record of over obligations so incurred. 

Adams. 
6 : 37P/7. 

14. General Russell. Colonel, I want to ask you if in reply to the 
memorandum which we furnished you, heretofore, and conferences 
that have been held between you and me since that time — if you have 
gotten from the files of the Hawaiian Department all documents and 
data along the lines which were described in that letter and which have 
been subsequently described in my oral talks with you. 

Colonel Hain. I did not find all of the documents which [3661} 
you requested in the basic letter. 

15. General Russell. You have indorsed that basic letter back to 
the Board, however, in which you have detailed all those documents 
requested by us which you did not find ; is that true 'i 

Colonel Hain. That is correct, sir. 

16. General Russell. Colonel, I will repeat the question, there- 
fore: that you have made available to the Board all of the records 
that you were able to find in the Adjutant General's office of the 
Hawaiian Department along the lines described in that memorandum 
and in my subsequent oral talks with you. 

Colonel Hain. Yes, sir; I have made available all records which 
had any bearing on the subject which I was requested to locate. 

17. General Russell. So far as I know, that completes a search 
of the records of the Adjutant General's department, a selection of 
the material which was submitted to me, and its introduction before 
the Board. 

18. General Grunert. All right. The witness may then be excused. 

19. General Russell. You may be excused. Thank you for your 
help, Colonel. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

20. General Russell. I will offer in evidence or introduce into 
evidence a memorandum dated 12 September 1944, confidential in 
its nature, on the stationery of the United States Pacific Fleet, Pacific 
Ocean Areas. This memorandum is signed by McMorris (I believe 
it is C. H. ; we will have to check that) , [3662] Rear Admiral, 
United States Navy, Chief of Joint Staff; and over the signature is, 
in handwriting, the language, "The foregoing supplements my testi- 
mony given on 11th September." 

The subject of the memorandum is the Japanese task force that 
attacked tearl Harbor, summary of information concerning, de- 
rived from prisoners of war and captured documents. 

Attached to this memorandum is a map of the part of the Pacific 
area which purports to show a track of Japanese aircraft carriers 
from November '41 through April '42, reproduced from Japanese map 
of Pacific area, taken at New Georgia, early July, 1943. 

I ask that these documents be marked exhibit next in order. 



1876 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

21. Colonel Toulmin. That is going to be Exhibit No, 51. 
(Memorandum of September 12, 1944, by Admiral McMorris, with 
map attached, was marked Exhibit No. 51 and received in evidence.) 

[3663] TESTIMONY OF COLONEL BENJAMIN R. WIMER, CORPS 
OF ENGINEERS, ENGINEER CENTRAL PACIFIC BASE COMMAND, 
APO 958 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you please state to" the Board your 
name, rank, organization and station. 

Colonel WiMER. Colonel Benjamin R. Wimer, Colonel, Corps of 
Engineers, Engineer Central Pacific Base Command, stationed at 
APO 958. 

2. General Grunert. Colonel, I will turn you over to General 
Frank, assisted by Major Clausen, to develop this particular part of 
our investigation. 

3. General Frank. How long have you been out here. Colonel ? 
Colonel Wimer. I arrived on the 10th of January, 1942. 

4. General Frank. 1942? 

Colonel Wimer. The 10th of January, 1942, yes, sir. 

5. General Frank. On what duty were you in 1941 ? 

Colonel Wimer. In 1941, up to the 24th of November, I was assist- 
ant District Engineer in Galveston. 

6. General Frank. Wlien you arrived here in 1942, what were your 
duties ? 

Colonel Wimer. I arrived here as the executive officer of the 47th 
Engineers^ and remained on that job until the 1st of February, 1942, 
at which time I became Assistant Department Engineer under Colonel 
Lyman. 

7. General Frank. The 47th Engineers was the engineer regiment 
atSchofield? 

Colonel Wimer. No, sir. The 47th Engineers was a general service 
regiment that I came out here with on the 10th of [3664] 

January. 

8. General Frank. What is your job now? 

Colonel Wimer. I have three jobs. I am the District Engineer of 
the Honolulu Engineer District ; I am Engineer of the Central Pacific 
Command, and I am in command of the construction service. 

9. Major Clausen. I have only a few questions which relate to the 
records. Colonel. I would like to get all copies in your office of letters 
or communications of any kind that were exchanged between Colonel 
Wyman and Mr. Rohl, and Mr. Rohl and Colonel Wyman, back and 
forth, in the year 1941. I asked the other day Major Lozier to get 
those copies for me, and he said he would get them, but as yet I have 
not received them. 

Colonel Wimer. I will do that. 

10. Major Clausen. One other thing. I was in Washington talk- 
ing with Mr. McKay and we discussed the preparation of a map in 
the local office here indicating the construction work. Yesterday I 
returned to the office here and found some maps on the desk. I 
don't know whether those are the maps you sent over or not. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1877 

Colonel WiMEiR. Major Lozier probably brought them over. I have 
been trying to have him be the only contact on that thing, to avoid 
confusion. 

11. Major Clausen. If Major Lozier will indicate to me that those 
are the maps, then I will know that it is a fact. 

Colonel WiMER. The request for maps of all of the construction 
projects was more than we could handle in the time that was called for, 
but we did pick out the critical matters, [3665] the airfields, 
the gasoline, AWS and the large installations, because there were about 
1,500 different jobs involved. 

12. Major Clausen. I might offer a suggestion, since we are pressed 
for time; that if Major Lozier would be here tomorrow morning at 8 
o'clock I will meet him here and he at that time could bring over the 
copies of those communications and also explain to me just what maps 
he apparently has already brought here. 

Now, certain items of information were also requested by the Board 
of different people, but it might be that some of the things that we 
have asked for have been brought here, but this was what I was par- 
ticularly interested in ; I have completed, sir. 

13. General Grunert. Are there any questions ? If not, then appar- 
ently this witness is just on the question of getting some records. 

14. Major Clausen. This was suggested by the Office of the Chief 
of Engineers, sir. 

15. General Grunert. Have you any information that you would 
like to give the Board that may be pertinent to the issue ? 

Colonel WiMER. No, sir, I have no personal knowledge of anything 
of concern to the Board. 

16. General Grunert. Thank you very much. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 
(Thereupon, at 11 : 40 a. m., the Board, having concluded the hear- 
ing of witnesses for the morning, took up the consideration of other 
business. ) 

[3666] AFTERNOON SESSION 

At 1 p. m., the Board reconvened and proceeded further with the 
hearing of witnesses, as follows :) 

General Grunert. The Board will come to order. 

TESTIMONY OF IT. COL. J. J. KESTLY, CORPS OF ENGINEERS; 
ENGINEER, BASE COMMAND 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your 
name, rank, organization, and station. 

Colonel Kestly. J. J. Kestly; Lieutenant Colonel, Corps of Engi- 
neers; Engineer, Base Command. 

2. General Grunert. Colonel, General Frank will conduct this par- 
ticular part of our investigation, so I will turn you over to General 
Frank, assisted by Major Clausen. 

3. General Frank. Colonel Kestley, on what duty were you, in 
1941? 

Colonel Kestly. I was area engineer, of field area 3, with my head- 
quarters at Wheeler Field. 



1878 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

4. General Frank. Did you have charge of the 9,000-foot access 
road from Kolekole Pass over to the cableway at Mt. Kaala? 

Colonel Kestly. Yes, sir. 

5. General Frank. That was started on the 6th of March, was it 
not? 

Colonel Kestly. Yes, sir. 

6. General Frank. Do you know whether or not it was completed 
on time ? 

Colonel Kj:stly. Well, it was usable. That is, I mean usable — it 
wasn't paved, but you could use the road, during [3667] Sep- 
tember. We started work on the cableway at that time. 

7. General Frank. Do you mean to say that it took from March 
until September to build 9,000 feet of road? 

Colonel Kestly. Yes, sir. 

8. General Frank. Wliy? 

Colonel Kestly. Well, because of the amount of yardage. It was 
fairly heavy construction, and with the equipment that we had avail- 
able and the personnel we had available, operating on the one shift; 
also, there were considerable heavy culverts which had to be con- 
structed of reinforced concrete. 

9. General Frank. It was only two miles in length ? 
Colonel Kestly. Yes, sir. 

10. General Frank. And yet it took six months ? What was your 
opinion of the progress of the work? 

Colonel Kestly. Fair, considering the weather and the culverts. 
You know, you had to put the culverts in before you could put the 
fill in. 

11. General Frank. Yes. 

Colonel Kestly. And there were quite a few of those, and they were 
fairly large. That all took time. That is hand work. We had to get 
the aggregate in, reenforcing steel ; we had to build temporary roads 
to do that. We had to mix concrete with a small mixer which we 
were able to get in there. It is a prett}^ rainy section of the island. 
We were hampered a lot bj^ mud and rain. 

12. General Frank. This contract was being carried by Hawaiian 
Constructors ? 

Colonel Kestly. Yes, sir. 

13. General Frank. Do you think they did a pretty good piece 
[3668] of work, or were their delays in there excessive ? 

Colonel Kestly. Considering the personnel, I don't think we had 
the. superintendents and the foremen and the laborers and the reen- 
forcing steel men; we didn't have the best, we couldn't get them. 

14. General Frank. But the Government was paying for a first- 
class job, was it not ? 

Colonel Kestly. Yes, sir. 

15. General Frank. What kind of work was it getting, "considering 
the personnel," to use your own words? 

Colonel Kestly. Fair. 

16. General Frank. Is "fair" a second-rate, third-rate, or a fourth- 
rate job, or what ? 

Colonel Kestly. Well, I would say excellent, good, and fair. 

17. General Frank. This would be a third-rate job? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1879 

Colonel Kestly, Well, the job itself, General, as completed, was a 
good job. The progress is what I am saying was poor, considering 
the personnel and the equipment that we had on hand at that time. 

18. General Frank. Then so far as the amount that it cost the 
Government is concerned, you feel that as a result of its being only a 
fair job, the cost was excessive, because of the length of time that it 
took, is that correct ? 

Colonel Kestly. Well, I don't know that that affected the actual 
cost, as they were paid on an estimated cost, weren't they ? That is as 
I understood it. 

19. General Frank. It was on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis. 
Colonel Kestly. Yes; of which the cost was estimated and set, 

wasn't it? That is the way I always understood that a job was esti- 
mated, and, if it cost more than that, why it was their loss. 

20. General Frank. No. 

\{3669^ Colonel Kestley. It wasn't ? I always understood that. 

21. General Frank. It is actually cost-plus-fixed-fee; therefore, if 
it took an excessive length of time, it cost the Government an exces- 
sive amount of money ? 

Colonel Kestley, It cost it more than if we had had first-class per- 
sonnel and plenty of equipment ; yes, sir. 

22. General Firank. Yes. 

Colonel Kestley. And plenty of personnel ; which we didn't have. 

23. General Frank. Were you the engineer on the cableway? 
Colonel Kestley. Yes, sir. 

24. General Frank. That was held up through lack of equipment, 
wasn't it ? 

Colonel Kestley. Well, the materials for the cableway; yes, sir — 
the towers and so forth. 

25. General Frank. Was the camp ever built on the top of Kaala? 
Colonel KJESTLEY. Not while I was there. General. There was the 

underground work that was built while I was there. 

26. General Frank. That was finished ? 

Colonel Kestley. It was finished, but later, due to a change in the 
type of equipment, why, I understood — I wasn't there on the change, 
but it was changed to a certain extent. 

27. General Frank. How much opportunity did you have to ob- 
serve the work of the Hawaiian Constructors? 

Colonel Kestley. Well, I was there seven days a week, 10 or 12 
hours a day, and I was out in the field a gi-eat deal. 

28. General Frank. What other contractors in the Hawaiian De- 
partment had you been able to observe? 

[3670] Colonel I^stley. Well, none, sir, that I had had a 
chance to observe. 

29. General Frank. Where did you come from ? 
Colonel Kestley. California and Oregon. 

30. General Frank. When did you come to the Hawaiian Islands? 
Colonel Kestley. December 1939. 

31. General Frank. The Hawaiian Constructors were not operat- 
ing in December 1939? They did not come on the job until Decem- 
ber 1940. 

Colonel Kestley. Yes, sir. I was stationed at Midway for a year 
and two days, and I returned here and was area engineer on the 5th of 
February 1941. 



1880 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

32. General Frank. And that was on the Hawaiian Constructors' 
contract ? 

Colonel Kestlet. Yes, sir. 

33. General Frank. Who was the countractor at Midway? 
Colonel Kestley. We did our own work, the United States Engi- 
neers. 

34. General Frank. They did their own work ? 
Colonel Kestley. Yes, sir. 

35. General Frank. What was the relative efficiency between the 
work at Midway and that done by the Hawaiian Constructors ? 

Colonel KJESTLEY. Due to the class of personnel I got at Midway, it 
wasn't any better than it was here. 

36. General Frank. It was not satisfactory, then, according to good 
standards? 

Colonel Kestly. That is right. I would not consider it so. It was 
because of the class they would send from the mainland. They 
would send 60 or 70 or 80 or 90 men, and out of that many we would 
probably get 25 that were Avhat you [36711 would consider 
good mechanics or laborers, or whatever you needed. The rest of 
them, some of them I would feel like shipping them back on the same 
boat ; but we had to put up with those things. That is, I had to, any 
way, because that is all I got. 

37. Major Clausen. Colonel Kestly, whom did you talk to about 
your appearance before this Board, before you came here today to 
testify? 

Colonel Kestly. Well, about my appearance here ? 

38. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. 

Colonel Kestly. Well, I talked to Colonel Wimer. That is, we 
didn't discuss what might be said, or anything, with anyone. I talked 
to Colonel Wyman. I said "hello" to him and just passed the time. 
He didn't say anything about what I might say at the Board. 

39. Major Clausen. Did you see and talk with General Bragdon ? 
Colonel Kestly. A few minutes ; yes, sir. 

40. Major Clausen. What did he tell you about your appearance 
before this Board ? 

Colonel Kestly. He said that they were not going to talk with me 
about it, because they didn't want it to appear that they might influ- 
ence me in my appearance before the Board. 

41. Major Clausen. What else did he say to you about your appear- 
ance ? 

Colonel Kestly. Well, the only other thing that I heard of was 
that there would be an informal gathering, and that I shouldn't be 
afraid of anything. 

42. Major Clausen. He told you you didn't have to be afraid? 
Colonel Kestly. Well, I mean, that I should feel perfectly at ease. 
[3672] 43. Major Clausen. Yes? What else did he say? 
Colonel Kestly. That is all. 

44. Major Clausen. Were they all in a group when the General 
told you this ? 

Colonel Kestly. Colonel Wyman and the General. 

45. Major Clausen. I begyour pardon ? 

Colonel Kestly. Colonel vVyman and the General were together. 

46. Major Clausen. When did you have this talk. Colonel? " 
Colonel Kestly. Wednesday. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1881 

47. Major Clausen. How did General Bragdon know that you 
were going to appear before this Board ? 

Colonel Kestly. I don't know, sir. 

48. Major Clausen. You have no idea ? 

Colonel Kestly. No, I don't know how. I just assumed he knew, 
because of a "radio" to the engineer, why. Colonel Wimer had given 
me the job of collecting data for General Bragdon when he arrived 
here. 

49. General Frank. Were you sent for, or did you report here to 
General Bragdon ? 

Colonel Kestly. I just walked in there and asked about my appear- 
ance before the Board. 

50. General Frank. Why did you have to ask about it? 
Colonel Kestly. Well, I didn't know just what I should know, 

whether I should look up and see how many laborers I had, and what 
dates certain jobs were started, and how much yardage, and so forth. 
If there was anything that I should refresh my memory on, I wanted 
to do it. 

51. General Frank. Did you talk to Major Powell? 
[3673] Colonel Kestly. No, sir. 

52. General Frank. Do you know who Major Powell is? 
Colonel Kestly. Well, I just know that Major Powell is there with 

General Bragdon; yes, sir. 

53. General Frank. You did not have any conversation at all with 
Major Powell? 

Colonel Kestly. No, sir. 

54. General Frank. Did you have any conversation with Major 
Lozier ? 

Colonel Kestly. Yes; Major Lozier, when he first arrived, came 
in my office and was helping us gather this information in the proper 
form, that was to be turned over to General Bragdon. 

55. Major Clausen. What did General Bragdon say? "Don't be 
afraid of the Board ; just go up there, and be at ease"? 

Colonel Kestly. He didn't say, "Don't be afraid of the Board." 

56. Major Clausen. What did he say about "being at ease"? Did 
he say, "This is just a Board, don't pay" 

Colonel Kestly. Oh, no ! 

57. Major Clausen. "Don't let them give you the 'willies' "? 
Colonel Kestly. No, sir. 

58. Major Clausen. "Just go right there, and don't be afraid"? 
Is that what he said ? 

Colonel Kestly. No, sir. 

59. Major Clausen. Well, what did he say? Tell the Board. 

, Colonel Kestly. Well, just as I stated before, that the meetings 
were informal, and he was just putting me at ease, as I would state 
it in the easiest words. 

[3674] 60. Major Clausen. In other words, he was putting you 
at ease, on Wednesday, before your appearance before the Board, 
on Friday, is that right? 

Colonel Kestly. Yes, sir 

61. Major Clausen. Are you at ease, now? 

Colonel Kestly. Well, I don't know. Not entirely ! 

79716—46 — Ex. 145, vol. 3 18 



1882 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

62. Major Clausen. Well, he didn't do a very good job then, did 
he? Or did you think that I was going to ask you these questions? 

Colonel Kestly. No, sir ; I didn't know you were going to ask. 

63. Major Clausen. Well, let me ask you this: Did he tell you 
also to tell the truth, here? 

Colonel Kestly. Well, I didn't need to be told that, sir. 

64. Major Clausen. No. Well, did you have to be told that you 
should come up here and be at ease ? 

Colonel Kestly. Well, not — never having appeared before 'a board 
of this kind, I didn't know just what I was supposed to do. 

65. Major Clausen. How long have you been in the Army, Colonel 
Kestly? 

Colonel Kestly. Two years, last August. 

66. Major Clausen. You never appeared before a Board, before, 
in your life ? 

Colonel Kestly. Not a military board ; no, sir. 

67. Major Clausen. Well, any kind of board? 

Colonel KJESTLY. Well, when I was with the Railroad Commission 
of California, I used to appear before the commission. 

[S675~\ 68. Major Clausen. Do you know Leon Winchell ? 
Colonel Kestly. Yes, sir. 

69. Major Clausen. Well, that is a fairlj^ formal body, isn't it? 
Colonel Kestly. Well, no. Their proceeding was rather informal, 

I think. 

70. Major Clausen. Did he tell you that you should only answer 
what you knew, in answer to questions ? 

Colonel Kestly. No, sir; he didn't say that. 

71. Major Clausen. That is all. 

72. General Grunert. Have you any questions? 

73. Colonel Toulmin. I would like to know from this officer, if I 
may, General Grunert, why he should be disturbed. Have you got 
something on your mind, Colonel, that we probably might ask that 
would disturb you? 

Colonel Kestly. Not a thing. 

74. Colonel Toulmin. Well, when you sat down here, you seemed 
to be very much perturbed. I am just wondering what it was that 
might perturb a Lieutenant Colonel of the Engineers. 

Colonel Kestly. I seemed to be ? 

75. Colonel Toulmin. Yes. You haven't got anything on your 
mind ? 

Colonel Kestly. No, sir. 

76. Colonel Toulmin. All right. If you have, why, spit it out, now, 
and let these people know about it. 

Colonel Kestly. If there were, I certainly would; yes, sir. 

77. Colonel Toulmin. They want the facts. 

78. General Grunert. Then I understand you have nothing 
[3676] else that you want to testify about or tell the Board ? 

Colonel KJESTLY. No, sir. 

79. General Grunert. There are many witnesses, you know, that 
have something that they want to get at, and they do not get the 
opportunity', and so I am giving you the opportunity. 

Colonel I^isTLY. No, the only thing I can say is that from the time 
I arrived and went to work at Midway, and then the month in be- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1883 

tween, and then started to work here as area engineer, I have been 
under pressure every bit of the time, making every effort to do as 
much work as we possibly could. 

80. General Grunert. By "pressure," you mean the amount of 
work ? 

Colonel Kestly. Yes, sir; and are trying to rush all the work we 
could. It has been quite a long period of it, and there hasn't been 
any let-up in it. 

81. General Frank. How many men were on this road job from 
Kolekole Pass over to the base at Kaala ? 

Colonel Kestly. Well, I couldn't say for sure. General. 

82. General Frank. If it took the length of time you state, that was 
1,500 feet a month, or 50 feet a day. 

Colonel Kestly. The number of men, of course, when you had 
so many structures ahead of the grading, which you would have to 
get in, well, there would be a certain group up here on the excavation 
of this one, while on this one they would be pouring the footings, and 
this one, they would be pouring the arch, and then there would be 
the shovel crews and the truck drivers. 

83. General Frank. How long have you been in the engineering 
game? 

[3677] Colonel Kestly. Since 1911. 

84. General Frank. How did the progress of that work stack up 
in your opinion with the experience you had had in the past? 

Colonel Kestly. Well, I think I would say that it was fair. General. 

85. General Frank. All right, nothing further. 

86. General Grunert. That is all? That appears to be all they 
want of you. Colonel. Thank you for coming. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

TESTIMONY OF AHOON H. WONG, DEPUTY COUNTY ENGINEEK; 

WAILUKU, MAUI 

(The witness was sworn by the Eecorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Mr. Wong, will you please state to the Board 
your name and address. 

Mr. Wong. Ahoon H. Wong. My present address is Wailuku, Maui. 

2. Colonel West. What is your occupation ? 

Mr. Wong. I am the deputy county engineer, now. 

3. General Frank. Mr. Wong, from June through December, 1941, 
what was your employment? 

Mr. Wong. Area engineer of the Sixth Field Area of the U. S. 
Engineers Department. 

4. General Frank. Did the construction of the road on Haleakala 
come under your supervision ? 

Mr. Wong. Yes, sir. 

5. General Frank. What was the length of it? 

Mr. Wong. It was approximately 4,000 feet, extending [3678] 
from the end of the then road to the very top of the mountain. 

6. General Frank. The copy of the job order indicates the com- 
mencement date as June 25, 1941. 

Mr. Wong. That is approximately right, yes, sir. 



1884 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

7. General Frank. That is correct, is it ? 
Mr. Wong. Yes, sir. 

8. General Frank. The estimated date for completion was Septem- 
ber 25, 1941. 

Mr. Wong. That is how it read. 

9. General Frank. That was the estimated date ? 
Mr. Wong. Yes, sir. 

10. General Frank. Then, a revised date for completion was 
November 30. Do you remember when it was completed? 

Mr. Wong. The whole job, as first drawn out? 

11. General Fr^vnk. The road. 

Mr. Wong. Oh, the road? The road was completed before that 
date, I am sure. 

12. General Frank. It was? 
Mr. Wong. Yes, sir. 

13. General Frank. Was there some delay in the construction of 
the road ? 

Mr. Wong. There was no delay in the construction of the road. 

14. General Frank. It went along? 
Mr. Wong. Yes, sir. 

15. General Frank. Where did the labor come from ? 
Mr. Wong. Local labor. 

16. General Frank. AVho had the contract for the road? 
Mr. Wong. The Hawaiian Constructors. 

[3679] 17. General Frank. Who was their man in charge of the 
job ? 

Mr. Wong. Superintendent by the name of Sloan. 

18. General Frank. Was he a pretty good man ? 
Mr. Wong. Yes, sir; he was a good man. 

19. General Frank. What other project did you have over there? 
Mr. Wong. We had only that project; that is, a straight contract 

project with the Hawaiian Constructors. We had other projects, the 
CAA airport, under CAA funds, which was also under my jurisdiction. 

20. General Frank. Who was in charge of building that ? 

Mr. Wong. That was the Territorial Airport Constructors, a sepa- 
rate company. 

21. General Frank. Was the progress of this work on this road 
satisfactory to you ? 

Mr. Wong. Yes, sir. 

22. General Frank. And when did you arrive on Oahu from Maui ? 
Mr. Wong. Yesterday evening. 

23. General Frank. And to whom did you report ? 

Mr. Wong. Well, I didn't report, until early this morning. 

24. General Frank. Wliere ? 

Mr. Wong. To Sergeant Montgomery. 

25. General Frank. Have you been to the district engineer's office? 
Mr. Wong. I have. 

26. General Frank. Whom did you see? 
Mr. Wong. I saw General Bragdon. 

27. General Frank. What conversation did you have with General 
Bragdon ? 

[3680] Mr. Wong. Well, he asked me what jobs were then under 
construction, prior to December 7. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1885 

28. General Frank. And what was your comment? 
Mr. Wong. The same as I just stated. 

29. General Frank. What further advice if any did he give you ? 
Mr. Wong. None at all. 

30. General Frank. He made no comment to you about your appear- 
ing before this Board? 

Mr. Wong. He made no comment ; no, sir. 

31. General Frank. Not any? 

Mr. Wong. No, sir; I told him that I was coming. 

32. General Frank. Did you see anybody else ? 
Mr. Wong. I saw Colonel Wyman. 

33. General Frank. Did you know him before? 
Mr. Wong. Yes, sir ; he was my immediate boss. 

34. General Frank. Did you have any comment from him, on ap- 
pearing before the Board ? 

Mr. Wong. No, sir. 

35. General Frank. Did he mention the Board, at all ? 
Mr. Wong. No, sir. 

36. General Frank. Did you tell him you were coming to appear 
before this Board? 

Mr, Wong. Yes, sir. 

37. Major Clausen. Mr. Wong, this job that General Frank was 
asking you about, Mt. Haleakala, Maui, is job-order 41.0, and the order 
to proceed was given June 14, 1941, is that correct? 

Mr. Wong. That is right. 

38. Major Clausen. The job was only about 80 percent complete 
on [3681] December 1, 1941, is that correct? 

Mr. Wong. What was the date, please ? 

39. Major Clausen. December 1, 1941. 
Mr. Wong. That was approximately right. 

40. Major Clausen. You are not employed by the United States 
Engineering Department at the present time, are you ? 

Mr. Wong. No, sir; I left them about a year ago last May. 

41. Major Clausen. How did you come to talk with General Brag- 
don? 

Mr. Wong. Well, he called me over the long-distance telephone a 
few days ago ; if I were coming to Honolulu, to drop in to see him. 

42. Major Clausen. What did he say he wanted to talk to you 
about ? 

Mr. Wong. Well, he just wanted me to discuss construction jobs on 
Maui prior to December 7, what jobs were then in operation. 

43. Major Clausen. Well, how did he know that you had been no- 
tified to appear before the Board, and to call you ? 

Mr. Wong. Well, he asked me if I were coming down, and I told 
him I was coming down to appear before this Board. 

44. Major Clausen. Did he tell you when you saw him and talked 
with him here in town to give correct testimony ? 

Mr. Wong. Pardon? 

45. Major Clausen. I say, when he talked with you here in town 
did he tell you to give correct answers ? 

Mr. Wong. He did not give me any instructions at all. He just 
asked me what jobs were then in operation. 

[3682] 46. Major Clausen. What jobs were then in operation? 
Mr. Wong. Yes, sir. 



1886 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

47. Major Clausen. You mean, were in operation in 1941 ? 
Mr. Wong. That is right ; in operation in 1941. 

48. Major Clausen. Well, did he tell you why he would have to ask 
you that question when he could just look at the records to find out, 
so simply 'i 

Mr. Wong. Well, that is up to him. I don't know his reasons for 
asking me that. 

49. Major Clausen. No, I mean, did he tell you anything about 
that? 

Mr. Wong. Oh, no ; he didn't say. 

50. Major Clausen. I mean, did he say that for some special reason 
he didn't want to look at the records, he wanted to talk to you ? 

Mr. Wong. No; he didn't say that. 

51. Major Clausen. Do you have connections, over there in your 
present job as deputy county engineer, with the U. S. Engineer De- 
partment ? 

Mr. AVoNG. No, sir; I am with the County of Maui, a local organiza- 
tion. 

52. Major Clausen. I think that is all. 

53. General Grunert. Are there any other questions ? Mr. Wong, 
do you think of anything that you could tell the Board which might 
be of help to it, as to the conditions prior to the attack and during the 
attack — anything that you have in mind that you think the Boa'rd 
ouglit to know ? 

Mr. Wong. I think, in so far as the County of Maui, in so far as the 
work on Maui was concerned, and my observations [3683] in 
other areas, I think our work went along at a much more rapid rate. 

54. General Grunert. In Maui? 
Mr. Wong. Yes, sir. 

55. General Grunert. Do you know anything about the delays or the 
slowness of the work elsewhere ? 

Mr. Wong. No, sir ; I don't. 

56. General Grunert. Then how do you make the comparison? 
Mr. Wong. Well, just my observation. I just know that the work 

on our island was progressing much faster. 

57. General Grunert. You had charge of that work over there, 
didn't you ? 

Mr. Wong. Well, I was the area engineer. 

58. General Grunert. And you knew that your work was going 
faster than the other work ; then the other work must have been going 
slower than yours. 

Mr. Wong. Well, that is to be presumed. 

59. General Grunert. Do you know the reason for the slowness? 
Mr. Wong. I don't know that. 

60. General Grunert. Is there anything else that you might want to 
say? 

Mr. Wong. No, sir. 

61. General Grunert. All right ; thank you for coming up. 
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

62. General Grunert. General Russell? 

[3684] 63. General Russell. I have been furnished by the G-2 
office, Hawaiian Department, two estimate of the international Japa- 
nese situation. The issuing office was G-2, Hawaiian Department, 
Army Contact Office, Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii. One is dated the 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1887 

I7th of October, 1941, and signed by one George W. Bicknell, Lieuten- 
ant Colonel, General Staff Corps. It shows the distribution as follows : 
Chief of Staff, H. H. D., G-2, H. H. D., G-2, H. A. F., G-2 Schofield 
Barracks {3 copies), G-3, H. H. D., F. B. I. Honolulu (2 copies), 

0. N. I. Honolulu (2 copies) , 

(G-2 estimate of international (Japanese) situation, October 17, 
1941, is as follows:) 

1. Summary of Situation 

a. With the faU of the Third Konoye Cabinet, the 16th instant, tension in the 
Pacific reached a new high. The fall of said cabinet is apparently primarily due 
to a breakdown of the rapprochement negotiations between America and Japan, 
and also due to extreme pressure from the rightest element in Japan a^ a result 
of German success against Russia, and also for fear of complete encirclement of 
Japan by the ABCD group. 

b. The situation is generally admitted as being exrtemely critical, and is still 
necessarily uncertain, due to the fact that the formation of the new cabinet has 
not been completed and, consequently, little or no definite information is available 
as to the attitude of individual members, and nothing as to what the attitude of 
the cabinet as a whole will be. 

c. Based upon contemporary opinions from various sources, however, it is 
fairly certain that Japan's basic policy, as heretofore frequently stated, will 
remain unchanged ; and it is expected that Japan will shortly announce her de- 
cision to challenge militarily any nation or combination of nations which might 
oppose the execu- [3685] turn of said policies — irrespective of what 
means she may choose to adopt or course she may decide to take in their 
achievement. 

2. Conclusions 

According to present indications, it is highly probable that Japan will, in the 
near future, take military action in new areas of the Far East. The primary 
reasons for such a move or moves are 'believed to be as follows : 

a. Capabilities. 

1. Desperate economic conditions internally — making it perhaps preferable to 
risk a major foreign war rather than internal revolution. 

2. Violent opposition by the "rightist" elements who are opposed to any 
appeasement of the democracies and desire more active cooperation with the 
Axis^-for the time being. 

3. That major successes of the Axis in Europe and the potential collapse of 
Russian resistance, afford an unparalleled opportunity for expansion with chances 
of minimum resistance — that is, when the strength of the Axis is at its maximum, 
and the strength of the democracies not yet fully mobilized. 

4. A desire to break the so-called encirclement of the ABCD block. 

b. Probable Moves. The most likely moves whicli Japan may make in the 
near future, and the sequence thereof, are as follows : 

1. Attack Russia from the east. 

2. Pressure French Indo-China and Thailand for concessions in the way of 
military, naval, and [3686] air bases, and guarantees of economic co- 
operation. 

3. Attack British possessions in the Far East. 

4. Defend against an American attack in support of the British. 

5. Attack simultaneously the ABCD block at whichever points might promise 
her greatest tactical, strategic and economic advantages. 

c. Reasons Justifying These Moves. The basis for each of the above possible 
moves are considered to be as follows : 

1. Attack on Russia. 

(a) Japan's desire to extend her first line of defense as far to the west as 
possible as a primary defense against potential aerial attacks on the heart of 
Japan proper by a continental power. 

(b) To set up a buffer state between herself and Germany (assuming that 
Germany will eventually attempt to extend her influence and control eastward 
to the Pacific). 

(c) To secure immense quantities of nmch-needed raw matei'ials known to 
be in Siberia. 



1888 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(d) To secure effective control over, or perhaps stamp out, communism in the 
Far East by striking at the root or source of the doctrine. 

(e) A possibility that an attack on Russia at this time can be undertaken 
with a reasonable chance of non-military intervention by the United States ; and 
that even the British might not [3687] resort to active military action in 
support of Russia in the Pacific, due to the fact that both the Americans and 
British are preoccupied in Europe, and that neither power has any genuine desire 
to ever see the state of the USSR emerge sufficiently strong to again plague the 
democratic states with the sinister ideals of communism. 

(f ) To open communications with Germany for the purpose of closer coordina- 
tion and supply, in case it becomes necessary to continue the war against other 
Pacific powers. 

(g) To achieve a spectacular victory which is now greatly needed to revive 
the morale of the people and prepare them for future efforts toward the south. 

2. Pressure French Indo-China and Thailand. 

Pressure on French Indo-China and Thailand for concessions of military, naval 
or air bases, and guarantees of economic cooperation, is entirely to be expected, 
and this may either precede or follow, or occur simultaneously with an attack 
on Russia, in order to insure security in the south while her primary objective 
in the north is being achieved; and to afford her more and better strategic bases 
from which she can operate against Chungking's lines of communications in case 
it becomes necessary to defend herself against either or both of these powers. 
Also, to secure additional raw materials, food, etc. 

3. Attack on British Possessio7is in the Far East. 

Following the principle of defeating one [3688] opponent at a time — 
famous with her Axis partner. Hitler — it is believed that Japan, if faced with 
certain Bi'itish military resistance to her plans, will unhesitatingly attack the 
British ; and do so without a simultaneous attack on American possession, because 
of no known binding agreement between the British and Americans for joint 
military action against Japan, and that the American public is not yet fully 
prepared to support such action. However, it must be evident to the Japanese 
that in case of such an attack on the British, they would most certainly have to 
fight the United States within a relatively short time. 

4. Simultaneous Attack, on the ABCD Powers. 

While a simultaneous attack on the ABCD powers would violate the principle 
mentioned above, it cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if 
Japan considers war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of her 
actions against Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide to strike 
before our naval program is completed. 

An attack on the United States could not be undertaken without almost certain 
involvement of the entire ABCD block, hence there remains the possibility that 
Japan may strike at the most opportune time, and at whatever points [3689] 
might gain for her the most strategic, tactical or economical advantages over 
her opponents. 

3. In conclusion, barring unforeseen and untoward actions, which might set 
off a conflict in any quarter and invite measures and countermeasiires never 
contemplated, it is believed that the above represents the most logical taajor 
moves that Japan may take and the probable consequence thereof. This is 
assuming that the new cabinet will be, as generally predicted, 'strongly mill-* 
tary' and will support the present demands of the 'rightists' elements which were 
largely responsible for the fall of Third Konoye Cabinet. 

Then he has another one following that, dated the 25th of October, 
1941, these being the only two G-2 estimates I was able to get. The 
first one was the 17th of October. The one I am going to read now 
is the 25th of October. 

(G-2 estimate of international (Japanese) situation, dated October 
25, 1941, is as follows:) 

1. Simvmary of Situation. Reference paragraph 1, G-2 Estimate of the Inter- 
national (Japanese) Situation, 1200 Oct. 17, 1941, there have been no funda- 
mental changes in the international situation, centering on Japan, since the 
time mentioned ; and the estimate is still in almost complete accord with con- 
temporary opinions of jnost high ofiicials and reputable observers who are 
known to be in close touch with the various phases of the present fast-moving 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1889 

situation. However, tlie following general summary is considered appropriate 
at this time: 

a. A crisis of the first magnitude was created in the Pacific by the fall of 
the Third Konoye Cabinet on the 16th instant. The fall of said cabinet was 
allegedly precipitated by unsatisfactory [3689A] progress of the rap- 
proachment negotiations between America and Japan, and by extreme pressure 
from "rightist" elements who have been clamoring for stronger ties with the 
*Axis and more forceful opposition to the ABCD block, including Russia. 

b. An apparently imminent collapse of the Russian forces in the west, to- 
gether with the loudly proclaimed German successes everywhere, tended to accen- 
tuate the cry for action on the side of the axis to such a degree that the 
Konoye cabinet could no longer resist, hence resigned en block, and was almost 
immediately replaced by a new cabinet headed by ex-War Minister General Tojo. 

c. Ministers of the new cabinet, as well as Premier Tojo, have openly de- 
clared their intentions of stronger ties with the Axis, which automatically 
underscores Japan's policies with "intensified aggression" ; definitely places 
Japan in a camp hostile to the United States and other democracies; makes 
all protestations of peaceful intentions a sham or objective of suspicion ; and 
forces America into a state of constant vigilance, but at least clarifies the 
situation to such an extent that we do know where we stand, what to expect, 
and what should be done. 

2. Conclusions. No change in paragraph 2 of G-2 Estimate of 17 Oct. 1941. 
However, several important incidents have transpired, or are scheduled to 
take place, which are certain to have a profound bearing on the probable course 
of events in question in the near future. These are : 

a. The formation of a new Japanese "War Cabinet", headed by ex-War 
Minister, General Tojo. 

[3690] b. The decision of Premier to continue his predecessor's order to 
permit three Japanese vessels to visit American ports for the purpose of trans- 
porting stranded Americans and Japanese nationals to their respective home- 
lands. 

c. Premier Tojo's expressed desire to continue rapproachment negotiations 
with the United States. 

d. The order by the Navy Department to American vessels to avoid Asiatic 
ports in the north Pacific, including Shanghai. 

e. The announced decision of^the American government to abandon Vlad^.- 
vostok as a part of entry for wa'r supplies to Russia, and to adopt the port of 
Archangel as the sole point of entry for such shipments. 

f. Announcement of Ambassador Nomura's return to Japan for consultation 
with the new cabinet. 

3. Justifications for conclusions. The following is a brief analysis and evalua- 
tion of the above, based on limited reiwrts, and is not to be regarded as; con- 
clusive, but rather to assist in making accurate conclusions on the general situa- 
tion as subsequent events and special situations are presented : 

a. Neto GaMnet. Paragraph 1 c above is the general answer. The only other 
noteworthy viewi>oint received and considered to be worth mentioning, is that 
General Tojo was selected to head the new cabinet because he was the only man 
considered capable of controlling the "extremist" army elements, and [3691] 
thus stave off any precipitate action until such time as the situation in Europe 
has become definitely clear, and until at least a decisive stage has been reached 
in rapproachement negotiations with the United States.. 

b. Japanese vessels to America. The Japanese Government's decision to permit 
three ships to visit America for the purpose of repatriating stranded nationals of 
both countries, may be regarded either as a peaceful gesture or as a measure to 
"clear the decks" in the Pacific with a view to future naval and military moves. 
It will be recalled that the Japanese were careful to remove Japanese nationals 
from the interior of south China before spreading military operations to that 
section. It is considered impracticable to remove all Japanese nationals from 
America and American territories. 

c. Rapprochement 'Negotiations. Inasmuch as the new Japanese cabinet has 
openly declared its intentions of stronger ties with the Axis — definitely our 
enemy — we can only expect Japan to make a similar use of peace negotiations 
as her partner, Hitler, i. e., as a means to delude and disarm her potential enemies. 
From a military point of view such peaceful overtures should be preceded by 
concrete evidence of sincerity before they can be seriously considered. 



1890 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

d. Ifavy Order to Clear American Ships from North Pacific. 

This action on the part of the Navy seems to have been largely "precautionary", 
which also appears [3692] fully justified, realizing that we are now 
definitely dealing with an exponent and ally of Hitler. 

e. Abandonment of Vladivostok as a Port of Entry for Russian Supplies. 
Two issues are here involved : - 

(1) Military. The crucial point as to whether we will be able to continue to 
face Hitler across the English Channel, across the Atlantic, or on American 
shores, centers in the British Isles. Convoys must cross the Atlantic in order 
to hold the British Isles at all cost, irrespective of what happens in the Pacific. 
Convoys to Archangel, for the greater part of the distance, could be carried on 
incidental to convoys going to the Britsih Isles. Requirements of armed escorts 
for the remaining distance to Archangel, would probably be less than what would 
be required over any Pacific route. In fact, with a hostile Japanese fleet in the 
Pacific, any practicable route across the Pacific to Russia may have been entirely 
rules out. Assuming this to be the case, the most logical step would be not to 
undertake a thing that would certainly have to be abandoned later. 

(2) Diplomatic. Inasmuch as the shipping of supplies to Russia via Vladi- 
vostok has been one of the major issues between America and Japan recently 
the abandonment of said route may serve to keep the door of diplomacy open 
for a longer period ; and, in case of an unforeseen major reserve for the Axis 
13693] in Europe, might provide an open door for successful negotiations at 
a time when Japan desired to change her mind, seeing that further ties with the 
Axis are useless, and that a compromise with the democracies has become 
inevitable. 

f. Nomura's report to New Cabinet. This is considered a very normal pro- 
cedure with the Japanese Government. Mr. Nomura will be expected to give a 
review of his efforts in Washington and perhaps the last word on the American 
attitude. If his previous work is still in harmony with Japan's new policy, he 
may return to Washington. If not, it seems a fair assumption that he may not 
even be replaced. In case the abnormal procedure is followed, of dispatching a 
subordinate to Tokyo, it may be taken as an attempt to conceal the real gravity 
of the situation. This is not, however, a prediction. 

REMARKS : Everyone is interested in the answer to the question. When will 
Japan move? — a question which no one dares to predict with certainty. How- 
ever, the following points are considered to be-worthy of mentioning : 

a. Things which tend to indicate that a major move will not take place for 
approximately another month are : 

(1) The dispatch of Japanese vessels to the United States for return of 
stranded nationals of both countries to their respective homelands. 

(2) Ambassador Nomura's return to Japan for purpose of reporting to the new 
cabinet. 

(3) Repeated declarations by Japanese officials [369^] that Japan de- 
sires to continue rapproachement negotiations. 

(4) Extreme cold 'over Eastern Siberia makes military operations against 
Russia very risky before spring. 

(5) A protracted Russo-German war seems much more likely now than it 
did immediately prior to the assumption of office by the new cabinet, and that 
the "rightists" who were crying for action against a "collapsing"' Russia, may 
again hesitate to take the final plunge on the side. of Hitler. If the intense cold 
plus a tired Russian Arhiy is able to stop the invincible legions of Hitler before 
Moscow (?), wisdom may dictate not to risk the matchless legions of Nippon 
against a rested Russian army under temperatures still lower than around 
Moscow. 

(6) Announcement that Cabinet leaders have requested Emperor Hirohito to 
convoke a special five-day session of the Imperial Diet, beginning Nov. 15, at 
which time, it is predicted, the government will be asked to clarify its stand on 
international policies, particularly with reference to former Premier Konoye's 
message to President Roosevelt and the progi-ess of the Washington negotiations. 

b. In other words, it seems logical to believe that no major move will be made 
before the latter part of November — in any direction — with a chance that the 
great break, if it comes, will not occur before spring. 

Those are the only G-2 estimates dealing with the Japanese 13695] sit- 
uation which I have been able to find in the War Department in Hawaii. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1891 

TESTIMONY OF SIMON PERLITER, 1901 UALAKAA STREET, 
HONOLULU, TERRITORY OF HAWAII 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Mr. Perliter, will you please state to the Board 
your name and address. 

Mr. Perliter. My name is Simon Perliter. I live at 1901 Ualakaa 
Street, Honolulu. My permanent home is in Los Angeles. 

2. Colonel West. Where are you employed at the present time, Mr. 
Perliter? 

Mr. Perliter. With the United States Engineers at Punahou, 
Punahou campus. 

3. General Grunert. General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen, 
will conduct this particular part of our investigation. 

4. General Frank. Wliat is your present assignment ? 

Mr. Perliter. My present assignment is design engineer, Chief 
Design Engineer, my civil service qualification is Head Engineer. 

5. General Frank. For whom? 

Mr. Perliter. U. S. Engineer's Office. 

6. General Frank. At? 

Mr. Perliter. At Punahou, Honolulu. 

7. General Frank. How long have you been there ? 
Mr. Perliter. Approximately four years. 

8. General Frank. You were there, then, during 1941? 
Mr. Perliter. Yes, sir. 

9. General Frank, Were you there when the Hawaiian Construc- 
[3696] tors' contract became effective ? 

Mr. Perliter. Yes, sir. 

10. General Frank. What position did you then hold ? 
Mr. Perliter. Chief of the Engineering Division, 

11. General Frank. And your duties consisted of what? 

Mr. Perliter. In charge of all designing work in the Honolulu 
District for the U, S, Engineer, 

12. General Frank. And as that you did what? 

Mr. Perliter. Prepared plans and specifications for all work in 
connection with the U. S. Engineer in the Honolulu District. 

13. General Frank. Under whose direct supervision did you work? 
Mr. Perliter. Colonel Wyman. 

14. General Frank. There was no intermediary between you and 
Colonel Wyman ? 

Mr. Perliter. There was an intermediate person later. He arrived 
at about February of 1941. He was Lieutenant Butz, D. C. Butz. 

15. Major Clausen. You said to me that General Bragdon has a 
message that you were to carry to me. 

Mr. Perliter. There were certain drawings which I prepared under 
the direction of General Bragdon that consisted of a series of maps 
and exhibits. I brought them here yesterday. They were to be 
used, I understood, by Colonel Wyman, but I understand they were 
not called for. They were made under my supervision and, there- 
fore, if there is any explanation of them I can make it. 

16. Major Clausen. Are these the maps? 
[S697] Mr. Perliter. Yes, sir. 



1892 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

17. Major Clausen. Suppose you take and explain them to the 
Board, give us a brief explanation of them. 

Mr. Perliter. This map, gentlemen, is a map of the Island of Oahu, 
and the circles indicate job orders that were issued for various jobs 
for the Hawaiian Constructors. 

_ As to the colors, the solid blue circles show permanent AWS sta- 
tions 5 the green circle shows mobile AWS stations ; the red circle is 
gasoline storage ; the brown circle is the information center, and the 
circle with no color whatsoever is all other jobs which pertained to 
the contract of the Hawaiian Constructors up to the 7th of December. 

We have the same thing on the other islands, if you care to see them, 
the same type of exhibits. 

18. Major Clausen. Those are marked just P-1. Now, will you 
explain the others. 

Mr. Perliter. This is a map of the Island of Maui, with the same 
notations and indications I just explained to you for the Island of 
Oahu. 

19. Major Clausen. Mark this P-2. 

Mr. Perliter. The same thing for the Island of Molokai. 

20. Major Clausen. Mark that P-3. 

Mr. Perliter. The same thing for the Island of Hawaii. 

21. Major Clausen. Mark that P^. 

Mr. Perliter. The same thing for the Island of Lanai. 

22. Major Clausen. That will be marked P-5. 

Mr. Perliter. And the same thing for the Island of Kauai. 

23. Major Clausen. Mark that P-6. 

Mr. Perliter. These maps were prepared on the basis of a [3698] 
wire that we received which stressed reserve aviation gasoline storage, 
gasoline storage and AWS, so instead of completing the plans, loading 
up with all the work, we prepared these maps stressing those three 
items. 

24. General Frank. But the other maps have all the work on them ? 
Mr. Perliter. Yes, sir. 

25. General Frank. Including those that you have here ? 
Mr. Perliter. Yes, sir. 

26. General Frank. Then I would say we do not want those. 

Mr. Perliter. This map is a map showing a chart of the airline 
distances and on it we have projected in blue the western ferry route 
that we constructed and in red the eastern ferry route, with one small 
alternate shown in dotted red, and the green are the routes we had 
understudy as possible other routes in the event those routes were 
knocked out by the enemy. 

27. General Frank. The only one you actually did any work on 
was the one in blue ? 

Mr. Perliter. No, sir, we built both routes. 

28. General Frank. Built both the blue and the red ? 
Mr. Perliter. Yes, sir. 

29. Major Clausen. Do you want those? 

30. General Frank. Yes, I think so. 

31. Major Clausen. All right, mark this P-7. 

Mr. Perliter. These drawings, gentlemen, are drawings which per- 
tain to details on the AWS, they are site plans, and also the gasoline 
storage. They are actual working drawings, but they just show the 
site in detail. That is all as far as the exhibits are concerned. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1893 

[36W] 32. General Grunert. Can you reproduce those seven? 
Mr. Perliter. Yes. How many copies, sir ? 

33. Colonel West. Five copies. 

Mr. PERLrTER. We will have them for you Monday morning. 

34. Major Clausen. I have no further questions. These maps are 
the maps that were made after you received instructions from the Chief 
of Engineers ; is that right ? 

Mr. Perliter. I made those maps after General Bragdon got here, 
which was last Sunday, and we made them on Monday. 

35. Major Clausen. I have no further questions. 

36. General Frank. I have none. 

37. General Grunert. I think I have one or two. 

You had during 1941, 1 understood you to say, charge of preparing 
all of the specifications for various jobs? 
Mr, Perliter. Plans and specifications. 

38. General Grunert. Were there many changes that were demanded 
on certain work drawings, for instance, that caused, you to make re- 
peated changes in the plans? 

Mr. Perliter. Yes, sir. 

39. General Grunert. What were the changes, such changes, and 
how much did that delay certain projects, generally speaking? 

Mr. Perliter. General speaking, I would say the changes were 
numerous. It would come in this manner: At the time this work was 
started, particularly in connection with war reserve gasoline and the 
AWS, neither the using agency or the designing engineer were ac- 
quainted nor experienced with the construction of such projects. As a 
result we worked with the using agency very closely. But they did 
not know what they [STOO] wanted. We would make up a lay- 
out which they thought they wanted. We would present it to them. 
They would ask for changes. In one instance I made up a complete 
set of plans for AWS, which I have unsigned in my office, for camps, 
which were discarded and new sets started just for such a thing as I 
have mentioned. 

As far as the gasoline storage is concerned — I am talking in terms 
of the war reserve — I have prepared, I think, chronological events 
from the time we first received instructions to prepare the first survey 
to the time we were told to go ahead with construction. There again 
the using agency would not be definite to any great extent, but no 
one seems to know exactly what they wanted. In the interest of 
standardization, they finally adopted a standard-sized tank, which, 
when you look at the over-all picture, no doubt saved time, but as 
far as this particular location was concerned it meant definite delay. 

As an example, a definite project report which I prepared was 
transmitted to the Chief of Engineers, and in that report I recom- 
mended the use of 50,000-barrel tanks. After the report was reviewed 
by the Chief of Engineers, they felt that 50,000 barrels in one basket 
was too great. They recommended a smaller storage unit in the 
amount of 25,000 barrels. We immediately prepared designs of these 
tanks on the basis of 25,000 barrel capacity, transmitted the bill of 
materials to the Division Engineer, who was our procurement agency 
at the time. We no sooner completed those when we were instructed 
that the best type of tank was a 30,000 barrel tank. We proceeded 
with those designs and billed the material. Then I had further 



1894 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

instructions to go to a 40,000-barrel tank, which was the final tank that 
was used. 

[-3701] 40. General Frank. From .whom did you get tliese in- 
structions ? 

Mr. Perlitee. From the Chief of Engineers. 

41. General Grunert. As to these plans and specifications that you 
drew, how long in the matter of days, approximately, does it take to 
switch from one to the other and prepare new ones; approximately? 

Mr. Perliter. That would be very difficult to answer, but I believe 
1 can answer that. 

42. General Grunert. Give me an example of some of those you 
changed and the approximate time it took to do that. 

Mr. Perliter. To prepare the first design always takes the greatest 
time, and the first 50,000-barrel tank, the design of that took about 6 
weeks, including the bill for the material ; the ones after that only took 
about 2 weeks to prepare, to change the general design. To actually 
draw up the details took about 3 weeks. 

43. General Fijank. How many baffles between tanks? 

Mr. Perliter. There are no baffles, sir. The present tank are 40,000- 
barrel tanks. They are a hundred feet in diameter, 30 feet high. They 
have a series of columns for supporting the slab, and they have stiff- 
ening around the periphery of the tank to keep the tank from col- 
lajjsing due to lateral load. 

44. General Grunert. During all this time that it took to change 
the plans could any work go forward on them? Could any ground- 
work go forward on them that the plan changes did not affect, or did 
everything have to wait until they got the blueprints in their hands? 

Mr. Perliter. No, sir. The work on the islands here is [3702] 
of such a nature that we never have a complete set of plans prepared 
before we start work. In this particular case we actually did break 
ground and received a radio from the Division office stating that we 
hold construction in abeyance until we heard from them, due to the 
fact that the plans were being materially changed. 

As an example of what I mean, this building, which was done under 
the District Engineer, was started the second day after General 
Eichardson had approved the sketch. I furnished him a foundation 
plan. There were 104 drawings on this building, and the building 
was completed in 45 days, the whole project. So you can see we are 
just one step ahead of the construction division. 

45. General Grunert. Suppose the whole project falls through; 
then what the contractor has done on that work is so much waste ? 

Mr. Perliter. In the case of the war reserve, we already had au- 
thority to go ahead with the project, but there was no definite approval 
of the plans. The amount of excavation we had was not wasted, for 
this reason: The initial excavation was clearing some of the pine- 
apples and then we also stockpiled the top soil, so that when we 
finished the project we placed the same top soil iDack on top of the 
tanks so we would get a good growth of pineapples. 

46. General Grunert. How was the delay in preparing these plans 
and specifications as compared to the delay it took to get approval of 
what was contemplated ? Do you see what I mean ? If the approval 
had to go from here to Washington, how much time could have been 
saved if the approval could have been local ? Have you ever figured 
that out? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1895 

[3703] Mr. Perliter. Yes, sir. I had very little experience 

with government procedure until the time I arrived on the islands. 
I had been in private work. One of the things that used to gripe me 
was the red tape of getting a project started. I was always anxious 
to get a job going. However, we had to submit all our plans and 
specifications to the Division Engineer for approval, and if you got 
your plans back in one month you were fortunate. 

47. General Frank. That is, from the Division Engineer ? 

Mr. Perliter. Yes, sir. On this particular project, on the war re- 
serve project, apparently the Chief's office, the A. G.'s office, the Air 
Corps, were all inter-related, and then there was a Board of Con- 
sultants on oil storage. They came into the picture later. So every- 
one seemed to have their finger in the pie as far as that particular 
project was concerned. 

In connection with the AWS, that took a little different aspect, in 
that we worked with the Signal Corps. The drawings had to go, 
after the Signal Corps approved them, to the Division Engineer for 
approval, but there again it is my understanding that the Signal 
Corps work is centralized in one bureau rather than decentralized like 
a District Engineer. Most of their information today comes direct 
from the Chief Signal Officer in Washington, and many times I would 
ask the Signal Corps how about this information, and they would say 
"We don't have it here. We will have to write to the Chief Signal 
Officer." That tended to delay the project. 

48. General Grunert. Can you tell me what the Division Engineer 
in his Division Engineer office could do to a plan or \370^'\ spec- 
ification that could not be done on the ground ? 

Mr. P'erliter. Well, I always claimed this, as a practical practicing 
engineer, that the man on the ground knows more about the job than 
the man that is 2,000 miles away or even 300 miles away, if he does not 
see the job. We know the intimate local 

49. General Grunert. I have the answer to my question. Do you 
know how many plans and specifications that were sent to the Division 
Engineer were not approved by him and changes were made? If so, 
what was the line of changes ? 

[STOS] Mr. Perliter. In general the changes were very small, 
and we had to resubmit either the plan or by correspondence say that, 
"The changes requested have been made," and that is all. 

50. General Grunert, What did they amount to? Something in 
the line of cost, or in what way did they change the plans ? That is 
what I want to find out, 

Mr. Perliter. Well, their design engineer might have a different 
idea, which in some cases might even be better than I had suggested. 

51. General Grunert, I see, 

Mr. Perliter. Usually that is the type of changes that you will get 
from a division office, because they are experienced personnel sitting 
there. They won't send in any arbitrary changes just to be arbitrary. 
They were constructive criticisms. 

52. General Grunert. Then, there is a question of one designer 
passing upon another's design, possibly to get the best value out of 
Uncle Sam's money ; is that it ? 

Mr. Perliter. Yes, sir. 

53. General Grunert. I have no further questions. 



1896 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

64. General Frank. When did yon come here ? 

Mr. Perliter. Wlien did I come here, sir? 

55. General Frank. Yes. 

Mr. Perliter. I came here October 13, 1940. 

5'6. General Frank. 1940. Did you have the same difficulty with 
changes in plans on aiixed-fee contract that you did in these cost-plus- 
fixed-fee contracts? 

Mr. Perliter. I don't believe I grasp that. I don't [3706] 
understand the question. 

57. General Frank. Well, a fixed-fee contract is a contract where 
you have open bids, the plans are presented to the contractors, and 
once he is given the contract he takes those plans and goes ahead with 
the construction without any changes unless the engineer requires some 
changes, and that requires a renegotiation of the contract. Do you 
understand what I mean now ? 

Mr.. Perliter. Yes, I believe I do, sir. That type of contract 

68. General Frank. Now, you had that kind of contract up until 
January of 1941 ? 

Mr. Perliter. That is correct, sir. In that type of' contract you 
have less delay than you do in the type of contract we had after the 
6th of January of '41, for this reason : When you ask a contractor or 
any group of contractors to submit a formal bid, you have to submit 
sufficient data and specifications so he can give you a bid on which you 
are getting the most for your money; whereas, with this other type 
of contract, that type of contract is drawn up for expediency. In 
other words, it is to get the work started right away, without going to a 
formal bid. 

59. General Frank. That is all. 

60. General Grunert. Are there any other questions ? 

61. Colonel Toulmin. I would like to ask him one question, General. 
Mr. Perliter, to what extent were the drawings on the contracts 

handled by Hawaiian Constructors distributed? That is, what was 
your distribution system, and to whom did the [3707] copies 
of the drawings go ? 

Mr. Perliter. Distribution system on drawings changes from time 
to time in the interest of expediency. Originally, if I recollect, they 
were sent directly from my office to the Hawaiian Constructors. 
Later, at the request of the Operations Division of the District En- 
gineer, we submitted the drawing to them, and they in turn submitted 
them to Hawaiian Constructors. And then still later, in the interest 
of getting things done, we sent one copy to the Operations Division, 
and the rest of the copies we transmitted to the Hawaiian Construc- 
tors direct, with a letter of transmittal. 

62. Colonel Toulmin. How many copies did the Hawaiian Con- 
structors get ? 

Mr. Perliter. Tliat also varied. 

63. Colonel Toulmin. Just approximately? 

Mr. Perliter. I would say approximately five sets ; four to five sets. 

64. Colonel Toulmin. Any restriction on distribution of these draw- 
ings? Any mark in any way to restrict them to certain people? 

Mr. Perliter. The distribution of these drawings was restricted 
only insofar as if they were secret, yes. If they were not secret, there 
"were no restrictions. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1897 

65. Colonel Toulmin. Do you know of your own knowledge whether 
or not copies of these drawings were sent direct to the main office of the 
contractors on the mainland ? 

Mr. PERLrrER. I do not. 

66. Colonel Toulmin. That is all. 

67. General Frank. Would it have been possible to have sent 
[3708] them direct without your knowing anything about it? 

Mr. Perliter. Yes, sir. 

68. Major Clausen. Mr. Perliter, do I understand that it- was nor- 
mal that one month's delay would ensue between the time that you 
would send plans to the Division Engineer with respect to his acting 
on these plans ? 

Mr. Perliter. Well, there is a normal period of delay in transmit- 
ting drawings. The shipments of the drawings were by boat, and he in 
turn had to check them and then send them back, and a month's time 
I don't believe is unusual. 

69. Major Clausen. And then where did the Chief of Engineers 
come into the picture? You said something about the approval of 
the Chief of Engineers being required. 

Mr. Perliter. The approval of the Chief of Engineers was required 
in the original work on the war reserve. That project was initiated 
in Washington. We were directed to prepare a survey, and later we 
were directed to prepare what is known as a definite project report, 
which is almost like a thesis, and that went back to the Chief of En- 
gineers through the Division Engineer. A definite project report out- 
lines the different methods you can do work — you can prepare this 
project, and method of design and the costs and your final recom- 
mendation. 

70. Major Clausen. AA^iat amount of delay did you have, then, 
from the standpoint of action that should have been taken by the 
Chief of Engineers ? 

Mr. Perliter. If you allow me, I can read you from the chrono- 
logical order of such a thing. 

71. Major Clausen. Well, you gave me one, rough. 

[3709] Mr. Perliter. Rough. Yes, I can tell you that. A 
definite project report was ordered about the 

72. General Frank. Well, not a project report. We don't care 
about project reports. 

Mr. Perliter. Well, we didn't have to submit the final — once the 
report was approved 

73. General Frank. What report is this? 
Mr. Perliter. Definite project report. 

74. Major Clausen. What time was taken in getting of this report 
so far as approval by the Chief was concerned ? 

Mr. Perliter. It took — it left this office on the 24th of June of 1941, 
and on the 30th of October we received definite approval to go ahead. • 

75. Major Clausen. General Frank wants to ask a question. 

76. General Frank. You said there was thirty days' delay when a 
project went from here to the Division Engineer and back? 

Mr. Perliter. Approximately thirty days. 

77. General Frank. Yes. Now, what delay was there, in general, 
when a project had to go to the Chief of Engineers? 

Mr. Perliter. I may not have made myself clear. 

79716— 46— Ex. 145, vol. 3 19 



1898 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

78. General Frank. Well, just answer that question, 

Mr. Perliter. There was only one project I know of, and I will 
answer it on that basis. 

79. General Frank. All right. 

Mr. Perliter. And that was the war reserve aviation gasoline stor- 
age, and the delay — I'll have to figure : from the 24th of June, 1941, to 
the 30th of October, 1941 ; that was the delay. 

[S710] 80. Major Clausen. Well, let me ask you this, Mr. 
Perliter 

81. General Frank. October. Four months, about? 
Mr. Perliter. Yes, sir. 

82. Major Clausen. You have been in the Engineers long enough 
now to know that the Chief of Engineers certainly knew the normal 
routine processing of plans from Hawaii to San Francisco and the time 
it would take ? 

Mr. Perliter. Yes, sir. 

83. Major Clausen. Well, the Chief of Engineers, therefore, sets 
forth in a contract that a job is to be done within six months. 

Mr. Perliter. Yes, sir. 

84. Major Clausen. The time that it would take to process plans 
is all a matter of coordination, isn't it ? In other words, you know that 
thirty days is going to take place, why, you coordinate your work, don't 
you? 

Mr. Perliter. Well, I would like to correct you on one point. I 
don't believe it is the Chief of Engineers that sets the construction 
period. I think the construction period is determined here on the spot. 

85. Major Cl^vusen. Let me ask you about these plans. If we, the 
Board, should want plans, that is, detailed plan drawings of some of 
these installations that are marked on the seven maps that we have, 
Mr. Perliter, wdiere would we get those ? 

Mr. Perliter. Out of my office. 

86. Major Clausen. And do copies exist in the office of the Chief at 
Washington ? 

Mr. Perliter. Some of them do and some don't. 

[S7U] 87. Major Clausen. How much time, how much delay 
would ensue between our making a request of your office and getting 
them in Washington ? 

Mr. Perliter. Delay of one day in printing and the time it would 
require by courier to go by mail — air mail from this station to Wash- 
ington. 

88. Major Clausen. In other words, if we determine that we 
should Avant certain plans, we could get them, these plan drawings, 
within a matterof some days, from you ? 

Mr. Perliter. If it was by courier and he was on a — well, say, a 
No. 3 priority, my guess would be three days. 

89. Major Clausen. All right. We may call on you for some. 
Mr. Perliter. Yes, sir. 

90. Major Clausen. No further questions. 

91. General Grunert. Anything else you might want to add that 
you thnik of that might be of value to the Board ? 

Mr. Perliter. Well, yes ; I would like to add a few things. 
I was through this whole thing from its very beginning, and I 
figure 1940 was the beginning. You gentlemen must recognize this : 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1899 

that we were out here 2,000 miles away from the mainland. In 1940 
a large war construction program was started on the mainland of the 
United States, and all technical men and skilled men were being 
gradually picked up in the mainland. Local help was not available. 
The Navy had gotten the jump on us and started work here, and 
natui-ally they picked up most of the local help. I had extreme diffi- 
culty in obtaining qualified technical men, and I imagine the same 
thing was experienced by the contractors. To me that is 13712'] 
important because considerable work 

92. General Frank. To whom? Important to whom? 

Mr. Perliter. It is important to getting the job done. I couldn't 
get enough technical help. My men used to work 12, 14, 16 hours a 
day because of a shortage of qualified help. And that has got to be 
recognized in a thing of this kind. 

Another thing that should be recognized: prior to December 7th 
we had no authority to stock-pile materials in the Islands. In other 
words, a job would be authorized. We would start from scratch, and 
we would start from the bills of materials. It was extremely difficult 
to get materials over here. One of the things we had trouble with 
was in connection with gasoline storage, welding material, pipe, fit- 
tings, pumps. It was next to impossible to get that type of material. 

Still another thing, there was a certain amount of confusion that 
existed in shipping for overseas projects. As an example, and this 
is after Pearl Hai-bor, on approximately the 8th of May of 1942 the 
Commanding General of — or General Farthing called me and asked 
me if I could expedite the construction of war reserves. That was 
in '42. 

I said, "General, there is nothing I can do here." 

He said. "Where is the plate for the tanks, and the pipe?" 

I says. It is on the mainland." 

About two hours later he called me, and he said, "Would you be 
willing to go to the mainland to pick that stuff up and identify it?" 

When I arrived at the Howard Street Terminal in Oakland, Cali- 
fornia, most of the material was there. I stayed there five days and 
identified most of the stuff. It was placed on [371S] board 
ship, and it was 12 days later it arrived here in Honolulu. However, 
when I arrived there, there wasn't a single person there that could 
identify the material. 

Now, those things have to be recognized. They are an important 
part of the whole story. 

93. General Frank. Have to be recognized by whom, Mr. Perliter? 
Mr. Perliter. Well, by anyone that's weighing facts, that's gather- 
ing facts. 

94. General Frank. All of these things are in extenuation of what ? 
Mr. Perliter. In extenuation of delaying construction. Take, for 

instance 

95. General Grunert. Then, you think that every big job needs a 
man like the Kaiser shipyards had ? What did they call him ? An 
expediter ? 

Mr. Perliter. Well, I would say an expediter 

96. General Grunert. In Hawaii if you have a big problem over 
here, and you turn it out properly and you plan it properly, why 
don't they put an expediter on there if he is needed ? 



1900 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

They used you once as an expediter, and you got results. Did they 
have any other such occasion ? 
Mr. Perliter. I can't answer that question, because I don't know. 
Here is something else that delayed work around here 

97. General Frank. The fact of the absence of an expediter is a 
failure to provide proper organization, then, it would seem, in accord- 
ance with your own logic. 

98. Major Clausen. Coordination. 

[S714] Mr. Perliter. Well, that is a matter of opinion on the 
process of how a man runs his organization. One man feels he can 
get things done one way ; another, another. 

99. General Frank. Yes, but you just got through telling what 
must be done by someone. 

Mr. Perliter. That is my opinion. 

100. General Frank. Or an organization. 
Mr. Perliter. That is my opinion on that. 

101. General Frank. Yes. 

Mr. Perliter. Another thing that delayed this work over on t]ie 
Island of Maui, on the A. W. S. station at Haleakala we had certain 
trouble getting real estate approval or getting right of access onto 
the grounds, because you were in park, national park property. That 
delayed the job. 

Another thing that delayed the job, the information center at 
Shafter: a sketch was handed to me, and they said, "This is going 
to be the information center." There was no one that knew exactly 
what went into an information center. We literally had to grope in 
the dark to get this thing designed. So things like that just naturally 
delay jobs. 

102. Major Clausen. What was the total fee paid Hawaiian con- 
structors on this job, Mr. Perliter? 

Mr. Perliter. I don't know, sir. 

103. Major Clausen. About $800,000? 
Mr. Perliter. I am not familiar with that. 

104. Major Clausen. The more delay, the more the fee; isn't that 
right? The more the delay, the more the work; the more the work, 
the more the fee. Isn't that the way it works ? 

Mr. Perliter. I don't think so. The fee is based upon [SYISI 
the estimated cost prior to construction. 

105. Major Clausen. Surely. Well, if you hire men for two months 
instead of hiring them for one month, then .you have more money to 
pay for the two months ; isn't that right ? 

Mr. Perliter. You are right, but that doesn't — that has nothing to 
do with the fee. The fee is the amount that goes to the contractor, and 
he gets one fee. The salary is paid by the Government. 

106. Major Clausen. But the total cost is the basis for determining 
the fee, isn't it? 

Mr. Perliter. No, sir. The total cost of that job was determined 
prior to start of construction, and it was determined based on a 
similar job or experience of a man that takes so long to do a job. 

107. Major Clausen. Well, your first cost was a million dollars, 
about, wasn't it? 

Mr. Perliter. Which job, sir? 

108. Major Clausen. This Hawaiian Constructors job. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1901 

Mr. Perliter. Oh, the first? 

109. Major Clausen. Yes. The first contract was about a million 
dollars ? 

Mr. Perliter. I don't know that. I don't know that. 

110. Major Clausen. You don't even know what the contract pro- 
vided with regard to the time for completion, then, do you ? 

Mr. Perliter. I wasn't concerned with that. , 

111. Major Ci^vusEN. You are not concerned with that? 
Mr. Perliter. No, I am not. 

112. Major Clausen. All right. That is all. 

[3716] 113. Colonel Toulmin. I would like to ask him just one 
question. 

Mr. Perliter, you followed usual engineering practice, that the 
last of a series of drawings on a given job indicate on their face the 
successive number of changes that were made, by date? 

Mr. Perliter. Yes, sir. 

114. Colonel Toulmin. That is all. Thank you. 

115. General Frank. To whom did you talk about coming up here 
to testify? 

Mr. Perliter. Oh, I have been with General Bragdon most of the 
time. I have helped General Bragdon get these things together, be- 
cause I am aware of the information in the District office. 

116. General Frank. What conversation did you have with Gen- 
eral Bragdon about coming up here to testify ? 

Mr. Perliter. None in regards to my testimony. In fact, when 
I was called I said, "I am going up to testify," and that's all. 

117. General Frank. You had no conversation whatever about 
being a witness up here ? 

Mr. Perliter. Oh, yes ; I told him I was being called as a witness. 
In fact, I informed him the very first day he arrived here; I told 
him, "For your information, I have been called as a witness." And 
I even showed him the first request to appear as a witness. 

118. General Frank. And he has made no comment whatever to 
you about being a witness up here ? 

Mr. Perliter. No instructions, if that's what you mean ; [3717] 
no, sir. 

119. General Frank. I said, comments. 

Mr. Perliter. Comments. Well, he said, "Go up there and tell 
'em what you know," and that's all. 

120. General Frank. Did you talk to Major Powell ? 
Mr, Perliter. Yes, sir. 

121. General Frank. What was the subject of your conversation 
with Major Powell? 

Mr. Perliter. I can't recollect it, but in a general sense I told him 
that I was called as a witness and that I was to appear, and he told 
me, "Just tell 'em evei^ything you know, and answer the questions 
they ask you." 

122. General Frank. How do you happen to be making statements 
there of what "must be considered" ? 

Mr. Perliter. I am making those statements just as an engineer 
and based upon approximately 20 years of my experience in this field. 



1902 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

123. General Frank. Well, what does that have to do with general 
engineering practice, and why should you tell this Board of what 
must be considered about some particular phase of an engineering 
project? 

Mr. Perliter. The same thing must be considered in any other 
project, regardless whether it was over here, particularly when you 
are removed so far from the mainland. 

124. General Frank. Specifically, were the points that you men- 
tioned there discussed by you with anybody in the office of the 
Engineers down at Punahou College ? 

Mr. Perliter. With the office, any particular 

125. General Frank. With anybody in that office. 

[3718] Mr. Perliter. No, sir, I never discussed that part of it. 

126. General Frank. How did you happen to be emphasizing those 
points here? 

Mr. Perliter. Because it has always been a very sore thing out 
here in the Islands, the inability to get materials here to do a project. 
I could quote many examples if you wish. 

127. General Frank. I have nothing further. 

128. Major Clauson. Mr. Perliter, don't you have in your office 
the contracts and the amounts of money reflected on the contracts, 
and the amounts of fees that are paid to contractors? 

129. General Frank. Not in his part of the office. 
]\Ir. Perliter. Not in my own office ; no, sir. 

130. Major Clausen. Well, there is some section down there that 
could get that for you, couldn't they ? 

Mr. Perliter. Oh, yes, sir. 

131. Major Clausen. Well, could you get me, for the time when 
you bring back the maps, the total fees paid Hawaiian Constructors 
under the basic contract and all supplements, and the face value of 
the basic contract ? 

Mr. Perliter. The total fees paid Hawaiian Constructors under 
the contract? 

132. Major Clausen. All supplements. 

Mr. Perliter. And all supplements. Up to 7th December? 

133. Major Clausen. Completion. No. To completion. Total 
completion of the contract. And the face value of the basic contract 
and all supplements. Just those two items. 

Mr. Perliter. Total fees paid Hawaiian Constructors under the 
contract and all supplements, and the face value of [3719] the 
basic contract ? 

134. Major Clausen. And all supplements. Just those two figures. 
Mr. Perliter. Yes, sir. 

135. Major Clausen. Thank you. 

136. General Grunert. That appears to be all. Thank you very 
much for coming. 

Mr. Perliter. Yes, sir. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

(There was a brief informal recess.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1903 

[3720] TESTIMONY OF HENRY P. BENSON, OF THE HAWAIIAN 
DREDGING COMPANY; HONOLULU, T. H. 

(The witness was sworn by the Assistant Recorder and advised of 
his rights under Article of War 24.) 

1. Major Clausen. Will you state your name and where you reside, 
Mr. Benson. 

Mr. Benson. Henry P. Benson ; Honolulu, T. H. 

2. Major Clausen. With what company are you connected at the 
present time ? 

Mr. Benson. The Hawaiian Dredging Company, 

3. General Grunert. Mr. Benson, General Frank, assisted by Major 
Clausen, will cover this particular part of the investigation, so I will 
turn you over to their tender mercies. 

4. General Frank. Mr. Benson, in 1941, you were associated with 
the Hawaiian Contracting Company? 

Mr. Benson. Yes ; I was president and manager. 

5. General Frank. Did you have any government contracts? 
Mr. Benson. Yes. 

6. General Frank. Prior to the time that the Hawaiian Construc- 
tors came in here ? 

Mr. Benson. I did. I had a job down at Kapalama, to build a 
wharf, and a number of air-raid housings and AA houses, and a 
tunnel at Shafter. It was a CPFF contract. 

7. General Frank. What is a CPFF contract? 
Mr. Benson. "Cost-plus-fixed-fee." 

8. General Frank. You had that ? 
Mr. Benson. Yes, sir. 

9. General Frank. You had those contracts before the Hawaiian 
Constructors came in? 

[3721] Mr. Benson. Oh, no; not before. Before we entered 
the Hawaiian Constructors, as a company. I don't remember the date 
of those contracts, but it was, my remembrance is, about midsummer 
1941 we started. 

10. General Frank. At that time, were you a member of the Ha- 
waiian Constructors ? 

Mr. Benson. No. 

11. General Frank, You did that as an independent firm? 

Mr. Benson. Yes; we were associated with Pacific Bridge Company 
in this particular contract. 

12. General Frank. Later you became associated with Hawaiian 
Constructors, did you ? 

Mr. Benson. I did. 

13. General Frank, And they had a central council or a central 
group that acted on matters of policy, did they not? 

Mr. Benson. Well, we had what we called the "executive com- 
mittee." 

14. General Frank. Were you a member of that executive com- 
mittee ? 

Mr. Benson. I was. 



1904 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

15. Major Clausen. Mr. Benson, you were operating here as a con- 
tracting organization in the month of November or December, 1940, 
were you not ? 

Mr. Benson. No ; our firm was started in '18, and had been operating 
ever since then. 

16. Major Clausen. 1918? 
Mr. Benson. Yes. 

17. Major Clausen. You were right here in Honolulu, ever since 
1918? 

[3722] Mr. Benson. Yes. 

18. Major Clausen. Mr. Benson, did anyone from the district en- 
gineer's office, up to the time this contract was made between the Gov- 
ernment and Hawaiian Constructors, ever come to you to ask whether 
you would be interested in the forthcoming work under that contract ? 

Mr. Benson. No. 

19. General Russell. Before you go on, let us connect that up. 
Were you available to have taken part of that work in December, 
1940, your company? 

Mr. Benson. Yes. 

20. General Russell. Were you engaged at that time in any work 
for the Navy, in December 1940? 

Mr. Benson. I don't think so. I am pretty sure we were not. It 
would be a very small job, if we were. 

21. General Russell. But you were open for a contract, in 1940? 
Mr. Benson. Yes. 

22. Major Clausen. This basic contract was in the sum of $1,067,000. 
You were never given an opportunity to bid on that, were you ? 

Mr. Benson. No. 

23. Major Clausen. Or on any part of it? 
Mr. Benson. No. 

24. Major Clausen. In the situation as it existed in 1940, Mr. Ben- 
son, do you know whether it was necessary to bring here this Rohl- 
Connolly, Shirley-Gunther, Callahan organization ? 

Mr. Benson. That is a very hard question to answer. It [3723'] 
depends. Of course, it was a million and how much, the first contract ? 

25. Major Clausen. Well, that was a million dollars. 

Mr. Benson. Well, if it was a million dollars, of course, it wasn't; 
but if they had other large work in view, perhaps it was. I am' just 
not prepared to answer that question. 

26. Major Clausen. Let us say, as of Pearl Harbor, December 7, 
1941 ; assume the contract at that time was something like $11,000,000 
worth of work to be performed : from what you know of the character 
of that work, the whole $11,000,000 worth of it, do you believe that the 
local contractors would have handled it as expeditiously and as 
economically as it was handled by the Hawaiian Constructors. 

Mr. Benson. I would say Yes. 

27. General Frank. Do you think that the Hawaiian Contracting 
Company, Black, McKee, McClure, Woolley, and the Pacific Con- 
struction Company could have associated together as coadventurers 
and could have handled this thing? 

Mr. Benson. Well, of course, Black, I think, at that time had quite 
a lot of Navy work, and Woolley had quite a lot of Navy work. Now, 
it would require a good deal of study to answer that question properly 
and correctly. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1905 

28. General Frank. But you had some pretty good organizations 
here? 

Mr. Benson. Oh, yes. 

29. General Frank. That is, in the Hawaiian Contracting Com- 
pany, in McKee, and in the McClure Company ? 

Mr. Benson. Yes. 

30. General Frank. They were sound, reputable organizations and 
concerns with plenty of financial backing? 

[S724] Mr. Benson. That is right. 

31. General Frank. And is there any question about their ability 
to have handled an $11,000,000 project? 

Mr. Benson. No. 

32. Major Clausen. As a matter of fact, Mr. Benson, you are of 
the opinion, or, rather, you were of the opinion, when Colonel John E. 
Hunt questioned you, that not only could these local men have done 
the job which existed as of Pearl Harbor, but they could have done 
it more expeditiously and more economically, isn't that correct? 

Mr. Benson. I am just trying to recollect just what I told Colonel 
Hunt. 

33. Major Clausen. Would you like me to read a portion of the 
testimony ? 

Mr. Benson. I would. 

34. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. 

Question. Well, from what you know of the situation as it was known to exist 
in 1940, do you have an opinion as to whether or not it was necessary to bring 
the Rohl-Connolly, Shirley-Gunther and Callahan organization over here? 

Answer. Well, I think I have answered that as far as I am concerned in saying 
that it could have been done by the local contractors. 

Question. All right. I will put it in a different way. As I understand it, be- 
tween the time that that contract was awarded on December 20, 1940, and the 
date of the attack on Pearl Harbor, something like eleven million dollars' worth 
of work was performed? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Now, from what you know of the character [3725] of that 
work, the whole eleven million dollars' worth of it, do you believe that the local 
contractors would have handled it as expeditiously and as economically as it 
was done by the Hawaiian Constructors? 

Answer. I do. 

Question. Do you think they could have done it more expeditiously or more 
economically? 

Answer. Well in my opinion, yes. (P. 464.) 

Do you recall giving that testimony ? 
Mr. Benson. Yes. 

35. Major Clausen. And you think it is correct, is it ? 
Mr. Benson. I think that i? correct. 

36. Major Clausen. This Pacific Bridge Company that you men- 
tioned — that was a mainland firm doing business over here, was it not ? 

Mr. Benson. Yes. 

37. Major Clausen. And that is a pretty good-sized outfit, in itself, 
isn't it? 

Mr. Benson. Yes. It was. They had a good deal of work at the 
time. I got them into the Kapalama job just to build up our organi- 
zation, to help us, the truth told. They built a drydock at Pearl Har- 
bor for all those, the three drydocks. 



1906 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

38. Major Clausen. They liad not only done that, but they built 
the piers of the Golden Gate Bridge, did they not, many of them ? 

Mr. Benson. Yes. They had some very large work. 

39. Major Clausen. That was a mainland firm? 
Mr. Benson. In San Francisco. 

[37^6] 40. Major Clausen. Now, how did you happen to get 
into this Hawaiian Constructors co-adventurer thing, then, if you were 
not invited in at the start, Mr. Benson ? 

Mr. Benson. Well, the Kapalama contract had a recapture clause, 
and on December 7, the U. S. E. D. grabbed all our plant, wherever 
it was, in Maui and around here, and a little later they asserted the 
recapture clause and took over that ; and I Avent to Colonel Wyman, 
some time in December, I think about the middle of December, ancl 
told him that he had our plant, that there didn't seem to be any 
chance of getting by, and he ought, to make a clean sweep of it, and 
he agreed, and our plant was taken over. 

41. General Frank. What do you mean by "make a clean sweep" ? 
Mr. Benson. Of our plant. 

42. General Frank. Taking it all? 
Mr. Benson. Of taking it all. 

43. General Frank. He had not taken it all, up to that time? 
Mr. Benson. He hadn't taken it all, up to that time. 

44. General Frank. What part had he not taken ? 

Mr. Benson. Well, I just can't tell you that, off-hand. When we 
went into this job, we submitted to the Negotiating Office, in Wash- 
ington, a full list of our plant with valuations. That was made a part 
of the Kapalama contract, and that is the basis on which we sold our 
plant, and the basis on which we took over. 

45. General Frank. Who made the valuation? 

Mr. Benson. We did; and it was subject of course to approval by 
the officer in charge. 

46. General Frank. Do you know whether a representative of the 
Corps of Engineers had an appraiser on it ? 

[57^7] Mr. Benson. It was appraised. 

47. General Frank. By whom ? 

Mr. Benson. Robley, for the engineers; a man named Robley; 
Gentry, for the Hawaiian Constructors, though I do not see why that 
should have come into it ; and a man named Ross, who was our shop 
foreman for us. They agreed on an appraisal, and the money was' 
paid. 

48. General Frank. Was all the equipment completely serviceable? 
Mr. Benson. All was completely serviceable. There was some 

marginal equipment, and that fact was reflected in the price. 

49. Major Clausen. At any event, isn't it correct that Mr. Rohl 
came to you and said he would like you to join the Hawaiian Con- 
structors on this Hawaiian job ? 

Mr. Benson. That is correct. 

50. Major Clausen. You were not only not invited in at the initial 
stages, but when Mr. Rohl came to you and invited you in, he wanted 
you to buy a 20% interest ? 

Mr. Benson. That is right. 

51. Major Clausen. And did you buy a 20% interest? 
Mr. Benson. We did. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1907 

52. Major Clausen. How much did you pay ? 
Mr. Benson. We paid very close to $100,000. 

53. Major Clausen. To whom? 

Mr. Benson. To Gunther & Shirley, Rohl-Connolly, and Callahan 
Construction, who all surrendered a portion of their holdings. 

54. Major Clausen. And that was when, Mr. Benson? 

[S/£8] Mr. Benson. I think that was effected about June 1941. 
Now, this is from memory, and I am not sure, but somewhere around 
mid year-. 

55. Major Clausen. If you want, I could read a portion of the 
testimony you gave Colonel Hunt on that. 

Mr.. Benson. If you would. 

56. Major Clausen. This is set forth on page 467: 

Question. Do you happen to know whether it was at anybody's further request? 

Answer. I do not. Towards the latter end of December, Mr. Rohl informed 
me that he would like to have us join his organization and that we could have 
a 20% interest. This we were supposed to buy, and this stayed in a very nebulous 
state until I think in May when we agreed to a price that was paid for the interest, 
and I believe it was made before the supplement was finally signed by the Chief 
of Engineers. 

Does that refresh your recollection ? 
Mr. Benson. Yes ; I think that is right. 

57. Major Clausen. This testimony refers to December, Mr. Benson, 
of what year ? 

Mr. Benson. 1941. 

58. Major Clausen. And was the Chief of Engineers advised of 
this payment by you to the Rohl outfit of $100,000 ? 

Mr. Benson. I could not tell you. 

59. Major Clausen. Do you have any papers from which you could 
refresh your recollection on that? 

Mr. Benson. No; I wouldn't know whether he was. He was 
advised, of course. We had to have some supplemental agreement 
[3729^ to get in under the contract ; but whether he was ever 
advised of the price we paid, I didn't know. 

60. Major Clausen. But the agreement by which you entered into 
this deal was just simply a fact that you were being brought in by 
the Hawaiian Constructors, which did not represent on there any price 
as having been paid, at all ? 

Mr. Benson. No. 

61. Major Clausen. But you remember that you did tell that to 
Colonel Wyman ? 

Mr. Benson. No, I don't. I don't remember. I may have ; I am 
not denying that, at all; but I don't remember that I did tell him. 

62. Major Clausen. Do you remember ever having any talk about 
that with Colonel Wyman ? 

Mr. Benson. No, I don't. I may have, as I say; I am not denying 
that I did, but I have no recollection at this time, and I don't know 
whether I could refresh my memory on it. 

63. Major Clausen. Do you remember having mentioned it to any 
employee or officer in the U. S. E. D. ? 

Mr. Benson. No. 

64. Major Clausen. Mr. Benson, are you familiar with a transac- 
tion whereby there was purchased from Rohl -Connolly Company 
equipment for a price of about $166,000? 



1908 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Benson. I know of the transaction, but I am not familiar- with it. 

65. Major Clausen. Did you know at the time of tlie transaction 
that the original appraisal had been some $131,000? 

Mr. Benson. I knew there was a difference. 

66. Major Clausen. What part did you play in that? 
[S7S0] Mr. Benson. No part. 

67. General Frank. Were you a member of the Hawaiian Construc- 
tors, Mr. Benson. 

Mr. Benson. Yes, I was. 

68. Major Clausen. Do you know anything about the yacht VEGA ? 
Mr. Benson. Well, I have heard enough about it to know something 

about it, but it is mostly hearsay, except the chartering or subletting, 
of course. I have read all those, and I knew when she got here. I 
don't believe I ever saw her. I might have passed there, but I never 
was on board of her. 

69. Major Clausen. By the way, what office did you hold in the 
Hawaiian Contracting Company,. during this time? 

Mr. Benson. President and manager. 

70. Major Clausen. And did Mr. Dillingham have an interest in it? 
Mr. Benson. He has an interest, but he isn't an officer or a director. 

71. Major Clausen. He had an interest at the time? 

Mr. Benson. Yes ; he has always. He is one of the founders of the 
company. 

72. Major Clausen. What part of this $100,000 did he pay? 
Mr. Benson. Who — Mr. Dillingham? 

73. Major Clausen. Yes, sir — if any. 

Mr. Benson. He didn't pay anything. The Hawaiian Contracting 
Company paid that. They are a corporation. 

74. Major Clausen. Was its treasury replenished by Mr. Dillingham 
to any extent to make up this $100,000 ? 

Mr. Benson. No, no; a pure business transaction between the Ha- 
waiian Contracting Company and these parties. 

[S'/Sl] 75. Major Clausen. The Hawaiian Contracting Com- 
pany sold some equipment, did it not, to the Government, for a price 
something like $156,000? 

Mr. Benson. Yes. 

76. Major Clausen. Do you remember quite a bit of discussion as 
to the fact that some of that was not usable? 

Mr. Benson. Yes ; I do, very keenly. 

77. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon, sir? 
Mr. Benson. Very keenly. 

78. Major Clausen. Tell the Board about that. 

Mr. Benson. Well, you have got to go back to December 7, when 
we were woefully short of equipment down here ; and remember that 
when December 7 came, why, they just grabbed plant wherever they 
could. A portion of that was under this recapture clause of our 
Kapalama contract. That has never been questioned ; but that went 
in at the same price, it was taken from the same list that our final price 
went in on. 

As I have stated, some of this plant was marginal, inasmuch as it 
wasn't up to date ; but as things looked then, every piece of it could 
have been used, and a good deal could have been used that wasn't used, 
as a matter of fact. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1909 

79. Major Clausen. Well, you know there was discussion about 
certain outmoded equipment that was included in this equipment? 

Mr. Benson. Yes; I think Colonel North had something about 
"horse-drawn wagons." Well, there were no horse-drawn wagons, at 
all. There were some wagons at, I think, $50 apiece, but they were 
planned to work on a chain drawn by a tractor. We bought those for 
grade work on Kauai, where a truck couldn't possibly go up ; and we 
kept them. They were in good order, [S732] and I have photo- 
graphs to show the order they were in. 

80. Major Clausen. The engineers did not take much of this equip- 
ment, though, when they bought it, did they? 

Mr. Benson. No ; not all of it. It was an insignificant amount, as 
a matter of fact. The mighty crane was left in the yard, there, but 
was working for the engineers constantly in assembling their plant. 
Now, that is one of the pieces they brought out. 

81. Major Clausen. You feel it was a fair deal? 

Mr. Benson. I feel it was a fair deal, and I can tell you this fact, 
that if somebody had come in the oflSce before this thing ever hap- 
pened and offered us the total cash that we got for all our plant, 
they would have walked out without the plant. It ended up by put- 
ting us out of business; and we have been out of business ever since. 

82. Major Clausen. By the way, you were part of the Hawaiian 
Constructors, through the Hawaiian Contracting Company, right up 
to the end, is that correct? 

Mr. Benson, Yes. 

83. Major Clausen. What was the total fee, Mr. Benson, that was 
paid under the basic contract, and all supplements, to the Hawaiian 
Constructors ? 

Mr. Benson. I just cannot tell you that exactly. I think the fee 
on the work was something like a million and 70 or 80 thousand dol- 
lars, and the work done was $108,000,000, if I remember rightly. That 
was the work completed. 

84. Major Clausen, You say the to^tal fee was only 70 or 80 thou- 
sand? 

Mr. Benson. One million 70 or 80 thousand. 

85. Major Clausen. You mean on the basic contract? 
[37SS] Mr. Benson. Oh, on tlie basic contract. 

86. Major Clausen. And all the supplements? 
Mr. Benson. Yes ; on the total thing, the total fee. 

87. Major Clausen. Oh, you mean the total fee was $1,080,000 ? 
Mr. Benson. That's it. 

88. Major Clausen. I have no further questions, now. 

89. General Russell. Two or three questions, Mr. Benson. 

You state that your company paid to the Hawaiian Constructors 
approximately $100,000 for the privilege of becoming one of the joint 
adventurers ? 

Mr. Benson. For a 20 percent interest. 

90. General Russell. Now, at the time that payment was made, 
what if any material rights did you acquire? By that I mean, did 
you get any material, or was it just an intangible interest in the right 
to make money thereafter? 

Mr. Benson. No, we got a 20 percent interest, which went back to 
the inception of the contract. In other words, we got a 20 percent 
interest, just as if we had been originally in the company. 



1910 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

91. General Russell. Now, let us assume, to be practical about it 
and in order that we may understand that deal, that they had earned 
$200,000 of this over-all fee of $1,070,000; then you would have gotten 
20 percent of the $200,000 in the eventual settlement; you got your 
20 percent interest in whatever part of the fee had been earned up 
until the time your company went in ? 

Mr. Benson. That is right ; just as if Ave had started. 

92. General Russell. Were there any other assets of any sort 
which belonged to the Hawaiian Constructors, in which you acquired 
rights by virtue of this payment of about $100,000 ? 

Mr. Benson. Nothing that I can think of. They didn't [57J^] 
own anything. 

93. General Russell. Now, let us say the contract would have 
stopped the day after you gave them your $100,000, and you had dis- 
tributed the accumulated assets of the Hawaiian Constructors as of 
that date; about how mucli would the assets have amounted to? 

Mr. Benson. We paid, in May. I just cannot tell you that, because 
I would have to know how much of the fee was earned by May. You 
see when we took the 20 percent interest — just let me explain a 
minute — that was on December 31. 

94. General Russell. Of what year ? 

. Mr. Benson. 1911. There was no price set at that time. That price 
w^as to be adjudicated, and we argued back and forth over that. If 
the job had been terminated in January, we would not have agreed 
to pay in $100,000, see ? 

95. General Russell. So there were two elements of value in the 
rights which you acquired by virtue of a payment of this money; 
firet, the fee which had been earned to the time of the payment; and 
second, the possibility of future earnings ? 

Mr. Benson. That is right. 

96. General Russell. And your, $100,000 was a consideration for 
both of those things ? 

Mr. Benson. That is right. 

97. General Russell. Now, could you tell us roughly how much of 
this $100,000 purchase price would properly be allocated to the future 
earnings, and how much, to earnings already made? 

Mr. Benson. No; I couldn't, because I didn't pay this $100,000 
until I was sure that we were all right in paying that amount. We 
had about a thousand men on Kapalama. They came into the Ha- 
waiian Constructors. They were Hawaiian Contracting Company 
men. We contributed those. We had a couple of what would have 
developed into several contracts, that we waived, and went' in. 

[3735] 98. General Russell. Those rights were substantial, but 
intangible ? 

Mr. Benson. But intangible, that is right. 

99. General Russell, Now then, at the time you went into this 
agreement and paid your $100,000 and became a part of this venture, 
you had what you were then referring to as a plant, which, as a matter 
of fact, was largely equipment ? 

Mr. Benson. No, not at that time. Our plant was all gone at that 
time when I paid the $100,000. 

100. General Russell. You mean, you had sold out all the stuff 
that you had acquired for $156,000, prior to the time that you acquired 
this interest? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1911 

Mr. Benson. That is right. 

101. General Russell. Therefore, when you made your sale to the 
government, the Engineers Department, you were no longer in busi- 
ness ? 

Mr. Benson. Except that I had an organization of 1,000 men. 

102. General Russell. And you turned around and gave $100,000 
out of your $156,000 for the right to go in with these people? 

Mr. Benson. That is right. 

103. General Russell. And participate in the profits? 
Mr. Benson. That is right. 

104. General Russell. Now then, thereafter you became a member 
of the executive committee, as I understand it ? 

Mr. Benson. That is right. 

105. General Russell. And that executive committee had the fixing 
of the policies of these Constructors, Hawaiian Constructors? 

[3730] Mr. Benson. That is yes and no. 

106. General Russell. Qualify it, if you want to. 

Mr. Benson. Our work was divided up to a certain extent. My 
job, because I came in late and was unacquainted with the organization 
itself, was principally in the office. INIr. Woolley took the outside 
islands, Mr. Rohl and Mr. Graf e out in the field. 

107. General Russell. You, Rohl and Woolley, after Grafe's de- 
parture, constituted this executive committee? 

Mr. Benson. That is right. 

108. General Russell. When you first went into this association 
a man by the way of Wyman, Colonel Wyman, represented the En- 
gineering Department, the United States Government, is that right ? 

Mr. Benson. Yes. 

109. General Russell. And he was there until late February or 
early March of 1942, when he was relieved, and a man by the name of 
Colonel Lyman became District Engineer? 

Mr. Benson. Yes. 

110. General Russell. You worked under both of those? 
Mr. Benson. Under both of those. 

111. General Russell. Were you intimately associated with the two 
in a business way, would you say ? 

Mr. Benson. Colonel Lyman, of course, I have known for a great 
many years, and I would say there was quite a friendly relationship, 
but Colonel Wyman was just mainly business. I would call him and 
he would call me. My relationship with him was business; that is the 
only time I saw him, unless just before he left. 

[3737'] 112. General Russell. I want to ask you this question : 
The smoothness of the operation of the Hawaiian Constructors in their 
accomplishment of this contracting business here on the islands, was 
that affected by the Engineer's Office under which you operated or 
with which you operated ? 

Mr. Benson. The period after the blitz was a period of great con- 
fusion. We blamed the Engineer and the Engineer blamed us for 
various things. I think we both did what would have been expected 
under the circumstances. 

113. General Frank. Could the circumstances have been improved ? 
Mr. Benson. Well, the Japs brought that out. 



1912 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

114. General Frank. I mean the circumstances under which the 
work was done. ' 

Mr. Benson. I don't believe so, General. Everybody was hysterical 
at the time. If any of you gentlemen were down here, we were all 
jittery. We didn't know when we were going to be attacked again. 
We didnt' know whether we were going to get any equipment or any 
men from the coast, millions of dollars of equipment on the coast 
there. We didn't know when we were going to get it. We didn't 
know when we were going to get supplies. It was not until after 
Midway that things really settled down in our minds. 

And everything had to be done at one time. As I understand, be- 
fore the blitz we were short of materials and short of equipment, and 
the priorities exercised then were to get the most out of the men 
without any priority on jobs. Now, I think that is right. Of course, 
I was not connected then, but from what I heard that is right. After 
that priorities were established on jobs and changed very rapidly. 
The Commanding [37S8] General would see something that 
had to be done now and would grab men off one job and put them onto 
another. The material was supplied. It was really a pretty bad 
situation. I don't think the circumstances could have been helped 
much. 

115. General Russell. Now then, as you got along into the spring, 
Mr. Rohl left here and went back to the continent ? 

Mr. Benson. Yes, he went back a couple of times. 

116. General Russell. I mean he left the islands and was no longer 
a member of this executive committee? 

Mr. Benson. Oh, no. He was back and forth. 

117. General Russell. Until the end? 

Mr. Benson. It was very near the end. I don't know when he left 
last, but my remembrance would be November, 1942, when the con- 
tract was terminated on January 31, of 1943. That is just my re- 
membrance. 

118. General Russell. Is it not a fact, Mr. Benson, that Mr. Rohl 
was asked to leave here along in May or June of 1942 by the District 
Engineer, Colonel Lyman, because Lyman thought that operations 
would be better without Rohl than with him ? 

Mr. Benson. If that is so, I was not informed of it. 

119. General Russell. How frequently did you people have com- 
mittee meetings? 

Mr. Benson. Well, we were all in the office every day. I was there 
while the heat was on every day and every night. 

120. General Russell. Give us a rough estimate of how much of 
the time Rohl spent on the islands after June of 1942 until the ter- 
mination of the contract ? 

Mr. Benson. I hate to do that. I can give you the exact dates he 
went away and the exact dates he came back, but I just [3739'\ 
hate to make a wild guess at it. 

121. General Russell. You could give us that for the record? 
Mr. Benson. Yes. 

122. General Russell. Could you do that some time tomorrow? 
Mr. Benson. Yes. 

123. General Russell. Just give us a memorandum of it. 

Mr. Benson. I tell you; I understand Mr. Woolley is coming on 
and he has all the records. If you ask him that same question he 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1913 

can get the records. 

124. General Kussell. Will you confer with Woolley after you go 
away from here and see whether or not he can furnish those ? 

Mr. Benson. Yes. 

125. General Russell. I want to go back just for one or two more 
questions to clarify the sitaution about the sale of the equipment. You 
were out here on an island, as I understand it, away from Oahu, doing 
some work, or doing some work on some part of Oahu on December 
7th, 1941; is that right? 

Mr. Benson. We were doing work on Maui. 
126'. General Russell. On December 7th, 1941? 
Mr. Benson. That is right. 

127. General Russell. Is it true that the government just came and 
took the plant and equipment and said they were going to use it ? 

Mr. Benson. Yes. 

128. General Russell. And then it became necessary for you to 
neg6tiate with them for a price for the property which they had 
already taken over? 

Mr. Benson. That is right. 

129. General Russell. Did you have anything to do with telling 
[3740] the government which part or parts of that equipment they 
could take, or did they select the parts they wanted ? 

Mr. Benson. They took wherever they saw it. 

130. General Russell. And left some parts there ? 

Mr. Benson. Yes. They took what they needed immediately. That 
that they needed, they took. Nobody said nay to anything that any- 
body wanted at that time. 

131. General Russell. What percentage of your equipment or plant 
did the government take charge of and move in here away from you 
where you were operating and begin to use ? 

Mr. Benson. That would be pretty hard to tell. A large percentage. 

132. General Russell. 75 per cent? 
Mr. Benson. I would say so. 

133. General Russell. Then that left you with what they didn't 
want? 

Mr. Benson. That is right. 

134. General Russell. And you could not operate with the stuff 
they left you? 

Mr. Benson. That is right. 

135. General Russell. And this marginal stuff about which you 
have testified is the part of the equipment which they left? 

Mr. Benson. Yes, sir. 

136. General Russell. That is all. 

137. General Frank. Mr. Benson, was the Hawaiian Constructors 
an incorporated outfit? 

Mr. Benson. No. 

138. General Frank. From whom did you buy a 20 per cent interest 
for $100,000? 

\_37Jfl'\ Mr. Benson. I bought from the individuals, from the 
Callahan Construction Company, Rohl-ConnoUy, Gunther-Shirley. 
They each put in a percentage of their holding to make my 20 per cent. 

139. General Frank. It was not a corporation; they were not 
banded together into a single organization for purposes other than 

79716 — 46— Ex. 145, voL 3 20 



1914 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to be co-adventurers for the United States Government in Hawaiian 
constructing? The government had taken your plant for $156,000 
and had given it to the Hawaiian Constructors for use, is that correct? 
Mr. Benson. That is right. 

140. General Frank. Then they did the same thing with the plant 
of the Callahan, Rohl-Connolly and Gunther-Shirley companies? 

Mr. Benson. I don't know. 

141. General Frank. Do you know whether Rohl-Connolly, 
Gunther-Shirley, and W. E. Callahan had bought themselves into 
this organization? 

Mr. Benson. No. They were the originators of it. They went in 
together and each one put up so much money as a working fund, and 
that gave them an interest. Later on R. E. WooUey came in and he 
put up his proportion. When I came in I bought part of the ownership 
of the three members who were already in, so instead of putting up 
uiy proportion of the working fund I bought from them. 

142. General Frank. When did you come in ? In May when ? 
Mr. Benson. I came in on paper December 31, 1941, but I paid 

for it, according to the record, in May. 

143. General Grunert. You actually became a stockholder in 
[374^'] each one of those companies ? 

Mr. Benson. No. There was only one company; it is one joint 
venture, and their interests 

144. General Frank. Do you remember the date in May that you 
came in ? 

Mr. Benson. I came in in December. 

145. General Frank. I know that. 

Mr. Benson. Except that I had not paid — I don't know the date. 

146. General Frank. From May, 1942, this was? 
Mr. Benson. That is right. 

147. General Frank. You came in in May, 1942, and from May, 
1942 to January 1st, 1943, that was eight months? 

Mr. Benson. Yes. 

148. General Frank. And according to your own figures the profits 
were around $1,070,000. 20 per cent is $215,000. Therefore, in eight 
months you got over 100 percent interest on your money, didn't you ? 
That is a pretty good investment, is it not ? 

Mr. Benson. I would not consider that as eight months. I was 
in there aaround January 1st, 1942, I w^as in that organization, and 
I worked from that time on for that organization, and my organiza- 
tion went in at that date and worked. 

149. General Frank. Even so, 100 per cent realization on your in- 
vestment is pretty good, in one year ? 

Mr. Benson. Well, of course, that fee is not all profit. There were 
non-reimbursable items, and plenty of them, that the Hawaiian Con- 
structors had to pay themselves, pay out of that fee. That was not 
all profit. It was a good investment. [374^1 No question 
about that. 

150. Colonel Toulmin. Did you get a salary ? 
Mr. Benson. From the Hawaiian Constructors ? 

151. Colonel Toulmin. Yes. 
Mr. Benson. No. 

152. Colonel Toulmin. Who paid your salary? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1915 

Mr. Benson. The Hawaiian Contractors. 

153. Colonel Toulmin. How about the others, like Mr. Woolley, 
Rohl, and the rest of them? 

Mr. Benson. Wait a minute. I would like to correct that. There 
was a period when Woolley and I were down here alone. They made 
an allowance, which I paid into the Hawaiian Contractors, because 
I was on a salary from them. I will have to check that. 

154. Colonel Toulmin. Was it $5,000, $10,000, $15,000 ; what kind 
of a salary? 

Mr. Benson. No, three months they allowed 

155. Colonel Toulmin. What amount? 

Mr. Benson. I am trying to think. I have just got a blank on 
this, but if I had my guess on it I would guess $250 a month for 
three months. 

156. Colonel Toulmin. Tliat is the salary that was paid? 
Mr. Benson. Yes. 

.157. Colonel Toulmin. How about the others? 

Mr. Benson. No salary. 

158, Colonel Toulmin. This arrangement of the Hawaiian Con- 
structors was just a partnership and when you bought in a 20 per 
cent interest there was a new alignment of interests ? 

Mr. Benson. Yes, sir. 

[S744] 159. General Eussell. The questions Colonel Toulmin 
has asked you has brought up some questions that I want to develop 
but which have not been developed so far. The government agreed 
to pay a fixed fee for this supervision by Callahan and you and others. 
Where down the line did the government start paying people? Do 
3^ou get the point I am after. They did not pay you or Rohl or Grafe, 
apparently, any money at all. Your time was paid for out of this 
fixed fee. 

Mr. Benson. They paid all salaries that legitimately belonged to 
the work, except some that were in excess of their regulation, that 
could not be paid out of their fee, that is, we had to hire some men 
who would not come for the top fee that the Engineer would allow. 
Those we paid. 

160. General Russell. Let us be definite about your organization, 
the Hawaiian Contracting Company. You were in there as the presi- 
dent and general manager of that corporation ? 

Mr. Benson. Yes, sir. 

161. General Russell. You had other executives in that corporation^ 
too, didn't you ? 

Mr. Benson. Yes. 

162. General Russell. A vice president, secretary-treasurer, and 
those people ? 

Mr. Benson. Yes. 

163. General Russell. Now, were those other executives in the Ha- 
waiian Contracting Company paid by the Hawaiian Contracting Com- 
pany, or was that a 

Mr. Benson. They were paid by the Hawaiian Contracting Com- 
pany. The government did not pay a cent. 

164. General Russell. So your top organization then had to be 
paid out of this fixed fee, out of your part in the fixed fee? 

Mr. Benson. Yes. 



1916 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

165. General Russell. I wonder where the line would be drawn 
[S74S] as to who was paid by the Contracting Company and who 
was paid by the Government? 

Mr. Benson. There is a clause, I think, in the contract, that no part 
of the Contractor's general overhead would be paid by the govern- 
ment. We ran a separate organization. Everybody there worked for 
the Hawaiian Constructors on government work and did nothing for 
any of the other parties in the case. 

166. General Russell. They were paid by whom ? 

Mr. Benson. They were paid by the government. The government 
paid all the costs. 

167. General Russell. Who were the people that were paid out of 
this fixed fee ? 

Mr. Benson. Well, each one of us had an organization. 

168. General Russell. How big was your organization that was paid 
out of the fixed fee? 

Mr. Bensojst. We worked with the Hawaiian Dredging Company 
on a split basis, that is, we would divide up the work in the oflfice in 
proportion 'at that time. We have altogether an engineer, cost ac- 
countant, assistant cost accountant, cashier, bookkeeper, purchasing 
agent, stenographers, payroll clerks — I cannot tell how much money 
went against that from our organization without going into quite a 
study. 

169. General Russell. All these people you just furnished the names 
of and others in the same category were paid out of this fixed fee 
and were not paid by the government ? 

Mr. Benson. They were not paid by the government. There was 
no money paid by the government except the people that devoted 
their full time to the work of the government. 

[3746] Major Clausen. Mr. Benson, do you have any papers 
which will refresh your recollection as to whether Colonel Wyman was 
advised of this $100,000 deal? 

Mr. Benson. No, sir, I have not. 

171. Major Clausen, Do you have papers evidencing your par- 
ticipation of the 20 per cent of the $100,000 and any allied papers in 
connection with that? 

Mr. Benson. Well, we have an agreement of sale, but Colonel 
Wyman had nothing to do with that. 

172. Major Clausen. Would you produce that tomorrow? 
Mr, Benson. Yes, sir. 

173. Major Clausen. What portion, Mr. Benson, of the total profit 
which accrued to the Hawaiian Contracting Company on this job went 
to Mr. Dillingham ? 

Mr. Benson. That is a rather peculiar question. The only profit 
that goes to Mr. Dillingham is A profit by reason of his stockholdings, 
dividends. 

174. Major Clausen. Wliat portion of the stock during this time 
did Mr. Dillingham own in the Hawaiian Contracting Company? 

Mr. Benson. Lfct me see. My guess would be that he owned about 
a ten per cent interest. 

175. Major Clausen. That is all. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1917 

Mr. Benson. But, understand, there is no earmarking of any par- 
ticular amount here. When we liave got money to pay dividends, we 
pay dividends; and he gets his proportion the same as I do or any 
other stockholder. 

176. Major Clausen. Of course, I had understood from what you 
told General Frank that you were out of business and this was the 
final wind-up of your business. 

[S747] Mr. Benson. No, we are still in business. 

177. Major Clausen. What is that, sir? 

Mr. Benson, That is, we are ready to get into business. 

178. Major Clausen. You are ready to get into business? 

Mr. Benson. We have a quarry out at Kauai that is still running, 
and we have a small repair yard with a few men in it. 

179. Major Clausen. In other words, you have assets ? 

Mr. Benson. Yes, but outside of that our main work is through. 
We are not doing anything. 

180. Major Clausen. That is all. 

181. General Grunert. Are there any other questions? 

Mr. Benson, do you think of anything else that you might tell the 
Board that might be of assistance to it on any of the subjects that 
relate to the attack on Hawaii and to the construction at that time? 

Mr. Benson. I can give you my personal opinion of Colonel Wyman. 

182. General Grunert. If you so desire, we would like to have it. 
Mr. Benson, I would like to give it, because I think it is due him. 

I think he did a wonderful job. As I say, there was great confusion. 
I think possibly he tried to do too much and carried too much himself. 
As far as the work was concerned, he pushed it and pushed it hard. 
He worked hard himself. I have been over there, I w^as going to say 
many, but more than a few evenings, when we had to go over there 
or were called over, and we had been there to 11 or 12 o'clock, and when 
we left he had two stenographers and had a stack of papers on his desk 
that [3748] high and was going at it. At 8 o'clock the next 
morning he would make the rounds with the Commanding General. 

Of course, in the great confusion and the grabbing of stuff after 
the blitz, proper orders were not given. When we came to get our pay 
we just could not get it. That just raised a very great howl against 
Colonel Wyman, and no doubt I joined in it myself. Looking back 
over it, I think we were wrong, 

183. Major Clausen. Is he a shareholder in this Hawaiian Con- 
tracting Company? 

Mr. Benson. No, sir. 

184. Major Clausen. Is he a shareholder in any of the other 
companies ? 

Mr. Benson. No, sir. 

185. Majoi* Clausen. Is any of his family or relatives, to your 
knowledge, shareholders in any of those companies ? 

Mr. Benson. No, sir. Not to my knowledge. I know he was not 
in with Woolley. He was not in the Hawaiian Contracting Com- 
pany and I know he was not in the Hawaiian Constructors. That is 
as far as I can say of my own knowledge. 

186. General Russell. You have gone into the work of Colonel 
Wyman, Now, you had to do with rather big operations in your 



1918 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

time, haven't you, with top-flight executives and successful operators ; 
isn't that correct? 
Mr. Benson. That is right. 

187. General Russell. Did you gather the opinion in estimating 
Colonel Wyman's work that he was attempting to do a lot of things 
that he should have been doing by an organization and give him a 
chance to have acted as a top-flight executive, rather than being tied 
to his desk all the time ? 

Mr. Benson. That very well might be, sir. 

188. General Russell. Did you get that impression ? 
[3749] Mr. Benson. Yes, I got that. 

189. General Grunert. Any other questions? If not, we thank 
you. 

Mr. Benson. All right, sir. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

[3760] TESTIMONY OF RALPH E. WOOLLEY, 2349 OAHU AVENUE, 

HONOLULU, T. H. 

(The witness was sworn by the Assistant Recorder and advised of 
his rights under Article of War 24.) 

1. Major Clausen. What is your full name? 
Mr. WooLLEY. Ralph E. WooUey. 

2. Major Clausen. And your residence? 
Mr. WooLLEY. 2349 Oahu Avenue, Honolulu. 

3. Major Clausen. What is your business or occupation ? 
Mr. WoOLLEY. General contractor. 

4. Major Clausen. And what is the name of that firm, Mr. Woolley ? 
Mr. WooLLEY. It is under my name, Ralph E. Woolley. 

5. Major Clausen. You recall having been associated with the Ha- 
waiian Constructors in the defense work here on the Islands with re- 
gard to a contract dated December 1940, and its supplements ? 

Mr. WooLLEY. Yes, sir. 

6. Major Clausen. When did you join that joint venture of the Ha- 
waiian Constructors ? 

Mr. Woolley. It was sometime in May. 

7. Major Clausen. Of what year, Mr. Woolley? 
Mr. Woolley. '41. 

8. Major Clausen. And did you pay a consideration to the Ha- 
waiian Constructors for that interest? 

Mr. Woolley. Yes, I did. I put in 

9. Major Clausen. How much ? 

Mr. Woolley. I couldn't — I can give you it exactly, but my recol- 
lection is it was in the neighborhood of $65,000, [3751] which 
was a 20 percent interest. • 

10. Major Clausen. You got that interest for $65,000 ? 

Mr. Woolley. That is, I put up $65,000 of capital, which was on the 
same basis that the others put up, and that I was given a 20 percent 
interest. 

11. Major Clausen. Before you made that deal, had you sold any 
equipment to the Government?* 

Mr. Woolley. No, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1919 

12. Major Clausen. Let me ask this question : Prior to the time this 
basic contract of December 1940 was executed, were you ever ap- 
proached by Colonel Wyman or any of his assistants or men connected 
with the Engineers, with a view to determining whether or not you 
would be interested in taking on any of the work that was contem- 
plated ? 

Mr. WooLLEY. No, sir. 

Major Clausen. You paid this $65,000 in May 1942 ; isn't that right ? 

Mr. WooLLEY. I wouldn't be sure of the exact date, but that was the 
date 

14. General Frank. The year ? 

Mr. Woolley. The time when I was admitted. 

15. Major Clausen. May 1942? 
Mr. WooLLEY. '41. 

16. Major Clausen. '41? 
Mr. Woolley. Yes. 

17. Major Clausen. I see. May '41? 
Mr. Woolley. May '41. 

18. Major Clausen. Did Colonel Wyman, before this basic contract 
of December 1940 was signed, or any of his assistants, ^ [S752] 
ever approach you with regard to using any of your equipment on 
this job? 

Mr. Woolley. No, sir. 

19. Major Clausen. Would you have been in a position in Decem- 
ber 1940 to have taken on some of the work that was included within 
that basic contract and the supplements ? 

Mr. Woolley. It depends entirely on what kind of work would 
have been offered. 

20. Major Clausen. You would have been able to take some of the 
work ? 

Mr. Woolley. To take some of the work. 

21. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. And if you had been advised that 
there was to be this basic contract in existence, would you have been 
desirous of taking on this work, at December 1940? 

Mr. Woolley. I am not sure that I would, because I was doing 
some work for the Navy at that time. 

22. Major Clausen. Well, do you recall having given testimony 
before Colonel John E. Hunt, of our Inspector General's Depart- 
ment ? 

Mr. Woolley. Yes, sir. 

23. Major Clausen. Let me just read a portion of that testimony 
on page 448 : 

Question. As I recall it, the Hawaiian Constructors' contract was effective 
as of December 20, 1940, is that right? 

Answer. 1 think that is. 

Question. I think that is the approximate date. 

Answer. I know it is the latter part of 1940. 

[3753] Question. At that time would you have been in a position to 
undertake any of the work that you now understand to have been included in 
the original IJawaiian Constructors' contract? 

Answer. Yes, I would have been able to have taken on some of that work. 

Question. If you had been advised that is was going on, would you have 
been desirous of taking it on? 

Answer. I would have been. 



1920 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Do you remember giving that testimony ? 
Mr. WooLLEY. Yes, I do. 

24. Major Clausen. Well, which statement is correct, Mr. WooUey; 
the one 

' Mr. WooLLET. Well, if it was the same class of work that was 
handled by the Hawaiian Constructors, I would have been able to 
take on some of the work. 

25. Major Clausen. The question, though, that I put to you today 
was this : whether you would then, in December of 1940, have desired 
to take it on, and your answer that you gave to Coloijel Hunt was, 
"I would have been." Is that correct, sir? 

Mr. Woollet. Well, I think that is correct, yes, sir. 

26. Major Clausen. All right. Now, in December 1940 you were 
acquainted with the setup of the approximate work being done by 
the Hawaiian Contracting Company, local concern, Mr. Benson's 
company ? 

Mr. AVoolley. In December of 1940 ? 

27. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. I mean, you knew in December 
1940 that Mr. Benson, the Hawaiian Contracting Company, was in 
business here ? 

[3754] Mr. WooLLEY. Oh, yes. 

28. Major Clausen. And Mr. Glover? He was one of the local 
contractors? 

Mr. WooLLEY, That is right. 

29. Major Clausen. And Mr. Black? He was one of the con- 
tractors ? 

Mr. WooLLEY. That is right. 

30. Major Clausen. As a matter of fact, you were familiar with 
various contractors here? 

Mr. WooLLEY. That is right. 

31. Major C-lausen. And they could have taken on this work, 
couldn't they? And McKee and Company, and McClure? 

Mr. Woolley. Well, I am not sure, but I think probably they could. 

32. Major Clausen. All right. 

33. General Frank. May I ask a question ? 

34. Major Clausen. Yes, certainly. 

35. General Frank. Mr. Woolley, with which outfit would you have 
preferred to have become identified, the Hawaiian Constructors or a 
group of men composing McClure, McKee, AVoolley, Benson, Black, 
and so forth ? 

Mr. Woolley. Well, General, I would have preferred to have as- 
sociated myself with local contractors. I don't believe I would have 
cared to associate myself with McKee because of his method of op- 
erations. He was a one-man operator. 

36. General Russell. Was he an effective operator ? 
Mr. Woolley. Very good. 

37. General Russell. But he was just a lone wolf type ? 

[S7SS] Mr. Woolley. Just a lone wolf, and sometimes when 
he gets two or three men together, unless they are congenial in their 
operations, it isn't worth-while going in a joint venture with him. 

38. General Frank. As a matter of fact, he himself has stated that 
he was a lone wolf type. 

39. Major Clausen. Are you finished. General Frank ? 

40. General Frank. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1921 

41. Major Clausen. Mr. Woolley, are you acquainted with the trans- 
action where the Government bought from the Eohl-Connolly Com- 
pany some equipment, approximately $166,000, which had theretofore 
been appraised by a Government employee at $131,000 ? 

Mr. WoOLLEY. I am not very well acquainted with that transaction. 
It was handled directly by Mr. Rohl, as I understand it, with the con- 
tracting officer. 

42. Major Clausen. Were you in on some of the preliminary dis- 
cussions ? 

Mr. Woolley. Only insofar as the desire of getting additional equip- 
ment was concerned, request to the contracting officer for additional 
equipment. 

43. Major Clausen. Were you there when the conversations were 
held regarding the appraisal that had been rendered on March the 
12th? 

Mr. Woolley. I think I was in the same room, but I don't recollect 
any details of the conference. 

44. Major Clausen. Do you remember that Mr. Parker was told 
to put down this extra money between $131,000 and $166,000 on the 
basis of back rental ? 

[S756] Mr. Woolley. No, I do not know that. 

45. Major Clausen. Do you remember that Mr. Parker said, "Well, 
I guess I might as well put it down, as long as it's going to go through 
that way," or words to that effect? 

Mr. Woolley. No, sir, I do not. 

46. Major Clausen. Do you recall a transaction where the Govern- 
ment purchased equipment from the Hawaiian Contracting Com- 
pany, which equipment was in part unusable? 

Mr. Woolley. Well, I know only of the request that we had made 
for additional equipment, and this was available, and we requested 
for this construction contracting officer, if possible to make it avail- 
able to us. 

47. Major Clausen. Did you know, or are you acquainted with the 
fact that on March 3, 1943, almost a year after the purchase was made 
of this equipment, that part was still in the yards of the Hawaiian 
Contracting Company, unused because it couldn't be used ? 

Mr. Woolley. I was informed that there were some few of these 
dump wagons that were — or at least hadn't been used. 

48. Major Clausen. And these dump wagons in themselves total 
something like $9,100; isn't that right? 

Mr. Woolley. I don't know as to their value. 

49. Major Clausen. I have no further questions. 

50. General Russell. Were you a member of the executive com- 
mittee which fixed the policies for the Hawaiian Constructors after 
Pearl Harbor or after the blitz here ? 

Mr. Woolley. Yes, sir. 

51. General Eussell. Who were the other members of that, Mr. 
Woolley? 

[3757] Mr. Woolley. There was Mr. Grafe, Paul Grafe, and 
Percy Benson, and Mr. Rohl. 

52. General Russell. How long did Grafe stay here after the blitz ? 
Mr. Woolley. To the best of my recollection, it was the early part 

of February. 



1922 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

53. General Kussell. In '42? 
Mr. WooLLEY. In '42. 

54. General Russell. How long did Rohl stay here after the first 
of the year '42? 

Mr. WooLLEY. I wouldn't be sure, General, but I think some time 
in either May or June. I know he made a number of trips, and I 
wouldn't be sure which was the final trip that he made. 

55. General Russell. Well, why did you select the month of May 
or June in '42 as being the time when Rohl left? Did you mean to 
convey the idea that from that date on he did not participate any 
more in the activities of this executive committee ? 

Mr. Woolley. Well, I think that was about the early part of May. 
I think that was about the time. 

56. General Russell, Well, he point is this, Mr. Wooley : Did Mr. 
Rohl come back after this time that we are attempting to fix now, 
irrespective of when it was ? 

Mr. Woolley. I think he did. 

57. General Russell. And he actually served after that time, upon 
his return to the Islands, as a member of this committee? 

Mr. Woolley. Yes, he — I think he made a trip in April and then 

another one which was later. I can't get the 

[37SS~\ 58. General Russell. A trip to where ? 
Mr. Woolley. To the coast. 

59. General Russell. He went to the coast in April. How long did 
he stay? Do you recall? 

Mr. Woolley. I think two or three weeks. 

60. General Russell. And he came back ? 
Mr. Woolley. He came back. 

61. General Russell. And he stayed over here until when ? 

Mr. Woolley. Well, my recollection is that it was either the latter 
part of possibly June — I couldn't give you the exact dates without 
referring to records. 

62. General Russell. All right. Then he went away ? 
Mr. Woolley. Yes, sir. 

63. General Russell. How long did he stay on that trip ? 
Mr. Woolley. I couldn't give you the exact date. 

64. General Russell. Then he came back and began to function 
again as a member of the committee? 

Mr. Woolley. Well, he came back. He didn't — he was in poor 
health. He didn't function very well from then on. 

65. General Russell. When did his health fail ? 

Mr. Woolley. I couldn't give you that exact date. He was in the 
hospital at Hickam Field. I couldn't, without going to the record. 

66. General Russell. Along in the spring of '42 did his health get 
right bad ? 

Mr. Woolley. Well, he claimed that his heart was bad and that he 
was having these heart attacks and supposed to be under the doctor's 
care. 

67. General Russell. Did that continue until this work ended 
[3759'] over here sometime in '43 ? 

Mr. Woolley. No. 

68. General Russell. His condition of poor health? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1923 

Mr. WooLLEY. No. He left here in the middle siiinmer. I couldn't — 
I can refer to the records and give you those exact dates. And then 
he didn't come back again. 

69. General Russell. In other words, his health got poor in the 
spring of '42, and he went to the hospital, and sometime in the sum- 
mer of '42 he went to the continent and never did come back ? 

Mr. WooLLEY. That's right. 
. 70. General Russell. All right. That is about what I want. 

Now, you say that you became a member of these Hawaiian Con- 
structors sometime along in May of '41 ? 

Mr. WooLLEY. That's right. ^ 

71. General Russell. That you were not approached back in Decem- 
ber when these constructors organized and initiated the work over 
here ? 

Mr. Woolley. That's right. 

72. General Russell. You were not approached then at all? 
Mr. Woolley. Not at all. 

73. General Russell. Not by the Engineer contracting officer nor 
by the constructors ? 

Mr. Woolley. No, sir, I was not approached. 

74. General Russell. On whose motion, then, did you get into the 
constructors along in May of '41 ? 

Mr. AVooLLEY. Mr. Paid Grafe came to see me in my office, early 
part of May, and asked me if I would be interested in becoming a 
member of the Hawaiian Constructors. I told him that [3760} 
I would like to investigate and check into it and think it over before 
I'd give him an answer, 

75. General Russell. What reasons, if any, did Grafe assign for 
approaching you and making this inquiry ? 

Mr. Woolley. He told me that the contracting officer had requested 
them to get a builder into their organization because they expected to 
have considerable building as a part of the work, and that they had 
decided that I would be the one who would be acceptable, and so they 
asked me if I would consider it. I told them I would. 

76. General Russell. Then, his sole reason was that a new type of 
work had to be done, for which the Hawaiian Constructors, as then 
organized, was not fitted ? 

Mr. Woolley. Well, that was the principal reason, and that the work 
was going to expand. 

77. General Russell. Be a lot more work ? 
Mr. Woolley. A lot more work. 

78. General Russell. Now, did Benson come into this organization 
about May of '41, about the time you went into it? 

Mr. Woolley. No; Mr. Benson — the Hawaiian Contracting Com- 
pany did not come in until January of 1942, the first of January 1942. 

79. General Russell. Now, you told the Major a moment ago that 
you paid approximately $65,000 for a 20 percent interest in this con- 
tract. Then when you bought in, there was Callahan and their 
associate 

Mr. Woolley. Rohl-Connolly. 

80. General Russell. Rohl-Connolly, and the other? 
Mr. Woolley. Gunther-Shirlev. 



1924 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[S761] 81. General Kussell. Gunther-Shirley. And they re- 
tained 80 percent, and you acquired 20 percent of the interest ? 

Mr. WooLLEY. Yes. They told me they had put up so much money 
as capital then, and that if I came in I would have to put in an equal 
amount, based on what they had put in, and that I would participate 
equally with them from the beginning, on the contract. 

82. General Russell. Did you understand those people to mean, 
then, that $65,000, or approximately that amount, that you were re- 
quired to pay, represented 20 percent of the funds that these people 
had put into this operation ? 

Mr. WooLLEY. That that was actual cash put in ; that I would be 
•obligated for any additional money required or loans that might have 
to be made to carry on the joint venture. 

83. General Russell, How were you going to get that $65,000 back, 
Mr. Woolley? 

Mr. Woolley. Well, this was a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract. 

84. General Russell. Yes. 

Mr. Woolley. And the capital that you put in, initial capital, when 
you didn't need it, would be returned on the same priority basis. 

85. General Russell. How much eventually — I will give you the 
background of the examination : It appears that eventually the fixed 
fee amounted to some million plus seventy thousand dollars. 

Mr. Woolley. That's right. 

86. General Russell. How much of that fee had been earned when 
you went into this undertaking in May of '41? 

[S762] Mr. Woolley. I couldn't give you it exactly, but the 
amount of work, total amount of work under contract, was, I think, 
less than $5,000,000 in aggregate. 

87. General Russell. Then a very small percentage 

Mr. Woolley. Small. 

88. General Russell. — of this million-plus had been earned at 
that time ? 

Mr. Woolley. That is right; quite a small percentage. 

89. General Russel. All right. But this $65,000 which you put 
in was largely in the nature of working capital ? 

Mr. Woolley. That's it. 

90. General Russell. And you expected it to be returned to you? 
Mr. Woolley. That is right. It was working 

91. General Russell. Well, was a great part of that returned to 
you, plus your interest in the million seventy thousand dollars ? 

Mr. Woolley. The entire capital that I put up, initial amount, was 
returned. 

92. General Russell. And in addition to that you participated to 
the extent of 20 percent in the aggregate fixed fee of a million seventy 
thousand ? 

Mr. Woolley. That's right. 

93. General Russell. Now, we are interested, Mr. Woolley, to 
know — and it might be that we could have informed ourselves, but 
we haven't — as to how definitely the contract defined the non-reim- 
bursable items of expense that these joint adventurers might have 
been called upon to pay from their funds as distinguished from Gov- 
ernment funds. Now, could you tell us [3763] about that ? 

Mr. Woolley. Well, you mean through the entire contract? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1925 

QA. CtPTIP'TrI "RiTTSSF'T L JL gs 

Mr. WooLLET. As I remember, we had some $170,000, $180,000 of 
non-reimbursable items. 

95. General Russell. That was all of the contract, all of the ad- 
venturers, including you and Benson's outfit and everybody, at the 
end of the 

Mr. WooLLEY. That was the non-reimbursables of the joint 
venturers. 

96. General Russell. Then, if the total fixed fee was a million 
seventy thousand dollars, and you had non-reimbursables of $170,000, 
the story is that the joint adventurers divided up to $900,000 and got 
back in addition thereto all of their initial investment in the nature 
of working capital ? 

Mr. WooLEY. Well, yes, that is correct. 

97. General Russell. So each of the five participating adventurers 
received approximately, or each 20 percent interest in the contract 
was worth just under $200,000 : five into $900,000? 

Mr. WooLLEY. At the end of the contract. 

98. General Russell. Yes. 
Mr. WooLLEY. Yes. 

99. Colonel Toulmin. Plus the return of the invested capital. 

100. General Russell. Plus the return of the invested capital, of 
course. 

Mr. WooLLEY. That is right. 

101. General Russell. So the net profit of the operation was in the 
aggregate about $900,000? 

[S764] Mr. Woolley. Well, I wouldn't say the net profit, be- 
cause there were — each of us had our own expenses, our office expenses, 
in addition to that, which is part of our current operating costs. 

102. General Russell. Well, in order that the Board may be in- 
formed in a general way of this operation, about what size organiza- 
tion did you have from which you paid the operating expenses out of 
this 20 percent of $900,000? 

[3765] Mr. Woolley. Well, up until "the end of '41 I had other 
contracts operating at the same time, and I couldn't give you, without 
going to the records, what those figures were, interests, and so forth. 

103. General Russell. Off-hand, can you recall about what percent- 
age of your 20% of the $900,000 you were compelled to expend to 
carry on the duties required of you and your organization under this 
agreement ? 

Mr. Woolley. No, I couldn't give that to you now. 

104. General Russell. You do not remember how much of this 20% 
of $900,000 was net profit to you, and how much was gross profit ? 

Mr. Woolley. No, I do not, because that extended over a period of 
three years. 

105. General Russell. I was going into that. This operation began 
in December 1940 and ended some time in 1943 ? 

Mr. Woolley. The contract was terminated in 1943 but it continued 
on into 1944. 

106. General Russell. Were you, if you know, working in connec- 
tion with this operation into 1944? 

Mr. Woolley. No, we were trying to get our contract settled and 
get our money. 



1926 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACit 

107. General Russell. After when ? 

Mr. WooLLEY. After January 31, 1943 ; only some 14 months or more. 

108. General Russell. The story from your standpoint is that you 
went in, in May 1941, and came out in January 1943, with 20% of 
$900,000, and during that time rather extensive work had been done 
here on the island, is that true? It was a big operation? 

13766'] Mr.WooLLEY. It was. 

109. General Russell. As I have heard the jfigure some place, it 
amounted to more than $100,000,000. 

Mr. WooLLEY. The total work under contract according to estimates 
was around close to $130,000,000. Then there were certain works that 
were canceled and terminated, so that the net was just under 
$100,000,000. 

110. General Russell, Now, there are two or three other things, and 
I will be through. I don't believe that my mind is clear, and I do not 
know, as to the other Members of the Board, on who determined the 
expenses that the adventurers were to pay and the expenses which the 
Government had to pay in an operation of this kind, 

Mr. WooLLEY. My understanding of the operation was that all of 
the expenses incident to carrying on the work, if we thought that it 
was properly chargeable to the work, they were to present it to the 
contracting officer, who in turn reviewed them. If in his opinion 
they were proper charges he would O. K. them for payment; if not 
they would be sent back to us with a statement that they were non- 
reimbursable. 

111. General Russell. And that man was the contracting officer, 
who during this period was either Wyman, Lyman, or Kramer? 

Mr, WooLLEY, That is right. 

112. General Russell, Now, did you with your organization prepare 
the account which you desired the Government to .pay and submit it, 
and Rohl would prepare his, and Callahan would prepare his, and 
send them to the officer and each of you deal with the contracting officer 
as an entity ? 

Mr. Woolley. No. All of the expense items which w,ere [3767] 
chargeable went through the Hawaiian Constructors. 

113. General Russell, The central agency? 

Mr, Woolley, And none of us submitted expense items independ- 
ently. 

114. General Russell. Then all the items that the contracting of- 
ficer received were debited against him, or attempted to be debited 
against him by the Hawaiian Constructors ? 

Mr. WoolijEY. That is true. 

115. General Russell. And not the individual members ? 
Mr. Woolley. That is right. 

116. General Russell. Were there numerous bickerings between 
the contracting officer and the Hawaiian Constructors as to what ac- 
counts should be paid by the F'ederal Government and what accounts 
should be paid by the constructor ? 

Mr. Woolley. In general I do not think there was a lot of bickering, 
because all of the expenditures had to be authorized prior to the time 
of contracting for the work,^ and had to be approved by the contracting 
officer, and so that, once the authorization was given, the routine of 
submitting the bills or the requisitions for payment was a matter of 
routine. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1927 

117. General Kussell. Who took Rohl's place on this executive com- 
mittee after his health failed and he went back to the continent? 

Mr. WooLLEY. AVell, jointly Mr. Benson and I handled the work 
of the executive committee. 

118. General Russeix. You had an opportunity to observe the or- 
ganizations which were brought over here to the islands from the 
continent by Callahan and Rohl and Gunther-Shirley, you saw those 
organizations, did you not, their supervisors and foremen ? 

[S76S] Mr. WooLLEY. Yes, sir. 

119. General Russell. How did they compare in your opinion with 
the supervisors and foremen and laborers of the local members of that 
association ? 

Mr. WoOLLEY. Well^ a good many of those who were sent over here 
were heavy-construction operators, and those superintendents were 
entirely familiar with heavy work, whereas my organization is pri- 
marily a building organization, so that the two kinds of operation were 
not comparable. I should say the general quality of men was some- 
what on a par. 

120. General Russell. With the local men ? 

Mr. Woolley. With the local men; some better, and some not so 
good. 

121. General Russell. The same as in your organization, you had 
good, bad, and indifferent, too ? 

Mr. Woolley. Well, we tried to get the best, but sometimes we didn't 
have them. 

122. General Russell. I do not believe I have any other questions. 

123. General Grunert. Is there anything else? 

124. Major Clausen. Was your organization a corporation, Mr. 
Woolley? 

Mr. Woolley. No, sir. 

125. Major Clausen. To your knowledge did Colonel Wyman or 
any person connected with him, or any of those people, halve an inter- 
est in your organization ? 

Mr. Woolley. No, sir. 

126. Major Clausen. You said in response to a question by General 
Russell that when Mr. Grafe came to you and solicited [37691 
your entry into this joint venture, that he had come to you because 
the contracting officer had asked him to get some builder, you recall 
that? 

- Mr. Woolley. Yes ; I stated. That is what he told me. 

127. Major Clausen. Well, who was the contracting officer at that 
time ? 

Mr. Woolley. Mr. Wyman. 

128. Major Clausen. Yes; and you afterwards had a talk with 
Colonel Wyman, did you, about your entry into this joint venture? 

Mr. Woolley. That is right. 

129. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon? 
Mr. Woolley. Yes, sir. 

130. Major Clausen, And you told him that you were willing to 
come in at this $65,000 figure ? 

Mr. Woolley. Well, I did not discuss any figure with him. I dis- 
pussed the figure with Paul Grafe, 



1928 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

131. Major Clausen. Well, did you ever discuss this $65,000 figure 
with Colonel Wyman ? 

Mr. WooLLEY. Now, I may have ; I would not be sure of that. 

132. Major Clausen. Well, do you have any memoranda or papers 
that would indicate that fact? 

Mr. Woolley. No, sir. 

133. Major Clausen. And the contracting officer during this period 
of construction of the projects here during that time was Colonel 
Wyman, was he not ? 

Mr. Woolley. Colonel Wyman. 

134. Major Clausen. That is all. 

135. General Geunert. Colonel Toulmin ? 

136. Colonel Toulmin. Nothing. 

137. General Grunert. Colonel West? 

138. Colonel West. No. 

139. General Grunert. Is there anything else that occurs to 
[3770'] you that you might tell the Board, that might be of assist- 
ance to it in coming to a conclusion ? 

Mr. Woolley. The only thing, I think probably. General, you all 
know that this type of contract, the cost-plus contract, is one that is 
very flexible, and because of the nature of it, the control of it must 
be vested in the contracting officer, and so that the directing head is 
the contracting officer, and so that our part in the performance of 
this contract was to comply with the instructions and orders given 
to us. 

140. General Grunert. Isn't it true that, late in 1941, the Chief of 
Engineers' Office got out a memorandum of instructions that govern 
or that set forth what the engineer should do and what the contrac- 
tors should do under this cost-plus program ? 

Mr. Woolley. You mean that directive issued from Washington? 
Yes, I know about that. 

141. General Grunert. Now, wasn't there a considerable departure 
from those instructions on the part of the engineers, themselves? 

Mr. Woolley. Well, I think the records will show that. 

142. General Grunert. That appeared to handicap and probably 
delay, and caused quite a number of at least of discussions between 
the two of you ? 

Mr. Woolley. Well, that's why I stated that the nature of this is 
one where we had to follow orders. If it were left to a contractor 
to operate a job as we normally operate, we probably could hav^ 
speeded things up a little better. 

143. General Grunert. Now then, the contracting officer was the 
one that passed upon what bills the Government should pay, that 
the contractors "ran up" we might say. Do you know whether there 
are any regulations governing generally what [3771] those 
bills should be, or what sort of items the Government would pay for, 
or was it left entirely to the contracting officer to decide what they 
were to pay for ? 

Mr. Woolley. No, there is a regular book of instructions and regu- 
lations that the contracting officer is supposed to follow. 

144. General Grunert. You say there was very little bickering 
about the payment of such bills, because they had the approval of 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1929 

getting stuff before it was actually gotten, it had to be passed on by 
the contracting officer? 

Mr. WooLLEY. That is right. 

145. General Grunert. Was there any bickering about that? 

Mr. WooLLET. Well, sometimes there was; for example, the ques- 
tion of whether we needed it or not, and whether there was an im- 
mediate need, or they had already taken care of it You see 
under this contract the Government bought all of the materials, be- 
cause they had a buying power, and they did not want to duplicate, 
and we have a directive to that effect; and with our insistence on 
getting certain materials and things of that sort, we had to plead 
with the contracting officer to furnish them. 

' 146. General Grunert. .Up to the time Kohl left he was a "spark 
plug" of the directing group, was he not? 

Mr. Woolley. Well, he was a member of the executive committee, 
and we had a general superintendent of construction. 

147. General Grunert. In other words, they got Rohl over here, 
and Grafe sort of faded out of the picture, until he left, and up until 
the time Rohl turned over to you and Benson, why, Rohl did most 
of the directing? 

[S772] Mr. WooLLEY. No, I wouldn't say that. General. I think 
Mr. Benson and I shared in it, assisted in the directing and helping 
to shape the policies of the work. 

148. General Grunert. On every committee, even an executive 
committee, there has got to be one man that does most of the work? 

Mr. Woolley. That is right. 

149. General Grunert. Are there any other questions? 

150. General Russell. Yes. I knew I had missed something I 
wanted to talk to you about. Were there any efforts made, along 
in April or May 1941, about which you know, looking to having 
work done under a fixed-price contract ; that is, by bids ? 

Mr. Woolley. I don't recall of any. 

151. General Russell. You did not participate with other local 
contractors in working out bids for some work that Wyman wanted 
done here along in the spring of 1941 ? 

Mr. Woolley. Not with Colonel Wyman; no. We did under the 
constructing quartermaster. 

152. General Russell. Do you remember hearing of or seeing ad- 
vertisements of requests for bids from local contractors for work 
that was to be done? 

Mr. Woolley. I think there were some airfields that were adver- 
tised. 

153. General Russell. Did you make bids on those airfields? 
Mr. Woolley. No, sir. 

154. General Russell. Do you recall about when that was? 

Mr. Woolley. No, I don't. I really don't, because I wasn't in- 
terested in that question. 

[3773] 155. General Russell. You just did not take any interest 
in it? 

Mr. Woolley. Didn't take any part of it. 

156. General Grunert. One more question. In that executive com- 
mittee was the amount of power and decision and one thing and 
another apportioned according to the amount of interest held in the 

79716— 46— Ex. 145, vol. 3 21 



1930 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Hawaiian Constructors? You held 20%, and Benson, 20%, and 
somebody else held the other 60% ? 

Mr. WooLLEY. That question never came up. 

157. General Grunert. Are there any other questions? Is there 
anything else you can think of that you might want to open up, or 
something that might be brewing in your mind for some time and 
ought to come out? 

Mr. WooLLEY. No; the only thing, the records will show that we 
were more than willing to cooperate all the way through; and the 
records will show that. 

158. General Grunert. If there are no other questions, we tliank you 
for coming. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 
(Whereupon, at 5 p. m., the Board having concluded the hearing of 
witnesses for the day, took up the consideration of other matters.) 



iPROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1931 



13774] CONTENTS 



SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1944 
Testimony of — Page » 

Maurice Gaylord Parker, Honolulu, T. H 3775 

DOCUJIENTS 

Memorandum, 9/16/44, Major Lozier to Major Clausen 3796 

Memorandum, . 9/15/44, Major Lozier to Major Clausen 3797 

Memorandum, 9/11/44, John Edgar Hoover to SAC, Honolulu-*- 3S00 

EXHIBITS 

No. 52. Essential documents in re Bernard Otto Kuehn 3799 

53. Laboratory report of F.B.I., 11/19/41 re HMAR 3801 

'■ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original transcript of proceedings. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1933 



[3775-] PEOCEEDINGS BEFORE THE AEMY PEARL 

HARBOR BOARD 



saturday, september 16, 1944. 

Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii. 

The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted 
the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the 
Board, presiding. 

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. 
Russell and Maj. Gen. "Walter H. Frank, Members. 

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C. 
Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., 
Executive Officer. 

General Gkunert. The Board will come to order. 

TESTIMONY OP MAURICE GAYLORD PARKER, HONOLULU, T. H. 

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights 
under Article of War 24.) 

1. Colonel West. Mr. Parker, will you please state to the Board your 
full name and address. 

Mr. Parker. Maurice Gaylord Parker ; Elks Club ; Honolulu. 

2. Colonel West. What is your occupation ? 

Mr. Parker. At the present time I am planning on going in the ice 
business for myself. 

3. General Grunert. Mr. Parker, General Frank, assisted by Major 
Clausen, will conduct this particular part of our investigation. 
General Frank. 

4. General Frank. Go ahead. Major Clausen. 

. 5. Major Clausen. Mr. Parker, what is your present [S776] 
occupation ? Are 3^ou employed right now ? 
Mr. Parker. No, I am not. 

6. Major Clausen. What was your most recent occupation? 

Mr. Parker. Working for Schuman Carriage Company. That was 
the job I had before I went to work with the engineers in 1942. 

7. Major Clausen. But you were employed most recently though 
with the United States Engineering Department ? 

Mr. Parker. Well, that was May, up until the latter part of May of 
this year ; then I got released on furlough for six months. 

8. Major Clausen. You mean they let you go for six months? 
Mr. Parker. Yes, sir. 

9. Major Clausen. The period during which you worked for the 
Engineering Department extended over what dates ? 

Mr. Parker. From January 3, 1942, until the latter part of May, 
this year. 



1934 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

10. Major Clausen. In what capacity were you first employed by 
the United States Engineering Department? 

Mr. Parker. As an appraiser of used equipment — trucks and cars 
and so forth. They didn't put it in as "appraiser," it was "civil engi- 
neer" on the boards. 

11. Major Clausen. Actually, though? 

Mr. Parker. But the work that I did was appraise equipment. 

12. Major Clausen. And how long did you perform that function 
of appraiser for the Engineering Department — over what periods? 

Mr. Parker. It started January 3. 

13. Major Clausen. January 3, of what year? 

[S7?7] Mr. Parker. 1942; until October 1942; I don't know the 
exact date. 

14. Major Clausen. And what experience, Mr. Parker, had you 
had as an appraiser of used equipment? 

Mr. Parker. The only experience I had had up till that time was 
on trucks and cars, when I was working with Schuman Carriage 
Company. 

15. Major Clausen. And is that a local concern, here? 
Mr. Parker. Yes, sir. 

16. Major Clausen. You had also Avorked for the Thomas Hafferty 
Company ? 

Mr. Parker. That is correct. 

17. Major Clausen. And what kind of work did you do there? 
Mr. Parker. Well, originally, I was a buyer, local buyer, the buy- 
ing of merchandise and equipment in town here. 

18. Major Clausen. You did the purchasing then for that com- 
pany ? 

Mr. Parker, And then the company liquidated after they finished 
a job at Lualualei, and we took all that old equipment we had had on 
the job and took it to pier 6, and I was foreman down there, and we 
sold and repaired to rent different pieces of equipment. 

19. Major Clausen. How long? 
Mr. Parker. About a year, there. 

20. Major Clausen. About a year doing that, also? 
Mr. Parker. Yes, sir. 

21. Major Clausen. And this was all before you went to work with 
the United States Engineering Department, is that so? 

Mr. Parker. That is correct. 

22. Major Clausen. Now, in all the activities of yours as an 
appraiser, did you ever have anybody question your appraisal? 

Mr. Parker. Yes, I did. 

\3778] 23. Major Clausen. In how many instances? 

Mr. Parker. Once. 

24. Major Clausen. Only one? 

Mr. Parker. Well, of course, when we went out to appraise, why, 
the owner might bring up the question, but I was never, as far as 
working for the engineers, questioned, but once. 

25. Major Clausen. And this one occasion occurred when Mr. 
Parker? 

Mr. Parker. I can't give the exact date, because I don't remember. 

26. Major Clausen. What year was it, Mr. Parker ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1935 

Mr. Parker. 1942. I think it was in March, April, or May of 1942. 
I am not sure. 

27. Major Clausen. Was that in connection with some equipment 
owned by the Rohl-Connolly Company ? 

Mr. Parker, Yes, sir. 

28. Major Clausen. And your appraisal was in the neighborhood 
of $131,000, whereas they insisted upon an appraisal of $166,000? 

Mr. Parker, I wouldn't say for tlie figures. It was about $30,000 
if I remember right, difference on those thmgs. 

29. Major Clausen. In making that particular appraisal, as to 
which there arose this question, you feel that you made a fair, square, 
on-the-level appraisal ? 

Mr. Parker. I do. 

30. Major Clausen. And just what did you do? How did you go 
about making that appraisal, and what basis did you use? 

Mr. Parker. Well, as I say, I don't remember the date, but it was 
early this morning when one of the boys that worked for the Ha- 
waiian Constructors came down, with a list, and also, [3779^ I 
think it was, Captain, in charge of or had to do with all the pur- 
chasing in the Engineers; I forget his name, now; and they had a 
list of equipment belonging to the Hawaiian Constructors, that he said, 
this young fellow, the captain, said we had to appraise that morning 
and have it in by that night, and there were about 14 pieces if I 
remember right. That is, there were more pieces, because, however, 
there were 10 or 12 trucks in there, but 12 or 14 different items of 
shovels. 

31. General Frank. You mean steam shovels ? 

Mr. Parker. Yes, sir; they were Diesel shovels, and there were 
trucks, and they were scattered all over the island at the time, so this 
boy from the Hawaiian Constructors, knowing where this equipment 
was, he was to take me around, starting this morning, to appraise this 
equipment ; so we started out, and on this list was the equipment, and 
also prices, the prices that the Hawaiian Constructors were asking 
for it. 

32. Major Clausen. You mean that Rohl-Connolly Company was 
asking the Hawaiian Constructors? 

Mr. Parker. Well, now, Rohl-Connolly, I didn't know at the time. 
I thought it was Hawaiian Constructors. That is who we were pur- 
chasing for — that is, doing the appraising. 

33. Major Clausen. At any event, before you went out on the -job, 
they gave you a list with the prices on that they wanted you to verify ? 

Mr. Parker. That is right. 

34. Major Clausen. As the value of the property? 
Mr. Parker. That is right. 

35. Major Clausen. All right. Proceed, and tell the Board just 
what you did. 

[3780] Mr. Parker. So we started out, but we had orders, this 
young fellow and myself, who worked for the constructors — I was 
working for the Government — to have each 

36. General Frank. Now, just a minute. This Captain was work- 
ing ? 

Mr. Parker. No, this Captain told me to go with this Hawaiian 
Constructors' man, I forget his name. 



1936 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

37. General Frank. Oh, there was another civilian who represented 
Hawaiian Constructors ? 

Mr. Parker. That is right; yes, sir; so we had orders to get the 
area engineers or the Hawaiian Constructors' superintendent to sign 
for this equipment, showing that it was on the job. 

Well, there was some equipment at Hickam Field, and there was 
equipment at Schofield, equipment down where it was being repaired, 
like this called "Island Welding," now ; some at base yard 6. Well, 
it was scattered all over. There was some out here, I forget the name 
of the fort ; it was where they have the big gun out there on the way 
to Waianae. There was a shovel out there, and it took us the whole 
day to get around to see all this equipment. We had trouble with 
some of the superintendents. They wouldn't sign for it. They would 
take a look at it and say, "No ! we don't want it on the job !" Like 
there was a pump, I forget what they call them. It was at Hickam, 
any way, and the superintendent there said lie would not sign for it 
because they didn't need it on the job, it was laying out in the field. 

38. General Frank. Was it serviceable ? 

Mr. Parker. That, I would not say. It was sitting [3781] 
there, and from my looks it was serviceable, yes, if they wanted it. 

After I had checked it over and looked at the pipe and everything, 
there were pieces of pipe strewn all around, they had so many lengths 
of pipe I couldn't count them all and see whether they were there. I 
was taking a list as to the number of pieces, and I was supposed to 
have these pieces appraised and the report turned in that night; which 
I did, about eight o'clock. 

39. Major Clausen. Did you go around all over the island to get 
these ? 

Mr. Parker. Went and saw every piece that was on the list they had. 
If I remember right, there were 10 or 12 trucks, and there were 8 — if 
there was 10, there was 8 of them at 104-W ; that is, out at Schofield ; 
and two of them were sitting down, hadn't been able to run yet. They 
were down at Automotive Service being repaired. 

40. Major Clausen. In making that appraisal, therefore, you were 
told to have this job done that day, and to have it in that night ? 

Mr. Parker. That is correct. 

41. Major Clausen. What reason did they give for this "rush act"? 
Mr. Parker. They didn't give any reason. I didn't ask. They 

said they wanted it in, that night, because it was a job they wanted 
finished up, that's all there was. 

42. Major Clausen. Did anybody then tell you that Colonel Wy- 
man, who was doing part of the work, was going to be relieved in two 
days? 

[37S2] ^ Mr. Parker. No, sir; I didn't know a thing about it. 

43. Major Clausen, 1^J the way, when you made your appraisal on 
this particular equipment, did you follow any usual practice as to get- 
ting the purchase price, valuing the wear and tear, and the depre- 
ciation? 

Mr. Parker. I know about what the shovels cost. They run around 
$31,000 at the time, but they had been used; and the trucks, I knew 
what the price of trucks run, new, and they had been used ; so I used 
my own judgment, like I appraised everything else. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1937 

44. Major Clausen. In other words, you were familiar with the 
catalog purchase-price figures? 

Mr. Parker, Not necessarily, because prices down here vary for 
this equipment. On the coast they would be able to buy it much 
cheaper. You would have to figure freight and so forth down here, 
and the catalog prices on this equipment would be different here. 

45. Major Clausen. In that connection, therefore, did you con- 
sider that the Hawaiian Constructors did not have to pay the freight 
from the mainland ? 

Mr. Parker. No, I didn't. When I appraised any piece of equip- 
ment here I took into consideration the wear and tear, and what it 
would originally cost, only. 

46. General Frank, Here? 

Mr. Parker. Here ; that is correct. 

47. Major Clausen, In the Hawaiian Islands? 

Mr. -Parker. If it was shipped down, as if you would buy a truck 
and have it shipped out here, and the amount of money they might 
have spent to repair it, which this [3783] equipment had been 
all repaired. 

48. Major Clausen. You say this equipment had all been repaired ? 
Mr. Parker. Well, that is, the pieces like the trucks and the shovels. 

Now, the pumps were in good shape; that is, they looked in good 
shape ; they were not running. 

If I remember my figures, why, I didn't depreciate the pumps very 
much. I took them as the figure they turned in for them. It was 
the equipment like the shovels and the trucks that were the ones that 
I didn't think were worth the money. 

49. Major Clausen. In any event, your final total appraisal in the 
neighborhood of $131,000 was turned in later on that af ternot)n ? 

Mr. Parker. That evening, about eight o'clock. 

50. Major Clausen. And to whom did you give that, Mr. Parker? 
Mr. Parker. I gave it to this captain ; but as I say, I can't remember 

his name. 

51. Major Clausen. And then what was said, or what was the next 
thing you did? 

Mr. Parker. That is all there was to it. 

52. Major Clausen. Well, you later on, though, did something? 
Mr. Parker. Then, the next morning, when I came back, they told 

me — well, it wasn't the next morning, because I went out to work, and 
about one o'clock I came back to the office, and they told me I had to 
report down to the Young building, to Colonel Robinson, that after- 
noon. 

53. Major Clausen. That was Colonel B. L. Robinson ? 

Mr. Parker. I don't know whether that was the next day [3784] 
or the day after. I don't remember whether it was one or two days. 

54. Major Clausen. All right. Wliat happened when you got 
down there to the Young building ? 

Mr. Parker. Well, I went into the office and met Colonel Robinson, 
and he asked me, he said, "There is some discrepancy here in your 
figures and what the Hawaiian Constructors are asking for this equip- 
ment that you appraised." And I said, "Well," I said, "I don't know 
what it is. I appraised the equipment as I thought it was worth to 
the Government." He said, "Well, did you know at the time that 



1938 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

there was rental due on this equipment?" and I said, "No; and it 
wouldn't make any difference if there was. That rental don't inter- 
fere with the appi-aisals that I put on equipment." He said, "Well, 
there should be rental added to it," and he says, "Some of the Ha- 
waiian Constructors' men are going to come up here, and they want to 
talk to you." I said, "O. K." And about five minutes later, why, in 
walked Mr. Woolley, Mr. Kohl, and Mr. Benson, and Mr. Middleton. 

55. Major Clausen. These men were all Hawaiian Constructors 
men, were they not ? 

Mr. Parker. Yes, sir ; and Colonel Robinson said, "You go over to 
that desk and talk to them." So I went over there with all these "big 
shots" from the Hawaiian Constructors. I felt really out of place. 

66. Major Clausen. Were you the only government representative 
there? 

Mr, Parker. I was the only one. That is why I felt out of place. 
Well, we sat down at this table, and I don't remember [S785] 
who did the talking, because they all had something to say, but one 
of them spoke up and said, "How does it happen that your appraisal 
is so much lower than our figures?" I said, "Well, T appraised it as 
what I thought it was worth." One of them said, "Well, we repaired 
all that equipment before it was sent down here, and we have figures." 
They had papers there of figures showing that they had spent so much 
money fixing up these trucks and the shovels and so forth, and I said, 
"Well, I still consider that my appraisal is fair, and even though you 
fixed it up," I said, "it was a poor job, because there's cracks in the 
pumps, all the shovels are not running, and the trucks are broken 
down right now, and," I said, "they did a very good job of painting 
over all these defects." 

Mr. Rohl spoke up and said, "Look here, young man," he said, "we 
don't do such things as that." He says, "All our equipment is in good 
shape." And I said, "Well, I still contend that my appraisal is fair, 
and I am not going to change it." So they said, "Well, do you under- 
stand that there is rental due on this?" And I said, "Yes, Colonel 
Robinson just told me, but I didn't know it before, and," I said, "it 
don't make any difference as far as the appraisal is concerned. If there 
is rental due,.of course, the Government will pay you." And they said, 
"Well, there's rental due on it. It happens that it starts from the 
time the equipment was delivered in San Francisco, until the time it 
was brought here, and up to the present time, even though it is not 
working." And I said, "Well, I am not changing it, but I will turn 
in a letter to Colonel Robinson to the effect that if the appraisal equals 
the amount the Hawaiian Constructors ask for their equipment, or 
exceeds it, why, I will O. K. the price that they had set [3786] 
on all of this equipment." 

57. General Frank. I don't get that. If what ? 
Mr. Parker. If the amount. 

58. General Frank. What amount? 

Mr. Parker. Well, you see I was $30,000 or $35,000 under Hawaiian 
Constructors' set figure of this equipment. Well, if the amount — say 
my figures were $75,000 or $80,000, and they had so much rental 
coming to meet the figures that were set up, or exceed those figures, 
why, it was perfectly all right for the Government to pay it, if they 
h?id that rental coming. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1939 

59. Major Clausen. What you mean is that, if their claim to this 
rental was correct, then quite obviously they were entitled to the 
rental ? 

Mr. Parker. Why, certainly. 

60. Major Clausen. That is all it amounted to, that you told them ? 
Mr. Parker. That is all — my appraisal plus the rental that they 

were entitled to, would exceed or meet the price they asked, why 
then it was up to the Government to pay it. I didn't, as far as my ap- 
praisal, I wasn't going to boost it just because there was rental due on 
it. That had nothing to do with me. If they had gone into a con- 
tract with the Government for rental, why, as I say, that was a dif- 
ferent story. 

61. Major Clausen. Bearing in mind, therefore, that your ap- 
praisal was in the neighborhood of $131,000, and that they asked for 
$166,000, did you therefore write a letter, to the effect that if the dif- 
ference between $131,000 and $166,000 was rental, then that repre- 
sented a sum total that they should be paid of $166,000 ? 

Mr. Parker. Yes, sir. 

[3787] 62. Major Clausen. Did anybody at any time, Mr. 
Parker, ever show you a basis for their claim to this rent in the form 
of a written document ? 

Mr. Parker. I never saw and I don't suppose I ever did see any of 
those written contracts anyway. 

63. Major Clausen. Did not this all strike you as a most unusual, 
unheard-of proceeding? 

Mr. Parker. Well, at the time, no, it did not. But it seemed kind 
of funny that they would ask me to boost the price if there was rental 
or a contract written at the time, because we were so busy at the 
time I didn't even stop to think about it. I did my work and had 
more work to do and it did not — well, I just thought about it, that 
is all — I didn't ask questions or go and ask anybody else about it. 

64. Major Clausen. I do not mean the rental part. I mean this 
idea of putting you off in a corner with all these contractors and men 
surrounding you and you being the only government man there. 

Mr. Parker. I felt very much out of place and I was put out about 
it, that somebody else was not there to represent the government. I 
thought, in fact, that Colonel Robinson should have been there to tell 
me about this rental thing. 

65. Major Clausen. Did it seem to you a gang-up to force you to 
agree upon an established price ? 

Mr. Parker. Very much so. 

66. Major Clausen. As a matter of fact, this equipment was not 
all in good operating condition. 

Mr. Parker. It was not workable, I do not believe, in my opinion. 

[3788] 67. Colonel .Toulmin. Do you mean it was not workable 
because it was not in working condition or not workable because they 
were not using it then ? 

Mr. Parker. It was not workable equipment, because they were 
doing repair work on it while I was there. 

68. Major Clausen. Did you also have occasion with respect to 
another appraisal to work with a Mr. Tillman ? 

Mr. Parker. Yes. 



1940 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

69. Major Clausen. Had that to do with the purchase of certain 
equipment from, the Hawaiian Contracting Company ? 

Mr. Parker. Yes, sir. 

70. Major Clausen. Do you recall the story to that in such a man- 
ner that you can briefly tell the Board what that was about ? 

Mr. Parker. There was a Mr. Gilman 

71. Major Clausen. Gihnan? 
Mr. Parker. Gilman, yes. 

72. Major Clausen. In addition to Mr. Tillman? 

Mr. Parker. That is right. — and myself, went out to look over 
some equipment that was in the yard of the Hawaiian Contractors 
at Moilili. It seemed like the equipment had already been appraised, 
but they were going out there to check it over, for what reason I do 
not know, because Mr. Tillman did not tell us. We went out there 
and met Mr. Ross, who was in charge of the yard. We looked over 
a few pieces, and Mr. Ross got a telephone call, and he came over 
after he finished with the phone and talked to Mr. Tillman, and we 
left. We did not appraise any of the equipment. We just had started 
checking it. Mr. Tillman received this — well, they stepped off to 
one side for their conversation. I don't know what was said [S789~] 
to Mr. Tillman, and he came over and said "Let's go back" and we 
were called back. 

73. Major Clausen. Were you there long enough and had you had 
observation enough of some of this equipment to see whether it was 
workable or was in poor condition ? 

Mr. Parker. At that time, no. 

74. Major Clausen. Did you later on? 
Mr. Parker. Later on, we did. 

75. Major Clausen. And you verified what fact as to those que's- 
tions ; what were your observations as to the condition of this equip- 
ment ? 

Mr. Parker. You mean at that time. 

76. Major Clausen. Later on, Mr. Parker. 

Mr. Parker. It was equipment that was old, obsolete equipment, 
had not been used for years. 

77. Major Clausen. Such as what? 

Mr. Parker. There were a couple of graders, a scarifier, some old 
wagon dumps on steel wheels, some wagon dumps on wooden wheels. 
In fact, there was about, I should say, 15 pieces or 25, between 15 and 
25 pieces that were sitting in the yard there that was old equipment. 

78. Major Clausen. And this second observation, I mean this second 
trip of yours out there, occurred how long after the first trip ? 

Mr. Parker. I don't remember. 

79. Major Clausen. Was it within a matter of months? 

Mr. Parker. Oh, three months. The F. Bu I. came and took us out 
there. 

80. Major Clausen. You say then the Engineers put you on 
furlough ? 

[S790] Mr. Parker. Well, after October, 1942 ; then I still re- 
mained with them until 1943, or 1944, this year. 

81. Major Clausen. Did anyone from the Engineers communicate 
with you about your appearance before the Board before you came 
here today ? 

Mr. Parker, Only the MP said I was to report up here. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1941 

82. Major Clausen. That is all. 

Mr. Parker. You mean from the outside, some civilian contractor ? 

83. Major Clausen. Yes. 
Mr. Parker. That is all. 

84. General Russell. In this conference that you discussed where 
some four people representing the Hawaiian Constructors were present 
and you were the sole agent of the federal government, do you remem- 
ber who led in the conversations at that time for the Constructors? 

Mr. Parker. Mr. Rohl and Mr. Middleton. 

85. General Russell. Did you know to whom this equipment be- 
longed that you had recently estimated the value of ? 

Mr. Parker. Who do you mean belonged to? A company or an 
individual? 

86. General Russell. As far as you know, any one or more of the 
Hawaiian group could have owned it ? 

Mr. Parker. I knew the local men did not, that is, Mr. Woolley and 
Mr. Benson of the Hawaiian Contractors, because at that time, selling 
trucks, I got around and saw these people. 

87. General Russell. Wlio was this man Middleton ? 

Mr. Parker. He was in charge of administration, I guess ; he was 
their business manager. 

[S791~\ 88. General Russell. For all of the contractors? 
Mr. Parker. Hawaiian Constructors, so far as I knew. 

89. General Russell. Was he a local man or was he from the main- 
land? 

Mr. Parker. He was from the mainland. 

90. General Russell. I was answering the telephone and may have 
missed one or two things. "What time in the morning did you start 
on this inspection ? 

Mr. Parker. At 8 o'clock. 

91. General Russell. And you finished that night? 

Mr. Parker. Yes, sir. We really had to go to do it, too. We were 
driving 40 and 50 miles an hour. 

92. General Russell. You say "we had to go". Who was with 
you ? 

Mr. Parker. This young fellow who knew where all the equip- 
ment was that worked for the Hawaiian Constructors, He went 
around and checked equipment, so he knew where it was all located. 

93. General Russell. They gave you a list when you started out 
on this trip of the equipment you were to appraise ? 

Mr. Parker. Yes, sir. 

94. General Russell. You appraised all of that equipment in one 
day? 

Mr. Parker. Yes, sir. 

95. General Russell. You were thoroughly familiar with all those 
items of equipment? 

Mr. Parker. No, sir. 

96. General Russell. You were not thoroughly familiar? 
Mr. Parker. No, sir. 

[3792'] 97. General Russell. Therefore, on some of the ap- 
praisals you were influenced by what, if you did not know the value ? 

Mr. Parker. Influenced by the figures they had on the paper, like — 
I will give you two instances. This — I wish I could think what it 
called. It is a pump. 



1942 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

98. Colonel Toulmin. What kind of a pump was it ? 

Mr. Parker. For pumping in tunnel work and things like that. 

99. General Frank. A suction pump? 

Mr. Parker. No. It is more than a suction pump. 

100. Colonel Toulmin. Water? 
Mr. Parker. Cement. 

101. Major Clausen. To pour cement? 
Mr. Parker. Cement. 

102. Colonel Toulmin. Cement gun pump ? 

Mr. Parker. A great big thing that pushed through a big pipe. 
But on the trucks and the shovels and also the motors, those I checked. 
I looked at every truck. 

103. General Russell. You did feel yourself qualified and com- 
petent to appraise those latter items of property you just described? 

Mr. Parker. Now, you say competent. I felt that my job was 
something that was a little bigger than I had ever had before, but I 
felt from my experience over here — now, you don't fit the experience 
over here like you do on the mainland, if you are taken and put in 
the same position as an appraiser that has had the experience in the 
States or that sold big equipment — no, I was not. 

104. General Russell. But is it true, or not, that where there was 
doubt in your mind as to the value at which you might [3793] 
appraise a given item of equipment, you gave the Hawaiian Construc- 
tors the benefit of that doubt by adopting the figures at which they 
had listed this equipment ? 

Mr. Parker. Yes, I think I did. 

105. General Russell. Then the outcome of your appraisal must 
necessarily have been that if it erred at all it was on the side of liberal- 
ity toward the Constructors rather than otherwise? 

Mr. Parker. No, I felt that I was not being liberal to the Construc- 
tors. I was trying to make it fair for both the government by apprais- 
ing it where they would get their value in usage out of the equipment 
that we would buy — I say "we". I mean the government. 

10^. General Russell. You felt, however, that the appraisal which 
you made of the entire lot of equipment was full and fair to the 
Constructors ? 

Mr. Parker. Very much, both fair to the Constructors and to the 
government. 

107. General Russell. You called them as you saw them? 

Mr. Parker. Yes, sir. I was not led or had anybody tell me a thing 
about it. 

108. General Grunert. Any other questions? 

109. Colonel Toulmin. I have one question. What were the defects 
that you found on this equipment covered up by the paint, do you 
remember ? 

Mr. Parker. You know, those shovels, how they crack. They 
Avelded them and there were still cracks. 

110. Colonel Toulmin. Where ? In the boom ? 
IVTi* "Parket? "i PS sir 

[379J^] 111. Colonel Toulmin. The turntable ? 
- Mr. Parker. The boom. 

112. Colonel Toulmin. How were the gears? 
Mr. Parker. The gears were in good shape. 

113. Colonel Toulmin. How about the motors? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1943 

Mr. Parker. The motors — two of the shovels were running and 
one, as I said before, they were still working on it, and they couldn't 
get the darned thing to run. 

114. Colonel Totjlmin. How about the cables and sheaves? 
Mr. Parker. Worn. 

115. Colonel Toulmin. Not badly worn? 
Mr. PARitER. Not badly worn. 

116. Colonel Toulmin. But they were worn ? 
Mr. Parker. Yes. 

117. Colonel Toulmin. How were the bearings on the sheaves? 
Mr. Parker. The bearings on the sheaves were fair. There were 

a lot of new parts they had put on them, but you yourself know that 
a boom will crack. They did a good job of welding and painting over. 

118. Colonel Toulmin, "Well, a boom that has been cracked and 
welded is a pretty second-rate kind of an article? 

Mr. Parker. It will bust again. 

119. General Grunert. Now, Mr. Parker, do you think of anything 
that you might tell the Board to assist it in coming to a conclusion, 
anything else on your mind that you think the Board ought to know ? 

Mr. Parker. I could mention one thing that you might know 
already. 

120. General Grunert. Go ahead and tell us. 

[379S] Mr. Parker. On this equipment that the Hawaiian Con- 
tracting Company had, we never used any of it as far as 1 know, of 
the pieces that I mentioned a while ago, these graders and these old 
wagons. I happened to be down at the junk base yard yesterday and 
there they were sitting down there. They never were used, as far 
as I know. 

121. General Grunert. Anything else ? 
Mr. Parker. No. 

122. General Grunert. Thank you very much. 

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.) 

123. Major Clausen. I wish to read into the record a memorandum 
written to me in pencil by Major Lozier heretofore referred to in the 
testimony, which memorandum is that 

124. General Grunert. Who is Major Lozier? 

125. Major Clausen. Major Lue Lozier, JAGD referred to in the 
radiogram as being now permanently assigned to the Hawaiian De- 
partment and which radiogram was the one which indicated that 
General Bragdon and Major Powell were coming to the islands. 

[3796] 126. General Grunert. Is that radiogram in the record ? 

127. Major Clausen. It was read in the record, yes, sir. Major 
Lozier previously was on duty in the Office of the Chief of Engi- 
neers, Washington, D. C. 

This memorandum reads as follows : 

(Memorandum dated September 16, 1944, Major Lozier to Major Clausen, is 
as follows : ) 

16 Septembeb 1944. 

Major Clausen: I have searched the files in Col. Wimer's office USED and 
can find no letters or telegrams between Col. Wyman and Mr. Rohl — or records of 
telephone conversations between them. Col. Wyman says there is only one that 
he recalls — a formal travel order in February 1941 to Rohl to come out here — 
but I cannot locate it. As Col. Wyman recalls there was no answer to this one 
and I cannot locate any record of reply or action on this following the issuance 
of the travel order. 



1944 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Signed "Lozier". 

128. General Grunert. Wliat is Colonel Wimer's office ? What of - 
ficial position? 

129. Major Clausen. Colonel Wimer is presently the District En- 
gineer ; he testified yesterday. 

And then I have this memorandum also from Major Lozier. It 
refers to "above data," which data are : estimated cost of total work, 
estimated cost of work canceled, final estimated cost of work, and ' 
the fees. 

The memorandum reads : 

[3797] (Memorandum dated September 15, 194:4, Major Lozier 
to Major Clausen, is as follows:) 

Major Clausen : Above data taken directly from the basic contract, the 
supplements and the change orders. #53 was the final settlement agreement 
whereby it was estimated that 87.2% of the work theretofore put under the 
contract had been completed. 

Signed "Lozier". 

The figures I give will be the total figures : 

Estimated cost of total work under the Hawaiian Constructors' Contract No. 
W-414-eng-602, $112,031,375. 
Estimated cost of work canceled, $14,342,514. 
Final estimated cost of work, $97,688,861. 
Fixed fee, $1,215,597. 

Fixed fee canceled by termination, $155,597. 
Fixed fee received by Hawaiian Constructors, $1,060,000. 

Then he has on here the figures as of 7 December 1941, if the Board 
wishes them. I may as well read them : 

Estimated cost on that date, $19,545,557. 
Fixed fee as of that date, $455,145. 

And he has on here, with respect to the basic contract : 

Estimated cost of work per basic contract, $1,097,673. 
Fixed fee per basic contract, $52,220. 

130. General Grunert. All right. Now you go ahead, Colonel 
Toulmin. 

131. Colonel Toulmin. I have here before me the complete record 
of the trial before a military commission in this Territory of Bernard 
Julius Otto Kuehn, which resulted in his [3798~\ conviction 
and sentence to death. This was reviewed and changed to a sentence 
in the federal penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, for a period of ■ 
50 years. The essence of the record is found in the following 
documents : 

First, the order of commitment of Kuehn to the federal peniten- 
tiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, consisting of six pages; the essential 
messages which constitute the essence of his offense, consisting of the 
code that he had supplied to the Japanese consulate in connection 
with his conspiracy with the Japanese consulate to transmit informa- 
tion as to the fleet in Pearl Harbor, and copies of three wires under 
dates respectively of December 3, 1941, December 5, 1941, and Decem- 
ber 6, 1941 ; a statement by Kuehn under oath, taken before the in- 
vestigator, Captain Chapman, under date of February 5, 1942, which 
sets out in summary his offense ; an exhibit of January 3, 1942 which 
consists of an affidavit by Kuehn of some five pages, setting forth his 
actions that he admitted that he had taken and the offenses that he 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1945 

had committed; and another affidavit of Kiiehn under date of Janu- 
ary 1, 1942, consisting of some eleven pages. 

The sum and substance of these several documents, which I shall 
state for the benefit of the record, is that Kuehn visited Pearl Harbor 
from time to time, by agreement with the Japanese consulate, and 
located the vessels in the harbor so effectively that the testimony of 
the Port Captain showed that his locations were substantially cor- 
rect. He apparently also even located them according to some code 
designation sb that they could be picked out by anyone familiar with 
the harbor, and he supplied to the Japanese consulate, as a result of 
[3799] several visits, a simplified code by which the Japanese 
consulate could communicate and by which he himself could com- 
municate by a variety of means, not only with Japan but with 
Japanese submarines offshore, these means of communication con- 
sisting of signals by the arrangement of sails on his boat, short- 
wave radio, a system of lights in his house, and a system of fires on 
the shore. The significant portion of the record is the fact that this 
information was an essential piece of information to the attack 
upon the fleet in Pearl Harbor, and the transactions occurred within 
approximately two weeks prior to the date of the attack. 

The several documents heretofore mentioned are offered in evi- 
dence of a single exhibit, under the next number. 

132. General Frank. I think you had better give a designation of 
the thing as a whole, so if somebody wants to come back and see 
that he will know where it is. 

133. Colonel Toulmin. All right. The Otto Kuehn trial and con- 
viction record, with appended affidavits and copies of the incrimi- 
nating messages. 

134. General Frank. Where on file? 

135. Colonel Toulmin. The complete record, with attached ex- 
hibits, is on file in the records of the Hawaiian Department, now 
under the control of the Headquarters Pacific Area. 

(Copy of essential documents in re Bernard Julius Otto Kuehn, 
was marked Exhibit No. 52 and received in evidence.) 

136. Major Clausen. I shall read into the record at this time 
Office Memorandum, United States Government; date: September 
11, 1944; to: SAC, Honolulu; No. 65-33780; from: John Edgar 
Hoover, Director — Federal Bureau of Investigation; his initials, 
"JEH": 

[J8(MJ] (Memorandum dated September 11, 1944, from John 

Edgar Hoover to Sac, Honolulu, is as follows :) 

Subject: KURT FREDERICK LUDWIG was; et al ; ESPIONAGE— G 

Reference is made to your radiogram dated September 10, 1944, and to Bureau 
cable dated September 11, 1944. 

The information desired by Major Clausen is a letter addressed to C. W. 
Smith, Esquire, Post Office Box 1254, Shanghai, China, which had enclosed a 
postal card depicting Diamond Head and a map of the Island of Oahu. The 
letter was signed "Hmar." 

On March 18, 1941, an individual having a passport in the name of Julio Lopez 
was killed at Times Square, New York City, by a taxicab and it was subsequently 
determined that his true name was Ulrich von der Osten. Investigation deter- 
mined that Von der Osten had been sent to the United States by the German 
Intelligence to direct the espionage activities of Kurt Frederick Ludwig and his 
associates. 



with 



A Laboratory report reflecting the identification of the handwriting of Lopez 
ith that on the "Hmar" letter is attached for your information. 



79716 — 46— Ex. 145, vol. 3- 



1946 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Ludwig and all of his associates received substantial sentences for their 
espionage activities in March of 1942. 
Attachment 

[3801] The attachment I offer in evidence as the exhibit next 
in order. 

(Copy of Laboratory report of F. B. I. dated November 19, 1941, 
re: HMAE; C. W. Smith; Espionage (G), was marked Exhibit 
No. 53 and received in evidence.) 

137. General Grunert. All right. "VVe shall go to other business. 

(Whereupon, at 10 :10 a. m., the Board, having concluded the hear- 
ing of witnesses for the morning, took up the consideration of other 
business.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1947 



[S802-\ CONTENTS 



MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1944 
Testimony of — Page ■ 

Colonel Bernard L. Robinson, Corps of Engineers, 520 1st Engineers 

Construction, Hollandia, New Guinea (Recalled) 3803 

Brig. Gen. John Stewart Bragdon, Chief of Construction Division, 

Office of Chief of Engineers, War Department, Washington, D. C. 

(Recalled) 3831 

Colonel C. A. Powell, Signal Officer, POA, Fort Shatter, Territory of 

Hawjaii 1 3885 

Major Byron C. Meurlott, Military Intelligence, Honolulu, Territory 

of Hawaii - 3918 

DOCUMENTS 

Memorandum to Colonel Robinson from M. G. Parker, March 12, 1942 3806 

Excerpts from Report of Colonel Hunt 3827 

Memorandum from Office of Engineer, Headquarters Central Pacific Base 

Command, Sept. 16, 1944 3881 

Memorandum for Colonel Colton, Materiels Branch, from C. A. Powell, Lt. 

Col. Signal Corps, Nov. 14, 1941 3896 

Letter to Pearl Harbor Board of Investigation, signed H. P. Benson, 

Sept. IS, 1944 3916 

EXHIBITS 

No. 54. Eight-page estimate of equipment, Hawaiian Contracting Co., Ltd-_ 3806 

55. Circular letter, December 9, 1940, from Office of Chief of Engineers- 3849 

56. Affidavit and exhibits of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr . 3851 

57. Memorandum to Maj. Gen. Frank, signed A. R. Marcy, Colonel, 

Signal Corps, POA 3914 

58. Report on the Establishment of the AWS in Hawaii, 31 August, 

1944__ 3915 

' Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original transcript of proceedings. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1949 



[380S-\ PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL 

HARBOR BOARD 



MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1944 

Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii, 

The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on Saturday, September 16, 
1944, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Qen. George Grunert, 
President of the Board, presiding. 

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. 
Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members. 

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry 
D. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., 
Executive Officer. 

General Grunert. The Board will come to order. 

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL BERNARD L. ROBINSON, CORPS OF 
ENGINEERS, 520 1ST ENGINEERS CONSTRUCTION, HOLLANDIA, 
NEW GUINEA (Recalled) 

1. Colonel West. Colonel Robinson is being recalled by the Board. 
The witness is reminded he is still under oath. 

2. General Grunert. All right. General Frank, go right ahead. 

3. General Frank, Colonel Robinson, you have an additional state- 
ment that you would like to present to the Board ? 

Colonel Robinson, Yes, sir. 

4. General Frank. Is it a satisfactory mode of presentation, do 
you think, to read the statement that you have signed, and then to 
submit the chart as an exhibit? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir, that would be satisfactory. 

5. General Frank. All right, suppose you read your statement. 
[^SSOIf.'] Colonel Robinson (reading) : 

Since appearing before tlie Army Pearl Harbor Board on September 15, 1944, 
I liave reviewed the files of the District Engineer's office relative to appraisal 
of equipment owned by the Rohl-ConnoUy Company, and desire to submit in 
further explanation of my testimony, a copy of a memorandum to me signed by 
Mr. M. G. Parlier. I submit this memorandum as Exhilnt A to this statement. 
On the memorandum appears in my handwriting and initialed by me, a state- 
ment as follows: "Rentals added to appraisal exceed the appraisal price. Prices 
submitted by Rohl approved." IVIy statement on this memorandum was written 
on or about March 12, 1942, and means that the rentals plus Mr. Parker's ap- 
praisal price exceeds the price at which the Rohl-Connolly Company appraised 
the equipment in question. A calculation was made of the rentals and it sub- 
stantially exceeds the difference l)etween Hawaiian Constructors appraisal and 
Mr. Parker's appraisal. The price asked by the Rohl-Connolly Company was 
therefore approved in accordance with Mr. Parker's recommendation. It would 
appear therefore that had the procedure suggested to me by the Board during 
my testimony been followed, to wit : the payment of rental plus Mr. Parker's 
appraisal of about Marcli 12, a greater price would have been paid by the Gov- 
ernment for this equipment than was actually paid under the procedure adopted. 



1950 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The exhibit that refers to that much of this statement is this single 
letter here. 

On the second point : . 

[3805] At my appearance before the Board on 15 September, it was stated 
that it had been reported to me that the equipment purchased from the Hawaiian 
Contracting Company was "junk," and that I had then said we would not pur- 
chase it. However, I caused an appraisal to be made by an employee of the 
Department named Gentry. An appraisal was also made by Mr. Roblee. 

There is a copy of this here, attached, in 8 sheets. 

The price asked by the Hawaiian Contracting Company was $159,08;"). Gentry's 
appraisal was $154,500. Roblee's was $1.56,150. The appraisal was submitted to 
the District Engineer who approved it in the sum of $156,411, or approximately 
$2,500 less than the asking price. 

And also what does not appear as part of this record, but which I 
checked in the District Files were the vouchers, "which indicated it had 
been paid in the amount approved by the District Engineer. 

The approval was dated March 13, 1942. It is to be noted that each and 
every item of equipment was appraised by competent appraisers at some sub- 
stantial value and any statement therefore that this equipment or any item of it 
was "valueless," "worthless" or "junk" is in error and any inference that the 
government did not get full value is incorrect. 

6. General Frank. What about the next page ? 
Colonel Robinson. That is the exhibit. 

7. General Frank. That is part of the exhibit? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes. I can read this first exhibit. The other will 
be rather bulky. This is a memorandum to [3806] Colonel 
Robinson under date of March 12th. 

8. General Frank. Just a minute. This is written to you by Mr. 
Parker, the man who made the appraisal? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

9. General Frank. All right. 
Colonel Robinson (reading) : 

(Memorandum to Colonel Robinson from M. G. Parker, dated March 12, 1942, is 
as follows : ) 

With reference to the attached appraisal of equipment owned by Rohl-ConnoUy 
Company : 

It has been explained that it will be necessary for the government to pay back 
rental on this equipment from the time of delivery. 

If the rental from the time of delivery plus the appraised price shown on the 
attached list exceeds the price set by the Rohl-Connolly Co., it is recommended the 
purchase price asked by the Rohl-Connolly Co. be accepted. 

Signed : "M. G. Parker, Appraiser." 

And the following is in ink in my handwriting : 

Rentals added to appraisal exceed the appraisal price. Prices submitted by 
Rohl approved. 

And initialed by me "B. L. R." 

(Eight-page estimate of equipment, Hawaiian Contracting Co., 
Ltd., was marked Exhibit 54 and was received in evidence.) 

[38071 10- General Frank. You have seen the basic contract? 
Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

11. General Frank. With the Hawaiian Constructors? 
Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

12. General Frank. That contract provides for rental of equip- 
ment, is that correct ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1951 

Colonel Robinson. I believe it does, yes, sir. I have not reviewed it 
recently. 

13. General Frank. That is rental of equipment from the Ha- 
waiian Constructors ? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes. 

14. General Frank. What written agreement existed which pro- 
vided for the payment of rental equipment that belonged to the Rohl- 
Connolly Company ? 

Colonel Robinson. I do not know, sir. 

15. General Frank. Then what authority did you have for author- 
izing rental? 

Colonel Robinson. I did not authorize rents. 

16. General Frank. Was not the difference between the appraisal 
and the amount that was paid the difference between the appraisal 
value and the appraisal value plus the rental ? 

Colonel Robinson. This was a means of arriving at the value of 
the equipment at the time the Government received it. It was the 
basis used for arriving at that value. 

17. General Frank. How long had they had it? How long did 
they use it? 

Colonel Robinson. The Government had received it in Los Angeles 
some time prior to December 7th. I do not know the exact date, but 
it was prior to December 7th, because that was [3S08] the 
equipment that was in the vicinity of Christmas Island on December 
7th, on the LUDINGTON. 

18. General Frank. How long had they used it? 

Colonel Robinson. I believe it arrived here some time in January, 
but "I am not certain of the date. 

19. General Frank. Of what year? 
Colonel Robinson. Of 1942. 

20. General Frank. It arrived here in January of 1942? 

Colonel Robinson. That is my recollection. I am not sure of the 
date. 

21. General Frank. And this is being bought in March ? 
Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

22. General Frank. Therefore, for 3 months use you are paying 
26 percent of its value? 

Colonel Robinson. No, sir. This is a means of arriving at the 
value of the equipment at the time it was received^by the Govern- 
ment. 

23. General Frank. But what is your explanation of the considera- 
tion for the rental ? 

Colonel Robinson. Mr. Parker appraised the equipment as of 
March 12th. That was its value on that date. In order to arrive at 
the value on the date on which the equipment was received, a means 
of computation was used of simply checking the fairness of Mr. Rohl's 
price or the Rohl-Connolly price, of adding to Mr. Parker's appraisal 
what the government would have paid in rental had it rented the 
equipment. 

24. General Frank. But it did not rent the equipment ? 
Colonel Robinson. No, sir, it purchased it outright. 

25. General Frank. Yes. 

[-3809] Colonel Robinson. Shortly after this date. 



1952 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

26. General Frank. Since it did not rent this equipment, I do not 
understand your explanation, because Mr. Parker in his report says it 
will be necessary for the Government to pay back rental on this equip- 
ment from the time of delivery and in the following memorandum 

Colonel Robinson. That is Mr. Parker's statement 

[3810] 27. General Frank. And in the following memorandum 
that you signed you say, "Rentals added to appraisal exceed the ap- 
praisal price. Prices submitted by Rohl approved." 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

28. General Frank. Well, that is where you enter into the rentals. 
Colonel Robinson. No, sir. , I didn't accept that price. I accepted 

a lower price, which was the price given by the Rohl-Connolly 
Company. 

29. General Frank. But right there you took rentals into con- 
sideration? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

30. General Frank. And what authority did you have for it? 
Colonel Robinson. I had the — it was simply a means of arriving 

at the — at a fair price, to determine what the actual value of the 
property was. 

31. General Frank. Was there a voucher signed on which this 
property was paid for? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

32. General Frank. Who signed the voucher? 

Colonel Robinson. I remember seeing the disbursing officer's sig- 
nature. Major McCrone's signature, on there. I don't know who 
approved the voucher, sir. 

33. General Frank. Somebody had to sign the voucher that the 
property taken over was, at the time it was bought, fit for the pur- 
pose for which it was to be used and was worth the price that was 
being paid for it, didn't he? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

34. General Frank. That is a regular, standard voucher, [3<S11\ 
isn't it? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

35. General Frank. And if that voucher was signed, in the face 
of your explanation here, that certification couldn't have been cor- 
rect ? 

Colonel Robinson. I don't understand that statement, sir. 

36. General Frank. Well, because this is being taken over as of 
March 12. 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

37. General Frank. And you have the appraised value of it as of 
March 12 as being some 26 percent less. 

Colonel Robinson. Well, the recommendation of the appraiser is 
that in the event that under this computation the price exceeds that 
asked by Rohl, the price be approved as asked by Rohl, which was 
done. 

38. General Frank. Yes, but the appraiser had pressure brought 
upon liim to make this statement (indicating). We have had the 
appraiser before this Board. 

Colonel Robinson. Did you? 

39. General Frank. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1953 

Colonel KoBiNSON. Well, if he considered pressure, I certainly 
brought no pressure to bear on him. 

40, General Frank. Go ahead. 

41, Major Clausen. Colonel Robinson, you come now before the 
Board, and you give a statement here in explanation or change of your 
testimony ; is that correct ? 

Colonel Robinson, It's an explanation of it, yes, sir. 

42, Major Clausen. All right. Now, you say here: 

On the memorandum appears in my handwriting and [SS12\ initialed 
by me, a statement as follows : "Rentals added to appraisal exceed the appraisal 
price." 

What basis whatsoever was there for that rental, in writing ^ 
Colonel Robinson, None that I know of, sir, 

43, Major Clausen. All right. You tell me here in this statement 
that you have reviewed the files of the District Engineer's office relative 
to this matter since you testified. You have looked for that and 
couldn't find it, haven't you? 

Colonel Robinson, No, sir, I didn't look for any such thing, 

44, Major Clausen, Well, why did you not look for the basis for 
the rentals? 

Colonel Robinson. I have explained before that this method was 
a method — I have forgotten whether it was my idea to do it that way 
or whether it was the District Engineer's to do it that way : a basis 
of arriving at the true value of the equipment at the time the Govern- 
ment received it, 

45, Major Clausen, Don't you understand that before you can pay 
rent to anyone there is a prescribed procedure that must be fol- 
lowed 

Colonel Robinson, I paid no rent. Major, 

46, Major Clausen, — which assumes a written agreement, sir? 
Colonel Robinson. I paid no rent. 

47, Major Clausen. Was the procedure that you followed in this 
regard with respect to rent your usual procedure in the Engineering 
Department when you were under Colonel Wyman here ? 

Colonel Robinson, It was the procedure to check the value of the 
equipment, yes, sir, 

48, Major Clausen, Was the ])rocedure that you followed in 
[38L3] this case your usual procedure with regard to payment of 
rents ? Just answer yes or no, and explain. 

Colonel Robinson. I don't believe I can answer that yes or no. It 
was one of the checks made in the cases where property had been in 
use prior to the time that the appraisal was made, which, due to the 
circumstances at around December 7th, where troops and other agen- 
cies were taking this property and putting it to use without any au- 
thority, and later the District Engineer's office having to settle up 
those accounts, that was a procedure used ; yes, sir. 

49, Major Clausen. Regardless of what this contract stated, you 
would pay rental without any written agreement? 

Colonel Robinson. I have stated that we did not pay the rental. 

50, General Frank. Let me ask him, just a minute. 

Colonel Robinson. That it was a method of arriving at the true 
value of the equipment. 



1954 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

51. General Frank. If you didn't pay any rental, let me ask you 
this : For how long was the equipment actually used? 

Colonel Robinson. Well, to the best of my knowledge the equip- 
ment arrived here in January on the LUDINGTON. Now, I have 
stated that I couldn't recall the exact date. 

52. General Frank. And it was used but two or three months? 
Colonel EoBiNSON. From January until March 12, if that's the pe- 
riod we are taking up, yes, sir. 

53. General Frank. And the rest of the time from the time it was 
put on the boat at Los Angeles it was on the LUDINGTON ? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 
■ 54. General Frank. That is correct, isn't it? 

[3814.] Colonel Robinson. Well, I don't know, sir. I believe 
some of it was taken off at Christmas Island. 

55. General Frank. But you don't know ? 
Colonel Robinson. I am not sure of that. 

56. General Frank. You don't know ? 
Colonel Robinson. I don't know, no, sir. 

57. General Frank. Yes. But, so far as you know, it was not in use 
by the Government other than in transit on a boat ? 

Colonel Robinson. Some of it possibly at Christmas Island. 

58. General Frank. Yes. 

Colonel Robinson. The remainder in transit on the boat, yes, sir. 

59. General Frank. Yes. Now, do you think that 26 percent is a 
reasonable rental on equipment for two or three months' use? 

Colonel Robinson. Well, the life of some of the equipment is as low 
as one or two years ; the life of some of the equipment. 

60. General Frank. Well, if that is right, the equipment would pay 
for itself in five months? Four months? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. But we didn't pay that. We paid less 
than that. 

61. General Frank. I know. But do you think that 26 percent is a 
reasonable rental for two or three months' use ? 

Colonel Robinson. Well, it sounds high. 

62. General Frank. It sounds high ? 
Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

63. Geneial Frank. All right. Then, the difference between any 
rental, if there were any, and what you paid, was an excess in ap- 
praisal, because the equipment should have arrived, to all intent and 
purposes, in as good condition as when it left Los Angeles ? 

[38JS] Colonel Robinson. No, sir, I don't believe that. 

64. General Frank. AVell, do you know anything about it? 
Colonel Robinson. That particular equipment? 

65. General Frank. No. Do you know whether it suffered en 
route ? 

Colonel Robinson. No, sir, I don't recall it. 

66. General Frank. All right; go ahead. 

67. Major Clausen. Well, if you don't know, from where did you 
get your information as to whether the rentals added to appraisal 
exceed the appraisal price ? Wliy do you think that the rentals added 
to appraisal 

Colonel Robinson. I believe I made the computation myself, sir. 

68. Major Clausen. You made a computation? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1955 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir, 

69. Major Clausen. You had read this basic contract, though, 
hadn't you ? This is a stock form of contract ? 

Colonel Robinson. I had at that time, yes, sir. 

70. Major Clausen. And you knew then, as it stated here and as 
read by General Frank, that each contract for rental of construction 
plants equipment, and so forth, shall be in a form prescribed by the 
Secretary of War, approved by the contracting officer? You knew 
that then ? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

71. Major Clausen. And you had no such form or contract before 
you, did you? 

Colonel Robinson. On this equipment rental ? 

72. Major Clausen. Yes, sir, on the equipment. 
Colonel Robinson. That's the only contract I know of. 

[.3S16] 73. Major Clausen. You had no such contract for the 
rental of this Rohl-Connolly Company equipment, did you ? 
Colonel Robinson, No, sir, 

74. Major Clausen. All right. Now, you said to the Board here 
something with regard to this second point, and you furnished several 
so-called appraisals by various men. Who was this man Gentry ? 

Colonel Robinson. Gentry was an employee of the District Engi- 
neer, sir. 

75. Major Clausen. He was representing the Hawaiian Construc- 
tors, was he not, in making this appraisal? 

Colonel Robinson. No, sir. I believe Mr. Roblee was represent- 
ing the Hawaiian Constructors. 

76. Major Clausen. Well, you believe. Do you know, sir? 
Colonel Robinson. I am fairly certain of that. 

77. Major Clausen. Do you understand that a Colonel Hunt, John 
E, Hunt, made a very exhaustive study of this matter ? 

Colonel Robinson, I may have the two men's names mixed around, 
I believe that one of these men is an employee of the Department and 
the other is an employee of the Hawaiian Constructors. 

78. Major Clausen. This man Roblee, H. J, Roblee, who was he? 
Colonel Robinson, I was under the impression — I may be wrong — 

that Gentry represented us and Roblee represented the Hawaiian 
Constructors, 

79. Major Clausen. In other words, Mr. Gentry was employed by 
the Hawaiian Constructors but represented the Engineering Corps 
in this matter ; is that right ? 

Colonel Robinson. I believe one of these men represented [3817] 
the Engineering Corps. 

80. Major Clausen. But j'-ou don't know? 

Colonel Robinson. I don't know at the moment, no, sir. I can 
probably find that out from the records. 

81. Major Clausen. Well, you say you examined the files. Don't 
you think that is rather important, for you to see whether the Govern- 
ment had a man in on this appraisal, sir ? 

Colonel Robinson. Well, probably I sliould have checked it fur- 
ther, yes, sir. 

82. Major Clausen. But you haven't done that ? 
Colonel Robinson. No, sir. I can do that, however. 



1956 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

83. Major Clausen. And this Mr. H. J.- 



84. General Fraxk. Haven't you already submitted this as sworn 
testimony ? 

85. Major Clausen. Yes. 
Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

86. Major Clausen. And had we not had the privdege of cross- 
examining you, don't you know that this may have swayed the Board? 

(There was no response.) 

87. Major Clausen. Who is this Mr. H. J. Roblee that you refer 
to in your statement? 

Colonel Robinson. I will have to find out, sir. 

88. Major Clausen. You don't know? 

Colonel Robinson. I don't know at this time, no, sir. 

89. Major Clausen. All right. Who else was in on this appraisal 
that you referred to here? Mr. Gentry and Mr. Roblee and who else? 

Colonel Robinson. As far as I know, those were the only two ap- 
praisers, as given hy this record riglit here. 

[3SJ8] 90. Major Clausen. AVasn't there a Mr. Ross? 
Colonel' Robinson. Not to my knowledge. 

91. Major Clausen. A Mr. Edward Ross, an employee of the Ha- 
waiian Contracting Company? You don't know that either, sir? 

Colonel Robinson. Well, we had the Hawaiian Contracting Com- 
pany price here. I don't know who his represent — who bro'ught up 
this price over here. 

92. Major Clausen. Well, do you know if a Mr. Edward Ross, an 
employee of the Hawaiian Contracting Company, had anything to 
do witli this appraisal? 

Colonel Robinson. No, sir; I don't recall Mr. Ross. 

98. Major Clausen. Do you know whether this appraisal that 
you have offered to the Board here this morning is the amount sub- 
stantially, named in a letter addressed by Mr. Rohl to the District 
Engineer, dated 9 January 1942, that he Wanted? 

Colonel Robinson. That may be true. I don't know, sir. 
"94. Major Clausen. Do you know that? 

Colonel Robinson. No, sir, I don't. 

95. Major Clausen. You haven't found that in your search of the 
files? 

Colonel Robinson. My searcli of the files simply asked for — call- 
ing for the documents on the appraisals. 

96. Major Clausen. No. Colonel, you say you have reviewed the 
files? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

97. Major Clausen. Relative to that appraisal? 
Colonel Robinson. I have reviewed these files. 

98. Major Clausen. Now, jaist refer back to the Rohl -Connolly 
[S8L9^ equipment. That was finally at a price set by Mr. Rohl; 
i.sn't that correct? Some $166,000? 

Colonel Robinson. That was his asking price; yes, sii". I believe 
so, sir. ^ 

99. Major Ci^usen. Yes. Now, I am asking you the question, with 
regard to this property purchased from the Hawaiian Contracting 
Company, whether the same thing wasn't true there, that Mr. Rohl 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY TEARL HARBOR BOARD 1957 

suggested this price that was finally the appraisal of these three men, 
Gentry, Roblee, and Ross. 

Colonel Robinson. It may have been. I do not know, sir. 

100. Major Clausen. Now let me ask you this: You said here in 
this statement this morning 

(There was colloquy oflf the record.) 

101. Major Clausen. You say now something about this equip- 
ment not being junk. You make the bald statement here ; 

It is to he noted that each and every item of equipment was appraised by 
competent appraisers at some substantial value and any statement therefore 
that this equipment or any item of it was "valueless." "worthless," or "junk" is 
in error and any inference that the government did not get full value is incor- 
rect. 

Whose language is that ? 

Colonel Robinson. That is my language, sir. 

102. Major Clausen. And when did you dictate that ? 

Colonel Robinson. I did not dictate it, sir. I wrote it in longhand 
on the — Saturday, I believe it was. 

103. Major Clausen. Don't you know, sir, that some of that same 
equipment is, even today, or as recently as a few days ago, unused 
because it was just plain, clear junk? 

[SS20] Colonel Robinson. No, sir ; I don't know that. 

104. Major Clausen. Have you looked to see? 
Colonel Robinson. No, sir. 

105. Major Clausen. Have you inquired to find out? 
Colonel Robinson. No, sir. 

106. Major Clausen. And yet you made that statement that it is not 
junk, and you haven't inquired to find out? 

Colonel Robinson. I base that on this record right here. 

107. Major Clausen. You base it on the appraisal ? 
Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

108. Major Clausen. But the appraisal was made before the price 
was paid, wasn't it ? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir, 

109. Major Clausen. So you don't know whether the equi])ment was 
ever used or not, do you ? 

Colonel Robinson. No, sir ; I don't. 

110. Major Clausen. All right; that is about all. 

[38£1] 111. General Russell. Colonel, in this written affidavit 
which you have submitted, I copied, or understood you to read, this 
language : 

A calculation was made on the rentals. 

That is in that statement ? 
Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

112. General Russell. Was that a written calculation? 

Colonel Robinson. As I recall, it w^as made by me. I looked in the 
files for that and couldn't find it. It was probably based on the AGC 
rentals which I spoke of the other day, but I remember making such 
a computation. 

113. General Russell. Do you remember how old that equipment 
was when it came into the hands of the Government? 

Colonel Robinson. No, sir ; I don't recall that. 



1958 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

114. General Kussell. As a matter of fact, it had been used rather 
extensively and had been repaired by Rohl prior to the time it was 
brought to the islands, had it not? 

Colonel Robinson. I am quite sure it was used equipment. Yes, sir ; 
it was in use over there in Los Angeles, or in the vicinity of Los Angeles. 

115. General Russell. Do you remember the argiunent wdth Rohl, 
in which he was charged with having painted over defects in this 
machinery or this equipment, and in which Rohl asserted rather vigor- 
ously that that statement was untrue, that they had spent considerable 
money in putting it in condition? Do you recall that argument? 

Colonel Robinson. Xo, sir. 

116. General Russell. But you do have the definite impression that 
it was seconcl-hand, repaired equipment when it was loaded on the 
boat in Los Angeles and sent out ? 

[3822] Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir ; I have that impression. 

117. General Russell. Do you know how long this equipment was 
in use ? 

Colonel Robinson. No, sir ; I don't recall that. I left here about the 
middle of May 1942. 

118. General Russell. Colonel, my view of it is that the rental 
agreement, the basis for arriving at that sum of approximately 
$35,000 for the use of this second-hand equipment which had a market 
value of only $130,000, for the short period of January, was approxi- 
mately 60 days. I repeat that I believe the Board, or I as an individual 
Member of the Board, at least, am very much interested in the basis 
of that rental calculation, and if it is possible for vou to give us a 
more intelligent idea as to those bases, it would be helpful. 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

119. General Russell. That is all I have, 

120. Colonel Toulmin. Colonel, may I ask you just a question or 
two, to clear up this matter ? Why was it, if you were going to pay 
rental indirectly, as the procedure indicates that you did, in taking it 
into consideration as a partial basis of compensation to the contractor, 
that you did not follow the normal procedure specified by the basic con- 
tract as to having written documents duly approved authorizing the 
payment of all rental? Why did you not follow that procedure? 

Colonel Robinson. Well, probably the price to the Government 
would have been greater under that scheme. That is probably the 
reason. 

121. Colonel Toulmin. Let us assume it was. Let us assume 
[3823] It would have been greater, andj if just, the Government 
could have paid the larger fee; but I am asking you the question, why. 
did you not follow the normal procedure as to rentals specified by the 
basic contract ? 

Colonel Robinson. I don't believe that that was my decision, sir. 

122. Colonel Toulmin. Whose decision was it? 

Colonel Robinson. I believe it was the District Engineer. 

123. Colonel Toulmin. Colonel Wyman's ? 

Colonel Robinson. Or some agreement that was reached. 

124. Colonel Toulmin. Was the decision Colonel Wyman's? 
Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. I don't recall weighing that, or hav- 
ing that authority. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1959 

125. Colonel Toulmin, I see. So your recollection is it was Colonel 
Wyman's decision? 

Colonel Robinson. That is my recollection; yes, sir. 

126. Colonel Toulmin. Are you aware of the fact that the con- 
tractor, the seller, might have made a very substantial additional profit 
by this procedure, against the Government interests, by treating the 
rental as a part of a sales price, instead of as income, and paid income- 
tax upon it ? Did you take that into consideration ? 

Colonel EoBiNsoN. I don't believe I get the point, sir, on income, 
tax. 

(Question read.) 

Colonel Robinson. I didn't take into consideration any tax matters ; 
no, sir. 

127. Colonel Toulmin. I think that is all. 

127-A. General Russell, I want to ask a question based on this 
13S2Jf] last testimony. Now, do I understand, Colonel, that it is 
your present testimony that as you remember you were directed by 
Colonel Wyman to make this calculation of the rentals clue on this 
equipment ? 

Colonel Robinson. No, sir ; I didn't state that. I am not sure that 
that was so. 

128. General Russell. Well, why did you make the calculation, not 
in keeping with the provisions of the basic contract? As I recall, 
now, you stated that the decision to make the calculations not in 
keeping with the terms of the basic contract was Colonel Wyman's 
decision. 

Colonel Robinson. No, sir. 

129. General Russell. I am merely attempting to get that straight. 
Colonel Robinson. No, sir. I believe my statement was that it was 

Colonel Wyman's decision to buy the equipment on the basis on which 
it was bought. I believe it was my decision, working under Colonel 
Wyman's direction, to have the property appraised, to use the method 
which I have described here. 

130. General Russell. I am afraid you are running around the 
stump on us, to use a common expression. Colonel. 

Colonel Robinson. No, sir. There were two questions. 

131. General Russell. Now, wait a minute. I would like to have 
an answer to a very simple question. The calculation of the rentals 
was made not in keeping witli the basic contract. Now, somebody 
made the decision to calculate the rentals in that way, and I want 
to know whether you made that decision, or whether Wyman made it. 
Now, do you understand the question ? 

[38251 Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

132. General Russell. All right. Can you answer that? 
Colonel Robinson. To the best of my knowledge, I used that 

method. 

133. General Russell. And you made the decision to use that 
method ? 

Colonel Robinson. In arriving at an appraisal price which I could 
submit to the district engineer. 

134. General Russell. That question may be answered Yes or No. 
Many questions cannot; that one can. 



1960 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Robinson. I believe I answered it, sir. To the best of my 
knowled<2:e I made the decisi(m to use that method of arriving at the 
final appraisal price to submit to the district engineer. 

135. General Russell. Very well. 

136. General Grunert. Did the district engineer approve your 
method of attempting to arrive at an appraisal price in that manner? 

Colonel RoRiNSoN. He approved the recommendation. I don't 
know as he approved the details of it. 

137. General Grunert. Did you recommend that the appraisal 
price be set at $166,000. or whatever it was, and not at $131,000? 
Did he have knowledge of how you arrived at the $166,000, instead of 
taking the $131,000? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

138. General Grunert. He had knowledge of that? 
Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

130. General Grunert. And you acted as hip agent in doing that? 
[3826] Colonel Robinson. Well, I submitted it to him for